[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author'sspelling has been maintained. 

Unusual subscripts have been marked with ^, e. G. : V^te for Vicomte. ]

[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. Engraved by T. Levasseur. 

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 

Drawn by F. Gérard. ]

 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

 BY

 WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE PH. D. , L. H. D. , LL. D. _Professor of History in Columbia University_

 Revised and Enlarged With Portraits

 VOLUME III

[Illustration: Editor's arm. ]

 NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1916

 Copyright, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1910 BY THE CENTURY CO. 

 _Published, October, 1910_

CONTENTS

 CHAPTER Page

 I. War with Russia: Pultusk................................ 1

 II. Check to the Grand Army: Eylau......................... 12

 III. An Indecisive Victory: Friedland....................... 24

 IV. Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit....................... 39

 V. The Treaty of Tilsit................................... 54

 VI. The Path of Napoleonic Empire.......................... 66

 VII. The New Feudalism...................................... 80

 VIII. The Empires of Land and Ocean.......................... 97

 IX. French Empire and European Nationality................ 115

 X. The Awakening of Spain................................ 137

 XI. The First Revolt of Nations........................... 153

 XII. Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurt...................... 171

 XIII. The Failure of the Spanish Campaign................... 182

 XIV. The Transformation of Austria......................... 192

 XV. The Fifth War with Austria--Eckmühl................... 202

 XVI. Aspern, Essling, and Wagram........................... 218

 XVII. The Peace of Schönbrunn............................... 233

 XVIII. Napoleon's Fatal Decision............................. 244

 XIX. The Austrian Marriage................................. 251

 XX. Rigors of the Continental System...................... 262

 XXI. The Continental System Completed...................... 274

 XXII. The Course of the Peninsular War...................... 282

 XXIII. Birth of the King of Rome............................. 293

 XXIV. Tension Between Emperor and Czar...................... 303

 XXV. The Array of Nations.................................. 313

 XXVI. The Congress of Kings................................. 325

 XXVII. The Invasion of Russia--Borodino...................... 335

 XXVIII. The Evacuation of Moscow.............................. 346

 XXIX. The Retreat from Russia............................... 357

 XXX. The Horrors of the Beresina........................... 368

 XXXI. The Prodigal's Return................................. 378

 XXXII. The Revolt of the Nations............................. 388

 XXXIII. The First Campaign in Saxony.......................... 401

 XXXIV. The Nations in Grand Array............................ 413

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

 The Emperor Napoleon................................. _Frontispiece_

 Map of the Battle of Eylau....................................... 14

 Map of the Battle of Heilsberg................................... 28

 Map of the Battle of Friedland................................... 36

 Napoleon--by Ingres.............................................. 50

 Queen Hortense................................................... 98

 Napoleon in his Study........................................... 146

 Map of the Spanish Campaign..................................... 184

 Joseph Bonaparte................................................ 196

 Map of the Battle of Eckmühl.................................... 212

 Two Maps of the Battles of Aspern and Essling................... 221

 Map of the Battle of Wagram..................................... 228

 Eugène Beauharnais.............................................. 246

 Napoleon Bonaparte in 1809...................................... 296

 Map of the Russian Campaign, 1812............................... 340

LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

CHAPTER I

WAR WITH RUSSIA: PULTUSK[1]

 [Footnote 1: References as before. ]

 Poland and the Poles -- The Seat of War -- Change in the Character of Napoleon's Army -- The Battle of Pultusk -- Discontent in the Grand Army -- Homesickness of the French -- Napoleon's Generals -- His Measures of Reorganization -- Weakness of the Russians -- The Ability of Bennigsen -- Failure of the Russian Manoeuvers -- Napoleon in Warsaw. 

[Sidenote: 1806-07]

The key to Napoleon's dealings with Poland is to be found in hisstrategy; his political policy never passed beyond the first tentativestages, for he never conquered either Russia or Poland. The struggleupon which he was next to enter was a contest, not for Russianabasement but for Russian friendship in the interest of hisfar-reaching continental system. Poland was simply one of his weaponsagainst the Czar. Austria was steadily arming; Francis received thequieting assurance that his share in the partition was to beundisturbed. In the general and proper sorrow which has been felt forthe extinction of Polish nationality by three vulture neighbors, theterrible indictment of general worthlessness which was justly broughtagainst her organization and administration is at most times and bymost people utterly forgotten. A people has exactly the nationality, government, and administration which expresses its quality and securesits deserts. The Poles were either dull and sluggish boors or haughtyand elegant, pleasure-loving nobles. Napoleon and his officersdelighted in the life of Warsaw, but he never appears to haverespected the Poles either as a whole or in their wrangling cliques;no doubt he occasionally faced the possibility of a redeemed Poland, but in general the suggestion of such a consummation served hispurpose and he went no further. That he had no sentiment about Polishnationality is self-evident. 

After Jena the Czar displayed great activity. In spite of beingcompelled to detach eighty thousand men for service against Turkey, hehad got together a second numerous army; Lestocq, with a corps offifteen thousand Prussians, had joined him, and he was clearlydetermined to renew the war. For a time the French had no certaininformation as to whether he would cross the Prussian frontier or not, and Napoleon at first expected the city of Posen to be the center ofoperations. Before long, however, it became evident that the Russianswere drawing together on Pultusk. Displaying an astounding assuranceas to the stability of his power in France, and without regarding thepossible effect upon conditions at home of a second war, at anenormous distance, Napoleon determined to meet them. With the samecelerity and caution as of old, the various French divisions were ledfirst across the Vistula, and then over the plains, until in the endof December they were concentrated before the enemy. During the threeweeks consumed in these operations much besides was done to strengthenthe position of the French and to assure their communications. TheRussians were dislodged from Warsaw, and Thorn was besieged; theVistula, Bug, Wkra, Narew, and other rivers were bridged; and acommissary department was organized. The seat of war was differentindeed from any of those to which Napoleon had hitherto beenaccustomed. It was neither as densely settled nor as well tilled asItaly and Germany, the population was far lower in the scale ofcivilization, and therefore fiercer. The inhabitants could easilystrip their villages of the little forage and the few goods theypossessed, and at that season the fields were bare. The roads were ofthe worst description; the rivers were deep and broad, often withswampy banks and treacherous bottoms. In these circumstances it wasalmost impossible to secure reliable information, for scouts and spieswere alike at fault. 

These new conditions of warfare were further complicated by a changein the character of Napoleon's army. After Austerlitz many men ofGerman speech were to be found among the rank and file, and after Jenathe character of the soldiery grew more and more cosmopolitan. On thefirst appearance of the imperial eagles of France in Poland, Jeromewas at the head of a whole corps of Würtembergers and Bavarians; manyPoles, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch were in others of the French corps;and among the foreigners there were even Prussians from beyond theElbe. Some confusion was caused by this, and it was not diminished bythe fact that the French themselves had scarcely recovered from theorgies in which they had been indulging for the last six weeks. Moreover, the determination of the Emperor to "conquer the sea byland" had emphasized in his mind the necessity of an overwhelmingsuperiority of numbers, and in November he demanded from the Frenchsenate the eighty thousand conscripts who, according to law, could notbe drawn until September, 1807. This was the beginning of the fatalpractice destined in the end to enervate France and demoralize thearmy. There was already little patriotism among the men, except whatserved as a pretext for plunder; the homogeneity of purpose, principle, nationality, and age was soon to disappear. 

In the preliminary operations this deterioration was not apparent. Thetroops marched doggedly through the mud, worked hard when called upon, and although their rations, which were supplied by rascallycontractors, were very bad and altogether different from those towhich they had become accustomed in the years just preceding, the menate them without murmuring. But when, on December twenty-sixth, theyjoined battle, the old push and nerve seemed lacking. The preparationshad been made on the plan of concentration, but at the last momentLannes was detached with his division to cut off the enemy's line ofretreat over the Narew. Napoleon, as at Jena, believed the main armyof his opponent to be where it was not, and he was incautious in thusdividing and weakening his forces. Accordingly the battle had anirregular and indecisive character. Lannes came unexpectedly upon themass of the Russian army, two columns forming the center and right, and engaged them from ten in the morning until two in the afternoon. At that hour a reserve arrived under Gudin, and attacked the Russianright. But Bennigsen, the commander of that column, had ready a freshreserve, and with its aid the newcomers were repulsed. Lannes, who hadsimultaneously made a final onset, was also beaten off by the superiorforce of his enemy. On the same day, Murat, Davout, and Augereaureached the neighboring village of Golymin, expecting to find theRussian center there; on the left wing, at Neidenburg, Ney stood faceto face with Lestocq and his Prussians. There was nothing butskirmishing at either place, for the French emperor could not drag hisartillery through the mud swiftly enough to make it tell at the righttime, and both Prussians and Russians drew slowly off. Soult was tohave repeated the turning manoeuver as carried out before Jena, butthe marching was so difficult, owing to a thaw, that he could notaccomplish anything like the necessary distance. 

The morning after this indecisive battle the entire Russian army wasfar away. For strategic reasons and for lack of provisions it hadwithdrawn to Ostrolenka. There was no pursuit. The natural question, Why? is still unanswered. Some declare that the French troops were tooweary and bad-tempered; others, that Napoleon, in view of thequagmires to which the roads were now reduced, dared not abandon hisbase of supplies, as he was accustomed to do in summer weather and infruitful lands. There is still a third answer, that nothing was to begained; for of what use were the few miles of bare, flat land whichthe army, putting forth its utmost exertions, might have been able totraverse? All these reasons have validity. There was discontent amongthe soldiers, for there was no booty; not even a soldier's commoncomforts could be found. For the first time men of the line shoutedinsults after the Emperor, and with impunity; even the faithful guardindulged in double-meaning quips, but they, on the other hand, were atthe proper time soundly berated. "The short campaign of fifteen days, "wrote one of them, "made us ten years older. " There was also danger inadvancing beyond reach of the commissary department, --deficient andcontemptible as it was in the hands of unscrupulous speculators, --andthere was indeed little to be gained by such a pursuit as waspossible, except prestige, which at that moment and at that distancefrom France was not a valuable commodity. 

This element of distance from home was weighty. In far-off Egypt andSyria, French soldiers had fought bravely; an ideal will carry eventhe commonest Frenchman far, and they then believed themselves to befighting for a principle. But since the armies of France had begun tofight for booty and glory, they must have both. Of the former therewas little or none at all in the lands they now occupied; the lattercould be enjoyed only in the jubilations of their kinsfolk; andalthough no account of any battle was more beclouded than that ofPultusk which the Emperor sent to Paris, the approbation of thefatherland could not reach Poland until long afterward, and in tonesthat were low and almost inaudible. It is an old French saying thatnext to the kingdom of heaven France is the most beautiful land, andevery Frenchman believes it. The Emperor himself said that his Frenchsoldiers were unfitted for distant expeditions by their yearnings forhome. In his mind, therefore, the one essential thing to restore thespirits of his men was rest. This opinion was strengthened when heendeavored to visit the posts. Although his carriage stuck in the mudand a saddle-horse could scarcely make its way, yet he got far enoughto see that his men were suffering and destitute. 

This preliminary campaigning, allowing for all obstacles so farenumerated, was so generally inefficient and futile, that thereremains a conviction of further causes not lying on the surface. Thatwhich is most to be suspected is the hastening corruption in thecharacter and morals, not of the soldiery, --that has been noted, --butof the generals. One diarist of the time saw four marshals at Anspach. He sketches Bernadotte as "a very tall dark man with fiery eyes underthick brows. " Humble as was his origin, his ambitions were lofty andhe was beginning to make ventures on his own account, not for themaster who had made him. There was also Mortier, fairly tall, "with astupid sentinel look"; considering his career, he was probablyputting up his mask. There too were "Lefebvre, an old Alsatiancamp-boy, with his wife, former washerwoman in the regiment; andDavout, a little smooth-pated, unpretending man, who was never tiredof waltzing. " Mme. Lefebvre was aware of how costly were suchdrawing-room triumphs as she imaged in her ambitious soul, and wherethe supplies of booty could be found; Davout and Lannes and Ney werestill faithful and efficient; Augereau in action was utterlyuncertain, in morals pompous and wrong-headed; Murat knew where andhow the great prizes were to be found, and was as dashing andventuresome as he was selfish and worldly-wise. The Russian generalswere plodding disciples of routine. Bennigsen was an able Hanoverianmercenary, despising alike his Livonian colleague, Buxhöwden, and hischief, the servile Russian marshal, Kamenski. The Prussian generalLestocq was capable but inexperienced. The chief and his subordinatewere far from harmonious. 

The measures adopted to secure a period of comfort and repose for thearmy were, unlike those taken for the campaign, apparently adequate. The Emperor proceeded at once to station the various corps along theVistula, with provision and munition depots behind them. Thecommissary department was thoroughly overhauled and much improved. Theline ran from Warsaw northwestward through Poland into Prussia, to theriver's mouth near Dantzic. Bernadotte had eighteen thousand men; Ney, sixteen thousand; Soult, twenty-eight thousand; Augereau, eleventhousand; Davout, twenty thousand; Lannes, eighteen thousand; Murat, fourteen thousand; and the guard numbered fifteen thousand--a total ofabout a hundred and forty thousand men. As conscripts and troops fromvarious garrisons came in, a new corps of twenty-three thousand menwas formed, and placed under the command of Lefebvre. At the sametime, from his headquarters at Warsaw, the Emperor proceeded with theorganization of a government for Poland, and with the training of hernational guard. The two Russian columns had withdrawn to Szuczyn, where they united under the command of Bennigsen, and the Prussianswere at Angerburg under Lestocq. This left open the way to Königsberg, and early in January, 1807, Ney, overpowered by the temptation torelieve the miseries of his men, and to make a stroke on his ownaccount by seizing the capital of East Prussia, set out fromNeidenburg without orders, leaving Bernadotte's position at Elbingmuch exposed. Lestocq, however, managed to block Ney's path until theRussians under Bennigsen arrived and compelled the French general toreturn with his men to their quarters. Napoleon administered a severereprimand; and well he might, for the advantage thus offered to theRussians had tempted Bennigsen to move, and the Russian army, onceafoot, seemed determined to remain so. In this way were destroyedNapoleon's excellent calculations for the season of absolutelyessential repose. 

The action of Pultusk had made clear two serious defects in theefficiency of Russia's force. During the battle, Kamenski, thegeneral-in-chief, a martinet and disciple of routine, had twice giventhe order for retreat, and it was Bennigsen's disobedience which madethe conflict so indecisive that Russia claimed it as a victory. If avictory, it was a barren one, because a weak and venal administrationof the commissary department had deprived the soldiers of sustenanceat the critical moment. Kamenski, who was seventy-six years old, wasretired on the ground of his health, and Bennigsen succeeded him, butthe bad commissary administration was not remedied. The Russian armywas strong in regular infantry, but weak in well-disciplined cavalry, although the latter defect was largely supplied by the Cossacks, apeculiar body of riders from the Volga and the Don, who paid therental of their lands to the crown by four years' military service attheir own charges. Then, as now, they fought with barbaric ferocity;they attacked in open formation, each man for himself, and gave noquarter until the Czar offered a ducat for every live Frenchman. Theywere known to ride a hundred miles in twenty-four hours, and theirservices in pursuing an enemy were invaluable. 

The one remarkable and unique feature of the Russian army in everybranch of the service has ever been its personal devotion to the Czar. This feeling is a compound of religious fervor, patriotism, anddynastic loyalty; these elements, welded inseparably, form a sentimentof tremendous strength, which is a fair substitute for enlightenedpatriotism. The case is different with the Tatar hordes from CentralAsia, who fight only for plunder, and in a crisis are often utterlyunreliable. At this time both Cossacks and Tatars were in the field, the former in considerable numbers. The appointment of Bennigsen ascommander-in-chief, and the results of Pultusk, awakened greatenthusiasm among his hungry soldiers, who were now clamorous for adecisive battle. He had ninety thousand men, --at least on paper, --andwas not disposed to leave the French in peace to recruit their numbersand physical strength in comfortable winter quarters. Unlike thePrussian officers, he had learned the lessons of recent campaigns, andhad the strength of his character been equal to the cleverness of hisstrategy, he would have been a fair match for Napoleon. Moreover, theKing of Prussia, shut up in Königsberg with a few thousand men, was ina most precarious situation, both Ney and Bernadotte being withinstriking distance. Finally, the garrison of the fortress at Graudenzwas dependent on the precarious supplies which they received asLestocq found an opportunity to send them. 

Very soon, therefore, the Cossacks were sent out to scour the country. In their repeated skirmishes with the French light cavalry they showedsuch daring and address that their foes became timid and cautious. Inthis way the movements of Bennigsen's army were successfullyconcealed, and he hoped by a swift march to overtake and destroy Ney'sisolated division; if successful he would secure access to Dantzic anda connection with Graudenz, Kolberg, and other fortresses, which wouldgive him a position strong enough to jeopardize that of Napoleon atWarsaw. Accordingly, with about sixty-five thousand men he began arapid and circuitous march northwesterly and around behind theimpenetrable belt of dark forests, past Lake Spirding to Heilsberg, where he found Ney in full retreat on January twenty-second. But hehad overestimated the strength of his Russians; they were tooexhausted to strike quickly. Frost had set in, snow had fallen, andboth Ney and Bernadotte made their escape to Gilgenburg, the latterafter defeating the Russian advance-guard in a skirmish at Mohrungen. Bennigsen was compelled to retire in order to recruit the strength ofhis men. 

The Emperor of the French was still at Warsaw. The Polish capital wasgay and frivolous. New hopes had awakened the spirit of folly in thearistocracy, and the "liberator, " now at the very height of hisphysical power, was often conspicuous in the revels. In the intervalsof his serious labors Napoleon gave way to a life of sensuality, andthe women were prodigal of their charms. One of them was thewell-known Countess Walewska, a beautiful woman, who while yet achild had been forced into wedlock with an aged nobleman. She was nowmade to feel that the future of her country depended upon hercaptivating Napoleon, for he had singled her out as the most beautifulof all the crowd which pressed around him on his entry. Indignant whenthe proposition was first made, she finally listened to the prejudicedmorality of her friends, and gave an unwilling consent. It is thoughtthat her child was the first born to Napoleon, and that this fact, combined with his disgust for Josephine's incessant and inconsistentoutpourings of jealous complaint as to his conduct, had much to dowith his attitude concerning the political advantages of the divorce. Such was the young Polish noblewoman's eventual devotion to the fatherof her boy, that throughout his subsequent life in Europe she ranevery risk to be near her idol, and actually followed him to Elba. Their son, the Count Walewski, was a devoted Frenchman, and a man ofquality, filling, with dignity, important offices in the service ofhis country. 

CHAPTER II

CHECK TO THE GRAND ARMY: EYLAU[2]

 [Footnote 2: References more specifically valuable for this and the next chapter are Häusser, Czartoryski, Marbot, Lejeune, Oudinot, Lettow-Vorbeck, Sir R. Wilson, with the Castlereagh Letters and Napoleon's Correspondence. ]

 Napoleon's Preparations -- His Clever Strategy -- The Plan Discovered by the Russians -- The Armies at Eylau -- Failure of Napoleon's Tactics -- The Battle Indecisive -- The French Army Demoralized -- Napoleon's Anxiety -- His Army in Winter Quarters -- The Emperor's Activity -- Rearrangement of his Forces -- An Envoy from the Shah of Persia -- Reinforcements from France and Germany -- The Neutrality of Austria. 

[Sidenote: 1807]

It was not a very rude shock to his sensuous ease, however, when onJanuary twenty-seventh, 1807, Napoleon received the news ofBennigsen's march. In a general way he had been aware for some daysthat the enemy was moving, but he believed they had no other intentionthan to derive what immediate advantage could be had from Ney'srashness. In the absence of fuller information he had not changed hisopinion, but the army was nevertheless put in readiness, the trainswere equipped, and orders were issued for abandoning temporarily thesiege of Dantzic and for the complete occupation of Thorn. This stepwas taken, as a glance at the map will show, to insure a new line ofconnection with Posen and Berlin, directly in front of his base, incase the oblique one he was holding between Warsaw and Bartensteinshould be endangered by a flank movement of the Russians. 

Believing that Bennigsen's plan was to reach Elbing and defend hiscommunications with Dantzic, Napoleon issued orders on Januarytwenty-seventh for a countermarch in that direction, to engage himeither there or farther to the eastward. The orders given next day toDavout and Augereau show that by swift movements he hoped to attack atWillenberg, break through Bennigsen's center, and scatter his forcesright and left. Lannes had been taken ill after Pultusk, and was stillan invalid; Savary was therefore put in command of his well-triedcorps to bear the brunt of the battle. His business was to cover theline of the Narew for the purpose of assuring freedom of action to themain French army, and with that end in view to attack the Russiancorps under Essen, which was menacing it. Three days after the ordersof Napoleon were given, his army of a hundred thousand men was inposition on a line running in general east and west within the spacebounded by Willenberg, Gilgenburg, Mlawa, and Przasnysz, with onereserve of forty thousand on the left, to prevent the loss of Thorn, and another of fourteen thousand on the right. Everything was inreadiness for an advance under the most advantageous circumstances, totake Bennigsen by surprise, strike him on his flank, and close thecampaign in a single battle. On January thirty-first the final orderswere issued for the advance, and the march began. As in Franconia, onthe eve of Jena, it seemed as if the victory were already assured, wonby the marvelous moving of great bodies of men, this time in the depthof winter. 

[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Eylau. ]

On what a slender thread hang the fortunes of war! That day a Frenchcourier carrying to Bernadotte a particularly detailed account of theEmperor's plan, and orders to advance to Gilgenburg, was caught by theCossacks. The precious papers were in Bennigsen's hands next morning. The Russian troops were still in a wretched condition, badly clothed, and sustaining life by marauding; moreover, they numbered but sixty-fivethousand, Lestocq not yet having come in from Mohrungen. The Russiangeneral saw how he was entrapped, and that he could escape only by aswift retreat. His conduct of the movement was masterly, and on Februarysixth, though the French columns were not far behind, he had reachedHeilsberg. During the day the Russian rear-guard was driven in, andBennigsen, marching all night, found himself next morning before thetown of Eylau, or, more precisely, Preussisch-Eylau, the spot he hadselected for a desperate stand in defense of Königsberg. The Russianrear-guard was again overtaken, this time at Landsberg, where Muratarrived with his cavalry on the morning of the seventh. All day theRussians slowly resisted him, fighting bravely under Prince Bagration, and receding steadily as far as Eylau, which they held by a stubbornstand until induced to evacuate it voluntarily by the considerations ofgathering darkness and a foe superior in numbers. Their loss during theday was upward of two thousand. When night fell the Russian lines were ashort distance behind Eylau, and stretched two miles, from Serpalten onthe left to Schloditten on the right. Lestocq, coming up with hisPrussians, had reached Rositten, between nine and ten miles away, wherehe received orders to hurry onward. The French held the town of Eylau;in and near it were the troops of Murat, Soult, Augereau, and just intheir rear the Emperor with the guard. Ney was farther to the north andwest on the left, with orders to cut off Lestocq. The terrain aboundedin lakes and ponds of considerable size, but a black frost had renderedthem so hard, and the snow had so completely bedecked them, that theywere for the purposes of manoeuvering as available as the solidearth, both for cavalry and artillery. 

When day broke on February eighth the general arrangement of thehostile lines was such as to favor neither. Soult was before the townon the French left, Augereau in the center, and Saint-Hilaire with onedivision of Soult on the right. Behind the two latter was Murat withthe cavalry; in the rear, on rising ground, was the guard underBessières as a reserve. Davout was far out on the right nearBartenstein. The total number of French on the ground was about eightythousand. The Russian right was commanded by Tutschkoff, the center bySacken, the left by Ostermann-Tolstoi; their reserve was behind thecenter, under Doctoroff and Prince Galitzin. Their total number wasabout fifty-eight thousand, but they were superior to their enemy inartillery. Between the armies, in a low plain, lay several of thefrozen ponds, covered with snow. Napoleon's plan was to send Davoutaround the Russian left flank, while Saint-Hilaire engaged Tolstoi. Augereau and the cavalry were to be hurled against the center and topush toward the enemy's right; the combined onset would roll upBennigsen's entire line and result in a rout; Ney would intervene, andmake the battle not only decisive, but annihilating. 

The combination did not work out correctly. It was a raw and bitterday; during the morning there were occasional snow flurries, and atmidday a heavy downfall. Bennigsen seized the initiative, and openedthe battle by a cannonade. Napoleon, divining his plan, sent amessenger for Ney to come and strengthen Soult. At nine the Russianright advanced and drove in the French left, which was weak, to thetown. At that moment the order was given for Augereau andSaint-Hilaire to move. In the driving storm they lost connection witheach other, and the latter was repulsed by Russian cavalry, whileAugereau's corps was almost destroyed by the enemy's center. Thedashing horsemen of Galitzin reached the foot of the very hill onwhich Napoleon stood, and a panic seized all about him, not exceptingBerthier and Bessières, who excitedly called up the guard to savetheir Emperor. The Emperor, though almost "trodden under foot" asBertrand testified, nevertheless remained calm, exclaiming, "Whatboldness! What boldness!" The pursuers fell back exhausted, and Muratin turn dashed with his cavalry toward the gap between the enemy'scenter and right. So worn out were both sides, however, that without acollision they ceased to charge, and began to fire. 

About noon Davout at last arrived on the Russian left, and drove itfrom its position, while Saint-Hilaire again charged, and the two incombination effected the movement contemplated by the Emperor. In afew hours the Russians, who were receding in fair order and fightingfiercely, began to waver, and some of the formations broke intoflight. In this crisis Scharnhorst arrived with five thousandPrussians; he had been compelled to make a long detour in order toavoid Ney, with whom Lestocq had been engaged. By nightfall the Frenchwere brought to a stand, and soon after they were driven back from thehamlets which they had seized in their advance. Night ended the fight. Ney had not received his orders until two in the afternoon, andarrived too late for service. The armies retained their relativepositions, and both claimed the day. Neither had lost, neither hadgained, the field. But the battle was disastrous for both: from firstto last the struggle had been desperate and bloody. The losses werevirtually equal--about eighteen thousand men on each side. During theevening Napoleon began to arrange a retreat; in fact, Davout wasabout to begin it when he learned that there was a great commotion inthe enemy's bivouac. Advancing as far as possible, the marshal put hisear to the ground and distinctly noted a diminishing rumble, whichconvinced him that the Russians were withdrawing. This was anagreeable surprise, and Napoleon, when informed of the fact, orderedhis army to stand fast. The morning light displayed an abandonedRussian camp. 

It is impossible to tell which army was in the worse plight; both werein the utmost distress. Augereau had been wounded, and, though notdisabled, had left the field. This brought down on him the commander'sdispleasure, and inasmuch as his corps was nearly annihilated, it wasdisbanded; some of his regiments were virtually destroyed. The livingwere gaunt, exhausted, and ill with hunger; an eye-witness declaredthat but for the arrival, about noon, of some Jewish traders fromWarsaw with four tuns of brandy, thousands would have perished fromcold and fatigue. The dead were strewn thick over the field, and insome places were piled in heaps. On the white background of a Northernwinter the carnage was terribly apparent; the prowlers who skulkedfrom place to place in search of booty could be distinguished in alldirections. Marauding began on a frightful scale, discipline wasslackened by misery, and for miles around thousands of wretchedsoldiers stripped the scarcely less wretched peasantry of their fewremaining bits of property. 

The army was eager to be gone from these sickening sights. ButBennigsen had technically admitted defeat by his withdrawal, which thePrussians characterized as "a sin and a shame. " Napoleon, therefore, waited to secure his victory, and formally despatched a few parties inpursuit. Murat advanced to within touch of Bennigsen, who had takenhis position under the walls of Königsberg. At the same time theEmperor dictated a glowing account of the French triumph and of theadmirable condition of the army. It was at once despatched forpublication in the official journals of Paris. Soon afterward, onFebruary thirteenth, a messenger carried to Frederick William verbalproposals for either an armistice or a separate peace on mostfavorable terms. In these Napoleon set forth that the relation ofPrussia to Russia was mere vassalage, and that her rehabilitation asan independent power was essential to the peace of Europe, agreeing torestore her lands as far as the Elbe, and saying that as to Poland hecared nothing whatever. The confident feeling of the allies was shownby the Prussian king's prompt refusal to accept such overtures, and byhis determination to abide by the issue. On the other hand, the merefact of the proposition was evidence of Napoleon's anxiety. It is saidon good authority that the French emissary verbally offered thecomplete restoration of Prussia if she would desert her ally. 

Stern necessity would wait no longer on Napoleon's bravado; in a fewdays his troops withdrew to the tableland behind the river Passarge. There they found better cantonments, but the food was neither betternor more abundant. The Emperor had only a thatched hovel for hisheadquarters at Osterode, and, as he wrote to his brother Joseph, lived in snow and filth, without wine, brandy, or bread. "We shall bein fine condition when we get bread, " he said to Soult. "My positionwould be fine if I had food; the lack of food makes it only moderate, "he wrote, on February twenty-seventh, to Talleyrand. This was true, because now the army was more concentrated than before; and whenheadquarters were moved in the spring to Finkenstein the Emperor wasmore comfortable. The movements culminating in Pultusk clearly provethat Napoleon could not until then adapt his means to the novelconditions of warfare he found in Poland. But in the movementsantecedent to Eylau there are, in spite of virtual defeat, a clearapprehension of the difficulties, and an evident ability to surmountthem. While Bennigsen constantly assumes the offensive, Napoleonalways seizes the initiative, and in the retreat his choice of theplateau around Osterode as a rallying-point displays a continuedmastery of all the conditions. 

Around the camp-fires there was, during the remaining months ofwinter, a passive endurance, mingled with some murmuring about thehorrors caused by one man's ambition. The Emperor set his men anexample of uncomplaining cheerfulness. His health continued asexuberant as it had been for the year past, and his activity, thoughno longer feverish, lost nothing of its intensity. Savary thought heoutdid himself, accomplishing in one month what elsewhere would havebeen, even for him, the work of three. Mme. De Rémusat remembered tohave heard him say that he felt better during those months than everbefore or after. This vigor of body, combined with the same irondetermination as of old, did indeed work miracles, and this in spiteof the fact that his indefatigable secretary, Maret, was long at thepoint of death. 

To remedy the blunder of having left Dantzic behind in the hands ofthe Prussians, Lefebvre was despatched with his new corps to beleaguerit. Savary drove the Russians from the Narew and out of Ostrolenka;Mortier threatened Stralsund and stopped the Swedes, who, as membersof the coalition, were finally about to take an active share in thefighting. To strengthen the weakened ranks of the invaders, new levieswere ordered in both Switzerland and Poland, while at the same timesome of the soldiers occupying Silesia and besieging her fortresseswere called in. Both Neisse and Glatz were still beset by Frenchtroops, but the siege of Kolberg was abandoned, and still furtherreinforcements thus became available. In the daily skirmishes whichoccurred at the outposts the fighting was sharp; but the Cossacks wereas saucy as ever, and the French light horse could bring in littlenews. Meantime Russia's difficulties, of which Napoleon remainedignorant, kept her from reinforcing her army to the proper size. Hercredit was so low that she could raise no money on her own account, and when she applied to England for a subsidy, it was refused. TheCzar was consequently furious, and strained Russia's resources to theutmost; but he could give Bennigsen no more than enough funds and mento restore his original strength. 

The arms of Russia had been fairly successful on the lower Danube, forthe Turks had been paralyzed by an unforeseen danger. Great Britainhad sent a fleet to Constantinople, and the Sultan, though heimmediately declared war against England, was terrified. ButNapoleon's emissary, Sebastiani, engaged the English admiral innegotiations until the shore batteries were sufficiently strengthenedto compel the British fleet to retire. Filled by this success with newenthusiasm for his Eastern projects, the Emperor of the French devisedand set on foot a scheme for the alliance of Turkey and Persia inorder to checkmate the ambitions of either Russia or Austria. Aboutthe end of April an envoy from the Shah arrived at Finkenstein. He wasreceived with great demonstrations, and France was delighted to seethe kings of the East seeking, as she believed, her Emperor's favor. Napoleon's information with regard to the Orient was detailed andaccurate; his knowledge of the Eastern character was fraternallyinstinctive. A treaty was easily negotiated in which France promisedto drive Russia from Georgia and to supply Persia with artillery; inreturn the Shah was to break with England, confiscate Britishproperty, instigate the peoples of Afghanistan and Kandahar torebellion, set on foot an army to invade India, and in case the Frenchshould also despatch a land force against India, he was to give themfree passage along a line of march to be subsequently laid out, together with means of sustenance. None of the Emperor's achievementsduring this eventful winter shows more clearly than this how he couldrise above the discouragements of a doubtful situation, and howsanguine his disposition was when his health was really good. 

Throughout the late campaign the Emperor Francis had occupied aposition of non-intervention and hesitating neutrality similar to thatof Frederick William the year before. If he had intervened any timeduring the winter after Eylau, his will would have been imperative. But as Prussia had held off in his hour of need, leaving Napoleonuntrammeled, so now he let Prussia drink of the same cup, and remainednominally neutral. Andréossy reported, however, that Austria'sstrength was being rapidly recruited, and that her preparationsforeboded a renewal of hostilities. There was a new prime minister, Count Stadion, remarkable for his energy and insight. Napoleonimmediately began to make propositions for an alliance, intendedmerely to gain time. As he had the previous year called for the boyconscripts of 1807, so he now demanded those for 1808, who were evensomewhat younger. The Confederacy of the Rhine was summoned to supplyfresh troops, and even Spain, in which there had recently beensymptoms of serious uneasiness, was called on for a large contingentof auxiliaries. Before the close of negotiations with Francis, Napoleon had virtually doubled his army; the new levies were kept inSilesia and central Prussia, apparently as a reserve, but they werenot far from the Austrian frontier. 

On May twenty-sixth, in spite of a gallant and persistent defense byKalkreuth, Dantzic, the queen fortress of the Baltic, capitulated. This made Lefebvre's force available to strengthen further the armywhich still lay behind the Passarge. Napoleon again offered Silesia toFrancis, this time entire and outright, as the price of an alliance;he was even willing to make an exchange for Dalmatia. On Apriltwenty-sixth, at Bartenstein, Russia and Prussia had signed a newtreaty, according to which they bound themselves to make no separatepeace, and agreed that they would endeavor to unite the Scandinavianpowers with England, Austria, and themselves for a general war ofliberation. The Viennese cabinet was again divided on the question ofrenewing hostilities, and in the end proposed its services as amediator, provided that Poland should remain divided and Turkeyunmolested, and that German affairs should be rearranged. Napoleoncoquetted with this proposal until Russia and Prussia gave theirreply, which was not an assent to Austria's proposition, but a requestfor Francis's adherence to the convention of Bartenstein. [3] WhenAustria's offer was thus refused the French position was virtuallysecure as against her, at least for the season. Shrewd onlookers couldhardly credit their senses, and thought that so far from Francis'spolicy being one of neutrality, it was a favor of the highestimportance to Napoleon. The fact was that Austria knew Prussia'sweakness and had little confidence in Russia's strength. Moreover, France had powerful friends in Vienna, where Andréossy wasinfluential, and Austria's own preparations were not complete. Itwould be a serious matter if she should conclude a treaty with twoallies who might be beaten before she could herself take the field. Hence nothing disturbed the impenetrable front of the Danube power;her own plans were maturing slowly but surely, and while the enormousFrench reinforcements in central Europe were in a sense a menace, shethrew a strong military cordon upon the frontiers of Galicia, andhaughtily held aloof from anything likely to fetter her own ambitions. 

 [Footnote 3: On the refusal of Russia and Prussia to join Austria, see Vandal: Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, Vol. I, Chapitre Préliminaire. ]

CHAPTER III

AN INDECISIVE VICTORY: FRIEDLAND[4]

 [Footnote 4: References as before. ]

 The State of France -- Remedies Proposed by the Emperor -- Napoleon's Self-Indulgence -- Perplexities of both Combatants in Poland -- Opening of the Campaign -- Heilsberg -- Friedland -- The Result Indecisive -- The Strategic Problem -- The Statesman's Point of View -- The Armistice -- Napoleon's Resolution -- The Czar's Obligations to Prussia -- His Attitude toward Napoleon. 

The situation in Paris was even less satisfactory to Napoleon thanthat in the rest of Europe. Then, as now, France was too much like oneof those interesting creatures called by the pleasant scientific nameof cephalopod--all head except a few tentacles; so we say Paris, andnot France. Imperial interests rested on two supports, Paris and therest of the world. When Napoleon withdrew behind the Passarge, not allthe fictions which his fertile brain could devise and his busy agentsspread were sufficient to deceive the astute operators of the Parisexchange. Accordingly, the price of French government bonds went downwith a serious drop; England having announced soon afterward that shemeant to land a great army on the shores of the Baltic, publicconfidence was further shaken. A year before, the French nation hadbeen startled by the premature demand for more French youth; the newcall to anticipate the conscription filled them with consternation. These were grave matters, and the roads from Paris to Osterode andFinkenstein continually resounded under the hoofs of horses and theroll of wheels as messengers sped back and forth with questions andreplies. The nature of this correspondence shows how perfectly thegovernment of France was centralized in Napoleon's person, even in hisabsence at such a distance: the whole gamut of administration was run, from state questions of the gravest importance down to the dispositionof trivial affairs connected with the opera and its coryphées. As toreviving the finances, the Emperor was at his wit's end, and in a sortof blind helplessness he ordered the state to lend five hundredthousand francs per month to such manufacturers as would keep at workand deposit their wares in a government storehouse as collateral; nordid he disdain such measures as the founding of one or two factoriesof military supplies, or even the refurnishing of the Tuileries, inwhich he requested the women of his family to spend their moneyfreely. 

Of course he was absurdly unsuccessful; scarcely less so than he wasin his attempts to restore general confidence by the publication ofinspired articles in the newspapers. The censorship was more rigidthan ever, and Fouché was instructed to stop indiscreet privateletters from the army. Nevertheless, with no great difficulty thesenate was bullied into approving the new conscription, and thevolatile people soon listened without alarm to the siren voice oftheir Emperor, which said these boys would be only a national guard, children obeying the law of nature, the objects of his own paternalcare. Louis, who was governing Holland with reference to its own bestinterests, and ordering the affairs of his family rigidly butadmirably, received a severe and passionate reprimand from the Emperorfor his economy. What was wanted was pay for the troops, plenty ofconscripts, encouragement for the Dutch Catholics, and a giddy courtwhere men would forget more serious things, and where the gay youngQueen Hortense could make a display. "Let your wife dance as much asshe wants to; it is proper for her age. I have a wife forty years old, and from the field of battle I recommend her to go to balls; while youwant one of twenty to live in a cloister, or like a wet-nurse, alwaysbathing her child. " In the absence of her bogy, Mme. De Staël, whosaid she loved the gutters of Paris better than the mountain streamsof Switzerland, reappeared in the suburbs of that city. When Napoleonheard of it he grew furious, and gave orders to seize her as anintriguer, and to send her back to Geneva, by force if necessary. Itwas done, but an awful presentiment took possession of the Emperorthat she had appeared like a crow foreboding a coming tempest. As ifto compensate France for the loss of the exile's literary powers andthose of her friends, many means were devised and tried for theencouragement of an imperial literature. In his assumed and noisycontempt for ideals, Napoleon displayed his fear of them: the Academywas ordered to occupy itself with literary criticism; when in publicassemblies mention was made of Mirabeau or other Revolutionary heroes, the speaker was to be admonished that he should confine himself totheir style and leave their politics alone; the schools were orderedto train the children in geography and in history, but the instructionmust be confined to facts, and not be philosophical or religious. 

Napoleon's worst qualities and his growing weaknesses were mademanifest this winter in two exhibitions of self-indulgence mostfar-reaching in their results. The first bad symptom was his notoriouslicense, which brought from the Empress expressions of the bitterestreproach. Growing old at forty-three, not forty, as Napoleon gallantlybut untruthfully wrote to Louis, the aging Creole dismissed frommemory the sins of her own youth and middle age, while in jealousfury she charged her husband not only with his adulteries, but withcrimes the mere name of which sullies the ordinary records of humanwickedness and folly. She would have followed the Emperor to Poland, but his repeated dissuasions, although honeyed, were virtualprohibitions, and she dared not. His unfriendly annalist, Mme. DeRémusat, says he retorted to all Josephine's charges that he neededbut one reply, the persistent I: "I am different from every one else, and accept the limitations of no other. " Her continuous weeping, hewrote to his consort, showed neither character nor courage. "I don'tlike cowards; an empress should have pluck. " The second sign ofweakness was the growing neglect of detail in his work. Life hasalways been too short for a despot both to gratify his passions and atthe same time to be a beneficent ruler, even under the simplestconditions. On the recovery of Maret, the Emperor relaxed very much inhis personal attention to detail, while his secretary sought to drowna domestic sorrow and scandal in a feverish activity still greaterthan that which he had always displayed. This conjunction gave thesecretary an eminence he had not hitherto reached, and made himthereafter a power behind the throne whose influence was dangerous tothe Empire, to France, and to the peace of Europe. 

In spite of the enemy's numerical inferiority, Napoleon had beenthwarted at Eylau by the weather, by the unsurpassed bravery of theRussian soldiers, and by the able tactics of Bennigsen. The latter hadnot been worsted in the arbitrament of arms, yet the Emperor'scharacter for resolution and energy had virtually defeated theRussians, and had given him not only a technical but a real victory. Although he fell back and assumed the defensive, feeling that withoutenormous reinforcements and the capture of Dantzic he could notresume the offensive, yet nevertheless he had remained for four monthsunmolested by his foe. Bennigsen's perplexities were great. TheRussian court was rent by dissensions, affairs at Constantinople wereoccupying much of the Czar's attention, and the force available forfighting in the North seemed too small for a decisive victory: heremained virtually inert. There was an effort late in February todrive the French left wing across the Vistula, but it failed. A fewdays later Napoleon in person made a reconnaissance on his right, andthis show of activity reduced the opposing ranks to inactivity. He hadproposed to resume hostilities on June tenth, and had by that timeincreased his strength on the front to one hundred and sixty thousandmen, all well equipped and fairly well fed. The reserve army incentral Europe was much larger; there were about four hundred thousandmen, all told, in the field. 

[Illustration: Battle of Heilsberg. ]

Meanwhile, however, the pleasant season had mended the roads and driedthe swamps. The Russians were refreshed by their long rest, and, children of nature as they were, felt the summer's warmth as a spur toactivity. Bennigsen had by that time about ninety thousand men, excluding the Prussians, who now numbered eighteen thousand. By hisdelay he had lost the services of his best ally, the inclementweather; but he had at least come to a decision, and forestallingNapoleon's scheme, advanced on June sixth to the Passarge, againstNey's corps, which was the French advance-guard. Ney retreated, andthe seventh was spent in manoeuvers which resulted in uniting hiscorps with the main army. Bennigsen, having hoped to cut off anddestroy his division before attacking in force, felt compelled, inconsequence of failure, to retreat in turn, and this movement leftLestocq at a dangerous distance to the right. At this junctureNapoleon determined to assume the offensive himself. On the eighth hebegan to concentrate his troops, and took measures to find the enemyin order to force a battle. Bennigsen had withdrawn beyond the riverAlle; Soult and Lannes, with Murat in advance, were sent up its leftbank to Heilsberg; Davout and Mortier were to pass farther on, as partof a general movement to surround; Ney and the guard were held inreserve, while Victor was despatched to block Lestocq. 

The first shock occurred on the morning of the tenth, in theneighborhood of Heilsberg; for Bennigsen had sent a considerablenumber of his troops back over the river to feel the enemy. TheRussians were slowly driven across the plain, fighting fiercely asthey went, until by six in the evening they reached the heights nearthe town, which had been intrenched. Here they turned, and for fivehours hurled back one advancing French column after another untileleven o'clock at night, when, fortunately for the attackingtroops, --so at least thought Savary, who was with them, --it grew toodark, even near the summer solstice and in those high latitudes, tofight longer. Next morning Napoleon woke after his bivouac and lookedto see his enemy gone, as at Pultusk and Eylau. But this time arepetition of that pleasant experience was denied him. His losses hadbeen so serious the day before that he spent the eleventh inmanoeuvers, further concentrating his army before Heilsberg, anddespatching Davout to throw himself between Lestocq and Bennigsen, thus turning the latter's right and checking the former, if all wentwell. This movement determined the character of the whole campaign. Ithad the desired effect, and on the morning of the twelfth the trenchesin front of him were empty. The Russians had stolen away, and for twodays they steadily retreated down the Alle in the general directionof Königsberg, until on the evening of the thirteenth they reachedFriedland. 

Bennigsen had expected to retreat still farther, hoping to reachWehlau, and cross to the right bank of the Pregel for a strongdefensive position before Königsberg. Lestocq with the Prussians waswell forward on the extreme right toward that place. But at three inthe morning of June fourteenth the head of Lannes's column appearedbefore Friedland, and the Russian commander, supposing he had to dowith a single division, turned, and crossing to the left bank of theAlle, passed through Friedland in order to meet his enemy in the open. His evident intention was to follow the Napoleonic plan ofoverwhelming the attacking divisions one by one as they arrived. Hisright wing was stationed in the rear of the hamlet of Heinrichsdorf, his left rested on a forest known as the Sortlack. When hisarrangements were completed it was nine o'clock in the morning. Whatinformation he had is unknown, but what he did remains inexplicable. Starting to seize Heinrichsdorf, he was, after a short conflict, repulsed; for Lannes had stretched his line far to the left for thesame purpose, and had been reinforced by Mortier's vanguard. Bennigsenwithdrew about noon to his first position, and stood there in idlenessfor three long hours, exchanging useless volleys with his foe. Havinghis entire force already on the field, he remained absolutely inactivewhile the enemy formed their line. In respect to his having massed hisforces before the French could form, his position was exactly parallelto that which the latter had occupied at Jena with regard to thePrussians, and which was used by Napoleon with such vigor for a flankattack. But Bennigsen lacked the promptness and insight necessary touse his advantage, and the long delay was decisive. In the interval, Ney, Victor's artillery, and the guard arrived; at three the Emperorissued his orders for forming the line; and two hours later he gavethe signal for Ney to attack on the right. The Russians had butshortly before learned that the main French army was in front of them, and were beginning their retreat with the intention of recrossing theAlle, many having entered Friedland, which lies on the left bank ofthe stream. In the first rush toward the town, Ney was repulsed withdreadful loss; but as Ney's corps rolled back to right and left, Dupont appeared with Victor's first division in the very middle of thebreaking lines, and at the same moment Sénarmont pressed forward closeto the Russian ranks with all Victor's artillery, --thirty-sixpieces, --and began to pour in a deadly fire. This routed the enemy, who fled through the town and over the stream; but their right wing, being thus turned into the rear-guard, was caught by Lannes before itreached the crossing, and checked. The wooden bridge was set inflames, and before nightfall that portion of the Russian army whichhad not yet crossed was virtually annihilated. 

About eighty thousand French and about fifty-five thousand Russianstook part in this battle; the former lost seven thousand men, thelatter sixteen thousand, with eighty field-pieces. It was the only oneof Napoleon's great engagements in which he admitted his numericalsuperiority to his enemy. The same day Soult and Davout, with Murat'scavalry, drove Lestocq into Königsberg, and prepared to invest thetown. But Lestocq's troops, with the garrison and the court, escaped, flying for refuge toward the Russian frontier. Bennigsen collected atAllenburg the troops he had saved, and, retreating in good order, crossed the Niemen at Tilsit four days later. He then had the optionof awaiting Napoleon, who was close behind, or of making peace, or ofwithdrawing into the interior beyond the enemy's reach, as Alexanderhad done after Austerlitz. As a matter of fact, he confessed utterdefeat. "This is no longer a fight, it is butchery, " he wrote to theCzar's brother, the Grand Duke Constantine. "Tell the Emperor what youwill, " he said again, "if only I can stop the carnage. "[5]

 [Footnote 5: Oudinot: Mémoires, Ch. II. ]

The campaign of Friedland shows either less genius or more than anyother of Napoleon's victories, according to the standpoint from whichit is judged. If he is to be regarded throughout its duration merelyas a general, then his conduct shows comparatively little ability. Hecame on his enemy where he did not expect a battle. Although he hadample time to evolve and execute an admirable plan, and while his losswas trifling compared with that of his opponents, yet, nevertheless, Friedland was a commonplace, incomplete affair. It compelled the foeto abandon Heilsberg, but it did not annihilate him or necessarily endthe war. Bennigsen found all Russia behind him after his defeat:twenty-five thousand men came in from Königsberg, Prince Labanoffbrought up the Russian reserves, and thus was formed a substantialarmy. A retreat with this force into the vast interior would have leftNapoleon as a general just where he was before. This ineffectualresult was entirely due to a single deliberate move which terminatedhis scheme of surrounding and annihilating the foe--the detachment ofDavout against Lestocq on the enemy's extreme right. 

But when viewed from the statesman's point of view, Friedland appearsin a very different light. [6] It is a strange coincidence that in themonth previous a rebellion of the janizaries had deprived Selim IIIof his throne, and that, Sebastiani's influence being thus ended, France's position in the Oriental question was utterly changed. Theformal despatches announcing this fact did not reach Tilsit until Junetwenty-seventh or twenty-eighth, but there is a strong probabilitythat it was known to Napoleon before the battle of Friedland. Is itpossible that the Emperor intended Friedland to do no more thansatisfy his army's eagerness for glory, and yet leave Alexander in ahumor to unite with him for the gratification of those well-knownOriental ambitions of his which he had so recently seen jeopardized bythe Franco-Turkish alliance and the consequent ascendancy of Frenchinfluence at Constantinople? Such a hypothesis is by no means wild;nevertheless, a careful study of the campaign seems to prove thatNapoleon, in suddenly changing from the defensive to the offensive, and so finding himself at Heilsberg face to face with defeat, took thequickest and easiest means to relieve a critical situation. It wouldhave appeared something very much like bravado had Davout's corpspenetrated between Lestocq's division and the Russian army, and thushave exposed itself to a rear attack. If the easy self-relianceNapoleon felt after a winter of robust health had been somewhat less, and if his intellectual acumen had been somewhat greater, the wholesituation might have been foreseen and provided for. As neither wasthe case, he did as a general the best thing that was possible at themoment. Admitting this, we shall find the statesman making the most ofthe general's poor situation; for the treaty which followed Friedlandis unique in the history of diplomacy. 

 [Footnote 6: Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr, I, XIII. ]

There were forcible reasons on both sides for arriving at anunderstanding. It has been remarked that Napoleon never discharged thestings and darts of personal abuse at Alexander I as he did at thepersons of other enemies. In what was almost a personal correspondenceat an earlier time the Czar had exhibited his noblest qualities and anenlightened liberalism. To be sure, every humiliation had been heaped onRussia in spurning the Oubril treaty of the previous year and by thelight disdain of peace obligations solemnly taken. Yet Napoleon wasalive to the present and imperative need of a strong ally if hismercantile attack on England were to have even a chance of success. WithAustria he had employed all the diplomatic arts of Talleyrand andAndréossy to no avail: the Polish campaign had made Francis alert, thatof Russia was reviving the bellicose spirit of the Austrian army. Negotiation with Frederick William had failed because based on theconcept of a new Prussia eastward of the Elbe, a menace alike to Russiaand Austria, and a confession of defeat by the King, who preferred toplace his trust in Alexander. Francis was equally adverse toTalleyrand's elaborate scheme of a realm eastern in fact as in name, stretching away down the Danube valley to the Euxine, a buffer againstRussian aggression, a menace or a support to Turkey as occasionrequired. It was therefore a categorical imperative which determined theEmperor of the French to woo the Emperor of all the Russias at thisjuncture. When a proposition for an armistice was made by Bennigsen onJune twenty-first, it was not only courteously but impressivelyaccepted, and within a very short time things were moving as if the twoemperors were no longer enemies, but rather as if they were alreadyintimate friends, anxious to embrace. At least, even before theirmeeting, such was the attitude they assumed in their communications witheach other and ostentatiously displayed to those about them. Some thingsare perfectly patent in the Czar's desire for peace. Russian autocracyas a system was still unshakable, but the authority of his house wasnot: in sixty years there had been no fewer than four revolutionaryupheavals, either by the soldiery or by a palace cabal. The instabilityof the throne had sadly diminished the prestige of the country, andafter Austerlitz the nation had been treated with contempt in the personof the Czar, both in his political and his military character, the restof Europe being profoundly indifferent to Russian chagrin. His situationwas not improved by Pultusk, Eylau, or Friedland. Dissensions in thefield were not concealed by the hallelujahs and hosannas of the populacein the cities; victory bore no fruits; without Austria the next stepcould not be taken, and hesitancy still marked that uneasy monarchy asits own. Prussia, although the principal in the fight, was but a feeblepower. England, though reaping the harvest of Russia's commerce, hadbecome niggardly in regard to subsidies, and had delayed thelong-promised, much-vaunted Baltic expedition until it was useless. TheKing of Sweden was so hated by his own subjects that his efforts as anally had been rendered almost futile. In Russia itself there was astrong party, led by the Grand Duke Constantine, which steadilydenounced the war as one in the interest of strangers, and in it wereincluded most, if not all, the Russian officers. It was evident thatAlexander as an auxiliary would lose no prestige at home in withdrawingfrom a quarrel which was not Russia's, and in which he had more thanpaid any debt he owed to Prussia by the sacrifice in her behalf of hisguards and of the flower of his army. Moreover, misery abounded amongthe survivors, and Russian finances were not exactly in a flourishingcondition. Such was the general discontent with the war that men ofimportance--at least so it was said at the time--ventured to remindAlexander of his father's violent death. 

On the other side the urgency was becoming acute. As the strategistssay, Napoleon had won a battle, but not a victory, at Friedland. Thesituation in Paris continued highly unsatisfactory. The threatenedEnglish expedition to the Baltic might arrive at any time. Contemptible as was Gustavus of Sweden, he was in Pomerania with anAnglo-Hanoverian army of ten thousand men. Most disquieting of all, there were movements both of intellectual agitation and of activepartizan warfare in Prussia that presaged a speedy convalescence onher part. It is evident that an alliance with Russia was better forFrance than one with Prussia as regards both the Oriental and Europeanplans of Napoleon. He therefore determined to suggest the mostglittering prospects to Alexander's messenger--nothing less than thepartition of Turkey, and the Vistula as the Russian frontier on theBaltic. 

[Illustration: Battle of Friedland. ]

But all these reasons on both sides seem inadequate to explain theextraordinary character of the events preliminary to the meeting ofthe two emperors at Tilsit, of what occurred at that meeting, and ofthe treaty there negotiated. When Bennigsen first proposed anarmistice, Napoleon demanded as a guarantee the three fortresses ofPillau, Kolberg, and Graudenz. His messenger returned with the replythat they were not Russia's to give. Soon Duroc was despatched to thehostile camp. Would the Czar make a separate peace? To do so would beto betray Prussia by expressly violating the Bartenstein treaty. Technically the document was invalid, for Austria had never signed it, although she would gladly have done so when brought to face aFranco-Russian alliance. Morally it would be base for Alexander tonegotiate separately, for Frederick William had refused a similaroffer. [7] The young Czar, however, cared nothing for the royal Europeof former days, and but little for the theory of a Western empireunder Napoleon. What he did care for was Russian influence ingeographical Europe under whatever name, for the dismemberment ofTurkey, and for the extension of his empire toward the west by theacquisition of Finland from Sweden. Having failed to realize hispurpose by a coalition of so-called legitimate sovereigns, and havingheard the almost incredible suggestions which Napoleon had made toPrince Labanoff, his messenger, he was overpowered by the temptationthus held out, and, deserting Prussia, answered, "Yes. " On thetwenty-first an armistice without serious guarantees was concludedbetween France and Russia; but none was made with Prussia, for theterms offered to her were so severe that, desperate as was her King, he could not endure the thought of accepting them. She was no longeran equal with either France or Russia, but a dependent on either andon both; her nomad court was reduced to Frederick William, hisminister Hardenberg, and a few followers who were here to-day andthere to-morrow, wherever they felt most was to be gained from theself-interest of either their former ally or their conqueror. TheQueen and royal family were at Memel, the farthest outpost ofPrussia's shattered domain. 

 [Footnote 7: On the character of Alexander, see Vandal: Napoléon et Alexandre, Vol. I, Ch. I. ]

The attitude of the Czar toward Napoleon was markedly different fromthat of his predecessors in defeat. Frederick William's ancestor hadonly a century before bought his title by supplying Prussian troops tothe German-Roman emperor, and, like Napoleon, had set the crown on hisown head. Francis I of Austria was the grandson of Maria Theresa, apowerful and masterful woman, who held her throne in directcontravention of legitimist theories, because she had conquered it. Both were nevertheless overpowered by the sense of their legitimacyand sacred aloofness. When Francis humiliated himself before hisconqueror after Austerlitz, his mien was distant and his salutehaughty; the miserable King of Prussia was, like him, dignified andsevere even in his beggary. The Czar was too close to the crime whichhad set him on his throne to assume any airs of superiority with theFrench Cæsar. Having taken the first step, he began to show a childisheagerness for a personal meeting with Napoleon. The Emperor was farfrom averse, and made a formal proposal to that effect, which waspromptly accepted; the intercourse between French and Russian officersgrew warmer and closer every day, and the arrangements for aninterview between the would-be Eastern and Western emperors were sooncompleted. 

CHAPTER IV

NAPOLEON AND ALEXANDER AT TILSIT[8]

 [Footnote 8: For the years of the Franco-Russian alliance the French archives contain a wealth of documentary material: regular despatches, verbatim reports of conversations between the French ambassadors and the Czar, the news of the day in St. Petersburg and the gossip of society. Savary and Caulaincourt may be said to have kept their master in personal touch with their friend and ally. There is likewise the ordinary regular diplomatic correspondence with Austria, Prussia, Turkey, and the other European states. An interesting and invaluable peculiarity of French archives is, that bound up with despatches received are the outlines of those sent, and generally not merely a sketch, but the first draft with all annotations and corrections, these quite often in Napoleon's almost cryptic but still decipherable handwriting. Much of course is in cipher, but the key is available and sometimes the official decipherment. The archives of St. Petersburg are also available for properly accredited searchers; Tratchefski has gone a considerable distance in publishing the decisive papers, and Tatistcheff has printed many important documents in various periodicals. Other sources have been already indicated: the published correspondence of Napoleon and of Pozzo di Borgo, the histories of Bignon, Lefebvre, and Rambaud, and the monumental work of Vandal: Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, are all of the first importance. Bertrand: Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon, contains the replies of the minister to his chief. Duckworth's check at Constantinople is fully explained by Juchereau de Saint Denys: Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808. Cf. Also Hassel: Geschichte der Preussischen Politik, 1807 bis 1815. Choiseul-Gouffier: Réminiscences sur Napoléon Ier et Alexandre Ier. Adami: Louise de Prusse, Erinnerungen der Gräfen von Voss. Savary: Mémoires. Life of Sir Robert Wilson. ]

 The Floating Pavilion -- Emperor, Czar, and King -- The Two Principals -- Their Relation to Frederick William -- A Diplomatic Novelty -- Napoleon's Motives -- Great Britain and the World's Commerce -- The Orders in Council -- Napoleon's Decrees -- Russia as an Ally -- The Ministers and the Negotiations -- Imperial Amusements -- The Fate of Turkey -- The Two Friends -- Work after Play. 

On the morning of June twenty-fifth, 1807, there lay anchored in themiddle of the Niemen, before Tilsit, a pavilion ingeniouslyconstructed by French soldiers from boats and boards. It was gailydecorated, according to the taste of their country, with flags andgarlands. The front bore a large monogram composed of the letters Nand A interlaced. Within were two comfortable rooms, one for thesovereigns, one for their suites. At a signal two skiffs put out, onefrom each shore, amid the mingled cheers of the French and Russianguards, drawn up in view of each other across the intervening stream. The dull roar of cannon intoned the tidings of reconciliation. In oneboat was Alexander, suitably arrayed in uniform; in the other wasNapoleon, wearing the traditional gray coat and undress hat. TheEmperor of the French was first on board the float, and received hisguest with all that winning grace which he could so well command. After a formal embrace he began an informal conversation, which thencontinued without a break as the two schemers withdrew to theapartment arranged for their interview. The staff, at a respectfuldistance, could catch nothing of what was said, and although theinterview lasted nearly two hours, no words of it are known except theopening phrases, reported by Napoleon himself. "Sire, " remarked theCzar, "I shall second you against the English. " "In that case, " wasthe reply, "everything can be arranged, and peace is made. " Some doubthas been cast on the literal truth of this momentous dialogue, sinceit rests on a single authority. For a century it has not been denied, and the cup of bitterness which England had held to Alexander's lipswas certainly brimming. Since the beginning of hostilities GreatBritain had failed in every single engagement. Her naval force in theBaltic was puny, but it preyed on Russian commerce; the promised warmaterial did not arrive; her support at Constantinople was farcical;she had no more heart in Turkish partition than before and eversince; Canning was less than half-hearted and favored Austria toRussia's disadvantage; even the money support expected and tacitlypromised was refused. The Czar knew that he had been betrayed byEngland in the interest of Austria: he did not know how grave had beenNapoleon's coquetry in a similar suit. He was as much bent on theemancipation of Russian commerce from English tyranny as Napoleon onthe "freedom of the seas, " the revolutionary phrase for Britishhumiliation. The conversation may well have taken place literally asreported: even though the Czar hoped to postpone the rupture for somemonths, he may have given his complete confidence under four eyes. Whocan measure the fascination under which the young enthusiast fell atfirst sight? In any case nothing apparently occurred to disturb theamiability of either monarch. It was doubtless agreed that they shouldform a dual alliance, absolute and exclusive. [9] "I have often slepttwo in a bed, " the suave but inelegant Napoleon was heard to say at asubsequent meeting, "but never three. " Savary declared that thesmiling and complacent young Czar thought the remark delightful. Themeaning of the riddle, if riddle there be, was, of course, thatAustria could no longer count as an equal in the Continental Olympus, the membership of which was thus reduced to two. 

 [Footnote 9: On this point, see Vandal: Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, Ch. I. ]

The Czar's conscience smote him in regard to his desertion ofPrussia, but with no great effort he obtained material concessions forher from his new ally. The same afternoon an armistice was arrangedwith Frederick William, by the terms of which he temporarily kept hisstrong places in Silesia and Pomerania; but his propositions for analliance were incontinently rejected. Next day there was anothermeeting on the same raft, but this was tripartite, for the King ofPrussia was present. Napoleon was blunt and imperious, reproachingFrederick William with the duplicity of his policy, vindictively (thedescriptive word he used himself), and with emphasis, demandingHardenberg's dismissal. At parting he invited Alexander to dinner, butostentatiously omitted to include Frederick William in the request. Itwas agreed that to expedite the final negotiations the three monarchsshould remain on the ground; one half the town of Tilsit wasneutralized and divided into three portions, each of the three partiesto take up his residence in one. This closed the preliminaries, andthe two emperors returned with mutual satisfaction to the respectivesides of the river from which they had come. The sensations ofFrederick William, who accompanied Alexander, must have been those ofa soldier on the field under a capital operation in surgery. That veryafternoon the Czar removed to the quarter of Tilsit appropriated tohim. The King of Prussia took lodgings in the house of a miller, butspent only a part of each day in them, preferring the melancholysolitude of the neighboring hamlet of Piktupönen, where he andHardenberg had last alighted. 

Alexander was now thirty years of age, sanguine, ambitious, impressionable, and mature in proportion to his years. His featureswere well formed on Slavic lines, his look was sympathetic, and hisform elegant. The many graces of his mind and person were natural. "Myfriend, " wrote Napoleon to Josephine on the twenty-fifth, "I havejust met the Emperor Alexander. I have been much pleased with him; heis a very handsome, good young emperor; he has more intelligence thanis generally thought. " Napoleon himself was only eight years older, but his mind was more penetrating and adroit by a whole generation. The classic cast in his features, which only a few years before madesculptors mold him like the statue of the young Augustus, had nearlydisappeared. A complete transformation had been produced in his bodilyappearance by the robust health he had for some time enjoyed. He hadbecome more of a primitive Italian and less of a Roman. His skin wasnow clear and of a rich, dark tint. His powerful frame was fullydeveloped, and while fat, he was not obese; the great head sat on aneck which was like a pillar in thickness and strength. His expressionwas slightly sensuous about the mouth and chin, but his eyes werequick and penetrating in their glance. It was rarely that his gaze wasintent. The good manners and polished courtesy in which he indulged atthis time were an unwonted luxury. 

Cobenzl said that the last step but one to universal conquest was todivide the world between two. At that moment there was little doubt asto which of these two would ultimately survive. Alexander wasimpressionable and eager for friendship. He was flattered by theattentive and considerate manner of the greatest man in Europe. Theglittering, intoxicating generalities of Napoleon attracted hisaspiring mind, while the fascination of the Emperor's person stronglymoved his heart. On the other hand, the influence of the Czar on theEmperor was substantial. Beneath his frank and chivalric manners, behind his enthusiasm and romanticism, lay much persistence and shrewdcommon sense. The advantages which he gained were granted by Napoleonmainly from motives of self-interest, for Russia, strong, was the besthelper in reducing Austria to impotence; nevertheless, they weresecured largely through personal influence, and were substantialadvantages which might be permanent in case of disaster to a singlelife. Frederick William was only two years younger than Napoleon. Hisdevelopment had been slow; he was well-meaning but dull, proud buttimid. Though destined to see a regeneration of Prussia under his ownreign, he had as yet done nothing to further it, and in an access ofresentment had declared a war in which she had been virtuallyannihilated. His former ally insisted that he should occasionallyattend the conferences, but his presence was distasteful to Napoleon. Thus he sat, dejection and despair stamped on his homely face;haughty, yet a suppliant; a king, yet only by sufferance. Fortunatelyhis queen, Louisa, the woman of her day, beautiful, virtuous, andwise, came finally to his support. Her hopes were destined to berudely shattered, and her charm was to be used in vain; but it was herpresence alone which gave any dignity to Prussia at Tilsit. 

Both from the place and circumstances, from the station and characterof the persons negotiating, as well as from the nature of the results, the meeting at Tilsit is the most remarkable in the history ofdiplomacy. The motives which disposed Napoleon to an armistice wereplain enough; those which determined his later conduct can only bedivined. Prussia had seemed to the French liberals of the Revolutionto belong by nature to their system: they were quite as angry with herpersistent neutrality as was either Austria or England, both of whomthought she should adhere to them, if only for self-preservation. Napoleon's repeated but vain attempts to secure a Prussian alliancebefore Jena, or a separate negotiation afterward, rooted thistraditional bitterness in his mind. To secure the prize for which hewas fighting he had only two courses open: either to restore Poland asthe frontier state between the civilization of his empire and thesemi-barbarism and ambitions of Russia, or else to negotiate withRussia herself. 

The former course meant an interminable warfare with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, at a distance of fifteen hundred miles from Paris; forRussia would fight to the death rather than lose the only possessionswhich put her into the heart of Europe, and thus be relegated to thecharacter of an Asiatic power. The Emperor of the French had alreadyseen after Eylau how untrustworthy the grand army was, even in Poland;if dejected and insubordinate there, as he may well have recalled wasactually the case, what would it be on the banks of the Dnieper, inthe plains of Lithuania? Such considerations probably determined notonly the fact of peace, but its character. In order to secure what hehad gained in western, southern, and central Europe, England must bebrought to terms. Russia must therefore not only be an ally, but ahearty ally: as the price of her subscription to the Berlin Decree, and the consequent closing of her harbors to English shipping, shecould gratify any reasonable ambition, and might virtually dictate herown terms. With an engine in his hands as formidable as Russia'sadhesion to his commercial policy, he could act at the nick oftime, --which, as he declared at this very season to Joseph, was thehighest art of which man is capable, --could destroy England'scommerce, and in a long peace could consolidate the empire he hadalready won. His empire thus consolidated, he would be virtual masterof half the solid earth in the Eastern hemisphere. If ambition shouldstill beckon him on, he would still be young; he could then considerthe next step to universal empire. 

It may safely be said that Great Britain was never more haughty thanat this moment. Her king had turned the ministry of "All the Talents"out of doors; for after Fox's death the combination lost all dignityand power. The Duke of Portland was now prime minister. He was a blindbut energetic conservative, his Toryism, unlike that of Pitt in hisenlightened days, being of the sort which lay close to his sovereign'sheart. England's monopoly of European commerce seemed assured: Sweden, Denmark, and the Hanse towns were the only important seafaring powersof Europe that retained a nominal neutrality, and it was only aquestion of time when they must accept terms either from France orfrom her. With every other European nation embroiled in the Napoleonicwars and deeply concerned for its own territorial integrity, theUnited States of America was her only real maritime rival, and she hadbullied us into a temporary acquiescence in her interpretation ofinternational law. [10]

 [Footnote 10: The importance of American commerce at that time has not usually had due recognition; statement of its value see Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol. II, pp. 231-2. ]

When colonies were first recognized as essential to the prosperity ofEuropean nations, the rule was universally observed that only themother country could trade with her own. In 1756 France endeavored tobreak this rule by permitting neutral ships to engage in trafficbetween herself and her West Indian possessions. England at once laiddown the "rule of 1756, " that neutrals should not exercise in time ofwar privileges of traffic which they were not permitted to enjoy intime of peace; and this principle she was able to maintain more orless completely until 1793, when France declared war on her, and againinvited neutral commerce to French colonial harbors. England, havingregained her supremacy of the seas, reasserted in 1793 the rule of1756, but nevertheless so modified it the following year that shepermitted neutral traders to break, in their own or in her harbors, their voyages from or to colonial ports. In 1796 France notified allneutrals that she would treat them just as they permitted GreatBritain to treat them, and in 1798 shut all her harbors to any vesselwhich had even touched at a British port. This state of affairscontinued until the peace of Amiens. When war was renewed in 1803between England and France the former again asserted the rule of 1756as binding, while indirect trade between neutral ports and the portsof an enemy was again allowed, but under the new proviso that theneutral ship did not on her outward voyage furnish the enemy withgoods contraband of war. This privilege of indirect trade wasinvaluable to American ship-owners, and for two years the oceancommerce of all Europe was in their hands. The fortunes they thusaccumulated were enormous, while Great Britain saw her ownmanufactures displaced by those of continental nations, and thecolonies of her enemies prospering as never before. In 1805, therefore, she withdrew the privilege of indirect trade, and her flagbeing, after Trafalgar, the only belligerent one left on the ocean, proceeded both to enforce the new rule and to abuse the provisoconcerning neutral vessels carrying contraband of war by ruthlesslyexercising the right of search. Under the orders in council ofSeptember fifth, 1805, every neutral ship must be examined to seewhether its lading was a cargo of neutral goods, or whether itcontained anything contraband. This could only mean that everyAmerican ship laden with other than American goods was to be seized;and in May of the following year, by the still more notorious order ofthe sixteenth, Great Britain declared that every European harbor fromBrest to the mouth of the Elbe was blockaded. This was a distance ofeight hundred miles, and even she had not ships enough to enforce herdecree. Trafalgar had turned the heads of English statesmen. 

This paper blockade was the challenge which called forth the BerlinDecree from Napoleon. American ships, like those of the French, werefor a time seized, searched, and detained by the British on theslightest suspicion that they were either leaving or were destined fora hostile port, while their sailors were pitilessly impressed. Thegovernment at Washington authorized reprisals, but Americanship-owners found it more profitable to compromise than to resist, andMonroe came to an understanding with the English ministry; theprosperity of American shipping was again revived, and the merchantsof the United States continued to prosper by carrying English waresunder the American flag into harbors where the union jack wasforbidden. By this evasion Great Britain retained her commercialsupremacy, and her prosperity was rather increased than diminished. She withheld a similar coöperation from Sweden and Russia until it wastoo late, her enterprise being chiefly concerned to open new channelsfor her commerce in Egypt and in South America. 

How was this leviathan, which was drawing the wealth of all Europe toits stores, and eluding or repelling all attack on its chosenelement--how was this tyrant of the ocean to be slain? Clearly theAmericans must be so harassed and annoyed that in the end the publicspirit of the United States would be aroused to resent Englishcontrol, and bid defiance to Great Britain's assumption of maritimesupremacy. To this end the rigid enforcement of the Berlin Decreewould be well adapted in the long run, but in the interval much couldbe done: if its principle could be extended to the destruction of allsmuggling, to the absolute exclusion of British commerce from theentire Continent--not only from the seaports, but from themarkets--the end would be gained. With Russia's coöperation alone wasthis possible. Napoleon's present plan, therefore, was to secureFrance and the French Empire, as far as won, by compelling the worldto a lasting peace through the immediate establishment of acounterpoise, the French and Russian empires against Great Britain, leaving time to do its perfect work of exasperating the rising navalpower of the United States into open hostility against the parentland. 

These, it seems, must have been the considerations which controlledthe course of affairs at Tilsit. The deliberations were both formal, so called, and informal. At the former were present the threesovereigns with their ministers--Talleyrand for France, Kurakin andLabanoff for Russia, Kalkreuth and Goltz for Prussia; at the latterwere sometimes all three of the monarchs, frequently only the twoprincipals, for they found Frederick William a damper on theirhilarity. The generals, the staff, and the men of the two great armieswhich had fought so bravely at Friedland harmonized in mutual respect;but the unwarlike King and his suite, both military and civil, wereoutsiders. Immediately after the formal and brilliant entry ofAlexander into Tilsit, Napoleon began the exchange of prisoners, anddespatched messengers commanding his forces in Germany to restore totheir sovereign the territories of Mecklenburg, whose reigning housewas kin to the Czar. For Frederick William there was scarcely a showof kindness--nothing, in fact, but a cold condemnation of Hardenberg, to whose influence, combined with that of the military party, theconqueror charged Prussia's declaration of war. This minister, banished at Napoleon's instance, was near by. The King pleaded in vainthat he might still serve as mentor in the coming negotiation; theEmperor scornfully refused. There were no others available, rejoinedthe King. Napoleon named several: among them, and probably not byinadvertence, Stein. This great name is welded to the regeneration ofPrussia, but its bearer was a liberal in the measures he enforced. Hardenberg, great and adroit as he was, stood for the passingconservatism, and while he was indefatigable to the end, he was afterall a worker at twilight, unable to see the coming metamorphosis ofold Europe into the new. It was a proposition outlined by him whichbrought forward the first vital question, the partition of Turkey. Hissovereign's stateliest lands had been gained by the partition ofAustria and of Poland; he now suggested that Russia and Austria shoulddivide the Danubian principalities between them, that France shouldtake Greece and her isles, and that Poland should be restored andgiven to the King of Saxony, who in turn should hand over his Germandomains to Prussia. The Czar accepted the paper, which wascommunicated to him as approved by the King, but kept silence. 

A favorite amusement of the two emperors was playing with the Frencharmy. Napoleon delighted in the display of his condescension to themen, and in the exhibition of their enthusiastic affection for him. Their drill, their uniforms, the niceties of military ceremonial, thegorgeous drum-majors twirling their batons or marching in puffystate--every detail fascinated the Czar, whose house, saidCzartoryski, was affected with the disease of paradomania. 

[Illustration: Napoleon Exposition, 1895. 

NAPOLEON, by Ingres. 

From nature, during a mass at the Tuileries. Belonging to M. GermainBapst]

At an opportune moment on one of these reviewing expeditions, Napoleon, surrounded by all the splendors of his power, was approachedby a hurrying courier, who put into his hands despatches announcingthe overthrow of the Sultan Selim. "It is a decree of Providence, announcing the end of Ottoman empire!" he cried. Thenceforth he talkedincessantly of the Orient. As if inspired by prophetic fire, hesketched a missionary enterprise for the liberation and regenerationof Greece, and for the emancipation and reorganization of the landsand peoples on the Danube and in the Levant by distributing them amongenlightened sovereigns. It was language identical with that whichCatherine the Great employed to inspire her people and her descendantsfor Russia's policy. But the millennium must wait; for the present thebarbarous Turks must be driven back, not by force, but by a steady, continuous application of the policy thus outlined; the consummation, when reached, would be permanent. For the moment more immediate andpressing matters must be settled; when Alexander should pay hispromised visit to Paris they would have more abundant leisure todiscuss ulterior plans. These dazzling prospects were a part of theCzar's consideration. He promised in return to conclude a separatepeace with Turkey, which, in the absence of French support, he doubtednot he could make most favorable. But in case the Porte should proveobdurate, a provisional plan of partition was drawn up to indicateapproximately what Russia might expect. 

As the days passed, a routine life was gradually established. The twoemperors met privately in the morning, and chatted about everyconceivable point, pacing the floor or bending with heads touchingover the map of Europe to consider its coming divisions. Alexander hadsaid at the outset that his prejudice against Napoleon disappearedat first sight, and later he exclaimed, "Why did we not meet sooner?"He now repudiated any fondness whatever for the "legitimate" politicsof Europe; he had visited the Bourbon pretender, the so-called LouisXVIII, at Mittau, and had found him of no account; he even acceptedthe light suggestion of his new-found friend that the Russiancouncilor Budberg should have no share in the conferences, as beingpossibly too closely wedded to old ideas. "You be my secretary, " saidNapoleon, "and I will be yours. " In the afternoon the King of Prussia, with his staff, was generally invited to join their cavalcade for aride. The Emperor of the French gave in later years a maliciousaccount of these jaunts. Himself a fearless though awkward horseman, he spurred his charger to full speed, and the Czar followed with glee, while the King, as timid in the saddle as in the cabinet, jounced andbounced, often knocking Napoleon's arms with his elbows. The Frenchand Russian officers paired in good-fellowship, while the fewPrussians rode together. Constantine gathered Murat, Berthier, andGrouchy about him, and treating them on equal terms, displayed thestrongest proofs of his regard. The dinners which followed, thoughalways large and stately, were made short, for the emperors wished tobe alone as quickly and as long as possible. The Czar was full ofcuriosity. How did Napoleon win victories? How did he rule men? Whatwere his family relations? How did he regulate his inner life? TheEmperor was full of good humor: he told again and again the tale ofhis victories, and expounded the principles on which he had won them;he explained with candor and in detail the structure and workings ofhis administrative machine; he opened his heart, and told how itsstrings had been wrung by the death of the "Little Napoleon, " theeldest son of Queen Hortense. 

In such pleasant converse the hours of ease rolled swiftly by, andthen the work of negotiation began once more. Where differencesappeared, Napoleon evaded close discussion and passed to othermatters. Next morning early, the Czar would receive a carefullyworded, concise note on the points at issue, together with anargument. Sometimes he replied in writing, more frequently not. Whenthey met again, Napoleon sought, or appeared to seek, a compromise, and never in vain. The council of ministers, in which there was not asingle man of force except Talleyrand, received the conclusions fromtime to time, and elaborated the details. 

CHAPTER V

THE TREATY OF TILSIT[11]

 [Footnote 11: References as before. Further: Lefebvre: Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe. Tatistcheff: Alexandre Ier et Napoléon. Ranke: Hardenberg und die Geschichte des Preussischen Staates von 1793-1813. Pingaud: Les Français en Russie et les Russes en France. ]

 Two Equal Empires -- Central Europe and the Orient -- Prussia as a Second-rate Power -- The Grand Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Westphalia -- Napoleon and Frederick William -- Queen Louisa of Prussia -- The Meeting of Napoleon and Louisa -- Courtesy and Diplomacy -- The Bitterness of Disappointment -- The Last Plea -- Prussia's Humiliation -- The Parting of the Emperors -- Alexander's Disenchantment -- Napoleon's Gains and Losses. 

By such hitherto unknown simplicity and address diplomacy at Tilsitwas rendered most expeditious. The negotiations were complete, thetreaties drawn up, and the signatures affixed on July seventh. Therewere three different documents: a treaty of peace, a series of sevenseparate and secret articles, and a treaty of alliance. The firstpoint gained by Napoleon was the recognition of all his conquestsbefore 1805. The Czar admitted for the first time absolute equalitybetween the two empires, and recognized the limits of the Frenchsystem as it then existed: first, the Confederation of the Rhine, withany additions yet to be made; second, the kingdom of Italy, includingDalmatia; third, the vassalage of Holland, Berg, Naples, andSwitzerland. There was a verbal understanding, it is said, thatNapoleon might do as he liked in Spain and the Papal States, whilethe Czar should have the same liberty in regard to Finland. Subsequentevents attested the probability of this statement. To illustrateNapoleon's attitude toward the recent, but now dissolved alliance, Prussia was given to understand that she owed to Russia what remnantsof territory she retained; the stipulations with regard to her weretherefore included in the treaty with Russia. 

Still, there was to be a Prussia. Between the two great empires was tolie, in realization of a long-cherished plan, a girdle of neutralstates like the "marches" established by Charles the Great. In thisline Silesia was the only break. Prussia and Austria, one on each sideof this mark, shorn of their strength and prestige, might await theirdestiny. France was to mediate for peace between Russia and Turkey, Russia between England and France. In case Great Britain should notprove tractable, --that is, admit the sanctity of all flags on the highseas, and restore all the colonies of France and her allies capturedsince 1805, --then Russia, in common with France, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria, would declare commercial war on England, andcomplete the continental embargo on British trade. Should Turkeyrefuse favorable terms, the two empires would divide between them allher European lands except Rumelia and the district of Constantinople. Alexander afterward declared that Napoleon gave a verbal promise thatRussia should have a substantial increment on the Danube. The rumorwas that Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria were indicatedto the Czar as his share. 

No mention was made of Austria, which the treaty of Presburg hadsufficiently dismembered. But Prussia? In order to complete the great"march" between east and west, Silesia was essential. At firstNapoleon thought of combining it with Prussian Poland to form akingdom. This would not restore the real Poland, but it would create aPoland, and give him a Polish army. It was already decided that theElbe should form Frederick William's western frontier; to weaken hisstrength still further would destroy all balance between Prussia andAustria. Moreover, Alexander made a tender appeal, and adroitlysuggested a distasteful counter-proposition. Accordingly it wassettled that the great province should remain Prussian. This was alarge concession to the Czar. 

To make some pretense of fulfilling the lavish but indefinite promisesmade to the Poles, the lands of Warsaw and the province of Posen, witha considerable tract not now contained in it, were erected into thegrand duchy of Warsaw. Under the influence of historical reminiscencethis was given, not as a province but as a separate sovereignty to theElector of Saxony, who was simultaneously made king and a member ofthe Rhine Confederation. The Czar, in return for his cessions to thegrand duchy of Warsaw, received the Prussian district of Bielostok. Asa compensation for the Bocche di Cattaro and the Ionian Islands, Dantzic was restored to its position of a free city. The Prussianlands of the Elbe, together with Hesse-Cassel and many minor domains, were erected into the kingdom of Westphalia for the Emperor's brotherJerome. We have almost forgotten in our day how, less than a centuryago, Germany was divided into insignificant fragments. It isinstructive to recall that the formation of this new kingdombeneficently ended the separate existence of no fewer than twenty-fourmore or less autonomous powers--electorates, duchies, counties, bishoprics, and cities. It contained the all-important fortress ofMagdeburg, the possession of whose frowning walls carried with it thecommand of the Elbe, and virtually made Prussia a conquered andtributary state. 

This seemed to Frederick William the climax of his misfortunes. He haddaily information from the Czar of what was under consideration, andthe rescue of Silesia by his mediator gave him high hopes for thepreservation of Magdeburg. But his poor-spirited behavior wearied evenAlexander, who, willing at the outset to atone for desertion byintervention, became toward the end very cold. When the King desiredpermission to plead in person for Magdeburg, Napoleon refused. ThePrussian case might be presented by counsel. Goltz was speedilysummoned to the task, but though he was always about to have aninterview with the French emperor, he never secured it. 

It was at this crisis of Prussia's affairs that the King, after muchurging, consented to summon his Queen. The rumors and insinuationsconcerning the Czar's undue admiration of her, so industriously spreadby Napoleon, had made him over-sensitive; but as a last resort he feltthe need of her presence. She came with a single idea--to make thecause of Magdeburg her own. She had suffered under the maliciousinnuendos of Napoleon regarding her character; she had shared thedisgrace of the Berlin war party in the crushing defeat at Jena andAuerstädt; she had been a wayfarer among a disgraced and helplesspeople; but her spirit was not broken, and she announced her visitwith all the dignity of her station. The court carriage in which shedrove, accompanied by her ladies in waiting, reached Tilsit on Julysixth, and drew up before the door of the humble miller under whoseroof were the rooms of her husband. Officers and statesmen weregathered to receive and encourage her with good advice; but she wavedthem away with an earnest call for quiet, so that she might collecther ideas. 

In a moment Napoleon was announced. As he climbed the narrow stairwayshe rose to meet him. Friend and foe agree as to her beauty, hertaste, and her manners; her presence, in a white dress embroideredwith silver, and with a pearl diadem on her brow, was queenly. In herhusband's apartments she was the hostess, and as such she apologizedfor the stair. "What would one not do for such an end!" gallantlyreplied the somewhat dazzled conqueror. The suppliant, after making afew respectful inquiries as to her visitor's welfare, and the effectof the Northern climate on his health, at once announced the object ofher visit. Her manner was full of pathos and there were tears in hereyes as she recalled how her country had been punished for its appealto arms, and for its mistaken confidence in the traditions of thegreat Frederick and his glory. The Emperor was abashed by the loftystrain of her address. So elevated was her mien that she overpoweredhim; for the instant his self-assurance fled, and he felt himself buta man of the people. He felt also the humiliation of the contrast, andwas angry. Long afterward he confessed that she was mistress of theconversation, adding that she stood with her head thrown back likeMlle. Duchesnois in the character of Chimène, meaning by thiscomparison to stigmatize her attitude and language as theatrical. Soeffective was her appeal that he felt the need of something to savehis own rôle, and accordingly he bowed her to a chair, and in themoment thus gained determined to strike the key of high comedy. Takingup the conversation in turn, he scrutinized the beauties of herperson, and, complimenting her dress, asked whether the material wascrape or India gauze. "Shall we talk of rags at such a solemn moment?"she retorted; and then proceeded with her direct plea for Magdeburg. In the midst of her eloquence, when the Emperor seemed almostovercome by her importunity, her meddling husband most inopportunelyentered the room. He began to argue and reason, citing his threadbaregrievance, the violation of Ansbach territory, and endeavoring toprove himself to be right. Napoleon at once turned the conversation toindifferent themes, and in a few moments took his leave. "You askmuch, " he said to the Queen on parting; "but I promise to think itover. " The courageous woman had done her best, but her cause--if, indeed, it was ever in the balance--was lost from the moment she puther judge in an inferior position. Her majestic bearing was fine, butit was not diplomacy. She might, nevertheless, have succeeded had shebeen the wife of a wiser man. Long afterward Napoleon thought herinfluence on the negotiations would have been considerable if she hadappeared in their earlier stages, and congratulated himself that shecame too late, inasmuch as they were already virtually closed when shearrived. 

The remainder of the day passed for the Queen in a whirl ofexcitement, receiving messengers from Napoleon with the pardons ofPrussian prisoners and accepting polite attentions from his adjutants. She gladly consented to dine with Napoleon, and Berthier was chosen toescort her to his Emperor's lodging. On arrival she was received withdistinction, and assigned at table to the seat of honor between thehost and the Czar. The Emperor was all politeness, offering unwelcomeconsolations to Frederick William, and expressing astonishment at theQueen's courage. "Did you know my hussars nearly captured you?" hesaid to her. "I can scarcely believe it, sire, " was the reply; "I didnot see a single Frenchman. " "But why expose yourself thus? Why didyou not wait for me at Weimar?" "Indeed, sire, I was not eager. "There is a tradition that Talleyrand, whose work the treaty reallywas, grew anxious and whispered to Napoleon later in the evening thatsurely he would not surrender the benefits of his greatest conquestfor the sake of a pretty woman. Whether this admonition was given ornot, the Emperor was respectful and polite, but non-committal. Afterdinner he conversed long with his fair guest. To her lady in waiting, the Countess Voss, he offered snuff--a singular mark of condescension. Next day, in a note to Josephine, he said that he had been compelledcontinually to stand on his guard; and the day following, July eighth, he again wrote to his Empress: "The Queen is really charming, usingevery art to please me; but be not jealous: I am like a waxed clothfrom which all that glides off. It would cost me too much to play thegallant. " The Emperor's courtesy had deceived the poor Queen entirely, and she is said to have returned to her husband's lodgings atPiktupönen in the highest spirits. 

On that very night, immediately after the dinner, the step she so muchdreaded was taken, and orders were given to conclude the treaty as itstood. At the last hour Goltz secured his interview to plead theexpectations awakened in the Queen, but the Emperor coldly explainedthat his conduct had been politeness, and nothing more; the house ofPrussia might be glad to recover a crown at all. Talleyrand showed acompleted and final draft of the treaty ready for signature, and saidthat his master was in haste, that in two days the documents would besigned. This was the news which greeted Louisa next morning. Shereturned at once to Tilsit, her eyes swollen with weeping; but sheappeared in a stately dress, and with a smile on her lips. Again shewas the object of the most distinguished courtesy from Napoleon'sadjutants, but the expected visit from himself was not made. However, she was again the Emperor's honored guest at dinner. The host at oncebegan to speak of her costume. "What, the Queen of Prussia with aturban! Surely not to gratify the Emperor of Russia, who is at warwith the Turks!" "Rather, I think, " replied the Queen, "to propitiateRustan, " rolling her large, full eyes toward the swarthy Mamelukebehind his master's chair. She had the air, according to Napoleon'saccount, of an offended coquette. After the meal it was Murat who tookthe part filled the previous evening by the Emperor. "How does yourMajesty pass the time at Memel?" "In reading. " "What does your Majestyread?" "The history of the past. " "But our own times afford actionsworthy of commemoration. " "It is already more than I can endure tolive in them. "

Before parting, Napoleon spent a few moments at her side, and at theend, turning, pulled from a bunch a beautiful rose, which he offeredwith gestures of gallantry and homage. Hesitating a moment, the Queenat last put out her hand, and said as she accepted it, "At least withMagdeburg. " "Madame, " came the frigid reply, "it is mine to give andyours to accept. " But he gave his arm to conduct her to the carriage, and as they descended the stair together the disappointed guest said, in a sentimental and emotional voice, "Is it possible that, having hadthe happiness to see so near the man of the century and of allhistory, he will not afford me the possibility and the satisfaction ofbeing able to assure him that he has put me under obligations forlife?" With solemn tones Napoleon replied, "Madame, I am to be pitied;it is a fault of my unlucky star. " Queen Louisa's own lady in waitingrelated that her sovereign's bitterness overcame her at the last, andas she stepped into the carriage she said, "Sire, you have cruellydeceived me. " It is certain that next day she overwhelmed Duroc withreproaches; but she afterward frankly confessed that she could recallno definite promise made by Napoleon. To Talleyrand she said, withfine sarcasm, that only two persons regretted her having come toTilsit--he and she. Her duty, she believed, as a loving wife, as atender mother, as the queen of her people, was fulfilled; but herheart was broken. Queen Mary of England said of the loss of Calais, "Should they open my heart, they will find the name of Calaisinscribed in bloody letters within. " Queen Louisa patheticallyrecalled this moan; she could say the same of Magdeburg. 

The treaty with Prussia, signed two days later, did not modify in theleast the terms arranged with Alexander, and for six years thatcountry remained in a mutilated and conquered condition, compelled toobey with outward respect the behests of Napoleon. Every domain shehad owned west of the Elbe went to the kingdom of Westphalia, thecircle of Kottbus went to Saxony, the Polish provinces of southPrussia and new east Prussia to the grand duchy of Warsaw, the circleof Bielostok to Russia. Napoleon is said to have urged the Czar toseize Memel and the strip of Prussian land east of the Niemen; butthis is denied, and in any case, Alexander, desiring to be at peacewith his neighbor, firmly refused; moreover, he verbally stipulatedfor the evacuation of the Hohenzollern lands by French troops at anearly date. Nominally, therefore, the King of Prussia regainedsovereignty over less than half of his former territory. For thisconsideration he was to pay an indefinite but enormous and almostimpossible indemnity, which was to cover the total cost of the war. Toguarantee this a large portion of the French army was, in spite ofAlexander's demand, still left quartered in the Hohenzollern lands, sothat the Prussian people were daily reminded of their disgrace, aswell as irritated by extortionate taxation. First and last, the warcost Prussia, in the support of the French army and in actualcontributions to France, over a billion of francs--about the grossnational income of thirteen years. The process of Prussianconsolidation begun three years before was thus hastened. What Pozzodi Borgo called a masterpiece of destruction turned out in the end tobe the beginning of a new birth for the nation. But the royal pairwere stricken down: the high-souled Queen died, three years later, ofchagrin; the King lived to see his people strong once more, but in asort of obstructing stupor, being always an uncompromisingconservative. When he died, in 1840, he left to his successor a legacyof smothered popular discontent. 

The treaties of Tilsit between France and Russia were signed, as wassaid, on July seventh. The principal personages engaged on both sidesin this grand scene of reconciliation were on that day reciprocallydecorated with the orders of the respective courts, while the imperialguards of both emperors received food and drink for a great festivity. Next day Napoleon paid his farewell visit. At his morning toilet hehad his valet loosen the threads which fastened the cross of theLegion of Honor to his coat, and as the Czar advanced to meet him heasked in audible tones permission to decorate the first grenadier ofRussia. A veteran named Lazaref was summoned from the ranks, and witha wrench the Emperor tore off his cross, and fastened it on the breastof the peasant. The welkin rang with applause, while Lazaref kissedhis benefactor's hands and the hem of his coat. Next day Alexandercrossed the Niemen. Savary went with him as a French envoy, partly tokeep up the Czar's courage and spirits, which would be endangered bythe sullen humor of the court circles in St. Petersburg, partly tostudy the temper of the Russian people. 

To the last moment of their intercourse the Czar appeared to be underthe spell of Napoleon's seductive powers. He came as a conqueredprince; he left with an honorable peace, with the friendship of hismagnanimous conqueror, and with an unsmirched imperial dignity. He hadsaved his recent ally from destruction, and had secured a smallincrease of territory for himself; for the future there were Finlandand the fairest portion of Turkey. But in a few days the magic beganto pass. He had not secured Constantinople, and he had promised toevacuate Wallachia and Moldavia; he had not secured the completeevacuation of Prussia; he had risked a rupture with England; he had, above all, submitted to the creation of a state which, under the thindisguise of another name, was but the germ of a reconstructed Poland. It began to appear as if he had been wheedled. There is sufficientevidence that such bitter reflections made their appearance very soon;but they were repressed, at first from pure shame, and afterward fromstern necessity, when England began to vent her anger. But theRussians themselves could not be repressed. Before long Savary washated and abused by the public, the more because he maintained hisascendancy over the Czar. The reports sent home by the former policeagent were clever and instructive, but their pictures of factionaldisputes and Oriental plots at court, of aristocratic luxury andgeneral poverty, of popular superstition and barbarous manners, werenot reassuring, and confirmed in his Emperor's mind doubts felt fromthe beginning as to the stability of the alliance consummated atTilsit, an alliance outwardly fair, but, like all Talleyrand'sdiplomacy, more showy than substantial. [12]

 [Footnote 12: For an interesting comment on Talleyrand's diplomacy, see Sorel: L'Europe et la Révolution Française, Vol. VI, pp. 23-25. ]

Napoleon left for Königsberg the same day on which he bade adieu toAlexander. His route was by way of Dresden. He was not in theslightest degree deceived. The peace of Europe, he said, was in St. Petersburg; the affairs of the world were there. But he had gainedmuch. The outposts of his empire were established, and from one ofthem he could touch with his hand the enchanted East. He had securedthe temporary coöperation of Russia, and with that as a beginning hemight consolidate the Continent against England, and complete thestage in his progress now gained. Above all, he could at once restorethe confidence of France by the proclamation of peace and theupbuilding of her prosperity. To be sure, he had forecast a divisionof his prospective Eastern empire with Russia, he had left Prussiaoutraged and bleeding, and Austria was uneasy and suspiciouslyreserved; but he had checkmated them all in the menace of a restoredPoland, while their financial weakness and military exhaustion, combined with the reciprocal jealousies of their dynasties, might berelied on to prevent their immediate hostility. Besides, while he hadsung a certain tune at Tilsit, in the future he would, as hesarcastically said somewhat later, have to sing it only according tothe written score. 

CHAPTER VI

THE PATH OF NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE[13]

 [Footnote 13: References: Jauffret: Mémoires historiques sur les affaires ecclésiastiques de France pendant les premières années du XIXe siècle. Thorsoë: Den danske Statspolitiske Historie 1800-1864. Lemoine: Napoléon et les Juifs. Lémann: Napoléon et les Israélites; La prépondérance juive. ]

 Napoleon and the Neutral Powers -- The Protectorate of Portugal and the End of Etruria -- Annexation of the Papal Legations -- Seizure of the Danish Fleet by Great Britain -- The Degradation of Spain -- Godoy's Impolicy -- The Spanish Court and the Heir Apparent -- Effects of the Russian Alliance in Paris -- Napoleon's Commentary on the Treaty -- His Administrative Wisdom -- Public Works in France -- The Jews in France -- The Sanhedrim -- Napoleon's Successful Reforms -- War Indemnities and Finance -- Annoyances of the Continental System. 

But in order to fulfil the purposes and realize the possibilitieswhich were indicated in the treaties of Tilsit, no time was to belost. The fate of Sweden and the Hanse towns having been virtuallysettled, there remained three small maritime states in Europe whichstill maintained a nominal neutrality--Denmark, Portugal, and Etruria. One and all, they must choose between England and France. To each asummons was to be addressed, and Napoleon wrote the preliminarydirections at Dresden. Between the lines of his despatches it wasclear that the precious naval armaments of all three powers--ships, arsenals, stores, and men--must be put at the disposal of France. "Athing must needs be done before the announcement of your plan, " wasone of Napoleon's own principles, and it was his intention so toproceed in this case. At Dresden, also, was promulgated the newconstitution of Warsaw. Modeled on that of France, it was far fromliberal; but it abolished serfdom, made all citizens equal before thelaw, and introduced the civil code. 

In 1804 Portugal had purchased her neutrality for the duration of thewar with the sum of sixteen million francs. She was now ordered toclose her ports to the British, to seize all their goods and ships, and finally to declare war against Great Britain. Junot, formerlyimperial ambassador at Lisbon, was despatched with twenty-seventhousand men, designated as a "corps of observation, " to be ready onthe frontier to enforce the command. In reply, England seized thePortuguese fleet, and kept it in security until the close of the war. During the late campaigns in Poland and Prussia, King Louis of Etruriahad died, and his helpless widow, the Spanish infanta, Maria Louisa, acting as regent for her young son, had admitted the English to theharbor of Leghorn. Prince Eugène was now ordered to take another"corps of observation" of six thousand men, and drive them out. He didso promptly. Duroc at once suggested to the Spanish minister thatNapoleon would like some proposition for the indemnification of MariaLouisa for the loss of Etruria--say one portion of Portugal for her, and the rest for Godoy, the Prince of the Peace. 

This "deformity" removed from the Italian peninsula, it revealed astill greater one--the fact that the Papal States disturbed theconnection between the two kingdoms of Italy and Naples. Pius VII, returning disillusioned and embittered after the coronation ceremony, and finding that his temporal weapons had failed him, had taken astand with his spiritual armor. It has already been recalled that hebegan to refuse everything Napoleon desired, --the coronation asWestern emperor, the extension of the Concordat to Venice, theconfirmation of bishops appointed in France and Italy by the temporalpower, the annulment of Jerome's marriage, the recognition of Joseph'sroyalty, --except in return for a guarantee of his own independence andneutrality; in short, he feebly abjured the French alliance and allits works. There now came a demand from Napoleon that henceforth thereshould be as many French cardinals as Roman, that the agents ofhostile powers should be banished from the Papal States, and that thepapal ports should be closed to England. The Emperor was weary, too, of the petty squabbles in connection with the Church, of the threatsto excommunicate him and declare his throne vacant. Did they mean toput him in a convent and whip him like Louis the Pious? If not, letthe full powers of an ambassador be sent to the cardinal legate atParis; in any case, let there be an end to menaces. At the same timeEugène showed to Pius a personal letter from his stepfather, which, though marked confidential, was intended to be thus shown. Itcontained the threat that the Emperor contemplated calling a councilof the Gallican, Italian, German, and Polish churches to liberatethose peoples from the domination of Roman priests. The Pontiff wasterrified, and hastened to yield the most pressing demands made in themessage which he had himself received, among them the nomination of anegotiator. But he childishly refused the letter of the Emperor'sdemand, and commissioned, not the French cardinal legate at Paris, butan Italian cardinal. Napoleon notified the See that he would treatonly with Bayanne, the French cardinal at Paris, and that longerdallying would compel him to annex Ancona, Urbino, and Macerata tothe kingdom of Italy. Pius yielded at once, nominating Bayanne, agreeing to enter the federation with France, and promising to crownNapoleon; but the annexation took place quite as expeditiously as thesurrender--was, in fact, complete before it!

Of the three minor sea powers, Denmark, commanding as she did thegateway of the Baltic, was far the most important. Bernadotte wasalready on her borders with an army. She was notified by him that shemust declare war against England immediately, or lose all hercontinental possessions. Her government promised to obey, butprocrastinated. It has been claimed that English spies at Tilsit hadcaught scraps of the bargain contained in the secret articles, andthat the Portland cabinet, in which Canning was secretary for foreignaffairs and Castlereagh for war and the colonies, had divined therest. It is now known that Canning believed there were no secretarticles, but was convinced that the two emperors had reached a secretunderstanding hostile to England. [14] During the summer the ministryreceived what they called the most positive information--what was itsextent and how it was obtained have never been made known--that theFrench intended to invade Holstein and force Denmark to close theSound to British commerce. The danger seemed imminent: the Danishfleet contained no fewer than twenty ships of the line, eighteenfrigates, nine brigs, and a number of gunboats. Such a reinforcementof the French navy would put it again on a war footing. The Englishministry, therefore, offered to defend Denmark, guarantee hercolonies, and give her every means of defense, naval, military, pecuniary, if only she would surrender her fleet to England, to berestored in the event of peace. The Danish regent was alreadycommitted to France, and did not accept. Accordingly the English armyunder Cathcart landed, and laid siege to Copenhagen, while the fleetbombarded it for three days, until the government agreed to theirstipulations. This shameful deed of high-handed violence must be laidat Canning's door. It was the first step in the humiliation of a finepeople, to their loss of Norway, and ultimately of Schleswig andHolstein. Moreover, it was impolitic in the highest degree, making theCzar a bitter enemy of England for four years. The wretched country, in distraction, threw itself into the arms of Bernadotte. ChristianVII had long been an imbecile, and his son, Frederick VI, thoughenergetic and well-meaning, turned Denmark into another vassal stateof France by the treaty of Fontainebleau, signed October thirtieth, 1807. 

 [Footnote 14: See discussion of this question by J. H. Rose, "A British Agent at Tilsit, " in English Historical Review, Oct. , 1901. ]

In none of their many sovereignties had the incapacity of the Bourbonsbeen more completely demonstrated than in Spain. With intermittentflickerings, the light of that famous land had been steadily growingdimmer ever since Louis XIV exultingly declared that the Pyrenees hadceased to exist. Stripped of her colonial supremacy, shattered innaval power, reduced to pay tribute to France, she looked silently onwhile Napoleon trafficked with her lands, mourning that even thememory of her former glories was fading out in foreign countries. Theproud people themselves had, however, never forgotten their past; witheach successive humiliation their irritation grew more extreme, andsoon after Trafalgar they made an effort to organize under the crownprince against the scandalous régime of Godoy. Both parties soughtFrench support, and the quarrel was fomented from Paris until thewhole country was torn by the most serious dissensions. 

When, in the previous year, Prussia declared war, and the Frenchlegions were about to face those trained in the school of Frederickthe Great, a vigorous attempt was made by the Russian envoy in Madridto win the support of Spain for the coalition. England, too, at thesame moment, threatened to make the South American coloniesindependent if she did not consent. Godoy was persuaded that Napoleonhad at last found his match, if not his master, and on Octoberfourteenth issued a manifesto couched for the most part in ambiguousterms, but clearly announcing war as an immediate necessity. By astrange coincidence, its date was that of the day on which was foughtthe battle of Jena, and after hearing the news of that event thePrince of the Peace hastened to make his submission in the name of theKing. Napoleon turned pale as he read the news of the contemplateddefection, which reached him at Berlin; he never forgave thetreachery, although for the time he feigned ignorance of itsexistence. The renewal of Charles IV's submission gave him theopportunity to demand that the Spanish fleet should proceed to Toulon, that the King should send fifteen thousand men to oppose a possibleEnglish landing at the mouth of the Elbe, and at the same timeundertake the sustenance of twenty-five thousand Prussian prisoners ofwar, while thenceforward he must rigidly enforce the embargo onEnglish trade in all Spanish ports and markets. 

These demands the weak and contemptible government could not resist. Godoy and the Queen resumed their scandalous living, while the Kingjoined in a conspiracy to cut off his son Ferdinand from thesuccession. The young prince had the people's sympathy; but althoughhe had sought Napoleon's favor, and wished to marry the EmpressJosephine's niece, there was no response, and he remained impotentbefore an administration apparently supported by France. He was, inthe sequel, arrested on a charge of conspiring against his father'slife. Before the summer of 1807 closed, everything was ripe forNapoleon's contemplated intervention to "regenerate" Spain. 

Such was the harvest of Tilsit in the field of foreign relations--aharvest which to the last the Emperor claimed that Talleyrand hadsown. As to its effect in France, Metternich, then Austrian ambassadorin Paris, declared that men sat in the cafés coldly discussing anentire reconstruction of Europe--two empires, and seventeen newkingdoms with new sovereigns either from or in the interest of theimperial houses! "Rhapsodies, " he said, "which proved that all Europemight crumble without exciting a single emotion of sorrow, astonishment, or satisfaction in a people degraded beneath all others, beneath all imagination, and which, worn out, demoralized to the pointwhere every trace of even national feeling is wiped out, by nineteenyears of revolution and crimes, now looks on with cold-bloodedindifference at what is passing beyond its own frontiers. Wise menthink that the treaties, being as advantageous to Russia as to France, necessarily contain a germ which in developing will prove dangerous tothe latter. " In reality there was not now a state in Europe towardwhich the French empire did not stand in strained relations, not anationality besides the French which did not feel its self-respectwounded, and resent the abasement. 

This, however, was not the panorama which the Emperor unfolded inParis. He reached St. Cloud quietly on the evening of Julytwenty-seventh. The people of Paris learned the news incidentally, andburst into spontaneous rejoicings, illuminating the city, and sendingaddresses in which the terms of adulation were exhausted. Napoleon wasno longer an actor in merely human history: he was a man of theheroic age; he was beyond admiration; nothing but love could rise tohis lofty place. On August sixteenth the Emperor opened thelegislature in person. "Since your last session, " he said, "new wars, new triumphs, new treaties, have changed the face of Europe. " If thehouse of Brandenburg still reigned, he continued, it was due to thesincere friendship he felt for the Czar. A French prince would rule onthe Elbe, and would know how to conciliate his subjects, while evermindful of his most sacred duties. Saxony had recovered herindependence, the peoples of Dantzic and the duchy of Warsaw theircountry and their rights. All nations rejoiced to see the direfulinfluence of England destroyed. France was united to the Confederationof the Rhine by its laws, by the federative system to the countries ofHolland, Switzerland, and Italy; her new relations with Russia werecemented by reciprocal esteem. In all this, he affirmed, his pole-starhad been the happiness of his people, dearer to him than his ownglory. He would like maritime peace, and for its sake would overlookthe exasperations caused by a people tossed and torn by party strife. Whatever happened, he would be worthy of his people, as they had shownthemselves to be worthy of him. Their behavior in his absence had onlyincreased his esteem for their character. He had thought of severalmeasures to simplify and perfect their institutions. 

This picture of martial and political renown, painted by a master whohad on one campaign changed the meaning of his title from itsprimitive sense of military ruler to its later and grander one ofchief among and over princes, thus realizing the revival of theWestern Empire, could not but please the fancy and arouse theenthusiasm of a generous, imaginative, forgiving people. Theimpression was heightened by their Emperor's activity in keeping faithas to their own prosperity. As after Austerlitz, his first care wasnow finance. The new commercial code was promulgated, and it provedscarcely less satisfactory to the merchants than the civil code hadbeen to the people at large. The Bank of France was immediatelycompelled to lower its rate of discount, and a council was held toconsider how Italy and the Rhine Confederation could be made tributaryto French industry and commerce. Recourse was also had to thosemeasures of internal development by the execution of great publicworks which had been begun after Austerlitz, but were suspended beforeJena. 

Before the last campaign the Emperor and Empress had been accustomedto visit various portions of France. During every halt the Emperorwould mount his horse, and, attended occasionally by one or more ofthe local officials, but usually only by Rustan or an adjutant, wouldgallop hither and thither, gathering information, examiningconditions, and making suggestions. Immediately afterward he wouldthrow off a sketch of needed improvements: public buildings, almshouses, roads, canals, aqueducts, town streets, mountainroads--anything, in short, which would arouse local enthusiasm andbenefit the country at large. Many--most, perhaps--of these schemesremained inchoate; but many of the grandest were executed, andNapoleon has left his impress as indelibly upon France itself as uponits society. The routes of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, the greatcanals which bind together the river systems, the restoration of thecathedral at St. Denis, the quays of the Seine in Paris, the greatTriumphal Arch, the Vendôme Column, the Street of Peace, the Street ofRivoli, the bridges of Austerlitz, Jena, and the Arts--these are someof the magnificent enterprises due to his initiative. Such works werepushed throughout the summer of 1807 by employing large numbers oflaborers and artisans, while local workshops were opened in everydepartment to furnish employment to all who could not otherwise findit. The political economist may lift his eyebrows and shrug hisshoulders in contemplating such shifts; but they were imperial shifts, and created a high degree of comfort at the time, while they satisfiedin permanency that passion for beauty in utility which does notsufficiently enter as an element into economic science. 

Closely connected with this policy was a measure of Napoleon's alreadyreferred to, but little known. In some respects it was more successfulthan any other; it certainly is most characteristic of the man. Theevil aimed at was cured at the time, and the permanent question isless acute in modern France than in any other European country. Foryears past there had been chronic distress among the agriculturalclasses in some of the most fertile districts of France, notably inthe northeast. This was attributed to the presence of Jews in largenumbers. The stringent laws of the old régime had crowded thatunfortunate people out of all occupations but two--peddling andmoney-lending. In both of these they became experts, and whenemancipated by the Revolution they used their liberty, not to widentheir activities, but to intensify the evils of the monopoly whichthey had secured. Since 1791 large numbers of Polish and German Jewshad established themselves on the right bank of the Rhine; andreaching hands across that stream to their kinsfolk on the left bank, they combined to strip the French peasantry by the familiar arts ofbarter and usury, which need not be described here, until in a fewyears they were creditors to the extent of twenty-three millionfrancs, and had become extensive landed proprietors. They were neverseen to labor with their hands, and having no family name, they evadedthe conscription laws with impunity, while the courts of justicebecame their humble servants in enforcing the collection of scandalousdebts or in the foreclosure of inflated mortgages. 

In 1806 a temporary decree had suspended all legal executions incertain districts, and many Jews of the better class made ready to bowbefore the coming tempest and come to the assistance of thegovernment. Napoleon, aware that the Old Testament law was civil andpolitical as well as religious, shrewdly asked advice from these andother men of the more enlightened sort. It was agreed to call acouncil. The Emperor summoned his prefects to name its members, andappointed a committee to represent the government at its sessions. Decisions taken by this assembly were to be submitted to a generalSanhedrim of all Europe. The assembly of French Israelites met inParis during the latter part of 1806, and after due deliberation gavesatisfactory answers to a carefully prepared set of questionspropounded by the government commission. In 1807 the economicsituation had nevertheless become graver. The Sanhedrim met early inFebruary. Its members vied in flattery with the Roman priesthood, setting the imperial eagle above the ark of the covenant, and blendingthe letters N and J with those of the Jehovah in a monogram for theadornment of their meeting-place. On March fourth they issued a decreewhich is still the basis of religious instruction among Jewish youth. They forbade polygamy, and admitted the principle of civil marriagewithout anathema; they ordered all Israelites to treat those whobelieve that God is the Creator of heaven and earth as fellow-citizensand brothers; to obey the civil and military laws, including that ofconscription, and to train their children to industry and handiwork;they also invited them to enter the learned professions, and to attachthemselves to the country by the purchase of public obligations. Usurywas absolutely forbidden, the Israelite being enjoined as a religiousprecept to make no distinction in money transactions between Hebrewand Christian. The minutest details of the whole transaction wereforeseen and regulated by Napoleon, and may be studied in hiscorrespondence with his ministers. 

A year later, after careful and mature deliberation, there appeared animperial decree, not only organizing the Jewish Church and regulatingits relations with the state, but defining the civil and politicalstatus of Hebrews. They were pronounced to be citizens like other men;but they could not exact higher interest than five per cent. , while ifthey should demand over ten they should be punished for usury. EveryJew in the northeastern department must have a license to do business, and a notarial authorization for pawnbrokerage. Any Jew not domiciledat the moment in Alsace might not thereafter acquire domicile in thatdepartment, and could do so in others only by becoming a landowner andtilling the soil. Every Jew should be liable to military service, and, unlike his Christian fellow-citizens might not provide a substitute;moreover, he must adopt and use a family name. This stringent law wasrigidly enforced, except in Bordeaux, the Gironde, and the Landes, where no offense had been given. Its effect was steady and sure. Before long, first one and then another Israelite was exempted fromits rigors, until finally, in 1812, the department or the man stillsubject to its provisions was the exception and not the rule. Fromthat day to this there has scarcely been in France what is knownelsewhere as the Jewish question. Hebrews are found in every line ofhuman activity; they have the same civil, political, and religiousstanding as men of other blood and confessions; they are illustriousin finance, in politics, in science, and in the arts. They are, moreover, passionate patriots, and to the casual observer scarcelydistinguishable in mien and appearance from other citizens. Thetemporary contravention of the civil code, both as to spirit andletter, by the notorious decree above referred to has been sobeneficent that it has for the most part escaped any criticism or evenremark. [15]

 [Footnote 15: See Lemoine: Napoléon et les Juifs. ]

While in ways like these the clutch of the usurer was relaxed and thegeneral well-being promoted, measures were taken to crown the work bya stable system of finance. It will be recalled that two years beforethe Emperor had saved the public credit by the direct expenditure ofthe Austrian war indemnity. It was his fixed principle that Franceshould not pay for his wars, except with her children. He knew toowell the thrift of the whole nation and the greed of the lower classesto jeopardize their good will either by the emission of paper money orby the increase of tax rates. The panic of 1805 had been precipitatedby the virtual failure of a bankers' syndicate which made advances tothe government on its taxes and on the annual Spanish contribution aswell. In 1807 the war indemnity exacted from Prussia, Poland, andWestphalia was used for a double purpose, the creation of two funds:one to furnish an immediate supply of cash on the outbreak of war, theother to replace the bankers' syndicate by making advances on thetaxes whenever required. There was therefore no increase in the rateof taxation, work was abundant, and under the forcing process thewheels were moving in almost every department of trade and industry. The price of the imperial bonds on the Bourse rose to ninety-nine, aprice never afterward reached in Napoleon's day. 

There was one sharp pinch. Coffee and sugar were no longer luxuries, but necessities; and through the continental embargo colonial wareshad become, and were likely to remain, very dear and very scarce. Suchsubstitutes as ingenuity could devise were gradually accepted for theformer; to provide the latter the beet-root industry was fostered byevery means. The Emperor kept a sample of sugar made from beets on hischimney-piece as an ornament, and occasionally sent gifts of theprecious commodity to his fellow-sovereigns. The story is told that anofficial who had been banished from favor recovered his standingentirely by planting a whole estate with beets. Such traits wereconsidered evidence of plain, homely common sense by the people, whoenjoyed the sensation that their Emperor shared their feelings andparticipated in their daily shifts. 

CHAPTER VII

THE NEW FEUDALISM[16]

 [Footnote 16: See Blanc: Napoléon Ier. Taine: Le régime moderne. Pasquier: Mémoires, Histoire de mon temps. Méneval: Napoléon et Marie-Louise. V^te de Broc: La vie en France sous le premier empire. Metternich: Mémoires. Mme. De Rémusat: Mémoires. ]

 Imperial France -- The Aristocracy -- The Vassal Sovereigns -- Suppression of the Tribunate -- The Right of Entail -- Evasions of Law -- The New Nobility -- Titles and Emoluments -- Style in the First Empire -- Theory of the University -- Its Establishment -- The Lycées -- Effects of the System -- Regulation of the Court -- The Emperor's Moods -- Matrimonial Alliances with Royalty -- Gloom at Court -- Decline of Talleyrand's Influence -- His New Rôle. 

[Sidenote: 1807-08]

It was not long before the people of Paris and of all France were inthe best possible humor; they were busy, they were clothed, they werefed, they were making and saving money. With every hour grew thefeeling that their unity and strength were embodied in the Emperor. Mme. De Rémusat was tired of his ill-breeding: it shocked her toobserve his coarse familiarity, to see him sit on a favorite's knee, or twist a bystander's ear till it was afire; to hear him sowdissension among families by coarse innuendo, and to see him crushsociety that he might rule it. But such things would not have shockedthe masses of plain burgher Frenchmen at all. When the querulous ladyopened her troubles to the sympathetic Talleyrand, and bemoaned thesad fate which kept her at the imperial court to gain a living, hisreply was not consoling. As time passed, the gulf between the rulerand his venal but soft-spoken minister had been widening, and thePrince of Benevento had oftentimes to hear taunts and reproaches inscenes of such violence as were unsuspected even by the complaininglady in waiting. But nevertheless Talleyrand replied to her thatNapoleon still stood for the unity of France, and it was both his andher duty to endure and support their monarch. 

No doubt the Emperor was perfectly aware of the situation. But he feltthat what was a new aristocracy in truth, though not yet so in name, must be appeased as well as the people. He was furious at times withthe venality of his associates. Talleyrand once admitted that he hadtaken sixty millions from various German princes. Masséna, Augereau, Brune, and Junot were not so colossal in their greed, but they wereequally ill-disposed, and very successful in lining their coffers. With Talleyrand Napoleon never joked; but when he wished to give awarning to the others he drew a bill for some enormous sum on one orother of them, and deposited it with a banker. There is no evidencethat such a draft was ever dishonored. On one occasion Massénadisgorged two millions of francs in this way. Of the ancient nobilitythe Emperor once said, with a sneer: "I offered them rank in my army, they declined the service. I opened my antechambers to them, theyrushed in and filled them. " To this sweeping statement there were manynoteworthy exceptions, but on the whole Napoleon never classed theestate of the French nobles lower than they deserved. Still they had apower which he recognized, and it was with a sort of grim humor thathe began to distribute honors and the sops of patronage among both theold and the new aristocracy--a process which only made the latterindependent and failed to win the affections of the former. 

It was in the hope of securing the good will of the ancient nobilitythat he took two steps radical in their direct negation ofRevolutionary principles: the destruction of the tribunate and therestoration of the right of entail. The connection between the twolies in the tendency of both: merging tribunate and legislature madeit easy to substitute for an elective senate a hereditary house oflords. Feeling himself sufficiently strong, Napoleon clearly intendedto gratify in others the weak human pride which, as Montesquieu says, desires the eternity of a name, and thereby to erect a four-squarefoundation for the perpetuity of his own dynasty. The brothers Joseph, Louis, and Jerome were now no longer Bonapartes, but Napoleons, rulingas Joseph Napoleon, Louis Napoleon, Jerome Napoleon, over theirrespective fiefs. Murat, the brother-in-law, was already provided forin the same way, and there were three reigning princes among thesatellites of the imperial throne. All these could transmit their nameand dominions in the line of hereditary succession. It may be read inthe "Moniteur" of July, 1810, that, in whatever position they wereplaced by Napoleon's politics and the interest of his empire, theirfirst duty was to him, their second to France. "All your other duties, even those to the people I may intrust to you, are only secondary. "

Ten years earlier General Bonaparte had declared that what the Frenchwanted was glory and the gratification of their vanity; of liberty, hesaid, they knew nothing. The Emperor Napoleon, in one of his spokenmusings, applied the same conception to all continental Europeans, saying that there were everywhere a few men who knew what freedom wasand longed to secure it; but that the masses needed paternal guidance, and enjoyed it as long as they were comfortable. The asylum of thisenlightened minority in France was for a time the tribunate; to manyit seemed that, if free government be government by discussion, inthe tribunate alone was any semblance of freedom left; its name hadconsequently retained a halo of nobility, and its mere existence was acomfort to the few who still recalled the ideals of the Revolution. But, in truth, the body itself had ceased to have any dignitywhatsoever. The system of legislation was briefly this: from thethrone came a message exposing the situation of the country, thecouncil of state then formulated the measures set forth as necessary, the tribunate approved them in one or other of its sections, and thelegislature gave the enacting vote. The suppression of the tribunate, therefore, appeared to the general public like final proceedings inbankruptcy. Some of the members went into the legislature, some intoofficial administrative positions, and the right of discussion incommittee behind closed doors was transferred to certain sections ofthe legislature. By way of compensation it was "decreed by thesenate, " as the formality was called, that no man could thenceforthsit in the legislature until he had reached the age of forty. PerhapsNapoleon remembered that his own fiery ambition had made him emperorbefore he was thirty-six. The measure was announced to the tribunes asa mere matter of course, and created no stir at the time. In lateryears it was recalled that the English Parliament under thePlantagenets had never entirely perished, and so was ready forpowerful deeds in more propitious days. But in France's later crisisthe French tribunate could not be revived; with it disappeared foreverthe last rallying-point for the scattered remnant still true to theRevolution. 

The complement of this negative measure was the creation of the rightto transmit together, and for an indefinite time, a title and therealty on which its dignity reposed. Though the restoration of thisinstitution was slightly anterior in time to the other as to itsbeginnings, yet the final decree was not published until 1808, andlogically it is complementary and subsequent to it. To this day manymen of ancient and honorable name in France have not ceased to bemoanthe destruction of primogeniture by the Revolution and the CodeNapoléon. They are proud to transmit their title untarnished to theirdescendants, are ready to make serious sacrifices in its behalf, toexercise the rigid self-denials of family control for its sake, and toengrave the motto of "noblesse oblige" on their hearts in order tosustain it; but they bitterly complain that without the majorat, andthe transmission of outward, visible supports in land and houses tostrengthen it, the empty sound carries little weight. The compulsorysubdivision of estates at the death of the owner enables every scionto live, if not to thrive, on the home stock. The failure of France incolonization is largely due to the absence of men from good familiesamong the colonizers, while England sends her younger sons to the endsof the earth, there to found new houses and perpetuate the old lineunder favorable conditions. Hence, too, the petty dimensions ofaristocratic French life: little fortunes, little ambitions, littleestablishments, little families, among that very class in societywhich by cultivating the sentiment of honor should leaven thepractical, materialistic temper of the multitude. At the present time, when the burghers amass in trade far greater fortunes than thearistocracy possess, when the learned secure greater power byintellectual vigor, when the demagogues grow mightier by the commandof votes, titles alone carry little weight, and the virtues of honor, of chivalry, of elegance, can with difficulty display their example. 

No argument can ever restore general confidence in the institution ofprimogeniture, but it dies hard, even in England. In the UnitedStates the absolute liberty of testamentary disposition enables awealthy father to found a family almost as perfectly as if the rightof entail existed, and the bulk of large fortunes is constantly leftby will to the most capable son, in order that he may keep up thefamily name, the family estates, and the family pride. But under theprovisions of the Code Napoléon such a course is impossible. As thelawgiver did not hesitate to contravene his own legislation in thecase of the Jews, so he again disregarded it in order to consolidatethat aristocracy of which he hoped to make another strong prop to histhrone; for he already had the Church and the people. "The code, " hesaid, "was made for the welfare of the people; and if that welfaredemands other measures, we must take them. " This was not difficult, because the imperial power had gradually shaped two instrumentswherewith to act: one was the laws sanctioned by the legislature andpertaining ordinarily to abstract questions of jurisprudence; theother was the Emperor's personal decrees, which, though discussed bythe council of state, were the expression of the Emperor's will, andcovered in their scope the whole field of authority. 

It was by the latter course that he had intended to create the newnobility. Ostensibly the measure was to be the last blow of the ax atthe root of feudalism. The new dignities carried no privilege withthem; they were, it was explained, a sort of civic crown to which anyone might aspire, and their creation was therefore in no wayderogatory to the principle of equality. The holders might become tooindependent and self-reliant, they might even display a class spirit;but the Emperor felt himself to be striving upward, these creatures ofhis would have to run fast before they could outstrip their master. AtSt. Helena the prisoner, recalling with bitterness the ingratitude ofhis beneficiaries, declared that he took the unfortunate step in orderto reconcile France with the rest of Europe. He was by that time awarethat though the Legion of Honor was, and would continue to be, aninstitution dear to the French heart, this one was not so, and neededan apology; for his imperial nobility had never been taken seriouslyor kindly by the people, who could not draw the nice distinctionbetween a feudal and an imperial aristocracy. Even in the first stepsof his enterprise he was made to feel the need of caution, and it wasby statute, after all, not by decree, that the whole matter wasfinally regulated. So curious is popular fickleness that an Emperorwho could boldly tyrannize in almost any other direction felt that hedared not take the risk of constituting himself a fountain of honor, such as legitimate monarchs were. 

The system was for the world outside like some fairy wonder completedovernight, since the duchies had been ready the year before. TheItalian titles were the most honorable and the most highly endowed. They were either at once or later given as follows: Soult, Duke ofDalmatia; Mortier, Duke of Treviso; Savary, Duke of Rovigo; Bessières, Duke of Istria; Duroc, Duke of Friuli; Victor, Duke of Belluno;Moncey, Duke of Conegliano; Clarke, Duke of Feltre; Masséna, Duke ofRivoli; Lannes Duke of Montebello; Marmont, Duke of Ragusa; Oudinot, Duke of Reggio; Macdonald, Duke of Taranto; Augereau, Duke ofCastiglione; Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo. In Germany there werecreated three similar duchies--Auerstädt for Davout, Elchingen forNey, and Dantzic for Lefebvre. Berthier was made Prince of Neufchâtel. So much for the military officials. In civil life there werecorresponding distinctions: Cambacérès, Duke of Parma; Maret, Duke ofBassano; Lebrun, Duke of Piacenza; Fouché, Duke of Otranto;Champagny, Duke of Cadore. The members of the senate, the councilorsof state, the presiding officers of the legislature, and thearchbishops were all created counts. Each one of these titles was, like the others, richly endowed with land from the public domains inPoland, Germany, and Italy. But the distinction bestowed on thesoldiers was marked in the difference between the accompanying giftsto them and those to civilians. The only portion of the great forcewhich had returned to France was the guard, who were instructed tokeep themselves as exclusive as possible. A most lavishpension-system, as it was considered even in that age of militarysplendor, drew from the army chest five hundred francs a year forsoldiers who had lost a limb; officers received as high as tenthousand francs, according to the nature of their disabilities. Butthe marshals were showered with gold. Berthier had a million; Ney, Davout, Soult, and Bessières, six hundred thousand each; Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Mortier, and Victor, four hundred thousandapiece; and the rest two hundred thousand. But even this was nothingto what some of them secured later by holding several offices at once. At one time Berthier had a yearly income of a million three hundredand fifty-five thousand francs; Davout, of nine hundred and tenthousand; Ney, of seven hundred and twenty-eight thousand; Masséna, ofsix hundred and eighty-three thousand. The ministers were able tosecure salaries averaging about two hundred thousand francs, andambassadors had incomes corresponding to their dignity. Caulaincourt, the ablest of all the latter class, had eight hundred thousand francsat St. Petersburg wherewith to support the imperial state of France. It is interesting to note from Napoleon's letters that he hadoccasionally to admonish some of these gentlemen to make use of theirtitles. 

The Revolution had chosen to find its artistic expression in thecorrect and strict severity of classical forms. Napoleon had from thebeginning of his career been under the spell of Greek and Romanexamples. Thus it happened that the art of the First Empire was whatit is--heavy, conventional, and reminiscent. With the ever-growingrigidity of censorship, literature sometimes took refuge inabstractions, or, what is much the same thing, in the contemplation ofevents so remote that their discussion could give no offense. Sometimes authors accepted the curious task of defending the externalforms and results of the Revolution as expressed in the Empire, whilecombating every principle from which the movement had sprung. Able menlike Chénier published some of their writings, and locked others intheir desks against a brighter day. In religion the Emperor'sprinciple was that his subjects should hate the English because theywere heretics, and the Pope because he was a fanatic. The "ideologues"and "metaphysicians" were anarchists, for the public order wasendangered by their teachings. The newspapers were not only gagged, but metamorphosed--the "French Citizen" into the "French Courier, " the"Journal of Debates" into the "Journal of the Empire. " Their columnswere filled with laudations of the Emperor; their political articleswere virtually composed in the Foreign Office; and there was not asymptom of anything like the existence of party feeling. A certainjournalist having been allowed to make statements concerning theluxury at court, the editor of the offending paper was given tounderstand that the Emperor would tolerate no such criticism nor anyremarks contrary to his interests. [17]

 [Footnote 17: In general, for the censorship of the press see Welschinger: La censure sous le Premier Empire. Sorel: Essais d'histoire et de critique. ]

But the crowning work of this period was the final realization of theplan for organizing public instruction in what was designated by thehead of the state as the Imperial University. Though somewhat changedin name and character, it exists to-day virtually as it came from themaker's hand. Like the institution of the prefecture, it is afaultless machine of equalization and centralization, molding the massof educated Frenchmen into one form, rendering them responsive andreceptive to authoritative ideas from their youth upward, and passivein their attitude toward instruction. Joseph de Maistre used to preachthat, all social order depending on the authority of beliefs as wellas on the authority of behavior, no man who denied the supremacy ofthe Pope would permanently admit the sovereignty of the state. Napoleon furnished a standing refutation of this thesis. The wholesystem of public instruction in France has under the third republicnot merely been secularized, but it has been made, and for a quarterof a century has remained, substantially infidel. Twenty-five academicgenerations of living French citizens, reckoning each year's output asa generation, have come out from its laboratory with a minimum offaith; but state supremacy and state socialism are, in a moderateform, more prevalent among them than among any similar body of menelsewhere. 

The University of France means literally the totality of allinstruction in the country, organized by successive stages into asingle system, and rigidly controlled from above. The outlinessketched in the law passed in 1802, and supplemented in 1806, werecarefully followed by Napoleon in his final step, and neither thetheory nor the method need be again discussed. It is significant thatit was an imperial decree, and not a statute, which on Marchseventeenth, 1808, created the organism. There was an endowment offour hundred million francs, and a separate budget, "in order thatinstruction might not suffer by passing disturbances in imperialfinances. " In order, also, that its doctrine might not feel theinfluence of every passing philosophical fashion, the corporation wassubordinate to, but separate from, the ministry, with a grand master, chancellor, and treasurer of its own, and thirty members, of whom tenwere appointed for life by the Emperor, the rest being annuallydesignated by the grand master. They made rules for the discipline, revised the textbooks, and chose the instructors of all theinstitutions of learning in all France, except some of the greatecclesiastical seminaries and a few of the technical schools. At theoutset it was ordered that all the masters, censors, and teachers inthe great intermediate schools or lyceums should be celibates! Theprofessors might marry, but in that case they could not live in theprecincts of what was virtually a military barrack. 

Liberal culture, so far as given, was provided in the lyceums, andthey really form the heart of the university. Under the Empire theirinstruction was largely in mathematics, with a sprinkling of Latin. Itis now greatly broadened and elevated. The pupils of the primaryschools felt a quasi-dependence on the Emperor; those of the lyceumswere the very children of patronage, for the cheapness of theireducation, combined with their semi-military uniforms and habits, impressed at every turn on them and their families the immanence ofthe Empire. They entered by government examinations; all their letterspassed through the head master's hands; they were put under athreefold system of espionage culminating in the grand master; the onehundred and fifty scholarships and bourses in each were paid by thestate; the punishments were, like those of soldiers, arrest andimprisonment. With the acquisition of military habits the young_lycéen_ could look forward to military promotion, for two hundred andfifty of the most select were sent every year to the military schools, where they lived at the Emperor's expense, expecting professionaladvancement by the Emperor's patronage. Others of less merit weredetached for the civil service, and in that also their careers were atthe imperial mercy. They were daily and hourly reminded of Napoleon'sgreatness, for twenty-four hundred foreigners from the vassal statesof the Empire were scattered among these institutions, where they wereturned into Frenchmen and docile subjects at the Emperor's expense, while being virtually held as hostages for the good behavior of theirparents. These powerful engines did not work in vain. During thecomparatively short existence of the Empire their product assumedenormous proportions, and largely modified the temper of societythroughout France. The youth educated by priests or tutors were foundunable to keep pace with their favored contemporaries from thegovernment schools, and from the first no prophet was needed toforetell the destiny of private institutions and ecclesiasticalseminaries. Little by little they made way for or became annexed tothe lyceums which one after another were founded wherever needed. Thecharges of the latter were, and are, very low; and thrifty fathersappreciate the fact. The state is at enormous cost to support them;but public sentiment, preferring indirect to direct taxation, approvesof the expenditure, while crafty statesmen, whether royalist, imperialist, or republican, employ them to create citizens of the kindin power at the time. 

Throughout the late summer and autumn of 1807 the imperial court wasmore stately than ever before. The old nobility became assiduous intheir attendance, and, as one of the Empress's ladies in waiting issaid to have remarked they "received good company. " On his returnNapoleon had found Josephine's extravagance to be as unbounded asever; but he could not well complain, because, although for the mostpart frugal himself, he had latterly encouraged lavishness in hisfamily. Still, it was not agreeable to have dressmakers' bills flunginto his carriage when driving in state with his consort, and on oneoccasion he sent an unprincipled but clever milliner to the prison ofBicêtre for having disobeyed his orders in furnishing her wares to theEmpress at exorbitant prices. The person was so indispensable to thecourt ladies, however, that they crowded her cell, and she was soonreleased. At St. Cloud, Malmaison, the Tuileries, and Fontainebleauthe social vices of courts began to appear; but they were sternlyrepressed, especially high play. By way of contrast, the city of Pariswas at that very moment debauched by a profusion of gambling-hells andhouses of prostitution, all licensed at an enormous figure by Fouchéand producing great revenues for the secret police. The gorgeous stateuniforms of the marshals, the rich and elegant costumes of the ladies, the bespangled and begilt coats of the household, dancing, theatricals, concerts, and excursions--all these elements should havecombined to create brilliancy and gaiety in the imperial circle, butthey did not. 

There was something seriously amiss with the central figure. He wasoften sullen and morose, often violent and even hysterical. To calmhis nervous agitation the court physician ordered warm baths, which hespent hours in taking. Then again he was irregular in his habits, being often somnolent during the daytime, but as frequently breakinghis rest at midnight to set the pens of his secretaries scampering tokeep pace with the flow of his speech. With old friends he was coarseand severe: even the brutal Vandamme confessed that he trembled beforethat "devil of a man, " while Lannes was the only human being who stilldared to use the familiar "thou" in addressing his old comrade. To theface of his generals the Emperor was merely cold: behind their backshe sneered--saying, for instance, of Davout that he might give himnever so much renown, he would not be able to carry it; of Ney that hewas disposed to ingratitude and turbulence; of Bessières, Oudinot, andVictor that they were mere mediocrities. Among all these dazzlingstars he himself moved in simple uniform and in a cocked hatornamented with his favorite cheap little cockade. It was awell-calculated vanity, for with increasing corpulence plainness ofdress called less attention to his waddling gait and growingawkwardness of gesture. 

The summer of 1807 saw the social triumph of the Bonaparte family, thesometime Jacobins, but now emperor and kings. Jerome Napoleon wasmarried on August twenty-second to the Princess Catherine ofWürtemberg. The Emperor had already spoken at Tilsit with the Czarabout unions for himself and family suitable to their rank, but thehint of an alliance with the Romanoffs was coldly received. In theEmperor's opinion this, however, was a really splendid match. TheRhine princes and subsidiary monarchs hastened to Paris, and one ofthem showed his want of perspicacity by marked attentions toJosephine, which he hoped would secure her husband's favor. When menof such lofty and undisputed lineage were joining what was apparentlyan irresistible movement, the recusant nobility of France itself couldnot well stand aloof any longer. It amused and interested the Emperorto see them obey Fouché's hint, and throng to be introduced in thecorrect way to the new and undisputed sovereign, not merely of France, but of western Europe. 

Moreover, they were no longer impertinent. They remembered the fatemeted out to Mme. De Staël for her solemn innuendos, and did notforget that the last item in the indictment on which Mme. De Chevreusehad been banished was a snippish remark to Napoleon's face. Astonishedat the splendor of her diamonds, he had in his own court clumsilyasked if they were all real. "Indeed, sire, I do not know, " shereplied; "but they are good enough to wear here. " In consequence, therefore, of this new and now well-intentioned element the courtswelled in numbers and gained in grace, but not in joyousness. TheEmpress was already foreboding her fate; there was the stiffness ofinaptitude about everything, even the amusement, and the languidweariness of the ladies was an unforgiven imperial sin. The quick witof the Emperor remarked this annoying fact, and demanded counsel ofTalleyrand. The Prince of Benevento had by this time resigned hisposition as minister, and the relations between himself and theEmperor were strained, but he was not rebuked when he ventured on theold license of speech. "It is because pleasure will not move at thedrum-tap, " was his answer, "and you look as if you would command everyone just as you do the army: 'Ladies and gentlemen, forward march!'"

Talleyrand's numberless intrigues, his venality and self-seeking, hiscynicism and contemptuous airs, had finally destroyed hispreponderance with Napoleon, although he still retained muchinfluence. No one was better aware of the fact than he was. Thus farhe had reckoned himself an indispensable factor in the administrationof the Empire; now he saw that he was so no longer, that his time hadcome. 

He had a sterile mind, and was destitute of principle. Constructivepolitics were beyond his powers, and he was hopelessly ignorant ofsocial movements. The real Europe of his time was to him a closedbook; and while Napoleon was well served in every other function ofstate, because he himself could assist and supervise, he waswretchedly betrayed in the matter of permanent gains by diplomacy, inwhich he was personally a blunderer and a tyro. Talleyrand was adistinguished and typical aristocrat of the old French school, elegant, adroit, smooth-spoken, and sharp. He was an unequaledcourtier, influential by his moderation in word, gesture, andexpression, but a feeble adviser, and utterly incapable of broadviews. His character, being unequal to his skill, was not strongenough either to curb or guide a headstrong master, for his intellectwas neither productive nor solid. No treaty ever made by him waslasting, and he must have known that even the peace of Tilsit wouldbegin to crumble almost before the papers were signed. The balance ofEurope was disturbed but temporarily by that agreement, notpermanently, as had been intended; the attempted seclusion of Prussiaby Napoleon destroyed her old antagonism to other German powers, andmarked the beginning of amalgamation with all her sister states forthe reconstruction of an avenging German nationality. 

Something may be forgiven to an adventurer in the storms ofrevolution, but Talleyrand trimmed his sails to every wind, outrodeevery storm, and made gains in every port. He was a trusted officialof the Republic, the Consulate, the Empire, and the restored monarchy. Wise in his day and generation, he had long before made ready towithdraw, if necessary, from active life, by the accumulation of anenormous fortune, heaped up by means which scandalized even imperialFrance. He had been embittered at the close of the Consulate byNapoleon's determination that his ministers should not be his highestdignitaries, his arch-officers. The title of "prince, " with twohundred thousand francs a year, was a poor consolation when men likeLebrun and Cambacérès had the precedence as arch-treasurer andarch-chancellor, while--most unendurable of all--they drew salaries ofthree hundred and fifty thousand francs. Berthier, the Prince ofNeufchâtel, had recently been made vice-constable to represent LouisBonaparte, who, though still constable, had left Paris to become LouisNapoleon, King of Holland. This was Talleyrand's opportunity to resignfrom the ministry on his own initiative. He demanded a dignity forhimself similar to that accorded to Berthier. The Emperor told himthat, accustomed to power as he had become, he would be unhappy in astation which precluded his remaining in the cabinet. But the ministerknew his rôle in the little comedy, and, persisting, was on Augustninth made vice-grand elector, while Champagny, an excellent andlaborious official, took his seat at the council-board as minister ofexternal relations. Talleyrand's withdrawal had not the slightestinfluence on the Emperor's foreign policy; in fact, the quidnuncs atFontainebleau declared that he was seen limping into Napoleon's officealmost every evening. [18] But he was so well known in every court, hiscircle of personal acquaintances was so large, so timorous, and soreverential, that superstitious men believed his retirement auguredthe turn of Napoleon's fortunes. 

 [Footnote 18: Sorel, Vol. VII, pp. 191-2. ]

CHAPTER VIII

THE EMPIRES OF LAND AND OCEAN[19]

 [Footnote 19: References as before, and Mahan: Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. Loir: Études d'histoire maritime. Clowes: The Royal Navy. Stanhope: Life of Hon. William Pitt. ]

 Diplomacy at St. Petersburg -- Internal Politics of Russia -- Alexander's Perplexities -- War between Great Britain and Russia -- New Orders in Council -- The Milan Decree -- Position of the United States -- The Regeneration of Prussia -- Napoleon's Repressive Measures -- Austria's New Army -- Diplomatic Tension between Russia and France -- Designs of Napoleon as to Egypt -- He Temporizes with Alexander -- Caulaincourt and Tolstoi -- The Czar's Demands -- Napoleon's Visit to Italy -- Limitations of his Ambition -- Visions of Oriental Empire -- Control of the Mediterranean -- His Proposition to Russia -- His Complete Program. 

The diplomatic intrigues at St. Petersburg were intensely amusingafter the peace of Tilsit. Alexander coquetted with the Englishagents, and concealed his plans from the conservative Russians. Hislips were sealed about what had occurred at the meeting with Napoleon, and the charge has been disproved that some of his suite blabbedenough to the British diplomats to enable them to divine the rest. Canning's acuteness and his conviction that Napoleon and Alexander hadreached an understanding hostile to England sufficiently account forthe bombardment of Copenhagen, and place the responsibility for it onhis shoulders. But in the interval before that event the Czar cajoledthe English embassy until they felt assured of a triumph, whilealmost simultaneously he assured Lesseps, the French consul-general, how precious Napoleon's society had been to him, and declared that ifEngland did not yield the two allies would compel her. To the formalintroductory communications of Russia concerning peace, Canningreplied by a demand for the secret articles of Tilsit, and despatchedthe fleet to the Baltic. The successful stroke made in September atCopenhagen filled the Czar with solicitude; for, like his ally, he hadhoped to gain time, and such promptness in imitating Napoleon'scontempt for neutral rights dismayed him. It looked as though thiswere the first event in a maritime war which would end by destroyingthe shipyards at Cronstadt, or perhaps even St. Petersburg itself. Butinstead of further aggression came a new mission from the Londoncabinet asking for Alexander's good offices in appeasing Denmark, andoffering every indemnity to that power except the restoration of thefleet. Great Britain, commanding the Baltic, could be magnanimous. 

[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. Engraved byLangier. 

QUEEN HORTENSE. 

Painted by Girodet. ]

This conjunction of affairs destroyed Alexander's self-control. He hadplayed the friend of England to no advantage, and England now askedfor new and impossible proofs of his friendship. He could neitherdisclose to her the secret articles nor mediate in her behalf with acountry which had already joined his own system. On the other hand, Savary, the French ambassador, and Lesseps, the French consul-general, were daily reminding him of his engagements to Napoleon. There waslittle need, for the alliance meant to him the attainment of his mostcherished ambitions: the acquisition of Finland to the westward, andof the great Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia to thesouth. In all contingencies he had to reckon with the wealthy Russianproprietors, whose prosperity demanded the easy export of theirenormous produce in timber and grain by the same British ships whichsupplied them with essential articles that were not manufactured inRussia. To them the continental blockade was a horror, and many in thearmy declared they would not shed their blood to undermine thenational prosperity. 

This tension could not last. The English secretly introduced intoRussia a pamphlet charging that the peace of Tilsit had separated theCzar from both his people and his troops. Savary, mindful of his olddetective arts, discovered its origin and adroitly laid the factsbefore Alexander, who burst into angry abuse of the "libel, " andbemoaned the lack of able men to support him both in a wise foreignpolicy and in such internal reforms as the abolition of serfdom, whichhe was determined to accomplish. Moreover, Napoleon's conduct was suchas to produce serious uneasiness. So far from evacuating Prussia, French troops still occupied all her harbor towns, and menaced theRussian frontier as if their commander were a foe and not a friend. The agreement made with Kalkreuth for the gradual withdrawal of theFrench army from Prussia was held to be null, for the Prussians couldnot raise the indemnity of a hundred and fifty million francs computedas the direct cost of the war. To this was added the fact that no movewas made toward the dismemberment of Turkey. The Emperor of the Frenchhad seized and fortified Corfu, but in a preliminary armistice betweenRussia and Turkey, due to his intermediation, not a word was saidabout the Danubian principalities; although the Russian troops werestill in Wallachia, it was clear that French influence was dailygrowing stronger at Constantinople, and might grow strong enough tothwart the Czar's plans entirely. 

Such were the disquieting considerations which finally brought to aclimax the relations of Russia with England. On October twenty-sixth, Lord Leveson-Gower, the English ambassador, received a note from CountRumianzoff to the effect that twice Russia had taken up arms forEngland's advantage, and had in vain solicited even such coöperationas would seem to have been in Great Britain's own interest. She hadnot even asked, said the writer, for reinforcements, but merely for adiversion, and had been chagrined to see that her ally, so far frommaintaining the Czar's cause, had instead, like a cold observer of thebloody theater where war had been kindled at her behest, despatchedexpeditions on her own behalf to seize Egypt and to attack BuenosAyres. After all this the Czar had still offered his mediation, but invain: Great Britain had replied by an act of unheard-of violence, despoiling an ancient and dignified monarchy. Could the Czar apologizefor such a deed? It was insulting to expect it. After reciting thesegrievances and asserting the principles of the armed neutrality, thepaper announced a rupture of all diplomatic relations until reparationshould be made to Denmark. 

War was formally declared by Russia on November seventh, and Englandretorted by orders in council, issued on the eighteenth andtwenty-sixth of the same month, which declared that every continentalport closed to her flag was thereafter in a state of blockade. Theneutral states were each and all notified that she would exercise theright of search to the fullest extent; that all neutral ships must putinto English harbors before proceeding to their destination, and pay aduty in case of reëxportation of their cargoes. An exception to thislatter regulation was made in the case of the United States, theybeing graciously permitted to have direct commercial intercourse withSweden, but with Sweden only. This, of course, meant that neutralstates must either carry on England's trade under their own flags orabandon their commerce altogether. 

This measure was in utter contempt of international law, even as thenunderstood, and was a high-handed outrage against neutral powers, inparticular against the United States. It was treating the oceanexactly as Napoleon had treated the lands of Europe. But it was apowerful weapon, for if successfully enforced it would destroyNapoleon's Continental System entirely. Accordingly, in pursuance ofhis policy that fire must be fought with fire, the Emperor retortedwith equal ruthlessness, fulminating the terrible Milan Decree ofDecember seventeenth, 1807. In it he declared that any vessel whichobeyed the orders of the English admiralty or suffered itself to besearched was and would be regarded as an English ship. It wasessential, therefore, that any nation desiring exemption from theenactments of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the one hand and of theEnglish orders in council on the other must make itself respected byforce of arms. The Americans must either accept the humiliating termsof England or enter the French system and seek in a maritime war tocapture the continental markets for themselves. 

Napoleon, as has already been narrated, intended to force them intothe latter course immediately, but he was not well informed concerningAmerican affairs. Jefferson was at that time in his second term asPresident of the United States. The Democratic party, of which he wasthe leader, was vastly more concerned with agricultural than withcommercial interests. They were afraid to increase the public debt, cared little for the prosperity of New England commerce, and, seekingto avoid the dilemma arranged for them by England and France, passedthe notorious embargo act forbidding all foreign commerce whatsoever. American ships must avoid foreign waters, which, like the land, hadbecome the arena of a bloody duel in which the United States were notinterested--so, at least, the Democrats fondly believed. Exports toEngland fell in a single year from forty-nine to nine millions ofdollars. In other words, the embargo, though causing great distress, could not be perfectly enforced, since the Eastern merchants continuedtheir humiliating submission to England for the sake of theirlucrative speculations. 

At the same time the farmers were suddenly awakened to the fact thatin the end they suffered as much under the prohibition as the traders. In the resulting agitations Jefferson closed his public career withoutéclat. Madison wisely secured a modification of the embargo by theNon-intervention Act, which opened all foreign commerce except thatwith England and France. But the merchants of New England wererebellious and dissatisfied even with this. The Federalists wanted anavy and a place in the European system; in other words, a fair sharein the world's carrying-trade for the seafarers of the Atlantic coast. Matters drifted on in general discontent and mutual recriminationuntil 1810. Napoleon in that year shrewdly announced that he hadabandoned his policy, but for all that he actually continued toenforce it. This empty pretense of friendship embroiled the UnitedStates still further with England, and in the end led to a second warfor independence. 

The Czar had no sooner taken the decisive step of finally declaringwar on England than the Napoleonic policy began further to unfold. Prussia was at once compelled to follow her protector's example, andbefore the ensuing season all her harbors were fortified and closed. In spite of the French occupation, a national reform movement hadbegun in this land. In Königsberg was formed the League of Virtue, which focused the new morality and patriotism of the masses. The pensof Fichte, Schleiermacher, and other great writers continued to buildup public spirit. Stein accepted office, stipulating that the privycouncil should be abolished, and then freed the serfs. Among otherimportant reforms he destroyed the old distinction between landtenures, and made transfers simple. Self-government was granted to thecities. The schools were entirely reconstructed under the direction ofWilliam von Humboldt, and the University of Berlin was founded as anursery for the new national spirit. 

Under these influences the monarchy of Frederick the Great ceased toexist; the authority of the "yunker" class which supported it and hadrashly brought on the war with France was temporarily eclipsed by awholesome expression of national vigor, and the enlightened liberalismof Prussia became the stimulus for a similar movement in all Germany. As to the army, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst entered with zeal upon thetask of reorganization, and the latter was a very genius of reform. Napoleon at length showed his true colors, forbade his victim tomaintain more than forty-two thousand troops, and declared to the faceof Frederick William's brother in Paris that the occupation of thefortresses had passed from the narrow domain of particular politicsinto the great field of general policy. He meant, of course, that hewas thereby virtually holding in check not merely Prussia, but Russiaand Austria as well. The limitation set by him to the active militaryforce of the captive state was easily evaded by the subterfuge ofsubstituting new recruits for those who had completed their trainingin the ranks; but the French occupation seemed to be virtuallypermanent. 

The military reorganization of Austria was already complete, andMetternich wrote on July twenty-sixth, 1807, to Stadion, the ministerof state, that as the peace of Tilsit had sown broadcast the germs ofits own destruction, the wisdom of his correspondent's administrationwould one day bring Austria to the point where three hundred thousandmen united under one will and directed to one goal would play thefirst rôle in Europe, "in a moment of universal anarchy, at one ofthose epochs which always follow great usurpations, and wipe out thetraces of the conquerors; an epoch of which no one can foretell thedate, but which nothing postpones except the life of a single man, andwhich all the genius of that man can so much the less postpone as hehas not yet taken the first step to preclude its certain results. "This reference to Napoleon's childlessness and the dependence of hissystem on his single life is clear enough. The Emperor of the Frenchwas himself thoroughly aware of the influence exerted by such aconsideration upon the course of affairs, and in consequence hisdealing with Francis was somewhat less peremptory than that withFrederick William. Nevertheless, the results were exceedinglyhumiliating to Austria's pride. In a treaty concluded at Fontainebleauon October tenth, 1807, with reference to the Italian frontier, herdominions were shorn to the quick. At Napoleon's suggestion, CountStarhemberg, her ambassador in London, intimated that England, in theinterest of peace, ought to restore the Danish fleet and make termswith France. On the prompt refusal of Great Britain to listen, theenvoy withdrew from London; but he did not leave the English cabinetin doubt as to the cause. He knew and broadly hinted that though hismaster dared not trifle with a Franco-Russian alliance, his heart waswith the English cause. To all outward appearance, therefore, Austriawas quite as subservient as Prussia to the mighty coalition ofFrance and Russia. 

Almost immediately after the rupture with England, Alexander had themortification of seeing his worst fears realized. Napoleon had openedto him at Tilsit a dazzling vista of territorial aggrandizement. Slowly but surely the desired effect was produced. Aware of all thedangers he ran, the Czar nevertheless sacrificed every otherconsideration, even that of his people's material comfort, in order todemonstrate his good faith. By declaring war he likewise paid inadvance. But at the earliest possible moment, on November seventh, hisambassador to France, sent for the purpose, demanded the return--towit, the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Simultaneouslyand in another quarter this same demand was made emphatic. Immediatelyafter the meeting at Tilsit, Guilleminot, a French general, had beensent as mediator between Russia and Turkey to the seat of war on theDanube. An armistice was concluded under his direction at Slobozia, inwhich were two or three compensatory clauses promising that Russiawould make restitution to Turkey of certain vessels and munitions ofwar which had been captured. The Czar professed to take great umbrageat these stipulations. Shortly afterward he rejected the whole paper, and the Russian troops remained in Wallachia. This conduct wasintended to indicate his obstinate determination to have the vaguepromises of Napoleon defined, and then to secure their performance. 

The Emperor of the French had been kept well informed by Savary, andknew that the Tilsit alliance, being distasteful to the Russianpeople, hung on the personal good will of their sovereign. He wouldhave been glad to put Alexander off with some slight rectification ofthe border-line between Russia and Turkey and with further indefinitepromises, but he dared not. Accordingly he devised the plea that theaggrandizement of the Eastern and Western empires must keep equalpace, not in the West, for that was his by right, but in thosedebatable lands wherewith Russia hoped to secure a permanent seat inthe councils of Europe. He was confirmed in his desire to postpone thepartition of Turkey by finding that Mustapha, the Sultan who hadoverthrown Selim in defiance of France, was now ready in turn to makefriends with her and perform her behests. The hope of getting Egyptwas again awakened, but the times were not ripe and delay must besecured. 

In addition to these considerations there was that of immediatesafety. The last two campaigns had seen Napoleon a victor, once overAustria and Russia combined, again over Prussia and Russia combined;but in each there had been moments when the coalition of the threewould have overwhelmed him. For this reason he would gladly havedeclared at Tilsit that the house of Hohenzollern had ceased to reign, in order thereby to preclude any future danger from a triple alliance. This idea he had abandoned for the time in order to gratify Alexander. His ally secure, he now returned or pretended to return to it. Prussiawas regaining her strength too rapidly; her embittered hostility wasan ever-increasing menace. On the plea that she could never pay thepromised indemnity, and was therefore to be treated as a bankrupt, Napoleon declared at last that Russia could have the Danube provincesif France could take Silesia for the grand duchy of Warsaw. "Prussia, "ran Napoleon's despatch on this subject--"Prussia would have but twomillions of inhabitants; but would not that be enough for the welfareof the royal family, and is it not in their interest to place herwithout delay and with perfect resignation among the inferiorpowers, since all their efforts to restore the position she has lostmerely serve to distress their subjects and cherish idle regrets?""What the Emperor would prefer, " said this same memorandum, "is thatthe Turks should remain in peaceable possession of Wallachia andMoldavia; still he would hand over these provinces to the Czar inreturn for a just compensation from Prussian lands; and finally, though far from wishing a complete partition of Turkey, he desires younot to condemn utterly the plan, but rather to dwell on the motivesfor postponing it. This ancient project of Russian ambition is a tiewhich can bind Russia to France. "

For the purposes of this difficult negotiation Napoleon had chosenCaulaincourt, his devoted servant and most adroit diplomat. Havingbeen concerned in the expeditions to Strasburg and Ettenheim whichcaptured Enghien, the ambassador had been deeply, though unjustly, involved in the disrepute of the execution, and that fact was a tiewhich bound him to his master. The two seemed thoroughly to understandeach other. Alexander had chosen an envoy who was the very antipodesof the adroit and elegant Caulaincourt. Count Tolstoi was a bluffsoldier, selected in the belief that he would be uninfluenced by theintrigues of Paris society, and could secure the utmost return for theagreement of Tilsit by direct negotiation with the Emperor himself, asone old soldier talking with another. This officer was instructed tolay great stress on the liberation of Prussia, but to remember thatthe object of his mission was to cement harmony and confidence. On thejourney to Paris he paused at Memel to pay his respects to FrederickWilliam and his Queen. He found them, considering their station, actually in want, dependent on the Czar's gifts of clothes and othernecessaries for the little personal comfort they enjoyed. This made adeep impression on Tolstoi's heart, and though received at Paris withsuch distinction as had never been accorded to any other ambassador, he was cold and distant with both the Emperor and the court. At lastthere was positive disagreement between him and the great personagesof the capital; there was even a rumor that Ney and he would fight aduel. The offensive remarks which led to such tension were due to astatement by Tolstoi that Russia had been beaten by accident, thatRussian soldiers were invincible, and might one day take theirrevenge. 

Moreover, the ambassador could not even get on with Napoleon. Both heand his staff avoided the splendors of Fontainebleau, preferring tofrequent the drawing-rooms of a notorious actress whose name had oftenbeen linked with that of the Emperor. Under such circumstancesdiplomacy gathered but little fruit. Napoleon offered both theDanubian provinces for Silesia, or else the evacuation of Prussiaproper for that of Wallachia; he even mentioned the magic word"Constantinople" as part of Russia's share in an eventual partition ofthe whole Turkish empire. Tolstoi wrote to St. Petersburg that Francewas postponing the evacuation of Prussia for selfish purposes, meaningto dismember her; and from that starting-point depicted the horrors ofa Napoleonic Europe. Such opinions dismayed Alexander, and although hereceived Caulaincourt with distinction equal to that which had beenaccorded to Tolstoi, he firmly refused the bargain offered by him. Hewould not consent to a further dismemberment of Prussia, partly forsentimental reasons, chiefly because he could not endure thestrengthening of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the new political organismwhich suggested the restoration of Poland. As to the principalities, these he would have. Russian society had for the moment repressedits hostility to the Czar and his treaty of Tilsit, and was quietlywaiting to see what would be the substantial results. No gain lessthan the acquisition of Wallachia and Moldavia would reinstateAlexander in their good will or make the French alliance endurable. This was of course a serious crisis; but Caulaincourt, nothingdismayed, set himself, by the exercise of all those social arts ofwhich he had such a mastery, to win the aristocratic circles of St. Petersburg. 

In the month of December, 1807, Napoleon was on a royal progressthrough his kingdom of Italy, and the news of the diplomatic crisis inRussia reached him at Venice, which had become his as a result ofAusterlitz and by the treaty of Presburg. Although he had gone thitherfor a serious consultation with Joseph, its fascinations were alreadyweaving curious plans in the Emperor's mind. His rapid journey throughLombardy and a short visit to Milan, whence he fulminated his reply tothe English admiralty, had convinced him of the firm sovereignty heexercised throughout these splendid realms. In the few days of hispresence he had further strengthened his power by many generous andbeneficent decrees. It was with a sense of security that he came toVenice; at once he yielded to her spell, realizing that at last hiscontrol of the Adriatic was complete, inasmuch as now he held bothshores and commanded the entrance by the possession of Corfu. Justbeyond was the brilliant East, ripe for conquest. Could he or shouldhe lose the opportunity to use such a superb base of operations, winthe gratitude of all Venetia by restoring the ancient glories of hercapital, and thereby lay his hand at last on the bauble which had oncebefore so dazzled him? Besides, Great Britain, his hated rival, scorning the terms he had offered, disdaining the continentalblockade, anchored in her strength by the control of Western seas, was vulnerable in India, and there alone. These considerationsreturned with overpowering allurement to his imagination, and fourmillions of francs were appropriated to improve the harbor and restoresomewhat the splendors of Venice. 

New Year's day found the Emperor again at the Tuileries, in time toreceive a new courier from Russia with still more vigorousrepresentations of Alexander's desires. The idea of a generalpartition of Turkish lands grew stronger, and in an interview withMetternich, Napoleon hinted that Austria should have a share. Instructions were sent to Caulaincourt that he should hold out hopesin order to gain time and to learn whether it was definitelyimpossible that matters should remain as the treaty of Tilsit, takenliterally, had arranged them. This procrastinating attitude of mindhad a twofold cause. One appears to have been a gradual realization inNapoleon's consciousness that dreams and schemes must materialize, that in the mystery of a life like his one step inevitably leads toanother, that his career must encircle the vast globe, while hehimself was but mortal, finite, and already verging to the utmostlimit of his powers. A year before he had written to Josephine that hewas of all men the most enslaved; "my master has no bowels, and thatmaster is the nature of things. " The other cause was the fearless andwarlike attitude taken in Great Britain by both crown and Parliamentand announced with threats of eternal war at the opening of thelegislative session of 1807. It appears probable, likewise, thatwhatever answer should be given by Alexander to his pregnant question, he felt his only safety now to be in the alliance with the Czar. 

Time, time, time--that was the prime necessity; there were onlytwenty-four hours in the day, and only a certain quantity of nerveforce in his own system. Before the partition of Turkey, ifAlexander's reply should make it inevitable, two weighty matters mustbe settled: first, the road to an Oriental empire must be secured; andsecond, the already existing Western empire of Europe must be roundedout by the "regulation" of Spanish affairs--the appropriation, if itshould seem best, of the whole Iberian peninsula. Any tyro ingeography could see by a glance at the map that as navigation was inthose days--that is, by the propulsion of fickle winds amid the partlyknown currents of ocean and sea--the command of Gibraltar and Maltameant the control of the Levant, and the British held both places. With Spain in French hands, Gibraltar eventually might be taken, butthe case of Malta was far different. In the possession of a seafaringnation like the English the island was impregnable. But was this inreality the only outlet for the French empire to the East? From Franceproper, yes; but from Italy, by the Adriatic, there was an admirablealternative, if not, indeed, the only true line of trade. 

Since the first awakening of his ambition, Napoleon had dreamed ofsupremacy in the Mediterranean, and every successive treaty made withNorthern powers had looked to some strengthening of French influenceon that sea. Now at last he had Corfu, and the English, straitened fortroops, were withdrawing the forces which occupied Sicily to send theminto Portugal. The squadrons from Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort wereat once ordered to unite in the Mediterranean. This was the moment toseize Sicily, and with that island added to Corfu, France wouldcontrol the best road into Egypt. But the hostile fate which seemed toattend all Napoleon's undertakings by sea again checkmated him. English cruisers were found hovering about Corfu, and the landing inSicily was temporarily abandoned in order to sweep the English fromthe waters of the Ionian Isles. In the event of success, the invasionof Turkey, the seizure of Egypt, and the gratification of Alexanderwould be easy. More remotely, the deadly blow at England could bestruck in Asia. What a conception! What a debauch of the imagination!

But there was one specter which, though laid for intervals, would notentirely down, and returned with stolid persistency: the existence ofthe Western empire hung on the thread of a single life; the verycrowns of France and Italy had no heir. The situation was muchdiscussed in court circles, sometimes even among the people, and wasbecoming acute. In order to solve the problem peace was essential, andnot a remote, but an immediate one, if possible. The Russianambassador, returning from London, had reported on his journey throughFrance that the English were not so envenomed as they seemed. It wasonly a straw, yet it was talked of. At once Napoleon seized it, andannounced that his one aim, his most ardently desired goal, was--peace. 

It was now the close of January; Tolstoi was invited to join ahunting-party, and in the heart of the forest Napoleon found means tobe alone with him. After a long, vague, contradictory, but dramaticconversation setting forth the same three alternatives, --peace betweenRussia and Turkey without the principalities, or the principalities inexchange for Silesia, or the ultimate but not immediate partition ofTurkey, --the great actor suddenly paused as if in an ecstasy ofsincerity, and snatching his hat off his head with both hands, flungit on the ground as he said: "Hark you, M. Tolstoi; it is not theEmperor of the French, but an old general of division that is nowtalking to another. May I be thought the vilest of men if I do notscrupulously fulfil the contract I made at Tilsit, and if I do notevacuate both Prussia and the duchy of Warsaw as soon as you havewithdrawn your troops from Moldavia and Wallachia! I am neither a foolnor a child, not to know what I stipulate, and what I stipulate Ialways fulfil. " Leaving this objurgation time to work its effect, theEmperor of the French a few days later--on February second--wrote withhis own hand to the Emperor of all the Russias. It was an innocent andkindly epistle, advising his friend to strengthen his army, andpromising all aid possible in case he should feel that the border-lineof Sweden was too near St. Petersburg. An army of fifty thousand men, Russian, French, perhaps a "little Austrian, " marching into Asia byway of Constantinople, would not reach the Euphrates before Englandwould begin to tremble. "I am strong in Dalmatia, you on the Danube. One month after an agreement we could be on the Bosporus. But ourmutual interests require to be combined and equalized in a personalconference. Tolstoi is not built on the proportions of Tilsit. Wecould have everything ready, you and I, or perhaps Caulaincourt andRumianzoff, before March fifteenth, and by May first our troops couldbe in Asia at the moment when those of your Majesty were in Stockholm. We would have preferred peace, you and I, but we must do what ispredestined, and follow whither the irresistible march of eventsconducts us. "

This letter was a masterpiece. It meant, first, a little Europeanwar, short and sharp, whereby Russia would get Finland as a sop andhave her attention drawn off from Prussia and Spain; secondly, amenace which would bring England to terms and produce a peace;thirdly, the neutralization of Austria by inviting her to sit down atthe feast; lastly, the consolidation of Napoleon's dynasty for theultimate completion of his designs in the Orient either with orwithout Russia's aid. The alternative would be a war of hithertounknown dimensions, including not only all Europe, but Asia Minor andnorthern Africa; out of such a conflict might result a permanent orderthe foundation and copestone of which would be French supremacy. England would of course rush to the assistance of Sweden, the onlyland now left in Europe that had never fallen into the orbit of theFrench system. At that moment Spain and Portugal, abandoned to theirfate, must drop into French hands. If England should still proveresolute, then an expedition to Egypt would sail from Corfu, whilesimultaneously the united armies of Russia, France, and Austria wouldmarch to the conquest of Turkey and the seizure of India. It was ascheme so vast, so logical, so imperial, that it left far behind thedreams of a Corsican patriot or the visions of an ardent Frenchman. Successful as a soldier, the Emperor was carried by each new victoryinto widening circles of enterprise which could have no relation tonarrow national limits. 

CHAPTER IX

FRENCH EMPIRE AND EUROPEAN NATIONALITY[20]

 [Footnote 20: See Oman: Peninsular War. Martins: Historia de Portugal. Delagrave: La Campagne de Portugal. Also Memoirs, etc. , by Barkhäusen, Brandt, Gomm, Moore, Naylies, Roveréa, Savary, Miot de Melito. ]

 Diplomatic Fencing with Russia -- Caulaincourt and Rumianzoff -- Plight of the Czar -- Napoleon and the Papacy -- The Pope a Prisoner -- The House of Braganza -- Partition of Portugal -- Flight of the Royal Family -- Junot's Aspirations -- The Condition of Spain -- The Court -- The Crown Prince -- The Popular Factions -- Napoleon's Plans -- Quarrel of Charles and Ferdinand -- Trial of Ferdinand -- Invasion of Spain -- Napoleon and Lucien at Mantua -- Napoleon and Joseph at Venice -- Godoy Thwarted -- The French Armament -- The Humiliation of Spain -- Fall of Godoy -- Abdication of the King. 

[Sidenote: 1808]

The instructions issued by Napoleon to Caulaincourt in this crisisreveal the writer's entire political system during the turning-pointof his career: they show him at the height of his powers, promising, cajoling, suggesting, procrastinating, representing his own actions inthe best light without regard to truth, using Russia as long as shecould serve him, and abandoning her within a few days when she becamerecalcitrant; all this to gain time and opportunity. The Czar had beenfrom the outset instigated by the French ambassador to seize Finland, but feeling that success in that quarter would weaken his claims onthe principalities, he hesitated. Court intrigue began to thickenabout him once more. With every day the miseries and uncertaintiesof his position made him more wretched. At last he behaved with theinconsistency of distraction and hesitation. Almost while soothingwords were being uttered to the Swedish ambassador, Russian columnssuddenly burst into the Swedish province, and were not withdrawn. Alexander renewed his demand for the Danube provinces. Napoleon senthim exquisite presents, Sèvres porcelain or some specimen of choicearmor. At last came the letter of February second. The firstimpression made on the Czar by its reading was one of exaggerated joyand enthusiasm: "Ha! the style of Tilsit! What a great man! What largeideas!" Such were his exclamations as he read. But calm deliberationawakened suspicions, and before long a defiant spirit led to acategorical request that any ultimate design on Silesia should beformally renounced, whereupon Caulaincourt replied: "The EmperorNapoleon demands that your Majesty shall not be more urgent with himthan he is with you. "

As a preliminary to the second personal interview between the twomonarchs, suggested at Tilsit, and for which proposals were nowrenewed from Paris, the two ministers, Caulaincourt and Rumianzoff, finally began to discuss the terms of a partition of Turkey. Thediplomatic gladiators were well matched; between offer and substitute, demand and excuse, feint and counterfeint, the days passed in a mostentertaining manner, until suddenly the Czar became aware that timewas flying and that he was not making headway. Somewhat petulantly theinterview was postponed, for it was clear that the ministers would notagree by the time suggested, and without an agreement Alexanderrefused to attend. Meanwhile his troops in Finland had met with bitterand obstinate resistance. His army had been driven from easternBothnia, and his fleet lay blockaded by that of Great Britain underAdmiral Saumarez. St. Petersburg was terrified by the presence of anEnglish fleet in the Baltic. The Czar could not weaken his force onthe Danube, lest he should lose the coveted provinces, and he darednot withdraw troops from Poland, for the French were still in Silesia. With the understanding that Bernadotte should be their activeauxiliary, the Russian forces had rashly crossed the Swedish borderwith inadequate numbers; and in reality the marshal did set out tojoin them, but half-way on his march, for some unexplained reason, hehad paused. Caulaincourt said it was because of the difficultiesencountered in crossing the Belt; but the halt was, of course, onemove in Napoleon's game. On April twenty-fifth the latter wrote toTalleyrand: "Was I to send my soldiers so lightly into Sweden? Therewas nothing for me there. " Simultaneously the French forces in bothPoland and Prussia were compacted and strengthened, while at theconfluence of the Bug and the Vistula, in the grand duchy of Warsaw, over against the Russian frontier, were steadily rising the walls of apowerful fort above which waved the tricolor. What a plight was thisfor the White Czar, the grandson of Catherine II, the philosophicmonarch educated by Laharpe, the beneficent despot! Behind him adisgusted nation, before him illimitable warfare; bound by the letterof an ambiguous treaty, occupied in a doubtful conquest, thwarted inhis ambitions; in short, if not checkmated, put into a position verymuch like that known in the noble game of chess as stalemate!

Napoleon's treatment of the Czar makes the whole situation in northernEurope and Austria easily comprehensible; it is necessary to examinefrom the same standpoint, also, what occurred in the southern statesof Europe, remote as they were; otherwise the course of affairs atthe opposite extremities of Europe seems utterly mysterious. If thepath followed at St. Petersburg was tortuous, what shall be said ofthe policy pursued in the Papal States, in Tuscany, in Portugal and inSpain? During the diplomatic reconnaissance led by Caulaincourt, thestatesmen of these countries had been busy at Fontainebleau. WhatCardinal Bayanne seemed anxious to obtain for Pius VII--namely, theinviolability of his territories--had been lost even before theconcessions demanded from the Pope were made. The trembling prelatehad consented to join the federation against England, to drive out themonks, to accept an increased French representation in the College ofCardinals, and to admit Venetia to the Concordat. But to useNapoleon's own expression in the decree issued from Vienna on Mayseventeenth, 1809, the Western Emperor had already "resumed the grant"of Charles the Great which had been used against his successor. Therewas no longer a hostile strip of land, stretching from sea to sea, which separated the kingdoms of Naples and Italy, for the threelegations were occupied in December, 1807. 

With this fulcrum Bayanne had been moved to negotiate a formal treatycontaining all Napoleon's stipulations. The Pope was exasperated bythe occupation of his lands, and refused his assent to the paper; hewould not even enter the French federative system. This attitudeappears to have been quite as agreeable to the Emperor of the Frenchas one of submission would have been. Appealing to public opinion onthe ground of necessity, he sent his troops on February second, 1808, into the city of Rome; in March, Ancona, Macerata, Fermo, and Urbinowere consolidated with the kingdom of Italy; and before the end ofApril, the foreign priests were banished, the Pope's battalions wereenrolled under the tricolor, and the guard of nobles was disbanded:the entire administration was in French hands. For a year thesuccessor of St. Peter remained a fainéant prince shut up in theQuirinal. To a demand for the resignation of his temporal power hereplied by a bull, dated June tenth, 1809, excommunicating theinvaders of his states; thereupon he was seized and sent a prisoner toGrenoble. Napoleon, looking backward in the days of his humiliation, said that this quarrel with the Pope was one of the most wearingepisodes in all his career. It undid much of the web knitted in theConcordat, by alienating the Roman Catholics both in France itself andin his conquered or allied lands. 

During the same autumn months of 1807 another treaty was negotiated atFontainebleau; namely, a secret compact with Spain for the partitionof Portugal. The house of Braganza, like the other so-calledlegitimate monarchies of Europe, had fallen into a moral and physicaldecline. The Queen was a lunatic, and her son Don John, who wasregent, though a mild and honorable man, lacked every element ofgreatness such as would have enabled him to swim in the troubledwaters of his time. The land, moreover, was saturated with democraticprinciples. There had been a tacit understanding that on account ofthe enormous tribute paid to France for the acknowledgment ofneutrality she would close one eye to the traffic with England, whichwas essential to the prosperity, if not to the very existence, of thelittle country. But the Berlin and Milan decrees were intended to bemeasures of serious war, and the Emperor now insisted that they shouldbe enforced. Although the regent was the son-in-law of Charles IV ofSpain, yet after the peace of Tilsit the court of Madrid united withthat of Fontainebleau in an effort to compel the closing of allPortuguese harbors and the fulfilment of the decrees to the letter, demanding the dismissal of the English minister, the arrest of allBritish subjects, and the confiscation of all English goods. The replyof John was a consent to everything except the arrest of innocenttraders. 

This partial refusal was a sufficient pretext; at once the Frenchenvoy at Lisbon was recalled, Junot was ordered to enter Spain and tomarch on Portugal, while the terms of partition were settled atFontainebleau with Charles's minister, Izquierdo, in a compact whichNapoleon must have looked upon as the great practical joke of hislife. For fear he should be too quickly found out, he positivelyinhibited Charles from communicating it to his ministers. The Frenchambassador at Madrid was also kept in ignorance of its terms. Under itthe King of Spain was to be styled Emperor of the Two Americas; and inreturn for Etruria, which was at last to be formally incorporated withthe kingdom of Italy, he was to have what he had so long desired, thevirtual sovereignty of Portugal. Over one portion the young King ofEtruria was to reign as a vassal; over a second, the generalissimo andhigh admiral of Spain, the Prince of the Peace, the Queen's paramour, the King's trusted servant, Manuel Godoy; a third was to remainunappropriated for Charles's disposal at a later date. 

The treaty ended with the seemingly innocent stipulation that a newFrench army of forty thousand men should be formed at Bayonne, to bein readiness should Great Britain land troops in Portugal. It was not, however, to enter Spain without the agreement of both contractingparties. Meantime Junot, by his Emperor's command, was sending homemaps, plans, topographical sketches, and itineraries of Spain. Although twenty-five thousand Spaniards were marching with him, hereceived orders, dated October thirty-first, three days after thetreaty was signed at Fontainebleau, to seize all the strong places ofPortugal, occupy them with French troops, and not to permit theSpaniards to garrison a single one. His first object, he had beenalready told, should be to capture the fleet lying in the Tagus and totake the regent prisoner. The clever and ambitious general marchedswiftly, and on November twenty-seventh reached, with his exhaustedtroops, Abrantes, a town about eighty miles from Lisbon. The news ofhis arrival was unexpected in the capital; worse still, as it appearedto the dismayed court, were the evidences that he would receive anenthusiastic reception from many influential elements of thepopulation, who still considered the word "French" a synonym for"democratic. " Sir Sidney Smith, who commanded the British ships in theTagus, addressed a letter to Don John promising that England wouldnever recognize a rule in Portugal hostile to the house of Braganza, and strongly urging him to embark the royal family for the Portuguesedominions in South America. The prince had probably read what had beenpublished in the "Moniteur" of November thirteenth: to wit--"Theregent of Portugal loses the throne. The fall of the house of Braganzais a new proof of the inevitable destruction attending those who unitewith England. " At any rate the hard-pressed ruler was unnerved, andissued a jerky, feeble proclamation, declaring that he would neversubmit to the tyranny of Napoleon, announcing his flight, naming acouncil of regency, and requesting those who were so disposed toaccompany him. A very few faithful subjects joined themselves to theroyal family, and with the mad Queen in their midst the little bandembarked. 

The fleet had hardly worked its way out of the river when Junotreached Lisbon with a small corps of panting, worn-out men. His preyhad escaped, but so had the mad Queen, and from that moment he beganto wonder why a crown would not sit comfortably on his own head. Hehad been Bonaparte's faithful confidant from the outset of his career, and could furnish a queen who boasted an ancestry no lessdistinguished than that of the Greek emperors of the Comnenian family. The people were most friendly, deputations from the powerful secretsociety of Freemasons presented addresses, the regency made noresistance, the commander-in-chief and his army gave in theirsubmission. But the French general showed no sign of organizing theliberal government which they so earnestly desired and fully expected. On the contrary, he established military provinces, seized all thepublic moneys, and sought to conciliate his master's debtors at hismaster's expense; for, instead of the forty millions indemnitydemanded by Napoleon, he took his pen, like the unjust steward, andwrote twenty. In return the Portuguese radicals were to ask theEmperor that he should be made their king. Owing in part to Junot'sinsatiable greed and his appropriation of enormous privatetreasure, --an example which his army was quick to follow, --in part tothe subsequent disenchantment and a general revulsion of feeling, theplan came to naught. Before long the Spanish general Bellesca seizedthe French governor of Oporto and began a rebellion in favor of DonJohn. The commander-in-chief, called from Lisbon to suppress theinsurgents, left the city under a committee at the head of which wasthe Bishop of Oporto. The prelate at once applied to England for help, and in a short time the whole country had organized secret juntas inorder to throw off the French yoke. England responded with alacrity, sending troops from Sicily and from Ireland; but the strongestreinforcement of all was the general appointed to command them, SirArthur Wellesley. Before the middle of August, 1808, the Peninsularwar was raging and the laurels were England's. 

Meantime the contemplated upheaval had occurred in Spain. It isimpossible to conceive deeper degradation than that into which theBourbon monarchy of that country had sunk, and the court had carriedthe country with it in its debasement. The population had fallen toten millions, and of a nominal army of a hundred and twenty thousandmen not fifty thousand were really effective. The host ofoffice-holders and privileged nobility which battened like leeches onan exhausted treasury was equaled in number only by the clergy, secular and regular, with nuns, novices, and servants, who lived onthe revenues of the ecclesiastical estates, and on what could beextorted from an impoverished people. By a terrible form ofprimogeniture the lands which did not belong to the Church hadgradually fallen into the hands of a few owners, who lived in state atMadrid and never laid eyes on their farms, forests, or pastures. Thepeasantry had no interest to improve what might be taken from them atthe death of the proprietor, or by caprice be appraised at a highervalue on account of their very efforts toward the amelioration oftheir lot. The grandees kept gloomy state in vast palaces filled withhordes of idle servants. The remnants from their lavish but poorlyserved tables supported the crowds of beggars that thronged theirgates. Of social life they had little; they were gloomy, lonely, andsullenly indifferent. In their stables stood herds of mules and hungstores of gaudy trappings, but these were used only a few times eachyear to convey the owners in proper dignity to the great publicfunctions. 

On such a foundation stood the court: the King, generous-minded butdeceived, and jealously attached to the crown servants, impatient ofany annoyance, and always declaring a willingness to resign histhrone; the Queen, clear-headed and ambitious, but self-indulgent, extravagant, and vicious; Godoy, the Prince of the Peace, --so calledfrom the treaty which he had negotiated at Basel to conclude theFrench and Spanish revolutionary wars, --the real ruler, soothing theKing's sensibilities and gratifying the Queen's passions. To preservehis ascendancy this trimmer had thrown in his lot with Napoleon; but, faithless and perfidious, he would gladly have rejected that or anyother protection to fly to one he believed stronger. In anycentralized monarchy the administrative law is the backbone; in Spainthe administration was feeble and corrupt, for every member of it wasengaged in humbly imitating the example of its head, whose house was adepot of plunder, whence toward the close of his career the spoilswere transferred on pack-mules by night, no one knew whither. It wassaid, and many sober men believed it, that Godoy had all the wealth ofSpain. 

Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, and heir apparent to the throne, was ayoung widower of good impulses but feeble character. His deceasedwife, married in 1803, had been the daughter of Queen Caroline ofNaples; having quarreled with her mother-in-law, Louisa, she had diedprematurely, probably poisoned. The prince knew the scandals of hisfather's household and the abuses of Godoy's administration, butthought the bonds of degradation too strong to be stricken off by aweak hand like his own. His followers, however, headed by the Duke delInfantado and the ambitious Canon Escoiquiz, his former tutor, werenumerous and enlightened. They understood how hollow was theprotection vouchsafed by Napoleon to Godoy, and how faithless was thepretended friendship of the latter for France. Their plan was thatFerdinand should refuse the proffered hand of Godoy's sister-in-law, demand that of a Beauharnais princess, and thus secure the interestand aid of the French emperor. With such support they might hope tooverthrow the minister and reform the administration. No doubt theyalso dreamed of power and place for themselves. 

As time passed, the sympathies of the nation rallied more and more toFerdinand, until at last he became the leader and representative ofthe solid elements in society. Between the waning power of Godoy andthe rising popularity of the crown prince, something like anequilibrium was at last established, and in 1807 the two embitteredfactions stood like gladiators looking for a chance to strike. Thissituation was made to Napoleon's hand; but as it gave rise to more andmore serious intrigues, a decision had to be taken promptly. Should heaccede to Ferdinand's desire, formally communicated in a letter sentby Escoiquiz on October twelfth? Talleyrand and Fouché both urged theadoption of the policy. What prompted Talleyrand cannot be surmised. After Austerlitz he had urged moderation, but it was probably becausehe was bribed by the vanquished. His judgment and interest may, however, have kept equal pace in that conclusion. He was most likelyinfluenced in this one by the Empress, whose position was becomingdesperate, for the Bonaparte family were now persistently and openlyurging a divorce. All Josephine's arts seemed unavailing against herobdurate enemies, and her last hope was to obtain royal alliances forher relatives, thus securing new support against those of the Emperor. She had a charming niece, Mlle. Tascher de la Pagerie, to whom she wasardently devoted; and to set on the throne of Spain one who was almosta daughter would both gratify natural affection and fortify her ownposition. 

There is no indication, however, that Talleyrand's hand was crossedthis time, though again his judgment coincided with his interest insound advice. The country was utterly disorganized and a change mustoccur; the people were too haughty to endure their humiliation longer;it would be better to support Ferdinand as a reformer, and therebysecure for the French system not merely the kingdom proper, but allher colonial dominions. As Fouché put it, the King had so far been oneof the best of French prefects, and if he were no longer efficient hislegitimate heir had better be continued in the office. But the idea ofsecuring the Spanish colonies for his Empire dazzled and allured theEmperor more than the assured support of Spain. Having determined forthat purpose to put one of his brothers on the Spanish throne, hedisregarded both the clamorous calls for aid from the King on one sideand the approaches of Ferdinand on the other. All remonstrance fromhis own family was vain, and he proceeded with his scheme. A newconscription secured the forty thousand men for Bayonne, and GeneralClarke was ordered to fortify the frontier. 

Exactly in the nick of time the intrigues at Madrid had come to ahead. On October twenty-eighth an armed Spanish force seized theperson and papers of Ferdinand. Godoy feigned illness and kept hisrooms, while the Queen examined what was found. It was said that therewas a cipher code for corresponding with friends; a memorial fromFerdinand to Napoleon charging Godoy with a design to seize thethrone, and mentioning his mother's shame in covert terms; a memorialfrom Escoiquiz asking from the Emperor the hand of a French princess;and an order under the seal of Ferdinand VII, with blank date, to theDuke del Infantado, appointing him to the command of New Castile onthe King's death. Two days later Godoy's connection with the seizurewas proved; for, ill as he feigned to be, he was observed entering theEscorial after nightfall. Next day the King announced the discovery ofthis "conspiracy" in a proclamation to his people, and wrote a letterof similar wording to Napoleon, complaining that Beauharnais, theFrench ambassador, had been the center of the intrigue. The charge wasstrictly true, for this brother of the Empress's first husband, thougha bluff, honest man, was blindly self-confident, and had fallen intothe trap set for him in Paris. He was not unwilling to gratifyJosephine, he despised Godoy, and his evident friendship for the crownprince had been largely instrumental in creating the popularconfidence that France would regenerate Spain by means of thelegitimate heir. 

Charles also announced his intention of cutting Ferdinand off from thesuccession, and humbly requested Napoleon's advice. A commission ofCastilian grandees was appointed to try the culprit, whilesimultaneously strenuous efforts were made to force a confession ofconspiracy from him. The latter scheme failed, but the prince obeyedwith alacrity the summons to appear. Exactly what occurred is unknown, but it can be imagined; some of the facts leaked out, and the resultwas a wretched compromise both at court and among the people. Theprince asserted that he had written the suspicious order during hisfather's recent illness, basely denounced his accomplices, and bydeclaring that it was Beauharnais who had suggested his asking a wifefrom the Emperor strengthened the general belief that Napoleon hadinstigated his entire course. This was enough to cow the King andQueen. The offender was at once released, and wrote a formal requestfor pardon. His sire issued a proclamation granting the boon. Hisfriends were formally tried, but Godoy dared not ask questionscompromising the French ambassador, and they were acquitted. 

During the trial the "secret hand" was indicated as being stillunknown; some said it was that of the Queen, a few thought the grandinquisitor had been meddling. Napoleon sent a wily and misleadingepistle declaring that he had never received a letter from the Princeof Asturias, --which literally was true, though he had been informed ofits existence and of its contents, --and that he had heard nothing butthe vague gossip of palace talk. This letter of Napoleon's wasconfided on November thirteenth to one of his shrewdest counselors, the chamberlain de Tournon, who was carefully instructed to bring homethe most accurate information he could secure regarding the state ofpublic feeling, and secretly to observe the condition in which hefound the frontier fortresses of Pamplona and Fuenterrabia. On thesame day orders were issued for Dupont to take advantage of thegeneral excitement incident to the recent events, cross the frontierwith his division, and advance to Vitoria, whence he shouldreconnoiter the surrounding country. As if to emphasize his ownindifference, in reality to avoid unpleasant questions and with themost serious objects in view, the Emperor set out for Italy a few daysearlier; and the day of his arrival in Milan was the date on whichDupont invaded Spain. During this visit to Venice, which has beenreferred to as the time in which Russia was brought to a standstilland the ultimate method of procedure in the Orient outlined, Napoleonmet the Queen Regent of Etruria. She declared, as was expected of her, that she could not continue to reign where she did not rule, herdominions being occupied on the ground of large policy by Frenchtroops; accordingly she was despatched to Madrid with a royal train. Her sometime kingdom was incorporated with that of Italy, and theunsuspecting Beauharnais was instructed to have her new Portugueserealm ready against her arrival. 

But the real object of that winter journey to Italy seems to have beenthe two interviews which the Emperor had with his brothers Joseph andLucien, the former being beckoned from Naples to Venice, the latterfrom Rome to Mantua. The younger brother had, after the first juvenileheats of radicalism, become a moderate republican, holding hisconvictions resolutely. Having opposed a hereditary consulate forNapoleon, and unmindful of any reward he might have claimed for hisservices of Brumaire, he withdrew from public life to spend his timein study and the gratification of his literary tastes. On the death ofhis first wife, by whom he had two daughters, he married, in directopposition to Napoleon's wishes, the beautiful and accomplished Mme. De Jauberthon. This was in 1803. Having been importuned to put heraway and lend himself to the project of buttressing the Empire byaccepting a crown and contracting a royal marriage, he had refused. Byfar the ablest and most courageous of the Bonaparte brothers, he wasutterly indifferent to the rise of Napoleonic empire, for hisprinciples were fixed. It was with reluctance that he came to Mantua. There are two accounts of what happened there: that which has longbeen accepted--of Lucien hotly refusing the crown of Portugal, withthe hand of Prince Ferdinand for his daughter Charlotte; and thatwhich makes Napoleon's first offer to have been Etruria. Both accountsagree, however, that the Emperor raised his bid to the promise ofItaly--always on condition that his brother should divorce his wifeand rule in the interest of the imperial power. Lucien disdained eventhis bribe, declaring that he would accept the crown, but that hewould rule in the interests of his subjects, and that he would in nocase consider a divorce. Angry words were spoken. Napoleon crushed inhis hand a watch with which he had been toying, hissing out that thushe would crush wills which opposed his. "I defy you to commit acrime, " retorted Lucien. Before parting there was a halfreconciliation, and Napoleon requested that at least his brother'seldest daughter might be sent to Paris for use in the scheme of royalalliances. Lucien assented, and the child, a clever girl of aboutfourteen, was sent to live with Madame Mère. She was thoroughlydiscontented, and wrote bright, sarcastic letters to her stepmother, whom she loved, depicting the avarice of her grandmother and thefoibles of her other relatives. These, like all other suspectedletters of the time, were intercepted and read in the "cabinet noir";their contents being made known to Napoleon, he sent the petulant, witty writer back to her father. Despairing of any support from Lucienor his family, Napoleon formally adopted his stepson Eugène, theviceroy, with a view to consolidating and confirming the Italianfeeling of dependence on France. 

Joseph's character also had ripened by this time. Experience haddestroyed the adventurous spirit in which he entered on his career; hehad become a gentle, philosophic, industrious monarch, careful of thebest interests of his people, and he was accordingly beloved by them. Roederer had introduced order into the Neapolitan finances, his ownadministrative reforms worked smoothly, and the only discontentedelement of his people was composed of the nobles, who chafed at therepression of their power and the curtailment of their privileges. There is positive evidence that Joseph was summoned and came toVenice, but there is no record of the interview, except a marginalnote written by Joseph himself in an existing copy of Miot deMelito's memoirs, to the effect that Napoleon spoke of the troublesamong the members of the royal family of Spain as likely "to produceresults which he dreaded. " The last word is underscored. "I haveenough anxiety prepared, " he said; "troubles in Spain can only benefitthe English, who do not desire peace, by destroying the resourceswhich I find in that ally to carry on the war against them. " Over andabove this information there is, however, a high probability thatJoseph was then informed that since Lucien had proved refractory, hehimself was now destined for Spain; that the King expressed at first adecided unwillingness to accept the unwelcome task; and that, likeLucien, he departed under his brother's disfavor. Napoleon's offer hadalready been discussed at Tilsit as a contingency. Joseph was soaccustomed to obey that a sober second thought led him to repent ofhis creditable hesitation; within a week, and before leaving Venice, he had despatched a confidential messenger to secure Alexander'sformal compliance with his transfer to Spain. He was under the spellof the magician, for it was probably Napoleon who prompted histhoughts. After that of Charles the Great, the empire of Charles V hadbeen the most splendid in Europe, and Joseph perhaps dreamed that ifnot first he might be second, eclipsed only by his brother. 

Godoy was an adroit diplomat. In reply to Napoleon's letter hepersonally asked and urged the bestowal on Ferdinand of a Frenchprincess in marriage, but at the same time he also urged thepublication of what had been stipulated at Fontainebleau. The answerwas most dilatory, and when it was written there was a new tone:Napoleon would gladly draw the bonds of alliance tighter by such amatch as had been so often suggested, but could such a mark ofconfidence be shown to a dishonored son without some proof of hisrepentance? He added that it would be premature to publish thearticles of Fontainebleau. In open contempt of that document, a decreewas issued on December twenty-third, 1807, from Milan, appointingJunot governor of all Portugal. On February second, 1808, this paperwas communicated to the King of Spain by Beauharnais, with theintimation that the treaty must temporarily remain suspended. Thescales now fell from Godoy's eyes. His agent in Paris informed himthat he had been coldly received by Champagny, the Minister ofExternal Relations; and soon afterward Mlle. Tascher de la Pagerie wasmarried to an unimportant member of the Rhenish Confederation, theDuke of Aremberg. It was thought at Madrid that the Emperor hadabandoned both the court factions; public opinion, whether favorableto one or the other, was soon united in a common irritation againstFrance, and before long it was current talk that Napoleon contemplatedthe dismemberment of Spain by the connivance of Godoy. 

Meantime the new conscription had been carried through, and everlarger numbers of French striplings, dignified by the name of troops, appeared at Bayonne, and crossed the border. The sturdy Spaniardsregarded them with amazement and contempt. There was no appearance asyet of any English invasion, and the army in Portugal was in no needof assistance; but Moncey followed Dupont with thirty thousandso-called men; Duhesme led an army corps to Barcelona at one end ofthe Pyrenees, while Darmagnac passed the gorge of Roncesvalles intoNavarre with his division, and seized Pamplona; Bessières hurried onbehind with the guard; and Jerome was ordered to levy forty thousandmen in Westphalia. Figueras, San Sebastian, and Valladolid were soonin French hands. The "Moniteur" of January twenty-fourth explainedthat these acts were necessitated by plans of the English to land atCadiz. Six days afterward the Emperor estimated that he had eighthundred thousand men under arms, and that he would soon have eightythousand more. In the presence of such facts the Prince of the Peacewas prostrated, while terror overpowered the feeble King and hiswicked consort. Nor was their panic diminished when a second letterarrived from Napoleon, dated February twenty-fifth, which plainlyshowed a determination to quarrel. "Your Majesty asked the hand of aFrench princess for the Prince of Asturias; I replied on January tenththat I consented. Your Majesty speaks no more of this marriage. Allthis leaves in the dark many objects important for the welfare of mypeoples. " In a few weeks Izquierdo arrived from Paris and reluctantlyexplained the appalling truth: that the gossamer bonds of the treatyhe had negotiated at Fontainebleau were blown away, and that Portugalwas to be given entire to one of the Bonapartes. This was theexplanation of the appalling armaments in northern Spain, beyond theEbro. Godoy returned an answer refusing all proposals tending to sucha conclusion. Izquierdo carried back this reply, and toward the closeof March Talleyrand was appointed to negotiate with him under thepretense of finding some compromise. 

Talleyrand was heartily sick of his inactivity, and eagerly seized theopportunity to reassert his importance. Abandoning utterly theposition of semi-resistance to Napoleon which he had held for sometime past, he now used his adroit and clever gift to further theEmperor's schemes. The document which was finally drawn up by him gavethe French equal rights in the Spanish colonies with Spanish subjects, and proposed an exchange for Portugal of the great march north of theEbro, which had once been held by Charles the Great and was now heldby Napoleon. When Izquierdo heard the hard stipulations he cried outin dismay, but to every remonstrance came the cool reply that such wasthe Emperor's will. Early in March Bessières entered Spain withthirty-five thousand men. This raised the total number in thescattered divisions of the French troops now south of the Pyrenees toabout a hundred thousand. The Spaniards were at last thoroughly awaketo the fact of their humiliation. Excitement became more and moreintense, until an eruption of popular violence was imminent. 

At this crisis Napoleon took a step of great significance. Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, arrived at Burgos on March thirteenth, with fullpowers as commander-in-chief, and at once assumed command. Ordering aconcentration of all the divisions, he slowly marched on Madrid. ThePrince of the Peace and the King heard their hour striking. Godoy'sfirst thought was to imitate the example set by the house of Braganza, and, flying beyond the seas, to establish the Spanish Bourbons inMexico or Peru. The Queen was from the first ardent for a projectwhich would prolong the semblance of power for herself and thefavorite, but it was days before Charles could bring himself to such aconclusion. At last, on March fifteenth, the council was summoned tohear his determination, and orders were given to keep open the routeto Cadiz. The populace felt that disgrace could go no further, and, denouncing Godoy, besought the King to remain. 

They could get no satisfactory answer from Aranjuez, where thevacillating, terrified, and disunited court now was. One day followedanother, and the streets of that town swarmed with angry men whosepride and scorn found expression in calls for Godoy's death. On theevening of the seventeenth they began to riot, and the wretchedprince saw his house surrounded. Half clad and half starved, he triedfirst one door and then another; all were beset, and he was compelledto take refuge in the loft, where he remained hidden under a rubbishheap while the mob worked their will in the handsome rooms below. Nextmorning Charles yielded to the popular clamor, and deposed Godoy fromhis high offices. For forty-eight hours the minister lay concealed. Atlast he could no longer endure the tortures of hunger and thirst;evading the attention of his own household, he reached the street, andon the nineteenth was taken in charge by the guards who held it. Therumor of his capture spread fast, and it required great courage on thepart of the soldiers to protect their prisoner from violence. Theirefforts were only partly successful; they had a bloody and faintingburden when they reached their barracks and withdrew behind the doors. In that moment, when it seemed as if the mob would finally break downeven the strong entrance and seize its prey, Charles despatched hisson to calm the storm. 

The people adored the Prince of Asturias, and without difficulty hequieted the rioters and offered life to his enemy. The haughtygrandee, broken by pain, fell on his knees and implored protection;but he retained enough of interest in the situation to murmur throughhis gory lips, "Are you already king?" "Not yet, but I shall be soon, "was the reply. On a promise that the traitorous betrayer of hiscountry's honor should be delivered to the courts and tried by therigor of the law, the excited populace withdrew. At once Charles beganpreparations to carry Godoy beyond their reach; but the fact could notbe kept secret, and once more rioting began. The populace of Madridburned all the palaces belonging to the prince, except one, whichthey spared because they thought it was the property of theirsovereign. The King submitted to what was inevitable, but determinedto lay down the burden of his royal dignity. On the same day, thenineteenth, he signed the necessary papers and abdicated in favor ofhis son. Next morning, in the presence of a great council summoned toAranjuez, he explained that he was overwhelmed by misfortune and theweight of government, and that for his health's sake he must seek theease of private life in a milder clime. 

CHAPTER X

THE AWAKENING OF SPAIN[21]

 [Footnote 21: See Baumgarten: Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der Französischen Revolution bis auf unsere Tage. Manini: Historia de la marina real española. Arteche y Maro: Guerra de la Independencia. Toriño: Guerra de la Independencia. 

 On the question of the national rising in Spain see an article by J. B. Rye and R. A. Bence-Pembroke, of Oxford, in the Army Service Corps Quarterly, October, 1905. ]

 The National Spirit -- The Spaniards and their Dynasty -- Murat's Fatal Blunder -- Louis Napoleon and the Spanish Throne -- Napoleon's Subterfuge -- A Trap for Charles and Ferdinand -- The Course of Savary -- Napoleon and Ferdinand -- Dethronement of the Spanish Bourbons -- Quarrels of Father and Son -- The Madrid Massacre -- Ferdinand a Prisoner -- Napoleon's Idea of Legitimacy -- The Spanish Cortes at Bayonne -- Joseph, King of Spain -- The Spanish People -- Agitations in Madrid -- Uprising of Spain. 

If there be a time when the turn of Napoleon's fortunes is evident, itis the spring of 1808. Between the determination to complete hissystem of commercial warfare in western Europe and the contempt whichhe entertained for the Spanish throne, he appears to have fallen intoa deadly snare--the failure to appreciate how strong and lively wasthe popular passion for nationality in Spain, a feeling so longeclipsed by the failures of Spanish government, the licentiousness ofthe Spanish court, and the turbulence of personal ambitionsindifferent to the public welfare. The measures he devised and orderedtaken were ruthless in their purpose to cow officials and monarch, intheir stern repression of disorder, in their intent to give a bitterlesson to all opposing his designs. But rude as was his procedure, admirable as were his military dispositions, there is abundantevidence of his consciousness that ultimately he must reckon with thenational pride of a people which, though crushed to earth, was eagerto rise again. But such reckoning must be postponed until afterconquest and the effort to rise was put forth in the resistance toinvasion with a speed and vigor no one could have foreseen. Ferdinand's first act as king was to request Napoleon's favor andprotection. His letter was written on March twentieth, and intrustedto an embassy of three grandees. Charles and Louisa had, however, repented almost before the formalities of abdication were over, andthe newly arrived Queen of Etruria supported them in their fickleness. With despicable inconsistency they too despatched an embassy, but toMurat, imploring his interference on their behalf and his favor forGodoy. In reply, Murat, whether from slyness or from a desire to gaintime, requested a formal, written demand to that effect. He waspromptly furnished with a paper, signed by both King and Queen, declaring that they had acted under fear, and begging to bereinstated. This document was a precious arrow for Napoleon's quiver. Still, the perplexity of the French commander was great; he knewnothing of Napoleon's plans, he dared not acknowledge Ferdinand asking, and he dared not restore Charles, whose sovereignty he had beenvirtually menacing by his march. In this dilemma he despatched anaide-de-camp to Aranjuez with verbal messages of comfort, and, hurrying forward, entered Madrid with his army on the twenty-third. 

Napoleon had frequently enjoined his brother-in-law to enter the city, recruit his supplies, and give his troops a rest; but with thoseinjunctions he had likewise given strict commands to allay any fearsin the court. These instructions had not contemplated the revolutionof Aranjuez, and by it every condition was changed. Murat would havebeen wise if he had disobeyed the letter of his orders; but he didnot, for new circumstances breed new ideas, and within twenty-fourhours he had made up his mind. Here was a new kingdom; the other menof the family--Louis, Jerome, and Joseph--all had crowns; the grandduchy of Berg was very well, but a kingdom was better, and he mightsecure that of Spain for himself. For this end he must throw Ferdinandaltogether into the shade, while placing the glory and power of Francein the most brilliant illumination. It was a fatal step to occupyMadrid, more fatal still for the French general to exhibit himself ina martial splendor which sadly contrasted with the troops of beardlessboys at his back. He was received by the inhabitants with coolcontempt. Next day Ferdinand made his royal entry. The populace wentmad with delight, and displayed a passionate devotion which auguredill for the schemes of Prince Joachim of Berg. A less egoistic manwould have seen that a national uprising was imminent. But Murat wasneither modest nor penetrating; he was a great and dashing cavalrygeneral, at times an excellent commander-in-chief, but he was not astatesman. His conduct entangled the skeins of Spanish intrigue into aknot which only war could sever. 

His course did not even ultimately lead to the goal, but toconsequences far different. When on March twenty-fifth Napoleonreceived the despatch announcing the revolution of Aranjuez andMurat's neutral attitude, he replied in commendatory language, instructing his brother-in-law to keep the balance as it was, neitherrecognizing the new King until further directions, nor indicating byany action that the old one had ceased to reign. The same day, thetwenty-fifth, a letter was despatched to King Louis at The Hague, asking for an answer in categorical terms as to whether he wouldaccept the Spanish throne. Joseph had hesitated and was momentarilyout of favor, while the perpetual smuggling of the Dutch had convincedNapoleon that the only means to secure the continental embargo was toincorporate Holland with France. Three days later Murat received stillhigher praise, with a perfectly irrelevant clause interjected: "Isuppose Godoy will come by way of Bayonne. " This was, of course, ahint to send the Prince of the Peace into France. If the commander ofthe French forces should act on the suggestion, he would do the workthoroughly; and under the same date Bessières was instructed to treatthe old King and Queen with distinction if they should pass his way. Publicly it was to be made known in Madrid that the long-talked-ofvisit by the Emperor would not be further postponed. Such wasNapoleon's confidence in the quick apprehension of his subordinatesthat henceforward he regarded the whole royal household of Spain ashis prisoners. 

There is in existence what purports to be a letter from Napoleon toMurat, dated March twenty-ninth. [22] It is undoubtedly by Napoleon, but it was either written at the time, for public effect, and notsent, or it was a later fabrication intended to mislead posterity, because its formal style is not used elsewhere in the correspondence. It explains to "His Imperial Highness" what was not known until tenyears later, namely, that the Spaniards were a people with violentpolitical passions, capable of indefinite warfare; that the nationcould and must be regenerated only by careful management; and thatnothing must be done precipitately. At the same time it gives theProtector, as Murat is designated, his own option in regard to arecognition of Ferdinand, expresses disapproval of the precipitateseizure of Madrid, and warns him that he must not create anirrepressible opposition. Whether the letter be authentic or not, whether it was sent or not, really matters but little as regards ourjudgment of the facts. The disorganization of Spain had been its ownwork; the court intrigues were already burning before they were fannedby Napoleon's agents in the hope that, like the royal house ofPortugal, the incapable Spanish Bourbons would fly to America. Therevolution of Aranjuez was a bitter disappointment to the greatschemer, and disconcerted his plans. But Murat's conduct andFerdinand's character rendered difficult, if not impossible, anycourse which would combine the consummation of his fixed designs witheven the slightest degree of popular good will in Spain. Nothing wasto be gained at such a supreme moment by the ordinary brutal abusewhich the Emperor was accustomed to heap on his brother-in-law forcommonplace offenses; moreover, in view of the disappointingrevolution, Murat's course was perhaps as good as any other. He must, however, bear whatever responsibility attached to it, and thatresponsibility would have been his even without the supposititiousletter which he never received. The contempt of the people for theboy-soldiers at whose head he had marched into Madrid, combined withdisdain for his own pompousness and with fury at his subsequentcruelty, goes far to account for much that was disastrous to Frenchprestige and to France in the sequel. 

 [Footnote 22: For a discussion of this letter see Murat, by Murat, Paris, 1897, p. 139. Rosebery: The Last Phase, pp. 10 and 11. ]

In order to secure the Spanish crown it was now necessary that boththe quarreling factions should be removed from the scene of theirscandalous intrigues. Perhaps it would be possible, perhaps not. Napoleon set out on April second for Bayonne, accompanied by hisEmpress with a stately suite, and the adroit Savary was despatched toMadrid. Savary's memoirs indicate that his instructions for thismemorable journey were very vague: the Emperor wished to see whetherthe Bourbons merited dethronement; in other words, whether they couldbe uncrowned. For himself, Savary naively declared that much of hisown participation in the subsequent events was mere accident. Murathad obeyed both his verbal and his implied instructions. According tothe former, Charles and his consort were in the Escorial, treated withall honor, but prisoners. Godoy, also, was aware that he must soonappear at Bayonne. But Murat had gone further, for he had slylysuggested to Napoleon that Ferdinand should appear at the samerendezvous. Beauharnais told Ferdinand to his face that he ought tomeet Napoleon half-way on his journey, in order the better to make hispeace. 

This hint was quietly conveyed to Savary before his departure, and hewas at the same time intrusted with a letter to Murat expressing adesire that the Prince of Asturias should either remain at Madrid orcome out to meet the Emperor, who intended not to enter Spain for thepresent, but to wait at Bayonne. The careful plan worked admirably. Noone knows on conclusive evidence what Savary said to Ferdinand, whathopes he held out, what promises he made in his master's name; but onApril tenth the young King placed Madrid under the administration of ajunta and set out, expecting to meet Napoleon at Burgos. He had beeneasily moved to this course, for Murat had so far coldly refused torecognize him, while Savary was prodigal of obsequiousness andaddressed him as king. His ministers Escoiquiz and Cavallos declare, in their justificatory writings, that in addition to the impressionproduced by his conduct, Savary actually said, as if in a burst ofmilitary frankness, that the Emperor was already on his way to assurehimself whether Ferdinand's dispositions toward the French system wereas sincere as his father's had been, and would of course be favorablyimpressed if a personal interview should be sought by the young Kingbefore his guest could reach Madrid. 

At Burgos Ferdinand learned that Napoleon was not yet within theSpanish borders; at Vitoria he was informed that the Emperor had notyet even passed Bordeaux. His people had utterly disapproved of thejourney, but they acclaimed him joyously on the two days' progress toBurgos. Thereafter he remarked a change, and the nearer he approachedthe frontier the more they showed their irritation at his insensatefolly. At Vitoria, therefore, he summoned Savary, whose carriage was"accidentally in the King's convoy, " and reproached him with deceit. It was too late; divisions of French soldiers were scattered allabout, among them the splendid cavalry of Bessières. To wheel andreturn would have been an open insult to the Emperor, which Frenchsoldiers would not have tolerated. The uneasy young King thereuponpenned and despatched by a special courier a long letter recalling thefacts, and begging the Emperor to terminate the equivocal position inwhich he found himself placed. 

The reply was speedy and most insulting, for it studiously avoided therecognition of Ferdinand's sovereignty. The Emperor had expectedbefore this to visit Madrid in person and institute some necessaryreforms, but affairs in the North had delayed him, and the revolutionat Aranjuez had changed the situation. He hoped Ferdinand wouldquickly put an end to any attempt at a trial of Godoy, for itsrevelations must necessarily dishonor the Queen. "Your RoyalHighness, " he wrote, "has no other rights to the throne than thosetransmitted through your mother. " Had the abdication been a free actor not? He would like to talk to Ferdinand as to whether or not it wasforced by the riots of Aranjuez. His "Royal Highness" had behaved illabout his marriage, for he should not have acted without the King'sknowledge, and every such approach to a foreign sovereign made by anheir apparent is a criminal act. If there had not been force atAranjuez, there would be no difficulty in recognizing Ferdinand;moreover, a French marriage for him would be not merely advantageousto the Spaniards, but to the interest of the French. 

The following day, April seventeenth, orders were issued to Bessièresthat if the prince should continue his journey there should be nointerference; but if, however, he turned back toward Burgos, he was tobe arrested and brought by force to Bayonne. Ferdinand hesitated as heread the insults, promises, and compliments which made up Napoleon'sletter. His Spanish counselors advised a return; Savary laughed atsuch scruples, and was not only voluble in verbal commentaries on theambiguous text, but profuse in promises. On the twentieth FerdinandVII of Spain, as his supporters called him, was at the gates ofBayonne. He was received, not with royal honors, but by his ownlegates, the three grandees whom he had sent to Napoleon; and theytold him with mournful accents that the Emperor with his own lips haddeclared that the Bourbons could no longer reign in Spain. It was withdejected mien and shaky steps that the young monarch and his suitefollowed Duroc and Berthier to the wretched quarters provided fortheir residence. The Empress was, throughout the three months spentat Bayonne, both gracious and conciliatory, playing her part ashostess with grace, and alleviating with kindness the bitterness ofher compulsory guests. On the evening of Ferdinand's arrival ahandsome dinner was given at the château where the court was lodged, and the visiting prince was most decorously treated. His train grewmore joyous and hopeful as the hours passed, although they noted thatthe Emperor did not address his guest as king. Still, that was aslight matter, and they returned in gaiety to their poor lodgings--allbut one: Canon Escoiquiz had been asked to remain for a short privateinterview, while Savary escorted his master. It was an identicalcommunication which was then made in the same hour to both ministerand prince; short, terse, and brutal: to wit, the Bourbons had ceasedto reign in Spain, and Ferdinand would be indemnified by Etruria if hewould formally renounce a crown which was not even technically his, since Charles declared that he had abdicated through fear. Thedocument in which this was announced had already been printed andpublished at Madrid by Napoleon's command. He now summoned Charles, Louisa, and Godoy to Bayonne. 

Murat had found trouble in liberating the Prince of the Peace, for thejunta feared the populace if they should remember the object of theirhate and scorn. But he finally succeeded, and in the last days ofApril Godoy reached Bayonne, where by the thirtieth all the puppetswere assembled. Dejected and broken-spirited, the minister agreed toplay the part assigned to him. The honors of a royal progress had beenpaid to Charles, and he posed for a few days as the King. Ferdinand, whose character and behavior awakened the contemptuous scorn even ofTalleyrand, was the culprit at the bar, charged with dishonoring hisparents. The trial scene was a shocking exhibition of human frailty. Ferdinand was summoned before a bench composed of his parents, whoclaimed to be still sovereigns, and the French emperor; Godoy, lookinglike a bull, as Talleyrand thought, sat sullenly by. The old Kingdemanded his crown. Ferdinand persistently refused to surrender it. Finally the trembling and invalid father rose on his shaky, rheumaticlegs and brandished his staff; the undutiful son remained unmoved. Asecond demand was made by letter; it was to the same effect, but theanswer was different. Ferdinand agreed that he would renounce histhrone before the assembled Cortes at Madrid, but there only, and toCharles IV alone. At Napoleon's command Charles refused to considerthe proposal, giving as a reason that Spain could be saved only by theEmperor. This was Napoleon's opportunity. Two days later an imperialdecree was promulgated, which appointed Murat dictator of Spain, underthe style "lieutenant-general of the kingdom. "

[Illustration: In the collection of the Countess of Sandwich. 

NAPOLEON IN HIS STUDY. 

From the painting by Paul Hippolyte Delaroche]

Meantime that intriguer had been making for himself a tortuousapproach to royalty. Nothing could more hasten the progress of eventsthan a riot in Madrid. The sensibility of the inhabitants of that cityhad been rasped by the French occupation; they had seen the departureof their idol with irritation, and had been further exasperated byGodoy's liberation. Murat set fire to the train of their passionsfirst by a new disposition of his forces, which so menaced the placeas to make it clear that he was no longer an ally, but a conqueror, and then by the announcement that the infante Don Francisco was to bedespatched to Bayonne with his uncle and all the remaining members ofthe royal family, including the Queen of Etruria and her children. OnMay second the entire population rose to resist this insolent tyranny. Murat was ready for the move; the conflict was short, but it wassharp, for he lost several hundred soldiers, perhaps half as many asthe patriots, in whose ranks some eight hundred fell. The aspirant toroyal honors yielded with ostentatious grace to the firstrepresentations of the junta, and promised a general amnesty; but healso thought it best to make an example before the eyes of his futuresubjects, and in spite of his plighted word two hundred of theinsurgent patriots were seized and shot. This very day, however, therewas pronounced a decree of rude disenchantment for him. It was on Maysecond that Napoleon definitely wrote to him that the kingdom of Spaincould not be his; he might have Naples or Portugal. The Emperor wastired of Bayonne, and longed to be back in Paris, where he could beactive about the business of perpetuating his empire and his dynasty. The stubborn Ferdinand was therefore summoned once more, and chargedwith having instigated the upheaval of Madrid. He remained mute forsome minutes, and with downcast eyes. "If before midnight, " came thecold words of the Emperor, "you have not recognized your father aslegitimate king, and notified the fact at Madrid, you will be treatedas a rebel. " Some declare that there was besides a menace of death. 

This ended all resistance. Ferdinand resigned his rights as king intohis father's hands, his rights as heir into those of Napoleon. Charleshad already assigned his rights as king to the same suzerain. [23] Thecomplacent old man was actually cheerful and joyous, as hisentertainer desired he should be; but Ferdinand, in spite of the factthat he was to have the château of Navarre with an income of a millionfrancs, in spite of promises that all the royal family would beliberally pensioned, remained silent and gloomy. Napoleon was notpleased by this behavior, and in commending him to the hospitality ofTalleyrand, at the splendid castle of Valençay, declared that hiswhole character could be summed up in a single word--sullen. PoorTalleyrand! he saw himself condemned to the "honorable mission" ofturnkey to a dispossessed monarch whose guard of honor was a troop ofeighty mounted police. By the Emperor's grace the young culprit wasnot to be committed to jail, for he had voluntarily surrenderedhimself; but Talleyrand was to watch and amuse him, and discover, ifpossible, some charming and marriageable girl to entangle hisaffections, so that in her society he might forget the delights ofpower, while time should weaken the promptings of ambition andrevenge. In a few days Charles, Louisa, and Godoy were comfortablyinstalled at Compiègne, while Ferdinand, with his brother, wentsullenly away to "visit" at Valençay. The prisoner's character wassoon displayed. The day of his arrival at his destination he wrote acringing letter to Napoleon, and soon after not only congratulated theEmperor on the accession of the King of Naples to the throne he hadclaimed for his own, but even felicitated Joseph himself on hiscoronation as Catholic Majesty. 

 [Footnote 23: Originals will be found in Oman, Vol. I, pp. 616-18. ]

Napoleon knew the mysterious power throughout Europe of that charmedword "legitimacy. " He despised the concept that it expressed, while hemeant to make the most of its power. Having misunderstood the strengthof Spanish patriotism, he now made the blunder of supposing that theSpaniards would receive as a legitimate prince whomsoever he chose toappoint as heir to the "legitimacy" which the Spanish Bourbons hadjust put into his hands. Louis, moreover, had but recently illustratedthe force of a new environment under the notion of legitimacy. Replying to Napoleon's letter of March twenty-fifth, he had flatlyrefused the Spanish crown, on the ground that he had sworn a solemnoath to the Dutch. Joseph was immediately restored to favor andordered to Bayonne. He came with apparent alacrity, due, as heclaimed, to his desire to free his beloved brother Napoleon fromembarrassment. Soon all was apparently ready for his inauguration. 

The treaty of Fontainebleau had produced unexpected complications anddisastrous results on its political side; the apparently insignificantmilitary clauses had so far been successfully executed. One Spanisharmy was far away on the Baltic, held under curb by Bernadotte;another had been despatched to western Spain, and had remained there;in the mean while the north and the center of the country wereoccupied by the French. General Solano had made some movement to leadback his troops into the occupied territory, but was checked in hisadvance by instructions from the ministers of Charles IV at Madrid. Uncertain as to their powers in a revolutionary crisis, he renderedonly a half-obedience; but it was sufficient for Napoleon's object, and there was no body of Spanish troops within striking distance ofthe capital. Accordingly, when the Spanish notables were summoned toBayonne, they could not well refuse, and a hundred and fifty of themresponded. On June sixth, 1808, the crown of Spain was offered toJoseph by this strange Cortes, and he accepted it. At the same timethe new constitution, destined by Napoleon to regenerate the country, was laid before the same body, which discussed and adopted it. In thefollowing month his Catholic Majesty presented himself, with thisdocument and a cabinet of able ministers, to the people of Madrid. Charles IV and his followers found Compiègne too cold, and soon moved, first to Marseilles, then to Italy. Murat became King of Naples. Ferdinand remained contentedly in France, licking the hand which hadstruck him down. Napoleon returned to Paris, uneasy at the attitude ofthe Spanish nation, but hoping that local discontent could besmothered by the strong hand, as he had seen it smothered in France, Italy, and the Orient. In this, however, he was to find himself sadlymistaken. 

In the story of Spanish degradation at its worst two names must standtogether as partners in political crime--those of Godoy and Escoiquiz, who sought to mask their own base ambitions behind the acts of theirfeeble creatures, the King and Ferdinand respectively. Throughout thewhole vile complot moves also the figure of the Queen, whosecounterpart must be sought in the annals of witches, furies, andhetæræ. But there were still left uncontaminated eleven millions ofthe Spanish people. They were indolent by nature, had been fetteredboth by tradition and by worn-out institutions, and had long groanedin the chains of corrupt administration. With the removal of theBourbons all these paraphernalia were swept away. The brothersNapoleon believed, and no doubt honestly, that pure and capableadministration under a modern system would soon produce order, industry, prosperity, and peace, and that a grateful nation wouldbefore long acclaim its preservers, and enroll itself as a devotedally against the "perfidious and tyrannical" supremacy of GreatBritain. It is useless to speculate how far this dream would have beenrealized but for the utter rottenness of the instruments with whichthe reformers worked. The King's senility, the Queen's lust, Godoy'sgreed, Escoiquiz's self-seeking, Ferdinand's unreliability, Murat'sambition, made a poor armory of weapons wherewith to accomplish abeneficent revolution. But the one vital blunder was, after all, notin the use of such tools: it was in the contempt for nationalityshown first in making the treaty of Fontainebleau, then in itsviolation by the subsequent seizure of Portugal, and finally in theoccupation of Spain by French troops. Declaring that more had beenlost than gained by the events which occurred at Bayonne, Talleyrandsays that on one occasion he icily observed to Napoleon that societywould pardon much to a man of the world, but cheating at cards never. If this be true, it was a stinging rebuke and one which touched theheart of the whole matter. 

To the bloody butchery and broken faith of May second, the day of theMadrid riots, may be attributed the turn of Napoleon's fortunes. Howfar he was responsible for each of Murat's successive acts cannot beknown. With exaggerated conceptions of the Emperor's ubiquity, someattribute every detail in every step to the direct intervention of themaster. This is unproved and highly improbable; but the spirit washis, and the use he made of each occasion as it arose is matter ofhistory. The fires of rebellion were lighted thenceforth on everySpanish hearth. Madrid itself was dangerous enough, but Madrid was notSpain, as Paris is France, and the fine local enthusiasm ofuncorrupted Spanish blood in every district was awakened into vigorousactivity by the news of how faithless had been the French treatment, not only of the royal house, but of the citizens--men and women whowere themselves true Spaniards, brothers and sisters of every otherSpaniard. This possibility Napoleon had not foreseen, and he did notgrasp the fact until long afterward, when years of bitter experiencehad rolled over his head. The Madrid riots, suppressed by Murat withsuch terrible bloodshed, were at the time, in Napoleon's mind, only awelcome leverage for moving Ferdinand to compliance, and that was all. 

But the city had been full of provincials attracted from all parts ofthe country to swell the triumph of their idol Ferdinand on hisaccession to the throne. They returned to their homes inspired withhatred for the French and with bitter scorn for the pretexts on whichSpain and Portugal had been torn from a commercial system that broughtthem considerable prosperity and many comforts, in order that theymight be incorporated, under foreign princes, into another system, which not only required serious self-denial, but brought stagnation, disorganization, and the presence of an armed soldiery. One weaknessof the Spanish monarchy had always been the absence of centralization, but that very fact had been the national strength in fostering localattachments. Into every city, town, and hamlet, each nourishing itsown local pride by local patriotism, came the news from Madrid of howthe invaders were trampling not merely upon Spanish rights, but uponevery consideration of humanity and good faith. The national will wasstirred as never before or since; its expression grew louder everyday, until at last the conflagration of devotion to a national causewas kindled far and near. Every community formed its committees, andthese organized such neighborhood resistance as was possible, whilecommunicating with other juntas of the same sort to unite their littlewars, or guerrillas, into a great combined and vigorous effortwherever the opportunity offered. Under the surface throughout allSpain the fires of resistance began to kindle; the crackling could beheard even while the assembly at Bayonne was adopting the newconstitution. 

CHAPTER XI

THE FIRST REVOLT OF NATIONS[24]

 [Footnote 24: See Yorck: Napoleon als Feldherr. Correspondence of Napoleon, vols. 17 and 18. Ducasse: Les rois frères de Napoleon Ier. Krones: Geschichte Österreich im Zeitalter der französischen Kriege. Pelet: Mémoires sur la guerre de 1809 en Allemagne. Maxwell: Life of Wellington. Schlesier: Erinnerungen an W. Von Humboldt. Arndt: Geist der Zeit. Fichte: Fichtes Leben. ]

 The New Rôle of Spain -- Guerrilla Warfare -- The French Cowed -- The Capitulation of Baylen -- The French Retreat from Spain and Portugal -- Complaints of King Joseph -- Napoleon's Exasperation -- Imperialist Sentiment in France -- The Emperor's Determination -- The Spirit of Prussia -- The Work of Stein -- The Revolution in Turkey -- Austria's Anxieties -- War Feeling at Vienna -- Napoleon Turns to the Czar -- Alexander's Hesitancy -- Napoleon's Misrepresentations -- Austria Warned -- Talleyrand and the Czar -- Napoleon's Allocution at St. Cloud. 

Thus far in the history of Europe all politics had been in the maindynastic. The nations having been consolidated under powerful houses, it was the reigning family which seemed to constitute the nationalentity, not the common institutions, common speech, common faith, common territory, common aims, and common destiny of the people. Spain, like Italy, had a clearly marked national domain, and, in spiteof some striking differences, a fairly homogeneous population. It wasfitting and not entirely unnatural that the land of the Inquisition, the land of ignorance, the land of intolerance, the land, in short, which had sunk the lowest under absolutism, should begin thecounterrevolution which, checking the excesses of Napoleon and theFrench Revolution in their disregard for nationality, ushered into theworld's forum the nation and national sentiment as the strongest forceof the nineteenth century. 

This was exactly what happened in Spain. Napoleon's strategy hadlaughed at the military formation of Frederick the Great's system; theguerrillas of Spain laughed at the formations of regular warfare inany shape. They rose to fight, and dispersed for safety, leaving theirsmarting foe unable to strike for lack of a billet. The occasionalsuccesses of the Spanish regulars showed, moreover, that the generalswere not entirely ignorant of Napoleon's own system. When Josephentered Madrid the whole land was already in open rebellion, exceptwhere French force compelled a sullen acquiescence in French rule. Thelong inactive, sluggish ecclesiastics suddenly seemed to feel thevigor to resist and the power to lead. They joined the insurgents, andinvoked the orthodoxy of the nation so as to inflame the passions ofthe masses against the persecutor of the Pope. Irregular and undefinedas were the elements of the uprising, it was nevertheless essentiallya popular movement; as Napoleon himself later admitted, it was thepeople themselves who refused to ratify his new institutions, and whodeclared for Ferdinand VII. The sequel furnished ample illustration ofthis fact: the mountaineers of Asturias rose in united rebellion; theinhabitants of Cartagena threw open their arsenals to the volunteersof the neighborhood; the citizens of Saragossa beat off theirbesiegers, while those of Valencia first massacred the French who tookrefuge in their citadel, and then repulsed Moncey in a desperateconflict. When the Spanish leaders ventured into an open battle-fieldthey were defeated; on the other hand, when they kept the hills andfought like bandits they were victorious. 

So quick and general was the Spanish rising that the various Frencharmy divisions shut themselves up for safety in whatever towns theycould hold: pretending to defy the national guards, who seemed tospring from the ground without, they were in reality awestrickenbefore the wrath of the armed citizens within. A quick burst ofSpanish anger, a sharp stab of the Spanish poniard--the frequency ofsuch incidents began to create a panic among the French boy-soldiers. The seizure and sack of a city had for years been a traditionalamusement of the grand army, connected in Italy and Germany withlittle or no loss of life, and enhanced by the acquisition of enormousbooty. The young conscripts, who had heard the oft-told tale fromtheir fathers' lips, found to their bitter disappointment that inSpain a sack meant much bloodshed and little, if any, booty. Sometimesthe tables were more than turned. A French squadron put in at Cadiz tocoöperate with a force despatched by Napoleon, under pretense ofresisting an invasion threatened by the English, but really for thepurpose of terrorizing southern Spain. The arrival of the troopshaving been delayed by the outbreak of rebellion farther north, thetownsfolk of that ancient city rose and seized the fleet. The corpsesof French soldiers, wherever found throughout the country, weremutilated by the furious Spaniards, and the wounded received noquarter. 

At the end of May, Murat was in Madrid as commander-in-chief, withMoncey as his lieutenant; he had thirty thousand troops. Junot was inPortugal with twenty-five thousand. Bessières had twenty-five thousandmore, half in Old Castile under himself, half in Aragon under Verdier. Duhesme commanded the thirteen thousand who were in Catalonia; Dupontstood on the Tagus near Toledo with twenty-four thousand more. In thefirst weeks of June four different skirmishes occurred between theFrench regulars and the insurgents in different parts of the country. Verdier at Logroño on the sixth, Frère in Segovia on the seventh, Lefebvre at Tudela on the eighth, and Lasalle near Valladolid on thetwelfth, had all dispersed the hordes opposed to them. By the middleof the month a regular advance was ordered. It took the form ofdispersion for the sake of complete occupation. While Lefebvre laidsiege to Saragossa, Moncey started for Valencia with ten thousandsoldiers, Dupont for Andalusia with nine thousand, and Bessières'sdivision was distributed throughout Castile up to the walls ofSantander, which closed its gates and prepared for resistance. Owingto the defiant attitude and desperate courage of the people, every oneof these movements was unsuccessful, each failing in its own specialpurpose. Cordova was captured, but it had almost instantly to beabandoned. At once Napoleon changed his carefully studied but futilestrategy, and determined to concentrate the scattered columns on thecritical point, wherever it might be. By this time Palafox and othersof the Spanish leaders had shown great ability as generals. The dangernow was that a Spanish army would seize Madrid, and thither the Frencharmy must betake itself. On July fourteenth Bessières successfullyoverwhelmed the opposition made at Medina de Rio Seco by the Spaniardsunder La Cuesta and the Irish general Blake. The only corps leftexposed was that of Dupont, to whom reinforcements had been promptlydespatched; but the Spaniards under Castaños caught his army, nowtwenty-five thousand strong, in the mountain pass of La Carolina, among the Sierra Moreña mountains, and on July twenty-first forcedhim to capitulate at Baylen, where his whole corps laid down theirarms. 

This was an awful blow, for Madrid was thereby rendered untenable. TheEmperor gave orders to retreat behind the Duero, and directedBessières to keep open the connection with Junot by way of Valladolid. In fact, he began to appreciate his task, for he warned his generalsagainst any system of cordons in dealing with such an enemy, useful asa string of posts might be in checking smugglers; and besides thischange of plan, there were indications that he would himself soon takecharge in Spain. There was need of this, for his generals andboy-soldiers did not stop to hold the Duero; evacuating Madrid, theynever halted until they were behind the Ebro, in what they considereda kind of French borderland. The siege of Saragossa was abandoned, andDuhesme evacuated Catalonia. Junot's situation was thus rendered mostprecarious, for when Wellesley landed early in August with fourteenthousand English troops, and found that the junta of Corunna had noneed of him, he promptly advanced against the invaders of Portugal. Having driven in the French outposts on the seventeenth, four dayslater he attacked and defeated Junot at Vimeiro. At the very height ofthe contest, when victory seemed already secure, Burrard, a superiorofficer, arrived to assume command. This reduced Wellesley to the rankof an adviser, and, his advice not being taken, Junot escaped to thestrong position of Cintra, whence, although entirely cut off from hisbase in Spain, he was able to dictate his own terms of surrender. Heand all his troops had a free return by sea to France, but Portugalwas to be evacuated. 

Napoleon was at St. Cloud, near Paris, when the news of this disasterarrived. To some extent he was already aware of the situation. He knewthat the Spaniards would not keep any stipulations they made, claiming that no faith was due to a hostile army which had enteredtheir country under the guise of allies--an army, moreover, whichstole the sacred vessels from the sanctuaries of their churches, andwould not keep its promise to restore them. The letters of Joseph, whowas now utterly disenchanted, had for some time been but one string ofbitter complaints. He had asked the Emperor whether an end could notbe made to the organized pillage of the churches, and had told himthat the movement in Spain was as irrepressible as that of the FrenchRevolution, emphasizing his hopelessness by the suggestion that ifFrance had raised a million soldiers, Spain could probably raise atleast half as many. He said, too, that men talked openly ofassassinating him; that he had no friends but the scoundrels, thehonest men and patriots being on the other side. "My generals, " wasthe Emperor's comment on this querulousness, "are a parcel ofpost-inspectors; the Ebro is nothing but a line; we must resume theoffensive at Tudela. " "I have a spot there, " he said, pointing withhis finger at his uniform. To calm his brother's fears, he repliedthat the whole Spanish matter had been arranged long before withRussia; that Europe recognized the change as an accomplished fact; andthat the priests and monks were at the bottom of all the trouble, stirring up sedition, and acting for the greedy Inquisition. "There isno question of death, but of life and victory; you shall have both.... I may find in Spain the Pillars of Hercules, but not the limits of mypower. " True to his old principles, Napoleon refused to "call off thethieves, " as Joseph besought him, and declared that, according to thelaws of war, when a town was captured under arms pillage wasjustifiable. 

These were all brave words, but the Emperor was in the last stage ofexasperation. The letters he wrote at the time betray something of theunutterable pain he felt. No one but himself could really know thedifference to him: his glory was smirched, his Oriental plans and hisscheme for peace with England were indefinitely postponed, hisimpatient ally was again put off, while Austria and Prussia wereencouraged to revolt. Was the vast structure he had so laboriouslyerected now to fall in one crash at his feet? The news of Junot'ssurrender was further embittered by the receipt of information thatthe Spanish troops under General La Romana, which had slyly beenposted first in Hamburg, and then sent to Denmark as Bernadotte'sadvance-guard, had at last revolted, and were embarking on Englishships for home in order to join the movement of national redemption. By this disaster the demonstration against Sweden promised to the Czarwas made impossible. This accumulation of misfortunes--defeat beforeValencia, defeat before Saragossa, disaster and surrender at Baylen, disaster and disgrace at Vimeiro, retreat from Madrid, desertion ofthe Duero as a line of defense, exchange of the offensive for a weakdefensive, and loss of the whole Iberian peninsula except the stripbehind the Ebro--all this was shameful and hard to bear. Nevertheless, under favorable conditions the situation might have been retrieved. The conditions, however, were most unfavorable. The example andsuccess of Spain were daily giving new comfort to Napoleon's enemiesboth in France and abroad. 

For the present, however, France might be trusted. The people as awhole had become imperial to the core. The republicans and royalistswere so diminished in numbers, and so silenced by the censorship, thatthey were virtually impotent. The real ability of the country was nolonger in retreat, but in the public service; the administration, both financial and judicial, had every appearance of solidity, and theindustrial conditions were so steadily improving that the mostenterprising and intelligent merchants began to have faith in theultimate success of the Continental System as a means of securing aEuropean monopoly to French manufactures and commerce. The perfectcentralization of France kept the provinces in such close touch withParis that there was no open expression of discontent in any part ofthe country. The people were not well informed as to the facts, andthey were slow to apprehend the significance of what they learned. Bythis time the Emperor was France, and whatever he did must be welldone. The gradual infusion of the military spirit into the masses hadmade them passive and obedient. There had been, they knew, someunpleasant troubles beyond the Pyrenees, but the season was not over, and before winter the Emperor's discipline would no doubt besuccessful. The grand army now pouring out of Germany across Franceinto Spain evidently meant serious business, but there could be nodoubt of the result. 

The court remained solemn and dull in its weary round of ceremony. Themoving spirit was now occupied elsewhere, and his constantabsent-mindedness made the whole structure meaningless; for it was anopen secret that the soft grace and beseeching eyes, the graceful andwillowy form, the exquisite taste and winning ways of Josephine wouldavail her no longer. The little nephew, Hortense's son and Napoleon'sdarling, his intended heir, was dead; Joseph had only daughters, andthere being no male successor to the throne, reasons of state made adivorce inevitable. [25] The deference of others to the Empress and hercondescension to them were but a mockery, the reality of her powerhaving vanished. In this vain show the Emperor moved more dark andmysterious than ever. It was his will that nothing should be changed, and every courtier played his part as well as possible, the twoleading actors playing theirs superbly. There was an outward displayof confidence and kindness between them, which sometimes may have beenreal; there were quarrels, explanations, and reconciliations--amomentary return at times to old affection: but the resultant of theconflicting forces was such as to destroy conjugal trust and creategeneral disquietude. 

 [Footnote 25: Masson: Joséphine répudiée. Welschinger, La divorce de Napoléon. ]

When Napoleon looked abroad he saw nothing to reassure him, andeverything to create alarm. In Prussia there was a regeneration suchas was comparable only to a new birth. The old military monarchy, under which the land had been repressed like an armed camp by itssovereigns, was gone forever. The Tugendbund, that "band of virtue"already mentioned, had ramified to the farthest borders; partizanwarfare was abandoned; piety, dignity, purity, courage, and the powerof organization were filling the land. The presence of the Frenchcould not quench the new spirit, but instead it added fuel to theflames of national hatred. Patriotic conventicles and every other formof secret meeting were held. Scharnhorst went steadily on with thetraining and reform of the army, while Stein, with a noble devotion, and under an unsympathetic master, was working to perfect his newadministrative system. The churches were filled, and the hearersunderstood every allusion in the glowing sermons addressed to them bya devoted and patriotic clergy; schools, colleges, and universitiesswarmed with students, whose youthful zeal found every encouragementin the instruction of their teachers, which combined two qualities notalways found united in teaching, being at the same time thoroughlyscientific and highly stimulating. 

At last, in August, Napoleon, who had looked and listened with deepinterest, read with his own eyes in one of Stein's intercepted lettersthat the minister and his colleagues were aiming at a nationaluprising, not of Prussia alone, but of all Germany. The illustriousstatesman, having emancipated the Prussian people, and having seen thereform of the whole political organism in that great land, wasproceeding to extend his beneficent influence throughout all Germany. In September Napoleon demanded Stein's dismissal, and enforced thedemand by sequestrating Frederick William's Westphalian estates, threatening at the same time to continue the French occupation ofPrussia indefinitely. There was apparently no alternative, for thecountry, although rejuvenated, had no allies, and could not fightalone. Stein, therefore, resigned after an eventful ministry of abouta year, in which he had prepared the way for every one of the changeswhich ultimately reconstructed Prussia. 

The two movements which in Spain and Germany menaced Napoleon'sprestige were national; there were two others, which, if not that, may, by a stretch of definition, be called at least dynastic. Thefirst was a revolution in Constantinople. The Sultan Mustapha IV hadbeen from the beginning a feeble creature of the soldiers, who, afteroverthrowing Selim, had set him on the throne. Before long he becamethe contemptible tool of an irresponsible robber gang known as the"yamacks, " who, under the guise of militia, held the Turkish capitalin terror. The situation in Constantinople had finally grownunendurable even to the Turks, and the Pasha of Rustchuk appeared atthe gates of the city to restore Selim III, who was still a captive inthe Seraglio. When the doors of that sacred inclosure were forcedopen, the first object seen was the body of the murdered sovereign, killed by Mustapha in the belief that he himself was now the soleavailable survivor of Othman's line. But the soldiers ransacked thepalace, and dragged from his concealment the young prince Mahmud, second of the name, and destined to be a great reformer. Him theyproclaimed Sultan and set upon the throne, appointing their leadergrand vizir. The new government was devoted to reform, contemptuous ofFrench influence, and determined to repress the evils which seemed tohave ruined its predecessor. This severity was more than thelicentious capital would endure. At once every element of discontentburst forth again, --the janizaries, the Ulema, or doctors of thesacred law, and the people, --some mistrusting one thing, othersanother, all alike unwilling to obey any master but their own will. Disintegration of what little administrative organization there stillwas, seemed imminent. The Turkish generals on the Danube began to makelight of the armistice or truce of Slobozia, Napoleon's one reliancein his Eastern designs; they actually set in motion their troops, andprepared to take the offensive against Russia. This was in the hopethat, before asking a separate peace from the Czar or returning toseize the leadership at Constantinople, they might secure somemilitary prestige as a working capital. The whole outlook seemed toforetell the extinction of French influence with the Porte and a crashin the Orient before Napoleon was ready to take advantage of it. 

But the events of Bayonne had been productive of greater alarm to thehouse of Austria than to any other power. In the humiliation of theHohenzollerns, Napoleon had the sanction of conquest, though, in viewof Prussia's rising strength, it was now commonly said that he haddone too much or too little. While in weakening that nation he hadrudely lopped the strength of an old French ally, yet he had notdestroyed it, and he had exercised what all Europe still admitted tobe a right--that of superior force. Austria, on the other hand, hadbeen an old and inveterate rival of France in the race for territorialextension. Napoleon's treatment of her after Austerlitz had beenbitter, but the Hapsburgs could not plead former friendship. Here, however, was a new development in Napoleonic ambition. The successiveannouncements that minor ruling dynasties had ceased to reign had allbeen made with the partial justification of either conquest or generalexpediency, or, as in most cases, of both. The Spanish Bourbons hadbeen the Emperor's most obsequious and useful allies, obeying hisbehests without a question: for their degradation there was no pleaeither of expediency or of a right secured by conquest. The extinctionof what still ranked as a great royal house was accomplished bychicane, was due to a boundless ambition, and was rendered utterlyabhorrent to all divine-right dynasties by the specious pretext ofreform under which it was accomplished. This gave Francis food forreflection. 

In the territorial expansion of Rome her victims were first conquered, then made dependent allies, then at last destroyed, and their landsturned into Roman provinces. It appeared as if this, too, were, ingeneral, Napoleon's policy; but in some cases he showed himself quitewilling to dispense with any intermediary stage and marched direct tohis goal. Austria, already irritated by the disposition made ofEtruria and by the treatment of the Pope, could endure the suspense asto her own fate no longer. Her new military system was complete, herarmies were reorganized and reëquipped, her administration was wellordered, her generals and statesmen were alike confident. The Emperorof the French had shown quite the same impatience with Austria inJuly as with Prussia in September, admonishing both to observe theContinental System with strictness; but his warning produced no effectat Vienna. On the contrary, the Viennese newspapers took a belligerenttone, and called for war; English goods poured in through the harborof Triest; communications between the ministry at London and thecabinet at Vienna became more frequent and regular; the nationsupported its monarch and assumed a warlike attitude. The disasters inSpain tied Napoleon's hands, and he did nothing in a military wayexcept to call Davout from Poland into Silesia, and to strengthenMortier in Franconia. 

With the inconsistency of the highest greatness, Napoleon changed hiswhole political campaign in the twinkling of an eye, as he so oftendid his military ones. During the long months since the interview atTilsit, Alexander had been kept in an agony of uncertainty, deprivedof real French coöperation in regard either to Sweden or to Turkey, and actually menaced by the continued occupation of Prussia and thefortification of the strategic points in the duchy of Warsaw. Caulaincourt had found his mission of dissimulation andprocrastination most difficult, partly by reason of Pozzo di Borgo'sinfluence, partly because the conquest of Muscovite society was a taskhitherto unknown to French arts, and experience had to be dearlybought. In this latter work his success was very moderate, but hebecame unconsciously an intimate friend and adviser of the Czar. Thisdispleased Napoleon, who promptly recalled him to his senses by awarning that he must not forget that he was a Frenchman. Caulaincourtbravely repelled the insinuation, but the correspondence of Napoleonboth with him and with the Czar became so voluminous that the Emperorwas virtually his own ambassador. 

The contents of these letters were partly personal and friendly;partly promissory, in preparation for what was about to be done atBayonne; partly preliminary to the second interview between the twoemperors, which had been mentioned at Tilsit and often discussed sincethen. But so far there was not the slightest change of front, nosubstantial fulfilment of the vague promises, no coöperation; theworld was still under the system of Tilsit in the union of Russia andFrance--a union so far represented by the will of Napoleon. The eventsat Bayonne deeply affected Alexander. His ally knew they would, and onJuly tenth he wrote a long letter to St. Petersburg, lamely justifyinghis conduct. But, after all, the Czar cared little for ancientEuropean dynasties, and, recovering from the first shock, he began tomake sport of a king "who had nothing further to live for than hisLouise and his Emmanuel, " and then took a firm stand in approval ofhis ally's course. The French and Russian ministers had now completedtheir scheme for the partition of Turkey, and the Czar finally andunconditionally assented to the second meeting with the Emperor. 

But before the details of the all-important interview could bearranged there was much to be done; in particular, Austria must beheld in check. An English vessel had arrived at Triest with adeputation of Spanish insurgents who offered the throne of theircountry to the Archduke Charles. The armaments of Francis grewstronger day by day. No one could hold the Hapsburg empire in checkexcept the Czar. Even amid the exhausting labors of Bayonne, Napoleonremembered this, and thought of the East, reorganizing his fleet inpreparation for coöperation with that of Russia, and commandingreports to be made on the geography and military history of Persia. After the loss of Baylen, of which he learned in the first days ofAugust, his ingenuity did not desert him, in spite of his heavyheart. A swift courier was despatched on the fifth, with a letterdated back to July twenty-first, and written as if in ignorance ofevents in Spain. He was enjoined to outrun the ordinary news-carriers, in order that, reaching St. Petersburg before them, he might presentas an offering of friendship to Alexander the promise of a virtualevacuation of Prussia--even, in certain contingencies, of Warsaw. Twenty-four hours later another messenger was despatched, conveyingthe bad news in the mildest form, and expressing as the Emperor'sgreatest concern a hope that the Russian squadron which had been sentto Lisbon would escape, as he had reassuring news from its commander. It mattered not to him that this was untrue; the end was gained, andthe real significance of Baylen was thereby largely concealed from theCzar, or at least the impression made on him by the news was weakened. 

Waiting for these communications to produce their effect, the Emperorforwarded a formal remonstrance to Vienna, in his own name, againstAustria's warlike attitude, and two weeks later categorically demandeda similar step from the Czar, opening out once more the vista ofindefinite aggrandizement for Russia in the East if only the Europeanconflagration were not rekindled. The Czar was charmed by the promisesof Napoleon, but when it came to a menacing remonstrance with Austriahe hesitated. The anti-French party in Russia were now repeating, likeparrots, first, Spain is annihilated, then Austria, then we ourselves. Moreover, as Alexander himself felt, arrangements like those of Tilsitare but too easily overset by unforeseen circumstances, and in such anevent what would Europe be without the Hapsburgs? In the end a feeblehint, backed up by a weak menace, was sent to Vienna. Peace, wrotethe Czar, is the best policy for Austria. "May not the peace ofTilsit, which I made, carry some obligations with it?" The warningproduced a momentary impression in the city on the Danube. [26]

 [Footnote 26: See Vandal, Vol. I, Chapitre Préliminaire. ]

In this short interval every preparation was hastened for theinterview which had now become indispensable to both parties. Napoleonhad only one object--to draw the alliance closer in the eyes of allEurope for the conservation of his prestige. Alexander hadseveral--the mitigation of Prussia's bondage, the successfuloccupation of Finland, and, what was the real bond of the alliance, the partition of Turkey. This was substantially what the Czar had beenpromised at Tilsit, but he had not yet obtained a single item of thelist then agreed upon. In spite of Caulaincourt's caresses andNapoleon's cajoling, he was now in a determined humor, and meant todemand the fulfilment of his ally's engagement, not from good will, but from necessity. Talleyrand, wearied to distraction by the dulllife of Valençay and the charge of the Spanish princes, had determinedto regain his diplomatic power, and now began, by the agency of hismany devoted friends in Paris, an extensive course of preparation fora return to public life and to influence. Through semi-officialchannels the Czar was informed that France, drunk with victory andconquest, now looked to his wisdom for protection from the furtherambitions of her fiery ruler. Before long Alexander's own agents beganto confirm this statement. The French nation, at least the reasonableportion of it, they said, was weary of Napoleon's imperial policy. Ifthis were true, Spain and Austria might be used to hold France incheck while Russia should work her will on the Danube. No matter nowif her ally were faithless: compliance could be forced from hisweakness. 

This disposition had been partly foreseen by Napoleon; he was informedby Caulaincourt how steadily it was crystallizing into a fixeddetermination. To the observer the moment seemed critical, but thegreat adventurer was still able to ride the storm. Whence the impulsecame is not easily determined, but he turned to Talleyrand as an agentlikely to be useful in such complications. The intriguer came forwardpromptly, and, receiving the Caulaincourt despatches, together with averbal explanation from the Emperor, was quickly in readiness for theduty of counselor, to which he was called. Napoleon himself assumed alofty tone. On August fifteenth he held a levee at St. Cloud to whichall the representatives of foreign powers were summoned; those ofRussia and Austria stood near together. Again, as on the famousoccasion before the rupture of the peace of Amiens, he uttered apublic allocution in the form of a conversation; this time it was withMetternich, the Austrian ambassador, and he was calmer and morecourtly. Reproaching the Emperor of Austria with ingratitude, heannounced his political policy; to wit, that Russia would hold Austriain check, while he and Alexander divided the East between them withoutreference to Francis, unless the latter should disarm and recognizeJoseph as king of Spain. Tolstoi remained frigid throughout the longharangue. It was he who had declared and repeated that eventuallyNapoleon, having humbled Austria, would attack Russia. A fortnightearlier, in an interview with the stern old Russian, the Emperor hadasseverated the contrary, but to no effect: Tolstoi had shown nosymptoms of faith or conviction. The address to Metternich was, therefore, a second string to Napoleon's bow in case he should fail atErfurt to win Alexander. His general mien was undaunted and his toneloftier than ever. The tenor of his private conversation withMetternich and others was that he would rest content with what he had. Spain would no longer be a danger in the rear, Austria and Russiawould be his allies, sharing in the mastery of the world, and England, the irreconcilable enemy of them all, would be finally reduced toignominious surrender by the loss of her means of subsistence. 

CHAPTER XII

NAPOLEON AND ALEXANDER AT ERFURT[27]

 [Footnote 27: See Fischer: Goethe und Napoleon. Pingaud: Bernadotte, Napoléon et les Bourbons. Rose: Napoleonic Studies. Bernhardi: Geschichte Russlands und der europäischen Politik im XIX^ten Jahrhundert. Schilder: The Emperor Alexander I, his Life and Reign. ]

 Napoleon's Imperial Hospitality -- The Interviews of Napoleon and Goethe -- Meeting of Napoleon and Wieland -- Their Conversation -- The Gains of Russia -- Dangerous Elements in the Dual League -- Austria Menaced -- Napoleon's Marital Relations -- Fouché's Machinations for the Divorce of Josephine -- Napoleon's Proposal for a Russian Princess. 

The second meeting of the two most powerful monarchs then livingoccurred at Erfurt on September twenty-seventh, and theirdeliberations lasted eighteen days. It was Napoleon's greatestdiplomatic engagement, and he was the victor. The town was his, and hewas, of course, the host. Such splendid hospitality as he lavishedwould have touched a harder heart than Alexander's. The luxury andmilitary display were barbaric on the one hand, while, on the other, Germany's greatest scholars and men of letters were summoned toflatter the Czar's intellectual pretensions. There was the sameexhibition, too, of frank personal confidence and of imperialmagnanimity as at Tilsit. Talleyrand and the Russian chancellor, Rumianzoff, held protracted conferences, the former, as he confessesin his memoirs, plotting against his master's interests, in order tosee that Austria should suffer no harm. Day after day Napoleon andAlexander paced the floor of the great room in the palace which hadbeen fitted as an office, examining details and bringing matters to aconclusion. There was intoxication in the very air. The kings ofBavaria, Würtemberg, and Westphalia were present with their consortsand attendant courtiers; so, too, were the Prince Primate and theminor rulers of Germany. The drawing-rooms, streets, and theaters ofErfurt were filled with the splendors of their gorgeous apparel andthat of their bedizened attendants. On October fourth the "Oedipe" ofVoltaire was given at the playhouse before the assembled courts. Atthe words, "A great man's friendship is a boon from the gods, "Alexander rose, and, grasping Napoleon's hand, stood for a moment inan attitude that typified a renewed alliance. The house thundered withapplause. 

More memorable still was the appearance on the scene of Germany's mosttranscendent genius, who came to lay the homage of his intellect atthe feet of him whom he considered at the moment, and long after, notonly to be the greatest power, but the greatest idealist, in theworld. Goethe and Napoleon met twice--once in Erfurt, once in Weimar. On both occasions it was the man of arms who sought out the man ofletters--_par nobile fratrum_. They talked of Werther and his sorrows;the Emperor appreciatively, and with a knowledge of detail. It is saidthat the latter took exception to some one passage in particular;which one is not known. The poet had probably just risen from penningthe "Elective Affinities, " and seemed to recognize his dazzling hostas a creature familiar with such ties, transcending the bounds ofnations, the trammels of commonplace human limitations, the confinesof ordinary thought and speech. "A great man can be recognized onlyby his peers, " is one of Goethe's own sentences. What to the poet werecommon men and the chains of political bondage, what were nations andtheir ambitions, in comparison with a society where mind and moralshad the glorious license of Olympians and could follow theunobstructed paths of inclination in realms controlled only by fancy!Napoleon's greeting was laconic, "Vous êtes un homme. " This flatteredGoethe, who called it the inverse "ecce homo, " and felt its allusionto his citizenship, not in Germany, but in the world. Thenineteenth-century Cæsar then urged the great writer to carry out analready-formed design and compose a drama on the life of his own greatprototype; such a work, he was sure, would be worthier of the themethan Voltaire's effort. At St. Cloud Napoleon had once paid a glowingeulogy to the power of tragic dramas, and, speaking of Corneille, declared that to his inspiration the French nation owed many of itsfinest impulses and its most brilliant deeds. "If he were here, Iwould make him a prince. " To Goethe he now said that in art, as inpolitics, there should be rule and ordered beauty; apropos of thedrama imitated from Shakspere, which mingles tragedy and comedy, theterrible with the burlesque, he expressed surprise that a great mindlike Goethe's did not like clean-cut models--"N'aime pas les genrestranchés. " These two judgments, taken together, give a valuablepicture of Napoleon's mind. 

Amid the brilliant scenes arranged for the entertainment of Napoleonin the stately little town of Weimar, when surrounded by that Germanaristocracy which he had humbled, he summoned to his presence the manwho in the two periods of his career personified first the strengthand then the weakness of the German folk--the aged Wieland. Indeed, the Emperor's conversation throughout that excursion to Weimar waschiefly of learning, as if he bowed before German knowledge, Germanscience, German letters. He had studied much, he said, in thebarracks, "when I was a young lieutenant of artillery, " and his cold, piercing glance seemed to search the very hearts of the proud princesand dukes who crowded around and literally stood at his chair indomestic service. It was at the ball given by the Grand Duchess thathe asked for Wieland. During the evening this gentle and now temperateold man had been present while the actors of the French comedy, brought among other decorative trappings from Paris, had declaimed the"Death of Cæsar" from the stage of the ducal theater; he had listenedto Talma's significant utterance of the words, "Rule without violenceover a conquered universe, " and then, wearied by the excitement ofthese strange experiences, had withdrawn from further revelry. TheGrand Duchess of Weimar, anxious to gratify her great guest, sent hercarriage to fetch the author of "Oberon"; and rather than detain theillustrious dictator, the poet started as he was, in his ordinarygarments, with unpowdered hair, wearing his little skull-cap and feltshoes. The meeting was therefore most dramatic. The dancing almostceased when Napoleon advanced to meet his visitor, for the companycrowded in a wide circle to look on and catch what they might hear. But the conversation was in a low tone. 

Wieland would never tell or write what was said, and we know onlyenough to feel that the great soldier's words were worthy both of hisgenius and of the occasion. He had treated the German nobility withhaughtiness; this plain scholar he treated as an equal. Speaking ofthe ancients, and defending the Cæsars against Tacitus, he discussedthe rise of Christianity and emphasized the value of all religions inconserving morals. The poet replied, when needful, in broken French, but soon felt at his ease, for the Emperor seemed disposed to engrossthe conversation, and in the manner of the times proposed questions. "Which of your works do you prefer?" Wieland disclaimed merit for any, but, under urgency, confessed that he liked best his "Agathon" and"Oberon. " Then Napoleon asked the stock query which he so often put toscholars and men of letters: "Which has been the happiest age ofhumanity?" "Impossible to give a reply, " said the poet; "good andevil, virtue and vice, continually alternate; philosophy mustemphasize the good and make the evil tolerable. " "Admirable!admirable!" said Napoleon; "it is not just to paint everything dark, like Tacitus. He is certainly a skilful artist, a bold, seductivecolorist, but above all he aims at effect. History wants no illusions;it should illuminate and instruct, not merely give descriptions andnarratives which impress us. Tacitus did not sufficiently develop thecauses and inner springs of events. He did not sufficiently study themystery of facts and thoughts, did not sufficiently investigate andscrutinize their connection, to give posterity a just and impartialopinion. History, as I understand it, should know how to catch men andpeoples as they would appear in the midst of their epoch. It shouldtake account of external circumstances which would necessarilyexercise an important influence on their actions, and clearly seewithin what limits that influence wrought. The Roman emperors were notso bad as Tacitus describes them. Therefore I am forced to preferMontesquieu; he is more just, and his criticism is closer to thetruth. " In discussing Christianity Napoleon said: "Philosophers seekin vain a better doctrine than one which has reconciled man withhimself, and has guaranteed the peace and public order of peoples, aswell as the happiness and hope of individuals. " The talk lasted fortwo hours, and the interview ended by a movement, not of Napoleon, butof Wieland himself, who seemed weary with standing. "Go, go, " said theEmperor, gently. "Good-night. "

Such were the scenes which unrolled themselves before the eyes ofEurope. Festival succeeded festival--plays, processions, parades, hunts, balls, and dinners. Onlookers sent broadcast to every quarteraccounts of the millennial harmony which presided over all. Emperors, kings, princes, nobles, marshals, generals, historians, scholars, poets, players, diplomatists, --the most brilliant actors on theworld's great stage, --were brought together at Erfurt in a group notoften equaled. The stars of Russian decorations, the ribbons of theLegion of Honor, glittered for the first time on breasts like those ofGoethe and Wieland, which were not accustomed to such distinctions. The dual league of emperors appeared to the world stronger and moreillustrious than before. In a sense this was true, for at the closeAlexander seemed to have obtained much, if not all, that he haddemanded. The two empires were still to act in unity for thereëstablishment of a general peace on terms which would guarantee toFrance her conquests made in the south since Tilsit, and to Russiawhat she had secured in the east and north. Things were lookingbrighter for the Czar in Finland, and of the Eastern acquisitionswhich he so ardently desired, Wallachia and Moldavia were alreadywithin his grasp. In other words, England was to be forced intoacknowledging the new order of things established by France in Spain, and into acquiescing in Russia's seizure of Finland, Wallachia, andMoldavia. If Austria should ally herself with the Turks to defeatRussia's aims, France would intervene for her ally, and, reciprocally, Russia would do the same in case the cabinet of Vienna should declarewar against France. In any case, Francis was to be compelled torecognize the new kings of Spain and Naples under the virtualcompulsion of a united summons by Russia and France. If England shouldagain prove intractable, the two monarchs would meet a third time, andwithin a year, to concert further measures. These were verysubstantial gains for Russia, and for the time being theFranco-Russian alliance was, as it appeared to the world, mightier andfirmer than it had been. 

But, on the other hand, it contained now what was wantingbefore--active germs of dissolution. In the first place, Alexander andhis ministers had shown themselves so firm that more than once therehad been hot words even between the emperors, and the memories ofthese were a source of the increased suspicions which Alexandercarried back to the Neva. The Czar had, moreover, been compelled toyield a very important point. The treaty, as a whole, was to remainsecret for at least ten years. He might occupy and consider as his ownthe two coveted provinces, but even they were not to be openly annexeduntil England's answer was received. An Anglo-Turkish alliance, Napoleon reasoned, would be disastrous, while a Russo-Turkishalliance, in case of Russian victory, would give the ministers at St. James's too much insight into the agreement of Erfurt, and perhapsbring on some such calamity as the seizure of the Danish fleet whichthe suspicions entertained at London concerning Tilsit hadprecipitated. The ultimate aim of the treaty was to be indefinitelyconcealed. Another dangerous element in the affairs of Erfurt was thatcontained in the additional provocation given to Prussia and Austria. It is generally believed that Napoleon urged Alexander to send troopsand occupy not only Warsaw, but parts of both Austria and Prussia. This would embroil him with his neighbors, and make central Europesecure while France was fighting Spain. If this be true, it explainstwo facts. Prussia in her despair had sent one agent after another toParis in order to secure some mitigation of Napoleon's demands. Thelast had been Prince William, the King's brother, who early inSeptember had agreed that his country should pay one hundred and fortymillions of francs, surrender to France the forts on the Oder, andreduce her army to forty-two thousand men, in return for thewithdrawal of Napoleon's troops and a reduction of the indemnity byfourteen and a half millions of francs. On October ninth, three weeksafterward, the prince was invited by Napoleon to hunt hares on thebattle-field of Jena! This incident, taken in connection with thedemand for Stein's dismissal, seemed very significant of Napoleon'sattitude toward Prussia. 

General Vincent had been despatched from Vienna nominally to explainaway at Erfurt the Austrian armaments; in reality, to observe what wasgoing on. Although he found no difficulty in winning the versatileTalleyrand to his cause, he was treated with scant courtesy byNapoleon, and sent back with a letter from him to Francis containingbitter reproaches and menaces. Stein, after his withdrawal, found, like Hardenberg, a refuge in Vienna. There he formed one of aninfluential coterie composed of Alexander's envoy, Pozzo di Borgo, andothers of like mind, who were steadily consolidating the warsentiment. The activity of these men explained a phrase in the letterto Francis, --"The last rising in mass would infallibly have brought onwar if I could have supposed that that levy and those preparations hadbeen arranged with Russia, "--which hinted at Russia's possibleinterest in the military preparations; and one day at Erfurt, asNapoleon's grenadiers were marching by, the Czar had to listen whiletheir Emperor vaunted the courage they had displayed at Pultusk andFriedland. Apropos of Napoleon's lack of delicacy, it is said thatonce in the Tuileries he significantly addressed one of his courtladies, not renowned for purity, with the words, "You are fond of men, I understand. " "Yes; when they are polite, " was the rejoinder. AtErfurt Talleyrand gave the same explanation of his master's vagaries. "We French are more civilized than our monarch, " he said to Montgelas, the Bavarian minister of state; "his is only the civilization of Romanhistory. "

But there was another incident at Erfurt more pregnant of ultimatechanges than any of these. Thanks to Fouché's Mephistophelianinsinuations, and the details which leaked out concerning the quarrelsbetween Queen Hortense, representing her mother, and the Grand Duchessof Berg, representing the Bonapartes, the subject of Napoleon'sdivorce had become common talk. The new position at Tilsit as therecognized head of Europe's kingly hierarchy seems as early as that tohave tempted the Emperor to a course distasteful to the man; but whatoccurred there is uncertain, and did not commit him. At Fontainebleau, the following autumn, his harsh and distant treatment of Josephinegave color to the suspicion that he was again under temptation. Whomwould he choose? asked the gossips. Sometime during the year a list ofmarriageable princesses was prepared by the Emperor's orders. Itincluded Maria Louisa of Austria, aged sixteen; Maria Amelia, niece ofthe King of Saxony; and the two sisters of the Czar, the younger ofwhom was not quite thirteen. The general opinion seemed to fix on oneor the other of the Czar's unmarried sisters. This rumor soon reachedSt. Petersburg, and the scandal-mongers of that capital promptlydesignated the Grand Duchess Catherine, for she was of marriageableage, and they said she was learning French country dances. Alexanderwas in consternation; the Russian party would be aghast if he shouldconsent, while a refusal might endanger the alliance on which hung allhis ambitions. 

Some months previously, Fouché, aware of the conflict in Napoleon'smind, had actually suggested to the Empress, and probably with herhusband's knowledge, that she should take the initiative. In reply sheran with disheveled hair and streaming eyes to ask an explanation fromher lord in person. He consoled her with many protestations, but heleft for Italy without having entirely reassured her. On his returnfrom Milan he roundly abused his minister of police, and forbade hiscontinued plotting. Nevertheless, the daring functionary persistentlydisobeyed, and by the month of March, 1808, the air of Paris was thickwith embittered and ardent pleas on one side or the other. One eveningthe court was to attend a gala performance to be given in theTuileries. Their Majesties did not appear. Napoleon, in fact, had notmade ready; instead he had retired to his private apartments and hadsent for Josephine. She entered her husband's chamber in full array ofevening costume, to find him in bed, pale, worn, and weary. At once hebegan the recital of his perplexities, pouring out, as it were, hiswhole heart, and, though not uttering the request, he seemed as ifbeseeching in dumb despair the decisive word from her. The Empress, however, was inflexible. Was he, he said in fierce disappointment, tobe compelled to adopt his bastard children? Surprised and touched byher signs of assent, the Emperor vowed never to desert her, and therematters had remained. 

At Erfurt the same vacillation overmastered Napoleon as that withwhich he had been tormented since Tilsit. By his command Talleyrandand Caulaincourt were to drop the remark before Alexander that thematter of the divorce was a European question; he wished to test, hesaid, the temper of his ally. Both ministers suggested that acontemplated match between the daughter of Paul I and the King ofSweden had fallen through because of the confessional difficulties, the latter being a Protestant, the former of the Greek Church. TheEmperor shrugged his shoulders in displeasure, and they dischargedtheir task. Apparently the Czar was not shocked, for, opening thesubject himself, he told Napoleon that his best friends looked withanxiety to see him consolidate his work and his dynasty by a secondmarriage. This of course led to a confidential talk, in which thepossibility of a matrimonial as well as a political alliance wasmentioned. If Napoleon had demanded on the spot the hand of the Czar'smarriageable sister, Catherine, it is doubtful if Alexander would haverefused. But the imperial host still vacillated, for he had not takenthe irrevocable step; a hesitating mention was made of his guest'syounger sister, Anne, who was still a child, as an eventualpossibility, and nothing more was said. 

To stamp the success of the meeting, a joint letter was sent to GeorgeIII, asking for peace on the principle of "uti possidetis. " The twomonarchs parted with every manifestation of personal devotion; but onAlexander's return to his capital his elder sister was married withindecent haste to the Duke of Oldenburg. 

CHAPTER XIII

THE FAILURE OF THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN[28]

 [Footnote 28: See Jomini: Napoleon, III. Cevallos: Exposicion de los hechos y maquinaciones que han preparado la usurpation de la corona de España, y los medios que el emperador de los franzeses ha puesto en obra para realizarla. Suchet: Mémoires sur ses campagnes en Espagne, 1808-1814. Rocca: Memoirs, 1808-1812. Also Memoirs of Godoy, Marbot, Masséna, and Murat. ]

 The Grand Army in France -- Their Entrance to Spain -- The Opposing Forces -- Napoleon's Strategic Plan -- French Victories -- Sir John Moore -- The British and the Spaniards -- Napoleon's Advance to Madrid -- His Return Northward -- Moore's Retreat -- Napoleon at Paris -- Death of Moore -- The Napoleonic Constitution for Spain -- Spanish Resistance -- Joseph's Weakness -- Establishment of the New Monarchy. 

[Sidenote: 1808-09]

While Alexander was hastening the preparations for his sister'smarriage, Napoleon was hurrying toward Spain, whither, too, thelegions of the grand army, released by the evacuation of Prussia, hadalready been ordered. Baylen and Cintra must be retrieved at any cost. As the splendid array of soldiers passed through France they werereceived like men who had already conquered. The civil authoritiesspread banquets for them, compliments rained from the honeyed lips ofchosen orators, poets sang sweet strains on the theme of theirglories. This appeared a spontaneous outburst to the troops, and theymarched with the elasticity of enthusiasm to their task. The curiousmay read to-day what the army could not know--that by Napoleon'spersonal decree the ministry of war had prepared every detail of thattriumph, that the prefects acted under stringent orders, that threesets of warlike songs were written by commission in Paris, andforwarded one each to various points, so that, as the Emperor wrote, "the soldier may not hear the same thing twice. " The success of theplan was complete, and the jubilations had every appearance of beinggenuine. 

It was therefore not a tired and disheartened army which was gatheredunder the walls of Burgos early in November, but a body of picked andenergetic veterans. Joseph, to be sure, had done little in theinterval to take advantage of the foolish and careless tumult intowhich the joy of victory had thrown the Spanish people. In spite ofthe minute directions which had been received almost daily fromNapoleon, Jourdan, who, having been the King's military adviser inNaples, had come in the same capacity to Spain, gradually lost everyadvantage of position. But the French boys who had fought in thesummer were older and more experienced. The defensive attitude oftheir leader had given them the training of camp life, and had securedthe recuperation of their strength. When, therefore, they were mingledwith the newcomers, they might be considered almost as good soldiersas those who had arrived from Germany. 

Moreover, the best generals were now in command: Victor was atAmurrio, Bessières at Miranda on the Ebro, Moncey at Tafalla, Lefebvrenear Bilbao, Ney at Logroño on the Ebro, Saint-Cyr at La Junquera, each with a corps, the smallest of twenty, the largest of thirtythousand men. Duhesme was shut up in Barcelona with ten thousand. There was a reserve of thirty-five thousand, the guard and cavalry, atTolosa and Vitoria. Mortier's corps of twenty-four thousand was in therear, and Junot, who had been better received in Paris than heexpected, was coming up with nineteen thousand more. In all, therewere about two hundred and forty thousand troops. Napoleon, reachingBayonne on November third, had it announced that there were betweenthree and four hundred thousand! With such a numerous and efficientfighting force, there was no need of exaggeration. To oppose it Blakehad thirty-two thousand Spaniards at Valmaseda as the left wing of theSpanish army, and La Romana, having disembarked at Santander, soonarrived with eight thousand more; the center, twenty-five thousandstrong, lay between Calahorra and Tudela under Castaños; the rightseventeen thousand in number, was at and near Saragossa under Palafox. Before Barcelona was Vives, with twenty thousand, and near Burgos wasa reserve of eighteen thousand under Belvedere--about a hundred andtwenty thousand men, all told. In addition to this regular army, therewas another irregular one of vast but vague dimensions, consisting ofthe entire nation. 

[Illustration: Map of the Spanish Campaign. ]

Amid the exciting cares of Erfurt, Napoleon had still found time tostudy the military situation in Spain with minuteness, and he finallywrote to Joseph that he was coming in person to end the war by oneskilful stroke. This hope was founded on the position held by Blake, advanced as it was beyond the Spanish line, and remote enough to beexposed. By a swift blow that general's army might therefore be cutoff from its support, and annihilated; the center and right wouldsuccessively meet the same fate. This plan had been jeopardized by therashness of Lefebvre. On October thirty-first Blake had advanced fromDurango for an attack. He had not only been routed, but in the heat ofvictory had been thrown far back to Valmaseda by the over-zealousFrench general. Although the Emperor had hoped for something quitedifferent, having given orders to draw him forward toward Biscay andNavarre, he still did not abandon his strategic plan. The Spaniardshad grown warlike in a day, but their victories had intoxicatedthem, and of military science they had only what they had learned byexperience. There was no harmony among the generals--not even apreconcerted plan of operation. Accordingly the mass of the Frencharmy was directed toward Burgos to cut off and overwhelm Blake, whiletwo corps under Soult were directed to intercept his retreat. 

Burgos fell almost without opposition on November tenth; Blake wasdefeated the next day at Espinosa, and his scattered columns, turnedbut not captured by Soult, fled into Asturias, where they joined theforce of La Romana. Without a moment's hesitation Ney was nowdespatched to the southeast in order to fall on Castaños's rear, whileLannes was to unite Moncey's corps with Lagrange's division and attackhis front. The Spanish general was posted, as has been said, on theEbro between Calahorra and Tudela. Before the twentieth the two moveshad been executed and all was in readiness. The Spaniards fled beforeLannes's attack on the twenty-third, but Ney with his cavalry remainedinexplicably stationary, and did not cut off their retreat. They weretherefore able to reassemble at Siguenza, while Palafox withdrew toSaragossa. This was seemingly an easy triumph for Napoleon's matchlessstrategy; his plan worked without real resistance, for hisself-sufficient and ignorant enemy was scattered. Nevertheless, itwill be observed that the execution was deficient and the resultdisproportionate. Neither Soult on the right nor Ney on the leftshowed such vigor or promptness as of old; there was no generalsurrender by the Spaniards, nor was any portion of their forceannihilated. All that was gained--and for a common general it wouldhave been much--was the ability to take another step. 

The capitulation at Cintra, the affair at Bayonne, and the uprising ofthe Spaniards had combined to intensify rebellion in Portugal. She wasnow in full sympathy with Spain, and her people were scarcely lessbitter or less active than the Spaniards. The easy terms secured byJunot had infuriated England, and not only Dalrymple and Burrard, butWellesley himself, had been recalled to give an account of theirconduct. The last was triumphantly vindicated; but while the otherswere not convicted of dereliction in duty, they were virtuallywithdrawn from active life. Sir John Moore was now in command of theEnglish troops in the Peninsula. He had been reinforced with tenthousand men, and feeling sure of Portugal, had advanced into Spain. To Napoleon it seemed evident that his intention was to seize Madrid. 

This was a mistake. The jubilant Spaniards, expecting to treatNapoleon as they had treated Dupont, had summoned the English to jointhem. Moore's orders were to assist them, and he prepared to obey, although he well knew what would be the consequences of Spanishhallucination. With one column he reached Salamanca on Novemberthirteenth; the head of the other was at Astorga. His own divisionnumbered only fifteen thousand men; the other was even smaller--tenthousand at the most. It was on that date that he learned ofNapoleon's victories. Accordingly he halted to await the next move ofthe French. That move was against Madrid. Saragossa was besieged byMoncey, Lefebvre was thrown out to guard the right flank, and Ney toprotect the left of the advancing columns; the march began on Novembertwenty-eighth. 

The first obstacle was the mountain-range of Guadarrama, which had tobe crossed by the pass of Somosierra. This defile was found to bestrongly guarded; there were not only infantry stationed on theheights, but artillery also, sixteen guns being below the turn of thepass in a most advantageous position. In the early morning of thethirtieth the French infantry began to climb the cliffs on each sideof the narrow gorge, and as the mists were heavy their movements weresuccessfully concealed until the Spanish bivouacs were reachedsurprised, and dislodged. Simultaneously a regiment of Polish lighthorse was launched against the battery. Their charge was magnificent, and the gunners could fire only a single round before they wereoverpowered. By the ordinary breakfast hour the pass was free. On theevening of December second the whole army--infantry, cavalry, andartillery--was united on the heights of Chamartin before the gates ofMadrid. Two days later, after a gallant resistance by its littlegarrison and the undaunted inhabitants, the city yielded to thesuperior strength of Napoleon, and proposed terms. After some parleythese were accepted, but under the circumstances the Emperor felt thatmildness must be seasoned by menace. There were disorders in thestreets, incident to the new occupation by the French, and that facthe used as a plea to declare the capitulation null and the Spanishofficers prisoners of war. Their men had escaped the day before. 

The military operations of the campaign were of course not yet ended, for Moore had not appeared in the valley of the Tagus, marching, as itwas believed he would, toward Madrid. The first task was to find him. The different corps were sent out in all directions, but it was notuntil the middle of the month that the British position was evenapproximately ascertained. Napoleon was surprised by what he learned, and concluded that the English were about to abandon Portugal in orderto secure Ferrol as a base of supplies. His first impulse was tomarch out himself and prevent such a disaster; on the twentieth halfof his army set forth from Madrid, and on the twenty-second he ledthem through the snows of the Guadarrama. 

Meanwhile Moore had made his decision. It was to attract the attentionof the French, draw them toward him, and then slowly retreatnorthward, thus leaving Andalusia free from interference, and givingthe southern Spaniards time to organize once more and equip themselvesfor a second Baylen. To this end he prepared on the twenty-third toattack Soult, but, learning of Napoleon's rapid advance, he promptlychanged his plan and began his retreat; three days later he led histroops safely across the Esla. Then began a famous chase. The Emperorhurried forward, marching on foot through cold and snow to encouragehis tired men. He was eager to strike a blow at his enemy's rearbefore they should get too far away, and Soult was urged onward toMansilla, to flank the retreating column. On the twenty-ninth theFrench cavalry reached the Esla and were driven back by the Englishrear-guard, while Moore stopped only long enough to destroy themagazines at Benevento, and then hurried on to Astorga. 

For two days longer the retreat continued. Moore, after manysuccessful skirmishes, reached Corunna, where he hoped to embark. Soult crossed the Esla at last, and on New Year's day, 1809, theEmperor found himself at Astorga. He believed there was an Englishfleet at Ferrol; the weather was bitter, and his health wasjeopardized by the severity of the cold; moreover, disquieting lettersarrived, and he determined that this game was not worth the candle. Soult was intrusted with the pursuit, Ney was stationed at Astorga asa reserve, and Napoleon, putting himself at the head of his guards, set out for Valladolid, which he reached on the sixth. After a restof ten days, new and more disquieting despatches made clear the urgentneed for his presence in Paris, though his task in Spain was far fromended. On January twenty-third he reached the Tuileries. 

The tale of Moore's splendid retreat, of his courage and calmness inloss and disaster, of his superb control of his men in theirdisappointment when Corunna was reached and no fleet was found there, of his brave fight with Soult on January sixteenth, of the mortalwound which struck him down in the hour of victory, and of theself-forgetfulness which enabled him in the agonies of death to makeall necessary arrangements for his men to embark on the belatedships--all this is a brilliant page of English history, perhaps thefinest record in its entire course of glory won in retreat, ofpatience, moderation, and success in the very hour of bitterestdisappointment. It was the spirit and example of Moore which madepossible the victories of Wellington. 

The French interests in Spain were left in a most deplorablecondition. The populace of Madrid had received the hero of the agewith coldness, and shut themselves up in their houses to avoid forminga crowd or creating any enthusiasm in the streets. They would not evencome out to see the gorgeous military parade which was arranged fortheir benefit. The gentry and nobility had been alike distant andcold. It was clear that Spain could neither be wheedled, cajoled, northreatened into even passive acquiescence in the new conquest. It wasessential, therefore, that another course should be tried. On Decemberfourth, Napoleon, in the rôle of reformer-statesman, pronounced andissued from Chamartin a series of the most thoroughgoing edicts. Allfeudal privileges, all interprovincial customs dues, were swept away;the Inquisition was abolished, and the number of convents was reducedto a third. These measures were in themselves most salutary, andstruck at the very root of the upas-tree under the baneful shade ofwhich Spain had been slowly perishing. But to do good they must beenforced; there must be a complete military conquest of the country, and a capable administration. 

There was neither. The Spanish army had been defeated, but, severe ashad been its punishment, its power of resistance was not destroyed;the occupation of the country was also sadly incomplete, and it madeno difference whither French soldiers marched, or what strategicpoints they held, some kind of Spanish fighting force, no matter howirregular, sprang up behind them and on their sides. The completemilitary centralization of Prussia had made Jena decisive for thewhole loose-jointed territory of that kingdom; the compact territoryof Spain and the local independence of her peoples made regularvictories utterly fruitless so far as the open country was concerned. 

Moreover, Joseph, although he had been driven from his capital, andhad enjoyed neither power nor consequence except as the general ofNapoleon's armies, now asserted that he, and not his brother, was theking of Spain. He was angry and hurt by the Emperor's assumption ofsuperior sovereignty. He was the one, he felt, who could best dealwith the Spaniards, win their affection, and consolidate his power. Tobe shouldered off his throne, and compelled to stand by while suchradical measures were taken, embittered him. Shame, he said, coveredhis face before his pretended subjects; he renounced all rights to thethrone, preferring honor and honesty to power so dearly bought. Thisangered Napoleon, and he threatened to divide the land into militaryprovinces; but, like his gentler brother, he himself recoiled beforethe utter annihilation of a nationality so ancient and dignified asthat of Spain. 

As the price for the evacuation of Madrid, the people of the capitalswore to accept Joseph once more as their king. Similar oaths ofallegiance came from all the provinces occupied by the French. Although these oaths were not considered binding by those who tookthem, inasmuch as they held themselves to be acting under compulsion, yet at least the shadow of Joseph's monarchy reappeared under theimperial protection, and a so-called liberal constitution, modeled onthat of France, was given to the people as a boon. "It depends onyourselves, " was the Emperor's language, "to make this charter yours. If all my endeavors prove vain, and you do not justify my confidence, then I have nothing left but to treat you as a conquered province, andcreate another throne for my brother. In that case I shall put thecrown of Spain on my own head, and teach the ill-disposed to respectit; for God has given me the power and the will to overcome allobstacles. "

CHAPTER XIV

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUSTRIA[29]

 [Footnote 29: See Metternich: Nachgelassene Papiere (English translation as Memoirs). Mazade: Alexandre Ier et le Prince Czartoryski. Duncker: Friedr. Wilhelm im Jahre 1809. Ranke: Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preussischen Staates von 1793-1813. Rapp: Mémoires. ]

 Dangers in Napoleon's Rear -- The State of Paris -- Austria Warlike -- The Czar's Policy -- National Movements in Germany -- Napoleon's True Position -- Talleyrand's Responsibility -- The Needs of France -- The Conscription again Anticipated -- The Archduke Charles -- War Declared by Austria -- Charles's Appeals to National Sentiment -- Imperial Excess and Dynastic Moderation -- The Uprising of the Tyrol -- Austria's Successes. 

[Sidenote: 1809]

The news from central Europe which reached Napoleon in Spain was of amost alarming character, and made certain considerations so emphaticthat all others became insignificant. It mattered not that he mustleave behind him a half-accomplished task; that while his strategy hadbeen successful, he had lost the opportunity to annihilate theEnglish, which, though he did not know it at the time, he had reallyhad in the tardy arrival of their transports at Corunna; that thenational uprising was not suppressed by his carefully devisedmeasures; that the oaths of allegiance sworn to Joseph and theconstitution had been sworn under compulsion by a minority, who, piousas the people were, did not, for that reason, consider even themselvesas bound, much less the nation as a whole--all this was seriousenough, but it was paltry when compared with what had taken place inGerman lands while he had been absent from Paris. 

During the campaign of Marengo there had been a knot of active, self-seeking, and traitorous men who, having risen by Bonaparte'shelp, schemed how best to sustain themselves in case of his death. This same group, under the leadership of Talleyrand and Fouché, hadbeen again arranging plans for their guidance should misfortuneoverwhelm Napoleon in Spain. Such was their activity that evenMetternich had been deceived into the belief that they had a largeparty of French patriots behind them, who, weary of the Emperor'sincessant calls on France for aid in enterprises foreign to herwelfare, would gladly be rid of him. So grave did the Austrianambassador consider the crisis that late in November he left his postand set out for Vienna. Vincent's reports about the friction at Erfurthad already found credence in the Austrian capital among the warparty, and the belief was spreading that the Franco-Russian alliancewas hollow. 

Stein's absence from North Germany had only intensified the sympathyof the people with his policy. Even at Königsberg, the seat ofgovernment, public opinion demanded the measures he had desired. Prussia was not only strong once more, but was ardent to redeem itsdisgrace. The reflex influence of the popular movements in Prussia andAustria upon one another had intensified both, until the more advancedleaders in the two countries cared little whether the process ofGerman regeneration was begun under Hohenzollern or Hapsburgleadership. Into this surcharged atmosphere came Metternich with hisexaggerated statements about the great reactionary party in France. The effect was to raise the elements. He declared, besides, that theSpanish war had absorbed so much of Napoleon's effective militarystrength that not more than two hundred thousand men were availablefor use in central Europe, and that Austria alone, with her newarmaments, would be a match for any army the French emperor could leadagainst her, at least in the first stages of a war. Austria had beennegotiating for an English subsidy, without which her troops, fine asthey were, could not be maintained; but Great Britain refused a grantuntil they should actually take the field. This fact was an inducementso strong as to put a climax on the already hostile inclinations ofthe Emperor Francis; and as his minister Stadion had long felt thatNapoleon's power must not be allowed time for further consolidation, the government concluded to strike while the difficulties in Spainwere at their height. 

Although the Czar had left Erfurt in an anxious mood, he wasnevertheless clear in his mind that through Napoleon alone could hisambitions be gratified. He was equally convinced that, while theEuropean system should not be further upturned, it must for thepresent be maintained as it now was. On his homeward journey he hadtime to reflect on the situation, and as he passed through Königsbergthe warlike temper of Prussia was so manifest that he thoughtFrederick William, for a while at least, should be removed from itsinfluence. Accordingly he pressed the King to pay a visit to St. Petersburg. The invitation was accepted, and the Czar's efforts wereso successful that when his visitor left for home his feeling was asunwarlike as it had ever been. He informed Austria that his interestswere those of Russia, that there should be no offensive warfare, andthat any conflict must be confined to repelling an attack. The Czardeclared on March second, in response to an inquiry from Vienna, thatif Austria should begin a war he would fulfil his obligations toNapoleon; but six weeks later, seeing how determined was the warsentiment at Vienna, and how complete were the preparations ofFrancis, it seemed best to throw an anchor to windward, and he so farmodified his attitude as to explain that in the event of war he wouldnot put his strength into any blow he might aim at Austria. 

The cabinet of Vienna was perfectly aware that neither Alexander norFrederick William represented the national feeling of their respectivepeoples. They knew that Austria's opportunity to lead a great revoltagainst Napoleon was to be found in the support of the powerfulconservatives of Russia, in the enthusiasm of all Prussia, where Arndtwas already crying, "Freedom and Austria!" and in the passionateloyalty of her own peoples, not excepting the sturdy Tyrolese, who, chafing under Napoleon's yoke, were ready for insurrection. On Marcheighteenth, 1809, the French minister at Vienna wrote to Paris that in1805 the government, but neither army nor nation, had desired war;that now the government, the army, and the people all desired it. TheAustrian plenipotentiary was ordered, in requesting a subsidy fromGreat Britain, to state that in the event of victory his governmenthoped to secure such internal vigor as Austria had enjoyed before thetreaty of Presburg. As to the neighboring states, she desired someminor rectifications of her own frontier, with indemnifications to theyounger branches of her dynasty for their lost domains. These might befound either in Germany or in Italy, and if she should succeed indestroying Napoleon's system of tributary powers, she meant to restoreall their territories to their rightful owners, not excepting those ofthe German princes who had been hostile. 

To suppose, as many do, that no inkling of all the stupendous schemesreached Napoleon in Spain is preposterous. Bavaria was his faithfulsubordinate, and Poland still hoped everything from his successes. Both were in the heart of Germany, and through a carefully organizedsystem of spies, information of the most reliable nature was regularlyreceived in both countries. The same historians who assert that afterMarengo Bonaparte left Italy for Paris to cloak his defeat, and thathe fled to Malmaison to conceal his direct connection with Enghien'sdeath, expect us to believe that Napoleon fled from Spain merely tothrow the responsibility of failure on Joseph. Most men in any crisisact from mixed motives. Such a charge displays skill in combiningfacts, but Marengo, whether a defeat or a victory, secured France tothe general who commanded there; the retreat to Malmaison did notinduce the Consul to deny his responsibility for the execution atVincennes; and it would have been simply an intervention of thesupernatural if Napoleon, for purely subjective reasons, had leftSpain to return to Paris just at the very instant when his presencewas absolutely essential there, not only to check those who, althoughostensibly his supporters, were in reality his deadly foes, but alsofor the warlike preparations to meet the storm which was about toburst. His secretary has asserted that the letters which reached himat Astorga contained all this disquieting news, and there isabsolutely no proof that they did not. The probability is all on theside of the account which was universally accepted until attacked bythe group of over-credulous French historians whose zeal for theRevolution is such that they feel bound to deny every statement of theequally biased school of Napoleonic advocates. 

[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. Engraved by S. W. Reynolds. 

JOSEPH BONAPARTE. 

Painted by J. Goubaud, January 30, 1831, Point-Breeze, U. S. A. ]

Moreover, it was from Spain that the Emperor warned the princescomposing the Confederation of the Rhine to have their contingentsready. His language is guarded--whether the cabinet of Vienna haddrunk from the waters of Lethe or from those of the Danube, hehimself would be ready. Besides, his actions could have but onemeaning. The moment he reached Paris, significant looks and conductwarned Talleyrand to beware. "Is Joseph, " the Emperor said, in aninterview with Roederer, "to talk like an Englishman or behave likeTalleyrand? I have covered this man with honors, riches, and diamonds;he has used them all against me. At the first opportunity he had, hehas betrayed me as much as he could. He has declared during my absencethat he kneeled in supplication to prevent my enterprise in Spain; fortwo years he tormented me to undertake it.... It was the same withregard to Enghien. I did not even know him; it was Talleyrand whobrought him to my notice. I did not know where he was; it wasTalleyrand who told me the spot, and after having advised theexecution he has groaned over it with every acquaintance. "

At the same time the columns of the "Moniteur" were filled withhalf-true accounts of the Emperor's success in Spain, and the Frenchpeople knew everything that was favorable; but there was a completesuppression of all the rest. As Austria desired war to secure hersubsidies from England, so France was again in need of funds which herown resources could not provide. Because of the failure to paralyzeSpain by a single blow, Napoleon had, for the first time in hishistory, returned after a "successful" campaign without an enormouswar indemnity. Once again, after temporary patching, French financeswere in disorder, and there was urgent need to repair them. The peopledesired peace for their enterprises, but the continental blockade sohampered commerce that any peace which did not include a pacificationof the seas would avail them little. It was a customary formality ofNapoleon's to put the entire responsibility of war on the enemy, andit was announced in February that negotiations with Austria hadfailed. This was in a large sense true, although the particular effortreferred to was perfunctory, and was intended technically to securethe help of Russia, which was to fight only in case Austria should bethe aggressor. 

Gradually, therefore, the war spirit revived in France. No oneremonstrated when once more recourse was had to the fatal policy ofanticipating the annual conscription. Not only were the conscripts for1810 called out, but the number was stretched to the utmost, and thosewho from immaturity or other causes had been unavailable in 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809 were now collected. The total of the youths thusswept together was not less than a hundred and sixty thousand. Torender available their slender efficiency, they were divided among thevarious regiments already in the field, in each of which these raw andboyish recruits constituted a fifth battalion. 

Since the Archduke Charles had been again at the helm of militaryaffairs in Austria, not only had a transformation been wrought in thearmy as a fighting instrument, but the general staff had likewise beencompletely reorganized. For two years, therefore, Austria's occupationhad been not only forging a sword, but practising, as well, thewielding of it. The lessons taught her by previous experience inNapoleonic warfare were thoroughly learned. It was consequently a verydifferent strategic problem which the Emperor of the French had tosolve in this campaign. 

For two years the Archduke had been studying his task, and that in thelight of ample experience. The conclusion he reached was that he wouldattack and overpower Davout in Saxony; then, by an appeal to theirGerman patriotism, raise and use the peoples of northern and centralGermany for an overwhelming assault on Napoleon. But as the time foraction grew near, the moral influence of those annihilating blowswhich the French armies had struck once and again began to assertitself and to create hesitancy. Count Stadion, the minister of state, knew that diplomacy had reached the limit of its powers and could gainat most only a few weeks. These he felt sure the enemy would use tobetter advantage in strengthening himself than Austria in her povertycould do. He was therefore urgent for prompt action. Charles, on theother hand, hesitated to face the miraculous resources of Napoleonwithout a finishing touch to some of his preparations which were stillincomplete. He therefore began in January to procrastinate, andconsequently it was not until February that Francis demanded anadvance. In this interval the whole plan of campaign was changed. Themain army, under Charles, was to be collected in Bohemia, ready foraction in any direction, so as to thwart whatever course Napoleonmight adopt. Hiller was to guard the line of the Inn, the ArchdukeFerdinand was to march against Warsaw, while the Archduke John was toenter the Tyrol from Italy and excite the people to revolt. On Aprilninth all these movements were well under way; Hiller had reached theInn, and Charles declared war. 

Ostensibly this war was to be unlike any other so far waged. Thesecret instructions given to the imperial Austrian envoy in Londonclearly indicated that the Hapsburgs hoped by victory to restore theirinfluence both in Italy and Germany; for that was the meaning of"restoration to rightful owners" and the "slight rectification oftheir frontiers, " or, in other words, the restoration of Europeanconditions to what they had been before Napoleon's advent. This wasthe dynastic side; the national side was also to be used for the sameend. "The liberties of Europe have taken refuge under your banner, "ran Charles's proclamation to the army; "your victories will breaktheir bonds, and your German brethren still in the enemy's ranks awaittheir redemption. " To the German world he said, "Austria fights notonly for her own autonomy, but takes the sword for the independenceand national honor of Germany. " Another manifesto, written by Gentz, the ablest statesman in Vienna, declared that the war was to be wagednot against France, but against the persistent extension of her systemwhich had produced such universal disorder in Europe. 

The tone and language of these papers have an audible Napoleonic echoin them: if an upstart house, represented by a single life and withoutdirect descendants, could win success by appeals to the people, andgain the support of their enthusiasm by identifying its interests withtheirs, why might not an ancient dynasty, with vigorous stock andnumerous shoots, do likewise? Moreover, Napoleon no longer respectedthe limits of natural physical boundaries, or the restrictions ofbirth, speech, religion, and custom, which inclosed a nation: hisempire was to disdain such influences, to found itself on theuniversal brotherhood of man, and to secure the regeneration ofhumanity by liberal ideas of universal validity. Austria would offsetthis alluring summons by a trumpet-call to the brotherhood of Germans, to the strong forces of national feeling, to the respect for traditionand history which would animate her soldiers and justify her course. 

If she needed a concrete illustration she could point to the Tyrolese. Since the treaty of Presburg their chains had chafed their limbs tothe raw; at this very moment they were again in open rebellion. Theadministrative reforms introduced by Maximilian of Bavaria were inreality most salutary; his determined stand against priestlydomination over the Tyrolese people proved in the end their salvation. But the evils of feudalism were always least among mountaineers, andrelations of patriarchal tenderness existed between the aristocracyand the peasantry. The devotion of both classes to their institutions, their habits, their clothes, their customs, their local names, wasintense. They had no mind to see the name of their country disappearforever, to lose their pleasant, easy-fitting institutions, or tosubmit to the conscription and join in the great leveling movementwhich compelled them to serve in the ranks as ordinary soldiers. Withtheir local assemblies they meant to keep their military exclusivenessas scouts, skirmishers, and sharp-shooters, in all of which lines theyexcelled. 

The more enlightened citizens of the towns were well pleased withBavarian rule, but the impulsive, ignorant, and superstitiouspeasantry were the glad instruments of Austrian emissaries. When theylearned that war was inevitable and would soon be formally declared, they at once rose, seized Innsbruck, and held it against the Bavariantroops. When an Austrian garrison marched in, their reception wasenthusiastic. This was in the middle of April; simultaneously theArchduke John defeated Prince Eugène in Italy and drove him back uponthe Adige, while Ferdinand overpowered all resistance in Poland, andon the twentieth occupied Warsaw. Such successes were intoxicating;the great general had, it seemed, been caught napping at last, and theadvantage of a successful opening appeared to be with his enemy. 

CHAPTER XV

THE FIFTH WAR WITH AUSTRIA--ECKMÜHL[30]

 [Footnote 30: See Saski: Campagne de 1809, Lejeune, Mémoires du général. Fournier: Österreich nach dem Frieden von Wien. Beer: Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik (1801-10). ]

 Strategic Preliminaries -- Final Orders -- The Defensive Plan of Austria -- Berthier's Failure -- Napoleon's Arrival at Donauwörth -- The Height of Napoleon's Ability -- The Austrian Advance -- The First Collision -- Concentration of Napoleon's Army -- The Austrians Divided -- The Austrians at Eckmühl -- The Battle -- Charles's Retreat -- The Five Days' Fight -- Its Results -- Charles at the Bisamberg -- Napoleon at Vienna -- The German Risings Demoralized -- Discrimination of the People -- Napoleon's Unsuccessful Appeal to Hungary -- Pius VII Loses his Secular Power -- Napoleon's Activity -- Charles's Sluggishness -- Plans of Both Generals -- Napoleon on the Lobau. 

It was Napoleon's pride that in his campaigns no enemy should lay downthe law to him. He did not ask, How will my foe behave? What must I doto thwart him?--that was defensive warfare. For his purposes he mustask, Whence can I best strike? This question he now answered byselecting the valley of the Danube as his line of approach, andRatisbon as his headquarters. He had before him the most difficulttask he had so far undertaken. The concentration and sustenance of histroops must be made along the line of very least resistance. Davouthad four divisions--one each in Magdeburg, Hanover, Stettin, andBayreuth; he was also in command of the Poles and Saxons. Bernadottehad two divisions distributed in Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck; Oudinothad one in Hanau; the soldiers of the Rhine Confederation werescattered in all its towns. Two other divisions were just starting forSpain. In the beginning of March Berthier was again appointed chief ofstaff, and the Emperor's orders were issued. They were as clear, concise, and adequate as any of his best; he was once more on familiarground, under ordinary conditions, facing a well-known foe, whosestrength was greater than ever before, but whose identity was stillthe same. Davout was to collect his troops at Bamberg, the Poles wereto remain in Warsaw, the Saxons in Dresden. To the latter capitalBernadotte should lead his army and then assume command. Oudinot wasordered to Augsburg, where he was to be reinforced. The departingdivisions were brought to a halt and sent back to Ulm for Masséna'scommand, while two fresh ones were gathered in France and sent toStrasburg. The Rhine princes were to have their contingents ready andawait orders. 

A glance at the map will show that, as Napoleon said, he could then inan emergency reach Munich like lightning. But he expected no move fromhis enemy before the middle of April. By that time he hoped to havehis German army gathered, equipped, and ready; in the interval theforces already on the ground could hold Charles in check; by the endof March there would be a hundred thousand French in Bamberg, Ulm, andAugsburg, with thirty thousand Bavarians under Lefebvre about Munich;before the outbreak of hostilities he hoped to have a total of twohundred thousand available fighting troops. "Should the Austriansattack before April tenth, " were the orders given on Marchtwenty-eighth, "the army shall be collected behind the Lech, the rightoccupying Augsburg, the left resting on the right bank of the Danubeat Donauwörth. " Then followed the most minute instructions toBerthier, explaining every move, and setting forth the reasons whyRatisbon had been chosen as headquarters. This would assure control ofthe Danube, keep open a line of communication, and enable the writerso to control space and time that he could open the campaign much ashe chose. 

These dispositions had already compelled another change of plan by theAustrians. They had expected a repetition of Moreau's advance byMunich; instead, they were called on to defend their capital a secondtime. Two divisions were left to watch the Bohemian Forest; the restof the army, with Charles at its head, set out, by the circuitousroute through Linz, to join Hiller and assume the offensive in theDanube valley. In case of a battle the two divisions were to come upby the short, direct route through Ratisbon, and add their strength tothe main army. On the declaration of hostilities the Austrians at oncecrossed the Inn and began their march; it was the sixteenth beforethey reached the line of the Isar. Had the Archduke not been sosparing of his troops, wearied as they were by the circuit throughLinz, he might have changed the course of history. Napoleon had notyet arrived, and Berthier, who was but human, had proved unequal tothe execution of his commander's orders. 

It had been the object of Napoleon to gather his army on a certaindefinite, well-connected line, and thence use it as necessitydemanded. Instead of obeying the letter of his instructions, Berthierhad struggled to obey their spirit, and had failed. The command on theleft bank had been assigned to Davout; that of all the troops on theother side had been given to Masséna; the latter was to concentrate onthe Lech, the former at Ingolstadt. So far all was good; then Berthierlost his head (the critics say he never could have learned strategy, if he had had ten lives), and, swerving from the clear letter ofNapoleon's orders, he attempted a more rapid combination--not thatbehind the Lech, but one directly at Ratisbon. Davout was to marchthither and remain there; the other divisions were successively tojoin him. The result was that three days elapsed before any army wasgathered at all; the two portions, one at Ratisbon, the other atAugsburg, being for that time widely separated, and each exposed tothe separate attack of an enemy without possibility of coöperation bythe other half. 

When the Archduke Charles learned the general situation of his enemyhe determined to do exactly this thing--that is, to attack andoverwhelm each portion of the French army separately. For this purposehe crossed the Isar, and, turning to the right, marched directly onRatisbon to attack Davout's command with his superior force beforeMasséna's scattered divisions could reach the positions assigned tothem. But he was too late. The semaphore telegraph then in use hadflashed from station to station its signals of the declaration of warand of the enemy's advance over the Inn, until the news reachedNapoleon in Paris on the twelfth. On the sixteenth, after four days'almost unbroken travel, he reached Donauwörth. The confusion intowhich Berthier's orders had thrown his carefully arranged plansinfuriated him; but when he heard, as he descended from histraveling-carriage, where the enemy was, he could not believe hisears. When assured of the truth he seemed, as eye-witnesses declared, to grow taller, his eyes began to sparkle, and with every indicationof delight he cried: "Then I have him! That's a lost army! In onemonth we are in Vienna!" The enemy's first decisive blunder was themarch by Linz; the second was yet to be made. 

Napoleon's strategy during the following days was, both in his ownopinion and in that of his military commentators, the greatest of hislife. Such had been Berthier's indecision when he saw his blunder thatone general at least--to wit, Pelet--charged him with being a traitor. In twenty-four hours his puzzled humor and conflicting orders had moreor less demoralized the whole army. But Napoleon's presence inspiredevery one with new vigor, from the division commanders to the men inthe ranks. Promptly on the seventeenth the order went forth for Davoutto leave Ratisbon and challenge the enemy to battle by a flank marchup the right bank of the Danube to Ingolstadt in his very face. Lefebvre was to cover the movement, and Wrede, with one Bavariandivision, was held ready to strengthen any weak spot in case ofbattle. Next day Masséna was ordered to set out from Augsburg for thesame point, "to unite with the army, catch the enemy at work, anddestroy his columns. " To this end he was to march eastward byPfaffenhofen. In a twinkling the scattered French army seemed alreadyconcentrated, while scouts came one after the other to announce thatthe Austrians were separating. 

The Austrians had crossed the Isar in good order, Charles himself atLandshut. If they had kept directly onward they might have stillwedged themselves between Davout and Lefebvre. But the Archduke grewtimid at the prospect of swamps and wooded hills before him; uncertainof his enemy's exact position, he threw forward three separate columnsby as many different roads, and thus lengthened his line enormously, the right wing being at Essenbach, the center advanced before Landshutto Hohen-Thann, the left at Morsbach. At four in the morning of theeighteenth Lefebvre received orders to fall on the Austrian left, while flying messengers followed each other in quick succession tospur on Masséna with urgent pleas of immediate necessity. It was hopedthat he might come up to join an attack which, though intended mainlyto divert the Austrians from Davout, could by his help be turned intoan important victory. 

The Archduke during the day collected sixty-six thousand men at Rohrfor his onset, and thirty-five thousand men at Ludmannsdorf to coverhis flank, leaving twenty-five thousand at Moosburg. That nightDavout's last corps, that of Friant, came in, and he began his march. Masséna, who had collected his army and was coming from Augsburg, wasordered to turn, either left toward Abensberg, in order to joinDavout, or right toward Landshut, to attack Charles's rear, ascircumstances should determine. Lefebvre was now commanded to assumethe defensive and await events at Abensberg. Throughout the morning ofthe nineteenth Davout and Charles continued their march, drawing evercloser to each other. At eleven the French van and the Austrian leftcollided. The latter made a firm stand, but were driven in with greatslaughter. 

A considerable force which had been sent to strike Davout on the flankat Abensberg was also defeated by Lefebvre. Before evening the entireFrench army was united and in hand. Davout was on the left toward theriver Laber, Lefebvre, with the Bavarians and several Frenchdivisions, was in the center beyond the river Aben, while Masséna hadreached a point beyond Moosburg. Within sixty hours Napoleon hadconceived and completed three separate strategic movements: thewithdrawal of the whole army toward Ingolstadt, the advance of hisright to strengthen the incoming left, and the rearrangement of hisentire line with the right on his enemy's base of operations. 

"In war you see your own troubles; those of the enemy you cannot see. You must show confidence, " wrote the French emperor about this time toEugène. How true it was of his own course! On the morning of thetwenty-first he declared that the enemy was in full retreat. This wasover-confidence on his part, and not true; but it might as well havebeen. As a result of the preceding day's skirmishing andcountermarching the Austrian army was almost cut in two; one division, the right, under Charles, was pressing on to Ratisbon, while theother, under Hiller, was marching aimlessly behind in a generalnorthwesterly direction, and the whole straggling line was not lessthan twenty miles in length. Lannes, the sturdiest, mostrough-and-ready of all the marshals, had arrived from Spain the nightbefore. His presence increased the army's confidence that they wouldwin, and next day he commanded a division formed from the corps ofMorand, Gudin, and Nansouty. Davout received orders to hold the enemyin front; Masséna was to spread out along their rear from Moosburgdown the Isar, ready to harass either flank or rear with half hisstrength, and to send the rest, under Oudinot, to Abensberg. 

On the morning of the twentieth the Emperor himself, with Lannes andWrede, set out to sever the enemy's line. They had little difficulty. The thin column dispersed before them to the north and south. Hillerwas driven back to Landshut, whence he fled to Neumarkt, leaving theIsar in possession of the French. Davout advanced simultaneouslyagainst the Archduke's army, which, although very much stronger thanHiller's division, nevertheless retired and occupied Eckmühl, standingdrawn up on the highroad toward Ratisbon. At Landshut the Emperorbecame aware that the mass of the Austrian army was not before him, but before Davout. Leaving Bessières and two divisions of infantry, with a body of cavalry, to continue the pursuit of Hiller, he turnedback toward Eckmühl at three in the morning of the twenty-second. Here, again, a great resolve was taken in the very nick of time and inthe presence of the enemy. With the same iron will and burning genius, the same endurance and pertinacity, as of old, he pressed on at thehead of his soldiers. It was one o'clock when the eighteen-mile marchwas accomplished and the enemy's outposts before Eckmühl were reached. 

Meantime one of the Austrian divisions left in Bohemia had arrived atRatisbon. Charles, strengthened by this reinforcement, had determinedto take the offensive, and at noon his advance began. Vandamme seemeddestined to bear the force of the onset, but in the moment before theshock would have occurred, appeared Napoleon's van. Advancing rapidlywith Lannes, the Emperor rode to the top of a slight rise, and, scanning the coming Austrians, suddenly ordered Vandamme to seizeEckmühl, and then despatched Lannes to cross the Laber and circumventthe enemy. Davout, having learned the direction of the Austriancharge, threw himself against the hostile columns on their right, andafter a stubborn resistance began to push back the dogged foe. In lessthan two hours the French right, left, and center were all advancing, and the enemy were steadily retreating, but fighting fiercely as theywithdrew. This continued until seven in the evening, when Lannesfinally accomplished his task. 

This destroyed all resistance. The Emperor weakly yielded to hisgenerals' remonstrance that the troops were exhausted, and did notorder a pursuit. Charles withdrew into Ratisbon. During the night andearly morning he threw a pontoon bridge across the stream, which wasalready spanned by a stone one, and next day, after a skirmish inwhich his outposts were driven into the town, he crossed the Danube;three days later he effected a junction with his second division, leftin the Bohemian Forest, and stood at Cham with an effective fightingforce of eighty thousand men. The result proved that Napoleon'sjudgment had been unerring; had he pursued, in spite of allremonstrance and in disregard of the fatigue of his men, he would havehad no mighty foe to fight a few weeks later at Wagram. Some timethereafter he told an Austrian general that he had deliberated long, and had refrained from following Charles into Bohemia for fear theNorthern powers would rise and come to the assistance of Austria. "HadI pursued immediately, " he said at St. Helena, "as the Prussians didafter Waterloo, the hostile army crowded on to the Danube would havebeen in the last extremity. "

"Labor is my element, " he remarked on the same dreary isle almost amidthe pangs of dissolution. "I have found the limit of my strength ineye and limb; I have never found the limit of my capacity for work. "This was certainly true of this five days' fight. "His Majesty iswell, " wrote Berthier on the twenty-fourth, "and endures according tohis general habit the exertion of mind and body. " Once more his enemywas not annihilated, but this contentment and high spirits seemnatural to common minds, which recall that in a week he had evolvedorder from chaos, and had stricken a powerful, united foe, cutting hisline in two, and sending one portion to the right-about in utterconfusion. To the end of his life Napoleon regarded the strategicoperations culminating at Eckmühl as his masterpiece in thatparticular line. Jomini, his able critic, remained always of the sameopinion. French history knows this conflict as the Battle of FiveDays; Thann, Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon being theplaces in or near which on each day a skirmish or combat occurred tomark the successive stages of French victory. 

The results were of the most important kind. In the first place, Austria's pride and confidence were gone. She had lost fifty thousandmen, and her warfare was no longer offensive, but defensive. Charlescalled for peace, but the Emperor would not listen. The Archduke John, moreover, was compelled to abandon the Tyrol, and when he foundhimself again in Italy, he was no longer confronted by Eugène alone, that excellent youth but feeble general, whom he had so easilydefeated: Macdonald was associated with the viceroy in the command. InPoland, also, Ferdinand's easy successes had carried him too far inpursuit of Poniatowski, and he began to retreat. Lefebvre with theBavarians was stationed at Salzburg to prevent an irruption of theTyrolean mountaineers toward the north; all the rest of the Emperor'sarmy was immediately ordered to march on the Austrian capital. 

The advance was scarcely contested. Hiller, commanding Charles's leftwing, had paused in his retreat, and crossing the Inn with his thirtythousand men, had successfully attacked Wrede at Erding. He hadprobably heard that Charles was marching to Passau, but the news wasfalse. Learning the truth, he turned again and recrossed the Inn;thence he continued to withdraw, stopping an instant at the Traun toavail himself of a strong position and hold the line if Charles wereperchance coming thither to join him. At Ebelsberg, on May third, hemade a splendid and momentarily successful resistance, but wasoverwhelmed by superior numbers. Hearing of his leader's slow advance, and being himself in despair, on the seventh he led his army atMautern across to the left bank of the Danube in order to effect ajunction with the disheartened Archduke, and then destroyed the bridgebehind him. The forces of Charles and Hiller met and halted on theslopes of the great hill known as the Bisamberg, which overlooksVienna from the north shore, and commands the fertile plains throughwhich the great river rolls past the Austrian capital. 

[Illustration: Battle of Eckmühl 22 April 1809. ]

Day after day, with unimportant interruptions but no real check, theFrench ranks marched down the right bank of the stream. On May tenththey appeared before Vienna. Then, as now, it had no efficientfortifications, and its garrison consisted of a citizen militia, strengthened by a small detachment which Hiller had sent forward toreinforce and encourage them. The defenders were commanded by theArchduke Maximilian. There was a brave show of resistance; all thesuburbs were evacuated, and the populace gathered behind the old brickwalls which had been erected two centuries before against the Turks. At first Napoleon thought there would be a second instance of suchembittered and desperate resistance as he had encountered at Madrid. But a feint of the French to cut off the communication of the townwith the river, together with a few cannon-balls, quickly brought theunhappy capital to terms; Maximilian marched out at midnight on theeleventh, and on the twelfth Napoleon returned to the neighboringpalace of Schönbrunn, where he had already established hisheadquarters. The news which arrived from day to day was mostencouraging. Poniatowski was again in possession of Warsaw, which theArchduke Ferdinand had evacuated in order to rejoin his brotherCharles. The Archduke John, flying before Macdonald, had passed theCarinthian mountains into Hungary, where the liberal movementthreatened Austrian rule. The Bavarians, after desperate fightingunder Lefebvre, had driven the Tyrolese rebels from Innsbruck. Itseemed a proper time to complete, if possible, the demoralization ofthe whole Austrian empire before crossing the Danube to annihilate itsmilitary force. Francis had sown the wind in his declaration of war:he must reap the whirlwind. 

From the beginning Napoleon had made the most of his enemy's being theaggressor. There were no terms too harsh for the "Moniteur" to applywhen speaking of the hostile court and the resisting populations. TheEmperor's proclamations reveled in abuse of the Tyrolese and ofSchill. The latter was a Prussian partizan who, having distinguishedhimself after Jena, was now striving to use the Austrian war in orderto arouse the North Germans. He had already gathered a few desperatepatriots, and in open hostility was defying constituted authority withthe intention of calling his country to arms. The news of Eckmühl haddestroyed his chances of success, and he was soon to end his gallantbut ill-starred career in a final stand at Stralsund, whither he hadretreated. He was stigmatized by Napoleon as a "sort of robber, whohad covered himself with crimes in the last Prussian campaign. " Inrepeated public utterances the Emperor of Austria was characterized ascowardly, thankless, and perjured, while the Viennese were addressedas "good people, abandoned and widowed. " The last acts of their flyingrulers had been murder and arson; "like Medea, they had with their ownhands strangled their own children. "

This policy of wooing the people while abusing their rulers had beensuccessfully undertaken in Italy, and continued with varying resultsfrom that day. No more effective revolutionary engine could have beendevised for Europe in Napoleon's age. The specious statements of theEmperor were based on truth, and while the idea they expressed wasdistorted and reiterated until its exaggeration became falsehood, yetFrance and the Napoleonic soldiers appeared to fight and sufferenthusiastically for what they still considered a great cause. Eventhe dull boors, whose intelligence had been nearly quenched bycenturies of oppression, felt stirrings of manhood as they listened tothe Emperor's fiery words; the middle classes, though not deceived, had no power to refute such language from such a man; and among thefew truly enlightened men of each nation who were aware of theircountry's abasement under dynastic absolutism, a tremendous impressionwas often created, at least temporarily. 

This fact had already been well illustrated in Poland. Austria hadanother appanage whose people cared little for the prestige of theirforeign kings and much for their own liberties. The Hungarians were aconservative, capable race; many of them were ardent Protestants, welleducated and well informed, successfully combining in theirinstitutions the best elements of both civic and patriarchal life. Tothem Napoleon issued a proclamation on May fifteenth which was amasterpiece of its kind. It set forth that the Emperor Leopold II inhis short reign had acknowledged their rights and confirmed theirliberties; that Francis I had sworn to maintain their laws andconstitution, but had never convoked their estates except to demandmoney for his wars; that in view of such treatment, Hungary should nowrise and secure national independence. The proclamation produced someeffect, but as a whole the Hungarians stood fast in their allegiance. 

Four years earlier Napoleon's proclamation declaring that the Bourbonsof Naples had ceased to reign was launched from Schönbrunn. Nowanother, to which reference has already been made, equally famous, was dictated within its walls, though dated, May seventeenth, from the"Imperial Camp at Vienna. " It was a document even abler than thataddressed to the Hungarians. Citing the abuses which had fromimmemorial times resulted from the confusion of temporal withspiritual power in the papacy, it revoked the donation of Charles theGreat to Hadrian I (made a thousand years before!), declared that PiusVII had ceased to reign, and that, as an indemnity for the loss of hissecular power, he was to receive an annual increase of incomeamounting to two million francs. In time of peace this decree wouldhave produced throughout Europe a tremendous stir; but in the intervalbetween the two acts of a great campaign, men were much more occupiedwith speculations about the decision of arms than with a change whichwas, after all, only another phase of a protracted, tiresome strugglein which the papacy had long since fallen from its pinnacle. It was, however, an element of terrific demoralization in the house ofAustria, which thus saw the consolidation of Italy under the Napoleonfamily complete, and their last hope to regain their Europeaninfluence by enlargement in that peninsula extinguished. 

Such was the scenic diversion provided for the great world in thepause of a few days after the occupation of Vienna. These moments werelikewise occupied by the greatest military activity. Morning, noon, and night secretaries wrote and messengers ran; the roads of centralEurope resounded beneath the feet of tramping infantry and the hoofsof horses which were dragging provision-trains and artillerycarriages, or bearing despatches to distant points. 

The Archduke Charles was a fine strategic theorist, in his age secondonly to Napoleon. After the fatal division of his army beforeLandshut, he had wonderfully retrieved his strength in seizingRatisbon, crossing the Danube, and standing at Cham eighty thousandstrong, as he did after his reinforcement by the division which hecalled in from the Bohemian Forest. But again he became the victim ofindecision. Calling for peace negotiations, he loitered long atBudweis, failed to join Hiller so as to throw their united forceacross the French advance to Vienna, and when at last he brought up onthe slopes of the Bisamberg he seemed for an instant aimless. Thus canthe hope of peace paralyze a great general's activity. But when, having offered to open negotiations with his adversary, he received noanswer, when he learned that the Austrian ministry also was determinedto fight the struggle out, he was himself again. His plan was thegreatest perhaps ever devised by him: so great, indeed, that fouryears later Napoleon made it his own at Dresden. It was to free Viennaby threatening the French communications. 

The idea was old enough; the novelty lay in the details. Kollowrathwas to detach twenty-five thousand men from his own force, and toseize Linz with its bridge; the Archduke John was to join the Army ofthe Tyrol, which had retreated to the head waters of the Enns, andthen march with fifty thousand men to the same point. But Masséna wasalready master of the Enns valley, and Bernadotte was sent to assistVandamme at Linz. The Emperor had already divined the plan, andthwarted it by the rapidity with which his orders were transmitted anddistant divisions summoned. The communications were threatened, butnot broken, and Napoleon gave his whole attention to the problem ofcrossing a great river in the face of an enemy. He had done it before, but never under circumstances so peculiar as these which confrontedhim in the size of the Danube and the strength of his foe. 

The mighty stream follows for the most part a single channel until itenters the plains which face Vienna on the north, where, at intervals, it divides into several arms, inclosing numerous islands. Thesebranches are nearly all substantial streams; many of them arenavigable. It was determined to choose two such points, one above andthe other below the town, to build bridges at both, and to selectwhichever one should prove more feasible when the task was done. Theenterprise above the town failed entirely through the vigilance of theAustrians. Masséna had better success at the other end, and succeededin gathering sufficient material without great difficulty; his bridgesbetween the two shores by the island of Lobau were ready on Maytwentieth. In this interval Charles advanced, and occupied a linefarther forward in the great plain, stretching from hamlet tohamlet--from Korneuburg, Enzersfeld, and Gross-Ebersdorf toStrebersdorf. Eugène and Macdonald had reached Villach, whence theycould march direct to Vienna; the Archduke John was at Völkermarkt, onhis way down the Drave toward Hungary. Two days before, eight hundredFrench soldiers had crossed into the island of Lobau to drive out theAustrian scouts; on the nineteenth Napoleon arrived, and the necessaryfortifications were constructed; on the twentieth the passage began, and Masséna, with Lannes's light cavalry, was sent out to reconnoiter. 

CHAPTER XVI

ASPERN, ESSLING, AND WAGRAM[31]

 [Footnote 31: See Marbot: Memoirs. Smekal: Die Schlacht bei Aspern und Essling. Strobl: Aspern und Wagram. Cadet de Gassicourt: Voyage en Autriche. Schmölzer: Hofer und seine Kampfgenossen. ]

 The Marchfeld -- Tactics of the Two Armies -- The Battle in Aspern and Essling -- The Indecisive Result -- Napoleon's Retreat -- Character of the Battle -- Discontent in the French Army -- The Spirit of Austria -- Preparations to Renew the Conflict -- The French Army on the Lobau -- Napoleon's New Tactics -- The First Day of Wagram -- Napoleon's Use of Artillery -- The Second Day of Wagram -- The Victory Dearly Bought -- A French Panic -- Napoleon's Dilemma. 

Charles, having apparently determined to let his enemy crossunmolested, and to fight the decisive battle on his own ground, hadadvanced meantime to still another line of hamlets--Strebersdorf, Gerasdorf, Deutsch-Wagram. On the morning of the twenty-firstNapoleon's army was partly across the main stream, some of his troopsbeing yet on the Lobau, some entirely over on the left bank, but alarge portion still on the right bank. His cavalry was again sent toclear the Marchfeld of the Austrian light horse, who were coursingfrom one vantage-point to another; and he himself, in order to surveythe country, advanced to the first slight rise beyond the low meadowswhich border the river. Near where he stood was the comfortable hamletof Aspern, composed like the others round about of one-story stonehouses and high stone barns, some of which are of great size, withwalls many feet thick. The farmsteads and churchyards are inclosedwith ordinary masonry walls. At a short distance to the eastward layEssling, which, like Aspern, had a few hundred inhabitants, andfarther still, but easily visible, the somewhat larger village ofEnzersdorf. The plain, though not rolling, is yet not perfectly flat, and small watercourses traverse it at frequent intervals, theirdirection marked by the trees growing on their banks. The mostimportant of these, the Russbach, was some miles north of where hestood. Turning to Masséna, after scanning the ground, he said: "Ishall refuse on the left, and advancing on the right, turn in theAustrian front to the left. " That is, he would leave his own left onthe river, turn the Austrian left, and rolling up their line, inclosethem with their rear to the Danube. His success would be theirannihilation, for they had no means of crossing in retreat. 

To men of less daring this would have seemed a mad plan. A carefulgeneral would, without hesitation, have seized and strongly garrisonedAspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, in order that his own line of retreatmight be secure, and sufficient room be assured in which to deploy. Pelet, in his memoirs, declares that the Emperor's orders were "tocross the river and march against the enemy. " Be this as it may, therewere as yet only three infantry divisions on the left bank of theDanube, and Aspern was but weakly garrisoned. Charles was determinedto maintain if possible his superiority of numbers. The river wassomewhat swollen and he sent floats laden with stones down the mainchannel to crash through Napoleon's bridges. The attempt met with onlyslight success, though it weakened the most important bridge. Meantimethe Austrians were advancing in five columns, one by Breitenleeagainst Aspern, one by Aderklaa against Essling, one direct onEnzersdorf to their left; the two others were cavalry, and bore inthe general direction of Breitenlee toward Aspern. They appeared infull sight about one o'clock, the column destined to attack Napoleonbeing nearest. Napoleon's over-confidence disappeared at once, andwhile the Austrians deployed for the attack, and occupied Aspern, hesent in Molitor's division to seize and hold that hamlet, Massénabeing in command. The divisions of Legrand and Boudet were in therear, on the right and left respectively. Bessières, with the cavalryof Lasalle and Espagne, stood between Aspern and Essling; the divisionof Carra Saint-Cyr arrived later and was held in reserve. Lannes andBoudet, with a small force, were ordered to hold Essling. Enzersdorfwas abandoned, and quickly occupied by the Austrian left. 

The fighting at Aspern was awful. The French pushed in, were drivenout, then turned and seized the place again. Once more, and still oncemore, the same alternation of success and defeat was repeated, thethickest of the fight being at the churchyard in the western end ofthe village. At Essling the fore-post about which the battle raged wasa great barn with mighty walls and vaulted cellars. Meanwhile theEmperor was calling in his troops as fast as possible from behind, butat three in the afternoon his main bridge over the chief arm of theDanube gave way before masses of rubbish brought down from thehill-country by a freshet, which was hourly increasing in volume. TheAustrians were from first to last superior in numbers on thebattle-field; their enfilading batteries were able to sweep the Frenchlines for several hours, and the carnage was dreadful. At lastBessières succeeded in dislodging them from Essling, and by greatexertion that place was held until dusk, when the Austrians drew offto bivouac. But at Aspern the numbers engaged were greater, Legrandbeing sent in toward nightfall. The Archduke intended to take and holdthe village if possible, and the fighting continued there untilmidnight. Weakened and inferior in numbers though the French were, they understood better than their foes the defense of such a place, and when firing ceased they still held half of the long main street. 

[Illustration: Battle of Aspern or Essling. 21st of May 1809. ]

[Illustration: Battle of Aspern or Essling. 22nd of May 1809. ]

By midnight the French bridge was again repaired, and Davout, inresponse to Napoleon's urgent orders, began to bring upreinforcements, especially artillery, holding them on the south shoreof the main stream in readiness for crossing. At two in the morningthe Austrians made still another effort to drive out the enemy fromAspern; soon afterward they again attacked Essling. Masséna called inCarra Saint-Cyr to Aspern; within an hour both attacks had beenrepulsed, and the latter hamlet was entirely cleared of the enemy. While the desperate struggle again went on, the Emperor once moresurveyed the field; and when at seven in the morning Davout sent wordthat a portion of the reinforcements was already on the Lobau, Napoleon determined to break through the enemy's center, and for thatpurpose threw forward the troops already on the ground. But once morethe weakened and patched structure over the Danube gave way, and thearrival of reinforcements was stopped; the available French force wasimmediately drawn back, and stationed to hold the line from Aspern toEssling. The enemy was encouraged and pressed on to the attack withrenewed vigor; in the former village the scenes of the previous daywere repeated, first one and then the other contestant holding it fora time. In the center, where the Austrians almost broke through theline, Napoleon quickly brought together his recently arrived artilleryand Bessières's cavalry; after terrific struggles they succeeded inholding the Austrians in check. On the right Essling, after beingcaptured and recaptured several times by each side, was taken and longheld by the enemy's left; it was then retaken at about three in theafternoon, by a portion of the French reserve, Napoleon's "youngguard. " Thereupon, from the sheer exhaustion of both sides, theconflict ceased, nothing being heard but desultory discharges ofartillery. The French were in possession of both Aspern and Essling. At seven the Emperor called a council of war; the generals advisedrecrossing the Danube and a retreat into Vienna. "You must mean toStrasburg, " said their chief; "for if Charles should follow, he mightdrive me thither, and if he should march to cut me off at Linz, I mustmarch thither, too, to meet him. In either case, I must abandon thecapital, my only source of supplies. " There was no reply, and it wasdetermined to withdraw into the Lobau, and hold it until a strongerbridge could be constructed and Davout bring over his entire force. After two days of terrific defensive fighting, --so terrific that theAustrians were several times on the point of retreat, --Napoleon wasobliged to abandon the field. 

The night of May twenty-second was the beginning of such bitternessfor the French emperor as he had not yet tasted. His enemy's forcesnumbered about seventy thousand, his own perhaps forty-five thousand;but this was entirely his own fault, due largely to overweeningconfidence in himself and a weak contempt for foes who, after a longand severe novitiate, now fought like veteran Frenchmen, and were ledby one who had learned the lessons of Napoleon's own strategy. Fivetimes Essling had been lost and won; how often Aspern had beencaptured and retaken could only be estimated. Both hamlets were nowabandoned by the French. The last Austrian charge against the centerhad been made and repelled with fiery valor, but in it Lannes wasmortally wounded. The grand total, therefore, of the two days was aloss of gallant troops by the thousand, and of this marshal, Napoleon's greatest division general, the friend of his youth, and theonly surviving one that was both fearless and honest. Worse even thanthis, the "unconquerable, " though not conquered, had been checked, andthat, too, not in a corner, as in Spain or at Eylau, but in the sightof all Europe, on a field chosen by himself. 

As the war-sick Emperor passed the litter on which lay his oldcomrade, he threw himself on the living but maimed and half-consciousform in an agony of tenderness; and that night, as he sat at tablebefore an untasted meal, briny tears rolled over cheeks which did notoften know the sensation. But the bulletin which he dictated ran, "Theenemy withdrew to their position, and we remained masters of thefield. " This latter clause was exactly as true of the French at Aspernas it had been of the Russians at Eylau--the affair was a technicalvictory, a moral defeat. The Austrians celebrated the battle as theirvictory, the honors of which they accorded to the last cavalry chargeunder Prince John Liechtenstein; and in the peaceful churchyard atAspern lies the effigy of a majestic lion stricken to the heart, as areminder to patriotic Austrians of those two days' victoriousfighting, which literally drenched the spot with blood. "We could notuse the victory, " wrote Charles's chief of staff on the twenty-fourth;"for the enemy's strong position made pursuit impossible. " This hewell knew, because the night before the Austrians had tried withsignal failure to dislodge the French army from the Lobau. 

The respective feelings of the two forces are mirrored in two facts. On the twenty-third Napoleon again visited Lannes, who was now fullyconscious and aware that he was doomed. He was as fearless as ever andwith the stern candor of an old republican poured out to the Emperorall that he felt. The army, he said, was weary of bloodshed, thenation of its sense of exhaustion; for both were alike aware that theysuffered and bled no longer for a principle, but for the boundlessambition of one man. The veteran marshal refused all sympathy orconsolation, and turned his face to the wall. Both Marbot and Peletdeclare that this story of Cadet de Gassicourt is an invention; if so, it is a clever one, for we know from other sources that the languageascribed to Lannes expressed the sentiments of the soldiery. As therewas little chance for booty in such rapid marching and constantfighting, the youth and the poor were disheartened. The great fortuneswon by the officers were of little use while peace was denied fortheir enjoyment; the millions of Masséna did not save him from theexposures and hardships of the battle-field, and he confessed that heloved luxury and immoral self-indulgence. Such voices had created anundercurrent of discontent. 

The feeling of Charles and his soldiers was not greatly different. There was nothing possible as the result of their victory but to takeup a more comfortable position on the same Marchfeld which hadwitnessed their losses. Before them were the bodies of ten thousanddead and four times that number had been wounded: losses which wereabout equally divided between their brethren and their foes. TheArchduke urged that now was the time for diplomacy. The battle ofAspern had softened Napoleon, he said, and Austria might secure anadvantageous peace. But Francis had not changed his nature; he wouldawait the final decision. His brother Ferdinand would soon arrive fromPoland, and John was already in Hungary. To Frederick William III hehad offered Warsaw if Prussia would only come to his assistance. Butthe King of Prussia was stubborn. Fearing lest Austria should secureGerman leadership, and expecting in the end to gain more from Russia, he refused, in spite of the earnest advice of all his ministers, toassist his rival. It was only when he was assured that Alexanderintended to remain neutral that he consented to a secret armament, butthen it was too late. The insurrection in Westphalia, to assist whichSchill, in disobedience of orders, had led his battalion of hussarsfrom Berlin, was easily suppressed. This fact, with Napoleon's signalsuccess in Bavaria, seemed to justify Frederick William, and thefailure of Francis to secure any advantage after Aspern confirmed theopinion. Such, however, was the temper of the Prussian people that, under moral compulsion, their King finally proposed formal terms ofalliance. Austria's real spirit appeared in her vague answer. Shefirst asked England for more assistance, but failing to secure it, turned ungraciously and with indefinite proposals to Prussia. Herenvoy of course found no response. Thus it was that Charles andNapoleon lay for weeks watching each other like gladiators, each readyto take advantage of any false step made by the other, and bothsteadily gathering strength to renew the struggle in the same arena. 

Napoleon seemed to make his preparations with a determination to riskall in the next encounter. His line of communication with the west wasabandoned altogether; the Tyrol, too, was virtually evacuated, andLefebvre, with the Bavarians, relieved Vandamme and Bernadotte atLinz, so that both the latter might at once advance within strikingdistance. Eugène had reached Bruck in Styria, and was therefore athand; Marmont with ten thousand men was called from Illyria. Beingthus safe toward the south, the Emperor sent two divisions to watchthe Austrians at Presburg. Before June tenth he had compacted in andabout Vienna an army of two hundred and forty thousand men. On thethirteenth the Archduke John, having turned and advanced toward Raab, was attacked, defeated, and driven back into Hungary by Eugène, whohad learned, if not generalship, at least obedience, and havingcarefully obeyed his stepfather's injunctions, had thus won animportant victory. 

Meantime all was activity on the Lobau. A new and solid bridge wasbuilt across the main stream. To forestall another such accident ashad occurred before, this structure was not only protected by piles, but guarded by rowboats which were armed with field-pieces and mannedby artillerymen. The enemy had withdrawn behind the Russbach in a linefrom Deutsch-Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl, leaving only a corps tofortify the old line from Aspern to Essling. In consequence theEmperor entirely changed his plan. The island of Lobau was firststrongly fortified, and then, not one, but numerous bridges wereconstructed to the mainland on the left bank under cover of the guns. Lower down similar measures were taken. In this way the French troopscould effect their passage very rapidly and much farther eastward thanbefore, avoid the Aspern-Essling line, and reaching Enzersdorf underprotection of their own forts, turn the enemy's left almost in the actof crossing, and so roll up the left wing of his line, which wasstrongly posted on high ground behind the Russbach, fromMarkgrafneusiedl through Parbasdorf toward Wagram, where it wasconnected with the center. These arrangements were all completed byJuly first, on which date the Emperor left Schönbrunn for the Lobau. During the fighting at Aspern he had observed the field from theswinging rungs of a rope-ladder fastened to one of the tall trees onthe island. This time he brought with him a long step-ladder, one ofthose used in the palace gardens to trim high shrubs. The ArchdukeJohn was now in Presburg; the Archduke Charles had raised his numbersto a hundred and thirty thousand men. On and near the Lobau were ahundred and eighty thousand French soldiers; twenty-two thousand morewere behind. 

It was the fifth before all the preliminary moves were successfullytaken. The passage had been safely accomplished during the previousnight exactly as had been planned, a feint against Aspern havingthrown the Austrians on a false scent. In the morning, therefore, thetwo lines were arrayed opposite, but somewhat obliquely, to eachother, the French right overlapping the Austrian left beyondEnzersdorf as far as Wittau, so as either to prevent the approach ofArchduke John or to outflank the Austrian left according tocircumstances. The French center was thus in front of the Austrianleft, and Masséna, with the French left resting on the Danube, was toattack the Austrian center at the village of Gerasdorf, whileBernadotte and Eugène were to throw themselves on Charles's left, which stretched behind the Russbach from Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl. Napoleon waited for some hours while scouts reconnoitered towardPresburg. Being assured about five that John had not left that citynor given any signs of moving, he prepared his columns, and aboutseven in the evening ordered the onset. 

Masséna made a vigorous effort to hold the enemy's center and right, while Napoleon launched his own center and right against the positionsheld by his opponent's left. For some hours there was vigorousfighting, but Charles saw the Emperor's manoeuver, and swiftlythrowing his reserve from behind Gerasdorf into his left, gained timeto call up reinforcements from his right at the Bisamberg. Bernadottemoved slowly, and did not render his force effective at the crucialmoment. Napoleon was much incensed by his apparent sluggishness. Anattack made at seven against Wagram by Oudinot failed. This hamlet wasthe key of the Austrian position, forming as it did the angle of theirline, and the fighting there was desperate. By nine o'clock the Frenchwere thrown back all along, and compelled to resume the positions theyhad held in the morning. At eleven a last attempt was made by Eugèneand Bernadotte on Wagram, but like the other it was bloody anduseless. At the council-fire that evening the leaders of the Frenchleft and center were ordered to move farther to the right, and toconcentrate next morning on the positions behind the Russbach. Aboutdawn the change was made, and before sunrise all was ready, theEmperor having passed a sleepless night on his tiger-skin behind thebivouac fire in front of his tent. 

[Illustration: Battle of Wagram. Positions July 5th 1809. ]

But Charles did not wait to be attacked. With new courage and addedconfidence he ordered his right, under Klenau, to follow down theDanube against the enemy's weakened left, which might thus be turned, while with the break of day his center advanced against Masséna. For atime the Austrians carried all before them, and Masséna retreated stepby step until it appeared as if the tables would be turned andNapoleon overwhelmed by his own tactics. Both Aspern and Essling weretaken, and then, turning north, the united Austrian center and rightentirely surrounded the French left and attacked it on the flank. Theythought themselves victorious, when unexpectedly the heavy artilleryon the Lobau opened fire upon them, and they began to waver. At thiscrisis the great artillerist brought into action the strongbatteries of his own arm which he had so carefully prepared. Lauristonwas chosen to carry out the decisive movement, and his splendidconduct not merely secured the victory, but made it overwhelming. According to the most conservative estimate, there were under hiscommand one hundred field-pieces, --sixty from the guard, --and thesewere supported by cavalry and cuirassiers; some estimate the number ofguns at four hundred, but this is manifestly a wild exaggeration. Asthe artillery rolled up and unlimbered, volleys of shot, shell, andgrape began to follow in swift succession, and in a short time theenemy's pursuit was not only stayed, but with the approach ofMacdonald's infantry to form a new flank it was turned into retreat. The Austrians made one gallant stand, but were finally forced back tothe foot of the Bisamberg. 

Meantime Davout had attacked the left. While he fought he was steadilyreinforced, until at one time, about midday, over a third of the armywas concentrated under his command. The Austrians opposed to themcould not, even with their vantage of high ground, withstand the everstronger pressure, and slowly rolled back northward in a curve. Eugènecaptured Wagram, and then turned in that direction to unite withMacdonald, whose division had joined that of Wrede, and had beensteadily pushing back the enemy's line toward the same point. Theywere supported by Davout and Oudinot. The Austrians on the right werethen once more dislodged and compelled to withdraw on the highway toBrünn. It was about two in the afternoon. Davout had been ordered towait for a signal to make the decisive advance. It was given, and asOudinot rushed up the heights at Parbasdorf, his comrade appeared fromMarkgrafneusiedl, driving the enemy before him. A breach in theopposing line was made at once, and the whole Austrian wing, beingthus disorganized, hurried back to reform if possible beyond Wagram, cross the Russbach, and join the main army. They were successful. TheFrench right halted just beyond the village which gave its name to thebattle. Lasalle, a brilliant light-horse general, was killed in thelast charge, and both armies bivouacked for the night. Next morningCharles withdrew toward Znaim, Masséna, Davout, and Marmont followingwith the van of Napoleon's army. Several skirmishes took place betweenportions of the Austrian rear and various corps of the French van, inwhich the latter were decidedly checked. Marmont was obliged to assumethe defensive under the walls of Znaim. The Austrian losses at thebattle of Wagram were computed at twenty-four thousand, includingseven hundred and fifty-three officers. Those of the French werecertainly not less, if we include seven thousand who were takenprisoners. They lost, moreover, twelve standards and eleven guns. 

In the early hours of July sixth, Charles had despatched an adjutantto Presburg with orders to the Archduke John to march at once andattack the enemy's rear. The story at first accepted was that themessenger found the bridges over the river March destroyed, andarrived six hours too late for his errand to be successful. Therewere, however, many at the time who attributed criminal negligence toJohn, among them his own brother, the commander-in-chief. For a time, by means of court intrigue and persistent misrepresentation, the blamewas put, not on John, but on Charles, but eventually the former wasfound guilty and banished to Styria. Had the latter's plan succeeded, Napoleon would have had a different task--a task so difficult that theissue of the battle might well have been doubtful, if not disastrous. As it was, the victory was dearly bought, and the Austrians were notdemoralized. 

On the other hand, in the very hour of victory the French, who hadhalted to take breath, were thrown into a panic by the appearance of afew Austrian pickets from the Archduke John's army, then coming up, and thousands of the victorious soldiers fled in wild demoralizationtoward the Danube. John, whose appearance but a short time earlierwould have turned his brother's defeat into victory, drew back histhirteen thousand men in good order to guard Hungary. As Napoleonhimself had been in a dangerous condition of over-confidence beforeAspern, so now his soldiery were clearly in the same plight. Self-conceit had made them unreliable. Bernadotte's corps haddisplayed something very much like cowardice and mutiny at the last. The army still fought in the main like the perfect machine it was, butthe individual men had lost their stern virtue. They believed thatvictory, plunder, and self-indulgence were the fair compensations oftheir toils. Ungirt and freed from the restraints of discipline, theygave signs that the petulance, timidity, and unruliness which had beenmanifested in Poland and Prussia were not diminished. 

Their Emperor, if his vision had been unclouded, would haveunderstood that endurance, suffering, and privation would make suchmen an untrustworthy dependence in the hour of need. How changed hewas himself is clear from the fact that Bonaparte would never haverested until his foe was disorganized and overpowered, while Napoleonsaw himself forced to treat with an opponent who, though beaten, wasstill undaunted and active. If the victor had been fighting for life, his position would have been morally strong; fighting as aworld-conqueror, it was illogical; fighting as equal with equal torepel aggression, it was comprehensible. This last was the attitudeinto which he was forced by the campaign of Aspern, Essling, Wagram. Francis, whose power he had meant to crush, upon whom a few shortweeks before he had heaped insult and abuse, had turned out a mostdangerous foe. Technically conquered, it would not be well for hisopponent to try conclusions with him again in the still uncertainposition of the Napoleonic power. Rather reap the field secured, thedaunted conqueror reasoned, than risk devastation by grasping formore. This, and no other, is the explanation of that remarkablesomersault in Napoleon's diplomacy which followed in the next fewweeks. 

CHAPTER XVII

THE PEACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN[32]

 [Footnote 32: See Majol de Lupe: Fournier: Gentz und der Friede von Schönbrunn in Deutsche Rundschau, tom. 44. Un pape prisonnier à Savone, d'après des documents inédits. In Le Correspondant, 6 articles, du 10 mars au 25 mai. Clair: Hofer et l'insurrection du Tyrol. ]

 Schill and the Duke of Brunswick -- Andreas Hofer -- The Armistice of Znaim -- The Northern Powers Adhere to France -- Wellesley's Successes in the Peninsula -- The Walcheren Expedition -- Negotiations for Peace -- Austria a Second-rate Power -- Attempt on Napoleon's Life -- His Great Uneasiness -- The Tyrol Subdued -- The Pope a Prisoner. 

Napoleon's course was probably somewhat influenced both by themutterings of national discontent in France and by the actualinsurrections which were taking place in Germany. Schill, afterleaving Berlin, had been successively harassed by the Dutch, theWestphalians, and the Danes, until in despair he threw himself intoStralsund in hope of coöperation from an English fleet. The city wasimmediately beleaguered, and on May thirty-first it fell. The King ofPrussia had already denounced the gallant adventurer and hiscompanions as a robber band of outlaws. As has been told, the daringpatriot was killed in the assault, and only a hundred and fifty of hiscomrades escaped. The officers who fled into Prussia werecourt-martialed, and punished by a light sentence of imprisonment. Those captured in Stralsund were taken to Brest and sentenced to penalservitude. Frederick William, the young Duke of Brunswick, deprivedby Napoleon of his throne, and determined to avenge his father, hadraised, during the progress of the French campaign in Austria, a corpsof Bohemian and other adventurers, which was soon famous for itsextraordinary exploits, and became world-renowned as the Black Legion. With this force, assisted by that of the Austrian commandant inFranconia, General Kienmayer, he defeated the Saxons at Nossen, aFrench army under Junot at Berneck, and repelled King Jerome ofWestphalia; he then seized Dresden, Leipsic, and Lindenau, holding atthe time of Wagram a considerable portion of Franconia. Napoleon'svictory rendered his situation desperate, but with fifteen hundred menhe cut his way northward through Leipsic, Halle, Halberstadt, andBrunswick, defeating the Westphalian, Saxon, and Dutch troops whichsought to intercept him, and reached the shores of the North Sea atElsfleth, where, seizing a merchant flotilla, he embarked with his menfor England. He was received in London with jubilation, and was richlypensioned for his heroic adventures. 

Almost simultaneously the Tyrolese, taking advantage of Lefebvre'swithdrawal, rose again. The exploits of their hero, Andreas Hofer, form a romantic episode of history, but they very indirectly affectedthe central story, if at all. In the five weeks intervening betweenAspern and Wagram, that able and devoted man had virtually reorganizedhis country and cleared it of intruders. Even the double invasion ofFrench and Bavarians, on one side from Klagenfurth, on the other downthe valley of the Inn, was successfully repelled. The tactics ofHofer's men were most effective against regular troops, who, marchingin thin lines through mountain defiles, were cut down bysharp-shooters, overwhelmed with rocks hurled from high ledges overthe precipitous walls of ravines, entrapped by ambushes, orslaughtered by the scythes, clubs, and pitchforks of the peasantry. 

Leaving Eugène to hold the Marchfeld, Napoleon and his army pressed onafter Marmont in pursuit of Charles. Before Znaim, which was reachedon the eleventh, the vanguard had just suffered something very like arepulse, and the Emperor made ready for another battle if it should benecessary. In the very midst of the preparations came a propositionfrom Charles for an armistice. After a long discussion by the Frenchgenerals, Napoleon accepted it. "You must fight only when the hope ofany fortunate turn is gone, " he wrote about this time; "for in itsnature the result of a battle is always doubtful. " The Archduke'smotive was to gain time. The Emperor Francis had accepted a planproposed by John for a reunion of the Austrian armies on the confinesof Hungary to continue the war, and he was still hoping to retrievethe blunder he had made in not negotiating on equal terms withPrussia. He therefore acquiesced in Charles's proposal, though notintending the armistice as a preliminary of peace. Napoleon affecteduncertainty, and demanded an enormous cession of territory as theprice of a truce. Francis in turn demurred, but finally yielded. Tothis again Charles, confident in his ability to carry on the war, would not listen. His quarrel with Francis and John was growing morebitter; and the Emperor felt that in order to compose the familydifficulties and allay jealousies, time must now be gained at anyprice. Francis therefore persisted, Charles resigned the command, andthe former assumed it himself. 

The Austrian Emperor's first step was to open negotiations in the hopeof prolonging them until he could rearrange the control of his armyand recuperate his strength, trusting that in the interval thekaleidoscope of European diplomacy might entirely change. He was notdisappointed in the fact of a change, but the change was far differentfrom what he had expected. The King of Prussia now definitely withdrewthe propositions which he had half-heartedly made before Wagram. Hethought it was better to reign behind the Oder than not to reign atall. The Czar kept the promise made at Erfurt most unwillingly; buthaving at last secured Finland, he felt bound to fulfil the letter ofhis engagement. Prince Galitzin had been put at the head of thirtythousand unwilling Russians, and sent to invade Galicia. Crossing thefrontier, his officers declared their distaste for the task, and knewthey were reflecting the sentiments of an overpowering majority oftheir own nation. The invasion turned out a farce, and was rather inthe nature of a friendly reception by the inhabitants. 

Francis therefore hoped for something from Alexander's lukewarmness. The latter, however, would do nothing, for nominally, and inoccasional skirmishes really, he was fighting Turkey, and meant, afterthe peace, to claim the fulfilment of Napoleon's promise. It would beimpolitic to jeopardize his whole ambition by any deviation from theletter of the Erfurt agreement. Francis therefore was informed that hemust make the best terms with Napoleon that he could. As to GreatBritain, the chances seemed better. In the seas that bordered Italyand the Ionian Isles, off the coasts of Spain and Portugal, on thewaters of the Baltic, her flag was seen. Wellesley had been landed inthe Iberian peninsula, and, driving Soult before him, had not onlyexpelled the French from Portugal, but had defeated Victor atTalavera, and was preparing for the invasion of Spain. The Englishgovernment had in readiness another army of forty thousand men andanother fleet of thirty-five ships of the line. Where best could theyemploy them? After long deliberation the selfish policy was adopted ofusing them, not to cripple Napoleon, but for England's immediateadvantage. They were not sent to reinforce Wellesley and insure theconquest of Spain, nor to save Schill, nor to strengthen Austria. Byany one of these courses the European uprising against the Frenchemperor would have been inaugurated that very year. 

As it was, they were despatched to destroy the dockyards of theNetherlands, where it was said, and perhaps believed, that Napoleonwas building ships to dispute British supremacy at sea. Afterdisembarking on the island of Walcheren, the army combined with thefleet in a successful attack on Flushing, which fell on Augustfifteenth. This was their only success. Fouché raised an army ofnational guards, and Bernadotte, who, having incurred the Emperor'sdispleasure at Wagram for his slowness and lack of success, had beensent home in disgrace, was induced to put himself at its head. Thearmy and navy officers of the English disagreed as to how they shouldmeet him. The result was separation and disaster; the fleet sailedback to England and the army withdrew to Walcheren, where it was heldin check while the swamp-fever devastated its ranks. About the sametime a plague also broke out in the Austrian army, and, as wasclaimed, destroyed its efficiency. Wellesley, unsupported, saw himselfthreatened by a flank movement of Soult and drew back, while, inAugust, Sebastiani defeated a division of the Spanish army. 

These were the circumstances which turned the pretended peacenegotiations of Francis into reality. When proceedings first began atAltenburg they were simply farcical. Napoleon really needed peace, ifPrussia and Russia were meditating war; but the first proposal madeby Austria he scorned, and talked of Francis's abdication, with apartition of Hapsburg lands among the new Napoleonic states. When thenominal plenipotentiaries, Champagny and Metternich, actually met, theformer still scouted anything like reasonable terms, demanding for hisEmperor the lands occupied by French troops. The Austrian, anxious togain time, replied with equally impossible propositions. But as thesummer passed, and Francis's hopes of support grew fainter andfainter, he sent a personal representative, General Bubna, toNapoleon, and this plenipotentiary began to display sincerity. Thereupon the Emperor of the French manifested his earnest desire forpeace. So far he had relied on the Czar, who stood by the alliance inthe face of his people's opposition. How much longer, Alexander musthave asked himself, could this state of things continue? It waspraiseworthy in him that he cared nothing for popular opinion, but hemight not be able to hold out against it much longer. It was verysignificant that in a formal note just received from St. Petersburg bythe hand of a Russian officer, Alexander advised peace. To thismessenger, when speaking of the chances for renewing hostilities, Napoleon exclaimed in undisguised horror, "Blood, blood, alwaysblood!" And then, with a sudden change of manner, he said: "I amanxious to get back to Paris. " Like his generals, the Emperor of theFrench was plainly sick of war. His sad countenance, like theirs, wasan open book in which the Russian could clearly read this importantfact. Indeed, the anxious, war-worn, unsettled Napoleon actuallycontemplated an alliance with Austria. It was clear that if herterritories were left intact she would gladly join in one. He had needto be done with her in order to settle his affairs in Spain andelsewhere. But he feared Francis, and hoped that such a vacillatingtemporizer might abdicate in favor of some thoroughly trustworthysuccessor. Napoleon confessed to Bubna that he admired the Austriantroops; they were as good as his own, and under his leadership wouldbe victorious. Champagny's demands, he admitted, were not final, butcertain territories on the south, on the west, and in Galicia he musthave. 

With this understanding, full powers were given to PrinceLiechtenstein, and he went direct to Schönbrunn. The terms of peaceturned out very hard indeed. A war indemnity of a hundred millionfrancs was first incorporated in the treaty itself; but afterward, ina secret article, Francis was required to reduce his army to a hundredand fifty thousand men, and the indemnity was diminished toeighty-five millions. This would have been an awful burden to lay onthe empire even as it had been, and Austrian territory was now to beseriously diminished. Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and the Inn quarterwent to the Confederation of the Rhine, New Galicia to the grand duchyof Warsaw, along with a large district in East Galicia and the town ofCracow. A small strip of the same province was reserved for Russia. But the most deadly blow was the constitution of a subsidiarygovernment, to be known as Illyria, by the surrender directly toFrance of Görz, Monfalcone, Triest, Carniola, Willach in Carinthia, and Croatia east of the Save. This made Austria not only asecond-class, but an inland power, cutting her off entirely from thesea; but she was, nevertheless, to enter the Continental Systemagainst England, and recognize all that Napoleon had done or might doin Spain, Portugal, and Italy. These were the hard but imperativeconditions which the Emperor laid down. Liechtenstein accepted themsubject to his sovereign's approval. 

But the conqueror was in haste. On October twelfth there had been agreat review of his troops at Schönbrunn. In the crowd was a youth, scarcely more than a child, who pressed forward to gain access toNapoleon. His urgency attracted the attention of Berthier, and he wasseized by General Rapp. On his person was a large knife, and he openlyavowed his purpose of assassination. He was confronted with hisintended victim. His name, he said, was Staps, and he was the son of aProtestant pastor at Naumburg. The Emperor coldly asked what he woulddo if pardoned. "Try again to kill you, " was the culprit's reply. Heavowed no penitence, but declared he had no personal feeling. He wouldgladly have reasoned with Napoleon, he further said, if he could buthave gained an interview; if unsuccessful in his plan, he would havethought it a deed of honor to smite down the world's oppressor. Thewould-be assassin was secretly shot, and the police had instructionsto say, if there should be much talk, that he was crazy. This eventseemed deeply to impress the intended victim with the intensity offeeling among the common people of Germany, and he was anxious to begone. His fears were well founded; assassination was in the minds ofmany unbalanced men. A captain in the Austrian army actually sought afurlough, giving as his reason that he desired to kill Napoleon. 

This mania for assassination completed the depression of spirits whichfor some time past had been noticeable in the French emperor. Severelywounded in the great toe at Ratisbon, he had there been compelled toexercise enormous self-control to prevent a panic in the army. Knockedsenseless by a fall from his horse on the road to Schönbrunn, he hadfor the same reason been forced to enjoin silence on nearly twohundred persons who were aware of the fact. At Essling he had thoughtit necessary to throw himself into the bullet hail to sustain themorale of his troops, and having saved Lannes from drowning during apreliminary reconnaissance of the Danube banks, he had finally losthim under the most distressing circumstances. To cap the climax ofthese experiences, it now seemed as if his own life were in constantjeopardy. When, therefore, the official articles of the peace weredrawn up on the fourteenth, and Liechtenstein departed to lay thembefore Francis, the French cannon did not wait for formalities, butproclaimed the peace as already made. The next night Napoleon was onhis way to Paris. 

The armistice of Znaim had utterly crushed the hopes of the Tyrolese, but they continued to fight in despair. The peace of Schönbrunn setfree the entire French army to overwhelm them. A second doubleinvasion was organized. Prince Eugène offered amnesty to theinsurgents, and the Austrian ministry advised them to ceaseresistance. But Hofer had by this time convinced himself that hismission was more than earthly. After some hesitation, he refused toaccept Austria's advice, and the conflict was renewed. The Tyrolesewere now alone, and after a vain resistance the combatants dispersedamong the mountains. The land was again reduced to submission. Hoferremained safely hidden for some time, but he was eventually betrayed, captured, and sent to Mantua for the formality of a trial. Napoleon'sdirections to Eugène were very concise. Whenever the order shouldreach him, the viceroy was to name a court-martial, try the prisoner, and have him shot. Throughout suffering and imprisonment the herodisplayed the greatest firmness, and met his death with loftydevotion. In the previous spring, when at Austria's instigation theTyrol had risen, he had been ennobled; ten years later the title andestates of Passeyr were bestowed on his family. Among the easternAlps the name of Andreas Hofer is like that of William Tell among themountains of Switzerland. His rugged virtues are celebrated in verse, and tradition lingers about his haunts. 

Napoleon's decree of May seventeenth, depriving the Pope of hissecular power, reached Rome in due time, and Murat proceeded withoutdelay to execute it. There were no difficulties, for it will beremembered that in February General Miollis had occupied the city. Acommittee of administration was immediately named, whose duties wereto prepare the way for incorporation with Italy. On June tenth formalproclamation was made that Pius VII was no longer a secular prince, his dominion having passed to the King of Italy. He was still toreside in Rome as spiritual head of the Catholic Church. That nightthe Pope promulgated a bull excommunicating Napoleon and hisadherents, favorers, and councilors. Unlike similar instruments of hispredecessors, it contained a clause declaring the punishment to bepurely spiritual, and prohibiting every one from using it as asanction for attack on the persons of those against whom it wasissued. On the night of July fifth a French general with his guardforced the doors of the Quirinal palace, and demanded from Pius aformal renunciation of his secular power. The Pope having firmly andquietly refused, he was informed that he must make ready to leave thecity. At three the next morning he was placed in a carriage with asingle cardinal, and on a second dignified and solemn refusal tocomply was carried to Florence. There he was separated from his onecompanion and put in charge of the gendarmes. Traveling by day andnight, sometimes in a litter, sometimes by sea, the aged man wasfinally brought to Grenoble. The devout French of that city could notunderstand the secrecy and haste of his journey, and hastened to payhim homage. So great were the crowds and so intense was the feelingthat very soon his presence in France was considered dangerous. He wastherefore carried back to Savona, where he remained a state prisonerunder rigid supervision in decent but plain apartments until 1812, when he was conducted to Fontainebleau and lodged like a prince. 

CHAPTER XVIII

NAPOLEON'S FATAL DECISION[33]

 [Footnote 33: See Welschinger: Le divorce de Napoléon. Vandal: Négociations avec la Russie relatives au second mariage de Napoléon, in the Revue historique, tom. 44, pp. 1-42. ]

 Napoleon's Explanations to Alexander -- His New Manner -- Sad Plight of Josephine -- The Divorce Announced and Confirmed by the Senate -- Negotiations for the Czar's Sister -- Napoleon's Impatience -- His Desire for a Great Match. 

The treaty of Schönbrunn was a flagrant violation of the agreementmade between Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurt, inasmuch as itmaterially enlarged the grand duchy of Warsaw and thus menaced Russiawith the reconstruction of Poland. "Clearly, " said Rumianzoff toCaulaincourt, "you want to be rid of the Russian alliance, and tosubstitute for it that with the grand duchy. " Alexander was veryangry, but, though in the strict observance of forms he had beenirreproachable, his conduct in the real support of his ally had notbeen sincere. His people were more embittered with the French allianceevery day, and Napoleon knew how both the nation and the Czar wouldfeel when they were informed that provinces occupied by Russian troopshad been assigned to Poland. Francis, wroth as he was, had not daredto disturb the popular joy so loudly expressed over Napoleon'spremature announcement of peace. Accordingly, on October twentieth, 1809, the very day in which the papers were signed and ratified, anexplanation was sent to Alexander by the Emperor of the French. Itpleaded that he could not abandon a friendly people to Austria'svengeance, but declared that he would guarantee their good behaviorunder Saxon rule; as for the names of Poles and Poland, for all hecared, they might disappear from history. The Czar accepted the excusewith what grace he could, for the partition of Turkey was not yetaccomplished. But the peace of Schönbrunn marked the initiation of apolicy which dissolved the peace of Tilsit. There could now no longerbe any serious question of marriage between members of the two courts. Compelled by circumstances to choose between a dual alliance with afirst-rate power which must share on equal terms in the dominion ofthe world, and one with a second-rate power whose armies weresurpassed by none, Napoleon had deliberately chosen the latter, as theshortest way to absolute and complete supremacy, to the assertion of asovereign will over a conquered universe. 

Napoleon's return to Paris was celebrated in the manner usual after avictorious campaign. The departments of government issued the mostfulsome addresses; subsidiary and vassal kings crowded to offer theircongratulations; there were the ordinary manifestations of popularjoy, and no one seemed to remember that the Emperor had been smittenby the papal bolt. But men remarked a great change in his bearing andexpression. Cambacérès said that he seemed to be walking in the midstof his glory. Moreover, he withdrew from the capital, and held hiscourt in Fontainebleau. The air was all surcharged. The Duc de Broglietells us in his memoirs that he had seen the Empress early that year, surrounded by the brilliant throng of "ladies in waiting, ladies ofthe court and palace, accompanied by the train of 'readers, ' whichcomposed the harem of our sultan, and enabled him for a time to endurethe painted old age of the former sultana. " The truth which underliesthis is notorious, and the scene over the divorce before the Emperor'sdeparture for the campaign just concluded bears witness to the depthto which Josephine had fallen in her desperate attempts to retain bothher place and some portion of Napoleon's tenderness. 

[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. 

EUGÈNE BEAUHARNAIS. 

Drawn by Vigneron after Le Gros]

Napoleon himself had long since announced that he was superior toplain virtues, and the list of his paramours was daily growing longerand better known. But all this self-abasement on the part of Josephineand all the self-indulgence of Napoleon could not do more thanpostpone the judgment day. "My enemies, " the Emperor was accustomed tocry out--"my enemies make appointments at my tomb. " He could not restcontent with an empire for himself which he knew would break of itsown weight on his death unless he left a legitimate heir. On hisreturn from Austria his resolution to divorce the Empress was taken, and Eugène was summoned to convey it to his mother. Josephine, thoughforewarned, was still unable to realize the fact. She behaved well;her own long career of intrigue, license, and extravagance forbaderecriminations, and besides, she was to enjoy the title and state ofan empress for life. Still, as women under the Directory loved, sheloved her husband, and there had been much tenderness between them, neither taking very seriously the infidelities of the other. To theend, even after the moderate beauty and great physical charm of hermiddle age were transformed into the faded colors and form of old age(for she was old at forty-five), and when the arts of the toilet couldno longer conceal the ravages of time and license, there stillcontinued to exist between the Empress and her second husband a mutualgood will and a feeling of comradeship engendered by the memories ofadventure, risk, plots, and gains encountered side by side througha married life of thirteen years. She had little intellect and notmuch character, but she had much feminine sweetness and many soft, winning ways. Her only weapon, therefore, in the hour of defeat wastears, and those she shed abundantly. When the paroxysms of grief wereover, the Emperor made a display of tenderness, and the Empressmanifested a gentle and affecting courage. 

On December fifteenth, 1809, before the grand council held in theTuileries, the divorce was pronounced, and the next day it wasconfirmed by decree of the senate. Josephine withdrew to Malmaison todrag out her remaining years in empty state, for the support of whichshe had a grant of two million francs a year. To the hour of herdeath, five years later, she asserted her love for Napoleon, and ingeneral she displayed great anxiety for his welfare and success. Posterity has always felt a certain tenderness for the unfortunatewoman who was raised so high and then cast down so suddenly. She wasnot virtuous, she was not strong, she was not even very beautiful. Herwrong-doing was like the naughtiness of household pets, impulsive butnot malicious, deceitful but without rancor, determined but quicklydeprecated. For this reason her misfortune has veiled her weakness andsoftened the harshness of men's judgment. 

Almost a month before the formal divorce Caulaincourt had receivedinstructions to address the Czar on the question of marriage betweenhis sister Anne, now sixteen years of age, and the Emperor of theFrench. The ambassador was to make no formal demand, but was to askfor some expression of general intentions and feelings. Alexander wasin the provinces, and did not return until the middle of December. Meantime Caulaincourt, after careful inquiry, had learned that theyoung princess was frail in health and not yet of marriageable age. The letter to his master conveying this information was crossed by oneof Napoleon's making a formal demand. The difference in confessionaladherence was of no account, he said, and an immediate answer wasdesired. "Take as your standpoint that children are wanted. " This putthe Czar in a serious dilemma. An alliance with France was still nearhis heart. By the treaty of Friedrichshamn, which had been signed onSeptember ninth, 1809, he had secured Finland at last, but of theother splendid projects suggested at Tilsit and confirmed at Erfurtnot one was realized. Aside from the chagrin he had felt at the warwith Austria, and its menacing results in the enlargement of Poland, there was now an additional cause of anxiety; for in the conflict withTurkey his troops had but recently been driven back across the Danube. If he broke with Napoleon he might even lose Moldavia and Wallachia, and realize nothing further. A few weeks had softened the displeasurehe felt after Schönbrunn, and he now began to shower favors onCaulaincourt, expressing the greatest anxiety for the match. The youthof the princess was, however, a serious obstacle, and he must consulthis empress-mother. Of course the dowager made every objection to themarriage; she was an ardent sympathizer with the old Russian party, and hated Napoleon. There is little doubt that she was entirely right, moreover, in declaring at last as an insuperable obstacle that herdaughter was too young. Alexander then turned his whole attention tocajoling the French ambassador in order to gain time. He had alwaysbeen more Napoleon's friend than his ally, he said; surely the Emperorwould grant a delay for a few months. 

But this was exactly what the suitor would not do. His dignityforbade him to abide the empress-dowager's time; the divorce had beenpronounced, and state reasons made his marriage imperative. "Toadjourn is to refuse, " he replied; "and besides, I want no strangepriests in my palace between my wife and me. " This was apparently acomplete somersault, for it meant that either Alexander must yield orthe alliance would be jeopardized. No one can divine from the evidenceexactly which alternative Napoleon desired; but in view of his generalcharacter, of the treaty he had made with Francis, and of subsequentevents, it was probably the latter. He could have used the Czar'scompliance to found his dynasty, but he seems to have made up his mindthat Austria was the better dependence. Besides, he had very seriousreasons of state for urgency. He recognized at every step of hiscareer that his power rested in the popular will, not on tradition ortheories. Hence, at every moment two purposes were immediate: first, to keep the popular favor; second, to transform his tenure of power bythe infusion of a dynastic element. 

In the winter of 1809 the people of France were not comfortable. Thepromised peace with England seemed again postponed; the war in theSpanish peninsula was still raging; the Continental System wassteadily undermining public prosperity. There was stagnation in thegreat French seaports; hand in hand with commerce, both industry andtrade were languishing. The great southern towns, deprived of theirSpanish market, were nearly bankrupt. In addition the clergy and theiradherents were thoroughly roused by the treatment of the Pope. On theother hand, the Emperor's personal popularity was also sufferingserious ravages. In the new administrative system the places which ledto promotion had now for a long time been given to members of the oldnobility; the recipients looked on them as their right, and neitherthey nor their families were grateful, while the sturdy democracy feltslighted and injured. Even the new nobility grew more unmanageablewith every day. In full possession of their estates, titles, andincomes, they felt their independence, and refused to be longer guidedby the hand which had led them into their promised land. They hadallied themselves with the oldest families in France, and thehaughtiness of family pride led them to feel condescension for thegreat adventurer whose blood so far flowed in no aristocratic veins. It seemed to Napoleon that in order to secure popular good will hemust restore prosperity, which was not easy, and to assert a moralascendancy over his court he must make a suitable match, which waseasy enough. Neither must be half done; his prestige required a greatstroke, and it was better to make the match first, and thereby easethe tension until England could be brought to terms--with Russia's aidif possible, without it if necessary. 

CHAPTER XIX

THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE[34]

 [Footnote 34: See Welschinger: Le Divorce de Napoléon. Vandal: Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, Vol. II, Le second mariage de Napoléon. Correspondance de Marie Louise 1799-1847. Lettres intimes et inédites à la C^tesse de Colloredo et à Mlle de Poutet, depuis 1810 C^tesse de Crenneville. Welschinger: Le mariage de Napoléon et de Marie Louise, in Revue de la révolution, Paris, Nov. , 1788. Durand, Madame la Générale, A Memoir, Napoleon and Marie-Louise ("Mémoires sur Napoléon et Marie-Louise"). ]

 Anxieties of the Austrian Court -- The Plan for a Matrimonial Alliance with Napoleon -- Opening of Formal Negotiations -- The Deliberations in Paris -- Napoleon's Decision -- The Czar's Indignation -- The Ceremonies at Vienna -- Napoleon's Preparations -- His Meeting with Maria Louisa -- The Wedding -- Gifts and Rejoicings -- Impressions of the New Empress -- The New Dynasty. 

[Sidenote: 1809-10]

The court of Vienna had regarded what were apparently preparations fora matrimonial alliance between France and Russia with nothing lessthan consternation. Such an arrangement would, if consummated, temporarily seal the political bond already existing, and mightguarantee it indefinitely. The empire of Austria, already shorn of somany fair territories, was no longer a first-rate power. The languageused by Napoleon after the armistice of Znaim about Francis and thenecessity for his abdication, had made a deep impression in view ofthe events at Bayonne. Was the ancient monarchy really to behumiliated and remain permanently dismembered? Not if an imperialalliance was the only thing necessary to secure Napoleon's favor. There was an archduchess of the proper age, and the house of Hapsburgwas far more ancient and splendid than the house of Romanoff. 

Among the many confidential agents of Napoleon concerned informulating the treaty of Schönbrunn was a certain Alexandre deLaborde, who had once been in the Austrian service and knew Viennawell. Remaining behind after his employer's departure, he wrote amemoir in December, 1809, which, though sent to Maret, was intendedfor the Emperor himself, and was seen by him. In it is detailed aconversation with Metternich, in which the latter had first vaguelyand then distinctly spoken of a match between Napoleon and theArchduchess Maria Louisa. This, it was explained, was to be consideredonly in case the divorce should take place, and the Austrian ministerdeclared that his master knew nothing of the project. There is noreasonable doubt that Laborde's statement was substantially true, foras long as there was glory in being the author of the suggestionMetternich claimed the credit of it, and, in a letter of Septembereleventh, 1811, categorically asserted that it was his; but afterNapoleon's fall he declared that the scheme originated in France, andit was then said that Napoleon had himself taken the initiative, on ahint from Schwarzenberg, the new Austrian ambassador in Paris. WhetherNapoleon or Francis was the suitor, it soon transpired that both werewilling. When, therefore, the former learned that the fate of theRussian alliance was in the hands of the empress-dowager, he gave thesurly answer already quoted, and turned toward Austria. During thepathetic scene of the divorce he formally asserted that having losthope of offspring by his well-beloved spouse, he was about tosacrifice the tenderest emotions of his heart for the welfare of hispeople. Being but forty years old, he might still hope to bring upchildren and train them in his own ideas. Josephine gave her consentto the dissolution of her marriage, because it was an obstacle to thewell-being of France, in that it stood in the way of her country'sfuture government by the descendants of a great man. 

To emphasize this thought, the Emperor employed two devices. The firstwas to produce an effect intended for home consumption. After thebattle of Wagram, Stadion, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, who had advocated the war, resigned; Metternich, who had been calledfrom the embassy at Paris to negotiate the peace on his master's side, remained in Vienna to succeed Stadion, and Prince Schwarzenberg wasappointed to France. But the Countess Metternich was still in Paris. The Beauharnais family--Eugène with the Austrian ambassador, Josephineand Queen Hortense with Frau von Metternich--opened the negotiationfor securing Maria Louisa as the second Empress of France. To removeall religious scruples, the bishops' court of Paris met, and onJanuary fourteenth pronounced Napoleon's first marriage null. 

The second device was to lay before an extraordinary council the twoalternatives and ask their decision. Murat, Cambacérès, and probablyFouché, voted for Russia. Fouché, like Talleyrand, had long beensuspected of playing not for Napoleon's, but for his own interest. Acertain independence of conduct and language which he had displayed inraising the national guards to repel the Walcheren expedition hadawakened further suspicion in the Emperor's mind, and there had beenplain speaking between them. The minister of police, according to oneaccount, now declared that there were only two parties inEurope--those who had gained and those who had lost by the Revolution;that Russia belonged to the former, and was the true ally for theFrench empire. It was believed that this argument was an endeavor toregain the Emperor's favor, for the words have a Napoleonic ring. Themajority of the council, however, was under Maret's leadership, andafter a long, vague harangue from Talleyrand, in which he seemed toconcur with Maret, expressed itself in favor of Austria. Fromimmemorial times she had been the pivot of every Continental coalitionagainst France. She was now irritated, and must be soothed. 

Napoleon's friends assert that he himself really favored the Russianalliance, but looked on the request for delay as a covert refusal, andconsidered himself the victim of circumstances. This is not probable, for Maret was still his confidential man; at any rate, the Emperoraccepted the decision of the majority. Accordingly, a family councilwas next called, and the matter was laid before them. There was nodoubt as to the conclusion: they declared for the Austrian marriage. The formalities of arrangement were speedily concluded. Berthier, thePrince of Neuchâtel, was named ambassador extraordinary to marry theArchduchess by proxy at Vienna, and the date was fixed for Marcheleventh, 1810. The news was received at the Austrian capital withjubilation. The populace had already lost much of its bitternessagainst the French, for they had convinced themselves that in the lastwar their own cabinet had been the aggressor. Stadion's resignationwas probably to many minds a confession of the fact, though in realityit merely marked a change of policy. The French wounded were nursed bythe Viennese with tender care, and even under the lash many turned toregard the strong hand which wielded it as probably the only powerable to restore peace and bring back its blessings. In judicious mindsthe French alliance, even if not a high-spirited course, was popularbecause it guaranteed Austria on the east against Russia and on thewest against France. If her identity were not destroyed, she mighthope at some distant day to regain her strength and her place inEurope. 

At St. Petersburg the news produced different effects. Theconservatives were not greatly disturbed, for now they were freed fromthe possible disgrace of an imperial marriage with the Bonapartes, andthey could put up with the insult if only it should break the bondswhich tied them to the hated Continental System of Napoleon. But theCzar was outraged; he had been personally insulted, and his policy wastoppling. He had secured nothing, he would be the laughing-stock ofhis people, and he could no longer justify himself in resistance topopular tendencies. He was likewise true-hearted enough to feel theloss of a friend, and proud enough to smart under the feeling that hehad been duped. Much of this he concealed, although his suite thoughtthey could discern all these emotions. In the face of both Austria andFrance he could not attack the deed itself. Caulaincourt assured himin Napoleon's name that the match had no political character, andchanged nothing in the personal friendship which his Emperor continuedto feel. He insinuated that the real cause of the decision was thereligious difference. But this Alexander would not accept. "Congratulate the Emperor on the choice he has made, " was the reply. "He wants children; all France wants them for him. The decision wasthe one which should have been taken, but it is fortunate that thematter of age stopped us here. Where would we have been if I had notspoken of it to my mother? What reproaches could she not have heapedon me? What must I not have said to you? for it is clear you weredealing in both quarters. Why, " he concluded, "has anything been saidabout the difference in religion, when at the outset the Emperordeclared it would be no obstacle?" Thus was reached the second stagein the dissolution of the famous alliance of Tilsit. 

The scenes in Vienna were brilliant in the extreme. On the one hand, they marked the Austrian approach to democracy, because for the firsttime the tricolor was displayed in the streets, and the rigidetiquette of the Hapsburgs, preserved from hoary antiquity with piouscare, snapped at every turn which Berthier took. On the other hand, they marked the approach of France to absolutism. Napoleon orderedthat his bride should receive the same presents as those which LouisXV had ordered for Maria Leszcynska, the splendors of the ceremonialwere to be royal, the new Empress's train was arranged according tothe same model, the itinerary of her journey was marked out as a royalprogress. The civil contract was signed on the tenth; the religiousceremony occurred on the eleventh, as appointed; and then followed abanquet where Berthier was absolved from all the ceremonies consideredobligatory upon one of his rank in the Hofburg. Three days later thenew Empress was handed to her traveling-carriage by the ArchdukeCharles, and amid salvos of artillery, mingled with the cheers of thepopulace, she set forth. There were a few signs of discontent amonglittle knots who collected to curse their national humiliation, andthe aristocracy were not reconciled to see Prince Esterhazy in therôle of guide to the Prince of Wagram, as Berthier had now been styledby imperial decree in Paris. But, on the whole, Europe was impressedwith a sense of Francis's sincerity. The father went forth a day'sjourney to spend an evening alone with his daughter and bestow inparting his paternal blessing on a child who had saved her country. Her journey through Bavaria and Würtemberg was one long ovation, forthese countries believed their welfare to be bound up with that ofFrance. On the twenty-sixth her cortège, having passed by way ofStrasburg, was moving toward Soissons. 

After the divorce Napoleon had withdrawn in solitude to the Trianon atVersailles, as if to mourn his widowhood the appointed and decent timein silence. The spot chosen had a significance with reference to thecoming celebrations. For a week he spent his days in the unaccustomedbut truly royal occupation of field sports. Once he visited Josephineat Malmaison. The next months he had spent again in Paris conductingthe matrimonial negotiations and arranging every detail of theetiquette to be observed in the cumbrous ceremonial which he haddevised for the celebration of his marriage in France. When all wascompleted to his satisfaction he left for Compiègne to supervise thearrangements made for the reception of his new consort, and spent thelast week of waiting there. Of all his family the giddiest and mostworldly was his sister Pauline. She and his sister-in-law, thesensible and charming Queen of Westphalia, were chosen to advise andcounsel regarding matters of dress and behavior. The latter wrote toher brother a full account of the Emperor's passionate expectation. During these days his occupations were singularly human. Much of thetime was spent in trying on gorgeous clothes: gold-laced coats, andembroidered waistcoats, which had been sent by Paris tailors. Some ofit was passed in the acquisition of accomplishments, notably inlearning to waltz. Every day he sent a letter with flowers to meet thenew Empress at every stage of her progress, and every day he receiveda reply from her written in correct French. 

At last she reached the close of the final stage, and her bridegroomwent out to meet her. Half-way between Soissons and Compiègne werepitched three splendid pavilions. Her suite was to remain in thatnearest their last lodging, his in that nearest the palace, the bridalpair were to meet in the central tent, where, according to the customof feudalism, she was to kneel and pay homage to her liege as hisforemost subject. But when the Emperor heard that his bride was sonear, his impatience seemed to break through all bounds. Entering hiscarriage without ceremony or warning, and attended by only a singlecompanion, the King of Naples, he drove far past Soissons until thecarriages met, when he stepped out of his own, tore open the door ofthe other, and entered with the eagerness of a youthful lover toembrace his bride. The prearranged stops were countermanded, and thesame evening, at ten, the wedding-train reached Compiègne. Such wasthe lover's ardor that he again flung propriety to the winds, and, claiming the validity of the procuratorial ceremony at Vienna, sleptunder the same roof with his bride, instead of in the chamberfurnished for his use in one of the administrative buildings. As anexcuse for this conduct he pleaded the example of Henry IV. 

Next day the ladies and gentlemen of the Empress's court werepresented, and formally took the oath of office. On the morrow St. Cloud was reached in the imperial progress; and two days later, onApril first, the civil ceremony of marriage was performed in thepresence of all the great dignitaries of the empire, including all thecardinals but two. Excepting only those who pleaded their age orinfirmities, the entire college had been transplanted from Rome toParis shortly after the seizure of the Pope. There was the usualfestival at night, accompanied by salvos of artillery, withilluminations of the palace grounds and fountains. The weather, likethe date, was untoward, but the Parisian populace streamed out inspite of pouring rain to get a foretaste of the more magnificentspectacles soon to follow. The solemn procession of the bridal pairinto the capital occurred next day, and the religious ceremony wascelebrated in the great gallery of the Louvre, before an assemblydeclared at the time to be the most superb ever seen in France, exceptfor one ominous fact--the twenty-seven cardinals were absent. Theyprotested that their absence was an empty form, due only to thecircumstance that Pius VII had not sanctioned the divorce. ButNapoleon was as keenly sensitive to the effectiveness of forms as anyRoman prelate; the offenders were banished from Paris, stripped oftheir great revenues, and forbidden to wear the color or insignia oftheir office. The popular speech dubbed them black cardinals. 

In the first outburst of enthusiastic loyalty, Paris and the nationcould not sufficiently manifest their joy. The illuminations werelavish, the crowds exuberant, the presents to the Empress superb. Among the latter was a complete toilet service of silver-gilt, including not merely small vessels, but large pieces of furniture, such as an arm-chair and cheval glass. Apparently the French peoplefelt assured that they had exchanged an old, worn-out dynasty for anew and vigorous one. They were jubilant at the thought of peace andsafety, which seemed to a generation cradled under royalty to be evenyet impossible in Europe except in connection with a great conqueringfamily. It was for this they poured forth their sentiment and theirsubstance, not for the affection they bore the new Empress. 

Measured by a certain standard, Maria Louisa was beautiful. Herabundant light-brown hair softened the high color of her brilliantcomplexion, her eyes were blue and mild, her features had the prettybut uncertain fullness of her eighteen years, her glance was frank anduntroubled; but her lips were full and heavy, her waist was long andstiff, her form was plump like a child's, and her timidity andself-consciousness were uncontrollable. The French taste inclines tolines in the human form which suggest a lithe and sinewy figure; theFrench instinct seeks in the expression signs of quick emotion, not tosay passion; the French eye knows but one standard of taste in dress;that alone is natural to French feeling which is the product ofself-control and consummate art. In all these respects the Austrianarchduchess was woefully deficient. She was pious, and, as her lettersdeclare, had spent much of the previous winter in praying thatProvidence would choose another consort for Napoleon. But with theresignation of her faith, which some call fatalism, and with theobedience which German life demands from all women, even those of thehighest station, she had accepted her destiny. These qualities, combined with her capacity for motherhood, soon gained a courteous andaffectionate support from her husband, and together they defied bothirreconcilable royalists and radical republicans, who, in spite oftheir ever-waning influence and ever-thinning ranks, still annoyed theEmperor by significant whisperings and glances. Both were in despairbecause the strongest indictment they had urged was now quashed. Onepretext of England, Napoleon declared, had been that he intended todestroy the ancient dynasties of Europe. Circumstances having openedthe way to his choice of a consort, he had used the opportunity inorder to destroy the flimsy plea under which Great Britain haddisturbed the nations and had stirred up the strife which hadinundated Europe with blood. Metternich heard people wondering inVienna whether a new French dynasty was really to be established forthe peace and welfare of France, or whether the alliance was intendedto throw the strength of a hitherto implacable and courageous foe intoanother Napoleonic combination for the conquest of Europe and theworld. 

The solution of this enigma has never been found. There was at themoment a lull in the storm; for a time it seemed as if it wouldlengthen into a prolonged calm. During the ceremonies at the Louvrethe Austrian ambassador, who had taken to himself the credit of whatwas passing, and had impressively accepted the congratulationsshowered on him, caught up a wine-glass from the breakfast-table, and, appearing at the window, announced in a loud voice that he drank tothe "King of Rome, " a title reserved under the Holy Roman Empire forthe heir apparent. It was but a short time since Schwarzenberg's proudmaster had renounced his proudest style, that of Roman emperor. Thecrowd knew that the toast as now given was intended for Napoleon'sissue, and they burst into cheers at this new sign of Austrian amity. The captive Spaniards at Valençay were not to be outdone. They chanteda "Te Deum" in their chapel, and drank toasts to the health "of ouraugust sovereigns, the great Napoleon and Maria Louisa, his augustspouse. " Ferdinand set a climax to his disgusting obsequiousness in apetition begging to be adopted as a son, and asking for permission toappear at court. Compiègne, whither the imperial pair soon returned, was crowded with royal personages, with the most distinguisheddiplomatists, and with the couriers bearing congratulatory despatchesfrom persons of consequence throughout Europe. 

CHAPTER XX

RIGORS OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM[35]

 [Footnote 35: References: Marbot, Memoirs, ch. 28. Mahan: Influence of Sea Power. Sloane: Political Science Quarterly, The Continental System of Napoleon, XIII, pp. 213 _et seq. _]

 Measures of Ecclesiastical Procedure -- Reforms in the Church -- Napoleon as Suzerain of the Pope -- Methods of Defying the Continental System -- Measures to Enforce it -- Rearrangement of German Lands -- Napoleon as a Smuggler -- "Simulated Papers" -- Evasions of the Imperial Restrictions -- Visit to the Netherlands -- Napoleon and his Brother Louis -- The Latter Defiant -- Louis's Negotiations with England -- Fouché's Interference -- His Counterplot. 

[Sidenote: 1810]

The consolidation of Napoleonic power appeared to be progressingrapidly. In February a decree of the senate had declared the PapalStates to be divided into two French departments, under the names ofRome and Trasimenus. The Eternal City was to give her name, as secondcity of the Empire, to the imperial heir. The Pope, endowed with aroyal revenue of four millions, was to have a palace in each ofseveral different places, and reside, according to his choice, in anyone, or in all in turn. He was to swear that he would never contravenethe judgments of the Gallican Church, and his successors were each tobe similarly bound on their accession to office. Daunou wrote a book, which was published at the Emperor's expense, maintaining the twotheses of Machiavelli: first, that the court of Rome had always usedits spiritual power to increase its temporal estate; secondly, thatits efforts had always been directed against the temporal powerstrongest at the moment in Italy. Unconquerable as was the resistanceof Pius VII on the whole, he had nevertheless surrendered temporarilyat the beginning of what might be called the second quarrel ofinvestitures, by inducting into their offices the bishops nominated byNapoleon. After he had been thrown into captivity, however, he flatlyrefused to continue, and the Emperor cut the knot by installing in thebishoprics, as they fell vacant, men of his own choice, under thestyle of "vicars of the chapters. "

This was but the initial step to an entire destruction of theadministrative scheme devised and perfected by the Roman hierarchy. The college of cardinals had first been brought to Paris, and itsmembers then banished in pairs to the great provincial towns; theecclesiastical courts, with all their archives, were likewisetransplanted from Rome to the French capital; the thirty episcopatesof the two new French departments were reduced to four; the army offoreign prelates which had been supported by the papal system wasdispersed into the various lands from which its members had come. Thenumber of Roman parishes, too, was reduced, and all the convents weresecularized. Such of the discharged priests as were ready to swearallegiance to the Emperor and the Gallican Church received a smallpension; the rest--and they appear to have been in a majority--sawtheir personal as well as ecclesiastical goods confiscated and werethemselves exiled. 

These or similar measures being applied likewise to Piedmont, Liguria, Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, the sums of money raised fromconfiscated estates became enormous. A large proportion of these fundsflowed of course into the imperial coffers, and to this fact, as wellas to the restored public confidence, was largely due the rise inprices on the stock exchange which occurred on the consummation of theAustrian marriage. These sweeping changes were of great service totrue religion and to the lands in which they were made, breaking asthey did the chains of an ecclesiastical oppression under which thepopulace had been reduced to poverty, ignorance, and apathy. Unfortunately the new rule, while more economical than the old, wasnot less arbitrary--military despotism being as little fitted for thedevelopment of a people as the rule of a corporation. Men lookedaghast as the papacy and papal influence crumbled together, while theseat of real ecclesiastical power was removed from the banks of theTiber to those of the Seine. Time seemed to be taking its revenge. Seven centuries earlier Lothair had been the vassal of Innocent II;Napoleon was now the suzerain of Pius VII. So contemptible had thePope become, even in the eyes of devout Catholics, that de Maistrecalled the inflexible but supine Pontiff a punchinello of noimportance. 

It had been clear since Trafalgar that though France might dominateearth, air, and fire in Europe, she could not gain the mastery of thesea and its islands, at least, by the ordinary means. The Emperor'sinfatuation with the plausible scheme of destroying England's commerceby paper blockades and by embargoes on British goods had not beendiminished either by his inconclusive struggle in Spain or by hisvictory over Austria. It was in vain that he had changed his navalpolicy from one of fleet-fighting to one of commerce-destroying; thathe had seized and was continuing to seize neutral vessels laden withBritish wares; that he had expanded his political system by conquestuntil he was nominally master of the Mediterranean, Atlantic, andBaltic harbors. Since 1805 English trade with the Continent, so farfrom diminishing, had steadily increased in the hands ofcontrabandists and neutral carriers, until it had now reached annualdimensions of twenty-five millions sterling. In spite of the Tilsitalliance, even French soldiers occasionally wore English-made shoesand clothing. English ships carried naval stores out of Russianharbors, and colonial wares found their way from the wharves of Rigato the markets of Mainz. But the chief offenders in defying Napoleon'schimerical policy were the Dutch and Hanseatic cities. The resistanceelsewhere in the Continent was passive compared with the energeticsmuggling and the clandestine evasion of decrees which went on underthe eyes of the officials in places like Amsterdam and Hamburg. 

These facts had not been concealed from the Emperor of the French atany time, and he now made ready to enforce the threats which he haduttered in the agony of the late wars. It had come to a life-or-deathstruggle between the policies laid down respectively in the imperialdecrees and in the British orders in council. Neither measure was inthe strictest sense military, but it is easy to see that the two wereirreconcilable in their intent, while the success of either one meantthe ruin of the land which upheld the other. It was for the sake, apparently, of waging this decisive though unwarlike contest thatNapoleon renounced leading his victorious legions into Spain for theexpulsion of English troops from the peninsula. What he himself calledthe "Spanish ulcer" might weaken the French system, and one hundredthousand good troops, together with the imperial guard, were to besent to heal it by overwhelming the great English general who had beenmade Duke of Wellington, and by seizing Lisbon. But the Englishcommerce with the peninsula was slender in comparison with what shecarried on with the Baltic and with Holland through the connivance ofgovernments which were nominally her foes. The Continental System, therefore, must first be repaired, and it was to convert a nominalacquiescence into a real one that Davout was despatched to hold thefortresses from Dantzic westward, while Oudinot was to coerce Holland. 

With such purposes in view, the lands taken from Austria wereapportioned among Bavaria, Italy, Würtemberg, and Baden. Each of thesevassal states was made to pay handsomely for its new acquisitions. Theprincipality of Ratisbon was given to Dalberg, the prince-primate, andhe in turn delivered that of Frankfort to Prince Eugène. The King ofWestphalia received Hanover and Magdeburg, promising in return aboutten millions a year of tribute, and engaging to support the eighteenthousand French troops who occupied his new lands. The gradualevacuation of South Germany began, and before long the entirecoast-land between the Elbe and the Weser was held by soldiers who hadfought at Essling and Wagram. Hamburg, Bremen, and the other Hanseatictowns, East Friesland, Oldenburg, a portion of Westphalia, the cantonof Valais, and the grand duchy of Berg were destined very soon to beincorporated with France in order to round out the imperial domain. Itmight be possible for southern Europe to substitute flax andNeapolitan cotton for American cotton, chicory for coffee, grape syrupor beet sugar for colonial sugar, and woad for indigo, but the Northcould not. Like Louis, though in a less degree, Murat and Jerome, sympathizing with their peoples, had sinned against the ContinentalSystem, and were soon to do penance for their sins by the loss ofimportant territories. But for the present the ostensible complianceof the northern dependencies was accepted. 

It is a curious and amusing fact that the great smuggler and realdelinquent was Napoleon himself. Even he felt the exigencies of Franceto be so fierce that, by a system of licenses, certain privilegedtraders were permitted to secure the supplies of dye-stuffs andfish-oil essential to French industries by exporting to England bothwine and wheat in exchange. The licensed monopolists paid handsomelyfor their privilege, not only in the sums which they publicly turnedover, but in those which lined the pockets of unscrupulous ministerslike Fouché, who winked at great irregularities not contemplated bythe immunities secured from Napoleon. 

An evasion of the British orders in council analogous to that of theFrench decrees was extensively practised, and licenses to neutraltraders were also issued by the English government. But it practisedmore discretion, and the regulation of the extensive commerce whichresulted was not attended by those court and private scandals so rifein France. The worst feature of the English procedure was its adoptionof the so-called "neutralization" system. Dutch, French, and Spanishtrading vessels had long been provided by their owners with forgedpapers certifying a neutral origin, generally Prussian. To these bothcaptains and crews swore without compunction when searched by Britishcruisers. This system England made her own, issuing not merely toreal, but also to sham neutrals, licenses which insured them againstsearch when laden with wares for or from English ports. The firmswhich engaged in the trade--and after the removal of thenon-intercourse restrictions many of them were American--compoundedmorality with legality, considering themselves perfectly reputable, even though they continued to furnish "simulated papers"--that is, prepared forgeries--to their ships as part of the regular outfit. 

Such immoralities, inequalities, and absurdities were the necessaryconsequence of a fight for the means of subsistence between twocombatants one of which had no hands and the other no feet. Soextensive was the traffic, however, that although England had found itnecessary, in consequence of the Spanish rebellion, to restrict herpaper blockade to the coasts of Holland, France, and northern Italy, she nevertheless doubled her importations of naval stores during theseason of 1808, while the prices of wool, silk, and colonial waresgave temporary promise of a revival of manufactures. As long asNapoleon's energy was elsewhere engaged, the ubiquity of Englishwar-ships on the high seas rendered the use of "simulated papers"inordinately profitable; and even after he began to give his undividedattention to policing the harbors and guarding the coast-line, itcontinued to be fairly so. It must further be remembered that in thetreaty which Russia made with Sweden on September seventeenth, 1809, the latter country promised not only to cede Finland, but also to shutout from her harbors all British ships except such as brought salt andcolonial wares. In January, 1810, Napoleon had made an agreement withthe same power that he would hand back Pomerania, but in return Swedenwas to import nothing but salt. 

The Austrian marriage having now been consummated and Austria havingbeen added to his system, Napoleon was ready in June to open his novelcampaign and begin the commercial warfare which eventually furnishedone of the most important elements in his overthrow, the other twobeing the national uprisings and the treachery of his friends, socalled. But the zenith had not even yet been reached by his star. Itwas with undimmed sagacity and undiminished power that, accompanied byhis bride, he set out about the end of April from Compiègne, to visitthe Dutch frontier, his object being to observe how far Holland'swell-nigh open contempt for his cherished scheme would now justify thedestruction of her autonomy and the utter overthrow of her government. The nominal purpose of the journey was to please the young Empress, and to gratify the peoples of Belgium and Brabant by a sight of hercharms. This aim was observed in all the arrangements, but inwell-nigh every town visited the sun's first rays saw the Emperor onhorseback inspecting troops, ships, fortifications, and arsenals; andwhen its last beams faded away the unwearied man was still holdinginterviews with the local authorities, in which every detail ofadministration was revised and strengthened. To all appearance the endof the journey was as prosperous as its inception. Favors weredistributed with lavish hand, the people displayed a wild enthusiasmwhen the affable but distant Empress showed herself, and nothingoccurred to mar the outward state in which the Emperor returned toParis. But the condition of his mind cannot be depicted, such was hisrage and humiliation in regard to a revelation of treachery madeinadvertently and innocently by Louis on the eve of their separation. To explain what had occurred a short retrospect is necessary. 

From earliest childhood certain qualities of Louis had endeared him toNapoleon. The school of poverty, in which the younger brother had beenthe pupil of the elder, was likewise a school of fraternal affection. Throughout the Italian and Egyptian campaigns they stood in intimaterelations as general and aide-de-camp, and one of the earliest caresof the First Consul was to bestow the beautiful Hortense deBeauharnais on his favorite brother. In 1804 Louis was made general, then councilor of state, and finally in 1806 he was elevated to thethrone of Holland. His child until its untimely death was cherished byNapoleon as a son destined to inherit imperial greatness. But, likethe other royal Bonapartes, the King of Holland regarded his highestate not as a gift from the Emperor, but as a right. He ruled theland assigned him, if not in his own interest, at least not in that ofthe Empire, and from the outset filled his letters with bittercomplaints of all that entered into his lot, not excepting his wife. Napoleon admonished and threatened, but to no avail. The interests ofhis own royalty and of the Dutch were nearer to Louis than those ofthe Empire. 

At last the Emperor hinted that the air of Holland did not agree withits monarch, indicating that circumstances required it to beincorporated with France. In March, 1808, he offered the crown ofSpain as a substitute. A little later the suggestion was made thatLouis might have the Hanseatic towns in exchange for Brabant andZealand. Both propositions were scouted. When we remember who thepotentates were, by whom such offers were made and refused, we seemforced to dismiss all notions of patriotism, uprightness, and loyaltyas the motives of either, and must attribute Louis's course topetulance. Napoleon was highly incensed. On the failure of theWalcheren expedition, both Brabant and Zealand were occupied by Frenchtroops, and Louis was summoned to Paris. His first desperate thoughtwas one of resistance, but on reflection he obeyed. On his arrival helearned that his fate was imminent. Napoleon announced to thelegislature that a change in the relations with Holland wasimperative. The minister of the interior explained that, as being thealluvium of three French rivers--namely, the Rhine, the Meuse, and theScheldt--that land was by nature a portion of France, one of the greatimperial arteries. Louis sought to fly, but was detained. He at oncedespatched the Count de Bylandt with orders to close the Dutchfrontier fortresses and defend the capital against the French troops. This was done, but Louis's defiance was short. After signing a treatywhich bound him, among other things, to open his fortresses, seize all"neutralized, " and even all neutral, vessels in his harbors, includingthose of the United States, --a document which thus left him only anominal throne, --he was permitted early in April, 1810, to return toAmsterdam. 

Napoleon's subsequent course was dictated by what might appear to be asudden change of view, but was in reality a revival of his perennialhopes for peace with England. Having in mind the annexation ofHolland, it occurred to him that by desisting from that measure hemight wrench from Great Britain the lasting peace which she had thusfar refused. Accordingly he ordered his brother to open a negotiationwith London and represent his kingdom as in danger of annihilationunless the British government would consent to a cessation ofhostilities and an enduring treaty of peace. This was done, and thoughLabouchere, Louis's agent, had so little to offer that hispropositions were farcical, yet there was at least the show of adiplomatic negotiation. At this juncture the superserviceableMephistopheles of the Empire, Fouché, intervened. By an agent of hisown he approached the cabinet of St. James with an offer of peace onthe basis of restoring the Spanish Bourbons and compensating LouisXVIII by a kingdom to be carved from the territories of the UnitedStates!

The agent of Fouché reached London somewhat ahead of the one sent byLouis. He was firmly sent to the right-about. Labouchere was then toldthat before entering further on the question, a proposition for peacemust be formulated and presented, not by the King of Holland, but bythe Emperor. The failure of the Walcheren expedition had exasperatedEngland, Canning had fallen, and Lord Wellesley, his successor, represented a powerful sentiment for the continuation of the war. Napoleon replied, therefore, by a note suggesting not a definitepeace, but a step toward it. If England would withdraw the orders incouncil of 1807, he would evacuate Holland and the Hanseatic towns. His note closed with a characteristic threat. If England should delay, having already lost her trade with Naples, Spain, Portugal, and theport of Triest, she would now lose that with Holland, the Hanseatictowns, and Sicily. 

Nothing dismayed by his first rebuff, the audacious Fouché againintervened. This time he selected Ouvrard, a friend of Labouchere'sand of his own, a man well known as a stormy petrel of intrigue, tooperate insidiously through the accredited envoy, who innocentlysupposed his friend to be representing Napoleon's own views. There wasconsequently but little sense of restraint in the renewed negotiation. Virtually the entire continental situation was considered as open, andFouché's pet scheme of an American kingdom for Louis XVIII was furtheramplified by the suggestion of an Anglo-French expedition to establishit. Labouchere having returned to Holland, much of the negotiation hadbeen carried on by letter, and Napoleon, getting wind during hisBelgian visit of Ouvrard's presence at the Dutch court, suspectedtrickery and called for the correspondence. Its very existence enragedhim; that such matters should have been put in writing wascompromising to his entire policy. Ouvrard afterward declared that hepersonally informed the Emperor of what was going on, but he couldnever prove it; the only possible basis which can be found for hisstatement consists in the seizure and confiscation about this time ofsome hundred and thirty American vessels lying in continentalharbors; but, base as that deed was, it proves nothing and was due toanother cause. It is not easy to determine whether this deed was awell-considered measure of French diplomacy, intended to arouse thepugnacity of the United States, or a temporary shift to fill emptycoffers. In either case it was not intended to have a direct bearingon irregular diplomatic negotiations between England and Holland. Thecircumstances were a direct result of the Berlin Decree. 

CHAPTER XXI

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM COMPLETED

 The Bayonne and Rambouillet Decrees -- Fouché Replaced by Savary -- Abdication of King Louis -- Conduct of Louis and Lucien -- Holland Incorporated into the Empire -- Napoleon's Relatives Untrue to his Interests -- French Empire at its Greatest Extent -- The Continental System as Perfected -- Discontent in Russia and in Sweden. 

The American Embargo Act of 1807 had been for manifest reasonsentirely to Napoleon's liking, as is proved by the Bayonne Decree of1808, which ordered the seizure and sale in French harbors of allAmerican ships transgressing it. The Non-intercourse Act of Marchfirst, 1809, was, however, quite another thing. It was passed by theDemocratic majority of Congress in defiance of Federalist sentiment, and prohibited commercial intercourse with both Great Britain andFrance. Napoleon declared that French vessels had been seized underits terms in United States harbors; and it was nominally inretaliation for this, which was not a fact, that, according to theRambouillet Decree, issued on March twenty-third, 1810, Americanvessels with their cargoes, worth together upward of eight milliondollars, were seized and kept. In reality Napoleon regarded orpretended to regard the Non-intercourse Act as one of open hostilityto himself, and used it to fill his depleted purse, exactly as he usedthe substitutes passed by Congress in the following year to bring onthe War of 1812. Owing to the general use of "simulated" Americanpapers and seals, the non-intercourse system introduced British goodsinto every continental harbor. A vessel holding both a French and aBritish license and "simulated papers" of the United States or anyother neutral state might by unscrupulous adroitness trade in Englishgoods almost without restriction, and this was far from Napoleon'sintention. Between 1802 and 1811, nine hundred and seventeen Americanvessels were seized by the British and five hundred and fifty-eight bythe French in their harbors; the number seized in the ports ofHolland, Spain, Denmark, and Naples was very large, but it is notdefinitely known. The dealings of Napoleon with the United States inthis matter, like those of England, were irregular and evasive; butthere is nothing in them to show that the Emperor of the Frenchcontemplated either the dismemberment of the American republic or theabandonment of his Continental System. 

Having traced the whole English-Dutch conspiracy directly to Fouché, Napoleon contemplated bringing the treacherous minister to trial onthe charge of treason. Fearing, however, the effect not merely inEurope, but particularly in France, of such a spectacle, and therevelations which must necessarily accompany it, he contented himselfwith degrading and banishing his unruly henchman. The important officeof police minister was filled by the appointment of Savary, an equallyunscrupulous but more obedient tool. The murderer of Enghien, and thekeeper of Ferdinand as he now was and had been since Talleyrand'sreturn to public life, was both feared and hated in Paris. "Ibelieve, " he says in his memoirs, "that news of a pestilence havingbroken out on some point of the coast would not have caused moreterror than did my nomination to the ministry of police. "

Louis, within the narrowed sphere of his activities, continued quiteas incorrigible as before. He refused the perfect obedience demanded, and even treated the French diplomatic agent in Holland withindignity. Napoleon's scorn burst its bounds. "Louis, " he wrote in aletter carefully excluded from the authorized edition of hiscorrespondence, "you do not want to reign long; your actions revealyour true feelings better than your personal letters. Listen to onewho has known those feelings longer than even you yourself. Retraceyour steps, be French at heart, or your people will drive you out, andyou will leave Holland, the object of pity and ridicule on the part ofthe Dutch. Men govern states by the exercise of reason and the use ofa policy, and not by the impulses of an acid and vitiated lymph. " Twodays later, on hearing of a studied insult from his brother to theFrench minister, he wrote again: "Write no more trite phrases; youhave been repeating them for three years, and every day proves theirfalseness. This is the last letter I shall write you in my life. " In ashort time French troops were marching on Amsterdam. Louis summonedhis council and advised resistance; but the councilors convinced himhow useless such a course would be. The dispirited King at onceabdicated and fled. 

For some days Louis's whereabouts were unknown. There was much talk, and Napoleon was agitated. He wrote beseeching Jerome to learn wherethe fugitive was and send him to Paris, that he might withdraw to St. Leu and cease to be the laughing-stock of Europe. In ten days it wasknown that Louis was at Teplitz in Bohemia. A circular was at onceaddressed to the French diplomatists abroad, explaining that the Kingof Holland must be excused for his conduct on the ground of his beinga chronic invalid. Inasmuch as about the same time Lucien found theair of the French department of Rome not altogether to his liking, andbesought his brother's leave to expatriate himself to the UnitedStates, the family relations of the Emperor were published throughoutEurope in a most unbecoming light. The ship in which Lucien sailed wascaptured by an English frigate, and he was taken to England, where heremained in an agreeable captivity until 1814. 

The "Moniteur" of July ninth, 1810, published a laconic imperialdecree stating that Holland was henceforth a portion of the Empire. "What was I to do?" the Emperor exclaimed at St. Helena. "LeaveHolland to the enemy? Nominate a new king?" It is difficult from hisstandpoint to answer these questions except in the negative. Louis hadviewed his royal task as if he had been a dynastic king, which ofcourse he never was, though much beloved by many of his subjects. Hehad moved the capital from The Hague to Amsterdam, had reformed theDutch jurisprudence by the introduction of the Code Napoléon, hadpatronized learning and the arts. In all this he had not followed hisbrother's leading, and the results were excellent. But the Dutchmerchants suffered exactly in proportion to the enforcement of thecontinental blockade, riots of the unemployed became frequent, and theKing, forgetting the ladder by which he had climbed, became the friendand the ally of his people. His fate was a natural consequence of hisconduct. 

As a portion of the French empire, Holland was divided into eightdepartments, her public debt was scaled down from eighty to twentymillions, the French administration was put upon a basis of the mostrigid economy, and for the ensuing four years the Dutch found whatconsolation they might for the loss of their independence and theirtrade in a tolerable physical well-being, in the suppression of alldisorders, and in an enforced calm such as Louis, by reason of hisfalse position, had not been able to secure for them--a boon which, it must be confessed, their placid dispositions did not undervalue. When, however, opportunity was ripe, they bravely rose to assert oncemore their nationality. 

In this connection it is interesting to note the effect which theconduct of the Emperor's family had finally produced in his mind. Brothers and sisters alike had come to consider their changed fortunesas having introduced them into the royal hierarchy of the oldabsolutist Europe, which their narrowness and ignorance led them toregard as still existent. Their behavior was distinctly that of theold dynastic sovereigns, whose lives were their model. The Emperor atlast saw his mistake. "Relatives and cousins, male or female, " he saidin September to Metternich, "are all worthless. I should not have lefta throne in existence, even for my brothers. But one grows wise onlywith time. I should have appointed nothing but stadholders andviceroys. " This policy he thenceforward adopted. Carrying out thethreat made in response to Joseph's complaints, Spain as far as theEbro had been annexed to the Empire in March, 1810; in December thewhole North Sea coast as far as Lübeck was likewise incorporated intothe Empire. Jerome was deprived of a portion of Hanover, which he hadreceived only in January, and the Duke of Oldenburg, who had marriedthat favorite sister of Alexander for whose hand Napoleon hadtentatively sued, was dethroned. 

The same year Valais, the little commonwealth which had been separatedfrom Switzerland and made independent in order to neutralize thehighway into Italy, was likewise annexed. This new department, calledthat of the Simplon, together with the four erected out of thecoast-line of the North Sea, brought the limits of Napoleonic empireto their greatest extent. The Illyrian provinces and the Ionian Isleswere not under direct civil administration from Paris, being held asmilitary outposts. Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia were eachlikewise held as military governments. Murat was made king of Naples, Louis's infant son became grand duke of Berg, Elisa was already grandduchess of Tuscany and princess of Lucca and Piombino. It will beremembered that Pauline was duchess of Guastalla, Jerome king ofWestphalia, Joseph king of Spain, Berthier prince of Neuchâtel, Talleyrand prince of Benevento, and Eugène viceroy of the kingdom ofItaly. These states, together with the Confederation of the Rhine, theHelvetic Republic, Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg, and Denmark, withNorway, were all vassal powers. But Rome, Genoa, Parma, Florence, Siena, Leghorn, Osnabrück, Münster, Bremen, and Hamburg were nowcapitals of actual French departments, the total number of whichreached one hundred and thirty. They were directly administered by acentral bureaucracy as autocratic as any military despotism. 

Thus at last was carried out the program of the Revolution, whoseleaders had determined in 1796 to close the Continent to Englishcommerce. What republican idealism had imagined, imperial vigor atleast partially realized. According to the Trianon decree of Augustfifth, 1810, and that of Fontainebleau, issued on October eighteenthof the same year, French soldiers crossed the frontiers of the Empire, seized every depot of English wares within a four-mile limit, andburned all the contents except the sugar and coffee, which weretransported to the great towns, and sold at auction for the Emperor'sextraordinary expenses; the smugglers themselves were hunted down, captured, and handed over to the tender mercies of a court createdespecially to try them. From the Pyrenees to the North Cape the"licenses" devised by the Directory and issued by the Empire were theonly certificates under which English goods could be introduced intothe now nearly completed system. Denmark, which still held Norwayunder its sway, had neither forgotten nor forgiven the bombardment ofCopenhagen in 1807; and her king, Frederick VI, hoping that in thechapter of accidents Sweden too might fall to his crown, was only toowilling to assist the Emperor and close his ports to all Britishcommerce, even to "neutral" ships carrying English goods. The popularfury against England made the people willing to forego all thecomforts and advantages of free trade in colonial wares. 

It was with jealous eyes that Napoleon saw Russia's growinglukewarmness and marked her evasions of her pact. He knew also that inspite of his decrees and his vigilance English goods were stilltransported under the Turkish flag into the Mediterranean. But directand efficient intervention on the Baltic or in the Levant was as yetimpossible. To complete one portion of his structure, a cordon mustfirst be drawn about both Sweden and Spain. The former was apparentlysecure, for Gustavus IV, having nearly ruined his country bypersisting in the English alliance, had made way for his uncle, whonow ruled as Charles XIII under the protection of Napoleon. The newKing, being childless, had selected as his successor MarshalBernadotte, whose kindly dealings with the Pomeranians had endearedhim to all Swedes. The estates of Sweden, remembering that he hadmarried a sister of Joseph Bonaparte's wife, and recalling his longassociation with Napoleon, believed that in him they had a candidateacceptable to the French emperor, and therefore formally accepted him. They did not know the details of his unfriendly relations toNapoleon, nor with what unwillingness consent was given by the Emperorto his candidacy. The bonds of French citizenship were most grudginglyloosed by the Emperor, for there rankled in his breast a deep-seatedfeeling of distrust. But he was forced to a distasteful compliance bythe fear of exposing unsavory details of his own policy. The new crownprince himself was well aware of the facts. He coveted Norway andasked for it, that on his accession he might bring Sweden a substitutefor the loss of Finland; but Napoleon would not thus alienate the Kingof Denmark. The Czar was not hampered in the same way, and inDecember, 1810, offered Sweden the coveted land as the price of heralliance. When we recall the early republicanism of Bernadotte, hisrepeated failures in critical moments, --as on the Marchfeld andelsewhere, --the impatient and severe reproofs administered to theinefficient and fiery Gascon by his commander, we are not amazed thatthe crown prince Charles John, as his style now ran, began immediatelyafter his installation at Stockholm to vent his spleen on Napoleon. Though there was no declared enmity, yet this fact augured ill for thesteadfastness to the French alliance of the land over which he wassoon to reign. 

CHAPTER XXII

THE COURSE OF THE PENINSULAR WAR[36]

 [Footnote 36: See Napier, Peninsular War. ]

 Napoleon's Plans for Spain -- Character of the Troops Sent Thither -- Conflicting Policies in England -- The Battle of Busaco -- The Lines of Torres Vedras -- Soult's Dilatoriness -- Consequences of the Spanish Campaign -- English Opinion Opposed to Wellington -- Difficulties of Spanish Warfare -- Marmont Replaces Masséna -- French Successes -- Their Slight Value -- The French Character and the Spanish Invasion. 

But matters were much worse beyond the Pyrenees, where there was openwarfare. The seizure of the northern provinces marked the commencementof a new policy, nothing less than the incorporation of all Spain inFrance. Azanza, the envoy of Joseph at Paris, could scarcely trust hissenses when, after long and fruitless efforts to persuade Napoleonthat the troubles of Spain were due to the rapine of the Frenchgenerals and the quarrels of their unbridled soldiery, and that thenew King's moderation would be a perfect remedy if left to work itseffects, he was finally shown his master's carefully writtenabdication, only waiting on events for publication, and was harshlytold in reply to his intercessions for the integrity of his countrythat it was merely "the natural extension of France. " It wasTalleyrand who originally said that Italy was the flank of France, Spain its natural continuation, and Holland its alluvium. 

Spain was to be conquered step by step, and by a season of militaryadministration each new acquisition was to be made ready for theeventual dignity of a French department. A manifesto setting forththis policy was prepared and was to be duly issued to the Spanishpeople, but it never reached Madrid. The courier who carried it wascaptured by a guerrilla, and the proclamation was at once printed in apopular journal and copied thence into the "London Courier. " It is notdifficult to imagine how its perusal intensified the ever-growingnational passion of the insurgent Spaniards for emancipation from theFrench yoke. 

This spirit was England's powerful ally and Masséna's destructive foe. The great marshal, second in ability only to his imperial master, hadsucceeded to the command in the peninsula. The Imperial Guard was themainstay of the reinforcements despatched thither in order to end themilitary conflict and inaugurate the new peaceful warfare by enforcingthe Continental system of commercial embargo for humiliating England. Besides the guard there were, however, some of those regiments whichhad quailed at Vienna before the supposed approach of the ArchdukeJohn's army from Hungary after the battle of Wagram, by no means theflower of the Emperor's troops. These newcomers, together with theforces already in Spain under Suchet, Augereau, Reille, and Thouvenot, and the remnant of those troops which had been under Soult, werequickly organized for offensive warfare, first against the Spaniardsand then against the English under Wellington who were still holdingPortugal. The three army corps which were collected in Leon ready foradvance were commanded respectively by Ney, Junot, and Regnier. Theirnumber on paper was eighty thousand; in reality there were not morethan fifty thousand effective fighting men. By the arrival of Hill'scorps to reinforce Wellington the English numbered nearly if not quiteas many. 

For three years public opinion in England had been divided, somesustaining on the one hand Canning's policy of striving to defeatNapoleon by rousing the Continental nations and furnishing them withsubsidies for warfare, others preferring that of Castlereagh, whichadvocated the sending of English forces into the Continent. The lattertheory had temporarily prevailed. Three expeditions, one to Portugal, one to Walcheren, and one to Sicily, had been entire or partialfailures. But Wellington's victory at Talavera having kept thepeninsular ports open to English trade, his older brother, LordWellesley, who was now secretary for foreign affairs in the newcabinet, and who ardently believed that thus alone could England win, managed continuously to reinforce the army in Portugal until at lastit was strong in numbers and efficient as a fighting machine. 

From beginning to end Masséna's campaign was marked by unexpecteddisaster. Such were the zeal and endurance of the Spaniards that theold, ill-constructed fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo held out from thebeginning of June until the ninth of July. Owing to the great heat andthe preparations necessary in a hostile and deserted land, Almeida, which next blocked the way, was not even beleaguered until Augustfifteenth, and it held out for nearly a fortnight. Finally, onSeptember sixteenth, Masséna crossed the Portuguese frontier, andWellington, who lay near by but had not ventured to assume theoffensive, began a slow and cautious retreat down the valley of theMondego, devastating the country as he went. At last he made a standon the heights near Busaco, over against a gorge where the riverbreaks through the hills into the plains below. Masséna attacked onSeptember twenty-seventh and was repulsed with a loss of four thousandfive hundred dead and wounded. His division commanders showed at oncea spirit which soon developed into unruliness: they had declared fromthe outset that their force was not sufficiently strong for the taskassigned to it, and they now demanded a retreat. But the veteranMasséna stood firm: his scouts had brought word of a certainunprotected vale or rather depression of the land on the English left, which, having apparently escaped Wellington's observation, was notfortified, and the French commander determined to outflank his foe onthat line. The movement was thoroughly successful and the Britishbegan a rapid retreat southward before the advancing French. 

Masséna found easy sustenance for man and beast in the rich lowlandsabout Coimbra, and halting in that town for a short time to recruithis strength and nurse his sick, started at last in the full tide ofsuccess for Lisbon and the sea, to drive the English to their shipsand complete the Continental embargo. As one day succeeded another, his hopes grew higher until at last he overtook and began to skirmishwith the English rear-guard. But after a final dash on Octobereleventh, that rear-guard suddenly vanished. Two days later the Frenchwere brought suddenly to a standstill before a long, perfectlyconstructed, and bristling line of fortifications of whose existencethey had known absolutely nothing. These were the famous lines ofTorres Vedras, constructed by Wellington in his recent enforcedvacation, to guard his eventual retreat and embarkment, provided SirJohn Moore's unfortunate campaign and the last Austrian war shouldfind a climax in a similar French victory over all Spain. These lineseffectually protected the right bank of the Tagus. They consisted ofone hundred and fifty-two redoubts, equipped with seven hundred gunsand manned by thirty thousand English, thirty thousand Portuguese, and eight thousand Spaniards. As Masséna now had but forty-fivethousand men, there could be no question of storming such a fortress, and nothing was left but to await reinforcements and plan a strategicmovement by which he might cross the Tagus, threaten Lisbon from theleft bank, draw off the foe to its defense, and thus perhaps, havingweakened the garrison, secure the possibility of a successful attackon the fortified lines in front. 

The notion was not visionary. Soult had been despatched with a strongforce southward into Andalusia, with orders to crush out theresistance of that province; he was then to turn westward, joinMasséna in Portugal, and coöperate with him under his orders for theexpulsion of the English. The belated expedition had not arrived, butin spite of the delay and disappointment it must surely come at last;and if the Emperor would but consent to order up the troops lying inCastile, the quickly formed and brilliant plan of Masséna would befeasible. But, alas for the scheme, what was apparently jealousy onthe part of Soult had quenched all ardor in the Andalusian invasion. He was at this moment before Cadiz, carrying on a siege in whicheither the Spanish were displaying great courage or the French butlittle heart. His sluggish progress was not unobserved at Paris, andfinally under pressure he left half his force before the walls of the"white city, " while with the other he advanced and captured thefortress of Badajoz. There he paused of necessity, being falselyinformed that Masséna, who had only withdrawn toward Santarem, was infull retreat, but being correctly notified that the portions of hisown force left before Cadiz were not able to hold their own. Havingbeen virtually defeated in his attack on Sir John Moore, his invasionof Portugal in 1809 had been temporarily successful; but he hadoccupied Oporto only to conspire like Junot for the crown of thecountry, and he had been driven out without difficulty by the English. Made commander-in-chief after the empty victory of Wellington atTalavera, he had won a great battle at Ocaña on November nineteenth, 1809; but since then his time had been virtually wasted, for hisbickerings with Joseph and his jealousy of Masséna made all hissuccesses, even this last one at Badajoz, entirely useless. In a shorttime he returned to Cadiz, and the French before Lisbon remainedtherefore without their auxiliaries. 

Both these checks displeased Napoleon greatly. It is often stated thatit was because he felt contempt alike for the Spanish guerrillas andthe English infantry that he delegated the conduct of affairs in thepeninsula to his lieutenants. Quite the reverse appears to be thetruth. Foy, Masséna's envoy, reached Paris about the end of November, and found the Emperor in something like a dull fury. His personalexperience had now the confirmation of that undergone by Masséna andSoult, two of his greatest lieutenants. He had himself found therugged and ill-cultivated country unable to support large armies. Itwas a discouraging fact that neither Soult nor Masséna had succeededbetter than the great captain himself, and Napoleon was thus convincedthat the Continental System could not be enforced against such doggedpersistency as that of the unreasoning, disorganized, but courageousand frenzied Spaniards, assisted by the cold, calculating, and luckyWellington: at least not without terrible cost in life and money. Accordingly Masséna was left without immediate reinforcement, while onDecember tenth, 1809, was promulgated the decree incorporating theNorth Sea coast into the Empire. Alexander chose to regard thisfateful act as merely disrespectful, remonstrated with the Frenchenvoy at St. Petersburg, and sent a circular to the powers reservingthe rights of his house over Oldenburg; he refused the pettyindemnification of Erfurt offered by Napoleon, and a year later, inDecember, 1810, issued a ukase which laid prohibitive duties on Frenchsilks and wines, while at the same time it favored the "neutral"traffic in English wares. But at the moment he bore the affrontwithout any menace of war, and merely called attention to the commonobligations of friendship between sovereigns. If the breach were tooccur, it must be plainly and manifestly Napoleon's doing. 

Napoleon's failure to reinforce Masséna left the situation beforeLisbon precarious. It cannot be proved that he understood all thedifficulties in Wellington's position, but it is not unlikely that hedid. Lisbon was overcrowded with fugitives, and demanded speedy reliefby offensive operations. If Masséna had opened a bombardment from theopposite bank, its inhabitants would have risen in rebellion againstthe English general. The opposition party in Westminster used whatseemed in England to be the perennial and everlasting delay of theyounger brother as ground to attack the older one's conduct and toarraign the entire ministerial policy. The English people had heard ofthe Spanish insurrection with wild delight, but the inefficiency andstubbornness of the insurgent leaders, together with theuntrustworthiness of the provisional governments, had cooled theirardor, and after the defeat at Ocaña--a battle which the vaingloriousSpaniards had fought in direct opposition to Wellington's advice--theywere loud in abuse of their allies. Lord Liverpool openly attackedWellington, popular discontent was heightened by the oppositiontaunts, and it seemed for a time as if the ministry must abandon theexpedition or fall. 

But if Wellington required all the force of his will and thecompulsion of a higher necessity to make him deaf to the clamor of hisallies for an advance, Masséna had equal need for strength to sustainhis forces, and to resist the clamor of his own generals for retreat. Foy finally brought back the necessary orders for reinforcements tocome in from Castile; but, as a large proportion of the men stationedin that province existed merely on paper, only nine thousand could bespared from those who actually were there. Still Masséna stood like arock. Wellington wrote home that with all his money, and assisted bythe good will of the inhabitants, he could not have maintained onedivision where all the winter long Masséna found sustenance for sixtythousand men and twelve thousand beasts. This tribute to thecampaigning powers of the French reveals incidentally the exaggeratedconception of their strength entertained by the enemy. 

The return of Soult to Cadiz emboldened Wellington to advance intoSpain. After various movements on the part of both sides, Masséna wasbeaten at Fuentes de Onoro, and Almeida was retaken by the English. Badajoz was beset by the English, and Soult once more advanced to itsassistance. He, too, was defeated in a battle at Albuera, butsucceeded finally in effecting a junction with Masséna, so thatWellington felt compelled to retreat again into Portugal before theunited army. The exasperation of Napoleon at the failure of Masséna inthe battle of Fuentes de Onoro led to the disgrace of the old marshal, and Marmont was sent to replace him. Such was the difficulty which theFrench experienced in securing commissary stores from an impoverishedland that Wellington seemed content to let want fight his battles. Theseason of 1811 was marked by inactivity on both sides except in theeast, where Suchet captured Aragon and Valencia, annihilating theSpanish army under Blake. But at the close of the year Soult wascompelled to withdraw southward toward the coast, in the hope ofsecuring indispensable supplies. The Spanish guerrillas of centralSpain harassed the French soldiers and took the heart out of them. Wellington at once resumed the offensive; Ciudad Rodrigo fell beforehim on January twelfth, 1812, and on April eighth, after one of thebravest and bloodiest assaults recorded in English annals, Badajozalso was carried. 

Marmont drew back for concentration, and the English advanced to theDuero. Thereupon the French turned again, Wellington retreated onSalamanca, and there made his stand, defeating his enemy on Julytwenty-second, in a brilliant engagement. The French commander thenmarched to Burgos, but his opponent, instead of following, turnedtoward Madrid, in order first to drive Joseph from his capital. Bythat time Burgos had been made so strong that all efforts to captureit proved unavailing, Soult at once abandoned Cadiz and turnednorthward to aid Joseph. The English were thus between two foes, andsuch was the demoralization of the British soldiery when theyunderstood their danger that Wellington could with difficulty leadthem back into Portugal. At the close of 1812 the French were incontrol of all Spain except the south, which had been freed by Soult'snorthward movement. Cadiz became the capital of the nationalists, butthey could not restrain their revolutionary impulses long enough toform a respectable or trustworthy government, and Wellington was oncemore relegated to inactivity. His enforced leisure was occupied by theconsideration of plans for the great successes with which he crownedthe following season. 

Viewed from a military standpoint, the French warfare in Spainappeared utterly disastrous. [37] Regiments melted away like ice beforean April sun; desertions became ominously numerous, and disease laidthousands low. Guerrilla warfare demoralized the regular forces. Thenew conscripts at first showed a noisy zeal, but they had been torntoo young from their home nurture, and had neither strength nor powerof resistance. The troops from vassal kingdoms and newly annexedterritories were dismayed by the sufferings they had to endure, andbeheld with interest the national uprising of the Spaniards, which, inspite of local jealousies, of rabid and radical doctrines that couldlead to nothing but anarchy, of disastrous failure in government, offeebleness and falsehood in the temporary rulers, seemed likely torender of no avail the efforts and successes of a great empire. 

 [Footnote 37: Oman, History of the Peninsular War, furnishes much valuable material on this period. His point of view in one feature is corrected by J. B. Rye and R. A. Bence-Pembroke of Oxford. See the Army Service Corps Quarterly, October, 1905. ]

Yet in some respects the French character appeared in a stronger lightthroughout the disasters of the Peninsular war than at any other time. Marbot's tale of the beautiful young cantinière, or woman sutler, ofthe Twenty-sixth regiment, who after Busaco rushed unhurt through theEnglish outposts in order to alleviate the sufferings of the capturedgeneral of her brigade, and who returned on her donkey through thelines without having suffered an insult, reflects equal credit on theunselfish daring of the French, which she typified, and on thepure-minded gallantry of the English. The same writer's narrative ofthe French deserters who, under a leader nicknamed Marshal Stockpot, established themselves as freebooters in a convent not far fromMasséna's headquarters at Santarem, and of the general's swift, condign punishment of such conduct, graphically delineates the straitsof the French, which led them into the extreme courses that devastatedthe land, but it also displays the quality of the discipline which wasexercised whenever possible. Nor should it be forgotten that the twomost splendid writers of France's succeeding age were profoundlyimpressed with the terrible scenes of the French invasion of Spain. George Sand was in Madrid as an infant for a considerable portion of1808; Victor Hugo passed the year 1811 in a Madrid school, fightingchildish battles for "the great Emperor, " whom his Spanish schoolmatescalled Napoladron (Napo the robber). Upon both the fact of theirconnection with the repulse of Napoleon's armies left a profoundimpression. The former was irresistibly drawn to revisit the country;the latter recalled his impressions in some of his noblest verse. 

CHAPTER XXIII

BIRTH OF THE KING OF ROME[38]

 [Footnote 38: References as before, and Helfert: Marie Louise. Welschinger: La censure sous le premier empire. Wertheimer: Die Heirat der Erzherzogin Marie Louise mit Napoleon I. Montbel: Le duc de Reichstadt. Welschinger: Le roi de Rome. ]

 England Under the Continental System -- End of Constitutional Government in France -- Napoleon's Personal Rule -- Wealth of his High Officials -- Literature and the Empire -- Mme. De Staël's Aspirations -- Her Attempts to Win Napoleon -- Her Genius Saved by Defeat -- The Decennial Prizes -- Pregnancy of Maria Louisa -- The Heir of the Napoleon Dynasty. 

[Sidenote: 1810-11]

It would be idle to suppose that during the winter of 1810-11 theSpanish situation was not thoroughly appreciated by the imperialbridegroom at Paris, or that he underrated the ultimate effects ofwhat was taking place in the Iberian peninsula if the process were togo on. Still less is it probable that with the direction of all hisenergy toward that quarter he could not have quenched the uncertainand spasmodic efforts of Spanish patriotism, either by arts of whichhe was a master, or by making a desert to call it a peace. No; everyindication is that his eye was still fixed on England at her vitalpoint, and that he took his measures in the North to deal her such athrust that the life-blood which sustained the Peninsular war wouldeither flow inefficacious, or be turned away altogether from Spain, and change the ever-doubtful success of Wellington into assureddisaster. Wealthy as England was, it was certain that her credit couldnot long hold out in view of the lavish subsidies she was constantlygranting to continental powers, while the expeditions to Spain, Holland, and Sicily were even more costly, inconclusive as they had sofar been. In 1810 English bank-notes were twenty per cent. Below par, and the sovereign could be exchanged on the Continent for onlyseventeen francs instead of the twenty-five it usually brought. Business failures were becoming ominously frequent in London, andpanic was stalking abroad. What must be the necessary result if thecontinental embargo were more thoroughly enforced? The enormouscontraband trade of the North was now virtually at an end. WhereEnglish merchants had so far been able to secure at least half of theprices obtained from the consumers by smugglers, they could now nolonger secure even that doubtful market at any price; theincorporation of Holland and the North Sea shores into France leftvirtually no opening into Europe for them except through Russia. Thefate of England and of the world seemed to hang on how far the Czarcould or would keep the engagements which he had made at Tilsit. 

This might not have been so completely true if the French finances hadbeen desperate; but they were not--that is, the Emperor's personalfinances were not. After the legislative assembly met in December, 1809, it was soon clear to France that the farce of constitutionalgovernment under the Empire was nearly played out. Not only were themembers of the senate, who should have retired according to theconstitution, kept in their seats by a decree of the body to whichthey belonged, but an imperial edict appointed the deputies for thenew departments without even the form of an election. Fontanes retiredfrom the presidency of the senate to become grand master of theuniversity; the grand chamberlain of the palace was appointed in hisstead. The Emperor had already sold to private corporations thecanals which belonged to the state; the legislature ratified theillegal act. The penal code was now ready. It contained the iniquitousand dangerous penalty of confiscation for certain crimes, thuspunishing the children for the faults of their sires, and opening amost tempting avenue to the courts for indulgence in venality underlegal forms. There was little debate, and the code was adopted in itsentirety as presented. 

The reason for this paralysis of constitutional government is clear. Even the immense war indemnities taken from conquered states did notsuffice for the maintenance of the enormous armies which coveredEurope like swarms of locusts. The marshals and generals wereinsatiate, and the greed of the civil administrators was scarcelyless. From the top to the bottom of the public service every officialstood with open hand and hungry eyes. This state of things wasdirectly due to Napoleon's policy of attaching everybody to himself bypersonal ties, and in giving he had the lavish hand of a parvenu. Therecipients were never content, hoarding their fees, and becomingopulent, pursuing all the time each his personal ambitions, andofttimes returning insolence for favors. To meet these enormousexpenditures there had been inaugurated throughout Europe a system ofwhat may be termed private confiscations, the vast dimensions of whichcan never be justly estimated. German princes and Spanish grandees, English merchants and the Italian clergy, had all been wrung dry;timorous statesmen, crafty churchmen and sly contractors, unprincipledfinanciers and ambitious politicians, not one was forgotten oroverlooked in the accumulation of hoards which, having long beencalled the army chest, were now erected into the dignity of an"extraordinary domain. "

Kept so far in a decent obscurity, these ill-gotten possessions, whichbelonged, if not to their original owners, then to the state, were, inthe low condition of public morality, not merely recognized--they wereactually increased from new sources of supply. The confiscatedpalaces, forests, lands, and fisheries, the proceeds from the sale ofAmerican ships, values of every kind, were all made the privateproperty of the Emperor. If any of these rills of revenue should rundry, the criminal code with its legislation of confiscation might berelied on to supply a menace strong enough to express inexhaustibletreasure from storehouses yet untouched. One orator declared thisbarbaric fund to have been in the Emperor's hands a "FrenchProvidence, which made the laurel a fertile tree, the fruits of whichhad nourished the brave whom its branches covered. " Napoleon had foundthe crown moneys sufficient for himself. Berthier now had a revenue ofone million three hundred and fifty thousand eight hundred francs, andDavout was scarcely less regal with one of nine hundred and tenthousand; Ney had only seven hundred and twenty-eight thousand, andMasséna five hundred thousand; Soult was ambitious to increase hisincome of three hundred and five thousand by securing the Portuguesecrown. What with the great public charities endowed from thisextraordinary fund, what with the great public works in Paris andelsewhere which had been carried on by its means, the totalexpenditures had been more than four hundred and thirty millionfrancs. The total receipts had risen to about seven hundred and sixtymillions, and there were therefore still in the Emperor's purse upwardof three hundred millions. He could not be called destitute or evenpoor. 

[Illustration: NAPOLEON BONAPARTE in 1809. 

From a painting by René-Théodore Berthon, in the possession of thepainter's descendants in Canada. ]

The same years which saw the extinction of the remnants oflegislative independence saw likewise the establishment of six stateprisons, in which were to be confined those disaffected persons whowere too powerful to be left at liberty, but whose trials in opencourt would have revealed troublesome facts. The censorship of thepress was likewise reëstablished with iron rigidity, and thepublishers purchased the meager immunities they were permitted toenjoy by the payment of whatever pensions the Emperor chose to grantto needy men of letters. Chénier the poet, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, the author of "Paul and Virginia, " and others enjoyed, in addition todecorations of the Legion of Honor, substantial incomes that werevirtually paid by their fellow-craftsmen; while a chosenfew--including Gros, Gérard, Guérin, Lagrange, Monge, andLaplace--were elevated to the new baronage. Even Carnot did nothesitate to accept employment and place from Napoleon. At first hesolicited a loan for the relief of his urgent necessities. This theEmperor made unnecessary by ordering the War Office to pay all arrearsin his rations and other perquisites, by giving him a commission toprepare a volume on fortification, and by according him a pension often thousand francs. The ponderous sledge-hammer of the censorship wasapparently forged to kill a gnat. Nothing is known to the history ofliterature so subservient and humble as the conduct of the greatmajority of French writers and artists under the Empire. 

There was one exception--Mme. De Staël. That overestimated woman hadgained the halo of martyrdom by the so-called persecution of theEmperor. But the persecution was, in the opinion of keen observers, more on her part than his. The Committee of Public Safety had foundher an intriguer, and had called upon her husband to remove her fromParis; the Directory kept her under watch at Coppet, and ordered herarrest should she return to France. Her aspirations were boundless, and Mallet du Pan, royalist agent, said that she shamelessly flauntedher charms on public occasions. In 1796, aspiring to rule the countrythrough her friends, she wrote to Bonaparte, who was in Italy, thatthe widow Beauharnais was far from possessing the necessary qualitiesto supplement those of a genius such as he was, and on his return toParis she at once made suspicious advances to win his favor. Bourrienne declares that he saw one of her letters to Bonaparte, inwhich she flatly stated that they two, she herself and hercorrespondent, had been created for each other. Mention has elsewherebeen made of the coldness with which Bonaparte treated her when by herown request she was presented to him in Talleyrand's drawing-room. Notlong afterward, at the reception given by the minister of foreignaffairs to the conqueror of Italy, the indefatigable seeker fornotoriety addressed the latter once again. 

The scene is given in the memoirs of Arnault. At first she plied hersuit with fulsome compliment. Bonaparte listened coldly, and theconversation flagged. In despair she blurted out, "General, what womancould you love the most?" "My own, " was the stinging reply. ("Quellefemme?" "La mienne. ") Woman and wife being the same word in French, Napoleon's retort was a disdainful pun. "Very well; but which wouldesteem you the highest?" she persisted. "The best housekeeper. " "Yes, I understand; but which one would be for you the foremost amongwomen?" "She who should bear the most children, madame, " was the icyrejoinder, as the harried and disgusted soldier turned on his heel. Somewhat later she said to Lucien in a melting voice, "I am but a foolin my desire to please your brother. I am at a loss when I wish toconverse with him. I choose my language and modify my expressions; Iwant to make him think of me and occupy himself with me. It ends in mybeing and feeling as silly as a goose. " When the complacent Lucienreported the language his brother replied: "I know her thoroughly.... She declared to one who informed me that since I would neither loveher nor permit her to love me, there was nothing left but for her tohate me, as she could not remain indifferent. What a virago!" In aletter to Joseph, dated March nineteenth, 1800, the future Emperorwrote: "M. De Staël is in the depths of misery, and his wife is givingdinners and balls. If you should continue to see her, would it not bewell to have the woman allow her husband one thousand or one thousandtwo hundred francs a month? Have we already reached a time when, without any protest from decent people, not merely morality but themost sacred ties which bind children to their parents can be trampledunder foot? Suppose we judge Mme. De Staël as we should a man, --only, of course, as a man inheriting the fortune of M. De Necker, --one whohad long enjoyed the prerogatives of a distinguished name, and whoshould leave his wife in misery while he lived in abundance: could weassociate with a man like that?"

Soon afterward the battle of Marengo was fought. All her passion beingnow turned into hate, the scheming woman openly desired Bonaparte'sdefeat. Thenceforward she was an avowed and bitter enemy; he wouldhave called her a conspirator. The ten years of her banishment, as sheherself declared, were occupied in wandering from court to court inEngland, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, engaged in the task ofundermining the Emperor's name and fame, and in fomenting thecoalitions which eventually ruined him. As Bonaparte became anultra-imperialist she became an ultra-liberal. Her book on Germany, published in 1810, was a laudation, in the main just and fair, of aregenerated land; but it held up to France as a model the achievementsof the country which was now her bitterest foe. The censors gave it afictitious renown by ordering its complete suppression. 

When, in November, 1810, the decennial prizes, instituted as a spur toliterature and science, were distributed, the judges could findnothing in science later than 1803 worthy of their favor; but theprize-winners, old as they were, were all men of real distinction. Thenames of the literary men who were crowned are now known only to thestudent of history. Napoleon demanded why the name of Chateaubriandhad been omitted from the list, as it was. He may have remembered, asone of his detractors suggests, that in that writer's great book theRoman doctrine of obedience to constituted authority was attractivelypresented; or else, and more probably, he may have wished his list ofauthors to be more brilliant. The Emperor may have instituted thoseprizes, as his apologists declared he himself said that he did, tokeep active minds from occupying themselves with politics; but theexhibition of how the Empire had crushed out originality and fecundityin the French brain must have appalled him, whatever were histhoughts. 

During the winter of 1810-11 Napoleon's private life was virtuallydevoted to beneficence. In addition to the favors granted to Carnot, he lavished money on other objects, some not so worthy. Canova, whohad been called from Rome to make a portrait-statue of the Empress, obtained a substantial grant for the learned societies of that city. Chénier, like Carnot, had been a pronounced adversary of the Empire. He now sought employment under it, and was made inspector-general ofthe university, an office which he did not live long to enjoy. All theold favorites were remembered in a general distribution of goodthings. Talleyrand having just lost an immense sum by the failure of atrusted bank, the Emperor came to his relief by purchasing one of hisminister's most splendid palaces for more than two million francs. Thecourt resided sometimes at St. Cloud, sometimes at Rambouillet, sometimes at the Trianon, but for the most part at Fontainebleau, where the ceremonious life, to which all concerned were now wellaccustomed, was marked by none of the old awkwardness and friction, but ran as brilliantly as lavish expenditure could make it. 

The pregnancy of the Empress was celebrated with great festivities, during which Napoleon performed one of his most applauded acts--theendowment of a vast maternity hospital. The Empress was brought intogreat prominence as the president of a society consisting of athousand noble ladies under whose patronage the charity was placed. 

The unconcealed and ecstatic delight of the prospective father foundvent in delicate and tender attention to the mother of his child, anduntil her deliverance he was a gentle, devoted, and consideratehusband. His whole nature seemed transformed. When in the earlymorning of March twentieth, 1811, word was brought that the Empresswas in labor, and that a false presentation made it of instantnecessity to choose between the life of the mother and that of thechild, the feelings of the Emperor can better be imagined thandescribed. 

If the expected heir should die his dynasty would be jeopardized, hisenemies would once more be making appointments over his grave, thehopes of a lifetime might be shattered. But there was not a moment'swavering. "Think only of the mother, " he cried. The fears of theattending physician were vain, after all, and the man-child, comingwithout a cry into the world and lying breathless for seven minutes asif hesitating to accept or decline his destiny, finally gave a wail asat last he caught the breath of life. Napoleon turned, caught up histreasure, and pressed it to his bosom. A hundred guns announced thebirth, and the city burst into jubilations, which were reëchoedthroughout Europe from Dantzic to Cadiz. Festival succeeded festival, and for an interval men believed that the temple of Janus would beagain closed. No boy ever came on the earthly stage amid suchsplendors, or seemed destined to honors such as appeared to await thisone. The devotion of the father was passionate and unwavering. Itlasted even after he had been deserted and betrayed by the mother, after the child had been estranged and turned into an Austrian prince. 

CHAPTER XXIV

TENSION BETWEEN EMPEROR AND CZAR[39]

 [Footnote 39: References: Bernhardi, Geschichte Russlands, II. Ranke, Hardenberg u. Preussen (vol. 48 of his complete works, 1879). Lefebvre, Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe. Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, parts of Vols. II and III. ]

 Menaces of War -- Napoleon's "Extraordinary Domain" -- Rupture of the Concordat -- The Prospect of War -- The Empire Prepared for a Commercial Siege -- Napoleon's Self-deception -- The Empires of Ocean and Continent -- The Czar's Humiliation -- Poland and the French Empire -- Alexander's Approach to Francis -- Spurious Negotiations. 

[Sidenote: 1811]

Among other bodies which sent deputations to congratulate the Emperoron the birth of his child was the Paris Chamber of Commerce. Theiraddress was sufficiently adulatory, but it contained a suggestion thatthe trade and commerce of the country were not all that could bedesired. Napoleon replied in language which attracted attentionthroughout Europe. There was some irritability in his tone, but therewas an unqualified assurance with regard to the future. He said, amongother things, that England was depressed. This was true; the newmeasures taken to enforce the Continental system had told. Britishharbors were glutted with the products of all the colonies--not onlyof her own, but of those she had seized during the Napoleonic wars. The storehouses could hold no more; and as colonial trade wasconducted by barter, all the products of English industry must remainat home for lack of an export market. Business was at a standstill, and the specter of English bankruptcy stalked abroad. As to France, the Emperor declared that he was in no sense the successor of eitherLouis XIV or Louis XV, but of Charles the Great; for the presentEmpire was but the continuation of the old Frankish dominion. In fouryears, he said in substance, I shall have a navy. When my fleets shallhave been three or four years at sea we can hold our own with theEnglish. I know I may lose three or four battles; very good, I willlose them. But we are ever courageous, ever booted and spurred, and weshall succeed. Before ten years have expired I shall have beatenEngland. No state of Europe will any longer have intercourse with her. It is my customhouses which do the greatest harm to the English. Herblockade has injured herself the most by teaching us how to get onwithout her products, her sugar, her indigo. A few years longer, andwe shall be thoroughly accustomed to it. I shall soon have enoughbeet-root sugar to supply all Europe; for your manufactures there isan open market in France, Italy, Naples, and Germany. At the close headded words to this effect: The Bank of France is full of silver, while that of England has not a white sou [five francs]. Since 1806 Ihave taken over a milliard francs in contributions. I alone havemoney. Austria is already bankrupt, and Russia and England will be. There exist three versions of this famous allocution. In one of themare the words: "I showed mercy to the Emperor of Russia at Tilsit inreturn for promises of help; but if those promises are not kept, Iwill go, if need be, to Riga, to Moscow, to St. Petersburg. "

Three points of the utmost significance demand attention in this, atypical deliverance of the "imperator, " uttered at the flood-tide ofimperial success: two of them, both negative, are ominous; the thirdis positive and plain. There is no reference to the financialcondition of France, or to the ecclesiastical situation. Russia wasopenly threatened. The boast of wealth referred to Napoleon's own"extraordinary domain. " About this time Metternich reported to hisgovernment that France was the richest country in Europe, but that hertreasury was empty. The budget of 1811 had nine hundred millions onthe credit side, but it had also nine hundred and fifty-four millionson the debit. The previous year had required five hundred and tenmillions for army and navy, the present required six hundred and fiftymillions. It was a fixed principle of the Emperor to make eachgeneration pay its own expenses. The only source of supply he couldfind was an increase of the indirect taxes and the institution of astate monopoly in tobacco. His remedy would have been adequate but fortwo causes--the drought of the ensuing summer and Russia's hostileattitude in regard to French silks and wines. The year 1811 closedwith a deficit of forty-eight millions. This fact had a bearing on thepolitical situation because in general the Emperor's remedy for anempty treasury was a new war. 

The ecclesiastical situation had now become acute. As one bishopricafter another had fallen vacant, bishops had been nominated by theEmperor; but the Pope, who was still sitting in captivity at Savona, had from the moment of his incarceration steadily refused to institutethem. For a time, as has been explained, the difficulty had beeningeniously avoided by the process of ecclesiastical law, according towhich the chapters of the various dioceses elected the imperialcandidates as vicars capitular, and thus enabled them to performepiscopal functions without regard to institution. But this could notgo on forever, and every effort had been made to induce the prisonerof Savona to yield. In response he took a firmer stand, and indicatedto the chapters both of Italy and France that they should no longerelect the imperial nominees as vicars capitular. This was a rupture ofthe Concordat, and was so regarded by Napoleon. The attitude of allpious Catholics was becoming uneasy, and this new declaration of warby the Church could only serve to heighten the bellicose humor of theEmperor. The Pope was eventually brought to terms, partly byincreasing the rigors of his imprisonment, partly by terrorizing hisagents in France, but chiefly through the representations made to himby the ablest ecclesiastics of the realm, and by the summoning of achurch council, which turned out nearly as subservient to the secularauthority as the Jewish Sanhedrim had been. 

With reference to the third point, it seems impossible to determinewhether the menace to Russia was actually made, as one version of thereply has it, or whether a later speech, at the opening of thelegislature in June, and the report on the situation of France, issuedin the same month, have not both been confused with the Emperor's talkin March. In either case the result was identical, for France andEurope instinctively took in the situation, and clearly understoodthat the Emperor was not indisposed toward the renewal of war innorthern Europe. This third point was of course the most noteworthy ofthe three, for it could be only a question of time when the stormshould burst. 

If it were possible at that epoch of the world's history todistinguish between Napoleon the man and Napoleon the embodiedpolitical force of Europe, the aspect of the former would abound inhuman interest. Filled with paternal tenderness, his sole ambitionappeared for a time to be that of retaining what he had gained, theleadership of a Western empire as splendid as that of Charles theGreat. To make sure of this acquisition and hand it on to his heir, he seems for a moment to have dreamed of standing forth as thepacificator of Europe. He actually withdrew the mass of his troopsfrom Germany for use in Spain, leaving only enough to watch Prussiaand guard Westphalia; with the former power he finally formulated hispecuniary demands, as if thus to put an end to strife. The "rebellion"in Spain he intended to crush out by the pacific operations of acommercial warfare with England, which he felt certain would bringGreat Britain to terms, now that for the first time since the outbreakof hostilities the blood of her soldiers "was flowing in a stream. " Hewas probably strengthened in this conviction by the reluctant consentof the cabinet of St. James to open negotiations for the exchange ofprisoners on the very basis he had suggested long before. Believing, moreover, that European princes had by this time lost their delicatesensibility, it seemed no monstrous crime to consolidate his empirefor its commercial siege by the simple expedient of removing the Dukeof Oldenburg from his hereditary domains which bordered on the oceanand offering him the inland sovereignty of Erfurt, or by adopting thealternative expedient of leaving him to enjoy the former under Frenchprotection. It seems presumptuous to attempt any revelation of hisfeelings, but surely he might hope that then, controlling every inletto European commerce from Corfu around by Triest, Italy, Spain, andthe Texel as far as Lübeck, his wall of protection for Frenchmanufactures would do its work, that in a few years France would bethe industrial and commercial center of continental Europe. With Paristhe capital of a new Western empire, the true relation between thesecular and ecclesiastical heads of the world would be reëstablished, as it could not be while the papacy had its seat at Rome, and allthings would work together under a strong hand to humble the islandempire of England, destroy her ascendancy on the mainland, and thusbring in a moral and material millennium for the civilized world. 

But alas for such self-deception, if, indeed, it ever existed. Natureis too complex and habit too strong for such sudden sublimations ofpurpose. Had the true, complex Napoleon in his supposed communingasked the question, What then? sincerity would have compelled him toreply, More beyond. Men remembered to have heard him use theexpression, "Emperor of the Continent, " in these very days, jocularly, perhaps, but still with significance. Orders were issued in March, 1811, to fit out vessels for two expeditions, one against Sicily andEgypt, one against Ireland; if these were successful he could thenwork his will at the Cape of Good Hope and ultimately in the East andWest Indies. "They want to know where we are going, where I shallplant the new Pillars of Hercules, " he said. "We will make an end ofEurope, and then, as robbers fling themselves on others less bold, wewill fling ourselves on India, which the latter class have mastered. "About the same time the Bavarian minister, pleading for peace, received the retort: "Three years more, and I am lord of theuniverse. " When Mollien advised against war, on account of the fiscaldisorders, the reply was: "On the contrary, the finances are fallinginto disorder, and for that very reason need war. " Behind Napoleon thefather was the ambitious and haughty statesman combined with theself-reliant general, the embodiment of French ambitions as they hadconsolidated in the old régime, and had been transmitted through theRevolution, the Directory, and the Consulate to the Empire. 

But there were two other gladiators in the arena: England, hardpressed but still undaunted in her mastery of the seas which flowedaround her majestic colonial empire; Russia, grimly determined to holdan even balance with France in Europe while reëstablishing by theoverthrow of Turkey the eastern counterpoise to Napoleon's westerndominion. The Czar of Muscovy would fain have passed for aphilosopher. Fourteen years earlier, when in his eighteenth year, hehad fallen under the charm of Prince Adam Czartoryski, a youth ofabout his own age, whom the Empress Catherine had taken as a hostageafter the final dismemberment of Poland in 1795. Trained by hisgrandmother to play her own rôle of enlightened despot, the youngruler, still in those early years when generous impulses rule, conversed with his friend, the representative of a downtrodden land, about the possibility of a restored and regenerated Poland, avowinghis secret detestation of all that he was compelled in public toprofess. We may picture the joy of the noble Pole at the thought ofhis country made whole once more, even though it were destined to bebut semi-autonomous as a member of the Russian empire. But yearsrolled by, and Czartoryski, though preferred to place and honor by theCzar, heard less and less of the young philosopher's scheme. In 1805he finally wrung from Alexander a promise that he would begin to act;but it was very soon withdrawn, and Czartoryski retired to hisestates. The realities and selfishness of life eclipsed the man ofsensibility and developed the despot. For a time, however, he essayedthe rôle of European mediator, with what success Tilsit is thewitness. 

Disgusted from the practical point of view with the old dynasties andtheir chicanery, Alexander had not only eschewed the idea of areconstructed Poland, but had become indifferent to the territoriallines of all ancient Europe, and momentarily dreamed of Napoleon ashis twin emperor. To this end he too must likewise be a conqueror. Finland he had gained, but at the price of adhesion to a commercialsystem which was gradually ruining his people. The exhausting, slow-moving war with Turkey was still dragging on, and neitherMoldavia nor Wallachia was yet acquired. Oldenburg was incorporatedinto France. The grand duchy of Warsaw was not merely the specter of arestored Poland: the addition of Galicia to its territories had givenit solidity and substance. The Franco-Austrian alliance was a menaceto all the Czar's aspirations on the Balkan peninsula. It was clearthat he must choose between keeping his engagements to the letter andan open rupture. He had been beaten and humiliated at his own game. 

The first steps toward a rupture had already been taken beforeNapoleon's second marriage. In the last days of 1809 Alexander hadnegotiated with Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, a treaty requiring from his ally a formal promise that Poland shouldnever be restored and the name never officially used. It is certain, from the language used at the time, that the two questions of Polandand the Russian marriage were not connected; the former he could raisemerely as an ally with a just expectation of a favorable reply. It isof course possible that Alexander hoped Napoleon might connect them, and thus sign the Polish treaty in the hope that his request for thegrand duchess would be granted as a return. In that case the Russianemperor could still have refused his sister's hand, putting his ally'scompliance in regard to Poland on the ground of existing politicalrelations. He might then have laughed in his sleeve at his outwitteddupe. Be that as it may, Napoleon was the craftier. He replied that hewould sign, not this document, but one slightly different, thoughquite as satisfactory to Russia. Accordingly he drew up, executed, andforwarded to Russia a counter-project promising "never to give help orassistance to any power, or to any internal rising whatsoever, lookingto a restoration of the kingdom of Poland. " A few days after itsarrival at St. Petersburg came the news of the Austrian marriage. 

Two courses were now open to the Czar. One was to take advantage ofthe strong Russian party which existed among the Poles in Warsaw, promise a restoration of Poland with himself as king, and enter on anoffensive campaign against France. This scheme is contained in anextant letter addressed to him by Prince Galitzin. The other was tonegotiate further and await events. After dallying for a time with theformer idea, the Czar at length told Czartoryski that he could neverconsider giving up provinces already incorporated into Russia, --whichmeant of course that he would not restore the integrity ofPoland, --but that he might accept the crown of the grand duchy ofWarsaw as it was, including Galicia. Secret agents were thereupondespatched to sound the Austrian court. If the partition of Turkeyshould take place, as was already determined, could not Russia andAustria join hands to secure each her own interests against France? Inview of the fact that Napoleon had rejected the idea of destroyingTurkey because Russia had displayed jealousy of Austria and hadrefused her any share in the Turkish lands, this was a virtualdeclaration of hostilities. 

Alexander's overture was unheeded at Vienna, at least for the moment, because Metternich was in Paris wooing Napoleon's good will. Simultaneously and openly, therefore, the fencing between Paris andSt. Petersburg went on. A rejoinder to the counter-project was laidon Napoleon's desk, containing the identical words, "that the kingdomof Poland shall never be restored. " This persistence angered therecipient, and seemed capable of but one interpretation. If Alexanderdid not consider the guarantees given by France after Friedland andWagram to be sufficient, could Napoleon see in this reiterated demandanything more or less than a determination of the Czar not to abide bythe engagements of Russia unless new ones were given by himself? Hereturned therefore a softly worded, non-committal reply, and began tomake unmistakable preparations: a journey to Flanders for the purposeof rousing public opinion on his behalf, the strengthening of certainfortresses, and a general rapprochement to Austria in all hisrelations. The negotiations continued a little longer, Russiainsisting on the phrase as first written, France declaring that itsuse would be a confession of the insinuation contained in it, andtherefore incompatible with her dignity. Any other equivalent languageshe would use, but not that. 

CHAPTER XXV

THE ARRAY OF NATIONS[40]

 [Footnote 40: References as before, to which add Lehmann: Scharnhorst, Vol. II. ]

 Estrangement of France and Russia -- Premonitions of War -- Alexander's Secret Policy -- The Various Factors in the Situation -- Bernadotte -- The Eve of a General Conflagration -- England and Prussia -- Austria and Prussia -- Alliance between Sweden and Russia -- England and the United States -- The Confederation of the Rhine -- The State of France. 

[Sidenote: 1811-12]

Meanwhile Metternich, confident that in the partition of Turkey betterterms could be obtained for Austria from Napoleon than from Alexander, was doing his utmost to embitter the relations of France and Russia. Astrong Russian party in Vienna was in close touch with the numerousPoles in Warsaw who looked to Alexander for the restoration of theircountry's integrity. In both places there was much talk of therestoration of Poland, in Warsaw especially, and the phrase wasconstantly in the newspapers. Alexander's ambassador in Paris madeurgent representations concerning "a persistent rumor that the Emperorintends to restore Poland. " Napoleon retorted in fury, and threatenedwar, but immediately wrote a soothing assurance that he was still trueto the engagements of Tilsit, and as to the treaty itself he wouldagree to changes, but would never brand his own memory with dishonor. On July first, while the lines were in the copyist's hands, thereoccurred the incident which many thought at the time changed thecourse of history. During a magnificent festival given by the Austrianambassador, the decorations in an open court took fire, and theconflagration spread, enveloping the entire embassy. All the importantguests escaped unhurt except Kourakine, the Russian ambassador, whowas so injured that he could no longer perform his official duties. Itappeared to throw a strong light on Napoleon's character as a man thatalmost immediately his humor seemed to change; his personalobligations to the much-abused but well-bred envoy could not now bewiped out by a gentle reply to the master; hence, apparently, hecurtly dismissed the Russian chargé d'affaires, and ended thenegotiation. It was when this news reached St. Petersburg thatAlexander a second time offered Norway to Sweden. 

The real cause of Napoleon's abrupt manner was the news communicatedby Metternich that the Russian army had advanced successfully to theDanube. On July seventeenth Francis despatched an envoy requesting hisnew son-in-law to join him in a protest against the aggressions of theCzar; in other words, to throw the agreements of Tilsit and Erfurt tothe winds. Napoleon returned an unhesitating and honorable refusal, but said significantly to Metternich: "If Russia quarrels with us shewill lose Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, " adding that if the Czar, contrary to his engagement of 1808, should seize anything south of theDanube, then he himself would intervene on Austria's behalf. But allEurope seemed convinced that war was inevitable. In all thewatering-places the talk was of nothing else. The Russian party inVienna grew bolder; Pozzo di Borgo, Napoleon's life-long foe, who hadbeen temporarily under a cloud in Russia, appeared in Vienna in hisRussian uniform, courted and oracular. A French interpreter on his wayto Persia was stopped by him, and bribed to enter the Russian service. In a terse personal note written by his own hand, Napoleon calledAlexander's attention to the facts, but without awaiting the reply hewent further. Kourakine, partly recovered, was leaving Paris for home. Through him the Emperor poured into his ally's ear a long exposure ofthe situation, saying in substance that war was to be avoided, that hehad not the slightest intention of restoring Poland, and that if theCzar would write what was desired as a guarantee in the form of anewspaper article, the words should be inserted unchanged in the"Moniteur. " At the same time orders were sent commanding Caulaincourtto end all negotiation, and the Poles were peremptorily enjoined tosilence. Simultaneously schemes for a new naval campaign weregradually being perfected, so that they might be realized thefollowing year. 

Something of Alexander's secret diplomacy must have leaked out, but heappeared unmoved. He was steadily preparing for war, strengthening hisfortresses, and locating fortified camps in the district between theDwina and the Dnieper. But his chief concern was with Poland. Relyingon the Jesuit influence at Warsaw for support against the jailer ofthe Pope, he again took up his old scheme of restoring the country asan appanage of the Russian crown, and wrote to Czartoryski. The planwas dazzling: a national army, a national administration, and aliberal constitution. But that nobleman, after a long residence in hisnative land, had learned how strong was the conviction of hiscountrymen that Napoleon would give them a more complete autonomy thanthe Czar, and sent back what must have been a discouraging reply, although it has never been found. Alexander on its receipt determinedthat the coming war should be defensive on his part, and immediatelyopened communications with England and Sweden concerning theContinental System. Finally, in the closing days of the year, heissued a ukase excluding wines, silks, and similar luxuries fromFrance, but facilitating the entry of the colonial wares in whichEngland dealt. This was an act of open hostility to his old ally, adeclaration of commercial war. Prussia immediately made semi-officialadvances to the Czar, but they were repelled. 

It is not easy to estimate Napoleon's responsibility for what hadhappened and was about to happen. He was persistently domineering, contemptuous of national feeling and dynastic politics, over-confidentin the unswerving devotion of France, inflexible in his policy ofterritorial aggrandizement, ruthless in applying his peculiarconceptions of finance and political economy, and pitiless in his ownself-seeking. On the other hand, Alexander, having received Prussia'sautonomy as his part, had proved an untrustworthy ally from theoutset. Having seized Finland, he would not pay the price, but firstevaded the Continental System, then rejected it, and finally declaredcommercial war on France; in the latest conflict between France andAustria he had actually wooed the latter's favor. Procrastinating inthe marriage affair, he was furious when the suppliant turnedelsewhere, and at once displayed an insulting mistrust concerningPoland; finally, he declared diplomatic war by his overtures toEngland and his secret machinations in Vienna; there was but a finalstep in the evolution of complete hostility, the declaration ofmilitary war. Austria, too, had done her utmost to bring on aconflict, hoping to find her account in the dissensions of the twoempires. Her policy demanded her territorial aggrandizement at theexpense of Turkey; in a war between France and Russia she was sure tofind her account, and there was nothing in Metternich's dealingswith Napoleon which tended to preserve the peace of Europe. 

Sweden, under Bernadotte, was manifestly anxious to find a cause ofoffense, being defiant in temper, and ready to do anything for thepurpose of strengthening the hands of Alexander and escaping fromFrench protection. So feeble was the titular King of Sweden that theadoptive crown prince speedily became the real ruler, and his personaldesires were soon the public policy. It was a strange transformationwhich took place in the man. He had been generous and kindly in thedifficult positions he held as a French general. Avowedly arevolutionary democrat of the most radical stripe, he was neverthelessa true Gascon and failed to display his great abilities wherever hisheart was not engaged. He had, moreover, basked in the sunshine ofimperial favor, and in an age of atheism had remained in the fold ofthe Roman Church. Having himself schemed against Napoleon under thepromptings of personal ambition, he often gave aid and comfort to theEmperor's enemies. When adopted into the royal family of Sweden itcost him little effort to profess Lutheranism; his republicansympathies were quenched, and he developed into a beneficent despotanxious to put Sweden in line with Russia. He never was able to winthe affections of his people, and when before the close of his lifethey demanded a liberal constitution, this democratic sovereign, brought up under the illumination of French revolutionary doctrines, held back until the paper had to be wrung from him. The phases ofNapoleon's life are scarcely more startling than those of this rathercommonplace actor on a stage which was provincial when compared withthe cosmopolitan scene of the Emperor's life-drama. 

In the spring of 1811 all Europe knew that war was inevitable. "Itwill occur, " wrote Napoleon on April second of that year, "in spite ofme, in spite of the Emperor Alexander, in spite of the interests ofFrance and those of Russia. I have already so often seen this that itis my experience of the past which unveils to me the future.... It isall a scene in an opera, and the English control the machinery. " Aweek later he notified Alexander that he was aware of the movement ofRussian troops toward Poland, and declared that he himself waslikewise preparing. Lauriston was sent to replace the too pacificCaulaincourt at St. Petersburg, and Champagny was removed from theForeign Office to make way for the fiery Maret. There was much to bedone before the actual outbreak of hostilities. England's history isthe story of her struggles for nationality, for religious, civil, andpolitical liberty, and for mercantile ascendancy. Her inborn longingsfor the highest civilization were not inconsistent with her grimdetermination to resist a system that stood on the Continent forprogress, but which she had come to believe meant national ruin forher. Prussia, with a new vigor born of self-denial, education, andpassionate patriotism; Sweden, restless and uneasy under the yoke ofNapoleonic supremacy; Denmark, friendly, but independent in herquasi-autonomy; the United States, chafing under the restrictions ofher commerce; Turkey, sick to death, but then as now pivotal in allEuropean politics--the relation of all these powers to the comingconflict was still a question, and during a year much might be done ina diplomatic way to determine it. The whole civilized world was to bein array, although the life-and-death struggle was to be between twoinsatiate despotisms, one Western and modern, the other Oriental andtheocratic. Napoleon grasped the tendency of his own career but dimly. Goethe said of him, "He lives entirely in the ideal, but can neverconsciously grasp it. " Unconsciously, too, Alexander the Great hadfought for the extension of Greek culture; Cæsar, to destroy thestifling institutions of a worn-out system; Charles the Great, torealize the "city of God" on earth; Napoleon, for nationality, individual liberty, popular sovereignty. What was personal and pettyin the work of these Titans, being ephemeral, disappeared in the deathof each; what was human and large has endured and will endure. Thecreative ideas of the revolutionary era with which Napoleon's name isso closely connected are no longer called in question; his own careerwas now verging to its decline, but in his fall the fundamentalconceptions of the epoch were firmly established. 

In January, 1812, Wellington, as has been mentioned, stormed CiudadRodrigo; on April sixth Badajoz fell. On April eighteenth Napoleonoffered terms of peace, Spain to be kept intact under Joseph, Portugalto be restored to the house of Braganza, Sicily to remain underFerdinand, and Naples under Murat. Considering all the circumstances, the offer was worthy of consideration; but the English cabinet refusedit. The possibility of peace with Great Britain being thusextinguished, Napoleon considered what course he should pursue towardthe other great Protestant land, which also felt itself to bestruggling for life. Some well-informed persons asserted that at firstthe Emperor contemplated destroying the Hohenzollern power utterly. Ifso, he quickly dismissed the idea as involving unnecessary risk. Withthe reforms of Stein and Hardenberg successfully accomplished, withher educational system completed and her army reorganized, with herpeople electrified at last into true patriotism, Prussia was again aredoubtable power. Her influence permeated all Germany, and thesecret associations which ramified everywhere labored for Germanunity, their members already dreaming of the Jura, Vosges, andArdennes as the western frontier of their fatherland. At firstFrederick William made overtures to the Czar, offering an army of ahundred thousand men. Alexander, desiring a purely defensive war, wascold; but late in 1811 he agreed, in case of an attack on Prussia, toadvance as far as the Vistula, "if possible. "

Meantime Austria had at first contemplated neutrality, but sheabandoned the policy when convinced that, whichever side should bevictorious, Prussia would be dismembered. Francis saw Alexander'scontinued successes on the Danube with growing anxiety, and, learningthat Napoleon would put four hundred thousand men into the field, madeup his mind that France must win. Accordingly, in March, 1812, atreaty was executed which put thirty thousand Austrian troops underNapoleon's personal command, and stipulated for Austria's enlargementby Galicia, Illyria, and even Silesia, in certain contingencies. During these negotiations Frederick William had learned how stupendousNapoleon's preparations were, and, with some hesitancy, he finallysent Scharnhorst to sound Austria. The result was determinative, andon February twenty-fourth, 1812, a treaty between France and Prussiawas signed, which gave Prussia nothing, but exacted from her twentythousand men for active service, with forty-two thousand for garrisonduty, and afforded the French armies free course through herterritories, with the right to charge up such requisitions as weremade against the war indemnity. To this pass Alexander's narrownesshad brought the proud, regenerated nation; its temper can be imagined. 

French diplomacy, triumphant elsewhere, was utterly unsuccessfulwith Sweden. Alexander offered Norway as the price of alliance, withhints of the crown of France for Bernadotte somewhere in the dimfuture. Napoleon temptingly offered Finland for forty thousand Swedishsoldiers. But the new crown prince was seemingly coy, and dallied withboth. This temporizing was brought to a sudden end in January, 1812, when Davout occupied Swedish Pomerania. On April twelfth the alliancebetween Sweden and Russia was sealed. It carried with it an armisticebetween Russia and Great Britain. This was essential to the Czar, forhe would be compelled to withdraw his troops from the Danube forservice in the North, and to that end must make some arrangement withTurkey. He offered the most favorable terms; Napoleon, on the otherhand, demanded a hundred thousand men if he were to restore to theSublime Porte all it had lost. England threatened to bombardConstantinople if there should be too much hesitancy, and on Maytwenty-eighth, 1812, the Sultan closed a bargain with Russia whichgave him the Pruth as a frontier. 

In spite of Turkey's submission, Great Britain was not to be leftpassive. The neutrality of the United States had, on the whole, beensuccessfully maintained, but their commerce suffered. On May first, 1810, Congress enacted that trade with Great Britain should beforbidden if France revoked her decrees, and vice versa. Madison andthe Republicans believed that this would relieve the strain underwhich farmers as well as merchants were now suffering. This enabledNapoleon, in those days of slow communication, to make a pretense ofrelaxing the Berlin and Milan decrees, while continuing to seizeAmerican ships as before. England was not for a moment deceived, andenforced the orders in council with added indignities. This conduct soexasperated the American people that they demanded war with theoppressor, and on June nineteenth the war of 1812 began. Napoleon'sdiplomatic juggling had been entirely successful. 

A year earlier the princes of the Rhenish Confederation had receivedtheir orders. Their peoples were unresponsive, but the zeal of therulers overcame all opposition. The King of Saxony was grateful in alively sense of favors to come, and his grand duchy of Warsaw becamean armed camp, the Poles themselves expecting their nationalresurrection. The prince primate's realm was erected into a grandduchy for Eugène, whose viceroyalty was destined for the little Kingof Rome, and under the stimulus of a fresh nationality the people gavemore than was demanded. Würtemberg and Baden learned that Napoleon"preferred enemies to uncertain friends, " and both found means tosupply their respective quotas. Jerome, true to the fraternalinstincts of the Bonapartes, hesitated; but his queen was a woman ofsound sense, and both were alive to the uncertainties of tenure inroyal office, so that, receiving a peremptory summons, Westphalia fellinto line. Bavaria and Switzerland furnished their contingents as amatter of course. Among the Germans, some hated Napoleon for hisdealings with the papacy, some as the destroyer of their pettynationalities; some devout Protestants even thought him theantichrist. But the great majority were in a state of expectancy, manyrealizing that even the dynastic politics of Europe had been vitalizedby his advent; others, liberals like Goethe, Wieland, and Dalberg, hoped for the complete extinction of feudalism and dynasticism beforehis march. 

This had already been accomplished in France, and for that reason thepeasantry and the townsfolk upheld the Empire. In Paris the upperclasses had never forgotten the Terror, and were ready for monarchyin any form if only it brought a settled order and peace. There werestill a few radicals and many royalists, but the masses cared only fortwo things, glory and security. They enjoyed the temporary reposeunder a rule which protected the family, property, and in a certainsense even religion. Family life at the Tuileries was a model, theEmperor finding his greatest pleasure in domestic amusements, playingbilliards, riding, driving, and even romping, with his young wife, while his tenderness for the babe was phenomenal. Still he was nopuritan, and the lapsed classes could indulge themselves in vice ifonly they paid; from their purses fabulous sums were turned into theEmperor's secret funds. Under the Continental System industry was at astandstill, and every household felt the privation of abstaining fromthe free use of sugar and other colonial wares. There was, however, general confidence in speedy relief, and there were worse things thanwaiting. The peasantry were weary of seeing their soldier sons returnfrom hard campaigning with neither glory nor booty, and began toresent the conscription law, which tore the rising generation fromhome while yet boys. Desertions became so frequent that a terrible lawwas passed, making, first the family, then the commune, and lastly thedistrict, responsible for the missing men. It was enforced mercilesslyby bodies of riders known as "flying columns. " Finally, everyable-bodied male was enrolled for military service in threeclasses--ban, second ban, and rear ban, the last including all betweenforty and sixty. Nevertheless, and in spite of all other hardships, there was much enthusiasm at the prospect of a speedy change for thebetter. In March, 1812, Napoleon could count not far from four hundredand seventy-five thousand men ready for the field. Berthier wasretained as chief of staff. In the guard were forty-seven thousandpicked men, the old guard under Lefebvre, the young guard underBessières. Davout's corps numbered seventy-two thousand, all French;Oudinot's thirty-seven thousand, French and Swiss; Ney's thirty-ninethousand, French and Würtembergers; Prince Eugène's forty-fivethousand, French and Italians; Poniatowski's thirty-six thousand, allPoles; Gouvion Saint-Cyr's twenty-five thousand, all Bavarians;Regnier's seventeen thousand, all Saxons; Vandamme's eighteenthousand, Hessians and Westphalians; Macdonald's thirty-two thousand, Prussians and Poles. Murat commanded the cavalry reserve of four corpsunder Nansouty, Montbrun, Grouchy, and Latour-Maubourg respectively, and numbering in all forty thousand. In addition to this majesticarray there were thirty thousand Austrians under Schwarzenberg, andthe ninth corps of thirty-three thousand French and Germans underVictor was to follow. "I have never made greater preparations, " theEmperor wrote to Davout. 

CHAPTER XXVI

THE CONGRESS OF KINGS[41]

 [Footnote 41: References: Bittard des Portes: Les préliminaires de l'entrevue d'Erfurt (1808). In Revue d'histoire diplomatique, tom. IV, pp. 95-144. Sklower: Entrevue de Napoleon Ier et de Goethe suivie de notes et commentaires. ]

 Forebodings -- Napoleon and Maria Louisa -- The Czar's Ultimatum and the Emperor's Choice -- Napoleon's Last Diplomatic Move -- The Imperial Court at Dresden -- Napoleon and Poland -- The Health of Napoleon -- His Strategic Powers Undiminished. 

[Sidenote: 1812]

Ready--at least to outward appearance, Napoleon was in truth ready asfar as equipment, organization, commissariat, strategic plan, and everynice detail of official forethought could go. But how about theefficiency and zeal of men and officers? There had been murmurings forsome years past. It was remarked that Napoleon's studies in 1808 werethe campaigns of Rome against the Parthians from the days of Crassusonward; from his death-bed Lannes had warned his chief in 1809 how readymany of his most trusted servants were to betray him if he continued hiscareer of conquest; Decrès, another true friend, expressed his anxietyin 1810 lest they should all be thrown into a final horrid elementalcrash; and in 1811 Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angély exclaimed, "Theunhappy man will undo himself, undo us all, undo everything. " TheEmperor heard neither of these last forebodings, but is doubtfullyreported to have himself declared, "I am driven onward to a goal which Iknow not. " Caulaincourt made no secret of how his anxiety increased ashe knew Russia better. He was recalled because, having learned Russia'spride and Russia's resources, he made no attempt to conceal his aversionto the final arbitrament of bloodshed. Poniatowski believed Lithuaniawould refuse to rise against her despot; Ségur and Duroc foresaw thatFrance, if degraded to be but one province of a great empire, would loseher enthusiasm; even Fouché, having been permitted, on the plea ofill-health, to return from his exile in Italy, ventured to draw up avigorous and comprehensive memorial against war, and instanced the fateof Charles XII. The contents of Fouché's paper were divulged to Napoleonby a spy, and when the author presented it he was met by contemptuoussarcasm. The Emperor believed Prussia to be helpless, chiding Davout forhis doleful reports of the new temper which had been developed. Jominideclared, but long afterward, that the great captain had avowed to aconfidential friend his eagerness for the excitement of battle. 

But in spite of the anxiety felt by a few leading Frenchmen, there wasgeneral confidence, and it was not until after the catastrophe thatdetails like those enumerated were recalled. It is customary toattribute Napoleon's zeal for war to the fiery counsels of Maret. Butthere is no necessity to seek any scapegoat. In reality the outlook in1812 was better than in 1809. Napoleon's spirits were higher, hisconscripts were not visibly worse than any drafted since the beginningof the Consulate, and the veteran Coignet's remark concerning themarch to Russia is that "Providence and courage never abandon the goodsoldier. " As to the commander-in-chief, he had largely forsaken hislicentious courses, partly from reasons of policy, partly because ofhis sincere attachment to wife and child. Throughout the years ofyouth and early manhood he had indulged his amorous passions, butuntil his second marriage not a single woman had been preferred topower, not even Josephine. Maria Louisa, however, was an imperialconsort, for whom no attention, no elevation, was too great. Pliantwhile an Austrian archduchess, she remained so as empress, apparentlywithout will or enterprise. Men felt, nevertheless, that, remaining anAustrian externally, she was probably still one at heart, perhaps amere lure thrown out to keep the hawk from other quarry. There wasmuch in her subsequent conduct to justify such suspicions, but theutter shamelessness of her later years argues rather theself-abandonment of one in revolt against the rigid social restraintsand personal annihilation of early life. The hours which Napoleonspent with her were so many that he laid himself open to the charge ofuxoriousness. The physician attendant at the birth of the infant Kingof Rome declared that the mother would succumb to a secondconfinement, and the father exercised a self-restraint consonant withthe consideration he had displayed at the birth of his heir. He wasthe squire and constant attendant of his spouse, her riding-mastereven, and often her playfellow in the romps of which she was stillfond. Scenes of idyllic bliss were daily observed by the keen eyes ofthe attendants. The choice of governesses, tutors, and servants forthe little prince was personally superintended by his sire, and everydetail of the feeding, dressing, and airing of the prospective emperorwas the subject of minute inquiry and regulation. When it was clearthat war was imminent, Napoleon seemed for the first time ready toabandon his abhorrence for female governance. Certainly his domestichappiness had not sapped his moral power; possibly it rendered himover-anxious at times, and, perhaps in revulsion from anxiety, over-confident. 

During two years of diplomatic fencing the initiative had beenRussian, the instigation French. For the war which followed no singlecause can be assigned. Some blamed Napoleon, claiming that with hisscheme of universal empire it was inevitable; Metternich said Russiahad brought on war in an unpardonable manner. The Tilsit alliance waspersonal; the separation of the contracting parties inevitablyweakened it. The affiliations of the Russian aristocracy with theAustrian; the smart of both under the Continental System, whichrendered their agriculture unprofitable; England's stand underCastlereagh; the Oldenburg question--all these were cumulative intheir effect. With Alexander, Poland and the Continental System werethe real difficulties; the marriage question was only secondary. OnJanuary twelfth, 1812, the Czar with mournful and solemn mien declaredhis hands clean of blood-guiltiness and laid down his ultimatum. Tothe concentration of Russian troops Napoleon had replied by sendinghis own to Erfurt and Magdeburg. Alexander formally stated hisreadiness to take back his own move if the Emperor would withdraw theFrench soldiers; he would even accept Erfurt for Oldenburg, and permitWarsaw to be capital of a Saxon province. But he said not a word aboutthe Continental System, being fully determined not to yield one jot, and for Napoleon this was the primary matter. Alexander's ultimatum byits clever form compelled his ally either to abandon the scheme ofWestern empire or to fight. Both parties to the Tilsit allianceunderstood that with European harbors shut to English trade, GreatBritain must cease to support the Spanish insurrection, which in thatcase a few thousand troops could hold in check. Then the great schemeof revolutionary extension which had been inaugurated by theConvention and logically developed by Napoleon step by step in everywar and treaty since Campo Formio would in a few short years becomplete. But two real powers would thus remain in continentalEurope--France and Russia. They could by united action crush Britishpower both by land and by sea. To dash this brimming cup from his lipswas for Napoleon an insupportable thought. With the hope, apparently, of securing from the Czar the last essential concession, he set histroops in motion toward the Vistula on the very day after his treatywith Prussia was signed. 

The natural counter-move to Napoleon's advance would be the invasionof Warsaw; although the new Poland was fortified for defense, yet itmight be overwhelmed before assistance could reach the garrisons. Moreover, there were ominous signs in France at the opening of 1812. Food supplies were scarce, and speculators were buying such as therewere. Napoleon felt he must remain yet a little while to check such anoutrage and to strengthen public confidence. Ostensibly to avoid afinal rupture, but really to prevent the premature opening of war, hetherefore summoned Czernicheff, the Czar's aide-de-camp, who, as akind of licensed spy, had been hovering near him for three years past, and offered to accept every item of the Russian ultimatum, if only anequitable treaty of commerce could be substituted for the ukase ofDecember, 1810; in other words, if Alexander would agree to observethe letter and spirit of the Continental System. During the two monthsintervening before the Czar's reply not a Cossack set foot on Polishsoil, while day by day Napoleon's armies flowed onward across Europetoward the plains of Russia, and a temporary remedy for the economictroubles of France was found. When, late in April, the answer came, itwas, as expected, a declaration that without the neutral trade Russiacould not live; she would modify the ukase somewhat, but, as acondition antecedent to peace, France must evacuate Prussia and makebetter terms with Sweden. On May first the French army reached theVistula; on May ninth Napoleon and his consort started for Dresden, whither all the allied sovereigns had been summoned to pay their courtas vassals to the second Charles the Great. 

The surge of German patriotism had nearly drowned Napoleon in 1809, but for manifest reasons it had again receded. The Austrian marriagehad withdrawn the house of Hapsburg from the leadership of Germany;the imperial progress to Dresden and the high imperial court heldthere were intended to dazzle the masses of Europe, possibly tointimidate the Czar. The French were genuinely enthusiastic; theGermans displayed no spite; princes, potentates, and powers swelledthe train; all the monarchs of the coalition, under Francis as dean ofthe corps, stood in array to receive the august Emperor. From thespectacular standpoint Dresden is the climax of the Napoleonic drama. Surrounded by men who at least bore the style of sovereigns, theCorsican victor stood alone in the focus of monarchical splendor. Athis side, and resplendent, not in her own but in his glory, was thedaughter of the Cæsars, the child of a royal house second to none inantiquity or majesty, his wife, his consort, his defiance to a passingsystem. Maria Louisa was as haughty as the Western Empress should be, patronizing her father and stepmother, and boasting how superior thecivilization of Paris was to that of Vienna. It was during these daysthat she first saw Neipperg, the Austrian chamberlain, who was laterher morganatic husband. Napoleon appeared better: self-possessed, moderate, and genial. His vassals and his relatives, his marshals andhis generals, all seemed content, and even merry. The King of Prussiahad lost his beautiful and unfortunate queen; he alone wore a sadcountenance. Yet it was rumored that the Prussian crown prince was asuitor for one of Napoleon's nieces. Beneath the gay exterior weremany sad, bitter, perplexed hearts. The Emperor was seldom seen exceptas a lavish host at public entertainments; most of the time he spentbehind closed doors with the busy diplomats. As a last resort, Narbonne was sent to Russia, ostensibly to invite Alexander's presencein the interest of peace; actually, of course, to get a final glimpseof his preparations. The Abbé de Pradt was despatched into Poland tofan the enthusiasm for France. 

This unparalleled court was dismissed on May twenty-eighth, theEmpress returning by way of Prague to Paris, Napoleon hastening byPosen and Warsaw to Thorn. The Poles were exuberant in their delight;they little knew that their supposed liberator had bargained awayGalicia to Francis in return for Austrian support. For this betrayal, and his general contempt of the Poles, he was to pay dearly. Had helabored sincerely to organize a strong nucleus of Polish nationality, a coalition of Russia, Prussia, and Austria such as finallyoverwhelmed him would have been difficult, perhaps impossible. But thefounder of an imperial dynasty could not trust a Polish democracy. When the Diet, sitting at Warsaw, besought him to declare theexistence of Poland, he criticized the taste which made them composetheir address in French instead of Polish, and gave a further inklingof his temper by sending his Austrian contingent to serve in Volhynia, so that neither French nor Polish enthusiasm might rouse the RussianPoles. When he reached Vilna he found that the impassive Lithuanianshad no intention of rising against Russia, and no attempt was made torouse them. If, as appears, his first intention had been to wage afrontier campaign, that plan was quickly changed. Retaining Veniceand Triest for use against the Orient, with Austria virtually a memberof his system, he determined to force Russia back on to the confinesof Europe, perhaps into Asia, and then--Who can say? It seems as ifPoland was to have been divided into French departments instead ofbeing erected into another troublesome nation, vassal state, orsemi-autonomous power. 

At the opening of the Russian campaign the gradual change which hadbeen steadily going on in Napoleon's physique was complete. He was nowplethoric, and slow in all his movements. Occasionally there wereexhibitions of quickened sensibility, which have been interpreted assymptoms of an irregular epilepsy; but in general his senses, like hisexpression, were dull. He had premonitions of a painful disease(dysuria), which soon developed fully. His lassitude was noticeable, and when he roused himself it was often for trivialities. In othercampaigns he had stolen away from Paris in military simplicity; thistime he had brought the pomp of a court. He planned, too, to bringtheater companies and opera troupes to the very seat of war. Aboveall, he was deeply concerned with his imperial state, having in histrunks the baubles and dress he had worn at his coronation in NotreDame. His bearing was proud, but there was no sparkle in his eye; heseemed spiritless and ailing; he showed no confidence in hismagnificent army. 

The haughty, exacting mien of 1812 was very different from thehalf-jocular, half-sarcastic curl of the lip and sparkle of the eyewhich had inspired his followers in former days quite as much as hisstirring, incisive harangues. Yet careful study will prove that hissagacity as a great captain was in no way dimmed; his militarycombinations were greater than any he had ever formed. As no parallelto the numbers engaged in this enterprise can be found in Europeanstory, nothing comparable to its organization can be found in thehistory of any land or age. Every corps had its ammunition-train, andgreat reserves of supplies were stored in Modlin, Thorn, Pillau, Dantzic, and Magdeburg. In the two last-named arsenals weresiege-trains for beleaguering Dünaburg and Riga. There were pontoonsand bridge material in abundance; one thousand three hundred and fiftyfield-pieces, and eighteen thousand horses to draw them. Thecommissary stores were prodigious, and there were thousands ofox-wagons to transport them. The cattle were eventually to beslaughtered and eaten. In various convenient strongholds there were, besides, stores for four hundred thousand men for fifty days. KnowingRussia, he had prepared to conquer streams and morasses, to feed thearmy without fear of a devastating population, and to trust the seatof war for nothing except forage. His strategic plan was amazing, containing, as it did, the old elements of unexpected concentration, of breaking through the opposing line, of conclusive victory, andoccupation of the enemy's capital. It was carried also to successfulcompletion, and in one respect the execution was fine. The obstaclesto be surmounted made every movement slow, and while a vast, complicated military organization may be reliable for weeks, to makeit work for months requires qualities of greatness which increase ingeometrical ratio according to the extension of time. Twice Napoleonbared his inmost thought, once to Metternich in Dresden, once toJomini at a dinner company in Vilna. The first season he intended toseize Minsk and Smolensk, winter there, and organize his conquests. Ifthis should not produce a peace, he would advance in the followingseason into the heart of the country, and there await the Czar'ssurrender. To his army he issued an address as direct and ringing asthat which had echoed sixteen years before across the plains ofLombardy. Its substance is that the second Polish war would bring thesame renown to French arms as the first, but the peace would be suchas should end forever the haughty interference of Russia in Europeanaffairs. It seemed to those who heard it as if Russia's hour hadstruck. 

CHAPTER XXVII

THE INVASION OF RUSSIA--BORODINO[42]

 [Footnote 42: References: Tatistcheff: Alexandre Ier et Napoléon. Czartoryski: Memoirs. De Chambray: Oeuvres. Ségur: La campagne de Russie. Labaume: Relation circonstanciée de la campagne de Russie. Wilson: A Narrative of the Campaign in Russia during the Year 1812. Du Casse: Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène. Rapp: Mémoires. Bausset: Mémoires. Davout: Correspondance (ed. Mazade, 1885), Vol. III. Lossberg, V. , Briefe in die Heimat geschrieben während d. Feldzugs 1812 in Russland. Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr. Stoltyk: Napoléon en Russie. ]

 Success and Failure -- The Struggle with Summer Heat -- Napoleon at Vitebsk -- The Russians Over-confident -- The Fight at Smolensk -- Technical Victory and Real Defeat -- Napoleon's Fatal Decision -- The Russians at Borodino -- The Battle Array -- Napoleon's Victory -- Russian Efforts to Burn Moscow. 

When Napoleon left Dresden his force was so disposed that the Russianscould not tell whether he meant to strike from north or south, andaccordingly they divided theirs, Barclay de Tolly, with a hundred andtwenty-seven thousand men, standing before Vilna; Bagration, withsixty-six thousand, ensconcing himself behind the swamps of the upperPripet in Volhynia. Barclay, hoping to strike a sharp, swift blow, andopen the campaign with a moral victory, was soon convinced of thedanger, and called in Bagration, who was to be replaced by anauxiliary force. But before the long Russian line could be drawntogether Napoleon struck the first decisive blow. Disposing his armyin echelon, with beautiful precision he suddenly turned against theenemy's right, crossed the Niemen, and seized Vilna. This turned theRussian flank, and Barclay fell back to the fortified camp which hadbeen established at Drissa in order to cover St. Petersburg. If, then, Jerome's division had promptly advanced from Grodno, Bagration wouldhave been cut off and annihilated. The plan failed, partly becauseNapoleon did not superintend its operation in person, partly becauseDavout did not coöperate with sufficient alertness, but chieflythrough Jerome's ignorance, slowness, and self-assertion. Bagrationturned back, and, descending the Dnieper, placed himself beyondpursuit. For a moment Napoleon contemplated a junction of Ney andEugène against Barclay, but the former had pushed on to seizeDünaburg, and was out of reach. This scheme, like the other, came tonaught; Bagration, by a long, painful detour, was able to establishcommunication with Drissa, and seemed likely to effect a junction withBarclay on the road to Smolensk. As in these movements both theRussian commanders had lost many men, there would be only a hundredand twenty thousand in their united force, a beggarly showing in viewof the two years' preparation necessary to bring it together. Consternation reigned in the Russian camp. The Czar could raise nomoney, Drissa was painfully inadequate as a bulwark, and the peoplegrew desperate. The nation attributed its sorry plight to the badadvice of the Czar's German counselors, and such was thedemoralization at the capital that Alexander was compelled to hastenthither in order to avert complete disaster. In spite of his personalunpopularity, he met with considerable success. The nobility andburghers of both St. Petersburg and Moscow caught the war fever, opened their coffers, equipped a numerous militia, and by the end ofJuly all Russia was hopeful and eager for battle. 

This, too, was the earnest desire of Napoleon. The advance from theVistula to the Niemen and from the Niemen to the Dwina had beensuccessfully carried forward--but at what a cost! "Since we havecrossed the Niemen, " wrote the artist Adam, who was at the viceroy'sheadquarters, "the Emperor and his entire army are occupied by asingle thought, a single hope, a single wish--the thought of a greatbattle. " Men talked of a great battle as of a great festival. If theRussian army in its own territory shriveled as it did before thesummer heat by sickness and desertion, it may be imagined how that ofthe French dwindled. Their terrible sufferings could be ended only bya battle. Heat, dust, and drought wrought havoc in their columns; thepitiless northern sun left men and animals with little resistingpower; the flying inhabitants devastated their fields, the horses andoxen gorged themselves on the half-rotten thatch of the abandonedhuts, and died by the wayside; the gasping soldiery had no food butflesh. Dysentery raged, and soldiers died like flies. For a timeSaint-Cyr's Bavarian corps lost from eight to nine hundred men a day, and it was by no means a solitary exception. Such facts account forthe dilatoriness of Napoleon's movements in part; for the rest, hisimperial plans demanded that he should organize all the territories inhis rear, and he gave himself the utmost pains to do so. Besides, hehad never before had a task so heroic in all its dimensions, and everydetail of military and political procedure required time and care infullest measure, the more so when preparing for a decisive, uncommonbattle. 

Vitebsk and Smolensk occupy analogous positions on the rivers Dwinaand Dnieper, the former of which is to the westward and flows north;the latter, farther inland, flows in the opposite direction into thevery heart of Russia. Barclay had planned to await Bagration atVitebsk, and Napoleon, arriving on July twenty-seventh, hoped for adecisive battle there. But Davout's movements drove Bagration farthereastward, and Barclay, instead of waiting, hurried to Smolensk, wherethe junction was effected. This compulsory pursuit had, ascommunications then were, thrown the extreme wings of Napoleon's armyvirtually out of reach, the Prussians being near Riga, and theAustrians in Volhynia. The long, thin line of his center must be, therefore, drawn in for safety; and since the character of the countryhad improved, he determined to concentrate near Vitebsk, andrecuperate his troops in the comparatively pleasant land whichenvirons that city. Both commander and officers were at first sodisheartened that they contemplated remaining for the season, Muratalone remonstrating; but Napoleon said three years were necessary forthe Russian war. Such counsels did not long prevail; with new strengthcame the old daring, and orders were sent both to Macdonald and thePrussians on the left, and to the Austrians under Schwarzenberg on theright, which were indicative of a great project. Napoleon's prestigeamong the Poles had in fact shrunk along with his army. The latter hecould not recruit, but the former he must repair at any hazard; thiscould be done only by what he designated to Jomini as a "good battle. "The success of the minor engagements to right and left, incident toconcentration, was encouraging for such a speedy and overwhelmingtriumph. 

The Russians at Smolensk were vainglorious at having outwittedNapoleon, and longed to fight. Barclay alone was uneasy, but, indeference to the prevalent sentiment, he advanced to offer battle, andon August ninth there was a skirmish between pickets. Napoleon atonce set his army in motion, but as neither general was really wellinformed or prepared, Barclay pushed on to the right, and the twoarmies lost touch. Once aroused, the French spirit brooked no furtherdelay, and it was determined to seek the "good battle" beforeSmolensk, which, lying on the right, or north, bank of the Dnieper, could be reached only by crossing the stream. This manoeuver wasbrilliantly executed. Barclay was a day's march distant on the southbank when Ney and Murat deployed on the other side for action onAugust sixteenth. Bagration, nearer at hand, threw one corps acrossthe river into the town, and then hurried his main force down-streamto oppose its passage by the French. 

Smolensk, called from its site the Key of Russia, and designated, fromits importance as a shrine, "The Sacred, " was then a town of aboutthirteen thousand inhabitants. Around the inner city was a line ofthick but dilapidated walls, and these were surrounded outside bydensely built faubourgs. The first attempt of Ney to storm the wallsfailed, and a bombardment was ordered. By evening of the seventeenththe French army were all drawn up on the north bank between the cityand the river; the Russians were opposite on the heights. During thenight of the seventeenth the Russian army began to cross the Dnieperby the permanent bridge, which they held; a fresh garrison was throwninto Smolensk, and at four in the morning of the eighteenth the vanbegan to retreat toward Moscow. Napoleon, foiled in his attempt tocarry Smolensk by storm, had hoped that Barclay would offer battleunder the walls of the town. He, therefore, waited until afternoon forthe expected appearance of his foe, but in vain. Puzzled and uneasy, he then determined to force the fighting by a fresh assault. Thesuburbs were captured late in the evening, but the walls wereimpregnable. Barclay then set fire to the quarter opposite thatattacked by the French, and in the resulting confusion safely drew outhis garrison; the next morning saw his rear well beyond Napoleon'sreach, with the bridges destroyed behind it. On the twenty-third hehalted and drew up for battle behind the Uscha. 

[Illustration: Map of the Russian Campaign 1812. ]

Technically Napoleon had won, since an important frontier fortress wascaptured; but he had not fought his great battle, nor had he cut offhis enemy's retreat. Ney and Murat were despatched in pursuit, but itis charged on good authority that they acted recklessly, withoutconcert, and gave the first exhibition of a demoralization destinedlater to be disastrous. In another land and under ordinarycircumstances the fight at Smolensk would have been, if not a decisivevictory, at least an effective one. But while Russia is despoticpolitically, socially she is the least centralized of all lands, and awound in one portion of her loose organism does not necessarily reacha vital point nor affect the seat of life and action. This Napoleonperfectly understood. He could either summon back the patience he hadvaunted first at Dresden, then at Vitebsk, or he could yield to hisimpulse for swift action and go on to Moscow in the hope, beforeentering the capital, of fighting the "good battle" for which he solonged. The older officers with long memories compared the RussianSmolensk with the Syrian Acre. Murat had foreseen that an affair atSmolensk would amount to nothing, and had begged Napoleon to avoid aconflict. Rapp came in after the victory, and recalled the scenes ofdistress which had marked every step of his long journey from theNiemen: the numerous victims of dysentery and typhus who lay dyingalong the roadsides, the desperate bands of marauders and deserterswho were eking out a doubtful existence by ravaging the villages, themaddened hordes of peasants and tradespeople who were shooting orstriking down the enfeebled stragglers from the army like bullocks inthe shambles. Recounting all these horrors, he pleaded with theEmperor to desist. But Napoleon remembered that his transport bargeshad been wrecked on the river bars, and that his wagon-trains werewithout horses or oxen to draw them. The counterfeit paper money hehad brought from Paris would no longer pass; where was he to findsustenance for his still numerous force of a hundred and eighty-fivethousand men at least? Only by pressing on to some populous city; andon the twenty-fourth his army was in motion eastward. If Alexandercould be brought to terms, he would yield more quickly with one of hiscapitals in the enemy's grasp. In the attempt to form a calm judgmentconcerning this conclusion it must be remembered that the French basewas secure; there were garrisons of about fourteen thousand men eachin Vitebsk, Orscha, and Mohileff; another was left at Smolensk. Theline from the Niemen to Moscow was very long, yet Schwarzenberg was onthe right to prevent Tormassoff from breaking through, and Napoleonfelt sure that Wittgenstein on the left was too weak to be a menace. If the great captain had halted at Smolensk and strengthened himselfon the double line of the Dwina and Dnieper, as was perhaps possiblein spite of all difficulties, he would have been quite as strong in amilitary way as before Austerlitz or Eylau. But had Russia learnednothing from these two experiences, and would she come on again athird time as on those two occasions to certain defeat? To have actedon the affirmative hypothesis would have been to expect much. The Czarwould rather take time to raise the whole nation; if need be, toorganize, discipline, and drill his numerous levies; to wear out thepatience of the invaders and strike when the advantage was his, nottheirs. Making all allowance for troops to be left in garrison, Napoleon would still have a hundred and fifty-seven thousand men, hardened veterans who, though murmuring and grumbling after thesoldier's manner, were nevertheless altogether trustworthy, and wouldturn sulky if compelled to retreat. 

If this were Napoleon's reasoning, it proved to be fallacious, becausethe Russians were constantly increasing their strength, while that ofthe French, both on the base of operations and on the line of march, was diminishing. The Austrian troops, moreover, behaved toward Russiaas the Russian soldiers had behaved toward Austria in the lastcampaign; that is, as a friendly exploring guard, and not as hostileinvaders. It is now easy to say that to lengthen the French line ofoperation was a military blunder. It was certainly wrong. The reasonsare, however, not altogether strategic; they are chiefly moral, andwere not so clearly discernible then. In the face of national feeling, before the march of national regeneration, a single man, world-conqueror though he may have been during a period of nationaldisorganization, is an object of microscopic size. The French emperordid not know the strength of Russian feeling, the great revolutionistwas ignorant of the Europe he had unconsciously regenerated. If heblundered as a strategist in not confessing defeat at Smolensk, hebehaved like a tyro in statesmanship when he courted an overthrow atMoscow. 

Barclay was charged by the old Russians with being too German infeeling, with manoeuvering timidly when he ought to fight, and--sacrilege of sacrileges!--with leaving the sacred image of theVirgin at Smolensk to fall into hostile hands. Yielding to the stormof popular feeling, Alexander appointed in his stead Kutusoff, thedarling of the conservative Slavonic party; but Barclay was persuadedto remain as adviser, and his policy was sustained. The Russianswithdrew before the French advance, until, on September third, theirvan halted on the right bank of the Kalatscha, opposite Borodino, tostrike the decisive blow in defense of Moscow. On the fourthNapoleon's van attacked and drove before it the Russian rear, whichwas just closing in. He had a hundred and twenty-eight thousand men athand, and six thousand more within reach. That night he issued aringing address: recalling Austerlitz, he summoned the soldiers tobehave so that future generations would say of each, "He was in thatgreat battle under the walls of Moscow. " Next morning a courierarrived, bringing a portrait of the little King of Rome. The Emperorhung it before his tent, and invited his officers to admire it. But atnight the sinister news of Marmont's defeat at Salamanca arrived. Napoleon said nothing, but was heard in self-communing to deplore thebarbarity of war. All night he seemed restless, fearing lest theRussians should elude him as they had in other crises; but, rising atfive, and discerning their lines, he called aloud: "They are ours atlast! March on; let us open the gates of Moscow. "

The Russians, roused by religious fervor, and elevated by a fatalisticpremonition of success, had thrown up trenches and redoubts atadvantageous points on their chosen battle-fields. In their firstonset they advanced like devotees, with the cry, "God have mercy uponus!" and, as each forward rank went down before the relentlessinvaders, those behind pressed onward over the bodies of theircomrades. But it was all in vain; throughout the fourth and fifth ofSeptember one outpost after another was taken, until at ten in theevening of the latter day the whole Russian force was thrown back onits main position, stretching from the bank of the Moskwa on thenorth, behind the Kalatscha, as far as Utizy on the south, suchportions as were not naturally sheltered being protected by strongredoubts. There were a hundred and twenty thousand in all, of whichabout seventeen thousand were ununiformed peasantry. Opposite stoodthe French, Poniatowski on the right, Davout, with the guard, in therear, then Eugène; behind Davout, to the left, Ney; and fartherbehind, in the same line, Junot. The orders were for an openingcannonade, Poniatowski to surround the Russian left, Eugène to crossthe Kalatscha by three bridges thrown over during the night, andattack the Russian right, while Morand and Gérard, his auxiliaries, should move on the center, and storm the defenses erected there. 

The battle was conducted almost to the letter of these orders, butsuch was Russian valor that, instead of being a brilliant manoeuver, it developed into a bloody face-to-face conflict, determined by sheerforce. At six in the morning the artillery opened. Poniatowskiadvanced, was checked, but, supported by Ney, stood firm until Junotcame in; they two then stood together, while Ney and Davout dashed atthe enemy's center. Eugène having acted in perfect concert, Poniatowski then advanced alone, and his task was completed by nine. But he was so weakened by his terrific exertions that he could onlyhold what he had gained. At ten Ney and Davout, reinforced by Friant, seized the central redoubts; but they, too, were exhausted, and couldonly hold the Russian line, which bent inward and stood withoutbreaking. Eugène then massed his whole division, and charged. Theresistance was stubborn, and the fighting terrific, but by three hisopponents yielded, his artillery opened, and he held his gains. Aboutthe same time Junot reached Poniatowski, and their combined effortsfinally overpowered the Russian left. So superhuman had been theexertions of both armies that they rested on their arms in theserelative positions all night, the Russians too exhausted to flee, theFrench too weary to pursue. But early on the seventh the flight ofKutusoff began, and the French started in pursuit. 

Between the generals of the Russian rear and those of Napoleon's vanan agreement was made that if the former were left to pass throughMoscow unmolested, the latter should gain the city without a blow. Thecontracting parties kept their pact; but the governor of Moscowrendered the agreement void. Great crowds of the inhabitants joinedthe Russian columns as, six days later, they marched between the rowsof inflammable wooden houses of which the suburbs were composed; and, while they tramped sullenly onward, thin pillars of ascending smokebegan to appear here and there on the outer lines. But when, two hoursafter the last Russian soldier had disappeared, the cavalry of Muratclattered through the streets, the fires attracted little attention, nor at the moment was Napoleon's contentment diminished by them, as, from the "mount of salutation, " whence pious pilgrims were wont togreet the holy city, he ordered his guard to advance and occupy theKremlin, that fortress which enshrines all that is holiest in Russianfaith. Kutusoff, boasting that he had held his ground overnight, hadpersuaded the inhabitants of Moscow, and even the Czar, that he hadbeen the victor, and that he was withdrawing merely to await thearrival of the victorious and veteran legions from the Danube, when hewould choose his field and annihilate the invaders. 

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE EVACUATION OF MOSCOW[43]

 [Footnote 43: References: Marguerou: Campagne de Russie, specially part III. Bertin: La campagne de 1812 d'après des témoins oculaires. Mosbach: Der Übergang über die Beresina aus ungedruckten Denkw. D. Polnischen Obersten Bialkowski, Streffleur's "Österr. Militär. Zeitschrift, " 1875. Clausewitz: "Über die Schlacht a. D. Beresina, " letter to Stein, published in the "Hist. Zeitschrift" for 1888. George: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. Fabry: Campagne de Russie, 1812, Opérations Militaires. ]

 The Reasons for Napoleon's Advance -- The Importance of Moscow -- The Burning of the City -- The French Occupation -- The Military Situation -- Alexander's Steadfastness -- Napoleon's Impatience -- The Strategic Problem -- The Exaggeration of the Factors -- The Plan of Retreat -- Malojaroslavetz -- Napoleon's Vacillation. 

Some insight into the state of Napoleon's mind may be secured bycontemplating his conduct during and after the battle of Borodino. That conflict was, on the whole, the bloodiest and most fiercelycontested of all so far fought by him. The French losses were computedby the Emperor at twenty thousand men, those of the Russians were notless than double the number. Yet the day was not decisive. Napoleon, suffering from a severe cold and loss of voice, displayed an unwontedlassitude. Setting a high value on his personal safety, he did notintervene at crucial moments, as he was wont to do and as he assertedwas essential in the new science of war, for the purpose ofelectrifying officers and men. His scheme of rolling up Kutusoff'sline by a double attack on left and center consequently failed, inthe opinion of the greatest experts, because he did not throw in theguard on the center at the decisive moment. This failure was due to adisregard of his own maxim that "generals who save troops for the nextday are always beaten"; not divining a complete cessation ofhostilities by Kutusoff, he thought his reserve might be required onthe morrow. It seems, too, as if he were gradually becoming aware ofthe dangers attendant on the prolongation of his base to Moscow. AtMozhaisk he halted three days, doubtless with the hope that Alexanderwould open negotiations to prevent the sack of his sacred capital. During this pause careful orders were issued for the concentration ofa strong French reserve at Smolensk. Victor was summoned to bring inhis thirty thousand men from the Niemen so as to be ready in anemergency to advance even as far as Moscow. It seems like a case ofwilful self-deception that on the tenth Napoleon wrote to Maret as ifconvinced that the exposure of his flanks would escape Kutusoff'snotice, saying that the enemy struck in the heart was occupied onlywith the heart, and not with the extremities. This would have been ajustifiable confidence had Borodino been decisive. But it was notdecisive, since the Russian army, far from being annihilated, drew offwith its files, companies, and regiments so far intact as to be easilyavailable for the quick incorporation of new recruits. This it waswhich gave verisimilitude to Kutusoff's boast and made the Frenchoccupation of Moscow a matter of doubtful expediency. 

Yet the temptation was irresistible. Mother Moscow, as runs thecaressing Russian phrase, is indeed the source of all Muscoviteinspiration. Watered by the winding stream of the same name, its heartis the Kremlin, its citadel of Russian architecture, Russianorthodoxy, Russian authority, and Russian learning. From itschurches are promulgated the authoritative utterances of the GreekMetropolitan, within its triangular walls is found the mostcharacteristic Muscovite architecture, behind its portals stand thelargest bell ever cast and the largest cannon ever founded until themost recent times; statues of Russian heroes adorn its open spaces, the splendors of its palaces are lavished with Muscovite profuseness, the edicts of the White Czar thunder over his many million subjectsfrom its walls. Clustered about the Kremlin are the various quartersof the town, which cover a space equal to the area of Paris, andcontain about one fourth as many inhabitants. The epithet of "holycity" is amply justified by the sanctuary-citadel, but its aptness isfurther sustained by the three hundred and sixty churches, each withits tower and onion-shaped cupola, which are scattered through all thedistricts. In the beginning of this century Moscow from withinappeared like a congeries of villages surrounded with groves andgardens, each with its manor-house and parochial church. Around thewhole was a girdle of country-seats, and the beauty of the scene asviewed by the approaching traveler was such as to kindle enthusiasm inthe coldest breast. The inhabitants had hoped that the "victory" ofBorodino would spare their home the shame of foreign occupation. Whenthe governor announced that in a council of war it had been decided toabandon the city, there was first dismay, then fury, then despair. Thelong trains of departing citizens wailed their church hymns withsullen mien and joyless voices. 

The surrender was marked by barbarous conduct on the part of the civilauthorities. It has been recounted that by a military convention theRussian rear-guard had been permitted to withdraw unmolested afterBorodino, in return for a promise not to destroy Moscow. Yet onSeptember fourteenth, the day of the French occupation, as has alsobeen told, fires had been kindled in the suburbs, whether by accidentor design cannot be determined. Besides this, on receipt of the noticeto evacuate, such stores as in the short interval could be reachedwere destroyed; the prison doors were opened, and a horde of maddenedcriminals was set free in the streets. Nevertheless, there was fairorder throughout the fifteenth. Next day a raging conflagration burstforth. At the time, and long afterwards, this was attributed as a deedof dastardly incendiarism to the invaders; with the growth of modernideas about ruthlessness in warfare, Russian historians have begun toattribute it to the inhabitants as a heroic measure. It is nowasserted that the governor cast the first brand into his owncountry-seat. More probably, the fanaticism of the populace, heightened by the criminal rage of the escaped prisoners, led to thealmost simultaneous firing of many buildings in various quarters. Apossibility of method in the destruction of the city begins to dawn, however, when it is remembered that the devastation of the surroundingcountry by the fleeing Russians was equally thorough, and was carriedout according to a carefully devised plan. 

The entry of the French into Moscow has been compared to theappearance of great actors before an empty house. When theconflagration broke out, every effort was made to stop it, and eighthundred fire fiends were summarily punished. But as the burning wallsof the storehouses fell, the rabble seized the barrels of spirits thusrevealed, and drank themselves into blind fury; the French soldierypillaged with little restraint, not sparing even the Kremlin. Finally, the flames were checked and order was restored, but not until threequarters of the city proper were destroyed; the Kremlin and theremaining fourth were saved. On the evening of the fourth day theFrench army was disposed in rude comfort within or about the site ofMoscow, and Murat's riders began to bring in reports concerningKutusoff's army. To soothe the peasantry of the neighboring districts, one of the old insidious proclamations was issued, appealing to theirmanhood against the tyranny of their rulers. "Die for your faith andthe Czar!" was the answering cry, as they seized the Frenchstragglers, surprised the garrison of Wereja, and beset the Smolenskroad. Day by day the people labored, the townsfolk helping to gatherthe peasants' goods, both classes waylaying the French supply-trains, and hiding every article of use in vast underground chambersconstructed for the purpose. Consternation filled the invaders, andtheir plight became desperate when they learned of the Russianmilitary dispositions, and understood how Kutusoff already menacedtheir safety. 

Instigated by Castlereagh, Bernadotte had released the Russian corpsplaced at his disposal for conquering Norway, and Wittgenstein, on theRussian right, thus suddenly acquired a force of forty thousandwherewith to menace Napoleon's outlying left on the north. By Englishmediation, also, a peace was arranged between Turkey and Russia, thusreleasing Tchitchagoff, who promptly joined Tormassoff, and opposedSchwarzenberg on the extreme French right with nearly two to one. Meanwhile Kutusoff had taken a position at Tarutino, where hecommanded the left flank of the main French army, and daily receivednew recruits, who flocked to fill his depleted ranks. Napoleon had, since Borodino, been in daily expectation of some communication fromthe Czar. His critical situation made him impatient, and on thetwentieth he wrote, informing his strangely silent foe that Moscow wasburned, a misfortune which might have been averted had negotiationsbeen opened after Borodino. There was no response. On October fifthLauriston was despatched to Kutusoff's camp, nominally to secure anexchange of prisoners. The latter said that the affair must bereferred to St. Petersburg; but the French general learned that theRussians had extended their line south toward Kaluga to secure thefertile base behind, and further threaten the long, weak French flank. 

Alexander's silent steadfastness was, indeed, remarkable. Hitherto inevery crisis--as, for example, after Austerlitz and Friedland--he hadyielded. Why was he now so firm? Stein, the Prussian patriot, was athis side; but so was the trusted Rumianzoff, leader of the Frenchparty, which was for peace. The Old Russian party, demoralized byNapoleon's advance to the heart of the empire, was also clamorous forpeace negotiations. An English embassy, composed of Lord Cathcart andthe body of English officers under Sir Robert Wilson sent toreorganize the Russian army, had so far been able to accomplishlittle, for by all accounts their influence was slight. The improvedmilitary situation no doubt accounts for much, but the bestinformation goes to show that Alexander moved and talked like onedazed, feeling himself to be a storm-tossed child of fate. Destituteof self-reliance, he appears to have been drawn toward Galitzin, whosepiety was eminent, and verged upon mysticism. It is certain that inthose days the Czar for the first time became an ardent Bible reader, and frequently exclaimed, "The hand of God hath done this!" On leavingSt. Petersburg at last for the seat of war, his parting act was tofound the Russian Bible Society. It was with but small reliance on themilitary situation, and with a feeling of providential guidance, thathe determined to renew the conflict. 

Thus passed five weeks. Interminable they seemed to the anxiousconqueror at Moscow, who yawned even at the theater; who forgot thestern abstemiousness of his table habits, and, like a gourmet, spenthours at his meals merely to kill time; who threw himself into viciousways, and contracted a loathsome disease; who lost all interest evenin his troops, and finally, unkempt, preoccupied, and feverish, seemedindifferent to everything. The crown, scepter, and robe wherewith hehad hoped to be invested as Emperor of the West were not unpacked fromthe camp chests. The pompous ceremonies of military occupation werescrupulously performed; drills, parades, and concerts followed in duesuccession; but the Emperor's interest was languid. At last the drearywaiting became intolerable, the season, although neither early norsevere, was rapidly advancing, the predatory excursions of thesoldiers into the surrounding country were growing longer, moredifficult, and less fruitful of results with every day. The elementsof danger were hourly increasing in an appalling ratio. Daru advisedturning Moscow into an armed camp and wintering there. "A lion'sadvice, " said Napoleon, but he put it aside. The question of retreatwould soon be imperative, and that he sometimes discussed, but onlylanguidly, until, on October eighteenth, without warning, a truce madeby Murat was broken, and his command driven in. Then at last thecaptain in Napoleon awakened, the emperor vanished, the retreat wasordered, and universal empire, a dependent Czar, the march from Tiflisto the Ganges, England humiliated, and the ocean liberated--all wereforgotten in the presence of reality. Robe, scepter, and crown werenever seen again. 

Political considerations prompted a movement of withdrawal toward thenorthwest, as if against St. Petersburg, but military considerationsprevailed, and between the two alternatives--a direct retreat toSmolensk through a devastated land, or a circuit south-westward, through fertile districts, toward Kaluga, as if to attackKutusoff--the choice fell on the latter. The reason is clear. The seatof war was within a triangle marked by Riga, Brest-Litovski, andMoscow; from Riga to Moscow, the left flank, is five hundred and fiftymiles; from Riga to Brest, the base, is three hundred and seventy-fivemiles; from Brest to Moscow, the right flank, is six hundred and fiftymiles; the perpendicular from Moscow to the base, which was theshortest line of retreat, is therefore about five hundred andseventy-five miles. These distances are all enormous; on the left wereonly forty-two thousand men, on the right, about thirty-four thousand;along the line, forty-two thousand. The diagram, if drawn, willdisplay all the peculiarities of Napoleonic formation in mass, abstractly considered, but it will likewise display the fact that withthe highest and most perfect army organization then known, it wouldhave been well-nigh impossible to work the combination. Neither of themonstrous flanks could be held by the comparatively scanty forcesavailable; the line of operation was equally weak. What safety wasthere for the army in retreat? None. 

There will never be complete agreement as to the causes of Napoleon'sdisaster in Russia. A comparison of the relative values ofmass-formation, tactics, and organization in modern warfare, whichuses railroads and telegraphs, with the distances practicable inpresent-day operations, must nevertheless reveal the chief cause--thatthe Napoleonic organization had not kept pace with the development ofNapoleonic strategy. The emperor had overweighted the general, theformer having soared into an ether which would not sustain thepinions of the latter. The well-used plea of an "act of God" will notstand. The autumn of 1812 was mild, the winter late in opening. Neither cheerless steppes, nor phenomenal cold, nor unheard-of snows, nor any reversal of nature's laws, --not even the motley nationalitiesof the grand army, or an unhistoric migration from south tonorth, --none of these was the chief cause of failure, which is to befound in the attempt monstrously to exaggerate the factors of astrategic system evolved for national, but not for continental, proportions. 

The first and natural thought of a direct retreat to Smolensk wasmomentarily entertained; but it had to be abandoned because, with weakflanks and a bare country, the distance was too far. The same was truein regard to the move toward St. Petersburg--the distance was toogreat for the conditions. The circuit toward Kaluga was firstconsidered as a feint to throw the Russians off the scent; it became anecessity when they assumed the offensive in the unforeseen andunexpected attack on Murat. The Emperor did not dare to expose hisflank and rear to an advancing foe, and accordingly his army wasassembled on the road toward Kaluga. Should he advance or await afurther movement of the enemy? Evidently the former, otherwise theentire moral effect of the first offensive would be lost. A long marchhad to be extended still farther, partly for strategic reasons, butchiefly in order to secure an additional advantage of the firstimportance; to wit, sustenance from the country when the distanceswere too great for the workings of any feasible commissariatdepartment. If the Russians should even momentarily be deceived intobelieving that the French had resumed the offensive, a line fromKaluga direct to Smolensk would still be open for retreat while theenemy was preparing for action. 

The report was spread in Moscow that Napoleon was going out tooverwhelm Kutusoff and then return. Mortier, with eight thousand ofthe young guard, remained behind, his orders being to blow up theKremlin before leaving. The main army advanced across the river Pachraand moved toward the Lusha. There was as yet no word of the enemy;possibly he had been misled and was advancing directly on Moscow. Napoleon, therefore, turned westward in the hope that he might reachKaluga without opposition. On the twenty-fourth the Russian vanappeared. Had Kutusoff acted on his correct information and thrownforward his whole army, a decisive battle might have ended theinvasion. As it was, Eugène, after a bloody conflict atMalojaroslavetz, remained master of the field, and the timid Kutusoffdrew back his force. Meantime the truth leaked out in Moscow. Suspicion was excited, as the resident French observed not merely theimmense booty packed in the officers' baggage, but also the loads ofMuscovite art treasures under which the government wagons groaned. They were quick to act, and soon, accompanied by women and children, they joined the march with all the paraphernalia of their householdgoods. From the first this throng, uniting with the usual horde ofstragglers and camp-followers, prevented all rapid movements by thearmy; in fact, but for them the half-senile Kutusoff would not havebeen able to show even his van to the French line. Mortier's effort todestroy the Kremlin failed, and served no purpose except to exhibitthe thirst for revenge of a savage nature brought to bay. 

In short, every plan of Napoleon's seemed ineffectual, and indecisionmarked his every act. Eugène's terrible struggle had resulted in alist of wounded numbering four thousand. The old Napoleon would haveabandoned them and then have attacked Kutusoff even in the forestdefiles where he was ensconced; or else he would have pressed on pastKaluga, or would have swiftly wheeled to regain the northern roadtoward Smolensk. The harried, sick, exhausted man of 1812 did none ofthese things, but called a council of war, and weighed the argumentsthere presented for nearly a week, when, finally, he decided, and withforced marches drove his columns toward the northern road to Smolensk. He wrote to Junot that his motive for delay was to provide for thesuffering from his depot at Mozhaisk, but, in fact, he had not waitedlong enough materially to assist the wounded, and had secured noadvantage from the bloody battle. In the absence of trustworthyinformation he took (when once he did move) a long, circuitous road. As yet there was no cold except the usual sharpness of autumn nights;but the summer uniforms of the troops were tattered and their shoesworn. Germans, Italians, and Illyrians began to straggle, and thehorrors of the approaching cold, as depicted by Russian prisoners, sank deep into the minds of the dispirited French, so far away fromtheir pleasant homes. 

CHAPTER XXIX

THE RETREAT FROM RUSSIA[44]

 [Footnote 44: References as in the preceding chapter. Also: Cathcart: Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany, 1812 to 1813. Clausewitz: Der Feldzug von 1812 in Russland, der Feldzug von 1813 bis zum Waffenstillstand und der Feldzug von 1814 in Frankreich. Combe: Mémoires sur les campagnes de Russie 1812, de Saxe 1813, de France 1814 et 1815. Jomini: Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814. Labaume: Relation circonstanciée de la campagne de Russie. Gentz: Österreichs Theilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Jahre 1813-1815, nach Aufzeichnungen von F. Von Gentz, nebst einem Anhang: "Briefwechsel zwischen dem Fürsten Schwarzenberg und Metternich. " Porter: A Narrative of the Campaign in Russia in 1812. Ségur: Histoire de Napoléon et de la grande armée pendant l'année 1812. Gourgaud: Napoléon et la grande armée en Russie, ou examen critique de l'ouvrage de M. Le C^te Ph. De Ségur. Vandal: Napoléon et Alexandre Ier. Wilson: Private diary of travels, personal services and public events during mission and employment with the European armies in the campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814; ed. By his nephew, H. Murray. Wolseley: The Decline and Fall of Napoleon. ]

 State of Napoleon's Mind -- Destruction Imminent -- The Affair at Wiazma -- Kutusoff's Timidity -- Napoleon's Despair -- Arrival at Smolensk -- The Army Reorganized -- Napoleon's Daring at Krasnoi -- Ney's Great Feat -- Sufferings of the Army -- The Russian Plan -- Tchitchagoff's Capture of Borrissoff. 

For nine days the retreat went steadily on. Mortier came in on Octobertwenty-seventh; Davout was assigned to keep the rear. Napoleon was nolonger seen on horseback; sometimes he drove, but generally he trudgedamong the men, to all outward appearance as spiritless as any one. ToJunot he wrote that he had taken his decision in consequence of thecold and in order to provide for his wounded from the depot atMozhaisk. There was as yet no severe cold, and there was a far shorterroad to Smolensk. The writer's mind was chaotic, confusing what heknew soon would be with present realities. His maps were worthless, and clinging to experience, he showed none of his accustomedventuresomeness. The well-worn summer uniforms of his men were noprotection even against the coolness of autumn nights. What a prospectwhen winter's cold should come! It was enough to stun even a Napoleon. 

But the present was bad enough, and momentarily grew worse. The roadwas lined with charred ruins and devastated fields, and the waysideswere dotted with groups of listless, desperate soldiers who fell outand sank on the ground as the straggling ranks of their comradestramped on. Skirting the battle-field of Borodino, the marchingbattalions looked askance on the ghastly heaps of unburied corpses;but the wounded survivors were dragged from field hospitals and othercavernous shelters to be carried onward with the departing army. Theywere a sight which in some cases turned melancholy into madness. Inorder to transport them the wagons were lightened by throwing thespoils of Moscow into the pond at Semlino. On the thirtieth despatchesof grave import reached the Emperor informing him that Schwarzenberghad retreated behind the Bug, leaving an open road from Brest forTchitchagoff's veterans to attack the right flank of the columnsflying from Moscow. Victor, learning of Napoleon's straits, had leftfifteen thousand men in Smolensk, and was advancing to join Saint-Cyron the Dwina in order to assure the safety of the main army from thatside. To him came the dismal news that Wittgenstein had resumed theoffensive against Saint-Cyr, and that the line of attack on the Frenchleft was as open from the north as was that on the other side from thesouth. Davout's rear-guard was steadily disintegrating under hardshipsand before the harassing attacks of the Russian riders under Platoff. Partizan warfare was assuming alarming dimensions. In a single swooptwo thousand French recruits under Baraguey d'Hilliers had been madeprisoners, and similar events were growing all too frequent. Inconsequence of these crushing discouragements the whole army wasrearrayed. "We must march as we did in Egypt, " ran the order: "thebaggage in the middle, as densely surrounded as the road will permit, with a half battalion in front, a half battalion behind, battalionsright and left, so that when we face we can fire in every direction. "Ney's corps was then assigned to the place of danger in the rear--aplace he kept with desperate gallantry until he earned the title"bravest of the brave. "

The early promise of substantially reinforcing Kutusoff's army had notbeen fulfilled. The fanatic zeal at first displayed soon effervesced, the new levies were untrustworthy, and the long marches of theRussians told almost as terribly upon them as the retreat did upontheir enemies. Kutusoff's army therefore, though available fordefense, was a poor weapon for attack, especially when the object wasa French army under the dreaded Napoleon. The Russian commander wasonly half-hearted in his pursuit; and when, having taken the short cutwhich was unknown to his enemy, his van came in contact with theFrench line at Wiazma on November third, the Russian soldiers hadlittle heart to fight. The circumstances offered every chance for apowerful if not a decisive blow on the flying column from flank andrear; but the onset was feeble, the commander-in-chief held back hismain force in anxious timidity, and a second time the opportunity waslost for annihilating the retreating foe, now reduced in number toabout sixty thousand. Napoleon was far away on the front when Kutusoffattacked, and the battle was conducted on the French side by themarshals in consultation with Eugène and Poniatowski. The rear-guardwas momentarily severed from the line, but these two generals wheeledand fiercely attacked the advancing Russians, engaging all withinreach until Davout was able to evade the mêlée and rejoin the mainarmy. 

The French lost about four thousand, the Russians about half as many. Neither of the two armies had any courage to renew the struggle nextmorning, and each kept its way as best it could, both of themexhausted, both shrinking hourly in vigor and numbers. Kutusoff'sconduct both at Malojaroslavetz and at Wiazma has been explained byhis fixed resolution to leave the destruction of the invaders to hisgaunt allies, want and winter. If, however, as was possible at eitherplace, he had annihilated the retreating army, this might have beenthe last Napoleonic war, since it was not for a new army that theEmperor of the French appealed to his people, but for something quitedifferent; namely, men to recruit the old one. As it was, Napoleonfirst learned of the conflict at Wiazma on the fourth, andcontemplated a movement which might lead his pursuers into an ambush. But he found the three columns which had been engaged so pitifullydisintegrated that he gave up in despair--a feeling heightened when, for the first time, snowflakes came ominously fluttering through thefrosty air. 

The weary march was therefore resumed, and there was some semblance oforder in it, although Ney wrote Berthier that already on the fourththere were without exaggeration four thousand men of the grand armywho refused to march in rank. The number was increasing daily. On thesixth Napoleon was informed that Victor, having effected a junctionwith Saint-Cyr, had checked Wittgenstein in a series of gallantstruggles, but that step by step the two divisions had been drivenback until now they were only thirty miles distant, having abandonedthe line of the Dwina, including the depot of Vitebsk. "Seize theoffensive; the safety of the army depends on it, " was Napoleon'sdesperate reply. Terrible as this news was to the general, it waseclipsed in horror for the Emperor by the accounts he received at thesame time from Paris describing Malet's conspiracy, a movement tooverthrow the Empire based on the false rumor of his own death. "AndNapoleon II, did no one think of him?" he cried in anguish. Grandarmy, reputation, personal prestige--all these he might lose andsurvive; but to lose France, that were ruin indeed. 

That night a heavy frost fell; then, and no sooner, did the relentlessseverity of the Russian winter begin. This is proved by Napoleon'sfamous twenty-ninth bulletin, and by the journal of Castellane, theaide-de-camp who made the final copy of it; in spite of assertions putforth later to sustain the legend of an army conquered by theelements, the autumn had dallied far beyond its time. Next day theweary march began again; scarcely a word escaped the Emperor. He waspale, but his countenance gave no sign of panic; there was merely agrim, persistent silence. The enemy hung on flank and rear, harassingthe demoralized column until it was more like a horde than an army. With numbed limbs and in the gnawing misery of bitter cold, the Frenchstraggled on. Men and horses died by the score; the survivors cutstrips of carrion wherewith to sustain life, and desperately pressedforward, for all who left the highway fell into the enemy's hands. Insome bivouacs three hundred died overnight; there are statements inthe papers of officials which seem to indicate that in the strugglefor life the weaker often perished at the hands of their own comrades. The half-crazed, frost-bitten, disorderly soldiers of the French vanreached Smolensk on the ninth, and on the thirteenth the remnants ofthe rear, with many stragglers, came up and encamped. The heroes ofthe hour were Eugène and Ney. Ney's division had well-nigh vanished intheir glory. Fighting without fear, and dying undaunted, they hadsaved the moiety of the grand army which reached Smolensk; the otherhalf had perished by the way. Eugène had taken a long circuit, but hisdivision had lost fewer and was less demoralized than those of hiscolleagues. Murat's recklessness in fighting the Cossacks had resultedin the loss of nearly all his horses; his men arrived on foot. 

The scenes in Smolensk were shameful. At first the garrison shut thegates in the very faces of the human wolves who clamored for food andshelter. Discipline having been restored, the guard was admitted. Thestores were ample for a fortnight's rations to all survivors; but theravening mob could not be restrained, and the distribution was soirregular that precious supplies were tumbled into the streets; in theend it was discovered that the guard had secured sustenance for afortnight, while the line had scarcely sufficient for a week. The sickand wounded were, however, housed and made fairly comfortable. Thesenauseating tumults over, the Emperor seemed to regain much of hisbodily vigor, and with it returned his skill and ingenuity: stragglerswere reincorporated into regiments; supply-wagons were destroyed inlarge numbers and the horses assigned to the artillery, many of theguns being abandoned so that the service of the remainder might bemore efficient; the army was rearrayed in four divisions, under theEmperor, Eugène, Davout, and Ney respectively; and the French madeready to leave Smolensk with a bold front. Napoleon's contempt for hisenemy was matched only by their palpitating fear of him. Most menwould have abandoned hope in such a crisis. Napoleon was fertile notmerely in strategic expedients, but in devices for realizing hisplans. Accordingly he arranged that the four columns should move onparallel lines toward Lithuania, a day's march distant from eachother, he with six thousand of the guard in the van; Ney, taking theother four thousand to strengthen his own line, was to keep the rear. The movement began on the twelfth, that is, before the last stragglershad come in; on the fourteenth Napoleon took his departure; and threedays later, on the seventeenth, the towers of the ramparts having beenblown up, the last of the newly ordered ranks marched out. The sickand wounded had found shelter in houses adjacent to the walls; manywere killed by the explosions, the rest were abandoned to the foe andfound humane treatment. Disorderly and mutinous French soldiersremained in considerable numbers to plunder; these were for the mostpart caught by the entering Russians, and inhumanly done to death. Inall these days the cold had not abated, and at times the thermometermarked fifteen degrees below zero. 

The further line of retreat was through Krasnoi, Borrissoff, andMinsk, the Emperor expecting Schwarzenberg, reinforced by fourteenthousand German recruits, to cover the crossing of the Beresina atBorrissoff. The Russians followed doggedly on their parallel line ofpursuit, harassing the French rear and flanks. On the fifteenth theirvan came in touch with Napoleon's division near Krasnoi almost as hehimself passed, and their artillery opened fire. The balls yelled asthey sped by, and there was great excitement. Lebrun called attentionto the fact as if it were remarkable. "Bah!" said Napoleon, as hepressed forward; "bullets have been flying about our legs these twentyyears. " He well knew that his anxious foe would not seriously attackhim and his guard; but, justly considering that the case would bedifferent in regard to his rear, he halted to await their arrival. Early on the morning of the seventeenth he sent out a reconnoiteringparty, as if about to wheel and give battle; Kutusoff, who for themoment was considerably inferior in numbers, fell instantly into thesnare, and drawing back his van, as Napoleon had foreseen and desired, made ready for battle. 

Eugène and Davout were within reach, but Ney's position was terrible:he was only then leaving Smolensk. Was he to be left to his fate?Around and behind his six thousand troops were swarming almost as manystragglers; and on the eighteenth the Russians, in spite of theirmomentary halt, threw forward their van with the hope of cutting offhis hampered and sore-pressed division. But the short delay had beenprecious: Ney rose to the occasion, and on the nineteenth crossed theDnieper over the ice, hoping to follow the right bank westward andrejoin the main army at Orcha. This was one of his most daring feats, perhaps his most brilliant deed of arms. Summoned by a flag of truceto surrender, he replied: "A marshal of the Empire has neversurrendered!" Platoff and the Cossacks were hard on his heels; butfighting and marching throughout the weary, bitter day, at night theundaunted marshal found himself in touch with Eugène, who had turnedout on the highway from Vitebsk to Orcha to meet him. When, on thetwentieth, they effected a junction, Ney had only eight hundred men inthe ranks with him; perhaps two thousand more were trudging behind indisorder. 

On the eighteenth a thaw had set in; it had begun to rain, the crustbroke under the men's feet, and the roads were lines of icy clods. Thesoldiers had no foot-gear but rags; every step was an agony, andthousands who had so far endured now gave up, and flung away theirguns and equipments. There were not more than twenty-five thousandregularly marching. Already on the previous day the guard had shownsigns of demoralization. The Emperor alone seemed impassive. For dayshe had shared the common hardships; clad in a long Polish coat ofmarten fur, a stout birch staff in his hand, without a sign of eitherphysical or nervous exhaustion he had marched silently for longdistances among his suffering men. If we picture him standing atKrasnoi, weighing how long he dared to brave an enemy which ifconsolidated and hurled upon his lines would have annihilated them, wemust feel that collapse was prevented then only by his nerve and bythe terror of his name. Once more he threw the influence of hispresence into the scale, and, stepping before the guard on thisdreadful day, he said simply: "You see the disorganization of my army. In unhappy infatuation most of the soldiers have thrown away theirguns. If you follow this dangerous example no hope remains. " The stateof the men was, if possible, worse than ever; in fact, it wasindescribable. Night after night they had bivouacked in the snow. Whatwith the wet, the dazzling glitter, and the insufficient food, --for atbest they had only a broth of horse-flesh thickened with flour, --somewere attacked with blindness, some with acute mania, and some with aprostrating insensibility. Those who now remained in the ranks wereclad in rags and scarcely recognizable as soldiers. It seemed, therefore, as if such an appeal could only awaken an echo in an emptyvault; but such was the French character that, desperate as were thecircumstances, the cry was heard. The response was grim and sullen, but the call was not in vain; and reaching Orcha on the nineteenth, there was still an army. As yet, however, there was no news of Ney. 

The sky seemed dark and the prospect blank when it was learned thatboth Victor and Schwarzenberg had been steadily thrown back. TheRussian plan was for Wittgenstein and Tchitchagoff to drive in theextreme left and right divisions respectively of Napoleon's attenuatedline, and then to concentrate at Borrissoff and attack the main Frencharmy retreating before Kutusoff. So far the various parts of thisscheme had been successfully executed. Borrissoff and its bridge werestill in possession of a Polish regiment; but the garrison was verysmall, and could not repulse the attack of the converging Russiancolumns or of any portion of them. It behooved Napoleon, therefore, tomove swiftly if his few remaining troops were to cross the Beresina insafety. It was in this frightful dilemma that Ney at last appeared. Said Napoleon, when the news was brought to him: "If an hour ago I hadbeen asked for the three millions I have in the Tuileries vaults asthe price of this event, I would have handed them over. " The marshal'spresence was in itself a splendid encouragement. 

Purchasing such stores as Jewish contractors offered, abandoning theheavy pontoons, and hitching the horses to a few field-pieces found inthe park, the undaunted Emperor sent orders to both Victor andOudinot, enjoining them to make forced marches and meet him atBorrissoff. On the twenty-first, amid the slush, mud, and broken cakesof crust, he started his own army on a swift despairing rush for thatcrucial point. It was too late; that very day Tchitchagoffs van, aftera stubborn and bloody struggle, occupied the town and captured theall-important bridge. The thaw had opened the river, and itsoverflowing stream, more than sixty yards in width, was full offloating ice. To the Russians it seemed as if Napoleon were alreadytaken in their snare, and Tchitchagoff issued a general order that allcaptives below medium stature should be brought to him. "He is short, stout, pale; has a short, thick neck, and black hair, " ran hisdescription of the "author of Europe's miseries. " By a special decreeof the Czar, all the French prisoners of war were kindly treated, eachbeing furnished with warm clothing at an expense of about twentydollars. 

CHAPTER XXX

THE HORRORS OF THE BERESINA[45]

 [Footnote 45: References: Bertin, La campagne de 1812, d'après des témoins oculaires. Du Casse, Mémoires à l'histoire de la campagne de 1812 en Russie. Exner, Der Antheil der Königl. Sächsischen Armee am Feldzuge gegen Russland, 1812. Lafon, Histoire de la conjuration du Gén. Malet, avec des détails officiels sur cette affaire. Labaume, Relation circonstanciée de la campagne de Russie. Lecointe de Laveau, Moscou avant et après l'incendie, ou notice contenant une description de cette capitale, des moeurs de ses habitants, des événements qui se passèrent pendant l'incendie, et des malheurs qui accablèrent l'armée française pendant la retraite de 1812. Mikhailowsky-Danilewsky, Le passage de la Beresina. Von Pfuel, E. , Der Ruckzug der Franzosen aus Russland. De Puibusque, Lettres sur la guerre de Russie, en 1812, sur la ville de Saint-Pétersbourg, les moeurs et les usages des habitants de la Russie et de la Pologne. ]

 Napoleon at Bay -- The Enemy at Fault -- The Crossing of the Beresina -- The Carnage -- End of the Tragedy -- Napoleon's Departure -- The Remnants of the Army at Vilna -- The Russian Generals -- Napoleon's Journey -- Malet's Conspiracy -- The Emperor's Anxiety -- The State of France -- Affairs in Spain. 

The situation of the French was desperate indeed. With a relentlessfoe behind, and on each side, and now in front protected by therampart of a swollen river, which was overflowing its banks and wasbordered on both sides by dense forests, the army seemed doomed. Asingle overmastering thought began to take possession of Napoleon'smind--that of his personal safety. He appeared to take a momentousdecision--the determination to sacrifice his army bit by bit that hemight save its head. This resolution once formed, he became strong andcourageous, his head was clear, and his invention active. Oudinot wassummoned, with his eight thousand men, to drive out Tchitchagoff; andorders were sent to Victor, commanding him to take the eleventhousand which he had, and at any hazard cut off Wittgenstein fromthe Beresina. Schwarzenberg had been temporarily checked by a divisionof Russians under Sacken, and was no longer a factor in the problem. Oudinot accomplished his task, but the Russians fired the bridge asthey fled. 

Napoleon was scarcely consoled by news that his cavalry had found aford at Studjenka. Early on the twenty-third the Frenchbridge-builders, with all available assistants and material, were ontheir way up the river. The remnants of the army were reorganized, andthe baggage-train was reduced to the smallest possible dimensions. Unfortunately, Victor had not received his orders in time, and, ignorant of the Emperor's plans, had changed his line of march to onemore southerly, thus leaving the road to Studjenka open forWittgenstein, who abandoned the pursuit and marched direct to thespot. The latter's advance was, however, slow; Tchitchagoff wascompletely deceived, as many of the French believe, by a feint ofOudinot's, but, as he himself declared, both by false informationconcerning the movements of Schwarzenberg, and by misrepresentationsconcerning Napoleon's march as communicated through both Kutusoff andWittgenstein. Be this as it may, the veterans from the Danube marcheda whole day down the stream to guard against an imaginary danger. TheFrench therefore worked at Studjenka without disturbance, and, as thefrost set in once more, the swampy shores were hardened enough to makeeasy the approach to their works. By the twenty-sixth two bridgeswere completed--a light one for infantry early in the morning, andlate in the afternoon another considered strong enough for artilleryand wagons. At one o'clock Oudinot's foot-soldiers began to cross, anda body of cavalry successfully swam their horses over the stream, which owing to the freshet was now in places five feet deep instead ofthree and a half as when the ford was first discovered; a few hourslater artillery followed, and the opposite shore was cleared of theenemy sufficiently to open the bridge-head entirely, and control thedirect road to Vilna, which leaves Minsk to the south. This greatsuccess was due partly to unparalleled good fortune, but chiefly tothe gallant fellows who worked for hours without a murmur in thefreezing water, amid cakes of grinding ice. 

With two short interruptions, of three and four hours respectively, due to the breaking of the heavier bridge, the crossing went forwardirregularly, at times almost intermitting, until the morning of thetwenty-eighth. About noon on the twenty-seventh the Emperor passed;having superintended certain repairs to the bridge, he started nextmorning for Zembin. The same afternoon, Victor's van reachedBorrissoff somewhat in advance of Wittgenstein, who came up a fewhours later, and attacking the former's rear, captured two thousandmen. Tchitchagoff, having finally learned the truth, appeared thatnight opposite Borrissoff; communication with the opposite shore wasquickly established, and after a conference the two belated Russiangenerals agreed to march up-stream, on the right and left banksrespectively. At eight next morning Tchitchagoff attacked Oudinot andNey--twenty-six thousand men against seventeen thousand; two hourslater Wittgenstein, with twenty-five thousand, fell upon Victor, whonow had about seven thousand. Yet the French kept the bridges. 

Throughout the day a bloody fight went on; it was rendered uncertainand disorderly by the thousands of stragglers present, and by theintensity of the steadily increasing cold. Behind the two heroiccombats scenes were occurring which beggar description. Incrediblenumbers of stragglers cumbered the roadways and approaches; the vastmob of camp-followers held stubbornly to their possessions, and, withloud imprecations, lashed their tired horses while they put their ownshoulders to the wagon wheels. Hundreds were trampled under foot;families were torn asunder amid wails and shrieks that filled the air;the weak were pushed from the bridges into the dark flood nowthickening under the fierce cold. Toward midday a cutting wind beganto blow, and by three it was a hurricane. At that instant the heavierbridge gave way, and all upon it were engulfed. An onlooker declaredthat above storm and battle a yell of mortal agony rose which rang inhis ears for weeks. 

The mob on the river-bank was momentarily sobered, and for a timethere was order in crossing the remaining bridge; but as dusk fellboth wind and battle raged more fiercely, and groups began to surgeout on right and left to pass those in front. Many dashed headlonginto the angry river; others, finding no opening, seated themselves indumb despair to wait the event. At nine the remnant of Victor's ranksbegan to cross, and the Russians commenced cannonading the bridge. Soon the beams were covered with corpses, laid like the transverselogs on a corduroy road; but the frightful transit went on until allthe soldiers had passed. The heavy bridge was temporarily repaired, but at last neither was safe; little knots gathered from the rabble atintervals and rushed recklessly over the toppling structures, until ateight next morning the French, not daring to wait longer, set fire toboth, leaving seven thousand of their followers in Studjenka. Theyburned also the wooden track they had constructed through the swamps. The Russian accounts of what was seen in the morning light portrayscenes unparalleled in history: a thousand or more charred corpseswere frozen fast on the surface of the river, many of the ghastlyheads being those of women and children; the huts of the town werepacked with the dead. Twenty-four thousand bodies were burned in oneholocaust, and it is solemnly stated that in the spring thaws twelvethousand more were brought to light. Ten years afterward there werestill islets in the shallows of the stream covered with forget-me-notswhich decked the moldering bones of those who had perished during thatawful night of November twenty-eighth, 1812. 

Next day the Emperor wrote to Maret confessing the truth. "The army isnumerous, but shockingly disorganized, " he declared. "A fortnightwould be necessary to bring it once more under the standards; and howcan we find a fortnight? Cold and privation have disorganized it. Wemay reach Vilna--can we maintain ourselves there? If we only could, even for the first eight days! But suppose we were attacked withinthat time, it is doubtful if we should be able to remain. Food! food!food!--without that there are no atrocities which this unruly throngwould not commit against the town. In this situation I may regard mypresence in Paris as essential for France, for the Empire--yes, evenfor the army. " He also composed on the same day a bulletin, sincefamous, which was dated December third. It speciously declared thatuntil November sixth the Emperor had been everywhere successful;thereafter the elements had done their fell work. The only completetruth it contained was the closing sentence: "The health of hisMajesty was never better. " As the sorry remnants of the grand armymoved toward Vilna, they grew scantier and scantier. Many weredelirious from hunger and cold, many were in the agonies of typhusfever. On December third there were still nine thousand in the ranks;on the fifth the marshals were assembled to hear Napoleon explain hisdetermination to leave at once for Paris, and immediately afterward hetook his departure. 

It was not a very "grand army" which was left behind under Murat'scommand, with orders to form behind the Niemen. On the eighth thethermometer marked twenty-five degrees below zero, and a few unarmedwretches, perhaps five hundred in all, trailed after their leader intoVilna. Their ears and throats, their legs and feet, were swathed inrags; their bodies were wrapped in the threadbare garments of theirdead comrades, or in such cast-off woman's apparel as they had beenable to secure by the way. They were followed by Ney with fourhundred, Wrede with two thousand, and finally by two or three thousandstragglers. After a few half-hearted and ineffectual efforts toorganize this mob into the semblance of an army, Murat abandoned theattempt and posted away to his kingdom of Naples--a course severelycensured by the Emperor. This was the closing scene of Napoleon'sgreat drama of invasion. His men and horses had succumbed to summerheats as rapidly and extensively as to winter frosts; he had broughtruin to his enterprise by miscalculating the proportions of inanimatenature and human strategy, and by fatal indecision at critical momentswhen the statesman's delay was the soldier's ruin. Russia, like Spain, had the strength of low organisms; her vigor was not centralized inone member, the destruction of which would be the destruction of thewhole; Moscow was not the Russian empire, as Berlin was the Prussiankingdom. 

Yet justice requires the consideration of certain undoubted facts. Making all due allowance, it is true that the elements were Napoleon'sworst foe when once his retreat was fairly under way, and it was notthe least of Napoleon's magnificent achievements that after thecrossing of the Beresina there was still the framework of an armywhich within a few months was again that marvelous instrument withwhich the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 were fought. This miracle was dueto the shortsightedness and timidity of the Russian generals. Tchitchagoff is inexcusable both for the indifference he displayedregarding the various points at which the Beresina might be crossed, and for the ignorance which made him the easy dupe of feints andmisleading reports. As to Wittgenstein, the caution which he exercisedbecause operating alone was near in its character to cowardice; hissnail-like movements prevented any efficient coöperation in thegeneral plan, and he failed in grasping a situation of affairs whichleft open but a single line of retreat for Napoleon. Neither of thesetwo had any adequate conception of the losses suffered by the French, and they permitted the last opportunity for annihilating the invadersto escape. As to Kutusoff, who was fully informed concerning the utterdisintegration of the "grand army, " his conduct in holding back themain Russian force at the crucial moment is utterly indefensible; hesaved thousands of his troops, perhaps, but he has passed into historyas the man who is indirectly responsible for the rivers of blood whichwere still to drench the continent of Europe. Both he and Wittgensteinunloaded all the blame on Admiral Tchitchagoff, and contemporaryopinion sustained them. "Had it not been for the admiral, " said thecommander-in-chief, replying to a toast proposed to the conqueror ofNapoleon, "the plain gentleman of Pskoff (namely, himself) could havesaid: Europe breathes free again. " This opinion is one which historymust reject as utterly false. 

When the soldiers heard that their Emperor had departed there was analmost universal outburst of frenzied wrath. "He flies, " theyshrieked, "as in Egypt! He abandons us after he has sacrificed us!" Ashas been remarked, this despair was natural, but the accusation wasunjust. Napoleon's abandonment of the grand army at Smorgoni was not adesertion like the secret flight from Egypt; for now he was chief andnot subordinate, his own judgment was the court of final appeal. Moreover, it was necessary for the very existence of the army that itsgeneral should once more be emperor, the head of the state. Travelingincognito, he passed through Vilna, Warsaw, and Dresden. Maret wasleft in charge of matters in Lithuania, de Pradt was carefullyinstructed how to treat the Poles, and on December fourteenth, atDresden, despatches were written to both Francis and Frederick Williamin order to assure their continued adhesion. The King of Saxony wasfirmly bound in the fetters of a personal fascination never entirelydispelled. Twice on the long, swift journey efforts were made bydisenchanted German officers to assassinate Napoleon, but he escapedby the secrecy of his flight. Such conspiracies were the presage ofwhat was soon to happen in Germany. They were trivial, however, whencompared with the state of public opinion in Paris as displayed by theMalet conspiracy. In spite of all that he had done to establish asettled society, France was not yet cured of its revolutionary habits;it was only too clear that the constitution, codes, and admirableadministrative system were operative, not from political habit, butby personal impulsion. This was the real sore; the conspiracy itselfwas a grotesque affair, the work of a brain-sick enthusiast, lightlyformed and easily crushed. 

Malet was a fiery nobleman who, having run the gamut between royalistand radical, had turned conspirator, having, in 1800, plotted to seizethe First Consul on his way to Marengo, and again, in 1807, havingbeen imprisoned in the penitentiary of La Force for attempting tooverthrow the Empire. Feigning madness, he succeeded in beingtransferred to an asylum, where he successfully reknit hisconspiracies, and finally escaped. On October twenty-third, 1812, hepresented himself to the commander of the Paris guard, announcingNapoleon's death on the seventh; by the use of a forged decree of thesenate purporting to establish a provisional republican government, and by the display of an amazing effrontery, he secured the adhesionof both men and officers. Marching at their heads, he liberated hisaccomplices, Lahorie and Guidal, from La Force, seized both Savary andPasquier, minister and prefect of police respectively, and woundedHulin, commandant of the city, in a similar attempt. But Doucet, Hulin's assistant, seized and overpowered the daring conspirator, Savary and Pasquier were at once released, and almost before the factswere known throughout the city the accomplices of the plot were allarrested. Malet and twelve of his associates were tried and executed. 

The Paris wits declared that the police had made a great "tour deforce, " and as far as the city was concerned the affair appeared tohave ended in a laugh. But Napoleon was dismayed, for he saw deeper. "It is a massacre, " he exclaimed, on hearing of the number shot. 

If the Russian campaign had been successful, it would have put thecapstone on imperial splendor. But already its failure was known amongthe French masses, and ghastly rumors were rife; the Emperor himselfwas far distant; the Empress was not beloved; the little heir wasscarcely a personage; the imperial administration was much criticized;the "system" was raising prices, depressing industry, and increasingthe privations of every household. Pius VII was now living in comfortat Fontainebleau, but he was a prisoner, and earnest Catholics weretroubled; perhaps Heaven was visiting France with retribution. Worstof all, ever since the nations at both extremities of Europe had risenin arms against Napoleon's tyranny, French youth had perished underthe imperial eagles in appalling numbers, and throughout the districtsof France which were at heart royalist there was a rising tide ofbitter vindictiveness. 

What had occurred in Spain did not allay the general uneasiness. Marmont, having outmanoeuvered Wellington until July twenty-second, had on that fatal day extended his left too far at Salamanca, and hadsuffered overwhelming defeat; southern Spain was lost to France. Suchet, having taken and held Tarragona, concentrated to the eastward, so that by his holding Aragon and Catalonia for Napoleon, Joseph couldset up a government temporarily at Valencia. Wellington, hampered bythe distracted condition of English politics, had felt bound, in spiteof victory, to withdraw to the Portugal frontier. 

CHAPTER XXXI

THE PRODIGAL'S RETURN[46]

 [Footnote 46: References: Foucart: Bautzen, une bataille de deux jours, 20-21 mai, 1813. Fiévée: Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte, Mémoires of Savary. Rousset: La grande armée de 1813. ]

 War Between Great Britain and the United States -- Napoleon Renews his Strength -- His Administrative Measures -- Social Forces and Political Results -- Ideas of Peace -- The Military Situation -- The Czar's Resolutions -- The Convention of Tauroggen -- Defection of Prussia -- Supreme Exertions of France in Napoleon's Cause -- Napoleon as a Wonder-worker. 

[Sidenote: 1813]

By stringently enforcing the Orders in Council Canning had seriouslyinjured Great Britain. It was in some sense the outcome of generalexasperation that early in May, 1812, Perceval, the Tory premier, wasassassinated in the lobby of the House of Commons by Bellingham, abankrupt of disordered mind. In the consequent reconstruction of thecabinet, Castlereagh had succeeded the Marquis of Wellesley. On Maythirteenth the disastrous orders were repealed, but the United Stateshad already declared war. By land the Americans failed dismally at theoutset; but at sea they were five times victorious in as manydifferent engagements, two English frigates striking their flags towhat was then considered as fairly equal force. This was a moralvictory of immense importance. It was disproportionate of course tothe actual English loss, which was easily reparable, but it was anappalling novelty to the British, who unwillingly realized that thesons had shown a seamanship of the highest quality and were notunworthy of their sires. The anxiety of Wellington and the maritimesuccesses of the Americans were not unwelcome lights in the otherwisedark picture of European affairs upon which Napoleon was forced tolook after his return from Moscow. 

The prodigal Emperor was undismayed; as he had recuperated hisphysical powers under incredible hardships, so he sharpened those ofhis mind amid the greatest difficulties. His first care was to makesure of France. To a deputation of the servile senate he roundlydenounced all faint-hearted civil officials as menacing the authorityof law. "Timid and cowardly soldiers, " he said, "may cost a nation itsindependence; faint-hearted officials, however, destroy the authorityof the laws. The finest death would be that of the soldier on thefield of honor, were not that of the official who dies to defend hismonarch, the throne, and the laws still more glorious. " To the councilof state he scorned all such as had continued to attribute to thepeople a sovereignty which it was incapable of exercising; who derivedauthority, not from the principles of justice nor from the nature ofthings nor from civil rights, but from the caprice of persons whounderstood neither legislation nor administration. The meaning of suchlanguage was clear, and the words of the master sufficed to bring theentire machine into perfect order. The great officers of state werenot slow in their response--from the police, from the university, fromthe courts came protestation after protestation of loyalty; thevocabulary of the French language was ransacked for terms to expressthe most fulsome adulation. Napoleon's firm front was in itself aninspiration, and such unanimity of devotion in high quarters confirmedthe people in their changed tendency. Soon not merely the Frenchnation but the whole Empire was once again under the magician'sspell. Deputations began to arrive, not only from all parts of Franceitself, but from the great cities of central and western Europe, fromRome, Florence, Turin, and Milan, from Hamburg, Mainz, and Amsterdam, and the expressions of devotion uttered by the deputies were limitedonly by the possibilities of expression. Scoffing wits recalled thefamous scene from Molière, in which the infatuated Orgon displaysindifference to his faithful wife and shows interest only in Tartufe. 

But in spite of this trenchant joke, Napoleonic government stood firmin France, and soon, this all-important point having been gained, there was not a little infectious enthusiasm, which grew in proportionas the Emperor deployed with every day and hour his marvelousfaculties of administration. Reduced as the appropriations were, thepublic works in Paris went on; the naval station of Brest wascompleted; the veterans received their Emperor's minutest care; thedestitute families of soldiers who had perished for France wererelieved; the imperial pair were everywhere conspicuous when a goodwork was to be done. Finally, when a plan of regency for Maria Louisawas divulged, the praiseworthy, genuine sentiment which underlay thesepublic activities was found to have reinforced their dramatic effectsufficiently to make the scheme acceptable. This plan, while giving tothe Empress all the splendors of imperial sovereignty throughout boththe Empire and the vassal states, was carefully constructed withwholesome checks. What she could not do was, however, less evident andless important than what she could do. In the hands of an able, devoted wife the regency might have been a tower of strength to anabsent husband battling for the existence of his Empire; worked by avain, unstable, and perhaps already disloyal nature, it had, withall its strength and display, but little value as a safeguard againstthe complots of the Talleyrand set, who desired the crash of theEmpire that, amid the ruins, they might further pillage on their ownaccount. 

That the schemers were not sooner successful than they were is due toa combination of small things--each perhaps trivial in itself, but thewhole most efficacious in perpetuating Napoleon's hold on the French. During his presence in Paris all the old inquisitiveness and boundlessconcern for detail seemed to return without diminution of force. Before his last departure he had won the popular heart by the modelfamily life of the Tuileries, which, though never ostentatiouslydisplayed, was yet seen and widely discussed. In the thick of Russianhorrors he had found time to correspond with his infant's governessconcerning the difficulties and dangers of teething; it was felt thatwhile the emperor and general was warring on the steppes of Muscovy, the husband and father was present in spirit on the banks of theSeine. On his return it was generally remarked that his reception intothe bosom of his family was tender and affectionate, and that parentalpride in a thriving child was paramount to the ruler's ambition for anestablished dynasty. The imperial pair were seen in company alike onthe thronged thoroughfares and on the outer boulevards of Paris. Theywere always greeted with enthusiasm, sometimes there was a display ofpassionate loyalty. When the Emperor visited his invalid veterans, hetasted their food and would have the Empress taste it too; shegraciously assented and there was universal delight. In short, thedomestic bliss of the Tuileries radiated happiness into the plainhomes of the nation, and made the common people not merely tolerantbut fond of such a paternal despotism. 

Napoleon returned from Russia sincerely protesting that what he mostdesired was peace. Yes, peace; but of what kind? The answer wasinclusive of the whole European question. It was easy to believe thatSpain was nearly exhausted, that if the process of devastation couldbe continued three years longer, her shattered society would finallyaccept the gentle Joseph as its regenerator. It was not unnatural forthe Emperor to regard his Confederation of the Rhine as safe andloyal; yet, just as in the Moscow campaign his superlative strategyfar outran the remainder of his system, so he had failed, embodimentof the new social order as he believed himself to be, in fullyestimating the creative force of the revolution in middle and southernGermany. Some inkling of the national movement he must have had, forSchwarzenberg's lukewarmness had awakened suspicions of Austria, andPrussia's new strength could not be entirely concealed. Soon afterreaching Paris he learned with dismay that his Prussian auxiliarieshad made terms with the Czar. This was done in defiance of their king;but it indicated the national temper, which, seeing the hand of God inthe disasters of the monster who after humiliating Prussia had daredto invade Russia, made it impossible for Prussian troops to serveagain in the ranks of a French army. The bolts of divine wrath hadfallen on the French and the French dependants, the Prussian and theAustrian contingents had escaped unscathed; both German armies mustsurely have been spared for a special purpose. 

In his interview at Warsaw with de Pradt, Napoleon had predicted thathe would speedily have another army of three hundred thousand menafoot. In this rough calculation he had included both Prussians andAustrians. With a spirit of bravado, he there referred to the narrowescapes of his life: defeated at Marengo until six, next morning hehad been master of Italy; at Essling, the rise of the Danube bysixteen feet in one night had alone prevented the annihilation ofAustria; having defeated the Russians in every battle, he had expectedpeace; was it possible, he asked, for him to have foreseen the Russiancharacter, or have foretold their heroic sacrifice of Moscow, forwhich doubtless he himself would catch the blame? So now, if hisallies stood firm, he would have another great army, and stillconquer. Not all this was bluster, for his figures were in the maincorrect. Moreover, Russia's strength was steadily diminishing, a factof which he was dimly aware. Of Kutusoff's two hundred thousand menonly forty thousand remained when he entered Vilna after theNapoleonic forces had left it; Wittgenstein's army had sufferedproportionately, and the troops from the Danube still more. Kutusoffwanted peace quite as much as did Napoleon, and the ineffectiveRussian pursuit was intrusted to Yermoloff, an untried officer; toWittgenstein; and to the incapable Tchitchagoff. The bickerings andinsubordination of the French marshals had now become notorious, butthey were fully offset by the discord and inefficiency of the Russiangenerals. 

Alexander, however, was not for peace. Out of the rude experiences hehad been undergoing there had been formed two fixed ideas: thatNapoleon could not, even if he would, surrender his preponderance inEurope, and that he himself might hope to appear as the liberator ofEuropean nationality. For a moment it appeared possible for the Czarto establish himself as king of Poland by the aid of the Jesuits andof Czartoryski's friends. But the Jesuit leader knew that Napoleon'sstrength was far from exhausted, and fled to Spain. Czartoryskientertained the idea that in case of Napoleon's overthrow he mightunite Poland under his own leadership and demand a truly liberalconstitution, such as could not be worked by a Russian autocrat withthree hundred thousand Russian soldiers at his back. Should thevirtual independence of Poland be wrung from Alexander, and not besecured by the French alliance, then the only available constitutionalruler would, he thought, be a member of his own princely family andnot one of the rival Poniatowskis. The autocrat did not clearlyunderstand the drift of his boyhood friend, but he saw enough torender the notion of reconstructing Poland in any form distasteful, and finally abandoned it. He then took the sensible resolution torecruit his strength, not by emptying his own lean purse, but bysecuring the coöperation with his forces of the strong armies built upby Prussia and Austria. It was therefore with a fairly definitepurpose that, on December eighteenth, he left St. Petersburg forVilna. He had in mind first to secure the fruits of victory byenergetic pursuit, then to sound the temper of Prussia and Austria. 

Murat had left the remnant of the grand army over the Niemen onDecember fourteenth; on the nineteenth he entered Königsberg. The daybefore Macdonald had learned by a despatch from Berthier of the finaldisasters to the Russian expedition, and on the twenty-eighth his vanreached Tilsit. The Prussian auxiliaries were in the rear under York, who had been for nearly two months in regular communication with theCzar, and knew the details of Napoleon's rout, as Macdonald did not. Wittgenstein had been despatched to cut off Macdonald's retreat. Butwith the dilatoriness which characterized all the Russian movements hecame too late, a single detachment under Diebitsch falling in with thePrussians on their own territory. The Prussian general was in aquandary; he was quite strong enough to have beaten Diebitsch, but hissoldiers were friendly to Russia and embittered against Napoleon. Hisown sympathies being identical with those of his men, and consideringthat he might in extremity plead his isolation, he therefore, onDecember thirtieth, concluded the convention of Tauroggen, in which heagreed to neutralize the district of Prussia which he occupied, and toawait orders from Berlin. Six days later an envoy arrived fromFrederick William, nominally to degrade York, in reality to conclude atreaty of alliance with Russia. 

By the assistance of Stein, who had been called from Vienna to counselthe Czar, such a document was finally composed and signed at Kalish onFebruary twenty-eighth, 1813. Prussia and Germany were thus born againunder the auspices of Russia. It was by the Czar's authorization thatStein began the reorganization of the provinces held by the Prussiantroops. These circumstances left Murat's positions at Dantzic and onthe Vistula untenable. Throughout the campaign he had been vastly moreconcerned for his personal prestige than for Napoleon's cause, and hewas only too ready to leave a sinking ship. On January fifteenth, ashas already been told, after surrendering his command to Eugène atPosen, he left for Naples. He was in haste, for on the twelfth theRussians had entered the grand duchy of Warsaw on their way to itscapital. Schwarzenberg, with his own and the remnants of two othercorps, --those of Reynier and Poniatowski, --could easily have checkedthe foe; but the convention of Tauroggen had quickened the Austrianmemory of Russia's friendly lukewarmness in 1809, Francis was in nohumor to bolster the falling cause of his terrible son-in-law, andafter some show of negotiation a temporary neutrality was arranged. When a few Cossacks appeared before Warsaw, on February sixth, theAustrian general evacuated the city as if yielding to superior force, and withdrew across the Vistula toward the frontier. 

These blows seemed to fall lightly on the armor of Napoleon'sintrepidity. So far from feeling any dismay, the Emperor did notcontemplate curtailing his ambition. Perhaps he was not entirelydeceived; quite possibly, by the slightest exhibition of diminishedactivity he might have weakened his influence in the great land whichformed the heart of his dominions. As one piece of bad news afteranother reached Paris, each in turn seemed only a goad to new exertionfor Emperor and people. France was by that time not merelyenthusiastic; she was fascinated and adoring. The ordinaryconscription of 1813 yielded a hundred and forty thousand recruits;four regiments were formed for artillery service from the idlesailors, three thousand men were taken from the gendarmerie, some evenfrom the national guard. On January thirteenth the senate decreed afurther draft of a hundred thousand from the lists of 1813, andordered that the conscription for 1814 should be forestalled in orderthat the hundred and fifty thousand boys thus collected might behardened by a year's camp life, and rendered available for immediateuse when their time arrived. There is truth in the charge thatNapoleon robbed the cradle and the grave. In order to officer thismighty host, which included about a third of the able-bodied men ofFrance between seventeen and forty-five, such commanders as could bespared were called home from Spain, and the rabble of non-commissionedand commissioned officers which began to straggle in from Russia wasdrawn back into the service. These survivors were treated likeconquerors, being praised and promoted until the nation becamebewildered, and thought of the Russian campaign as a series ofvictories. Foreign visitors wrote that the Emperor had but to stamphis foot and armed men sprang up on every side like Æetes' corps ofColchian warriors on the field of Mars. 

The comparison halted--Napoleon was Æetes and Jason combined; he yokedthe bulls that snorted fire and trod the fields with brazen hoofs, heheld the plow, he harrowed the field, he sowed the teeth and reapedthe harvest. We have abundant proof that literally every department ofadministration felt the impulse of his will, while to the organizationof the army, to the arrangement of uniforms, to the designing ofgun-carriages, to questions concerning straps, buckles, and commissarystores, to the temper of the common soldier, to the opinion of thenation, to each and all these matters he gave such attention as leftnothing for others to do. By this exhibition of giant strength therewas created a true national impulse. With this behind them, the senatein April called out another body of a hundred and eighty thousand men, partly from the national guard and partly from those not ordinarilytaken as recruits. By this time the farmsteads of France and westernGermany had yielded up all their available horses, a number sufficientto make a brave show of both cavalry and artillery. Allowing forsickness, desertion, and malingering, --and of all three there wasmuch, --France and her wizard Emperor had ready on May first a fairlyeffective force of nearly half a million armed men. This was exclusiveof the Spanish contingent, and there were a hundred thousand more ifthe levies of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Rhenish confederation bereckoned. At the time men said a miracle had been wrought: it was themiracle of an iron will, a majestic capacity, and a restlesspersistence such as have been combined in few if any other men besidesNapoleon Bonaparte. All that he could do was done, --equipment, drill, organization, --but even he could not supply the one thing lacking tomake soldiers of his boys--two years of age and experience. 

CHAPTER XXXII

THE REVOLT OF THE NATIONS[47]

 [Footnote 47: References: Haussonville: L'Église romaine et le premier empire. De Pradt: Les quatre concordats. De Fallois: L'Empereur Napoleon Ier et le Pape Pie VII. Séché: Les origines du concordat. Theiner: Histoire des deux concordats de la république française et de la république cisalpine conclus en 1801 et 1813, entre Napoléon Bonaparte et le Saint-Siège. ]

 Napoleon as a Financier -- Failure to Secure Aid from the Aristocracy -- The Fontainebleau Concordat -- Napoleon Defiant -- His Project for the Coming Campaign -- State of the Minor German Powers -- Metternich's Policy -- Its Effect in Prussia -- Prussia and her King -- The New Nation -- The Treaty of Kalish -- The Sixth Coalition. 

This magic was wrought, moreover, without any assistance from theprecious army lists which Napoleon delighted to call his library, forthose volumes had either been lost, destroyed, or left behind indistant headquarters: it was not merely by recalling his old powers, but by a supreme effort of memory so comprehensive that not evensuperlatives can describe it, that the great captain brought orderinto his military estate. No wonder that under such a strain the othertasks which demanded consideration were not so perfectly performed. The financial situation, the social uncertainty, the religiousproblem, none of these could be overlooked, and each in turn wasclamorous for attention. In the methods employed to meet theseemergencies the revolutionary training of the Emperor comes to light. To cover the enormous expense of his new army, contributions were"invited" from the rich corporations and financiers, and it wasannounced that any private person who was disposed to maintain a horseand rider for the imperial service would earn the Emperor's specialgratitude. To any increase of the direct taxes the despot would notlisten. "Credit, " he said, "is but a dispensation from paying cash. "In spite of Mollien's protest, however, a new issue of paper money wasordered, but for this there was collateral security. It was found incertain plots of land or domains belonging respectively to each ofmany thousand communes, by the rentals of which they severallydiminished their direct local taxes. Worth three hundred and seventymillion francs, these properties yielded only nine millions, althoughtheir prospective returns would be far larger. With government fiveper cents. Selling at seventy-five, an investment of a hundred andthirty-five millions would yield the interest actually received. Thisstep was taken, the lands were seized, and the government cleared twohundred and thirty-five millions; a hundred and forty millions of thefive per cents. Were set aside to cover the income charges, and usedsimultaneously as collateral for notes to pay current expenses untilthe lands could be sold. These last were kept at a fair price bytaking seventy-one millions of treasure from the Tuileries vaults fortheir purchase. Throughout the previous year the moribund legislaturehad been left inert, the budget being decreed without its consent, andthe Emperor told Metternich at Dresden that he contemplated itsabolition. In a crisis like this latest one, however, its aid was notto be despised; it was now galvanized, and made to stamp these puerilemeasures with the "popular" approval. 

There has always been "a mystery in the soul of state. " When menceased to invest government with a supernatural character, they didnot for all that dispel the mystery. Modern statesmen by the scorehave chosen to believe the occult doctrine that the state's promise topay is payment, and Napoleon was one of these. He was equally childishin regard to the knotty social question which confronted him, apparently believing that his personal volition, as the expression ofpolitical power, was or ought to be equivalent to popular spontaneity. The mixture of the old and new aristocracies had, in spite of allefforts, been mechanical rather than chemical, except so far as thatthe former was rather the preponderating influence giving color to thecompound. In order to make the blending real, the Emperor proposed a"spontaneous" rising of those high-born youth who had somehow escapedthe conscription. They were to be formed into four regiments, anddesignated "guards of honor. " The measure was found to be so utterlyunpopular that it was for the moment abandoned; the young men had nostomach even for fancy campaigning, and their relatives no mind todeliver them up as hostages. The guard, moreover, displayed a violentjealousy. 

There remained the ecclesiastical question--that, namely, of canonicalinstitution. Pius VII had lost much of his obstinacy since his removalto Fontainebleau, for the Austrian alliance was now the sheet-anchorof France; the French ecclesiastics had threatened to depose the Pope;but the Roman Catholics of Bavaria, Italy, and Austria were loyal, andthey were important factors in Napoleon's problem. After an exchangeof New Year's compliments, negotiations between the temporal and thespiritual powers were reopened. At first the Emperor was exacting, andthe Pope unyielding. Finally, on January eighteenth, Napoleon appearedin person at Fontainebleau, accompanied by Maria Louisa, andunannounced they entered the prisoner's apartment. The Pope startedup in pleased surprise. "My father, " cried his visitor. "My son, " camethe response. The Emperor caught the old man to his arms and kissedhim. Next morning began a series of personal conferences lasting fivedays. What happened or what was said was never divulged by eitherparticipant, but on January twenty-third the terms of a new concordatwere settled. Pius VII was to reside at Avignon with his cardinals inthe enjoyment of an ample revenue, and institute in due form thebishops selected by the council. There was to be amnesty for allprelates in disgrace, the sees of the Roman bishops were to bereëstablished, and the Pope was to have the nominations for tenbishoprics either in France or in Italy at his choice; his sequesteredRoman domains were likewise to be restored. The document was not to bepublished without the consent of the cardinals, and Napoleon wasactively to promote the innumerable interests of the Church. TheEmperor and the Pope had scarcely separated before the former began toprofess chagrin that he had gained so little, and the latter became avictim to real remorse. The cardinals were no sooner informed of thenew treaty than they displayed bitter resentment, and Napoleon, foreseeing trouble, violated his promise, publishing the text of theFontainebleau Concordat on February fourteenth as an imperial decree. On March twenty-fourth the Pope retracted even his qualified assent. The Emperor had gained a temporary advantage, and had asserted a soundposition in antagonism to the temporal sovereignty of the Pope; but hehad won no permanent support either from France or from the Roman see, with which he had dealt either too severely or too leniently. 

In the previous July a treaty between the Czar and the Spanish nation, as represented by the Cortes, had been negotiated through theintermediation of Great Britain. The recent conduct of York wassufficient indication of how the Prussian people felt. Napoleontherefore knew that he was face to face with a virtual coalitioncomprising Great Britain, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, Spain, and Prussia. Since his return from Russia he had displayed in private life theutmost good sense. But in public life he seemed incapable of acceptingthe situation in which he must have known himself to be, holding theloftiest and most pretentious language both to the French nation andto the world. In his address on the opening of the legislature hedwelt on Wellington's reverses in the peninsula, and offered peace toGreat Britain on the old terms of "uti possidetis" in Spain. In a lesspublic way he had it thoroughly understood throughout Europe that hewould take no steps toward peace with Russia; that he would not yieldan inch with reference to the grand duchy of Warsaw, or regarding theannexed lands of Italy, Holland, and the Hanseatic League. It was asif the whole world must see that ordinary human concessions could notbe expected from one who had been conquered only by act of Providence, and was, now as ever, invincible so far as men were concerned. He did, however, allow the hint to escape him that Prussia, which was stillbound by her treaty, might hope for some territorial increase, andthat Austria might expect Illyria. Such ideas, expressed ingrandiloquent phrase, could not be regarded as indicating a pacificfeeling. Every social class in France had a grievance; yet amid thedin of arms, and in the dazzling splendors of military preparation, even the retraction of the Concordat attracted little attention, and afew riots in Dutch cities, which were the only open manifestation ofdiscontent throughout the whole Empire, aroused no interest at all. The report of Napoleon's conciliatory attitude had gone abroad, there was money in the treasury, a vast armament was prepared, thepeace so ardently desired was evidently to be such as is made by thelion with his prey. On April fifteenth the still haughty Emperor ofthe West started for the seat of war. 

Around the skeleton abandoned by Murat at Posen Eugène built up out ofthe stragglers an army of fourteen thousand men, which he hoped wouldenable him to make a stand; but with York deserting at one end of theline, and Schwarzenberg seeking shelter in Cracow at the other, he wascompelled to withdraw to Berlin. Finding his reception too chilly forendurance, and being again menaced by the Russian advance, he fellback thence beyond the Elbe, and early in March had established hisheadquarters at Leipsic. By that time new forces had arrived fromFrance and the various garrison towns, so that on the curving linefrom Bremen by Magdeburg, Bernburg, Wittenberg, Meissen, and Dresden, there stood a force of about seventy-five thousand men in sixdivisions, under Vandamme, Lauriston, Victor, Grenier, Davout, andReynier. Napoleon charged Eugène to take a position before Magdeburg, whence he could protect Holland and keep Dresden. The Emperor'sgeneral plan was to assemble an Army of the Elbe on the line ofMagdeburg, Havelberg, Wittenberg, and an Army of the Main on the lineof Würzburg, Erfurt, Leipsic; then, despatching the former throughHavelberg toward Stettin, to hurry the latter on its heels, relieveDantzic, and seize the lower Vistula. 

This would have been a plan worthy of Napoleon's genius but for onefact. "In war, " he had written four years earlier, "the moral elementand public opinion are half the battle. " If he had understood thesefactors in 1813, and if a sound judgment had developed his ideas, theprojected campaign would have become famous for the boldness of itsconception and for its careful estimate of natural advantages. Buthuman nature as the conquering Napoleon had known it--at leastPrussian human nature--had changed, and of this change the defeatedNapoleon took no account. He was no longer fighting absolute monarchswith hireling armies, but uprisen nations which were themselves armiesinstinct with capacity and energy. On March twenty-first Eugène beganto carry out his stepfather's directions. But for the new feeling inPrussia they might have been fully executed. The vassal princes of theRhine Confederacy had received the imperial behests concerning newlevies. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, aware of the German nationalmovement and furthest removed from French influence, refused to obey. King Jerome of Westphalia pleaded poverty, and procrastinated until hedared do so no longer. Bavaria dreamed for an instant of asserting herneutrality, but the menace of French armaments wrung an unwillingcompliance from her. Würtemberg and Frankfurt were too near France tohesitate at all. Saxony was in a position far different from that ofany other state in the confederation, the predicament of FrederickAugustus, her king, being peculiar and exceptional. After hisinterview with Napoleon on the latter's flight through Dresden he felthow precarious was the future. Warsaw, the gem of his crown, was gone, and the Prussian people were in revolt against the Emperor of theFrench; he turned perforce toward Austria. But Austria also wasuneasy; the people were again hostile to Napoleon, and Francis, in anagony of uncertainty, could only temporize. With Saxony in thisattitude, Metternich gave full course to his ingenuity. 

For a year past that minister had been playing a double game. Seekingthrough his envoy at Stockholm to embroil Bernadotte with the Czar, hetold Hardenberg almost simultaneously that it was all up with Russia, that England was worn out, and that Austria was about to assume therôle of mediator. It was to his purpose that, on the other hand, hepromised to treat Russia as Russia had treated Austria in 1809. When, in his despair, Napoleon wrote to Francis from Dresden demanding anincrease of the Austrian contingent to check Kutusoff's advancethrough Poland, Metternich suffered his master to give no answer, butsent a special peace embassy to London, and despatched Bubna, afavorite with Napoleon, to seek the same end at Paris. The Emperor ofthe French laid down his old ultimatum, but offered a subsidy toAustria if she would double the number of her auxiliaries. ThereuponMetternich prepared to desert Napoleon, refused to furnish theauxiliaries, ordered Schwarzenberg "to save his troops for the nextcampaign, " and secretly advised Prussia to join her cause with that ofRussia. Careful not to formulate any definite terms for the peace heso clamorously invoked, he refused to intervene with Russia for therestoration of Prussian Poland, thus avoiding an open rupture withFrance, assuring that the seat of war would be in Saxony, and gainingtime to secure Austria's dignity as a mediator by the preparation ofarmaments strong enough to enforce her suggestions. 

This attitude compelled Prussia to make a decision. Frederick Williamcould no longer wage a sham warfare nor cover hostile intentions by apretense of disinterestedness. A decision must be taken, and theconduct of General York had indicated what the painful conclusion mustbe. The convention of Tauroggen had been duly disavowed; but an envoywas at Russian headquarters, and Alexander had entered Prussianterritory in his advance against Eugène; Napoleon was demanding anincreased auxiliary force. The temporizer could temporize no longer. He firmly believed that nothing short of a coalition between Austria, Russia, and Prussia could annihilate France, and Austria had virtuallyrefused to enter such a combination. Russia, moreover, was under noengagement in regard to Prussian Poland. What was to be done? TheKing's first instinct led him to seek refuge with Napoleon, and hedespatched an envoy, offering his continued alliance for either anincrease of territory, or for ninety million francs in payment of thecommissary supplies furnished during 1812. With every day, however, the Prussian people grew more Russian in feeling, and on Januarytwenty-second, 1813, before the return of the ambassador, the courtwas forced by popular opinion to withdraw from Berlin to Breslau, outof the sphere of French influence. Napoleon's answer soon arrived;there was no word of payment, and no binding engagement as toterritory--merely a repetition of vague promises. Frederick Williamwas disappointed, and reluctantly consented to the mobilization of hisnow regenerated and splendid army. He cherished the hope of keepingAlexander behind the Vistula, and forcing Napoleon to an armisticebefore he could cross the Elbe. 

But Hardenberg, Stein, and Scharnhorst were all convinced that therecould be no peace in Europe without restoring the ancient balance ofpower and annihilating Napoleon's preponderance, especially since, from every class in the nation, came addresses and petitionsexpressing detestation of French rule. Moreover, the long, difficultprocess of German unification was, in a sense, complete. "I have butone fatherland, and that is Germany, " wrote Stein, in December, 1812;"the dynasties are indifferent to me in this moment of mightydevelopment. " A born and consistent liberal, he abhorred alike thetyranny of Napoleon, of Francis, of Alexander, and of his own king. But the Czar loved him, since a united Germany would be indifferent tothose Polish provinces about which Prussia cared so much. Certain, therefore, of the Russian monarch, the great statesman determined tojoin Frederick William at Breslau, and urge on the work of mobilizingtroops. Already, by Alexander's authority, he had induced the estatesof eastern Prussia to sanction York's action, and to provide forarming the militia and reserves. Their ready compliance was the moresignificant because the German patriot had to some extent been out oftouch with the general movement, having consistently and fromprinciple refused to work through the popular League of Virtue, or anysecret association whatsoever, and having become in his long exile avirtual stranger among the Prussians. 

It is scarcely possible within moderate limits to give the faintestconception of Prussia at the opening of 1813. The popular hatred ofNapoleon was defiant; the death of Queen Louisa had made the Kingsullen. There was a splendid army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, and the statesmen had managed so well that there were arms for everyable-bodied male between seventeen and twenty-four. Of these scarcelyany shirked; most volunteered, numbers paid, many did both. The womensold their hair and their gold ornaments, wearing iron trinkets as astimulus to patriotism. In some cases the stout German maidens servedthe guns of their artillery, and one of them, disguised in a uniform, fought in the ranks until seriously wounded. The peasantry saw theirhomesteads destroyed with equanimity when told that it would weakenFrance. Körner sang and fought; Arndt sounded the trumpet of Germanunity; Lützow gathered his famous "black troop, " and the universitieswere so fervid that Professor Steffens of Breslau issued the firstcall for war against Napoleon; a summons which swept the students ofthat university, as well as those of Berlin, Königsberg, Halle, Jena, and Göttingen, into the ranks. Wherever the Russians appeared theywere hailed as deliverers, not merely in the Prussian army, but amongthe citizens. 

This was the impelling power which Frederick William could not resist. Step by step he went forward, postponing his plans for getting backhis Polish provinces and accepting instead contingent promises. By thetreaty of Kalish, already mentioned in another connection, Old Prussiawas definitely guaranteed to him, and he was to have a stripconnecting it with Silesia, but the territorial aggrandizement of thekingdom was to await the conquest of North Germany, all of whichexcept Hanover might under certain circumstances be incorporated underhis crown. Both parties agreed to use their best endeavors to winAustria for the coalition, Russia promising likewise to seek a subsidyfrom Great Britain for her impoverished ally. Another stipulation wasfulfilled when on March seventeenth Frederick William called out allthe successive services of the national army and, summoning his peopleto emancipate their country from a foreign yoke, declared war. Twodays later a ringing proclamation was issued which summoned to armsnot merely Prussians but even the Germans of the Rhine Confederation. Hesitating princes were threatened with loss of their domains, and--what was a very pointed hint--Stein was made head of anadministrative committee to erect new governments in all occupiedlands. Kutusoff's last public act was to issue a manifesto declaringthat those German princes who were untrue to the German cause wereripe for destruction by the power of public opinion and the might ofrighteous arms. 

Such a situation was terrible for the King of Saxony. Russia alreadyhad his grand duchy, Prussia coveted his kingdom; in fact, the Czarwas currently and correctly reported to have said that Saxony wasbetter suited than Poland to round out Frederick William's dominions. Dresden welcomed the Russian and Prussian sovereigns because thecitizens were smarting under the trials of military occupation. Butwhen the King turned to Austria, and marching with his cavalry toRatisbon virtually put his army at Metternich's disposal, the Saxonsin general supported him. On April twentieth was signed a secretagreement between Saxony and Austria whereby the former in return forthirty thousand troops secured the integrity of her dominions. Thiswas a triumph for the Austrian minister, but not the only one, becauseEuropean diplomacy in general soon joined hands with the nationaluprisings. Napoleon, determining too late on the dismemberment ofPrussia, made a last attempt to win back his old comrade in arms, andin February offered Bernadotte not merely Pomerania, but the landsbetween the Elbe and the Weser. But the crafty Gascon had studied thePrussian movement, and, putting aside the rather indefinite promisesof Napoleon, preferred to join the coalition for the safer, easierprize of Norway. Great Britain abandoned her scheme for a Hanoverexpanded to stretch from the Scheldt to the Elbe, and, subsidizingboth Sweden and Prussia, cemented the new coalition. This was a returnto Pitt's policy of restoring the old balance of power in the oldEurope. Bernadotte, promising thirty thousand men, transported twelvethousand across to Germany, and joined Bülow to cover Berlin. Thisforce soon became the Russian right. Kutusoff died in April, andBarclay was ultimately restored to the chief command, having Blücherand a second Prussian army as part of the Russian center. Metternichsaw that the coalition did not intend to conclude such a peace aswould leave Napoleon the preponderance in Europe; to secure any peaceat all he would be compelled, as Talleyrand said, to become king ofFrance. Accordingly a new turn was quickly given to Austriandiplomacy, and the French emperor's definite offer of Silesia for ahundred thousand men was rejected. With the thirty thousand whichSaxony had put at his disposal, and with such an army as Austriaherself could raise, the minister felt sure that at some criticalmoment she would be able, as a well-armed mediator, to command a peacein terms restoring to his country the prestige of immemorial empire. 

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY[48]

 [Footnote 48: References: Fain: Manuscrit de l'an 1813. Müffling: Aus meinem Leben. Bade: Napoleon im Jahre 1813. Schimpf: 1813; Napoleon in Sachsen. Foucart: Bautzen une bataille de deux jours. Metternich's Memoirs, Memoirs of Hardenberg. ]

 Napoleon Over-hasty -- Weakness of his Army -- The Low Condition of the Allies -- Napoleon's Plan Thwarted -- The First Meeting a Surprise -- The Battle of Lützen -- An Ordinary Victory -- The Mediation of Austria -- Napoleon's Effort to Approach Russia -- The Battle of Bautzen -- Death of Duroc -- Napoleon's Greatest Blunder. 

The grim determination of Napoleon to rule or ruin can be read in hisconduct at this time. This might almost be called foolhardy, inasmuchas when he arrived at Mainz, on April seventeenth, he knew little ornothing of the enemy's position, force, or plans. Desirous ofanticipating his foe in opening the campaign, he spent a week offruitless endeavor at that place, and then started for Erfurt toobtain a nearer view. The general aspect of his soldiers was notreassuring, for the young recruits were still raw and the immaturityof his preparations was evident in a lack of trained horses andriders. He had stolen three weeks from the enemy, but he had robbedhimself of all that his indefatigable energy might have accomplishedin that time. His recklessness in diplomacy, his refusal of allconcessions, and his exaggerated cleverness in anticipating hisopponents were to prove his undoing from the military point of view. The other elements of his failure were the political factor alreadymentioned. 

At the first appearance of Tettenborn's Cossacks, Hamburg rose anddrove out the French, remaining in possession of the allies until theend of May; but the trusty French garrisons in Dantzic, Stettin, Küstrin, Glogau, Modlin, and Zamosc, having been reinforced by Eugène, held their respective strongholds, and were left to do so. The absenceof these much-needed veterans was the first element of weakness inNapoleon's army. A second was the insufficiency of real cavalry, braveas had been the parade of horses in France. It was the great captain'sfirm conviction, repeatedly and emphatically expressed, that withoutactive cavalry, armed with long-range guns, offensive warfare was notpossible. This defect he had hoped to remedy in the last three weeksbefore opening the campaign. The third element in a fatal triad wasthe temper of his generals, which was restless and insubordinatealmost from the outset. They were his mightiest men: Berthier as chiefof staff; Mortier commanding the guard; Davout, Ney, Bertrand, Lauriston, Marmont, Reynier, Macdonald, and Oudinot, each in readinesswith a corps; Victor coming up with another; Augereau preparing tolead the Bavarians, Rapp at Dantzic, Poniatowski in Galicia--twelvecorps in all. 

The French soldiers formed a great army: two hundred and thirty-fivethousand men on paper, actually two hundred thousand, of whom ahundred and thirty-five thousand were mobile and in readiness when theEmperor took command. Eugène had forty-seven thousand more. Consequently when Napoleon, troubled by the exaggerated reports of hisenemy being stronger and more forward in preparation than he hadbelieved possible, set out for Saxony three weeks earlier than the dayoriginally fixed by him for the beginning of hostilities, he wasalready a victim of his own nervous apprehensions. In colder phlegmhe would have foreseen the truth. Russia had become apathetic as soonas the seat of war was transferred beyond her borders; strenuous aswere the efforts of Prussia, Scharnhorst's means were slender, and hecould not work miracles. All told, the allies had at the moment onlyseventy thousand men ready for the field. Wittgenstein was for themoment commander-in-chief. The monarchs, utterly uncongenial, werestruggling to act in harmony, but double weakness is not strength. They had only a single advantage--excellent horses in abundance forboth cavalry and artillery. "The worse the troops, the greater theneed of artillery"; "great battles are won with artillery"; these weretwo of Napoleon's aphorisms. The great strategist had lost hisreconnoitering arm in Russia and Poland, the artillery specialist musthave scorned the antiquated guns which now replaced the splendidfield-pieces that rested on the bottom of ponds and rivers whither hehad flung them on his disastrous retreat. With his high officerssullen, his ranks untried, his cavalry feeble, his artillery hastilycollected from arsenal stores, his staff incomplete, and his prestigewaning, the Emperor might well abdicate temporarily and exclaim, as hedid, "I shall conduct this war as General Bonaparte. " This resolutionwas sacredly kept. 

The premature opening of the campaign was certain to make Austriapivotal in European politics once again. Her preparations were notwell advanced, but her strength was growing daily, while that of herrivals was sure to diminish until in the end the coalition would bepowerless without her. This Napoleon saw, and he arranged his strategyto checkmate what he now felt to be a hostile neutrality. Believingthat the enemy would meet him half way, his first plan showed all themarks of greatness which characterized the similar one he had sosuccessfully executed at Jena. Its central idea was a mass formationwith Eugène to break through the enemy's line, then by a wheel towardthe south to annihilate their left, and finally to present himselfvictorious before Austria. If successful he might dictate his ownterms. But the enemy did not advance; it was perhaps well for theEmperor of the French that they did not. An eye-witness declared thaton what was supposed to be the very eve of battle there was littlereal discipline outside the sphere of the commander's personalobservation, that the officers had no confidence in their men and themen but little in their officers, that the superiors were absorbed insecuring some measure of physical comfort, that the inferiors werelistless and disobedient. The forward movement was successful, and theunion with Eugène was effected on April twenty-eighth. Two whole dayselapsed, however, before the enemy was found, and it was May firstwhen the French van drove in the Russian outposts from Lützen, everfamous as the scene of Wallenstein's overthrow by Gustavus Adolphus ahundred and eighty-one years earlier. The Russian center wasconcentrated between the Elster and the Pleisse; Napoleon's line wasmore extended, overlapping his enemy's, both right and left. In apreliminary skirmish at the pass of Rippach, Bessières, rashlyexposing himself at the head of the cavalry of the guard, was killed. His loss in such a crisis was like the ruin of a great cohort on theeve of a close battle. Marmont, forgiven for his failure in Spain, wasnear; but close to Napoleon as he was, even he could not replace thegallant, trusted cavalry leader who for nearly seventeen years hadscarcely quitted his Emperor's side. 

Owing probably to the inadequate scouting force of Napoleon, thebattle of Lützen was in the nature of a surprise. Wittgenstein haddetached five thousand men as if to cover Leipsic, toward which theFrench line was advancing; then, concentrating the mass of his centerand left, he crossed the Elster early on May second in order to attackNey's corps on the Emperor's right. About nine Lauriston's corps, withwhich Napoleon was, came upon the enemy, and was fiercely engaged--sohotly, indeed, that it seemed as if it must be the Russian right wingwhich barred the way. A messenger was immediately despatched to bringin Ney, who arrived about eleven. The marshal and his emperor at onceadvanced to reconnoiter, and were just remarking that there was only asmall force between them and the city, which through theirfield-glasses they could dimly discern in the background, its roofscrowded with curious onlookers, when behind, on the right, was heardthe sound of heavy cannonading. General Bonaparte was himself at once. No movement is considered more difficult than that by which an armymarching in columns wheels when attacked on its flank, so as in turnto outflank the assailants. In a flash, and apparently without athought, the Emperor issued minute orders for this intricatemanoeuver, and his generals accomplished it with a masterly dexterity. Napoleon then galloped forward toward Lützen to carry the guard behindthe center as a reserve, and Ney dashed into the thickest of the fightto take command of his boy conscripts, who were beginning to yield. 

The conflict raged all day, with varying results, along the line fromGreat and Little Görschen to Starsiedel, the latter hamlet being thescene of terrific fighting. At five the Prussians withdrew from Kaja, and began to yield along the whole line as far as the Görschens, whichthey had so far held. Napoleon had from the outset been reckless, cheering his boys by presence and example until they fought likeveterans. As the Prussians gave signs of weakness, he brought in hisartillery, poor as it was, with the old grand style, and ordered theyoung guard into the gap he felt sure of making. A Russian reservearrived, however, at the crucial instant, and stayed his onset untilseven. At that hour Macdonald bore down his opponents at Eisdorf, andattacked the Russo-Prussian line on the flank; the second column wasthen hurled against its center, and the battle was ended. The Russianreserve was strong enough to prevent the retreat from becoming a rout, but since Lauriston had occupied Leipsic as early as two in theafternoon there was but one course open for the allies: to withdrawbehind the Elbe. Napoleon gathered his army into three columns andfollowed; but slowly and circumspectly, because without cavalry hecould not harass them. When, on May eighth, the French reachedDresden, they found that their enemy had blown up the bridges, andwere entrenched in the Neustadt on the right, or north, shore. Thusthe victory of Lützen was, after all, indecisive. 

And yet the utmost skill and bravery had been shown by the combatantson both sides. The field was strewn with the corpses, not of such rudeand stalwart peasants as had hitherto filled the ranks of opposingarmies, but of gentle youth from French lyceums and Prussianuniversities. There were forty thousand in all, an equal number fromeach army, who remained dead or wounded on the hard-contested field. They had fallen to little purpose. The victor captured neitherprisoners nor guns in important numbers, and to him it was slightcompensation for the loss of Bessières that Scharnhorst was killed. The allies, though beaten, were undismayed; long experience hadsharpened their wits and toughened their purpose; there was alreadymuch strategical ability at their headquarters, and there was aboutto be more, since Moreau, summoned from America, was soon to takeservice with his splendid powers against his country. Great as thebattle was, it must therefore be reckoned as an ordinary victory; itserved to prolong existing conditions, but it did not decide an issue. It was, however, something that it gave the French a self-confidencebordering on enthusiasm, and it was more that after Napoleon hadcommenced to rebuild the Dresden bridges, Frederick Augustus, the Kingof Saxony, declared himself favorable to the French. AbandoningAustria, he summoned his forces from Torgau, and the allies retreatedeastward behind the Spree. The lower Elbe was also recovered. The Kingof Denmark had despatched an auxiliary force to Hamburg. Theircommander, believing Napoleon's fortunes submerged already, at firstassisted the Russians: but after Lützen he turned his arms toVandamme's assistance. The city was retaken, three thousand ofBernadotte's force marched out, and on May thirtieth Davout, withfifteen thousand of his own men and three thousand Danes, marched in. 

Napoleon's chief purpose, however, was unfulfilled, for Austria wasneither panic-stricken nor dismayed. On the contrary, she still stoodforth as a mediator, and now with armaments to enforce her demands. Immediately after Lützen, Stadion, sometime Austrian minister of war, was sent to the camp of the allies. He stated that the minimum termsof peace would be the dismemberment of Warsaw, the restoration ofPrussia, the surrender by France of Holland, Oldenburg, and theHanseatic lands, the abandonment of the protectorate over theConfederation of the Rhine by Napoleon, and the surrender to Austriaof Illyria and Dalmatia, with a rectification of her western frontier. Almost simultaneously Bubna appeared at Napoleon's headquarters withsuggestions for a general armistice, during which peace negotiationsshould be carried on as rapidly as possible by a congress of thepowers. Dwelling on the necessity of territorial concessions by Francefor the sake of a general pacification of the Continent, the envoydeclared that if this were accomplished, Great Britain, findingherself isolated, must yield, and grant to Napoleon a substantialindemnification from her vast colonial system. The propositions ofAustria were received by the allies with open eagerness, by theEmperor of the French with apparent hesitancy. Next to theestablishment of his continental empire, the humiliation of GreatBritain was Napoleon's highest ambition. Compromise with her meantdefeat. With a mixture of proud determination and anxiety, hetherefore replied to Francis that he desired a pacification asardently as any one; that he was ready for such a congress as wassuggested; that he would even go further, and admit to it delegatesfrom the insurgent Spaniards; that he would still further consent to atruce during its sessions: but that he would rather die at the head ofhis high-spirited Frenchmen than make himself ridiculous beforeEngland. Never was the writer's statecraft unfolded to greater daring. Long consultations were held with the King of Saxony, a man ofgentleness and refinement, who was completely won by Napoleon's almostfilial attentions, and Bubna was often kept at the council-table untilafter midnight. Eugène, however, was instantly despatched to raise anew army in Italy, with orders not to conceal his movements fromAustria. 

But Napoleon's chief efforts were put forth in the direction ofRussia. The adroit Caulaincourt was chosen as a fitting envoy, andinstructed not merely to reknit his personal relations with the Czar, but also to surrender every point which had been contested in theprevious negotiations. He was to offer, first, the surrender of theContinental System as far as Russia was concerned; and, second, such areconstruction of the map of eastern Europe as would put an end to thegrand duchy of Warsaw forever. This mushroom state, with the domain ofDantzic, was to be divided between the Duke of Oldenburg, Alexander'snear kinsman, and the King of Prussia; Prussia itself was to be aborder state under Russian influence, with a capital at eitherKönigsberg, Dantzic, or Warsaw. Brandenburg, with Berlin, would fallto Jerome, and Saxony would doubtless get the territory aroundKrossen. No surrender could have been more complete. "Your chiefconcern, " ran the final instruction, written on May seventeenth, "willbe to secure a conversation with the Emperor Alexander. My intentionis to build a golden bridge to save him from the intrigues ofMetternich. " Alas for such vain hopes! A new diplomatic star had risenat the Russian court in the person of the young Count Nesselrode, andthe personal interview so earnestly desired by Caulaincourt wassteadily refused; Napoleon's proposals, the envoy was informed, mustbe made through the Austrian cabinet, or not at all. 

During the parleyings of Austria, Napoleon won a second great victory, which was utterly ineffectual because he had no cavalry forcewherewith to pursue. For some days after the occupation of Dresden, for the same reason, he had been ignorant of his enemy's whereabouts. Learning at last that the allies had not been separated, as he hadhoped, but were standing at Bautzen in a strong defensive positionbehind the Spree, he left Dresden at noon on the eighteenth of May, determined to strike a decisive blow. His enemy, having beenreinforced by Barclay with sixteen thousand Russians and by Kleistwith eleven thousand Prussians, was about ninety thousand strong. Onthe nineteenth both Barclay and York advanced from Bautzen; the formerwas defeated by Bertrand in a sharp struggle, the latter by Lauristonin a protracted fight; and at nightfall the French were before theplace. In front was the unimportant stream, and beyond it were theallies in a double line, their front on the bank, their rear on theheights behind. About midday of the twentieth the French attacked. Macdonald stormed the bridge, Marmont and Bertrand crossed bypontoons; at three their footing was won, and the assault of the placebegan. For three hours the fighting was terrific, but at six a portionof the defenders withdrew behind the town to the second line; at eightthe rest did likewise. Next morning at five, Napoleon, after asleepless night, issued his orders; at eight the conflict opened allalong the line. Then first, the Mameluke body-servant having spread acouch of skins, the Emperor sought repose; he slept to the lullaby ofcannon and musketry for several hours, calmly assured of hiscombinations working perfectly. By one Ney had rolled up the Russianright under Barclay, and Napoleon, waking, sent Marmont and Bertrandaround the right of the enemy's center. By four the allied armies werein full retreat. Then would have been the moment for artillery tocrash and cavalry to pursue; but neither was efficient, and while theFrench army did what men could do, at best they could only follow atequal speed with the foe, and could not throw his ranks into disorder. "What! no results from such carnage?" said Napoleon. "Not a gun? Not aprisoner?"

There was worse to come. From time to time the flying columns wheeledand poured a heavy artillery fire into their pursuers. NearReichenbach, Bruyères was killed by a ball; then Kirchener byanother, which, ricochetting from a tree, mortally wounded Duroc, thecommander's faithful aid, his second self. Such a blow was stupefyingindeed, for it was the loss of his closest confidant, of one whothrough every vicissitude had been a near, true friend, almost theonly companion of a man reduced to solitude by his great elevation. Napoleon was stricken to the heart, and, halting, gave way untilnightfall to his despair. "Poor man!" said the troopers one toanother, "he has lost his children. " "Everything to-morrow, " was thesorrowing ruler's one reply to all suggestions. From time to time hebetook himself to the bedside of the dying man; at last Duroc himselfcould no longer endure his Emperor's prostration, and besought him torejoin the soldiers. The friends parted in a long embrace. Thereuponthe pursuit was continued, but without ardor and without success. 

The nature of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen was his undoing. Had itbeen a second Friedland, Caulaincourt no doubt would have metAlexander; but, as it was, the allies had saved their army, andAustria's accession to the coalition would still insure their success. Nesselrode was convinced that Metternich would assent, and, dark aswas the hour, persisted in refusing to communicate with France exceptby way of Austria. Wittgenstein lost his command, Barclay was fullyreinstated as commander-in-chief, and, to gain time for Austria to tryher vaunted mediation, a short armistice was proposed to Napoleon. Hadthe latter known the weakness, the discord, the exhaustion of his foe, wretched as was the state of his own army and depressed as were hisspirits, he might have refused, and even the monumental error of 1812might now have been made good. As it was, the year 1813 is the date ofhis one irreparable blunder, the initiation of his final disaster. Other mistakes he had made, but they were all petty compared with thegreat one to which he was now tempted. But his faithful officers werefalling like standing grain under a hail-storm; his boy soldiers, though fighting like veterans, inspired little confidence, for therewas the same uneasiness among the humble privates as among the greatofficers; he had neither cavalry nor artillery, and his availableforce was reduced to a hundred and twenty thousand, men and boys;Barclay might, as for a moment he contemplated doing, draw off intothe Russian steppes; the traitors in Paris were already stirring; inshort, the Emperor felt that he must at least consider. This was themonumental blunder of his life because it put him at Austria's mercywithout her being forced to reveal her policy. 

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE NATIONS IN GRAND ARRAY[49]

 [Footnote 49: References: Von Odeleben, Napoleons Feldzug in Sachsen im Jahre 1813. Yorck, Napoleon als Feldherr. Weil, Campagne de 1813. ]

 Condition of Affairs after Bautzen -- The Armistice of Poischwitz -- Austria's New Terms -- Napoleon's Reliance on his Dynastic Influence -- Intervention of British Agents -- Napoleon's Interview with Metternich -- The Emperor's Wrath -- Metternich's Determination -- Wellington's Victories -- Napoleon at Mainz -- The Coalition Completed -- Diplomatic Fencing -- Renewal of Hostilities -- The Responsibility. 

Napoleon determined, however, to deliberate on the strongest possiblevantage-ground, and for this reason continued his pursuit as far asBreslau, which was occupied by the end of the month. SimultaneouslyBerlin was threatened by Oudinot, Victor had relieved Glogau, andVandamme was marching to Davout's assistance, so that Hamburg wassafely in hand. The allied forces stood behind Schweidnitz, and by thesame marvelous strategy as of old the various corps of the French armywere disposed, under Ney, Lauriston, Reynier, Macdonald, and Bertrand, so as virtually to engirdle the enemy. Napoleon was at Neumarkt withthe guard; a single bold dash southward toward the Eulen Mountainswith his concentering force, and he would have crushed his opponents. But another victory like Lützen and Bautzen would reduce his armystill further, and then in his weakness he would be confronted by thehundred thousand Austrians which, according to the best advices, hisfather-in-law had assembled in Bohemia. In that juncture Francis mightrisk a battle, and if successful he could dictate not merely anarmistice, but the terms of peace--a contingency more terrible thanany other. Time, moreover, seemed quite as valuable to the Emperor ofthe French as to his foe: while they were calling in reserves andstrengthening their ranks, his hundred and eighty thousand conscriptsof 1814 could be marched to the Elbe, and Eugène could complete hiswork in Italy. Ignorant of the panic at his enemy's headquarters, theuneasy conqueror decided therefore that his best course was, byexhibiting a desire for peace and assenting to an armistice, to avoidthe general reprobation of Europe. Accordingly, he took anotherdisastrous step, and accepted the proposal of the allies for aconference. 

How earnestly Napoleon desired peace appears from his spontaneousconcessions. He would agree to the evacuation of Breslau for the sakeof harmony, and would consent to such a truce as the majesty of aruler and the rights of a successful general might alike exact; but hewould not be treated like a besieged commander. Hamburg should remainas it was at the conclusion of negotiations, and the duration of thearmistice must be longer than the term proposed--six weeks at theleast. On these two points he took his stand. The fatal armistice ofPoischwitz was signed at that village on June fourth by threecommissioners, Shuvaloff for Russia, Kleist for Prussia, andCaulaincourt for France. It was a compromise providing for a neutralzone, stretching from the mouth of the Elbe southeastward to Bohemia, which was to separate the combatants until July twentieth. Hostilitiesmight not be renewed until August first. Breslau was to be evacuated;Hamburg was to remain as the truce found it. These terms were reachedonly after much bluster, the allies, weak and disorganized as theywere, demanding at first the evacuation of both Breslau and Hamburg, with a cessation of arms for a month. This stand they took in reliancepartly on England, partly on Austria. The compromise, as mutuallyaccepted, was reached in spite of British influence when Francis, apparently nervous and anxious, arrived at Gitschin, near the Bohemianfrontier, and opened a conference with Nesselrode. 

At Vienna men had said, when the news of Bautzen came, that theconqueror was perhaps an angel, perhaps a devil--certainly not a man. The cabinet had seen with alarm his attempt to negotiate directly withthe Czar. Success in winning Russia would put Austria again atNapoleon's mercy; Alexander must be kept in warlike humor at allhazards. Nesselrode demanded nothing less than Austria's adherence tothe coalition; Francis was still unready to fight; and Metternich, displaying all his adroitness, finally wrung from Nesselrode a basisfor mediation comprising six articles: the extinction of Warsaw, theenlargement of Prussia by her Polish provinces and Dantzic, therestoration of Illyria to Austria, the independence of the Hanseatictowns, the dissolution of the Rhenish Confederacy, and the restorationof Prussia's western boundaries to the lines of 1806. This was a"minimum" considerably smaller than that proposed before Bautzen; butthe allies could well accept it if Austria would promise never to takesides with France, as Metternich is said to have verbally assured theCzar in a secret meeting would be the case. On June twenty-seventh itwas formally arranged that a congress to pacify the Continent on thisbasis should be held preliminary to a general peace including England;and the treaty binding Russia, Prussia, and Austria to alliance incase of Napoleon's refusal was signed that day in secret atReichenbach. Should Napoleon reject Austria's articles of mediation, she was, on July twentieth, to join the coalition, and fight not onlyuntil he was driven behind the Rhine, but until the fortresses on theOder and the Vistula were evacuated, Italy liberated, Spain restoredto the Bourbons, and Austria reënlarged to her boundaries of 1805. 

"If the allies do not in good faith desire peace, " said Napoleon onJune fifth, as he left his headquarters for Dresden, "this armisticemay prove fatal to us. " Late in life he believed that if he had in hisgreat crisis marched right on, Austria would not have declared againsthim. Shrewd as he was, he was a tyro in dynastic politics. Austria hasbeen made, aggrandized, and saved by marriages; but no conception ofthe duty imposed on families by that relation as understood in privatelife has ever controlled her politics. Francis was never unwilling touse his daughter for public ends, and seems to have delighted in theconstruction of family feeling formed in his son-in-law's mind byhomely sentiment. It is preposterous to suppose that Napoleon reallyentertained such a view of his marriage as that of the Parisianbourgeois; but viewing himself as an established dynastic ruler, hecould well imagine that when Austria had her choice between two purelydynastic alliances, she would, for the sake of Maria Louisa, havechosen that with France. This rather simple conception he seems tohave entertained for a time, because when Maret and Metternich met, the former urged the matrimonial bond as a consideration. "Themarriage, " rejoined the latter, with a cough--"yes, the marriage; itwas a match founded on political considerations, but--" and theconclusion of the sentence was a significant wag of the head. 

Napoleon's first instinct of treachery was that of the general, andit was sound. His suspicions were fully aroused as soon as he reachedDresden; for Bubna began at once to stickle for antiquated formalitiesin negotiation, and stung Napoleon to exasperation by his evidentdetermination to procrastinate. Accordingly the Emperor summonedMetternich to a personal meeting. The minister could not well explain. Since Castlereagh's return to power in January, 1812, Great Britainhad kept at Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna able diplomats ready, with purse in hand, to pay almost any sum for a strong coalition. Ithad been the appearance of Sir Charles Stewart from Berlin, and ofLord Cathcart from St. Petersburg, at the allied headquarters whichaccounted for the arrogant firmness of Shuvaloff and Kleist, anddetermined the character of the armistice. On June fourteenth andfifteenth those envoys further concluded treaties with Prussia andRussia respectively which explain the performances of Bubna atDresden, and of the congress which later met at Prague. Prussiapromised, in return for a subsidy of two thirds of a million poundssterling, to cede a certain portion of lower Saxony, with thebishopric of Hildesheim, to the electorate of Hanover, and agreed tokeep on foot eighty thousand men; Russia was to maintain a hundred andsixty thousand men, in return for one and a third million pounds, andfor the care of English vessels in her harbors she was to receive afurther sum of half a million. Great Britain and Russia were inconjunction to emit an issue of paper money to the amount of fivemillions sterling, and this loan was to be guaranteed by England, Prussia, and Russia conjointly. In conclusion it was solemnlystipulated that neither Russia nor Great Britain should negotiateseparately with France. 

In view of the successive stages of Napoleon's isolation, --namely, thearmistice, these two subsidy treaties, and the secret treaty of Junetwenty-seventh signed at Reichenbach, --it seems futile to discuss thequestion whether or not Napoleon really wished peace in his famousinterview with Metternich on June twenty-seventh--an interview whichlasted from a quarter before twelve at midday until nearly nine atnight, and has improperly been considered as the turning-point inNapoleon's career. Up to that moment Metternich's intervention hadamounted to nothing short of selfish double-dealing. Of this Napoleonhad written evidence. No wonder the shifty minister described hisinterview as "a most curious mixture of most heterogeneous subjects, of intermitting friendliness with the most passionate outbreaks, " andstrove in his account to deepen the shadows of his picture by discreetsilence as to certain points--a trick he may have learned fromWhitworth. The unfriendly narrator declares that Napoleon, when toldthat his soldiers were only boys, flung his hat into a corner, andhissed, "You do not know what passes in a soldier's mind; I grew up inthe field, and a man like me troubles himself little about a millionmen. " The Austrian statesman further reported the French emperor tohave characterized his second marriage as a piece of stupidity, and tohave charged his princely interlocutor with venality!

Probably all this is true: the professional soldier's point of view isterrible to the laity. Kossuth declared to a trustworthy witness that hehad seen the letters of Maria Louisa which betrayed her husband to herfather; and no one has ever denied that Napoleon was a fair judge ofcharacter, and called a spade a spade when he was angry. And angry hewas. Here was the man who had plumed himself on the Bonaparte-Hapsburgalliance, who had hitherto professed the most ardent personal esteem forNapoleon himself, and who had so far found Austria's highest welfare insupporting the Napoleonic system. And what was his conduct? A completeand sudden reversal of his previous behavior, personal insolence, andpublic scorn. Then and there he demanded the suspension, at leasttemporarily, of the treaty of alliance between Austria and France--apaper solemnly negotiated by himself but little more than one short yearearlier; then, too, he demanded a further prolongation of the armisticewhile the peace congress held its sessions, and, coldly throwing everyother consideration to the winds, gave his victim to understand thatAustria was no longer a mediator, but an armed arbiter, determined toregain her glory by the line of least resistance--that is, by alliancewith Russia, in order to secure a continental peace, to which GreatBritain should not be a party. 

Is it wonderful that under such provocation Napoleon's hot Corsicanblood boiled over, or that his unruly tongue uttered startlinglanguage? The time had come when he must recognize masters and laws, and it was not easy. At thirty, as he liked to boast, he had gainedvictories, appeased a popular storm, fused parties, and rallied anation. Further, for years he had made sport of European dynasties, and in particular had found that of Austria both double-faced andtime-serving. Having taken a leaf from her book, he had become herdupe, and it was hard to bear the consequences. The stormy side of thefamous interview is therefore unimportant historically; its onlysignificance is that it marks the last stage in the evolution ofAustrian diplomacy. Being now strong enough to reassert equality withFrance in the councils of Europe, the Hapsburg empire was about toact. Metternich believed that Alexander's aid would be more valuablethan Napoleon's, and in a letter to his master, written two daysafter the famous interview, he explained that through a continentalpeace lay the line of least resistance. The arrangement he suggestedto Napoleon would leave England and France to renew the struggle andfight until exhausted, while Austria, Russia, and Prussia wererecuperating. Napoleon's one weapon against England was hisContinental System; on the morrow of a victorious campaign he couldnot so easily throw it down. If there was to be a continental peace, and not a general one, it must be made after a final decisive victory;and to assemble his troops for a grand battle with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, he needed time. The Poischwitz armistice was his firstfatal blunder; before the close of the interview he consented to itsprolongation until August tenth, ostensibly that the Congress ofPrague might arrange terms for a continental peace; and this was hisundoing. 

The Congress of Prague was a puppet-show, and has no place in historyexcept as it displayed the character of Metternich, deceiving himselfto its close with the belief that he was what he professed to be--anarmed mediator turning the course of European politics back intodynastic channels. In reality it was as Napoleon said--he believedhimself to be directing everybody, when everything was directing him. Behind the puppets were Alexander's fatalism, Prussia's regeneratednationality, the half-awakened sensibility of Austria, and lastly, British gold with British victories. Wellington had finally focusedthe national power of Spain, and was actually menacing the soil ofFrance. His famous "march to Vitoria, " as it has been called becauseof the decisive battle fought at that place on June twenty-first, 1813, forced Napoleon finally to abandon Spain. Already the Emperorhad withdrawn his choicest veterans thence, and he was well aware howfutile any further struggles for Joseph's throne must be. His conduct, therefore, was perfectly consistent; with a bold front he laid downthe ultimatum of _uti possidetis_ for the congress, and left forMainz, where he remained from July twenty-fifth to August first, arranging his military plans for the defense of the Pyrenees, anddespatching Soult, who went against his will, for the campaign whichsealed the marshal's reputation as a great soldier. Doubtless, too, Napoleon felt that distance from the absurd congress would absolve himfrom the guilt of its empty pretense. 

There, too, he met his empress; perhaps he fondly dreamed that shemight intercede with her sire; in the long interviews they held he wasprobably drilling her in the functions of a regent chosen to sustainin Paris the tottering cause of her consort and her child. Fouché, too, was recalled from his suspicious retirement to untangle thethread of Austrian duplicity. But the long hours of consultation, arrangement, and execution were mainly concerned, we may suppose, withthe hurrying in of new levies, the raising of cavalry, the creation ofartillery, and the general preparation for the life-and-death strugglewhich was soon to take place. The Danish alliance was strengthened, and Murat by strenuous efforts was kept within the shadowy lines ofthe vanishing Napoleonic system. Beugnot, then head of the Frenchregency of Berg, was one day called at a moment's notice to act asamanuensis, and in a flurry twice took his Emperor's chair. "So youare determined to sit in my seat, " was Napoleon's simple remark; "youhave chosen a bad time for it. " The mayor of Mainz was St. André, astanch conventional of the old school; another day he and Beugnot, with the Prince of Nassau, accompanied the visitor on a riverexcursion, and the Emperor, scanning with intense interest the castleof Biberich, leaned far over the boat. "What a curious attitude, "whispered the veteran revolutionary to the terrified Beugnot; "thefate of the world depends on a kick or two. "

The fate of the world was not in jeopardy, and the seat of Napoleon asEmperor of the West was not to be occupied by another; but the affairsof the Continent were to be readjusted, the beneficent work of theRevolution was to be transferred to other hands, and the notion ofWestern empire was to vanish like other baseless fabrics. Thediplomacy of Lord Aberdeen, Castlereagh's envoy at Vienna, hadsucceeded before Napoleon returned to Dresden, and the treaty ofeventual triple alliance, signed at Reichenbach on Junetwenty-seventh, was made good on August first by Francis, who agreed, in return for an enormous subsidy from Great Britain, to join Russiaand Prussia with two hundred thousand men. The rosters of Austria'sarmy had been surreptitiously obtained by French agents in Prague. Napoleon was aghast as he read the proof of her gigantic efforts. Atonce he redoubled his own, and began to unfold a marvelous diplomaticshrewdness. With Poland's three despoilers thus united in England'spay, his isolation would be complete; a few days only remained untilthe expiration of the armistice; he had but one arrow left in hisquiver, and he determined to speed it: to bribe Austria intoneutrality by accepting her conditions and restoring the nationalequilibrium of Europe. 

The proposition was made, and staggered Francis; for two days hedallied, and then made a counter-proposition with a new clause, whichsecured, not the emancipation of states, but dynastic independence forthe sovereigns of the Rhine Confederation. This drew the veil fromMetternich's policy. Afraid of a German nationality in which Prussiawould inevitably secure the hegemony, he was determined to perpetuatethe rivalries of petty potentates, and regain Austria's ascendancy inGermany as well as in Italy. This, too, would strip Napoleon of hisGerman troops, and confine France to the west shore of the Rhine, eventhough it left Westphalia and Berg under French rulers. Such acontingency was abhorrent to one still pretending to Western empire, andNapoleon in turn procrastinated until the evening of the ninth, when, asa final compromise, he offered the dismemberment of Warsaw, the freedomof Dantzic and Illyria, including Fiume, but retaining Triest. But bythis time dynastic jealousy had done its work at Prague, and when theseterms were communicated to the plenipotentiaries unofficially, Cathcart's bellicose humor, which was heightened by the news fromWellington, served to complement Alexander's jealousy of Austria'srising power. The Prussian nationalists, too, saw their emancipationindefinitely postponed; and since the communication of Napoleon'sultimatum was unofficial, and an official notification had not arrivedat midnight on the tenth, the commissioners of Russia and Prussia roseat the stroke of the clock, and informed Metternich that, their powershaving expired, he was bound by the terms of Reichenbach. 

Metternich kept up his mask, and continued to discuss withCaulaincourt the items of Napoleon's proposition, but the otherdiplomats gave vent to their delight. Humboldt lingered untilAustria's formal declaration of war was under way to Dresden;simultaneously beacons, prearranged for the purpose on Bohemian hills, flashed the welcome news to the expectant armies of Russia andPrussia. Napoleon still stood undismayed by forms, for under the termsof the armistice a week's notice must be given before the renewal ofhostilities. On the thirteenth he offered Austria everything exceptHamburg and Triest; on the fifteenth he offered even these greatports. But technical right was on the side of war, and his proposalswere refused. 

Where the blame or merit for the renewal of hostilities rests willever remain a matter of opinion. Amid the tangles of negotiation, itmust be remembered that on March twenty-fourth, 1812, Russia andSweden began the coalition; that Russia and Prussia were forced intounion on February twenty-eighth, 1813, by the element of interestcommon to Alexander's dynasty and the Prussian people; that GreatBritain entered on the scene in her commercial agreement with Swedenon March third, 1813; and that English diplomacy combined with theinterests of Austrian diplomacy to complete and cement the coalitionwith the necessary subsidies. If we view the negotiations ofPoischwitz and Prague in connection with Napoleon's whole career, theyappear to have run in a channel prepared by his boundless ambition; ifwe isolate them and scrutinize their course, we must think him themoral victor. Whatever he may have been before, he was now eager forpeace, and sincere in his professions. Believing himself to have actedgenerously when Austria was under his feet, he was outraged when hesaw that he had been duped by her subsequent course. The concessionsto which he was forced appear to have been made slowly, because whathe desired was not a continental peace in the interests of theHapsburgs, but a general peace in the interest of all Europe asrepresented by the Empire and the dynasty which he had founded. Atthis distance of time, and in the light of intervening history, somecredit should be given to his insight, which convinced him thatstrengthened nationality, as well as renewed dynastic influence, might retard the liberalizing influences of the Revolution, which hefalsely believed himself still to represent. For the duration of theHoly Alliance this was to a certain extent true. It will be noticedthat throughout the closing negotiations no mention was made of the"Continental System. " That malign concept of the revolutionary epochperished in Napoleon's decline, and history knows its name no more. 

END OF VOLUME III