[Illustration]

THESE VOLUMES ofThe Sponsors'EditionOF THE AUTHORIZED LIFE OFGeorge Washingtonby John MarshallISSUED IN ITS ORIGINALFORMAT, BUT WITH THETEXT OF THE REVISEDEDITION, HAVE BEENSPECIALLY PREPAREDFORHenry H. Kimball

[Illustration: George Washington

_From the portrait by Gilbert Stuart_

_This canvas, valued at $60, 000, hangs in the Masonic Lodge rooms atFredericksburg, Virginia. It is one of the several portraits ofWashington which the artist began executing in 1795 and which are themost famous of both artist and sitter. Of our First President, thiscelebrated painter has also given us his interesting pen-picture ofhis subject: "All of his features were indications of the strongestand most ungovernable passions, and had he been born in the forest, hewould have been the fiercest man among the savage tribes. "_]

THE

LIFE

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF

OF THE

AMERICAN FORCES, DURING THE WAR WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF HIS COUNTRY, AND

FIRST PRESIDENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES. 

COMPILED UNDER THE INSPECTION OF

THE HONOURABLE BUSHROD WASHINGTON, FROM

_ORIGINAL PAPERS_

BEQUEATHED TO HIM BY HIS DECEASED RELATIVE, AND NOW IN POSSESSION OFTHE AUTHOR. 

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN INTRODUCTION, CONTAINING A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE COLONIES PLANTED BY THE ENGLISHON THE

CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA, FROM THEIR SETTLEMENT TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THAT WAR WHICH TERMINATEDIN THEIR

INDEPENDENCE. 

BY JOHN MARSHALL. 

VOL. III. 

THE CITIZENS' GUILDOF WASHINGTON'S BOYHOOD HOMEFREDERICKSBURG, VA. 

1926

Printed in the U. S. A. 

[Transcriber's Note: In the original book, some proper names arespelled inconsistently. The inconsistencies have been preserved inthis e-text. For the reader's information, the first of each of thefollowing pairs of names is the correct spelling: Wemys/Wemyss, Tarleton/Tarlton; Dundass/Dundas; M'Lane/M'Clane; Viominel/Viominil. ]

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. 

Incursion into Jersey.... General Lacy surprised.... Attempt onLafayette at Barren hill.... General Howe resigns the command of theBritish army.... Is succeeded by Sir H. Clinton.... He evacuatesPhiladelphia, and marches through the Jerseys.... A council of warwhich decides against attacking the British on their march.... Battleof Monmouth.... General Lee arrested.... Sentenced to be suspended forone year.... Thanks of Congress to General Washington and his army. 

CHAPTER II. 

Count D'Estaing arrives with a French fleet.... Meditates an attack onthe British fleet in New York harbour.... Relinquishes it.... Sails toRhode Island.... Lord Howe appears off Rhode Island.... Both fleetsdispersed by a storm.... General Sullivan lays siege to Newport.... D'Estaing returns.... Sails for Boston.... Sullivan expresses hisdissatisfaction in general orders.... Raises the siege of Newport.... Action on Rhode Island.... The Americans retreat to the Continent.... Count D'Estaing expresses his dissatisfaction with Sullivan in aletter to congress.... General Washington labours successfully to healthese discontents.... Lord Howe resigns the command of the Britishfleet.... Colonel Baylor's regiment surprised.... Captain Donopdefeated by Colonel Butler.... Expedition of the British against EggHarbour.... Pulaski surprised. 

CHAPTER III. 

Arrival of the British commissioners.... Terms of conciliationproposed.... Answer of congress to their propositions.... Attempts ofMr. Johnson to bribe some members of congress.... His private lettersordered to be published.... Manifesto of the commissioners, andcounter-manifesto of congress.... Arrival of Monsieur Girard, ministerplenipotentiary of France.... Hostilities of the Indians.... Irruptioninto the Wyoming settlement.... Battle of Wyoming.... Colonel Dennisoncapitulates for the inhabitants.... Distress of the settlement.... Colonel Clarke surprises St. Vincent.... Congress determines to invadeCanada.... General Washington opposes the measure.... Induces congressto abandon it. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Divisions in Congress.... Letters of General Washington on the stateof public affairs.... Invasion of Georgia.... General Howe defeated byColonel Campbell.... Savannah taken.... Sunbury surrenders.... Georgiareduced.... General Lincoln takes command of the Southern army.... Major Gardener defeated by General Moultrie.... Insurrection of theTories in South Carolina.... They are defeated by Colonel Pickens.... Ash surprised and defeated.... Moultrie retreats.... Prevost marchesto Charleston.... Lincoln attacks the British at Stono Ferryunsuccessfully.... Invasion of Virginia. 

CHAPTER V. 

Discontents in a part of the American army.... Letter from GeneralWashington on the subject.... Colonel Van Schaick destroys an Indiansettlement.... Expedition against the Indians meditated.... FortFayette surrendered to the British.... Invasion of Connecticut.... General Wayne storms Stony Point.... Expedition against Penobscot.... Powles Hook surprised by Major Lee.... Arrival of AdmiralArbuthnot.... Of the Count D'Estaing.... Siege of Savannah.... Unsuccessful attempt to storm that place.... Siege raised.... Victoryof General Sullivan at Newtown.... Spain offers her mediation to thebelligerents.... Declares war against England.... Letter from GeneralWashington to congress respecting the annual formation of the army.... The army goes into winter quarters. 

CHAPTER VI. 

South Carolina invaded.... The British fleet passes the bar, and getspossession of the harbour of Charleston.... Opinion of GeneralWashington on the propriety of defending that place.... Sir HenryClinton invests the town.... Tarleton surprises an American corps atMonk's Corner.... Fort Moultrie surrendered.... Tarleton defeatsColonel White.... General Lincoln capitulates.... Buford defeated.... Arrangements for the government of South Carolina and Georgia.... SirHenry Clinton embarks for New York.... General Gates takes command ofthe Southern army.... Is defeated near Camden.... Death of De Kalb.... Success of General Sumpter.... He is defeated. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Distress in the American camp.... Expedition against Staten Island.... Requisitions on the states.... New scheme of finance.... Committee ofcongress deputed to camp.... Resolution to make up depreciation ofpay.... Mutiny in the line of Connecticut.... General Knyphausenenters Jersey.... Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York.... Skirmishat Springfield.... Exertions to strengthen the army.... Bankestablished in Philadelphia.... Contributions of the ladies.... Farther proceedings of the states.... Arrival of a French armament inRhode Island.... Changes in the quartermaster's department.... Enterprise against New York abandoned.... Naval superiority of theBritish. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Treason and escape of Arnold.... Trial and execution of MajorAndré.... Precautions for the security of West Point.... Letter ofGeneral Washington on American affairs.... Proceedings of congressrespecting the army.... Major Talmadge destroys the British stores atCoram.... The army retires into winter quarters.... Irruption of MajorCarleton into New York.... European transactions. 

CHAPTER IX. 

Transactions in South Carolina and Georgia.... Defeat of Ferguson.... Lord Cornwallis enters North Carolina.... Retreat out of thatstate.... Major Wemys defeated by Sumpter.... Tarleton repulsed.... Greene appointed to the command of the Southern army.... Arrives incamp.... Detaches Morgan over the Catawba.... Battle of theCowpens.... Lord Cornwallis drives Greene through North Carolina intoVirginia.... He retires to Hillsborough.... Greene recrosses theDan.... Loyalists under Colonel Pyle cut to pieces.... Battle ofGuilford.... Lord Cornwallis retires to Ramsay's mills.... ToWilmington.... Greene advances to Ramsay's mills.... Determines toenter South Carolina.... Lord Cornwallis resolves to march toVirginia. 

CHAPTER X. 

Virginia invaded by Arnold.... He destroys the stores at Westham andat Richmond.... Retires to Portsmouth.... Mutiny in the Pennsylvanialine.... Sir H. Clinton attempts to negotiate with the mutineers.... They compromise with the civil government.... Mutiny in the Jerseyline.... Mission of Colonel Laurens to France.... Propositions toSpain.... Recommendations relative to a duty on imported and prizegoods.... Reform in the Executive departments.... Confederationadopted.... Military transactions.... Lafayette detached toVirginia.... Cornwallis arrives.... Presses Lafayette.... Expeditionto Charlottesville, to the Point of Fork.... Lafayette forms ajunction with Wayne.... Cornwallis retires to the lower country.... General Washington's letters are intercepted.... Action nearJamestown. 

CHAPTER XI. 

Farther state of affairs in the beginning of the year 1781.... Measures of Mr. Morris, the superintendent of finances.... Designs ofGeneral Washington against New York.... Count Rochambeau marches tothe North River.... Intelligence from the Count de Grasse.... Plan ofoperations against Lord Cornwallis.... Naval engagement.... Thecombined armies march for the Chesapeake.... Yorktown invested.... Surrender of Lord Cornwallis. 

THE LIFE

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON

CHAPTER I. 

 Incursion into Jersey.... General Lacy surprised.... Attempt on Lafayette at Barren Hill.... General Howe resigns the command of the British army.... Is succeeded by Sir H. Clinton.... He evacuates Philadelphia, and marches through the Jerseys.... A council of war which decides against attacking the British on their march.... Battle of Monmouth.... General Lee arrested.... Sentenced to be suspended for one year.... Thanks of congress to General Washington and his army. 

[Sidenote: 1778]

The position at Valley Forge had been taken for the purposes ofcovering the country, protecting the magazines, and cutting off allsupplies to Philadelphia. Although the intercourse of the inhabitantswith that place could not be entirely prevented; the sufferings of theBritish army from the scarcity of fresh provisions and forage wereconsiderable; and, as the spring opened, several expeditions wereundertaken both to relieve their own wants, and to distress the armyof the United States. 

About the middle of March, Colonel Mawhood and Major Simcoe, who weredetached into Jersey at the head of about twelve hundred men, landedat Salem, nearly opposite Reedy Island, and dispersed the small bodiesof militia who were stationed in that part of the country. 

[Sidenote: March 23. ]

General Washington had given early intelligence of this expedition toGovernor Livingston; and had requested that he would immediately orderout the militia to join Colonel Shreve, whose regiment was detachedinto Jersey; but the legislature had neglected to make provision forpaying them; and the governor could not bring them into the field. Colonel Shreve, on his arrival at Haddonfield, the place at which theyhad been directed to assemble, found less than one hundred men. Colonel Ellis, their commanding officer, remarked, in a letter to thegovernor, that "without some standing force, little was to be expectedfrom the militia, who, being alone not sufficient to prevent theincursions of the enemy, each one naturally consults his own safety, by not being found in arms. "

Mawhood, of course, was unrestrained; and the devastation committed byhis party was wantonly distressing. Its course of destruction waspreceded by a summons to Colonel Hand, the commanding officer of themilitia, to lay down his arms, which was accompanied with a threat ofthe consequences to result from his refusal. This threat was toofaithfully executed. 

After completing his forage, without molestation, Mawhood returned toPhiladelphia. During the continuance of this incursion, which lastedsix or seven days, not more than two hundred men could be collected toreinforce Colonel Shreve, who was consequently unable to effect anything, and did not even march to the lower parts of Jersey, which wereplundered without restraint. [1]

[Footnote 1: See note No. I. At the end of the volume. ]

[Sidenote: May 1. ]

Not long after this incursion into Jersey, an enterprise wasundertaken against General Lacy, who, with a small number ofPennsylvania militia, seldom amounting to six hundred, and sometimesnot exceeding fifty, watched the roads leading to Philadelphia on thenorth side of the Schuylkill, and was generally posted within twentymiles of that town. 

[Sidenote: General Lacy surprised. ]

This expedition was entrusted to Colonel Abercrombie and Major Simcoe, who avoided all the posts Lacy had established for his security, andthrew a body of troops into his rear before he discovered theirapproach. After a short resistance, he escaped with the loss of a fewmen killed, and all his baggage. His corps were entirely dispersed, and he was soon afterwards relieved by General Potter. 

To maintain the command of the water as far as was practicable, congress had ordered impediments to be sunk in many of the rivers ofcommon use, so as to obstruct the passage up them, and hadconstructed frigates, and other smaller vessels, to be employed abovethose impediments or elsewhere, as the occasion might require. Severalof them had been commenced above Philadelphia, but were not completedwhen the British obtained the command of the river. General Washingtonthen became apprehensive for their safety, and repeatedly expressedhis desire that they should be sunk in such a manner as to be weighedwith difficulty, should any attempt be made to raise them. Thepersons, however, who were entrusted by congress with this business, supposed it would be equally secure to put plugs in their bottoms, which might be drawn out on the approach of danger. 

Against these vessels, and some stores collected at Bordentown, anexpedition was planned which ended in their total destruction. GeneralDickenson was in the neighbourhood, but his force was too small tointerrupt the execution of the design; and General Maxwell, who hadbeen ordered to his assistance, was retarded in his march by a heavyrain, which did not obstruct the movement of the British, who passedup the river in vessels. 

[Sidenote: May 18. ]

To cover the country more effectually on the north of the Schuylkill, to form an advance guard for the security of the main army, and to bein readiness to annoy the rear of the enemy, should he evacuatePhiladelphia, an event believed to be in contemplation, GeneralWashington detached the Marquis de Lafayette, with more than twothousand choice troops, to take post near the lines. As this corpsformed a very valuable part of the army, the Commander-in-chiefrecommended in his instructions to General Lafayette the utmostattention to its safety; and, particularly, to avoid any permanentstation, as a long continuance in one position would facilitate theexecution of measures which might be concerted against him. 

[Sidenote: Attempt on Lafayette at Barren Hill. ]

The Marquis crossed the Schuylkill and took post near Barren Hillchurch, eight or ten miles in front of the army. Immediate notice[2]of his arrival was given to Sir William Howe, who reconnoitred hisposition, and formed a plan to surprise and cut him off. 

[Footnote 2: General Wilkinson, in his memoirs, says that this noticewas given by a person formerly a lieutenant in Proctor's regiment ofartillery, who, disgusted at being discarded from the Americanservice, became a spy to Sir William Howe; and, the better to fulfilhis new engagements, kept up his acquaintance with his formercomrades, and frequently visited the camp at Valley Forge. To avoidthe suspicion which would be excited by his going into Philadelphia, arendezvous had been established on Frankford Creek, where he met amessenger from General Howe, to whom his communications weredelivered. This statement is certainly correct. ]

[Sidenote: May 20. ]

On the night of the 19th of May, General Grant with five thousandselect troops, took the road which leads up the Delaware, andconsequently diverges from Barren Hill. After marching some distance, he inclined to the left, and passing White Marsh, where several roadsunite, took one leading to Plymouth meeting-house, the position he wasdirected to occupy, something more than a mile in the rear of theMarquis, between him and Valley Forge. He reached his point ofdestination rather before sunrise. Here the roads fork; the oneleading to the camp of Lafayette, and the other to Matron's ford overthe Schuylkill. 

In the course of the night, General Gray, with a strong detachment, had advanced up the Schuylkill on its south side, along the ridgeroad, and taken post at a ford two or three miles in front of theright flank of Lafayette, while the residue of the army encamped onChestnut hill. 

Captain M'Clane, a vigilant partisan of great merit, was posted on thelines some distance in front of Barren Hill. In the course of thenight, he fell in with two British grenadiers at Three Mile Run, whoinformed him of the movement made by Grant, and also that a large bodyof Germans was getting ready to march up the Schuylkill. Immediatelyconjecturing the object, M'Clane detached Captain Parr, with a companyof riflemen across the country to Wanderers hill, with orders toharass and retard the column advancing up the Schuylkill, and hastenedin person[3] to the camp of Lafayette. He arrived soon after daybreak, and communicated the intelligence he had received. It was, not longafterwards, confirmed by the fire of Parr on the Ridge road, and by aninhabitant who had escaped from White Marsh as the British columnpassed that place. [4]

[Footnote 3: Extracts of letters from the adjutant general and theofficer of the day to Captain M'Clane. 

_Camp Valley Forge, May 21st, 1778. _

Dear Captain, --I am happy you have with your brave little partyconducted with so much honour to yourself. The Marquis effected, owingto your vigilance, a glorious retreat as well as a difficult one. 

Signed ALEX. SCAMMELL, _Adj. Gen. _

_Camp Valley Forge, May 23d, 1778. _

Dear Captain, --I am pleased to hear you are still doing something todistinguish yourself in the eyes of your country. I have the pleasureto inform you that your conduct with the Marquis has been verypleasing to his Excellency and the whole army. 

I am your obedient servant, CHARLES SCOTT, _Brig. Gen. And officer of the day. _]

[Footnote 4: The danger with which this detachment was threatened, wasperceived from the camp at Valley Forge, soon after it had beencommunicated to Lafayette. Alarm-guns were fired to announce it tohim, and the whole army was put under arms, to act as circumstancesmight require. It has been erroneously stated that General Washingtonwas unapprised of this movement of the British army until its objectwas defeated. The author was in camp at the time, saw theCommander-in-chief, accompanied by his aids and some of the generalofficers ride, soon after sun-rise, to the summit of the hill on theside of which the huts were constructed, and look anxiously towardsthe scene of action through a glass. He witnessed too the joy withwhich they returned after the detachment had crossed the Schuylkill. ]

Thus surrounded with danger, Lafayette took with promptitude anddecision the only course which could preserve him. He instantly puthis troops in motion, and passed over at Matron's ford, which wasrather nearer to General Grant, than to himself, without beingintercepted by that officer, or sustaining a greater loss than ninemen. 

General Grant, who reached the ground lately occupied by Lafayettesoon after it was abandoned, followed his rear, and appeared at theford just after the Americans had crossed it; but, finding themadvantageously posted, did not choose to attack them; and the wholearmy returned to Philadelphia, having effected nothing. 

He did not escape censure for having allowed the great advantage hehad acquired, to slip through his hands unused. He might with theutmost certainty have reached Matron's ford before the Marquis, andhave cut off the only retreat which remained for him. But the sameskill and address were not displayed in executing this plan as informing it. [5]

[Footnote 5: It has been said that his troops were excessivelyfatigued by a march of upwards of twenty miles, and that he waited, confident that the Marquis could not escape him, for information thatGray had reached his position. ]

In the statement of this affair made by General Lafayette, herepresents himself to have advanced the head of a column towardsGrant, as if to attack him, while the rear filed off rapidly towardsthe Schuylkill. This movement gained ground even for the front, which, while it advanced towards the enemy, also approached the river, and atthe same time induced General Grant to halt, in order to prepare forbattle. 

While this manoeuvre was performing in the face of the detachmentunder Grant, a small party was thrown into the church yard, on theroad towards General Gray, which also gave the appearance of anintention to attack in that quarter. By these dispositions, happilyconceived, and executed with regularity, the Marquis extricatedhimself from the destruction which had appeared almost inevitable. Ina letter to congress, General Washington termed it "a timely andhandsome retreat, " and certainly the compliment was merited. 

It might be supposed that this young nobleman had not displayed thesame degree of military talent in guarding against the approach ofdanger, as in extricating himself from it. But the imputation whichgenerally attaches to an officer who permits an enemy to passunobserved into his rear, is removed by a circumstance stated byLafayette. The Pennsylvania militia were posted on his left flank withorders to guard the roads about White Marsh. Without his knowledge, they changed their position, and retired into the rear, leaving thatimportant pass open to the enemy. 

[Sidenote: General Howe resigns his command and returns to England; issucceeded by Sir Henry Clinton. ]

This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe. Heresigned the command of the army into the hands of Sir Henry Clinton, and embarked for Great Britain. About the same time, orders werereceived for the evacuation of Philadelphia. The part it was nowevident France was about to take in the war, and the naval force whichhad been prepared by that power before she declared herself, renderedthat city a dangerous position, and determined the administration towithdraw the army from the Delaware. 

The preparations for this movement could not be made unobserved; butthey indicated equally an embarkation of the whole army, or anintention to march to New York through Jersey. The last was believedby the American chief to be most probable; and he made every exertionto take advantage of the movement. His detachments were called in, andthe state governments were pressed to expedite the march of theirlevies. 

In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton hastened his preparations for theevacuation of Philadelphia; and the opinion that he intended to reachNew York through Jersey, gained ground. 

General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, was ordered over theDelaware to take post at Mount Holly, and to join Major GeneralDickenson, who was assembling the militia of that state for thepurpose of co-operating with the continental troops, in breaking downthe bridges, felling trees in the roads, and otherwise embarrassingthe march of the British General. 

[Sidenote: June 17. ]

In this state of things intelligence was received that a great part ofthe British army had crossed the Delaware, and that the residue wouldsoon follow. 

The opinion of the general officers was required on the course now tobe pursued. General Lee, who had been lately exchanged, and whoseexperience gave great weight to his opinions, was vehement againstrisking either a general or partial engagement. The British army wascomputed at ten thousand effective men, and that of the Americansamounted to between ten and eleven thousand. General Lee was decidedlyof opinion that, with such an equality of force, it would be"criminal" to hazard an action. He relied much on the advantageousground on which their late foreign connexions had placed the UnitedStates, and contended that defeat alone could now endanger theirindependence. To this he said the army ought not to be exposed. Itwould be impossible he thought to bring on a partial action, withoutrisking its being made general, should such be the choice of theenemy, since the detachment which might engage must be supported, orbe cut to pieces. A general action ought not to be fought unless theadvantage was manifestly with the American army. This at present wasnot the case. He attributed so much to the superior discipline of theenemy as to be of opinion that the issue of the engagement would be, almost certainly, unfavourable. 

General Du Portail, a French officer of considerable reputation, maintained the same opinions; and the Baron de Steuben concurred inthem. The American officers seem to have been influenced by thecouncils of the Europeans; and, of seventeen generals, only Wayne andCadwallader were decidedly in favour of attacking the enemy. Lafayetteappeared inclined to that opinion without openly embracing it; andGeneral Greene was inclined to hazard more than the councils of themajority would sanction. The country, he thought, must be protected;and if, in doing so, an engagement should become unavoidable, it wouldbe necessary to fight. 

[Sidenote: The British army evacuate Philadelphia and march throughthe Jerseys. ]

On the morning of the 18th, Philadelphia was evacuated;[6] and, by twoin the afternoon, all the British troops were encamped on the Jerseyshore, from Cooper's Creek to Red Bank. Although they availedthemselves to a great extent of the transportation by water, yet theirline of march was so lengthened and encumbered by baggage, and theweather was so intensely hot, that they were under the necessity ofproceeding slowly. Indeed their movements wore the appearance ofpurposed delay; and were calculated to favour the opinion that SirHenry Clinton was willing to be overtaken, and wished for a generalengagement. 

[Footnote 6: As the British army moved down Second street, CaptainM'Lane, with a few light horse and one hundred infantry, entered thecity, and cut off, and captured one Captain, one Provost Marshal, oneguide to the army, and thirty privates, without losing a man. ]

As his line of march, until he passed Crosswicks, led directly up theDelaware, General Washington found it necessary to make an extensivecircuit, and to cross the river at Coryell's Ferry; after which hekept possession of the high grounds in Jersey, thereby retaining thechoice of bringing on, or avoiding an action. 

[Sidenote: June 24. ]

As Sir Henry Clinton encamped at, and about, Allentown, the main bodyof the American army lay in Hopewell township, about five miles fromPrinceton, Major General Dickenson, with about one thousand militia, and Maxwell's brigade, hung on Sir Henry Clinton's left flank. GeneralCadwallader, with Jackson's regiment and a few militia, was in hisrear; and Colonel Morgan with a regiment of six hundred men watchedhis right. 

[Sidenote: Council of war called by General Washington; decideagainst attacking the enemy on the march. ]

Notwithstanding the almost concurrent opinion of his general officersagainst risking an action, Washington appears to have been stronglyinclined to that measure. He could not be persuaded that, with an armyrather superior in point of numbers to his enemy, too much washazarded by fighting him. The situation of the two armies was, therefore, once more submitted to the consideration of the generalofficers, who were asked whether it would be adviseable, of choice, tohazard a general action? And, if it would, whether it should bebrought on by an immediate general attack, by a partial attack, or bytaking such a position as must compel the enemy to become theassailants?

If the council should be of opinion that it was unadviseable to hazardan engagement, then he asked what measures could be taken with safetyto the army, to annoy the enemy in his march, should he proceedthrough the Jerseys?

The proposition respecting a general action was decidedly negatived. But it was proposed to strengthen the corps on the left flank of theenemy with a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men, and to preserve, with the main body of the army, a relative position which would enableit to act as circumstances might require. 

In pursuance of this opinion, the troops on the lines werestrengthened with a detachment of fifteen hundred select men, commanded by General Scott; and the army moved forward the next day toKingston. 

[Sidenote: The opinion of the general against this decision. ]

[Sidenote: June 25. ]

Though the council had been almost unanimous against a general action, several officers, whose opinions were highly valued, secretly wishedfor something more than light skirmishing. Knowing this, GeneralWashington, who was still in favour of an engagement, determined totake his measures on his own responsibility. As the British army movedtowards Monmouth court-house, he ordered Brigadier General Wayne, withan additional detachment of one thousand select men, to join theadvanced corps. As the continental troops, now constituting the frontdivision, amounted to at least four thousand men, he deemed it properthat they should be commanded by a major general. Lee had a right toclaim this tour of duty; but, as he had declared himself openly andstrongly against hazarding even a partial engagement, and supposedthat nothing further would be attempted than merely to reconnoitrethe enemy, and restrain plundering parties, he showed no inclinationto assert his claim. Unintentionally promoting the private wishes ofGeneral Washington, that the command should be given to an officerwhose view of the service comported more with his own, Lee yieldedthis important tour of duty to Lafayette. The orders given to thisgeneral were, to proceed immediately with the detachment; and, afterforming a junction with General Scott, and taking command of thetroops on the lines, to gain the enemy's left flank and rear; give himevery practicable annoyance; and attack by detachment, or with hiswhole force, as the occasion might require. 

These dispositions and orders could scarcely fail to bring on anengagement. Wayne had openly supported that measure; and Lafayette, though against seeking a general action, had been in favour of apartial one. Of consequence, should any proper occasion offer, hewould certainly attack with his whole force, which would as certainlyproduce such a state of things as would render it proper to supporthim with the whole army. 

[Sidenote: June 26. ]

Immediately after the march of this detachment, General Washingtonmoved to Cranberry, that he might be in readiness to support his frontdivision. 

The intense heat of the weather; a heavy storm; and a temporary wantof provisions, prevented the army from continuing its march that day. The advanced corps had pressed forward, and taken a position aboutfive miles in rear of the British army, with the intention ofattacking it next morning on its march. Thinking this corps too remoteto be supported in case of action, General Washington ordered theMarquis to file off by his left towards Englishtown. These orders wereexecuted early in the morning of the twenty-seventh. 

[Sidenote: June 27. ]

Lafayette had scarcely taken command of the advanced party, whenGeneral Lee began to regret having yielded it to him. He perceivedthat, in the opinion of all the general officers, great importance wasattached to it, and that his reputation was in danger of beingimpaired by connecting his strenuous opposition to even a partialaction, with his declining the command of a very strong detachment, which, it was believed, would engage the rear of the enemy. Hetherefore solicited earnestly for the command he had before declined. 

To relieve the feelings of Lee, without wounding those of Lafayette, General Washington detached him with two additional brigades toEnglishtown, to support the Marquis. He would, of course, have thedirection of the whole front division, which would now amount to fivethousand continental troops; but it was expressly stipulated, that ifany enterprise had been already formed by Lafayette, it should becarried into execution, as if the commanding officer had not beenchanged. Lee acceded to this condition; and, with two additionalbrigades, joined the front division of the army, encamped atEnglishtown. The rear division also moved forward, and encamped aboutthree miles in his rear. Morgan's corps still hovered on the rightflank of the British, and General Dickenson on their left. 

Sir Henry Clinton occupied the high grounds about Monmouthcourt-house, having his right flank in the skirt of a small wood, while his left was secured by a very thick one, and a morass runningtowards his rear. His whole front was also covered by a wood, and fora considerable distance towards his left, by a morass. 

This position seemed unassailable; and the British were within twelvemiles of the high grounds about Middletown, after reaching which theywould be perfectly secure. 

Under these circumstances, General Washington ordered Lee to attackthe British rear the moment it should move from its ground. 

[Sidenote: June 28. ]

About five in the morning, intelligence was received from GeneralDickenson that the front of the enemy was in motion. The troops wereimmediately put under arms, and Lee was ordered to attack the rear, "unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary. " He was atthe same time informed that the rear division would be on its march tosupport him. 

Sir Henry Clinton had observed the appearances on his flanks and rearon the twenty-seventh; and, conjecturing that the American army was inhis neighbourhood, had changed the order of his march. The baggage wasplaced under the care of General Knyphausen, while the strength andflower of his army, entirely unincumbered, formed the rear division, under the particular command of Lord Cornwallis, who was accompaniedby the Commander-in-chief. 

To avoid pressing on Knyphausen, Cornwallis remained on his grounduntil about eight; and then, descending from the heights of Freeholdinto an extensive plain, took up his line of march in rear of thefront division. [7]

[Footnote 7: Letter of Sir Henry Clinton. ]

General Lee had made dispositions for executing the orders given thepreceding evening, and repeated in the morning; and, soon after theBritish rear had moved from its ground, prepared to attack it. GeneralDickenson had been directed to detach some of his best troops, to takesuch a position as to co-operate with him; and Morgan was ordered toact on the right flank. 

Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after Lord Cornwallis hadleft them; and, following the British into the plain, ordered GeneralWayne to attack the rear of their covering party with sufficientvigour to check it, but not to press it so closely as either to forceit up to the main body, or to draw reinforcements to its aid. Inthe mean time, he intended to gain the front of this party by ashorter road, and, intercepting its communication with the line, tobear it off before it could be assisted. 

[Illustration: Martha Washington

_From the portrait by Gilbert Stuart_

_After studying under Benjamin West, the American painter whosucceeded Sir Joshua Reynolds as (second) president of the RoyalAcademy in London, Gilbert Stuart established a studio in Philadelphiawhere he met and painted the first of his famous portraits of GeorgeWashington. This one of Martha Washington, the best known likeness ofher in existence, was painted in the city of Washington, where theartist had a studio between 1800 and 1802. She gave him severalsittings at Mount Vernon. _]

While in the execution of this design, a gentleman in the _suite_ ofGeneral Washington came up to gain intelligence; and Lee communicatedto him his present object. 

Before he reached the point of destination, there was reason tobelieve that the British rear was much stronger than had beenconjectured. The intelligence on this subject being contradictory, andthe face of the country well calculated to conceal the truth, hedeemed it adviseable to ascertain the fact himself. 

Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march, received intelligence that an American column had appeared on his leftflank. This being a corps of militia was soon dispersed, and the marchwas continued. When his rear guard had descended from the heights, hesaw it followed by a strong corps, soon after which a cannonade wascommenced upon it; and, at the same time, a respectable force showeditself on each of his flanks. Suspecting a design on his baggage, hedetermined to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously, as tocompel a recall of those on his flanks; and, for this purpose, marchedback his whole rear division. This movement was in progress as Leeadvanced for the purpose of reconnoitring. He soon perceived hismistake respecting the force of the British rear, but still determinedto engage on that ground, although his judgment disapproved themeasure; there being a morass immediately in his rear, which wouldnecessarily impede the reinforcements which might be advancing to hisaid, and embarrass his retreat should he be finally overpowered. 

This was about ten. While both armies were preparing for action, General Scott (as stated by General Lee) mistook an oblique march ofan American column for a retreat; and, in the apprehension of beingabandoned, left his position, and repassed the ravine in his rear. 

Being himself of opinion that the ground was unfavourable, Lee did notcorrect the error he ascribed to Scott, but ordered the wholedetachment to regain the heights. He was closely pressed, and someslight skirmishing ensued without much loss on either side. 

As soon as the firing announced the commencement of the action, therear division of the army advanced rapidly to the support of thefront. As they approached the scene of action, General Washington, whohad received no intelligence from Lee giving notice of his retreat, rode forward, and, to his utter astonishment and mortification, metthe advanced corps retiring before the enemy, without having made asingle effort to maintain its ground. The troops he first saw neitherunderstood the motives which had governed General Lee, nor his presentdesign; and could give no other information than that, by his orders, they had fled without fighting. 

General Washington rode to the rear of the division, where he metGeneral Lee, to whom he spoke in terms of some warmth, implyingdisapprobation of his conduct. 

Orders were immediately given to Colonel Stewart and LieutenantColonel Ramsay to form their regiments for the purpose of checking thepursuit; and General Lee was directed to take proper measures with theresidue of his force to stop the British column on that ground. TheCommander-in-chief then rode back to arrange the rear division of thearmy. 

[Sidenote: He attacks the enemy at Monmouth Court-house. ]

These orders were executed with firmness; and, when forced from hisground, Lee brought off his troops in good order, and was directed toform in the rear of Englishtown. 

This check afforded time to draw up the left wing and second line ofthe American army on an eminence, covered by a morass in front. LordStirling, who commanded the left wing, brought up a detachment ofartillery under Lieutenant Colonel Carrington, and some field pieces, which played with considerable effect on a division of the Britishwhich had passed the morass, and was pressing on to the charge. Thesepieces, with the aid of several parties of infantry, effectuallystopped the advance of the enemy. 

[Sidenote: The action severe but not decisive. ]

Finding themselves warmly opposed in front, the British attempted toturn the left flank of the American army, but were repulsed. They thenattempted the right with as little success. General Greene hadadvanced a body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece ofground in his front, which not only disappointed the design of turningthe right, but enfiladed the party which yet remained in front of theleft wing. At this moment, General Wayne was advanced with a body ofinfantry to engage them in front, who kept up so hot and well directeda fire, that they soon withdrew behind the ravine, to the ground onwhich the action had commenced immediately after the arrival ofGeneral Washington. [8]

[Footnote 8: General Lafayette, in a communication made to the authorrespecting this battle, expresses himself thus: "Never was GeneralWashington greater in war than in this action. His presence stoppedthe retreat. His dispositions fixed the victory. His fine appearanceon horseback, his calm courage, roused by the animation produced bythe vexation of the morning, (le depit de la matinée) gave him the airbest calculated to excite enthusiasm. "]

The position now taken by the British army was very strong. Bothflanks were secured by thick woods and morasses; and their front wasaccessible only through a narrow pass. The day had been intensely hot, and the troops were much fatigued. Notwithstanding thesecircumstances, General Washington resolved to renew the engagement. For this purpose he ordered Brigadier General Poor, with his own andthe North Carolina brigade, to gain their right flank, while Woodfordwith his brigade should turn their left. At the same time theartillery was ordered to advance, and play on their front. Theseorders were obeyed with alacrity; but the impediments on the flanks ofthe British were so considerable that, before they could be overcome, it was nearly dark. Farther operations were therefore deferred untilnext morning; and the brigades which had been detached to the flanksof the British army continued on their ground through the night, andthe other troops lay on the field of battle with their arms in theirhands. General Washington passed the night in his cloak in the midstof his soldiers. 

The British employed the early part of the night in removing theirwounded; and, about midnight, marched away in such silence that theirretreat was not perceived until day. 

As it was certain that they must gain the high grounds aboutMiddletown before they could be overtaken; as the face of the countryafforded no prospect of opposing their embarkation; and as the battlealready fought had terminated in a manner to make a general impressionfavourable to the American arms; it was thought proper to relinquishthe pursuit, leaving a detachment to hover about the British rear, themain body of the army moved towards the Hudson. 

The Commander-in-chief was highly gratified with the conduct of histroops in this action. Their behaviour, he said, after recovering fromthe first surprise occasioned by the unexpected retreat of theadvanced corps, could not be surpassed. General Wayne was particularlymentioned; and the artillery were spoken of in terms of high praise. 

The loss of the Americans in the battle of Monmouth was eight officersand sixty-one privates killed, and about one hundred and sixtywounded. Among the slain were Lieutenant Colonel Bonner ofPennsylvania, and Major Dickenson of Virginia, both of whom were muchregretted. One hundred and thirty were missing; but a considerablenumber of these afterwards rejoined their regiments. 

In his official letter, Sir Henry Clinton states his dead and missingat four officers, and one hundred and eighty-four privates. Hiswounded at sixteen officers and one hundred and fifty-four privates. This account, so far as respects the dead, can not be correct, as fourofficers and two hundred and forty-five privates were buried on thefield by persons appointed for the purpose, who made their report tothe Commander-in-chief; and some few were afterwards found, so as toincrease the number to nearly three hundred. The uncommon heat of theday proved fatal to several on both sides. 

As usual, when a battle has not been decisive, both parties claimedthe victory. In the early part of the day, the advantage was certainlywith the British; in the latter part, it may be pronounced with equalcertainty to have been with the Americans. They maintained theirground, repulsed the enemy, were prevented only by the night, and bythe retreat of the hostile army from renewing the action, and sufferedless in killed and wounded than their adversaries. 

It is true that Sir Henry Clinton effected what he states to have beenhis principal object, --the safety of his baggage. But when it isrecollected that the American officers had decided against hazardingan action, that this advice must have trammeled the conduct, andcircumscribed the views of the Commander-in-chief, he will be admittedto have effected no inconsiderable object in giving the American armsthat appearance of superiority which was certainly acquired by thisengagement. 

Independent of the loss sustained in the action, the British army wasconsiderably weakened in its march from Philadelphia to New York. About one hundred prisoners were made, and near one thousand soldiers, chiefly foreigners, deserted while passing through Jersey. 

The conduct of Lee was generally disapproved. As however he hadpossessed a large share of the confidence and good opinion of theCommander-in-chief, it is probable that explanations might have beenmade which would have rescued him from the imputations that were caston him, and have restored him to the esteem of the army, could hishaughty temper have brooked the indignity he believed to have beenoffered him on the field of battle. General Washington had taken nomeasures in consequence of the events of that day, and would probablyhave come to no resolution concerning them without an amicableexplanation, when he received from Lee a letter expressed in veryunbecoming terms, in which he, in the tone of a superior, requiredreparation for the injury sustained "from the very singularexpressions" said to have been used on the day of the action by theCommander-in-chief. 

[Sidenote: June 30. ]

[Sidenote: General Lee arrested for his behavior in this action, andafterwards to the commander-in-chief. ]

This letter was answered by an assurance that, so soon ascircumstances would admit of an inquiry, he should have an opportunityof justifying himself, to the army, to America, and to the world ingeneral; or of convincing them that he had been guilty of disobedienceof orders, and misbehaviour before the enemy. On his expressing a wishfor a speedy investigation of his conduct, and for a court-martialrather than a court of inquiry, he was arrested. 

First. For disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy on the28th of June, agreeably to repeated instructions. 

Secondly. For misbehaviour before the enemy on the same day, in makingan unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat. 

Thirdly. For disrespect to the Commander-in-chief in two letters. 

[Sidenote: Court-martial appointed to try him. Sentenced to besuspended for one year. ]

Before this correspondence had taken place, strong and specificcharges of misconduct had been made against General Lee by severalofficers of his detachment, and particularly by Generals Wayne andScott. In these, the transactions of the day, not being wellunderstood, were represented in colours much more unfavourable to Lee, than facts, when properly explained, would seem to justify. Theserepresentations, most probably, induced the strong language of thesecond article in the charge. A court-martial, over which LordStirling presided, after a tedious investigation, found him guilty ofall the charges exhibited against him, and sentenced him to besuspended for one year. This sentence was, afterwards, though withsome hesitation, approved, almost unanimously, by congress. The courtsoftened, in some degree, the severity of the second charge, byfinding him guilty, not in its very words, but "of misbehaviour beforethe enemy, by making an unnecessary, and, in some few instances, adisorderly retreat. "

Lee defended himself with his accustomed ability. He proved that, after the retreat had commenced, in consequence of General Scott'srepassing the ravine, on the approach of the enemy, he had designed toform on the first advantageous piece of ground he could find; andthat, in his own opinion, and in the opinion of some other officers, no safe and advantageous position had presented itself until he metGeneral Washington; at which time it was his intention to fight theenemy on the very ground afterwards taken by that officer. Hesuggested a variety of reasons in justification of his retreat, which, if they do not absolutely establish its propriety, give it soquestionable a form as to render it probable that a public examinationnever would have taken place, could his proud spirit have stooped tooffer explanation instead of outrage, to the Commander-in-chief. 

His suspension gave general satisfaction through the army. Withoutbeing masters of his conduct as a military man, they perfectlyunderstood the insult offered to their general by his letters; and, whether rightly or not, believed his object to have been to disgraceWashington, and to obtain the supreme command for himself. Sodevotedly were all ranks attached to their general, that the meresuspicion of such a design, would have rendered his continuance in thearmy extremely difficult. 

Whatever judgment may be formed on the propriety of his retreat, it isnot easy to justify, either the omission to keep theCommander-in-chief continually informed of his situation andintentions, or the very rude letters written after the action wasover. 

[Sidenote: The thanks of congress presented to General Washington andhis army for their conduct in the battle at Monmouth. ]

The battle of Monmouth gave great satisfaction to congress. Aresolution was passed unanimously, thanking General Washington for theactivity with which he marched from the camp at Valley Forge, inpursuit of the enemy; for his distinguished exertions in forming theline of battle, and for his great good conduct in the action; and hewas requested to signify the thanks of congress to the officers andmen under his command, who distinguished themselves by their conductand valour in the battle. 

[Sidenote: July 5. ]

After remaining a few days on the high grounds of Middletown, SirHenry Clinton proceeded to Sandy Hook, whence his army passed over toNew York. 

CHAPTER II. 

 Count D'Estaing arrives with a French fleet.... Meditates an attack on the British fleet in New York harbour.... Relinquishes it.... Sails to Rhode Island.... Lord Howe appears off Rhode Island.... Both fleets dispersed by a storm.... General Sullivan lays siege to Newport.... D'Estaing returns.... Sails for Boston.... Sullivan expresses his dissatisfaction in general orders.... Raises the siege of Newport.... Action on Rhode Island.... The Americans retreat to the Continent.... Count D'Estaing expresses his dissatisfaction with Sullivan in a letter to congress.... General Washington labours successfully to heal these discontents.... Lord Howe resigns the command of the British fleet.... Colonel Baylor's regiment surprised.... Captain Donop defeated by Colonel Butler.... Expedition of the British against Egg Harbour.... Pulaski surprised. 

[Sidenote: 1778 July. ]

[Sidenote: Count D'Estaing arrives on the coast of Virginia with aFrench fleet under his command. ]

Before General Washington could reach the ground he designed tooccupy, intelligence was received that a powerful French fleet, underthe command of the Count D'Estaing, had appeared off Chingoteagueinlet, the northern extremity of the coast of Virginia. 

The Count had sailed from Toulon on the 13th of April, with twelveships of the line and six frigates, having on board a respectable bodyof land forces. His destination was the Delaware; and he hoped to findthe British fleet in that river, and their army in Philadelphia. Anuncommon continuance of adverse winds, protracted his voyage acrossthe Atlantic to the extraordinary length of eighty-seven days. Thisunusual circumstance saved the British fleet and army. 

[Sidenote: He meditates an attack on the British fleet at New York, but is obliged to relinquish it. ]

On reaching the capes of the Delaware, the Count announced his arrivalto congress; and, having failed in accomplishing his first object, proceeded along the coast to New York, in the hope of being able toattack the British fleet in the harbour of that place. 

Sir Henry Clinton was again indebted to some fortunate incidents forhis safety. 

The violent storms of the preceding winter had broken through thenarrow isthmus by which Sandy Hook was connected with the continent, and had converted the peninsula into an island. This rendered itnecessary for the army to pass from the main to the Hook on a bridgeof boats, which would have been impracticable, if obstructed by asuperior fleet. It was effected the very day on which D'Estaingappeared off Chingoteague inlet. 

[Sidenote: July 13. ]

At Paramus, in Jersey, General Washington received a letter from thepresident of congress, advising him of this important event, andrequesting that he would concert measures with the Count for conjointand offensive operations. 

The next day he received a second letter on the same subject, enclosing two resolutions, one directing him to co-operate with theFrench admiral, and the other authorizing him to call on the statesfrom New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, for such aids of militiaas he might deem necessary for the operations of the allied arms. 

He determined to proceed immediately to the White Plains, whence thearmy might co-operate with more facility in the execution of anyattempt which might be made by the fleet, and despatched LieutenantColonel Laurens, one of his aids de camp, with all the informationrelative to the enemy, as well as to his own army, which might beuseful to D'Estaing. Lieutenant Colonel Laurens was authorized toconsult on future conjoint operations, and to establish conventionalsignals for the purpose of facilitating the communication ofintelligence. 

The French admiral, on arriving off the Hook, despatched Major deChoisi, a gentleman of his family, to General Washington, for thepurpose of communicating fully his views and his strength. His firstobject was to attack New York. If this should be found impracticable, he was desirous of turning his attention to Rhode Island. To assist incoming to a result on these enterprises, General Washington despatchedLieutenant Colonel Hamilton with such farther communications as hadbeen suggested, by inquiries made since the departure of LieutenantColonel Laurens. 

[Sidenote: July 21. ]

Fearing that the water on the bar at the entrance of the harbour wasnot of sufficient depth to admit the passage of the largest ships ofthe French fleet without much difficulty and danger, GeneralWashington had turned his attention to other objects which might be, eventually, pursued. General Sullivan, who commanded the troops inRhode Island, was directed to prepare for an enterprise againstNewport; and the Marquis de Lafayette was detached with two brigadesto join him at Providence. The next day Lieutenant Colonel Hamiltonreturned to camp with the final determination of the Count D'Estaingto relinquish the meditated attack on the fleet in the harbour of NewYork, in consequence of the impracticability of passing the bar. 

General Greene was immediately ordered to Rhode Island, of which statehe was a native; and Lieutenant Colonel Laurens was directed to attachhimself to the French admiral, and to facilitate all his views byprocuring whatever might give them effect; after which he was to actwith the army under Sullivan. 

[Sidenote: Sails out to Rhode Island and arrives off Newport. ]

The resolution being taken to proceed against Rhode Island, the fleetgot under way, and, on the 25th of July, appeared off Newport, andcast anchor about five miles from that place, just without Brenton'sledge; soon after which, General Sullivan went on board the Admiral, and concerted with him a plan of operations for the allied forces. Thefleet was to enter the harbour, and land the troops of his ChristianMajesty on the west side of the island, a little to the north ofDyer's island. The Americans were to land at the same time on theopposite coast, under cover of the guns of a frigate. 

Although the appearance of the French fleet had animated the wholecountry, and had produced a considerable degree of alacrity for theservice; although the success of the enterprise essentially dependedon maintaining a superiority at sea, which there was much reason toapprehend would soon be wrested from them; yet such are the delaysinseparable from measures to bring husbandmen into the field assoldiers, that the operations against Newport were suspended forseveral days on this account. 

[Sidenote: August 8. ]

As the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts approached, GeneralSullivan joined General Greene at Tiverton, and it was agreed with theAdmiral that the fleet should enter the main channel immediately, andthat the descent should be made the succeeding day. The ships of warpassed the British batteries and entered the harbour, withoutreceiving or doing any considerable damage. 

The militia not arriving precisely at the time they were expected, General Sullivan could not hazard the movement which had beenconcerted, and stated to the Count the necessity of postponing it tillthe next day. Meanwhile, the preparations for the descent beingperceived, General Pigot drew the troops which had been stationed onthe north end of the island into the lines at Newport. 

[Sidenote: August 9. ]

On discovering this circumstance the next morning, Sullivan determinedto avail himself of it, and to take immediate possession of the workswhich had been abandoned. The whole army crossed the east passage, andlanded on the north end of Rhode Island. This movement gave greatoffence to the Admiral, who resented the indelicacy supposed to havebeen committed by Sullivan in landing before the French, and withoutconsulting him. 

Unfortunately, some difficulties, on subjects of mere punctilio, hadpreviously arisen. The Count D'Estaing was a land as well as seaofficer; and held the high rank of lieutenant general in the serviceof France. Sullivan being only a major general, some misunderstandingon this delicate point had been apprehended; and General Washingtonhad suggested to him the necessity of taking every precaution to avoidit. This, it was supposed, had been effected in their firstconference, in which it was agreed that the Americans should landfirst, after which the French should land, to be commanded by theCount D'Estaing in person. The motives for this arrangement are notstated; but it was most probably made solely with a view to thesuccess of the enterprise. Either his own after-reflections or thesuggestions of others dissatisfied the Count with it, and he insistedthat the descent should be made on both sides of the island preciselyat the same instant, and that one wing of the American army should beattached to the French, and land with them. He also declinedcommanding in person, and wished the Marquis de Lafayette to takecharge of the French troops as well as of the Americans attached tothem. 

It being feared that this alteration of the plan might endanger bothits parts, D'Estaing was prevailed on to reduce his demand from onewing of the American army to one thousand militia. When, afterwards, General Sullivan crossed over into the island before the time to whichhe had himself postponed the descent, and without giving previousnotice to the Count of this movement, some suspicions seem to havebeen excited, that the measure was taken with other views than wereavowed, and no inconsiderable degree of excitement was manifested. TheCount refused to answer Sullivan's letter, and charged LieutenantColonel Fleury, who delivered it, with being more an American than aFrenchman. 

At this time a British fleet appeared, which, after sailing close intothe land, and communicating with General Pigot, withdrew somedistance, and came to anchor off point Judith, just without the narrowinlet leading into the harbour. 

After it had been ascertained that the destination of the CountD'Estaing was America, he was followed by a squadron of twelve shipsof the line under Admiral Byron, who was designed to relieve LordHowe, that nobleman having solicited his recall. The vessels composingthis squadron meeting with weather unusually bad for the season, andbeing separated in different storms, arrived, after lingering througha tedious passage, in various degrees of distress, on different andremote parts of the American coast. Between the departure of D'Estaingfrom the Hook on the 23d of July, and the 30th of that month, fourships of sixty-four and fifty guns arrived at Sandy Hook. 

This addition to the British fleet, though it left Lord Howeconsiderably inferior to the Count D'Estaing, determined him toattempt the relief of Newport. He sailed from New York on the 6th ofAugust; and, on the 9th, appeared in sight of the French fleet, beforeintelligence of his departure could be received by the Admiral. 

[Sidenote: Sails to attack Lord Howe, who appears off Rhode Island. ]

[Sidenote: August 10. ]

At the time of his arrival the wind set directly into the harbour, sothat it was impossible to get out of it; but it shifted suddenly tothe north-east the next morning, and the Count determined to stand outto sea, and give battle. Previous to leaving port, he informed GeneralSullivan that, on his return, he would land his men as that officershould advise. 

Not choosing to give the advantage of the weather-gage, Lord Howe alsoweighed anchor and stood out to sea. He was followed by D'Estaing;and both fleets were soon out of sight. 

The militia were now arrived; and Sullivan's army amounted to tenthousand men. Some objections were made by Lafayette to his commencingoperations before the return of D'Estaing. That officer advised thatthe army should be advanced to a position in the neighbourhood ofNewport, but should not break ground until the Count should be inreadiness to act in concert with them. It was extremely desirable toavoid whatever might give offence to the great ally on whoseassistance so much depended; but time was deemed of such importance toan army which could not be kept long together, that this advice wasoverruled, and it was determined to commence the siege immediately. 

[Sidenote: August 12. ]

[Sidenote: Fifteenth. ]

[Sidenote: General Sullivan lays siege to Newport. ]

Before this determination could be executed, a furious storm blew downall the tents, rendered the arms unfit for immediate use, and greatlydamaged the ammunition, of which fifty rounds had just been deliveredto each man. The soldiers, having no shelter, suffered extremely; andseveral perished in the storm, which continued three days. On thereturn of fair weather the siege was commenced, and continued withoutany material circumstance for several days. 

As no intelligence had been received from the Admiral, the situationof the American army was becoming very critical. On the evening ofthe 19th, their anxieties were relieved for a moment by thereappearance of the French fleet. 

[Sidenote: Both fleets dispersed by a storm. ]

The two Admirals, desirous the one of gaining, and the other ofretaining the advantage of the wind, had employed two days inmanoeuvring, without coming to action. Towards the close of thesecond, they were on the point of engaging, when they were separatedby the violent storm which had been felt so severely on shore, andwhich dispersed both fleets. Some single vessels afterwards fell inwith each other, but no important capture was made; and both fleetsretired in a very shattered condition, the one to the harbour of NewYork, and the other to that of Newport. 

[Sidenote: D'Estaing returns to Newport, and against the solicitationsof Sullivan, sails for Boston. ]

A letter was immediately despatched by D'Estaing to Sullivan, informing him that, in pursuance of orders from the King, and of theadvice of all his officers, he had taken the resolution to carry thefleet to Boston. His instructions directed him to sail for Bostonshould his fleet meet with any disaster, or should a superior Britishfleet appear on the coast. 

This communication threw Sullivan and his army into despair. GeneralGreene and the Marquis de Lafayette were directed to wait on theAdmiral with a letter from Sullivan remonstrating against thisresolution, and to use their utmost endeavors to induce him to changeit. 

They represented to him the certainty of carrying the garrison if hewould co-operate with them only two days, urged the impolicy ofexposing the fleet at sea, in its present condition, represented theport of Boston as equally insecure with that of Newport, and addedthat the expedition had been undertaken on condition that the Frenchfleet and army should co-operate with them; that confiding in thisco-operation, they had brought stores into the island to a greatamount, and that to abandon the enterprise in the present state ofthings, would be a reproach and disgrace to their arms. To be desertedat such a critical moment would have a pernicious influence on theminds of the American people, and would furnish their domestic foes, as well as the common enemy, with the means of animadverting severelyon their prospects from an alliance with those who could abandon themunder circumstances such as the present. They concluded with wishingthat the utmost harmony and confidence might subsist between the twonations, and especially between their officers; and entreated theAdmiral, if any personal indiscretions had appeared in conducting theexpedition, not to permit them to prejudice the common cause. 

Whatever impression these observations may have made on the Count, they could not change the determination he had formed. 

General Greene, in his representation of this conversation, statedthat the principal officers on board the fleet were the enemies ofD'Estaing. He was properly a land officer, and they were dissatisfiedwith his appointment in the navy. Determined to thwart his measures, and to prevent, as far as could be justified, his achieving anybrilliant exploit, they availed themselves of the letter of hisinstructions, and unanimously persevered in advising him to relinquishthe enterprise, and sail for Boston. He could not venture, with suchinstructions, to act against their unanimous opinion; and, althoughpersonally disposed to re-enter the harbour, declined doing so, andsailed from the island. 

On the return of Greene and Lafayette, Sullivan made yet anothereffort to retain the fleet. He addressed a second letter to theAdmiral, pressing him, in any event, to leave his land forces. Thebearer of this letter was also charged with a protest signed by allthe general officers in Rhode Island except Lafayette, the only effectof which was to irritate D'Estaing, who proceeded, without delay, onhis voyage to Boston. 

[Sidenote: In consequence of the departure of the French fleet, Sullivan raises the siege of Newport. ]

Thus abandoned by the fleet, Sullivan called a council of generalofficers, who were in favour of attempting an assault if five thousandvolunteers who had seen nine months service could be obtained for theenterprise; but the departure of the fleet had so discouraged themilitia, that this number could not be procured; and, in a few days, the army was reduced by desertion to little more than five thousandmen. As the British were estimated at six thousand, it was determinedto raise the siege, and retire to the north end of the island, thereto fortify, and wait the result of another effort to induce D'Estaingto return. 

[Sidenote: August 28. ]

In the night of the 28th, the army retired by two roads leading to theworks on the north end of the island, having its rear covered byColonels Livingston and Laurens, who commanded light parties on each. 

[Sidenote: August 29. ]

Early next morning the retreat was discovered by the British, whofollowed in two columns, and were engaged on each road by Livingstonand Laurens, who retreated slowly and kept up the action with skilland spirit until the English were brought into the neighbourhood ofthe main body of the Americans, drawn up in order of battle on theground of their encampment. The British formed on Quaker Hill, a verystrong piece of ground, something more than a mile in front of theAmerican line. 

[Sidenote: Action between Sullivan and the British army. ]

Sullivan's rear was covered by strong works; and in his front, ratherto the right, was a redoubt. In this position, the two armiescannonaded each other for some time, and a succession of skirmisheswas kept up in front of both lines until about two in the afternoon, when the British advanced in force, attempted to turn the rightflank, and made demonstrations of an intention to carry the redoubt infront of the right wing. General Greene, who commanded that wing, advanced to its support, and a sharp engagement was continued forabout half an hour, when the British retreated to Quaker Hill. Thecannonade was renewed, and kept up intermingled with slightskirmishing until night. 

According to the return made by General Sullivan, his loss in killed, wounded and missing was two hundred and eleven. That of the British, as stated by General Pigot, amounted to two hundred and sixty. 

[Sidenote: August 30. ]

The next day, the cannonade was renewed, but neither army was inclinedto attack the other. The British waited for reinforcements, andSullivan had at length determined to retire from the island. 

The Commander-in-chief had observed some movements among the Britishtransports indicating the embarkation of troops, and had suggested toSullivan the necessity of securing his retreat. A fleet of transportssoon put to sea with a large body of troops, of which immediate noticewas given to Sullivan in a letter recommending his retreat to thecontinent. This reinforcement, which consisted of four thousand men, commanded by Sir Henry Clinton in person, was delayed by adverse windsuntil the letter of General Washington was received, and theresolution to evacuate the island was taken. The whole army passedover to the continent unobserved by the enemy, and disembarked aboutTiverton by two in the morning. 

[Sidenote: Sullivan retreats with his army to the continent. ]

Never was retreat more fortunate. Sir Henry Clinton arrived the nextday; and the loss of the American army would have been inevitable. 

[Sidenote: Sullivan, in one of his general orders, makes use ofexpressions which offend the count. ]

The complete success of this expedition had been confidentlyanticipated throughout America; and the most brilliant results hadbeen expected from the capture of so important a part of the Britisharmy as the garrison of Newport. The chagrin produced bydisappointment was proportioned to the exaltation of their hopes. Ingeneral orders issued by Sullivan, soon after the departure ofD'Estaing, he permitted some expressions to escape him which wereunderstood to impute to the Count D'Estaing, and to the French nation, an indisposition to promote the interests of the United States. Theseinsinuations wounded the feelings of the French officers, and added, in no small degree, to the resentments of the moment. In subsequentorders, the General sought to correct this indiscretion; and allegedthat he had been misunderstood by those who supposed him to blame theAdmiral, with whose orders he was unacquainted, and of whose conducthe was, consequently, unable to judge. He also stated explicitly theimportant aids America had received from France, aids of which heought not to be unmindful under any disappointment; and which shouldprevent a too sudden censure of any movement whatever. 

[Sidenote: Count D'Estaing expresses to congress his dissatisfactionwith General Sullivan. ]

The Count D'Estaing, on his part, addressed a letter to congresscontaining a statement of all the movements of his fleet subsequent toits arrival on the coast, in which his chagrin and irritation were butill concealed. 

In congress, after approving the conduct of Sullivan and his army, anindiscreet proposition was made to inquire into the causes of thefailure of the expedition; but this was set aside by the previousquestion. 

In the first moments of vexation and disappointment, General Sullivanhad addressed some letters to the governor of Rhode Island, complaining bitterly of being abandoned by the fleet. These despatcheswere transmitted by the governor to the speaker of the assembly, andwere on the point of being submitted publicly to the house, when theywere fortunately arrested by General Greene, who had been introducedon the floor, and placed by the side of the chair; and to whom theywere shown by the speaker. 

The discontent in New England generally, and in Boston particularly, was so great as to inspire fears that the means of repairing theFrench ships would not be supplied. To guard against the mischiefwhich might result from this temper, as well as for other objects, General Hancock had repaired from camp to Boston, and Lafayette hadfollowed him on a visit to D'Estaing. 

[Sidenote: General Washington labours to heal these discontents, inwhich he succeeds. ]

The consequences to be apprehended from this unavailing manifestationof ill temper, soon induced all reflecting men to exert themselves tocontrol it. In the commencement of its operation, General Washington, foreseeing the evils with which it was fraught, had laboured toprevent them. He addressed letters to General Sullivan, to GeneralHeath, who commanded at Boston, and to other individuals of influencein New England, urging the necessity of correcting the intemperance ofthe moment, and of guarding against the interference of passion withthe public interest. 

Soon after the transmission of these letters, he received a resolutionof congress, directing him to take every measure in his power toprevent the publication of the protest entered into by the officers ofSullivan's army. In his letter communicating this resolution, he said, "the disagreement between the army under your command and the fleet, has given me very singular uneasiness. The continent at large isconcerned in our cordiality, and it should be kept up by all possiblemeans, consistent with our honour and policy. First impressions, youknow, are generally longest retained, and will serve to fix, in agreat degree, our national character with the French. In our conducttowards them, we should remember that they are a people old in war, very strict in military etiquette, and apt to take fire when othersscarcely seem warm. Permit me to recommend in the most particularmanner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and yourendeavours to destroy that ill humour which may have found its wayamong the officers. It is of the utmost importance too, that thesoldiers and the people should know nothing of this misunderstanding, or, if it has reached them, that means may be used to stop itsprogress, and prevent its effects. " In a letter to General Greene, after expressing his fears that the seeds of dissension and distrustmight be sown between the troops of the two nations, he added, "Idepend much on your temper and influence, to conciliate that animositywhich, I plainly perceive by a letter from the Marquis, subsistsbetween the American and French officers in our service. This, you maybe assured, will extend itself to the Count, and to the officers andmen of his whole fleet, should they return to Rhode Island, unless areconciliation shall have taken place. The Marquis speaks kindly of aletter from you to him on this subject. He will therefore take anyadvice from you in a friendly way; and, if he can be pacified, theother French gentlemen will, of course, be satisfied; since they lookup to him as their head. The Marquis grounds his complaint on ageneral order of the 24th of August, and upon the universal clamourthat prevailed against the French nation. 

"I beg you will take every measure to keep the protest entered into bythe general officers from being made public. Congress, sensible of theill consequences that will flow from our differences being known tothe world, have passed a resolve to that purpose. Upon the whole, mydear sir, you can conceive my meaning, [9] better than I can expressit, and I therefore fully depend on your exerting yourself to heal allprivate animosities between our principal officers and the French, andto prevent all illiberal expressions and reflections that may fallfrom the army at large. "

[Footnote 9: Alluding, it is presumed, to the delicacy of suggestingto General Sullivan the mischief to be apprehended from anyintemperate expressions. ]

The General also seized the first opportunity to recommence hiscorrespondence with the Count; and his letters, without noticing thedisagreement which had taken place, were calculated to soothe everyangry sensation which might have been excited. A letter from theadmiral stating the whole transaction, was answered by GeneralWashington in a manner so perfectly satisfactory, that the irritationwhich threatened such serious mischief, appears to have entirelysubsided. 

Congress also, in a resolution which was made public, expressed theirperfect approbation of the conduct of the Count, and directed thepresident to assure him, in the letter which should transmit it, thatthey entertained the highest sense of his zeal and attachment. 

These prudent and temperate measures restored harmony to the alliedarmies. 

[Sidenote: Lord Howe resigns command of the British fleet. ]

The storm under which the French fleet had suffered so severely didconsiderable damage also to that of Lord Howe. The British, however, had sustained less injury than the French, and were soon in acondition to put again to sea. Having received information that theCount D'Estaing had made for Boston, Lord Howe sailed for the sameport, in the hope of reaching it before him. But in this he wasdisappointed. On entering the bay he found the French fleet already inNantasket Road, where such judicious dispositions had been made forits defence, that he relinquished the idea of attacking it, andreturned to New York; where he resigned the command to AdmiralGambier, who was to retain it till the arrival of Admiral Byron. 

Finding that General Sullivan had retreated to the continent, SirHenry Clinton returned to New York, leaving the command of the troopson board the transports with Major General Gray, who was directed toconduct an expedition to the eastward, as far as Buzzards bay. 

[Sidenote: September 5. ]

Gray entered Acushnet River, where he destroyed a number of privateerswith their prizes, and some merchant vessels. He also reduced part ofthe towns of Bedford and Fairhaven to ashes, in which some militaryand naval stores had been collected. The troops re-embarked the nextday, before the militia could be assembled in sufficient force tooppose them, and sailed to Martha's Vineyard, where they destroyedseveral vessels, and some salt works, and levied a heavy contributionof live stock on the inhabitants. 

While so large a detachment from the British army was depredating thecoasts of New England, preparations were making in New York for somedistant expedition; and many were of opinion that the French fleet wasits object. To be in readiness to oppose a combined attack by sea andland on the fleet, General Gates was directed with three brigades, toproceed by easy marches as far as Danbury, in Connecticut. AndWashington moved northward to Fredericksburg; while General Putnam wasdetached with two brigades to the neighbourhood of West Point, andGeneral M'Dougal, with two others, to join General Gates at Danbury. 

[Sidenote: September 22. ]

Soon after the return of General Gray from New England, the Britisharmy moved up the North River on each side in great force. The columnon the west side, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, consisting of aboutfive thousand men, took a position with its right on the river, andits left extending to Newbridge, on the Hackensack; while the otherdivision, which was commanded by General Knyphausen, consisting ofabout three thousand men, was advanced about the same distance on theeast side of the Hudson. The command of the river enabled these twocolumns to communicate freely with each other; and, at any time, toreunite. Although General Washington conjectured that this movementwas made for the purpose of foraging, yet it was possible that thepasses in the Highlands might be its object; and orders were given tothe detachments on the lines to hold themselves in readiness toanticipate the execution of such a design. 

Colonel Baylor, with his regiment of cavalry, had crossed theHackensack early in the morning of the 27th of September, and takenquarters at Taupaun, or Herringtown, a small village near New Taupaun, where some militia were posted. Immediate notice of his position wasgiven to Lord Cornwallis, who formed a plan to surprise and cut offboth the cavalry and militia. The party designed to act againstColonel Baylor was commanded by General Gray, and that against themilitia, by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell. 

[Sidenote: September 28. ]

[Sidenote: Colonel Baylor's regiment surprised. ]

That part of the plan which was to be executed by Campbell wasdefeated by delays in passing the river, during which a deserter gavenotice of his approach, and the militia saved themselves by flight. But the corps commanded by General Gray, guided by some of the countrypeople, eluded the patrols, got into the rear of the sergeant's guardwhich had been posted at a bridge over the Hackensack, cut it offwithout alarming Baylor, and completely surprised his whole regiment. The British troops rushed into a barn where the Americans slept; and, refusing to give quarter, bayoneted for a time all they saw. Of onehundred and four privates, sixty-seven were killed, wounded, andtaken. The number of prisoners, amounting to about forty, is stated tohave been increased by the humanity of one of Gray's captains, who, notwithstanding his orders, gave quarter to the whole of the fourthtroop. Colonel Baylor and Major Clough, who were both wounded with thebayonet, the first dangerously, the last mortally, were among theprisoners. 

[Sidenote: September 30. ]

[Sidenote: Captain Donop, with his corps, attacked by Colonel Butler, and defeated. ]

Three days after this affair, Colonel Richard Butler, with adetachment of infantry, assisted by Major Lee with a part of hiscavalry, fell in with a small party of chasseurs and yagers underCaptain Donop, which he instantly charged, and, without the loss of aman, killed ten on the spot, and took the officer commanding thechasseur, and eighteen of the yagers, prisoners. Only the extremeroughness of the country, which impeded the action of the cavalry, andprevented part of the infantry from coming up, enabled a man of theenemy to escape. Some interest was taken at the time in this smallaffair, because it seemed, in some measure, to revenge the loss ofColonel Baylor. 

After completing their forage, the British army returned to New York. 

[Sidenote: Expedition of the British against Egg Harbour. ]

This movement had been, in part, designed to cover an expeditionagainst Little Egg Harbour, which was completely successful; and theworks and store-houses at the place, as well as the merchandise andvessels, were entirely destroyed. 

[Sidenote: Pulaski surprised, and his infantry cut off. ]

It has been already stated that Count Pulaski had been appointedgeneral of the American cavalry. The dissatisfaction given by thisappointment to the officers, had induced him to resign his commission;but, thirsting for military fame, and zealous in the American cause, he obtained permission to raise a legionary corps, which he officeredchiefly with foreigners, and commanded in person. In this corps, oneJuliet, a deserter, had been admitted as an officer. The Count hadbeen ordered to march from Trenton towards Little Egg Harbour, and waslying eight or ten miles from the coast, when this Juliet againdeserted, carrying with him intelligence of Pulaski's strength andsituation. A plan was formed to surprise him, which succeededcompletely so far as respected his infantry, who were put to thebayonet. The British accounts of this expedition assert that the wholecorps was destroyed. Pulaski stated his loss at about forty; andaverred that on coming up with his cavalry to the relief of hisinfantry, he repulsed the enemy. It is probable that the one accountdiminishes the importance of this enterprise as much as the othermagnifies it. 

[Sidenote: October 12. ]

Admiral Byron reached New York, and took command of the fleet aboutthe middle of September. After repairing his shattered vessels, hesailed for the port of Boston. Soon after his arrival in the bay, fortune disconcerted all his plans. A furious storm drove him out tosea, and damaged his fleet so much that he found it necessary to putinto the port of Rhode Island to refit. This favourable moment wasseized by the Count D'Estaing, who sailed, on the 3d of November, forthe West Indies. 

Thus terminated an expedition from which the most important advantageshad been anticipated. A variety of accidents had defeated plansjudiciously formed, which had every probability in their favour. 

The Marquis de Lafayette, ambitious of fame on another theatre, wasdesirous of returning to France. Expecting war on the continent ofEurope, he was anxious to tender his services to his king, and to hisnative country. 

From motives of real friendship as well as of policy, GeneralWashington was desirous of preserving the connexion of this officerwith the army, and of strengthening his attachment to America. Hetherefore expressed to congress his wish that Lafayette, instead ofresigning his commission, might have unlimited leave of absence, toreturn when it should be convenient to himself; and might carry withhim every mark of the confidence of the government. 

This policy was adopted by congress in its full extent. The partialityof America for Lafayette was well placed. Never did a foreigner, whoseprimary attachments to his own country remained undiminished, feelmore solicitude for the welfare of another, than was unceasinglymanifested by this young nobleman, for the United States. 

There being no prospect of an active winter campaign in the northernor middle states, and the climate admitting of military operationselsewhere, a detachment from the British army, consisting of fivethousand men commanded by Major General Grant, sailed, early inNovember, under a strong convoy, for the West India Islands; and, towards the end of the same month, another embarkation was made forthe southern parts of the continent. This second detachment wascommanded by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who was escorted byCommodore Hyde Parker, and was destined to act against the southernstates. 

[Sidenote: December. ]

As a force sufficient for the defence of New York yet remained, theAmerican army retired into winter quarters. The main body was cantonedin Connecticut, on both sides the North River, about West Point, andat Middlebrook. Light troops were stationed nearer the lines; and thecavalry were drawn into the interior to recruit the horses for thenext campaign. The distribution, the protection of the country, thesecurity of important points, and a cheap and convenient supply ofprovisions, were consulted. 

The troops again wintered in huts; but they were accustomed to thismode of passing that inclement season. Though far from being wellclothed, their condition in that respect was so much improved bysupplies from France, that they disregarded the inconveniences towhich they were exposed. 

CHAPTER III. 

 Arrival of the British commissioners.... Terms of conciliation proposed.... Answer of congress to their propositions.... Attempts of Mr. Johnson to bribe some members of congress.... His private letters ordered to be published.... Manifesto of the commissioners, and counter-manifesto of congress.... Arrival of Monsieur Girard, minister plenipotentiary of France.... Hostilities of the Indians.... Irruption into the Wyoming settlement.... Battle of Wyoming.... Colonel Dennison capitulates for the inhabitants.... Distress of the settlement.... Colonel Clarke surprises St. Vincent.... Congress determines to invade Canada.... General Washington opposes the measure.... Induces congress to abandon it. 

[Sidenote: 1778]

About the time that Commodore Parker sailed for the southernstates, the commissioners appointed to give effect to the lateconciliatory acts of Parliament, embarked for Europe. They had exertedtheir utmost powers to effect the object of their mission, but withoutsuccess. Great Britain required that the force of the two nationsshould be united under one common sovereign; and America was no longerdisposed, or even at liberty to accede to this condition. All thoseaffections, which parts of the same empire should feel for each other, had been eradicated by a distressing war; the great body of the peoplewere determined, at every sacrifice, to maintain their independence;and the treaty with France had pledged the honour and the faith ofthe nation, never to consent to a reunion with the British empire. 

[Sidenote: Arrival of the British commissioners. ]

[Sidenote: Terms of conciliation proposed. ]

The commissioners arrived in Philadelphia while that place was yet inpossession of their army, and are understood to have brought positiveorders for its evacuation. Their arrival was immediately announced toGeneral Washington by Sir Henry Clinton, who was joined with them inthe commission, and a passport was requested for their secretary, Doctor Ferguson, as the bearer of their first despatches to congress. The Commander-in-chief declined granting this passport until he shouldreceive the instructions of his government; on which a letteraddressed "To the president and other the members of congress, " wasforwarded in the usual manner. Copies of their commission, and of theacts of Parliament on which it was founded, together with propositionsconforming to those acts, drawn in the most conciliatory language, were transmitted with this letter. 

[Sidenote: Answer of Congress to these propositions. ]

Some observations having been introduced into it reflecting on theconduct of France, [10] the reading was interrupted, and a motion madeto proceed no farther in consequence of this offensive language to hismost Christian Majesty. This motion producing some debate, anadjournment was moved and carried. When congress reassembled, thewarmth of the preceding day had not entirely subsided; but, afterseveral ineffectual motions to prevent it, the letter was read andcommitted. The answer which was reported by the committee, andtransmitted to the commissioners, declared that "nothing but anearnest desire to spare the farther effusion of human blood, couldhave induced them to read a paper containing expressions sodisrespectful to his most Christian Majesty, the good and great allyof these states, or to consider propositions so derogatory to thehonour of an independent nation. 

[Footnote 10: The offensive words were "insidious interposition of apower which has, from the first settlement of the colonies, beenactuated with enmity to us both; and notwithstanding the pretendeddate or present form of the French offers. "]

"That the acts of the British Parliament, the commission from theirsovereign, and their letter, supposed the people of the United Statesto be subjects of the crown of Great Britain, and were founded on theidea of dependence, which is totally inadmissible. 

"That congress was inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjustclaims from which this was originated, and the savage manner in whichit was conducted. They would therefore be ready to enter upon theconsideration of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent withtreaties already subsisting, when the King of Great Britain shoulddemonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solidproof of this disposition would be an explicit acknowledgment of theindependence of these states, or the withdrawing his fleets andarmies. "

[Sidenote: July 13. ]

On the 13th of July, after arriving at New York, the commissionersaddressed a second letter to congress, expressing their regrets thatany difficulties were raised which must prolong the calamities of war;and reviewing the letter of congress in terms well calculated to makean impression on those who had become weary of the contest, and torevive ancient prejudices in favour of England and against France. 

This letter being read, congress resolved that, as neither theindependence of the United States was explicitly acknowledged, nor thefleets and armies withdrawn, no answer should be given to it. 

It would seem that the first letter of congress must have convincedthe British commissioners that no hope could be indulged of restoringpeace on any other terms than the independence of the United States. Congress must have been equally certain that the commissioners werenot empowered to acknowledge that independence, or to direct thefleets and armies of Great Britain to be withdrawn. The intercoursebetween them therefore, after the first communications were exchanged, and all subsequent measures, became a game of skill, in which theparties played for the affections and passions of the people; and wasno longer a diplomatic correspondence, discussing the interests of twogreat nations with the hope of accommodation. 

[Sidenote: Attempts of Mr. Johnson to bribe influential members ofcongress. ]

The first packet addressed by the commissioners to congress, containedseveral private letters, written by Governor Johnson to members ofthat body, in which he blended, with flattering expressions of respectfor their characters and their conduct, assurances of the honours andemoluments to which those would be entitled who should contribute torestore peace and harmony to the two countries and to terminate thepresent war. 

[Sidenote: Congress orders the publication of the private lettersfrom Johnson to the members of that body. ]

A few days before the receipt of the letter of the 13th of July, congress passed a resolution requiring that all letters of a publicnature received by any member from any subject of the British crown, should be laid before them. In compliance with this resolution, theletters of Governor Johnson were produced; and, some time afterwards, Mr. Read stated, in his place, a direct offer which had been made himby a third person, of a considerable sum of money, and of any officein the gift of the crown, as an inducement to use his influence forthe restoration of harmony between the two countries. Congressdetermined to communicate these circumstances to the American people, and made a solemn declaration, in which, after reciting the offensiveparagraphs of the private letters, and the conversation stated by Mr. Read, they expressed their opinion "that these were direct attempts tocorrupt and bribe the congress of the United States, and that it wasincompatible with their honour to hold any manner of correspondenceor intercourse with the said George Johnson, Esquire, especially tonegotiate with him upon affairs in which the cause of liberty isinterested. " After an unsuccessful attempt to involve the othercommissioners in the same exclusion, this declaration was transmittedto them while they were expecting an answer to a remonstrance on thedetention of the army of General Burgoyne. 

On receiving it, Mr. Johnson withdrew from the commission, declaringthat he should be happy to find congress inclined to retract theirformer declaration, and to negotiate with others on terms equallyconducive to the happiness of both countries. This declaration wasaccompanied by one signed by the other commissioners, in which, without admitting the construction put by congress on his letters, orthe authority of the person who held the conversation with Mr. Read, they denied all knowledge of those letters or of that conversation. They at the same time detailed the advantages to be derived by Americafrom the propositions they had made, "advantages, " they added, "decidedly superior to any which could be expected from an unnaturalalliance with France, only entered into by that nation for the purposeof prolonging the war, after the full knowledge on their part of theliberal terms intended to be offered by Great Britain. " With thisdeclaration was transmitted a copy of the former remonstrance[11]against the detention of the convention troops, without the signatureof Governor Johnson, and an extract from the instructions given by theSecretary of State to Sir Henry Clinton, authorizing him to demand, inexpress terms, a performance of the convention made with GeneralBurgoyne, and, if required, to renew and ratify all its conditions inthe name of the king. 

[Footnote 11: Some expressions having been used in the letter, respecting the convention troops, which were deemed disrespectful, noother reply was made to it than that "congress gave no answer toinsolent letters. "]

All the publications of the British commissioners indicate an opinionthat they could be more successful with the people than with congress;and, not unfrequently betray the desire that the constituents of thatbody might be enabled to decide on the measures taken by theirrepresentatives. 

On the part of congress, it was decreed of the utmost importance tokeep the public mind correct, and to defeat all attempts to makeunfavourable impressions on it. Several members of that body enteredthe lists as disputants, and employed their pens with ability andsuccess, as well in serious argument, as in rousing the variouspassions which influence the conduct of men. The attempt to accomplishthe object of the mission by corruption was wielded with great effect;and it was urged with equal force that should the United States nowbreak their faith with France, and treat on the footing of dependence, they would sacrifice all credit with foreign nations, would beconsidered by all as faithless and infamous, and would forfeit allpretensions to future aid from abroad; after which the terms nowoffered might be retracted, and the war be recommenced. To theserepresentations were added the certainty of independence, and thegreat advantages which must result from its establishment. The lettersof the commissioners were treated as attempts to sow divisions amongthe people of which they might afterwards avail themselves, and thuseffect by intrigue, what had been found unattainable by arms. 

These essays were read with avidity, and seem to have produced all theeffect which was expected from them among the friends of therevolution. 

[Sidenote: October 8. ]

[Sidenote: Manifesto of the commissioners, and counter-manifestos bycongress. ]

The commissioners appear still to have cherished the hope, that acomplete knowledge of the terms they had offered, operating on thedisappointment of the extravagant hopes which had been founded on thearrival of a French fleet, would make a great impression on a largeportion of the American people. This opinion induced them, beforetheir departure, to publish a manifesto, addressed, not only tocongress, but to all the provincial assemblies, and all theinhabitants of the colonies of whatever denomination, brieflyrecapitulating the several steps they had taken to accomplish theobject of their mission, and the refusal of congress even to open aconference with them. They declared their readiness still to proceedin the execution of the powers contained in their commission, and totreat either with deputies from all the colonies conjointly, or withany provincial assembly or convention individually, at any time withinthe space of forty days from the date of their manifesto. They alsoproclaimed a general pardon for all treasons and rebellious practicescommitted at any time previous to the date of their manifesto, to suchas should, within the term of forty days, withdraw from theiropposition to the British government, and conduct themselves asfaithful and loyal subjects. To enable all persons to avail themselvesof this proffered pardon, thirteen copies of the manifesto wereexecuted, one of which was transmitted by a flag of truce to eachstate. A vast number of copies were printed, and great exertions weremade by flags and other means to disperse them among the people. 

On being informed of these proceedings, congress, without hesitation, adopted the course which the government of an independent nation isbound to pursue, when attempts are made by a foreign power to opennegotiations with unauthorized individuals. They declared the measure"to be contrary to the law of nations, and utterly subversive of thatconfidence which could alone maintain those means which had beeninvented to alleviate the horrors of war; and, therefore, that thepersons employed to distribute such papers, were not entitled to theprotection of a flag. " They recommended it to the executivedepartments in the respective states, "to secure, in close custody, every person who, under the sanction of a flag, or otherwise, wasfound employed in circulating those manifestoes. " At the same time, toshow that these measures were not taken for the purpose ofconcealment, they directed a publication of the manifesto in theAmerican papers. Care, however, was taken to accompany it withcomments made by individuals, calculated to counteract its effect. Avessel containing a cargo of these papers being wrecked on the coast, the officers and crew were made prisoners; and the requisition ofAdmiral Gambier for their release, in consequence of the privilegeafforded by his flag, was answered by a declaration that they hadforfeited that privilege by being charged with seditious papers. 

[Sidenote: October 30. ]

Not long after the publication of this paper, a counter-manifesto wasissued by congress, in which, after touching on subjects which mightinfluence the public mind, they "solemnly declare and proclaim, thatif their enemies presume to execute their threats, or persist in theirpresent course of barbarity, they will take such exemplary vengeanceas shall deter others from a like conduct. "

Thus ended this fruitless attempt to restore a connexion which hadbeen wantonly broken, the reinstatement of which had becomeimpracticable. With the war, and with independence, a course ofopinion had prevailed in America, which not only opposed greatobstacles to a reunion of the two countries under one commonsovereign, but, by substituting discordant materials in the place ofthe cement which formerly bound them together, rendered such an eventundesirable even to the British themselves. The time was arrived whenthe true interest of that nation required the relinquishment of anexpensive war, the object of which was unattainable, and which, ifattained, could not be long preserved; and the establishment of thoseamicable relations which reciprocal interests produce betweenindependent states, capable of being serviceable to each other by afair and equal interchange of good offices. 

This opinion, however, was not yet embraced by the cabinet of London;and great exertions were still to be made for the reannexation of theAmerican states to the British empire. Even the opposition was notunited against a continuance of the war for the object now proposed;and the Earl of Chatham, who had endeavoured first to prevent theconflict, and afterwards to produce conciliation, closed his splendidlife in unavailing efforts to prevent that dismemberment which hadbecome inevitable. [12]

[Footnote 12: The author has been favoured by his estimable friend, Major General Scott, with the perusal of an introduction written byMr. L. De Sevelinges, to Botta's "History of the war of theindependence of the United States of America, " translated into French. 

Mr. De Sevelinges professes to have received the most preciousexplanations, relative to incidents and motives, from a gentlemanequally distinguished for his knowledge and his character, whosesituation enabled him to become acquainted with facts which wereconcealed from the public. Speaking of the attempt made by Mr. Johnson, he says, p. 19, it was essential "to break off allcommunication with the agents of the British minister. Mr. Girarddirected all his efforts to this object, and had the good fortune toeffect it. 

"But the English faction of tories subsisted. It was powerful from thecredit of its chiefs. "

In a note on this passage, he says, "The most influential were SamuelAdams and Richard Lee, (Richard H. Lee, ) the brother of Arthur Lee, one of the deputies of congress in France. He was convicted of havingsecret intelligence with the British minister. "

It would be injustice to the memoirs of these distinguished patriotsto attempt their vindication against this atrocious and unfoundedcalumny. A calumny supported by no testimony, nor by a singlecircumstance wearing even the semblance of probability, and confutedby the whole tenour of their lives. The annals of the Americanrevolution do not furnish two names more entirely above suspicion thanSamuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee. With the first gentleman theauthor was not personally acquainted. With the last he was; and canappeal with confidence to every man who knew him, to declare theconviction, that he died as he lived, a pure and devoted, as well asenlightened friend of American independence. The same character wasmaintained by Mr. Adams. 

In casting about for the foundation of this calumny, the author isinclined to look for it in the opinions entertained by thesegentlemen, on subjects connected with the negotiations for peace. 

Since the publication of the secret journals of congress, it isgenerally known that France countenanced the claim of Spain tocircumscribe the western boundary of the United States, by the lineprescribed in the royal proclamation of 1763, for settlement of vacantlands. After Great Britain had consented to acknowledge theindependence of the United States, it was understood by those who wereacquainted with the views of the belligerents, that a dispositionexisted on the part of France and Spain, to continue the war forobjects in which the United States felt no interest, --among others, for Gibraltar and Jamaica. Some American statesmen, and the Lees wereof the number, probably Mr. Adams also, were extremely apprehensivethat the miseries of their country would be prolonged for theseobjects. It is not impossible that the sentiments of these gentlemenon these subjects, being in opposition to the views of France, might, though founded entirely in American policy, be attributed to Britishintrigues. ]

[Sidenote: July 14. ]

[Sidenote: Arrival of Girard, minister plenipotentiary from the Kingof France. ]

In the midst of these transactions with the commissioners of GreatBritain, the Sieur Girard arrived at Philadelphia, in the character ofMinister Plenipotentiary of his Most Christian Majesty. 

The joy produced by this event was unbounded; and he was received bycongress with great pomp. 

While these diplomatic concerns employed the American cabinet, andwhile the war seemed to languish on the Atlantic, it raged to the westin its most savage form. 

[Sidenote: June 11. ]

The difficulties which the inability of the American government tofurnish the neighbouring Indians with those European articles whichthey were accustomed to use, opposed to all the efforts of congress topreserve their friendship, have already been noticed. Early in 1778, there were many indications of a general disposition among thosesavages to make war on the United States; and the frontiers, from theMohawk to the Ohio, were threatened with the tomahawk and the scalpingknife. Every representation from that country supported the opinionthat a war with the Indians should never be defensive; and that, toobtain peace, it must be carried into their own country. Detroit, whose governor was believed to have been particularly active inexciting hostilities, was understood to be in a defenceless condition;and congress resolved on an expedition against that place. Thisenterprise was entrusted to General M'Intosh, who commanded atPittsburg, and was to be carried on with three thousand men, chieflymilitia, to be drawn from Virginia. To facilitate its success, theresolution was also taken to enter the country of the Senecas at thesame time, by the way of the Mohawk. The officer commanding on theeast of the Hudson was desired to take measures for carrying thisresolution into execution; and the commissioners for Indian affairs, at Albany, were directed to co-operate with him. 

Unfortunately, the acts of the government did not correspond with thevigour of its resolutions. The necessary preparations were not made, and the inhabitants of the frontiers remained without sufficientprotection, until the plans against them were matured, and the stormwhich had been long gathering, burst upon them with a fury whichspread desolation wherever it reached. 

[Sidenote: Colonel John Butler, with a party of Indians, breaks intothe Wyoming settlement. ]

About three hundred white men, commanded by Colonel John Butler, andabout five hundred Indians, led by the Indian chief Brandt, who hadassembled in the north, marched late in June against the settlement ofWyoming. These troops embarked on the Chemung or Tyoga, anddescending the Susquehanna, landed at a place called the ThreeIslands, whence they marched about twenty miles, and crossing awilderness, and passing through a gap in the mountain, entered thevalley of Wyoming near its northern boundary. At this place a smallfort called Wintermoots had been erected, which fell into their handswithout resistance, and was burnt. The inhabitants who were capable ofbearing arms assembled on the first alarm at Forty fort, on the westside of the Susquehanna, four miles below the camp of the invadingarmy. 

The regular troops, amounting to about sixty, were commanded byColonel Zebulon Butler;[13] the militia by Colonel Dennison. ColonelButler was desirous of awaiting the arrival of a small reinforcementunder Captain Spalding, who had been ordered by General Washington tohis aid on the first intelligence of the danger which threatened thesettlement; but the militia generally, believing themselvessufficiently strong to repel the invading force, urged an immediatebattle so earnestly, that Colonel Butler yielded to theirremonstrances, and on the 3d of July marched from Forty fort at thehead of near four hundred men to attack the enemy. 

[Footnote 13: This gentleman is stated not to have been of the samefamily with the leader of the invading army. ]

The British and Indians were prepared to receive him. Their line wasformed a small distance in front of their camp, in a plain thinlycovered with pine, shrub oaks, and under growth, and extended from theriver about a mile to a marsh at the foot of the mountain. TheAmericans advanced in a single column, without interruption, untilthey approached the enemy, when they received a fire which did notmuch mischief. The line of battle[14] was instantly formed, and theaction commenced with spirit. The Americans rather gained ground onthe right where Colonel Butler commanded, until a large body ofIndians passing through the skirt of the marsh turned their leftflank, which was composed of militia, and poured a heavy and mostdestructive fire on their rear. The word "retreat" was pronounced bysome person, and the efforts of the officers to check it wereunavailing. The fate of the day was decided, and a flight commenced onthe left which was soon followed by the right. As soon as the line wasbroken, the Indians, throwing down their rifles and rushing upon themwith the tomahawk, completed the confusion. The attempt of ColonelButler and of the officers to restore order were unavailing, and thewhole line broke and fled in confusion. The massacre was general, andthe cries for mercy were answered by the tomahawk. Rather less thansixty men escaped, some to Forty fort, some by swimming the river, andsome to the mountain. A very few prisoners were made, only three ofwhom were preserved alive, who were carried to Niagara. 

[Footnote 14: The representation of this battle, and of thecircumstances attending the destruction of the Wyoming settlement, have been materially varied from the statement made of them in thefirst edition. The papers of General Washington furnished allusions tothe transaction, but no particular account of it. The author thereforerelied on Mr. Gordon and Mr. Ramsay, whose authority was quoted. Soonafter the work was published, he received a letter from a gentlemanthen residing in that country, (Mr. Charles Miner, ) who asserted withconfidence that the statement was incorrect, and gave himself a minutedetail of events, collected from persons who were in the settlement atthe time, and witnessed them. 

The author has been since indebted to the same gentleman for astatement of the battle, and of the events which followed it, drawn upby one of the descendants of Colonel Zebulon Butler, to which thecertificates of several gentlemen are annexed, who were engaged in theaction. These documents, with one which will be mentioned, convincehim that the combined treachery and savage ferocity which have beenpainted in such vivid colours, in the narratives that have been givenof this furious and desolating irruption, have been greatlyexaggerated. Historic truth demands that these misstatements should becorrected. 

The other document alluded to, is a letter from Zebulon Butler to theboard of war, making his report of the transaction. The letter hasbeen lately found among his papers, and is copied below. 

_Grandenhutten, Penn Township, July 10th, 1778. _

Honoured Sir, --On my arrival at Westmoreland, (which was only fourdays after I left Yorktown, ) I found there was a large body of theenemy advancing on that settlement. On the first of July we musteredthe militia, and marched towards them by the river above thesettlement, --found and killed two Indians at a place where the daybefore they had murdered nine men engaged in hoeing corn. We foundsome canoes, &c. But finding we were above their main body, it wasjudged prudent to return. And as every man had to go to his own housefor his provision, we could not muster again till the 3d of July. Inthe mean time, the enemy had got possession of two forts, one of whichwe had reason to believe was designed for them, though they burnt themboth. The inhabitants had seven forts for the security of their womenand children, extending about ten miles on the river, and too many menwould stay in them to take care of them; but after collecting aboutthree hundred of the most spirited of them, including Captain Hewitt'scompany, I held a council with the officers, who were all agreed thatit was best to attack the enemy before they got any farther. Weaccordingly marched, --found their situation, --formed a front of thesame extension of the enemy's, and attacked from right to left at thesame time. Our men stood the fire well for three or four shots, tillsome part of the enemy gave way; but unfortunately for us, throughsome mistake, the word _retreat_ was understood from some officer onthe left, which took so quick that it was not in the power of theofficers to form them again, though I believe, if they had stood threeminutes longer, the enemy would have been beaten. The utmost painswere taken by the officers, who mostly fell. A lieutenant colonel, amajor and five captains, who were in commission in the militia, allfell. Colonel Durkee, and Captains Hewitt and Ransom were likewisekilled. In the whole, about two hundred men lost their lives in theaction on our side. What number of the enemy were killed is yetuncertain, though I believe a very considerable number. The loss ofthese men so intimidated the inhabitants, that they gave up the matterof fighting. Great numbers ran off, and others would comply with theterms that I had refused. The enemy sent flags frequently--the termsyou will see in the enclosed letter. They repeatedly said they hadnothing to do with any but the inhabitants, and did not want to treatwith me. Colonel Dennison, by desire of the inhabitants, went andcomplied, --which made it necessary for me and the little remains ofCaptain Hewitt's company to leave the place. Indeed it was determinedby the enemy to spare the inhabitants after their agreement, and thatmyself and the few continental soldiers should be delivered up to thesavages. Upon which I left the place, and came scarcely able to move, as I have had no rest since I left Yorktown. It has not been in mypower to find a horse or man to wait on the board till now. I mustsubmit to the board what must be the next step. The little remains ofHewitt's company (which are about fifteen) are gone to Shamoken, andCaptain Spalding's company, I have heard, are on the Delaware. Severalhundred of the inhabitants are strolling in the country destitute ofprovisions, who have large fields of grain and other necessaries oflife at Westmoreland. In short, if the inhabitants can go back, theremay yet be saved double the quantity of provisions to supportthemselves, otherwise they must be beggars, and a burthen to theworld. 

I have heard from men that came from the place since the people gaveup, that the Indians have killed no person since, but have burnt mostof the buildings, and are collecting all the horses they can, and aremoving up the river. They likewise say the enemy were eight hundred, one-half white men. I should be glad that, if possible, there might bea sufficient guard sent for the defence of the place, which will bethe means of saving thousands from poverty--but must submit to thewisdom of congress. I desire farther orders from the honourable boardof war with respect to myself, and the soldiers under my direction. 

I have the honour to be

Your Honour's most obedient, humble servant, ZEBULON BUTLER. ]

[Sidenote: Colonel Dennison capitulates for the inhabitants. ]

Further resistance was impracticable, Colonel Dennison proposed termsof capitulation, which were granted to the inhabitants. It beingunderstood that no quarter would be allowed to the continental troops, Colonel Butler with his few surviving soldiers fled from the valley. 

[Sidenote: Distress of the settlement. ]

The inhabitants generally abandoned the country, and, in greatdistress, wandered into the settlements on the Lehigh and theDelaware. The Indians, as is the practice of savages, destroyed thehouses and improvements by fire, and plundered the country. Afterlaying waste the whole settlement, they withdrew from it before thearrival of the continental troops, who were detached to meet them. 

[Sidenote: July 15. ]

To cover every part of the United States would have required a muchgreater number of men than could be raised. Different districts weretherefore unavoidably exposed to the calamities ever to be experiencedby those into the bosom of whose country war is carried. The militiain every part of the Union, fatigued and worn out by repeated tours ofduty, required to be relieved by continental troops. Theirapplications were necessarily resisted; but the danger whichthreatened the western frontier had become so imminent; the appealmade by its sufferings to national feeling was so affecting, that itwas determined to spare a more considerable portion of the army forits defence, than had been allotted to that part of the Union, sincethe capture of Burgoyne. On the first intelligence of the destructionof Wyoming, the regiments of Hartley and Butler, with the remnant ofMorgan's corps, commanded by Major Posey, were detached to theprotection of that distressed country. They were engaged in severalsharp skirmishes, made separate incursions into the Indiansettlements, broke up their nearest villages, destroyed their corn, and by compelling them to retire to a greater distance, gave somerelief to the inhabitants. 

While the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania were thus sufferingthe calamities incident to savage warfare, a fate equally severe waspreparing for Virginia. The western militia of that state had madesome successful incursions into the country north-west of the Ohio, and had taken some British posts on the Mississippi. These wereerected in the county of Illinois; and a regiment of infantry, with atroop of cavalry, were raised for its protection. The command of thesetroops was given to Colonel George Rogers Clarke, a gentleman whosecourage, hardihood, and capacity for Indian warfare, had givenrepeated success to his enterprises against the savages. 

This corps was divided into several detachments, the strongest ofwhich remained with Colonel Clarke at Kaskaskia. Colonel Hamilton, theGovernor of Detroit, was at Vincennes with about six hundred men, principally Indians, preparing an expedition, first against Kaskaskia, and then up the Ohio to Pittsburg; after which he purposed todesolate the frontiers of Virginia. Clarke anticipated and defeatedhis design by one of those bold and decisive measures, which, whetherformed on a great or a small scale, mark the military and enterprisinggenius of the man who plans and executes them. 

[Sidenote: 1779 February. ]

[Sidenote: Colonel Clarke surprises St. Vincents, and takespossession of it. ]

He was too far removed from the inhabited country to hope for support, and was too weak to maintain Kaskaskia and the Illinois against thecombined force of regulars and Indians by which he was to be attackedso soon as the season for action should arrive. While employed inpreparing for his defence, he received unquestionable information thatHamilton had detached his Indians on an expedition against thefrontiers, reserving at the post he occupied only about eightyregulars, with three pieces of cannon and some swivels. Clarkeinstantly resolved to seize this favourable moment. After detaching asmall galley up the Wabash with orders to take her station a few milesbelow Vincennes, and to permit nothing to pass her, he marched in thedepth of winter with one hundred and thirty men, the whole force hecould collect, across the country from Kaskaskia to Vincennes. Thismarch, through the woods, and over high waters, required sixteen days, five of which were employed in crossing the drowned lands of theWabash. The troops were under the necessity of wading five miles inwater, frequently up to their breasts. After subduing thesedifficulties, this small party appeared before the town, which wascompletely surprised, and readily consented to change its master. Hamilton, after defending the fort a short time, surrendered himselfand his garrison prisoners of war. With a few of his immediate agentsand counsellors, who had been instrumental in the savage barbaritieshe had encouraged, he was, by order of the executive of Virginia, putin irons, and confined in a jail. 

This expedition was important in its consequences. It disconcerted aplan which threatened destruction to the whole country west of theAlleghany mountains; detached from the British interest many of thosenumerous tribes of Indians south of the waters immediatelycommunicating with the great lakes; and had, most probably, considerable influence in fixing the western boundary of the UnitedStates. 

[Sidenote: Congress determine to attack Canada, and the other Britishpossessions in North America. ]

We have already seen that congress, actuated by their wishes ratherthan governed by a temperate calculation of the means in theirpossession, had, in the preceding winter, planned a second invasion ofCanada, to be conducted by the Marquis de Lafayette; and that, as thegenerals only were got in readiness for this expedition, it wasnecessarily laid aside. The design, however, seems to have beensuspended, not abandoned. The alliance with France revived the latentwish to annex that extensive territory to the United States. Thatfavourite subject was resumed; and, towards autumn, a plan wascompletely digested for a combined attack to be made by the allies onall the British dominions on the continent, and on the adjacentislands of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. This plan was matured aboutthe time the Marquis de Lafayette obtained leave to return to his owncountry, and was ordered to be transmitted by that nobleman to DoctorFranklin, the minister of the United States at the court ofVersailles, with instructions to induce, if possible, the Frenchcabinet to accede to it. Some communications respecting this subjectwere also made to the Marquis, on whose influence in securing itsadoption by his own government, much reliance was placed; and, inOctober, 1778, it was, for the first time, transmitted to GeneralWashington, with a request that he would inclose it by the Marquis, with his observations on it, to Doctor Franklin. 

This very extensive plan of military operations for the ensuingcampaign, prepared entirely in the cabinet, without consulting, so faras is known, a single military man, consisted of many parts. 

Two detachments, amounting, each, to sixteen hundred men, were tomarch from Pittsburg and Wyoming against Detroit, and Niagara. 

A third body of troops, which was to be stationed on the Mohawk duringthe winter, and to be powerfully reinforced in the spring, was toseize Oswego, and to secure the navigation of Lake Ontario withvessels to be constructed of materials to be procured in the winter. 

A fourth corps was to penetrate into Canada by the St. Francis, and toreduce Montreal, and the posts on Lake Champlain, while a fifth shouldguard against troops from Quebec. 

Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But, Upper Canadabeing reduced, another campaign would still be necessary for thereduction of Quebec. This circumstance would require that the armyshould pass the winter in Canada, and, in the mean time, the garrisonof Quebec might be largely reinforced. It was therefore essential tothe complete success of the enterprise, that France should be inducedto take a part in it. 

The conquest of Quebec, and of Halifax, was supposed to be an objectof so much importance to France as well as to the United States, thather aid might be confidently expected. 

It was proposed to request his Most Christian Majesty to furnish fouror five thousand troops, to sail from Brest, the beginning of May, under convoy of four ships of the line and four frigates; the troopsto be clad as if for service in the West Indies, and thick clothes tobe sent after them in August. A large American detachment was to actwith this French army; and it was supposed that Quebec and Halifaxmight be reduced by the beginning or middle of October. The armymight then either proceed immediately against Newfoundland, or remainin garrison until the spring, when the conquest of that place might beaccomplished. 

It had been supposed probable that England would abandon the fartherprosecution of the war on the continent of North America, in whichcase the government would have a respectable force at its disposal, the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attentionof the Commander-in-chief. He had contemplated an expedition againstthe British posts in Upper Canada as a measure which might beeventually eligible, and which might employ the arms of the UnitedStates to advantage, if their troops might safely be withdrawn fromthe sea board. He had, however, considered every object of this sortas contingent. Having estimated the difficulties to be encountered insuch an enterprise, he had found them so considerable as to hesitateon the extent which might safely be given to the expedition, admittingthe United States to be evacuated by the British armies. 

In this state of mind, he received the magnificent plan alreadyprepared by congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticabilityof executing that part of it which was to be undertaken by the UnitedStates, should the British armies continue in their country; and withthe serious mischief which would result to the common cause, as wellfrom diverting so considerable a part of the French force from otherobjects to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising, as from theill impression which would be made on the court and nation by thetotal failure of the American government to execute its part of a planoriginating with itself; a failure which would, most probably, sacrifice the troops and ships employed by France. 

On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in thedifferent parts of the world, the former appeared to him to maintain adecided superiority, and consequently to possess the power of shuttingup the ships of the latter which might be trusted into the St. Lawrence. To suppose that the British government would not availitself of this superiority on such an occasion, would be to impute toit a blind infatuation, or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which could not be safely assumed in calculations of such seriousimport. 

[Sidenote: General Washington urges reasons against the plan. ]

A plan too, consisting of so many parts, to be prosecuted both fromEurope and America, by land and by water; which, to be successful, required such a harmonious co-operation of the whole, such a perfectcoincidence of events, appeared to him to be exposed to too manyaccidents, to risk upon it interests of such high value. 

[Illustration: George Washington

_From the portrait by John Trumbull_

_Colonel Trumbull, whose portraits of Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Adams, George Clinton and other Revolutionary contemporaries form anotable gallery, was General Washington's aide-de-camp at the outbreakof the War for Independence, and during its progress became a pupil ofBenjamin West, in London. The news of André's execution fastened uponhim the suspicion of being a spy, and he spent eight months in anEnglish prison. Returning to America he painted this and otherportraits of Washington, as well as a number of historical pictures, including the "Resignation of Washington at Annapolis, " which hangs inthe Capitol at Washington. _]

In a long and serious letter to congress, he apologized for notobeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon itto the Marquis; and, entering into a full investigation of all itsparts, demonstrated the mischiefs, and the dangers, with which it wasreplete. This letter was referred to a committee, whose report admitsthe force of the reasons urged by the Commander-in-chief against theexpedition, and their own conviction that nothing important could beattempted unless the British armies should be withdrawn from theUnited States; and that, even in that event, the present plan was fartoo complex. 

Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favourite andflattering projects on which they have long meditated; and thecommittee, in their report, proceeded to state the opinion that theposts held by the British in the United States would probably beevacuated before the active part of the ensuing campaign; and that, therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken. 

This report concludes with recommending "that the general should bedirected to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that subject; andalso to write to the minister of these states at the court ofVersailles very fully, to the end that eventual measures may be taken, in case an armament should be sent from France to Quebec, forco-operating therewith, to the utmost degree, which the finances andresources of these states will admit. "

This report also was approved by congress, and transmitted to theCommander-in-chief; who felt himself greatly embarrassed by it. Whilehis objections to the project retained all their force, he foundhimself required to open a correspondence for the purposes ofsoliciting the concurrence of France in an expedition he disapproved, and of promising a co-operation he believed to be impracticable. Inreply to this communication, he said, "The earnest desire I havestrictly to comply in every instance, with the views and instructionsof congress, can not but make me feel the greatest uneasiness, when Ifind myself in circumstances of hesitation or doubt, with respect totheir directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice andcandour of that honourable body, emboldens me to communicate, withoutreserve, the difficulties which occur in the execution of theirpresent order; and the indulgence I have experienced on every formeroccasion, induces me to imagine that the liberty I now take will notmeet with disapprobation. "

After reviewing the report of the committee, and stating hisobjections to the plan, and the difficulties he felt in performing theduty assigned to him, he added, "But if congress still think itnecessary for me to proceed in the business, I must request their moredefinitive and explicit instructions, and that they will permit me, previous to transmitting the intended despatches, to submit them totheir determination. 

"I could wish to lay before congress more minutely the state of thearmy, the condition of our supplies, and the requisites necessary forcarrying into execution an undertaking that may involve the mostserious events. If congress think this can be done more satisfactorilyin a personal conference, I hope to have the army in such a situationbefore I can receive their answer, as to afford me an opportunity ofgiving my attendance. "

[Sidenote: Induces Congress to abandon it. ]

Congress acceded to his request of a personal interview; and, on hisarrival in Philadelphia, a committee was appointed to confer with him, as well on this particular subject as on the general state of the armyand of the country. 

The result of these conferences was, that the expedition againstCanada was entirely, though reluctantly, [15] given up, and everyarrangement recommended by the Commander-in-chief, received theattention to which his judgment and experience gave all his opinionsthe fairest claim. 

[Footnote 15: See note No. II. At the end of the volume. ]

CHAPTER IV. 

 Divisions in Congress.... Letters of General Washington on the state of public affairs.... Invasion of Georgia.... General Howe defeated by Colonel Campbell.... Savannah taken.... Sunbury surrenders.... Georgia reduced.... General Lincoln takes command of the Southern army.... Major Gardiner defeated by General Moultrie.... Insurrection of the Tories in South Carolina.... They are defeated by Colonel Pickens.... Ash surprised and defeated.... Moultrie retreats.... Prevost marches to Charleston.... Lincoln attacks the British at Stono Ferry unsuccessfully.... Invasion of Virginia. 

[Sidenote: 1779]

After the relinquishment of that extensive plan of conquest whichhad been meditated against Canada, no other object seemed to callforth the energies of the nation, and a general languor appeared todiffuse itself through all the civil departments. The alliance withFrance was believed to secure independence; and a confidence thatBritain could no longer prosecute the war with any hope of success--aconfidence encouraged by communications from Europe--prevented thoseexertions which were practicable, but which it was painful to make. This temper was seen and deplored by the Commander-in-chief, whoincessantly combated the opinion that Britain was about to relinquishthe contest, and insisted that great and vigorous exertions on thepart of the United States were still necessary to bring the war to asuccessful termination. 

It being no longer practicable to engage soldiers by voluntaryenlistment, and government not daring to force men into the servicefor three years, or during the war, the vacant ranks were scantilysupplied with drafts for nine, twelve, and eighteen months. A greatproportion of the troops were discharged in the course of each year;and, except that the old officers remained, almost a new army was tobe formed for every campaign. 

Although the Commander-in-chief pressed congress and the stategovernments continually and urgently, to take timely measures forsupplying the places of those who were leaving the service, the meansadopted were so slow and ineffectual in their operation, that theseason for action never found the preparations completed; and thenecessity of struggling against superior numbers was perpetual. 

The pleasing delusion that the war was over, to which the public minddelighted to surrender itself, made no impression on the judgment ofWashington. Viewing objects through a more correct medium, heperceived that Great Britain had yet much to hope, and America much tofear, from a continuance of hostilities. He feared that the impressionwhich the divisions, and apparent inertness of the United States hadmade on the British commissioners, would be communicated to theirgovernment; and this consideration increased his anxiety in favour ofearly and vigorous preparations for the next campaign. Yet it was notuntil the 23d of January that congress passed the resolution, authorizing the Commander-in-chief to re-enlist the army, nor, untilthe 9th of March, that the requisition was made on the several statesfor their quotas. The bounty offered by the first resolution beingfound insufficient, the government was again under the necessity ofresorting to the states. Thus, at a season when the men ought to havebeen in camp, the measures for raising them were still to be adopted. 

About this period, several circumstances conspired to foment thosepernicious divisions and factions in congress, which, in times ofgreater apparent danger, patriotism would have suppressed. 

[Sidenote: Divisions in congress. ]

The ministers of the United States, in Europe, had reciprocallycriminated each other, and some of them had been recalled. Theirfriends in congress supported their respective interests withconsiderable animation; and, at length, Mr. Deane published amanifesto, in which he arraigned at the bar of the public, the conductnot only of those concerned in foreign negotiations, but of themembers of Congress themselves. 

The irritation excited by these and other contests was not a littleincreased by the appearance, in a New York paper, of an extract froma letter written by Mr. Laurens, the president of congress, toGovernor Huiston, of Georgia, which, during the invasion of thatstate, was found among his papers. In this letter, Mr. Laurens hadunbosomed himself with the unsuspecting confidence of a personcommunicating to a friend the inmost operations of his mind. In agloomy moment, he had expressed himself with a degree of severity, which even his own opinion, when not under the immediate influence ofchagrin, would not entirely justify, and had reflected on theintegrity and patriotism of members, without particularizing theindividuals he designed to censure. 

These altercations added much to the alarm with which GeneralWashington viewed that security which had insinuated itself into thepublic mind; and his endeavours were unremitting to impress the sameapprehensions on those who were supposed capable of removing thedelusion. In his confidential letters to gentlemen of the mostinfluence in the several states, he represented in strong terms thedangers which yet threatened the country, and earnestly exhorted themto a continuance of those sacrifices and exertions which he stilldeemed essential to the happy termination of the war. The dissensionsin congress; the removal of individuals of the highest influence andcharacter from the councils of the nation to offices in the respectivestates; the depreciation of the currency; the destructive spirit ofspeculation which the imaginary gain produced by this depreciation haddiffused throughout the Union; a general laxity of principles; and anunwillingness to encounter personal inconvenience for the attainmentof the great object, in pursuit of which so much blood and treasurehad been expended; were the rocks on which, he apprehended, the statevessel might yet split, and to which he endeavoured, incessantly, topoint the attention of those whose weight of political characterenable them to guide the helm. 

[Sidenote: Letters from General Washington on the state of publicaffairs. ]

"I am particularly desirous of a free communication of sentiments withyou at this time, " says the General in a letter written to a gentlemanof splendid political talents, "because I view things verydifferently, I fear, from what people in general do, who seem to thinkthe contest at an end, and that to make money, and get places, are theonly things now remaining to be done. I have seen without despondency, even for a moment, the hours which America has styled her gloomy ones;but I have beheld no day since the commencement of hostilities, when Ihave thought her liberties in such imminent danger as at present. Friends and foes seem now to combine to pull down the goodly fabric wehave hitherto been raising at the expense of so much time, blood, andtreasure. "

After censuring with some freedom the prevailing opinions of the day, he added, "To me it appears no unjust simile to compare the affairsof this great continent to the mechanism of a clock, each staterepresenting some one or other of the smaller parts of it, which theyare endeavouring to put in fine order, without considering how uselessand unavailing their labour is, unless the great wheel, or spring, which is to set the whole in motion, is also well attended to, andkept in good order. I allude to no particular state, nor do I mean tocast reflections upon any one of them, nor ought I, it may be said, todo so on their representatives; but, as it is a fact too notorious tobe concealed, that congress is rent by party; that much business of atrifling nature and personal concernment, withdraws their attentionfrom matters of great national moment at this critical period; when itis also known that idleness and dissipation take place of closeattention and application, no man who wishes well to the liberties ofthis country, and desires to see its rights established, can avoidcrying out--where are our men of abilities? Why do they not come forthto save their country? Let this voice, my dear sir, call upon you, Jefferson, and others. Do not, from a mistaken opinion that we are tosit down under our vine and our own fig-tree, let our hitherto noblestruggle end in ignominy. Believe me when I tell you there is dangerof it. I have pretty good reasons for thinking that administration, alittle while ago, had resolved to give the matter up, and negotiate apeace with us upon almost any terms; but I shall be much mistaken ifthey do not now, from the present state of our currency, dissensions, and other circumstances, push matters to the utmost extremity. NothingI am sure will prevent it but the intervention of Spain, and theirdisappointed hope from Russia. "

The circumstances in the situation and temper of America, which madeso deep an impression on the Commander-in-chief, operated with equalforce on the British commissioners, and induced them to think that, bycontinuing the war, more favourable terms than were now demanded mightbe obtained. They seem to have taken up the opinion that the mass ofthe people, fatigued and worn out by the complicated calamities of thestruggle, sincerely desired an accommodation on the terms proposed byGreat Britain; and that the increasing difficulties resulting from thefailure of public credit, would induce them to desert congress, orcompel that body to accede to those terms. These opinions, whencommunicated to the government, most probably contributed to protractthe war. 

The narrative of military transactions will now be resumed. 

The British arms had heretofore been chiefly directed against thenorthern and middle states. The strongest parts of the Americancontinent were pressed by their whole force; and, with the exceptionof the attempt on Sullivan's island in 1776, no serious design hadyet been manifested to make an impression in the south. Entertainingthe most confident hopes of recovering all the colonies, the Britishgovernment had not prosecuted the war with a view to partial conquest. But the loss of the army commanded by Burgoyne, the alliance ofAmerica with France, and the unexpected obstinacy with which thecontest was maintained, had diminished their confidence; and, when thepacific propositions made in 1778 were rejected, the resolution seemsto have been taken to change, materially, the object of their militaryoperations; and, maintaining possession of the islands of New York, todirect their arms against the southern states, on which, it wasbelieved, a considerable impression might be made. 

It was not unreasonable to suppose that the influence of thisimpression might extend northward; but, however this might be, theactual conquest and possession of several states would, whennegotiations for a general peace should take place, give a complexionto those negotiations, and afford plausible ground for insisting toretain territory already acquired. The most active and interestingoperations therefore of the succeeding campaigns, were in the southernstates. 

Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who sailed from the Hook about the lastof November, 1778, escorted by a small squadron commanded byCommodore Hyde Parker, reached the isle of Tybee, near the Savannah, on the 23d of December; and, in a few days, the fleet and thetransports passed the bar, and anchored in the river. 

The command of the southern army, composed of the troops of SouthCarolina and Georgia, had been committed to Major General Robert Howe, who, in the course of the preceding summer, had invaded EastFlorida. [16] The diseases incident to the climate made such ravagesamong his raw soldiers, that, though he had scarcely seen an enemy, hefound himself compelled to hasten out of the country with considerableloss. After this disastrous enterprise, his army, consisting ofbetween six and seven hundred continental troops, aided by a fewhundred militia, had encamped in the neighbourhood of the town ofSavannah, situated on the southern bank of the river bearing thatname. The country about the mouth of the river is one tract of deepmarsh, intersected by creeks and cuts of water, impassable for troopsat any time of the tide, except over causeways extending through thesunken ground. 

[Footnote 16: So early as January, 1776, congress had recommended thereduction of St. Augustine to the southern colonies. --_Secret Journalsof Congress, page 38. _]

[Sidenote: Invasion of Georgia. ]

Without much opposition, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell effected alanding on the 29th, about three miles below the town; upon which Howeformed his line of battle. His left was secured by the river; andalong the whole extent of his front was a morass which stretched tohis right, and was believed by him to be impassable for such adistance, as effectually to secure that wing. 

After reconnoitring the country, Colonel Campbell advanced on thegreat road leading to Savannah; and, about three in the afternoon, appeared in sight of the American army. While making dispositions todislodge it, he accidentally fell in with a negro, who informed him ofa private path leading through the swamp, round the right of theAmerican lines to their rear. Determining to avail himself of thispath, he detached a column under Sir James Baird, which entered themorass unperceived by Howe. 

[Sidenote: General Howe defeated by the British under ColonelCampbell, who takes possession of Savannah. ]

As soon as Sir James emerged from the swamp, he attacked and disperseda body of Georgia militia, which gave the first notice to the Americangeneral of the danger which threatened his rear. At the same instant, the British troops in his front were put in motion, and theirartillery began to play upon him. A retreat was immediately ordered;and the continental troops were under the necessity of running acrossa plain, in front of the corps which had been led into their rear bySir James Baird, who attacked their flanks with great impetuosity, andconsiderable effect. The few who escaped, retreated up the Savannah;and, crossing that river at Zubly's ferry, took refuge in SouthCarolina. 

The victory was complete, and decisive in its consequences. About onehundred Americans were either killed in the field, or drowned inattempting to escape through a deep swamp. Thirty-eight officers, andfour hundred and fifteen privates, were taken. Forty-eight pieces ofcannon, twenty-three mortars, the fort with all its military-stores, alarge quantity of provisions collected for the use of the army, andthe capital of Georgia, fell into the hands of the conqueror. Theseadvantages were obtained at the expense of only seven killed, andnineteen wounded. 

No military force now remained in Georgia, except the garrison ofSunbury, whose retreat to South Carolina was cut off. All the lowerpart of that state was occupied by the British, who adopted measuresto secure the conquest they had made. The inhabitants were treatedwith a lenity as wise as it was humane. Their property was spared, andtheir persons protected. To make the best use of victory, and of theimpression produced by the moderation of the victors, a proclamationwas issued, inviting the inhabitants to repair to the Britishstandard, and offering protection to those who would return to theirallegiance. 

The effect of these measures did not disappoint those who adoptedthem. The inhabitants flocked in great numbers to the royal standard;military corps for the protection of the country were formed; andposts were established for a considerable distance up the river. 

[Sidenote: Sunbury surrenders to General Prevost. ]

The northern frontier of Georgia being supposed to be settled into astate of quiet, Colonel Campbell turned his attention towards Sunbury, and was about to proceed against that place, when he receivedintelligence that it had surrendered to General Prevost. 

[Sidenote: The State of Georgia reduced. ]

Sir Henry Clinton had ordered that officer to co-operate from EastFlorida, with Colonel Campbell. On hearing that the troops from thenorth were off the coast, he entered the southern frontier of Georgia, and invested Sunbury, which, after a slight resistance, surrendered atdiscretion. Having placed a garrison in the fort, he proceeded toSavannah, took command of the army, and detached Colonel Campbell witheight hundred regulars and a few provincials to Augusta, which fellwithout resistance, and thus the whole state of Georgia was reduced. 

While the expedition conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell waspreparing at New York, congress was meditating the conquest of EastFlorida. 

[Sidenote: General Lincoln takes the command of the southern army. ]

The delegates of South Carolina and Georgia, anxious that a general ofmore experience than Howe should command in the southern department, had earnestly pressed that he should be recalled, and that GeneralLincoln, whose military reputation was high, should be appointed tosucceed him. In compliance with their solicitations, Howe was orderedin September, 1778, to repair to the head quarters of GeneralWashington, and Lincoln was directed to proceed immediately toCharleston, in South Carolina, in order to take command in thesouthern department. In pursuance of this resolution, General Lincolnrepaired to Charleston, where he found the military affairs of thecountry in a state of utter derangement. Congress had established nocontinental military chest in the southern department. This omissionproduced a dependence on the government of the state for supplies tomove the army on any emergency, and consequent subjection of thetroops in continental service to its control. The militia, thoughtaken into continental service, considered themselves as subject onlyto the military code of the state. These regulations threatened toembarrass all military operations, and to embroil the general with thecivil government. 

While Lincoln was labouring to make arrangements for the ensuingcampaign, he received intelligence of the appearance of the enemy offthe coast. The militia of North Carolina, amounting to two thousandmen, commanded by Generals Ash and Rutherford, had already reachedCharleston; but were unarmed, and congress had been unable to providemagazines in this part of the Union. These troops were, therefore, entirely dependent on South Carolina for every military equipment; andarms were not delivered to them until it was too late to save thecapital of Georgia. 

So soon as it was ascertained that the British fleet had entered theSavannah river, General Lincoln proceeded with the utmost expeditiontowards the scene of action. On his march, he received intelligence ofthe victory gained over General Howe; and was soon afterwards joinedby the remnant of the defeated army at Purysburg, a small town on thenorth side of the Savannah, where he established his head quarters. 

The regular force commanded by General Prevost must have amounted toat least three thousand effective men; and this number was increasedby irregulars who had joined him in Georgia. The American army ratherexceeded three thousand six hundred men, of whom not quite twothousand five hundred were effective. Something more than one thousandwere continental troops, part of whom were new levies; the rest weremilitia. 

[Sidenote: Major Gardiner defeated by General Moultrie. ]

The theatre of action was so well adapted to defensive war, that, although General Prevost was decidedly superior to his adversary, itwas difficult to extend his conquests into South Carolina. With theview of entering that state by the way of the sea coast, he detachedMajor Gardiner with about two hundred men, to take possession of theisland of Port Royal. That officer, soon after reaching his place ofdestination, was attacked by General Moultrie, and compelled toretreat with considerable loss. This repulse checked the designs ofPrevost on South Carolina. 

[Sidenote: Insurrection of the Tories in South Carolina, who aredefeated by Colonel Pickens. ]

From the commencement of the war, a considerable proportion of thewestern inhabitants of the three southern states had been attached tothe royal cause. The first successes of the British were sooncommunicated to them, and they were invited to assemble and join theking's standard at Augusta. About seven hundred embodied themselves onthe frontiers of South Carolina, and began their march to that place. They were overtaken by Colonel Pickens at the head of the neighbouringmilitia, near Kittle Creek, and defeated with considerable loss. Colonel Boyd, their leader, was among the slain; and several of thosewho escaped were apprehended, tried, and five of them executed astraitors. About three hundred reached the British out-posts, andjoined the royal standard. This defeat broke the spirits of the Toriesfor a time; and preserved quiet in the west. 

As the American army gained strength by reinforcements of militia, General Lincoln began to contemplate offensive operations. Adetachment had been stationed nearly opposite to Augusta under GeneralAsh, and he purposed joining that officer so soon as a sufficientforce could be collected, and attempting to recover the upper parts ofGeorgia. Before he was able to execute this plan, General Prevostwithdrew his troops from Augusta to Hudson's Ferry. Ash was thenordered to cross the Savannah, and take post near the confluence ofBriar Creek with that river. This camp was thought unassailable. Itsleft was covered by a deep swamp, and by the Savannah. The front wassecured by Briar Creek, which is unfordable several miles, and makesan acute angle with the river. 

[Sidenote: Ash surprised and defeated by Prevost. ]

Having determined to dislodge the Americans from this position, Prevost kept up the attention of General Lincoln by the semblance of adesign to cross the Savannah; and, at the same time amused General Ashwith a feint on his front, while Lieutenant Colonel Prevost made acircuit of about fifty miles, and, crossing Briar Creek fifteen milesabove the ground occupied by Ash, came down, unperceived andunsuspected, on his rear. Ash, unused to the stratagems of war, was socompletely engaged by the manoeuvres in his front, that LieutenantColonel Prevost was almost in his camp before any intelligence of hisapproach was received. The continental troops under General Elbertwere drawn out to oppose him, and commenced the action with greatgallantry; but most of the militia threw away their arms and fled inconfusion. As they precipitated themselves into the swamp and swam theriver, not many of them were taken. General Elbert and his small bandof continental troops, aided by one regiment of North Carolinamilitia, were soon overpowered by numbers, and the survivors werecompelled to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The killed andtaken amounted to between three and four hundred men. General Elbertand Colonel M'Intosh were among the latter. But the loss sustained bythe American army was much more considerable. The dispersed militiareturned to their homes; and not more than four hundred and fifty ofthem could be reassembled. 

This victory was supposed to give the British such complete possessionof Georgia, that a proclamation was issued the succeeding day byGeneral Prevost, establishing civil government, and appointingexecutive and judicial officers to administer it. 

These disasters, instead of terrifying South Carolina into submission, animated that state to greater exertions. Mr. John Rutledge, agentleman of great talents and decision, was elected governor; and thelegislature passed an act empowering him and the council to do everything that appeared to him and them necessary for the public good. Allthe energies of the state were drawn forth. The militia were calledout in great numbers, and the laws for their government were renderedmore severe. [17]

[Footnote 17: Ramsay. ]

Thus reinforced, General Lincoln resumed his plan for recovering theupper parts of Georgia; and marched the main body of his army up theSavannah. 

This river was now swelled greatly beyond its usual limits; and theswamps, marshes, and creeks which intersect the country being full, seemed to present an almost impassable barrier to an invading army. Asmall military force being deemed sufficient to arrest the progress ofan enemy through a route which, if at all practicable, was sodifficult, about eight hundred of the state militia, aided by twohundred continental troops, were left with General Moultrie for thedefence of the country. 

[Sidenote: Prevost compels Moultrie to retreat. ]

Aware of the importance of this movement, and hoping to recall Lincolnby alarming him for the safety of Charleston, General Prevost suddenlycrossed the Savannah with three thousand men; and, advancing rapidlyon General Moultrie, obliged him to retreat with precipitation. Themilitia could not be prevailed on to defend the passes with any degreeof firmness; and Moultrie, instead of drawing aid from the surroundingcountry, sustained an alarming diminution of numbers by desertion. 

On the passage of the river by Prevost, an express had been despatchedto Lincoln with the intelligence. Persuaded that the British generalcould meditate no serious attempt on Charleston, and that the realobject was to induce him to abandon the enterprise in which he wasengaged, he detached a reinforcement of three hundred light troops toaid Moultrie, and crossing the Savannah himself, continued his marchdown the south side of that river towards the capital of Georgia. 

[Sidenote: Prevost marches to Charleston. ]

Though the original purpose of General Prevost had been limited to thesecurity of Georgia, the opposition he encountered was so much lessthan he had expected; the tenour of the country was so apparent; theassurances of those who flocked to his standard; of the generaldisposition of the people to terminate the calamities of war bysubmission, were so often and so confidently repeated, that he wasemboldened to extend his views, and to hazard the continuation of hismarch to Charleston. 

On receiving intelligence of this threatening aspect of affairs inSouth Carolina, Lincoln recrossed the Savannah, and hastened to therelief of that state. 

The situation of Charleston was extremely critical. The inhabitants, entirely unapprehensive of an attack by land, had directed their wholeattention to its protection against an invasion by sea. Had Prevostcontinued his march with the rapidity with which it was commenced, theplace must have fallen. But, after having gained more than half thedistance, he halted, and consumed two or three days in deliberating onhis future measures. While his intelligence determined him to proceed, and assured him of a state of things which rendered success almostcertain, that state of things was rapidly changing. Fortifications onthe land side were commenced and prosecuted with unremitting labour;the neighbouring militia were drawn into the town; the reinforcementsdetached by General Lincoln, and the remnant of the legion of Pulaskiarrived; and the governor also entered the city, at the head of sometroops which had been stationed at Orangeburg. 

The next morning Prevost crossed Ashly River, and encamped justwithout cannon shot of the works. The town was summoned to surrender, and the day was spent in sending and receiving flags. The neutralityof South Carolina during the war, leaving the question whether thatstate should finally belong to Great Britain or the United States, tobe settled in the treaty of peace, was proposed by the garrison, andrejected by Prevost; who required that they should surrenderthemselves prisoners of war. This proposition being also rejected, thegarrison prepared to sustain an assault. But an attempt to carry theworks by storm was too hazardous to be made; and Prevost came to theprudent resolution of decamping that night, and recrossing AshlyRiver. 

[Sidenote: Lincoln attacks the British at the ferry but withoutsuccess. ]

The British army passed into the island of St. James, and thence tothat of St. John's, which lies south of Charleston harbour; soon afterwhich General Lincoln encamped in the neighbourhood, so as to confinethem in a great degree to the island they occupied. This island isseparated from the main land by an inlet, to which the name of StonoRiver has been given; and the communication is preserved by a ferry. ABritish post was established upon the main land at this ferry, andworks were thrown up in front for its defence. When Prevost commencedhis retreat, and the troops were moving from island to island, theoccasion seemed a fair one for attacking it. Only eight hundred men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maitland, defended it; but a largecorps still lay on the island. To prevent these troops from supportingthose on the main land, General Moultrie, who commanded in Charleston, was ordered to pass over a body of militia into James's island, whoshould amuse the enemy in St. John's, while a real attack should bemade on the post at the ferry. About seven in the morning, GeneralLincoln commenced this attack with about one thousand men; andcontinued it with great spirit, until he perceived that strongreinforcements were crossing over from the island; when he called offhis troops, and retreated, unmolested, to his old ground. 

General Moultrie had been unable to execute that part of the planwhich devolved on him. Boats were not in readiness to convey the meninto James's island, and consequently the feint on St. John's was notmade. 

The loss of the Americans, in killed and wounded, amounted totwenty-four officers, and one hundred and twenty-five privates. Thatof the British was stated to be rather less. 

Three days after this action, the posts at Stono and St. John's wereevacuated. The heat now became too excessive for active service; andthe British army, after establishing a post on the island contiguousto Port Royal and St. Helena, retired into Georgia and St. Augustine. 

The American militia dispersed, leaving General Lincoln at the head ofabout eight hundred men; with whom he retired to Sheldon, where hisprimary object was to prepare for the next campaign, which it wassupposed would open in October. 

The invasion of the southern states wore so serious an aspect, thatBland's regiment of cavalry, and the remnant of that lately Baylor's, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Washington, with the new levies ofVirginia, were ordered to repair to Charleston, and to placethemselves under the command of General Lincoln. The execution ofthese orders was for a time suspended by the invasion of Virginia. 

[Sidenote: Invasion of Virginia by General Matthews. ]

An expedition against that state had been concerted in the springbetween Sir Henry Clinton and Sir George Collier, theCommander-in-chief of the British naval force on the American station. The land troops assigned to this service were commanded by GeneralMatthews. The transports, on board of which they embarked, wereconvoyed by the Admiral in person. On the 9th of May the fleet enteredthe Chesapeake, and the next day anchored in Hampton Roads. 

Virginia had raised a regiment of artillery for the performance ofgarrison duty in the state, which had been distributed along theeastern frontier; and slight fortifications had been constructed inthe most important situations, which were defensible on the side ofthe water, but were not tenable against a military force strong enoughto act on land. Fort Nelson, on the west side of Elizabeth river, garrisoned by about one hundred and fifty soldiers, commanded by MajorMatthews, was designed to protect the towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth, which were on each side of the river just above it; and the town ofGosport, which lies still higher up on a point of land interveningbetween two branches of the river. Norfolk and Portsmouth were placesof the most considerable commerce in Virginia. Large supplies for thearmy were deposited in them; and the state government had establishedat Gosport a marine yard, where ships of war and other vessels werebuilding, for which naval stores were collected to a very greatamount. The destruction of these vessels and stores, constituted theprincipal object of General Matthews. 

On the morning of the tenth, the fleet entered Elizabeth river, andthe troops were landed about three miles below the fort, withoutopposition. Foreseeing that the works would be attacked the nextmorning on the land side, the garrison evacuated the fort in thenight, and took refuge in a deep and extensive swamp, called theDismal, which could not be penetrated without difficulty, even bysingle persons. 

The whole sea-board, on the south side of James' river, being now inpossession of General Matthews, he fixed his head quarters atPortsmouth, whence small parties were detached to Norfolk, Gosport, Kemps' landing, and Suffolk, where military and naval stores to agreat amount, and several vessels richly laden, fell into his hands. 

This invasion was of short duration. General Matthews, afterdestroying the magazines which had been collected in the small townsnear the coast, and the vessels in the rivers, was ordered by SirHenry Clinton to return to New York, where he arrived towards the lastof May. 

The Admiral and General were both so impressed with the importance ofPortsmouth as a permanent station, that they united in representing tothe Commander-in-chief the advantages to be derived from keepingpossession of it. But, in the opinion of Sir Henry Clinton, the armydid not at that time admit of so many subdivisions; and, with a viewto more interesting objects, Portsmouth was evacuated. 

CHAPTER V. 

 Discontents in a part of the American army.... Letter from General Washington on the subject.... Colonel Van Schaick destroys an Indian settlement.... Expedition against the Indians meditated.... Fort Fayette surrendered to the British.... Invasion of Connecticut.... General Wayne storms Stony Point.... Expedition against Penobscot.... Powles Hook surprised by Major Lee.... Arrival of Admiral Arbuthnot.... Of the Count D'Estaing.... Siege of Savannah.... Unsuccessful attempt to storm that place.... Siege raised.... Victory of General Sullivan at Newtown.... Spain offers her mediation to the belligerents.... Declares war against England.... Letter from General Washington to congress respecting the annual formation of the army.... The army goes into winter quarters. 

[Sidenote: 1779]

The barbarities committed by the Indians, in the course of thepreceding year, on the inhabitants of the western frontiers, had addedmotives of mingled resentment and humanity to those of nationalinterest, for employing a larger force in the protection of that partof the Union than had heretofore been devoted to it. 

General Washington had always believed that it was impossible todefend the immense western frontier by any chain of posts which couldbe established; and that the country would be protected much morecertainly by offensive than by defensive war. His plan was topenetrate into the heart of the Indian settlements with a forcecompetent to the destruction of their towns; and also to reduce theBritish post at Niagara, which gave its possessors an almostirresistible influence over the six nations. This plan constituted oneof the various subjects of conference with the committee of congressin Philadelphia, and received the entire approbation of that body. 

The state governments also took a strong interest in the protection oftheir western settlements. Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania, applied, severally, to congress, urging the adoption of such vigorousmeasures as would secure the frontiers against a repetition of thehorrors which had been already perpetrated. These papers were referredto the committee which had been appointed to confer with GeneralWashington, in conformity with whose report it was resolved, "that theCommander-in-chief be directed to take efficient measures for theprotection of the inhabitants, and chastisement of the savages. "

The Six Nations had made some advances towards acquiring the comfortsof civilized life. Several comfortable houses were to be seen in theirpopulous villages; and their fertile fields and orchards yielded anabundant supply of corn and fruit. Some few of their towns wereattached to the United States; but, in general, they were under theinfluence of the British. Many of the loyalists had taken refuge amongthem, and had added to their strength without diminishing theirferocity. It was determined to lead a force into these villages, sufficient to overpower any numbers they could possibly bring into thefield, and to destroy the settlements they had made. To guard againstreinforcements from Canada, means were used to inspire that colonywith fears for itself. 

[Sidenote: Discontents in a part of the American army. ]

As the army destined for this expedition was about to move, alarmingsymptoms of discontent appeared in a part of it. The Jersey brigade, which had been stationed during the winter at Elizabethtown, wasordered early in May, to march by regiments. This order was answeredby a letter from General Maxwell, stating that the officers of thefirst regiment had delivered a remonstrance to their Colonel, addressed to the legislature of the state, declaring that, unlesstheir complaints on the subjects of pay and support should obtain theimmediate attention of that body, they were, at the expiration ofthree days, to be considered as having resigned; and requesting thelegislature, in that event, to appoint other officers to succeed them. They declared, however, their readiness to make every preparation forobeying the orders which had been given, and to continue theirattention to the regiment until a reasonable time should elapse forthe appointment of their successors. "This, " added the letter ofGeneral Maxwell, "is a step they are extremely unwilling to take, butit is such as I make no doubt they will all take; nothing butnecessity--their not being able to support themselves in time to come, and being loaded with debts contracted in time past, could haveinduced them to resign at so critical a juncture. "

The intelligence conveyed in this letter made a serious impression onthe Commander-in-chief. He was strongly attached to the army and toits interests; had witnessed its virtue and its sufferings; andlamented sincerely its present distresses. The justice of thecomplaints made by the officers could no more be denied, than themeasure they had adopted could be approved. Relying on theirpatriotism and on his own influence, he immediately wrote a letter toGeneral Maxwell, to be laid before them, in which, mingling thesensibility of a friend with the authority of a general, he addressedto their understanding and to their love of country, observationscalculated to invite their whole attention to the consequences whichmust result from the step they were about to take. 

[Sidenote: Letter from General Washington on this subject. ]

"The patience and perseverance of the army, " proceeds the letter, "have been, under every disadvantage, such as to do them the highesthonour both at home and abroad, and have inspired me with an unlimitedconfidence of their virtue, which has consoled me amidst everyperplexity and reverse of fortune, to which our affairs, in a struggleof this nature, were necessarily exposed. Now that we have made sogreat a progress to the attainment of the end we have in view, sothat we can not fail without a most shameful desertion of our owninterests, any thing like a change of conduct would imply a veryunhappy change of principles, and a forgetfulness, as well of what weowe to ourselves, as to our country. Did I suppose it possible thiscould be the case, even in a single regiment of the army, I should bemortified and chagrined beyond expression. I should feel it as a woundgiven to my own honour, which I consider as embarked with that of thearmy at large. But this I believe to be impossible. Any corps that wasabout to set an example of the kind, would weigh well theconsequences; and no officer of common discernment and sensibilitywould hazard them. If they should stand alone in it, independent ofother consequences, what would be their feelings on reflecting thatthey had held themselves out to the world in a point of light inferiorto the rest of the army. Or if their example should be followed, andbecome general, how could they console themselves for having been theforemost in bringing ruin and disgrace upon their country. They wouldremember that the army would share a double portion of the generalinfamy and distress, and that the character of an American officerwould become as infamous as it is now glorious. 

"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable, but I am convinced they seem to mean more than they really do. TheJersey officers have not been outdone by any others in the qualitieseither of citizens or soldiers; and I am confident, no part of themwould seriously intend any thing that would be a stain on their formerreputation. The gentlemen can not be in earnest; they have onlyreasoned wrong about the means of obtaining a good end, and, onconsideration, I hope and flatter myself they will renounce what mustappear to be improper. At the opening of a campaign, when undermarching orders for an important service, their own honour, duty tothe public and to themselves, and a regard to military propriety, willnot suffer them to persist in a measure which would be a violation ofthem all. It will even wound their delicacy, coolly to reflect thatthey have hazarded a step, which has an air of dictating terms totheir country, by taking advantage of the necessity of the moment. 

"The declaration they have made to the state, at so critical a time, that unless they obtain relief in the short period of three days, theymust be considered out of the service, has very much that aspect; andthe seeming relaxation of continuing until the state can have areasonable time to provide other officers, will be thought only asuperficial veil. I am now to request that you will convey mysentiments to the gentlemen concerned, and endeavour to make themsensible that they are in an error. The service for which theregiment was intended will not admit of delay. It must at all eventsmarch on Monday morning, in the first place to camp, and fartherdirections will be given when it arrives. I am sure I shall not bemistaken in expecting a prompt and cheerful obedience. "

The representations of this letter did not completely produce thedesired effect. The officers did not recede from their claims. In anaddress to the Commander-in-chief, they expressed their unhappinessthat any act of theirs should give him pain, but proceeded to justifythe step they had taken. Repeated memorials had been presented totheir legislature, which had been received with promises of attention, but had been regularly neglected. "At length, " said they, "we havelost all confidence in our legislature. Reason and experience forbidthat we should have any. Few of us have private fortunes; many havefamilies who already are suffering every thing that can be receivedfrom an ungrateful country. Are we then to suffer all theinconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of a military life, while ourwives and our children are perishing for want of common necessaries athome;--and that without the most distant prospect of reward, for ourpay is now only nominal? We are sensible that your excellency can notwish nor desire this from us. 

"We are sorry that you should imagine we meant to disobey orders. Itwas and still is our determination to march with our regiment, and todo the duty of officers until the legislature should have a reasonabletime to appoint others, but no longer. 

"We beg leave to assure your Excellency, that we have the highestsense of your ability and virtues;--that executing your orders hasever given us pleasure;--that we love the service, and we love ourcountry;--but when that country gets so lost to virtue and justice asto forget to support its servants, it then becomes their duty toretire from its service. "

This letter was peculiarly embarrassing. To adopt a stern course ofproceeding might hazard the loss of the Jersey line, an event not lessinjurious to the service, than painful to himself. To take up thesubject without doing too much for the circumstances of the army, would be doing too little for the occasion. He therefore declinedtaking any other notice of the letter, than to declare through GeneralMaxwell that, while they continued to do their duty in conformity withthe determination they had expressed, he should only regret the partthey had taken, and should hope they would perceive its impropriety. 

The legislature of New Jersey, alarmed at the decisive step taken bythe officers, was at length induced to pay some attention to theirsituation; they consenting, on their part, to withdraw theirremonstrance. In the meantime, they continued to perform their duty;and their march was not delayed by this unpleasant altercation. 

In communicating this transaction to congress, General Washington tookoccasion to remind that body of his having frequently urged theabsolute necessity of some general and adequate provision for theofficers of the army. "I shall only observe, " continued the letter, "that the distresses in some corps are so great, either where theywere not until lately attached to any particular state, or where thestate has been less provident, that the officers have solicited evento be supplied with the clothing destined for the common soldiery, coarse and unsuitable as it was. I had not power to comply with therequest. 

"The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honour, willsupport them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubtnot congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in thisrespect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it. "

[Sidenote: Colonel Van Schaick surprises and destroys one of theIndian settlements. ]

Before the troops destined for the grand expedition were put inmotion, an enterprise of less extent was undertaken, which wascompletely successful. A plan for surprising the towns of theOnondagas, one of the nearest of the hostile tribes, having beenformed by General Schuyler, and approved by the Commander-in-chief, Colonel Van Schaick, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Willet, and MajorCochran, marched from fort Schuyler on the morning of the 19th ofApril, at the head of between five and six hundred men; and, on thethird day, reached the point of destination. The whole settlement wasdestroyed, after which the detachment returned to fort Schuylerwithout the loss of a single man. For this handsome display of talentsas a partisan, the thanks of congress were voted to Colonel VanSchaick, and the officers and soldiers under his command. 

[Sidenote: Expedition against the Indians meditated. ]

The cruelties exercised by the Indians in the course of the precedingyear, had given a great degree of importance to the expedition nowmeditated against them; and the relative military strength andsituation of the two parties, rendered it improbable that any otheroffensive operations could be carried on by the Americans in thecourse of the present campaign. The army under the command of SirHenry Clinton, exclusive of the troops in the southern department, wascomputed at between sixteen and seventeen thousand men. The Americanarmy, the largest division of which lay at Middlebrook, under theimmediate command of General Washington, was rather inferior to thatof the British in real strength. The grand total, except those in thesouthern and western country, including officers of every description, amounted to about sixteen thousand. Three thousand of these were inNew England under the command of General Gates; and the remainingthirteen thousand were cantoned on both sides the North River. Thebare statement of numbers, must show the incompetency of the Americanarmy to the expulsion of the British from either New York or RhodeIsland. On their part, therefore, the plan of the campaign was, necessarily, defensive; and the hazards and difficulties attending theexecution of even a defensive plan were considerable. 

Independent of an extensive coast, at all places accessible to theinvading army, the Hudson, penetrating deep into the country which wasto be the theatre of action, gave great advantages in their militaryoperations to those who commanded the water. 

After the destruction of forts Clinton and Montgomery in 1777, it hadbeen determined to construct the fortifications intended for thefuture defence of the North River, at West Point, a position which, being more completely embosomed in the hills, was deemed moredefensible. The works had been prosecuted with unremitting industry, but were far from being completed. 

Some miles below West Point, about the termination of the Highlands, is King's Ferry, where the great road, affording the most convenientcommunication between the middle and eastern states, crosses the NorthRiver. The ferry is completely commanded by the two opposite points ofland. That on the west side, a rough and elevated piece of ground, isdenominated Stony Point; and the other, on the east side, a flat neckof land projecting far into the water, is called Verplank's Point. Thecommand of King's Ferry was an object worth the attention of eitherarmy; and Washington had comprehended the points which protect itwithin his plan of defence for the Highlands. A small but strong work, termed fort Fayette, was completed at Verplank's, and was garrisonedby a company commanded by Captain Armstrong. The works on Stony Pointwere unfinished. As the season for active operations approached, SirHenry Clinton formed a plan for opening the campaign with a brilliant_coup de main_ up the North River; and, towards the latter end of May, made preparations for the enterprise. 

[Sidenote: May. ]

These preparations were immediately communicated to GeneralWashington, who was confident that the British general meditated anattack on the forts in the highlands, or designed to take a positionbetween those forts and Middlebrook, in order to interrupt thecommunication between the different parts of the American army, toprevent their reunion, and to beat them in detail. Measures wereinstantly taken to counteract either of these designs. Theintelligence from New York was communicated to Generals Putnam andM'Dougal, who were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march;and, on the 29th of May, the army moved by divisions from Middlebrooktowards the highlands. On the 30th, the British army, commanded by SirHenry Clinton in person, and convoyed by Sir George Collier, proceededup the river; and General Vaughan, at the head of the largestdivision, landed next morning, about eight miles below Verplank's. Theother division, under the particular command of General Patterson, butaccompanied by Sir Henry Clinton, advancing farther up, landed on thewest side within three miles of Stony Point. 

[Sidenote: June 1. ]

[Sidenote: Fort Fayette surrendered to the British. ]

That place being immediately abandoned, General Patterson tookpossession of it on the same afternoon. He dragged some heavy cannonand mortars to the summit of the hill in the course of the night; and, at five next morning, opened a battery on fort Fayette, at thedistance of about one thousand yards. During the following night, twogalleys passed the fort, and, anchoring above it, prevented the escapeof the garrison by water; while General Vaughan invested it closely byland. No means of defending the fort, or of saving themselvesremaining, the garrison became prisoners of war. Immediate directionswere given for completing the works at both posts, and for puttingStony Point, in particular, in a strong state of defence. 

It is scarcely supposable that the views of Sir Henry Clinton inmoving up the river, were limited to this single acquisition. Themeans employed were so disproportioned to the object, as to justify abelief that he contemplated farther and more important conquests. Whatever may have been his plans, the measures of precaution taken byWashington counteracted their execution; and before Clinton was in asituation to proceed against West Point, General M'Dougal was sostrengthened, and the American army took such a position on the stronggrounds about the Hudson, that the enterprise became too hazardous tobe farther prosecuted. 

[Sidenote: July. ]

[Sidenote: Invasion of Connecticut. ]

After completing the fortifications on both sides the river, at King'sFerry, Sir Henry Clinton placed a strong garrison in each fort, andproceeded down the river to Philipsburg. The relative situation of thehostile armies presenting insuperable obstacles to any grandoperation, they could be employed offensively only on detachedexpeditions. Connecticut from its contiguity to New York, and itsextent of sea coast, was peculiarly exposed to invasion. The numeroussmall cruisers which plied in the Sound, to the great annoyance ofBritish commerce, and the large supplies of provisions drawn from theadjacent country, for the use of the continental army, furnished greatinducements to Sir Henry Clinton to direct his enterprisesparticularly against that state. He also hoped to draw GeneralWashington from his impregnable position on the North River into thelow country, and thus obtain an opportunity of striking at some partof his army, or of seizing the posts, which were the great object ofthe campaign. With these views, he planned an expedition againstConnecticut, the command of which was given to Governor Tryon, whoreached New Haven bay on the 5th of July, with about two thousand sixhundred men. 

General Washington was at the time on the lines, examining in personthe condition of the works on Stony and Verplank's Points; inconsequence of which, the intelligence which was transmitted to headquarters that the fleet had sailed, could not be immediatelycommunicated to the governor of Connecticut, and the first intimationwhich that state received of its danger, was given by the appearanceof the enemy. The militia assembled in considerable numbers withalacrity; but the British effected a landing, and took possession ofthe town. After destroying the military and naval stores found in theplace, they re-embarked, and proceeded westward to Fairfield, whichwas reduced to ashes. The good countenance shown by the militia atthis place is attested by the apology made by General Tryon for thewanton destruction of private property, which disgraced his conduct. "The village was burnt, " he says, "to resent the fire of the rebelsfrom their houses, and to mask our retreat. "

[Sidenote: July. ]

From Fairfield the fleet crossed the Sound to Huntingdon bay, where itremained until the eleventh, when it recrossed that water, afterwhich the troops were landed in the night on the low pasture, apeninsula on the east side of the bay of Norwalk. About the same time, a much larger detachment from the British army directed its coursetowards Horse Neck, and made demonstrations of a design to penetrateinto the country in that direction. 

[Sidenote: July. ]

On the first intelligence that Connecticut was invaded, GeneralParsons, a native of that state, had been directed by GeneralWashington to hasten to the scene of action. Placing himself at thehead of about one hundred and fifty continental troops, who weresupported by considerable bodies of militia, he attacked the Britishin the morning of the twelfth, as soon as they were in motion, andkept up an irregular distant fire throughout the day. But being tooweak to prevent the destruction of any particular town on the coast, Norwalk was reduced to ashes; after which the British re-embarked, andreturned to Huntingdon bay, there to wait for reinforcements. At thisplace, however, Tryon received orders to return to the White Stone;where, in a conference between Sir Henry Clinton and Sir GeorgeCollier, it was determined to proceed against New London with anincreased force. 

On the invasion of Connecticut, the Commander-in-chief was prompt inhis exertions to send continental troops from the nearest encampmentsto its aid; but, before they could afford any real service, Sir HenryClinton found it necessary to recall Tryon to the Hudson. 

General Washington had planned an enterprise against the posts atKing's Ferry, comprehending a double attack, to be made at the sametime, on both. But the difficulty of a perfect co-operation ofdetachments, incapable of communicating with each other, determinedhim to postpone the attack on Verplank's, and to make that part of theplan dependent on the success of the first. His whole attentiontherefore was turned to Stony Point; and the troops destined for thiscritical service, proceeded on it as against a single object. 

[Sidenote: July. ]

The execution of the plan was entrusted to General Wayne, whocommanded the light infantry of the army. Secrecy was deemed so muchmore essential to success than numbers, that no addition was made tothe force already on the lines. One brigade was ordered to commenceits march, so as to reach the scene of action in time to cover thetroops engaged in the attack, should any unlooked-for disaster befallthem; and Major Lee of the light dragoons, who had been eminentlyuseful in obtaining the intelligence which led to the enterprise, wasassociated with General Wayne, as far as cavalry could be employed insuch a service. The night of the fifteenth, and the hour of twelve, were chosen for the assault. 

Stony Point is a commanding hill, projecting far into the Hudson, which washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth is, in agreat measure, covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river onthe upper side, and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there isonly one crossing place; but at its junction with the river, is asandy beach, passable at low tide. On the summit of this hill stoodthe fort, which was furnished with heavy ordnance. Severalbreast-works and strong batteries were advanced in front of the mainwork; and, about half way down the hill, were two rows of abattis. Thebatteries were calculated to command the beach and the crossing placeof the marsh, and to rake and enfilade any column which might beadvancing from either of those points towards the fort. In addition tothese defences, several vessels of war were stationed in the river, and commanded the ground at the foot of the hill. The garrisonconsisted of about six hundred men, commanded by Colonel Johnson. 

General Wayne arrived about eight in the afternoon at Spring Steel's, one and a half miles from the fort; and made his dispositions for theassault. 

[Sidenote: General Wayne surprises and takes Stony Point. ]

It was intended to attack the works on the right and left flanks atthe same instant. The regiments of Febiger and of Meigs, with MajorHull's detachment, formed the right column; and Butler's regiment, with two companies under Major Murfree, formed the left. One hundredand fifty volunteers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Fleury and MajorPosey, constituted the van of the right; and one hundred volunteersunder Major Stewart, composed the van of the left. At half past eleventhe two columns moved to the assault, the van of each with unloadedmuskets, and fixed bayonets. They were each preceded by a forlorn hopeof twenty men, the one commanded by Lieutenant Gibbon, and the otherby Lieutenant Knox. They reached the marsh undiscovered; and, attwenty minutes after twelve, commenced the assault. 

Both columns rushed forward under a tremendous fire. Surmounting everyobstacle, they entered the works at the point of the bayonet; and, without discharging a single musket, obtained possession of the fort. 

The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous, norless honourable than their courage. Not an individual suffered afterresistance had ceased. 

All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree ofardour and impetuosity, which proved them to be capable of the mostdifficult enterprises; and all distinguished themselves, whosesituation enabled them to do so. Colonel Fleury was the first to enterthe fort and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted theworks almost at the same instant, and was the first to give the watchword--"The fort's our own. "--Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performedthe service allotted to them with a degree of intrepidity which couldnot be surpassed. Of twenty men who constituted the party of theformer, seventeen were killed or wounded. 

Sixty-three of the garrison were killed, including two officers. Theprisoners amounted to five hundred and forty-three, among whom wereone lieutenant colonel, four captains, and twenty subaltern officers. The military stores taken in the fort were considerable. [18]

[Footnote 18: The author was in the covering party, visited the fortnext day, and conversed with the officers who had been engaged instorming the works. ]

The loss sustained by the assailants was not proportioned to theapparent danger of the enterprise. The killed and wounded did notexceed one hundred men; General Wayne, who marched with Febiger'sregiment in the right column, received a slight wound in the headwhich stunned him for a time, but did not compel him to leave thecolumn. Being supported by his aids, he entered the fort with aregiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hay was also among the wounded. 

Although the design upon fort Fayette had yielded to the desire ofsecuring the success of the attack on Stony Point, it had not beenabandoned. Two brigades under General M'Dougal had been ordered toapproach the works on Verplank's, in which Colonel Webster commanded, and be in readiness to attack them the instant General Wayne shouldobtain possession of Stony Point. That this detachment might notpermit the favourable moment to pass unimproved, Wayne had beenrequested to direct the messenger who should convey the intelligenceof his success to the Commander-in-chief, to pass through M'Dougal'scamp, and give him advice of that event. He was also requested to turnthe cannon of the fort against Verplank's, and the vessels in theriver. The last orders were executed, and a heavy cannonade was openedon fort Fayette, and on the vessels, which compelled them to fall downthe river. Through some misconception, never explained, the messengerdespatched by General Wayne did not call on M'Dougal, but proceededdirectly to head quarters. Thus, every advantage expected from thefirst impression made by the capture of Stony Point was lost; and thegarrison had full leisure to recover from the surprise occasioned bythat event, and to prepare for an attack. This change of circumstancesmade it necessary to change the plan of operation. General Howe wasdirected to take the command of M'Dougal's detachment, to which somepieces of heavy artillery were to be annexed. He was ordered, aftereffecting a breach in the walls, to make the dispositions for anassault, and to demand a surrender; but not to attempt a storm untilit should be dark. To these orders, explicit instructions wereadded not to hazard his party by remaining before Verplank's, afterthe British should cross Croton River in force. 

[Illustration: The Ruins of Stony Point--On the Hudson

_Here, on the night of July 16, 1779, Brigadier-General (Mad Anthony)Wayne led his troops up the hill in darkness, surprised the Britishgarrison and captured this British stronghold at the point of thebayonet. Not a shot was fired by the Americans, who lost fifteenkilled and eighty-three wounded; the British sixty-three killed and533 prisoners. The fortifications were destroyed and the place, beinguntenable, was abandoned shortly afterwards by the Americans. _]

Through some unaccountable negligence in the persons charged with theexecution of these orders, the battering artillery was not accompaniedwith suitable ammunition; and the necessary intrenching tools were notbrought. These omissions were supplied the next day; but it was thentoo late to proceed against Verplank's. 

On receiving intelligence of the loss of Stony Point, and of thedanger to which the garrison of fort Fayette was exposed, Sir HenryClinton relinquished his views on Connecticut, and made a forced marchto Dobbs' Ferry. Some troops were immediately embarked to pass up theriver, and a light corps was pushed forward to the Croton. Thismovement relieved fort Fayette. 

The failure of the attempt to obtain possession of Verplank's Pointleaving that road of communication still closed, diminished theadvantages which had been expected to result from the enterprise somuch, that it was deemed unadviseable to maintain Stony Point. Onreconnoitring the ground, General Washington believed that the placecould not be rendered secure with a garrison of less than fifteenhundred men; a number which could not be spared from the army withoutweakening it too much for farther operations. He determined thereforeto evacuate Stony Point, and retire to the Highlands. As soon as thisresolution was executed, Sir Henry Clinton repossessed himself of thatpost, repaired the fortifications, and placed a stronger garrison init; after which he resumed his former situation at Philipsburg. 

The two armies watched each other for some time. At length, Sir HenryClinton, finding himself unable to attack Washington in the strongposition he had taken, or to draw him from it, and being desirous oftransferring the theatre of active war to the south, withdrew intoYork Island, and was understood to be strengthening the fortificationserected for its defence, as preparatory to the large detachments heintended making to reinforce the southern army. 

Although this movement was made principally with a view to southernoperations, it was in some degree hastened by the opinion, that NewYork required immediate additional protection during the absence ofthe fleet, which was about to sail for the relief of Penobscot. 

[Sidenote: Expedition against Penobscot. ]

Early in June, Colonel M'Clean, with six hundred and fifty men, hadpenetrated from Nova Scotia into the eastern parts of Maine, and takenpossession of a strong piece of ground on the Penobscot, which he hadbegun to fortify. 

[Sidenote: July 25. ]

The state of Massachusetts, alarmed at an invasion which threatened aserious diminution of territory, determined to dislodge him. Arespectable fleet, commanded by Commodore Saltonstal, and an army ofnear four thousand men, under General Lovell, were prepared with somuch celerity, that the whole armament appeared in the Penobscot asearly as the 25th of July. 

M'Clean had taken possession of a peninsula on the eastern side ofPenobscot, and had intrenched the isthmus connecting it with thecontinent. The part towards the river was steep and difficult ofaccess; and was also defended by his frigates and batteries, theprincipal of which was constructed about the centre of the peninsula. 

After being repulsed in his first attempt, General Lovell effected alanding on the western part of the peninsula, where he ascended aprecipice of two hundred feet; and, with the loss of only fifty menkilled and wounded, drove the party which defended it from the ground. A battery was erected within seven hundred and fifty yards of the mainwork of the besieged, and a warm cannonade was kept up for severaldays on both sides. 

Perceiving the difficulty of carrying the place with a militiaimpatient to return to their homes, General Lovell represented hissituation to the government of Massachusetts, who applied to GeneralGates, then commanding at Providence, for a reinforcement of fourhundred continental troops. This request was readily granted, andJackson's regiment was ordered to Penobscot. In the mean time anineffectual cannonade was continued, and preparations were made tostorm the works on the arrival of the expected reinforcements. 

Such was the posture of affairs on the 13th of August, when Lovellreceived information that Sir George Collier had entered the riverwith a superior naval force. He re-embarked his whole army thefollowing night, and drew up his flotilla in a crescent across theriver, as if determined to maintain its position. This show ofresistance was made in the hope of stopping Sir George Collier untilthe land forces on board the transports could be conveyed up theriver, and disembarked on the western shore. But the British generalwas too confident in his strength to permit this stratagem to succeed;and, as he approached, the Americans sought for safety in flight. Ageneral chase and unresisted destruction ensued. The ships of war wereblown up, and the transports fled in the utmost confusion up theriver. Being pursued by the British squadron, the troops landed in awild uncultivated country; and were obliged to explore their way, without provisions, through a pathless wilderness, for more than ahundred miles. Exhausted with famine and fatigue, they at lengthgained the settled parts of the country, after having lost several menwho perished in the woods. 

While Sir Henry Clinton continued encamped just above Haerlem, withhis upper posts at Kingsbridge, and the American army preserved itsstation in the Highlands, a bold plan was formed for surprising aBritish post at Powles Hook, which was executed with great address byMajor Lee. 

This officer was employed on the west side of the river withdirections to observe the situation of the British in Stony Point, but, principally, to watch the motions of their main army. While hisparties scoured the country, he obtained intelligence which suggestedthe idea of surprising and carrying off the garrison at Powles Hook, apoint of land on the west side of the Hudson, immediately opposite thetown of New York, penetrating deep into the river. On the pointnearest New York, some works had been constructed, which weregarrisoned by four or five hundred men. 

A deep ditch, into which the water of the river flowed, having over ita drawbridge connected with a barred gate, had been cut across theisthmus, so as to make the Hook, in reality, an island. This ditchcould be passed only at low water. Thirty paces within it was a row ofabattis running into the river; and some distance in front of it, is acreek fordable only in two places. 

This difficulty of access, added to the remoteness of the nearestcorps of the American army, impressed the garrison with the opinionthat they were perfectly secure; and this opinion produced anunmilitary remissness in the commanding officer, which did not escapethe vigilance of Lee. 

On receiving his communications, General Washington was inclined tofavour the enterprise they suggested; but withheld his full assent, until he was satisfied that the assailants would be able to make goodtheir retreat. 

The Hackensack, which communicates with the waters of the Hudson belowNew York, runs almost parallel with that river quite to its source, and is separated from it only a few miles. This neck is still farthernarrowed by a deep creek which divides it, and empties into theHackensack below fort Lee. West of that river runs the Passaick, whichunites with it near Newark, and forms another long and narrow neck ofland. From Powles Hook to the new bridge, the first place where theHackensack could be crossed without boats, the distance is fourteenmiles; and from the North River to the road leading from the one placeto the other, there are three points of interception, the nearest ofwhich is less than two miles, and the farthest not more than three. The British were encamped in full force along the North River, opposite to these points of interception. To diminish the danger ofthe retreat, it was intended to occupy the roads leading through themountains of the Hudson to the Hackensack with a select body oftroops. 

Every preparatory arrangement being made, the night of the eighteenthof August was fixed on for the enterprise. A detachment from thedivision of Lord Stirling, including three hundred men designed forthe expedition, was ordered down as a foraging party. As there wasnothing unusual in this movement, it excited no suspicion. LordStirling followed with five hundred men, and encamped at the newbridge. 

[Sidenote: The British post at Powles Hook surprised by Major Lee andthe garrison made prisoners. ]

Major Lee, at the head of three hundred men, took the road through themountains which ran parallel to the North River; and, having securedall the passes into York Island, reached the creek which surrounds theHook between two and three in the morning. He passed first the creek, and then the ditch undiscovered; and, about three in the morning, entered the main work, and with the loss of only two killed and threewounded, made one hundred and fifty-nine prisoners, including threeofficers. Very few of the British were killed. Major Sutherland, whocommanded the garrison, threw himself with forty or fifty Hessiansinto a strong redoubt, which it was thought unadviseable to attack, because the time occupied in carrying it might endanger the retreat. Wasting no time in destroying what could easily be replaced, Major Leehastened to bring off his prisoners and his detachment. 

To avoid the danger of retreating up the narrow neck of land which hasalready been described, some boats had been brought in the course ofthe night to Dow's Ferry on the Hackensack, not far from Powles Hook. The officer who guarded them was directed to remain until the arrivalof the troops engaged in the expedition, which, it was understood, would happen before day. The light having made its appearance withoutany intelligence from Major Lee, the officer having charge of theboats conjectured that the attack had been postponed; and, to avoiddiscovery, retired with them to Newark. The head of the retreatingcolumn soon afterwards reached the ferry; and, fatigued as they wereby the toilsome march of the preceding night, were compelled to passas rapidly as possible up the narrow neck of land between the tworivers to the new bridge. A horseman was despatched with thisinformation to Lord Stirling, and the line of march was resumed. 

About nine in the preceding evening, Major Buskirk had been detachedup the North River with a considerable part of the garrison of PowlesHook, and some other troops, for the purpose of falling in with theAmerican party supposed to be foraging about the Englishneighbourhood. 

On receiving intelligence of the disappointment respecting the boats, Lord Stirling took the precaution to detach Colonel Ball with twohundred fresh men to meet Lee, and cover his retreat. Just after Ballhad passed, Buskirk entered the main road, and fired on his rear. Taking it for granted that this was only the advanced corps of a largedetachment sent to intercept the party retreating from Powles Hook, Ball made a circuit to avoid the enemy; and Buskirk, finding adetachment he had not expected, took the same measure to secure hisown retreat. The two parties, narrowly missing each other, returned totheir respective points of departure; and Lee reached the new bridgewithout interruption. [19]

[Footnote 19: The author states these facts from his own observation, and conversations with other officers of the detachment. ]

This critical enterprise reflected much honour on the partisan withwhom it originated, and by whom it was conducted. General Washingtonannounced it to the army in his orders with much approbation; andcongress bestowed upon it a degree of applause more adapted to thetalent displayed in performing the service than to its magnitude. 

[Sidenote: Arrival of Admiral Arbuthnot. ]

A few days after the surprise of Powles Hook, the long expected fleetfrom Europe, under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, having on board areinforcement for the British army, arrived at New York. Thisreinforcement however did not enable Sir Henry Clinton to enterimmediately on that active course of offensive operations which hehad meditated. It was soon followed by the Count D'Estaing, whoarrived on the southern coast of America with a powerful fleet; afterwhich the British general deemed it necessary to turn all hisattention to his own security. Rhode Island, and the posts up theNorth River were evacuated, and the whole army was collected in NewYork, the fortifications of which were carried on with unremittingindustry. 

[Sidenote: St. Lucia taken by the British. St. Vincents and Grenadaby the French. ]

The Count D'Estaing and Admiral Byron, having sailed about the sametime from the coast of North America, met in the West Indies, wherethe war was carried on with various success. St. Lucia surrendered tothe British, in compensation for which the French took St. Vincentsand Grenada. About the time of the capture of the latter island, D'Estaing received reinforcements which gave him a decided navalsuperiority; after which a battle was fought between the two hostilefleets, in which the Count claimed the victory, and in which so manyof the British ships were disabled that the Admiral was compelled toretire into port in order to refit. 

The earnest representations made on the part of the United States hadprevailed on the cabinet of Versailles to instruct the Count D'Estaingto afford them all the aid in his power; and the present moment seemeda fit one for carrying these orders into execution. Letters fromGeneral Lincoln, from the executive of South Carolina, and from theFrench consul at Charleston, urged him to pay a visit to the southernstates; and represented the situation of the British in Georgia to besuch that his appearance would insure the destruction of the army inthat quarter, and the recovery of the state. 

[Sidenote: Count D'Estaing with his fleet arrives on the southerncoast of America. ]

Yielding to these solicitations, the Count sailed with twenty-twoships of the line, and eleven frigates, having on board six thousandsoldiers, and arrived so suddenly on the southern coast of America, that the Experiment of fifty guns, and three frigates, fell into hishands. A vessel was sent to Charleston with information of hisarrival, and a plan was concerted for the siege of Savannah. D'Estaingwas to land three thousand men at Beaulieu on the 11th of September, and Lincoln was to cross the Savannah on the same day with onethousand Americans, and effect a junction with him. 

The town of Savannah was, at that time, the head quarters of GeneralPrevost. Apprehending no immediate danger, he had weakened thegarrison by establishing several out-posts in Georgia; and by leavingColonel Maitland with a strong detachment in the island of Port Royal, in South Carolina. 

On the appearance of the French fleet, expresses were despatched toColonel Maitland and to all the out-posts, directing the troops torepair without loss of time to Savannah. These orders were promptlyobeyed; and, on the 10th of September, the several detachments inGeorgia had all arrived in safety, except the sick and convalescentsof the garrison of Sunbury, who were intercepted. 

[Sidenote: September. ]

[Sidenote: Siege of Savannah by the combined armies. ]

On the 11th, General Lincoln reached Zubly's Ferry, and, on the 15th, was assured that the French had disembarked in force. A junction ofthe two armies was formed the next day before the town of Savannah. 

On the night of the 12th, the Count D'Estaing had landed about threethousand men at Beaulieu; and the next day, before the arrival ofGeneral Lincoln, had summoned the garrison to surrender to the arms ofthe King of France. Being desirous of gaining time, General Prevostanswered the summons in such a manner as to encourage the opinion thathe designed to capitulate; in the expectation of which a suspension ofhostilities for twenty-four hours was granted. In that importantinterval, Colonel Maitland arrived from Beaufort, with the troopswhich had been stationed at that place. 

As the French were in possession of the main channel by which theSavannah communicates with the sea, Colonel Maitland entered the townby a route which had been deemed impracticable. He came round byDawfuskie, an island north of the mouth of the river, and landing in adeep marsh, drew his boats through it into the Savannah, above theplace where the ships lay at anchor, and thence made his way by smallparties into the town. 

On receiving this reinforcement, the resolution was taken to defendthe place to the last extremity; and, the next day, this determinationwas communicated to the Count D'Estaing. 

[Sidenote: September. ]

After bringing up the heavy ordnance and stores from the fleet, thebesieging army broke ground; and, by the first of October, had pushedtheir sap within three hundred yards of the abattis on the left of theBritish lines. Several batteries were opened on the besieged whichplayed almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression onthem. 

The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time hadalready been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had supposedwould be necessary for the destruction of the British force in thatstate. He became uneasy for the possessions of France in the WestIndies, and apprehensive for the safety of the ships under hiscommand. The naval officers remonstrated strenuously against longerexposing his fleet on an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season ofthe year, and urged the danger of being overtaken by a Britishsquadron, when broken and scattered by a storm, with a degree ofpersevering earnestness which the Count found himself incapable ofresisting. 

In a few days the lines of the besiegers might have been carried byregular approaches, into the works of the besieged, which would haverendered the capture of the town and garrison inevitable. ButD'Estaing declared that he could devote no more time to this object;and it only remained to raise the siege, or to attempt the works bystorm. The latter part of the alternative was adopted. 

On the left of the allied army, was a swampy hollow way which affordeda cover for troops advancing on the right flank of the besieged, to apoint within fifty yards of their principal work. It was determined tomarch to the main attack along this hollow; and, at the same time, todirect feints against other parts of the lines. 

[Sidenote: Unsuccessful attempt to storm it. ]

On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, a heavy cannonadeand bombardment were commenced from all the batteries, as preliminaryto the assault. About three thousand five hundred French, and onethousand Americans, of whom between six and seven hundred wereregulars, and the residue militia of Charleston, advanced in threecolumns, led by D'Estaing and Lincoln, aided by the principal officersof both nations, and made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception was warmer than had been expected. The fire from thebatteries of the besieged reached every part of the columns of theassailants which had emerged from the swamp, and did great execution. Yet the allied troops advanced with unabated ardour, passed throughthe abattis, crossed the ditch, and mounted the parapet. Both theFrench and Americans planted their standards on the walls, and werekilled in great numbers, while endeavouring to force their way intothe works. For about fifty minutes, the contest was extremelyobstinate. At length, the columns of the assailants began to relax, and a pause was manifested in the assault. 

In this critical moment, Major Glaziers, at the head of a body ofgrenadiers and marines, rushing suddenly from the lines, threw himselfon those who had made their way into the redoubts, and drove them overthe ditch and abattis into the hollow which they had marched to theattack. It became apparent that farther perseverance could produce noadvantage, and a retreat was ordered. 

In this unsuccessful attempt, the French lost in killed and wounded, about seven hundred men. Among the latter, were the Count D'Estainghimself, Major General De Fontanges, and several other officers ofdistinction. The continental troops lost two hundred and thirty-fourmen, and the Charleston militia, who, though associated with them indanger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed, and six privateswounded. 

The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed andwounded, it amounted only to fifty-five. So great was the advantageof the cover afforded by their works. 

[Sidenote: The siege raised. ]

[Sidenote: October 18. ]

After this repulse, the Count D'Estaing announced to General Lincoln, his determination to raise the siege. The remonstrances of thatofficer were ineffectual; and the removal of the heavy ordnance andstores was commenced. This being accomplished, both armies moved fromtheir ground on the evening of the 18th of October. The Americans, recrossing the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry, again encamped in SouthCarolina, and the French re-embarked. 

Although the issue of this enterprise was the source of severe chagrinand mortification, the prudence of General Lincoln suppressed everyappearance of dissatisfaction, and the armies separated withmanifestations of reciprocal esteem. 

The hopes which had brought the militia into the field beingdisappointed, they dispersed; and the affairs of the southern stateswore a more gloomy aspect than at any former period. 

On receiving intelligence of the situation of Lincoln, congress passeda resolution requesting General Washington to order the North Carolinatroops, and such others as could be spared from the northern army, tothe aid of that in the south; and assuring the states of SouthCarolina and Georgia of the attention of government to theirpreservation; but requesting them, for their own defence, to complywith the recommendations formerly made respecting the completion oftheir continental regiments, and the government of their militia whilein actual service. 

During these transactions in the south, the long meditated expeditionagainst the Indians was prosecuted with success. 

The largest division of the western army was to assemble at Wyoming, on the main branch of the Susquehanna, and General Sullivan expectedto leave that place in the month of June. Such, however, were thedelays in procuring provisions and military stores, that it was thelast of July[20] before he could move from the place of rendezvous. 

[Footnote 20: While Sullivan was preparing to invade their country, the savages were not inactive. At the head of a small party of whitesand Indians, Joseph Brandt fell upon the frontiers of New York, murdered several of the inhabitants, carried others into captivity, and burnt several houses. He was pursued by about one hundred andfifty militia, whom he drew into an ambuscade, and entirely defeated. A few days afterwards, Captain M'Donald, at the head of a small party, of whom a third were British, took a fort on the west branch of theSusquehanna, and made the garrison, amounting to thirty men, prisonersof war. The women and children, contrary to the usage of Indians, werepermitted to retire into the settled country. --_Gordon. _]

[Sidenote: August. ]

Another body of troops, designed to compose a part of the westernarmy, had passed the winter on the Mohawk. On the 22d of August, thesetwo divisions united, and the whole army, amounting to five thousandmen, marched up the Tyoga, which led into the heart of the Indiancountry. 

Such extensive and tedious preparations could not be made unobserved. The plan of operations contemplated by Sullivan seems to have beencompletely understood; and, notwithstanding the vast superiority ofhis force, the Indians determined to defend their country. Theyresolved to risk a general action for its preservation, and selectedthe ground for the conflict with judgment. 

About a mile in front of Newtown, they collected their whole force, estimated by General Sullivan at fifteen hundred men, but bythemselves at only eight hundred, commanded by the two Butlers, Grey, Johnson, M'Donald, and Brandt. Five companies of whites, calculated attwo hundred men, were united with them. They had constructed abreast-work about half a mile in length, on a piece of rising ground. The right flank of this work was covered by the river, which, bendingto the right, and winding round their rear, exposed only their frontand left to an attack. On the left, was a high ridge nearly parallelto the general course of the river, terminating somewhat below thebreast-work; and still farther to the left, was another ridge runningin the same direction, and leading to the rear of the American army. The ground was covered with pine interspersed with low shrub-oaks, many of which, for the purpose of concealing their works, had been cutup and stuck in front of them, so as to exhibit the appearance ofbeing still growing. The road, after crossing a deep brook at the footof the hill, turned to the right, and ran nearly parallel to thebreast-work, so as to expose the whole flank of the army to theirfire, if it should advance without discovering their position. 

Parties communicating with each other were stationed on both hills, soas to fall on the right flank and rear of Sullivan, as soon as theaction should commence. 

[Sidenote: August. ]

About eleven in the morning of the 29th of August, this work wasdiscovered by Major Par, who commanded the advance guard of the army;upon which, General Hand formed the light infantry in a wood, aboutfour hundred yards distant from the enemy, and stood upon his grounduntil the main body should arrive. In the mean time, a continualskirmishing was kept up between Par's rifle corps, and small partiesof Indians who sallied from their works, and suddenly retreated, apparently with the hope of being incautiously pursued. 

Conjecturing that the hills on his right were occupied by the savages, Sullivan ordered General Poor to take possession of that which ledinto his rear, and, thence, to turn the left, and gain the rear, ofthe breast-work; while Hand, aided by the artillery, should attack infront. These orders were promptly executed. While the artillery playedon the works, Poor pushed up the mountain, and a sharp conflictcommenced, which was sustained for some time, with considerable spiriton both sides. Poor continued to advance rapidly, pressing theIndians before him at the point of the bayonet, and occasionallyfiring on them. They retreated from tree to tree, keeping up anirregular fire, until he gained the summit of the hill. Perceivingthat their flank was completely uncovered by this movement, and thatthey were in danger of being surrounded, the savages abandoned theirbreast-work, and, crossing the river, fled with the utmostprecipitation. 

[Sidenote: Victory of General Sullivan at Newtown. ]

This victory cost the Americans about thirty men. The ascertained lossof the Indians was also inconsiderable. But they were so intimidated, that every idea of farther resistance was abandoned. As Sullivanadvanced, they continued to retreat before him without harassing hismain body, or even skirmishing with his detachments, except in asingle instance. 

He penetrated far into the heart of their country, which his partiesscoured, and laid waste in every direction. Houses, corn-fields, gardens, and fruit trees, shared one common fate; and Sullivanexecuted strictly the severe but necessary orders he had received, torender the country completely uninhabitable for the present, and thusto compel the hostile Indians, by want of food, to remove to a greaterdistance. 

The objects of the expedition being accomplished, Sullivan returned toEaston in Pennsylvania, having lost only forty men by sickness andthe enemy. 

The devastation of the country has been spoken of with some degree ofdisapprobation; but this sentiment is the result rather of an amiabledisposition in the human mind to condemn whatever may have theappearance of tending to aggravate the miseries of war, than ofreflection. Circumstances existed which reconciled to humanity thisseeming departure from it. Great Britain possessed advantages whichensured a controlling influence over the Indians, and kept them inalmost continual war with the United States. Their habitual ferocityseemed to have derived increased virulence from the malignity of thewhites who had taken refuge among them; and there was real foundationfor the opinion that an annual repetition of the horrors of Wyomingcould be prevented only by disabling the savages from perpetratingthem. No means in the power of the United States promised so certainlyto effect this desirable object, as the removal of neighbours whosehostility could be diminished only by terror, and whose resentmentswere to be assuaged only by fear. 

While Sullivan laid waste the country on the Susquehanna, anotherexpedition under Colonel Brodhead, was carried on from Pittsburg upthe Alleghany, against the Mingo, Munscy, and Seneca tribes. At thehead of between six and seven hundred men, he advanced two hundredmiles up the river, and destroyed the villages and corn-fields on itshead branches. Here too the Indians were unable to resist the invadingarmy. 

After one unsuccessful skirmish, they abandoned their villages to adestruction which was inevitable, and sought for personal safety intheir woods. 

On receiving the communications of General Sullivan, congress passed avote approving his conduct, and that of his army. That approbation, however, seems not to have extended beyond his conduct in the Indiancountry. His demands for military stores for the expedition had beenso high; in his conversations with his officers, he had so freelycensured the government for its failure to comply with those demands;in general orders, he had so openly complained of inattention to thepreparations necessary to secure the success of the enterprise; thatconsiderable offence was given to several members of congress, andstill more to the board of war. From the operation of these causes, when Sullivan, at the close of the campaign, complained of ill health, and offered, on that account, to resign his commission, the endeavoursof his friends to obtain a vote requesting him to continue in theservice, and permitting him to retire from actual duty until hishealth should be restored, were overruled; and his resignation wasaccepted. The resolution permitting him to resign was, however, accompanied with one thanking him for his past services. 

Although these great exertions to terminate Indian hostility did notafford complete security to the western frontiers, they were attendedwith considerable advantages. The savages, though not subdued, wereintimidated; and their incursions became less formidable, as well asless frequent. 

The summer of 1779 passed away without furnishing any circumstance inAmerica which could be supposed to have a material influence on theissue of the war. In Europe, however, an event took place which hadbeen long anxiously expected, and was believed to be of decisiveimportance. Spain at length determined to make one common cause withFrance against Great Britain. It was supposed that the two powerswould be able to obtain a complete ascendency at sea; and that theircombined fleets would maintain a superiority on the American coast, aswell as in Europe. 

From the first determination of France to take part in the war, itappears to have been the earnest wish of the cabinet of Versailles toengage Spain likewise in the contest. 

Her resentments against England, her solicitude to diminish the navalstrength of that nation, and her wish to recover Jamaica, Gibraltar, and the Floridas, urged her to seize the fair occasion now offered ofdismembering the British empire, and accomplishing these favouriteobjects. But her dread of the effect which the independence of theUnited States might produce on her own colonies, mingled with someapprehensions of danger from the contest she was about to provoke, hadproduced an appearance of irresolution, which rendered her futurecourse, for a time, uncertain. In this conflict of opposite interests, the influence of the cabinet of Versailles, and the jealousy of thenaval power of Britain, at length obtained the victory; and hisCatholic Majesty determined to prevent the reannexation of the UnitedStates to their mother country; but to effect this object bynegotiation rather than by the sword. 

[Sidenote: Spain offers her mediation to the belligerent powers. ]

In pursuance of this pacific system, he offered his mediation to thebelligerent powers. This proposition was readily accepted by France;but the minister of his Britannic Majesty evaded any explicitarrangements on the subject, while he continued to make general verbaldeclarations of the willingness of his sovereign to give peace toEurope under the mediation of his Catholic Majesty. In consequence ofthese declarations, the Spanish minister proposed a truce for a termof years, and that a congress of deputies from the belligerent powersshould assemble at Madrid to adjust the terms of a permanent treaty;into which deputies from the United States were to be admitted, asthe representatives of a sovereign nation. Although an explicitacknowledgment of their independence was not to be required, it was tobe understood that they should be independent in fact, and should becompletely separated from the British empire. 

This negotiation was protracted to a considerable length; and in themean time, all the address of the cabinet of London was used to detacheither France or the United States from their alliance with eachother. Notice of it was given to the American government by theminister of France at Philadelphia, as well as by Mr. Arthur Lee, oneof their agents in Europe; and congress was repeatedly urged by theformer, to furnish those who might be authorized to represent them inthe conferences for a general treaty, with ample powers andinstructions to conclude it. An extraordinary degree of solicitude wasmanifested to hasten the full powers, and to moderate the claims ofthe United States. 

It seems to have been the policy of the cabinet of Versailles toexclude the American States from a share of the fisheries, and tolimit their western boundary to the settlements then made. Either froma real apprehension that the war might be protracted should the UnitedStates insist on the acknowledgment of their independence as apreliminary to any treaty, or from an opinion that such preliminaryacknowledgment would leave the terms of the treaty less under thecontrol of France, and the American plenipotentiaries more masters oftheir own conduct, Monsieur Girard laboured to persuade congress torecede from that demand. If they could be independent in fact, hethought the form not worth contending for. [21]

[Footnote 21: The author has seen notes taken by a member of congress, of communications made by Mr. Girard, when admitted to an audience, which avow these sentiments. The secret journals of congress sustainthis statement. ]

While congress was employed in debating the instructions to theirministers, the negotiation was brought to a close. As Spain becameprepared for hostilities, the offered mediation was pressed in suchterms as to produce the necessity of either accepting or rejecting it. This drew from the cabinet of London a declaration that theindependence of the United States was inadmissible; upon which hisCatholic Majesty determined to take part in the war. 

[Sidenote: War between Spain and England. ]

On the departure of his minister from London without taking leave, theBritish government issued letters of marque and reprisal against thevessels and subjects of the Spanish crown; and a powerful Spanishfleet, which had been preparing during the negotiation, was expedited, to co-operate with that of France. Yet the independence of the UnitedStates was not acknowledged, nor was their minister accredited. Despatches, giving notice of the hostilities meditated by hisCatholic Majesty, were forwarded to Don Galvez, the governor ofLouisiana, who collected a considerable military force at New Orleans, and reduced the settlements held by the British crown on theMississippi, which had not been apprised of the war. 

Intelligence of this important event was given to congress while thatbody was deliberating on the instructions to their negotiators. It isnot impossible that this information had some influence on thosedeliberations; and, rendering the American government less solicitousabout the future conduct of Spain, diminished the motives for makingterritorial sacrifices to that power. Their ministers were ordered tomake it a preliminary article to any negotiation, that Great Britainshould agree to treat with the United States, as sovereign, free, andindependent; and that their independence should be expressly assuredand confirmed by the terms of the treaty itself. 

That the United States might be enabled to avail themselves withoutfurther delays, of any occasion which might be presented forterminating the war, Mr. John Adams, who was already in Europe, wasauthorized to negotiate a treaty of peace, and a commercial treatywith Great Britain; and Mr. Jay, at that time president of congress, was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the court of Madrid, withinstructions to insist on the free navigation of the Mississippi;--aclaim to which Spain objected, and which was discountenanced byFrance. 

As the campaign drew to a close without affording any solid foundationfor the hope that the war was about to terminate, General Washingtonrepeated those efforts which he had made so often and sounsuccessfully, to induce early preparations for the ensuing year. Hesubmitted to the view of his government a detailed report of the wholearmy, which exhibited the alarming fact, that by the last of thefollowing June, the terms of service of nearly one-half the men underhis command would expire. 

It was not the least considerable of the inconveniences attending thecomplex system of government then prevailing in the United States, that measures essential to the safety of the nation were never takenin season. Thus, when the time for raising the quotas of therespective states by voluntary enlistment had passed away, and thenecessity of resorting to coercive means had become absolute, thosemeans were so delayed, and so irregularly put in execution, that theterms of service of different portions of the army expired almostevery month in the year; and raw troops, ignorant of the firstrudiments of military duty, were introduced in the most criticalmoments of a campaign. Had timely and correspondent measures beentaken by the states to raise their respective quotas by a specifiedtime in the depth of winter, the recruits would have received theadvantage of a few months training before they were brought intoactual service, and the General, that of a certain uninterrupted forcefor each campaign. This course of proceeding had been continuallyrecommended, and the recommendation had been as continually neglected. 

[Sidenote: Letter from General Washington to Congress. ]

"In the more early stages of the contest, " said the Commander-in-chiefto congress, in a letter of the 8th of November, "when men might havebeen enlisted for the war, no man, as my whole conduct, and theuniform tenor of my letters will evince, was ever more opposed toshort enlistments than I was; and while there remained a prospect ofobtaining recruits on a permanent footing in the first instance, asfar as duty and a regard to my station would permit, I urged mysentiments in favour of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army byvoluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on tooprecarious and uncertain a footing to depend on for the exigency ofour affairs, I took the liberty in February, 1778, in a particularmanner, to lay before the committee of arrangement then with the armyat Valley Forge, a plan for an annual draught, as the surest and mostcertain, if not the only means left us, of maintaining the army on aproper and respectable ground. And, more and more confirmed in thepropriety of this opinion by the intervention of a variety ofcircumstances, unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom ofurging the plan to the committee of conference in January last; and, having reviewed it in every point of light, and found it right, atleast the best that has occurred to me, I hope I shall be excused bycongress in offering it to them, and in time for carrying intoexecution for the next year; if they should conceive it necessary forthe states to complete their quotas of troops. 

"The plan I would propose is, that each state be informed by congressannually of the _real deficiency_ of its troops, and called upon tomake it up, or such less specific number as congress may think proper, by a draught. That the men draughted join the army by the first ofJanuary, and serve until the first of January in the succeeding year. That from the time the draughts join the army, the officers of thestates from which they come, be authorized and directed to use theirendeavours to enlist them for the war, under the bounties granted tothe officers themselves, and to the recruits, by the act of the 23d ofJanuary, 1779, viz: ten dollars to the officer for each recruit, andtwo hundred to the recruits themselves. That all state, county, andtown bounties to draughts, if practicable, be entirely abolished, onaccount of the uneasiness and disorders they create among thesoldiery, the desertions they produce, and for other reasons whichwill readily occur. That on or before the first of October annually, an abstract, or return, similar to the present one, be transmitted tocongress, to enable them to make their requisitions to each state withcertainty and precision. This I would propose as a general plan to bepursued; and I am persuaded that this, or one nearly similar to it, will be found the best now in our power, as it will be attended withthe least expense to the public, will place the service on the footingof order and certainty, and will be the only one that can advance thegeneral interest to any great extent. "

These representations on the part of the Commander-in-chief were notmore successful than those which had before been made. Although thebest dispositions existed in congress, the proceedings of that bodywere unavoidably slow; and the difficulty of effecting a concert ofmeasures among thirteen sovereign states, was too great to besurmounted. In consequence of these radical defects in the systemitself, the contributions of men made by the states continued to beirregular, uncertain, and out of season; and the army could neveracquire that consistency and stability, which would have resulted froman exact observance of the plan so often recommended. 

On receiving information of the disaster which had been sustained bythe allied arms at Savannah, Sir Henry Clinton resumed his plan ofactive operations against the southern states. A large embarkationtook place soon after that event had been announced to him, whichsailed from the Hook towards the end of December. The troops werecommanded by himself in person, and the fleet by Admiral Arbuthnot. The defence of New York and its dependencies were entrusted to GeneralKnyphausen. 

The preparations made in New York for some distant enterprise wereimmediately communicated by his faithful intelligencers to GeneralWashington, who conjectured its object, and hastened the march of thetroops designed to reinforce General Lincoln. 

The season for action in a northern climate being over, the Generalturned his attention to the distribution of his troops in winterquarters. Habit had familiarized the American army to the use of hutsconstructed by themselves; and both officers and men were content topass the winter in a hutted camp. In disposing of the troops, therefore, until the time for action should return, wood and water, ahealthy situation, convenience for supplies of provisions, stationswhich would enable them to cover the country, and to defend particularpositions, were the objects taken into consideration, and were all tobe consulted. 

[Sidenote: The American army goes into winter quarters. ]

With a view to these various circumstances, the army was thrown intotwo great divisions. The northern was to be commanded by GeneralHeath; and its chief object was the security of West Point, and of theposts on the North River, as low as King's Ferry. Subordinate tothis, was the protection of the country on the Sound, and down theHudson to the neighbourhood of Kingsbridge. The other and principaldivision, under the immediate command of General Washington, was putunder cover, late in December, in the neighbourhood of Morristown. 

CHAPTER VI. 

 South Carolina invaded.... The British fleet passes the bar, and gets possession of the harbour of Charleston.... Opinion of General Washington on the propriety of defending that place.... Sir Henry Clinton invests the town.... Tarlton surprises an American corps at Monk's Corner.... Fort Moultrie surrendered.... Tarlton defeats Colonel White.... General Lincoln capitulates.... Buford defeated.... Arrangements for the government of South Carolina and Georgia.... Sir Henry Clinton embarks for New York.... General Gates takes command of the Southern army.... Is defeated near Camden.... Death of De Kalb.... Success of General Sumpter.... He is defeated. 

[Sidenote: 1780. ]

The departure of the French fleet produced a sudden change in theprospects of the southern states. The sanguine hopes which had beenentertained of the recovery of Georgia, gave place to gloomy and wellfounded apprehensions for South Carolina. 

The facility with which General Prevost had passed through the state, and the assurances he had received of the indisposition of a largeportion of the people to defend themselves, disclosed too certainlythe true situation of the country, not to convince all discerning menthat a real attempt at conquest would be made the ensuing year. General Lincoln perceived the approaching danger, without being ableto provide against it. His power, as a military commander, was toolimited, and his influence on the government of the state too weak, todraw forth even the means it possessed in time for its protection. 

Though the preservation of its metropolis was of vast importance tothe state, no preparations were making to put it in a condition tostand a siege. The forts on the islands were in ruins, and the worksacross the neck remained unfinished. The representations made on thissubject to the governor by General Lincoln were not disregarded; butfrom some defect in the existing law, the executive found itimpracticable to obtain labour for these interesting objects. 

[Sidenote: January 23. ]

Admiral Arbuthnot arrived at Savannah on the 31st of January. One ofhis transports, which had been separated from the fleet in a storm, was brought into Charleston harbour on the 23d of that month; and theprisoners gave the first certain intelligence that the expedition fromNew York was destined against the capital of South Carolina. 

[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton invests Charleston. ]

Before the middle of February, the fleet entered the harbour, orinlet, of North Edisto; and landed the troops without opposition onSt. John's Island. A part of the fleet was sent round to blockade theharbour of Charleston, while the army proceeded slowly and cautiouslyfrom Stono Creek to Wappoo Cut, and through the islands of St. Johnand St. James. 

This delay, in the event so fatal, but then deemed so propitious tothe American arms, was employed to the utmost advantage in improvingthe defence of Charleston. The legislature had enabled the executiveto employ slaves to work on the fortifications; and had passed an actdelegating great powers to the Governor and such of his council as hecould conveniently consult. Under these acts, six hundred slaves wereemployed on the works, and vigorous, though not very successfulmeasures were taken by the executive to assemble the militia of thecountry. The fallacious hope was entertained that, if the town couldbe rendered defensible, the garrison would be made sufficiently strongby reinforcements from the north, and by the militia of the state, tomaintain the place and compel Sir Henry Clinton to raise the siege. 

The American army being too weak to make any serious opposition to theprogress of the British through the country, the cavalry, with a smallcorps of infantry, were directed to hover on their left flank; and theother troops, consisting of about fourteen hundred regulars fit forduty, aided by the militia, were drawn into the town, and employed onthe works. 

[Sidenote: Colonel Washington defeats Tarlton. ]

Understanding that great exertions were making to improve thefortifications, and that the garrison was gaining strength, Sir HenryClinton ordered General Patterson to join him with the troops whichcould be spared from Georgia, and directed Lieutenant ColonelTarlton, after supplying the horses which had been lost during a verystormy voyage from New York, to cover his march through SouthCarolina. In one of the excursions of that active officer to dispersethe militia who assembled to oppose the progress of Patterson throughthe country, his cavalry encountered Lieutenant Colonel Washington, who commanded the remnant of Baylor's regiment, and were driven backwith some loss; but the want of infantry disabled Washington frompressing his advantage. 

In defending Charleston, the command of the harbour is of greatimportance. To preserve this advantage, congress had ordered fourfrigates to South Carolina, which, with the marine force belonging tothe state, and two French vessels, were placed under the command ofCommodore Whipple. 

General Washington was the more sanguine in the hope of defending theharbour, because it was understood that the bar was impassable by aship of the line, and that even a large frigate could not be broughtover it, without first taking out her guns, or careening her so muchthat the crew would be unable to work her. 

On sounding within the bar it was discovered that the water was tooshallow for the frigates to act with any effect, and that, in makingthe attempt, they would be exposed to the fire of the batteries whichthe assailants had erected. Under these circumstances, the officersof the navy were unanimously of opinion that no successful oppositioncould be made at the bar, and that the fleet might act moreadvantageously in concert with the fort on Sullivan's Island. 

The intention of disputing the passage over the bar being abandoned, Commodore Whipple moored his squadron in a line with fort Moultrie, ina narrow passage between Sullivan's Island and the middle ground; andthe British ships, without their guns, passed the bar, and anchored infive fathom hole. 

It being now thought impossible to prevent the fleet from passing fortMoultrie, and taking such stations in Cooper River as would enablethem to rake the batteries on shore, and to close that communicationbetween the town and country, the plan of defence was once morechanged, and the armed vessels were carried into the mouth of CooperRiver, and sunk in a line from the town to Shute's folly. 

This was the critical moment for evacuating the town. The loss of theharbour rendered the defence of the place, if not desperate, soimprobable, that the hope to maintain it, could not have beenrationally entertained by a person, who was not deceived by theexpectation of aids much more considerable than were actuallyreceived. 

[Sidenote: Opinion of General Washington on the subject of defendingCharleston. ]

When this state of things was communicated to General Washington, byLieutenant Colonel Laurens, he said in reply, "The impracticabilityof defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town andgarrison. At this distance it is impossible to judge for you. I havethe greatest confidence in General Lincoln's prudence; but it reallyappears to me, that the propriety of attempting to defend the town, depended on the probability of defending the bar; and that when thisceased, the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however, I suspend a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider what I sayas confidential. " Unfortunately, this letter did not arrive in time toinfluence the conduct of the besieged. 

[Sidenote: April 1. ]

Having crossed Ashley River, Sir Henry Clinton moved down the neck, and, on the night of the first of April, broke ground within eighthundred yards of the American lines. 

The defences of Charleston had been constructed under the direction ofa Mr. Laumay, a French gentleman in the American service; and, although not calculated to resist a regular siege, were far from beingcontemptible. 

While the besiegers were employed on their first parallel, thegarrison received a considerable reinforcement. General Woodford, whohad marched from Morristown in December, entered the town with the oldcontinental troops of the Virginia line, now reduced to seven hundredeffectives. General Hogan, with the line of North Carolina, hadarrived before him. The garrison consisted of rather more than twothousand regular troops, of about one thousand North Carolina militia, and of the citizens of Charleston. The exertions of the Governor tobring in the militia of South Carolina had not succeeded. 

[Sidenote: April 9. ]

By the 9th of April, Sir Henry Clinton completed his first parallelextending across the neck, and mounted his guns in battery. His worksformed an oblique line, from six to seven hundred yards distant fromthose of the besieged. About the same time, Admiral Arbuthnot passedSullivan's Island, under a heavy and well directed fire from fortMoultrie, then commanded by Colonel Pinckney, and anchored underJames' Island near fort Johnson, just out of gunshot of the batteriesof the town. 

Being now in complete possession of the harbour, the British Generaland Admiral sent a joint summons to General Lincoln, demanding thesurrender of the town, to which he returned this firm and modestanswer. "Sixty days have elapsed since it has been known that yourintentions against this town were hostile, in which, time has beenafforded to abandon it; but duty and inclination point to thepropriety of supporting it to the last extremity. "

On receiving this answer, the besiegers opened their batteries, butseemed to rely principally on proceeding by sap quite into theAmerican lines. 

About this time, the Governor with half the members of the council, went into the country, in the hope of collecting a respectable forcein the rear, and on the left flank of the besieging army. TheLieutenant Governor, and the other members of the council remained intown. 

Hitherto, Sir Henry Clinton had not extended his lines north ofCharleston neck, and the communication of the garrison with thecountry north-east of Cooper remained open. The American cavalry, under the command of General Huger, had passed that river, and wasstationed in the neighbourhood of Monk's corner, about thirty milesabove Charleston. As an additional security to this, the onlyremaining communication, two posts of militia were established, onebetween the Cooper and the Santee rivers, to which the Governorrepaired in person; and another at a ferry on the Santee, where boatswere to be collected for the purpose of facilitating the passage ofthe American army over that river, should it be deemed adviseable toevacuate the town. 

Such importance was attached to this object, that Lincoln, afterWoodford had entered Charleston, detached a part of his regulartroops, to throw up some works about nine miles above the town, onWando, the eastern branch of Cooper, and on Lamprere's point. Themilitia, it was hoped, though unwilling to enter Charleston, might bedrawn to these posts. 

[Sidenote: April 14. ]

[Sidenote: Tarlton surprises and defeats an American corps at Monk'scorner. ]

After the fleet had entered the harbour, Sir Henry Clinton turned hisattention to the country on the east of Cooper, to acquire thepossession of which it was necessary to disable the American cavalry. This service was committed to Lieutenant Colonel Webster, who detachedTarlton with the horse and a corps of infantry to execute it. Hesucceeded completely. Conducted in the night through unfrequentedpaths to the American videttes, he entered the camp with them, killedand took about one hundred men, and dispersed the residue, who savedthemselves on foot in a swamp. Near fifty wagons loaded with militarystores, and about four hundred horses, fell into the hands of thevictors. 

This decisive blow gave Lieutenant Colonel Webster possession of thewhole country between Cooper and Wando; and closed the only route bywhich the garrison could have retreated. 

The besiegers had now commenced their second parallel, and it becameevery day more apparent that the town must ultimately yield to theirregular approaches. An evacuation was proposed, and Lincoln isunderstood to have been in favour of that measure; but theremonstrances of the principal inhabitants, who entreated him not toabandon them to the fury of a disappointed enemy, added to the greatdifficulty which must attend such an attempt, especially when opposedby the civil government, deterred him from adopting the only coursewhich afforded even a probability, by saving his army, of saving thesouthern states. 

Soon after the affair at Monk's corner, Sir Henry Clinton received areinforcement of three thousand men from New York. This addition tohis strength enabled him to detach largely to the aid of LieutenantColonel Webster, after which Lord Cornwallis took command of thetroops on that side of Cooper River. 

[Sidenote: April 20. ]

Upon this change of situation, Lincoln called another council of war. Notwithstanding the multiplied difficulties attending an evacuation ofCharleston, he appears to have been still inclined to it. But a numberof fortunate circumstances must have concurred to render a retreatpossible; and the attempt was effectually prevented by the oppositionof the civil government. The opinion seems to have prevailed, that theescape of the garrison would be followed by the destruction of thetown, and the ruin of its inhabitants. 

The council advised that a capitulation should be proposed, and thatthe town should be surrendered on condition that the garrison shouldbe at liberty still to bear arms, and that the inhabitants should besecured in their persons and property. These propositions beingrejected, hostilities recommenced. 

The besiegers had completed their second parallel, and had begun thethird, when Colonel Henderson made a vigorous sally on their right, which was attended with some success. That this was the only sortiemade during the siege, is to be ascribed to the weakness of thegarrison. General Lincoln deemed it necessary to reserve all hisstrength to man his lines in the event of an assault, or to force aretreat, should he determine to evacuate the city. 

In this state of things, General Du Portail, who had been directed tojoin the southern army, was conducted by secret ways into the town. Heperceived the impossibility of defending the place, and repeated theproposition for attempting a retreat. This proposition was againrejected; and it only remained to defer the surrender as long aspossible, in the vain hope that some fortunate occurrence might bringrelief. 

[Sidenote: The garrison of fort Moultrie surrender themselvesprisoners of war. ]

Every day diminished this hope, and added to the difficulties of thebesieged. The admiral took possession of Mount Pleasant, which inducedthe immediate evacuation of Lamprere's point; soon after which thegarrison of fort Moultrie, amounting to about two hundred men, [22]surrendered themselves prisoners of war. On the same day, the cavalrywhich had escaped the disaster at Monk's corner, and had beenreassembled under the command of Colonel White, of New Jersey, wasagain surprised and defeated by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton atLanneau's ferry. 

[Footnote 22: After the fleet passed the fort, Colonel Pinckney and apart of the garrison were withdrawn. ]

The investment of the town was now complete; the advances were rapid;and it became obvious that the place could be defended only a few dayslonger. The besiegers had finished their third parallel; and by a sappushed to the dam that supplied the canal with water, had drained itin many places to the bottom. The garrison, fatigued and worn out withconstant duty, was too weak to man the lines sufficiently; their gunswere almost all dismounted; most of the embrasures demolished; theirshot nearly expended; their provisions, with the exception of a fewcows, entirely consumed; and the approaches of the besiegers so near, that their marksmen frequently picked off the men from the guns, andkilled[23] any person who showed himself above the works. 

[Footnote 23: Colonel Parker and Captain Peyton, two valuable officersfrom Virginia, fell in this manner. ]

In this state of things, the garrison was summoned, a second time, tosurrender; on which a council was again called, which advised acapitulation. In pursuance of this advice, General Lincoln proposedterms which were refused, and hostilities recommenced. 

The besiegers now advanced their works in front of their thirdparallel, crossed the canal, pushed a double sap to the inside of theabattis, and approached within twenty yards of the American works. Preparations for an assault by sea and land were making. With lessthan three thousand men, many of whom were militia, lines three milesin extent were to be defended against the flower of the British army, assisted by a powerful maritime force. Convinced that success was notpossible, the citizens prepared a petition to General Lincoln, entreating him to surrender the town on the terms which had beenoffered by the besiegers. 

[Sidenote: General Lincoln capitulates. ]

This proposition was made and accepted; and the capitulation wassigned on the 12th of May. 

[Sidenote: May 12. ]

The town, and all public stores were surrendered. The garrison, aswell the citizens who had borne arms as the continental troops, militia, and sailors, were to be prisoners of war. The garrison wereto march out of town, and to deposite their arms in front of theirworks; but their drums were not to beat a British march, nor theircolours to be reversed. The militia were to retire to their homes onparole, and their persons and property, as well as the persons andproperty of the inhabitants of the town, to be secure while theyadhered to their paroles. 

These terms being agreed on, the garrison laid down their arms, andGeneral Leslie was appointed to take possession of the town. 

The defence of Charleston was obstinate, but not bloody. The besiegersconducted their approaches with great caution; and the besieged, tooweak to hazard repeated sorties, kept within their lines. The loss onboth sides was nearly equal. That of the British was seventy-sixkilled and one hundred and eighty-nine wounded; and that of theAmericans, excluding the inhabitants of the town not bearing arms, wasninety-two killed, and one hundred and forty-eight wounded. 

From the official returns made to Sir Henry Clinton by his deputyadjutant general, the number of prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to five thousand six hundred and eighteen men. This report, however, presents a very incorrect view of the real strength of thegarrison. It includes every male adult inhabitant of the town. Theprecise number of privates in the continental regiments, according tothe report made to congress by General Lincoln, was one thousand ninehundred and seventy-seven; of whom five hundred were in the hospital. 

The unfortunate are generally condemned; and the loss of the garrisonof Charleston so maimed the force, and palsied the operations of theAmerican government in the south, that censure was unsparinglybestowed on the officer who had undertaken and persevered in thedefence of that place. In his justificatory letter to theCommander-in-chief, General Lincoln detailed at large the motives ofhis conduct, and stated the testimony on which those delusive hopes ofsubstantial assistance were founded, which tempted him to remain intown, until the unexpected arrival of the reinforcement from New Yorkdeprived him of the power to leave it. 

The importance of that great mart of the southern states, which hadbecome the depot for the country to a considerable extent around it;the magazines and military stores there collected, which, from thedifficulty of obtaining wagons, could not be removed; the ships ofwar, which must be sacrificed should the town be evacuated; theintention of congress that the place should be defended; theassurances received that the garrison should be made up to tenthousand men, of whom nearly one half would be regular troops; theanxious solicitude of the government of South Carolina; all concurredto induce the adoption of a measure which, in its consequences, wasextremely pernicious to the United States. In the opinion of those whowere best enabled to judge of his conduct, General Lincoln appears tohave been completely justified. The confidence of his government, andthe esteem of the Commander-in-chief, sustained no diminution. 

Sir Henry Clinton was aware of the impression his conquest had made, and of the value of the first moments succeeding it. Calculating onthe advantages to be derived from showing an irresistible force invarious parts of the country at the same time, he made three largedetachments from his army;--the first and most considerable, towardsthe frontiers of North Carolina; the second to pass the Saluda toNinety-Six; and the third up the Savannah towards Augusta. 

[Sidenote: Buford defeated. ]

Lord Cornwallis, who commanded the northern detachment, receivedintelligence, soon after passing the Santee, that Colonel Buford, withabout four hundred men, was retreating in perfect security towardsNorth Carolina. He detached Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton with hislegion, the infantry being mounted, in pursuit of this party. Thatofficer, by making a movement of near one hundred miles in two days, overtook Buford, in a line of march, at the Waxhaws, and demanded asurrender on the terms which had been granted to the garrison ofCharleston. This was refused. While the flags were passing, Tarltoncontinued to make his dispositions for the assault, and, the instantthe truce was over, his cavalry made a furious charge on theAmericans, who had received no orders to engage, and who seem to havebeen uncertain whether to defend themselves or not. In this state ofdismay and confusion, some fired on the assailants, while others threwdown their arms and begged for quarter. None was given. Colonel Bufordescaped with a few cavalry; and about one hundred infantry, who werein advance, saved themselves by flight; but the regiment was almostdemolished. Tarlton, in his official report, says that one hundred andthirteen were killed on the spot, one hundred and fifty so badlywounded as to be incapable of being moved, and fifty-three werebrought away as prisoners. The loss of the British was five killed andfourteen wounded. 

Tarlton gives a very different account of the circumstances whichpreceded this massacre. He says that the demand for a surrender wasmade long before Buford was overtaken, and was answered by a defiance;that, on overtaking him, the British vanguard made prisoners of asergeant and four light dragoons, in the presence of the twocommanders, who immediately prepared for action; that as he advancedto the charge, when within fifty paces, the American infantrypresented, and were commanded by their officers to retain their fireuntil the British cavalry should be nearer. [24]

[Footnote 24: Lieutenant Bowyer, an American officer who was in theengagement, near the person of Colonel Buford, in a letter which theauthor has lately seen, states this affair in a manner not muchconflicting with the statement made of it by Colonel Tarlton. ]

The American officers who survived the carnage of the day, generallyassert that flags passed after being overtaken, that they had receivedno orders from Colonel Buford when the charge was made, and that thefire of their troops was retained until the enemy was upon them, because they did not think themselves authorized to give it. The factsthat Buford's field pieces were not discharged, and that the loss wasso very unequal, are not to be reconciled with the idea of deliberatepreparation for battle, and justify the belief that the statementmade by the American officers is correct. 

After the defeat of Buford, scarcely the semblance of oppositionremained in South Carolina and Georgia. The military force employed bycongress was nearly destroyed; the spirit of resistance seemedentirely broken; and a general disposition to submit to the victordisplayed itself in almost every part of the country. 

The two other detachments saw no appearance of an enemy. They receivedthe submission of the inhabitants, who either became neutral by givingtheir paroles, not to bear arms against his Britannic Majesty, or tookthe oaths of allegiance, and resumed the character of Britishsubjects. 

To keep up this disposition, garrisons were posted in differentstations, and a series of measures was pursued for the purpose ofsettling the civil affairs of the province, and of giving stability tothe conquest which had been made. 

[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton takes measures for settling thegovernment of South Carolina and Georgia. ]

[Sidenote: June 3. ]

So entirely did the present aspect of affairs convince Sir HenryClinton of the complete subjugation of the state, and of thefavourable disposition of the people towards the British government, that he ventured to issue a proclamation, in which he discharged themilitia who were prisoners from their paroles, with the exception ofthose who were taken in Charleston and fort Moultrie, and restoredthem to all the rights and duties of British subjects; declaring, atthe same time, that such of them as should neglect to return to theirallegiance, should be considered and treated as enemies and rebels. 

This proclamation disclosed to the inhabitants their real situation. It proved that a state of neutrality was not within their reach; thatthe evils of war were unavoidable; that they must arrange themselveson the one side or the other; and that the only alternative presentedto them was, to drive the enemy out of their country, or take up armsagainst their countrymen. 

[Sidenote: June 5. ]

With the most sanguine hopes that the southern states would bereunited to the British empire, Sir Henry Clinton embarked for NewYork, leaving about four thousand British troops in South Carolina, under the command of Lord Cornwallis. 

His lordship found it necessary to suspend the expedition he hadmeditated against North Carolina. The impossibility of supporting anarmy in that state before harvest, as well as the intense heat of theseason, required this delay. His first care was to distribute histroops through South Carolina and the upper parts of Georgia, so as topromote the great and immediate objects of enlisting the young men whowere willing to join his standard, of arranging the plan of a militia, and of collecting magazines at convenient places. 

In the mean time, he despatched emissaries to his friends in NorthCarolina, to inform them of the necessary delay of his expeditioninto their country, and to request them to attend to their harvest, collect provisions, and remain quiet until late in August or early inSeptember, when the King's troops would be ready to enter theprovince. 

The impatience of the royalists, stimulated by the triumph of theirfriends in a neighbouring state, and by the necessary severities of avigilant government, could not be restrained by this salutary counsel. Anticipating the immediate superiority of their party, they could notbrook the authority exercised over them, and broke out into prematureand ill concerted insurrections, which were vigorously encountered, and generally suppressed. One body of them, however, amounting toabout eight hundred men, led by Colonel Bryan, marched down the eastside of the Yadkin to a British post at the Cheraws, whence theyproceeded to Camden. 

Having made his dispositions, and fixed on Camden as the place for hisprincipal magazines, Cornwallis left the command of the frontiers toLord Rawdon, and retired to Charleston for the purpose of making thosefarther arrangements of a civil nature, which the state of affairs andthe interest of his sovereign might require. 

His lordship, as well as Sir Henry Clinton, seems to have supposed thestate of South Carolina to be as completely subdued in sentiment asin appearance. Impatient to derive active aids from the new conquest, his measures were calculated to admit of no neutrality. For some timethese measures seemed to succeed, and professions of loyalty were madein every quarter. But under this imposing exterior, lurked a mass ofconcealed discontent, to which every day furnished new aliment, andwhich waited only for a proper occasion to show itself. 

The people of the lower parts of South Carolina, though far from beingunited, were generally attached to the revolution, and had enteredinto the war with zeal. They were conducted by a high spirited andintelligent gentry, who ardently sought independence as a real andpermanent good. 

Several causes had combined to suspend the operation of thissentiment. Many of their leaders were prisoners; and the brilliantsuccesses of the British arms had filled numbers with despair. Otherswere sensible of the inutility of present resistance; and a stillgreater number, fatigued and harassed with militia duty, were willingto withdraw from the conflict, and, as spectators, to await its issue. To compel these men to share the burdens of the war, was to restorethem to their former friends. 

Late in March, General Washington had obtained the consent of congressto reinforce the southern army with the troops of Maryland andDelaware, and with the first regiment of artillery. This detachmentwas to be commanded by the Baron De Kalb, a German veteran who hadengaged early in the service of the United States. 

Such, however, was the deranged state of American finances, and suchthe depression of public credit, that these troops could not be putimmediately in motion. They were at length embarked at the Head ofElk, and conveyed by water to Petersburg, in Virginia, whence theymarched towards South Carolina. Their progress was delayed by thatdifficulty of obtaining subsistence which had induced Lord Cornwallisto suspend the invasion of North Carolina until harvest should begathered. No preparations having been made for them, they were reducedto the necessity of spreading themselves over the country in smalldetachments, to collect corn, and grind it for their daily food. Inthis manner they proceeded through the upper parts of North Carolinato Deep River, and encamped near Buffalo Ford in July. At this placethe Baron halted for a few days, in some uncertainty respecting hisfuture course. [25]

[Footnote 25: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

The militia of North Carolina, commanded by General Caswell, werebeyond the Pedee, on the road to Camden, and had nearly consumed thescanty supplies which could be gleaned from a country that was farfrom being productive. The Baron was premeditating on a plan forleaving the direct road and moving up the country to the fertilebanks of the Yadkin, when the approach of Major General Gates wasannounced by the arrival of his aid-de-camp, Major Armstrong. [26]

[Footnote 26: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

[Sidenote: General Gates appointed to the command of the southernarmy. ]

[Sidenote: July. ]

Aware of the danger to which the loss of Charleston had exposed thatpart of the confederacy, congress deemed it of the utmost importanceto select a general for that department, in whom great militarytalents should be combined with that weight of character which mightenable him to draw out the resources of the country. They turned theireyes on Gates;[27] and sanguine hopes were entertained that theconqueror of Burgoyne would prove the saviour of the southern states. On the 13th of June, he was called to the command in the southerndepartment, and was directed to repair immediately to the army. Heentered, without loss of time, on the duties of his station; and, onthe 25th of July, reached the camp, where he was received by the BaronDe Kalb with the utmost cordiality and respect. 

[Footnote 27: This appointment was made without consulting theCommander-in-chief. He had determined, if consulted, to recommendGeneral Greene. ]

The approach of this army, and the information that great exertionswere making in Virginia to augment it, revived the hopes of SouthCarolina, and brought again into action a spirit supposed to beextinguished. The British troops having occupied the north-westernparts of the state, the most active friends of the revolution in thatquarter had fled from their homes, and sought an asylum in NorthCarolina and Virginia. As the discontents of their countrymenincreased, and the prospect of being supported by regular troopsbrightened, a small body of these exiles, amounting to less than twohundred, assembled together, and choosing Colonel Sumpter, an oldcontinental officer, for their chief, entered South Carolina. Theyskirmished with the royal militia and small corps of regulars on thefrontiers, sometimes successfully, and always with the active courageof men fighting for the recovery of their property. The followers ofSumpter were soon augmented to six hundred men; and a disposition oncemore to take up arms showed itself in various parts of the state. Somecorps of militia, which had been embodied under the authority of LordCornwallis, deserted his standard, and joined their countrymen. Perceiving this change of temper, the British general thought itnecessary to draw in his out-posts, and to collect his troops intolarger bodies. 

On taking command of the southern army, General Gates directed thetroops to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning;and, on the morning of the 27th, put the whole in motion. Disregardingthe judicious remonstrances which were made to him against pursuingthe direct road, he determined on taking the nearest route to theadvanced post of the British on Lynch's Creek, a few miles fromCamden. The motives assigned by himself for passing through thisbarren country were, the necessity of uniting with Caswell, who hadevaded the orders repeatedly given him to join the army, the danger ofdispiriting the troops, and intimidating the people of the country, bypursuing a route not leading directly towards the enemy, and theassurances he had received that supplies would overtake him, and wouldbe prepared for him on the road. 

[Sidenote: August 13. ]

These assurances were not fulfilled; and, the country being still morebarren than had been anticipated, the distress of the army wasextreme. The soldiers subsisted on a few lean cattle found in thewoods, and a very scanty supply of green corn and peaches. Encouragedby the example of their officers, who shared all their sufferings, andchecked occasional murmurs, they struggled through these difficulties, and, after effecting a junction with General Caswell and withLieutenant Colonel Porterfield, [28] the army reached Clermont, sometimes called Rugely's mills, on the 13th of August. Possession wastaken of this place without any opposition from Lord Rawdon, who, onthe approach of the American army, drew in his out-posts, andassembled all his forces at Camden. [29]

[Footnote 28: This valuable officer was pressing forward to Charlestonwhen that place surrendered. Continuing to advance, he was within oneday's march of Colonel Buford, when that officer was defeated. ColonelPorterfield still remained on the frontiers of the Carolinas; and hadthe address not only to avoid the fate of every other corps sent tothe relief of Charleston, but to subsist his men; and keep up thesemblance of holding that part of South Carolina. ]

[Footnote 29: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

The day after the arrival of Gates at Clermont, he was joined by sevenhundred militia from Virginia, commanded by Brigadier General Stevens, an officer of considerable merit, who, during the campaigns of 1777and 1778, had commanded a continental regiment. On the same day, anexpress arrived from Colonel Sumpter, with information that an escortof clothing, ammunition, and other stores for the garrison at Camden, was on the way from Ninety-Six, and must pass the Wateree at a ferryabout a mile from Camden, which was covered by a small redoubt on theopposite side of the river. One hundred regular infantry with twobrass field-pieces, were immediately detached to join Colonel Sumpter, who was ordered to reduce the redoubt, and to intercept theconvoy. [30]

[Footnote 30: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

To attract the attention of the garrison in Camden, and thusco-operate with the expedition under Sumpter, it was determined in acouncil of general officers to put the army in motion that evening, and to take a post about seven miles from Camden with a deep creek infront. 

The sick, the heavy baggage, and the military stores were orderedunder a guard to Waxhaws, [31] and the army was directed to be inreadiness to march precisely at ten in the evening in the followingorder. 

[Footnote 31: Colonel Williams says these orders were not executed. ]

Colonel Armand's legion composed the van. Porterfield's lightinfantry, reinforced by a company of picked men from Stevens'sbrigade, covered the right flank of the legion; while MajorArmstrong's light infantry of North Carolina militia, reinforced inlike manner from Caswell's division, covered the left. The Marylanddivision, followed by the North Carolina and Virginia militia, withthe artillery, composed the main body and rear guard; and thevolunteer cavalry were equally distributed on the flanks of thebaggage. 

In the event of an attack in front by the British cavalry, theinfantry on the flanks were directed to march up, and to continuetheir fire on the assailants. It was supposed they would enableColonel Armand to resist the shock; and his orders were positive tomaintain his ground against the cavalry, whatever their numbers mightbe. [32]

[Footnote 32: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

At the time of communicating these orders to Colonel Otho H. Williams, the Deputy Adjutant General, Gates, showed him a rough estimate of thearmy, making it upwards of seven thousand. Convinced that thisestimate was exaggerated, Colonel Williams availed himself of hismeans of information to make an abstract of the whole, which hepresented to the general, and which exhibited exactly three thousandand fifty-two in the column of present fit for duty, of whom more thantwo-thirds were militia. Gates expressed some surprise at the numbers, but said, "there are enough for our purpose, " and directed the ordersto be issued to the army. About ten at night, the line of march wastaken up, and the army had advanced about half way to Camden, when afiring commenced in front. [33]

[Footnote 33: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

Intelligence of the approach of the American army, and of thedefection of the country between Pedee and the Black River, had beencommunicated to Lord Cornwallis, and had induced him to hasten inperson to Camden, which place he reached the day Gates arrived atClermont. 

The British army did not much exceed two thousand men, of whom aboutnineteen hundred were regulars; but, as the whole country was rising, Lord Cornwallis apprehended that every day would strengthen his enemy, and therefore determined to attack him in his camp; hoping, by aprompt execution of this resolution, to surprise him. By one of thosecaprices of fortune on which great events often depend, he marchedfrom Camden to attack Gates in Clermont, at the very hour that Gatesmoved from that place towards Camden. [34]

[Footnote 34: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

[Sidenote: August 16. ]

About half past two in the morning, the advanced parties of thehostile armies, to their mutual surprise, met in the woods, and beganto skirmish with each other. Some of Armand's cavalry being woundedby the first fire, threw the others into disorder, and the wholerecoiled so suddenly that the first Maryland regiment, composing thefront of the column was broken, and the whole line thrown intoconsternation. From this first impression, the raw troops neverrecovered. The light infantry, however, particularly Porterfield'scorps, behaved so well as to check the advance of the British. Unfortunately, their gallant commander received a mortal wound, whichcompelled him to leave his regiment. Yet a part of it kept its ground;and, with the aid of the legion infantry, stopped the British van;upon which order was restored to the American army. 

The officers were immediately employed in forming a line of battle infront. The Maryland division, including the troops of Delaware, wereon the right, the North Carolina militia in the centre, and theVirginia militia on the left. 

In this rencounter some prisoners were made, from one of whom ColonelWilliams drew the information that the British army, consisting ofnear three thousand men, commanded by Lord Cornwallis in person, wasin full march five or six hundred yards in front. This intelligencewas immediately communicated to General Gates, who had supposed LordCornwallis to be still in Charleston. The general officers wereassembled in the rear of the line, and this information submitted tothem. After a short silence, Stevens said, "Gentlemen, is it not toolate to do any thing but fight?" No other advice being given, GeneralGates, who seems to have been himself disposed to risk a battle, directed the officers to repair to their respective commands. 

The ground on which the army was drawn up was so narrowed by a marshon each flank, as to admit of removing the first Maryland brigade, soas to form a second line about two hundred yards in rear of the first. The artillery was placed in the centre of the first line, andArmstrong's light infantry was ordered to cover a small intervalbetween the flank of the left wing and the marsh. 

Frequent skirmishes occurred during the night between the advancedparties, with scarcely any other effect than to discover the situationof the armies, evince the intention of the generals, and serve as aprelude to the events of the succeeding morning. 

At dawn of day the British appeared in front, advancing in column. Lieutenant Colonel Webster commanded on the right, and Lord Rawdon onthe left. The seventy-first regiment composed the reserve. Four fieldpieces were attached to the left, and one to the corps de reserve. 

Captain Singleton opened some field pieces on the front of the column, at the distance of about two hundred yards, soon after which theAmerican left was ordered to commence the action. It was thenperceived that the British right was advancing in line; and as Stevensled on his brigade in good order, Colonel Williams advanced in frontwith a few volunteers, intending by a partial fire to extort that ofthe enemy at some distance, and thereby diminish its effect on themilitia. The experiment did not succeed. The British rushed forwardwith great impetuosity, firing and huzzaing at the same time; and theterrified militia, disregarding the exertions of Stevens, who, in thefirm tone of courage, endeavoured to inspire them with confidence inthe bayonets they had just received, threw down their loaded muskets, fled from the field with the utmost precipitation, and were followedby the light infantry of Armstrong. The whole North Carolina division, except one regiment commanded by Colonel Dixon, an old continentalofficer, which was posted nearest the continental troops, followed theshameful example. Other parts of the same brigade, which was commandedby Gregory, paused for an instant; but the terror of their brethrenwas soon communicated to them, and they also threw away their arms, and sought for safety in flight. Their general, while endeavouring torally them, was dangerously wounded. 

Tarlton's legion charged them as they broke, and pursued them in theirflight. Gates, in person, assisted by their generals, made severalefforts to rally the militia; but the alarm in their rear stillcontinuing, they poured on like a torrent, and bore him with them. Hehastened with General Caswell to Clermont, in the hope of stopping asufficient number of them at their old encampment, to cover theretreat of the continental troops; but this hope was entirelydisappointed. Believing the continental troops also to be dispersed, he gave up all as lost, and retreated with a few friends to Charlotte, about eighty miles from the field of battle, where he left GeneralCaswell to assemble the neighbouring militia, and proceeded himself toHillsborough, in order to concert some plan of farther defence withthe government. 

Entirely deserted by the militia who composed the whole centre andleft wing of the army, the continental troops, with the Baron De Kalbat their head, were left without orders, under circumstances whichmight have justified a retreat. But taking counsel from their courage, and seeing only the path of duty, they preferred the honourable anddangerous part of maintaining their position. They were charged byLord Rawdon about the time the militia on their left were broken byWebster; but the charge was received with unexpected firmness. Thebayonet was occasionally resorted to by both parties, and the conflictwas maintained for near three quarters of an hour with equalobstinacy. During this time, the regiment on the left of the secondMaryland brigade being covered by the reserve, so that it could beonly engaged in front, gained ground and made prisoners. 

The reserve, having its left entirely exposed, was flanked by theBritish right wing under Webster; who, after detaching a part of hiscavalry and light infantry in pursuit of the flying militia, wheeledon that brigade, and attacking it in front and round the left flank, threw it into some disorder. The soldiers were, however, quicklyrallied, and renewed the action with unimpaired spirit. Overpowered bynumbers, they were again broken, and by the exertion of their officerswere again formed, so as still to maintain the combat, and still tocover the flank of their brethren of the second brigade, who were in amanner blended with the enemy, and who kept up a desperate conflict inthe hope of yet obtaining the victory. 

[Sidenote: Death of De Kalb. ]

The fire of the whole British army was now directed against these twodevoted brigades. They had not lost an inch of ground when LordCornwallis, perceiving that they were without cavalry, pushed hisdragoons upon them, and at the same instant, charged them with thebayonet. These gallant troops were no longer able to keep the field. They were at length broken; and, as they did not give way untilintermingled with the enemy, they dispersed and fled in confusion. Before they were reduced to this last extremity, the Baron De Kalb, who fought on foot with the second Maryland brigade, fell under elevenwounds. His aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel Du Buysson, received himin his arms, announced his rank and nation to the surrounding foe, andbegged that they would spare his life. While thus generously exposinghimself to save his friend, he received several wounds, and, with hisgeneral, was taken prisoner. The Baron expired in a few hours, andspent his last breath in dictating a letter, expressing the warmestaffection for the officers and men of his division, and the mostexalted admiration of their courage and good conduct. [35]

[Footnote 35: Journal of Colonel Williams. ]

Never was a victory more complete. Every corps was broken anddispersed in the woods. The general officers were divided from theirmen; and, except Rutherford of the North Carolina militia who was madea prisoner, reached Charlotte at different times. Colonel Williams, who witnessed the whole battle, and bore a conspicuous part in it, concludes his very animated description of it, with the observation, that "if in this affair the militia fled too soon, the regulars may bethought almost as blameable for remaining too long on the field;especially after all hope of victory must have been despaired of. " Hecensures freely the conduct of the brigadiers, who gave, he says, noorders whatever to their brigades. 

About two hundred wagons, with a great part of the baggage, militarystores, small arms, and all the artillery, fell into the hands of theconqueror. The loss of men could never be accurately ascertained, asno returns were received from the militia. Of the North Carolinadivision, between three and four hundred were made prisoners, andbetween sixty and one hundred were wounded. Of the Virginia militia, three were wounded on the field; and, as they were the first to fly, not many were taken. 

For the numbers engaged, the loss sustained by the regulars wasconsiderable. It amounted to between three and four hundred men, ofwhom a large portion were officers. The British accounts state theloss of the American army at eight or nine hundred killed, and aboutone thousand prisoners; while their own is said to be only threehundred and twenty-five, of whom two hundred and forty-five werewounded. Although many of the militia were killed during the flight, this account is probably exaggerated. It would seem too, that whilethe continental troops kept the field, the loss on both sides, in thatpart of the action, must have been nearly equal. 

On his retreat, the day of the battle, General Gates receivedinformation of the complete success of Sumpter. That officer had, onthe evening that Lord Cornwallis marched from Camden, reduced theredoubt on the Wateree, captured the guard, and intercepted theescort with the stores. 

This gleam of light cheered the dark gloom which enveloped his affairsbut for a moment. He was soon informed that this corps also wasdefeated, and entirely dispersed. 

[Sidenote: August 18. ]

On hearing of the disaster which had befallen Gates, Sumpter began toretreat up the south side of the Wateree. Believing himself out ofdanger, he had halted on the twenty-eighth, during the heat of theday, near the Catawba Ford, to give his harassed troops some repose. At that place he was overtaken by Tarlton, who had been detached inpursuit of him on the morning of the 17th, and who, advancing with hisaccustomed celerity, entered the American camp so suddenly, as in agreat measure to cut off the men from their arms. Some slightresistance made from behind the wagons was soon overcome, and theAmericans fled precipitately to the river and woods. Between three andfour hundred of them were killed and wounded; their baggage, artillery, arms, and ammunition were lost; and the prisoners andstores they had taken, were recovered. This advantage was gained withthe loss of only nine men killed and six wounded. 

Two videttes had been placed by Sumpter, on the road along whichTarlton had advanced, who fired upon his van and killed one of hisdragoons, upon which they were both sabred. We are informed byColonel Tarlton that the inquiries made by Sumpter respecting the twoshots, were answered by an assurance from an officer, just returnedfrom the advanced sentries, that the militia were firing at cattle. 

[Sidenote: August 19. ]

Intelligence of this disaster reached Charlotte next day. GeneralsSmallwood and Gist were then arrived at that place, and about onehundred and fifty straggling, dispirited, half famished officers andsoldiers had also dropped in. It was thought adviseable to retreatimmediately to Salisbury. From that place, General Gates directed theremnant of the troops to march to Hillsborough, where he wasendeavouring to assemble another army, which might enable him yet tocontend for the southern states. 

CHAPTER VII. 

 Distress in the American camp.... Expedition against Staten Island.... Requisitions on the states.... New scheme of finance.... Committee of congress deputed to camp.... Resolution to make up depreciation of pay.... Mutiny in the line of Connecticut.... General Knyphausen enters Jersey.... Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York.... Skirmish at Springfield.... Exertions to strengthen the army.... Bank established in Philadelphia.... Contributions of the ladies.... Farther proceedings of the states.... Arrival of a French armament in Rhode Island.... Changes in the quartermaster's department.... Enterprise against New York abandoned.... Naval superiority of the British. 

[Sidenote: 1780. ]

While disasters thus crowded on each other in the southern states, the Commander-in-chief found himself surrounded with difficulties, which required his utmost exertions to avoid calamities equallydistressing. His urgent requisitions for men to supply the places ofthose who were leaving the service, were not complied with, and thesoldiers who remained, could scarcely be preserved from eitherperishing with cold and hunger, or dispersing and living on plunder. 

General Greene and Colonel Wadsworth, who had, for the preceding year, been at the head of the quartermaster and commissary departments, possessed distinguished merit, and had employed assistants ofunquestionable ability and integrity. Yet, for a great part of thecampaign, the rations were frequently reduced, and the army wasrarely supplied with provisions for more than a few days in advance. Soon after coming into winter quarters, the magazines were exhausted, and afforded neither meat nor flour to be delivered to the men. 

This state of things had been long foreseen; and all the means in thepower of the Commander-in-chief had been used to prevent it. Repeatedrepresentations of the actual famine with which the army wasthreatened, had been made to congress, and to the state governments;but no adequate relief was afforded; and such was the condition of thefinances, so embarrassing the state of affairs, that it was perhapsattainable only by measures which the governments could not venture toadopt. 

The rapid depreciation of the continental currency, had long beenviewed with apprehensive anxiety by the enlightened friends of therevolution, and various unsuccessful expedients had been essayed forthe purpose of checking its progress. All perceived that the greatquantity in circulation was the principal cause of the diminution ofits value; and congress had resolved not to exceed two hundredmillions of dollars in their emissions. In the mean time, the utmostendeavours were used to defer an evil so justly dreaded, and among theexpedients employed, was that of withholding from the public agents, the money which was necessary for public purposes. This unwiseexperiment, while it defeated its own object, threatened thedissolution of the American army. 

The difference between the value of the article at the times ofcontract and of payment was soon perceived, and, of course, influencedits price. But this was the least mischievous consequence of thismistaken policy. The public agents contracted enormous debts whichthey were unable to discharge. Repeated disappointments destroyedtheir credit; and, towards the close of the year 1779, they found itimpracticable to obtain supplies for the subsistence of the army. 

From these causes, the contracts entered into could not beco-extensive with the public wants; and many of those which were madewere not complied with. 

In this critical state of things, an entire revolution was made in thecommissary department. Such was the prejudice against the systemadopted by Great Britain, for supplying by contract, that it had beenusual to allow, as a compensation to the commissary, a stipulatedcommission on all the monies expended on public account. After sometime, this allowance was supposed to be an inducement to purchase athigh prices; and an arrangement was made on the first of January, bywhich the commissary general was to receive a fixed nominal salary inthe paper currency, and was permitted to appoint assistants whosecompensations were also fixed, and who were to defray, out of thosecompensations, all the expenses attending the transactions of thebusiness. The practice of allowing them rations and forage wasdiscontinued. 

This new system was unfortunately so modified as to increase theembarrassments of the department. It was found difficult to obtainassistants and agents for the compensation allowed; and those who werewilling to be employed, were unequal to the duties assigned them. 

For several days, the soldiers were reduced to half allowance, andsometimes to less. At length, affairs came to the crisis which hadlong been threatened; and, early in January, a letter was receivedfrom Colonel Wadsworth, informing the general that it was absolutelyout of his power to supply the army longer with meat, as he waswithout money, and had totally exhausted his credit. About the sametime, the assistant commissary, residing in camp, gave notice that hisstock of provisions was on the point of being expended, and that hehad no immediate prospect of a farther supply. 

This state of things compelled the Commander-in-chief to adoptefficacious measures, to relieve the immediate and pressing wants ofhis soldiers. He required from each county in the state of Jersey, aquantity of meat and flour proportioned to its resources, to be raisedand forwarded to the army within a limited time, not exceeding sixdays. In a circular letter addressed to the magistrates, he stated thepressing wants of the army, and the necessity of resorting to coercionshould his requisition fail. 

To the honour of the magistrates and people of New Jersey, althoughtheir country was much exhausted, the supplies required were instantlyfurnished, and a temporary relief obtained. 

The patient and uncomplaining fortitude with which the soldiers boretheir sufferings, was strong evidence of their patriotism, and couldnot fail to make a deep impression on their general. But while theirvirtues excited his sensibilities, he expressed his fears very freelyto congress, that they might be too severely tried. 

The unusual severity of the winter, seemed to furnish an opportunityfor active enterprise, which the Commander-in-chief observed, withoutbeing able to improve. The garrison of New York and its immediatedependencies, was supposed to be reduced to ten or eleven thousandeffectives; and the security heretofore derived from its insularsituation no longer existed. The ice was so strong that the wholearmy, with its train of wagons and artillery, might pass over withoutdanger. This circumstance afforded a glorious occasion for striking ablow, which, if successful, would most probably terminate the war. The effort would seem not to have exceeded the strength of America, could that strength have been exerted in proper season; but thegovernment possessed neither sufficient energy nor concentration ofpower to call it forth; and this opportunity passed away, as manywhich present themselves in the course of human affairs, must passaway, if those who should take advantage of them, only begin todeliberate about making preparations in the season for action. 

The force under the immediate command of General Washington, wasdecidedly inferior to that in New York; and so far was he from havingreason to expect immediate reinforcements, that congress had notagreed on making a requisition for them. In addition to thisfeebleness in point of numbers, the soldiers were not half clothed;provisions for immediate use could be obtained only by contributionsfrom the people; the quartermaster's department was unable to put anarmy in motion; and the military chest did not contain a dollar. 

Under the pressure of this combination of discouraging circumstances, the active mind of Washington still looked forward to the possibilityof deriving some advantage from the exposed situation of hisadversary. 

The troops on Staten Island were computed at one thousand or twelvehundred men; and the firm bridge of ice now uniting that island tothe Jersey shore, seemed to furnish an opportunity for bearing offthis corps. General Washington determined to make the attempt with twothousand five hundred men, to be commanded by Major General LordStirling. The more distant troops moved down on sleds; and, to favoura surprise, the opinion was inculcated that they only constituted arelief for the detachment already on the lines. 

[Sidenote: January. ]

On the night of the 14th of January, Lord Stirling moved over from DeHart's point; and, detaching Lieutenant Colonel Willet to Decker'shouse, where Buskirk's regiment was stationed, proceeded himself tothe watering place, where the main body was posted. Notwithstandingthe precautions which had been taken, the alarm had been given at eachpost, and the troops had saved themselves in their works; so that onlya few prisoners were made. Contrary to the intelligence previouslyreceived, the communication with New York was still open; and theworks appeared too strong to justify the hazard of attempting to carrythem by assault. 

[Sidenote: January 17. ]

The object of the expedition being unattainable, Lord Stirlingcommenced his retreat, which was effected with inconsiderable loss. Abody of cavalry, which charged his rear, was repulsed; but, from theintenseness of the cold, and the defectiveness of his means to protecthis men from it, some of them were frost bitten, and a few stragglerswere made prisoners. 

The excessive cold continuing, the rivers were soon afterwardscompletely blocked up. Even arms of the sea were passable on the ice;and the islands about the mouth of the Hudson, presented theappearance of one whole and unbroken continent. This state of thingsproduced a great degree of suffering among all classes in New York. The supplies usually received by water failed totally, and a greatscarcity of provisions and of fuel was the consequence. To increasethis scarcity, the American troops on the lines were so disposed as tointerrupt the communication between the country and the town; andthese arrangements produced a partisan war, in which the advantage wasrather on the side of the British. 

In one of the most important of these skirmishes, Captain Roberts, ofMassachusetts, with fourteen of his men, were killed on the spot;seventeen were wounded, of whom three died in a few days; andLieutenant Colonel Thompson, of Massachusetts, who commanded theparty, two captains, four subalterns, and ninety non-commissionedofficers and privates were made prisoners. 

The emission of the full sum of two hundred millions of dollars incontinental bills of credit, which congress had solemnly resolved notto exceed, had been completed in November, 1779, and the money wasexpended. The requisitions on the states to replenish the treasury bytaxes were not fully complied with; and, had they even been strictlyobserved, would not have produced a sum equal to the publicexpenditure. It was therefore necessary to devise other measures forthe prosecution of the war. During the distresses which brought thearmy to the brink of dissolution, these measures were underconsideration. So early as December, 1779, congress had determined tochange the mode of supplying the army from purchases to requisitionsof specific articles on the several states. As preliminary to thissystem, commissioners were appointed to make the estimates, and tointroduce every practicable reform in the expenditures. This subjectwas under deliberation until the 25th of February, when sundryresolutions were passed, apportioning on the states their respectivequotas of provisions, spirits, and forage, for the ensuing campaign. The value of the several articles was estimated in specie; andassurances were given that accounts between the states should beregularly kept, and finally settled in Spanish milled dollars. 

For the purpose of inducing and facilitating a compliance with theserequisitions, congress also resolved, "that any state which shall havetaken the necessary measures for furnishing its quota, and have givennotice thereof to congress, shall be authorized to prohibit anycontinental quartermaster or commissary from purchasing within itslimits. "

These resolutions, constituting the basis of a new system on which thefuture subsistence of the army was essentially to depend, were toodeeply interesting not to receive the anxious attention of theCommander-in-chief. With regret, he communicated to congress theradical defects he perceived in their arrangements, with hisapprehensions that this untried scheme would fail in practice. 

His judgment, and the judgment of all men engaged in high andresponsible situations, was decidedly in favour of conducting the waron a national rather than on a state system. But, independent of thisradical objection, economy had been so much more consulted than theprobable necessities of the army, that, in almost every article, theestimate had fallen far short of the demand to be reasonably expected. 

The total omission to provide means for supplying occasionaldeficiencies from the surplus resources of any particular state, wasan error of still greater magnitude. It was obvious that the demand inany state which should become the theatre of war, would be muchgreater than its quota; and experience had shown that the carriage ofspecific articles from distant places was always difficult andexpensive, and sometimes impracticable. Yet no means were adopted tosupply such extraordinary demand, whatever might be the resources ofthe country. A still more radical objection to the system was theprinciple, enabling any state which should take means to comply withthe requisition, and should notify those means to the government ofthe United States, to prohibit the continental agents from making anypurchases within its territory. Among the states which adopted theproposition of congress was New Jersey, in which the largest divisionof the army was stationed. Its legislature passed an act prohibitingthe purchase of provisions within its jurisdiction by the staff of thecontinental line, under severe penalties; and refused to authorize itsown agents to provide for any emergency however pressing. It was anadditional objection to these requisitions, that they specified noperiods of the year within which certain portions of the articlesdemanded should be raised, and consequently might be complied with, although the army should be left destitute of every necessary for aconsiderable part of the campaign. 

These suggestions, however, with others less material to the militaryoperations, did not receive the attention which was due to theirimportance. A disposition in the members of congress, growinginevitably out of the organization of the government, to consult thewill of their respective states, and to prefer that will to any otherobject, had discovered itself at an early period, and had gainedstrength with time. The state of the national treasury was calculatedto promote this disposition. It was empty, and could be replenishedonly by taxes, which congress had not the power to impose; or by newemissions of bills of credit, which the government had pledged thepublic faith not to make, and which would rest for their redemptiononly on that faith, which would be violated in the very act of theiremission. Under these circumstances, it required a degree of energyseldom found, to struggle with surrounding difficulties for thepreservation of a general system, and to resist the temptation tothrow the nation at the feet of the states, in whom the vitalprinciple of power, the right to levy taxes, was exclusively vested. While the continental currency preserved its value, this essentialdefect of the constitution was, in some measure, concealed. Thefacility with which money was obtained from the press, was a temporarysubstitute for the command of the resources of the country. But whenthis expedient failed, it was scarcely possible to advance a singlestep, but under the guidance of the respective states. 

[Sidenote: Financial regulations. ]

Whatever might be the future effect of this system, it wasimpracticable to bring it into immediate operation. The legislaturesof the several states, by whom it was to be adopted, and carried intoexecution, were, many of them, not then in session; and were to meetat different times through the ensuing spring. It was consequently tobe expected that great part of the summer would pass away before thesupplies to be raised by the measure, could be brought into use. Inthe mean time, and until a new scheme of finance, which accompaniedthe requisition of specific articles, should be tried, there was noregular provision for the army. Bills to the amount of £100, 000sterling, payable at six months' sight, were drawn on Mr. Jay, andothers to the same amount, on Mr. Laurens, who were empowered tonegotiate loans in Europe. These bills were sold in small sums onpressing occasions; and the loan offices remained open for the purposeof borrowing from individuals. 

This new scheme of finance was a second essay to substitute creditunsupported by solid funds, and resting solely on the public faith, for money. 

The vast quantity of bills unavoidably emitted before theestablishment of regular governments possessing sufficient energy toenforce the collection of taxes, or to provide for their redemption, and before the governments of Europe were sufficiently confident oftheir stability to afford them aid or credit, was assigned by congressas the principal cause of that depreciation which had taken place inthe continental currency. The United States were now, they said, underdifferent circumstances. Their independence was secure; their civilgovernments were established and vigorous; and the spirit of theircitizens ardent for exertion. The government being thus renderedcompetent to the object, it was necessary to reduce the quantity ofpaper in circulation, and to appropriate funds that should ensure thepunctual redemption of the bills. 

For these purposes, the several states were required to continue tobring into the continental treasury, monthly, from February to Aprilinclusive, their full quotas of fifteen millions of dollars. Incomplying with this requisition, one Spanish milled dollar was to bereceived in lieu of forty dollars of the paper currency. 

The bills so brought in were not to be reissued, but destroyed; andother bills, not to exceed one dollar for every twenty received indischarge of taxes, were to be emitted. 

These bills were to be redeemable within six years, and were to bearan interest of five _per centum per annum_, to be paid at the time oftheir redemption in specie, or, at the election of the holder, annually, in bills of exchange drawn by the United States on theircommissioners in Europe, at four shillings and six pence sterling foreach dollar. They were to be issued in ascertained proportions on thefunds of the several states, with a collateral security on the part ofthe government, to pay the quota of any particular state, which theevents of the war might render incapable of complying with its ownengagements. The bills were to be deposited in the continentalloan-offices of the several states, and were to be signed only as themoney then in circulation should be brought in by taxes or otherwise. After being signed, six-tenths of them were to be delivered to thestates on whose funds they were to be issued, and the remainingfour-tenths to be retained for the use of the continent. 

The operation of this scheme of finance was necessarily suspended bythe same causes which suspended that for requiring specific articles. It depended on the sanction and co-operation of the several statelegislatures, many of which were yet to convene. 

As it would be impracticable to maintain the value of the money aboutto be emitted, should the states continue to issue bills of credit, they were earnestly requested to suspend future emissions, and to callthe current paper out of circulation. But the time for this measurewas not yet arrived, and many of the states continued the use of thepress till late in the following year. 

The establishment of the army for the ensuing campaign was fixed atthirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven men, and the measures forrecruiting it were founded on the state system, which was becomeentirely predominant. 

The few intelligent statesmen who could combine practical good sensewith patriotism, perceived the dangerous inefficacy of a system whichopenly abandoned the national character, and proceeded on theprinciple that the American confederacy was no more than an allianceof independent nations. 

That great delays would be experienced, that the different parts ofthe plan would be acted on too unequally and too uncertainly tofurnish a solid basis for military calculations, that the system wouldbe totally deranged in its execution, were mischiefs foreseen andlamented by many, as resulting inevitably from a course of measures towhich the government of the Union was under the painful necessity ofsubmitting. 

"Certain I am, " said the Commander-in-chief, in a confidential letterto a member of the national legislature, "that unless congress speaksin a more decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by theseveral states, competent to the great purposes of the war, or assumethem as matter of right, and they and the states respectively act withmore energy than they hitherto have done, our cause is lost. We can nolonger drudge on in the old way. By ill-timing the adoption ofmeasures; by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantablejealousies; we incur enormous expenses, and derive no benefit fromthem. One state will comply with a requisition from congress; anotherneglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ inthe manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are allworking up hill; and, while such a system as the present one, orrather want of one, prevails, we ever shall be unable to apply ourstrength or resources to any advantage. 

"This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of congress; but itis the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of longthinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one headgradually changing into thirteen; I see one army branching intothirteen; and, instead of looking up to congress as the supremecontrolling power of the United States, consider themselves asdependent on their respective states. In a word, I see the power ofcongress declining too fast for the respect which is due to them asthe great representative body of America, and am fearful of theconsequences. "

But whatever might be his objections to the proposed system, GeneralWashington was unremitting in his endeavours to render the planperfect in detail, and to give to its execution all the aid which hissituation and influence enabled him to afford. 

The distresses of the army for food, which had found temporary reliefin the particular exertions of the magistrates and people of NewJersey, soon returned; and it became once more necessary, even afterthe magazines had been in some degree replenished, to recur to thesame persons for assistance. The supplies of forage had failed, and agreat proportion of the horses had perished, or been rendered unfitfor use. Neither funds nor credit were possessed for the purchase ofothers, and the quarter-master-general found himself unable totransport provisions from remote magazines into camp. Thiscircumstance reduced the Commander-in-chief to the painful necessityof calling on the patriotism of private citizens, under the penalty ofa military impressment, should a voluntary contribution be refused, for those means of conveyance which the government could not supply. 

The want of food was not the only difficulty to be surmounted. Othersof a serious nature presented themselves. The pay of an officer wasreduced by the depreciation of the currency, to such a miserablepittance as to be unequal to the supply of the most moderate demands. The pay of a major general would no longer hire an express rider, andthat of a captain would not purchase the shoes in which he marched. The American officers were not rich; and many of them had expendedtheir _little all_ in the service. If they had exhausted their privatefunds, or if they possessed none, they could rely only on the state towhich they belonged for such clothing as the state might be willing orable to furnish. These supplies were so insufficient and unequal, asto produce extreme dissatisfaction. In the lines of some of thestates, the officers gave notice in a body, of their determination toresign on a given day, if some decent and certain provision should notbe made for them. The remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief producedan offer to serve as volunteers until their successors should beappointed; and, on the rejection of this proposition, they were withdifficulty induced to remain in service. 

Under these complicated embarrassments, it required all thatenthusiastic patriotism which pre-eminently distinguishes the soldierof principle; all that ardent attachment to the cause of their countrywhich originally brought them into the field, and which theirsufferings could not diminish; all the influence of theCommander-in-chief, whom they almost adored; to retain in the servicemen who felt themselves neglected, and who believed themselves to bethe objects of the jealousy of their country, rather than of itsgratitude. 

Among the privates, causes of disgust grew out of the very compositionof the army, which increased the dissatisfaction produced by theirmultiplied wants. 

The first effort made to enlist troops for the war had, in somedegree, succeeded. While these men found themselves obliged tocontinue in service without compensation, and often without the commonnecessaries of life, they perceived the vacant ranks in theirregiments filled up by men who were to continue only for a few months, and who received bounties for that short service, from individuals orfrom the states, which were of great real value, and which appeared tosoldiers not acquainted with the actual state of depreciation, to beimmense. They could not fail to compare situations, and to repine atengagements which deprived them of advantages which they saw inpossession of others. Many were induced to contest thoseengagements;[36] many to desert a service in which they experiencedsuch irritating inequalities; and all felt with the more poignantindignation, those distressing failures in the commissary department, which so frequently recurred. 

[Footnote 36: In some instances, the civil power of the state in whichsuch soldiers happened to be, attempted to interfere and to dischargeeven those belonging to the lines of other states, who asserted theirright to be discharged. It was with some difficulty the general couldarrest this dangerous interposition. ]

[Sidenote: Committee of Congress deputed to camp. ]

In consequence of the strong representations made to congress on thesevarious causes of disquiet, a committee of three members repaired tocamp for the purpose of consulting with the Commander-in-chief on sucharrangements as the means in possession of the government would enableit to make, and the present state of the army might require. Inrepresenting the condition of the troops, they said, "That the armywas unpaid for five months; that it seldom had more than six days'provisions in advance, and was on several occasions, for severalsuccessive days, without meat; that the army was destitute of forage;that the medical department had neither tea, chocolate, wine, norspirituous liquors of any kind; that every department of the army waswithout money, and had not even the shadow of credit left; that thepatience of the soldiers, borne down by the pressure of complicatedsufferings, was on the point of being exhausted. "

To relieve this gloomy state of things by transfusing into it a ray ofhope for the future, a resolution was passed, declaring that congresswould make good to the line of the army, and to the independent corpsthereof, the deficiency of their original pay, which had beenoccasioned by the depreciation of the continental currency; and thatthe money or other articles heretofore received, should be consideredas advanced on account, to be comprehended in the settlement to befinally made. The benefits of this resolution were confined to thosewho were then in actual service, or should thereafter come into it, and who were engaged for the war or for three years. 

This resolution was published in general orders, and had considerableinfluence on the army, but not sufficient to remove the various causesof dissatisfaction which existed, and were continually multiplying. The engagement to make good the depreciation of their pay, was an actof justice too long withheld; and no promise for the future, couldsupply the place of present comfortable subsistence. No hope wasgiven that their condition, in this respect, would be improved. For aconsiderable time, the troops received only from one-half toone-eighth of a ration of meat; and, at length, were several dayswithout a single pound of that necessary article. 

This long course of suffering had unavoidably produced some relaxationof discipline, and had gradually soured the minds of the soldiers tosuch a degree, that their discontents broke out into actual mutiny. 

[Sidenote: May 25. ]

On the 25th of May, two regiments belonging to Connecticut paradedunder arms with a declared resolution to return home, or to obtainsubsistence at the point of the bayonet. The soldiers of the otherregiments, though not actually joining the mutineers, showed nodisposition to suppress the mutiny. By great exertions on the part ofthe officers, aided by the appearance of a neighbouring brigade ofPennsylvania, then commanded by Colonel Stewart, the leaders weresecured, and the two regiments brought back to their duty. Somesentiments, however, were disclosed by the soldiers, in answer to theremonstrances of their officers, of a serious and alarming nature. Their pay was now five months in arrear, and the depreciation of themoney, they said, was such, that it would be worth nothing whenreceived. When reminded of the late resolution of congress for makinggood the loss sustained by depreciation, of the reputation acquired bytheir past good conduct, and of the value of the object for whichthey were contending; they answered that their sufferings were toogreat to be longer supported; that they wanted present relief; andmust have some present substantial recompense for their services. Apaper was found in the brigade, which appeared to have been brought bysome emissary from New York, stimulating the troops to the abandonmentof the cause in which they were engaged. 

[Sidenote: June 6. ]

[Sidenote: General Knyphausen enters Jersey. ]

The discontents of the army, and the complaints excited in the countryby the frequent requisitions on the people of New Jersey, had beencommunicated, with such exaggeration, to the officer commanding in NewYork, as to induce the opinion that the American soldiers were readyto desert their standards; and the people of New Jersey to changetheir government. To countenance these dispositions, GeneralKnyphausen embarked at Staten Island, and landed in the night withabout five thousand men at Elizabethtown Point, in New Jersey. Earlynext morning he marched towards Springfield, by the way of ConnecticutFarms, but soon perceived that the real temper, both of the countryand the army, had been misunderstood. 

On the appearance of the enemy, the militia assembled with alacrity, and aided the small patrolling parties of continental troops inharassing him on his march from Elizabethtown to the ConnecticutFarms, a distance of five or six miles, where a halt was made. In aspirit of revenge, unworthy the general of an army, more in thecharacter of Tryon who was present, than of Knyphausen who commanded, this settlement was reduced to ashes. [37]

[Footnote 37: This circumstance would scarcely have deserved noticehad it not been accompanied by one of those melancholy events, whicheven war does not authorize, and which made, at the time, a very deepimpression. 

Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of the clergyman of the village, had beeninduced to remain in her house, under the persuasion that her presencemight protect it from pillage, and that her person could not beendangered, as Colonel Dayton who commanded the militia determined notto stop in the settlement. While sitting in the midst of her children, with a sucking infant in her arms, a soldier came up to the window anddischarged his musket at her. She received the ball in her bosom, andinstantly expired. ]

From the Farms, Knyphausen proceeded to Springfield. The Jerseybrigade, commanded by General Maxwell, and the militia of the adjacentcountry, took an advantageous position at that place, and seemeddetermined to defend it. Knyphausen halted in its neighbourhood, andremained on his ground until night. 

Having received intelligence of this movement, General Washington puthis army in motion early in the same morning that Knyphausen marchedfrom Elizabethtown Point, and advanced to the Short Hills, in the rearof Springfield, while the British were in the neighbourhood of thatplace. Dispositions were made for an engagement the next morning, butKnyphausen retired in the night to the place of his disembarkation. 

General Washington continued on the hills near Springfield, too weakto hazard an engagement, but on ground chosen by himself. Hiscontinental troops did not exceed three thousand men. A return of thewhole army under his immediate command, made on the 3d of June, exhibited in the column, of present, fit for duty, only three thousandseven hundred and sixty, rank and file. So reduced was that force onwhich America relied for independence. "You but too well know, " saidGeneral Washington in a letter to a friend, giving an account of thisincursion, "and will regret with me the cause which justifies thisinsulting manoeuvre on the part of the enemy. It deeply affects thehonour of the states, a vindication of which could not be attempted inour present circumstances, without most intimately hazarding theirsecurity; at least so far as it may depend on the preservation of thearmy. Their character, their interest, their all that is dear, callupon them in the most pressing manner, to place the army immediatelyon a respectable footing. "

The long continuance of Knyphausen at Elizabethtown, strengthened asuspicion that Sir Henry Clinton was about to return from SouthCarolina, and intended, without disembarking his troops, to proceed upthe Hudson to West Point; and that the movement into Jersey was afeint designed to cover the real object. 

The letters of the Commander-in-chief, addressed about this period, tothose who might be supposed to possess influence in the government ofthe Union, or in those of the states, exhibit his conjecturesrespecting the designs of his adversary, as well as his apprehensionsfrom the condition of his own army. To the committee of congress, incamp, he observed, "General Knyphausen still continues in the Jerseyswith all the force which can be spared from New York, a force greatlysuperior to ours. Should Sir Henry join him, their superiority will bedecided, and equal to almost any thing they may think proper toattempt. The enemy, it is true, are at this time inactive; but theircontinuance in their present position proves that they have someproject of importance in contemplation. Perhaps they are only waitinguntil the militia grow tired and return home, (which they are doingevery hour, ) to prosecute their designs with the less opposition. Thiswould be a critical moment for us. Perhaps they are waiting thearrival of Sir Henry Clinton, either to push up the North Riveragainst the Highland posts, or to bend their whole force against thisarmy. In either case, the most disastrous consequences are to beapprehended. You, who are well acquainted with our situation, need noarguments to evince the danger. 

"The militia of this state have run to arms, and behaved with anardour and spirit of which there are few examples. But perseverance, in enduring the rigours of military service, is not to be expectedfrom those who are not by profession obliged to it. The reverse ofthis opinion has been a great misfortune in our affairs, and it ishigh time we should recover from an error of so pernicious a nature. We must absolutely have a force of a different composition, or we mustrelinquish the contest. In a few days, we may expect to rely almostentirely on our continental force, and this, from your ownobservation, is totally inadequate to our safety. The exigency callsloudly on the states to carry all the recommendations of the committeeinto the most vigorous and immediate execution; but more particularlythat for completing our batteries by a draught with all possibleexpedition. "

[Sidenote: June 18. ]

[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York. ]

In this precise state of things, he received intelligence of thereturn of Sir Henry Clinton from the conquest of South Carolina. 

The regular force in New York and its dependencies was now estimatedat twelve thousand men, great part of whom might be drawn into thefield for any particular purpose, because Sir Henry Clinton couldcommand about four thousand militia and refugees for garrison duty. 

In communicating to congress the appearance of the British fleet offthe Hook, General Washington observed, "a very alarming scene mayshortly open, and it will be happy for us if we shall be able tosteer clear of some serious misfortune in this quarter. I hope theperiod has not yet arrived, which will convince the different statesby fatal experience, that some of them have mistaken the truesituation of this country. I flatter myself, however, that we maystill retrieve our affairs if we have but a just sense of them, andare actuated by a spirit of liberal policy and exertion equal to theemergency. Could we once see this spirit generally prevailing, Ishould not despair of a prosperous issue of the campaign. But there isno time to be lost. The danger is imminent and pressing; the obstaclesto be surmounted are great and numerous; and our efforts must beinstant, unreserved, and universal. "

On the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, the design of acting offensivelyin the Jerseys was resumed; but, to divide the American army, demonstrations were made of an intention to seize West Point. To be inreadiness for either object, General Greene was left at Springfieldwith two brigades of continental troops, and with the Jersey militia;while, with the greater part of his army, General Washington proceededslowly towards Pompton, watching attentively the movements of theBritish, and apparently unwilling to separate himself too far fromGreene. He had not marched farther than Rockaway, eleven miles beyondMorristown, when the British army advanced from Elizabethtown towardsSpringfield in great force. General Washington detached a brigade tohang on their right flank, and returned with the residue of his armyfive or six miles, in order to be in a situation to support Greene. 

[Sidenote: June. ]

[Sidenote: Skirmish at Springfield. ]

Early in the morning of the 23d, the British army moved in twocolumns, with great rapidity, towards Springfield. Major Lee wasadvanced on the Vauxhall road, which was taken by the right column;and Colonel Dayton on the direct road, which was taken by the left. Both these corps made every possible exertion to check the advancingenemy, while General Greene concentrated his little army atSpringfield. Scarcely had he made his dispositions, when the Britishfront appeared, and a cannonade commenced between their van and theAmerican artillery which defended a bridge over Rahway, a small riverrunning east of the town, which was guarded by Colonel Angel with lessthan two hundred men. Colonel Shreve was posted at a second bridge, also over a branch of the Rahway, in order to cover the retreat ofAngel from the first. Major Lee with his dragoons and the piquetsunder Captain Walker, supported by Colonel Ogden, was directed todefend a bridge on the Vauxhall road. The residue of the continentaltroops were drawn up on high ground, in the rear of the town, with themilitia on their flanks. 

The right column of the British advanced on Lee, who disputed thepassage of the bridge until a considerable body of the enemy fordedthe river above him, and gained the point of a hill which endangeredhis position. At this instant, their left attacked Colonel Angel, whodefended himself with persevering gallantry. The conflict was sharp, and was maintained for about half an hour, when, compelled by superiornumbers to give way, he retired in good order, and brought off hiswounded. His retreat was covered by Colonel Shreve, who, after Angelhad passed him, was ordered by General Greene to join his brigade. TheEnglish then took possession of the town and reduced it to ashes. 

The obstinate resistance which had been encountered; the gallantry anddiscipline displayed by the continental troops who had been engaged;the strength of Greene's position; the firm countenance maintained byhis troops, small detachments of whom kept up a continual skirmishingwith a view to save a part of the town; all contributed to deter SirHenry Clinton from a farther prosecution of his original plan. Hewithdrew that afternoon to Elizabethtown; and, in the following night, passed over to Staten Island. It is probable that the cautionmanifested during this expedition is to be ascribed to theintelligence that a formidable fleet and army from France was dailyexpected on the coast. 

When the Marquis de Lafayette obtained permission to visit his nativecountry, he retained, with his rank in the American army, that zealfor the interests of the United States, which the affectionateattentions he had received, and the enthusiasm of a soldier in thecause of those for whom he had made his first campaigns, werecalculated to inspire in a young and generous mind, in favour of aninfant people, struggling for liberty and self-government with thehereditary rival of his nation. 

He was received at the court of Versailles with every mark of favourand distinction;[38] and all his influence was employed in impressingon the cabinet, the importance and policy of granting succours to theUnited States. 

[Footnote 38: After he had visited the ministers, an arrest of eightdays, during which he resided with his relation the Marshal deNoailles, was imposed on him for the sake of form and in honour of theroyal authority, which he had disregarded by proceeding to America. After the expiration of this term he presented himself to the King, who graciously said he pardoned his disobedience, in consideration ofhis good conduct and of his services. --_Letter from Gen. Lafayette. _]

[Sidenote: Lafayette brings intelligence of aid from France. ]

[Sidenote: Exertions of Congress and of the Commander-in-chief tostrengthen the army. ]

Having succeeded in this favourite object, and finding no probabilityof active employment on the continent of Europe, he obtainedpermission to return to America. He arrived late in April at Boston, and hastened to head quarters; whence he proceeded to the seat ofGovernment with the information that his most Christian Majesty hadconsented to employ a considerable land and naval armament in theUnited States, for the ensuing campaign. This intelligence gave a newimpulse both to congress and the state legislatures. The states fromNew Hampshire to Virginia inclusive were required to pay, withinthirty days, ten millions of dollars, part of their quotas whichbecame due on the first of March; and specie bills to the amount offifty thousand dollars were drawn on Messieurs Franklin and Jay. Thesesums were sacredly appropriated to the objects of bringing the armyinto the field, and forwarding their supplies. 

The defects in the requisition system, which had been suggested byGeneral Washington, were corrected; and the committee in camp, at thehead of which was the late General Schuyler, was empowered, at therequest of the Commander-in-chief, to take such measures as were inthe power of congress, for drawing out the resources of the nation. 

To give effect to these resolutions, the several state legislaturesfrom New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive, were requested to invest theExecutives, or some other persons, with powers sufficiently ample tocomply with such applications as might be made to them by thecommittee in camp, and a circular letter was addressed to the stategovernments, urging them to second the efforts of Congress. 

Letters equally stimulating were written by the committee from camp;and the well earned influence of the Commander-in-chief was alsoemployed to induce an exertion proportioned to the crisis. In additionto those incentives which might operate on ardent minds, heendeavoured, by a temperate review of the situation and resources ofthe belligerent powers, to convince the judgment that America wouldhave real cause to fear the issue of the contest, should she neglectto improve the advantage to be afforded by the succours expected fromFrance. [39]

[Footnote 39: See note No. III. At the end of the volume. ]

Under the impressions produced by these representations, the statelegislatures, generally, passed the laws which were required; but theenergy displayed in their passage was not maintained in theirexecution. In general, the assemblies followed the example ofcongress, and apportioned on the several counties or towns within thestate, the quota to be furnished by each. This division of the statewas again to be subdivided into classes, each of which was to furnisha man by contributions or taxes imposed upon itself. 

[Sidenote: Tardy proceedings of the states. ]

These operations were slow and unproductive. 

It was not on the state sovereignties only that beneficial effectswere produced by a candid statement of public affairs, severalpatriotic individuals contributed largely from their private funds tothe aid of the public. The merchants, and other citizens ofPhiladelphia, with a zeal guided by that sound discretion which turnsexpenditure to the best account, established a bank, for the supportof which they subscribed £315, 000, Pennsylvania money, to be paid, ifrequired, in specie, the principal object of which was to supply thearmy with provisions and rum. By the plan of this bank, its memberswere to derive no emolument whatever from the institution. Foradvancing their credit and their money, they required only thatcongress should pledge the faith of the Union to reimburse the costsand charges of the transaction in a reasonable time, and should givesuch assistance to its execution as might be in their power. 

The ladies of Philadelphia too gave a splendid example of patriotism, by large donations for the immediate relief of the suffering army. This example was extensively followed;[40] but it is not by thecontributions of the generous that a war can or ought to bemaintained. The purse of the nation alone can supply the expendituresof a nation; and, when all are interested in a contest, all ought tocontribute to its support. Taxes, and taxes only, can furnish for theprosecution of a national war, means which are just in themselves, orcompetent to the object. Notwithstanding these donations, thedistresses of the army, for clothing especially, still continued; andwere the more severely felt when a co-operation with French troops wasexpected. So late as the 20th of June, General Washington informedcongress, that he still laboured under the painful and humiliatingembarrassment of having no shirts for the soldiers, many of whom weredestitute of that necessary article. "For the troops to be withoutclothing at any time, " he added, "is highly injurious to the service, and distressing to our feelings; but the want will be more peculiarlymortifying when they come to act with those of our allies. If it bepossible, I have no doubt, immediate measures will be taken to relievetheir distress. 

[Footnote 40: This instance of patriotism on the part of our fair andamiable countrywomen, is far from being single. Their conductthroughout the war was uniform. They shared with cheerfulness andgaiety, the privations and sufferings to which the distress of thetimes exposed their country. In every stage of this severe trial, theydisplayed virtues which have not been always attributed to their sex, but which it is believed they will, on every occasion calculated tounfold them, be found to possess. With a ready acquiescence, with afirmness always cheerful, and a constancy never lamenting thesacrifices which were made, they not only yielded up all theelegancies, delicacies, and even conveniences to be furnished bywealth and commerce, relying on their farms and on domestic industryfor every article of food and raiment, but, consenting to share theproduce of their own labour, they gave up without regret, aconsiderable portion of the covering designed for their own families, to supply the wants of the distressed soldiers; and heroicallysuppressed the involuntary sigh which the departure of their brothers, their sons, and their husbands, for the camp, rended from theirbosoms. ]

"It is also most sincerely wished, that there could be some suppliesof clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whosecondition is still miserable. This is, in some instances, the casewith the whole lines of the states. It would be well for their ownsakes, and for the public good, if they could be furnished. They willnot be able, when our friends come to co-operate with us, to go on acommon routine of duty; and if they should, they must, from theirappearance, be held in low estimation. "

This picture presents in strong colours, the real patriotism of theAmerican army. One heroic effort, though it may dazzle the mind withits splendour, is an exertion most men are capable of making; butcontinued patient suffering and unremitting perseverance, in a servicepromising no personal emolument, and exposing the officer unceasingly, not only to wants of every kind, but to those circumstances ofhumiliation which seem to degrade him in the eyes of others, demonstrate a fortitude of mind, a strength of virtue, and a firmnessof principle, which ought never to be forgotten. 

As the several legislative acts for bringing the army into the field, did not pass until the months of June and July, General Washingtonremained uninformed of the force on which he might rely, and wasconsequently unable to form any certain plan of operations. 

This suspense was the more cruelly embarrassing, as, in the event ofan attempt upon New York, it was of the utmost importance that theFrench fleet should, on its arrival, take possession of the harbour, which was then weakly defended. But, should this measure be followedby a failure to furnish the requisite support, it would not only beineffectual; but, in a very possible state of things, might sacrificethe fleet itself. 

Should it be ascertained that the states were either unable orunwilling to make the exertions necessary for the siege of New York, other objects presented themselves against which the allied arms mightbe turned to advantage. To avoid the disgrace and danger of attemptingwhat could not be effected, and the reproach of neglecting anyattainable object, were equally desirable, and equally required acorrect knowledge of the measures which would be taken by the states. 

In a letter to congress communicating his anxiety on this interestingsubject, and his total want of information respecting it, GeneralWashington observed, "The season is come when we have every reason toexpect the arrival of the fleet, and yet, for want of this point ofprimary consequence, it is impossible for me to form a system ofco-operation. I have no basis to act upon; and, of course, were thisgenerous succour of our ally now to arrive, I should find myself inthe most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general andthe admiral, from the relation in which I stand, as soon as theyapproach our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to bepursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; butcircumstanced as I am, I can not even give them conjectures. Fromthese considerations, I have suggested to the committee, by a letter Ihad the honour of addressing them yesterday, the indispensablenecessity of their writing again to the states, urging them to giveimmediate and precise information of the measures they have taken andof the result. The interest of the states, the honour and reputationof our councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies, allrequire that I should, without delay, be enabled to ascertain andinform them, what we can or can not undertake. There is a point whichought now to be determined, on the success of which all our futureoperations may depend, on which, for want of knowing our prospects, Ican make no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and army of ourallies in circumstances which would expose them, if not seconded byus, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall be compelled tosuspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our hopes. "

The tardy proceedings of the states were not less perplexing tocongress than to the Commander-in-chief. To the minister of his mostChristian Majesty, who had in the preceding January communicated theprobability of receiving succour from France, that body, withoutcalculating accurately the means of complying with its engagements, had pledged itself unequivocally for effectual co-operation. Theminister was assured, that the United States had expectations on whichthey could rely with confidence, of bringing into the field, for thenext campaign, an army of twenty-five thousand men; and that suchnumbers of militia might be added to this continental force, as wouldrender it competent to any enterprise against the posts occupied bythe British within the United States. 

Assurances were also given that ample supplies of provisions for thecombined armies should be laid up in magazines under the direction ofcongress. The French minister addressed congress on this subject aboutthe time that General Washington expressed so strongly, the necessityof knowing with certainty, on what reinforcements he was to calculate. 

Thus pressed by their general and their ally, congress renewed theirurgent requisitions on the states, and desired the several governmentsto correspond weekly with the committee at head quarters, on theprogress made in complying with them. 

In the mean time, General Washington meditated unceasingly on thecourse to be pursued in the various contingencies which might happen;and endeavoured to prepare for any plan of operations whichcircumstances might render adviseable. The arrival of Sir HenryClinton diminished the variety of aspects in which the relativesituation of the two armies was to be contemplated, and rendered thesuccess of an attempt on New York more doubtful. It was now thoughtadviseable that the armament from France, instead of sailing directlyto the Hook, should proceed in the first instance to Rhode Island;where, after disembarking the troops, and providing for the sick, itmight wait until a definitive plan of operations should be concerted. 

[Sidenote: July 13. ]

[Sidenote: Arrival of a French armament in Rhode Island. ]

On the 13th of July, while the result of the measures adopted by theseveral states remained uncertain, the French fleet entered theharbour of Newport, and letters were soon afterwards received from theCount de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Tunay, the officers commandingthe land and naval forces, transmitting to General Washington anaccount of their arrival, of their strength, their expectations, andtheir orders. 

The troops designed to serve in the United States had assembled, earlyin the year, at Brest; but the transports at that place having beenchiefly employed for an armament destined for the West Indies; and theports from which it had been intended to draw others, being blockaded, only the first division, consisting of five thousand men, had arrivedat Newport; but letters from France contained assurances that thesecond division of the army might soon be expected. 

To obviate those difficulties which had occurred on former occasionsrespecting rank, the orders given to Lieutenant General Count deRochambeau, which were inclosed in his first letter, placed himentirely under the command of General Washington. The French troopswere to be considered as auxiliaries, and were, according to theusages of war, to cede the post of honour to the Americans. [41]

[Footnote 41: These orders were given at the instance of GeneralLafayette. --_Correspondence with General Lafayette. _]

Convinced that cordial harmony between the allied forces was essentialto their success, both generals cultivated carefully the friendlydispositions felt by the troops towards each other. Warm professionsof reciprocal respect, esteem, and confidence, were interchangedbetween them; and each endeavoured to impress on the other, and on allthe military and civil departments, the conviction that the twonations, and two armies, were united by the ties of interest andaffection. On this occasion, General Washington recommended to hisofficers, as a symbol of friendship and affection for their allies, toengraft on the American cockade, which was black, a white relief, thatbeing the colour of the French cockade. 

Late as was the arrival of the French troops, they found the Americansunprepared for active and offensive operations. Not even at that timewere the numbers ascertained which would be furnished by the states. Yet it was necessary for General Washington to communicate a plan ofthe campaign to the Count de Rochambeau. 

The season was already so far advanced that preparations for theoperations contemplated eventually, on the arrival of the seconddivision of the French fleet, must be immediately made, or therewould not be time, though every circumstance should prove favourable, to execute the design against New York. Such a state of things so illcomported with the engagements of congress, and with the interests ofthe nation, that, trusting to his being enabled, by the measuresalready taken by the states, to comply with what was incumbent on himto perform, he determined to hazard much rather than forego theadvantages to be derived from the aids afforded by France. Incommunicating this resolution to congress, he said--"Pressed on allsides by a choice of difficulties in a moment which required decision, I have adopted that line of conduct which comported with the dignityand faith of congress, the reputation of these states, and the honourof our arms. I have sent on definitive proposals of co-operation tothe French general and admiral. Neither the period of the season, nora regard to decency, would permit delay. The die is cast, and itremains with the states either to fulfil their engagements, preservetheir credit, and support their independence, or to involve us indisgrace and defeat. Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by thecommittee, I shall proceed on the supposition that they will, ultimately, consult their own interest and honour and not suffer us tofail for the want of means which it is evidently in their power toafford. What has been done, and is doing, by some of the states, confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in thecountry. Of the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangementfor bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground to doubt. If wefail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments, I trustthe responsibility will fall where it ought; and that I shall standjustified to congress, my country, and the world. "

[Illustration: Beverly Robinson Mansion at West Point

_Benedict Arnold made this house his headquarters while in command ofthe fort and garrison there. It was here that Washington came tobreakfast with Arnold, one September morning in 1780 and made thediscovery that his host had turned traitor and was conspiring tosurrender West Point to the British. _]

A decisive naval superiority, however, was considered as the basis ofany enterprise to be undertaken by the allied arms. This navalsuperiority being assumed, the outlines of the plan were drawn, andthe 5th of August was named as the day on which the French troopsshould re-embark, and the American army assemble at Morrissania. 

This plan was committed to Major General the Marquis de la Fayette, who was authorized to explain the situation of the American army, andthe views of the General, to the Count de Rochambeau. It was to beconsidered as preliminary to any operation--that the fleet and army ofFrance should continue their aid until the enterprise should succeed, or be abandoned by mutual consent. 

The Chevalier de Tunay did not long maintain his superiority at sea. Three days after he reached Newport, Admiral Greaves arrived with sixships of the line, and transferred it to the British. On hisappearance off the Hook, Arbuthnot passed the bar with four ships ofthe line; and hearing that De Tunay had reached Rhode Island, proceeded thither, and cruised off the harbour. The Count deRochambeau had been put into possession of all the forts and batteriesabout Newport, and the fleet had been moved in a line so as toco-operate with the land forces. This position appearing tooformidable to be attempted by the fleet alone, Arbuthnot continued tocruise off Block Island. 

As the commanders of the allied forces still cherished the hope ofacquiring a superiority at sea, the design on New York was onlysuspended. This hope was strengthened by intelligence that the Countde Guichen had been joined in the West Indies by a powerful Spanisharmament. The Chevalier de Tunay had despatched a packet to inform himthat he was blocked up by a superior force, and to solicit suchreinforcements as the situation of the Count might enable him tospare. Relying on the success of this application, and on the arrivalof the second division of the squadron from Brest, the Americangeneral impatiently expected the moment when De Tunay would be enabledto act offensively. 

In this crisis of affairs, a derangement took place in a mostimportant department, which threatened to disconcert the whole plan ofoperations, though every other circumstance should prove favourable. 

The immense expenditure of the quartermaster's department--theinadequacy of the funds with which it was supplied--the reciprocaldisgusts and complaints produced by these causes, had determinedcongress to make still another radical change in the system. Thissubject had been taken up early in the winter; but such were thedelays inseparable from the proceedings of the government, that thereport of the committee was not made until the month of March, norfinally decided on until the middle of July. 

This subject was too interesting to the army, and to the importantoperations meditated for the campaign, not to engage the anxiousattention of the Commander-in-chief. At his request, the quartermastergeneral, while the army lay in winter quarters, repaired toPhiladelphia for the purpose of giving congress all the information hepossessed. He proposed to withdraw the management of the departmentalmost entirely from the civil government, and to place it under thecontrol of the person who should be at its head, subject only to thedirection of the Commander-in-chief. 

The views of congress were entirely different. While the subjectremained suspended before that body, it was taken up by the committeeof co-operation at head quarters, where the combined experience andtalents of Generals Washington, Schuyler, and Greene, were employed indigesting a system adapted to the actual situation of the UnitedStates, which was recommended to congress. To give the more weight tohis opinion by showing its disinterestedness, General Greene offeredto continue in the discharge of the duties assigned to him, withoutany other extra emolument than his family expenses. This plan, whatever might have been its details, was, in its general outlines, unacceptable to congress. A system was, at length, completed by thatbody, which General Greene believed to be incapable of execution. Resolving not to take upon himself the responsibility of measures theissue of which must be calamitous and disgraceful, he determined towithdraw from a station in which he despaired of being useful. 

Apprehending the worst consequences from his resignation in socritical a moment, General Washington pressed him to suspend thisdecisive step, until the effect of an application from himself andfrom the committee of co-operation should be known. Theirrepresentations produced no effect. The resolution to make this boldexperiment was unalterable. General Greene's resignation was accepted;and the letter conveying it excited so much irritation, that a designwas intimated of suspending his command in the line of the army. Butthese impressions soon wore off, and the resentment of the momentsubsided. Colonel Pickering, who succeeded General Greene, possessed, in an eminent degree, those qualities which fitted him to combat andsubdue the difficulties of his department. To great energy of mind andbody, he added a long experience in the affairs of the continent, withan ardent zeal for its interests; and General Greene himself, withseveral of the former officers, at the request of theCommander-in-chief, continued for some time after their resignation, to render all the services in their power; but there was a defect ofmeans, for which neither talents nor exertion could compensate. 

In the commissary department the same distress was experienced. General Washington was driven to the necessity of emptying themagazines at West Point, and of foraging on a people whose means ofsubsisting themselves were already nearly exhausted by the armies onboth sides. The inadequate supplies drawn from these sources affordedbut a short relief; and, once more, at a time when the publicimagination was contemplating brilliant plans, the execution of whichrequired steady courage with persevering labour, and consequentlyample magazines, the army was frequently reduced to the last extremityby the want of food. 

So great were the embarrassments produced by the difficulty ofprocuring subsistence that, although the second division of the fleetfrom Brest was daily expected, General Washington found it necessaryto countermand the orders under which the militia were marching tocamp. 

Such was the state of preparation for the campaign, when intelligencewas brought by the Alliance frigate that the port of Brest wasblockaded. In the hope, however, that the combined fleets of Franceand Spain would be able to raise the blockade, General Washingtonadhered steadily to his purpose respecting New York, and continued hisexertions to provide the means for its execution. The details of theplan of co-operation continued to be the subject of a correspondencewith the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Tunay; and, atlength, a personal interview was agreed upon, to take place on the21st of September, at Hartford, in Connecticut. 

[Sidenote: Enterprise against New York relinquished. ]

In this interview, ulterior eventual measures, as well as an explicitand detailed arrangement for acting against New York, were thesubjects of consideration. No one of the plans, however, thenconcerted for the present campaign, was carried into execution. All, except an invasion of Canada, depended on a superiority at sea, whichwas soon rendered almost hopeless by certain information that theCount de Guichen had sailed for Europe. 

[Sidenote: Naval superiority of the British. ]

Not long after receiving this information, Admiral Rodney arrived atNew York with eleven ships of the line and four frigates. Thisreinforcement not only disconcerted all the plans of the allies, butput it in the power of the British to prosecute in security theirdesigns in the south. 

[Sidenote: Plans for the campaign abandoned. ]

It may well be supposed that the Commander-in-chief did notrelinquish, without infinite chagrin, the sanguine expectations he hadformed of rendering this summer decisive of the war. Never before hadhe indulged so strongly the hope of happily terminating the contest. In a letter to an intimate friend, this chagrin was thus expressed. "We are now drawing to a close an inactive campaign, the beginning ofwhich appeared pregnant with events of a very favourable complexion. Ihoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was opening which wouldenable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me todomestic life. The favourable disposition of Spain, the promisedsuccour from France, the combined force in the West Indies, thedeclaration of Russia, (acceded to by other powers of Europe, humiliating the naval pride and power of Great Britain) thesuperiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the Irish claims andEnglish disturbances, formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast, (which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams) that the hour ofdeliverance was not far distant; for that, however unwilling GreatBritain might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power tocontinue the contest. But alas! these prospects, flattering as theywere, have proved delusive; and I see nothing before us butaccumulating distress. We have been half of our time withoutprovisions, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, normoney to form them. We have lived upon expedients until we can live nolonger. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopesand temporary devices, instead of system and economy. It is in vain, however, to look back, nor is it our business to do so. Our case isnot desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is wisdomamong our rulers. But to suppose that this great revolution can beaccomplished by a temporary army; that this army will be subsisted bystate supplies; and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, isin my opinion absurd, and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion ofthe order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it werenecessary, it could be easily proved to any person of a moderateunderstanding, that an annual army, or any army raised on the spur ofthe occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, invarious ways that could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than apermanent body of men under good organization and military discipline;which never was, nor will be the case with raw troops. A thousandarguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, mightalso be adduced to prove that the army, if it is to depend upon statesupplies, must disband or starve, and that taxation alone (especiallyat this late hour) can not furnish the means to carry on the war. Isit not time to retract from error, and benefit by experience? Or do wewant farther proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciouslyadhered to. "

CHAPTER VIII. 

 Treason and escape of Arnold.... Trial and execution of Major André.... Precautions for the security of West Point.... Letter of General Washington on American affairs.... Proceedings of congress respecting the army.... Major Talmadge destroys the British stores at Coram.... The army retires into winter quarters.... Irruption of Major Carlton into New York.... European transactions. 

[Sidenote: 1780. ]

While the public mind was anticipating great events from thecombined arms of France and America, treason lay concealed in theAmerican camp, and was plotting the ruin of the American cause. 

The great services and military talents of General Arnold, his couragein battle, and patient fortitude under excessive hardships, hadsecured to him a high place in the opinion of the army and of hiscountry. 

Not having sufficiently recovered from the wounds received beforeQuebec and at Saratoga to be fit for active service, and having largeaccounts to settle with the government which required leisure, he was, on the evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778, appointed to the command inthat place. 

Unfortunately, that strength of principle and correctness of judgment, which might enable him to resist the various seductions to which hisfame and rank exposed him in the metropolis of the Union, were notassociated with the firmness which he had displayed in the field, andin the most adverse circumstances. Yielding to the temptations of afalse pride, and forgetting that he did not possess the resources ofprivate fortune, he indulged in the pleasures of a sumptuous table andexpensive equipage, and soon swelled his debts to an amount which itwas impossible to discharge. Unmindful of his military character, heengaged in speculations which were unfortunate; and with the hope ofimmense profit, took shares in privateers which were unsuccessful. Hisclaims against the United States were great, and he looked to them forthe means of extricating himself from the embarrassments in which hisindiscretions had involved him; but the commissioners to whom hisaccounts were referred for settlement, had reduced them considerably;and, on his appeal from their decision to congress, a committeereported that the sum allowed by the commissioners was more than hewas entitled to receive. 

He was charged with various acts of extortion on the citizens ofPhiladelphia, and with peculating on the funds of the continent. Notthe less soured by these multiplied causes of irritation, from thereflection that they were attributable to his own follies and vices, he gave full scope to his resentments, and indulged himself inexpressions of angry reproach against, what he termed, the ingratitudeof his country, which provoked those around him, and gave greatoffence to congress. Having become peculiarly odious to the governmentof Pennsylvania, the Executive of that state exhibited formal chargesagainst him to congress, who directed that he should be arrested andbrought before a court martial. His trial was concluded late inJanuary, 1779, and he was sentenced to be reprimanded by theCommander-in-chief. This sentence was approved by congress and carriedinto execution. 

From the time the sentence against him was approved, if not sooner, his proud unprincipled spirit revolted from the cause of his country, and determined him to seek an occasion to make the objects of hisresentment, the victims of his vengeance. Turning his eyes on WestPoint as an acquisition which would give value to treason, and inflicta mortal wound on his former friends, he sought the command of thatfortress for the purpose of gratifying both his avarice and hishate. [42]

[Footnote 42: The author is informed by General Lafayette that Arnold, while commanding at West Point, endeavoured to obtain from GeneralWashington the names of his secret emissaries in New York, and hismeans of communicating with them. He pressed Lafayette, who had alsohis private intelligencers, for the same information. His applicationswere of course unsuccessful. It cannot be doubted that his object wasto commit the additional crime of betraying them to Sir HenryClinton. ]

To New York, the safety of West Point was peculiarly interesting; and, in that state, the reputation of Arnold was particularly high. To itsdelegation he addressed himself; and one of its members had written aletter to General Washington, suggesting doubts respecting themilitary character of Howe, to whom its defence was then entrusted, and recommending Arnold for that service. This request was notforgotten. Some short time afterwards, General Schuyler mentioned tothe Commander-in-chief a letter he had received from Arnold intimatinghis wish to join the army, but stating his inability, in consequenceof his wounds, to perform the active duties of the field. GeneralWashington observed that, as there was a prospect of a vigorouscampaign, he should be gratified with the aid of General Arnold. Thatso soon as the operations against New York should commence, hedesigned to draw his whole force into the field, leaving even WestPoint to the care of invalids and a small garrison of militia. Recollecting however the former application of a member of congressrespecting this post, he added, that "if, with this previousinformation, that situation would be more agreeable to him than acommand in the field, his wishes should certainly be indulged. "

This conversation being communicated to Arnold, he caught eagerly atthe proposition, though without openly discovering any solicitude onthe subject; and, in the beginning of August, repaired to camp, wherehe renewed the solicitations which had before been made indirectly. 

At this juncture, Sir Henry Clinton embarked on an expedition hemeditated against Rhode Island, and General Washington was advancingon New York. He offered Arnold the left wing of the army, which thatofficer declined under the pretexts mentioned in his letter to GeneralSchuyler. 

Incapable of suspecting a man who had given such distinguished proofsof courage and patriotism, the Commander-in-chief was neither alarmedat his refusal to embrace so splendid an opportunity of recovering thefavour of his countrymen, nor at the embarrassment accompanying thatrefusal. Pressing the subject no farther, he assented to the requestwhich had been made, and invested Arnold with the command of WestPoint. Previous to his soliciting this station, he had, in a letter toColonel Robinson, signified his change of principles, and his wish torestore himself to the favour of his Prince by some signal proof ofhis repentance. This letter opened the way to a correspondence withSir Henry Clinton, the immediate object of which, after obtaining theappointment he had solicited, was to concert the means of deliveringthe important post he commanded to the British general. 

Major John André, an aid-de-camp of Sir Henry Clinton, and adjutantgeneral of the British army, was selected as the person to whom thematuring of Arnold's treason, and the arrangements for its executionshould be entrusted. A correspondence was carried on between themunder a mercantile disguise, in the feigned names of Gustavus andAnderson; and, at length, to facilitate their communications, theVulture sloop of war moved up the North River, and took a stationconvenient for the purpose, but not so near as to excite suspicion. 

[Sidenote: Treason and escape of Arnold. ]

The time when General Washington met the Count de Rochambeau atHartford was selected for the final adjustment of the plan; and, as apersonal interview was deemed necessary, Major André came up theriver, and went on board the Vulture. The house of a Mr. Smith, without the American posts, was appointed for the interview; and tothat place both parties repaired in the night--André being broughtunder a pass for John Anderson, in a boat despatched from the shore. While the conference was yet unfinished, day light approached; and, toavoid discovery, Arnold proposed that André should remain concealeduntil the succeeding night. He is understood to have refusedperemptorily to be carried within the American posts; but the promiseto respect this objection was not observed. They continued togetherthe succeeding day; and when, in the following night, his return tothe Vulture was proposed, the boatmen refused to carry him because shehad shifted her station during the day, in consequence of a gun whichwas moved to the shore without the knowledge of Arnold, and broughtto bear upon her. This embarrassing circumstance reduced him to thenecessity of endeavouring to reach New York by land. To accomplishthis purpose, he reluctantly yielded to the urgent representations ofArnold; and, laying aside his regimentals, which he had hitherto wornunder a surtout, put on a plain suit of clothes, and received a passfrom General Arnold, authorizing him, under the name of John Anderson, to proceed on the public service to the White Plains, or lower if hethought proper. 

With this permit, he had passed all the guards and posts on the roadunsuspected, and was proceeding to New York in perfect security, whenone of three militia men who were employed between the lines of thetwo armies, springing suddenly from his covert into the road, seizedthe reins of his bridle, and stopped his horse. Losing his accustomedself-possession, Major André, instead of producing the pass[43] fromGeneral Arnold, asked the man hastily where he belonged? He replied"to below;" a term implying that he was from New York. "And so, " saidAndré, not suspecting deception, "am I. " He then declared himself tobe a British officer on urgent business, and begged that he might notbe detained. The appearance of the other militia men disclosed hismistake, too late to correct it. He offered a purse of gold, and avaluable watch, with tempting promises of ample reward from hisgovernment, if they would permit him to escape; but his offers wererejected, and his captors proceeded to search him. They foundconcealed in his boots, in Arnold's hand writing, papers containingall the information which could be important respecting West Point. When carried before Lieutenant Colonel Jameson, the officer commandingthe scouting parties on the lines, he still maintained his assumedcharacter, and requested Jameson to inform his commanding officer thatAnderson was taken. Jameson despatched an express with thiscommunication. On receiving it, Arnold comprehended the full extent ofhis danger, and, flying from well merited punishment, took refuge onboard the Vulture. 

[Footnote 43: Mr. Johnson says he did produce it; but that, on beingsurprised, he had thrust a paper containing a plan of the route in hisboot, which, having been perceived, was demanded, and led to hisdiscovery. ]

[Illustration: Where Washington Stayed During André's Trial

_In this brick house at Tappan, Rockland County, New York, theAmerican Commander-in-Chief, during September, 1780, awaited theresult of the trial of Major John André, who conspired with BenedictArnold for the betrayal of West Point to the British. FourteenAmerican officers sat in judgment on André and ordered his executionon October 2, 1780. In Tappan also is still standing the old Tavernwhere André was imprisoned. _]

When sufficient time for the escape of Arnold was supposed to haveelapsed, André, no longer affecting concealment, acknowledged himselfto be the adjutant general of the British army. Jameson, seeking tocorrect the mischief of his indiscreet communication to Arnold, immediately despatched a packet to the Commander-in-chief containingthe papers which had been discovered, with a letter from André, relating the manner of his capture, and accounting for the disguise hehad assumed. 

The express was directed to meet the Commander-in-chief, who was thenon his return from Hartford; but, taking different roads, [44] theymissed each other, and a delay attended the delivery of the papers, which insured the escape of Arnold. 

[Footnote 44: General Lafayette adds some circumstances which are notfound among the manuscript papers of General Washington. TheCommander-in-chief with Generals Lafayette and Knox had turned fromthe direct route in order to visit a redoubt. Colonels Hamilton andM'Henry, the aids-de-camp of Generals Washington and Lafayette, wentforward to request Mrs. Arnold not to wait breakfast. Arnold receivedAndré's billet in their presence. He turned pale, left them suddenly, called his wife, communicated the intelligence to her and left her ina swoon, without the knowledge of Hamilton and M'Henry. Mounting thehorse of his aid-de-camp, which was ready saddled, and directing himto inform General Washington on his arrival that Arnold was gone toreceive him at West Point, he gained the river shore, and was conveyedin a canoe to the Vulture. 

The Commander-in-chief, on his arrival, was informed that Arnoldawaited him at West Point. Taking it for granted that this step hadbeen taken to prepare for his reception, he proceeded thither withoutentering the house, and was surprised to find that Arnold was notarrived. On returning to the quarters of that officer he receivedJameson's despatch, which disclosed the whole mystery. ]

[Sidenote: Precautions for the security of West Point. ]

Every precaution was immediately taken for the security of West Point;after which, the attention of the Commander-in-chief was turned toAndré. A board of general officers, of which Major General Greene waspresident, and the two foreign generals, Lafayette and Steuben, weremembers, was called, to report a precise state of his case, and todetermine the character in which he was to be considered, and thepunishment to which he was liable. 

The frankness and magnanimity with which André had conducted himselffrom the time of his appearance in his real character, had made avery favourable impression on all those with whom he had held anyintercourse. From this cause he experienced every mark of indulgentattention which was compatible with his situation; and, from a senseof justice as well as of delicacy, was informed, on the opening of theexamination, that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatorywhich might embarrass his own feelings. But, as if only desirous torescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more thandeath, he confessed every thing material to his own condemnation, butwould divulge nothing which might involve others. 

[Sidenote: Trial and execution of Major André. ]

The board reported the essential facts which had appeared, with theiropinion that Major André was a spy, and ought to suffer death. Theexecution of this sentence was ordered to take place on the daysucceeding that on which it was pronounced. 

Superior to the terrors of death, but dreading disgrace, André wasdeeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war decreeto persons in his situation. He wished to die like a soldier, not as acriminal. To obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this respect, headdressed a letter[45] to General Washington, replete with thefeelings of a man of sentiment and honour. But the occasion requiredthat the example should make its full impression, and this requestcould not be granted. He encountered his fate with composure anddignity; and his whole conduct interested the feelings of all whowitnessed it. 

[Footnote 45: See note No. IV. At the end of the volume. ]

The general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of warcompelled them to pronounce; and never perhaps did theCommander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates ofduty and policy. The sympathy excited among the American officers byhis fate, was as universal as it is unusual on such occasions; andproclaims alike the merit of him who suffered, and the humanity ofthose who inflicted the punishment. 

Great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom André wasparticularly dear, first, to have him considered as protected by aflag of truce, and afterwards, as a prisoner of war. 

Even Arnold had the hardihood to interpose. After giving a certificateof facts tending, as he supposed, to exculpate the prisoner, exhausting his powers of reasoning on the case, and appealing to thehumanity of the American general, he sought to intimidate thatofficer, by stating the situation of many of the most distinguishedindividuals of South Carolina, who had forfeited their lives, but hadhitherto been spared through the clemency of the British general. Thisclemency, he said, could no longer be extended to them should MajorAndré suffer. 

It may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold could have noinfluence on Washington. He conveyed Mrs. Arnold to her husband in NewYork, [46] and also transmitted his clothes and baggage, for which hehad written; but, in every other respect, his letters, which wereunanswered, were also unnoticed. 

[Footnote 46: General Lafayette mentions a circumstance not previouslyknown to the author, which serves to illustrate the character ofWashington, and to mark the delicacy of his feelings towards even theoffending part of that sex which is entitled to all the consolationand protection man can afford it. 

The night after Arnold's escape, when his letter respecting André wasreceived, the general directed one of his aids to wait on Mrs. Arnold, who was convulsed with grief, and inform her that he had done everything which depended on him to arrest her husband, but that, nothaving succeeded, it gave him pleasure to inform her that her husbandwas safe. It is also honourable to the American character, that duringthe effervescence of the moment, Mrs. Arnold was permitted to go toPhiladelphia, to take possession of her effects, and to proceed to NewYork under the protection of a flag, without receiving the slightestinsult. ]

The mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited in everybosom for the unfortunate André, seemed to increase the detestation inwhich Arnold was held. "André, " said General Washington in a privateletter, "has met his fate with that fortitude which was to be expectedfrom an accomplished man and a gallant officer; but I am mistaken if_at this time_ Arnold is undergoing the torments of a mental hell. Hewants feeling. From some traits[47] of his character which havelately come to my knowledge, he seems to have been so hardened incrime, so lost to all sense of honour and shame, that, while hisfaculties still enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there willbe no time for remorse. "

[Footnote 47: This allusion is thus explained in a private letter fromColonel Hamilton--"This man (Arnold) is in every sense despicable. Inaddition to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his commandin Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has unfolded, the history of his command at West Point is a history of little aswell as great villanies. He practised every dirty act of peculation, and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers to defraud thepublic. "]

From motives of policy, or of respect for his engagements, Sir HenryClinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier general inthe British service, which he preserved throughout the war. Yet it isimpossible that rank could have rescued him from the contempt anddetestation in which the generous, the honourable, and the brave, could not cease to hold him. It was impossible for men of thisdescription to bury the recollection of his being a traitor, a sordidtraitor, first the slave of his rage, then purchased with gold, andfinally secured at the expense of the blood of one of the mostaccomplished officers in the British army. 

His representations of the discontent of the country and of the armyconcurring with reports from other quarters, had excited the hope thatthe loyalists and the dissatisfied, allured by British gold, and theprospect of rank in the British service, would flock to his standard, and form a corps at whose head he might again display his accustomedintrepidity. With this hope he published an address to the inhabitantsof America, in which he laboured to palliate his own guilt, and toincrease their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things. 

This appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation addressed "Tothe officers and soldiers of the continental army, who have the realinterests of their country at heart, and who are determined to be nolonger the tools and dupes of congress or of France. "

The object of this proclamation was to induce the officers andsoldiers to desert the cause they had embraced from principle, byholding up to them the very flattering offers of the British general, and contrasting the substantial emoluments of the British service withtheir present deplorable condition. He attempted to cover thisdishonourable proposition with a decent garb, by representing the basestep he invited them to take, as the only measure which could restorepeace, real liberty, and happiness, to their country. 

These inducements did not produce their intended effect. Although thetemper of the army might be irritated by real suffering, and by thesupposed neglect of government, no diminution of patriotism had beenproduced. Through all the hardships, irritations, and vicissitudes ofthe war, Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officerwho abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest, andturned his sword upon his former companions in arms. 

When the probable consequences of this plot, had it been successful, were considered, and the combination of apparent accidents by which itwas discovered and defeated, was recollected, all were filled withawful astonishment; and the devout perceived in the transaction, thehand of Providence guiding America to independence. 

The thanks of congress were voted to the three militia men[48] who hadrendered this invaluable service; and a silver medal, with aninscription expressive of their fidelity and patriotism, was directedto be presented to each of them. In addition to this flatteringtestimonial of their worth, and as a farther evidence of nationalgratitude, a resolution was passed granting to each, two hundreddollars per annum during life, to be paid in specie or an equivalentin current money. 

[Footnote 48: Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, andIsaac Vanwert. ]

The efforts of General Washington to obtain a permanent militaryforce, or its best substitute, a regular system for filling the vacantranks with draughts who should join the army on the first day ofJanuary in each year, were still continued. Notwithstanding theembarrassments with which congress was surrounded, it is not easy tofind adequate reasons for the neglect of representations sointeresting, and of recommendations apparently so essential to thesafety of the United States. 

[Sidenote: Parties in Congress. ]

Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitatedcongress. One entered fully into the views of the Commander-in-chief. The other, jealous of the army, and apprehensive of its hostility toliberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to givestability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were toserve during the war. They seemed to dread the danger from the enemyto which its fluctuations would expose them, less than the dangerwhich might be apprehended for the civil authority from its permanentcharacter. They caught with avidity at every intelligence whichencouraged the flattering hope of a speedy peace, [49] but enteredreluctantly into measures founded on the supposition that the warmight be of long duration. Perfectly acquainted with the extent of thejealousies entertained on this subject, although, to use his ownexpressions to a friend, "Heaven knows how unjustly, " GeneralWashington had foreborne to press the necessity of regular and timelyreinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his ownjudgment directed. But the experience of every campaign furnished suchstrong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuingto rely on temporary expedients, and the uncertainty of collecting aforce to co-operate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarlyembarrassing, that he at length resolved to conquer the delicacy bywhich he had been in some degree restrained, and to open himself fullyon the subject which he deemed more essential than any other to thesuccess of the war. 

[Footnote 49: The following extract from a private letter of GeneralWashington to a member of congress, shows how sensible he was of themischief produced by this temper. "The satisfaction I have in anysuccesses that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, isalways allayed by the fear that it will lull us into security. Supineness, and a disposition to flatter ourselves, seem to make partsof our national character. When we receive a check and are not quiteundone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and when we dogain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive, and expect the warimmediately to end. The history of the war is a history of false hopesand temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! Thiswinter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassingscene than we have yet experienced, to the southward. I have littledoubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clintonwill detach to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far frombeing satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts. "]

[Sidenote: August. ]

In August, while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement to theChevalier de Tunay as would give him the command of the American seas, and while uncertain whether the campaign might not pass away withoutgiving a single advantage promised at its opening, he transmitted aletter to congress, fully and freely imparting his sentiments on thestate of things. 

[Sidenote: Letter of General Washington on American affairs. ]

As this letter contains an exact statement of American affairs, according to the view taken of them by General Washington, and afaithful picture of the consequences of the ruinous policy which hadbeen pursued, drawn by the man best acquainted with them, copiousextracts from it will, at least, be excused. 

After examining the sources of supplies for the campaign, he proceedsto say--"But while we are meditating offensive operations which maynot be undertaken at all, or, being undertaken, may fail, I ampersuaded congress are not inattentive to the present state of thearmy, and will view in the same light with me the necessity ofproviding in time against a period (the first of January) when onehalf of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army thatwill remain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, toabandon the service, without the hope which has hitherto supportedthem, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, andcertainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds somethingmore substantial to rest upon. This is a truth of which everyspectator of the distresses of the army can not help being convinced. Those at a distance may speculate differently; but on the spot anopinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale, would be chimerical. 

"The honourable the committee of congress, who have seen and heard forthemselves, will add their testimony to mine; and the wisdom andjustice of congress can not fail to give it the most seriousattention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs canmaintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either thetemper or the resources of the country will not admit of analteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliatingcondition of seeing the cause of America, in America, upheld byforeign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all ourconfidence, and all our gratitude; but it is neither for the honour ofAmerica, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the workentirely to them. "

He then reviewed the resources of Great Britain; and, after showingher ability still to prosecute the war, added--"The inference fromthese reflections is, that we can not count upon a speedy end of thewar; and that it is the true policy of America not to content herselfwith temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to giveconsistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to thiswill be immediately to devise a plan and put it in execution, forproviding men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end ofthe year; and for subsisting and for making a reasonable allowance tothe officers and soldiers. 

"The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and suchas will execute itself. Experience has shown that a peremptory draughtwill be the only effectual one. If a draught for the war or for threeyears can be effected, it ought to be made on every account; a shorterperiod than a year is inadmissible. 

"To one who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by shortenlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyonddescription; and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate achange. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have metwith in the military line, are to be attributed to this cause. 

"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by thecontinuance of the same men in service, had been capable ofdiscipline, we never should have to retreat with a handful of menacross the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, whichnothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we shouldnot have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, withsometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinaryguards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had onlythought proper to march against us; we should not have been under thenecessity of fighting at Brandywine with an unequal number of rawtroops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to avictorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with lessthan half the force of the enemy, destitute of every thing in asituation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen NewYork left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army ofthese states, while the principal part of their force was detached forthe reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves thisspring so weak as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable toprotect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a goodcountenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should nothave been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently themortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them, passunimproved for want of a force which the country was completely ableto afford; to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, theinhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the samecause. "

After presenting in detail the embarrassments under which the civildepartments of the army also had laboured, in consequence of theexpensiveness and waste inseparable from its temporary character, heproceeded to observe--"There is every reason to believe, that the warhas been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, madethe successes of the enemy greater. The fluctuation of the army keptalive their hopes; and at every period of a dissolution of aconsiderable part of it, they have flattered themselves with somedecisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemycould have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability havelistened to terms long since. If the army is left in its presentsituation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of theenemy; if it is put in a respectable one, it must have a contraryeffect; and nothing I believe will tend more to give us peace theensuing winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot, not only for another campaign, but for severalcampaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enableus to insist upon favourable terms in forcible language. An armyinsignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces, would bethe strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment alittle longer. It is an old maxim that the surest way to make a goodpeace is to be well prepared for war. 

"I can not forbear returning in this place to the necessity of a moreample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this headhave been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are manysymptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to uniteboth officers and men in a general refusal of the money, and somecorps now actually decline receiving it. Every method has been takento counteract it, because such a combination in the army would be asevere blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist thatthe accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods, and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will notbe satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good. 

"I have often said, and I beg leave to repeat it, the half payprovision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can beadopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not done, thearmy (already so much reduced in officers by daily resignations as notto have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it) must either ceaseto exist at the end of the campaign, or will exhibit an example ofmore virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance, than hasperhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm. 

"The dissolution of the army is an event that can not be regarded withindifference. It would bring accumulated distress upon us; it wouldthrow the people of America into a general consternation; it woulddiscredit our cause throughout the world; it would shock our allies. To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary. The lossof the veteran soldiers could not be replaced. To attempt to carry onthe war with militia against disciplined troops, will be to attemptwhat the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounceto be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to congress, todwell on observations of this kind in a letter to them. "

[Sidenote: Proceedings of Congress respecting the army. ]

At length the committee presented their report, reorganizing theregiments, reducing their number, and apportioning on the severalstates their respective numbers to complete the establishment. Thisreport, being approved by congress, was transmitted to theCommander-in-chief for his consideration. By this arrangement, thestates were required to recruit their quotas for the war, and tobring them into the field by the first of January; but, if in anystate, it should be found impracticable to raise the men for the warby the first day of December, it was recommended to such state tosupply the deficiency with men engaged to serve for not less than oneyear. 

In compliance with the request of congress, General Washingtonsubmitted his objections to the plan, in a long and respectful letter. 

He recommended that legionary corps should be substituted in the placeof regiments entirely of cavalry. He thought it more adviseable thatthe infantry attached to the cavalry should compose a part of thecorps permanently, than that it should be drawn occasionally from theregiments of foot. 

The reduction in the number of regiments appeared to him a subject ofgreat delicacy. The last reduction, he said, had occasioned many toquit the service, independent of those who were discontinued; and hadleft durable seeds of discontent among those who remained. The generaltopic of declamation was, that it was as hard as dishonourable, formen who had made every sacrifice to the service, to be turned out ofit, at the pleasure of those in power, without an adequatecompensation. In the maturity to which their uneasiness had now risenfrom a continuance of misery, they would be still more impatient underan attempt of a similar nature. 

It was not, he said, the intention of his remarks to discourage areform, but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill effectswhich might otherwise attend it, by making an ample provision both forthe officers who should remain in the service, and for those whoshould be reduced. This should be the basis of the plan; and withoutit, the most mischievous consequences were to be apprehended. He wasaware of the difficulty of making a present provision sufficientlyample to give satisfaction; but this only proved the expediency ofmaking one for the future, and brought him to that which he had sofrequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic, andthe most effectual, that could be devised; this was half pay for life. Supported by the prospect of a permanent provision, the officers wouldbe tied to the service, and would submit to many momentary privations, and to those inconveniences, which the situation of public affairsrendered unavoidable. If the objection drawn from the principle thatthe measure was incompatible with the genius of the government shouldbe thought insurmountable, he would propose a substitute, lesseligible in his opinion, but which would answer the purpose. It was tomake the present half pay for seven years, whole pay for the sameperiod. He also recommended that depreciation on the pay received, should be made up to the officers who should be reduced. 

No objection occurred to the measure now recommended, but the expenseit would occasion. In his judgment, whatever would give consistency tothe military establishment, would be ultimately favourable to economy. It was not easy to be conceived, except by those who had witnessed it, what an additional waste and increased consumption of every thing, andconsequently what an increase of expense, resulted from laxness ofdiscipline in an army; and where officers thought they did a favour byholding their commissions, and the men were continually fluctuating, to maintain discipline was impossible. Nothing could be more obviousto him than that a sound military establishment and real economy werethe same. That the purposes of war would be greatly promoted by it wastoo clear to admit of argument. He objected also to the mode ofeffecting the reduction. This was by leaving it to the several statesto select the officers who should remain in service. He regretted thatcongress had not thought proper to retain the reduction andincorporation of the regiments under their own discretion. Heregretted that it should be left to the states, not only because itwas an adherence to the state system, which in the arrangements of thearmy, he disapproved; but because also he feared it would introducemuch confusion and discontent in a business which ought to beconducted with the greatest circumspection. He feared also thatprofessing to _select_ the officers to be retained in service wouldgive disgust both to those who should be discontinued, and to thosewho should remain. The former would be sent away under the publicstigma of inferior merit, and the latter would feel no pleasure in apresent preference, when they reflected that, at some future period, they might experience a similar fate. 

He wished with much sincerity that congress had been pleased to makeno alteration in the term of service, but had confined theirrequisition to men who should serve for the war, to be raised byenlistment, draught, or assessment, as might be found necessary. As itnow stood, there would be very few men for the war, and all the evilsof temporary engagements would still be felt. In the present temper ofthe states, he entertained the most flattering hopes that they wouldenter on vigorous measures to raise an army for the war, if congressappeared decided respecting it; but if they held up a different ideaas admissible, it would be again concluded that they did not think anarmy for the war essential. This would encourage the opposition of menof narrow, interested, and feeble tempers, and enable them to defeatthe primary object of the revolution. 

This letter was taken into consideration; and the measures itrecommended were pursued in almost every particular. Even the twogreat principles which were viewed with most jealousy, --an army forthe war, and half pay for life, --were adopted. It would have greatlyabridged the calamities of America, could these resolutions have beencarried into execution. Every effort for the purpose was made by theCommander-in-chief. 

To place the officers of the army in a situation which would rendertheir commissions valuable, and hold out to them the prospect of acomfortable old age, in a country saved by their blood, theirsufferings, and the labours of their best years, was an object whichhad always been dear to the heart of General Washington, and he hadseized every opportunity to press it on congress. That body hadapproached it slowly, taking step after step with apparent reluctance, as the necessity of the measure became more and more obvious. 

The first resolution on the subject, passed in May, 1778, allowed toall military officers who should continue in service during the war, and not hold any office of profit under the United States or any ofthem, half pay for seven years, if they lived so long. At the sametime the sum of eighty dollars, in addition to his pay, was granted toevery non-commissioned officer and soldier who should serve to the endof the war. In 1779 this subject was resumed. After much debate, itsfarther consideration was postponed; and the officers and soldierswere recommended to the attention of their several states, with adeclaration that their patriotism, valour, and perseverance, indefence of the rights and liberties of their country, had entitledthem to the gratitude, as well as the approbation of their fellowcitizens. 

In 1780, a memorial from the general officers, depicting in strongterms the situation of the army, and requiring present support, andsome future provision, was answered by a reference to what had beenalready done, and by a declaration "That patience, self-denial, fortitude and perseverance, and the cheerful sacrifice of time andhealth, are necessary virtues which both the citizen and soldier arecalled to exercise, while struggling for the liberties of theircountry; and that moderation, frugality, and temperance, must be amongthe chief supports, as well as the brightest ornaments of that kind ofcivil government which is wisely instituted by the several states inthis Union. "

This philosophic lecture on the virtues of temperance to men who wereoften without food, and always scantily supplied, was still calculatedto assuage irritations fomented by the neglect which was believed tohave been sustained. In a few days afterwards, the subject was broughtagain before congress, and a more conciliating temper was manifested. The odious restriction, limiting the half pay for seven years to thosewho should hold no post of profit under the United States or any ofthem, was removed; and the bounty allowed the men was extended to thewidows and orphans of those who had died or should die in the service;at length, the vote passed which has been stated, allowing half payfor life to all officers who should serve in the armies of the UnitedStates to the end of the war. 

Resolutions were also passed, recommending it to the several states tomake up the depreciation on the pay which had been received by thearmy; and it was determined that their future services should becompensated in the money of the new emission, the value of which, itwas supposed, might be kept up by taxes and by loans. 

While the government of the Union was thus employed in maturingmeasures for the preservation of its military establishment, the timefor action passed away without furnishing any material event. Thehostile armies continued to watch each other until the season of theyear forced them out of the field. 

Just before retiring into winter quarters, a handsome enterprise wasexecuted by Major Talmadge, of Colonel Sheldon's regiment of lightdragoons. That gentleman had been generally stationed on the lines, onthe east side of the North River, and had been distinguished for theaccuracy of his intelligence. 

He was informed that a large magazine of forage had been collected atCoram, on Long Island, which was protected by the militia of thecountry, the cruisers in the Sound, and a small garrison in itsneighbourhood. 

[Sidenote: Major Talmadge destroys the British stores at Coram. ]

[Sidenote: Nov. 21. ]

At the head of a detachment of eighty dismounted dragoons, under thecommand of Captain Edgar, and of eight or ten who were mounted, hepassed the Sound where it was twenty miles wide, marched across theisland in the night, and so completely surprised the fort, that histroops entered the works on three different sides before the garrisonwas prepared to resist them. The British took refuge in two housesconnected with the fortifications, and commenced a fire from the doorsand windows. These were instantly forced open; and the whole party, amounting to fifty-four, among whom were a lieutenant colonel, captain, and subaltern, were killed or taken. Stores to a considerableamount were destroyed, the fort was demolished, and the magazines wereconsumed by fire. The objects of the expedition being accomplished, Major Talmadge recrossed the Sound without having lost a man. On therecommendation of General Washington, congress passed a resolution, expressing a high sense of the merit of those engaged in theexpedition. 

[Sidenote: December. ]

[Sidenote: The army retires into winter quarters. ]

No objects for enterprise presenting themselves, the troops wereplaced in winter quarters early in December. The Pennsylvania line wasstationed near Morristown; the Jersey line about Pompton, on theconfines of New York and New Jersey; and the troops belonging to theNew England states, at West Point, and in its vicinity, on both sidesthe North River. The line of the state of New York remained at Albany, to which place it had been detached for the purpose of opposing aninvasion from Canada. 

[Sidenote: Irruption of Major Carlton into New York. ]

Major Carlton, at the head of one thousand men, composed of Europeans, Indians, and Tories, had made a sudden irruption into the northernparts of New York, and taken forts Ann and George, with theirgarrisons. At the same time, Sir John Johnson, at the head of a corpscomposed of the same materials, appeared on the Mohawk. Several sharpskirmishes were fought in that quarter with the continental troops, and a regiment of new levies, aided by the militia of the country. General Clinton's brigade was ordered to their assistance; but beforehe could reach the scene of action, the invading armies had retired, after laying waste the whole country through which they passed. 

[Sidenote: European transactions. ]

While the disorder of the American finances, the exhausted state ofthe country, and the debility of the government, determined GreatBritain to persevere in offensive war against the United States, bykeeping alive her hopes of conquest, Europe assumed an aspect not lessformidable to the permanent grandeur of that nation, than hostile toits present views. In the summer of 1780, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, entered into the celebrated compact, which has been generallydenominated "THE ARMED NEUTRALITY. " Holland had also declared adetermination to accede to the same confederacy; and it is notimprobable that this measure contributed to the declaration of warwhich was made by Great Britain against that power towards the closeof the present year. 

The long friendship which had existed between the two nations wasvisibly weakened from the commencement of the American war. Hollandwas peculiarly desirous of participating in that commerce which theindependence of the United States would open to the world: and, fromthe commencement of hostilities, her merchants, especially those ofAmsterdam, watched the progress of the war with anxiety, and engagedin speculations which were profitable to themselves and beneficial tothe United States. The remonstrances made by the British minister atthe Hague against this conduct, were answered in the most amicablemanner by the government, but the practice of individuals continuedthe same. 

When the war broke out between France and England, a number of Dutchvessels trading with France, laden with materials for shipbuilding, were seized, and carried into the ports of Great Britain, although theexisting treaties between the two nations were understood to excludethose articles from the list of contraband of war. The British cabinetjustified these acts of violence, and persisted in refusing to permitnaval stores to be carried to her enemy in neutral bottoms. Thisrefusal, however, was accompanied with friendly professions, with anoffer to pay for the vessels and cargoes already seized, and withproposals to form new stipulations for the future regulation of thatcommerce. 

The States General refused to enter into any negotiations for themodification of subsisting treaties; and the merchants of all thegreat trading towns, especially those of Amsterdam, expressed theutmost indignation at the injuries they had sustained. In consequenceof this conduct, the British government required those succours whichwere stipulated in ancient treaties, and insisted that the _casusfoederis_ had now occurred. Advantage was taken of the refusal ofthe States General to comply with this demand, to declare the treatiesbetween the two nations at an end. 

The temper produced by this state of things, inclined Holland to enterinto the treaty for an armed neutrality; and, in November, the Dutchgovernment acceded to it. Some unknown causes prevented the actualsignature of the treaty on the part of the States General, until acircumstance occurred which was used for the purpose of placing themin a situation not to avail themselves of the aid stipulated by thatconfederacy to its members. 

While Mr. Lee, one of the ministers of the United States, was on amission to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, he fell in company with aMr. John de Neufwille, a merchant of Amsterdam, with whom he heldseveral conversations on the subject of a commercial intercoursebetween the two nations, the result of which was, that the plan of aneventual commercial treaty was sketched out, as one which mightthereafter be concluded between them. This paper had received theapprobation of the Pensionary Van Berkel, and of the city ofAmsterdam, but not of the States General. 

Mr. Henry Laurens, late president of congress, was deputed to theStates General with this plan of a treaty, for the double purpose ofendeavouring to complete it, and of negotiating a loan for the use ofhis government. On the voyage he was captured by a British frigate;and his papers, which he had thrown overboard, were rescued from thewaves by a British sailor. Among them was found the plan of a treatywhich has been mentioned, and which was immediately transmitted to SirJoseph Yorke, the British minister at the Hague, to be laid before thegovernment. 

The explanations of this transaction not being deemed satisfactory bythe court of London, Sir Joseph Yorke received orders to withdraw fromthe Hague, soon after which war was proclaimed against Holland. 

This bold measure, which added one of the first maritime powers inEurope to the formidable list of enemies with whom Britain was alreadyencompassed, was perhaps, not less prudent than courageous. 

There are situations, to which only high minded nations are equal, inwhich a daring policy will conduct those who adopt it, safely throughthe very dangers it appears to invite; dangers which a systemsuggested by a timid caution might multiply instead of avoiding. Thepresent was, probably, one of those situations. Holland was about tobecome a member of the armed neutrality, after which her immensenavigation would be employed, unmolested, in transporting the propertyof the enemies of Britain, and in supplying them with all thematerials for shipbuilding, or the whole confederacy must beencountered. 

America, however, received with delight the intelligence that Hollandalso was engaged in the war; and founded additional hopes of itsspeedy termination on that event. 

CHAPTER IX. 

 Transactions in South Carolina and Georgia.... Defeat of Ferguson.... Lord Cornwallis enters North Carolina.... Retreats out of that state.... Major Wemyss defeated by Sumpter.... Tarlton repulsed.... Greene appointed to the command of the Southern army.... Arrives in camp.... Detaches Morgan over the Catawba.... Battle of the Cowpens.... Lord Cornwallis drives Greene through North Carolina into Virginia.... He retires to Hillsborough.... Greene recrosses the Dan.... Loyalists under Colonel Pyle cut to pieces.... Battle of Guilford.... Lord Cornwallis retires to Ramsay's mills.... To Wilmington.... Greene advances to Ramsay's mills.... Determines to enter South Carolina.... Lord Cornwallis resolves to march to Virginia. 

[Sidenote: 1780. ]

[Sidenote: Transactions in South Carolina and Georgia. ]

In the South, Lord Cornwallis, after having nearly demolished theAmerican army at Camden, found himself under the necessity ofsuspending, for a few weeks, the new career of conquest on which hehad intended to enter. His army was enfeebled by sickness as well asby action; the weather was intensely hot, and the stores necessary foran expedition into North Carolina had not been brought fromCharleston. In addition, a temper so hostile to the British interestshad lately appeared in South Carolina as to make it unsafe to withdrawany considerable part of his force from that state, until he shouldsubdue the spirit of insurrection against his authority. Exertionswere made in other parts of the state, not inferior to those ofSumpter in the north-west. Colonel Marion, who had been compelled bythe wounds he received in Charleston to retire into the country, hadbeen promoted by Governor Rutledge to the rank of a brigadier general. As the army of Gates approached South Carolina, he had entered thenorth-eastern parts of that state with only sixteen men; hadpenetrated into the country as far as the Santee; and was successfullyrousing the well-affected inhabitants to arms, when the defeat of the16th of August chilled the growing spirit of resistance which he hadcontributed to increase. 

With the force he had collected, he rescued about one hundred andfifty continental troops who had been captured at Camden, and were ontheir way to Charleston. Though compelled, for a short time, to leavethe state, he soon returned to it, and at the head of a few spiritedmen, made repeated excursions from the swamps and marshes in which heconcealed himself, and skirmished successfully with the militia whohad joined the British standard, and the small parties of regulars bywhom they were occasionally supported. 

His talents as a partisan, added to his knowledge of the country, enabled him to elude every attempt to seize him; and such was hishumanity as well as respect for the laws, that no violence or outragewas ever attributed to the party under his command. 

The interval between the victory of the 16th of August, and theexpedition into North Carolina, was employed in quelling what wastermed the spirit of revolt in South Carolina. The efforts of thepeople to recover their independence were considered as new acts ofrebellion, and were met with a degree of severity which policy wassupposed to dictate, but which gave a keener edge to the resentmentswhich civil discord never fails to engender. Several of the mostactive militia men who had taken protections as British subjects, andentered into the British militia, having been afterwards found inarms, and made prisoners at Camden, were executed as traitors. Orderswere given to officers commanding at different posts to proceed in thesame manner against persons of a similar description; and these orderswere, in many instances, carried into execution. A proclamation wasissued for sequestering the estates of all those inhabitants of theprovince, not included in the capitulation of Charleston, who were inthe service, or acting under the authority of Congress, and of allthose who, by an open avowal of what were termed rebelliousprinciples, or by other notorious acts should manifest a wicked anddesperate perseverance in opposing the re-establishment of royalauthority. [50]

[Footnote 50: Rem. ]

While taking these measures to break the spirit of independence, LordCornwallis was indefatigable in urging his preparations for theexpedition into North Carolina. 

The day after the battle near Camden, emissaries had been despatchedinto that state for the purpose of inviting the friends of the Britishgovernment to take up arms. Meanwhile the utmost exertions werecontinued to embody the people of the country as a British militia;and Major Ferguson was employed in the district of Ninety Six, totrain the most loyal inhabitants, and to attach them to his owncorps. [51] After being employed for some time in Ninety Six, he wasdirected to enter the western parts of North Carolina, for the purposeof embodying the royalists in that quarter. 

[Footnote 51: Sted. ]

The route marked out for the main army was from Camden, through thesettlement of the Waxhaws to Charlottestown, in North Carolina. On the8th of September Lord Cornwallis moved from Camden, and reachedCharlotte late in that month, where he expected to be joined byFerguson. But in attempting to meet him, Ferguson was arrested by anevent as important as it was unexpected. 

[Sidenote: September. ]

Colonel Clarke, a refugee from Georgia, had formed a plan for thereduction of Augusta, which was defended only by a few provincials, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Brown. About the time LordCornwallis commenced his march from Camden, Clarke advanced againstAugusta, at the head of a body of irregulars whom he had collected inthe frontiers of North and South Carolina, and invested that place. Brown made a vigorous defence; and the approach of Lieutenant ColonelCruger with a reinforcement from Ninety Six, compelled Clarke torelinquish the enterprise, and to save himself by a rapid retreat. Intelligence of the transactions at Augusta was given to Ferguson, who, to favour the design of intercepting Clarke, moved nearer themountains, and remained longer in that country than had been intended. This delay proved fatal to him. It gave an opportunity to severalvolunteer corps to unite, and to constitute a formidable force. Thehardy mountaineers inhabiting the extreme western parts of Virginiaand North Carolina, assembled on horseback with their rifles, underColonels Campbell, M'Dowell, Cleveland, Shelby, and Sevier, and movedwith their accustomed velocity towards Ferguson. On receiving noticeof their approach, that officer commenced his march for Charlotte, despatching, at the same time, different messengers to Lord Cornwalliswith information of his danger. These messengers being intercepted, nomovement was made to favour his retreat. 

When within about sixteen miles of Gilbert-town, where Ferguson wasthen supposed to lie, Colonel M'Dowell deputed to Gates with arequest that he would appoint a general officer to command them; and, in the mean time, Colonel Campbell of Virginia was chosen for thatpurpose. On reaching Gilbert-town, and finding that the British hadcommenced their retreat, it was determined to follow them with theutmost celerity. At the Cowpens, this party was joined by ColonelsWilliams, Tracy, and Branan, of South Carolina, with about fourhundred men, who also gave information respecting the distance andsituation of their enemy. About nine hundred choice men were selected, by whom the pursuit was continued through the night, and through aheavy rain; and, the next day, about three in the afternoon, they camewithin view of Ferguson, who, finding that he must be overtaken, haddetermined to await the attack on King's mountain, and was encamped onits summit, --a ridge five or six hundred yards long, and sixty orseventy wide. 

[Sidenote: October 7. ]

The Americans, who had arranged themselves into three columns, theright commanded by Colonel Sevier and Major Winston, the centre byColonels Campbell and Shelby, and the left by Colonels Cleveland andWilliams, immediately rushed to the assault. The attack was commencedby the centre, while the two wings gained the flanks of the Britishline; and, in about five minutes, the action became general. Fergusonmade several impetuous charges with the bayonet, which, againstriflemen, were necessarily successful. But, before any one of themcould completely disperse the corps against which it was directed, theheavy and destructive fire of the others, who pressed him on allsides, called off his attention to other quarters, and the brokencorps was rallied, and brought back to the attack. 

[Sidenote: Defeat of Ferguson. ]

In the course of these successive repulses, the right and centre hadbecome intermingled, and were both, by one furious charge of thebayonet, driven almost to the foot of the mountain. With somedifficulty they were rallied and again brought into the action; uponwhich the British, in turn, gave way, and were driven along the summitof the ridge, on Cleveland and Williams, who still maintained theirground on the left. In this critical state of the action, Fergusonreceived a mortal wound, and instantly expired. The courage of hisparty fell with him, and quarter was immediately demanded. [52] Theaction continued rather more than an hour. 

[Footnote 52: The details of this battle are chiefly taken from apaper signed by Colonels Campbell, Shelby, and Cleveland, andpublished in the Virginia Gazette of the 18th of November, 1780. ]

In this sharp action one hundred and fifty of Ferguson's party werekilled on the spot, and about the same number were wounded. Eighthundred and ten, of whom one hundred were British troops, were madeprisoners, and fifteen hundred stand of excellent arms were taken. 

The Americans fought under cover of trees, and their loss wasinconsiderable; but among the slain was Colonel Williams, who wasgreatly and justly lamented. As cruelty generally begets cruelty, theexample set by the British at Camden was followed, and ten of the mostactive of the royalists were selected from the prisoners, and hungupon the spot. The victorious mountaineers, having accomplished theobject for which they assembled, returned to their homes. 

[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis retreats out of North Carolina. ]

The destruction of this party arrested the progress of Lord Cornwallisin North Carolina, and inspired serious fears for the posts in hisrear. He retreated to Wynnsborough, between Camden and Ninety Six, where he waited for reinforcements from New York. 

The victory obtained on the 16th of August having suggested views ofmore extensive conquest in the south, Sir Henry Clinton had determinedto send a large reinforcement to the southern army. In the opinionthat Lord Cornwallis could meet with no effectual resistance in theCarolinas, he had ordered the officer commanding this reinforcement toenter the Chesapeake in the first instance, and to take possession ofthe lower parts of Virginia, after which he was to obey the orders heshould receive from Lord Cornwallis, to whom a copy of hisinstructions had been forwarded. 

The detachment amounted to near three thousand men, under the commandof General Leslie. It sailed on the 6th of October, and, enteringJames River after a short passage, took possession of the country onthe south side as high as Suffolk. After a short time, Leslie drew inhis out-posts, and began to fortify Portsmouth. At this place hereceived orders from Lord Cornwallis to repair to Charleston by water. 

While Cornwallis waited at Wynnsborough for this reinforcement, thelight corps of his army were employed in suppressing the parties whichwere rising in various quarters of the country, in opposition to hisauthority. Marion had become so formidable as to endanger thecommunication between Camden and Charleston. Tarlton was detachedagainst him, and Marion was under the necessity of concealing himselfin the swamps. From the unavailing pursuit of him through marsheswhich were scarcely penetrable, Tarlton was called to a differentquarter, where an enemy supposed to be entirely vanquished, hadreappeared in considerable force. 

[Sidenote: Major Wemyss attacks and is defeated by Sumpter. ]

Sumpter had again assembled a respectable body of mounted militia, atthe head of which he advanced towards the posts occupied by theBritish. On receiving intelligence of his approach, Earl Cornwallisformed a plan for surprising him in his camp on Broad River, theexecution of which was committed to Major Wemyss. That officer marchedfrom Wynnsborough at the head of a regiment of infantry and aboutforty dragoons, reached the camp of Sumpter several hours before day, and immediately charged the out piquet, which made but a slightresistance. Only five shots are said to have been fired, but fromthese Wemyss received two dangerous wounds which disabled him from theperformance of his duty. The assailants fell into confusion, and wererepulsed with the loss of their commanding officer and about twentymen. After this action, Sumpter crossed Broad River, and, havingformed a junction with Clarke and Branan, threatened Ninety Six. 

Alarmed for the safety of that post, Earl Cornwallis recalled Tarlton, and ordered him to proceed against Sumpter. So rapid was his movementthat he had nearly gained the rear of his enemy before notice of hisreturn was received. In the night preceding the day on which heexpected to effect his purpose, a deserter apprised Sumpter of theapproaching danger, and that officer began his retreat. Tarlton, pursuing with his usual rapidity, overtook the rear guard at the fordof the Ennoree, and cut it to pieces; after which, fearing thatSumpter would save himself by passing the Tyger, he pressed forward, with, as he states, about two hundred and eighty cavalry and mountedinfantry, and, in the afternoon, came within view of the Americans, who were arranged in order for battle. 

Sumpter had reached the banks of the Tyger, when the firing of hisvidettes announced the approach of his enemy. He immediately postedhis troops to great advantage on a steep eminence, having their rearand part of their right flank secured by the river, and their leftcovered by a barn of logs, into which a considerable number of his menwere thrown. 

Tarlton, without waiting for his infantry, or for a field piece leftwith them in his rear, rushed to the charge with his usualimpetuosity. After several ineffectual attempts to dislodge theAmericans, he retired from the field with great precipitation anddisorder, leaving ninety-two dead, and one hundred wounded. 

After remaining in possession of the ground for a few hours, Sumpter, who was severely wounded in the action, crossed the Tyger, after whichhis troops dispersed. His loss was only three killed, and fourwounded. 

Availing himself of the subsequent retreat and dispersion of theAmerican militia, Tarlton denominated this severe check a victory;while congress, in a public resolution, voted their thanks to GeneralSumpter and the militia he commanded, for this and other serviceswhich had been previously rendered. 

The shattered remains of the army defeated near Camden, had beenslowly collected at Hillsborough, and great exertions were made toreorganize and reinforce it. The whole number of continental troops inthe southern army amounted to about fourteen hundred men. 

On receiving intelligence that Lord Cornwallis had occupied Charlotte, Gates detached Smallwood to the Yadkin, with directions to posthimself at the ford of that river, and to take command of all thetroops in that quarter of the country. The more effectually to harassthe enemy, a light corps was selected from the army and placed underthe command of Morgan, now a brigadier general. 

As Lord Cornwallis retreated, Gates advanced to Charlotte, Smallwoodencamped lower down the Catawba on the road to Camden; and Morgan waspushed forward some distance in his front. In the expectation thatfarther active operations would be postponed until the spring, Gatesintended to pass the winter in this position. Such was the arrangementof the troops when their general was removed. 

[Sidenote: November 5. ]

On the 5th of November, without any previous indications ofdissatisfaction, congress passed a resolution requiring theCommander-in-chief to order a court of inquiry on the conduct ofGeneral Gates as commander of the southern army, and to appoint someother officer to that command, until the inquiry should be made. 

[Sidenote: Greene appointed to the command of the southern army. ]

Washington, without hesitation, selected Greene for that important anddifficult service. In a letter to congress recommending him to theirsupport, he mentioned General Greene as "an officer in whoseabilities, fortitude, and integrity, from a long and intimateexperience of them, he had the most entire confidence. " To Mr. Matthews, a delegate from South Carolina, he said, "You have your wishin the officer appointed to the southern command. I think I am givingyou a general; but what can a general do without men, without arms, without clothing, without stores, without provisions?" About the sametime the legion of Lee was ordered into South Carolina. 

[Sidenote: Arrives in camp. ]

Greene hastened to the army he was to command; and, on the second ofDecember, reached Charlotte, then its head quarters. Soon after hisarrival in camp, he was gratified with the intelligence of a smallpiece of good fortune obtained by the address of Lieutenant ColonelWashington. 

Smallwood, having received information that a body of royal militiahad entered the country in which he foraged, for the purpose ofintercepting his wagons, detached Morgan and Washington against them. Intelligence of Morgan's approach being received, the party retreated;but Colonel Washington, being able to move with more celerity than theinfantry, resolved to make an attempt on another party, which wasstationed at Rugely's farm, within thirteen miles of Camden. He foundthem posted in a logged barn, strongly secured by abattis, andinaccessible to cavalry. Force being of no avail, he resorted to thefollowing stratagem. Having painted the trunk of a pine, and mountedit on a carriage so as to resemble a field piece, he paraded it infront of the enemy, and demanded a surrender. The whole party, consisting of one hundred and twelve men, with Colonel Rugely at theirhead, alarmed at the prospect of a cannonade, surrendered themselvesprisoners of war. [53]

[Footnote 53: The author received this account both from GeneralMorgan and Colonel Washington. ]

[Sidenote: Detaches Morgan over the Catawba. ]

To narrow the limits of the British army, and to encourage theinhabitants, Greene detached Morgan west of the Catawba, with ordersto take a position near the confluence of the Pacolet with the BroadRiver. His party consisted of rather more than three hundred chosencontinental troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard, ofMaryland, of Washington's regiment of light dragoons, amounting toabout eighty men, and of two companies of militia from the northernand western parts of Virginia commanded by Captains Triplet and Taite, which were composed almost entirely of old continental soldiers. Hewas also to be joined on Broad River by seven or eight hundredvolunteers and militia commanded by General Davidson, and by ColonelsClarke and Few. 

After making this detachment, Greene, for the purpose of entering amore plentiful country, advanced lower down the Pedee, and encamped onits east side, opposite the Cheraw hills. Lord Cornwallis remained atWynnsborough, preparing to commence active operations, so soon as heshould be joined by Leslie. 

The position he occupied on the Pedee was about seventy miles fromWynnsborough, and towards the north of east from that place. Thedetachment commanded by Morgan had taken post at Grindal's ford on thePacolet, one of the south forks of Broad River, not quite fifty milesnorth-west of Wynnsborough. The active courage of his troops, and theenterprising temper of their commander, rendered him extremelyformidable to the parties of royal militia who were embodying in thatquarter of the country. 

Supposing Morgan to have designs on Ninety Six, Lord Cornwallisdetached Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton with his legion, part of tworegiments of infantry, and a corps of artillery with two field pieces, consisting altogether of about one thousand men, across the BroadRiver, to cover that important post. As he lay between Greene andMorgan, he was desirous of preventing their junction, and of strikingat one of them while unsupported by the other. To leave it uncertainagainst which division his first effort would be directed, he orderedLeslie to halt at Camden until the preparations for entering NorthCarolina should be completed. Having determined to penetrate into thatstate by the upper route, he put his army in motion and directed hiscourse northwestward, between the Catawba and Broad Rivers. Leslie wasdirected to move up the banks of the former, and to join him on themarch; and Tarlton was ordered to strike at Morgan. Should thatofficer escape Tarlton, the hope was entertained that he might beintercepted by the main army. [54]

[Footnote 54: Letter of Lord Cornwallis. --_Stedman. _]

High waters delayed Cornwallis and Leslie longer than had beenexpected; but Tarlton overcame the same obstacles, and reached Morganbefore a correspondent progress was made by the other divisions. [55]

[Footnote 55: Letter of Lord Cornwallis. --_Stedman. _]

[Sidenote: 1781 January 14. ]

[Sidenote: Sixteenth. ]

The combined movements of the British army were communicated toGeneral Morgan on the 14th of January. Perceiving the insecurity ofhis own position, he retired across the Pacolet, the fords over whichhe was desirous of defending. But a passage of that river beingeffected at a ford about six miles below him, he made a precipitateretreat; and, on the evening of the same day, his pursuers occupiedthe camp he had abandoned. Morgan retired to the Cowpens, where hedetermined to risk a battle. It was believed that he might havecrossed the Broad River, or have reached a mountainous country whichwas also near him, before he could have been overtaken; and thesuperiority of his adversary was so decided as to induce his bestofficers to think that every effort ought to be made to avoid anengagement. But Morgan had great and just confidence in himself and inhis troops; he was unwilling to fly from an enemy not so decidedlyhis superior as to render it madness to fight him; and he also thoughtthat, if he should be overtaken while his men were fatigued andretreating, the probability of success would be much less than if heshould exhibit the appearance of fighting from choice. 

These considerations determined him to halt earlier than wasabsolutely necessary. [56]

[Footnote 56: These reasons for his conduct were given to the authorby General Morgan soon after his return from the southern campaign. ]

[Sidenote: Battle of the Cowpens. ]

Tarlton, having left his baggage under a strong guard, with orders notto move until break of day, recommenced the pursuit at three in themorning. 

Before day, Morgan was informed of his approach, and prepared toreceive him. 

Although censured by many for having determined to fight, and by somefor the ground he chose, all admit the judgment with which hisdisposition was made. 

On an eminence, in an open wood, he drew up his continental troops, and Triplet's corps, deemed equal to continentals, amounting tobetween four and five hundred men, who were commanded by LieutenantColonel Howard. In their rear, on the descent of the hill, LieutenantColonel Washington was posted with his cavalry, and a small body ofmounted Georgia militia commanded by Major M'Call, as a corps dereserve. On these two corps rested his hopes of victory, and with themhe remained in person. The front line was composed entirely ofmilitia, under the command of Colonel Pickens. Major M'Dowell, with abattalion of North Carolina volunteers, and Major Cunningham, with abattalion of Georgia volunteers, were advanced about one hundred andfifty yards in front of this line, with orders to give a single fireas the enemy approached, and then to fall back into the intervals, which were left for them in the centre of the first line. The militia, not being expected to maintain their ground long, were ordered to keepup a retreating fire by regiments, until they should pass thecontinental troops, on whose right they were directed again to form. His whole force, as stated by himself, amounted to only eight hundredmen. 

Soon after this disposition was made, the British van appeared insight. Confident of a cheap victory, Tarlton formed his line ofbattle, and his troops rushed forward with great impetuosity, shoutingas they advanced. 

After a single well directed fire, M'Dowell and Cunningham fell backon Colonel Pickens, who, after a short but warm conflict, retreatedinto the rear of the second line. [57] The British pressed forward withgreat eagerness; and, though received by the continental troops with afirmness unimpaired by the rout of the front line, continued toadvance. Soon after the action with the continental troops hadcommenced, Tarlton ordered up his reserve. Perceiving that the enemyextended beyond him both on the right and left, and that, on the rightespecially, his flank was on the point of being turned, Howard orderedthe company on his right to change its front, so as to face theBritish on that flank. From some mistake in the officer commandingthis company, it fell back, instead of fronting the enemy, upon whichthe rest of the line, supposing a change of ground for the whole tohave been directed, began to retire in perfect order. At this momentGeneral Morgan rode up, and directed the infantry to retreat over thesummit of the hill, about one hundred yards to the cavalry. Thisjudicious but hazardous movement was made in good order, andextricated the flanks from immediate danger. Believing the fate of theday to be decided, the British pressed on with increased ardour, andin some disorder; and when the Americans halted, were within thirtyyards of them. The orders then given by Howard to face the enemy wereexecuted as soon as they were received; and the whole line poured in afire as deadly as it was unexpected. Some confusion appearing in theranks of the enemy, Howard seized the critical moment, and ordered acharge with the bayonet. These orders were instantly obeyed, and theBritish line was broken. 

[Footnote 57: Some of them formed afterwards, and renewed the actionon Howard's right. ]

At the same moment the detachment of cavalry on the British right wasrouted by Washington. The militia of Pickens, who rode to the ground, had tied their horses in the rear of Howard's left. When the frontline was broken, many of them fled to their horses, and were closelypursued by the cavalry, who, while the continental infantry wereretiring, passed their flank, and were cutting down the scatteredmilitia in their rear. Washington, who had previously ordered his mennot to fire a pistol, now directed them to charge the British cavalrywith drawn swords. A sharp conflict ensued, but it was not of longduration. The British were driven from the ground with considerableslaughter, and were closely pursued. Both Howard and Washingtonpressed the advantage they had respectively gained, until theartillery, and great part of the infantry had surrendered. So suddenwas the defeat, that a considerable part of the British cavalry hadnot been brought into action; and, though retreating, remainedunbroken. Washington, followed by Howard with the infantry, pursuedthem rapidly, and attacked[58] them with great spirit; but, as theywere superior to him in numbers, his cavalry received a temporarycheck; and in this part of the action he sustained a greater loss thanin any other. But the infantry coming up to support him, Tarltonresumed the retreat. [59]

[Footnote 58: In the eagerness of pursuit, Washington advanced nearthirty yards in front of his regiment. Three British officers, observing this, wheeled about, and made a charge upon him. The officeron his right aimed a blow to cut him down as an American sergeant cameup, who intercepted the blow by disabling his sword arm. The officeron his left was about to make a stroke at him at the same instant, when a waiter, too small to wield a sword, saved him by wounding theofficer with a ball from a pistol. At this moment, the officer in thecentre, who was believed to be Tarlton, made a thrust at him which heparried; upon which the officer retreated a few paces, and thendischarged a pistol at him, which wounded his horse. ]

[Footnote 59: The author has received statements of this action fromGeneral Morgan and from Colonels Howard and Washington. ]

In this engagement upwards of one hundred British, including tencommissioned officers, were killed; twenty-nine commissioned officers, and five hundred privates were made prisoners. Eight hundred muskets, two field pieces, two standards, thirty-five baggage wagons, and onehundred dragoon horses, fell into the hands of the conquerors. 

Tarlton retreated towards the headquarters of Lord Cornwallis, thenabout twenty-five miles from the Cowpens. 

This complete victory cost the Americans less than eighty men inkilled and wounded. 

Seldom has a battle in which greater numbers were not engaged, been soimportant in its consequences as that of the Cowpens. Lord Cornwalliswas not only deprived of a fifth of his numbers, but lost a mostpowerful and active part of his army. Unfortunately, Greene was not ina condition to press the advantage. The whole southern army did notmuch exceed two thousand men, a great part of whom were militia. 

[Sidenote: Pursuit of the American army through North Carolina intoVirginia. ]

The camp of Lord Cornwallis at Turkey Creek on the east side of BroadRiver, was as near as the Cowpens to the fords at which Morgan was tocross the Catawba. Of consequence, that officer had much cause to fearthat, encumbered as he was with prisoners and military stores, hemight be intercepted before he could pass that river. Comprehendingthe full extent of his danger, he abandoned the baggage he had taken, and leaving his wounded under the protection of a flag, detached themilitia as an escort to his prisoners, and brought up the rear inperson with his regulars. Passing Broad River on the evening of theday on which the battle was fought, he hastened to the Catawba, whichhe crossed on the 23d, at Sherald's ford, and encamped on its easternbank. 

[Sidenote: January. ]

Lord Cornwallis employed the 18th in forming a junction with Leslie. Early next morning he put his army in motion, and, on the 25th, reached Ramsay's mills, where the roads taken by the two armies unite. At this place, to accelerate his future movements, he destroyed hisbaggage; and, after collecting a small supply of provisions, resumedthe pursuit. He reached Sherald's ford in the afternoon of the 29th;and, in the night, an immense flood of rain rendered the riverimpassable. 

[Sidenote: January 31. ]

While Morgan remained on the Catawba, watching the motions of theBritish army, and endeavouring to collect the militia, General Greenearrived, and took command of the detachment. 

In his camp on the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw hills, Greene had beenjoined by Lee's legion, amounting to about one hundred cavalry, andone hundred and twenty infantry. The day after his arrival, he wasordered to join Marion for the purpose of attempting to carry aBritish post at Georgetown, distant about seventy-five miles from theAmerican army. The fort was surprised, but the success was onlypartial. 

On receiving intelligence of the victory at the Cowpens, Greenedetached Stevens' brigade of Virginia militia, whose terms of servicewere on the point of expiring, to conduct the prisoners toCharlottesville in Virginia, and turned his whole attention to theeffecting of a junction between the two divisions of his army. It wasprincipally with a view to this object that he hastened to thedetachment under Morgan, leaving the other division to be commanded byGeneral Huger. 

[Sidenote: February 1. ]

Early in the morning of the first of February, Lord Cornwallis forceda passage over the Catawba, at a private ford which was defended byGeneral Davidson, with about three hundred North Carolina militia. Davidson was killed, and his troops dispersed. They were followed byTarlton, who, hearing in the pursuit, that several bodies of militiawere assembling at a tavern about ten miles from the ford, hastened tothe place of rendezvous, and charging them with his usual impetuosity, broke their centre, killed some, and dispersed the whole party. 

It was found impracticable to bring the militia into the field, andHuger, who had been directed to march to Salisbury, was ordered toeffect a junction between the two divisions of the army at some placefarther north. 

Greene retreated along the Salisbury road, and, in the evening of thethird, crossed the Yadkin at the trading ford. His passage of theriver, then already much swollen by the rain of the preceding day, wasfacilitated by boats which had been previously collected. The rearguard, which, being impeded by the baggage of the whigs who fled fromSalisbury did not cross till midnight, was overtaken by the van of theBritish army, and a skirmish ensued in which some loss was sustained, but the Americans effected the passage of the river. 

[Sidenote: February 3. ]

[Sidenote: Ninth. ]

The rains having rendered the Yadkin unfordable, and the boats beingcollected on the opposite side, the pursuit was necessarily suspended;but Greene continued his march to Guilford court house where he wasjoined by Huger. 

After some delay, and apparent hesitation respecting his movements, Lord Cornwallis marched up the Yadkin, which he crossed near itssource on the morning of the eighth. 

After the junction between the divisions of Huger and Morgan, theinfantry of the American army, including six hundred militia, amountedto about two thousand effectives; and the cavalry to between two andthree hundred. Lord Cornwallis lay twenty-five miles above them atSalem, with an army estimated from twenty-five hundred to threethousand men, including three hundred cavalry. Having failed in hisattempt to prevent the junction of the two divisions of the Americanarmy, his object was to place himself between Greene and Virginia, andforce that officer to a general action before he could be joined bythe reinforcements which were known to be preparing for him in thatstate. His situation favoured the accomplishment of this object. 

Greene, on the other hand, was indefatigable in his exertions to crossthe Dan without exposing himself to the hazard of a battle. To effectthis object, the whole of his cavalry, with the flower of hisinfantry, amounting together to rather more than seven hundred men, were formed into a light corps, for the purpose of harassing andimpeding the advance of the enemy, until the less active part of hisforce, with the baggage and military stores should be secured. Morganbeing rendered incapable of duty by severe indisposition, the commandof this corps was conferred on Colonels Otho and Williams. 

Lord Cornwallis had been informed that it would be impossible toobtain boats at the ferries on the Dan in sufficient numbers for thetransportation of the American troops before he could overtake them. And, as the river could not be forded below, he calculated withconfidence on succeeding in his object by keeping above Greene, andprevent his reaching those shallow fords by which alone it was thoughtpossible to escape into Virginia. 

Dix's ferry is about fifty miles from Guilford court house, and wasalmost equidistant from the two armies. Considerably below, and morethan seventy miles from Guilford court house, were two other ferries, Boyd's and Irwin's, which were only four miles apart. By directingtheir march towards the lower and more remote ferries, the distancefrom Lord Cornwallis was so much ground gained; and by despatching anofficer with a few men to Dix's, the boats at that, and at anintermediate ferry, might be brought down the river in time to meetthe army at the intended crossing place. These facts being suggestedby Lieutenant Colonel Carrington, quartermaster general for thesouthern department, the proposition was instantly adopted, and anofficer despatched to bring the boats from above down to Boyd'sferry. [60]

[Footnote 60: The author received this fact from Colonel Carrington. ]

The next day both armies resumed their line of march. While GeneralGreene pressed forward to Boyd's, Williams gained an intermediate roadleading to Dix's ferry, and thus placed himself between the twoarmies, a small distance in front of the one, and considerably in rearof the other. Such was the boldness and activity of this corps thatLord Cornwallis found it necessary to temper the eagerness of hispursuit with caution. Yet he moved with great rapidity;--marchingnearly thirty miles each day. On the morning of the third day, heattempted to surprise the Americans by marching from the rear of hiscolumn into the road which had been taken by them, while his vanproceeded slowly on its original route. Information of this movementwas received, and Lieutenant Colonel Lee charged his advanced cavalrywith such impetuosity, as to cut a company nearly to pieces. A captainand several privates were made prisoners. The whole British armyturned into this road and followed in the rear of Williams, who usedevery effort to delay their march. 

[Sidenote: February 14. ]

The measures adopted by Greene for collecting the boats weresuccessful; and, on the fourteenth, he effected the passage of histroops and stores. 

When Williams supposed that the American army had reached the Dan, heleft the road leading to Dix's ferry, and entering that which Greenehad taken, urged his march to the lower ferries with the utmostcelerity. Lord Cornwallis, being at length informed that Greene hadtaken the lower road, turned into it about the same time by a nearerway, and his front was in sight of the rear of Williams. So rapid werethe movements of both armies that, in the last twenty-four hours, theAmericans marched forty miles; and the rear had scarcely touched thenorthern bank, when the van of the enemy appeared on the oppositeshore. 

That General Greene was able to effect this retreat without loss, evidences the judgment with which he improved every favourablecircumstance. 

The exertions, the fatigues, the sufferings, and the patience of botharmies, during this long, toilsome, and rapid pursuit, were extreme. Without tents, without spirits, often without provisions, and alwaysscantily supplied with them; through deep and frozen roads, highwaters, and frequent rains; each performed, without a murmur, thesevere duties assigned to it. The difference between them consistsonly in this, --the British troops were well clothed; the Americanswere almost naked, and many of them barefooted. 

Great praise was bestowed by the general on his whole army; but theexertions of Colonel Williams, and of Lieutenant Colonel Carringtonwere particularly noticed. 

Although that part of North Carolina through which the armies hadpassed, was well affected to the American cause, such was the rapiditywith which they moved, and such the terror inspired by the presence ofthe enemy, that no aid was drawn from the militia. Indeed, those whohad joined the army from the more remote parts of the country couldnot be retained; and, when it reached the Dan, the militia attached toit did not exceed eighty men. 

[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis retires to Hillsborough. ]

Having driven Greene out of North Carolina, Lord Cornwallis turned hisattention to the re-establishment of regal authority in that state. For this purpose, he proceeded by easy marches to Hillsborough, atthat time its capital, where he erected the royal standard, and issueda proclamation inviting the inhabitants to repair to it, and to assisthim in restoring the ancient government. 

As soon as it was known that General Greene had entered Virginia, hewas reinforced by six hundred militia drawn from the neighbouringcounties, the command of which was given to General Stevens. 

Apprehension that Lord Cornwallis, if left in the undisturbedpossession of North Carolina, would succeed, to the extent of hishopes, in recruiting his army and procuring the submission of thepeople, General Greene determined, on receiving this smallreinforcement, to re-enter that state; and, avoiding a generalengagement, to keep the field against a superior enemy, who haddemonstrated his capacity for rapid movement and hardy enterprise. 

[Sidenote: February. ]

[Sidenote: Greene recrosses the Dan. ]

On the 18th, while Lord Cornwallis remained on the opposite shore, thelegion of Lee had passed the Dan. On the 21st, the light infantry alsorecrossed it; and, on the 23d, they were followed by the main body ofthe army. 

The light infantry hung round the quarters of the enemy, while themain body advanced slowly, keeping in view the roads to the westernparts of the country, from which a considerable reinforcement ofmilitia was expected. [61]

[Footnote 61: The western militia had been engaged in a war with theCherokee Indians, who, neglected by the United States, and incited bythe British, had determined once more to take up the hatchet. Themilitia from the western parts of Virginia and North Carolina enteredtheir country, burnt their towns, containing near one thousand houses, destroyed fifty thousand bushels of grain, killed twenty-nine men, took several prisoners, and compelled the nation to sue for peace. ]

General Greene was not mistaken in the consequences of leaving LordCornwallis in the peaceable possession of North Carolina. He wasinformed that seven independent companies were raised in one day. Alarge body of royalists had begun to embody themselves on the branchesof the Haw River; and Colonel Tarlton, with the cavalry of his legionand some infantry, was detached from Hillsborough to favour theirrising, and to conduct them to the British army. 

Intelligence of the movements of the loyalists and of Tarlton beingreceived, Greene ordered Lieutenant Colonel Lee with the cavalry ofhis legion, and General Pickens with between three and four hundredmilitia, who had just formed a junction near Hillsborough, to moveagainst both parties. 

[Sidenote: Party of loyalists commanded by Colonel Pyle, cut topieces. ]

In a long lane, Lee, whose cavalry was in front of the wholedetachment, came up with the royalists. He was mistaken by them forTarlton, whom they had not yet seen, to whose encampment they wereproceeding, and whose corps was then taking refreshment, not much morethan a mile distant from them. Perceiving their mistake, Lee receivedtheir expressions of joy and attachment, and had just reached theircolonel, to whom he was about to make communications which might haveenabled him to proceed on his design of surprising Tarlton, when theinfantry who followed close in his rear, were recognized by theinsurgents; and a firing took place between them. It being apparentthat this circumstance must give the alarm to the British, Lee changedhis plan, and turning on the royalists, who still supposed him to be aBritish officer, cut them to pieces while they were makingprotestations of loyalty, and asserting that they were "the very bestfriends of the king. " More than one hundred, among whom was ColonelPyle, their leader, fell under the swords of his cavalry. Thisterrible but unavoidable carnage broke, in a great measure, thespirits of the tories in that part of the country. Some who were ontheir march to join the British standard, returned, determined toawait the issue of events before they went too far to recede. 

The hope of surprising Tarlton being thus disappointed, Pickens andLee determined to postpone the attack till the morning; and took aposition for the night between him and a corps of militia which wasadvancing from the western counties of Virginia under Colonel Preston. Tarlton had meditated an attempt on this corps; but at midnight, whenhis troops were paraded to march on this design, he received anexpress from Lord Cornwallis, directing his immediate return to thearmy. In obedience to this order, he began his retreat long beforeday, and crossed the Haw, just as the Americans, who followed him, appeared on the opposite bank. Two pieces of artillery commanded theford and stopped the pursuit. 

To approach more nearly the great body of the loyalists, who weresettled between Haw and Deep Rivers, and to take a position in acountry less exhausted than that around Hillsborough, Lord Cornwalliscrossed the Haw, and encamped on Allimance creek. 

As the British army retired, General Greene advanced. Not being yet ina condition to hazard an engagement, he changed his ground everynight. In the course of the critical movements, which were made inorder to avoid an action, and at the same time to overawe theloyalists, and maintain a position favourable to a junction with theseveral detachments who were marching from different quarters to hisassistance, he derived immense service from a bold and active lightinfantry, and from a cavalry which, though inferior in numbers, wasrendered superior in effect to that of his enemy, by being much bettermounted. They often attacked boldly and successfully, and made suddenincursions into the country, which so intimidated the royalists, thatLord Cornwallis found it difficult to obtain intelligence. By thesemeans, all his attempts to bring the American general to action werefrustrated; and his lordship was under the necessity of keeping hismen close in their quarters. 

During this hazardous trial of skill, Lord Cornwallis moved out infull force towards Rudy fork, where the light infantry lay, in thehope of surprising that corps under cover of a thick fog; and probablywith ulterior views against General Greene. His approach wasperceived, and a sharp skirmish ensued between a part of the lightinfantry, and a much superior body of British troops commanded byLieutenant Colonel Webster, in which the loss was supposed to benearly equal. The advance of the British army obliged Williams toretire; and General Greene, by recrossing the Haw and uniting with thelight infantry on its north-eastern bank at the Rocky ford, disappointed any farther designs which might have been formed againstthe army then under his command, or against the reinforcements whichwere approaching. Being thus foiled, Lord Cornwallis withdrew to DeepRiver, and General Greene fell back to the iron works on Troublesomecreek. 

At length his reinforcements, though much inferior to the number hehad been taught to expect, were received, and Greene, in his turn, sought a battle. With this view, he dissolved the corps of lightinfantry, advanced towards his enemy, and encamped within eight milesof him, at Guilford court house. 

His army, including officers, amounted to about four thousand fivehundred men, of whom not quite two thousand were continental troopsand the residue consisted of Virginia and North Carolina militia. Those of Virginia were commanded by Generals Stevens and Lawson, andby Colonels Preston, Campbell, and Lynch; and those of North Carolina, by Generals Butler and Eaton. 

Of the four regiments which composed the continental infantry, onlyone, the first of Maryland, was veteran. The other three consisted ofnew levies, with a few old continental soldiers interspersed amongthem. The legion of Lee, and the cavalry of Washington, like the firstregiment of Maryland, added every advantage of experience to approvedcourage; and nearly all the officers commanding the new levies wereveteran. 

[Sidenote: March 15. ]

[Sidenote: Battle of Guilford. ]

Having determined to risk an action, Greene chose his ground withjudgment. Early in the morning of the 15th, the fire of hisreconnoitring parties announced the approach of the enemy on the greatSalisbury road, and his army was immediately arranged in order ofbattle. It was drawn up in three lines, on a large hill, surrounded byother hills, chiefly covered with trees and underwood. 

The front line was composed of the two brigades of North Carolinamilitia, who were posted to great advantage on the edge of the wood, behind a strong rail fence, with an extensive open field in front. 

The two brigades of Virginia militia formed the second line. They weredrawn up entirely in the wood, about three hundred yards in rear ofthe first, and on either side of the great Salisbury road. 

The third line was placed about three hundred yards in rear of thesecond, and was composed of continental troops. The Virginia brigade, commanded by General Huger, was on the right; that of Maryland, commanded by Colonel Williams, was on the left. They were drawn upobliquely, with their left diverging from the second line, and partlyin open ground. 

The first and third regiments of dragoons, amounting to one hundredand two troopers, Kirkwood's company of light infantry, and aregiment of militia riflemen under Colonel Lynch, formed a corps ofobservation for the security of the right flank, which was commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Washington. The legion, consisting of onehundred and sixty-eight horse and foot, and a body of riflemencommanded by Colonels Campbell and Preston, formed a corps ofobservation for the security of the left flank, which was placed underLieutenant Colonel Lee. The artillery was in the front line, in thegreat road leading through the centre, with directions to fall back asthe occasion should require. 

Though Lord Cornwallis was sensible that the numbers of the Americanarmy were greatly augmented by troops whose continuance in servicewould be of short duration, he deemed it so important to the interestsof his sovereign to maintain the appearance of superiority in thefield, that he was unwilling to decline the engagement now offeredhim. 

[Sidenote: March 14. ]

[Sidenote: Fifteenth. ]

On the advance of Greene, therefore, he prepared for action; and earlyin the morning moved from his ground, determined to attack the adversearmy wherever it should be found. About four miles from Guilford courthouse, the advance, led by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton, fell in withLee, and a sharp skirmish ensued, which was terminated by theappearance of such large bodies of British troops, as rendered itprudent for Lee to retire. His lordship continued to advance until hecame within view of the American army. His disposition for the attackwas then made in the following order. 

The seventy-first British regiment, with the German regiment of Bose, led by General Leslie, and supported by the first battalion of theguards under Colonel Norton, formed the right, and the twenty-thirdand thirty-third regiments, led by Lieutenant Colonel Webster, andsupported by Brigadier General O'Hara with the grenadiers and secondbattalion of the guards, formed the left. The light infantry of theguards and the Yagers, posted in the wood on the left of theartillery, and the cavalry in column behind it in the road, formed acorps of observation. [62]

[Footnote 62: Letter of Lord Cornwallis. --_Stedman. _]

This disposition being made, the British troops advanced to thecharge, with the cool intrepidity which discipline inspires. 

The North Carolina militia were not encouraged by the great advantagesof their position to await the shock. They broke instantly; and, throwing away their arms and flying through the woods, sought theirrespective homes. 

The British then advanced on the second line, which received them withmore firmness; and maintained their ground for some time with greatresolution. Lord Cornwallis perceiving the corps on his flanks, brought the whole of his reserved infantry into the line. On theright, General Leslie brought up the guards to oppose Lee; and, on theleft, Webster changed his front to the left, and attacked Washington, while the grenadiers and second battalion of guards moved forward tooccupy the place which he had just quitted. [63]

[Footnote 63: Letter of Lord Cornwallis. --_Stedman. _]

The ground being unfavourable to the action of horse, Washington hadposted Lynch's riflemen, with whom he remained in person, on a heightcovered with thick woods; and had drawn up his cavalry and continentalinfantry about one hundred yards in their rear. On being attacked byWebster, the riflemen broke; and Washington, finding it impossible torally them, rejoined his cavalry. 

The British continuing to advance, and it being well understood thatthe militia could not stand the bayonet, General Stevens, who hadreceived a ball in his right thigh, ordered his brigade to retreat. Lawson's brigade having given way a short time before, the second linewas entirely routed; and the enemy advanced boldly on the third. 

The several divisions of the British army had been separated from eachother by extending themselves to the right and left in order toencounter the distinct corps which threatened their flanks; and byadvancing in regiments at different times, as the different parts ofthe second line had given way. The thickness of the wood increasedthe difficulty of restoring order. They pressed forward with greateagerness, but with a considerable degree of irregularity. 

Greene, in this state of the action, entertained the most sanguinehopes of a complete victory. His continental troops were fresh, inperfect order, and upon the point of engaging an enemy, broken intodistinct parts, and probably supposing the severity of the action tobe over. This fair prospect was blasted by the misconduct of a singlecorps. The second regiment of Maryland was posted at some distancefrom the first, in open ground; its left forming almost a right anglewith the line, so as to present a front to any corps which mightattack on that flank. The British in advancing, inclined to the right;and the second battalion of guards entered the open ground immediatelyafter the retreat of Stevens, and rushed on the second regiment ofMaryland while the first was engaged with Webster. Without waiting toreceive the charge, that regiment broke in confusion. By pursuingthem, the guards were thrown into the rear of the first regiment, fromwhich they were concealed by the unevenness of the ground, and by askirt of wood. 

Greene was himself on the left, and witnessed the misfortune withoutbeing able to remedy it. His militia being entirely routed, the flightof one-fourth of his continental troops would most probably decidethe fate of the day. Unwilling to risk his remaining three regiments, only one of which could be safely relied on, without a man to covertheir retreat should the event prove unfortunate, he ordered ColonelGreene of Virginia to withdraw his regiment from the line, and to takea position in the rear, for the purpose of affording a rallying point, and of covering the retreat of the two regiments which still continuedin the field. 

The guards were soon called from the pursuit of the second Marylandregiment, and led by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart against the first. About this time Webster, finding himself overpowered by the firstMaryland regiment, then commanded by Colonel Gunby, and by Kirkwood'scompany and the remaining regiment of Virginia, with whom he wasengaged at the same time, had in a great measure withdrawn from theaction, and retired across a ravine into an adjoining wood. Thiscritical respite enabled Gunby to provide for the danger in his rear. Facing about, he met the guards, and a very animated fire took placeon both sides, during which the Americans continued to advance. 

In this critical moment, Lieutenant Colonel Washington, who was drawnto this part of the field by the vivacity of the fire, made a furiouscharge upon the guards and broke their ranks. At this juncture, Gunby's horse was killed under him, and the command devolved onLieutenant Colonel Howard. The regiment advanced with such rapiditythat Gunby could not overtake it, and was within thirty yards of theguards when they were charged by the cavalry. Almost at the sameinstant the Maryland infantry rushed upon them with the bayonet, andfollowing the horse through them, were masters of the whole battalion. In passing through it, Captain Smith of the infantry killed itscommanding officer. 

After passing through the guards into the open ground where the secondregiment had been originally posted, Howard perceived several Britishcolumns, with some pieces of artillery. Believing his regiment to bethe sole infantry remaining in the field, he retreated in good order, and brought off some prisoners. The cavalry also retreated. [64]

[Footnote 64: After passing through the guards into the clearedground, Washington, who always led the van, perceived an officersurrounded by several persons who appeared to be aids-de-camp. Believing this to be Lord Cornwallis, he rushed forward in the hope ofmaking him a prisoner, but was arrested by an accident. His cap fellfrom his head, and, as he leaped to the ground to recover it, theofficer leading the column was shot through the body, and renderedincapable of managing his horse. The animal wheeled round with hisrider, and galloped off the field. He was followed by all the cavalry, who supposed that this movement had been directed. ]

About the same time the remaining Virginia regiment commanded byColonel Hawes, and Kirkwood's infantry, who were still engaged withWebster, were directed by General Greene to retreat. The artillery wasunavoidably abandoned; the horses which drew the pieces being killed, and the woods too thick to admit of their being dragged elsewherethan along the great road. The retreat was made in good order, andGreene, in person, brought up the rear. 

Though the action was over on the right and centre, Campbell'sriflemen still maintained their ground on the extreme of the Americanleft, against General Leslie with the regiment of Bose and the firstbattalion of guards. 

After the guards had routed the brigade commanded by Lawson, they wereattacked on their right flank by the infantry of Lee's legion and byCampbell's riflemen, and were driven behind the regiment of Bose, which having moved with less impetuosity, was advancing in compactorder. 

This regiment sustained the American fire until Lieutenant ColonelNorton was able to rally the guards and to bring them back to thecharge; after which the action was maintained with great obstinacy onboth sides until the battle was decided on the right. LieutenantColonel Tarlton was then ordered to the support of Leslie. The legioninfantry had retreated, and only a few resolute marksmen remained inthe rear of Campbell who continued firing from tree to tree. Beingunable to resist a charge of cavalry, they were quickly driven fromthe field. 

Two regiments of infantry and a detachment of cavalry pursued theright wing and centre of the Americans for a short distance, but weresoon ordered to return. On examining his situation, Lord Cornwallisfound himself too much weakened, and his troops too much fatigued bythe action, to hazard its renewal, or to continue the pursuit. GeneralGreene halted about three miles from the field of battle, behind Rudyfork creek, for the purpose of collecting his stragglers; after whichhe retired about twelve miles, to the iron works on Troublesome creek, the place appointed for the rendezvous of his army in the event of itsbeing defeated. 

The returns made immediately after the action, exhibited a loss inkilled, wounded and missing in the continental troops, of fourteencommissioned officers, and three hundred and twelve non-commissionedofficers and privates. Major Anderson, a valuable officer of Maryland, was killed; and General Huger, who commanded the continental troops ofVirginia, was wounded. 

The same return states the loss of the militia at four captains andseventeen privates killed; and, in addition to General Stevens, onemajor, three captains, eight subalterns, and sixty privates, werewounded. A great proportion of this part of the army was missing; butit seems to have been expected that they would either rejoin theircorps, or be found at their homes. 

The victory at Guilford was dearly purchased. Official accounts statethe loss of the British army at five hundred and thirty-two men, amongwhom were several officers of high rank and distinguished merit. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart of the guards was killed, and LieutenantColonel Webster, who was ranked by his enemies among the best officersin the British service, was mortally wounded. This loss, when comparedwith the numbers brought by Lord Cornwallis into the field, was veryconsiderable. The Americans did not compute his troops at more thantwo thousand rank and file, but his own accounts state them at onlyfourteen hundred and forty-five. 

No battle in the course of the war reflects more honour on the courageof the British troops, than that of Guilford. On no other occasionhave they fought with such inferiority of numbers, or disadvantage ofground. Estimating his first line at nothing, General Greene's armyconsisted of three thousand two hundred men, posted on ground chosenby himself; and his disposition was skilfully made. 

The American general, expecting to be again attacked, prepared foranother engagement. But the situation of Lord Cornwallis had becometoo desperate to hazard a second battle, or to maintain his position. He found himself under the necessity of retreating to a place ofgreater security, where provisions might be obtained. 

When the expedition into North Carolina was originally meditated, Major Craig, at the head of a small military and naval force, tookpossession of Wilmington, a town near the mouth of Cape Fear, andextended his authority several miles up the river. Lord Cornwallis nowlooked to a communication with this post for aids which had becomeindispensable to the farther operations of the campaign. 

On the third day after the battle, he broke up his encampment, andproceeded by slow and easy marches towards Cross creek. 

[Sidenote: Greene advances to Ramsay's mills with a determination toenter South Carolina. ]

General Greene, on hearing that the British army was retreating, resolved to follow it. The difficulty of subsisting the troops in anexhausted and hostile country; and the necessity of waiting for asupply of ammunition, impeded the march of his army so much that hedid not reach Ramsay's mills until the 28th of March. 

[Sidenote: April 7. ]

At this place Lord Cornwallis had halted, and here General Greeneexpected to overtake and attack him. But, on the approach of theAmerican army, his lordship resumed his march to Cross creek, andafterwards to Wilmington, where he arrived on the 7th of April. 

General Greene gave over the pursuit at Ramsay's mills. So excessivehad been the sufferings of his army from the want of provisions, thatmany of the men fainted on the march, and it had become absolutelynecessary to allow them some repose and refreshment. The expiration ofthe time for which the Virginia militia had been called into service, furnished an additional motive for suspending the pursuit. 

At this place, the bold and happy resolution was taken to carry thewar into South Carolina. 

The motives which induced the adoption of this measure were stated byhimself in a letter communicating his determination to theCommander-in-chief. It would compel Lord Cornwallis to follow him, andthus liberate North Carolina, or to sacrifice all his posts in theupper parts of South Carolina and Georgia. 

The Southern army amounted to about seventeen hundred effectives. Thatof Lord Cornwallis is understood to have been still less numerous. Soimpotent were the means employed for the conquest and defence ofstates which were of immense extent and value. 

This unexpected movement gave a new aspect to affairs, and producedsome irresolution in the British general respecting his futureoperations. After weighing the probable advantages and disadvantagesof following Greene into South Carolina, he decided against thisretrograde movement and determined to advance into Virginia. 

CHAPTER X. 

 Virginia invaded by Arnold.... He destroys the stores at Westham and at Richmond.... Retires to Portsmouth.... Mutiny in the Pennsylvania line.... Sir H. Clinton attempts to negotiate with the mutineers.... They compromise with the civil government.... Mutiny in the Jersey line.... Mission of Colonel Laurens to France.... Propositions to Spain.... Recommendations relative to a duty on imported and prize goods.... Reform in the Executive departments.... Confederation adopted.... Military transactions.... Lafayette detached to Virginia.... Cornwallis arrives.... Presses Lafayette.... Expedition to Charlottesville, to the Point of Fork.... Lafayette forms a junction with Wayne.... Cornwallis retires to the lower country.... General Washington's letters are intercepted.... Action near Jamestown. 

[Sidenote: 1781]

[Sidenote: Virginia invaded by Arnold. ]

The evacuation of Portsmouth by Leslie afforded Virginia but ashort interval of repose. So early as the 9th of December, 1780, aletter from General Washington announced to the governor that a largeembarkation, supposed to be destined for the south, was about takingplace at New York. On the 30th, a fleet of transports under convoy, having on board between one and two thousand men, commanded by GeneralArnold, anchored in Hampton road. The troops were embarked the nextday on board vessels adapted to the navigation, and proceeded upJames' River under convoy of two small ships of war. On the fourth ofJanuary they reached Westover, which is distant about twenty-fivemiles from Richmond, the capital of Virginia. 

[Sidenote: January 2. ]

On receiving intelligence that a fleet had entered the capes, GeneralNelson was employed in raising the militia of the lower country; andon the 2d of January orders were issued to call out those above themetropolis and in its neighbourhood. 

On reaching Westover, Arnold landed with the greater part of his army, and commenced his march towards Richmond. The few continental troopsat Petersburg were ordered to the capital; and between one and twohundred militia, who had been collected from the town and itsimmediate vicinity, were directed to harass the advancing enemy. 

This party was too feeble for its object; and, the day after landingat Westover, Arnold entered Richmond, where he halted with about fivehundred men. The residue, amounting to about four hundred, includingthirty horse, proceeded under Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe to Westham, where they burnt a valuable foundry, boring mill, powder magazine, andother smaller buildings, with military stores to a considerableamount, and many valuable papers belonging to the government, whichhad been carried thither as to a place of safety. 

[Sidenote: He destroys valuable stores at Richmond. ]

This service being effected, Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe rejoined Arnoldat Richmond; where the public stores, and a large quantity of rum andsalt, the property of private individuals, were entirely destroyed. 

[Sidenote: January. ]

Leaving Richmond the next day, the army returned to Westover[65] onthe seventh; and, re-embarking on the morning of the tenth, proceededdown the river. It was followed by the Baron Steuben, who commanded inVirginia; and, near Hoods, Colonel Clarke drew a party of them into anambuscade, and gave them one fire with some effect; but, on its beingpartially returned, the Americans broke and fled in the utmostconfusion. [66]

[Footnote 65: While the army lay at Westover, Lieutenant ColonelSimcoe, at the head of less than fifty horse, attacked and dispersed abody of militia at Charles City court house, with the loss of only oneman killed, and three wounded. ]

[Footnote 66: The author witnessed this skirmish. ]

Arnold proceeded slowly down the river; and on the twentieth reachedPortsmouth, where he manifested the intention of establishing apermanent post. 

The loss of the British in this expedition, was stated in the gazetteof New York, at seven killed, including one subaltern, andtwenty-three wounded, among whom was one captain. This small loss wassustained almost entirely in the ambuscade near Hoods. 

In the north, the year commenced with an event, which, for a time, threatened the American cause with total ruin. 

The accumulated sufferings and privations of the army constitute alarge and interesting part of the history of that war which gaveindependence to the United States. Winter, without much lesseningtheir toils, added to those sufferings. The soldiers were perpetuallyon the point of starving, were often entirely without food; wereexposed without proper clothing to the rigours of the season, and hadnow served almost twelve months without pay. 

This state of things had been of such long continuance that scarcelythe hope of a change could be indulged. It produced, unavoidably, somerelaxation of discipline; and the murmurs, occasionally escaping theofficers, sometimes heard by the soldiers, were not without theirinfluence. 

In addition to the general causes of dissatisfaction, the Pennsylvanialine complained of a grievance almost peculiar to itself. 

When congress directed enlistments to be made for three years, orduring the war, the recruiting officers of Pennsylvania, in someinstances, instead of engaging their men, definitively, for the oneperiod or the other, engaged them generally for three years, or thewar. This ambiguity in the terms of enlistment produced its naturaleffect. The soldier claimed his discharge at the expiration of threeyears, and the officer insisted on retaining him in service during thewar. The soldier submitted with the more reluctance to the supposedimposition, as he constantly witnessed the immense bounties given tothose who were not bound by a former enlistment. 

[Sidenote: Mutiny in the Pennsylvania line. ]

The discontents which these various causes had been long fomenting, broke out on the night of the 1st of January, in an open and almostuniversal revolt of the line. 

On a signal given, the great body of the non-commissioned officers andprivates paraded under arms, avowing the determination to march to theseat of congress, and either obtain redress of their complicatedgrievances, or serve no longer. In the attempt to suppress the mutiny, six or seven of the mutineers were wounded on the one side; and on theother, Captain Billing was killed, and several other officers weredangerously wounded. The authority of General Wayne availed nothing. On cocking his pistol, and threatening some of the most turbulent, thebayonet was presented to his bosom; and he perceived that strongmeasures would produce his own destruction, and perhaps the massacreof every officer in camp. A few regiments who did not at first jointhe mutineers, were paraded by their officers; but, had they even beenwilling to proceed to extremities, they were not strong enough torestore order. Infected quickly with the general contagion, orintimidated by the threats of the mutineers, they joined theircomrades; and the whole body, consisting of about thirteen hundredmen, with six field pieces, marched, under the command of theirsergeants, towards Princeton. 

The next day. General Wayne, accompanied by Colonels Butler andStewart, officers possessing, in a high degree, the affections of thesoldiery, followed them, in the hope of bringing them back to theirduty, or at least of dividing them. They were overtaken nearMiddlebrook, and invited by a written message from General Wayne, toappoint one man from each regiment to state the grievances of whichthey complained. 

In consequence of this invitation, a sergeant from each regiment metthe officers at their quarters, and some verbal communications weremade, from the complexion of which sanguine hopes were entertainedthat the affair might be terminated without farther hazard, or muchinjury to the service. 

On the following day, the line of march was resumed, and the soldiersproceeded to Princeton. The propositions of the general and fieldofficers were reported to them, and a committee of sergeants, to whomthey were referred, stated their claims. These were, 1st. A discharge for all those who had served three years under theiroriginal engagements, whatever those engagements might have been, andwho had not taken the increased bounty, and re-enlisted for the war. 

2nd. An immediate payment of all their arrears of pay and clothing, aswell to those who should be discharged, as to those who shouldcontinue in service. 

3rd. The residue of their bounty, and future real pay to those whoshould continue in the army. 

General Wayne being unwilling to discharge all those who had notre-enlisted for the war, the subject was referred to the civil power. 

On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, congress appointed acommittee to confer with the executive of Pennsylvania respecting it. The result of this conference was that both the committee, and thegovernor with some members of the executive council, left Philadelphiafor the purpose of endeavouring to accommodate this dangerouscommotion. 

At his head quarters, at New Windsor, on the North River, GeneralWashington received intelligence of this alarming mutiny. Accustomedas he had been to contemplate hazardous and difficult situations, itwas not easy, under existing circumstances, to resolve instantly onthe course it was most prudent to pursue. His first impression--torepair to the camp of the mutineers--soon gave place to opinions whichwere formed on more mature reflection. 

It was almost certain that the business was already in the hands ofthe civil government, with whose arrangements it might be improper forhim to interfere. Independent of this consideration, other motives ofirresistible influence detained him on the North River. 

The most important among those subjects of complaint which werealleged as the causes of the mutiny, were true in fact, were common tothe whole army, and were of a nature to disseminate too generallythose seeds of disquiet, which had attained their full growth andmaturity in the Pennsylvania line. Strong symptoms of discontent hadalready been manifested; and it was, therefore, impossible to say withconfidence, how far the same temper existed among the other troops; orhow far the contagion of example had or would spread. 

The danger arising from this state of things was much increased by thecircumstance that the river was perfectly open, and afforded Sir HenryClinton an easy and rapid transportation for his army to West Point, should the situation of its garrison invite an enterprise against thatpost. 

It was an additional consideration of great weight, that it might havea most pernicious influence on the discipline of the whole army, should the authority of the Commander-in-chief be disregarded. Heought not to place himself in a situation where his orders might bedisobeyed with impunity; an event much to be apprehended, should herepair to the camp of the mutineers, unattended by a military forceadequate to the occasion. 

Such a force could not be immediately commanded. His effectives in theHighlands amounted only to thirteen hundred and seventy-six men; andthat whole division of the army, dispersed at various and distantstations, excluding the sick and those on furlough, did not exceedfour thousand. Assuming therefore the fidelity of the troops, it wasimpracticable to march immediately with a force sufficient to reducethe Pennsylvania line, without leaving the Highlands undefended. Norwas it unworthy of consideration that, in the actual situation of themutineers, the probability of their being attacked by such a forcemight drive them to the enemy, or disperse them, events, either ofwhich would deprive the army of a valuable part of its strength. 

It was therefore thought adviseable to leave the negotiation with thecivil power, and to prepare for those measures which ought to beadopted in the event of its failure. The disposition of the troops onthe North River was sounded, and found to be favourable; after which, a detachment of eleven hundred men was ordered to be in readiness tomove on a moment's warning. On the first notice of the mutiny, themilitia of Jersey took the field under General Dickenson, and measureswere taken to call out those of New York should the occasion requireit. 

[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton attempts to negotiate with themutineers. ]

To avail himself of an event appearing so auspicious to the royalcause, Sir Henry Clinton ordered a large body of troops to be inreadiness to move on the shortest notice; and despatched threeemissaries with tempting offers to the revolters; and instructions toinvite them, while the negotiation should be depending, to take aposition behind the South River, where they should be effectuallycovered by detachments from New York. While these measures weretaking, Sir Henry kept his eye on West Point, and held himself inreadiness to strike at that place, should any movement on the part ofGeneral Washington open to him a prospect of success. [67]

[Footnote 67: Letter of Sir Henry Clinton. ]

His emissaries were immediately seized by the revolters, and theirproposals communicated to General Wayne, with assurances of the utterdetestation in which every idea of going over to the common enemy washeld. 

This favourable symptom, however, was accompanied by suspiciouscircumstances. They retained the British emissaries in their ownpossession; and could not be induced to cross the Delaware, or tomarch from Princeton. They would not permit any of their formerofficers, other than those already mentioned, to enter their camp; andGeneral St. Clair, the Marquis de Lafayette, and Lieutenant ColonelLaurens, were ordered to leave Princeton. 

Such was the state of things when the committee of congress, andPresident Read with a part of his executive council, arrived in theneighbourhood of the revolters. The former having delegated theirpower to the latter, a conference was held with the sergeants who nowcommanded, after which proposals were made and distributed among thetroops for consideration. 

In these proposals the government offered, 1st. To discharge all those who had enlisted indefinitely for threeyears or during the war, the fact to be examined into by threecommissioners, to be appointed by the executive; and to beascertained, when the original enlistment could not be produced, bythe oath of the soldier. 

2dly. To give immediate certificates for the depreciation on theirpay, and to settle the arrearages as soon as circumstances wouldadmit. 

3dly. To furnish them immediately with certain specified articles ofclothing which were most wanted. 

[Sidenote: They compromise with the civil authority. ]

On receiving these propositions, the troops agreed to march toTrenton. At that place the terms were accepted, with the addition thatthree commissioners should also be deputed by the line, who, conjointly with those of the executive should constitute the boardauthorized to determine on the claims of the soldiers to bedischarged; and thereupon the British emissaries were surrendered, whowere tried, condemned, and executed as spies. 

Until the investigation should be made, and discharges given to thosewho should be found entitled to them, the sergeants retained theircommand. In consequence of the irksomeness of this state of things, the business was pressed with so much precipitation, that before theenlistments themselves could be brought from the huts, almost thewhole of the artillery, and of the five first regiments of infantry, were liberated on the testimony of their own oaths. The enlistmentsbeing then produced, it was found that not many of the remainingregiments had engaged on the terms which, under the compact, wouldentitle them to leave the service; and that, of those actuallydismissed, far the greater number had been enlisted absolutely for thewar. The discharges given, however, were not cancelled; and the fewwho were to remain in service received furloughs for forty days. 

Thus ended, in a temporary dissolution of the whole line ofPennsylvania, a mutiny, which a voluntary performance of much lessthan was extorted, would have prevented; and which, in the actualcondition of the army, was of a nature and extent to inspire the mostserious alarm. 

[Sidenote: Mutiny in the Jersey line. ]

The dangerous policy of yielding even to the just demands of soldiersmade with arms in their hands, was soon illustrated. The success ofthe Pennsylvania line inspired that of Jersey, many of whom were alsoforeigners, with the hope of obtaining similar advantages. On thenight of the 20th, a part of the Jersey brigade, which had beenstationed at Pompton, rose in arms; and, making precisely the sameclaims which had been yielded to the Pennsylvanians, marched toChatham, where a part of the same brigade was cantoned, in the hope ofexciting them also to join in the revolt. 

General Washington, who had been extremely chagrined at the issue ofthe mutiny in the Pennsylvania line, and who was now assured of theconfidence to be placed in the fidelity of the eastern troops, whowere composed of natives, determined, by strong measures, to stop thefarther progress of a spirit which threatened the destruction of thearmy, and ordered a detachment to march against the mutineers, and tobring them to unconditional submission. General Howe, who commandedthis detachment, was instructed to make no terms with the insurgentswhile in a state of resistance; and, as soon as they should surrender, to seize a few of the most active leaders, and to execute them on thespot. These orders were promptly obeyed, and the Jersey mutineersreturned to their duty. 

In the hope of being more successful with the revolters of Jersey thanhe had been with those of Pennsylvania, Sir Henry Clinton offered themthe same terms which had been proposed to the mutineers at Princeton;and General Robertson, at the head of three thousand men, wasdetached to Staten Island with the avowed purpose of crossing overinto Jersey, and covering any movement which they might make towardsNew York. The emissary, being in the American interest, delivered hispapers to the officer commanding at the first station to which hecame. Other papers were dispersed among the mutineers; but the mutinywas crushed too suddenly to allow time for the operation of thesepropositions. 

The vigorous measures taken in this instance were happily followed bysuch an attention on the part of the states, to the actual situationof the army, as checked the progress of discontent. Influenced by therepresentations of the Commander-in-chief, they raised three months'pay in specie, which they forwarded to the soldiers, who received itwith joy, considering it as evidence that their fellow citizens werenot entirely unmindful of their sufferings. 

Although the army was thus reduced to such extreme distress, thediscontents of the people were daily multiplied by the contributionswhich they were required to make, and by the irritating manner inwhich those contributions were drawn from them. Every article forpublic use was obtained by impressment; and the taxes were eitherunpaid, or collected by coercive means. Strong remonstrances were madeagainst this system; and the dissatisfaction which pervaded the massof the community, was scarcely less dangerous than that which hadbeen manifested by the army. 

To the judicious patriots throughout America, the necessity of givinggreater powers to the federal government became every day moreapparent; but the efforts of enlightened individuals were too feebleto correct that fatal disposition of power which had been made byenthusiasm uninstructed by experience. 

[Sidenote: Mission of Colonel Laurens to France. ]

To relieve the United States from their complicated embarrassments, aforeign loan seemed an expedient of indispensable necessity, and fromFrance they hoped to obtain it. Congress selected Lieutenant ColonelLaurens, a gentleman whose situation in the family of theCommander-in-chief had enabled him to take a comprehensive view of themilitary capacities and weaknesses of his country, for thisinteresting service; and instructed him also to urge the advantage ofmaintaining a naval superiority in the American seas. Before hisdeparture, he passed some days at headquarters, and received fromGeneral Washington in the form of a letter, the result of hisreflections on the existing state of things. 

In this paper he detailed the pecuniary embarrassments of thegovernment, and represented, with great earnestness, the inability ofthe nation to furnish a revenue adequate to the support of the war. Hedwelt on the discontents which the system of impressment had excitedamong the people, and expressed his fears that the evils felt in theprosecution of the war, might weaken the sentiments which began it. 

From this state of things, he deduced the vital importance of animmediate and ample supply of money, which might be the foundation forsubstantial arrangements of finance, for reviving public credit, andgiving vigour to future operations; as well as of a decided effort ofthe allied arms on the continent to effect the great objects of thealliance, in the ensuing campaign. 

Next to a supply of money, he considered a naval superiority in theAmerican seas, as an object of the deepest interest. 

To the United States, it would be of decisive importance, and Francealso might derive great advantages from transferring the maritime warto the coast of her ally. 

The future ability of the United States to repay any loan which mightnow be obtained was displayed; and he concluded with assurances thatthere was still a fund of inclination and resource in the country, equal to great and continued exertions, provided the means wereafforded of stopping the progress of disgust, by changing the presentsystem, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of thenation, and more capable of infusing activity and energy into publicmeasures; of which a powerful succour in money must be the basis. "The people were discontented, but it was with the feeble andoppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself. "

With reason did the Commander-in-chief thus urge on the cabinet ofVersailles, the policy of advancing a sum of money to the UnitedStates which might be adequate to the exigency. Deep was the gloomwith which their political horizon was overcast. The British, inpossession of South Carolina and of Georgia, had overrun the greaterpart of North Carolina also; and it was with equal hazard and addressthat Greene maintained himself in the northern frontier of that state. 

A second detachment from New York was making a deep impression onVirginia, where the resistance had been neither so prompt nor sovigorous[68] as the strength of that state and the unanimity of itscitizens had given reason to expect. 

[Footnote 68: A slave population must be unfavourable to great andsudden exertions by militia. ]

The perplexities and difficulties in which the affairs of America wereinvolved, were estimated by the British government even above theirreal value. Intercepted letters of this date from the minister, expressed the most sanguine hopes that the great superiority of forceat the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, would compel Washington with hisfeeble army to take refuge on the eastern side of the Hudson. 

[Sidenote: Propositions to Spain. ]

Even congress relaxed for an instant from its habitual firmness; and, receding from the decisive manner in which that body had insisted onthe territorial and maritime rights of the nation, directed theAmerican minister at Madrid to relinquish, if it should be absolutelynecessary, the claims of the United States to navigate the Mississippibelow the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and to a free port onthe banks of that river within the Spanish territory. It is remarkablethat only Massachusetts, Connecticut, and North Carolina, dissentedfrom this resolution; New York was divided. [69] On a subsequent day, the subject was again brought forward, and a proposition was made forstill farther concessions to Spain; but this proposition was negativedby all the states. [70]

[Footnote 69: Secret journals of Congress, v. 2, pp. 393, 396, 407. This measure was moved by the delegation from Virginia, in consequenceof instructions of 2d Jan. 1781. Sec. 10, H. At large, 538. ]

[Footnote 70: Secret journals of Congress, v. 2, p. 468. ]

Happily for the United States, Mr. Jay, their minister at the court ofMadrid, required as the price of the concessions he was instructed tomake, that the treaty he was labouring to negotiate should beimmediately concluded. 

[Sidenote: Recommendations relative to a duty on imported and prizegoods. ]

The establishment of a revenue subject to the exclusive control anddirection of the continental government, was connected inseparablywith the restoration of credit. The efforts therefore to negotiate aforeign loan were accompanied by resolutions requesting therespective states to place a fund under the control of congress, whichshould be both permanent and productive. A resolution was passed, recommending to the respective states to vest a power in congress tolevy for the use of the United States a duty of five _per centum advalorem_ on all goods imported into any of them; and also on allprizes condemned in any of the American courts of admiralty. 

This fund was to be appropriated to the payment of both the principaland interest of all debts contracted in the prosecution of the war;and was to continue until those debts should be completely discharged. 

Congress, at that time, contained several members who perceived theadvantages which would result from bestowing on the government of thenation the full power of regulating commerce, and, consequently, ofincreasing the import as circumstances might render adviseable; butstate influence predominated, and they were overruled by greatmajorities. Even the inadequate plan which they did recommend wasnever adopted. Notwithstanding the greatness of the exigency, and thepressure of the national wants, never, during the existence of theconfederation, did all the states unite in assenting to thisrecommendation; so unwilling are men possessed of power, to place itin the hands of others. 

[Sidenote: Reform in the organization of the executive departments. ]

About the same time a reform was introduced into the administration, the necessity of which had been long perceived. From a misplacedprejudice against institutions sanctioned by experience, all the greatexecutive duties had been devolved either on committees of congress, or on boards consisting of several members. This unwieldy andexpensive system had maintained itself against all the efforts ofreason and public utility. But the scantiness of the national means atlength prevailed over prejudice, and the several committees and boardsyielded to a secretary for foreign affairs, a superintendent offinance, a secretary of war, and a secretary of marine. But somiserably defective was the organization of congress, as an executivebody, that the year had far advanced before this measure, the utilityof which all acknowledged, could be carried into complete operation bymaking all the appointments. 

[Sidenote: Confederation adopted. ]

About this time the articles of confederation were ratified. Muchdifficulty was encountered in obtaining the adoption of thisinstrument. The numerous objections made by the states yieldedsuccessively to the opinion that a federal compact would be of vastimportance in the prosecution of the war. One impediment it was foundpeculiarly difficult to remove. Within the chartered limits of severalstates, were immense tracts of vacant territory, which, it wassupposed, would constitute a large fund of future wealth; and thestates not possessing that advantage insisted on considering thisterritory as a joint acquisition. At length this difficulty also wassurmounted; and, in February, 1781, to the great joy of America, thisinteresting compact was rendered complete. [71] Like many other humaninstitutions, it was productive, neither in war nor in peace, of allthe benefits which its sanguine advocates had expected. Had peace beenmade before any agreement for a permanent union was formed, it is farfrom being improbable that the different parts might have fallenasunder, and a dismemberment have taken place. If the confederationreally preserved the idea of union until the good sense of the nationadopted a more efficient system, this service alone entitles thatinstrument to the respectful recollection of the American people, andits framers to their gratitude. 

[Footnote 71: The secret journals of congress, published under theresolutions of March 27th, 1818, and April 21st, 1820, contain "AHistory of the Confederation. " The course of public opinion on a mostimportant point--the nature of the connexion which ought to bemaintained between these United States--may be in some degreeperceived in the progress of this instrument, and may not be entirelyuninteresting to the American reader. 

So early as July, 1775, Doctor Franklin submitted "Articles ofConfederation and perpetual union" to the consideration of congress, which were to continue in force until a reconciliation with GreatBritain should take place on the terms demanded by the colonies. Intothis confederation, not only all the British colonies on thecontinent, but Ireland and the West India islands were to be admitted. 

Congress was to consist of members chosen by each colony in proportionto its numbers, and was to sit in each successively. Its powers wereto embrace the external relations of the country, the settling of alldisputes between the colonies, the planting of new colonies; and wereto extend to ordinances on such general subjects as, though necessaryto the general welfare, particular assemblies can not be competent to, viz. "Those that may relate to our general commerce, or generalcurrency; the establishment of ports; and the regulation of our commonforces. "

The executive was to consist of a council of twelve, selected bycongress from its own body, one-third of whom were to be changedannually. 

Amendments were to be proposed by congress; and, when approved by amajority of the colonial assemblies, were to become a part of theconstitution. 

In June, 1776, a committee was appointed to prepare and digest theform of a confederation to be entered into between the UnitedColonies, which brought in a draft (in the hand writing of Mr. JohnDickinson) on the 12th of the succeeding month. 

This report was under debate until the 14th of November, 1777, onwhich day congress agreed on the articles afterwards adopted by thestates. 

In the scheme supposed to be prepared by Mr. Dickinson, theconfederation is considered as an alliance of sovereign states, whomeet as equals by their deputies assembled to deliberate on theircommon concerns, each sovereign having a voice. This principle wasretained; but several modifications in the language and principle ofthe original scheme were made, which indicate a watchful and growingjealousy of the powers of congress. 

In each, an article is introduced reserving the rights of the states. That which is found in the report, "reserves to each state the soleand exclusive regulation and government of its internal police, in allmatters that _shall not interfere with the articles of thisconfederation_. "

This article was so modified as to declare that "each state retainsits sovereignty, " "and every power, jurisdiction and right, which isnot by this confederation _expressly_ delegated to the United Statesin congress assembled. "

This denial of all incidental powers had vast influence on the affairsof the United States. It defeated, in many instances, the grantedpowers, by rendering their exercise impracticable. 

The report permits the states to impose duties on imports and exports;provided they "do not interfere with any stipulations in treatieshereafter entered into by the United States. "

The confederation confines this restriction on the power of the stateto such duties as interfere with the stipulations in treaties enteredinto "in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by congress to thecourts of France and Spain. "

Each plan assigns to the state in which troops shall be raised for thecommon defence, the power of appointing the field and inferiorofficers. The confederation adds the power of filling up suchvacancies as may occur. 

The report inhibits a state from endeavouring by force to obtaincompensation for advances made or injuries suffered during the war, which shall not be allowed by congress. 

The confederation omits this inhibition. 

The report gives to congress the power of making treaties. 

The confederation adds a proviso, "that no treaty of commerce shall bemade whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall berestrained from imposing such imports and duties on foreigners astheir own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportationor importation of any species of goods or commodities whatever. "

The report authorizes congress to appoint "courts for the trial of allcrimes, frauds, and piracies committed on the high seas, or on anynavigable river not within a county or parish. "

The confederation limits the jurisdiction to "piracies and feloniescommitted on the high seas. "

Both empower congress to appoint courts for the trial of appeals incases of capture; but the confederation provides that no member ofcongress shall be appointed a judge of any such court. 

Both empower congress to settle differences between the states. Theconfederation prescribes minutely the manner in which this power shallbe exercised. 

Both empower congress "to regulate the trade and manage all affairswith the Indians. " The confederation provides "that the legislativeright of any state within its own limits be not infringed orviolated. "

The report gives the power of "establishing and regulating postoffices throughout all the United Colonies (states) _on the lines ofcommunication_ from one colony (state) to another. "

The confederation varies the phraseology and adds, "and exacting suchpostage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite todefray the expenses of the said office. "

The report places many important portions of the executive power in acouncil of state, to consist of one delegate from each state to benamed annually by the delegates of that state. 

The confederation empowers congress to appoint a committee to sit inthe recess of congress, to be denominated "a committee of the states, "and to consist of one delegate from each state, to exercise suchpowers as congress might from time to time vest them with. 

A few of the states agreed to ratify the confederationunconditionally. By many, amendments were proposed which were steadilyrejected by congress. It was obvious that the delays would be almostinterminable should congress relax this determination, because everychange would make it necessary again to submit the instrument asamended to the several states. It is remarkable that Jersey aloneproposed an enlargement of the powers of congress. That state wasdesirous of investing the representatives of the state with the powerof regulating commerce. 

The states possessing no vacant lands, or an inconsiderable quantitywithin their chartered limits, pressed earnestly and perseveringlytheir claim to participate in the advantages of territory, which was, they said, acquired by the united arms of the whole; and Marylandrefused, on this account, to accede to the confederation. At length, several of the states empowered their members in congress to ratifythat instrument as forming a union between the twelve states who hadassented to it. Maryland, alarmed at the prospect of being excludedfrom the union, gave her reluctant consent to the confederation, accompanied by a protest, in which she still asserted her claim to herinterest in the vacant territory which should be acknowledged at thetreaty of peace, to be within the United States. 

It required the repeated lessons of a severe and instructiveexperience to persuade the American people that their greatness, theirprosperity, their happiness, and even their safety, imperiouslydemanded the substitution of a government for their favourite league. ]

[Sidenote: Military transactions. ]

Such was the defensive strength of the positions taken by the adversearmies on the Hudson, and such their relative force, that no decisiveblow could be given by either in that quarter of the continent. Theanxious attentions of General Washington, therefore, wereunremittingly directed to the south. One of those incidents whichfortune occasionally produces, on the seizing or neglect of which thegreatest military events frequently depend, presented, sooner than wasexpected, an opportunity which he deemed capable of being improved tothe destruction of the British army in Virginia. 

The French fleet, from its arrival on the American coast, had beenblocked up in the harbour of Newport; and the land forces of thatnation had been reduced to a state of inactivity by the necessity ofdefending their ships. Late in January, a detachment from the Britishfleet was encountered on the east end of Long Island by a furiousstorm, in which such damage was sustained as to destroy for a time thenaval superiority which Arbuthnot had uniformly preserved. 

To turn this temporary superiority to advantage, Monsieur Destouchesresolved to detach a ship of the line, with two frigates, to theChesapeake; a force which the delegation from Virginia had assured himwould be sufficient for the purpose. 

On receiving certain accounts of the loss sustained in the storm, General Washington conceived the design of improving thatcircumstance by immediate and powerful operations against Arnold. Confident that the critical moment must be seized, or the enterprisewould fail, he ordered a detachment of twelve hundred men, under thecommand of the Marquis de Lafayette, to the head of the Chesapeake;there to embark for that part of Virginia which was to become thetheatre of action, under convoy of a French frigate, for which heapplied to the admiral. He immediately communicated this measure tothe Count de Rochambeau, and to Monsieur Destouches, to whom he alsostated his conviction that no serious advantage could be expected froma few ships, unaided by land troops. "There were, " he said, "a varietyof positions to be taken by Arnold, one of which was Portsmouth, hispresent station, where his ships might be so protected by hisbatteries on the shore as to defy a mere naval attack; and where hewould certainly be able to maintain himself until the losses sustainedin the late storm should be repaired, and the superiority at searecovered, when he would unquestionably be relieved. "

To insure the success of the expedition, he recommended that the wholefleet should be employed on it, and that a detachment of one thousandmen should be embarked for the same service. 

[Sidenote: February 9. ]

These representations did not prevail. The original plan had alreadybeen put in execution. On the 9th of February, a sixty-four gun shipwith two frigates, under Monsieur de Tilley, had sailed for theChesapeake; and, as some of the British ships had been repaired, theFrench admiral did not think it prudent to put to sea with the residueof his fleet. 

As had been foreseen by General Washington, de Tilley found Arnold ina situation not to be assailed with any prospect of success. Aftershowing himself therefore in the bay, and making an ineffectualattempt to enter Elizabeth River, he returned to Newport. At thecapes, he fell in with the Romulus, a fifty gun ship, coming fromCharleston to the Chesapeake, which he captured. 

Both the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier Destouches, being welldisposed to execute the plans suggested by General Washington, theydetermined, on the return of Monsieur de Tilley, to make a secondexpedition to the Chesapeake with the whole fleet, and eleven hundredmen. General Washington, therefore, hastened to Newport, that in apersonal conference with them, he might facilitate the execution of anenterprise from which he still entertained sanguine hopes. 

[Sidenote: March 6. ]

Early on the 6th of March he reached Newport, and went instantly onboard the Admiral, where he was met by the Count de Rochambeau. It wasdetermined that a detachment from the army, then in perfect readiness, should be embarked under the Count de Viominil; and that the fleetshould put to sea as soon as possible. The wind was favourable to theFrench, and adverse to the British. Yet the fleet did not sail untilthe evening of the eighth. It appears from a letter of MonsieurDestouches, that this delay was in some measure attributable to adisaster which befel one of his frigates in getting out of port; andthere is reason to suppose that it may be ascribed to a want ofsupplies. Whatever may have been the cause, Arnold is most probablyindebted to it for his escape from the fate which his treason merited. 

Two days after Destouches had sailed, he was followed by Arbuthnot, who overtook him off the capes of Virginia. A partial engagementensued which continued about an hour, when the fleets were separated. 

The French admiral called a council of war the next day, in which itwas declared unadviseable to renew the action, and he returned toNewport. 

[Sidenote: March 26. ]

The arrival of two thousand men commanded by General Philips, gave theBritish a decided superiority in Virginia, and changed the destinationof Lafayette, who had been ordered to join the southern army, but towhom the defence of that state was now committed. The troops under hiscommand being taken chiefly from the eastern regiments, had imbibedstrong prejudices against a southern climate; and desertions became sofrequent as to threaten the dissolution of the corps. 

This unpromising state of things was completely changed by a happyexpedient adopted by Lafayette. Appealing to the generous principlesof his soldiers, principles on which the feelings of his own bosomtaught him to rely, he proclaimed in orders, that he was about toenter on an enterprise of great danger and difficulty, in which hepersuaded himself his soldiers would not abandon him. If, however, anyindividual of the detachment was unwilling to accompany him, a permitto return should most assuredly be granted him. 

This measure had the desired effect, and put an end to desertion. [72]To keep up the good dispositions of the moment, this ardent youngnobleman, who was as unmindful of fortune as he was ambitious of fame, borrowed from the merchants of Baltimore, on his private credit, a sumof money sufficient to purchase shoes, linen, spirits, and otherarticles of immediate necessity for the detachment. [73]

[Footnote 72: The author was assured by General Lafayette that thiswas true. Such was the enthusiasm of the moment, that a lame sergeanthired a place in a cart to keep up with the army. ]

[Footnote 73: It is not unworthy of notice, that the ladies ofBaltimore charged themselves with the toil of immediately making upthe summer clothing for the troops. Innumerable instances of theirzeal in the common cause of their country were given in every state inthe union. ]

Having made these preparations for the campaign, he marched with theutmost celerity to the defence of Virginia. That state was in greatneed of assistance. The enemy had penetrated deep into its bosom, andwas committing those excesses on its inhabitants to which a countryunable to repel invasion must always be exposed. 

General Philips, on his arrival, took command of all the Britishtroops in Virginia; and, after completing the fortification ofPortsmouth, commenced offensive operations. 

[Sidenote: April 24. ]

About two thousand five hundred men were embarked on board some smallvessels, and landed at various places in the neighbourhood ofWilliamsburg. Different detachments spread themselves over the lowerpart of that neck of land which is made by York and James Rivers; and, after destroying, without opposition, a ship yard belonging to thestate, with some armed vessels and public stores, re-embarked andproceeded to City Point, where they landed in the afternoon of the24th. The next day they marched against Petersburg, at which place, immense quantities of tobacco and other stores were deposited. 

Baron Steuben was not in a situation to check their progress. Thelevies of Virginia had marched to the aid of General Greene; and thewhole number of militia, at that time in the field, did not muchexceed two thousand men. Unwilling to abandon so important a place asPetersburg without the semblance of fighting, the baron posted aboutone thousand men a mile below the town with orders to skirmish withthe enemy. The British troops, without being able to bring him to aclose engagement, were two or three hours employed in driving himacross the Appomattox, the bridge over which being taken up as soon asthe militia had passed it, farther pursuit became impracticable. 

This skirmish having terminated with scarcely any loss on either side, the baron retreated towards Richmond, and Philips took quietpossession of Petersburg; where he destroyed a considerable quantityof tobacco, and all the vessels lying in the river. 

This service being accomplished, Arnold was detached through Osbornesto Warwick, between which place and Richmond, a respectable navalforce, consisting of small armed vessels, had been collected with theintention of co-operating with the French fleet against Portsmouth;and a few militia were stationed on the northern bank of the river toassist in defending the flotilla. 

[Sidenote: April 30. ]

The crews of the vessels, on receiving a fire from a few field piecesordered by Arnold to the bank, scuttled them, escaped to the oppositeshore, and dispersed with the militia. Philips marched with theresidue of the army to Chesterfield court house, the place ofrendezvous for the new levies of Virginia, where he destroyed thebarracks with a few public stores; after which he joined Arnold in theneighbourhood of Warwick, and marched without interruption toManchester, a small town on the southern bank of James River, immediately opposite to Richmond; where, as was the general practice, the warehouses were set on fire, and all the tobacco consumed. 

On the preceding evening, the Marquis de Lafayette, who had made aforced march from Baltimore, arrived with his detachment at Richmond;and that place, in which a great proportion of the military stores ofthe state were then collected, was saved, for the time, from a visitwhich was certainly designed. 

The regular troops composing this detachment were joined by about twothousand militia, and sixty dragoons. Not thinking it adviseable toattempt the passage of the river in the presence of so respectable anarmy, General Philips retired to Bermuda Hundred, a point of land inthe confluence of the James and Appomatox, [Transcriber's Note: sic]at which place he re-embarked his troops, and fell down the river toHog Island. 

The Marquis fixed his head quarters on the north of Chiccahominy, about eighteen miles from Richmond; where he remained until a letterfrom Lord Cornwallis called Philips again up James River. 

When that nobleman determined on marching from Wilmington intoVirginia, he signified his wish that the British troops in that state, should take their station at Petersburg. 

On receiving this letter, Philips proceeded to comply with the requestit contained. As soon as the fleet moved up the river, Lafayettereturned to the defence of Richmond. Having, on his arrival, receivedintelligence that Lord Cornwallis was marching northward, and findingPhilips landed at Brandon on the south side of the river, he waspersuaded that a junction of the two armies must be intended, andhastened to take possession of Petersburg[74] before Philips couldreach that place. In this however he was anticipated by the Britishgeneral; upon which he recrossed James River, and, encamping a fewmiles below Richmond, used his utmost exertions to remove the militarystores in that town to a place of greater security. 

[Footnote 74: General Lafayette states that this movement alsofacilitated the transportation of some military stores to the southernarmy, which were greatly needed. ]

[Sidenote: Cornwallis arrives. ]

In this position his army was permitted to repose itself but a fewdays. Lord Cornwallis, after passing through North Carolina and thesouthern parts of Virginia without encountering much opposition, andeffecting a junction with Arnold, who had succeeded by the death ofPhilips to the command of the army in Virginia, [75] found himself atthe head of a force which nothing in that state could resist; anddetermined on a vigorous plan of offensive operations. His immediateobject was to bring the Marquis to an action; for which purpose hecrossed James River at Westover, where he was joined by areinforcement from New York, and attempted, by turning the left flankof the American army, to get into its rear. Lafayette was not in acondition to risk an engagement. His objects were the security of thepublic stores, the preservation of his small army for future services, and a junction with the Pennsylvania line which was on its marchsouthward, under the command of General Wayne. As Lord Cornwalliscrossed James River, he retired towards the upper country, inclininghis route to the north in order to favour a junction with Wayne. 

[Footnote 75: General Philips died the day on which the army enteredPetersburg. Arnold on succeeding to the command addressed a letter toLafayette, which the American general refused to receive, informingthe officer who brought it, and whom he treated in other respects withgreat politeness, that he would receive no letter from Arnold. --_Cor. Of Lafayette. _]

The fine horses found in the stables of private gentlemen, gave to theBritish general an efficient cavalry; and enabled him to mount somany infantry, as to move large detachments with unusual rapidity. With these advantages, he was so confident of overtaking anddestroying his enemy, as to say exultingly in a letter which wasintercepted, "the boy can not escape me. " His sanguine hopes, however, were disappointed. Lafayette moved with so much celerity and cautionas to convince Cornwallis of the impracticability of overtaking him, or of preventing his junction with Wayne. 

After marching some distance up the northern side of Northanora, hislordship relinquished the pursuit, and turned his attention to otherobjects which were more attainable. 

Military stores had been collected in various parts of the middlecountry, and, among others, at the Point of Fork, a point of land madeby the confluence of the Rivanna and Fluvanna, the two branches ofJames' River. Colonel Simcoe was detached with five hundred menagainst this post, which was protected by between five and six hundrednew levies, and a few militia. Tarlton, with two hundred and fiftycavalry and mounted infantry, was ordered at the same time againstCharlottesville, where the general assembly was in session. So rapidwere his movements that a mere accident prevented his entering thetown before any notice of his approach was given. A private gentleman, Mr. Jouiette, who was acquainted with a nearer route than the greatroad, hastened to Charlottesville on a fleet horse with theinteresting intelligence, and entered the town about two hours beforethe British cavalry. Nearly all[76] the members of the legislaturemade their escape, and reassembled at Staunton, on the western side ofthe Blue Ridge. Tarlton, after destroying the stores atCharlottesville, proceeded down the Rivanna to the Point of Fork. 

[Footnote 76: Seven fell into the hands of Tarlton. ]

The detachment commanded by Simcoe, being composed chiefly ofinfantry, could not move with equal celerity. That officer, however, conducted his march with so much secrecy and address, that Steubenseems to have been either unapprized of his approach, or to have hadno accurate information of his numbers. Intelligence of the expeditionto Charlottesville had reached him, and he had prudently employedhimself in removing his stores from the Point of Fork to the southside of the Fluvanna. 

The river was at the time unfordable; and the boats were all securedon the southern bank. Yet Steuben, suspecting the detachment of Simcoeto be the van of the British army, or apprehending that Tarlton mightget into his rear, withdrew precipitately in the night, and marchednear thirty miles, leaving behind him such stores as could not beremoved. These were destroyed next morning by a small detachment ofmen who crossed the river in a few canoes. 

[Sidenote: Presses Lafayette over the Rapidan. ]

To secure his junction with Wayne, and to keep open his communicationtowards the north, Lafayette had crossed the Rapidan. 

[Sidenote: Lafayette forms a junction with Wayne. ]

These movements of the two armies had thrown Lord Cornwallis betweenLafayette and the military stores which had been transported fromRichmond up James' River, and deposited at different places, butprincipally at Albemarle old court house, high up that river. To thisplace Lord Cornwallis directed his march. 

The Marquis, having effected a junction with the Pennsylvania lineconsisting of eight hundred men, recrossed the Rapidan, and advancedwith so much celerity towards the British army, that he encampedwithin a few miles of it, while upwards of a day's march from itspoint of destination. 

Confident that the object of the American general must be to protectthe magazines on the Fluvanna, Lord Cornwallis encamped at Elk Island, and advanced his light troops to a position commanding the road, bywhich it was supposed the Americans must pass. 

Lafayette, however, discovered in the night a nearer road which hadlong been disused; and the next morning the British general had themortification to perceive that the American army had crossed theRivanna, and taken a strong position behind the Mechunk creek, which, in a great measure, commanded the route leading from the camp of hislordship to Albemarle old court house. At this place a considerablereinforcement of mountain militia was received. 

[Sidenote: Cornwallis retires to the lower country. ]

Apprehending the force opposed to him to be greater than it was inreality, and probably desirous of transferring the war to the lowercountry, Lord Cornwallis abandoned the objects he had pursued, andretired first to Richmond, and afterwards to Williamsburg. 

[Sidenote: June 18. ]

The Marquis followed with cautious circumspection. On the 18th ofJune, he was reinforced by four or five hundred new levies under theBaron Steuben, which augmented his army to four thousand men, of whomtwo thousand were regulars. That of Lord Cornwallis was, probably, rather more numerous. 

As the British army retreated to Williamsburg, Lafayette, who sought apartial, though he avoided a general engagement, pressed its rear withhis light parties. Colonel Simcoe, who covered the retreat, wasovertaken by Colonel Butler about six miles from Williamsburg, and asharp action ensued. The Americans claimed the advantage; but werecompelled to retire by the approach of the whole British army. 

In the bold and rapid course taken by Lord Cornwallis through thelower and central parts of Virginia, much private as well as publicproperty[77] was destroyed; and the resources of the state wereconsiderably diminished; but no solid advantage was obtained. Although, from various causes, especially from a want of arms, andfrom that general repugnance which a harassed, unpaid militia, willuniversally manifest to military service, less resistance wasencountered than was to be expected from the strength and populationof the state; no disposition was openly manifested to join the royalstandard, or to withdraw from the contest. The Marquis complained of"much slowness, and much carelessness in the country; but thedispositions of the people, " he said, "were good, and they requiredonly to be awakened. " This, he thought, would be best effected by thepresence of General Washington, an event for which he expressed themost anxious solicitude. But Washington deemed it of more importanceto remain on the Hudson, for the purpose of digesting and conducting agrand plan of combined operations then meditated against New York, bythe execution of which he counted more certainly on relieving thesouthern states, than by any other measure it was in his power toadopt. 

[Footnote 77: While the British army overran the country, their shipssailed up the rivers, pillaged the farms, received the slaves who fledfrom their masters, and, in some instances, reduced the houses toashes. While they were in the Potowmac, a flag was sent on shore atMount Vernon, requiring a supply of fresh provisions. The steward ofGeneral Washington, believing it to be his duty to save the propertyof his principal, and entertaining fears for the magnificent buildingsof the Commander-in-chief, went on board with the flag, carried asupply of fresh provisions, asked the restoration of the slaves whohad taken refuge in the fleet, and requested that the buildings mightbe spared. Mr. Lund Washington, to whom the general had entrusted themanagement of his estate, communicated these circumstances to him, andinformed him that he too had sustained considerable losses. "I amsorry, " said the general, in reply, "to hear of your loss; I am alittle sorry to hear of my own. But that which gives me most concernis, that you should have gone on board the vessels of the enemy andfurnished them with refreshments. It would have been a less painfulcircumstance to me to have heard, that in consequence of yournon-compliance with their request, they had burnt my home and laid theplantation in ruins. You ought to have considered yourself as myrepresentative, and should have reflected on the bad example ofcommunicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer ofrefreshment to them, with a view to prevent a conflagration. "]

[Sidenote: General Washington's letters are intercepted. ]

An express carrying letters, communicating to congress the result ofhis consultations on this subject, with the commanders of the land andnaval forces of France, was intercepted in Jersey. The interestingdisclosure made by these letters, alarmed Sir Henry Clinton for thesafety of New York, and determined him to require the return of a partof the troops in Virginia. Supposing himself too weak, after complyingwith this requisition, to remain at Williamsburg, Lord Cornwallis tookthe resolution of retiring to Portsmouth. 

In pursuance of this resolution, he marched from Williamsburg andencamped in such a manner as to cover the ford into the island ofJamestown. On the same evening, the Queen's rangers crossed over intothe island; and the two succeeding days were employed in passing overthe baggage. 

The morning after the evacuation of Williamsburg, Lafayette changedhis position, and pushed his best troops within nine miles of theBritish camp, with the intention of attempting their rear, when themain body should have passed into Jamestown. 

[Sidenote: July 6. ]

Suspecting his design, Lord Cornwallis encamped the greater part ofhis army on the main land as compactly as possible, and displayed afew troops on the island in such a manner as, in appearance, tomagnify their numbers. All the intelligence received by Lafayetteconcurred in the representation that the greater part of the Britisharmy had passed over to the island in the night. Believing this to bethe fact, he detached some riflemen to harass their out-posts, whilehe advanced at the head of the continental troops in order to cut offthe rear. 

Every appearance was calculated to countenance the opinion he hadformed. The British light parties were drawn in, and the piquets wereforced by the riflemen without much resistance, but an advanced postwhich covered the encampment from the view of the Americans, wasperseveringly maintained, though three of the officers commanding itwere successively picked off by the riflemen. Lafayette, who arrived alittle before sunset, suspected from the obstinacy with which thispost was maintained, that it covered more than a rear guard, anddetermined to reconnoitre the camp, and judge of its strength from hisown observation. [78] It was in a great measure concealed by woods;but from a tongue of land stretching into the river, he perceived theBritish force to be much more considerable than had been supposed, andhastened to call off his men. 

[Footnote 78: Correspondence with Lafayette. ]

[Sidenote: Action near Jamestown. ]

He found Wayne closely engaged. A piece of artillery had been leftweakly defended, which Wayne determined to seize. Scarcely was theattempt made, when he discovered the whole British army, arranged inorder for battle, moving out against him. To retreat was impossible, and the boldest had become the safest measure. Under this impressionhe advanced rapidly, and, with his small detachment, not exceedingeight hundred men, made a gallant charge on the British line. A warmaction ensued, which was kept up with great spirit until the arrivalof Lafayette, who, perceiving Wayne to be out-flanked both on theright and left, ordered him to retreat and form in a line with thelight infantry, who were drawn up about half a mile in his rear. Thewhole party then saved itself behind a morass. 

Fortunately for Lafayette, Lord Cornwallis did not improve theadvantage he had gained. Suspecting this to be a stratagem of theAmerican general to draw him into an ambuscade, a suspicion equallyfavoured by the hardiness and time of the attack, Lord Cornwallis, whosupposed his enemy to be stronger than he was in reality, would allowno pursuit; and, in the course of the night, crossed over into theisland, whence he, soon afterwards, proceeded to Portsmouth. 

In this action, the Americans lost one hundred and eighteen men, amongwhom were ten officers; and two pieces of artillery were left on thefield, the horses attached to them being killed. The British loss wasless considerable. 

All active operations were now suspended; and the harassed army ofLafayette was allowed some repose. 

Although no brilliant service was performed by that young nobleman, the campaign in Virginia enhanced his military reputation, and raisedhim in the general esteem. That with so decided an inferiority ofeffective force, and especially of cavalry, he had been able to keepthe field in an open country, and to preserve a considerableproportion of his military stores, as well as his army, was believedto furnish unequivocal evidence of the prudence and vigour of hisconduct. 

CHAPTER XI. 

 Farther state of affairs in the beginning of the year 1781.... Measures of Mr. Morris, the superintendent of finances.... Designs of General Washington against New York.... Count Rochambeau marches to the North River.... Intelligence from the Count de Grasse.... Plan of operations against Lord Cornwallis.... Naval engagement.... The combined armies march for the Chesapeake.... Yorktown invested.... Surrender of Lord Cornwallis. 

[Sidenote: 1781]

[Sidenote: State of affairs at the beginning of the year 1781. ]

The deep gloom which had enveloped the prospects of America in thecommencement of the year, which darkened for a time in the south, hadalso spread itself over the north. The total incompetency of thepolitical system adopted by the United States to their ownpreservation, became every day more apparent. Each state seemedfearful of doing too much, and of taking upon itself a larger portionof the common burden than was borne by its neighbour. 

The resolutions of congress had called for an army of thirty-seventhousand men, to be in camp by the first of January. Had thisrequisition been made in time, it is not probable that so large aforce could have been brought into the field; but it was made late, and then the difficulties and delays on the part of the severalstates, exceeded every reasonable calculation. The regular force drawnfrom Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, at no time, during thisactive and interesting campaign, amounted to three thousand effectivemen; and the states from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, solate as the month of April, had furnished only five thousand infantry. Of these, the returns for that month exhibit, in the northerndepartment, less than three thousand effectives. The cavalry andartillery, at no time, amounted to one thousand men. This small armywas gradually and slowly augmented so as, in the month of May, toexhibit a total of near seven thousand men, of whom rather more thanfour thousand might have been relied on for action. 

The prospects for the campaign were rendered still more unpromising bythe failure of supplies for the support of the troops. The longexpected clothing from Europe had not arrived; and the want ofprovisions[79] furnished a still more serious cause of alarm. 

[Footnote 79: See note No. V. At the end of the volume. ]

After congress had come to the resolution of emitting no more bills onthe credit of the continent, the duty of supplying the army withprovisions necessarily devolved on the states, who were required tofurnish certain specified articles for the subsistence of the troops, according to a ratio established by the federal government. Theserequisitions had been neglected to such a degree as to excite fearsthat the soldiers must be disbanded from the want of food. 

To increase the general embarrassment, the quartermaster departmentwas destitute of funds, and unable to transport provisions or otherstores from place to place, but by means of impressment supported by amilitary force. This measure had been repeated, especially in NewYork, until it excited so much disgust and irritation among thepeople, that the Commander-in-chief was under serious apprehensions ofactual resistance to his authority. 

While in this state of deplorable imbecility, intelligence from everyquarter announced increasing dangers. 

Information was received that an expedition was preparing in Canadaagainst Fort Pitt, to be conducted by Sir John Johnston, and ColonelConelly; and it was understood that many, in the country threatenedwith invasion, were ready to join the British standard. The Indianstoo had entered into formidable combinations, endangering the wholeextent of the western frontier. 

In addition to these alarming circumstances, some vessels had arrivedat Crown Point from Canada, with information that three thousand menhad been assembled on the lakes, for the purpose of attempting, oncemore, an invasion from that quarter. 

This information, though unfounded, was believed to be true, and was, at that critical moment, the more alarming, because a correspondenceof a criminal nature had just been discovered between some persons inAlbany and in Canada. A letter intercepted by Generals Schuyler andClinton, stated the disaffection of particular settlements, theprovision made in those settlements for the subsistence of an invadingarmy, and their readiness to join such army. 

This intelligence from the northern frontier derived increasedinterest from the ambiguous conduct observed by the inhabitants ofthat tract of country which now constitutes the state of Vermont. Theyhad settled lands within the chartered limits of New York, undergrants from the governor of New Hampshire; and had, early in the war, declared themselves independent, and exercised the powers ofself-government. The state of New York, however, still continuing toassert her claim of sovereignty, the controversy on this delicatesubject had become so violent as to justify the apprehension that, inthe opinion of the people of Vermont, the restoration of Britishauthority was an evil not of greater magnitude, than the establishmentof that of New York. The declaration was openly made that, if notadmitted into the union as an independent state, they held themselvesat liberty to make a separate peace; and some negotiations had beencommenced, which were believed to manifest a disposition in Vermont, to abandon the common cause of America. 

Accustomed to contemplate all public events which might grow out ofthe situation of the United States, and to prepare for them while at adistance, the American chief was not depressed by this state ofAmerican affairs. With a mind happily tempered by nature, and improvedby experience, those fortunate events which had occasionallybrightened the prospects of his country, never relaxed his exertions, or lessened his precautions; nor could the most disastrous state ofthings drive him to despair. Although entirely uncertain whatoperation he might be enabled to undertake during the approachingcampaign, he had adopted such preparatory steps as might enable him toturn to advantage any fortunate incident which might occur. Inconsequence of conferences previously held with the Count deRochambeau, for the purpose of digesting a system adapted tocontingent events, orders were transmitted to that officer, directinghim to be in readiness to march as large a body of the French troopsto the North River, as could be spared from the protection of thefleet. 

Early in May, the Count de Barras, who had been appointed to thecommand of the French fleet stationed on the American coast, arrivedin Boston accompanied by the Viscount de Rochambeau, and brought thelong expected information from the cabinet of Versailles, respectingthe naval armament designed to act in the American seas. Twenty shipsof the line, to be commanded by the Count de Grasse, were destined forthe West Indies, twelve of which were to proceed to the continent ofAmerica, and might be expected to arrive in the month of July. 

[Sidenote: Designs of General Washington against New York. ]

An interview between General Washington and the Count de Rochambeauimmediately took place at Weathersfield, in which it was determined tounite the troops of France to those of America on the Hudson, and toproceed against New York. The regular army at that station wasestimated at four thousand five hundred men, [80] and though it wasunderstood that Sir Henry Clinton would be able to reinforce it withfive or six thousand militia, it was believed that the post could notbe maintained without recalling a considerable part of the troops fromthe south; in which event, the allied army might be employedadvantageously in that part of the union. 

[Footnote 80: Sir H. Clinton in a letter to Lord Cornwallis, datedJune 11, 1781, states his effective force at ten thousand nine hundredand thirty-one. ]

The prospect of expelling the British from New York roused thenorthern states from that apathy into which they appeared to besinking, and vigorous measures were taken to fill their regiments. Yetthose measures were not completely successful. In the month of June, when the army took the field, and encamped at Peekskill, itseffective numbers did not exceed five thousand men. 

Such was the American force in the north, with which the campaign of1781 was opened. It fell so far short of that on which thecalculations had been made at Weathersfield, as to excite seriousdoubts respecting the propriety of adhering to the plan thereconcerted, although some compensation was made for this deficiency onthe part of the states by the arrival of a reinforcement of fifteenhundred men to the army of Rochambeau under convoy of a fifty gunfrigate. 

To supply even this army with provisions, required much greaterexertions than had ever been made since the system of requisitions hadbeen substituted for that of purchasing. The hope of terminating thewar produced these exertions. The legislatures of the New Englandstates took up the subject in earnest, and passed resolutions forraising the necessary supplies. But until these resolutions could beexecuted, the embarrassments of the army continued; and, for some timeafter the troops had taken the field, there was reason to apprehend, either that the great objects of the campaign must be relinquished forwant of provisions, or that coercive means must still be used. 

New England not furnishing flour, this important article was to bedrawn from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The two firststates were much exhausted; and the application to Pennsylvania didnot promise to be very successful. On this subject, therefore, seriousfears existed. 

These were removed, in a great degree, by the activity and exertionsof an individual. 

[Sidenote: Superintendent of finances appointed. ]

The management of the finances had been lately committed to Mr. RobertMorris, a delegate to congress from the state of Pennsylvania. Thisgentleman united considerable political talents to a degree ofmercantile enterprise, information, and credit, seldom equalled in anycountry. He had accepted this arduous appointment on the condition ofbeing allowed the year 1781 to make his arrangements; during whichtime, the department was to be conducted by those already employed, with the resources which government could command. But the criticalstate of public affairs, and the pressing wants of the army, furnishedirresistible motives for changing his original determination, andentering immediately on the duties of his office. The occasionrequired that he should bring his private credit in aid of the publicresources, and pledge himself personally and extensively, for articlesof absolute necessity which could not be otherwise obtained. Condemning the system of violence and of legal fraud, which had toolong been practised, as being calculated to defeat its own object, hesought the gradual restoration of confidence by the only means whichcould restore it:--a punctual and faithful compliance with hisengagements. Herculean as was this task in the existing derangement ofAmerican finances, he entered upon it courageously; and, if notcompletely successful, certainly did more than could have beensupposed possible with the means placed in his hands. It is, in noinconsiderable degree, to be attributed to him, that the very activeand decisive operations of the campaign were not impeded, perhapsdefeated, by a failure of the means for transporting military stores, and feeding the army. 

On determining to enter on the duties of his office, Mr. Morris laidbefore congress the plan of a national bank, whose notes were to bereceivable from the respective states as specie, into the treasury ofthe United States. Congress gave its full approbation to thisbeneficial institution; and passed an ordinance for its incorporation. 

Important as was this measure to the future operations of the army, acontract entered into with the state of Pennsylvania was of still moreimmediate utility. 

After furnishing flour to relieve the wants of the moment on hisprivate credit, Mr. Morris proposed to take on himself the task ofcomplying with all the specific requisitions made on Pennsylvania, andto rely for reimbursement on the taxes imposed by law, to becollected under his direction. This proposition being accepted, thecontract was made; and supplies which the government found itselfunable to furnish, were raised by an individual. 

[Sidenote: Count Rochambeau marches to the North River. ]

As the French troops approached the North River, intelligence wasreceived that a large detachment from New York had made an incursioninto Jersey, under appearances indicating an intention not to returnimmediately. This being thought a favourable moment for gaining theposts on the north end of York Island, a plan was formed for seizingthem by a _coup de main_. General Washington fixed on the night of thesecond of July for making the attempt; it being supposed that theCount de Rochambeau might join the American army at Kingsbridge bythat time. An aid-de-camp was therefore despatched to meet thatofficer with letters explaining the enterprise, and requesting him tomeet the Commander-in-chief at the time and place appointed. 

With the proposed attack on these works, an attempt to cut off somelight troops stationed on the outside of Kingsbridge at Morrissania, under the command of Colonel Delaney, was to be combined. This part ofthe plan was to be executed by the Duke de Lauzun, to whose legionSheldon's dragoons, and a small body of continental troops dispersedon the lines, under the command of General Waterbury, were to beadded. 

On the part of the Americans, all that could contribute to the successof this enterprise was done. A strong detachment commanded by GeneralLincoln, which fell down the river in boats with muffled oars, reachedits ground undiscovered on the night of the first of July; and thearmy, conducted by General Washington, marched to Valentine's hill. The next day, Lincoln perceived that the detachment had returned fromJersey, that the British were encamped in great force on the north endof the island, and that a ship of war watched the landing place. Theseunexpected obstacles having defeated the design upon the works, heproceeded to execute his eventual orders of co-operation with the Dukede Lauzun. These were, after landing above Spiken Devil Creek, tomarch to the high ground in front of Kingsbridge, and there concealhis detachment, until the attack on Delaney's corps should commence. 

The Duke de Lauzun did not arrive, and the return of day betrayedLincoln. A British corps advanced upon him; on hearing which, GeneralWashington put his troops in motion, and, on his approach, the Britishtroops retired into the island. 

Both parts of the plan having thus failed, the army retreated toDobbs' ferry, where it was joined by the Count de Rochambeau on thesixth of July. 

The thanks of the Commander-in-chief were given to that officer ingeneral orders, for the unremitting zeal with which he had proceededto form his so long wished for junction with the American army; and hewas requested to convey to the officers and soldiers under hiscommand, the grateful sense which the general entertained of thecheerfulness with which they had performed so long and laborious amarch at so hot a season. 

The utmost exertions were made for the grand enterprise against NewYork. But as the execution of any plan that could be formed, dependedon events which were uncertain, the Commander-in-chief directed hisattention to other objects, to be pursued if that which was mostdesirable should prove unattainable. Should the siege of New Yorkbecome unadviseable, his views were turned to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. 

[Sidenote: Intelligence from the Count de Grasse. ]

Early in August, the apprehension that he should be unable toaccomplish his favourite object, began to influence his conduct. Letters from the Marquis de Lafayette announced that a large portionof the troops in Virginia were embarked, and that their destinationwas believed to be New York. This intelligence induced him to turn hisattention more seriously to the south; but, to conceal from Sir HenryClinton this eventual change of plan, his arrangements were madesecretly, and the preparations for acting against New York werecontinued. A reinforcement from Europe of near three thousand men, induced Sir Henry Clinton to countermand the orders he had given toLord Cornwallis to detach a part of the army in Virginia to his aid;and also to direct that nobleman to take a strong position on theChesapeake, from which he might execute the designs meditated againstthe states lying on that bay, so soon as the storm which threatenedthe British power for the moment, should blow over. In a few daysafter the arrival of this reinforcement, the Count de Barras gaveGeneral Washington the interesting information, that De Grasse was tohave sailed from Cape Francis for the Chesapeake, on the third ofAugust, with from twenty-five to twenty-nine ships of the line, havingon board three thousand two hundred soldiers; and that he had madeengagements with the officers commanding the land and naval forces ofSpain in the West Indies, to return to those seas by the middle ofOctober. 

This intelligence manifested the necessity of determining immediately, and positively, on the object against which the combined forces shouldbe directed. The shortness of the time appropriated by De Grasse forhis continuance on the American coast, the apparent unwillingness ofthe naval officers to attempt to force a passage into the harbour ofNew York, and the failure of the states to comply with therequisitions which had been made on them for men, decided in favour ofoperations to the south; and Lafayette was requested to make such adisposition of his army as should be best calculated to prevent LordCornwallis from saving himself by a sudden march to Charleston. [81]

[Footnote 81: In pursuance of these orders, Wayne was detached to thesouth side of James River, under the pretext of reinforcing Greene, but was ordered to maintain a position which would enable him tointercept and oppose the march of Lord Cornwallis, should he attemptto force his way to Charleston. Lafayette was on the alert toco-operate with Wayne in the event of such a movement. --_Cor. WithLafayette. _]

Conformably to the intelligence communicated by the Count de Barras, the Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake late in August withtwenty-eight ships of the line and several frigates. At Cape Henry hefound an officer despatched by Lafayette with full intelligence of thesituation of the armies in Virginia. Lord Cornwallis had collected hiswhole force at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, which he was fortifyingassiduously; and the Marquis had taken a position on James River. 

In consequence of this information, four ships of the line and severalfrigates were detached to block up the mouth of York River, and conveythe land forces brought from the West Indies, under the command of theMarquis de St. Simon, up the James to join Lafayette, who, onreceiving this reinforcement, took post at Williamsburg. In the meantime, the fleet lay at anchor just within the capes. On the 25th ofAugust the Count de Barras[82] sailed from Newport for the Chesapeake. 

[Footnote 82: This admiral was the senior of De Grasse, to whom thecommand of the expedition had been entrusted, and was thereforeauthorized by the minister of marine, to cruise on the coast ofNewfoundland while his ships should join the grand fleet. He preferredserving under his junior officer. --_Cor. Of Lafayette. _]

Rodney was apprized of the destination of De Grasse, but seems not tohave suspected that the whole fleet would sail for the continent ofAmerica. Supposing therefore that a part of his squadron would besufficient to maintain an equality of naval force in the Americanseas, he detached Sir Samuel Hood to the continent with only fourteensail of the line. That officer arrived at Sandy Hook on thetwenty-eighth of August. 

Admiral Greaves, who had succeeded Arbuthnot in the command of thefleet on the American station, lay in the harbour of New York withseven ships of the line, only five of which were fit for service. Onthe day that Hood appeared and gave information that De Grasse wasprobably on the coast, intelligence was also received that De Barrashad sailed from Newport. 

The ships fit for sea were ordered out of the harbour; and Greaves, with the whole fleet, consisting of nineteen sail of the line, proceeded in quest of the French. 

Not suspecting the strength of De Grasse, he hoped to fall in with oneor the other of their squadrons, and to fight it separately. 

Early in the morning of the 5th of September, while the French fleetlay at anchor just within the Chesapeake, the British squadron wasdescried. Orders were immediately given by De Grasse to form the line, and put to sea. About four in the afternoon, the action commencedbetween the headmost ships, and continued until sunset. Several shipswere much damaged, but neither admiral could claim the victory. Forfive successive days the hostile fleets continued within view of eachother. After which, De Grasse returned to his former station withinthe capes. At his anchorage ground he found De Barras with thesquadron from Newport, and fourteen transports laden with heavyartillery, and military stores proper for carrying on a siege. TheBritish admiral approaching the capes, found the entrance of theChesapeake defended by a force with which he was unable to contend, and therefore bore away for New York. 

[Sidenote: Plan of operations against Lord Cornwallis. ]

[Sidenote: The combined armies march for the Chesapeake. ]

General Washington had determined to entrust the defence of the Hudsonto General Heath, and to command the southern expedition in person. All the French, and a detachment amounting to upwards of two thousandmen from the continental army, were destined for this service. On the19th of August, Hazen's regiment and the Jersey line, were directedto pass the Hudson at Dobbs' ferry, and take a position betweenSpringfield and Chatham, where they were to cover some bake-houses tobe constructed in the neighbourhood, for the purpose of veiling thereal designs of the American chief, and of exciting fears for StatenIsland. On the same day, the whole army was put in motion; and on thetwenty-fifth the passage of the river was completed. 

[Sidenote: September 6. ]

To conceal as long as possible the real object of this movement, themarch of the army was continued until the thirty-first, in such adirection as to keep up fears for New York; and a considerable degreeof address was used to countenance the opinion that the real designwas against that place. The letters which had been intercepted by SirHenry Clinton favoured this deception; and so strong was theimpression they made that, even after it became necessary for thecombined army to leave the route leading down the Hudson, he is statedto have retained his fears for New York, and not to have suspected thereal object of his adversary until he had approached the Delaware;[83]and it had become too late to obstruct the progress of the allied armytowards Virginia. He then resolved to make every exertion in his powerto relieve Lord Cornwallis, and in the mean time to act offensivelyin the north. An expedition was planned against New London, inConnecticut, and a strong detachment, under the command of GeneralArnold, was embarked on board a fleet of transports, which landedearly in the morning of the 6th of September on both sides theharbour, about three miles from the town. 

[Footnote 83: The first indication given by Sir Henry Clinton ofsuspecting the southern expedition, is in his letter to LordCornwallis of the 2nd of September, in which he says, "By intelligenceI have this day received, it would seem that Washington is movingsouthward. "]

New London is a seaport town on the west side of the Thames. A fortcalled fort Trumbull, and a redoubt had been constructed just belowit, on the same side of the river; and opposite to it, on Groton hill, was fort Griswold, a strong square fortification, but not fullymanned. General Arnold, who commanded in person the troops that landedon the western side of the harbour, advanced immediately against theposts on that side. These being untenable, were evacuated on hisapproach; and he took possession of them with inconsiderable loss. Toprevent the escape of the vessels up the river, Lieutenant ColonelEyre, who commanded the division which landed on the Groton side ofthe harbour, had been ordered to storm fort Griswold, which had beenrepresented to Arnold as too incomplete to make any seriousresistance. But the place being of some strength, and the approach toit difficult, Colonel Ledyard, who commanded it with a garrison of onehundred and sixty men, determined to defend it. On his refusing tosurrender, the British assaulted it on three sides, and overcoming thedifficulties opposed to them, made a lodgement on the ditch andfraized work, and entered the embrasures with charged bayonets. Further resistance being hopeless, the action ceased on the part ofthe Americans, and Colonel Ledyard delivered his sword to thecommanding officer of the assailants. Irritated by the obstinacy ofthe defence, and the loss sustained in the assault, the Britishofficer on whom the command had devolved, tarnished the glory ofvictory by the inhuman use he made of it. Instead of respecting, withthe generous spirit of a soldier, the gallantry which he had subdued, he indulged the vindictive feelings which had been roused by theslaughter of his troops. In the account given of this affair byGovernor Trumbull to General Washington, he says, "The sword presentedby Colonel Ledyard was immediately plunged into his bosom, and thecarnage was kept up until the greater part of the garrison was killedor wounded. "

In this fierce assault, Colonel Eyre was killed, and Major Montgomery, the second in command, also fell, as he entered the American works. The total loss of the assailants was not much less than two hundredmen. 

The town of New London, and the stores contained in it, were consumedby fire. To escape the odium which invariably attends the wantondestruction of private property, this fire was attributed to accident;but all the American accounts unite in declaring it to have beenintentional. 

[Sidenote: September 6. ]

The march of General Washington was not arrested by this excursioninto New England. Having made the arrangements for the transportationof his army down the Chesapeake, he proceeded in person to Virginia, attended by the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Chatelleux;and, on the 14th of September, reached Williamsburg[84] accompanied byRochambeau, Chatelleux, Knox, and Du Portail, he immediately repairedto the fleet, and a plan of co-operation was adjusted on board theVille de Paris, conforming to his wish in every respect, except thatthe Count de Grasse declined complying with a proposition to stationsome of his ships in the river above Yorktown, thinking it toohazardous. 

[Footnote 84: While the American troops were encamped at Williamsburgand the French fleet lay in the bay, the Count de Grasse, circumscribed in point of time, and therefore, unwilling to await thearrival of the army from the north, urged Lafayette to attack theBritish in Yorktown; offering to aid him not only with all the marinesof the fleet, but with as many seamen as he should require. TheMarquis de St. Simon, an officer of great experience, united himselfwith the admiral in pressing this measure. He stated that, the worksof Cornwallis being incomplete, Yorktown and Gloucester might, in allprobability, be carried by storm, if attacked by superior numbers. Thetemptation was great for a young general scarcely twenty-four years ofage. A full excuse for the attempt was found in the declaration of DeGrasse, that he could not wait for the arrival of the troops from thenorth. Success would have given unrivaled brilliancy to the reputationof Lafayette, but would necessarily have cost much blood. Lafayetterefused to sacrifice the soldiers which were confided to him to hispersonal glory, and persuaded De Grasse to await the arrival ofWashington and Rochambeau, when the capture of Cornwallis would becertainly made without the waste of human life. --_Cor. WithLafayette. _]

While the close investment of the British army was delayed, only untilthe troops from the north should arrive, serious apprehensions wereexcited that the brilliant results confidently anticipated from thesuperiority of the land and naval forces of the allies, would be putin imminent hazard. 

Information was received that a reinforcement of six ships of the lineunder Admiral Digby had reached New York. Confident that the Britishfleet, thus augmented, would attempt every thing for the relief ofLord Cornwallis, De Grasse expected to be attacked by a force not muchinferior to his own. Thinking his station within the Chesapeakeunfavourable for a naval combat, he designed to change it, andcommunicated to General Washington his intention to leave a fewfrigates to block up the mouths of James and York Rivers, and to putto sea with his fleet in quest of the British. If they should not haveleft the harbour of New York, he purposed to block them up in thatplace; supposing that his operations in that quarter would be of moreservice to the common cause, than his remaining in the bay, an idlespectator of the siege of York. 

The Commander-in-chief was much alarmed at this communication. Shouldthe admiral put to sea, the winds and many accidents might preventhis return to the Chesapeake. During his absence, a temporary navalsuperiority might be acquired by the British in those waters, and thearmy of Lord Cornwallis might be placed in perfect security. Themovement would expose to the caprice of fortune, an object of vastimportance, which was now reduced almost to certainty. The admiral wastherefore entreated to preserve his station. 

Fortunately, the wishes of the general prevailed, and the admiralconsented to relinquish those plans of active enterprise which histhirst for military glory had suggested, and to maintain a stationwhich the American general deemed so conducive to the interests of theallies. 

[Sidenote: September 25. ]

On the 25th of September, the last division of the allied troopsarrived in James River, and were disembarked at the landing nearWilliamsburg; soon after which, the preparations for the siege werecompleted. 

[Sidenote: Yorktown invested. ]

York is a small village on the south side of the river which bearsthat name, where the long peninsula between the York and the James, isonly eight miles wide. In this broad and bold river, a ship of theline may ride in safety. Its southern banks are high, and, on theopposite shore, is Gloucester Point, a piece of land projecting deepinto the river, and narrowing it, at that place, to the space of onemile. Both these posts were occupied by Lord Cornwallis. Thecommunication between them was commanded by his batteries, and by someships of war which lay under his guns. 

The main body of his army was encamped on the open grounds aboutYorktown, within a range of outer redoubts and field works, calculatedto command the peninsula, and impede the approach of the assailants;and Lieutenant Colonel Dundass, with a small detachment consisting ofsix or seven hundred men, held the post at Gloucester Point. He wasafterwards reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton. 

The legion of Lauzun, and a brigade of militia under General Weedon, the whole commanded by the French General de Choisé, were directed towatch the enemy on the side of Gloucester; and, on the twenty-eighth, the grand combined army moved down on the south side of the river, bydifferent roads, towards Yorktown. About noon, the heads of thecolumns reached the ground assigned them respectively; and, afterdriving in the piquets and some cavalry, encamped for the evening. Thenext day, the right wing, consisting of Americans, extended farther tothe right, and occupied the ground east of Beverdam creek; while theleft wing, consisting of French, was stationed on the west side ofthat stream. In the course of the night, Lord Cornwallis withdrew fromhis outer lines; and the works he had evacuated were, the next day, occupied by the besieging army, which now invested the town completelyon that side. 

Two thousand men were stationed on the Gloucester side for the purposeof keeping up a rigorous blockade. On approaching the lines, a sharpskirmish took place which terminated unfavourably for the British;after which they remained under cover of their works, making noattempt to interrupt the blockade. 

[Sidenote: October 6. ]

[Sidenote: October. ]

On the night of the sixth of October, until which time the besiegingarmy was incessantly employed in disembarking their heavy artilleryand military stores, and drawing them to camp, the first parallel wascommenced within six hundred yards of the British lines. Thisoperation was conducted with so much silence, that it appears not tohave been perceived until the return of daylight disclosed it to thegarrison; by which time the trenches were in such forwardness as tocover the men. By the evening of the ninth, several batteries andredoubts were completed, and the effect of their fire was soonperceived. New batteries were opened the next day, and the fire becameso heavy that the besieged withdrew their cannon from the embrasures, and scarcely returned a shot. The shells and red hot balls from thebatteries of the allied army reached the ships in the harbour, and, inthe evening, set fire to the Charon of forty-four guns, and to threelarge transports, which were entirely consumed. Reciprocal esteem, anda spirit of emulation between the French and Americans, beingcarefully cultivated by the Commander-in-chief, the siege was carriedon with great rapidity. The second parallel was opened, on the nightof the eleventh, within three hundred yards of the British lines. Thethree succeeding days were devoted to the completion of this parallel, during which the fire of the garrison, which had opened several newembrasures, became more destructive than at any previous time. The menin the trenches were particularly annoyed by two redoubts advancedthree hundred yards in front of the British works, which flanked thesecond parallel of the besiegers. Preparations were made, on thefourteenth, to carry them both by storm. The attack of one wascommitted to the Americans, and of the other to the French. TheMarquis de Lafayette commanded the American detachment, and the Baronde Viominel the French. Towards the close of the day, the twodetachments marched with equal firmness to the assault. ColonelHamilton, who had commanded a battalion of light infantry throughoutthis campaign, led the advanced corps of the Americans; and ColonelLaurens turned the redoubt at the head of eighty men, in order to takethe garrison in reverse, and intercept their retreat. The troopsrushed to the charge without firing a gun and without giving thesappers time to remove the abattis and palisades. Passing over them, they assaulted the works with irresistible impetuosity on all sides atthe same time, and entered them with such rapidity that their loss wasinconsiderable. [85] This redoubt was defended by Major Campbell, withsome inferior officers, and forty-five privates. The major, a captain, a subaltern, and seventeen privates, were made prisoners, and eightprivates were killed while the assailants were entering the works. 

[Footnote 85: One sergeant and eight privates were killed; and onelieutenant colonel, four captains, one subaltern, one sergeant, andtwenty-five rank and file, were wounded. 

The irritation produced by the recent carnage in fort Griswold had notso far subdued the humanity of the American character as to induceretaliation. Not a man was killed except in action. "Incapable, " saidColonel Hamilton in his report, "of imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocation, the soldiery spared every man thatceased to resist. " Mr. Gordon, in his History of the American War, states the orders given by Lafayette, with the approbation ofWashington, to have directed that every man in the redoubt, after itssurrender, should be put to the sword. These sanguinary orders, sorepugnant to the character of the Commander-in-chief and of Lafayette, were never given. There is no trace of them among the papers ofGeneral Washington; and Colonel Hamilton, who took a part in theenterprise, which assures his perfect knowledge of every materialoccurrence, has publicly contradicted the statement. It has been alsocontradicted by Lafayette. ]

The redoubt attacked by the French was defended by a greater number ofmen; and the resistance, being greater, was not overcome so quickly, or with so little loss. One hundred and twenty men, commanded by alieutenant colonel, were in this work, eighteen of whom were killed, and forty-two, including a captain and two subaltern officers, weremade prisoners. The assailants lost, in killed and wounded, near onehundred men. 

The Commander-in-chief was highly gratified with the active couragedisplayed in this assault. Speaking of it in his diary, he says--"Thebravery exhibited by the attacking troops was emulous andpraiseworthy. Few cases have exhibited greater proofs of intrepidity, coolness, and firmness, than were shown on this occasion. " The ordersof the succeeding day, congratulating the army on the capture of theseimportant works, expressed a high sense of the judicious dispositionsand gallant conduct of both the Baron de Viominel and the Marquis deLafayette, and requested them to convey to every officer and manengaged in the enterprise, the acknowledgments of theCommander-in-chief for the spirit and rapidity with which theyadvanced to the attack, and for the admirable firmness with which theysupported themselves under the fire of the enemy without returning ashot. "The general reflects, " concluding the orders, "with the highestdegree of pleasure, on the confidence which the troops of the twonations must hereafter have in each other. Assured of mutual support, he is convinced there is no danger which they will not cheerfullyencounter, no difficulty which they will not bravely overcome. "[86]

[Footnote 86: General Lafayette states a fact which proves in aneminent degree the good feelings of the American soldiers towardstheir allies. While encamped together under his command atWilliamsburg, the Americans, who were _bivouacked_, saw their alliesunder tents without a murmur; and saw them supplied regularly withrations of flour for three days from the American magazines, whilecorn meal was measured out very irregularly to themselves. Thesuperior officers lent their horses to those of France and walkedthemselves. Although their general was himself a Frenchman, theAmericans saw not only without jealousy, but with pleasure, everypreference given to their allies. ]

[Illustration: The Moore House at Yorktown, Virginia

_Where the terms for the surrender of the British army were arrangedbetween Washington and Cornwallis. The actual drafting of the termswas done by the Viscount de Noailles and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, representing the French-American forces, and Colonel Dundas and MajorRoss for the British. _]

During the same night, these redoubts were included in the secondparallel; and, in the course of the next day, some howitzers wereplaced in them, which, by five in the afternoon, were opened on thebesieged. 

[Sidenote: October 16. ]

The situation of Lord Cornwallis was becoming desperate. His workswere sinking, in every quarter, under the fire of the besiegers. Thebatteries already playing on him had silenced nearly all his guns, andthe second parallel was about to open, which must in a few hoursrender the town untenable. To suspend a catastrophe which appearedalmost inevitable, he resolved on attempting to retard the completionof the second parallel, by a vigorous sortie against two batterieswhich appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and were guarded byFrench troops. The party making this sortie was led by LieutenantColonel Abercrombie, who attacked the two batteries with greatimpetuosity about four in the morning, and carried both withinconsiderable loss; but the guards from the trenches immediatelyadvancing on the assailants, they retreated without being able toeffect any thing of importance. 

About four in the afternoon the besiegers opened several batteries intheir second parallel; and it was apparent that, in the course of theensuing day, the whole line of batteries in that parallel would beready to play on the town. The works of the besieged were not in acondition to sustain so tremendous a fire. In this extremity, LordCornwallis formed the bold design of forcing his way to New York. 

He determined to leave his sick and baggage behind, and, crossing overin the night with his effectives to the Gloucester shore, to attack DeChoisé. After cutting to pieces or dispersing the troops under thatofficer, he intended to mount his infantry on the horses taken fromthat detachment, and on others to be seized on the road, and, by arapid march to gain the fords of the great rivers, and, forcing hisway through Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Jersey, to form a junctionwith the army in New York. [87]

[Footnote 87: Stedman, Annual Register, letter of Lord Cornwallis. ]

This desperate attempt would be extremely hazardous; but the situationof the British general had become so hopeless, that it could scarcelybe changed for the worse. 

Boats prepared under other pretexts were held in readiness to receivethe troops at ten in the evening, and convey them over the river. Thearrangements were made with such secrecy that the first embarkationarrived at the point unperceived, and part of the troops were landed, when a sudden and violent storm interrupted the execution of thishazardous plan, and drove the boats down the river. The stormcontinued till near daylight, when the boats returned. But the planwas necessarily abandoned, and the boats were sent to bring back thesoldiers, who were relanded on the southern shore in the course of theforenoon without much loss. 

[Sidenote: October 17. ]

[Sidenote: October 18. ]

[Sidenote: Surrender of Lord Cornwallis. ]

In the morning of the seventeenth, several new batteries were openedin the second parallel, which poured in a weight of fire not to beresisted. The place being no longer tenable, Lord Cornwallis, aboutten in the forenoon, beat a parley, and proposed a cessation ofhostilities for twenty-four hours, that commissioners might meet atMoore's house, which was just in the rear of the first parallel, tosettle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester. Tothis letter General Washington returned an immediate answer declaringhis "ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood, and hisreadiness to listen to such terms as were admissible;" but as in thepresent crisis he could not consent to lose a moment in fruitlessnegotiations, he desired that "previous to the meeting of thecommissioners, the proposals of his lordship might be transmitted inwriting, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities for two hoursshould be granted. " The general propositions[88] stated by LordCornwallis as forming the basis of the capitulation, though not alladmissible, being such as led to the opinion that no great difficultywould occur in adjusting the terms, the suspension of hostilities wasprolonged for the night. In the mean time, to avoid the delay ofuseless discussion, the Commander-in-chief drew up and proposed sucharticles[89] as he would be willing to grant. These were transmittedto Lord Cornwallis with the accompanying declaration that, if heapproved them, commissioners might be immediately appointed to digestthem into form. In consequence of this message, the Viscount deNoailles, and Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, were met next day by ColonelDundass and Major Ross; but, being unable to adjust the terms ofcapitulation definitively, only a rough draught of them could beprepared, which was to be submitted to the consideration of theBritish general. Determined not to expose himself to those accidentswhich time might produce, General Washington could not permit anysuspense on the part of Lord Cornwallis. He therefore immediatelydirected the rough articles which had been prepared by thecommissioners to be fairly transcribed, and sent them to his lordshipearly next morning, with a letter expressing his expectation that theywould be signed by eleven, and that the garrison would march out bytwo in the afternoon. Finding all attempts to obtain better termsunavailing, Lord Cornwallis submitted to a necessity no longer to beavoided, and, on the 19th of October, surrendered the posts ofYorktown and Gloucester Point, with their garrisons, and the ships inthe harbour with their seamen, to the land and naval forces of Americaand France. 

[Footnote 88: See note No. VI. At the end of the volume. ]

[Footnote 89: See note No. VII. At the end of the volume. ]

[Sidenote: Nineteenth. ]

The army, artillery, arms, military chest, and public stores of everydenomination, were surrendered to General Washington; the ships andseamen, to the Count de Grasse. The total number of prisoners, [90]excluding seamen, rather exceeded seven thousand men. The losssustained by the garrison during the siege, amounted to five hundredand fifty-two men, including six officers. 

[Footnote 90: The return of prisoners contained two generals, thirty-one field officers, three hundred and twenty-six captains andsubalterns, seventy-one regimental staff, six thousand five hundredand twenty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates, and onehundred and twenty-four persons belonging to the hospital, commissary, and wagon departments, making in the whole seven thousand andseventy-three prisoners. To this number are to be added sixcommissioned, and twenty-eight non-commissioned officers and privatesmade prisoners in the two redoubts which were stormed, and in thesortie made by the garrison. ]

Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to introduce an article into thecapitulation, for the security of those Americans who had joined theBritish army; but the subject was declared to belong to the civildepartment, and the article was rejected. Its object, however, wasgranted without appearing to concede it. His lordship was permitted tosend the Bonetta sloop of war untouched, with despatches to Sir HenryClinton; and the Americans whose conduct had been most offensive totheir countrymen were embarked on board this vessel. 

The allied army may be estimated, including militia, at sixteenthousand men. In the course of this siege, they lost, in killed andwounded, about three hundred. The treaty was opened on the eleventhday after the ground was broken by the besiegers, and the capitulationwas signed on the thirteenth. The whole army merited greatapprobation; but, from the nature of the service, the artillerists andengineers were enabled to distinguish themselves particularly. Generals du Portail and Knox were each promoted to the rank of MajorGeneral; and Colonel Govion, and Captain Rochfontaine, of the corps ofengineers, were each advanced a grade by brevet. In addition to theofficers belonging to those departments, Generals Lincoln, DeLafayette, and Steuben, were particularly mentioned by theCommander-in-chief, in his orders issued the day after thecapitulation; and terms of peculiar warmth were applied to GovernorNelson, who continued in the field during the whole siege, at the headof the militia of Virginia; and also exerted himself, in a particularmanner, to furnish the army with those supplies which the countryafforded. The highest acknowledgments were made to the Count deRochambeau; and several other French officers were named withdistinction. So many disasters had attended the former efforts of theUnited States to avail themselves of the succours occasionallyafforded by France, that an opinion not very favourable to thealliance appears to have gained some ground in the country, and tohave insinuated itself into the army. The Commander-in-chief seizedthis occasion to discountenance a course of thinking from which he hadalways feared pernicious consequences, and displayed the great valueof the aids lately received, in language highly flattering to theFrench monarch, as well as to the land and naval forces of thatnation. 

Knowing the influence which the loss of the army in Virginia must haveon the war, Sir Henry Clinton determined to hazard much for itspreservation. About seven thousand of his best troops sailed for theChesapeake, under convoy of a fleet augmented to twenty-five ships ofthe line. This armament left the Hook the day on which thecapitulation was signed at Yorktown, and appeared off the capes ofVirginia on the 24th of October. Unquestionable intelligence beingthere received that Lord Cornwallis had surrendered, the Britishgeneral returned to New York. 

The exultation manifested throughout the United States at the captureof this formidable army was equal to the terror it had inspired. Incongress, the intelligence was received with joy proportioned to themagnitude of the event; and the sense of that body on this brilliantachievement was expressed in various resolutions, returning the thanksof the United States to the Commander-in-chief, to the Count deRochambeau, to the Count de Grasse, to the officers of the allied armygenerally, and to the corps of artillery, and engineers particularly. In addition to these testimonials of gratitude, it was resolved that amarble column should be erected at Yorktown, in Virginia, with emblemsof the alliance between the United States and his Most ChristianMajesty, and inscribed with a succinct narrative of the surrender ofEarl Cornwallis to his Excellency General Washington, theCommander-in-chief of the combined forces of America and France; tohis Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, commanding the auxiliarytroops of his Most Christian Majesty in America; and to his ExcellencyCount de Grasse, commanding in chief the naval army of France in theChesapeake. Two stand of colours taken in Yorktown were presented toGeneral Washington; two pieces of field ordnance to the Count deRochambeau; and application was made to his Most Christian Majesty, topermit the Admiral to accept a testimonial of their approbationsimilar to that presented to the Count de Rochambeau. Congressdetermined to go in solemn procession to the Dutch Lutheran church, toreturn thanks to Almighty God for crowning the allied arms withsuccess, by the surrender of the whole British army under LordCornwallis; and also issued a proclamation, appointing the 13th day ofDecember for general thanksgiving and prayer, on account of thissignal interposition of Divine Providence. 

It was not by congress only that the public joy at this great event, and the public approbation of the conduct of General Washington weredisplayed. The most flattering and affectionate addresses ofcongratulation were presented from every part of the union; and stategovernments, corporate towns, and learned institutions, vied with eachother in the testimonials they gave of their high sense of hisimportant services, and of their attachment to his person andcharacter. 

The superiority of the allied force opened a prospect of still fartheradvantages. The remaining posts of the British in the southern stateswere too weak to be defended against the army which had triumphed overLord Cornwallis; and the troops which occupied them could neitherescape nor be reinforced, if the Count de Grasse could be prevailed onto co-operate against them. Although, in his first conference, he hadexplicitly declared his inability to engage in any enterprise to beundertaken subsequent to that against Yorktown, [91] the siege of thatplace had employed so much less time than the admiral had consented toappropriate to it, that the general resumed his plan of southernoperations. In a letter addressed to De Grasse, he used every argumentwhich might operate on his love of fame, or his desire to promote theinterests of the allies, to prevail on him to co-operate in anexpedition against Charleston. If this object should be unattainable, his attention was next turned to Wilmington, in North Carolina, whichwas still occupied by a small detachment of British troops who keptthat state in check. The capture of this detachment, though not anobject of much consequence in itself, was supposed to derive someimportance from the influence which the complete liberation of NorthCarolina might have on the future military operations of the UnitedStates, and on their negotiations. General Washington proposed to senda detachment intended to reinforce General Greene, as far asWilmington, under convoy. The reduction of that place, he supposed, would detain the fleet but a few days, after which it might proceed tothe West Indies. 

[Footnote 91: See note No. VIII. At the end of the volume. ]

[Sidenote: October 23. ]

To enforce the representations contained in his letter, as well as topay his respects to the admiral, and to express in person the highsense entertained of his important services, the Commander-in-chiefrepaired on board the Ville de Paris. The Count acknowledged hisconviction of the advantages to be expected from an expedition againstCharleston; but said, that "the orders of his court, ulteriorprojects, and his engagements with the Spaniards, rendered itimpossible for him to remain on the coast during the time which wouldbe required for the operation. " As he also declined taking on boardthe troops designed to reinforce General Greene, preparations weremade for their march by land; and Major General St. Clair, whocommanded the detachment, was ordered to take Wilmington in his route, and to gain possession of that post. 

[Sidenote: November. ]

The Count de Grasse having consented to remain in the bay a few daysfor the purpose of covering the transportation of the eastern troops, and of the ordnance to the Head of Elk, they were embarked in thebeginning of November, under the command of General Lincoln, who wasdirected to march them into New Jersey and New York, and to cantonthem for the winter in those states. [92] The French troops remained inVirginia, not only for the protection of that state, but to be inreadiness to march southward or northward, as the exigencies of theensuing campaign might require. 

[Footnote 92: See note No. IX. At the end of the volume. ]

The transportation of the troops and ordnance to the Head of Elk beingeffected, the Count de Grasse sailed for the West Indies, and theCommander-in-chief proceeded to Philadelphia. 

NOTES. 

NOTE--No. I. _See Page 3_

_The following petition addressed to Governor Livingston, will furnishsome evidence of the situation to which that part of Jersey wasreduced. _

To his excellency William Livingston, esquire, governor, captaingeneral, and commander-in-chief in and over the state of New Jerseyand the territories thereunto belonging in America, chancellor andordinary in the same--the humble petition of the officers, civil andmilitary, whose names are hereunto subscribed, Showeth, --That a large detachment of the British army, a few weeksago, made an invasion into the lower counties of this state onDelaware, and plundered a few of the inhabitants. That at present alarge detachment are invading them a second time. That the enemy inthis second incursion, have, as we have been credibly informed, by theexpress orders of Colonel Mawhood, the commanding officer, bayonetedand butchered in the most inhuman manner, a number of the militia whohave unfortunately fallen into their hands. That Colonel Mawhoodimmediately after the massacre, in open letters, sent to both officersand privates by a flag, had the effrontery to insult us with a demand, that we should lay down our arms, and if not, threatened to burn, destroy, and lay the whole country waste, and more especially theproperty of a number of our most distinguished men, whom he named. That he has since put his threat into execution, in one instance, byburning one of the finest dwelling houses in Salem county, and all theother buildings on the same farm, the property of Colonel BenjaminHome. That plunder, rapine, and devastation in the most fertile andpopulous parts of these counties, widely mark their footsteps whereverthey go. That they are spreading disaffection, they are using everypossible means to corrupt the minds of the people, who, within theirlines, have so little virtue as to purchase from them. 

That we are in no state of defence. That we are so exposed by reasonof our situation, that some of our officers, civil and military, havemoved out of the counties for safety. That our militia, during thelast winter, have been so fatigued out by repeated calls andcontinued service, and disaffection is now so widely diffused, thatvery few can be called out, in some places, none. That we have notroops of light horse regularly embodied, there is a scarcity of smallarms among us, and no field pieces. That in these two incursions, wehave very sensibly felt the want of field pieces and artillery men, that the number of us assembled is so small, that though we should usethe greatest conduct and bravery, we could only provoke, not injureour enemy. 

That the extent of our country is so great, that our small number ofmen fatigued out, indifferently armed and without field pieces, cannot defend it. That, as Delaware runs all along those counties, we areliable to be attacked in numberless places. 

That the acquisition of these counties would be of great advantage tothe enemy. That they could nearly maintain their whole army a campaignby the plunder, forage, and assistance they could draw from them. Thatalthough the United States might not need them, yet it might perhapsbe adviseable to defend them, to prevent the advantage the enemy mightreceive from them. That our riches, and former virtue, make us a preyto an enemy, whose tender mercies are cruelties. 

That in short, our situation is beyond description deplorable. Thatthe powers civil and military are daily relaxing, and disaffectionprevailing. That we can neither stay at our houses, go out, nor comein with safety. That we can neither plough, plant, sow, reap norgather. That we are fast falling into poverty, distress, and into thehands of our enemy. That unless there can be sent to our relief andassistance a sufficient body of standing troops, we must be under thedisagreeable necessity of leaving the country to the enemy, andremoving ourselves and families to distant places for safety. Thatalthough the present detachment may be fled and gone, before therelief reaches us, yet a body of troops are necessary for ourprotection, as long as the enemy possess Philadelphia. And these arethe sentiments not only of us the subscribers, but of all the rest ofthe officers civil and military, and other the good subjects of thisstate in these counties. 

NOTE--No. II. _See Page 85_

_The following is the report made by the committee:_

"January 1, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with theCommander-in-chief on the operations of the next campaign, report, that the plan proposed by congress for the emancipation of Canada, inco-operation with an army from France, was the principal subject ofthe said conference. 

"That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace whichmust attend an infraction of the proposed stipulations, on the part ofthese states, your committee have taken a general view of ourfinances, of the circumstances of our army, of the magazines ofclothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions instore, and which can be collected in season. 

"Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence andobservations communicated to them by the Commander-in-chief, respecting the number of troops and strong holds of the enemy inCanada; their naval force, and entire command of the watercommunication with that country--the difficulties, while they possesssuch signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land--theobstacles which are to be surmounted in acquiring a navalsuperiority--the hostile temper of many of the surrounding Indiantribes towards these states, and above all the uncertainty whether theenemy will not persevere in their system of harassing and distressingour sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory war. 

"That on the most mature deliberation, your committee can not find roomfor a well grounded presumption that these states will be able toperform their part of the proposed stipulations. That in a measure ofsuch moment, calculated to call forth, and direct to a single object aconsiderable portion of the force of our ally, which may otherwise beessentially employed, nothing else than the highest probability ofsuccess could justify congress in making the proposition. 

"Your committee are therefore of opinion that the negotiation inquestion, however desirable, and interesting, should be deferred untilcircumstances render the co-operation of these states more certain, practicable, and effectual. 

"That the minister plenipotentiary of these states at the court ofVersailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the ministerof France, be respectively informed that the operations of the nextcampaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, aswell from our own internal circumstances and resources, as theprogress and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature andpoint out the plan which ought to be pursued. That congress, therefore, can not, with a degree of confidence answerable to themagnitude of the object, decide on the practicability of theirco-operating the next campaign, in an enterprise for the emancipationof Canada; that every preparation in our power will nevertheless bemade for acting with vigour against the common enemy, and everyfavourable incident embraced with alacrity, to facilitate, and hastenthe freedom and independence of Canada, and her union with thesestates--events which congress, from motives of policy with respect tothe United States, as well as of affection for their Canadianbrethren, have greatly at heart. "

Mr. De Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta's History, recites theprivate instructions given to Mr. Girard on his mission to the UnitedStates. One article was, "to avoid entering into any formal engagementrelative to Canada and other English possessions which congressproposed to conquer. " Mr. De Sevelinges adds that "the policy of thecabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of Canada by England, as a principle of useful inquietudeand vigilance to the Americans. The neighbourhood of a formidableenemy must make them feel more sensibly the price which they ought toattach to the friendship and support of the king of France. "

The author has reason to believe that this policy was known to theMarquis de Lafayette when his devotion to the interests of the UnitedStates induced him to add his influence to their solicitations for aidto this enterprise. 

NOTE--No. III. _See Page 233_

_A letter to President Reed of Pennsylvania from which the followingextracts are taken, is selected from many others written with the sameview. _

"Morristown, May 28th, 1780. 

"DEAR SIR, --I am much obliged to you for your favour of the 23d. Nothing could be more necessary than the aid given by your statetowards supplying us with provisions. I assure you, every idea you canform of our distresses, will fall short of the reality. There is sucha combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of thesoldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in everyline of the army, the most serious features of mutiny and sedition:all our departments, all our operations are at a stand; and unless asystem very different from that which has for a long time prevailed, be immediately adopted throughout the states, our affairs must soonbecome desperate beyond the possibility of recovery. If you were onthe spot, my dear sir, if you could see what difficulties surround uson every side, how unable we are to administer to the most ordinarycalls of the service, you would be convinced that these expressionsare not too strong: and that we have every thing to dread: Indeed Ihave almost ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a stateof insensibility and indifference to its interests, that I dare notflatter myself with any change for the better. 

"The committee of congress in their late address to the severalstates, have given a just picture of our situation. I very much doubtits making the desired impression; and if it does not, I shallconsider our lethargy as incurable. The present juncture is sointeresting, that if it does not produce correspondent exertions, itwill be a proof, that motives of honour, public good, and evenself-preservation, have lost their influence upon our minds. This is adecisive moment, one of the most, I will go further and say, the mostimportant America has seen. The court of France has made a gloriouseffort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by oursupineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind;nor can we, after that, venture to confide that our allies willpersist in an attempt to establish what it will appear we wantinclination or ability to assist them in. 

"Every view of our own circumstances ought to determine us to the mostvigorous efforts; but there are considerations of another kind, thatshould have equal weight. The combined fleets of France and Spain lastyear were greatly superior to those of the enemy; the enemynevertheless sustained no material damage, and at the close of thecampaign gave a very important blow to our allies. This campaign, thedifference between the fleets, from every account I have been able tocollect, will be inconsiderable: indeed it is far from clear thatthere will be an equality. What are we to expect will be the case ifthere should be another campaign? In all probability the advantagewould be on the side of the English, and then what would become ofAmerica? We ought not to deceive ourselves. The maritime resources ofGreat Britain are more substantial and real than those of France andSpain united. Her commerce is more extensive than that of both herrivals; and it is an axiom, that the nation which has the mostextensive commerce will always have the most powerful marine. Werethis argument less convincing, the fact speaks for itself: herprogress in the course of the last year is an incontestable proof. 

"It is true France in a manner created a fleet in a very short space, and this may mislead us in the judgment we form of her navalabilities. But if they bore any comparison with those of GreatBritain, how comes it to pass, that with all the force of Spain added, she has lost so much ground in so short a time, as now to havescarcely a superiority. We should consider what was done by France, asa violent and unnatural effort of the government, which, for want ofsufficient foundation, can not continue to operate proportionableeffects. 

"In modern wars, the longest purse must chiefly determine the event. Ifear that of the enemy will be found to be so. Though the governmentis deeply in debt and of course poor, the nation is rich, and theirriches afford a fund which will not be easily exhausted. Besides, their system of public credit is such, that it is capable of greaterexertions than that of any other nation. Speculatists have been a longtime foretelling its downfall; but we see no symptoms of thecatastrophe being very near. I am persuaded it will at least last outthe war. 

"France is in a very different position. The abilities of the presentfinancier, have done wonders; by a wise administration of therevenues, aided by advantageous loans, he has avoided the necessity ofadditional taxes. But I am well informed if the war continues anothercampaign, he will be obliged to have recourse to the taxes usual intime of war, which are very heavy, and which the people of France arenot in a condition to endure for any length of time. When thisnecessity commences, France makes war on ruinous terms, and England, from her individual wealth, will find much greater facilities insupplying her exigencies. 

"Spain derives great wealth from her mines, but it is not so great asis generally imagined. Of late years the profit to government isessentially diminished. Commerce and industry are the best mines of anation; both which are wanted by her. I am told her treasury is farfrom being so well filled as we have flattered ourselves. She is alsomuch divided on the propriety of the war. There is a strong partyagainst it. The temper of the nation is too sluggish to admit of greatexertions; and though the courts of the two kingdoms are closelylinked together, there never has been in any of their wars, a perfectharmony of measures, nor has it been the case in this; which hasalready been no small detriment to the common cause. 

"I mention these things to show that the circumstances of our allies, as well as our own, call for peace, to obtain which we must make onegreat effort this campaign. The present instance of the friendship ofthe court of France, is attended with every circumstance that canrender it important and agreeable, that can interest our gratitude orfire our emulation. If we do our duty we may even hope to make thecampaign decisive of the contest. But we must do our duty in earnest, or disgrace and ruin will attend us. I am sincere in declaring a fullpersuasion that the succour will be fatal to us if our measures arenot adequate to the emergency. 

"Now, my dear sir, I must observe to you, that much will depend on thestate of Pennsylvania. She has it in her power to contribute, withoutcomparison, more to our success, than any other state, in the twoessential articles of flour and transportation. I speak to you in thelanguage of frankness, and as a friend. I do not mean to make anyinsinuations unfavourable to the state. I am aware of theembarrassment the government labours under from the open opposition ofone party and the underhand intrigues of another. I know that with thebest dispositions to promote the public service, you have been obligedto move with circumspection. But this is a time to hazard, and to takea tone of energy and decision. All parties but the disaffected willacquiesce in the necessity and give their support. 

"The matter is reduced to a point. Either Pennsylvania must give usall we ask, or we can undertake nothing. We must renounce every ideaof co-operation, and must confess to our allies that we look wholly tothem for our safety. This will be a state of humiliation andbitterness against which the feelings of every good American ought torevolt. Yours I am convinced will, nor have I the least doubt, butthat you will employ all your influence to animate the legislature andthe people at large. The fate of these states hangs upon it. God grantwe may be properly impressed with the consequences. 

"I wish the legislature could be engaged to vest the executive withplenipotentiary powers. I should then expect every thing practicablefrom your abilities and zeal. This is not a time for formality andceremony. The crisis in every point of view is extraordinary, andextraordinary expedients are necessary. I am decided in this opinion. "

NOTE--No. IV. _See Page 261_

André having been unquestionably a spy, and his sentence consequentlyjust; and the plot in which he had engaged having threatenedconsequences the most fatal to America; his execution, had he been anordinary person, would certainly have been viewed with coldindifference. But he was not an ordinary person. In a letter writtenat the time by Colonel Hamilton, who in genius, in candour, and inromantic heroism, did not yield to this unfortunate Englishman, thecharacter of André is thus feelingly and eloquently drawn. "There wassomething singularly interesting in the character and fortunes ofAndré. To an excellent understanding, well improved by education andtravel, he united a peculiar elegance of mind and manners, and theadvantages of a pleasing person. It is said he possessed a prettytaste for the fine arts, and had himself attained some proficiency inpoetry, music, and painting. His knowledge appeared withoutostentation, and embellished by a diffidence that rarely accompaniesso many talents and accomplishments, which left you to suppose morethan appeared. His sentiments were elevated and inspired esteem, theyhad a softness that conciliated affection. His elocution was handsome, his address easy, polite, and insinuating. By his merit he hadacquired the unlimited confidence of his general, and was making rapidprogress in military rank and reputation. But in the height of hiscareer, flushed with new hopes from the execution of a project themost beneficial to his party that could be devised, he is at onceprecipitated from the summit of prosperity, sees all the expectationsof his ambition blasted, and himself ruined. The character I havegiven of him is drawn partly from what I saw of him myself, and partlyfrom information. I am aware that a man of real merit is never seen inso favorable a light as through the medium of adversity. The cloudsthat surround him are so many shades that set off his good qualities. Misfortune cuts down little vanities, that in prosperous times, serveas so many spots in his virtues; and gives a tone to humanity thatmakes his worth more amiable. 

"His spectators, who enjoy a happier lot, are less prone to detractfrom it through envy; and are much disposed by compassion to give thecredit he deserves, and perhaps even to magnify it. "

NOTE--No. V. _See Page 377_

On the first of May, 1781, General Washington commenced a militaryjournal. The following is a brief statement of the situation of thearmy at that time. "I begin at this epoch, a concise journal ofmilitary transactions, &c. I lament not having attempted it from thecommencement of the war in aid of my memory: and wish the multiplicityof matter which continually surrounds me, and the embarrassed state ofour affairs, which is momentarily calling the attention toperplexities of one kind or another, may not defeat altogether, or sointerrupt my present intention and plan, as to render it of littleavail. 

"To have the clearer understanding of the entries which may follow, itwould be proper to recite, in detail, our wants, and our prospects;but this alone would be a work of much time, and great magnitude. Itmay suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words, viz:

"Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scantypittance scattered here and there in the different states. 

"Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them. --Insteadof having the various articles of field equipage in readiness todeliver, the quartermaster general is but now applying to the severalstates (as the dernier ressort) to provide these things for theirtroops respectively. Instead of having a regular system oftransportation established upon credit--or funds in thequartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it--we haveneither the one or the other; and all that business, or a great partof it, being done by military impressment, we are daily and hourlyoppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating theiraffections. Instead of having the regiments completed to the newestablishments (and which ought to have been so by the ---- of ----[Transcriber's Note: end parenthesis missing] agreeably to therequisitions of congress, scarce any state in the union has, at thishour, one-eighth part of its quota in the field; and there is littleprospect that I can see of ever getting more than half. In a word, instead of having every thing in readiness to take the field, we havenothing. And instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensivecampaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy prospect of adefensive one; unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, landtroops and money from our generous allies: and these at present aretoo contingent to build upon. "

NOTE--No. VI. _See Page 405_

York in Virginia, 17th October, 1781, half past four, P. M. 

SIR, --I have this moment been honoured with your excellency's letterdated this day. The time limited for sending my answer will not admitof entering into the details of articles, but the basis of myproposals will be, that the garrisons of York and Gloucester shall beprisoners of war with the customary honours; and for the convenienceof the individuals which I have the honour to command, that theBritish shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, underengagements not to serve against France, America, or their allies, until released or regularly exchanged. That all arms and public storesshall be delivered up to you, but that the usual indulgence of sidearms to officers and of retaining private property shall be granted toofficers and soldiers; and the interests of individuals in civilcapacities, and connected with us, shall be attended to. If yourexcellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension of hostilitieswill be necessary to transmit your answer, I shall have no objectionto the hour that you propose. I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant, CORNWALLIS. 

His excellency General Washington, &c. &c. &c. 

NOTE--No. VII. _See Page 406_

Head quarters before York, 18th October, 1781. 

MY LORD, --To avoid unnecessary discussions and delays, I shall atonce, in answer to your lordship's letter of yesterday, declare thegeneral basis upon which a definitive treaty of capitulation must takeplace. The garrison of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, asyou propose, will be received prisoners of war. The condition annexedof sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe towhich they respectively belong, is inadmissible. Instead of this, theywill be marched to such parts of the country as can most convenientlyprovide for their subsistence; and the benevolent treatment ofprisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will beextended to them. The same honours will be granted to the surrenderingarmy, as were granted to the garrison of Charleston. 

The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their guns, stores, tackling, furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered in theirpresent state to an officer of the navy appointed to take possessionof them. 

The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public storesof every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired, to the heads ofdepartments, to which they respectively belong. 

The officers will be indulged in retaining their side arms, and theofficers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects with thisreserve, that property taken in the country will be reclaimed. 

With regard to the individuals in civil capacities, whose interestsyour lordship wishes may be attended to, until they are moreparticularly described, nothing definitive can be settled. 

I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be suppliedwith their own hospital stores, and attended by British surgeonsparticularly charged with the care of them. 

Your lordship will be pleased to signify your determination either toaccept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hoursfrom the delivery of this letter, that commissioners may be appointedto digest the articles of capitulation, or a renewal of hostilitiesmay take place. 

I have the honour to be, my lord, &c. 

GEORGE WASHINGTON. 

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. 

York, in Virginia, 18th October, 1781. 

SIR, --I agree to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of thegarrisons of York and Gloucester, including seamen, being prisoners ofwar without annexing the condition of their being sent to Europe; butI expect to receive a compensation in arranging the articles ofcapitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present state ofdefence. 

I shall in particular desire that the Bonetta sloop of war, may beleft entirely at my disposal from the hour the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry my despatches to Sir Henry Clintonand such soldiers as I may think proper to send as passengers in her, to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted tosail without examination when my despatches are ready; engaging on mypart that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if sheescapes the dangers of the sea; that the crew and soldiers sent aspassengers shall be accounted for in future exchanges as prisoners;that she shall carry off no officer without your consent, nor publicproperty of any kind; and I shall likewise desire that the traders andinhabitants may preserve their property, and that no person may bepunished or molested for having joined the British troops. 

If you choose to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shallappoint two field officers of my army to meet two officers from you atany time and place you think proper, to digest the articles ofcapitulation. I have the honour to be, sir, Your most obedient and most humble servant, CORNWALLIS. 

His excellency General Washington, &c. &c. &c. 

NOTE--No. VIII. _See Page 411_

Head quarters, 20th October, 1781. 

SIR, --The surrender of York, from which so much glory and advantageare derived to the allies, and the honour of which belongs to yourexcellency, has greatly anticipated our most sanguine expectations. Certain of this event under your auspices, though unable to determinethe time, I solicited your excellency's attention in the firstconference with which you honoured me, to ulterior objects of decisiveimportance to the common cause. Although your excellency's answer onthat occasion was unfavourable to my wishes, the unexpectedpromptness with which our operations have been conducted to theirfinal success having gained us time, the defect of which was one ofyour excellency's principal objections, a perspective of the mostextensive and happy consequences, engages me to renew myrepresentations. 

Charleston, the principal maritime port of the British in the southernparts of the continent, the grand deposite and point of support forthe present theatre of the war, is open to a combined attack, andmight be carried with as much certainty as the place which has justsurrendered. 

This capture would destroy the last hope which induces the enemy tocontinue the war; for having experienced the impracticability ofrecovering the populous northern states, he has determined to confinehimself to the defensive in that quarter, and to prosecute a mostvigorous offensive in the south, with a view of conquering states, whose spare population and natural disadvantages render theminfinitely less susceptible of defence; although their productionsrender them the most valuable in a commercial view. His navalsuperiority, previous to your excellency's arrival, gave him decisiveadvantages in the rapid transport of his troops and supplies: whilethe immense land marches of our succours, too tardy and expensive inevery point of view, subjected us to be beaten in detail. 

It will depend upon your excellency, therefore, to terminate the war, and enable the allies to dictate the law in a treaty. A campaign soglorious and so fertile in consequences, could be reserved only forthe Count de Grasse. 

It rarely happens that such a combination of means, as are in ourhands at present, can be seasonably obtained by the most strenuous ofhuman exertions. --A decisively superior fleet, the fortune and talentsof whose commander overawe all the naval force that the mostincredible efforts of the enemy have been able to collect; an armyflushed with success, and demanding only to be conducted to newattacks; and the very season which is proper for operating against thepoints in question. 

If upon entering into the detail of this expedition, your excellencyshould still determine it impracticable, there is an object whichthough subordinate to that above mentioned, is of capital importanceto our southern operations, and may be effected at infinitely lessexpense; I mean the enemy's post at Wilmington in North Carolina. Circumstances require that I should at this period reinforce thesouthern army under General Greene. This reinforcement transported bysea under your excellency's convoy, would enable us to carry the postin question with very little difficulty, and would wrest from theBritish a point of support in North Carolina, which is attended withthe most dangerous consequences to us, and would liberate anotherstate. This object would require nothing more than the convoy of yourexcellency to the point of operation, and the protection of thedebarkation. 

I intreat your excellency's attention to the points which I have thehonour of laying before you, and to be pleased at the same time toinform me what are your dispositions for a maritime force to be lefton the American station. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

GEORGE WASHINGTON. 

NOTE--No. IX. _See Page 413_

Late in October an irruption was made into the country on the Mohawk, by Major Ross, at the head of about five hundred men, composed ofregulars, rangers, and Indians. Colonel Willet, with between four andfive hundred men, partly of the troops denominated levies, and partlymilitia, immediately marched in quest of them, and fell in with themat Johnstown, where they were slaughtering cattle, apparentlyunapprehensive of an enemy. Before showing himself, he detached MajorRowley of Massachusetts with the left wing to fall on the rear, whilehe should engage the front. On his appearance the British partyretired to a neighbouring wood, and the American advance was justbeginning to skirmish with them, when that whole wing, without anyapparent cause, suddenly fled from the field, leaving a field-pieceposted on a height in order to cover a retreat, to fall into the handsof the enemy. Fortunately for the party, Rowley appeared in the rearat this critical juncture, and regained what the right wing had lost. Night soon coming on, Major Ross retired further into the wood, andencamped on the top of a mountain. He seems after this skirmish tohave been only intent on repassing the dreary wilderness in his rear, and securing his party; an object not to be accomplished withoutimmense fatigue and great suffering, as Colonel Willet had cut offtheir return to their boats, and they were to retreat by the way ofBuck island, or Oswegatchie. With a select part of his troops whowere furnished with five days provisions, and about sixty Indians whohad just joined him, and who, he said, "are the best cavalry for theservice of the wilderness, " he commenced a rapid pursuit, and in themorning of the 30th, at a ford on Canada creek, fell in with aboutforty whites and some Indians who were left in the rear to procureprovisions. These were attacked and the greater number of them killedor taken, upon which the main body fled with such rapidity that thepursuit proved ineffectual. In the party at Canada creek was MajorWalter Butler, the person who perpetrated the massacre atCherry-valley. His entreaties for quarter were disregarded, and hefell the victim of that vengeance which his own savage temper haddirected against himself. 

END OF VOLUME III.