The Iraq

Study Group

Report

 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs

 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. , Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson

Contents

Letter from the Co-Chairs

Executive Summary

I. Assessment

A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq

 1. Security 2. Politics 3. Economics 4. International Support 5. Conclusions

B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq

C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq

 1. Precipitate Withdrawal 2. Staying the Course 3. More Troops for Iraq 4. Devolution to Three Regions

D. Achieving Our Goals

II. The Way Forward--A New Approach

A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus

 1. The New Diplomatic Offensive 2. The Iraq International Support Group 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria 4. The Wider Regional Context

B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves

 1. Performance on Milestones 2. National Reconciliation 3. Security and Military Forces 4. Police and Criminal Justice 5. The Oil Sector 6. U. S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance 7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review 8. U. S. Personnel 9. Intelligence

Appendices

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations

Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions

Iraq Study Group Consultations

Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel

The Iraq Study Group

Iraq Study Group Support

Letter from the Co-Chairs

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation andprotect American interests. 

Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraqbut with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Ourpolitical leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring aresponsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Ourcountry deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and apolicy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President andCongress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthrightwith the American people in order to win their support. 

No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this pointwill stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide towardchaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences aresevere. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States inIraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United Stateshas special obligations. Our country must address as best it canIraq's many problems. The United States has long-term relationshipsand interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. 

In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Grouppresent a new approach because we believe there is a better wayforward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is stillpossible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq anopportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize acritical region of the world, and protect America's credibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqigovernment and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable andhopeful future. 

What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount ofpolitical will and cooperation by the executive and legislativebranches of the U. S. Government. It demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its successdepends on the unity of the American people in a time of politicalpolarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debatewithin a democracy. Yet U. S. Foreign policy is doomed to failure--asis any course of action in Iraq--if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our countrytoward such a consensus. 

We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who havecontributed information and assisted the Study Group, both inside andoutside the U. S. Government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thankthe members of the expert working groups, and staff from thesponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on theStudy Group, who have worked with us on these difficult issues in aspirit of generosity and bipartisanship. 

In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and the Americanpeople, we dedicate it to the men and women--military and civilian--whohave served and are serving in Iraq, and to their families backhome. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficultsacrifices. Every American is indebted to them. 

We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of theircountry, and the members of the Coalition Forces who have stood withus and with the people of Iraq. 

James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton

Executive Summary

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no paththat can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. 

In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to betaken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most importantrecommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and politicalefforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission ofU. S. Forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin tomove its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that thesetwo recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government movesforward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunityfor a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will beenhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, interests, and values will be protected. 

The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scopeand lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militiasand death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarianconflict is the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi peoplehave a democratically elected government, yet it is not adequatelyadvancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, ordelivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive. 

If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could besevere. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq'sgovernment and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries couldintervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win apropaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The globalstanding of the United States could be diminished. Americans couldbecome more polarized. 

During the past nine months we have considered a full range ofapproaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our recommended coursehas shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the beststrategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq andthe region. 

External Approach

The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly affect itsstability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in thelong term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are not doingenough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercuttingstability. 

The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensiveto build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and theregion. This diplomatic effort should include every country that hasan interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq'sneighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key states in and outside the regionshould form a support group to reinforce security and nationalreconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on itsown. 

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraqand their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States shouldtry to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence thebehavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives andincentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and trainingto Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and useits influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage nationalreconciliation. The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should continueto be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United NationsSecurity Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border withIraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in andout of Iraq. 

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unlessit deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regionalinstability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by theUnited States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts:Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-statesolution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must includedirect talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians(those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria. 

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the MiddleEast, the United States should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that mightbecome available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq. 

Internal Approach

The most important questions about Iraq's future are now theresponsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role inIraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their owndestiny. 

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility forIraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Armybrigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, theUnited States should significantly increase the number of U. S. Military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in andsupporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U. S. Combatforces could begin to move out of Iraq. 

The primary mission of U. S. Forces in Iraq should evolve to one ofsupporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primaryresponsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on theground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection couldbe out of Iraq. At that time, U. S. Combat forces in Iraq could bedeployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reactionand special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and supportefforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction andspecial operations forces would be to undertake strikes against alQaeda in Iraq. 

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from theUnited States for some time to come, especially in carrying outsecurity responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear tothe Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did notimplement their planned changes. The United States must not make anopen-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troopsdeployed in Iraq. 

As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize trainingand education of forces that have returned to the United States inorder to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipmentreturns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficientfunds to restore the equipment over the next five years. 

The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to supportthe achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on nationalreconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizensof the United States and other countries--that it deserves continuedsupport. 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the UnitedStates, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. Hislist is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestonesthat can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team should remain in closeand frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clearmessage: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to makesubstantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones. 

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makessubstantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on nationalreconciliation, security, and governance, the United States shouldmake clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, andsupport for Iraq's security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not makesubstantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on nationalreconciliation, security, and governance, the United States shouldreduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqigovernment. 

Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They includeimprovements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oilsector, the U. S. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U. S. Budgetprocess, the training of U. S. Government personnel, and U. S. Intelligence capabilities. 

Conclusion

It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that theserecommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraqand the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in acoordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out inisolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq asevents within Iraq. 

The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. Butby pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the UnitedStates of America can emerge stronger. 

I

Assessment

There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdadand several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has been removed frompower and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected governmentthat is broadly representative of Iraq's population, yet thegovernment is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The levelof violence is high and growing. There is great suffering, and thedaily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism ispervasive. 

U. S. Military and civilian personnel, and our coalition partners, aremaking exceptional and dedicated efforts--and sacrifices--to helpIraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrificesfor a better future. However, the ability of the United States toinfluence events within Iraq is diminishing. Many Iraqis are embracingsectarian identities. The lack of security impedes economicdevelopment. Most countries in the region are not playing aconstructive role in support of Iraq, and some are undercuttingstability. 

Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is criticalto U. S. Interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of Shia andSunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It has the world'ssecond-largest known oil reserves. It is now a base of operations forinternational terrorism, including al Qaeda. 

Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how theUnited States is viewed in the region and around the world. Because ofthe gravity of Iraq's condition and the country's vital importance, the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significantinternational challenges in decades. Because events in Iraq have beenset in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States hasboth a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to giveIraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. 

An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regionalsituation follows (all figures current as of publication), along withan assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues to deteriorate, and an analysis of some possible courses of action. 

A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq

1. Security

Attacks against U. S. , Coalition, and Iraqi security forces arepersistent and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for U. S. Forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total attacks inOctober 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006. Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more thandouble the level in January. Attacks against civilians in October werefour times higher than in January. Some 3, 000 Iraqi civilians arekilled every month. 

Sources of Violence

Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There aremultiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, alQaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and deathsquads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence--particularly inand around Baghdad--has become the principal challenge to stability. 

Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It hassignificant support within the Sunni Arab community. The insurgencyhas no single leadership but is a network of networks. It benefitsfrom participants' detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure, andarms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. Theinsurgents have different goals, although nearly all oppose thepresence of U. S. Forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni Arab rulein the country. Some aim at winning local power and control. 

Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious or politicaltargets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed ofSunni Arabs. Foreign fighters--numbering an estimated 1, 300--play asupporting role or carry out suicide operations. Al Qaeda's goalsinclude instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni andShia, and driving the United States out of Iraq. 

Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civiliancasualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgentattacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. Groups ofIraqis are often found bound and executed, their bodies dumped inrivers or fields. The perception of unchecked violence emboldensmilitias, shakes confidence in the government, and leads Iraqis toflee to places where their sect is the majority and where they feelthey are in less danger. In some parts of Iraq--notably inBaghdad--sectarian cleansing is taking place. The United Nationsestimates that 1. 6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1. 8million Iraqis have fled the country. 

Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantialthreat to immediate and long-term stability. These militias arediverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some are highlylocalized, and some are wholly outside the law. They are fragmenting, with an increasing breakdown in command structure. The militias targetSunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with oneanother. Some even target government ministries. They undermine theauthority of the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as theability of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalenceof militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserveand expand their power only if backed by armed force. 

The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number as many as 60, 000fighters. It has directly challenged U. S. And Iraqi government forces, and it is widely believed to engage in regular violence against SunniArab civilians. Mahdi fighters patrol certain Shia enclaves, notablynortheast Baghdad's teeming neighborhood of 2. 5 million known as "SadrCity. " As the Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, someelements have moved beyond Sadr's control. 

The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council for theIslamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by Abdul Azizal-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties with the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members have become integratedinto the Iraqi police, and others play policing roles in southernIraqi cities. While wearing the uniform of the security services, Badrfighters have targeted Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have alsoclashed with the Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq. 

Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many Iraqis. Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace in much of thecountry. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly in unstableareas like Anbar province. Some criminal gangs cooperate with, finance, or purport to be part of the Sunni insurgency or a Shiitemilitia in order to gain legitimacy. As one knowledgeable Americanofficial put it, "If there were foreign forces in New Jersey, TonySoprano would be an insurgent leader. "

Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure--Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percentof Iraq's population of 26 million. In Baghdad, the violence islargely between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is attributableto the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda, and the situation isdeteriorating. 

In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basraand the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia power struggle. The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of theKurdish north and parts of the Shia south. However, most of Iraq'scities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence. 

U. S. , Coalition, and Iraqi Forces

Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces-Iraq underU. S. Command, working in concert with Iraq's security forces. TheMulti-National Forces-Iraq were authorized by UN Security CouncilResolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate was extended in November 2006for another year. 

Approximately 141, 000 U. S. Military personnel are serving in Iraq, together with approximately 16, 500 military personnel from twenty-sevencoalition partners, the largest contingent being 7, 200 from theUnited Kingdom. The U. S. Army has principal responsibility for Baghdadand the north. The U. S. Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. The United Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly inBasra. 

Along with this military presence, the United States is building itslargest embassy in Baghdad. The current U. S. Embassy in Baghdad totalsabout 1, 000 U. S. Government employees. There are roughly 5, 000civilian contractors in the country. 

Currently, the U. S. Military rarely engages in large-scale combatoperations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus on a strategy of"clear, hold, and build"--"clearing" areas of insurgents and deathsquads, "holding" those areas with Iraqi security forces, and"building" areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects. 

Nearly every U. S. Army and Marine combat unit, and several NationalGuard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at least once. Many are ontheir second or even third rotations; rotations are typically one yearfor Army units, seven months for Marine units. Regular rotations, inand out of Iraq or within the country, complicate brigade andbattalion efforts to get to know the local scene, earn the trust ofthe population, and build a sense of cooperation. 

Many military units are under significant strain. Because the harshconditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more quickly thananticipated, many units do not have fully functional equipment fortraining when they redeploy to the United States. An extraordinaryamount of sacrifice has been asked of our men and women in uniform, and of their families. The American military has little reserve forceto call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises aroundthe world. 

A primary mission of U. S. Military strategy in Iraq is the training ofcompetent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, the Multi-NationalSecurity Transition Command-Iraq under American leadership isexpected to have trained and equipped a target number of approximately326, 000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138, 000 membersof the Iraqi Army and 188, 000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operationalcontrol over roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U. S. Hasoperational control over most of the rest. No U. S. Forces are underIraqi command. 

The Iraqi Army

The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliableand disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. Bythe end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to comprise 118 battalionsformed into 36 brigades under the command of 10 divisions. Althoughthe Army is one of the more professional Iraqi institutions, itsperformance has been uneven. The training numbers are impressive, butthey represent only part of the story. 

Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition andloyalties of some Iraqi units--specifically, whether they will carryout missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarianagenda. Of Iraq's 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numberedare made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, andthey have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. Asa result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions. 

The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significantchallenges:

--Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together andperform at higher levels of organization--the brigade and divisionlevel. Leadership training and the experience of leadership are theessential elements to improve performance. 

--Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions withoutadequate equipment. Congress has been generous in funding requests forU. S. Troops, but it has resisted fully funding Iraqi forces. Theentire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion)is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every twoweeks. 

--Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so thatthey can visit their families and take them their pay. Soldiers arepaid in cash because there is no banking system. Soldiers are givenleave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unitreadiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less. 

--Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustaintheir operations, the capability to transport supplies and troops, andthe capacity to provide their own indirect fire support, close-airsupport, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They willdepend on the United States for logistics and support through at least2007. 

The Iraqi Police

The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of theIraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers roughly 135, 000and is responsible for local policing. It has neither the training norlegal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepowerto take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The IraqiNational Police numbers roughly 25, 000 and its officers have beentrained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The BorderEnforcement Department numbers roughly 28, 000. 

Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage insectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, andtargeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organizedunder the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruptionand militia infiltration and lacks control over police in theprovinces. 

The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance ofreform. The current Minister of the Interior has called for purgingmilitia members and criminals from the police. But he has littlepolice experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U. S. Agreement on the character and mission of the police. U. S. Authoritiesdo not know with precision the composition and membership of thevarious police forces, nor the disposition of their funds andequipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officersparticipating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, andammunition for use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll butdon't show up for work. In the words of a senior American general, "2006 was supposed to be 'the year of the police' but it hasn'tmaterialized that way. "

Facilities Protection Services

The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. EachIraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the ministry'sinfrastructure. All together, these units total roughly 145, 000uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units have questionableloyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr--the FacilitiesProtection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. One senior U. S. Official described the Facilities Protection Serviceas "incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive. " Several Iraqis simplyreferred to them as militias. 

The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities ProtectionService under the control of the Interior Ministry. The intention isto identify and register Facilities Protection personnel, standardizetheir treatment, and provide some training. Though the approach isreasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of theInterior Ministry. 

Operation Together Forward II

In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U. S. Military forcesjoined with Iraqi forces to establish security in Baghdad with anoperation called "Operation Together Forward II, " which began inAugust 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U. S. Forces areworking with members of the Iraqi Army and police to "clear, hold, andbuild" in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There areroughly 15, 000 U. S. Troops in Baghdad. 

This operation--and the security of Baghdad--is crucial to security inIraq more generally. A capital city of more than 6 million, Baghdadcontains some 25 percent of the country's population. It is thelargest Sunni and Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations ofboth Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and Americanleaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq. 

The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening. Violence in Baghdad--already at high levels--jumped more than 43percent between the summer and October 2006. U. S. Forces continue tosuffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoodsin advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi policehave been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuingviolence. The Iraqi Army has provided only two out of the sixbattalions that it promised in August would join American forces inBaghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained securityoperations in Sadr City. 

Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capabilityto hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clearneighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias. U. S. Forces can"clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U. S. Troopspresent nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold"neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. Because none of the operations conducted by U. S. And Iraqi militaryforces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging thesectarian violence, U. S. Forces seem to be caught in a mission thathas no foreseeable end. 

2. Politics

Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council ofRepresentatives. A government of national unity was formed in May 2006that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraq has ratifieda constitution, and--per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders--hasinitiated a process of review to determine if the constitution needsamendment. 

The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, andkey players within the government too often act in their sectarianinterest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail todemonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, andtoo many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. Theresult is an even weaker central government than the constitutionprovides. 

There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement onthe key issues confronting the Iraqi government: nationalreconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political deal" amongIraq's sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oilrevenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, andamnesty; security, particularly curbing militias and reducing theviolence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provision of basicservices and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqileaders view issues through a sectarian prism, we will summarize thediffering perspectives of Iraq's main sectarian groups. 

Sectarian Viewpoints

The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for thefirst time in more than 1, 300 years. Above all, many Shia areinterested in preserving that power. However, fissures have emergedwithin the broad Shia coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance. Shia factions are struggling for power--over regions, ministries, andIraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad andfractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad to commentthat Shia leaders are held "hostage to extremes. " Within the coalitionas a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodationwith the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias. 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding ofthe key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for nationalreconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains have emergedbetween Maliki's government and the United States. Maliki has publiclyrejected a U. S. Timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered theremoval of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqisecurity forces, and resisted U. S. Requests to move forward onreconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias. 

Sistani, Sadr, Hakim

The U. S. Deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the mostpowerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national office. Of thefollowing three vital power brokers in the Shia community, the UnitedStates is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Alial-Sistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr). 

GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI: Sistani is the leading Shiite clericin Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day politics, he has been themost influential leader in the country: all major Shia leaders havesought his approval or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shiabloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani's influencemay be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventingintra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis. 

ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM: Hakim is a cleric and the leader of the SupremeCouncil for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest andmost organized Shia political party. It seeks the creation of anautonomous Shia region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakimhas consistently protected and advanced his party's position. SCIRIhas close ties with Iran. 

MOQTADA AL-SADR: Sadr has a large following among impoverished Shia, particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki's governing coalition, but his Mahdi Army has clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as withIraqi, U. S. , and U. K. Forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist. Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model ofHezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basicservices within the government and an armed militia outside of thegovernment. 

Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditionalposition of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether to seek theiraims through political participation or through violent insurgency. They remain angry about U. S. Decisions to dissolve Iraqi securityforces and to pursue the "de-Baathification" of Iraq's government andsociety. Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed thepresence of U. S. Forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect themagainst Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shiaadministration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not seea Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves. 

Hashimi and Dhari

The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government isquestionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni Arab figures have broad support. 

tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq andthe head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni Muslim bloc inparliament. Hashimi opposes the formation of autonomous regions andhas advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population, areversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militiafighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death squads haverecently killed three of his siblings. 

sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the Muslim ScholarsAssociation, the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq. Dharihas condemned the American occupation and spoken out against the Iraqigovernment. His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arabinsurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant wasrecently issued for his arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, anact that sparked bitter Sunni protests across Iraq. 

Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two mainpolitical blocs--the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have secured a largelyautonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominentrole for Kurds within the national government. Barzani leads theKurdish regional government, and Talabani is president of Iraq. 

Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within ademocratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan wouldbe surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, a majority of Kurds favorindependence. The Kurds have their own security forces--thepeshmerga--which number roughly 100, 000. They believe they couldaccommodate themselves to either a unified or a fractured Iraq. 

Barzani and Talabani

Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who havelong-standing ties in movements for Kurdish independence andself-government. 

MASSOUD BARZANI: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan DemocraticParty and the President of the Kurdish regional government. Barzanihas cooperated with his longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing anempowered, autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani hasordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish flags inKurdish-controlled areas. 

JALAL TALABANI: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas Barzani has focused hisefforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has secured power in Baghdad, andseveral important PUK government ministers are loyal to him. Talabanistrongly supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to bringreal power to the office of the presidency. 

Key Issues

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined a commendableprogram of national reconciliation soon after he entered office. However, the Iraqi government has not taken action on the key elementsof national reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which preventsmany Sunni Arabs from participating in governance and society;providing amnesty for those who have fought against the government;sharing the country's oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amendingthe constitution; and settling the future of Kirkuk. 

One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created alargely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to beestablished later, perhaps including a "Shi'astan" comprising ninesouthern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favored bythe Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Azizal-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generallyIraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believethey should govern. Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in theKurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible "Sunniregion. " Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitutionthat shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, whileallowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to theregions. 

The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-draftingprocess, and acceded to entering the government only on the conditionthat the constitution be amended. In September, the parliament agreedto initiate a constitutional review commission slated to complete itswork within one year; it delayed considering the question of forming afederalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months. 

Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich cityin northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that the constitution require apopular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk canformally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabsand Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violencesparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great. 

Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division of thecountry, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have littlecommitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader toldus pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percentof the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have foughtfor independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flagsand the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American generalcommented that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country theywant to have. " Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positionedleaders are not working toward a united Iraq. 

SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act insupport of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must make thedecision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must make the decision toseek their aims through a peaceful political process, not throughviolent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes mustaggressively pursue al Qaeda. 

Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of politicalaction. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the Sunniinsurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) and Shia militias(which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximizepower within the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said hewill address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningfulaction to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part toSadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his MahdiArmy. 

Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violentinsurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni politicians withinthe government have a limited level of support and influence amongtheir own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency. Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunnileaders--assassinating the family members of those who do participate inthe government. Too often, insurgents tolerate and cooperate with alQaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U. S. And Shiaforces. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recentlytook the positive step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreignfighters in their midst, and have started to take action on thosecommitments. 

Sunni politicians told us that the U. S. Military has to take on themilitias; Shia politicians told us that the U. S. Military has to helpthem take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches theother. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shiamilitias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunniinsurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groupswithin Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms. 

GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing itspeople with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below orhovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, thesituation is much worse. There are five major reasons for thisproblem. 

First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarianbasis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of Shia-governedBaghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day andtrash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdadis run like a "Shia dictatorship" because Sunnis boycotted provincialelections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in localgovernment. 

Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. Forinstance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made. 

Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated thatofficial corruption costs Iraq $5-7 billion per year. Notable stepshave been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit board and inspectorsgeneral in the ministries, and senior leaders including the PrimeMinister have identified rooting out corruption as a nationalpriority. But too many political leaders still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests. There are still no examples of seniorofficials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted oncorruption charges. 

Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic class waspushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Otherskilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has risen. Too often, Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as politicalspoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries, spendingas little as 10-15 percent of their capital budget. They lacktechnical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, abanking system that does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensivered tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry ofFinance reluctant to disburse funds. 

Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqijudiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicatedjudges. But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, andthey are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function. Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one seniorU. S. Official said to us, "We can protect judges, but not theirfamilies, their extended families, their friends. " Many Iraqis feelthat crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded. 

3. Economics

There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendouspotential for growth. But economic development is hobbled byinsecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidatedinfrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U. S. Official observed to us, Iraq's economy has been badly shocked and is dysfunctional aftersuffering decades of problems: Iraq had a police state economy in the1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, and a sanctions economy in the1990s. Immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oilsector. 

Economic Performance

There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are stable andgrowing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, and other appliances have increased dramatically. New businesses areopening, and construction is moving forward in secure areas. Becauseof Iraq's ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, significant growth is possible if violence is reduced and the capacityof government improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than40 percent in Kurdistan during this past year. 

The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks setby the International Monetary Fund. Most prominently, subsidies havebeen reduced--for instance, the price per liter of gas has increasedfrom roughly 1. 7 cents to 23 cents (a figure far closer to regionalprices). However, energy and food subsidies generally remain a burden, costing Iraq $11 billion per year. 

Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators arenegative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq isat roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. Theinvestment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements intheir daily economic situation. 

Oil Sector

Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq's GDP, and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq produces around2. 2 million barrels per day, and exports about 1. 5 million barrels perday. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqigovernment's target of 2. 5 million barrels per day, and far short ofthe vast potential of the Iraqi oil sector. Fortunately for thegovernment, global energy prices have been higher than projected, making it possible for Iraq to meet its budget revenue targets. 

Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack ofinvestment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailedknowledge of Iraq's infrastructure target pipelines and oilfacilities. There is no metering system for the oil. There is poormaintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, aswell as inadequate investment in modern technology. Iraq had a cadreof experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extendedmigration of experts to other countries have eroded technicalcapacity. Foreign companies have been reluctant to invest, and Iraq'sMinistry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15 percent of itscapital budget. 

Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150, 000 to200, 000--and perhaps as many as 500, 000--barrels of oil per day arebeing stolen. Controlled prices for refined products result inshortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving blackmarket. One senior U. S. Official told us that corruption is moreresponsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector. 

The Politics of Oil

The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country'salready fragile efforts to create a unified central government. TheIraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions to take the leadin developing new oil resources. Article 108 states that "oil and gasare the ownership of all the peoples of Iraq in all the regions andgovernorates, " while Article 109 tasks the federal government with"the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields. " Thislanguage has led to contention over what constitutes a "new" or an"existing" resource, a question that has profound ramifications forthe ultimate control of future oil revenue. 

Senior members of Iraq's oil industry argue that a national oilcompany could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues andreducing regional or local claims to a percentage of the revenuederived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious andresist this proposal, affirming the rights of local communities tohave direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. Kurdish leaders havebeen particularly aggressive in asserting independent control of theiroil assets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oilcompanies in northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to benegotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies. 

There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directlyto the population on a per capita basis. These proposals have thepotential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chiefnatural resource, but it would take time to develop a fairdistribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated into statebudget projections for the next several years. There is no institutionin Iraq at present that could properly implement such a distributionsystem. It would take substantial time to establish, and would have tobe based on a well-developed state census and income tax system, whichIraq currently lacks. 

U. S. -Led Reconstruction Efforts

The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion tosupport the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion hasbeen appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. "Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost all the funds have beencommitted. The administration requested $1. 6 billion forreconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1. 485 billion. Theadministration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line foreconomic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. 

Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds forreconstruction. There is a substantial need for continuedreconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about thecapacity of the U. S. And Iraqi governments. 

The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear linesestablishing who is in charge of reconstruction. 

As resources decline, the U. S. Reconstruction effort is changing itsfocus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and health tosmaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some degree managed bylocal communities. A major attempt is also being made to improve thecapacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, andprovincial levels to provide services to the population as well as toselect and manage infrastructure projects. 

The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, butit confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadrobjects to the U. S. Presence in Iraq, and therefore the ministries hecontrols--Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--will not work withAmericans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain andoperate reconstruction projects launched by the United States. 

Several senior military officers commented to us that the Commander'sEmergency Response Program, which funds quick-impact projects such asthe clearing of sewage and the restoration of basic services, isvital. The U. S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, isfocused on long-term economic development and capacity building, butfunds have not been committed to support these efforts into thefuture. The State Department leads seven Provincial ReconstructionTeams operating around the country. These teams can have a positiveeffect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hamperedby significant security constraints. 

Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided tocontractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstructionhas documented numerous instances of waste and abuse. They have notall been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as moreoversight has been exercised and fewer cost-plus contracts have beengranted; in addition, the use of Iraqi contractors has enabled theemployment of more Iraqis in reconstruction projects. 

4. International Support

International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid. International donors pledged $13. 5 billion to support reconstruction, but less than $4 billion has been delivered. 

An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a significantamount of Iraq's government debt and put the country on firmerfinancial footing. But the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia andKuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven. 

The United States is currently working with the United Nations andother partners to fashion the "International Compact" on Iraq. Thegoal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and credits fromthe Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid frominternational donors. In return, the Iraqi government will agree toachieve certain economic reform milestones, such as buildinganticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting a fair legalframework for foreign investors, and reaching economicself-sufficiency by 2012. Several U. S. And international officials toldus that the compact could be an opportunity to seek greater internationalengagement in the country. 

The Region

The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly influence itsstability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a chaoticIraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help it, and some areundercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors aremeddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq's neighbors areintervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official replied, "All of them. "

The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. U. S. Efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focusof U. S. Attention and resources on Iraq. Several Iraqi, U. S. , andinternational officials commented to us that Iraqi opposition to theUnited States--and support for Sadr--spiked in the aftermath ofIsrael's bombing campaign in Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran inIraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States. Many Sunni Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence inIraq and the region. Most of the region's countries are wary of U. S. Efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. 

Neighboring States

IRAN. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. Iranhas long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many of whomwere exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime. Iran hasprovided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militiaswithin Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties. There arealso reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices togroups--including Sunni Arab insurgents--that attack U. S. Forces. TheIranian border with Iraq is porous, and millions of Iranians travel toIraq each year to visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranianmeddling, and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leadingSunni politician told us, "If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, you will find Iran underneath. "

U. S. , Iraqi, and international officials also commented on the rangeof tensions between the United States and Iran, including Iran'snuclear program, Iran's support for terrorism, Iran's influence inLebanon and the region, and Iran's influence in Iraq. Iran appearscontent for the U. S. Military to be tied down in Iraq, a position thatlimits U. S. Options in addressing Iran's nuclear program and allowsIran leverage over stability in Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran andthe United States about the situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the UnitedStates in the streets of Baghdad. "

SYRIA. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis areupset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts toundermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so much to takeactive measures as to countenance malign neglect: the Syrians look theother way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border intoIraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria. LikeIran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. That said, the Syrians have indicated that they want a dialogue withthe United States, and in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomaticrelations with Iraq after a 24-year break. 

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. These countries for the most parthave been passive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debtrelief or substantial economic assistance to the Iraqi government. Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians complained that Saudi Arabia hasnot provided political support for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. One observed that Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when theIraqi government was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq. Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals withinSaudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments helpfacilitate U. S. Military operations in Iraq by providing basing andoverflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues. 

As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming moreactive. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have hosted meetings insupport of the International Compact. Saudi Arabia recently took thepositive step of hosting a conference of Iraqi religious leaders inMecca. Several Gulf States have helped foster dialogue with Iraq'sSunni Arab population. While the Gulf States are not proponents ofdemocracy in Iraq, they worry about the direction of events:battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq could pose a threat to their owninternal stability, and the growth of Iranian influence in the regionis deeply troubling to them. 

TURKEY. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging Kurdishnationalism, which is seen as an existential threat to Turkey's owninternal stability. The Turks have supported the Turkmen minoritywithin Iraq and have used their influence to try to block theincorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, andTurkish and Kurdish leaders have sought constructive engagement onpolitical, security, and economic issues. 

The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the KurdishWorkers Party (PKK)--a terrorist group based in northern Iraq that haskilled thousands of Turks. They are upset that the United States andIraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. The Turks havethreatened to go after the PKK themselves, and have made severalforays across the border into Iraq. 

JORDAN AND EGYPT. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided some assistancefor the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained thousands of Iraqipolice, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and King Abdullah recentlyhosted a meeting in Amman between President Bush and Prime MinisterMaliki. Egypt has provided some limited Iraqi army training. BothJordan and Egypt have facilitated U. S. Military operations--Jordan byallowing overflight and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt byallowing overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide importantcooperation on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700, 000 Iraqirefugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears a flood ofmany more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned about the position ofIraq's Sunni Arabs and want constitutional reforms in Iraq to bolsterthe Sunni community. They also fear the return of insurgents to theircountries. 

The International Community

The international community beyond the United Kingdom and our othercoalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq. The UnitedNations--acting under Security Council Resolution 1546--has a smallpresence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding elections, drafting theconstitution, organizing the government, and building institutions. The World Bank, which has committed a limited number of resources, hasone and sometimes two staff in Iraq. The European Union has arepresentative there. 

Several U. S. -based and international nongovernmental organizationshave done excellent work within Iraq, operating under great hardship. Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations play animportant role in reaching across sectarian lines to enhance dialogueand understanding, and several U. S. -based organizations have employedsubstantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, the participation of international nongovernmental organizations isconstrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts facea cumbersome and often politicized process of registration with thegovernment. 

The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary amount of resourcesto Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In addition to 7, 200 troops, the United Kingdom has a substantial diplomatic presence, particularlyin Basra and the Iraqi southeast. The United Kingdom has been anactive and key player at every stage of Iraq's political development. U. K. Officials told us that they remain committed to working forstability in Iraq, and will reduce their commitment of troops andresources in response to the situation on the ground. 

5. Conclusions

The United States has made a massive commitment to the future of Iraqin both blood and treasure. As of December 2006, nearly 2, 900Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 21, 000Americans have been wounded, many severely. 

To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the IraqWar, and costs are running about $8 billion per month. In addition, the United States must expect significant "tail costs" to come. Caringfor veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundredsof billions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for thefinal cost of the U. S. Involvement in Iraq. 

Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and thesituation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility fortheir own future. Iraq's neighbors and much of the internationalcommunity have not been persuaded to play an active and constructiverole in supporting Iraq. The ability of the United States to shapeoutcomes is diminishing. Time is running out. 

B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequencescould be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and theworld. 

Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflictgreater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq'sgovernment and economy would further cripple a country already unableto meet its people's needs. Iraq's security forces could split alongsectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as morerefugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjectedto another strongman who flexes the political and military musclerequired to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost. 

Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing theirborders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene toprotect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broaderregional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to preventKurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops torestore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oilfields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when thatcountry is on a path to producing nuclear weapons. 

Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear thedistinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections--perhaps fomented byIran--in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict couldopen a Pandora's box of problems--including the radicalization ofpopulations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes--thatmight take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads tothe other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could leadto a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the globaleconomy. 

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is nowa franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's. " Left unchecked, al Qaeda inIraq could continue to incite violence between Sunnis and Shia. Achaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations forterrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda willportray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significantvictory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for theircause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy toOsama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they willseek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to thesecular countries neighboring Iraq. " A senior European official toldus that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within hiscountry. 

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descendsfurther into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U. S. Military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. Perceived failurethere could diminish America's credibility and influence in a regionthat is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world'senergy supply. This loss would reduce America's global influence at atime when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demandour full attention and strong U. S. Leadership of internationalalliances. And the longer that U. S. Political and military resourcesare tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure inAfghanistan increase. 

Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization withinthe United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of thegovernment's handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel thatthere is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections werelargely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Argumentsabout continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fallon deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the governmentthat the United States invested so much to create. U. S. Foreign policycannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of theAmerican people. 

Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater Iraqi oppositionto the United States. Recent polling indicates that only 36 percent ofIraqis feel their country is heading in the right direction, and 79percent of Iraqis have a "mostly negative" view of the influence thatthe United States has in their country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqisapprove of attacks on U. S. -led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceiveAmericans as representing an occupying force, the United States couldbecome its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. 

These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq and theregion are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several positivesteps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown: Iraqis restored fullsovereignty, conducted open national elections, drafted a permanentconstitution, ratified that constitution, and elected a new governmentpursuant to that constitution. Iraqis may become so sobered by theprospect of an unfolding civil war and intervention by their regionalneighbors that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. Butat the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the Iraqipeople and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate the capacity orwill to act. 

C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq

Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of itsconsequences for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world, the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range ofalternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that there isno perfect solution and that all that have been suggested have flaws. The following are some of the more notable possibilities that we haveconsidered. 

1. Precipitate Withdrawal

Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, andthe role and commitments of the United States in initiating eventsthat have led to the current situation, we believe it would be wrongfor the United States to abandon the country through a precipitatewithdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure fromIraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence andfurther deterioration of conditions, leading to a number of theadverse consequences outlined above. The near-term results would be asignificant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regionaldestabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda woulddepict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraqdescends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventuallyrequire the United States to return. 

2. Staying the Course

Current U. S. Policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraqis rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning ata high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The UnitedStates is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to otherinternational crises is constrained. A majority of the American peopleare soured on the war. This level of expense is not sustainable overan extended period, especially when progress is not being made. Thelonger the United States remains in Iraq without progress, the moreresentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they are subjects of arepressive American occupation. As one U. S. Official said to us, "Ourleaving would make it worse. . . . The current approach withoutmodification will not make it better. "

3. More Troops for Iraq

Sustained increases in U. S. Troop levels would not solve thefundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence ofnational reconciliation. A senior American general told us that addingU. S. Troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highlylocalized area. However, past experience indicates that the violencewould simply rekindle as soon as U. S. Forces are moved to anotherarea. As another American general told us, if the Iraqi governmentdoes not make political progress, "all the troops in the world willnot provide security. " Meanwhile, America's military capacity isstretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make asubstantial, sustained increase in our troop presence. Increaseddeployments to Iraq would also necessarily hamper our ability toprovide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respondto crises around the world. 

4. Devolution to Three Regions

The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomousregions with loose central control would be too high. Because Iraq'spopulation is not neatly separated, regional boundaries cannot be easilydrawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces have mixed populations, as doBaghdad and most other major cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution couldresult in mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi securityforces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilizationof neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominateIraqi regions. Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such adivision would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that theUnited States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state. 

While such devolution is a possible consequence of continuedinstability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States shouldsupport this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on theIraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the United States should manage the situation to amelioratehumanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence, andminimize regional instability. The United States should support asmuch as possible central control by governmental authorities inBaghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues. 

D. Achieving Our Goals

We agree with the goal of U. S. Policy in Iraq, as stated by thePresident: an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defenditself. " In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadlyrepresentative government that maintains its territorial integrity, isat peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn'tbrutalize its own people. Given the current situation in Iraq, achieving this goal will require much time and will depend primarilyon the actions of the Iraqi people. 

In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the United States tosupport this objective, and it will offer people of Iraq a reasonableopportunity to lead a better life than they did under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of the policyalternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that itincludes the best strategies and tactics available to us to positivelyinfluence the outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it couldenable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people achance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America'sinterests and values in the years ahead. 

II

The Way Forward--A New Approach

Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are takenpromptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that have astake in the Middle East. 

To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course must be madeboth outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a comprehensivestrategy to build regional and international support for stability inIraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to assume control of their owndestiny. It offers a responsible transition. 

Externally, the United States should immediately begin to employ allelements of American power to construct a regional mechanism that cansupport, rather than retard, progress in Iraq. Internally, the Iraqigovernment must take the steps required to achieve nationalreconciliation, reduce violence, and improve the daily lives ofIraqis. Efforts to implement these external and internal strategiesmust begin now and must be undertaken in concert with one another. 

This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U. S. Presence in Iraq over time. 

A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus

The United States must build a new international consensus forstability in Iraq and the region. 

In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark ona robust diplomatic effort to establish an international supportstructure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in othercountries in the region. This support structure should include everycountry that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including allof Iraq's neighbors--Iran and Syria among them. Despite the well-knowndifferences between many of these countries, they all share aninterest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from achaotic Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regionaldestabilization. 

A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is clear thatthe Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, defending, andsustaining itself by relying on U. S. Military and economic supportalone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U. S. Military support in conjunction with Iraqi military and policecapabilities. Some states have been withholding commitments they couldmake to support Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction. Some stateshave been actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve apolitical solution within Iraq, a broader international supportstructure is needed. 

1. The New Diplomatic Offensive

Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other majorregional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put itsimply, all key issues in the Middle East--the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremismand terrorism--are inextricably linked. In addition to supportingstability in Iraq, a comprehensive diplomatic offensive--the NewDiplomatic Offensive--should address these key regional issues. Bydoing so, it would help marginalize extremists and terrorists, promoteU. S. Values and interests, and improve America's global image. 

Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and internationalinitiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government in achievingcertain security, political, and economic milestones. Achieving thesemilestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq's neighbors, and their active and timely cooperation would be highly desirable. 

The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic"Compact for Iraq" by also emphasizing political, diplomatic, andsecurity issues. At the same time, it would be coordinated with thegoals of the Compact for Iraq. The diplomatic offensive would also bebroader and more far-reaching than the "Gulf Plus Two" effortscurrently being conducted, and those efforts should be folded into andbecome part of the diplomatic offensive. 

States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a major rolein reinforcing national reconciliation efforts between Iraqi Sunnisand Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute substantially tolegitimizing of the political process in Iraq. Iraq's leaders may notbe able to come together unless they receive the necessary signals andsupport from abroad. This backing will not materialize of its ownaccord, and must be encouraged urgently by the United States. 

In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution, the StudyGroup recommends as follows:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqigovernment, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensiveto deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This newdiplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relatesto regional players should be to:

i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. 

ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbors. 

iii. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols withneighboring countries. 

iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyondIraq's borders. 

v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government fromnon-neighboring Muslim nations. 

vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation inIraq. 

vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad. 

viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in keycapitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). 

ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk. 

x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including better performance onissues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oilrevenues, and the dismantling of militias. 

RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and inaddition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States andthe Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference ormeeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference orthe Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promotingnational reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomaticpresence in Iraq. 

2. The Iraq International Support Group

This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includesthe active participation of those countries that have a critical stakein preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage theirparticipation, the United States should immediately seek the creationof the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should alsoinclude all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countriesin the region and the world. 

The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakingson the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assistIraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting tostrengthen Iraq's sovereignty--not diminish it. 

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighborsare anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraqthat is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but notso powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup ofthe Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation inIraq through the filter of its particular set of interests. Forexample:

--Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistanbecause of its own national security considerations. 

--Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq, but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its influenceand hedge its bets on possible outcomes. 

--Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups, would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq would haveon its own multiethnic and multiconfessional society. 

--Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim ofIraqi irredentism and aggression. 

--Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy inIraq and the region as a whole. 

--The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an outcomein Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunnitensions. 

--None of Iraq's neighbors--especially major countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel--see it in their interest for the situationin Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence by Iran. Indeed, they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence, steps that couldlead to an intraregional conflict. 

Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to reinforceethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi society. Butif the Support Group takes a systematic and active approach towardconsidering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can beencouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region. 

SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia's agreement not to intervene withassistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid pro quo forsimilar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, especially Iran. The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconciledifferences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in theIslamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hostingof a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Mecca suggests. If thegovernment in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation withthe Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaedain Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate. 

TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq's borders, Turkey canbe a partner in supporting the national reconciliation process inIraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful given Turkey's interestin Kurdistan remaining an integral part of a unified Iraq and itsinterest in preventing a safe haven for Kurdish terrorists (the PKK). 

EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world, Egypt shouldbe encouraged to foster the national reconciliation process in Iraqwith a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. At the same time, Egypt has the means, and indeed has offered, to train groups of Iraqimilitary and security forces in Egypt on a rotational basis. 

JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliationprocess in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professionalcapability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, anIraq International Support Group should be organized immediatelyfollowing the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive. 

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all thestates bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regionalstates, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanentmembers of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union;and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries--for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea--that might be willing to contribute toresolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraqcould also become members. 

RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of theSupport Group should be carried out with urgency, and should beconducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U. S. Effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, ascircumstances require. 

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participationof the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. TheUnited Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy ashis representative. 

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New DiplomaticOffensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countriesthat take into account the interests, perspectives, and potentialcontributions as suggested above. 

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria

Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is ourview that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversariesand enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistentwith its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should activelyengage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, withoutpreconditions. 

The Study Group recognizes that U. S. Relationships with Iran and Syriainvolve difficult issues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talksshould be extensive and substantive, and they will require a balancingof interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and militarydisincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, the United States should also consider incentives to try to engagethem constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya. 

Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include:

i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighborsand the region. 

ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Talibanfrom destabilizing Afghanistan. 

iii. Accession to international organizations, including the WorldTrade Organization. 

iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the UnitedStates. 

v. The prospect of a U. S. Policy that emphasizes political andeconomic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocatingregime change. 

vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiatedbetween Israel and Syria, with U. S. Involvement as part of a broaderinitiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below. 

RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive andthe Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iranand Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructivepolicies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria andIran, the United States should consider incentives, as well asdisincentives, in seeking constructive results. 

IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of theU. S. -Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperatedin Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model canbe replicated in the case of Iraq. 

Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States boggeddown in Iraq, Iran's interests would not be served by a failure ofU. S. Policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorialdisintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran's population is slightly morethan 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percentof the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-casescenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, withserious consequences for Iranian national security interests. 

Our limited contacts with Iran's government lead us to believe thatits leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomaticefforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctanceto their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran. 

Nevertheless, as one of Iraq's neighbors Iran should be asked toassume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. AnIranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of theworld Iran's rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead toits isolation. Further, Iran's refusal to cooperate on this matterwould diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in thebroader dialogue it seeks. 

RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran's nuclear programs shouldcontinue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council andits five permanent members (i. E. , the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany. 

RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group shouldseek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improvethe situation in Iraq. 

Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following:

--Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training toany group resorting to violence in Iraq. 

--Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity ofIraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty ofIraq and its government. 

--Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, toencourage national reconciliation. 

--Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economicreconstruction of Iraq. 

SYRIA. Although the U. S. -Syrian relationship is at a low point, bothcountries have important interests in the region that could beenhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how tomove forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. Inthis context, Syria's national interests in the Arab-Israeli disputeare important and can be brought into play. 

Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq's stability in severalways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the following:

RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group shouldencourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as thefollowing:

--Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extentpossible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, andterrorists in and out of Iraq. 

--Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with theIraqis. 

--Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq. 

4. The Wider Regional Context

The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the MiddleEast unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeliconflict. 

There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United Statesto a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution forIsrael and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who acceptIsrael's right to exist), and particularly Syria--which is theprincipal transit point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, andwhich supports radical Palestinian groups. 

The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding directinvolvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, we should act boldly:

--There is no military solution to this conflict. 

--The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being anation perpetually at war. 

--No American administration--Democratic or Republican--will everabandon Israel. 

--Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israelidispute because it is an axiom that when the political process breaksdown there will be violence on the ground. 

--The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth inUN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of"land for peace. "

--The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such asIsrael has achieved with Egypt and Jordan. 

This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in theregion, especially the democratically elected government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas. 

RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment bythe United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts:Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to atwo-state solution for Israel and Palestine. 

RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include--as soon as possible--theunconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspicesof the United States or the Quartet (i. E. , the United States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanonand Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (whoacknowledge Israel's right to exist) on the other. The purpose ofthese meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the MadridConference in 1991, and on two separate tracks--one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian. 

RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiatedpeace should be: be:

--Syria's full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 ofAugust 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regainsovereign control over its territory. 

--Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into politicalassassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and PierreGemayel. 

--A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use ofSyrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid toHezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel's problem withHezbollah. )

--Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for therelease of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers. 

--A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine thedemocratically elected government of Lebanon. 

--A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting throughSyria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups. 

--A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment ofIsrael's right to exist. 

--Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context ofa full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return theGolan Heights, with a U. S. Security guarantee for Israel that couldinclude an international force on the border, including U. S. Troops ifrequested by both parties. 

RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of thatnegotiated peace should include:

--Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to theprinciple of land for peace, which are the only bases for achievingpeace. 

--Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and thePalestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way fornegotiations with Israel. 

--A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidatingthe cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis inNovember 2006. 

--Support for a Palestinian national unity government. 

--Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement alongthe lines of President Bush's two-state solution, which would addressthe key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, theright of return, and the end of conflict. 

Afghanistan

At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of thesituation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by theTaliban. Afghanistan's borders are porous. If the Taliban were tocontrol more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda the politicalspace to conduct terrorist operations. This development woulddestabilize the region and have national security implications for theUnited States and other countries around the world. Also, thesignificant increase in poppy production in Afghanistan fuels theillegal drug trade and narco-terrorism. 

The huge focus of U. S. Political, military, and economic support onIraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan. As theUnited States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, it must also give priority to the situation in Afghanistan. Doing somay require increased political, security, and military measures. 

RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provideadditional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces aremoved from Iraq. 

B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves

The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper externalenvironment and support for the difficult internal steps that theIraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, establish security, and make progress on governance. 

The most important issues facing Iraq's future are now theresponsibility of Iraq's elected leaders. Because of the security andassistance it provides, the United States has a significant role toplay. Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustaincertain decisions critical to Iraq's future. 

1. Performance on Milestones

The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to supportthe achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on nationalreconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizensof the United States and other countries--that it deserves continuedsupport. 

The U. S. Government must make clear that it expects action by theIraqi government to make substantial progress toward these milestones. Such a message can be sent only at the level of our national leaders, and only in person, during direct consultation. 

As President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain inclose and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. There is nosubstitute for sustained dialogue at the highest levels of government. 

During these high-level exchanges, the United States should lay out anagenda for continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as wellas underscoring the consequences if Iraq does not act. It should beunambiguous that continued U. S. Political, military, and economicsupport for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government's demonstratingpolitical will and making substantial progress toward the achievementof milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance. The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces unitsfrom the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq'sperformance on milestones. 

The United States should also signal that it is seeking broadinternational support for Iraq on behalf of achieving thesemilestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climatefor its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, throughpublic statements by President Bush that reject the notion that theUnited States seeks to control Iraq's oil, or seeks permanent militarybases within Iraq. However, the United States could consider a requestfrom Iraq for temporary bases. 

RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his nationalsecurity team should remain in close and frequent contact with theIraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: theremust be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progresstoward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, thePresident should convey as much detail as possible about the substanceof these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqipeople, and the countries in the region well informed. 

RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political willand makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones onnational reconciliation, security, and governance, the United Statesshould make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraqbecomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, the U. S. Military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced. 

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantialprogress toward the achievement of milestones on nationalreconciliation, security, and governance, the United States shouldreduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqigovernment. 

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United Statesdoes not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqigovernment were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U. S. Government could consider that request as it would in the case of anyother government. 

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United Statesdoes not seek to control Iraq's oil. 

Milestones for Iraq

The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are necessaryto avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime Minister Malikihas worked closely in consultation with the United States and has putforward the following milestones in the key areas of nationalreconciliation, security and governance:

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

By the end of 2006-early 2007:

Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an election date

Approval of the Petroleum Law

Approval of the De-Baathification Law

Approval of the Militia Law

By March 2007:

A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary)

By May 2007:

Completion of Militia Law implementation

Approval of amnesty agreement

Completion of reconciliation efforts

By June 2007:

Provincial elections

SECURITY (pending joint U. S. -Iraqi review)

By the end of 2006:

Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels

By April 2007:

Iraqi control of the Army

By September 2007:

Iraqi control of provinces

By December 2007:

Iraqi security self-reliance (with U. S. Support)

GOVERNANCE

By the end of 2006:

The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 percent andappreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to combat acceleratinginflation. 

Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleumproducts and sell imported fuel at market prices. 

RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. Theseshould be completed by the first quarter of 2007. 

RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The UnitedStates should consult closely with the Iraqi government and developadditional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily livesof Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestonesshould be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible. 

2. National Reconciliation

National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence andmaintain the unity of Iraq. 

U. S. Forces can help provide stability for a time to enable Iraqileaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot stop theviolence--or even contain it--if there is no underlying politicalagreement among Iraqis about the future of their country. 

The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis that there isa place for them in national life. The government needs to act now, togive a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe they can get a fair dealin Iraq through the political process, there is no prospect that theinsurgency will end. To strike this fair deal, the Iraqi governmentand the Iraqi people must address several issues that are critical tothe success of national reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq. 

Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation

RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution isessential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on anurgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, andshould play a role in this process. 

RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliationrequires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists intonational life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regimeexcluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualifiedIraqi professionals--Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurdor Turkmen or Christian or Arab--into the government. 

RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue tothe central government and be shared on the basis of population. Noformula that gives control over revenues from future fields to theregions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatiblewith national reconciliation. 

RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections shouldbe held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, newprovincial elections should have been held already. They are necessaryto restore representative government. 

RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation inKirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communalviolence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations couldmake it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (asrequired by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would beexplosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on theagenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the NewDiplomatic Offensive. 

RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those inthe government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitterenemies. 

RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights ofall minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected. 

RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stopusing the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as atool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registrationshould be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for governmentcensorship and interference. 

Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of NationalReconciliation

The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq'sreconciliation process. 

The presence of U. S. Forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in anational reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the UnitedStates to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach thatwe oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make cleartheir shared interest in the orderly departure of U. S. Forces as Iraqiforces take on the security mission. A successful nationalreconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. 

RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U. S. Force presence mustbe on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialoguetakes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood ofparticipation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increasethe possibilities for success. 

Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue mustinvolve those who wield power, not simply those who hold politicaloffice. The United States must try to talk directly to Grand AyatollahSistani and must consider appointing a high-level American Shia Muslimto serve as an emissary to him. The United States must also try totalk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgentleaders. The United Nations can help facilitate contacts. 

RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts toengage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The UnitedStates must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtadaal-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders. 

The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presentsopportunities to seek broader support for a national reconciliationdialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international community andreligious leaders can play an important role in fostering dialogue andreconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States shouldactively encourage the constructive participation of all who can takepart in advancing national reconciliation within Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue betweensectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensiveabove. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq tospeak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation. 

Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an importantincentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be generous. Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be difficult for theUnited States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqisto make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis, not by Americans. Despite being politically unpopular--in the UnitedStates as well as in Iraq--amnesty is essential if progress is to takeplace. Iraqi leaders need to be certain that they have U. S. Support asthey move forward with this critical element of nationalreconciliation. 

RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut inWashington by either the executive or the legislative branch. 

Militias and National Reconciliation

The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate andnecessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violenceagainst institutions of the state. However, solving the problem ofmilitias requires national reconciliation. 

Dealing with Iraq's militias will require long-term attention, andsubstantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize, andreintegrate militia members into civilian society. Around the world, this process of transitioning members of irregular military forcesfrom civil conflict to new lives once a peace settlement takes hold isfamiliar. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration ofmilitias depends on national reconciliation and on confidence-buildingmeasures among the parties to that reconciliation. 

Both the United Nations and expert and experienced nongovernmentalorganizations, especially the International Organization forMigration, must be on the ground with appropriate personnel monthsbefore any program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militiamembers begins. Because the United States is a party to the conflict, the U. S. Military should not be involved in implementing such aprogram. Yet U. S. Financial and technical support is crucial. 

RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence ofneutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government onthe processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. 

RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial andtechnical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinateassistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid aprogram to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members. 

3. Security and Military Forces

A Military Strategy for Iraq

There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, canbring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the U. S. AndIraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increasethe probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance ofsuccess. 

The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed nationalreconciliation program to which it has already committed. And itshould accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security byincreasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the IraqiArmy increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should beable to take real responsibility for governance. 

While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the UnitedStates should significantly increase the number of U. S. Militarypersonnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting IraqiArmy units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combatforces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U. S. Forces in Iraq shouldevolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take overprimary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue tomaintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operationsforces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and forceprotection units. 

While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately amatter for the Iraqi government to determine, we should be firm on theurgent near-term need for significant additional trained Armybrigades, since this is the key to Iraqis taking over fullresponsibility for their own security, which they want to do and whichwe need them to do. It is clear that they will still need securityassistance from the United States for some time to come as they workto achieve political and security changes. 

One of the most important elements of our support would be theimbedding of substantially more U. S. Military personnel in all IraqiArmy battalions and brigades, as well as within Iraqi companies. U. S. Personnel would provide advice, combat assistance, and staffassistance. The training of Iraqi units by the United States hasimproved and should continue for the coming year. In addition to thistraining, Iraqi combat units need supervised on-the-job training asthey move to field operations. This on-the-job training could be bestdone by imbedding more U. S. Military personnel in Iraqi deployedunits. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on therecommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should belarge enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capabilityin Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve 10, 000 to 20, 000American troops instead of the 3, 000 to 4, 000 now in this role. Thisincrease in imbedded troops could be carried out without an aggregateincrease over time in the total number of troops in Iraq by making acorresponding decrease in troops assigned to U. S. Combat brigades. 

Another mission of the U. S. Military would be to assist Iraqi deployedbrigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logisticssupport, as well as providing some key equipment. 

A vital mission of the U. S. Military would be to maintainrapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These teams would beavailable to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq whenthe opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vitalby the U. S. Commander in Iraq. 

The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improvedif it had improved equipment. One source could be equipment leftbehind by departing U. S. Units. The quickest and most effective wayfor the Iraqi Army to get the bulk of their equipment would be throughour Foreign Military Sales program, which they have already begun touse. 

While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigadesare being deployed, U. S. Combat brigades could begin to move out ofIraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developmentsin the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades notnecessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U. S. Combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embeddedwith Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, andin training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search andrescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even afterthe United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we wouldmaintain a considerable military presence in the region, with ourstill significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, andnaval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as anincreased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficientlyrobust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions:

--Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order toavoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country. 

--Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq usingspecial operations teams. 

--Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces. 

--Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran. 

Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals andto our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to makea substantial increase (100, 000 to 200, 000) in the number of U. S. Troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe thatthe needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects ofthe security problem that are fed by the view that the U. S. Presenceis intended to be a long-term "occupation. " We could, however, supporta short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces tostabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U. S. Commander in Iraq determines that such steps would beeffective. 

We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because webelieve that so much is at stake. 

We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army thesupport it needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibilityfor Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the securitysituation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have thatsecurity role taken over by Iraqi security forces. 

The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keeplarge numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compellingreasons. 

First, and most importantly, the United States faces other securitydangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of Americanground forces at present levels will leave no reserve available tomeet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones, our NATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U. S. And NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Talibanforces. The United States should respond positively to that request, and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those inIran and North Korea. 

Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq atcurrent levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than athird of the Army units currently at high readiness levels. The Armyis unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraqwithout undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army isnow considering breaking its compact with the National Guard andReserves that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldierscan be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term riskthat the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will take yearsto reverse. 

And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would notprovide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take thepolitical actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarianviolence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi governmentmight continue to delay taking those difficult actions. 

While it is clear that the presence of U. S. Troops in Iraq ismoderating the violence, there is little evidence that the long-termdeployment of U. S. Troops by itself has led or will lead tofundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important torecognize that there are no risk-free alternatives available to theUnited States at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments inIraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leavingthose forces tied down in Iraq indefinitely creates its own set ofsecurity risks. 

RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-endedcommitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqigovernment that the United States could carry out its plans, includingplanned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its plannedchanges. America's other security needs and the future of our militarycannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqigovernment. 

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training andequipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by GeneralGeorge Casey on October 24, 2006. 

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with thehighest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, andsupport mission and to counterterrorism operations. 

RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U. S. Officers andmilitary personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, andAmerican teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the companylevel. The U. S. Military should establish suitable career-enhancingincentives for these officers and personnel. 

RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and betterequipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government toaccelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combatbrigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipmentfor Iraqi forces. 

Restoring the U. S. Military

We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that havegreat consequence for our nation. One consequence has been the stressand uncertainty imposed on our military--the most professional andproficient military in history. The United States will need itsmilitary to protect U. S. Security regardless of what happens in Iraq. We therefore considered how to limit the adverse consequences of thestrain imposed on our military by the Iraq war. 

U. S. Military forces, especially our ground forces, have beenstretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments inIraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3, 000 dead and more than21, 000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and acceleratedwear on equipment. 

Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray, as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs become clear. Itwill be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for othercurrent and future security threats that need to be accommodatedtogether with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a highpriority for the United States at this time. 

The U. S. Military has a long tradition of strong partnership betweenthe civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformedservices. Both have long benefited from a relationship in which thecivilian leadership exercises control with the advantage of fullycandid professional advice, and the military serves loyally with theunderstanding that its advice has been heard and valued. Thattradition has frayed, and civil-military relations need to berepaired. 

RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make everyeffort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating anenvironment in which the senior military feel free to offerindependent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagonbut also to the President and the National Security Council, asenvisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadershipshould emphasize training and education programs for the forces thathave returned to the continental United States in order to "reset" theforce and restore the U. S. Military to a high level of readiness forglobal contingencies. 

RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congressshould appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to fullfunctionality over the next five years. 

RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with therelevant committees of Congress, should assess the full futurebudgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on thefuture readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retainhigh-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in researchand development, and the budgets of other U. S. Government agenciesinvolved in the stability and reconstruction effort. 

4. Police and Criminal Justice

The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system areprofound. 

The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support the missionto "protect and serve" all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police donot embrace that mission, in part because of problems in how reformswere organized and implemented by the Iraqi and U. S. Governments. 

Recommended Iraqi Actions

Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and preventmilitia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization ofIraq's component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, the IraqiBorder Police, and the Iraqi Police Service. 

The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more military thandomestic in nature--involving commando-style operations--and is thusill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior. The more natural home forthe National Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which should bethe authority for counterinsurgency operations and heavily armedforces. Though depriving the Ministry of the Interior of operationalforces, this move will place the Iraqi National Police under betterand more rigorous Iraqi and U. S. Supervision and will enable theseunits to better perform their counterinsurgency mission. 

RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should betransferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commandounits will become part of the new Iraqi Army. 

Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bearslittle resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light of thecurrent flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and weaponry acrossIraq's borders and the need for joint patrols of the border withforeign militaries. Thus the natural home for the Border Police iswithin the Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority forcontrolling Iraq's borders. 

RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should betransferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have totalresponsibility for border control and external security. 

The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and provideslocal policing, needs to become a true police force. It needs legalauthority, training, and equipment to control crime and protect Iraqicitizens. Accomplishing those goals will not be easy, and the presenceof American advisors will be required to help the Iraqis determine anew role for the police. 

RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greaterresponsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expandits cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system inorder to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians. 

In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, theMinistry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial reforms topurge bad elements and highlight best practices. Once the ministrybegins to function effectively, it can exert a positive influence overthe provinces and take back some of the authority that was lost tolocal governments through decentralization. To reduce corruption andmilitia infiltration, the Ministry of the Interior should takeauthority from the local governments for the handling of policingfunds. Doing so will improve accountability and organizationaldiscipline, limit the authority of provincial police officials, andidentify police officers with the central government. 

RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo aprocess of organizational transformation, including efforts to expandthe capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or CriminalInvestigation Division) and to exert more authority over local policeforces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disbursefinancial support to local police should be transferred to theMinistry of the Interior. 

Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities ProtectionService under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the members willtake their weapons and become full-time militiamen or insurgents. Allshould be brought under the authority of a reformed Ministry of theInterior. They will need to be vetted, retrained, and closelysupervised. Those who are no longer part of the Facilities ProtectionService need to participate in a disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration program (outlined above). 

RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceedwith current efforts to identify, register, and control the FacilitiesProtection Service. 

U. S. Actions

The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U. S. Trainingmission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It hasnot always been clear who is in charge of the police training mission, and the U. S. Military lacks expertise in certain areas pertaining topolice and the rule of law. The United States has been more successfulin training the Iraqi Army than it has the police. The U. S. Departmentof Justice has the expertise and capacity to carry out the policetraining mission. The U. S. Department of Defense is already bearingtoo much of the burden in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise inthe United States on policing and the rule of law has beenunderutilized. 

The United States should adjust its training mission in Iraq to matchthe recommended changes in the Iraqi government--the movement of theNational and Border Police to the Ministry of Defense and the newemphasis on the Iraqi Police Service within the Ministry of theInterior. To reflect the reorganization, the Department of Defensewould continue to train the Iraqi National and Border Police, and theDepartment of Justice would become responsible for training the IraqiPolice Service. 

RECOMMENDATION 55: The U. S. Department of Defense should continue itsmission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi BorderPolice, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. 

RECOMMENDATION 56: The U. S. Department of Justice should direct thetraining mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry ofthe Interior. 

RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U. S. Military training teams are imbeddedwithin Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U. S. Policetrainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian trainingofficers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the IraqiPolice Service, including local police stations. These trainers shouldbe obtained from among experienced civilian police executives andsupervisors from around the world. These officers would replace themilitary police personnel currently assigned to training teams. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to trainthe Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded a large teamwithin Iraq for counterterrorism activities. 

Building on this experience, the training programs should be expandedand should include the development of forensic investigation trainingand facilities that could apply scientific and technical investigativemethods to counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal activity. 

RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative andforensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage ofterrorism as well as criminal activity. 

One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its lackof equipment, particularly in the area of communications and motortransport. 

RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expandand upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the IraqiPolice Service. 

The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department ofDefense to carry out the mission of reforming Iraq's Ministry of theInterior and Iraq's judicial system. Iraq needs more than training forcops on the beat: it needs courts, trained prosecutors andinvestigators, and the ability to protect Iraqi judicial officials. 

RECOMMENDATION 60: The U. S. Department of Justice should lead the workof organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. Thisapproach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels andmoving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standardadministrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measuresthat Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up inpartnership. 

RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U. S. Department of Justice toestablish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; andto create institutions and practices to fight corruption must bestrongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses withimproved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicialstaff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Serviceare essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice. 

5. The Oil Sector

Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of theIraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraqmaximize its capability. 

Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oilproduction from existing fields to 3. 0 to 3. 5 million barrels a dayover a three-to five-year period, depending on evolving conditions inkey reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil productionwould decline unless current problems in the oil sector wereaddressed. 

Short Term

RECOMMENDATION 62:

--As soon as possible, the U. S. Government should provide technicalassistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law thatdefines the rights of regional and local governments and creates afiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essentialto attract investment. 

--The U. S. Government should encourage the Iraqi government toaccelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in thesouthern fields needed to increase production, but the United Statesshould no longer fund such infrastructure projects. 

--The U. S. Military should work with the Iraqi military and withprivate security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a program to improve pipelinesecurity by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput(rather than fixed amounts). 

--Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. Thisstep would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector. 

--In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U. S. Government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in theenergy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis paymarket prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain. 

Long Term

Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will requirecreating corporate structures, establishing management systems, andinstalling competent managers to plan and oversee an ambitious list ofmajor oil-field investment projects. 

To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts forward thefollowing recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATION 63:

--The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sectorby the international community and by international energy companies. 

--The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize thenational oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhanceefficiency, transparency, and accountability. 

--To combat corruption, the U. S. Government should urge the Iraqigovernment to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Webso that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and exportrevenues. 

--The United States should support the World Bank's efforts to ensurethat best practices are used in contracting. This support involvesproviding Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training themin contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits. 

--The United States should provide technical assistance to theMinistry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the paymentsprocess, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updatingprofessional training programs for management and technical personnel. 

6. U. S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance

Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heartof U. S. Reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demandsadditional U. S. Resources. 

Progress in providing essential government services is necessary tosustain any progress on the political or security front. The period oflarge U. S. -funded reconstruction projects is over, yet the Iraqigovernment is still in great need of technical assistance and adviceto build the capacity of its institutions. The Iraqi government needshelp with all aspects of its operations, including improvedprocedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internalcontrols. The strong emphasis on building capable central ministriesmust be accompanied by efforts to develop functioning, effectiveprovincial government institutions with local citizen participation. 

Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for private-sectorjob generation, but the Commander's Emergency Response Programis a necessary transitional mechanism until security and the economicclimate improve. It provides immediate economic assistance for trashpickup, water, sewers, and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations, and it should be funded generously. Atotal of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY 2006. 

RECOMMENDATION 64: U. S. Economic assistance should be increased to alevel of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must workhard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and jobcreation, including reliance on the Commander's Emergency ResponseProgram, should be U. S. Priorities. Economic assistance should beprovided on a nonsectarian basis. 

The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more internationalpartners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The UnitedNations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League membersneed to become hands-on participants in Iraq's reconstruction. 

RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraqshould be greater involvement by and with international partners, whoshould do more than just contribute money. They should also activelyparticipate in the design and construction of projects. 

The number of refugees and internally displaced persons within Iraq isincreasing dramatically. If this situation is not addressed, Iraq andthe region could be further destabilized, and the humanitariansuffering could be severe. Funding for international relief efforts isinsufficient, and should be increased. 

RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in fundingassistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees, and other humanitarian agencies. 

Coordination of Economic and Reconstruction Assistance

A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington stillhampers U. S. Contributions to Iraq's reconstruction. 

Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in shortsupply. No single official is assigned responsibility or heldaccountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives ofkey foreign partners involved in reconstruction have also spoken to usdirectly and specifically about the need for a point of contact thatcan coordinate their efforts with the U. S. Government. 

A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies continuingto follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer dollars onduplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste will furtherundermine public confidence in U. S. Policy in Iraq. 

A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. Heor she should report to the President, be given a staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting ofsenior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U. S. Government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor'sresponsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. TheSenior Advisor must act as the principal point of contact with U. S. Partners in the overall reconstruction effort. 

He or she must have close and constant interaction with senior U. S. Officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially the Director ofthe Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, so that the realitieson the ground are brought directly and fully into the policy-makingprocess. In order to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, allinvolved must be on the same page at all times. 

RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor forEconomic Reconstruction in Iraq. ATION 67: The President should createa Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. 

Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs

Congress should work with the administration to improve its ability toimplement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, andeffectively. 

As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have theauthority to fund quick-disbursing projects to promote nationalreconciliation, as well as to rescind funding from programs andprojects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstratingeffective partnership. These are important tools to improveperformance and accountability--as is the work of the SpecialInspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have theauthority to spend significant funds through a program structuredalong the lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, andshould have the authority to rescind funding from programs andprojects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstratingeffective partnership. 

RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General forIraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistanceprograms in Iraq. 

U. S. Security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably bythe differing requirements of State and Defense Department programsand of their respective congressional oversight committees. SinceIraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provisionof training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistanceshould be delivered promptly, within weeks of a decision to provideit. 

RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program forIraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented. 

The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourageU. S. Partnerships with international donors and Iraqi participants topromote reconstruction. The ability of the United States to form suchpartnerships will encourage greater international participation inIraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U. S. Funds with those frominternational donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistanceprojects should be provided. 

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review

The public interest is not well served by the government'spreparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war inIraq. 

First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budgetrequest but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations. This means that funding requests are drawn up outside the normalbudget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, andmove quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing thenormal review erodes budget discipline and accountability. 

Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusingmanner, making it difficult for both the general public and members ofCongress to understand the request or to differentiate it fromcounterterrorism operations around the world or operations inAfghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answerwhat should be a simple question: "How much money is the Presidentrequesting for the war in Iraq?"

Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive brancherodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees(including the House and Senate Armed Services committees) spend thebetter part of a year reviewing the President's annual budget request. When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, theauthorizing committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to theappropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to actquickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. Theresult is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctoryreview. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes loadedwith special spending projects that would not survive the normalreview process. 

RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in thePresident's annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is inits fourth year, and the normal budget process should not becircumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presentedclearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry outits constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for thewar in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight. 

8. U. S. Personnel

The United States can take several steps to ensure that it haspersonnel with the right skills serving in Iraq. 

All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped byAmericans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of1, 000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level offluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficientcommunication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There arestill far too few Arab language--proficient military and civilianofficers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U. S. Mission. 

Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseasinterventions to restore and maintain order--stabilityoperations--outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature of themission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States hashad great difficulty filling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficientnumbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank. 

RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highestpossible priority to professional language proficiency and culturaltraining, in general and specifically for U. S. Officers and personnelabout to be assigned to Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civiliansvolunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fillthose positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken tomitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directedassignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized forU. S. Military personnel serving in Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States governmentneeds to improve how its constituent agencies--Defense, State, Agencyfor International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligencecommunity, and others--respond to a complex stability operation likethat represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and theprevious decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following theGoldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U. S. Armed services. 

RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel tocarry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operationoutside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish aForeign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to providesurge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similartechnical assistance capabilities. 

9. Intelligence

While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimessuperb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government stilldoes not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or therole of the militias. 

A senior commander told us that human intelligence in Iraq hasimproved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U. S. Intelligenceagencies can and must do better. As mentioned above, an essential partof better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills. As an intelligence analyst told us, "We rely too much on others tobring information to us, and too often don't understand what isreported back because we do not understand the context of what we aretold. "

The Defense Department and the intelligence community have notinvested sufficient people and resources to understand the politicaland military threat to American men and women in the armed forces. Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year forcountermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvisedexplosive devices, but the administration has not put forward arequest to invest comparable resources in trying to understand thepeople who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices. 

We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at theDefense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years' experiencein analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts are rotated to newassignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have abetter personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on theinsurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissectit, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The analyticcommunity's knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, andoperations of militias, as well as their relationship to governmentsecurity forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need toknow. 

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence inIraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keepevents out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is notnecessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source ofa sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. Aroadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U. S. Personnel doesn't count. For example, on one day in July 2006 therewere 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet acareful review of the reports for that single day brought to light1, 100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make wheninformation is systematically collected in a way that minimizes itsdiscrepancy with policy goals. 

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and theSecretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analyticresources to the task of understanding the threats and sources ofviolence in Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and theSecretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in thecollection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraqto provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground. 

Recommended Iraqi Actions

The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take fullresponsibility for this intelligence function. 

To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA shouldincrease its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorismintelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on thevarious sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would analyzedata concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and supportgroups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitateintelligence-led police and military actions against them. 

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraqto develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build acounterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitateintelligence-led counterterrorism efforts. 

Appendices

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations

The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking"fresh-eyes" assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations U. S. HouseAppropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf had with us. In late 2005, Congressman Wolf asked the United States Institute of Peace, abipartisan federal entity, to facilitate the assessment, incollaboration with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policyat Rice University, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, andthe Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the sponsoringorganizations and the administration, agreed that former RepublicanU. S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former DemocraticCongressman Lee H. Hamilton had the breadth of knowledge of foreignaffairs required to co-chair this bipartisan effort. The co-chairssubsequently selected the other members of the bipartisan Iraq StudyGroup, all senior individuals with distinguished records of publicservice. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, former Governor and U. S. Senator Charles S. Robb, formerCongressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, and VernonE. Jordan, Jr. , advisor to President Bill Clinton. Republicansincluded former Associate Justice to the U. S. Supreme Court Sandra DayO'Connor, former U. S. Senator Alan K. Simpson, former Attorney GeneralEdwin Meese III, and former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member fora period of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. 

The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, in a Capitol Hillmeeting hosted by U. S. Senator John Warner and attended bycongressional leaders from both sides of the aisle. 

To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created fourexpert working groups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analystsand specialists on Iraq. The working groups, led by staff of theUnited States Institute of Peace, focused on the StrategicEnvironment, Military and Security Issues, Political Development, andthe Economy and Reconstruction. Every effort was made to ensure theparticipation of experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted. 

We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study Group, especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks go to DanielP. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as executive director;Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study Group; John Williams, PolicyAssistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. Hamilton. 

 Richard H. Solomon, President United States Institute of Peace

 Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

 David M. Abshire, President Center for the Study of the Presidency

 John J. Hamre, President Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions

 March 15, 2006 April 11-12, 2006 May 18-19, 2005 June 13-14, 2006 August 2-3, 2006 August 30-September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad) September 18-19, 2006 November 13-14, 2006 November 27-29, 2006

Iraq Study Group Consultations

(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq)

Iraqi Officials and Representatives

 *Jalal Talabani--President *Tariq al-Hashimi--Vice President *Adil Abd al-Mahdi--Vice President *Nouri Kamal al-Maliki--Prime Minister *Salaam al-Zawbai--Deputy Prime Minister *Barham Salih--Deputy Prime Minister *Mahmoud al-Mashhadani--Speaker of the Parliament *Mowaffak al-Rubaie--National Security Advisor *Jawad Kadem al-Bolani--Minister of Interior *Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi--Minister of Defense *Hoshyar Zebari--Minister of Foreign Affairs *Bayan Jabr--Minister of Finance *Hussein al-Shahristani--Minister of Oil *Karim Waheed--Minister of Electricity *Akram al-Hakim--Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs *Mithal al-Alusi--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Ayad Jamal al-Din--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Sami al-Ma'ajoon--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud--Member, Commission on National Reconciliation *Wijdan Mikhael--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation Lt. General Nasir Abadi--Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces *Adnan al-Dulaimi--Head of the Tawafuq list Ali Allawi--Former Minister of Finance *Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi--representative of Moqtada al-Sadr *Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim--Shia Coalition Leader *Sheik Maher al-Hamraa--Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al Sadar *Hajim al-Hassani--Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya list *Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo--President of the Iraqi Minorities Council *Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi--Dean of the Islamic University of the Imam Al-Atham *Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili--Rafiday Al-Iraq Al-Jaded Foundation *Saleh al-Mutlaq--Leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue *Ayyad al-Sammara'l--Member of the Parliament *Yonadim Kenna--Member of the Parliament and Secretary General of Assyrian Movement *Shahla Wali Mohammed--Iraqi Counterpart International *Hamid Majid Musa--Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party *Raid Khyutab Muhemeed--Humanitarian, Cultural, and Social Foundation Sinan Shabibi--Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie--Ambassador of Iraq to the United States

Current U. S. Administration Officials

Senior Administration Officials

 George W. Bush--President Richard B. Cheney--Vice President Condoleezza Rice--Secretary of State Donald H. Rumsfeld--Secretary of Defense Stephen J. Hadley--National Security Advisor Joshua B. Bolten--White House Chief of Staff

Department of Defense/Military

CIVILIAN: Gordon England--Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Cambone--Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Eric Edelman--Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

MILITARY: General Peter Pace--Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Edmund Giambastiani--Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Abizaid--Commander, United States Central Command *General George W. Casey, Jr. --Commanding General, Multi-National Forces-Iraq Lt. General James T. Conway--Director of Operations, J-3, on the Joint Staff *Lt. General Peter Chiarelli--Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq Lt. General David H. Petraeus--Commanding General, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth *Lt. General Martin Dempsey--Commander Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq *Maj. General Joseph Peterson--Coalition Police Assistance Training Team *Maj. General Richard Zilmer--Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Colonel Derek Harvey--Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer--National War College (recently served in Iraq) Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler--National War College (recently served in Iraq) Lt. Colonel David Haight--National War College (recently served in Iraq) Lt. Colonel Russell Smith--National War College (recently served in Iraq)

Department of State/Civilian Embassy Personnel

 R. Nicholas Burns--Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Zelikow--Counselor to the Department of State C. David Welch--Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs James Jeffrey--Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and Coordinator for Iraq Policy David Satterfield--Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and Coordinator for Iraq Policy Zalmay Khalilzad--U. S. Ambassador to Iraq *Dan Speckhard--Charge D'Affaires, U. S. Embassy in Iraq *Joseph Saloom--Director, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office *Hilda Arellano--U. S. Agency for International Development Director in Iraq *Terrance Kelly--Director, Office of Strategic Plans and Assessments *Randall Bennett--Regional Security Officer of the U. S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq

Intelligence Community

 John D. Negroponte--Director of National Intelligence General Michael V. Hayden--Director, Central Intelligence Agency Thomas Fingar--Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council John Sherman--Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues Steve Ward--Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East Jeff Wickham--Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

Other Senior Officials

 David Walker--Comptroller General of the United States *Stuart Bowen--Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction

Members of Congress

United States Senate

 Senator William Frist (R-TN)--Majority Leader Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)--Minority Leader Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)--Majority Whip Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL)--Minority Whip Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)--Chair, Foreign Relations Committee Senator John Warner (R-VA)--Chair, Armed Services Committee Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)--Ranking Member, Foreign Relations Committee Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)--Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)--Ranking Member, Energy and Resources Committee Senator Kit Bond (R-MO)--Member, Intelligence Committee Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)--Member, Armed Services Committee Senator John Kerry (D-MA)--Member, Foreign Relations Committee Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)--Member, Armed Services Committee Senator John McCain (R-AZ)--Member, Armed Services Committee Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)--Member, Armed Services Committee

United States House of Representatives

 Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)--Minority Leader Representative Tom Davis (R-VA)--Chair, Government Reform Committee Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)--Ranking Member, Intelligence Committee Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO)--Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee Representative John Murtha (D-PA)--Ranking Member, Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN)--Member, Armed Services Committee Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX)--Member, International Relations Committee Representative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)--Member, Appropriations Committee Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT)--Member, Government Reform Committee Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA)--Member, Appropriations Committee

Foreign Officials

 Sheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah--Ambassador of Kuwait to the United States Michael Ambuhl--Secretary of State of Switzerland Kofi Annan--Secretary-General of the United Nations *Dominic Asquith--British Ambassador to Iraq Tony Blair--Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Prince Turki al-Faisal--Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States Nabil Fahmy--Ambassador of Egypt to the United States Karim Kawar--Ambassador of Jordan to the United States Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa--Ambassador of Qatar to the United States *Mukhtar Lamani--Arab League envoy to Iraq Sir David Manning--British Ambassador to the United States Imad Moustapha--Ambassador of Syria to the United States Walid Muallem--Foreign Minister of Syria Romano Prodi--Prime Minister of Italy *Ashraf Qazi--Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq Anders Fogh Rasmussen--Prime Minister of Denmark Nabi Sensoy--Ambassador of Turkey to the United States Ephraim Sneh--Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of Israel Javad Zarif--Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayad--Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates

Former Officials and Experts

 William J. Clinton--former President of the United States Walter Mondale--former Vice President of the United States Madeleine K. Albright--former United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher--former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger--former United States Secretary of State Colin Powell--former United States Secretary of State George P. Schultz--former United States Secretary of State Samuel R. Berger--former United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski--former United States National Security Advisor Anthony Lake--former United States National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft--former United States National Security Advisor General Eric Shinseki--former Chief of Staff of the United States Army General Anthony Zinni--former Commander, United States Central Command General John Keane--former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army Admiral Jim Ellis--former Commander of United States Strategic Command General Joe Ralston--former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Lt. General Roger C. Schultz--former Director of the United States Army National Guard Douglas Feith--former United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Mark Danner--The New York Review of Books Larry Diamond--Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University Thomas Friedman--New York Times Leslie Gelb--President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations Richard Hill--Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives and Analysis, CHF International Richard C. Holbrooke--former Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations Martin S. Indyk--Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution Ronald Johnson--Executive Vice President for International Development, RTI International Frederick Kagan--The American Enterprise Institute Arthur Keys, Jr. --President and CEO, International Relief and Development William Kristol--The Weekly Standard *Guy Laboa--Kellogg, Brown & Root Nancy Lindborg--President, Mercy Corps Michael O'Hanlon--Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution George Packer--The New Yorker Carlos Pascual--Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution Robert Perito--Senior Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace *Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret. )--advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior Kenneth Pollack--Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution Thomas Ricks--The Washington Post Zainab Salbi--Founder and CEO, Women for Women International Matt Sherman--former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director of Policy, Iraqi Ministry of Interior Strobe Talbott--President, The Brookings Institution Rabih Torbay--Vice President for International Operations, International Medical Corps George Will--The Washington Post

Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel

Economy and Reconstruction

 Gary Matthews, USIP Secretariat Director, Task Force on the United Nations and Special Projects, United States Institute of Peace

 Raad Alkadiri Director, Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy

 Frederick D. Barton Senior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

 Jay Collins Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc. 

 Jock P. Covey Senior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security and Sustainability Services, Bechtel Corporation

 Keith Crane Senior Economist, RAND Corporation

 Amy Myers Jaffe Associate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

 K. Riva Levinson Managing Director, BKSH & Associates

 David A. Lipton Managing Director and Head of Global Country Risk Management, Citigroup, Inc

 Michael E. O'Hanlon Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

 James A. Placke Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

 James A. Schear Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Military and Security

 Paul Hughes, USIP Secretariat Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace

 Hans A. Binnendijk Director & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology & National Security Policy, National Defense University

 James Carafano Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation

 Michael Eisenstadt Director, Military & Security Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

 Michèle A. Flournoy Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

 Bruce Hoffman Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

 Clifford May President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

 Robert M. Perito Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace

 Kalev I. Sepp Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School

 John F. Sigler Adjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

 W. Andrew Terrill Research Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute

 Jeffrey A. White Berrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Political Development

 Daniel P. Serwer, USIP Secretariat Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace

 Raymond H. Close Freelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East Politics

 Larry Diamond Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Sanford University, and Co-Editor, Journal of Democracy

 Andrew P. N. Erdmann Former Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning, National Security Council

 Reuel Marc Gerecht Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

 David L. Mack Vice President, The Middle East Institute

 Phebe A. Marr Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

 Hassan Mneimneh Director, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory Foundation

 Augustus Richard Norton Professor of International Relations and Anthropology, Department of International Relations, Boston University

 Marina S. Ottaway Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

 Judy Van Rest Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute

 Judith S. Yaphe Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Strategic Environment

 Paul Stares, USIP Secretariat Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace

 Jon B. Alterman Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

 Steven A. Cook Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

 James F. Dobbins Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation

 Hillel Fradkin Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute

 Chas W. Freeman Chairman, Projects International and President, Middle East Policy Council

 Geoffrey Kemp Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center

 Daniel C. Kurtzer S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

 Ellen Laipson President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center

 William B. Quandt Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution

 Shibley Telhami Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution

 Wayne White Adjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East Institute

Military Senior Advisor Panel

 Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. United States Navy, Retired

 General John M. Keane United States Army, Retired

 General Edward C. Meyer United States Army, Retired

 General Joseph W. Ralston United States Air Force, Retired

 Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr. United States Army, Retired

The Iraq Study Group

James A. Baker, III--Co-Chair

James A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions underthree United States presidents. He served as the nation's 61stSecretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992 underPresident George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the StateDepartment, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries as the UnitedStates confronted the unprecedented challenges and opportunities ofthe post-Cold War era. Mr. Baker's reflections on those years ofrevolution, war, and peace--The Politics of Diplomacy--was publishedin 1995. 

Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was alsoChairman of the President's Economic Policy Council. From 1981 to1985, he served as White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. Baker's record of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary ofCommerce to President Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service asWhite House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush fromAugust 1992 to January 1993. 

Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker ledpresidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush over thecourse of five consecutive presidential elections from 1976 to 1992. 

A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the UnitedStates Marine Corps, he entered the University of Texas School of Lawat Austin. He received his J. D. With honors in 1957 and practiced lawwith the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. 

Mr. Baker's memoir--Work Hard, Study . . . And Keep Out of Politics!Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life--was publishedin October 2006. 

Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991 and hasbeen the recipient of many other awards for distinguished publicservice, including Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Award, theAmerican Institute for Public Service's Jefferson Award, HarvardUniversity's John F. Kennedy School of Government Award, the Hans J. Morgenthau Award, the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of theTreasury's Alexander Hamilton Award, the Department of State'sDistinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary academic degrees. 

Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of BakerBotts. He is Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker III Institute forPublic Policy at Rice University and serves on the board of the HowardHughes Medical Institute. From 1997 to 2004, Mr. Baker served as thePersonal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seeka political solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with formerPresident Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal Election Reform. Since March 2006, Mr. Baker and former U. S. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton have served as the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, abipartisan blue-ribbon panel on Iraq. 

Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and his wife, theformer Susan Garrett, currently reside in Houston, and have eightchildren and seventeen grandchildren. Garrett, currently reside inHouston, and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren. 

Lee H. Hamilton--Co-Chair

Lee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter for Scholars in January 1999. Previously, Mr. Hamilton servedfor thirty-four years as a United States Congressman from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member of theHouse Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on InternationalRelations) and chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle Eastfrom the early 1970s until 1993. He was Chairman of the PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee toInvestigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 

Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressionalorganization, he served as Chair of the Joint Economic Committee aswell as the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, and was amember of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee. In hishome state of Indiana, Mr. Hamilton worked hard to improve education, job training, and infrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves asDirector of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, which seeksto educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how Congressoperates within our government. 

Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on matters ofinternational relations and American national security. He served as aCommissioner on the United States Commission on National Security inthe 21st Century (better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), wasCo-Chair with former Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-HamiltonCommission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, andwas Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Uponthe United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued its report inJuly 2004. He is currently a member of the President's ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board and the President's Homeland SecurityAdvisory Council, as well as the Director of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation's Advisory Board. 

Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated with his familyto Tennessee and then to Evansville, Indiana. Mr. Hamilton is agraduate of DePauw University and the Indiana University School ofLaw, and studied for a year at Goethe University in Germany. Beforehis election to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, Indiana. A former high school and college basketball star, he has beeninducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame. 

Mr. Hamilton's distinguished service in government has been honoredthrough numerous awards in public service and human rights as well ashonorary degrees. He is the author of A Creative Tension--The ForeignPolicy Roles of the President and Congress (2002) and How CongressWorks and Why You Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of WithoutPrecedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006). 

Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have three children--Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas NelsonHamilton--and five grandchildren: Christina, Maria, McLouis andPatricia Souza and Lina Ying Kremer. 

Lawrence S. Eagleburger--Member

Lawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U. S. Secretary ofState by President George H. W. Bush on December 8, 1992, and asDeputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989. 

After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburgerserved in the U. S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in the StateDepartment Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in the U. S. Embassy inBelgrade, and the U. S. Mission to NATO in Belgium. In 1963, after asevere earthquake in Macedonia, he led the U. S. Government effort toprovide medical and other assistance. He was then assigned toWashington, D. C. , where he served on the Secretariat staff and asspecial assistant to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President onFranco-NATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of theSecretariat staff. 

In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National Security Councilstaff. In October 1967, he was assigned as special assistant to UnderSecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. In November 1968, he wasappointed Dr. Henry Kissinger's assistant, and in January 1969, hebecame executive assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. InSeptember 1969, he was assigned as political advisor and chief of thepolitical section of the U. S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. 

Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in August1971. Two years later, he became Acting Assistant Secretary of Defensefor International Security Affairs. The same year he returned to theWhite House as Deputy Assistant to the President for National SecurityOperations. He subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the StateDepartment, becoming Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. 

In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and in 1981 he was nominated as Assistant Secretary of State forEuropean Affairs. In February 1982, he was appointed Under Secretaryof State for Political Affairs. 

Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including an honoraryknighthood from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II (1994); theDistinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J. Carr Award (1984), and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984) from the Department of State;the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal from the Department ofDefense (1978); and the President's Award for Distinguished FederalCivilian Service (1976). 

After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984, Mr. Eagleburger was named president of Kissinger Associates, Inc. Following his resignation as Secretary of State on January 19, 1993, he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell asSenior Foreign Policy Advisor. He joined the boards of HalliburtonCompany, Phillips Petroleum Company, and Universal Corporation. Mr. Eagleburger currently serves as Chairman of the InternationalCommission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. 

He received his B. S. Degree in 1952 and his M. S. Degree in 1957, bothfrom the University of Wisconsin, and served as first lieutenant inthe U. S. Army from 1952 to 1954. Mr. Eagleburger is married to theformer Marlene Ann Heinemann. He is the father of three sons, LawrenceScott, Lawrence Andrew, and Lawrence Jason. 

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. --Member

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. , is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard Frères& Co, LLC in New York. He works with a diverse group of clients acrossa broad range of industries. 

Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive Partnerwith the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, where heremains Senior Counsel. While there Mr. Jordan practiced general, corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D. C. 

Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: Presidentand Chief Executive Officer of the National Urban League, Inc. ;Executive Director of the United Negro College Fund, Inc. ; Director ofthe Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council;Attorney-Consultant, U. S. Office of Economic Opportunity; Assistant tothe Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council; Georgia FieldDirector of the National Association for the Advancement of ColoredPeople; and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia. 

Mr. Jordan's presidential appointments include the President'sAdvisory Committee for the Points of Light Initiative Foundation, theSecretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, the AdvisoryCouncil on Social Security, the Presidential Clemency Board, theAmerican Revolution Bicentennial Commission, the National AdvisoryCommittee on Selective Service, and the Council of the White HouseConference "To Fulfill These Rights. " In 1992, Mr. Jordan served asthe Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team. 

Mr. Jordan's corporate and other directorships include AmericanExpress Company; Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. ; Howard University(Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc. ; Lazard Ltd. ; Xerox Corporation;and the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold. 

Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the HowardUniversity Law School. He holds honorary degrees from more than 60colleges and universities in America. He is a member of the bars ofArkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and the U. S. SupremeCourt. He is a member of the American Bar Association, the NationalBar Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the BilderbergMeetings and he is President of the Economic Club of Washington, D. C. Mr. Jordan is the author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (Public Affairs, 2001). 

Edwin Meese III--Member

Edwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at theHeritage Foundation, a Washington, D. C. -based public policy researchand education institution. He is also the Chairman of Heritage'sCenter for Legal and Judicial Studies and a distinguished visitingfellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition, Meese lectures, writes, and consults throughout the United States on avariety of subjects. 

Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story, which waspublished by Regnery Gateway in June 1992; co-editor of Making AmericaSafer, published in 1997 by the Heritage Foundation; and coauthor ofLeadership, Ethics and Policing, published by Prentice Hall in 2004. 

Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United States fromFebruary 1985 to August 1988. As the nation's chief law enforcementofficer, he directed the Department of Justice and led internationalefforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In1985 he received Government Executive magazine's annual award forexcellence in management. 

From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position ofCounsellor to the President, the senior position on the White Housestaff, where he functioned as the President's chief policy advisor. AsAttorney General and as Counsellor, Meese was a member of thePresident's cabinet and the National Security Council. He served asChairman of the Domestic Policy Council and of the National DrugPolicy Board. Meese headed the President-elect's transition effortfollowing the November 1980 election. During the presidentialcampaign, he served as chief of staff and senior issues advisor forthe Reagan-Bush Committee. 

Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan's executive assistant andchief of staff in California from 1969 through 1974 and as legalaffairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Before joining GovernorReagan's staff in 1967, Meese served as deputy district attorney inAlameda County, California. From 1977 to 1981, Meese was a professorof law at the University of San Diego, where he also was Director ofthe Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management. 

In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and publicofficial, Meese has been a business executive in the aerospace andtransportation industry, serving as vice president for administrationof Rohr Industries, Inc. , in Chula Vista, California. He left Rohr toreturn to the practice of law, engaging in corporate and general legalwork in San Diego County. 

Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and holds a lawdegree from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a retiredcolonel in the United States Army Reserve. He is active in numerouscivic and educational organizations. Meese is married, has two grownchildren, and resides in McLean, Virginia. 

Sandra Day O'Connor--Member

Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated by President Reagan as AssociateJustice of the United States Supreme Court on July 7, 1981, and tookthe oath of office on September 25. O'Connor previously served on theArizona Court of Appeals (1979-81) and as judge of the Maricopa CountySuperior Court in Phoenix, Arizona (1975-79). She was appointed asArizona state senator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to twotwo-year terms from 1969 to 1975. During her tenure, she was ArizonaSenate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, andMunicipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the LegislativeCouncil, on the Probate Code Commission, and on the Arizona AdvisoryCouncil on Intergovernmental Relations. 

From 1965 to 1969, O'Connor was assistant attorney general in Arizona. She practiced law at a private firm in Maryvale, Arizona, from 1958 to1960 and prior to that was civilian attorney for Quartermaster MarketCenter in Frankfurt, Germany (1954-57), and deputy county attorney inSan Mateo County, California (1952-53)

She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee toReorganize Lower Courts (1974-75), Vice Chairman of the Arizona SelectLaw Enforcement Review Commission (1979-80), and, in Maricopa County, Chairman of the Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service (1960-62), theJuvenile Detention Home Visiting Board (1963-64), and the SuperiorCourt Judges' Training and Education Committee (1977-79) and a memberof the Board of Adjustments and Appeals (1963-64). 

O'Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College of William andMary and on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, theExecutive Board of the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, the Advisory Board of the Smithsonian National Museum of NaturalHistory, and the Advisory Committee of the American Society ofInternational Law, Judicial. She is an honorary member of the AdvisoryCommittee for the Judiciary Leadership Development Council, anhonorary chair of America's 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 2007, aco-chair of the National Advisory Council of the Campaign for the CivicMission of Schools, a member of the Selection Committee of theOklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, and a member of the AdvisoryBoard of the Stanford Center on Ethics. She also serves on severalbodies of the American Bar Association, including the Museum of LawExecutive Committee, the Commission on Civic Education and Separationof Powers, and the Advisory Commission of the Standing Committee onthe Law Library of Congress. 

O'Connor previously served as a member of the Anglo-American Exchange(1980); the State Bar of Arizona Committees on Legal Aid, PublicRelations, Lower Court Reorganization, and Continuing Legal Education;the National Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services(1974-76); the Arizona State Personnel Commission (1968-69); theArizona Criminal Code Commission (1974-76); and the Cathedral Chapterof the Washington National Cathedral (1991-99). 

O'Connor is a member of the American Bar Association, the State Bar ofArizona, the State Bar of California, the Maricopa County BarAssociation, the Arizona Judges' Association, the National Associationof Women Judges, and the Arizona Women Lawyers' Association. She holdsa B. A. (with Great Distinction) and an LL. B. (Order of the Coif) fromStanford University, where she was also a member of the board ofeditors of the Stanford Law Review. 

Leon E. Panetta--Member

Leon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia PanettaInstitute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan study center for theadvancement of public policy based at California State University, Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the chancellor ofthe California State University system, teaches a Master's in PublicPolicy course at the Panetta Institute, is a presidential professor atSanta Clara University, and created the Leon Panetta Lecture Series. 

Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served as alegislative assistant to U. S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California. In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and then Director of the U. S. Office for CivilRights. His book Bring Us Together (published in 1971) is an accountof that experience. In 1970, he went to New York City, where he servedas Executive Assistant to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971, Panettareturned to California, where he practiced law in the Monterey firm ofPanetta, Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976. 

Panetta was a U. S. Representative from California's 16th (now 17th)district from 1977 to 1993. He authored the Hunger Prevention Act of1988, the Fair Employment Practices Resolution, legislation thatestablished Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for hospice care forthe terminally ill, and other legislation on a variety of education, health, agriculture, and defense issues. 

From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House Committee on theBudget. He also served on that committee from 1979 to 1985. He chairedthe House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition; the House Administration Committee'sSubcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select Committee onHunger's Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He also served as ViceChairman of the Caucus of Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress and as amember of the President's Commission on Foreign Language andInternational Studies. 

Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the Office ofManagement and Budget for the incoming Clinton administration. Panettawas appointed Chief of Staff to the President of the United States onJuly 17, 1994, and served in that position until January 20, 1997. 

In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board of Directorsof the New York Stock Exchange beginning in 1997. He currently serveson many public policy and organizational boards, including as Chair ofthe Pew Oceans Commission and Co-Chair of the California Council onBase Support and Retention. 

Panetta has received many awards and honors, including the SmithsonianPaul Peck Award for Service to the Presidency, the John H. ChafeeCoastal Stewardship Award, the Julius A. Stratton Award for CoastalLeadership, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Centerfor the Study of the Presidency. 

He earned a B. A. Magna cum laude from Santa Clara University in 1960, andin 1963 received his J. D. From Santa Clara University Law School, where he was an editor of the Santa Clara Law Review. He served as afirst lieutenant in the Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the ArmyCommendation Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia MarieVarni. They have three grown sons and five grandchildren. 

William J. Perry--Member

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor atStanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman SpogliInstitute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. Heis a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the PreventiveDefense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvarduniversities. 

Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United States, servingfrom February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as DeputySecretary of Defense (1993-94) and as Under Secretary of Defense forResearch and Engineering (1977-81). He is on the board of directors ofseveral emerging high-tech companies and is Chairman of GlobalTechnology Partners. 

His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratorydirector for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-64) and asfounder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-77), executive vice presidentof Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-85), and founder and chairman ofTechnology Strategies & Alliances (1985-93). He is a member of theNational Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academyof Arts and Sciences. 

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps ofEngineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joinedthe Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenantin the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He has received a number ofawards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), theDepartment of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), andOutstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), theAir Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency(1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the Coast Guard (1997). He receivedthe American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), theEisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the ForrestalMedal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academyof Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. Hehas received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, andthe Air Force. 

He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, andthe United Kingdom. He received a B. S. And M. S. From StanfordUniversity and a Ph. D. From Penn State, all in mathematics. 

Charles S. Robb--Member

Charles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University as aDistinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy in 2001. Previouslyhe served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from 1978 to 1982; asVirginia's 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986; and as a United StatesSenator, from 1989 to 2001. 

While in the Senate he became the only member ever to servesimultaneously on all three national security committees(Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He also servedon the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees. 

Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the SouthernGovernors' Association, the Democratic Governors' Association, theEducation Commission of the States, the Democratic Leadership Council, Jobs for America's Graduates, the National Conference of LieutenantGovernors, and the Virginia Forum on Education, and was President ofthe Council of State Governments. 

During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United StatesMarine Corps, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve in 1991. He beganas the Class Honor Graduate from Marine Officers Basic School in 1961and ended up as head of the principal recruiting program for Marineofficers in 1970. In between, he served in both the 1st and 2nd MarineDivisions and his assignments included duty as a Military Social Aideat the White House and command of an infantry company in combat inVietnam. 

He received his law degree from the University of Virginia in 1973, clerked for Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. , on the U. S. Court of Appealsfor the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law with Williams and Connollyprior to his election to state office. Between his state and federalservice he was a partner at Hunton and Williams. 

Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman of theBoard of Visitors at the United States Naval Academy, Co-Chairman(with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of the U. S. Court of Appeals forthe D. C. Circuit) of the President's Commission on IntelligenceCapabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of MassDestruction, and Co-Chairman (with former Governor Linwood Holton) ofa major landowner's alliance that created a special tax district tofinance the extension of Metrorail to Tyson's Corner, Reston, andDulles Airport. He has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politicsat Harvard and at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at William andMary. 

He is currently on the President's Foreign Intelligence AdvisoryBoard, the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board(Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force), the FBI Director'sAdvisory Board, the National Intelligence Council's Strategic AnalysisAdvisory Board, the Iraq Study Group, and the MITRE Corp. Board ofTrustees (Vice Chairman). He also serves on the boards of the SpaceFoundation, the Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy, the ConcordCoalition, the National Museum of Americans at War, StrategicPartnerships LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency--andhe works on occasional projects with the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies. He is married to Lynda Johnson Robb and theyhave three grown daughters and one granddaughter. 

Alan K. Simpson--Member

Alan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States Senatorfrom Wyoming. Following his first term in the Senate, Al was electedby his peers to the position of the Assistant Majority Leader in1984--and served in that capacity until 1994. He completed his finalterm on January 3, 1997. 

Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, Kepler andEdwards, the Cody division of the Denver firm of Burg SimpsonEldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also a consultant in the Washington, D. C. , government relations firm The Tongour, Simpson, Holsclaw Group. He continues to serve on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards andtravels the country giving speeches. His book published by WilliamMorrow Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping withthe Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and views of theFourth Estate. 

From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a VisitingLecturer and for two years the Director of the Institute of Politicsat Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Duringthe fall of 2000 he returned to his alma mater, the University ofWyoming, as a Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Departmentand he continues to team teach a class part-time with his brother, Peter, titled "Wyoming's Political Identity: Its History and ItsPolitics, " which is proving to be one of the most popular classesoffered at UW. 

A member of a political family--his father served both as Governor ofWyoming from 1954 to 1958 and as United States Senator from Wyomingfrom 1962 to 1966--Al chose to follow in his father's footsteps andbegan his own political career in 1964 when he was elected to theWyoming State Legislature as a state representative of his native ParkCounty. He served for the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House ofRepresentatives, holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority FloorLeader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also served as amember of the Wyoming State Legislature. 

Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the Wyoming barand the United States District Court in 1958 and served for a shorttime as a Wyoming assistant attorney general. Simpson then joined hisfather, Milward L. Simpson, and later Charles G. Kepler in the lawfirm of Simpson, Kepler and Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He wouldpractice law there for the next eighteen years. During that time, Simpson was very active in all civic, community, and state activities. He also served ten years as City Attorney. 

Simpson earned a B. S. In law from the University of Wyoming in 1954. Upon graduation from college, he joined the Army, serving overseas inthe 5th Infantry Division and in the 2nd Armored Division in the finalmonths of the Army of Occupation in Germany. Following his honorabledischarge in 1956, Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming tocomplete his study of law, earning his J. D. Degree in 1958. He and hiswife Ann have three children and six grandchildren, who all reside inCody, Wyoming. 

Iraq Study Group Support

 Edward P. Djerejian Senior Advisor to the Study Group

 Christopher A. Kojm Senior Advisor to the Study Group

 John B. Williams Special Assistant to the Study Group

 Benjamin J. Rhodes Special Assistant to the Study Group

 United States Institute of Peace Support

 Daniel P. Serwer ISG Executive Director and Political Development Secretariat

 Paul Hughes Military and Security Secretariat

 Gary Matthews Economy and Reconstruction Secretariat

 Paul Stares Strategic Environment Secretariat

 Courtney Rusin Assistant to the Study Group

 Anne Hingeley Congressional Relations

 Ian Larsen Outreach and Communications

 Center for the Study of the Presidency Support

 Jay M. Parker Advisor

 Ysbrant A. Marcelis Advisor

 Center for Strategic & International Studies Support

 Kay King Advisor