_The Inside Story of

The Peace Conference_

_by

Dr. E. J. Dillon_

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

_NEW YORK AND LONDON_

THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Copyright 1920, by Harper & Brothers

Printed in the United States of America

Published February, 1920

_ToC. W. BARRON

in memory of interesting conversations

on historic occasions

These pages are inscribed. _

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

FOREWORD ix

I. THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 1

II. SIGNS OF THE TIMES 45

III. THE DELEGATES 58

IV. CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 117

V. AIMS AND METHODS 136

VI. THE LESSER STATES 184

VII. POLAND'S OUTLOOK IN THE FUTURE 264

VIII. ITALY 272

IX. JAPAN 322

X. ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 344

XI. BOLSHEVISM 376

XII. HOW BOLSHEVISM WAS FOSTERED 399

XIII. SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 407

XIV. THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 455

XV. THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA 464

XVI. THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 469

FOREWORD

It is almost superfluous to say that this book does not claim to be ahistory, however summary, of the Peace Conference, seeing that such awork was made sheer impossible now and forever by the chief delegatesthemselves when they decided to dispense with records of theirconversations and debates. It is only a sketch--a sketch of the problemswhich the war created or rendered pressing--of the conditions underwhich they cropped up; of the simplicist ways in which they wereconceived by the distinguished politicians who volunteered to solvethem; of the delegates' natural limitations and electioneeringcommitments and of the secret influences by which they were swayed; ofthe peoples' needs and expectations; of the unwonted procedure adoptedby the Conference and of the fateful consequences of its decisions tothe world. 

In dealing with all those matters I aimed at impartiality, which is anunattainable ideal, but I trust that sincerity and detachment havebrought me reasonably close to it. Having no pet theories of my own tochampion, my principal standard of judgment is derived from the law ofcausality and the rules of historical criticism. 

The fatal tactical mistake chargeable to the Conference lay in itsmaking the charter of the League of Nations and the treaty of peace withthe Central Powers interdependent. For the maxims that underlie theformer are irreconcilable with those that should determine the latter, and the efforts to combine them must, among other untoward results, create a sharp opposition between the vital interests of the people ofthe United States and the apparent or transient interests of theirassociates. The outcome of this unnatural union will be to damage thecause of stable peace which it was devised to further. 

But the surest touchstone by which to test the capacity and theachievements of the world-legislators is their attitude toward Russia inthe political domain and toward the labor problem in the economicsphere. And in neither case does their action or inaction appear to havebeen the outcome of statesman-like ideas, or, indeed, of any higherconsideration than that of evading the central issue and transmittingthe problem to the League of Nations. The results are manifest to all. 

The continuity of human progress depends at bottom upon labor, and it isbecoming more and more doubtful whether the civilized races of mankindcan be reckoned on to supply it for long on conditions akin to thosewhich have in various forms prevailed ever since the institutions ofancient times and which alone render the present social structureviable. If this forecast should prove correct, the only alternative to abreak disastrous in the continuity of civilization is the frankrecognition of the principle that certain inferior races are destined toserve the cause of mankind in those capacities for which alone they arequalified and to readjust social institutions to this axiom. 

In the meanwhile the Conference which ignored this problem of problemshas transformed Europe into a seething mass of mutually hostile statespowerless to face the economic competition of their overseas rivals andhas set the very elements of society in flux. 

E. J. DILLON. 

THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

I

THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE

The choice of Paris for the historic Peace Conference was anafterthought. The Anglo-Saxon governments first favored a neutralcountry as the most appropriate meeting-ground for the world'speace-makers. Holland was mentioned only to be eliminated withoutdiscussion, so obvious and decisive were the objections. FrenchSwitzerland came next in order, was actually fixed upon, and for a timeheld the field. Lausanne was the city first suggested and nearly chosen. There was a good deal to be said for it on its own merits, and in itssuburb, Ouchy, the treaty had been drawn up which terminated the warbetween Italy and Turkey. But misgivings were expressed as to itscapacity to receive and entertain the formidable peace armies withoutwhose co-operation the machinery for stopping all wars could not well befabricated. At last Geneva was fixed upon, and so certain wereinfluential delegates of the ratification of their choice by all theAllies, that I felt justified in telegraphing to Geneva to have a househired for six months in that picturesque city. 

But the influential delegates had reckoned without the French, who inthese matters were far and away the most influential. Was it not in theHall of Mirrors at Versailles, they asked, that Teuton militarism hadreceived its most powerful impulse? And did not poetic justice, whichwas never so needed as in these evil days, ordain that the chartereddestroyer who had first seen the light of day in that hall should alsobe destroyed there? Was this not in accordance with the eternal fitnessof things? Whereupon the matter-of-fact Anglo-Saxon mind, unable towithstand the force of this argument and accustomed to give way onsecondary matters, assented, and Paris was accordingly fixed upon. . . . 

"Paris herself again, " tourists remarked, who had not been there sincethe fateful month when hostilities began--meaning that something of thewealth and luxury of bygone days was venturing to display itself anew asan afterglow of the epoch whose sun was setting behind banks ofthunder-clouds. And there was a grain of truth in the remark. The VilleLumière was crowded as it never had been before. But it was mostlystrangers who were within her gates. In the throng of Anglo-Saxonwarriors and cosmopolitan peace-lovers following the trailing skirts ofdestiny, one might with an effort discover a Parisian now and again. Butthey were few and far between. 

They and their principal European guests made some feeble attempts tovie with the Vienna of 1814-15 in elegance and taste if not in pomp andsplendor. But the general effect was marred by the element of the_nouveaux-riches_ and _nouveaux-pauvres_ which was prominent, if notpredominant. A few of the great and would-be great ladies outbade oneanother in the effort to renew the luxury and revive the grace of thepast. But the atmosphere was numbing, their exertions half-hearted, andthe smile of youth and beauty was cold like the sheen of winter ice. The shadow of death hung over the institutions and survivals of thevarious civilizations and epochs which were being dissolved in thecommon melting-pot, and even the man in the street was conscious of itschilling influence. Life in the capital grew agitated, fitful, superficial, unsatisfying. Its gaiety was forced--something between achallenge to the destroyer and a sad farewell to the past and present. Men were instinctively aware that the morrow was fraught with bittersurprises, and they deliberately adopted the maxim, "Let us eat anddrink, for to-morrow we die. " None of these people bore on theirphysiognomies the dignified impress of the olden time, barring a fewaristocratic figures from the Faubourg St. -Germain, who looked as thoughthey had only to don the perukes and the distinctive garb of theeighteenth century to sit down to table with Voltaire and the Marquisedu Châtelet. Here and there, indeed, a coiffure, a toilet, the bearing, the gait, or the peculiar grace with which a robe was worn reminded onethat this or that fair lady came of a family whose life-story in thedays of yore was one of the tributaries to the broad stream of Europeanhistory. But on closer acquaintanceship, especially at conversationaltournaments, one discovered that Nature, constant in her methods, distributes more gifts of beauty than of intellect. 

Festive banquets, sinful suppers, long-spun-out lunches were as frequentand at times as Lucullan as in the days of the Regency. The outer, coarser attributes of luxury abounded in palatial restaurants, hotels, and private mansions; but the refinement, the grace, the brilliantconversation even of the Paris of the Third Empire were seen to besubtle branches of a lost art. The people of the armistice were wearyand apprehensive--weary of the war, weary of politics, weary of theworn-out framework of existence, and filled with a vague, namelessapprehension of the unknown. They feared that in the chaotic slough intowhich they had fallen they had not yet touched bottom. None the less, with the exception of fervent Catholics and a number of earnestsectarians, there were few genuine seekers after anything essentiallybetter. 

Not only did the general atmosphere of Paris undergo radical changes, together with its population, but the thoroughfares, many of them, officially changed their names since the outbreak of the war. 

The Paris of the Conference ceased to be the capital of France. Itbecame a vast cosmopolitan caravanserai teeming with unwonted aspects oflife and turmoil, filled with curious samples of the races, tribes, andtongues of four continents who came to watch and wait for the mysteriousto-morrow. The intensity of life there was sheer oppressive; to thetumultuous striving of the living were added the silent influences ofthe dead. For it was also a trysting-place for the ghosts ofsovereignties and states, militarisms and racial ambitions, which werepermitted to wander at large until their brief twilight should beswallowed up in night. The dignified Turk passionately pleaded forConstantinople, and cast an imploring look on the lone Armenian whoserelatives he had massacred, and who was then waiting for politicalresurrection. Persian delegates wandered about like souls in pain, waiting to be admitted through the portals of the Conference Paradise. Beggared Croesus passed famishing Lucullus in the street, and oncemighty viziers shivered under threadbare garments in the biting frost asthey hurried over the crisp February snow. Waning and waxing Powers, vacant thrones, decaying dominations had, each of them, their accusers, special pleaders, and judges, in this multitudinous world-center onwhich tragedy, romance, and comedy rained down potent spells. For theConference city was also the clearing-house of the Fates, where theaccounts of a whole epoch, the deeds and misdeeds of an exhaustedcivilization, were to be balanced and squared. 

Here strange yet familiar figures, survivals from the past, started upat every hand's turn and greeted one with smiles or sighs. Men on whom Ilast set eyes when we were boys at school, playing football together inthe field or preparing lessons in the school-room, would stop me in thestreet on their way to represent nations or peoples whose lives were outof chime, or to inaugurate the existence of new republics. One face Ishall never forget. It was that of the self-made temporary dictator of alittle country whose importance was dwindling to the dimensions of afootnote in the history of the century. I had been acquainted with himpersonally in the halcyon day of his transient glory. Like hispicturesque land, he won the immortality of a day, was courted andsubsidized by competing states in turn, and then suddenly cast asidelike a sucked orange. Then he sank into the depths of squalor. He waseloquent, resourceful, imaginative, and brimful of the poetry ofuntruth. One day through the asphalt streets of Paris he shuffled alongin the procession of the doomed, with wan face and sunken eyes, wearinga tragically mean garb. And soon after I learned that he had vanishedunwept into eternal oblivion. 

An Arabian Nights touch was imparted to the dissolving panorama bystrange visitants from Tartary and Kurdistan, Korea and Aderbeijan, Armenia, Persia, and the Hedjaz--men with patriarchal beards andscimitar-shaped noses, and others from desert and oasis, from Samarkandand Bokhara. Turbans and fezzes, sugar-loaf hats and headgear resemblingepiscopal miters, old military uniforms devised for the embryonic armiesof new states on the eve of perpetual peace, snowy-white burnooses, flowing mantles, and graceful garments like the Roman toga, contributedto create an atmosphere of dreamy unreality in the city where thegrimmest of realities were being faced and coped with. 

Then came the men of wealth, of intellect, of industrial enterprise, andthe seed-bearers of the ethical new ordering, members of economiccommittees from the United States, Britain, Italy, Poland, Russia, India, and Japan, representatives of naphtha industries and far-off coalmines, pilgrims, fanatics, and charlatans from all climes, priests ofall religions, preachers of every doctrine, who mingled with princes, field-marshals, statesmen, anarchists, builders-up, and pullers-down. All of them burned with desire to be near to the crucible in which thepolitical and social systems of the world were to be melted and recast. Every day, in my walks, in my apartment, or at restaurants, I metemissaries from lands and peoples whose very names had seldom been heardof before in the West. A delegation from the Pont-Euxine Greeks calledon me, and discoursed of their ancient cities of Trebizond, Samsoun, Tripoli, Kerassund, in which I resided many years ago, and informed methat they, too, desired to become welded into an independent Greekrepublic, and had come to have their claims allowed. The Albanians wererepresented by my old friend Turkhan Pasha, on the one hand, and by myfriend Essad Pasha, on the other--the former desirous of Italy'sprotection, the latter demanding complete independence. Chinamen, Japanese, Koreans, Hindus, Kirghizes, Lesghiens, Circassians, Mingrelians, Buryats, Malays, and Negroes and Negroids from Africa andAmerica were among the tribes and tongues forgathered in Paris to watchthe rebuilding of the political world system and to see where they "camein. "

One day I received a visit from an Armenian deputation; its chief wasdescribed on his visiting-card as President of the Armenian Republic ofthe Caucasus. When he was shown into my apartment in the Hôtel Vendôme, I recognized two of its members as old acquaintances with whom I hadoccasional intercourse in Erzerum, Kipri Keui, and other places duringthe Armenian massacres of the year 1895. We had not met since then. Theyrevived old memories, completed for me the life-stories of several ofour common friends and acquaintances, and narrated interesting episodesof local history. And having requested my co-operation, the Presidentand his colleagues left me and once more passed out of my life. 

Another actor on the world-stage whom I had encountered more than oncebefore was the "heroic" King of Montenegro. He often crossed my pathduring the Conference, and set me musing on the marvelous ups and downsof human existence. This potentate's life offers a rich field ofresearch to the psychologist. I had watched it myself at various timesand with curious results. For I had met him in various European capitalsduring the past thirty years, and before the time when Tsar AlexanderIII publicly spoke of him as Russia's only friend. King Nikita owes suchsuccess in life as he can look back on with satisfaction to hisadaptation of St. Paul's maxim of being all things to all men. Thus inSt. Petersburg he was a good Russian, in Vienna a patriotic Austrian, inRome a sentimental Italian. He was also a warrior, a poet after his ownfashion, a money-getter, and a speculator on 'Change. His allegedmartial feats and his wily, diplomatic moves ever since the first Balkanwar abound in surprises, and would repay close investigation. The easewith which the Austrians captured Mount Lovtchen and his capital made alasting impression on those of his allies who were acquainted with thestory, the consequences of which he could not foresee. What everybodyseemed to know was that if the Teutons had defeated the Entente, KingNikita's son Mirko, who had settled down for the purpose in Vienna, would have been set on the throne in place of his father by theAustrians; whereas if the Allies should win, the worldly-wise monarchwould have retained his crown as their champion. But these well-laidplans went all agley. Prince Mirko died and King Nikita was deposed. Fora time he resided at a hotel, a few houses from me, and I passed him nowand again as he was on his way to plead his lost cause before thedistinguished wreckers of thrones and régimes. 

It seemed as though, in order to provide Paris with a cosmopolitanpopulation, the world was drained of its rulers, of its prosperous andluckless financiers, of its high and low adventurers, of its tribe offortune-seekers, and its pushing men and women of every description. Andthe result was an odd blend of classes and individuals worthy, it maybe, of the new democratic era, but unprecedented. It was welcomed as ofgood augury, for instance, that in the stately Hôtel Majestic, where thespokesmen of the British Empire had their residence, monocleddiplomatists mingled with spry typewriters, smart amanuenses, and evenwith bright-eyed chambermaids at the evening dances. [1] The BritishPremier himself occasionally witnessed the cheering spectacle withmanifest pleasure. Self-made statesmen, scions of fallen dynasties, ex-premiers, and ministers, who formerly swayed the fortunes of theworld, whom one might have imagined _capaces imperii nisi imperassent_, were now the unnoticed inmates of unpretending hotels. Ambassadors whosemost trivial utterances had once been listened to with concentratedattention, sued days and weeks for an audience of the greaterplenipotentiaries, and some of them sued in vain. Russian diplomatistswere refused permission to travel in France or were compelled toundergo more than average discomfort and delay there. More than once Isat down to lunch or dinner with brilliant commensals, one of whom wasunderstood to have made away with a well-known personage in order to ridthe state of a bad administrator, and another had, at a secret_Vehmgericht_ in Turkey, condemned a friend of mine, now a friend ofhis, to be assassinated. 

In Paris, this temporary capital of the world, one felt the repercussionof every event, every incident of moment wheresoever it might haveoccurred. To reside there while the Conference was sitting was to occupya comfortable box in the vastest theater the mind of men has everconceived. From this rare coign of vantage one could witnesssoul-gripping dramas of human history, the happenings of years beingcompressed within the limits of days. The revolution in Portugal, themassacre of Armenians, Bulgaria's atrocities, the slaughter of theinhabitants of Saratoff and Odessa, the revolt of the Koreans--allproduced their effect in Paris, where official and unofficial exponentsof the aims and ambitions, religions and interests that unite or dividemankind were continually coming or going, working aboveground orburrowing beneath the surface. 

It was within a few miles of the place where I sat at table with thebrilliant company alluded to above that a few individuals of twodifferent nationalities, one of them bearing, it was said, a well-knownname, hatched the plot that sent Portugal's strong man, PresidentSidonio Paes, to his last account and plunged that ill-starred land intochaotic confusion. The plan was discovered by the Portuguese militaryattaché, who warned the President himself and the War Minister. ButSidonio Paes, quixotic and foolhardy, refused to take or brookprecautions. A few weeks later the assassin, firing three shots, had nodifficulty in taking aim, but none of them took effect. The reason wasinteresting: so determined were the conspirators to leave nothing tochance, they had steeped the cartridges in a poisonous preparation, whereby they injured the mechanism of the revolver, which, inconsequence, hung fire. But the adversaries of the reform movement whichthe President had inaugurated again tried and planned another attempt, and Sidonio Paes, who would not be taught prudence, was duly shot, andhis admirable work undone[2] by a band of semi-Bolshevists. 

Less than six months later it was rumored that a number of speciallyprepared bombs from a certain European town had been sent to Moscow forthe speedy removal of Lenin. The casual way in which these and kindredmatters were talked of gave one the measure of the change that had comeover the world since the outbreak of the war. There was nobody left inEurope whose death, violent or peaceful, would have made much of animpression on the dulled sensibilities of the reading public. All valueshad changed, and that of human life had fallen low. 

To follow these swiftly passing episodes, occasionally glancing behindthe scenes, during the pauses of the acts, and watch the unfolding ofthe world-drama, was thrillingly interesting. To note the dubioussource, the chance occasion of a grandiose project of world policy, andto see it started on its shuffling course, was a revelation in politicsand psychology, and reminded one of the saying mistakenly attributed tothe Swedish Chancellor Oxenstjern, "_Quam parva sapientia regiturmundus_. "[3]

The wire-pullers were not always the plenipotentiaries. Among those werealso outsiders of various conditions, sometimes of singular ambitions, who were generally free from conventional prejudices and conscientiousscruples. As traveling to Paris was greatly restricted by thegovernments of the world, many of these unofficial delegates had come incapacities widely differing from those in which they intended to act. Iconfess I was myself taken in by more than one of these secretemissaries, whom I was innocently instrumental in bringing into closetouch with the human levers they had come to press. I actually went tothe trouble of obtaining for one of them valuable data on a subjectwhich did not interest him in the least, but which he pretended he hadtraveled several thousand miles to study. A zealous prelate, whosebusiness was believed to have something to do with the future of acertain branch of the Christian Church in the East, in reality held abrief for a wholly different set of interests in the West. Some of theseenvoys hoped to influence decisions of the Conference, and theyconsidered they had succeeded when they got their points of view broughtto the favorable notice of certain of its delegates. What surprised mewas the ease with which several of these interlopers moved about, although few of them spoke any language but their own. 

Collectivities and religious and political associations, including thatof the Bolshevists, were represented in Paris during the Conference. Imet one of the Bolshevists, a bright youth, who was a veritable apostle. He occupied a post which, despite its apparent insignificance, put himoccasionally in possession of useful information withheld from thepublic, which he was wont to communicate to his political friends. Hisknowledge of languages and his remarkable intelligence had probablyattracted the notice of his superiors, who can have had no suspicion ofhis leanings, much less of his proselytizing activity. However this mayhave been, he knew a good deal of what was going on at the Conference, and he occasionally had insight into documents of a certain interest. Hewas a seemingly honest and enthusiastic Bolshevik, who spread thedoctrine with apostolic zeal guided by the wisdom of the serpent. He wasever ready to comment on events, but before opening his mind fully to astranger on the subject next to his heart, he usually felt his way, andonly when he had grounds for believing that the fortress was notimpregnable did he open his batteries. Even among the initiated, fewwould suspect the rôle played by this young proselytizer within one ofthe strongholds of the Conference, so naturally and unobtrusively wasthe work done. I may add that luckily he had no direct intercourse withthe delegates. 

Of all the collectivities whose interests were furthered at theConference, the Jews had perhaps the most resourceful and certainly themost influential exponents. There were Jews from Palestine, from Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, Rumania, Greece, Britain, Holland, and Belgium; butthe largest and most brilliant contingent was sent by the United States. Their principal mission, with which every fair-minded man sympathizedheartily, was to secure for their kindred in eastern Europe rights equalto those of the populations in whose midst they reside. [4] And to thecredit of the Poles, Rumanians, and Russians, who were to be constrainedto remove all the existing disabilities, they enfranchised the Hebrewelements spontaneously. But the Western Jews, who championed theirEastern brothers, proceeded to demand a further concession which many oftheir own co-religionists hastened to disclaim as dangerous--a kind ofautonomy which Rumanian, Polish, and Russian statesmen, as well as manyof their Jewish fellow-subjects, regarded as tantamount to the creationof a state within the state. Whether this estimate is true or erroneous, the concessions asked for were given, but the supplementary treatiesinsuring the protection of minorities are believed to have little chanceof being executed, and may, it is feared, provoke manifestations ofelemental passions in the countries in which they are to be applied. 

Twice every day, before and after lunch, one met the "autocrats, " theworld's statesmen whose names were in every mouth--the wise men whowould have been much wiser than they were if only they had creditedtheir friends and opponents with a reasonable measure of politicalwisdom. These individuals, in bowler hats, sweeping past in sumptuousmotors, as rarely seen on foot as Roman cardinals, were the destroyersof thrones, the carvers of continents, the arbiters of empires, thefashioners of the new heaven and the new earth--or were they only theflies on the wheel of circumstance, to whom the world was unaccountablybecoming a riddle?

This commingling of civilizations and types brought together in Paris bya set of unprecedented conditions was full of interest and instructionto the observer privileged to meet them at close quarters. The averageobserver, however, had little chance of conversing with them, for, asthese foreigners had no common meeting-place, they kept mostly amongtheir own folk. Only now and again did three or four members ofdifferent races, when they chanced to speak some common language, getan opportunity of enjoying their leisure together. A friend of mine, ahighly gifted Frenchman of the fine old type, a descendant ofTalleyrand, who was born a hundred and fifty years too late, opened hishospitable house once a week to the élite of the world, and partiallymet the pressing demand. 

To the gaping tourist the Ville Lumière resembled nothing so much as ahuge world fair, with enormous caravanserais, gigantic booths, gaudymerry-go-rounds, squalid taverns, and huge inns. Every place ofentertainment was crowded, and congregations patiently awaited theirturn in the street, undeterred by rain or wind or snow, offeringabsurdly high prices for scant accommodation and disheartened at havingtheir offers refused. Extortion was rampant and profiteering wentunpunished. Foreigners, mainly American and British, could be seenwandering, portmanteau in hand, from post to pillar, anxiously seekingwhere to lay their heads, and made desperate by failure, fatigue, andnightfall. The cost of living which harassed the bulk of the people wasfast becoming the stumbling-block of governments and the most powerfullever of revolutionaries. The chief of the peace armies resided insumptuous hotels, furnished luxuriously in dubious taste, flooded aftersundown with dazzling light, and filled by day with the buzz of idlechatter, the shuffling of feet, the banging of doors, and the ringing ofbells. Music and dancing enlivened the inmates when their day's toil wasover and time had to be killed. Thus, within, one could find anxiousdeliberation and warm debate; without, noisy revel and vulgar brawl. "Fate's a fiddler; life's a dance. "

To few of those visitors did Paris seem what it really was--a nest ofgolden dreams, a mist of memories, a seed-plot of hopes, a storehouse oftime's menaces. 

THE PARIS CONFERENCE AND THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

There were no solemn pageants, no impressive ceremonies, such as thosethat rejoiced the hearts of the Viennese in 1814-15 until the triumphalmarch of the Allied troops. 

The Vienna of Congress days was transformed into a paradise of delightsby a brilliant court which pushed hospitality to the point oflavishness. In the burg alone were two emperors, two empresses, fourkings, one queen, two crown-princes, two archduchesses, and threeprinces. Every day the Emperor's table cost fifty thousand gulden--everyCongress day cost him ten times that sum. Galaxies of Europe's eminentpersonages flocked to the Austrian capital, taking with them theirministers, secretaries, favorites, and "confidential agents. " So eagerwere these world-reformers to enjoy themselves that the court did not gointo mourning for Queen Marie Caroline of Naples, the last of MarieTheresa's daughters. Her death was not even announced officially lest itshould trouble the festivities of the jovial peace-makers!

The Paris of the Conference, on the other hand, was democratic, with astrong infusion of plutocracy. It attempted no such brilliant display asthat which flattered the senses or fired the imagination of theViennese. In 1919 mankind was simpler in its tastes and perhaps lessesthetic. It is certain that the froth of contemporary frivolity hadlost its sparkling whiteness and was grown turbid. In Vienna, balls, banquets, theatricals, military reviews, followed one another in dizzysuccession and enabled politicians and adventurers to carry on theirintrigues and machinations unnoticed by all except the secret police. And, as the Congress marked the close of one bloody campaign and usheredin another, one might aptly term it the interval between two tragedies. For a time it seemed as though this part of the likeness might becomeapplicable to the Conference of Paris. 

Moving from pleasure to politics, one found strong contrasts as well assurprising resemblances between the two peace-making assemblies, and, itwas assumed, to the advantage of the Paris Conference. Thus, at theAustrian Congress, the members, while seemingly united, were pullinghard against one another, each individual or group tugging in adifferent direction. The Powers had been compelled by necessity to uniteagainst a common enemy and, having worsted him on the battlefield, fellto squabbling among themselves in the Council Chamber as soon as theyset about dividing the booty. In this respect the Paris Conference--theworld was assured in the beginning--towered aloft above its historicpredecessor. Men who knew the facts declared repeatedly that thedelegates to the Quai d'Orsay were just as unanimous, disinterested, andsingle-minded during the armistice as they were through the war. Probably they were. 

Another interesting point of comparison was supplied by the _dramatispersonæ_? of both illustrious companies. They were nearly allrepresentatives of old states, but there was one exception. 

THE CONGRESS CHIEF

_Mistrusted, Feared, Humored, and Obeyed_

A relatively new Power took part in the deliberations of the ViennaCongress, and, perhaps, because of its loftier intentions, introduced ajarring note into the concert of nations. Russia was then a newcomerinto the European councils; indeed she was hardly yet recognized asEuropean. Her gifted Tsar, Alexander I, was an idealist who wanted, notso much peace with the vanquished enemy as a complete reform of theordering of the whole world, so that wars should thenceforward beabolished and the welfare of mankind be set developing like a sort ofpacific _perpetuum mobile_. This blessed change, however, was to becompassed, not by the peoples or their representatives, but by thegovernments, led by himself and deliberating in secret. At the ParisConference it was even so. 

This curious type of public worker--a mixture of the mystical and thepractical--was the terror of the Vienna delegates. He put spokes ineverybody's wheel, behaved as the autocrat of the Congress and felt asself-complacent as a saint. Countess von Thurheim wrote of him: "Hemistrusted his environment and let himself be led by others. But he wasthoroughly good and high-minded and sought after the weal, not merely ofhis own country, but of the whole world. _Son coeur eût embrassé lebonheur du monde_. " He realized in himself the dreams of thephilosophers about love for mankind, but their Utopias of humanhappiness were based upon the perfection both of subjects and ofprinces, and, as Alexander could fulfil only one-half of theseconditions, his work remained unfinished and the poor Emperor died, avictim of his high-minded illusions. [5]

The other personages, Metternich in particular, were greatly put out byAlexander's presence. They labeled him a marplot who could not and wouldnot enter into the spirit of their game, but they dared not offend him. Without his brave troops they could not have been victorious and theydid not know how soon they might need him again, for he represented anumerous and powerful people whose economic and military resourcespromised it in time the hegemony of the world. So, while they heartilydisliked the chief of this new great country, they also feared and, therefore, humored him. They all felt that the enemy, although defeatedand humbled, was not, perhaps, permanently disabled, and might, at anymoment, rise, phoenix-like and soar aloft again. The great visionary wastherefore fêted and lauded and raised to a dizzy pedestal by men who, intheir hearts, set him down as a crank. His words were reverentlyrepeated and his smiles recorded and remembered. Hardly any one had thebad taste to remark that even this millennial philosopher in thestatesman's armchair left unsightly flaws in his system for the welfareof man. Thus, while favoring equality generally, he obstinately refusedto concede it to one race, in fact, he would not hear of common fairnessbeing meted out to that race. It was the Polish people which was treatedthus at the Vienna Congress, and, owing to him, Poland's just claimswere ignored, her indefeasible rights were violated, and the work of thepeace-makers was botched. . . . 

Happily, optimists said, the Paris Conference was organized on a whollydifferent basis. Its members considered themselves mere servants of thepublic--stewards, who had to render an account of their stewardship andwho therefore went in salutary fear of the electorate at home. Thischeck was not felt by the plenipotentiaries in Vienna. Again, everythingthe Paris delegates did was for the benefit of the masses, although mostof it was done by stealth and unappreciated by them. 

The remarkable document which will forever be associated with the nameof President Wilson was the _clou_ of the Conference. The League ofNations scheme seemed destined to change fundamentally the relations ofpeoples toward one another, and the change was expected to beginimmediately after the Covenant had been voted, signed, and ratified. Butit was not relished by any government except that of the United States, and it was in order to enable the delegates to devise such a wording ofthe Covenant as would not bind them to an obnoxious principle or committheir electorates to any irksome sacrifice, that the peace treaty withGermany and the liquidation of the war were postponed. This delay causedprofound dissatisfaction in continental Europe, but it had theincidental advantage of bringing home to the victorious nations themarvelous recuperative powers of the German race. It also gave time forthe drafting of a compact so admirably tempered to the human weaknessesof the rival signatory nations, whose passions were curbed only by sheerexhaustion, that all their spokesmen saw their way to sign it. There wassomething almost genial in the simplicity of the means by which theeminent promoter of the Covenant intended to reform the peoples of theworld. He gave them credit for virtues which would have rendered theLeague unnecessary and displayed indulgence for passions which made itsspeedy realization hopeless, thus affording a _superfluous_ illustrationof the truth that the one deadly evil to be shunned by those who wouldremain philanthropists is a practical knowledge of men, and of thetruism that the statesman's bane is an inordinate fondness for abstractideas. 

One of the decided triumphs of the Paris Peace Conference over theVienna Congress lay in the amazing speed with which it got through thedifficult task of solving offhandedly some of the most formidableproblems that ever exercised the wit of man. One of the Paris journalscontained the following remarkable announcement: "The actual timeconsumed in constituting the League of Nations, which it is hoped willbe the means of keeping peace in the world, was thirty hours. Thisdoesn't seem possible, but it is true. "[6]

How provokingly slowly the dawdlers of Vienna moved in comparison maybe read in the chronicles of that time. The peoples hoped and believedthat the Congress would perform its tasks in a short period, but it wasonly after nine months' gestation and sore travail that it finallybrought forth its offspring--a mountain of Acts which have beenmoldering in dust ever since. 

The Wilsonian Covenant, which bound together thirty-two states--a leagueintended to be incomparably more powerful than was the HolyAlliance--will take rank as the most rapid improvisation of its kind indiplomatic history. 

A comparison between the features common to the two internationallegislatures struck many observers as even more reassuring than thecontrast between their differences. Both were placed in likecircumstances, faced with bewildering and fateful problems to which anexhausting war, just ended, had imparted sharp actuality. One of thedelegates to the Vienna Congress wrote:

"Everything had to be recast and made new, the destinies of Germany, Italy, and Poland settled, a solid groundwork laid for the future, and acommercial system to be outlined. "[7] Might not those very words havebeen penned at any moment during the Paris Conference with equalrelevance to its undertakings?

Or these: "However easily and gracefully the fine old French wit mightturn the topics of the day, people felt vaguely beneath it all thatthese latter times were very far removed from the departed era and, inmany respects, differed from it to an incomprehensible degree. "[8] Andthe veteran Prince de Ligne remarked to the Comte de la Garde: "Fromevery side come cries of Peace, Justice, Equilibrium, Indemnity. . . . Whowill evolve order from this chaos and set a dam to the stream ofclaims?" How often have the same cries and queries been uttered inParis?

When the first confidential talks began at the Vienna Congress, the samedifficulties arose as were encountered over a century later in Parisabout the number of states that were entitled to have representativesthere. At the outset, the four Cabinet Ministers of Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia kept things to themselves, excluding vanquishedFrance and the lesser Powers. Some time afterward, however, Talleyrand, the spokesman of the worsted nation, accompanied by the PortugueseMinister, Labrador, protested vehemently against the form and results ofthe deliberations. At one sitting passion rose to white heat andTalleyrand spoke of quitting the Congress altogether, whereupon acompromise was struck and eight nations received the right to berepresented. In this way the Committee of Eight was formed. [9] In Parisdiscussion became to the full as lively, and on the first Saturday, whenthe representatives of Belgium, Greece, Poland, and the other smallstates delivered impassioned speeches against the attitude of the BigFive they were maladroitly answered by M. Clemenceau, who relied, as thesource from which emanated the superior right of the Great Powers, uponthe twelve million soldiers they had placed in the field. It wasunfortunate that force should thus confer privileges at a PeaceConference which was convoked to end the reign of force and privilege. In Vienna it was different, but so were the times. 

Many of the entries and comments of the chroniclers of 1815 read likeextracts from newspapers of the first three months of 1919. "AboutPoland, they are fighting fiercely and, down to the present, with nodecisive result, " writes Count Carl von Nostitz, a Russian militaryobserver. . . . "Concerning Germany and her future federative constitution, nothing has yet been done, absolutely nothing. "[10] Here is a glosswritten by Countess Elise von Bernstorff, wife of the Danish Minister:"Most comical was the mixture of the very different individuals who allfancied they had work to do at the Congress . . . One noticed noblemen andscholars who had never transacted any business before, but now lookedextremely consequential and took on an imposing bearing, and professorswho mentally set down their university chairs in the center of alistening Congress, but soon turned peevish and wandered hither andthither, complaining that they could not, for the life of them, make outwhat was going on. " Again: "It would have been to the interest of allEurope--rightly understood--to restore Poland. This matter may beregarded as the most important of all. None other could touch so nearlythe policy of all the Powers represented, "[11] wrote the BavarianPremier, Graf von Montgelas, just as the Entente press was writing inthe year 1919. 

The plenipotentiaries of the Paris Conference had for a short periodwhat is termed a good press, and a rigorous censorship which never erredon the side of laxity, whereas those of the Vienna Congress werecriticized without truth. For example, the population of Vienna, we aretold by Bavaria's chief delegate, was disappointed when it discerned inthose whom it was wont to worship as demigods, only mortals. "Thecondition of state affairs, " writes Von Gentz, one of the clearest headsat the Congress, "is weird, but it is not, as formerly, in consequenceof the crushing weight that is hung around our necks, but by reason ofthe mediocrity and clumsiness of nearly all the workers. "[12] Oneconsequence of this state of things was the constant upspringing of newand unforeseen problems, until, as time went on, the bewildereddelegates were literally overwhelmed. "So many interests cross eachother here, " comments Count Carl von Nostitz, "which the peoples want tohave mooted at the long-wished-for League of Nations, that they fallinto the oddest shapes. . . . Look wheresoever you will, you are faced withincongruity and confusion. . . . Daily the claims increase as though moreand more evil spirits were issuing forth from hell at the invocation ofa sorcerer who has forgotten the spell by which to lay them. "[13] It wasof the Vienna Congress that those words were written. 

In certain trivial details, too, the likeness between the two greatpeace assemblies is remarkable. For example, Lord Castlereagh, whorepresented England at Vienna, had to return to London to meetParliament, thus inconveniencing the august assembly, as Mr. Wilson andMr. George were obliged to quit Paris, with a like effect. BeforeCastlereagh left the scene of his labors, uncharitable judgments werepassed on him for allowing home interests to predominate over hisinternational activities. 

The destinies of Poland and of Germany, which were then about to becomea confederation, occupied the forefront of interest at the Congress asthey did at the Conference. A similarity is noticeable also in the stateof Europe generally, then and now. "The uncertain condition of allEurope, " writes a close observer in 1815, "is appalling for the peoples:every country has mobilized . . . And the luckless inhabitants are crushedby taxation. On every side people complain that this state of peace isworse than war . . . Individuals who despised Napoleon say that under himthe suffering was not greater . . . Every country is sapping its ownprosperity, so that financial conditions, in lieu of improving sinceNapoleon's collapse, are deteriorating every where. "[14]

In 1815, as in 1919, the world pacifiers had their court painters, andIsabey, the French portraitist, was as much run after as was Sir WilliamOrpen in 1919. In some respects, however, there was a difference. "Isabey, " said the Prince de Ligne, "is the Congress become painter. Come! His talk is as clever as his brush. " But Sir William Orpen was soabsorbed by his work that he never uttered a word during a sitting. Thecontemporaries of the Paris Conference were luckier than their forebearsof the Vienna Congress--for they could behold the lifelike features oftheir benefactors in a cinema. "It is understood, " wrote a Parisjournal, "that the necessity of preserving a permanent record of thepersonalities and proceedings at the Peace Conference has not been lostsight of. Very shortly a series of cinematographic films of theprincipal delegates and of the commissions is to be made on behalf ofthe British government, so that, side by side with the Treaty of Paris, posterity will be able to study the physiognomy of the men who madeit. "[15] In no case is it likely to forget them. 

So the great heart of Paris, even to a greater degree than that ofVienna over a hundred years ago, beat and throbbed to cosmic measureswhile its brain worked busily at national, provincial, and economicquestions. 

Side by side with the good cheer prevalent that kept the eminentlawgivers of the Vienna Congress in buoyant spirits went the cost ofliving, prohibitive outside the charmed circle in consequence of thehigh and rising prices. 

"Every article, " writes the Comte de la Garde, one of the chroniclersof the Vienna Congress, "but more especially fuel, soared to incredibleheights. The Austrian government found it necessary, in consequence, toallow all its officials supplements to their salaries andindemnities. "[16] In Paris things were worse. Greed and disorganizationcombined to make of the French capital a vast fleecing-machine. The sumsof money expended by foreigners in France during all that time and amuch longer period is said to have exceeded the revenue from foreigntrade. There was hardly any coal, and even the wood fuel gave out nowand again. Butter was unknown. Wine was bad and terribly dear. A publicconveyance could not be obtained unless one paid "double, treble, andquintuple fares and a gratuity. " The demand was great and the supplysometimes abundant, but the authorities contrived to keep the two apartsystematically. 

THE COST OF LIVING

In no European country did the cost of living attain the height itreached in France in the year 1919. Not only luxuries and comforts, butsome of life's necessaries, were beyond the reach of home-comingsoldiers, and this was currently ascribed to the greed of merchants, thedisorganization of transports, the strikes of workmen, and thesupineness of the authorities, whose main care was to keep the nationtranquil by suppressing one kind of news, spreading another, and givingway to demands which could no longer be denied. There was another andmore effectual cause: the war had deprived the world of twelve millionworkmen and a thousand milliard francs' worth of goods. But of thispeople took no account. The demobilized soldiers who for years had beenwell fed and relieved of solicitude for the morrow returned home, flushed with victory, proud of the commanding position which they hadwon in the state, and eager to reap the rewards of their sacrifices. Butthey were bitterly disillusioned. They expected a country fit for heroesto live in, and what awaited them was a condition of things to whichonly a defeated people could be asked to resign itself. The food towhich the poilu had, for nearly five years, been accustomed at the frontwas become, since the armistice, the exclusive monopoly of thecapitalist or the _nouveau-riche_ in the rear. To obtain a ration ofsugar he or his wife had to stand in a long queue for hours, perhaps goaway empty-handed and return on the following morning. When hissugar-card was eventually handed to him he had again to stand in lineoutside the grocer's door and, when his turn came to enter it, wasfrequently told that the supply was exhausted and would not bereplenished for a week or longer. Yet his newspaper informed him thatthere was plenty of colonial sugar, ready for shipment, but forbidden bythe authorities to be imported into France. I met many poor people fromthe provinces and some resident in Paris who for four years had not onceeaten a morsel of sugar, although the well-to-do were always amplysupplied. In many places even bread was lacking, while biscuits, shortbread, and fancy cakes, available at exorbitant prices, wereexhibited in the shop windows. Tokens of unbridled luxury and glaringevidences of wanton waste were flaunted daily and hourly in the faces ofthe humbled men who had saved the nation and wanted the nation torealize the fact. Lucullan banquets, opulent lunches, all-night dances, high revels of an exotic character testified to the peculiar psychictemper as well as to the material prosperity of the passive elements ofthe community and stung the poilus to the quick. "But what justice, "these asked, "can the living hope for, when the glorious dead are sosoon forgotten?" For one ghastly detail remains to complete a picture towhich Boccaccio could hardly have done justice. "While all this wilddissipation was going on among the moneyed class in the capital thecorpses of many gallant soldiers lay unburied and uncovered on theshell-plowed fields of battle near Rheims, on the road toNeuville-sur-Margival and other places--sights pointed out to visitorsto tickle their interest in the grim spectacle of war. In vainindividuals expostulated and the press protested. As recently as Maypersons known to me--my English secretary was one--looked with thefascination of horror on the bodies of men who, when they breathed, wereheroes. They lay there where they had fallen and agonized, and now, inthe heat of the May sun, were moldering in dust away--a couple of hours'motor drive from Paris. . . . "[17]

The soldiers mused and brooded. Since the war began they had undergone agreat psychic transformation. Stationed at the very center of asustained fiery crisis, they lost their feeling of acquiescence in theestablished order and in the place of their own class therein. In thesight of death they had been stirred to their depths and volcanic fireswere found burning there. Resignation had thereupon made way for arebellious mood and rebellion found sustenance everywhere. The poiludemobilized retained his military spirit, nay, he carried about with himthe very atmosphere of the trenches. He had rid himself of the sentimentof fear and the faculty of reverence went with it. His outlook on theworld had changed completely and his inner sense reversed the socialorder which he beheld, as the eye reverses the object it apprehends. Respect for persons and institutions survived in relatively fewinstances the sacredness of life and the fear of death. He wasimpressed, too, with the all-importance of his class, which he hadlearned during the war to look upon as the Atlas on whose shoulders restthe Republic and its empire overseas. He had saved the state in war andhe remained in peace-time its principal mainstay. With his value asmeasured by these priceless services he compared the low estimate putupon him by those who continued to identify themselves with thestate--the over-fed, lazy, self-seeking money-getters who reserved tothemselves the fruits of his toil. 

One can well imagine--I have actually heard--the poilus putting theircase somewhat as follows: "So long as we filled the gap between thedeath-dealing Teutons and our privileged compatriots we were well fed, warmly clad, made much of. During the war we were raised to the rank ofpillars of the state, saviors of the nation, arbiters of the world'sdestinies. So long as we faced the enemy's guns nothing was too good forus. We had meat, white bread, eggs, wine, sugar in plenty. But, now thatwe have accomplished our task, we have fallen from our high estate andare expected to become pariahs anew. We are to work on for the old gangand the class from which it comes, until they plunge us into anotherwar. For what? What is the reward for what we have achieved, what theincentive for what we are expected to accomplish? We cannot afford asmuch food as before the war, nor of the same quality. We are in wanteven of necessaries. Is it for this that we have fought? A thousandtimes no. If we saved our nation we can also save our class. We have thewill and the power. Why should we not exert them?" The purpose of thesection of the community to which these demobilized soldiers mainlybelonged grew visibly definite as consciousness of their collectiveforce grew and became keener. Occasionally it manifested itself openlyin symptomatic spurts. 

One dismal night, at a brilliant ball in a private mansion, a selectcompany of both sexes, representatives of the world of rank and fashion, were enjoying themselves to their hearts' content, while theirchauffeurs watched and waited outside in the cold, dark streets, chewingthe cud of bitter reflections. Between the hours of three and four inthe morning the latter held an open-air meeting, and adopted aresolution which they carried out forthwith. A delegation was sentupstairs to give notice to the light-hearted guests that they must bedown in their respective motors within ten minutes on pain of notfinding any conveyances to take them home. The mutineers were nearly allprivate chauffeurs in the employ of the personages to whom they sentthis indelicate ultimatum. The resourceful host, however, warded off thedanger and placated the rebellious drivers by inviting them to animprovised little banquet of _pâtés de foie gras_, dry champagne, andother delicacies. The general temper of the proletariat remainedunchanged. Tales of rebellion still more disquieting were current inParis, which, whether true or false, were aids to a correct diagnosis ofthe situation. 

A dancing mania broke out during the armistice, which was not confinedto the French capital. In Berlin, Rome, London, it aroused theindignation of those whose sympathy with the spiritual life of theirrespective nations was still a living force. It would seem, however, tobe the natural reaction produced by a tremendous national calamity, under which the mainspring of the collective mind temporarily gives wayand the psychical equilibrium is upset. Disillusion, despondency, andcontempt for the passions that lately stirred them drive the people toseek relief in the distractions of pleasures, among which dancing isperhaps one of the mildest. It was so in Paris at the close of the longperiod of stress which ended with the rise of Napoleon. Dancing thenwent on uninterruptedly despite national calamities and privatehardships. "Luxury, " said Victor Hugo, "is a necessity of great statesand great civilizations, but there are moments when it must not beexhibited to the masses. " There was never a conjuncture when the dangerof such an exhibition was greater or more imminent than during thearmistice on the Continent--for it was the period of incubationpreceding the outbreak of the most malignant social disease to whichcivilized communities are subject. 

The festivities and amusements in the higher circles of Paris recall theglowing descriptions of the fret and fever of existence in the Austriancapital during the historic Vienna Congress a hundred years ago. Dancingbecame epidemic and shameless. In some salons the forms it took wererepellent. One of my friends, the Marquis X. , invited to a dance at thehouse of a plutocrat, was so shocked by what he saw there that he leftalmost at once in disgust. Madame Machin, the favorite teacher of thechoreographic art, gave lessons in the new modes of dancing, and her feewas three hundred francs a lesson. In a few weeks she netted, it issaid, over one hundred thousand francs. 

The Prince de Ligne said of the Vienna Congress: "Le Congrès danse maisil ne marche pas. " The French press uttered similar criticisms of theParis Conference, when its delegates were leisurely picking upinformation about the countries whose affairs they were forgathered tosettle. The following paragraph from a Paris journal--one of manysuch--describes a characteristic scene:

 The domestic staff at the Hôtel Majestic, the headquarters of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference, held a very successful dance on Monday evening, attended by many members of the British Mission and Staff. The ballroom was a medley of plenipotentiaries and chambermaids, generals and orderlies, Foreign Office attachés and waitresses. All the latest forms of dancing were to be seen, including the jazz and the hesitation waltz, and, according to the opinion of experts, the dancing reached an unusually high standard of excellence. Major Lloyd George, one of the Prime Minister's sons, was among the dancers. Mr. G. H. Roberts, the Food Controller, made a very happy little speech to the hotel staff. [18]

The following extract is also worth quoting:

 A packed house applauded 'Hullo, Paris!' from the rise of the curtain to the finale at the new Palace Theater (in the rue Mogador), Paris, last night. . . . President Wilson, Mr. A. J. Balfour, and Lord Derby all remained until the fall of the curtain at 12. 15 . . . And . . . Were given cordial cheers from the dispersing audience as they passed through the line of Municipal Guards, who presented arms as the distinguished visitors made their way to their motor-cars. [19]

Juxtaposed with the grief, discontent, and physical hardships prevailingamong large sections of the population which had provided most of theholocausts for the Moloch of War, the ostentatious gaiety of theprosperous few might well seem a challenge. And so it was construed bythe sullen lack-alls who prowled about the streets of Paris and told oneanother that their turn would come soon. 

When the masses stare at the wealthy with the eyes one so often noticedduring the eventful days of the armistice one may safely conclude, inthe words of Victor Hugo, that "it is not thoughts that are harbored bythose brains; it is events. "

By the laboring classes the round of festivities, the theatricalrepresentations, the various negro and other foreign dances, and theless-refined pleasures of the world's blithest capital were watched withill-concealed resentment. One often witnessed long lines of motor-carsdriving up to a theater, fashionable restaurant, or concert-hall, through the opening portals of which could be caught a glimpse of thedazzling illumination within, while, a few yards farther off, queues ofanemic men and women were waiting to be admitted to the shop where milkor eggs or fuel could be had at the relatively low prices fixed by thestate. The scraps of conversation that reached one's ears were far fromreassuring. 

I have met on the same afternoon the international world-regenerators, smiling, self-complacent, or preoccupied, flitting by in their motors tothe Quai d'Orsay, and also quiet, determined-looking men, trudging alongin the snow and slush, wending their way toward their laborconventicles, where they, too, were drafting laws for a new and strangeera, and I voluntarily fell to gaging the distance that sundered the twomovements, and asked myself which of the inchoate legislations wouldultimately be accepted by the world. The question since then has beenpartially answered. As time passed, the high cost of living wasuniversally ascribed, as we saw, to the insatiable greed of themiddlemen and the sluggishness of the authorities, whose incapacity toorganize and unwillingness to take responsibility increased and auguredill of the future of the country unless men of different type should inthe meanwhile take the reins. Practically nothing was done to amelioratethe carrying power of the railways, to utilize the waterways, to employthe countless lorries and motor-vans that were lying unused, topurchase, convey, and distribute the provisions which were at thedisposal of the government. Various ministerial departments woulddispute as to which should take over consignments of meat or vegetables, and while reports, notes, and replies were being leisurely written anddespatched, weeks or months rolled by, during which the foodstuffsbecame unfit for human consumption. In the middle of May, to take butone typical instance, 2, 401 eases of lard and 1, 418 cases of salt meatwere left rotting in the docks at Marseilles. In the storage magazinesat Murumas, 6, 000 tons of salt meat were spoiled because it was nobody'sbusiness to remove and distribute them. Eighteen refrigerator-carsloaded with chilled meat arrived in Paris from Havre in the month ofJune. When they were examined at the cold-storage station it wasdiscovered that, the doors having been negligently left open, thecontents of the cases had to be destroyed. [20] From Belgium 108, 000kilos of potatoes were received and allowed to lie so long at one of thestations that they went bad and had to be thrown away. When these andkindred facts were published, the authorities, who had long been silent, became apologetic, but remained throughout inactive. In other countriesthe conditions, if less accentuated, were similar. 

One of the dodges to which unscrupulous dealers resorted with impunityand profit was particularly ingenious. At the central markets, wheneverany food is condemned, the public-health authorities seize it and paythe owner full value at the current market rates. The marketmen oftenturned this equitable arrangement to account by keeping back largequantities of excellent vegetables, for which the population wasyearning, and when they rotted and had to be carted away, received theirmoney value from the Public Health Department, thus attaining theirobject, which was to lessen the supply and raise the prices on what theykept for sale. [21] The consequence was that Paris suffered from acontinual dearth of vegetables and fruits. Statistics published by theUnited States government showed the maximum increase in the cost ofliving in four countries as follows: France, 235 per cent. ; Britain, 135per cent. ; Canada, 115 per cent. ; and the United States, 107 percent. [22] But since these data were published prices continued to riseuntil, at the beginning of July, they had attained the same level asthose of Russia on the eve of the revolution there. In Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, the prices of various kinds of fish, shell-fish, jams, apples, had gone up 500 per cent. , cabbage over 900 per cent. , andceleriac 2, 000 per cent. Anthracite coal, which in the year 1914 cost 56francs a ton, could not be purchased in 1919 for less than 360 francs. 

The restaurants and hotels waged a veritable war of plunder on theirguests, most of whom, besides the scandalous prices, which bore noreasonable relation to the cost of production, had to pay the governmentluxury tax of 10 per cent, over and above. A well-known presscorrespondent, who entertained seven friends to a simple dinner in amodest restaurant, was charged 500 francs, 90 francs being set down forone chicken, and 28 for three cocktails. The _maître d'hotel_, inresponse to the pressman's expostulations, assured him that thesecharges left the proprietor hardly any profit. As it chanced, however, the journalist had just been professionally investigating the cost ofliving, and had the data at his finger-ends. As he displayed hisintimate knowledge to his host, and obviously knew where to look forredress, he had the satisfaction of obtaining a rebate of 150francs. [23]

Nothing could well be more illuminating than the following curiouspicture contributed by a journal whose representative made a specialinquiry into the whole question of the cost of living. [24] "I was diningthe other day at a restaurant of the Bois de Boulogne. There was a longqueue of people waiting at the door, some sixty persons all told, mostlyladies, who pressed one another closely. From time to time a voicecried: 'Two places, ' whereupon a door was held opened, two patientsentered, and then it was loudly slammed, smiting some of those who stoodnext to it. At last my turn came, and I went in. The guests were sittingso close to one another that they could not move their elbows. Only thehands and fingers were free. There sat women half naked, and men whosevoices and dress betrayed newly acquired wealth. Not one of themquestioned the bills which were presented. And what bills! The _horsd'oeuvre_, 20 francs. Fish, 90 francs. A chicken, 150 francs. Threecigars, 45 francs. The repast came to 250 francs a person at the verylowest. " Another journalist commented upon this story as follows: "Sincethe end of last June, " he said, "445, 000 quintals of vegetables, thesuperfluous output of the Palatinate, were offered to France at nominalprices. And the cost of vegetables here at home is painfully notorious. Well, the deal was accepted by the competent Commission in Paris. Everything was ready for despatching the consignment. The necessarytrains were secured. All that was wanting was the approval of the Frenchauthorities, who were notified. Their answer has not yet been given andalready the vegetables are rotting in the magazines. "

The authorities pleaded the insufficiency of rolling stock, but thepress revealed the hollowness of the excuse and the responsibility ofthose who put it forward, and showed that thousands of wagons, lorries, and motor-vans were idle, deteriorating in the open air. For instance, between Cognac and Jarnac the state railways had left about onethousand wagons unused, which were fast becoming unusable. [25] And thiswas but one of many similar instances. 

It would be hard to find a parallel in history for the rapacity combinedwith unscrupulousness and ingenuity displayed during that fateful periodby dishonest individuals, and left unpunished by the state. DoubtlessFrance was not the only country in which greed was insatiable and itsmanifestations disastrous. From other parts of the Continent there alsocame bitter complaints of the ruthlessness of profiteers, and in Italytheir heartless vampirism contributed materially to the revolutionaryoutbreaks throughout that country in July. Even Britain was not exemptfrom the scourge. But the presence of whole armies of well-paid, easy-going foreign troops and officials on French soil stimulated greedby feeding it, and also their complaints occasionally bared it to theworld. The impression it left on certain units of the American forceswas deplorable. When United States soldiers who had long been stationedin a French town were transferred to Germany, where charges were low, the revulsion of feeling among the straightforward, honest Yankees wascomplete and embarrassing. And by way of keeping it within the bounds ofpolitical orthodoxy, they were informed that the Germans had conspiredto hoodwink them by selling at undercost prices, in order to turn themagainst the French. It was an insidious form of German propaganda!

On the other hand, the experience of British and American warriors inFrance sometimes happened to be so unfortunate that many of them gavecredence to the absurd and mischievous legend that their governmentswere made to pay rent for the trenches in which their troops fought anddied, and even for the graves in which the slain were buried. 

An acquaintance of mine, an American delegate, wanted an abode tohimself during the Conference, and, having found one suitable for whichfifteen to twenty-five thousand francs a year were deemed a fair rent, he inquired the price, and the proprietor, knowing that he had to dowith a really wealthy American, answered, "A quarter of a millionfrancs. " Subsequently the landlord sent to ask whether the distinguishedvisitor would take the place; but the answer he received ran, "No, Ihave too much self-respect. "

Hotel prices in Paris, beginning from December, 1918, were prohibitiveto all but the wealthy. Yet they were raised several times during theConference. Again, despite the high level they had reached by thebeginning of July, they were actually quintupled in some hotels anddoubled in many for about a week at the time of the peace celebrations. Rents for flats and houses soared proportionately. 

One explanation of the fantastic rise in rents is characteristic. Duringthe war and the armistice, the government--and not only the Frenchgovernment--proclaimed a moratorium, and no rents at all were paid, inconsequence of which many house-owners were impoverished and othersactually beggared. And it was with a view to recoup themselves for theselosses that they fleeced their tenants, French and foreign, as soon asthe opportunity presented itself. An amusing incident arising out of themoratorium came to light in the course of a lawsuit. An ingenioustenant, smitten with the passion of greed, not content with occupyinghis flat without paying rent, sublet it at a high figure to a man whopaid him well and in advance, but by mischance set fire to the place anddied. Thereupon the _tenant_ demanded and received a considerable sumfrom the insurance company in which the defunct occupant had had toinsure the flat and its contents. He then entered an action at lawagainst the proprietor of the house for the value of the damage causedby the fire, and he won his case. The unfortunate owner was condemned topay the sum claimed, and also the costs of the action. [26] But he couldnot recover his rent. 

Disorganization throughout France, and particularly in Paris, verged onthe border of chaos. Every one felt its effects, but none so severely asthe men who had won the war. The work of demobilization, which begansoon after the armistice, but was early interrupted, proceeded atsnail-pace. The homecoming soldiers sent hundreds of letters to thenewspapers, complaining of the wearisome delays on the journey and thesharp privations which they were needlessly forced to endure. Thus, whereas they took but twenty-eight hours to travel from Hanover toCologne--the lines being German, and therefore relatively wellorganized--they were no less than a fortnight on the way between Cologneand Marseilles. [27] During the German section of the journey they werekept warm, supplied with hot soup and coffee twice daily; but during thesecond half, which lasted fourteen days, they received no beverage, hotor cold. "The men were cared for much less than horses. " That thesepoilus turned against the government and the class responsible for thisgross neglect was hardly surprising. One of them wrote: "They [theauthorities] are frightened of Bolshevism. But we who have not got home, we all await its coming. I don't, of course, mean the real Bolshevism, but even that kind which they paint in such repellent hues. "[28] Theconditions of telegraphic and postal communications were on a par witheverything else. There was no guarantee that a message paid for wouldeven be sent by the telegraph-operators, or, if withheld, that thesender would be apprised of its suppression. The war arrangements wereretained during the armistice. And they were superlatively bad. Acommittee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies to inquire into thematter officially, reported that, [29] at the Paris Telegraph Bureaualone, 40, 000 despatches were held back every day--40, 000 a day, or58, 400, 000 in four years! And from the capital alone. The majority ofthem were never delivered, and the others were distributed after greatdelay. The despatches which were retained were, in the main, thrown intoa basket, and, when the accumulation had become too great, weredestroyed. The Control Section never made any inquiry, and neither thesenders nor those to whom the despatches were addressed were everinformed. [30] Even important messages of neutral ambassadors in Rome andLondon fell under the ban. The recklessness of these censors, who ceasedeven to read what they destroyed, was such that they held up and madeaway with state orders transmitted by the great munitions factories, andone of these was constrained to close down because it was unable toobtain certain materials in time. 

The French Ambassador in Switzerland reported that, owing to theseholocausts, important messages from that country, containing orders forthe French national loan, never reached their destination, inconsequence of which the French nation lost from ten to twenty millionfrancs. And even the letters and telegrams that were actually passedwere so carelessly handled that many of them were lost on the way ordelayed until they became meaningless to the addressee. So, forinstance, an official letter despatched by the Minister of Commerce tothe Minister of Finance in Paris was sent to Calcutta, where the FrenchConsul-General came across it, and had it directed back to Paris. Thecorrespondent of the _Echo de Paris_, who was sent to Switzerland by hisjournal, was forbidden by law to carry more than one thousand francsover the frontier, nor was the management of the journal permitted toforward to him more than two hundred francs at a time. And when atelegram was given up in Paris, crediting him with two hundred francs, it was stopped by the censor. Eleven days were let go by withoutinforming the persons concerned. When the administrator of the journalquestioned the chief censor, he declined responsibility, having hadnothing to do with the matter, but he indicated the Central TelegraphControl as the competent department. There, too, however, they wereinnocent, having never heard of the suppression. It took another day toelicit the fact that the economic section of the War Ministry was aloneanswerable for the decision. The indefatigable manager of the _Echo deParis_ applied to the department in question, but only to learn that it, too, was without any knowledge of what had happened, but it promised tofind out. Soon afterward it informed the zealous manager that thedepartment which had given the order could only be the ExchangeCommission of the Ministry of Finances. And during all the time thecorrespondent was in Zurich without money to pay for telegrams or tosettle his hotel and restaurant bills. [31]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, in a report on the wholesubject, characterized the section of Telegraphic Control as "an organof confusion and disorder which has engendered extraordinary abuses, andrisked compromising the government seriously. "[32] It did not merelyrisk, it actually went far to compromise the government and the entiregoverning class as well. 

It looked as though the rulers of France were still unconsciously guidedby the maxim of Richelieu, who wrote in his testament, "If the peopleswere too comfortable there would be no keeping them to the rules ofduty. " The more urgent the need of resourcefulness and guidance, thegreater were the listlessness and confusion. "There is neither unity ofconduct, " wrote a press organ of the masses, "nor co-ordination of theDepartments of War, Public Works, Revictualing, Transports. All theseservices commingle, overlap, clash, and paralyze one another. There isno method. Thus, whereas France has coffee enough to last her atwelvemonth, she has not sufficient fuel for a week. Scruples, too, arewanting, as are punishments; everywhere there is a speculator who offershis purse, and an official, a station-master, or a subaltern to stretchout his hand. . . . Shortsightedness, disorder, waste, the frittering awayof public moneys and irresponsibility: that is the balance. . . . "[33]

That the spectacle of the country sinking in this administrativequagmire was not conducive to the maintenance of confidence in itsruling classes can well be imagined. On all sides voices were uplifted, not merely against the Cabinet, whose members were assumed to beactuated by patriotic motives and guided by their own lights, butagainst the whole class from which they sprang, and not in France only, but throughout Europe. Nothing, it was argued, could be worse than whatthese leaders had brought upon the country, and a change from thebourgeoisie to the proletariat could not well be inaugurated at a morefavorable conjuncture. 

In truth the bourgeoisie were often as impatient of the restraints andabuses as the homecoming poilu. The middle class during the armisticewas subjected to some of the most galling restraints that only the warcould justify. They were practically bereft of communications. To usethe telegraph, the post, the cable, or the telephone was for the mostpart an exhibition of childish faith, which generally ended in the lossof time and money. 

This state of affairs called for an immediate and drastic remedy, for, so long as it persisted, it irritated those whom it condemned toavoidable hardship, and their name was legion. It was also part of analmost imperceptible revolutionary process similar to that which wasgoing on in several other countries for transferring wealth andcompetency from one class to another and for goading into rebellionthose who had nothing to lose by "violent change in the politico-socialordering. " The government, whose powers were concentrated in the handsof M. Clemenceau, had little time to attend to these grievances. For itsmain business was the re-establishment of peace. What it did not fullyrealize was the gravity of the risks involved. For it was on the cardsthat the utmost it could achieve at the Conference toward therestoration of peace might be outweighed and nullified by theconsequences of what it was leaving undone and unattempted at home. Atno time during the armistice was any constructive policy elaborated inany of the Allied countries. Rhetorical exhortations to keep downexpenditure marked the high-water level of ministerial endeavor there. 

The strikes called by the revolutionary organizations whose aim was thesubversion of the regime under which those monstrosities flourished atlast produced an effect on the parliament. One day in July the FrenchChamber left the Cabinet in a minority by proposing the followingresolution: "The Chamber, noting that the cost of living in Belgium hasdiminished by a half and in England by a fourth since the armistice, while it has continually increased in France since that date, judges thegovernment's economic policy by the results obtained and passes to theorder of the day. "[34]

Shortly afterward the same Chamber recanted and gave the Cabinet amajority. In Great Britain, too, the House of Commons put pressure onthe government, which at last was forced to act. 

On the other hand, extravagance was systematically encouraged everywhereby the shortsighted measures which the authorities adopted andmaintained as well as by the wanton waste promoted or tolerated by theincapacity of their representatives. In France the moratorium andimmunity from taxation gave a fillip to recklessness. People who hadhoarded their earnings before the war, now that they were dispensed frompaying rent and relieved of fair taxes, paid out money ungrudgingly forluxuries and then struck for higher salaries and wages. 

Even the Deputies of the Chamber, which did nothing to mitigate the evilcomplained of, manifested a desire to have their own salaries--sixhundred pounds a year--augmented proportionately to the increased costof living; but in view of the headstrong current of popular opinionagainst parliamentarism the government deemed it impolitic to raise thepoint at that conjuncture. 

Most of the working-men's demands in France as in Britain were granted, but the relief they promised was illusory, for prices still went up, leaving the recipients of the relief no better off. And as the wagespayable for labor are limited, whereas prices may ascend to any height, the embittered laborer fancied he could better his lot by an appeal tothe force which his organization wielded. The only complete solution ofthe problem, he was assured, was to be found in the supersession of thegoverning classes and the complete reconstruction of the social fabricon wholly new foundations. [35] And some of the leaders rashly declaredthat they were unable to discern the elements of any other. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Cf. _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), March 12, 1919. 

[2] On December 18, 1918. 

[3] "With what little wisdom the world is governed. "

[4] "Mr. Bernard Richards, Secretary of the delegation from the AmericanJewish Congress to the Peace Conference, expressed much satisfactionwith the work done in Paris for the protection of Jewish rights and thefurtherance of the interests of other minorities involved in the peacesettlement. " (_The New York Herald_, July 20, 1919. ) How successful wasthe influence of the Jewish community at the Peace Conference may beinferred from the following: "Mr. Henry H. Rosenfelt, Director of theAmerican Jewish Relief Committee, announces that all New York agenciesengaged in Jewish relief work will join in a united drive in New York inDecember to raise $7, 500, 000 (£1, 500, 000) to provide clothing, food, andmedicines for the six million Jews throughout Eastern Europe _as well asto make possible a comprehensive programme for their completerehabilitation_. --American Radio News Service. " Cf. _The Daily Mail_, August 19, 1919. 

[5] Countess Lulu von Thurheim, _My Life_, 1788-1852. German edition, Munich, 1913-14. 

[6] _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), February 23, 1919. 

[7] Grafen von Montgelas, _Denwürdigkeiten des bayrischenStaatsministers Maximilian. _ See also Dr. Karl Soll, _Der WienerKongress_. 

[8] Varnhagen von Ense. 

[9] Friedrich von Gentz. 

[10] Dr. Karl Soll, _Count Carl von Nostitz_. 

[11] Cf. Dr. Karl Soll, _Der Wiener Kongress_. 

[12] Dr. Karl Soll, _Friedrich von Gentz_. 

[13] Dr. Karl Soll, _Count Carl von Nostitz_, p. 109. 

[14] Jean Gabriel Eynard--the representative of Geneva. 

[15] _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), March 22, 1919. 

[16] Count de la Garde. 

[17] Cf. _Le Matin_, May 31, 1919. A noteworthy example of thenegligence of the authorities was narrated by this journal on the sameday. To a wooden cross with an inscription recording that the grave wastenanted by "an unknown Frenchman" was hung a disk containing his nameand regiment! And here and there the skulls of heroes protruded from thegrass, but the German tombs were piously looked after by Bocheprisoners. 

[18] _The Daily Mail_ (Continental edition), March 12, 1919. 

[19] _Ibid. _, April 23, 1919. 

[20] Cf. _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), June 8, 1919. 

[21] Cf. _The New York Herald_, June 2, 1919. 

[22] Cf. _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), April 20, 1919. 

[23] _Le Figaro_, June 8, 1919. 

[24] _L'Humanité_, July 10, 1919. 

[25] _La Democratie Nouvelle_, June 14, 1919. 

[26] _Le Figaro_, March 6, 1919. 

[27] _L'Humanité_, May 23, 1919. 

[28] _3 Ibid. _

[29] _Le Gaulois_, March 23, 1919. _The New York Herald_ (Parisedition), March 22, 1919. _L'Echo de Paris_, June 12, 1919. 

[30] _The New York Herald_, March 22, 1919. 

[31] _L'Echo de Paris_, June 12, 1919. 

[32] _The New York Herald_, March 22, 1919. 

[33] _L'Humanité_, May 23, 1919. 

[34] on July 18, 1919. Cf. _Matin, Echo de Paris, Figaro_, July 10, 1919. 

[35] Cf. _L'Humanité_ (French Syndicalist organ), July 11, 1919. 

II

SIGNS OF THEIR TIMES

Society during the transitional stage through which it has for someyears been passing underwent an unprecedented change the extent andintensity of which are as yet but imperfectly realized. Its morestriking characteristics were determined by the gradual decomposition ofempires and kingdoms, the twilight of their gods, the drying up of theirsources of spiritual energy, and the psychic derangement of communitiesand individuals by a long and fearful war. Political principles, respectfor authority and tradition, esteem for high moral worth, to say nothingof altruism and public spirit, either vanished or shrank to shadowysimulacra. In contemporary history currents and cross-currents, eddiesand whirlpools, became so numerous and bewildering that it is not easyto determine the direction of the main stream. Unsocial tendenciescoexisted with collectivity of effort, both being used as weaponsagainst the larger community and each being set down as a manifestationof democracy. Against every kind of authority the world, or some of itsinfluential sections, was up in revolt, and the emergence of thepassions and aims of classes and individuals had freer play than everbefore. 

To this consummation conservative governments, and later on their chiefsat the Peace Conference, systematically contributed with excellentintentions and efficacious measures. They implicitly denied, and actedon the denial, that a nation or a race, like an individual, hassomething distinctive, inherent, and enduring that may aptly be termedsoul or character. They ignored the fact that all nations and races arenot of the same age nor endowed with like faculties, some being youngand helpless, others robust and virile, and a third category senescentand decrepit, and that there are some races which Nature has wholly andpermanently unfitted for service among the pioneers of progress. Inconsequence of these views, which I venture to think erroneous, theyapplied the same treatment to all states. Just as President Wilson, bystriving to impose his pinched conception of democracy and his loftyideas of political morality on Mexico, had thrown that country intoanarchy, the two Anglo-Saxon governments by enforcing their theoriesabout the protection of minorities and other political conceptions invarious states of Europe helped to loosen the cement of thepolitico-social structure there. 

Through these as well as other channels virulent poison penetrated tothe marrow of the social organism. Language itself, on which all humanintercourse hinges, was twisted to suit unwholesome ambitions, furtherselfish interests, and obscure the vision of all those who wanted realreforms and unvarnished truth. During the war the armies were never toldplainly what they were struggling for; officially they were said to becombating for justice, right, self-determination, the sacredness oftreaties, and other abstract nouns to which the heroic soldiers nevergave a thought and which a section of the civil populationmisinterpreted. Indeed, so little were these shibboleths understood evenby the most intelligent among the politicians who launched them that onehalf of the world still more or less conscientiously labors to establishtheir contraries and is anathematizing the other half for championinginjustice, might, and unveracity--under various misnomers. 

Anglo-Saxondom, taking the lead of humanity, imitated the Catholicstates of by-past days, and began to impose on other peoples its ownideas, as well as its practices and institutions, as the best fitted toawaken their dormant energies and contribute to the socialreconstruction of the world. In the interval, language, whether appliedto history, journalism, or diplomacy, was perverted and words lost theirformer relations to the things connoted, and solemn promises weresolemnly broken in the name of truth, right, or equity. For the new eraof good faith, justice and morality was inaugurated, oddly enough, by ageneral tearing up of obligatory treaties and an ethical violation ofthe most binding compacts known to social man. This happenedcoincidently to be in keeping with the general insurgence against allchecks and restraints, moral and social, for which the war is mainlyanswerable, and to be also in harmony with the regular supersession ofright by might which characterizes the present epoch and with thedisappearance of the sense of law. In a word, under the auspices of theamateur world-reformers, the tendency of Bolshevism throve andspread--an instructive case of people serving the devil at the biddingof God's best friends. 

As in the days of the Italian despots, every individual has the chanceof rising to the highest position in many of the states, irrespective ofhis antecedents and no matter what blots may have tarnished his'scutcheon. Neither aristocratic descent, nor public spirit nor even ablameless past is now an indispensable condition of advancement. InGermany the head of the Republic is an honest saddler. In Austria thechief of the government until recently was the assassin of a primeminister. The chief of the Ukraine state was an ex-inmate of an asylum. Trotzky, one of the Russian duumvirs, is said to have a record whichmight of itself have justified his change of name from Braunstein. BelaKuhn, the Semitic Dictator of Hungary, had the reputation of a thiefbefore rising to the height of ruler of the Magyars. . . . In a word, Napoleon's ideal is at last realized, "La carrière est ouverte auxtalents. "

Among the peculiar traits of this evanescent epoch may be mentionedinaccessibility to the teaching of facts which run counter to cherishedprejudices, aims, and interests. People draw from facts which theycannot dispute only the inferences which they desire. An amusinginstance of this occurred in Paris, where a Syndicalist organ[36]published an interesting and on the whole truthful account of thechaotic confusion, misery, and discontent prevailing in Russia and ofthe brutal violence and foxy wiles of Lenin. The dreary picture includedthe cost of living; the disorganization of transports; the terriblemortality caused by the after-effects of the war; the crowding ofprisons, theaters, cinemas, and dancing-saloons; the eagerness ofemployers to keep their war prisoners employed while thousands ofdemobilized soldiers were roaming about the cities and villages vainlylooking for work; the absence of personal liberty; the numerous arrests, and the relative popularity withal of the Dictator. This popularity, itwas explained, the press contributed to keep alive, especially since theabortive attempt made on his life, when the journals declared that hewas indispensable for the time being to his country. 

He himself was described as a hard despot, ruthless as a tiger whostrikes his fellow-workers numb and dumb with fear. "But he is under noillusions as to the real sentiments of the members of the Soviet whoback him, nor does he deign to conceal those which he entertains towardthem. . . . Whenever Lenin himself is concerned justice is expeditious. Some men will be delivered from prison after many years of preventiveconfinement without having been brought to trial, others who fired onKerensky will be kept untried for an indefinite period, whereas thebrave Russian patriot who aimed his revolver at Lenin, and whom theFrench press so justly applauded, had only three weeks to wait for hiscondemnation to death. "

This article appearing in a Syndicalist organ seemed an event. Somejournals summarized and commented it approvingly, until it wasdiscovered to be a skit on the transient conditions in France, whereuponthe "admirable _exposé_ based upon convincing evidence" and the"forcible arguments" became worthless. [37]

An object-lesson in the difficulty of legislating in Anglo-Saxon fashionfor foreign countries and comprehending their psychology was furnishedby two political trials which, taking place in Paris during theConference, enabled the delegates to estimate the distance thatseparates the Anglo-Saxon from the Continental mode of thought andaction in such a fundamental problem as the administration of justice. Raoul Villain, the murderer of Jean Jaurès--France's most eminentstatesman--was kept in prison for nearly five years without a trial. Hehad assassinated his victim in cold blood. He had confessed andjustified the act. The eye-witnesses all agreed as to the facts. Beforethe court, however, a long procession of ministers of state, politicians, historians, and professors defiled, narrating in detail thelife-story, opinions, and strivings of the victim, who, in the eyes of astranger, unacquainted with its methods, might have seemed to be thereal culprit. The jury acquitted the prisoner. 

The other accused man was a flighty youth who had fired on the FrenchPremier and wounded him. He, however, had not long to wait for histrial. He was taken before the tribunal within three weeks of his arrestand was promptly condemned to die. [38] Thus the assassin was justifiedby the jury and the would-be assassin condemned to be shot. "Supposethese trials had taken place in my country, " remarked a delegate of anEastern state, "and that of the two condemned men one had been a memberof the privileged minority, what an uproar the incident would havecreated in the United States and England! As it happened in westernEurope, it passed muster. "

How far removed some continental nations are from the Anglo-Saxons intheir mode of contemplating and treating another momentous category ofsocial problems may be seen from the circumstance that the Great Councilin Basel adopted a bill brought in by the Socialist Welti, authorizingthe practice of abortion down to the third month, provided that thehusband and wife are agreed, and in cases where there is no marriageprovided it is the desire of the woman and that the operation isperformed by a regular physician. [39]

Another striking instance of the difference of conceptions between theAnglo-Saxon and continental peoples is contained in the followingunsavory document, which the historian, whose business it is to flashthe light of criticism upon the dark nooks of civilization, can neitherignore nor render into English. It embodies a significant decision takenby the General Staff of the 256th Brigade of the Army of Occupation[40]and was issued on June 21, 1919. [41]

 SIGNS OF THE TIMES

 EXPLOITATION ET POLICE DE LA MAISON PUBLIQUE DE MÜNCHEN-GLADBACH

 (1. ) Les deux femmes composant l'unique personnel de la maison publique de Gladbach (2, Gasthausstrasse), sont venues en délégation déclarer qu'elles ne pouvaient suffire à la nombreuse clientèle, qui envahit leur maison, devant laquelle stationneraient en permanence de nombreux groupes de clients affamés. 

 Elles déclarent que défalcation faite du service qu'elles doivent assurer à leurs abonnés belges et allemands, elles ne peuvent fournir à la division qu'un total de vingt entrées par jour (10 pour chacune d'elle). 

 L'établissement d'ailleurs ne travaille pas la nuit et observe strictement le repos dominical. D'autre part les ressources de la ville ne permettent pas, paraît-il, d'augmenter le personnel. Dans ces conditions, en vue d'éviter tout désordre et de ne pas demander à ces femmes un travail audessus de leurs forces, les mesures suivantes seront prises:

 (2. ) JOURS DE TRAVAIL: Tous les jours de la semaine, sauf le dimanche. 

 RENDEMENT MAXIMUM: Chaque jour chaque femme reçoit 10 hommes, soit 20 pour les deux personnes, 120 par semaine. 

 HEURES D'OUVERTURE: 17 heures à 21 heures. Aucune réception n'aura lieu en dehors de ces heures. 

 TARIF: Pour un séjour d'un quart heure (entrée et sortie de l'établissement comprises) . . . 5 marks. 

 CONSOMMATIONS: La maison ne vend aucune boisson. Il n'y a pas de salle d'attente. Les clients doivent donc se présenter par deux. 

 (3. ) RÉPARTITION: Les 6 jours de la semaine sont donnés: Le lundi--1er bat. Du 164 et C. H. R. Le mardi--1er bat. Du 169 et C. H. R. Le mercredi--2e bat. Du 164 et C. H. R. Le jeudi--2e bat. Du 169 et C. H. R. Le vendredi--3e bat. Du 164. Le samedi--3e bat. Du 169. 

 (4. ) Dans chaque bataillon il sera établi le jour qui leur est fixé, 20 tickets déposés aux bureaux des sergents-majeur à raison de 5 par compagnie. Les hommes désireux de rendre visite à l'établissement réclamerout au bureau de leur sergent-majeur, 1 ticket qui leur donnera driot de priorité. 

The value of that document derives from its having been issued as anordinary regulation, from its having been reproduced in a widelycirculated journal of the capital without evolving comment, and from thestrong light which it projects upon one of the darkest corners of thecivilization which has been so often and so eloquently eulogized. 

Manifestly the currents of the new moral life which the Conference wasto have set flowing are as yet somewhat weak, the new ideals are stillremote and the foreshadowings of a nobler future are faint. Anothertoken of the change which is going forward in the world was reportedfrom the Far East, but passed almost unnoticed in Europe. The ChineseMinistry of Public Instruction, by an edict of November 3, 1919, officially introduced in all secondary schools a phonetic system ofwriting in place of the ideograms theretofore employed. This isundoubtedly an event of the highest importance in the history ofculture, little though it may interest the Western world to-day. At thesame time, as a philologist by profession, I agree with a continentalauthority[42] who holds that, owing to the monosyllabic character of theChinese language and to the further disadvantage that it lacks wholly orpartly several consonants, [43] it will be practically impossible, as theJapanese have already found, to apply the new alphabet to thetraditional literary idiom. Neither can it be employed for the needs ofeducation, journalism, of the administration, or for telegraphing. Itwill, however, be of great value for elementary instruction and forpostal correspondence. It is also certain to develop and extend. But itsmain significance is twofold: as a sign of China's awakening and as aninnovation, the certain effect of which will be to weaken national unityand extend regionalism at its expense. From this point of view thereform is portentous. 

Another of the signs of the new times which calls for mention is thespread and militancy of the labor movement, to which the war and itsconcomitants gave a potent impulse. It is differentiated from allprevious ferments by this, that it constitutes merely an episode in theuniversal insurgency of the masses, who are fast breaking through thethin social crust formed by the upper classes and are emerging rapidlyabove the surface. One of the most impressive illustrations of thisgeneral phenomenon is the rise of wages, which in Paris has set themunicipal street-sweepers above university professors, the formerreceiving from 7, 600 to 8, 000 francs a year, whereas the salary of thelatter is some 500 francs less. [44]

This general disturbance is the outcome of many causes, among which arethe over-population of the world, the spread of education and of equalopportunity, the anonymity of industrial enterprises, scientific andunscientific theories, the specialization of labor and its depressinginfluence. [45] These factors produced a labor organization which therailways, newspapers, and telegraph contributed to perfect and transforminto a proletarian league, and now all progressive humanity is tendingsteadily and painfully to become one vast collectivity for producing andsharing on more equitable lines the means of living decently. Thisconsummation is coming about with the fatality of a natural law, and theutmost the wisest of governments can do is to direct it through pacificchannels and dislodge artificial obstacles in its course. 

One of the first reforms toward which labor is tending with more orless conscious effort is the abolition of the hereditary principle inthe possession of wealth and influence and of the means of obtainingthem. The division of labor in the past caused the dissociation of theso-called nobler avocations from manual work, and gradually those whofollowed higher pursuits grew into a sort of hereditary caste whichbestowed relative immunity from the worst hardships of life's struggleand formed a ruling class. To-day the masses have their hands on theprincipal levers for shattering this top crust of the social sphere andseem resolved to press them. 

The problem for the solution of which they now menacingly clamor is theestablishment of an approximately equitable principle for theredistribution of the world's resources--land, capital, industries, monopolies, mines, transports, and colonies. Whethersocialization--their favorite prescription--is the most effectual way ofachieving this object may well be doubted, but must be thoroughlyexamined and discussed. The end once achieved, it is expected thatmankind will have become one gigantic living entity, endowed withsenses, nerves, heart, arteries, and all the organs necessary to operateand employ the forces and wealth of the planet. The process will becomplex because the factors are numerous and of various orders, and forthis reason few political thinkers have realized that its many phasesare aspects of one phenomenon. That is also a partial explanation of thecircumstance that at the Conference the political questions wereseparated from the economic and treated by politicians as paramount, theothers being relegated to the background. The labor legislation passedin Paris reduced itself, therefore, to counsels of perfection. 

That the Conference was incapable of solving a problem of this magnitudeis self-evident. But the delegates could and should have referred it toan international parliament, fully representative of all the interestsconcerned. For the best way of distributing the necessaries and comfortsof life, which have been acquired or created by manual toil, is aproblem that can neither be ignored nor reasoned away. So long as itremains a problem it will be a source of intermittent trouble anddisorder throughout the civilized world. The titles, which the classesheretofore privileged could invoke in favor of possession, are now beingrapidly acquired by the workers, who in addition dispose of the forceconferred by organization, numbers, and resolve. At the same time mostof the stimuli and inventives to individual enterprise are beinggradually weakened by legislation, which it would be absurd to condemnand dangerous to regard as a settlement. In the meanwhile productivityis falling off, while the demand for the products of labor is growingproportionately to the increase of population and culture. 

Hitherto the laws of distribution were framed by the strong, who werefew and utilized the many. To-day their relative positions have shifted;the many have waxed strong and are no longer minded to serve asinstruments in the hands of a class, hereditary or selected. But thedivision of mankind into producers and utilizers has ever been the solidand durable mainstay of that type of civilization from which progressivenations are now fast moving away, and the laws and usages against whichthe proletariat is up in arms are but its organic expression. 

From the days of the building of the Pyramids down to those of thedigging of the Panama Canal the chasm between the two social ordersremained open. The abolition of slavery changed but little in thearrangement--was, indeed, effected more in the interests of the oldeconomics than in deference to any strong religious or moral sentiment. In substance the traditional ordering continued to exist in a formbetter adapted to the modified conditions. But the filling up of thatchasm, which is now going forward, involves the overthrow of the systemin its entirety, and the necessity of either rearing a wholly newstructure, of which even the keen-sighted are unable to discern theoutlines, or else the restoration of the old one on a somewhat differentbasis. And the only basis conceivable to-day is that which would startfrom the postulate that some races of men come into the world devoid ofthe capacity for any more useful part in the progress of mankind thanthat which was heretofore allotted to the proletariat. It cannot begainsaid that there are races on the globe which are incapable ofassimilating the higher forms of civilization, but which might well bemade to render valuable services in the lower without either sufferinginjustice themselves or demoralizing others. And it seems nowiseimpossible that one day these reserves may be mobilized andsystematically employed in virtue of the principle that the weal of thegreat progressive community necessitates such a distribution of parts aswill set each organ to perform the functions for which it is bestqualified. 

Since the close of the war internationalism was in the air, and thelabor movement intensified it. It stirred the thought and warmed theimagination alike of exploiters and exploited. Reformers and pacifistsyearned for it as a means of establishing a well-knit society ofprogressive and pacific peoples and setting a term to sanguinary wars. Some financiers may have longed for it in a spirit analogous to that inwhich Nero wished that the Roman people had but one neck. And theConference chiefs seemed to have pictured it to themselves--if, indeed, they meditated such an abstract matter--in the guise of a _paxAnglo-Saxonica_, the distinctive feature of which would lie in thetransfer to the two principal peoples--and not to a board representingall nations--of those attributes of sovereignty which the other stateswould be constrained to give up. Of these three currents flowing in thedirection of internationalism only one--that of finance--appears for themoment likely to reach its goal. . . . 

FOOTNOTES:

[36] _L'Humanité, _ March 6 and 18, 1919. 

[37] Cf. _L'Humanité_, April 10, 1919. 

[38] The sentence was subsequently commuted. 

[39] _La Gazette de Lausanne_, May 26, 1919. 

[40] 128th Division. 

[41] It was reproduced by the French Syndicalist organ, _L'Humanité_ ofJuly 7, 1919. 

[42] R. De Saussure. Cf. _Journal de Genève_, August 18, and also May26, 1919. 

[43] d, r, t, l, g (partly) and p, except at the beginning of a word. 

[44] Cf. The French papers generally for the month of May--also_Bonsoir_, July 26, 1919. 

[45] Walther Rathenau has dealt with this question in several of hisrecent pamphlets, which are not before me at the moment. 

III

THE DELEGATES

The plenipotentiaries, who became the world's arbiters for a while, weretruly representative men. But they mirrored forth not so much the soulsof their respective peoples as the surface spirit that flitted over anevanescent epoch. They stood for national grandeur, territorialexpansion, party interests, and even abstract ideas. Exponents of anarrow section of the old order at its lowest ebb, they were in no senseheralds of the new. Amid a labyrinth of ruins they had no clue to guidetheir footsteps, in which the peoples of the world were told to follow. Only true political vision, breadth of judgment, thorough mastery of theelements of the situation, an instinct for discerning central issues, genuine concern for high principles of governance, and the rare moralcourage that disregards popularity as a mainspring of action--could havefitted any set of legislators to tackle the complex and thorny problemsthat pressed for settlement and to effect the necessary preliminarychanges. That the delegates of the principal Powers were devoid of manyof these qualities cannot fairly be made a subject of reproach. It wasmerely an accident. But it was as unfortunate as their honest convictionthat they could accomplish the grandiose enterprise of remodeling thecommunities of the world without becoming conversant with theirinterests, acquainted with their needs, or even aware of theirwhereabouts. For their failure, which was inevitable, was also bound tobe tragic, inasmuch as it must involve, not merely their own ambition tolive in history as the makers of a new and regenerate era, but also thedestinies of the nations and races which confidently looked up to themfor the conditions of future pacific progress, nay, of normal existence. 

During the Conference it was the fashion in most European countries toquestion the motives as well as to belittle the qualifications of thedelegates. Now that political passion has somewhat abated and theatmosphere is becoming lighter and clearer, one may without provokingcontradiction pay a well-deserved tribute to their sincerity, highpurpose, and quick response to the calls of public duty and moralsentiment. They were animated with the best intentions, not only fortheir respective countries, but for humanity as a whole. One and allthey burned with the desire to go as far as feasible toward ending theera of destructive wars. Steady, uninterrupted, pacific development wastheir common ideal, and they were prepared to give up all that theyreasonably could to achieve it. It is my belief, for example, that ifMr. Wilson had persisted in making his League project the cornerstone ofthe new world structure and in applying his principles without favor, the Italians would have accepted it almost without discussion, and theother states would have followed their example. All the delegates musthave felt that the old order of things, having been shaken to pieces bythe war and its concomitants, could not possibly survive, and theynaturally desired to keep within evolutionary bounds the process oftransition to the new system, thus accomplishing by policy whatrevolution would fain accomplish by violence. It was only when they cameto define that policy with a view to its application that theirunanimity was broken up and they split into two camps, the pacifists andthe militarists, or the democrats and imperialists, as they have beenroughly labeled. Here, too, each member of the assembly worked withcommendable single-mindedness, and under a sense of high responsibility, for that solution of the problem which to him seemed the most conduciveto the general weal. And they wrestled heroically one with the other forwhat they held to be right and true relatively to the prevalentconditions. The circumstance that the cause and effects of this clash ofopinions and sentiments were so widely at variance with earlyanticipations had its roots partly in their limited survey of thecomplex problem, and partly, too, in its overwhelming vastness and theirown unfitness to cope with it. 

The delegates who aimed at disarmament and a society of pacific peoplesmade out as good a case--once their premises were admitted--as those whoinsisted upon guarantees, economic and territorial. Everything depended, for the theory adopted, upon each individual's breadth of view, and forits realization upon the temper of the peoples and that of theirneighbors. As under the given circumstances either solution was sure toencounter formidable opposition, which only a doughty spirit would dareto affront, compromise, offering a side-exit out of the quandary, wasavidly taken. In this way the collective sagacities, working inmaterials the nature of which they hardly understood, brought forthstrange products. Some of the incongruities of the details, such, forinstance, as the invitation to Prinkipo, despatched anonymously, occasionally surpass satire, but their bewildered authors are entitledto the benefit of extenuating circumstances. 

On the momentous issue of a permanent peace based on Mr. Wilson'spristine concept of a league of nations, and in accordance with rigidprinciples applied equally to all the states, there was no discussion. In other words, it was tacitly agreed that the fourteen points shouldnot form a bar to the vital postulates of any of the Great Powers. Itwas only on the subject of the lesser states and the equality of nationsthat the debates were intense, protracted, and for a long whilefruitless. At times words flamed perilously high. For months thesolutions of the Adriatic, the Austrian, Turkish, and Thracian problemshung in poignant suspense, the public looking on with diminishinginterest and waxing dissatisfaction. The usual optimistic assurancesthat all would soon run smoothly and swiftly fell upon deaf ears. Faithin the Conference was melting away. 

The plight of the Supreme Council and the vain exhortations to believein its efficiency reminded me of the following story. 

A French parish priest was once spiritually comforting a member of hisflock who was tormented by doubts about the goodness of God as measuredby the imperfection of His creation. Having listened to a vivid accountof the troubled soul's high expectation of its Maker and of its deepdisappointment at His work, the pious old curé said: "Yes, my child. Theworld is indeed bad, as you say, and you are right to deplore it. Butdon't you think you may have formed to yourself an exaggerated idea ofGod?" An analogous reflection would not be out of place when passingjudgment on the Conference which implicitly arrogated to itself some ofthe highest attributes of the Deity, and thus heightened the contrastbetween promise and achievement. Certainly people expected much morefrom it than it could possibly give. But it was the delegates themselveswho had aroused these expectations announcing the coming of a new epochat their fiat. The peoples were publicly told by Mr. Lloyd George andseveral of his colleagues that the war of 1914-18 would be the last. His"Never again" became a winged phrase, and the more buoyant optimistsexpected to see over the palace of arbitration which was to besubstituted for the battlefield, the inspiring inscription: "A ladernière des guerres, l'humanité reconnaissante. "[46] Mr. Wilson's vastproject was still more attractive. 

Mr. Lloyd George is too well known in his capacity of Britishparliamentarian to need to be characterized. The splendid services herendered the Empire during the war, when even his defects provedoccasionally helpful, will never be forgotten. Typifying not only theaims, but also the methods, of the British people, he never seems todistrust his own counsels whencesoever they spring nor to lack thecourage to change them in a twinkling. He stirred the soul of the nationin its darkest hour and communicated his own glowing faith in its star. During the vicissitudes of the world struggle he was the right man forthe responsible post which he occupied, and I am proud of having beenone of the first to work in my own modest way to have him placed there. But a good war-leader may be a poor peace-negotiator, and, as a matterof fact, there are few tasks concerned with the welfare of the nationwhich Mr. Lloyd George could not have tackled with incomparably greaterchances of accomplishing it than that of remodeling the world. Hisantecedents were all against him. His lack of general equipment wasprohibitive; even his inborn gifts were disqualifications. One need notpay too great heed to acrimonious colleagues who set him down as aword-weaving trimmer, between whose utterances and thoughts there is noorganic nexus, who declines to take the initiative unless he seesadequate forces behind him ready to his to his support, who lacks themoral courage that serves as a parachute for a fall from popularity, but possesses in abundance that of taking at the flood the rising tidewhich balloon-like lifts its possessor high above his fellows. Butjudging him in the light of the historic events in which he played aprominent part, one cannot dismiss these criticisms as groundless. 

Opportunism is an essential element of statecraft, which is the art ofthe possible. But there is a line beyond which it becomes shiftiness, and it would be rash to assert that Mr. Lloyd George is careful to keepon the right side of it. At the Conference his conduct appeared tocareful observers to be traced mainly by outside influences, and asthese were various and changing the result was a zigzag. One day hewould lay down a certain proposition as a dogma not to be modified, andbefore the week was out he would advance the contrary proposition andmaintain that with equal warmth and doubtless with equal conviction. Guided by no sound knowledge and devoid of the ballast of principle, hewas tossed and driven hither and thither like a wreck on the ocean. Mr. Melville Stone, the veteran American journalist, gave his countrymen hisimpression of the first British delegate. "Mr. Lloyd George, " he said, "has a very keen sense of humor and a great power over the multitude, but with this he displays a startling indifference to, if not ignoranceof, the larger affairs of nations. " In the course of a walk Mr. LloydGeorge expressed surprise when informed that in the United States thewar-making power was invested in Congress. "What!" exclaimed thePremier, "you mean to tell me that the President of the United Statescannot declare war? I never heard that before. " Later, when questions ofnational ambitions were being discussed, Mr. Lloyd George asked, "Whatis that place Rumania is so anxious to get?" meaning Transylvania. [47]

The stories current of his praiseworthy curiosity about the placeswhich he was busy distributing to the peoples whose destinies he wasforging would be highly amusing if the subject were only a privateindividual and his motive a desire for useful information, but on therepresentative of a great Empire they shed a light in which the dignityof his country was necessarily affected and his own authority deplorablydiminished. For moral authority at that conjuncture was the sheet anchorof the principal delegates. Although without a program, Mr. Lloyd Georgewould appear to have had an instinctive feeling, if not a reasonedbelief, that in matters of general policy his safest course would be tokeep pace with the President of the United States. For he took it forgranted that Mr. Wilson's views were identical with those of theAmerican people. One of his colleagues, endeavoring to dispel thisillusion, said: "Your province at this Conference is to lead. Yourcolleagues, including Mr. Wilson, will follow. You have the Empirebehind you. Voice its aspirations. They coincide with those of theEnglish-speaking peoples of the world. Mr. Wilson has lost hiselections, therefore he does not stand for as much as you imagine. Youhave won your elections, so you are the spokesman of a vast communityand the champion of a noble cause. You can knead the Conference at yourwill. Assert your will. But even if you decide to act in harmony withthe United States, that does not mean subordinating British interests tothe President's views, which are not those of the majority of hispeople. " But Mr. Lloyd George, invincibly diffident--if diffidence itbe--shrank from marching alone, and on certain questions which matteredmuch Mr. Wilson had his way. 

One day there was an animated discussion in the twilight of the Parisconclave while the press was belauding the plenipotentiaries for theirtouching unanimity. The debate lay between the United States as voicedby Mr. Wilson and Great Britain as represented by Mr. Lloyd George. Onthe morrow, before the conversation was renewed, a colleague adjured theBritish Premier to stand firm, urging that his contention of theprevious day was just in the abstract and beneficial to the Empire aswell. Mr. Lloyd George bowed to the force of these motives, but yieldedto the greater force of Mr. Wilson's resolve. "Put it to the test, "urged the colleague. "I dare not, " was the rejoinder. "Wilson won'tbrook it. Already he threatens, if we do, to leave the Conference andreturn home. " "Well then, let him. If he did, we should be none theworse off for his absence. But rest assured, he won't go. He cannotafford to return home empty-handed after his splendid promises to hiscountrymen and the world. " Mr. Lloyd George insisted, however, and said, "But he will take his army away, too. " "What!" exclaimed the tempter. "His army? Well, I only . . . " but it would serve no useful purpose toquote the vigorous answer in full. 

This odd mixture of exaggerated self-confidence, mismeasurement offorces, and pliability to external influences could not but be balefulin one of the leaders of an assembly composed, as was the ParisConference, of men each with his own particular ax to grind andimpressible only to high moral authority or overwhelming military force. It cannot be gainsaid that no one, not even his own familiars, couldever foresee the next move in Mr. Lloyd George's game of statecraft, andit is demonstrable that on several occasions he himself was so littleaware of what he would do next that he actually advocated asindispensable measures diametrically opposed to those which he was topropound, defend, and carry a week or two later. A conversation whichtook place between him and one of his fellow-workers gives one themeasure of his irresolution and fitfulness. "Do tell me, " said thiscollaborator, "why it is that you members of the Supreme Council arehurriedly changing to-day the decisions you came to after five months'study, which you say was time well spent?"

"Because of fresh information we have received in the meanwhile. We knowmore now than we knew then and the different data necessitate differenttreatment. "

"Yes, but the conditions have not changed since the Conference opened. Surely they were the same in January as they are in June. Is not thatso?"

"No doubt, no doubt, but we did not ascertain them before June, so wecould not act upon them until now. "

With the leading delegates thus drifting and the pieces on the politicalchessboard bewilderingly disposed, outsiders came to look upon theConference as a lottery. Unhappily, it was a lottery in which there wereno mere blanks, but only prizes or heavy forfeits. 

To sum up: the first British delegate, essentially a man of expedientsand shifts, was incapable of measuring more than an arc of the politicalcircle at a time. A comprehensive survey of a complicated situation wasbeyond his reach. He relied upon imagination and intuition assubstitutes for precise knowledge and technical skill. Hence he himselfcould never be sure that his decision, however carefully worked out, would be final, seeing that in June facts might come to his cognizancewith which five months' investigations had left him unacquainted. Thisincertitude about the elements of the problem intensified the ingrainedhesitancy that had characterized his entire public career and warped hisjudgment effectually. The only approach to a guiding principle one canfind in his work at the Conference was the loosely held maxim that GreatBritain's best policy was to stand in with the United States in allmomentous issues and to identify Mr. Wilson with the United States formost purposes of the Congress. Within these limits Mr. Lloyd George wasunyielding in fidelity to the cause of France, with which he merged thatof civilization. 

M. Clemenceau is the incarnation of the tireless spirit of destruction. Pulling down has ever been his delight, and it is largely to his successin demolishing the defective work of rivals--and all human work isdefective--that he owes the position of trust and responsibility towhich the Parliament raised him during the last phase of the war. Physically strong, despite his advanced age, he is mentally brilliantand superficial, with a bias for paradox, epigram, and racy, unconventional phraseology. His action is impulsive. In the Dreyfus daysI saw a good deal of M. Clemenceau in his editorial office, when hewould unburden his soul to M. M. Vaughan, the poet Quillard, and others. Later on I approached him while he was chief of the government on adelicate matter of international combined with national politics, onwhich I had been requested to sound him by a friendly government, and Ifound him, despite his developed and sobering sense of responsibility, whimsical, impulsive, and credulous as before. When I next talked withhim he was the rebellious editor of _L'Homme Enchaîné_, whose corrosivestrictures upon the government of the day were the terror of Ministersand censors. Soon afterward he himself became the wielder of the greatnational gagging-machine, and in the stringency with which hemanipulated it he is said by his own countrymen to have outdone thegovernment of the Third Empire. His _alter ego_, Georges Mandel, isendowed with qualities which supplement and correct those of hisvenerable chief. His grasp of detail is comprehensive and firm, hismemory retentive, and his judgment bold and deliberate. A strikingillustration of the audacity of his resolve was given in the early partof 1918. Marshal Joffre sent a telegram to President Wilson inWashington, and because he had omitted to despatch it through the WarMinistry, M. Mandel, who is a strict disciplinarian, proposed that he beplaced under arrest. It was with difficulty that some public men movedhim to leniency. 

M. Clemenceau, the professional destroyer, who can boast that heoverthrew eighteen Cabinets, or nineteen if we include his own, wasunquestionably the right man to carry on the war. He acquitted himselfof the task superbly. His faith in the Allies' victory was unwavering. He never doubted, never flagged, never was intimidated by obstacles norwheedled by persons. Once during the armistice, in May or June, whenMarshal Foch expressed his displeasure that the Premier should haveissued military orders to troops under his command[48] without firstconsulting him, he was on the point of dismissing the Marshal andappointing General Pétain to succeed him. [49] Whether the qualitieswhich stood him in such good stead during the world struggle could be ofequal, or indeed of much, avail in the general constructive work forwhich the Conference was assembled is a question that needs only to beformulated. But in securing every advantage that could be conferred onhis own country his influence on the delegates was decisive. M. Clemenceau, who before the war was the intimate friend of Austrianjournalists, hated his country's enemies with undying hate. And he lovedFrance passionately. I remember significant words of his, uttered at theend of the year 1899 to an enterprising young man who had founded aFranco-German review in Munich and craved his moral support. "Is itpossible, " he exclaimed, "that it has already come to that? Well, anation is not conquered until it accepts defeat. Whenever France givesup she will have deserved her humiliation. "

At the Conference M. Clemenceau moved every lever to deliver his countryfor all time from the danger of further invasions. And, being a realist, he counted only on military safeguards. At the League of Nations he waswont to sneer until it dawned upon him that it might be forged into aneffective weapon of national defense. And then he included it in thelitany of abstract phrases about right, justice, and theself-determination of peoples which it became the fashion to raise tothe inaccessible heights where those ideals are throned which are to beworshiped but not incarnated. The public somehow never took hisconversion to Wilsonianism seriously, neither did his political friendsuntil the League bade fair to become serviceable in his country's hands. M. Clemenceau's acquaintanceship with international politics was at oncesuperior to that of the British Premier and very slender. But hisprogram at the Conference was simple and coherent, because independentof geography and ethnography: France was to take Germany's leadingposition in the world, to create powerful and devoted states in easternEurope, on whose co-operation she could reckon, and her allies were todo the needful in the way of providing due financial and economicassistance so as to enable her to address herself to the culturalproblems associated with her new rôle. And he left nothing undone thatseemed conducive to the attainment of that object. Against Mr. Wilson hemaneuvered to the extent which his adviser, M. Tardieu, deemed safe, andone of his most daring speculations was on the President's journey tothe States, during which M. Clemenceau and his European colleagues hopedto get through a deal of work on their own lines and to present Mr. Wilson with the decisions ready for ratification on his return. But thestratagem was not merely apparent; it was bruited abroad with indiscreetdetails, whereupon the first American delegate on his return broke thetables of their laws--one of which separated the Treaty from theCovenant--and obliged them to begin anew. It is fair to add that M. Clemenceau was no uncompromising partisan of the conquest of the leftbank of the Rhine, nor of colonial conquests. These currents took theirrise elsewhere. "We don't want protesting deputies in the FrenchParliament, " he once remarked in the presence of the French Minister ofForeign Affairs. [50] Offered the choice between a number of bridgeheadsin Germany and the military protection of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, heunhesitatingly decided for the latter, which had been offered to him byPresident Wilson after the rejection of the Rhine frontier. 

M. Clemenceau, whose remarkable mental alacrity, self-esteem, and loveof sharp repartee occasionally betrayed him into tactless sallies andepigrammatic retorts, deeply wounded the pride of more than one delegateof the lesser Powers in a way which they deemed incompatible alike withcircumspect statesmanship and the proverbial hospitality of his country. For he is incapable of resisting the temptation to launch a _bon mot_, however stinging. It would be ungenerous, however, to attach moreimportance to such quickly forgotten utterances than he meant them tocarry. An instance of how he behaved toward the representatives ofBritain and France is worth recording, both as characterizing the manand as extenuating his offense against the delegates of the lesserPowers. 

One morning[51] M. Clemenceau appeared at the Conference door, andseemed taken aback by the large number of unfamiliar faces and figuresbehind Mr. Balfour, toward whom he sharply turned with the brusqueinterrogation: "Who are those people behind you? Are they English?""Yes, they are, " was the answer. "Well, what do they want here?" "Theyhave come on the same errand as those who are now following you. "Thereupon the French Premier, whirling round, beheld with astonishmentand displeasure a band of Frenchmen moving toward him, led by M. Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In reply to his question as to themotive of their arrival, he was informed that they were all experts, whohad been invited to give the Conference the benefit of their views aboutthe revictualing of Hungary. "Get out, all of you. You are not wantedhere, " he cried in a commanding voice. And they all moved away meekly, led by M. Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Their services provedto be unnecessary, for the result reached by the Conference wasnegative. 

M. Tardieu cannot be separated from his chief, with whom he workeduntiringly, placing at his disposal his intimate knowledge of the nooksand crannies of professional and unprofessional diplomacy. He is one ofthe latest arrivals and most pushing workers in the sphere of the OldWorld statecraft, affects Yankee methods, and speaks English. Forseveral years political editor of the _Temps_, he obtained access to thestate archives, and wrote a book on the Agadir incident which was wellreceived, and also a monograph on Prince von Bülow, became Deputy, aimedat a ministerial portfolio, and was finally appointed Head Commissary tothe United States. Faced by difficulties there--mostly the specters ofhis own former utterances evoked by German adversaries--his progress atfirst was slow. He was accused of having approved some of the drasticmethods--especially the U-boat campaign--which the Germans subsequentlyemployed, because in the year 1912, when he was writing on the subject, France believed that she herself possessed the best submarines, and shemeant to employ them. He was also challenged to deny that he hadwritten, in August, 1912, that in every war churches and monuments ofart must suffer, and that "no army, whatever its nationality, canrenounce this. " He was further charged with having taken a kindlyinterest in air-war and bomb-dropping, and given it as his opinion thatit would be absurd "to deprive of this advantage those who had made mostprogress in perfecting this weapon. " But M. Tardieu successfullyexorcised these and other ghosts. And on his return from the UnitedStates he was charged with organizing a press bureau of his own, tosupply American journalists with material for their cablegrams, while atthe same time he collaborated with M. Clemenceau in reorganizing thepolitical communities of the world. It is only in the French Chamber, ofwhich he is a distinguished member, that M. Tardieu failed to score abrilliant success. Few men are prophets in their own country, and he isfar from being an exception. At the Conference, in its later phases, hefound himself in frequent opposition to the chief of the Italiandelegation, Signor Tittoni. One of the many subjects on which theydisagreed was the fate of German Austria and the political structure andorientation of the independent communities which arose on the ruins ofthe Dual Monarchy. M. Tardieu favored an arrangement which would bringthese populations closely together and impart to the whole ananti-Teutonic impress. If Germany could not be broken up into a numberof separate states, as in the days of her weakness, all the otherEuropean peoples in the territories concerned could, and should, beunited against her, and at the least hindered from making common causewith her. The unification of Germany he considered a grave danger, andhe strove to create a countervailing state system. 

To the execution of this project there were formidable difficulties. For one thing, none of the peoples in question was distinctlyanti-German. Each one was for itself. Again, they were not particularlyenamoured of one another, nor were their interests always concordant, and to constrain them by force to unite would have been not to preventbut to cause future wars. A Danubian federation--the concrete shapeimagined for this new bulwark of European peace--did not commend itselfto the Italians, who had their own reasons for their opposition besidesthe Wilsonian doctrine, which they invoked. If it be true, SignorTittoni argues, that Austria does not desire to be amalgamated withGermany, why not allow her to exercise the right of self-determinationaccorded to other peoples? M. Tardieu, on the other hand, not contentwith the prohibition to Germany to unite with Austria, proposed[52] thatin the treaty with Austria this country should be obliged to repress theunionist movement in the population. This amendment was inveighedagainst by the Italian delegation in the name of every principleprofessed and transgressed by the world-mending Powers. Even from theFrench point of view he declared it perilous, inasmuch as there was, andcould be, no guarantee that a Danubian confederation would not become atool in Germany's hands. 

Two things struck me as characteristic of the principalplenipotentiaries: as a rule, they eschewed first-rate men asfellow-workers, one integer and several zeros being their favoriteformula, and they took no account of the flight of time, planning asthough an eternity were before them and then suddenly improvising asthough afraid of being late for a train or a steamer. Thesepeculiarities were baleful. The lesser states, having mainly first-classmen to represent them, illustrated the law of compensation, whichassigned many mediocrities to the Great Powers. The former were also themost strenuous toilers, for their task bristled with difficulties andabounded in startling surprises, and its accomplishment depended on thewill of others. Time and again they went over the ground with infinitecare, counting and gaging the obstacles in their way, devising means toovercome them, and rehearsing the effort in advance. So much stress hadbeen laid during the war on psychology, and such far-reachingconsequences were being drawn from the Germans' lack of it, that thesepublic men made its cultivation their personal care. Hence, besidestracing large-scale maps of provinces and comprehensive maps[53] of thecountries to be reconstituted, and ransacking history for arguments andprecedents, they conscientiously ascertained the idiosyncrasies of theirjudges, in order to choose the surest ways to impress, convince, orpersuade them. And it was instructive to see them try their hand at thisnew game. 

One and all gave assent to the axiom that moderation would impress thearbiters more favorably than greed, but not all of them wieldedsufficient self-command to act upon it. The more resourceful delegates, whose tasks were especially redoubtable because they had to demand largeprovinces coveted by others, prepared the ground by visiting personallysome of the more influential arbiters before these were officiallyappointed, forcibly laying their cases before them and praying for theiradvice. In reality they were striving to teach them elementarygeography, history, and politics. The Ulysses of the Conference, M. Venizelos, first pilgrimaged to London, saying: "If the Foreign Officeis with Greece, what matters it who is against her. " He hastened to callon President Wilson as soon as that statesman arrived in Europe, and, to the surprise of many, the two remained a long time closeted together. "Whatever did you talk about?" asked a colleague of the Greek Premier. "How did you keep Wilson interested in your national claims all thattime? You must have--" "Oh no, " interrupted the modest statesman. "Idisposed of our claims succinctly enough. A matter of two minutes. Notmore. I asked him to dispense me from taking up his time with suchcomplicated issues which he and his colleagues would have ampleopportunity for studying. The rest of the time I was getting him to giveme the benefit of his familiarity with the subject of the League ofNations. And he was good enough to enumerate the reasons why it shouldbe realized, and the way in which it must be worked. I was greatlyimpressed by what he said. " "Just fancy!" exclaimed a colleague, "wasting all that time in talking about a scheme which will never cometo anything!" But M. Venizelos knew that the time was not misspent. President Wilson was at first nowise disposed to lend a favorable ear tothe claims of Greece, which he thought exorbitant, and down to the verylast he gave his support to Bulgaria against Greece whole-heartedly. TheCretan statesman passed many an hour of doubt and misgiving before hecame within sight of his goal. But he contrived to win the Presidentover to his way of envisaging many Oriental questions. He is apast-master in practical psychology. 

The first experiments of M. Venizelos, however, were not whollyencouraging. For all the care he lavished on the chief luminaries of theConference seemingly went to supplement their education and fill up afew of the geographical, historical, philological, ethnological, andpolitical gaps in their early instruction rather than to guide them intheir concrete decisions, which it was expected would be always left tothe "commissions of experts. " But the fruit which took long to matureripened at last, and Greece had many of her claims allowed. Thus inreorganizing the communities of the world the personal factor played apredominant part. Venizelos was, so to say, a fixed star in thefirmament, and his light burned bright through every rift in the clouds. His moderation astonished friends and opponents. Every one admired his_exposé_ of his case as a masterpiece. His statesman-like setting, inperspective, the readiness with which he put himself in the place of hiscompetitor and struck up a fair compromise, endeared him to many, andhis praises were in every one's mouth. His most critical hour--it lastedfor months--struck when he found himself struggling with the Presidentof the United States, who was for refusing the coast of Thrace to Greeceand bestowing it on Bulgaria. But with that dispute I deal in anotherplace. 

Of Italy's two plenipotentiaries during the first five months one wasthe most supple and the other the most inflexible of her statesmen, Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino. If her case was presented to theConference with less force than was attainable, the reasons are obvious. Her delegates had a formal treaty on which they relied; to the attitudeof their country from the outbreak of the war to its finish they rightlyascribed the possibility of the Allies' victory, and they expected tosee this priceless service recognized practically; the moderation andsuppleness of Signor Orlando were neutralized by the uncompromisingattitude of Baron Sonnino, and, lastly, the gaze of both statesmen wasfixed upon territorial questions and sentimental aspirations to theneglect of economic interests vital to the state--in other words, theybeheld the issues in wrong perspective. But one of the most popularfigures among the delegates was Signor Orlando, whose eloquence andimagination gave him advantages which would have been increased ahundredfold if he might have employed his native language in theconclave. For he certainly displayed resourcefulness, humor, a historicsense, and the gift of molding the wills of men. But he was greatlyhampered. Some of his countrymen alleged that Baron Sonnino was his evilgenius. One of the many sayings attributed to him during the Conferenceturned upon the quarrels of some of the smaller peoples amongthemselves. "They are, " the Premier said, "like a lot of hens being heldby the feet and carried to market. Although all doomed to the same fate, they contrive to fight one another while awaiting it. "

After the fall of Orlando's Cabinet, M. Tittoni repaired to Paris asItaly's chief delegate. His reputation as one of Europe's principalstatesmen was already firmly established; he had spent several years inParis as Ambassador, and he and the late Di San Giuliano and Giolittiwere the men who broke with the Central Empires when these were about toprecipitate the World War. In French nationalist circles Signor Tittonihad long been under a cloud, as the man of pro-German leanings. Thesuspicion--for it was nothing more--was unfounded. On the contrary, M. Tittoni is known to have gone with the Allies to the utmost lengthconsistent with his sense of duty to his own country. To my knowledge heonce gave advice which his Italian colleagues and political friends andadversaries now bitterly regret was disregarded. The nature of thatcounsel will one day be disclosed. . . . 

Of Japan's delegates, the Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino, little needbe said, seeing that their qualifications for their task weredemonstrated by the results. Mainly to statesmanship and skilfulmaneuvering Japan is indebted for her success at the Paris Conference, where her cause was referred by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau toMr. Wilson to deal with. The behavior of her representatives was anilluminating object-lesson in the worth of psychological tactics inpractical politics. They hardly ever appeared in the footlights, remained constantly silent and observant, and were almost ignored by thepress. But they kept their eyes fixed on the goal. Their program wassimple. Amid the flitting shadows of political events they marchedtogether with the Allies, until these disagreed among themselves, andthen they voted with Great Britain and the United States. Occasionallythey went farther and proposed measures for the lesser states whichBritain framed, but desired to second rather than propose. Japan, at theConference, was a stanch collaborator of the two English-speakingprincipals until her own opportunity came, and then she threw all herhoarded energies into her cause, and by her firm resolve dispelled anyopposition that Mr. Wilson may have intended to offer. One of the moststriking episodes of the Conference was the swift, silent, andsuccessful campaign by which Japan had her secret treaty with Chinahall-marked by the puritanical President of the United States, whosesense of morality could not brook the secret treaties concluded by Italyand Rumania with the Greater and Greatest Powers of Europe. Again, itwas with statesman-like sagacity that the Japanese judged the Russiansituation and made the best of it--first, shortly before the invitationto Prinkipo, and, later, before the celebrated eight questions weresubmitted to Admiral Kolchak. I was especially struck by an occurrence, trivial in appearance, which demonstrated the weight which they rightlyattached to the psychological side of politics. Everybody in Parisremarked, and many vainly complained of, the indifference, or rather, unfriendliness, of which Russians were the innocent victims. Among theAllied troops who marched under the Arc de Triomphe on July 14th therewere Rumanians, Greeks, Portuguese, and Indians, but not a singleRussian. A Russian general drove about in the forest of flags andbanners that day looking eagerly for symbols of his own country, but forhours the quest was fruitless. At last, when passing the JapaneseEmbassy, he perceived, to his delight, an enormous Russian flag wavingmajestically in the breeze, side by side with that of Nippon. "I shedtears of joy, " he told his friend that evening, "and I vowed thatneither I nor my country would ever forget this touching mark offriendship. "

Japanese public opinion criticized severely the failure of theirdelegates to obtain recognition of the equality of races or nations. This judgment seems unjust, for nothing that they could have done orsaid would have wrung from Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hughes their assent to thedoctrine, nor, if they had been induced to proclaim it, would it havebeen practically applied. 

In general, the lawyers were the most successful in stating their cases. But one of the delegates of the lesser states who made the deepestimpression on those of the greater was not a member of the bar. The headof the Polish delegation, Roman Dmowski, a picturesque, forciblespeaker, a close debater and resourceful pleader, who is never at a lossfor an image, a comparison, an _argumentum ad hominem_, or a repartee, actually won over some of the arbiters who had at first leaned towardhis opponents--a noteworthy feat if one realizes all that it meant in anassembly where potent influences were working against some of thedemands of resuscitated Poland. His speech in September on the future ofeastern Galicia was a veritable masterpiece. 

M. Dmowski appeared at the Conference under all the disadvantages thatcould be heaped upon a man who has incurred the resentment of the mostpowerful international body of modern times. He had the misfortune tohave the Jews of the world as his adversaries. His Polish friendsexplained this hostility as follows. His ardent nationalist sentimentsplaced him in antagonism to every movement that ran counter to theprogress of his country on nationalist lines. For he is above all thingsa Pole and a patriot. And as the Hebrew population of Poland, disbelieving in the resurrection of that nation, had long since struckup a cordial understanding with the states that held it in bondage, thegifted author of a book on the _Foundations of Nationalism_, which wentthrough four editions, was regarded by the Hebrew elements of thepopulation as an irreconcilable enemy. In truth, he was only the leaderof a movement that was a historical necessity. One of the theses of thework was the necessity of cultivating an anti-German spirit in Poland asthe only antidote against the Teuton virus introduced from Berlinthrough economic and other channels. And as the Polish Jews, whose idiomis a corrupted German dialect and whose leanings are often Teutonic, felt that the attack upon the whole was an attack on the part, theyanathematized the author and held him up to universal obloquy. And therehas been no reconciliation ever since. In the United States, where theJewish community is numerous and influential, M. Dmowski found spokes inhis wheel at every stage of his journey, and in Paris, too, he had tofull-front a tremendous opposition, open and covert. Whatever unbiasedpeople may think of this explanation and of his hostility to the Germansand their agents, Roman Dmowski deservedly enjoys the reputation of astraightforward and loyal fighter for his country's cause, a man whoscorns underhand machinations and proclaims aloud--perhaps toofrankly--the principles for which he is fighting. Polish Jews whoappeared in Paris, some of them his bitterest antagonists, recognizedthe chivalrous way in which he conducts his electoral and othercampaigns. Among the delegates his practical acquaintanceship with EastEuropean polities entitled him to high rank. For he knows the worldbetter than any living statesman, having traveled over Europe, Asia, andAmerica. He undertook and successfully accomplished a delicate missionin the Far East in the year 1905, rendering valuable services to hiscountry and to the cause of civilization. 

"M. Dmowski's activity, " his friends further assert, "is impassioned andunselfish. The ambition that inspires and nerves him is not of thepersonal sort, nor is his patriotism a ladder leading to place andpower. Polish patriotism occupies a category apart from that of otherEuropean peoples, and M. Dmowski has typified it with rare fidelity andcompleteness. If Wilsonianism had been realized, Polish nationalismmight have become an anachronism. To-day it is a large factor inEuropean politics and is little understood in the West. M. Dmowski livesfor his country. Her interests absorb his energies. He would probablyagree with the historian Paolo Sarpi, who said, 'Let us be Venetiansfirst and Christians after. ' Of the two widely divergent currents intowhich the main stream of political thought and sentiment throughout theworld is fast dividing itself, M. Dmowski moves with the national awayfrom the international championed by Mr. Wilson. The frequency withwhich the leading spirits of Bolshevism turn out to be Jews--to thedismay and disgust of the bulk of their own community--and the ingenuitythey displayed in spreading their corrosive tenets in Poland may nothave been without effect upon the energy of M. Dmowski's attitude towardthe demand of the Polish Jews to be placed in the privileged position ofwards of the League of Nations. But the principle of the protection ofminority--Jewish or Gentile--is assailable on grounds which have nothingto do with race or religion. " Some of the most interesting andcharacteristic incidents at the Conference had the Polish statesman fortheir principal actor, and to him Poland owes some of the most solid andenduring benefits conferred on her at the Conference. 

Of a different temper is M. Paderewski, who appeared in Paris to pleadhis country's cause at a later stage of the labors of the Conference. This eminent artist's energies were all blended into one harmoniouswhole, so that his meetings with the great plenipotentiaries were neverdisturbed by a jarring note. As soon as it was borne in upon him thattheir decisions were as irrevocable as decrees of Fate, he bowed to themand treated the authors as Olympians who had no choice but to utter thestern fiat. Even when called upon to accept the obnoxious clauseprotecting religious and ethnic minorities against which his colleaguehad vainly fought, M. Paderewski sunk political passion in reason andattuned himself to the helpful role of harmonizer. He held that it wouldhave been worse than useless to do otherwise. He was grieved that hiscountry must acquiesce in that decree, he regretted intensely thenecessity which constrained such proven friends of Poland as the Four topass what he considered a severe sentence on her; but he resignedhimself gracefully to the inevitable and thanked Fate's executioners fortheir personal sympathy. This attitude evoked praise and admiration fromMessrs. Lloyd George and Wilson, and the atmosphere of the conclaveseemed permeated with a spirit that induced calm satisfaction and thejoy of elevated thoughts. M. Paderewski made a deep and favorableimpression on the Supreme Council. 

Belgium sent her most brilliant parliamentarian, M. Hymans, as firstplenipotentiary to the Conference. He was assisted by the chief of theSocialist party, M. Vandervelde, and by an eminent authority oninternational law, M. Van den Heuvel. But for reasons which eludeanalysis, none of the three delegates hit it off with the duumviratewho were spinning the threads of the world's destinies. M. Hymans, however, by his warmth, sincerity, and courage impressed therepresentatives of the lesser states, won their confidence, became theirnatural spokesman, and blazed out against all attempts--and they werenumerous and deliberate--to ignore their existence. It was he who by hisdirect and eloquent protest took M. Clemenceau off his guard andelicited the amazing utterance that the Powers which could put twelvemillion soldiers in the field were the world's natural arbiters. In thisway he cleared the atmosphere of the distorting mists of catchwords andshibboleths. 

How decisive a role internal politics played in the designation ofplenipotentiaries to the Conference was shown with exceptional clearnessin the case of Rumania. That country had no legislature. The ConstituentAssembly, which had been dissolved owing to the German invasion, wasfollowed by no fresh elections. The King, with whom the initiative thusrested, had reappointed M. Bratiano Chief of the Government, and M. Bratiano was naturally desirous of associating his own historic namewith the aggrandizement of his country. But he also desired to securethe services of his political rival, M. Take Jonescu, whose reputationas a far-seeing statesman and as a successful negotiator is world-wide. Among his qualifications are an acquaintanceship with European countriesand their affairs and a rare facility for give and take which is of theessence of international politics. He can assume the initiative in_pourparlers_, however uncompromising the outlook; frame plausibleproposals; conciliate his opponents by showing how thoroughly heunderstands and appreciates their point of view, and by these means hehas often worked out seemingly hopeless negotiations to a satisfactoryissue. M. Clemenceau wrote of him, "C'est un grand Européen. "[54]

M. Bratiano's bid for the services of his eminent opponent was coupledwith the offer of certain portfolios in the Cabinet to M. Jonescu and toa number of his parliamentary supporters. While negotiations were slowlyproceeding by telegraph, M. Jonescu, who had already taken up his abodein Paris, was assiduously weaving his plans. He began by assuming whateverybody knew, that the Powers would refuse to honor the secret treatywith France, Britain, and Russia, which assigned to Rumania all theterritories to which she had laid claim, and he proposed first strikingup a compromise with the other interested states, then compactingRumania, Jugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Greece into a solidblock, and asking the Powers to approve and ratify the new league. Trulyit was a genial conception worthy of a broad-minded statesman. It aimedat a durable peace based on what he considered a fair settlement ofclaims satisfactory to all, and it would have lightened the burden ofthe Big Four. But whether it could have been realized by peoples movedby turbid passions and represented by trustees, some of whom wereavowedly afraid to relinquish claims which they knew to be exorbitant, may well be doubted. 

But the issue was never put to the test. The two statesmen failed toagree on the Cabinet question; M. Jonescu kept aloof from office, andthe post of second delegate fell to Rumania's greatest diplomatist andphilologist, M. Mishu, who had for years admirably represented hiscountry as Minister in the British capital. From the outset M. Bratiano's position was unenviable, because he based his country's caseon the claims of the secret treaty, and to Mr. Wilson every secrettreaty which he could effectually veto was anathema. Between the twomen, in lieu of a bond of union, there was only a strong force of mutualrepulsion, which kept them permanently apart. They moved on differentplanes, spoke different languages, and Rumania, in the person of herdelegates, was treated like Cinderella by her stepmother. The Council ofThree kept them systematically in the dark about matters which itconcerned them to know, negotiated over their heads, transmitted toBucharest injunctions which only they were competent to receive, insisted on their compromising to accept future decrees of theConference without an inkling as to their nature, and on their admittingthe right of an alien institution--the League of Nations--to intervenein favor of minorities against the legally constituted government of thecountry. M. Bratiano, who in a trenchant speech inveighed against theseclaims of the Great Powers to take the governance of Europe into theirown hands, withdrew from the Conference and laid his resignation in thehands of the King. 

One of the most remarkable debaters in this singular parliament, whereself-satisfied ignorance and dullness of apprehension were so hard topierce, was the youthful envoy of the Czechoslovaks, M. Benes. Thispolitician, who before the Conference came to an end was offered thehonorable task of forming a new Cabinet, which he wisely declined, displayed a masterly grasp of Continental politics and a rare gift ofidentifying his country's aspirations with the postulates of a settledpeace. A systematic thinker, he made a point of understanding his caseat the outset. He would begin his _exposé_ by detaching himself from allnational interests and starting from general assumptions recognized bythe Olympians, and would lead his hearers by easy stages to theconclusions which he wished them to draw from their own premises. Andtwo of them, who had no great sympathy with his thesis, assured me thatthey could detect no logical flaw in his argument. Moderation andsincerity were the virtues which he was most eager to exhibit, and theywere unquestionably the best trump cards he could play. Not only had hea firm grasp of facts and arguments, but he displayed a sense of measureand open-mindedness which enabled him to implant his views on the mindsof his hearers. 

Armenia's cause found a forcible and suasive pleader in Boghos Pasha, whose way of marshaling arguments in favor of a contention that wasfrowned upon by many commanded admiration. The Armenians asked for avast stretch of territory with outlets on the Black Sea and theMediterranean, but they were met with the objections that their totalpopulation was insignificant; that only in one province were they in amajority, and that their claim to Cilicia clashed with one of thereserved rights of France. The ice, therefore, was somewhat thin inparts, but Boghos Pasha skated over it gracefully. His description ofthe Armenian massacres was thrilling. Altogether his _exposé_ was amasterpiece, and was appreciated by Mr. Wilson and M. Clemenceau. 

The Jugoslav delegates, MM. Vesnitch and Trumbitch, patriotic, tenacious, uncompromising, had an early opportunity of showing the stuffof which they were made. When they were told that the Jugoslav state wasnot yet recognized and that the kingdom of Serbia must content itselfwith two delegates, they lodged an indignant protest against bothdecisions, and refused to appear at the Conference unless they wereallowed an adequate number of representatives. Thereupon the GreatPowers compromised the matter by according them three, and with stealthyrage they submitted to the refusal of recognition. They were not againheard of until one day they proposed that their dispute with Italyabout Fiume and the Dalmatian coast should be solved by submitting it toPresident Wilson for arbitration. The expedient was original. PresidentWilson, people remembered, had had an animated talk on the subject withthe Italian Premier, Orlando, and it was known that he had set his faceagainst Italy's claim and against the secret treaty that recognized it. Consequently the Serbs were running no risk by challenging SignorOrlando to lay the matter before the American delegate. Whether, allthings considered, it was a wise move to make has been questioned. Anyhow, the Italian delegation declined the suggestion on a number ofgrounds which several delegates considered convincing. The Conference, it urged, had been convoked precisely for the purpose of hearing andsettling such disputes as theirs, and the Conference consisted, not ofone, but of many delegates, who collectively were better qualified todeal with such problems than any one man. Europeans, too, could morefully appreciate the arguments, and the atmosphere through which thearguments should be contemplated, than the eminent American idealist, who had more than once had to modify his judgment on European matters. Again, to remove the discussion from the international court might wellbe felt as a slight put upon the men who composed it. For why shouldtheir verdict be less worth soliciting than that of the President of theUnited States? True, Italy's delegates were themselves judges in thattribunal, but the question to be tried was not a matter between twocountries, but an issue of much wider import--namely, what frontiersaccorded to the embryonic state of Jugoslavia would be most conducive tothe world's peace. And nobody, they held, could offer a more complete ortrustworthy answer than they and their European colleagues, who wereconversant with all the elements of the problem. Besides--but thisobjection was not expressly formulated--had not Mr. Wilson alreadydecided against Italy? On these and other grounds, then, they decided toleave the matter to the Conference. It was a delicate subject, and fewonlookers cared to open their minds on its merits. 

Albania was represented by an old friend of mine, the venerable TurkhanPasha, who had been in diplomacy ever since the Congress of Berlin inthe 'seventies of last century, and who looked like a modernized Nestor. I made his acquaintance many years ago, when he was Ambassador of Turkeyin St. Petersburg. He was then a favorite everywhere in the Russiancapital as a conscientious Ambassador, a charming talker, and aprofessional peace-maker, who wished well to everybody. The Young Turkshaving recalled him from St. Petersburg, he soon afterward became GrandVizier to the Mbret of Albania. Far resonant events removed the Mbretfrom the throne, Turkhan Pasha from the Vizierate, and Albania from thesociety of nations, and I next found my friend in Switzerland ill inhealth, eating the bitter bread of exile, temporarily isolated from theworld of politics and waiting for something to turn up. A few years moregave the Allies an unexpectedly complete victory and brought backTurkhan Pasha to the outskirts of diplomacy and politics. He suddenlymade his appearance at the Paris Conference as the representative ofAlbania and the friend of Italy. 

Another Albanian friend of mine, Essad Pasha, whose plans for theregeneration of his country differed widely from those of Turkhan, wasfor a long while detained in Saloniki. By dint of solicitations andprotests, he at last obtained permission to repair to Paris and lay hisviews before the Conference, where he had a curious interview with Mr. Wilson. The President, having received from Albanians in the UnitedStates many unsolicited judgments on the character and antecedents ofEssad Pasha, had little faith in his fitness to introduce and popularizedemocratic institutions in Albania. And he unburdened himself of thesedoubts to friends, who diffused the news. The Pasha asked for anaudience, and by dint of patience and perseverance his prayer was heard. Five minutes before the appointed hour he was at the President's house, accompanied by his interpreter, a young Albanian named Stavro, whoconverses freely in French, Greek, and Turkish, besides his nativelanguage. But while in the antechamber Essad, remembering that theAmerican President speaks nothing but pure English, suggested thatStavro should drive over to the Hôtel Crillon for an interpreter totranslate from French. Thereupon one of the secretaries stopped him, saying: "Although he cannot speak French, the President understands it, so that a second interpreter will be unnecessary. " Essad then addressedMr. Wilson in Albanian, Stavro translated his words into French, and thePresident listened in silence. It was the impression of those in theroom that, at any rate, Mr. Wilson understood and appreciated the gistof the Pasha's sharp criticism of Italy's behavior. But, to be on thesafe side, the President requested his visitor to set down on paper athis leisure everything he had said and to send it to him. 

PRESIDENT WILSON

President Wilson, before assuming the redoubtable rôle of world arbiter, was hardly more than a name in Europe, and it was not a synonym forstatecraft. His ethical objections to the rule of Huerta in Mexico, hisattempt to engraft democratic principles there, and the anarchy thatcame of it were matters of history. But the President of the nation towhose unbounded generosity and altruism the world owes a debt ofgratitude that can only be acknowledged, not repaid, deservedly enjoyeda superlative measure of respect from his foreign colleagues, and theauthor of the project which was to link all nations together by ties ofmoral kinship was literally idolized by the masses. Never has it fallento my lot to see any mortal so enthusiastically, so spontaneouslywelcomed by the dejected peoples of the universe. His most casualutterances were caught up as oracles. He occupied a height so far aloftthat the vicissitudes of everyday life and the contingencies of politicsseemingly could not touch him. He was given credit for a rare degree ofselflessness in his conceptions and actions and for a balance ofjudgment which no storms of passion could upset. So far as one couldjudge by innumerable symptoms, President Wilson was confronted with anopportunity for good incomparably vaster than had ever before beenwithin the reach of man. 

Soon after the opening of the Conference the shadowy outlines of hisportrait began to fill in, slowly at first, and before three months hadpassed the general public beheld it fairly complete, with many of itsnatural lights and shades. The quality of an active politician is nevermore clearly brought out than when, raised to an eminent place, he isset an arduous feat in sight of the multitude. Mr. Wilson's task wasmanifestly congenial to him, for it was deliberately chosen by himself, and it comprised the most tremendous problems ever tackled by man bornof woman. The means by which he set to work to solve them werestartlingly simple: the regeneration of the human race was to becompassed by means of magisterial edicts secretly drafted and sternlyimposed on the interested peoples, together with a new and not whollyappropriate nomenclature. 

In his own country, where he has bitter adversaries as well as devotedfriends, Mr. Wilson was regarded by many as a composite being made upof preacher, teacher, and politician. To these diverse elements theyrefer the fervor and unction, the dogmatic tone, and the practisedshrewdness that marked his words and acts. Independent American opiniondoubted his qualifications to be a leader. As a politician, they said, he had always followed the crowd. He had swum with the tide of publicsentiment in cardinal matters, instead of stemming or canalizing andguiding it. Deficient in courageous initiative, he had contented himselfwith merely executive functions. No new idea, no fresh policy, wasassociated with his name. His singular attitude on the Mexican imbrogliohad provoked the sharp criticism even of friends and the condemnation ofpolitical opponents. His utterances during the first stages of the WorldWar, such as the statement that the American people were too proud tofight and had no concern with the causes and objects of the war, [55]when contrasted with the opposite views which he propounded later on, were ascribed to quick political evolution--but were not taken assymptoms of a settled mind. He seemed a pacifist when his pride revoltedat the idea of settling any intelligible question by an appeal toviolence, and a semi-militarist when, having in his own opinion createda perfectly safe and bloodless peace guarantee in the shape of theLeague of Nations, he agreed to safeguard it by a military compact whichsapped its foundation. He owed his re-election for a second term partly, it was alleged, to the belief that during the first he had kept hiscountry out of the war despite the endeavors of some of its eminentleaders to bring it in; yet when firmly seated in the saddle, hefollowed the leaders whom he had theretofore with-stood and obliged thenation to fight. 

As chief of the great country, his domestic critics add, which had justturned victory's scale in favor of the Allies, Mr. Wilson saw a superbopportunity to hitch his wagon to a star, and now for the first time hemade a determined bid for the leadership of the world. Here the idealistshowed himself at his best. But by the way of preparation he asked thenation at the elections to refuse their votes to his politicalopponents, despite the fact that they were loyally supporting hispolicy, and to return only men of his own party, and in order to silencetheir misgivings he declared that to elect Republican Senators would beto repudiate the administration of the President of the United States ata critical conjuncture. This was urged against him as the inexpiablesin. The electors, however, sent his political opponents to the Senate, whereupon the President organized his historic visit to Europe. It mighthave become a turning-point in the world's history had he transformedhis authority and prestige into the driving-power requisite to embodyhis beneficent scheme. But he wasted the opportunity for lack of moralcourage. Thus far American criticism. But the peoples of Europe ignoredthe estimates of the President made by his fellow-countrymen, who, assuch, may be forgiven for failing to appreciate his apostleship, or setthe full value on his humanitarian strivings. The war-weary massesjudged him not by what he had achieved or attempted in the past, but bywhat he proposed to do in the future. And measured by this standard, hisspiritual statue grew to legendary proportions. 

Europe, when the President touched its shores, was as clay ready for thecreative potter. Never before were the nations so eager to follow aMoses who would take them to the long-promised land where wars areprohibited and blockades unknown. And to their thinking he was thatgreat leader. In France men bowed down before him with awe andaffection. Labor leaders in Paris told me that they shed tears of joy inhis presence, and that their comrades would go through fire and water tohelp him to realize his noble schemes. [56] To the working classes inItaly his name was a heavenly clarion at the sound of which the earthwould be renewed. The Germans regarded him and his humane doctrine astheir sheet-anchor of safety. The fearless Herr Muehlon said, "IfPresident Wilson were to address the Germans, and pronounce a severesentence upon them, they would accept it with resignation and without amurmur and set to work at once. " In German-Austria his fame was that ofa savior, and the mere mention of his name brought balm to the sufferingand surcease of sorrow to the afflicted. A touching instance of thiswhich occurred in the Austrian capital, when narrated to the President, moved him to tears. There were some five or six thousand Austrianchildren in the hospitals at Vienna who, as Christmas was drawing near, were sorely in need of medicaments and much else. The head of theAmerican Red Cross took up their case and persuaded the Americans inFrance to send two million dollars' worth of medicaments to Vienna. These were duly despatched, and had got as far as Berne, when the Frenchauthorities, having got wind of the matter, protested against thispremature assistance to infant enemies on grounds which the otherAllies had to recognize as technically tenable, and the medicaments wereordered back to France from Berne. Thereupon Doctor Ferries, of theInternational Red Cross, became wild with indignation and laid thematter before the Swiss government, which undertook to send somemedicaments to the children, while the Americans were endeavoring tomove the French to allow at least some of the remedies to go through. The children in the hospitals, when told that they must wait, werebright and hopeful. "It will be all right, " some of them exclaimed. "Wilson is coming soon, and he will bring us everything. "

Thus Mr. Wilson had become a transcendental hero to the Europeanproletarians, who in their homely way adjusted his mental and moralattributes to their own ideal of the latter-day Messiah. His legendaryfigure, half saint, half revolutionist, emerged from the transparenthaze of faith, yearning, and ignorance, as in some ecstatic vision. Inspite of his recorded acts and utterances the mythopeic faculty of thepeoples had given itself free scope and created a messianic democratdestined to free the lower orders, as they were called, in each statefrom the shackles of capitalism, legalized thraldom, and crushingtaxation, and each nation from sanguinary warfare. Truly, no human beingsince the dawn of history has ever yet been favored with such a superbopportunity. Mr. Wilson might have made a gallant effort to lift societyout of the deep grooves into which it had sunk, and dislodge the secularobstacles to the enfranchisement and transfiguration of the human race. At the lowest it was open to him to become the center of a countlessmultitude, the heart of their hearts, the incarnation of their noblestthought, on condition that he scorned the prudential motives ofpoliticians, burst through the barriers of the old order, and deployedall his energies and his full will-power in the struggle against sordidinterests and dense prejudice. But he was cowed by obstacles which hiswill lacked the strength to surmount, and instead of receiving hispromptings from the everlasting ideals of mankind and the inspiritingaudacities of his own highest nature and appealing to the peoplesagainst their rulers, he felt constrained in the very interest of hiscause to haggle and barter with the Scribes and the Pharisees, and endedby recording a pitiful answer to the most momentous problems couched inthe impoverished phraseology of a political party. 

Many of his political friends had advised the President not to visitEurope lest the vast prestige and influence which he wielded from adistance should dwindle unutilized on close contact with the realists'crowd. Even the war-god Mars, when he descended into the ranks of thecombatants on the Trojan side, was wounded by a Greek, and, screamingwith pain, scurried back to Olympus with paling halo. But Mr. Wilsondecided to preside and to direct the fashioning of his project, and togive Europe the benefit of his advice. He explained to Congress that hehad expressed the ideals of the country for which its soldiers hadconsciously fought, had had them accepted "as the substance of their ownthoughts and purpose" by the statesmen of the associated governments, and now, he concluded: "I owe it to them to see to it, in so far as inme lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, andno possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play myfull part in making good what they offered their lives and blood toobtain. I can think of no call to service which could transcendthis. "[57] No intention could well be more praiseworthy. 

Soon after the _George Washington_, flying the presidential flag, hadsteamed out of the Bay on her way to Europe, the United Press receivedfrom its correspondent on board, who was attached to Mr. Wilson'sperson, a message which invigorated the hopes of the world and evokedwarm outpourings of the seared soul of suffering man in gratitude towardthe bringer of balm. It began thus: "The President sails for Europe touphold American ideals, and literally to fight for his Fourteen Points. The President, at the Peace Table, will insist on the freedom of theseas and a general disarmament. . . . The seas, he holds, ought to beguarded by the whole world. "

Since then the world knows what to think of the literal fighting at thePeace Table. The freedom of the seas was never as much as alluded to atthe Peace Table, for the announcement of Mr. Wilson's militantchampionship brought him a wireless message from London to the effectthat that proposal, at all events, must be struck out of his program ifhe wished to do business with Britain. And without a fight or aremonstrance the President struck it out. The Fourteen Points were notdiscussed at the Conference. [58] One may deplore, but one cannotmisunderstand, what happened. Mr. Wilson, too, had his own fixed aim toattain: intent on associating his name with a grandiose humanitarianmonument, he was resolved not to return to his country without some sortof a covenant of the new international life. He could not afford to gohome empty-handed. Therein lay his weakness and the source of hisfailure. For whenever his attitude toward the Great Powers was taken tomean, "Unless you give me my Covenant, you cannot have your Treaty, " theretort was ready: "Without our Treaty there will be no Covenant. "

Like Dejoces, the first king of the Medes, who, having built his palaceat Ecbatana, surrounded it with seven walls and permanently withdrew hisperson from the gaze of his subjects, Mr. Wilson in Paris admitted tohis presence only the authorized spokesmen of states and causes, and notall of these. He declined to receive persons who thought they had aclaim to see him, and he received others who were believed to have none. During his sojourn in Paris he took many important Russian affairs inhand after having publicly stated that no peace could be stable so longas Russia was torn by internal strife. And as familiarity with Russianconditions was not one of his accomplishments, he presumably neededadvice and help from those acquainted with them. Now a large number ofRussians, representing all political parties and four governments, werein Paris waiting to be consulted. But between January and May not one ofthem was ever asked for information or counsel. Nay, more, those whorespectfully solicited an audience were told to wait. In the meanwhilemen unacquainted with the country and people were sent by Mr. Wilson toreport on the situation, and to begin by obtaining the terms of anacceptable treaty from the Bolshevik government. 

The first plenipotentiary of one of the principal lesser states was formonths refused an audience, to the delight of his political adversaries, who made the most of the circumstance at home. An eminent diplomatistwho possessed considerable claims to be vouchsafed an interview was putoff from week to week, until at last, by dint of perseverance, as itseemed to him, the President consented to see him. The diplomatist, pleased at his success, informed a friend that the following Wednesdaywould be the memorable day. "But are you not aware, " asked the friend, "that on that day the President will be on the high seas on his way backto the United States?" He was not aware of it. But when he learned thatthe audience had been deliberately fixed for a day when Mr. Wilson wouldno longer be in France he felt aggrieved. 

In Italy the President's progress was a veritable triumph. Emperors andkings had roused no such enthusiasm. One might fancy him a deityunexpectedly discovered under the outward appearance of a mortal and nowbeing honored as the god that he was by ecstatic worshipers. Everythinghe did was well done, everything he said was nobly conceived and worthyof being treasured up. In these dispositions a few brief months wroughta vast difference. 

In this respect an instructive comparison might be made between TsarAlexander I at the Vienna Congress and the President of the UnitedStates at the Conference of Paris. The Russian monarch arrived in theAustrian capital with the halo of a Moses focusing the hopes of all thepeoples of Europe. His reputation for probity, public spirit, and loftyaspirations had won for him the good-will and the anticipatory blessingsof war-weary nations. He, too, was a mystic, believed firmly in occultinfluences, so firmly indeed that he accepted the fitful guidance of anecstatic lady whose intuition was supposed to transcend the sagacity ofprofessional statesmen. And yet the Holy Alliance was the supremeoutcome of his endeavors, as the League of Nations was that of Mr. Wilson's. In lieu of universal peace all eastern Europe was stillwarring and revolting in September and the general outlook wasdisquieting. The disheartening effect of the contrast between thepromise and the achievement of the American statesman was feltthroughout the world. But Mr. Wilson has the solace to know that peoplehardly ever reach their goal--though they sometimes advance fairly nearto it. They either die on the way or else it changes or they do. 

It was doubtless a noble ambition that moved the Prime Ministers of theGreat Powers and the chief of the North American Republic to give theirown service to the Conference as heads of their respective missions. Forthey considered themselves to be the best equipped for the purpose, andthey were certainly free from such prejudices as professional traditionsand a confusing knowledge of details might be supposed to engender. Butin almost every respect it was a grievous mistake and the source ofothers still more grievous. True, in his own particular sphere each ofthem had achieved what is nowadays termed greatness. As a war leader Mr. Lloyd George had been hastily classed with Marlborough and Chatham, M. Clemenceau compared to Danton, and Mr. Wilson set apart in a category tohimself. But without questioning these journalistic certificates of fameone must admit that all three plenipotentiaries were essentiallypoliticians, old parliamentary hands, and therefore expedient-mongerswhose highest qualifications for their own profession were drawbackswhich unfitted them for their self-assumed mission. Of the concreteworld which they set about reforming their knowledge was amazinglyvague. "Frogs in the pond, " says the Japanese proverb, "know naught ofthe ocean. " There was, of course, nothing blameworthy in theirunacquaintanceship with the issues, but only in the offhandedness withwhich they belittled its consequences. Had they been conversant with thesubject or gifted with deeper insight, many of the things which seemedparticularly clear to them would have struck them as sheer inexplicable, and among these perhaps their own leadership of the world-parliament. 

What they lacked, however, might in some perceptible degree have beensupplied by enlisting as their helpers men more happily endowed thanthemselves. But they deliberately chose mediocrities. It is a mark ofgenial spirits that they are well served, but the plenipotentiaries ofthe Conference were not characterized by it. Away in the background someof them had familiars or casual prompters to whose counsels they werewont to listen, but many of the adjoints who moved in the limelight ofthe world-stage were gritless and pithless. 

As the heads of the principal governments implicitly claimed to be theauthorized spokesmen of the human race and endowed with unlimitedpowers, it is worth noting that this claim was boldly challenged by thepeoples' organs in the press. Nearly all the journals read by the massesobjected from the first to the dictatorship of the group of Premiers, Mr. Wilson being excepted. "The modern parasite, " wrote a respectabledemocratic newspaper, [59] "is the politician. Of all the privilegedbeings who have ever governed us he is the worst. In that, however, there is nothing surprising . . . He is not only amoral, but incompetentby definition. And it is this empty-headed individual who is intrustedwith the task of settling problems with the very rudiments of which heis unacquainted. " Another French journal[60] wrote: "In truth it is amisfortune that the leaders of the Conference are Cabinet chiefs, foreach of them is obsessed by the carking cares of his domestic policy. Besides, the Paris Conference takes on the likeness of a lyrical dramain which there are only tenors. Now would even the most beautiful workin the world survive this excess of beauties?"

The truth as revealed by subsequent facts would seem to be that each ofthe plenipotentiaries recognizing parliamentary success as the source ofhis power was obsessed by his own political problems and stimulated byhis own immediate ends. As these ends, however incompatible with eachother, were believed by each one to tend toward the general object, heworked zealously for their attainment. The consequences are notorious. M. Clemenceau made France the hub of the universe. Mr. Lloyd Georgeharbored schemes which naturally identified the welfare of mankind withthe hegemony of the English-speaking races. Signor Orlando was inspiredby the "sacred egotism" which had actuated all Italian Cabinets sinceItaly entered the war, and President Wilson was burning to associate hisname and also that of his country with the vastest and noblestenterprise inscribed in the annals of history. And each one moved overhis own favorite route toward his own goal. It was an apt illustrationof the Russian fable of the swan, the crab, and the pike being harnessedtogether in order to remove a load. The swan flew upward, the crabcrawled backward, the pike made with all haste for the water, and theload remained where it was. 

A lesser but also a serious disadvantage of the delegation of governmentchiefs made itself felt in the procedure. Embarrassing delays wereoccasioned by the unavoidable absences of the principal delegates whompressure of domestic politics called to their respective capitals, aswell as by their tactics, and their colleagues profited by their absencefor the sake of the good cause. Thus all Paris, as we saw, was awarethat the European chiefs, whose faith in Wilsonian orthodoxy was stillfeeble at that time, were prepared to take advantage of the President'ssojourn in Washington to speed up business in their own sense and toconfront him on his return with accomplished facts. But when, on hisreturn, he beheld their handiwork he scrapped it, and a considerableloss of time ensued for which the world has since had to pay veryheavily. 

Again, when Premier Orlando was in Rome after Mr. Wilson's appeal tothe Italian people, a series of measures was passed by the delegates inParis affecting Italy, diminishing her importance at the Conference, andmodifying the accepted interpretation of the Treaty of London. Some ofthese decisions had to be canceled when the Italians returned. Thesestratagems had an undesirable effect on the Italians. 

Not the least of the Premiers' disabilities lay in the circumstance thatthey were the merest novices in international affairs. Geography, ethnography, psychology, and political history were sealed books tothem. Like the rector of Louvain University who told Oliver Goldsmiththat, as he had become the head of that institution without knowingGreek, he failed to see why it should be taught there, the chiefs ofstate, having attained the highest position in their respectivecountries without more than an inkling of international affairs, wereunable to realize the importance of mastering them or the impossibilityof repairing the omission as they went along. 

They displayed their contempt for professional diplomacy and thisfeeling was shared by many, but they extended that sentiment to certaindiplomatic postulates which can in no case be dispensed with, becausethey are common to all professions. One of them is knowledge of theterms of the problems to be solved. No conjuncture could have been lessfavorable for an experiment based on this theory. The general situationmade a demand on the delegates for special knowledge and experience, whereas the Premiers and the President, although specialists in nothing, had to act as specialists in everything. Traditional diplomacy wouldhave shown some respect for the law of causality. It would have sent tothe Conference diplomatists more or less acquainted with the issues tobe mooted and also with the mentality of the other negotiators, and itwould have assigned to them a number of experts as advisers. It wouldhave formed a plan similar to that proposed by the French authoritiesand rejected by the Anglo-Saxons. In this way at least the technicalpart of the task would have been tackled on right lines, the war wouldhave been liquidated and normal relations quickly re-established amongthe belligerent states. It may be objected that this would have been ameager contribution to the new politico-social fabric. Undoubtedly itwould, but, however meager, it would have been a positive gain. Possiblythe first stone of a new world might have been laid once the ruins ofthe old were cleared away. But even this modest feat could not beachieved by amateurs working in desultory fashion and handicapped bytheir political parties at home. The resultant of their apparentco-operation was a sum in subtraction because dispersal or effort wasunavoidably substituted for concentration. 

Whether one contemplates them in the light of their public acts orthrough the prism of gossip, the figures cut by the delegates of theGreat Powers were pathetic. Giants in the parliamentary sphere, theyshrank to the dimensions of dwarfs in the international. In matters ofgeography, ethnography, history, and international politics they werehelplessly at sea, and the stories told of certain of their efforts tokeep their heads above water while maintaining a simulacrum of dignitywould have been amusing were the issues less momentous. "Is it afterUpper or Lower Silesia that those greedy Poles are hankering?" onePremier is credibly reported to have asked some months after the Polishdelegation had propounded and defended its claims and he had had time tofamiliarize himself with them. "Please point out to me Dalmatia on themap, " was another characteristic request, "and tell me what connectionthere is between it and Fiume. " One of the principal plenipotentiariesaddressed a delegate who is an acquaintance of mine approximately asfollows: "I cannot understand the spokesmen of the smaller states. To methey seem stark mad. They single out a strip of territory and for nointelligible reason flock round it like birds of prey round a corpse onthe field of battle. Take Silesia, for example. The Poles are clamoringfor it as if the very existence of their country depended on theirannexing it. The Germans are still more crazy about it. But for theireagerness I suppose there is some solid foundation. But how in Heaven'sname do the Armenians come to claim it? Just think of it, the Armenians!The world has gone mad. No wonder France has set her foot down andwarned them off the ground. But what does France herself want with it?What is the clue to the mystery?" My acquaintance, in reply, pointed outas considerately as he could that Silesia was the province for whichPoles and Germans were contending, whereas the Armenians were pleadingfor Cilicia, which is farther east, and were, therefore, frowned upon bythe French, who conceive that they have a civilizing mission there andmen enough to accomplish it. 

It is characteristic of the epoch, and therefore worthy of thehistorian's attention, that not only the members of the Conference, butalso other leading statesmen of Anglo-Saxon countries, were wont to makea very little knowledge of peoples and countries go quite a far way. Twoexamples may serve to familiarize the reader with the phenomenon and tomoderate his surprise at the defects of the world-dictators in Paris. One English-speaking statesman, dealing with the Italian government[61]and casting around for some effective way of helping the Italian peopleout of their pitiable economic plight, fancied he hit upon a felicitousexpedient, which he unfolded as follows. "I venture, " he said, "topromise that if you will largely increase your cultivation of bananasthe people of my country will take them all. No matter how great thequantities, our market will absorb them, and that will surely make aconsiderable addition to your balance on the right side. " At first theItalians believed he was joking. But finding that he really meant whathe said, they ruthlessly revealed his idea to the nation under theheading, "Italian bananas!"

Here is the other instance. During the war the Polish people wasundergoing unprecedented hardships. Many of the poorer classes wereliterally perishing of hunger. A Polish commission was sent to anEnglish-speaking country to interest the government and people in thecondition of the sufferers and obtain relief. The envoys had aninterview with a Secretary of State, who inquired to what port theyintended to have the foodstuffs conveyed for distribution in theinterior of Poland. They answered: "We shall have them taken to Dantzig. There is no other way. " The statesman reflected a little and then said:"You may meet with difficulties. If you have them shipped to Dantzig youmust of course first obtain Italy's permission. Have you got it?" "No. We had not thought of that. In fact, we don't yet see why Italy need beapproached. " "Because it is Italy who has command of the Mediterranean, and if you want the transport taken to Dantzig it is the Italiangovernment that you must ask!"[62]

The delegates picked up a good deal of miscellaneous information aboutthe various countries whose future they were regulating, and to theircredit it should be said that they put questions to their informantswithout a trace of false pride. One of the two chief delegates wendinghomeward from a sitting at which M. Jules Cambon had spoken a good dealabout those Polish districts which, although they contained a majorityof Germans, yet belonged of right to Poland, asked the French delegatewhy he had made so many allusions to Frederick the Great. "What hadFrederick to do with Poland?" he inquired. The answer was that thepresent German majority of the inhabitants was made up of colonists whohad immigrated into the districts since the time of Frederick the Greatand the partition of Poland. "Yes, I see, " exclaimed the statesman, "butwhat had Frederick the Great to do with the partition of Poland?" . . . Inthe domain of ethnography there were also many pitfalls and accidents. During an official _exposé_ of the Oriental situation before the SupremeCouncil, one of the Great Four, listening to a narrative of Turkishmisdeeds, heard that the Kurds had tortured and killed a number ofdefenseless women, children, and old men. He at once interrupted thespeaker with the query: "You now call them Kurds. A few minutes ago yousaid they were Turks. I take it that the Kurds and the Turks are thesame people?" Loath to embarrass one of the world's arbiters, thedelegate respectfully replied, "Yes, sir, they are about the same, butthe worse of the two are the Kurds. "[63]

Great Britain's first delegate, with engaging candor sought to disarmcriticism by frankly confessing in the House of Commons that he hadnever before heard of Teschen, about which such an extraordinary fusswas then being made, and by asking: "How many members of the House haveever heard of Teschen? Yet, " he added significantly, "Teschen verynearly produced an angry conflict between two allied states. "[64]

The circumstance that an eminent parliamentarian had never heard ofproblems that agitate continental peoples is excusable. Less so was hisresolve, despite such a capital disqualification, to undertake the taskof solving those problems single-handed, although conscious that thefate of whole peoples depended on his succeeding. It is no adequatejustification to say that he could always fall back upon specialcommissions, of which there was no lack at the Conference. Unless hepossessed a safe criterion by which to assess the value of thecommissions' conclusions, he must needs himself decide the matterarbitrarily. And the delegates, having no such criterion, pronouncedvery arbitrary judgments on momentous issues. One instance of thisturned upon Poland's claims to certain territories incorporated inGermany, which were referred to a special commission under thepresidency of M. Cambon. Commissioners were sent to the country to studythe matter on the spot, where they had received every facility foracquainting themselves with it. After some weeks the commission reportedin favor of the Polish claim with unanimity. But Mr. Lloyd Georgerejected their conclusions and insisted on having the report sent backto them for reconsideration. Again the commissioners went over thefamiliar ground, but felt obliged to repeat their verdict anew. Oncemore, however, the British Premier demurred, and such was his tenacitythat, despite Mr. Wilson's opposition, the final decision of theConference reversed that of the commission and non-suited the Poles. Bywhat line of argument, people naturally asked, did the first Britishdelegate come to that conclusion? That he knew more about the matterthan the special Inter-Allied commission is hardly to be supposed. Indeed, nobody assumed that he was any better informed on that subjectthan about Teschen. The explanation put in circulation by interestedpersons was that, like Socrates, he had his own familiar demon to prompthim, who, like all such spirits, chose to flourish, like the violet, inthe shade. That this source of light was accessible to the PrimeMinister may, his apologists hold, one day prove a boon to the peopleswhose fate was thus being spun in darkness and seemingly at haphazard. Possibly. But in the meanwhile it was construed as an affront to theirintelligence and a violation of the promise made to them of "opencovenants openly arrived at. " The press asked why the informationrequisite for the work had not been acquired in advance as thesesemi-mystical ways of obtaining it commended themselves to nobody. Wholly mystical were the methods attributed to one or other of the menwho were preparing the advent of the new era. For superstition ofvarious kinds was supposed to be as well represented at the ParisConference as at the Congress of Vienna. Characteristic of the epoch wasthe gravity with which individuals otherwise well balanced exercisedtheir ingenuity in finding out the true relation of the world's peace tocertain lucky numbers. For several events connected with the Conferencethe thirteenth day of the month was deliberately, and some occultistsadded felicitously, chosen. It was also noticed that an effort was madeby all the delegates to have the Allies' reply to the Germancounter-proposals presented on the day of destiny, Friday, June 13th. When it miscarried a flutter was caused in the dovecotes of theilluminated. The failure was construed as an inauspicious omen and itcaused the spirits of many to droop. The principal clairvoyante ofParis, Madame N----, who plumes herself on being the intermediarybetween the Fates that rule and some of their earthly executors, wasconsulted on the subject, one knows not with what result. [65] It wasgiven out, however, as the solemn utterance of the oracle in vogue thatMr. Wilson's enterprise was weighted with original sin; he had made onefalse step before his arrival in Europe, and that had put everything outof gear. By enacting fourteen commandments he had countered the magiccharm of his lucky thirteen. One of the fourteen, it was soothsaid, musttherefore be omitted--it might be, say, that of open covenants openlyarrived at, or the freedom of the seas--in a word, any one so long asthe mystic number thirteen remained intact. But should that beimpossible, seeing that the Fourteen Points had already becomehouse-hold words to all nations and peoples, then it behooved thePresident to number the last of his saving points 13a. [66]

This odd mixture of the real and the fanciful--a symptom, as theinitiated believed, of a mood of fine spiritual exaltation--met withlittle sympathy among the impatient masses whose struggle for bare lifewas growing ever fiercer. Stagnation held the business world, priceswere rising to prohibitive heights, partly because of the dawdling ofthe world's conclave; hunger was stalking about the ruined villages ofthe northern departments of France, destructive wars were being waged ineastern Europe, and thousands of Christians were dying of hunger inBessarabia. [67] Epigrammatic strictures and winged words barbed withstinging satire indicated the feelings of the many. And the fact remainson record that streaks of the mysticism that buoyed up Alexander I atthe Congress of Vienna, and is supposed to have stimulated Nicholas IIduring the first world-parliament at The Hague, were noticeable fromtime to time in the environment of the Paris Conference. The disclosureof these elements of superstition was distinctly harmful and might havebeen hindered easily by the system of secrecy and censorship whicheffectively concealed matters much less mischievous. 

The position of the plenipotentiaries was unenviable at best and theywell deserve the benefit of extenuating circumstances. For not even agenius can efficiently tackle problems with the elements of which helacks acquaintanceship, and the mass of facts which they had to dealwith was sheer unmanageable. It was distressing to watch them duringthose eventful months groping and floundering through a labyrinth ofobstacles with no Ariadne clue to guide their tortuous course, anddiscovering that their task was more intricate than they had imagined. The ironic domination of temper and circumstance over the fitfulexertions of men struggling with the partially realized difficulties ofa false position led to many incongruities upon which it would beungracious to dwell. One of them, however, which illustrates thesituation, seems almost incredible. It is said to have occurred inJanuary. According to the current narrative, soon after the arrival ofPresident Wilson in Paris, he received from a French publicist namedM. B. A long and interesting memorandum about the island of Corsica, recounting the history, needs, and aspirations of the population as wellas the various attempts they had made to regain their independence, andrequesting him to employ his good offices at the Conference to obtainfor them complete autonomy. To this demand M. B. Is said to have receiveda reply[68] to the effect that the President "is persuaded that thisquestion will form the subject of a thorough examination by thecompetent authorities of the Conference" Corsica, the birthplace ofNapoleon, and as much an integral part of France as the Isle of Man isof England, seeking to slacken the ties that link it to the Republic andreceiving a promise that the matter would be carefully considered by thedelegates sounds more like a mystification than a sober statement offact. The story was sent to the newspapers for publication, but thecensor very wisely struck it out. 

These and kindred occurrences enable one better to appreciate themotives which prompted the delegates to shroud their conversations andtentative decisions in a decorous veil of secrecy. 

It is but fair to say that the enterprise to which they set their handswas the vastest that ever tempted lofty ambitions since thetower-builders of Babel strove to bring heaven within reach of theearth. It transcended the capacity of the contemporary world's greatestmen. [69] It was a labor for a wonder-worker in the pristine days ofheroes. But although to solve even the main problems without residue wasbeyond the reach of the most genial representatives of latter-daystatecraft, it needed only clearness of conception, steadiness ofpurpose, and the proper adjustment of means to ends, to begin the workon the right lines and give it an impulse that might perhaps carry it tocompletion in the fullness of time. 

But even these postulates were wanting. The eminent parliamentariansfailed to rise to the gentle height of average statecraft. They appearedin their new and august character of world-reformers with all the rootsstill clinging to them of the rank electoral soil from which theysprang. Their words alone were redolent of idealism, their deeds weretoo often marred by pettifogging compromises or childishblunders--constructive phrases and destructive acts. Not only had theyno settled method of working, they lacked even a common proximate aim. For although they all employed the same phraseology when describing theobjects for which their countries had fought and they themselves wereostensibly laboring, no two delegates attached the same ideas to thewords they used. Yet, instead of candidly avowing this root-defect andremedying it, they were content to stretch the euphemistic terms untilthese covered conflicting conceptions and gratified the ears of everyhearer. Thus, "open covenants openly arrived at" came to mean arbitraryukases issued by a secret conclave, and "the self-determination ofpeoples" connoted implicit obedience to dictatorial decrees. The newresult was a bewildering phantasmagoria. 

And yet it was professedly for the purpose of obviating suchmisunderstandings that Mr. Wilson had crossed the Atlantic. Havingexpressed in plain terms the ideals for which American soldiers hadfought, and which became the substance of the thoughts and purposes ofthe associated statesmen, "I owe it to them, " he had said, "to see toit, in so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation isput upon them and no possible effort omitted to realize them. " And thatwas the result achieved. 

No such juggling with words as went on at the Conference had beenwitnessed since the days of medieval casuistry. New meanings wereinfused into old terms, rendering the help of "exegesis" indispensable. Expressions like "territorial equilibrium" and "strategic frontiers"were stringently banished, and it is affirmed that President Wilsonwould wince and his expression change at the bare mention of theseobnoxious symbols of the effete ordering which it was part of hismission to do away with forever. And yet the things signified by thosewords were preserved withal under other names. Nor could it well beotherwise. One can hardly conceive a durable state system in Europeunder the new any more than the old dispensation without something thatcorresponds to equilibrium. An architect who should boastingly discardthe law of gravitation in favor of a different theory would stand littlechance of being intrusted with the construction of a palace of peace. Similarly, a statesman who, while proclaiming that the era of wars isnot yet over, would deprive of strategic frontiers the pivotal states ofEurope which are most exposed to sudden attack would deserve to find fewdisciples and fewer clients. Yet that was what Mr. Wilson aimed at andwhat some of his friends affirm he has achieved. His foreign colleaguesre-echoed his dogmas after having emasculated them. It was instructiveand unedifying to watch how each of the delegates, when his owncountry's turn came to be dealt with on the new lines, reversed histactics and, sacrificing sound to substance, insisted on safeguards, relied on historic rights, invoked economic requirements, and appealedto common sense, but all the while loyally abjured "territorialequilibrium" and "strategic guarantees. " Hence the fierce struggleswhich MM. Orlando, Dmowski, Bratiano, Venizelos, and Makino had to carryon with the chief of that state which is the least interested inEuropean affairs in order to obtain all or part of the territories whichthey considered indispensable to the security and well-being of theirrespective countries. 

At the outset Mr. Wilson stood for an ideal Europe of a wholly new andundefined type, which would have done away with the need for strategicfrontiers. Its contours were vague, for he had no clear mental pictureof the concrete Europe out of which it was to be fashioned. He spoke, indeed, and would fain have acted, as though the old Continent were likea thinly inhabited territory of North America fifty years ago, unencumbered by awkward survivals of the past and capable of receivingany impress. He seemingly took no account of its history, its peoples, or their interests and strivings. History shared the fate of Kolchak'sgovernment and the Ukraine; it was not recognized by the delegates. Whathe brought to Europe from America was an abstract idea, old andEuropean, and at first his foreign colleagues treated it as such. Someof them had actually sneered at it, others had damned it with faintpraise, and now all of them honestly strove to save their own countries'vital interests from its disruptive action while helping to apply it totheir neighbors. Thus Britain, who at that time had no territorialclaims to put forward, had her sea-doctrine to uphold, and she upheld itresolutely. Before he reached Europe the President was notified in plainterms that his theory of the freedom of the seas would neither beentertained nor discussed. Accordingly, he abandoned it withoutprotest. It was then explained away as a journalistic misconception. That was the first toll paid by the American reformer in Europe, and itspelled failure to his entire scheme, which was one and indivisible. Itfell to my lot to record the payment of the tribute and the abandonmentof that first of the fourteen commandments. The mystic thirteenremained. But soon afterward another went by the board. Then there weretwelve. And gradually the number dwindled. 

This recognition of hard realities was a bitter disappointment to allthe friends of the spiritual and social renovation of the world. It wasa spectacle for cynics. It rendered a frank return to the ancient systemunavoidable and brought grist to the mill of the equilibrists. And yetthe conclusion was shriked. But even the tough realities might have beenmade to yield a tolerable peace if they had been faced squarely. If thenew conception could not be realized at once, the old one should havebeen taken back into favor provisionally until broader foundations couldbe laid, but it must be one thing or the other. From the political angleof vision at which the European delegates insisted on placingthemselves, the Old World way of tackling the various problems was aloneadmissible. Their program was coherent and their reasoning strictlylogical. The former included strategic frontiers and territorialequilibrium. Doubtless this angle of vision was narrow, the survey itallowed was inadequate, and the results attainable ran the risk of beingultimately thrust aside by the indignant peoples. For the world problemwas not wholly nor even mainly political. Still, the method wasintelligible and the ensuing combinations would have hung coherentlytogether. They would have satisfied all those--and they were many--whobelieved that the second decade of the twentieth century differs in noessential respect from the first and that latter-day world problems maybe solved by judicious territorial redistribution. But even thatconception was not consistently acted on. Deviations were permitted hereand insisted upon there, only they were spoken of unctuously assacrifices incumbent on the lesser states to the Fourteen Points. Forthe delegates set great store by their reputation for logic andcoherency. Whatever other charges against the Conference might betolerated, that of inconsistency was bitterly resented, especially byMr. Wilson. For a long while he contended that he was as true to hisFourteen Points as is the needle to the pole. It was not until after hisreturn to Washington, in the summer, that he admitted the perturbationscaused by magnetic currents--sympathy for France he termed them. 

The effort of imagination required to discern consistency in such of theCouncil's decisions as became known from time to time was so far beyondthe capacity of average outsiders that the ugly phrase "to make theworld safe for hypocrisy" was early coined, uttered, and propagated. 

FOOTNOTES:

[46] Cf. _Le Temps_, May 23, 1919. It is an adaptation of theinscription over the Pantheon, "Aux grands hommes, la Patriereconnaissante. "

[47] _The Daily Mail_, April 25, 1919 (Paris edition). 

[48] In Germany. 

[49] General Pétain is said to have rejected the suggestion. 

[50] Cf. _Bulletin des Droits de l'Homme_, 19ème année, p. 461. 

[51] It was either Friday, the 4th, or Saturday, the 5th of July. 

[52] At the end of August, 1919. 

[53] One delegate from a poor and friendless country had to take themaps of a rival state and retouch them in accordance with theethnographical data, which he considered alone correct. 

[54] _L'Homme Enchatné_, December 14, 1914. 

[55] "With its causes and objects we have no concern. " Speech deliveredby Mr. Wilson before the League to Enforce Peace in Washington on May24, 1916. 

[56] The testimony of a leading French press organ is worth reproducinghere: "La situation du Président Wilson dans nos démocraties estmagnifique, souveraine et extrêmement périlleuse. On ne connaît pasd'hommes, dans les temps contemporains, ayant eu plus d'autorité et depuissance; la popularité lui a donné ce que le droit divin ne conféraitpas toujours aux monarques héréditaires. En revanche et par le fait duchoc en retour, sa responsabilité est supérieure à celle du prince leplus absolu. S'il réussit à organiser le monde d'après ses rêves, sagloire dominera les plus hautes gloires; mais il faut dire hardiment ques'il échouait il plongerait le monde dans un chaos dont le bolchevismerusse ne nous offre qu'une faible image; et sa responsabilité devant laconscience humaine dépasserait ce que peut supporter un simple mortel. Redoutable alternative!"--Cf. _Le Figaro_, February 10, 1919. 

[57] From Mr. Wilson's address to Congress read on December 2, 1918. Cf. _The Times_, December 4, 1918. 

[58] Cf. Secretary Lansing's evidence before the Senate ForeignRelations Committee, _The Chicago Tribune_, August 27, 1919. 

[59] _La Démocratie Nouvelle_, May 27, 1919

[60] _Le Figaro_, March 26, 1919. 

[61] Both of them occurred before the armistice, but during the war. 

[62] For the accuracy of this and the preceding story I vouchabsolutely. I have the names of persons, places, and authorities, whichare superfluous here. 

[63] The Kurds are members of the great Indo-European family to whichthe Greeks, Italians, Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Hindus, Persians, andAfghans belong, whereas the Turks are a branch of a wholly differentstock, the Ural-Altai group, of which the Mongols, Turks, Tartars, Finns, and Magyars are members. 

[64] April 16, 1919. 

[65] Madame N---- showed a friend of mine an autograph letter which sheclaims to have received from one of her clients, "a world's famous man. "I was several times invited to inspect it at the clairvoyante's abode, or at my own, if I preferred. 

[66] Articles on the subject appeared in the French press. To the bestof my recollection there was one in _Bonsoir_. 

[67] The American Red Cross buried sixteen hundred of them in August, 1919. _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 30, 1919. 

[68] The reply, of which I possess what was given to me as a copy, isdated Paris, January 9, 1919, and is in French. 

[69] Imagine, for instance, the condition of mind into which thefollowing day's work must have thrown the American statesman, beset ashe was with political worries of his own. The extract quoted is takenfrom _The Daily Mail_ of April 18, 1919 (Paris edition). 

President Wilson had a busy day yesterday, as the following list ofengagements shows: 11 A. M. Dr. Wellington Koo, to present the ChineseDelegation to the Peace Conference. 11. 10 A. M. Marquis de Vogué had adelegation of seven others, representing the Congrès Français, topresent their view as to the disposition of the left bank of the Rhine. 11. 30 A. M. Assyrian and Chaldean Delegation, with a message from theAssyrian-Chaldean nation. 11. 45 A. M. Dalmatian Delegation, to present tothe President the result of the plebiscite of that part of Dalmatiaoccupied by Italians. _Noon_. M. Bucquet, Chargé d'Affaires of SanMarino, to convey the action of the Grand Council of San Marino, conferring on the President Honorary Citizenship in the Republic of SanMarino. 12. 10 P. M. M. Colonder, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs. 12. 20P. M. Miss Rose Schneiderman and Miss Mary Anderson, delegates of theNational Women's Trade Union League of the United States. 12. 30 P. M. ThePatriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox Eastern Church. 12. 45 P. M. Essad Pasha, delegate of Albania, to present the claims ofAlbania. 1 P. M. M. M. L. Coromilas, Greek Minister at Rome, to pay hisrespects. _Luncheon_. Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary for War. 4 P. M. Mr. Herbert Hoover. 4. 15 P. M. M. Bratiano, of the Rumanian Delegation. 4. 30P. M. Dr. Affonso Costa, former Portuguese Minister, Portuguese Delegateto the Peace Conference. 4. 45 P. M. Boghos Nubar Pasha, president of theArmenian National Delegation, accompanied by M. A. Aharoman and ProfessorA. Der Hagopian, of Robert College. 5. 15 P. M. M. Pasitch, of the SerbianDelegation. 5. 30 P. M. Mr. Frank Walsh, of the Irish-American Delegation. 

IV

CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY

Never was political veracity in Europe at a lower ebb than during thePeace Conference. The blinding dust of half-truths cunningly mixed withfalsehood and deliberately scattered with a lavish hand, obscured thevision of the people, who were expected to adopt or acquiesce in thejudgments of their rulers on the various questions that arose. Four anda half years of continuous and deliberate lying for victory haddisembodied the spirit of veracity and good faith throughout the worldof politics. Facts were treated as plastic and capable of being shapedafter this fashion or that, according to the aim of the speaker orwriter. Promises were made, not because the things promised were seen tobe necessary or desirable, but merely in order to dispose the publicfavorably toward a policy or an expedient, or to create and maintain acertain frame of mind toward the enemies or the Allies. At elections andin parliamentary discourses, undertakings were given, some of which wereknown to be impossible of fulfilment. Thus the ministers in some of theAllied countries bound themselves to compel the Germans not only to payfull compensation for damage wantonly done, but also to defray theentire cost of the war. 

The notion that the enemy would thus make good all losses was manifestlypreposterous. In a century the debt could not be wiped out, even thoughthe Teutonic people could be got to work steadily and selflessly forthe purpose. For their productivity would be unavailing if theirvictorious adversaries were indisposed to admit the products to theirmarkets. And not only were the governments unwilling, but some of thepeoples announced their determination to boycott German wares on theirown initiative. None the less the nations were for months buoyed up withthe baleful delusion that all their war expenses would be refunded bythe enemy. [70]

It was not the governments only, however, who, after having for overfour years colored and refracted the truth, now continued to twist andinvent "facts. " The newspapers, with some honorable exceptions, buttressed them up and even outstripped them. Plausible unveracity thusbecame a patriotic accomplishment and a recognized element of politics. Parties and states employed it freely. Fiction received the hall-mark oftruth and fancies were current as facts. Public men who had solemnlyhazarded statements belied by subsequent events denied having everuttered them. Never before was the baleful theory that error is helpfulso systematically applied as during the war and the armistice. If thefalsehoods circulated and the true facts suppressed were to be collectedand published in a volume, one would realize the depth to which thestandard of intellectual and moral integrity was lowered. [71]

The censorship was retained by the Great Powers during the Conference asa sort of soft cushion on which the self-constituted dispensers of Fatecomfortably reposed. In Paris, where it was particularly severe andunreasoning, it protected the secret conclave from the harsh stricturesof the outside world, concealing from the public, not only theincongruities of the Conference, but also many of the warnings ofcontemporary history. In the opinion of unbiased Frenchmen no suchrigorous, systematic, and short-sighted repression of press liberty hadbeen known since the Third Empire as was kept up under the rule of thegreat tribune whose public career had been one continuous campaignagainst every form of coercion. This twofold policy of secrecy on thepart of the delegates and censorship on the part of the authoritiesproved incongruous as well as dangerous, for, upheld by the eminentstatesmen who had laid down as part of the new gospel the principle of"open covenants openly arrived at, " it furnished the world with a fairlycorrect standard by which to interpret the entire phraseology of thelatter-day reformers. Events showed that only by applying that criterioncould the worth of their statements of fact and their promises ofamelioration be gaged. And it soon became clear that most of theirutterances like that about open covenants were to be construed accordingto the maxim of _lucus a non lucendo_. 

It was characteristic of the system that two American citizens wereemployed to read the cablegrams arriving from the United States toFrench newspapers. The object was the suppression of such messages astended to throw doubt on the useful belief that the people of the greatAmerican Republic were solid behind their President, ready to approvehis decisions and acts, and that his cherished Covenant, sure ofratification, would serve as a safe guarantee to all the states whichthe application of his various principles might leave strategicallyexposed. In this way many interesting items of intelligence from theUnited States were kept out of the newspapers, while others weremutilated and almost all were delayed. Protests were unavailing. Nor wasit until several months were gone by that the French public became awareof the existence of a strong current of American opinion which favored acritical attitude toward Mr. Wilson's policy and justified misgivings asto the finality of his decisions. It was a sorry expedient and anunsuccessful one. 

On another occasion strenuous efforts are reported to have been madethrough the intermediary of President Wilson to delay the publication inthe United States of a cablegram to a journal there until the PrimeMinister of Britain should deliver a speech in the House of Commons. Anaccident balked these exertions and the message appeared. 

Publicity was none the less strongly advocated by the plenipotentiariesin their speeches and writings. These were as sign-posts pointing toroads along which they themselves were incapable of moving. By their ownaccounts they were inveterate enemies of secrecy and censorship. ThePresident of the United States had publicly said that he "could notconceive of anything more hurtful than the creation of a system ofcensorship that would deprive the people of a free republic such as oursof their undeniable right to criticize public officials. " M. Clemenceau, who suffered more than most publicists from systematic repression, hadchanged the name of his newspaper from the _L'Homme Libre_ to _L'HommeEnchaîné_, and had passed a severe judgment on "those friends ofliberty" (the government) who tempered freedom with preventiverepression measured out according to the mood uppermost at themoment. [72] But as soon as he himself became head of the government hechanged his tactics and called his journal _L'Homme Libre_ again. Inthe Chamber he announced that "publicity for the 'debates' of theConference was generally favored, " but in practice he rendered thesystem of gagging the press a byword in Europe. Drawing his own line ofdemarcation between the permissible and the illicit, he informed theChamber that so long as the Conference was engaged on its arduous work"it must not be said that the head of one government had put forward aproposal which was opposed by the head of another government. "[73] Asthough the disagreements, the bickerings, and the serious quarrels ofthe heads of the governments could long be concealed from the peopleswhose spokesmen they were!

That bargainings went on at the Conference which a plain-dealing worldought to be apprised of is the conclusion which every unbiased outsiderwill draw from the singular expedients resorted to for the purpose ofconcealing them. Before the Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, State-Secretary Lansing confessed that when, after the treaty had beensigned, the French Senate called for the minutes of the proceedings onthe Commission of the League of Nations, President Wilson telegraphedfrom Washington to the Peace Commission requesting it to withhold them. He further admitted that the only written report of the discussions inexistence was left in Paris, outside the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates Senate. When questioned as to whether, in view of this system ofconcealment, the President's promise of "open covenants openly arrivedat" could be said to have been honestly redeemed, Mr. Lansing answered, "I consider that was carried out. "[74] It seems highly probable that inthe same and only in the same sense will the Treaty and the Covenant becarried out in the spirit or the letter. 

During the fateful days of the Conference preventive censorship waspractised with a degree of rigor equaled only by its senselessness. Aslate as the month of June, the columns of the newspapers were checkeredwith blank spaces. "Scarcely a newspaper in Paris appears uncensored atpresent, " one press organ wrote. "Some papers protest, but protests arein vain. "[75]

"Practically not a word as to the nature of the Peace terms that Franceregards as most vital to her existence appears in the French papers thismorning, " complained a journal at the time when even the Germans werefully informed of what was being enacted. On one occasion _Bonsoir_ wasseized for expressing the view that the Treaty embodied an Anglo-Saxonpeace;[76] on another for reproducing an interview with Marshal Fochthat had already appeared in a widely circulated Paris newspaper. [77] Byway of justifying another of these seizures the French censor allegedthat an article in the paper was deemed uncomplimentary to Mr. LloydGeorge. The editor replied in a letter to the British Premier affirmingthat there was nothing in the article but what Mr. Lloyd George couldand should be proud of. In fact, it only commended him "for havingserved the interests of his country most admirably and having hadprecedence given to them over all others. " The letter concluded: "We areapprehensive that in the whole business there is but one thing trulyuncomplimentary, and that is that the French censorship, for the purposeof strangling the French press, should employ your name, the name of himwho abolished censorship many weeks ago. "[78]

Even when British journalists were dealing with matters as unlikely tocause trouble as a description of the historic proceedings at Versaillesat which the Germans received the Peace Treaty, the censor held backtheir messages, from five o'clock in the afternoon till three the nextmorning. [79] Strange though it may seem, it was at first decided that nonewspaper-men should be allowed to witness the formal handing of theTreaty to the enemy delegates! For it was deemed advisable in theinterests of the world that even that ceremonial should be secret. [80]These singular methods were impressively illustrated and summarized in acartoon representing Mr. Wilson as "The new wrestling champion, "throwing down his adversary, the press, whose garb, composed ofjournals, was being scattered in scraps of paper to the floor, and underthe picture was the legend: "It is forbidden to publish what MarshalFoch says. It is forbidden to publish what Mr. George thinks. It isforbidden to publish the Treaty of Peace with Germany. It is forbiddento publish what happened at . . . And to make sure that nothing else willbe published, the censor systematically delays the transmission of everytelegram. "[81]

In the Chamber the government was adjured to suppress the institution ofcensorship once the Treaty was signed by the Germans, and Ministers werereminded of the diatribes which they had pronounced against thatinstitution in the years of their ambitions and strivings. In vainDeputies described and deplored the process of demoralization that wasbeing furthered by the methods of the government. "In the provinces aswell as in the capital the journals that displease are seized, eavesdroppers listen to telephonic conversations, the secrets of privateletters are violated. Arrangements are made that certain telegrams shallarrive too late, and spies are delegated to the most private meetings. At a recent gathering of members of the National Press, two spies weresurprised, and another was discovered at the Federation of the RadicalCommittees of the Oise. "[82] But neither the signature of the Treaty norits ratification by Germany occasioned the slightest modification in thesystem of restrictions. Paris continued in a state of siege and thecensors were the busiest bureaucrats in the capital. 

One undesirable result of this régime of keeping the public in the darkand indoctrinating it in the views always narrow, and sometimesmischievous, which the authorities desired it to hold, was that theabsurdities which were allowed to appear with the hall-mark ofcensorship were often believed to emanate directly from the government. Britons and Americans versed in the books of the New Testament wereshocked or amused when told that the censor had allowed the followingpassage to appear in an eloquent speech delivered by the ex-Premier, M. Painlevé: "As Hall Caine, the great American poet, has put it, 'O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?'"[83]

Every conceivable precaution was taken against the leakage ofinformation respecting what was going on in the Council of Ten. Notwithstanding this, the French papers contrived now and again, duringthe first couple of months, to publish scraps of news calculated toconvey to the public a faint notion of the proceedings, until one day aNationalist organ boldly announced that the British Premier haddisagreed with the expert commission and with his own colleagues on thesubject of Dantzig and refused to give way. This paragraph irritated theBritish statesman, who made a scene at the next meeting of the Council. "There is, " he is reported to have exclaimed, "some one among us herewho is unmindful of his obligations, " and while uttering these and othermuch stronger words he eyed severely a certain mild individual who issaid to have trembled all over during the philippic. He also launchedout into a violent diatribe against various French journals which hadcriticized his views on Poland and his method of carrying them incouncil, and he went so far as to threaten to have the Conferencetransferred to a neutral country. In conclusion he demanded aninvestigation into the origin of the leakage of information and theadoption of severe disciplinary measures against the journalists whopublished the disclosures. [84] Thenceforward the Council of Ten wassuspended and its place taken by a smaller and more secret conclave ofFive, Four, or Three, according as the state of the plenipotentiaries'health, the requirements of their home politics, or their relationsamong themselves caused one or two to quit Paris temporarily. 

This measure insured relative secrecy, fostered rumors and gossip, andrendered criticism, whether helpful or captious, impossible. It alsodrove into outer darkness those Allied states whose interests weredescribed as limited, as though the interests of Italy, whose delegatewas nominally one of the privileged five, were not being treated as morelimited still. But the point of this last criticism would be blunted if, as some French and Italian observers alleged, the deliberate aim of the"representatives of the twelve million soldiers" was indeed to enablepeace to be concluded and the world resettled congruously with theconceptions and in harmony with the interests of the Anglo-Saxonpeoples. But the supposition is gratuitous. There was no such deliberateplan. After the establishment of the Council of Five, Mr. Lloyd Georgeand Mr. Wilson made short work of the reports of the expert commissionswhenever these put forward reasoned views differing from their own. In aword, they became the world's supreme and secret arbiters withoutceasing to be the official champions of the freedom of the lesser statesand of "open covenants openly arrived at. " They constituted, so to say, the living synthesis of contradictories. 

The Council of Five then was a superlatively secret body. No secretarieswere admitted to its gatherings and no official minutes of itsproceedings were recorded. Communications were never issued to thepress. It resembled a gang of benevolent conspirators, whose debates andresolutions were swallowed up by darkness and mystery. Even the mostmodest meeting of a provincial taxpayers' association keeps minutes ofits discussions. The world parliament kept none. Eschewing traditionalusages, as became naïve shapers of the new world, and ignoring history, the Five, Four, or Three shut themselves up in a room, talked informallyand disconnectedly without a common principle, program, or method, andseparated again without having reached a conclusion. It is said thatwhen one put forth an idea, another would comment upon it, a third mightdemur, and that sometimes an appeal would be made to geography, history, or ethnography, and as the data were not immediately accessible eithercompetent specialists were sent for or the conversation took anotherturn. They very naturally refused to allow these desultory proceedingsto be put on record, the only concession which they granted to thecuriosity of future generations being the fixation of their own physicalfeatures by photography and painting. When the sitting was over, therefore, no one could be held to aught that he had said; there wasnothing to bind any of the individual delegates to the views he hadexpressed, nor was there anything to mark the line to which the Councilas a whole had advanced. Each one was free to dictate to his secretaryhis recollections of what had gone on, but as these _précis_ were givenfrom memory they necessarily differed one from the other on variousimportant points. On the following morning, or a few days later, theworld's workers would meet again, and either begin at the beginning, traveling over the same familiar field, or else break fresh ground. Inthis way in one day they are said to have skimmed the problems ofSpitzbergen, Morocco, Dantzig, and the feeding of the enemy populations, leaving each problem where they had found it. The moment the discussionof a contentious question approached a climax, the specter ofdisagreement deterred them from pursuing it to a conclusion, and theypassed on quickly to some other question. And when, after months hadbeen spent in these Penelopean labors, definite decisions respecting thepeace had to be taken lest the impatient people should rise up and wrestmatters into their own hands, the delegates referred the variousproblems which they had been unable to solve to the wisdom and tact ofthe future League of Nations. 

When misunderstandings arose as to what had been said or done it was theofficial translator, M. Paul Mantoux--one of the most brilliantrepresentatives of Jewry at the Conference--who was wont to decide, hismemory being reputed superlatively tenacious. In this way he attainedthe distinction of which his friends are justly proud, of being a livingrecord--indeed, the sole available record--of what went on at thehistoric council. He was the recipient and is now the only repository ofall the secrets of which the plenipotentiaries were so jealous, lest, being a kind of knowledge which is in verity power, it should be usedone day for some dubious purpose. But M. Mantoux enjoyed the esteem andconfidence not only of Mr. Wilson, but also of the British PrimeMinister, who, it was generally believed, drew from his entertainingnarratives and shrewd appreciations whatever information he possessedabout French politics and politicians. It was currently affirmed that, being a man of method and foresight, M. Mantoux committed everything towriting for his own behoof. Doubts, however, were entertained andpublicly expressed as to whether affairs of this magnitude, involvingthe destinies of the world, should have been handled in such secret andunbusiness-like fashion. But on the supposition that the generaloutcome, if not the preconceived aim, of the policy of the Anglo-Saxonplenipotentiaries was to confer the beneficent hegemony of the worldupon its peoples, there could, it was argued, be no real danger in theprocedure followed. For, united, those nations have nothing to fear. 

Although the translations were done rapidly, elegantly, and lucidly, allegations were made that they lost somewhat by undue compression andeven by the process of toning down, of which the praiseworthy object wasto spare delicate susceptibilities. For a limited number of delicatesusceptibilities were treated considerately by the Conference. Adefective rendering made a curious impression on the hearers once, whena delegate said: "My country, unfortunately, is situated in the midst ofstates which are anything but peace-loving--in fact, the chief danger tothe peace of Europe emanates from them. " M. Mantoux's translation ran, "The country represented by M. X. Unhappily presents the greatest dangerto the peace of Europe. "

On several occasions passages of the discourses of the plenipotentiariesunderwent a certain transformation in the well-informed brain of M. Mantoux before being done into another language. They were plunged, soto say, in the stream of history before their exposure to the light ofday. This was especially the case with the remarks of theEnglish-speaking delegates, some of whom were wont to make extensive useof the license taken by their great national poet in matters ofgeography and history. One of them, for example, when alluding to theex-Emperor Franz Josef and his successor, said: "It would be unjust tovisit the sins of the father on the head of his innocent son. Charles Ishould not be made to suffer for Franz Josef. " M. Mantoux rendered thesentence, "It would be unjust to visit the sins of the uncle on theinnocent nephew, " and M. Clemenceau, with a merry twinkle in his eye, remarked to the ready interpreter, "You will lose your job if you go onmaking these wrong translations. "

But those details are interesting, if at all, only as means of eking outa mere sketch which can never become a complete and faithful picture. Itwas the desire of the eminent lawgivers that the source of the mostbeneficent reforms chronicled in history should be as well hidden asthose of the greatest boon bestowed by Providence upon man. And theirmotives appear to have been sound enough. 

The pains thus taken to create a haze between themselves and the peopleswhose implicit confidence they were continuously craving constitute oneof the most striking ethico-psychological phenomena of the Conference. They demanded unreasoning faith as well as blind obedience. Anystatement, however startling, was expected to carry conviction once itbore the official hall-mark. Take, for example, the demand made by theSupreme Four to Bela Kuhn to desist from his offensive against theSlovaks. The press expressed surprise and disappointment that he, aBolshevist, should have been invited even hypothetically by the "deadlyenemies of Bolshevism" to delegate representatives to the ParisConference from which the leaders of the Russian constructive elementswere excluded. Thereupon the Supreme Four, which had taken the step insecret, had it denied categorically that such an invitation had beenissued. The press was put up to state that, far from making such anundignified advance, the Council had asserted its authority andperemptorily summoned the misdemeanant Kuhn to withdraw his troopsimmediately from Slovakia under heavy pains and penalties. 

Subsequently, however, the official correspondence was published, whenit was seen that the implicit invitation had really been issued and thatthe denial ran directly counter to fact. By this exposure the Council ofFour, which still sued for the full confidence of their peoples, wassomewhat embarrassed. This embarrassment was not allayed when whatpurported to be a correct explanation of their action was given out andprivately circulated by a group which claimed to be initiated. It wassummarized as follows: "The Israelite, Bela Kuhn, who is leading Hungaryto destruction, has been heartened by the Supreme Council's indulgentmessage. People are at a loss to understand why, if the Conferencebelieves, as it has asserted, that Bolshevism is the greatest scourge oflatter-day humanity, it ordered the Rumanian troops, when nearingBudapest for the purpose of overthrowing it in that stronghold, first tohalt, and then to withdraw. [85] The clue to the mystery has at last beenfound in a secret arrangement between Kuhn and a certain financial groupconcerning the Banat. About this more will be said later. In one of myown cablegrams to the United States I wrote: "People are everywheremurmuring and whispering that beneath the surface of things powerfulundercurrents are flowing which invisibly sway the policy of the secretcouncil, and the public believes that this accounts for the sinistervacillation and delay of which it complains. "[86]

In the fragmentary utterances of the governments and their press organsnobody placed the slightest confidence. Their testimony was discreditedin advance, on grounds which they were unable to weaken. The followingexample is at once amusing and instructive. The French ParliamentaryCommittee of the Budget, having asked the government for communicationof the section of the Peace Treaty dealing with finances, were told thattheir demand could not be entertained, every clause of the Treaty beinga state secret. The Committee on Foreign Affairs made a like request, with the same results. The entire Chamber next expressed a similar wish, which elicited a firm refusal. The French Premier, it should be added, alleged a reason which was at least specious. "I should much like, " hesaid, "to communicate to you the text you ask for, but I may not do sountil it has been signed by the President of the Republic. For such isthe law as embodied in Article 8 of the Constitution. " Now nobodybelieved that this was the true ground for his refusal. His explanation, however, was construed as a courteous conventionality, and as such wasaccepted. But once alleged, the fiction should have been respected, atany rate by its authors. It was not. A few weeks later the Premierordered the publication of the text of the Treaty, although, in themeantime, it had not been signed by M. Poincaré. "The excuse foundedupon Article 8 was, therefore, a mere humbug, " flippantly wrote aninfluential journal. [87]

An amusing joke, which tickled all Paris was perpetrated shortlyafterward. The editor of the _Bonsoir_ imported six hundred copies ofthe forbidden Treaty from Switzerland, and sent them as a present tothe Deputies of the Chamber, whereupon the parliamentary authoritiesposted up a notice informing all Deputies who desired a copy to call atthe questor's office, where they would receive it gratuitously as apresent from the _Bonsoir. _ Accordingly the Deputies, including theSpeaker, Deschanel, thronged to the questor's office. Even solemn-facedMinisters received a copy of the thick volume which I possessed eversince the day it was issued. 

Another glaring instance of the lack of straightforwardness whichvitiated the dealings of the Conference with the public turned upon theBullitt mission to Russia. Mr. Wilson, who in the depths of his heartseems to have cherished a vague fondness for the Bolshevists there, which he sometimes manifested in utterances that startled the foreignersto whom they were addressed, despatched through Colonel House somefellow-countrymen of his to Moscow to ask for peace proposals which, according to the Moscow government, were drafted by himself and Messrs. House and Lansing. Mr. Bullitt, however, who must know, affirms that thedraft was written by Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, Mr. Philip Kerr, andhimself and presented to Lenin by Messrs. Bullitt, Steffins, and Petit. If the terms of this document should prove acceptable the Americanenvoys were empowered to promise that an official invitation to a newpeace conference would be sent to them as well as to their opponents byApril 15th. The conditions--eleven in number--with a few slightmodifications in which the Americans acquiesced--were accepted by thedictator, who was bound, however, not to permit their publication. Thefacts remained secret until Mr. Bullitt, thrown over by Mr. Wilson, whorecoiled from taking the final and decisive step, resigned, and in aletter reproduced by the press set forth the reasons for hisdecision. [88]

Now, vague reports that there was such a mission had found its way intothe Paris newspapers at a relatively early date. But an authoritativedenial was published without delay. The statement, the public wasassured, was without foundation. And the public believed the assurance, for it was confirmed authoritatively in England. Sir Samuel Hoare, inthe House of Commons, asked for information about a report that "twoAmericans have recently returned from Russia bringing offers of peacefrom Lenin, " and received from Mr. Bonar Law this noteworthy reply: "Ihave said already that there is not the shadow of foundation for thisinformation, otherwise I would have known it. Moreover, I havecommunicated with Mr. Lloyd George in Paris, who also declares that heknows nothing about the matter. "[89] _E pur si muove_. Mr. Lloyd Georgeknew nothing about President Wilson's determination to have the Covenantinserted in the Peace Treaty, even after the announcement was publishedto the world by the Havas Agency, and the confirmation given to pressmenby Lord Robert Cecil. The system of reticence and concealment, coupledwith the indifference of this or that delegation to questions in whichit happened to take no special interest, led to these unseemly air-tightcompartments. 

From this rank soil of secrecy, repression, and unveracity sprangnoxious weeds. False reports and mendacious insinuations were launched, spread, and credited, impairing such prestige as the Conference stillenjoyed, while the fragmentary announcements ventured on now and againby the delegates, in sheer self-defense, were summarily dismissed as"eye-wash" for the public. 

For a time the disharmony between words and deeds passed unnoticed bythe bulk of the masses, who were edified by the one and unacquaintedwith the other. But gradually the lack of consistency in policy and ofmanly straightforwardness and moral wholeness in method became apparentto all and produced untoward consequences. Mr. Wilson, whose authorityand influence were supposed to be paramount, came in for the lion'sshare of criticism, except in the Polish policy of the Conference, whichwas traced to Mr. Lloyd George and his unofficial prompters. TheAmerican press was the most censorious of all. One American journalappearing in Paris gave utterance to the following comments on thePresident's rôle:[90]

 President Wilson is conscious of his power of persuasion. That power enables him to say one thing, do another, describe the act as conforming to the idea, and, with act and idea in exact contradiction to each other, convince the people, not only that he has been consistent throughout, but that his act cannot be altered without peril to the nation and danger to the world. 

 We do not know which Mr. Wilson to follow--the Mr. Wilson who says he will not do a thing or the Mr. Wilson who does that precise thing. 

 A great many Americans have one fixed idea. That idea is that the President is the only magnanimous, clear-visioned, broad-minded statesman in the United States, or the entire world, for that matter. 

 When he uses his powers of persuasion Americans become as the children of Hamelin Town. Inasmuch as Mr. Wilson of the word and Mr. Wilson of the deed seem at times to be two distinct identities, some of his most enthusiastic supporters for the League of Nations, being unfortunately gifted with memory and perception, are fairly standing on their heads in dismay. 

And yet Mr. Wilson himself was a victim of the policy of reticence andconcealment to which the Great Powers were incurably addicted. At thetime when they were moving heaven and earth to induce him to break withGermany and enter the war, they withheld from him the existence of theirsecret treaties. Possibly it may not be thought fair to apply the testof ethical fastidiousness to their method of bringing the United Statesto their side and to their unwillingness to run the risk of alienatingthe President. But it appears that until the close of hostility thesecret was kept inviolate, nor was it until Mr. Wilson reached theshores of Europe for the purpose of executing his project that he wasfaced with the huge obstacles to his scheme arising out of thosefar-reaching commitments. With this depressing revelation and theBritish _non possumus_ to his demand for the freedom of the seas, Mr. Wilson's practical difficulties began. It was probably on that occasionthat he resolved, seeing that he could not obtain everything he wanted, to content himself with the best he could get. And that was not asociety of peoples, but a rough approximation to the hegemony of theAnglo-Saxon nations. 

FOOTNOTES:

[70] The French Minister of Finances made this the cornerstone of hispolicy and declared that the indemnity to be paid by the vanquishedTeutons would enable him to set the finances of France on a permanentlysound basis. In view of this expectation new taxation was eschewed. 

[71] A selection of the untruths published in the French press duringthe war has been reproduced by the Paris journal, _Bonsoir_. It containsabundant pabulum for the cynic and valuable data for the psychologist. The example might be followed in Great Britain. The title is:"Anthologie du Bourrage de Crâne. " It began in the month of July, 1919. 

[72] Cf. _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), June 2, 1919. 

[73] Cf. _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), January 17, 1919. 

[74] Cf. _The Chicago Tribune_, August 27, 1919. 

[75] Cf. _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), June 10, 1919. 

[76] Cf. _Bonsoir_, June 20, 1919. 

[77] On April 27th. 

[78] _Bonsoir_, June 21, 1919. 

[79] _The New York Herald_, May 15. 1919. 

[80] _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), May 3, 1919. 

[81] _The New York Herald_, June 6, 1919. 

[82] Cf. _Le Matin_, July 9, 1919. The chief speakers alluded to wereMM. Renaudel, Deshayes, Lafont, Paul Meunier, Vandame. 

[83] _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), April 29, 1919. 

[84] Quoted in the Paris _Temps_ of March 28, 1919. 

[85] This explanation deals exclusively with the first advance of theRumanian army into Hungary. 

[86] Cabled to _The Public Ledger_ of Philadelphia, April 20, 1919. 

[87] _Bonsoir_, June 21, 1919. 

[88] Cf. _The Daily News_, July 5, 1919. _L'Humanité_, July 8, 1919. 

[89] Cf. _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), April 4, 1919. 

[90] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), July 31, 1919. 

V

AIMS AND METHODS

The policy of the Anglo-Saxon plenipotentiaries was never put intowords. For that reason it has to be judged by their acts, despite thecircumstance that these were determined by motives which varied greatlyat different times, and so far as one can conjecture were not oftenpractical corollaries of fundamental principles. From these acts one maydraw a few conclusions which will enable us to reconstruct such policyas there was. One is that none of the sacrifices imposed upon themembers of the League of Nations was obligatory on the Anglo-Saxonpeoples. These were beyond the reach of all the new canons which mightclash with their interests or run counter to their aspirations. Theywere the givers and administrators of the saving law rather than itsobservers. Consequently they were free to hold all that was theirs, however doubtful their title; nay, they were besought to accept a gooddeal more under the mandatory system, which was molded on their ownmethods of governance. It was especially taken for granted that thearchitects would be called to contribute naught to the new structure buttheir ideas, and that they need renounce none of their possessions, however shady its origin, however galling to the population itsretention. It was in deference to this implicit doctrine that PresidentWilson withdrew without protest or discussion his demand for the freedomof the seas, on which he had been wont to lay such stress. 

Another way of putting the matter is this. The principal aim of theConference was to create conditions favorable to the progress ofcivilization on new lines. And the seed-bearers of true, asdistinguished from spurious, civilization and culture being theAnglo-Saxons, it is the realization of their broad conceptions, thefurtherance of their beneficent strivings, that are most conducive tothat ulterior aim. The men of this race in the widest sense of the termare, therefore, so to say, independent ends in themselves, whereas theother peoples are to be utilized as means. Hence the difference oftreatment meted out to the two categories. In the latter were implicitlyincluded Italy and Russia. Unquestionably the influence ofAnglo-Saxondom is eminently beneficial. It tends to bring the rights andthe dignity as well as the duties of humanity into broad day. Thefarther it extends by natural growth, therefore, the better for thehuman race. The Anglo-Saxon mode of administering colonies, forinstance, is exemplary, and for this reason was deemed worthy to receivethe hall-mark of the Conference as one of the institutions of the futureLeague. But even benefits may be transformed into evils if imposed byforce. 

That, in brief, would seem to be the clue--one can hardly speak of anysystematic conception--to the unordered improvisations and incongruousdecisions of the Conference. 

I am not now concerned to discuss whether this unformulated maxim, whichhad strong roots that may not always have reached the realm ofconsciousness, calls for approval as an instrument of ethico-politicalprogress or connotes an impoverishment of the aims originally propoundedby Mr. Wilson. Excellent reasons may be assigned why the twoEnglish-speaking statesmen proceeded without deliberation on these linesand no other. The matter might have been raised to a higher plane, butfor that the delegates were not prepared. All that one need retain atpresent is the orientation of the Supreme Council, inasmuch as itimparts a sort of relative unity to seemingly heterogeneous acts. Thus, although the conditions of the Peace Treaty in many respects randirectly counter to the provisions of the Covenant, none the less theultimate tendency of both was to converge in a distant point, which, when clearly discerned, will turn out to be the moral guidance of theworld by Anglo-Saxondom as represented at any rate in the incipientstage by both its branches. Thus the discussions among the members ofthe Conference were in last analysis not contests about mereabstractions. Beneath the high-sounding principles and far-resonantreforms which were propounded but not realized lurked concrete racialstrivings which a patriotic temper and robust faith might easilyidentify with the highest interests of humanity. 

When the future historian defines, as he probably will, the main resultof the Conference's labors as a tendency to place the spiritual andpolitical direction of the world in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon race, it is essential to a correct view of things that he should not regardthis trend as the outcome of a deliberate concerted policy. It wasanything but this. Nobody who conversed with the statesmen before andduring the Conference could detect any sure tokens of such ultimateaims, nor, indeed, of a thorough understanding of the lesser problems tobe settled. Circumstance led, and the statesmen followed. The historianmay term the process drift, and the humanitarian regret that suchmomentous issues should ever have been submitted to a body of uninformedpoliticians out of touch with the people for whose behoof they claimedto be legislating. To liquidate the war should have been the first, asit was the most urgent, task. But it was complicated, adjourned, andfinally botched by interweaving it with a mutilated scheme for thecomplete readjustment of the politico-social forces of the planet. Theresult was a tangled skein of problems, most of them still unsolved, andsome insoluble by governments alone. Out of the confusion of clashingforces towered aloft the two dominant Powers who command the economicresources of the world, and whose democratic institutions and internalordering are unquestionably more conducive to the large humanitarian endthan those of any other, and gradually their overlordship of the worldbegan to assert itself. But this tendency was not the outcome ofdeliberate endeavor. Each representative of those vast states wassolicitous in the first place about the future of his own country, andthen about the regeneration of the human race. One would like to be ableto add that all were wholly inaccessible to the promptings of partyinterests and personal ambitions. 

Planlessness naturally characterized the exertions of the Anglo-Saxondelegates from start to finish. It is a racial trait. Their hosts, whowere experts in the traditions of diplomacy, had before the opening ofthe Conference prepared a plan for their behoof, which at the lowestestimate would have connoted a vast improvement on their own desultoryway of proceeding. The French proposed to distribute all the preparatorywork among eighteen commissions, leaving to the chief plenipotentiariesthe requisite time to arrange preliminaries and become acquainted withthe essential elements of the problems. But Messrs. Wilson and LloydGeorge are said to have preferred their informal conversations, involving the loss of three and a half months, during which no resultswere reached in Paris, while turmoil, bloodshed, and hunger fed thesmoldering fires of discontent throughout the World. 

The British Premier, like his French colleague, was solicitous chieflyabout making peace with the enemy and redeeming as far as possible hiselection pledges to his supporters. To that end everything else wouldappear to have been subordinated. To the ambitious project of a worldreform he and M. Clemenceau gave what was currently construed as anominal assent, but for a long time they had no inkling of Mr. Wilson'sintention to interweave the peace conditions with the Covenant. So far, indeed, were they both from entertaining the notion that the twoPremiers expressly denied--and allowed their denial to be circulated inthe press--that the two documents were or could be made mutuallyinterdependent. M. Pichon assured a group of journalists that no suchintention was harbored. [91] Mr. Lloyd George is understood to have gonefarther and to have asked what degree of relevancy a Covenant for themembers of the League could be supposed to possess to a treaty concludedwith a nation which for the time being was denied admission to thatsodality. And as we saw, he was incurious enough not to read thenarrative of what had been done by his own American colleagues evenafter the Havas Agency announced it. 

To President Wilson, on the other hand, the League was the _magnum opus_of his life. It was to be the crown of his political career, to mark theattainment of an end toward which all that was best in the human racehad for centuries been consciously or unconsciously wending withoutmoving perceptibly nearer. Instinctively he must have felt that theLaodicean support given to him by his colleagues would not carry himmuch farther and that their fervor would speedily evaporate once theConference broke up and their own special aims were definitely achievedor missed. With the shrewdness of an experienced politician he graspedthe fact that if he was ever to present his Covenant to the worldclothed with the authority of the mightiest states, now was hisopportunity. After the Conference it would be too late. And the onlycontrivance by which he could surely reckon on success was to insert theCovenant in the Peace Treaty and set before his colleagues anirresistible incentive for elaborating both at the same time. 

He had an additional motive for these tactics in the attitude of asection of his own countrymen. Before starting for Paris he had, as wesaw, made an appeal to the electorate to return to the legislature onlycandidates of his own party to the exclusion of Republicans, and theresult fell out contrary to his expectations. Thereupon the oppositionalelements increased in numbers and displayed a marked combativedisposition. Even moderate Republicans complained in terms akin to thoseemployed by ex-President Taft of Mr. Wilson's "partizan exclusion ofRepublicans in dealing with the highly important matter of settling theresults of the war. He solicited a commission in which the Republicanshad no representation and in which there were no prominent Americans ofany real experience and leadership of public opinion. "[92]

The leaders of this opposition sharply watched the policy of thePresident at the Conference and made no secret of their resolve toutilize any serious slip as a handle for revising or rejecting theoutcome of his labors. Seeing his cherished cause thus trembling in thescale, Mr. Wilson hit upon the expedient of linking the Covenant withthe Peace Treaty and making of the two an inseparable whole. Heannounced this determination in a forcible speech[93] to his owncountrymen, in which he said, "When the Treaty comes back, gentlemen onthis side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads ofthe Treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenantfrom the Treaty without destroying the whole vital structure. " Thisscheme was denounced by Mr. Wilson's opponents as a trick, but thehistorian will remember it as a maneuver, which, however blameless ormeritorious its motive, was fraught with lamentable consequences for allthe peoples for whose interests the President was sincerely solicitous. To take but one example. The misgivings generated by the Covenantdelayed the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the United StatesSenate, in consequence of which the Turkish problem had to be postponeduntil the Washington government was authorized to accept or compelled torefuse a mandate for the Sultan's dominions, and in the meanwhile massmassacres of Greeks and Armenians were organized anew. 

A large section of the press and the majority of the delegates stronglycondemned the interpolation of the Covenant. What they demanded wasfirst the conclusion of a solid peace and then the establishment ofsuitable international safeguards. For to be safeguarded, peace mustfirst exist. "A suit of armor without the warrior inside is but auseless ornament, " wrote one of the American journals. [94]

But the course advocated by Mr. Wilson was open to another direct andtelling objection. Peace between the belligerent adversaries was, in thecircumstances, conceivable only on the old lines of strategic frontiersand military guaranties. The Supreme Council implied as much in itsofficial reply to the criticisms offered by the Austrians to theconditions imposed on them, making the admission that Italy's newnorthern frontiers were determined by considerations of strategy. Theplan for the governance of the world by a league of pacific peoples, onthe other hand, postulated the abolition of war preparations, includingstrategic frontiers. Consequently the more satisfactory the Treaty themore unfavorable would be the outlook for the moral reconstitution ofthe family of nations, and _vice versa_. And to interlace the two wouldbe to necessitate a compromise which would necessarily mar both. 

In effect the split among the delegates respecting their aims andinterests led to a tacit understanding among the leaders on the basis ofgive-and-take, the French and British acquiescing in Mr. Wilson'smeasures for working out his Covenant--the draft of which wascontributed by the British--and the President, giving way to them onmatters said to affect their countries' vital interests. How smoothlythis method worked when great issues were not at stake may be inferredfrom the perfunctory way in which it was decided that the Kaiser's trialshould take place in London. A few days before the Treaty was signedthere was a pause in the proceedings of the Supreme Council during whichthe secretary was searching for a mislaid document. Mr. Lloyd George, looking up casually and without addressing any one in particular, remarked, "I suppose none of you has any objection to the Kaiser beingtried in London?" M. Clemenceau shrugged his shoulders, Mr. Wilsonraised his hand, and the matter was assumed to be settled. Nothing morewas said or written on the subject. But when the news was announced, after the President's departure from France, it took the other Americandelegates by surprise and they disclaimed all knowledge of any suchdecision. On inquiry, however, they learned that the venue had in truthbeen fixed in this offhand way. [95]

Mr. Wilson found it a hard task at first to obtain acceptance for hisill-defined tenets by France, who declined to accept the protection ofhis League of Nations in lieu of strategic frontiers and militaryguaranties. Insurmountable obstacles barred his way. The Frenchgovernment and people, while moved by decent respect for their Americanbenefactors[96] to assent to the establishment of a league, flatlyrefused to trust themselves to its protection against Teuton aggression. But they were quite prepared to second Mr. Wilson's endeavors to obligesome of the other states to content themselves with the guaranties itoffered, only, however, on condition that their own country was firstsafeguarded in the traditional way. Territorial equilibrium and militaryprotection were the imperative provisos on which they insisted. And asFrance was specially favored by Mr. Wilson on sentimental grounds whichoutweighed his doctrine, and as she was also considered indispensable tothe Anglo-Saxon peoples as their continental executive, she had nodifficulty in securing their support. On this point, too, therefore, thePresident found himself constrained to give way. And only did he abandonhis humanitarian intentions and his strongest arguments to be lightlybrushed aside, he actually recoiled so far into the camp of hisopponents that he gave his approval to an indefensible clause in theTreaty which would have handed over to France the German population ofthe Saar as the equivalent of a certain sum in gold. Coming from theworld-reformer who, a short time before, had hurled the thunderbolts ofhis oratory against those who would barter human beings as chattels, this amazing compromise connoted a strange falling off. Incidentally itwas destructive of all faith in the spirit that had actuated hisworld-crusade. It also went far to convince unbiased observers that theonly framework of ideas with decisive reference to which Mr. Wilsonconsidered every project and every objection as it arose, was that whichcentered round his own goal--the establishment, if not of a league ofnations cemented by brotherhood and fellowship, at least of the nearestapproach to that which he could secure, even though it fell far short ofthe original design. These were the first-fruits of the interweaving ofthe Covenant with the Treaty. 

In view of this readiness to split differences and sacrifice principlesto expediency it became impossible even to the least observant of Mr. Wilson's adherents in the Old World to cling any longer to the beliefthat his cosmic policy was inspired by firm intellectual attachment tothe sublime ideas of which he had made himself the eloquent exponent andhad been expected to make himself the uncompromising champion. In everysuch surrender to the Great Powers, as in every stern enforcement of hisprinciples on the lesser states, the same practical spirit of theprofessional politician visibly asserted itself. One can hardly acquithim of having lacked the moral courage to disregard the veto ofinterested statesmen and governments and to appeal directly to thepeoples when the consequence of this attitude would have been thesacrifice of the makeshift of a Covenant which he was ultimately contentto accept as a substitute for the complete reinstatement of nations intheir rights and dignity. 

The general tendency of the labors of the Conference then was shaped bythose two practical maxims, the immunity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples andof their French ally from the restrictions to be imposed by the newpolitico-social ordering in so far as these ran counter to theirnational interests, and the determination of the American President toget and accept such a league of nations as was feasible under extremelyinauspicious conditions and to content himself with that. 

To this estimate exception may be taken on the ground that it underratesan effort which, however insufficient, was well meant and did at anyrate point the way to a just resettlement of secular problems which thewar had made pressing and that it fails to take account of theformidable obstacles encountered. The answer is, that like efforts hadproceeded more than once before from rulers of men whose will, seeingthat they were credited with possessing the requisite power, was assumedto be adequate to the accomplishment of their aim, and that they had ledto nothing. The two Tsars, Alexander I at the Congress of Vienna, andNicholas II at the first Conference of The Hague, are instructiveinstances. They also, like Mr. Wilson, it is assumed, would fain haveinaugurated a golden age of international right and moral fellowship ifverbal exhortations and arguments could have done it. The only kind offresh attempt, which after the failure of those two experiments couldfairly lay claim to universal sympathy, was one which should withdrawthe proposed politico-social rearrangement from the domain alike ofrhetoric and of empiricism and substitute a thorough systematic reformcovering all the aspects of international intercourse, including all thecivilized peoples on the globe, harmonizing the vital interests of theseand setting up adequate machinery to deal with the needs of thisenlarged and unified state system. And it would be fruitless to seek forthis in Mr. Wilson's handiwork. Indeed, it is hardly too much to affirmthat empiricism and opportunism were among the principal characteristicsof his policy in Paris, and that the outcome was what it must be. 

Disputes and delays being inevitable, the Conference began its work atleisure and was forced to terminate it in hot haste. Having spent monthschaffering, making compromises, and unmaking them again while thepeoples of the world were kept in painful suspense, all of themcondemned to incur ruinous expenditure and some to wage sanguinary wars, the springs of industrial and commercial activity being kept sealed, thedelegates, menaced by outbreaks, revolts, and mutinies, began, aftermonths had been wasted, to speed up and get through their work withoutadequate deliberation. They imagined that they could make up for theerrors of hesitancy and ignorance by moments of lightning-likeimprovisation. Improvisation and haphazard conclusions were among theirchronic failings. Even in the early days of the Conference they hadpromulgated decisions, the import and bearings of which they missed, andwhen possible they canceled them again. Sometimes, however, the errorcommitted was irreparable. The fate reserved for Austria was a case inpoint. By some curious process of reasoning it was found to be notincompatible with the Wilsonian doctrine that German-Austria should beforbidden to throw in her lot with the German Republic, this prohibitionbeing in the interest of France, who could not brook a powerful unitedTeuton state. The wishes of the Austrian-Germans and the principle ofself-determination accordingly went for nothing. The representations ofItaly, who pleaded for that principle, were likewise brushed aside. 

But what the delegates appear to have overlooked was the decisivecircumstance that they had already "on strategic grounds" assigned theBrenner line to Italy and together with it two hundred and twentythousand Tyrolese of German race living in a compact mass--although amuch smaller alien element was deemed a bar to annexation in the case ofPoland. And what was more to the point, this allotment deprived Tyrol ofan independent economic existence, cutting it off from the southernvalley and making it tributary to Bavaria. Mr. Wilson, the public wascredibly informed, "took this grave decision without having gone deeplyinto the matter, and he repents it bitterly. None the less, he can nolonger go back. "[97]

Just as Tyrol's loss of Botzen and Meran made it dependent on Bavaria, so the severance of Vienna from southern Moravia--- the source of itscereal supplies, situated at a distance of only thirty-sixmiles--transformed the Austrian capital into a head without a body. Buton the eminent anatomists who were to perform a variety of unprecedentedoperations on other states, this spectacle had no deterrent effect. 

Whenever a topic came up for discussion which could not be solvedoffhand, it was referred to a commission, and in many cases thecommission was assisted by a mission which proceeded to the countryconcerned and within a few weeks returned with data which were assumedto supply materials enough for a decision, even though most of itsmembers were unacquainted with the language of the people whosecondition they had been studying. How quick of apprehension these envoyswere supposed to be may be inferred from the task with which theAmerican mission under General Harbord was charged, and the space oftime accorded him for achieving it. The members of this mission startedfrom Brest in the last decade of August for the Caucasus, making a stayat Constantinople on the way, and were due back in Paris early inOctober. During the few intervening weeks "the mission, " General Harbordsaid, "will go into every phase of the situation, political, racial, economic, financial, and commercial. I shall also investigate highways, harbors, agricultural and mining conditions, the question of raising anArmenian army, policing problems, and the raw materials of Armenia. "[98]Only specialists who have some practical acquaintanceship with theCaucasus, its conditions, peoples, languages, and problems, canappreciate the herculean effort needed to tackle intelligently any oneof the many subjects all of which this improvised commission under amilitary general undertook to master in four weeks. Never was a chaoticworld set right and reformed at such a bewildering pace. 

Bad blood was caused by the distribution of places on the variouscommissions. The delegates of the lesser nations, deeming themselvesbadly treated, protested vehemently, and for a time passion ran high. Squabbles of this nature, intensified by fierce discussions within theCouncil, tidings of which reached the ears of the public outside, disheartened those who were anxious for the speedy restoration of normalconditions in a world that was fast decomposing. But the optimism of thethree principal plenipotentiaries was beyond the reach of the mostdepressing stumbles and reverses. Their buoyant temper may be gaged fromMr. Balfour's words, reported in the press: "It is true that there is agood deal of discussion going on, but there is no real discord aboutideas or facts. We are agreed on the principal questions and there onlyremains to find the words that embody the agreements. "[99] These tidingswere welcomed at the time, because whatever defects were ascribed to thedistinguished statesmen of the Conference by faultfinders, a lack ofwords was assuredly not among them. This cheery outlook on the futurereminded me of the better grounded composure of Pope Pius IX during thestormy proceedings at the Vatican Council. A layman, having expressedhis disquietude at the unruly behavior of the prelates, the Pontiffreplied that it had ever been thus at ecclesiastical councils. "At theoutset, " he went on to explain, "the members behave as men, wrangle andquarrel, and nothing that they say or do is worth much. That is thefirst act. The second is ushered in by the devil, who intensifies thedisorder and muddles things bewilderingly. But happily there is always athird act in which the Holy Ghost descends and arranges everything forthe best. "

The first two phases of the Conference's proceedings bore a strongresemblance to the Pope's description, but as, unlike ecclesiasticalcouncils, it had no claim to infallibility, and therefore no third act, the consequences to the world were deplorable. The Supreme Council neverknew how to deal with an emergency and every week unexpected incidentsin the world outside were calling for prompt action. Frequently itcontradicted itself within the span of a few days, and sometimes at oneand the same time its principal representatives found themselves incomplete opposition to one another. To give but one example: In April M. Clemenceau was asked whether he approved the project of relievingfamine-stricken Russia. His answer was affirmative, and he signed thedocument authorizing it. His colleagues, Messrs. Wilson, Lloyd George, and Orlando, followed suit, and the matter seemed to be settleddefinitely. But at the same time Mr. Hoover, who had been the ardentadvocate of the plan, officially received a letter from the FrenchMinister of Foreign Affairs signifying the refusal of the Frenchgovernment to acquiesce in it. [100] On another occasion[101] the SupremeCouncil thought fit to despatch a mission to Asia Minor in order toascertain the views of the populations of Syria and Mesopotamia on therégime best suited to them. France, whose secular relations with Syria, where she maintains admirable educational establishments, are said tohave endeared her to the population, objected to this expedient assuperfluous and mischievous. Superfluous because the Francophilsentiments of the people are supposed to be beyond all doubt, andmischievous because plebiscites or substitutes for plebiscites couldhave only a bolshevizing effect on Orientals. Seemingly yielding tothese considerations, the Supreme Council abandoned the scheme and themembers of the mission made other plans. [102] After several weeks'further reflection, however, the original idea was carried out, and themission visited the East. 

The reader may be glad of a momentary glimpse of the interior of thehistoric assembly afforded by those who were privileged to play a partin it before it was transformed into a secret conclave of five, four, orthree. Within the doors of the chambers whence fateful decrees wereissued to the four corners of the earth the delegates were seated, mostly according to their native languages, within earshot of thespecial pleaders. M. Clemenceau, at the head of the table, has beforehim a delegate charged with conducting the case, say, of Greece, Poland, Serbia, or Czechslovakia. The delegate, standing in front of the sternbut mobile Premier, and encircled by other more or less attentiveplenipotentiaries, looks like a nervous schoolboy appearing beforeexacting examiners, struggling with difficult questions and eager toanswer them satisfactorily. Suppose the first language spoken is French. As many of the plenipotentiaries do not understand it, they cannot beblamed for relaxing attention while it is being employed, and keeping upa desultory conversation among themselves in idiomatic English, whichforms a running bass accompaniment to the voice, often finely modulated, of the orator. Owing to this embarrassing language difficulty, as soonas a delegate pauses to take his breath, his arguments and appeals aredone by M. Mantoux into English, and then it is the turn of the Frenchplenipotentiaries to indulge in a quiet chat until some question is putin English, which has forthwith to be rendered into French, after whichthe French reply is translated into English, and so on unendingly, eachgroup resuming its interrupted conversations alternately. 

One delegate who passed several hours undergoing this ordeal said thathe felt wholly out of sympathy with the atmosphere at the ConferenceHall, adding: "While arguing or appealing to my country's arbiters Ifelt I was addressing only a minority of the distinguished judges, whilethe thoughts of the others were far away. And when the interpreter wasrendering, quickly, mechanically, and summarily, my ideas without any ofthe explosive passion that shot them from my heart, I felt discouraged. But suddenly it dawned on me that no judgment would be uttered on thestrength of anything that I had said or left unsaid. I remembered thateverything would be referred to a commission, and from that to asub-commission, then back again to the distinguished plenipotentiaries, "

Another delegate remarked: "Many years have elapsed since I passed mylast examination, but it came back to me in all its vividness when Iwalked up to Premier Clemenceau and looked into his restless, flashingeyes. I said to myself: When last I was examined I was painfullyconscious that my professors knew a lot more about the subject than Idid, but now I am painfully aware that they know hardly anything at alland I am fervently desirous of teaching them. The task is arduous. Itmight, however, save time and labor if the delegates would receive ourtypewritten dissertations, read them quietly in their respective hotels, and endeavor to form a judgment on the data they supply. Failing that, I should like at least to provide them with a criterion of truth, forafter me will come an opponent who will flatly contradict me, and howcan they sift truth from error when the winnow is wanting? It is hard tofeel that one is in the presence of great satraps of destiny, but I madean act of faith in the possibilities of genial quantities lurking behindthose everyday faces and of a sort of magic power of calling into beingnew relations of peace and fellowship between individual classes andpeoples. It was an act of faith. "

If the members of the Supreme Council lacked the graces with which todraw their humbler colleagues and were incapable of accordinghospitality to any of the more or less revolutionary ideas floating inthe air, they were also utterly powerless to enforce their behests ineastern Europe against serious opposition. Thus, although they keptconsiderable Inter-Allied forces in Germany, they failed to impose theirdecrees there, notwithstanding the circumstance that Germany wasdisorganized, nearly disarmed, and distracted by internal feuds. TheConference gave way when Germany refused to let the Polish troopsdisembark at Dantzig, although it had proclaimed its resolve to insiston their using that port. It allowed Odessa to be evacuated and itsinhabitants to be decimated by the bloodthirsty Bolsheviki. It orderedthe Ukrainians and the Poles to cease hostilities, [103] but hostilitieswent on for months afterward. An American general was despatched to thewarring peoples to put an end to the fighting, but he returneddespondent, leaving things as he had found them. General Smuts was sentto Budapest to strike up an agreement with Kuhn and the MagyarBolshevists, but he, too, came back after a fruitless conversation. TheSupreme Council's writ ran in none of those places. 

About March 19th the Inter-Allied commission gave Erzberger twenty-fourhours in which to ratify the convention between Germany and Poland andto carry out the conditions of the armistice. But Erzberger declined toratify it and the Allies were unable or unwilling to impose their willon him. From this state of things the Rumanian delegates drew theobvious corollary. Exasperated by the treatment they received, theyquitted the Conference, pursued their own policy, occupied Budapest, presented their own peace conditions to Hungary, and relegated, withcourteous phrases and a polite bow to the Council, the directionselaborated for their guidance to the region of pious counsels. 

In these ways the well-meant and well-advertised endeavors to substitutea moral relationship of nations for the state of latent warfare known asthe balance of power were steadily wasted. On the one side the subtleskill of Old World diplomacy was toiling hard and successfully to reviveunder specious names its lost and failing causes, while on the otherhand the New World policy, naïvely ignoring historical forces andsecular prejudices, was boldly reaching out toward rough and ready modesof arranging things and taking no account of concrete circumstances. Generous idealists were thus pitted against old diplomatic stagers andboth secretly strove to conclude hastily driven bargains outside theCouncil chamber with their opponents. As early as the first days ofJanuary I was present at some informal meetings where such transactionswere being talked over, and I afterward gave it as my impression that"if things go forward as they are moving to-day the outcome will fallfar short of reasonable expectations. The first striking differencebetween the transatlantic idealists and the Old World politicians liesin their different ways of appreciating expeditiousness, on the onehand, and the bases of the European state-system, on the other hand. Astatesman when dealing with urgent, especially revolutionary, emergencies should never take his eyes from the clock. The politiciansin Paris hardly ever take account of time or opportunity. The overseasreformers contend that the territorial and political balance of forceshas utterly broken down and must be definitely scrapped in favor of aleague of nations, and the diplomatists hold that the principle ofequilibrium, far from having spent its force, still affords the onlygroundwork of international stability and requires to be furtherintensified. "[104]

Living in the very center of the busy world of destiny-weavers, who weregenerously, if unavailingly, devoting time and labor to the fabricationof machinery for the good government of the entire human race out ofscanty and not wholly suitable materials, a historian in presence of themanifold conflicting forces at work would have found it difficult tosurvey them all and set the daily incidents and particular questions incorrect perspective. The earnestness and good-will of theplenipotentiaries were highly praiseworthy and they themselves, as wesaw, were most hopeful. Nearly all the delegates were characterized bythe spirit of compromise, so valuable in vulgar politics, but soperilous in embodying ideals. Anxious to reach unanimous decisions evenwhen unanimity was lacking, the principal statesmen boldly had recourseto ingenious formulas and provisional agreements, which each party mightconstrue in its own way, and paid scant attention to what was going onoutside. I wrote at the time:[105]

"But parallel with the Conference and the daily lectures which itsmembers are receiving on geography, ethnography, and history there areother councils at work, some publicly, others privately, which representthe vast masses who are in a greater hurry than the political world tohave their urgent wants supplied. For they are the millions of Europe'sinhabitants who care little about strategic frontiers and much aboutlife's necessaries which they find it increasingly difficult to obtain. Only a visitor from a remote planet could fully realize the significanceof the bewildering phenomena that meet one's gaze here every day withoutexciting wonder. . . . The sprightly people who form the rind of thepolitico-social world . . . Are wont to launch winged words and coin wittyepigrams when characterizing what they irreverently term the efforts ofthe Peace Conference to square the circle; they contrast the nobleintentions of the delegates with the grim realities of the workadayworld, which appear to mock their praiseworthy exertions. They say thatthere never were so many wars as during the deliberations of thesefamous men of peace. Hard fighting is going on in Siberia; victories anddefeats have just been reported from the Caucasus; battles betweenBolshevists and peace-lovers are raging in Esthonia; blood is flowing instreams in the Ukraine; Poles and Czechs have only now signed anagreement to sheath swords until the Conference announces its verdict;the Poles and the Germans, the Poles and the Ukrainians, the Poles andthe Bolshevists, are still decimating each other's forces on territorialfragments of what was once Russia, Germany, or Austria. "

Sinister rumors were spread from time to time in Paris, London, andelsewhere, which, wherever they were credited, tended to shake publicconfidence not only in the dealings of the Supreme Council with thesmaller countries, but also in the nature of the occult influences thatwere believed to be occasionally causing its decisions to swerve fromthe orthodox direction. And these reports were believed by many even inConference circles. Time and again I was visited by delegatescomplaining that this or that decision was or would be taken in responseto the promptings not of land-grabbing governments, but of wealthycapitalists or enterprising captains of industry. "Why do you supposethat there is so much talk now of an independent little state centeringaround Klagenfurt?" one of them asked me. "I will tell you: for the sakeof some avaricious capitalists. Already arrangements are being pushedforward for the establishment of a bank of which most of the shares areto belong to X. " Another said: "Dantzig is needed forpolitico-commercial reasons. Therefore it will not be made part ofPoland. [106] Already conversations have begun with a view to giving theownership of the wharves and various lucrative concessions toEnglish-speaking pioneers of industry. If the city were Polish no suchliens could be held on it because the state would provide everythingneedful and exploit its resources. " The part played in the BanatRepublic by motives of a money-making character is described elsewhere. 

A friend and adviser of President Wilson publicly affirmed that theFiume problem was twice on the point of being settled satisfactorily forall parties, when the representatives of commercial interests cleverlyinterposed their influence and prevented the scheme from going throughin the Conference. I met some individuals who had been sent on a secretmission to have certain subjects taken into consideration by the SupremeCouncil, and a man was introduced to me whose aim was to obtain throughthe Conference a modification of financial legislation respecting therepayment of debts in a certain republic of South America. Thisoptimist, however, returned as he had come and had nothing to show forhis plans. The following significant passage appeared in a leadingarticle in the principal American journal published in Paris[107] on thesubject of the Prinkipo project and the postponement of its execution:

"From other sources it was learned that the doubts and delays in thematter are not due so much to the declination [_sic_] of several of theRussian groups to participate in a conference with the Bolshevists, butto the pulling against one another of the several interests representedby the Allies. Among the Americans a certain very influential groupbacked by powerful financial interests which hold enormously rich oil, mining, railway, and timber concessions, obtained under the old régime, and which purposes obtaining further concessions, is strongly in favorof recognizing the Bolshevists as a _de facto_ government. Inconsideration of the _visa_ of these old concessions by Lenin andTrotzky and the grant of new rights for the exploitation of rich mineralterritory, they would be willing to finance the Bolshevists to the tuneof forty or fifty million dollars. And the Bolshevists are surely inneed of money. President Wilson and his supporters, it is declared, aredecidedly averse from this pretty scheme. "

That President Wilson would naturally set his face against any suchdeliberate compromise between Mammon and lofty ideals it was superfluousto affirm. He stood for a vast and beneficent reform and by exhortingthe world to embody it in institutions awakened in some people--in themasses were already stirring--thoughts and feelings that might long haveremained dormant. But beyond this he did not go. His tendencies, or, say, rather velleities--for they proved to be hardly more--wereexcellent, but he contrived no mechanism by which to convert them intoinstitutions, and when pressed by gainsayers abandoned them. 

An economist of mark in France whose democratic principles are wellknown[108] communicated to the French public the gist of certain curiousdocuments in his possession. They let in an unpleasant light on some ofthe whippers-up of lucre at the expense of principle, who flocked aroundthe dwelling-places of the great continent-carvers and lawgivers inParis. His article bears this repellent heading: "Is it true thatEnglish and American financiers negotiated during the war in order tosecure lucrative concessions from the Bolsheviki? Is it true that theseconcessions were granted to them on February 4, 1919? Is it true thatthe Allied governments played into their hands?"[109]

The facts alleged as warrants for these questions are briefly asfollows: On February 4, 1919, the Soviet of the People's Commissaries inMoscow voted the bestowal of a concession for a railway linkingOb-Kotlass-Saroka and Kotlass-Svanka, in a resolution which states "(1)that the project is feasible; (2) that the transfer of the concession torepresentatives of foreign capital may be effected if production will beaugmented thereby; (3) that the execution of this scheme isindispensable; and (4) that in order to accelerate this solution of thequestion the persons desirous of obtaining the concession shall beobliged to _produce proofs of their contact with Allied_ and neutralenterprises, and of their capacity to financing the work and supply thematerials requisite for the construction of the said line. " On the otherhand, it appears from an _official_ document bearing the date of June26, 1918, that a demand for the concession of this line was lodged bytwo individuals--the painter A. A. Borissoff (who many years ago receivedfrom me a letter of introduction to President Roosevelt asking him topatronize this gentleman's exhibition of paintings in the UnitedStates), and Herr Edvard Hannevig. Desirous of ascertaining whetherthese petitioners possessed the qualifications demanded, the Bolshevistauthorities made inquiries and received from the Royal NorwegianConsulate at Moscow a certificate[110] setting forth that "citizenHannevig was a co-associate of the large banks Hannevig situated inLondon and in America. " Consequently negotiations might go forward. Thedocument adds: "In October Borissoff and Hannevig renewed their request, whereupon the journals _Pravda_, _Izevestia_, and _EkonomitsheskayaShizn_ discussed the subject with animation. At a sitting held onOctober 12th the project was approved with certain modifications, and onFebruary 1, 1919, the Supreme Soviet of National Economy approved itanew. "

The magnitude of the concession may be inferred from the circumstancethat one of its clauses conceded "_the exploitation of eight millions offorest land_ which even to-day, _despite existing conditions, can bringin a revenue of three hundred million rubles a year_. "

What it comes to, therefore, assuming that these official documents areas they seem, based on facts, is that from June 26th, that is to sayduring the war, the Bolshevist government was petitioned to accord animportant railway concession and also the exploitation of a forestcapable of yielding three hundred million rubles a year to a Russiancitizen who alleged that he was acting on behalf of English and Americancapitalists, and that Edvard Hannevig, having proved that he was reallythe mandatory of these great allied financiers, the concession wasfirst approved by two successive commissions[111] and then definitelyconferred by the Soviet of the People's Commissaries. [112]

The eminent author of the article proceeds to ask whether this canindeed be true; whether English and American capitalists petitioned theBolsheviki for vast concessions during the war; whether they obtainedthem while the Conference was at its work and soldiers of theirrespective countries were fighting in Russia against the Bolsheviki whowere bestowing them. "Is it true, " he makes bold to ask further, "thatthat is the explanation of the incredible friendliness displayed by theAllied governments toward the Bolshevist bandits with whom they werewilling to strike up a compromise, whom they were minded to recognize byorganizing a conference on the Princes' Island?. . . Many times alreadyrank-smelling whiffs of air have blown upon us; they suggested thebelief that behind the Peace Conference there lurked not merely whatpeople feared, but something still worse or an immense political Panama. If this is not true, gentlemen, deny it. Otherwise one day you willsurely have an explosion. "[113]

Whether these grave innuendoes, together with the statement made by Mr. George Herron, [114] the incident of the Banat Republic and theultimatum respecting the oil-fields unofficially presented to theRumanians suffice to establish a _prima facie_ case may safely be leftto the judgment of the public. The conscientious and impartialhistorian, however firm his faith in the probity of the men representingthe powers, both of unlimited and limited interests, cannot pass themover in silence. 

One of the shrewdest delegates in Paris, a man who allowed himself to bebreathed upon freely by the old spirit of nationalism, but was capablewithal of appreciating the passionate enthusiasm of others for a morealtruistic dispensation, addressed me one evening as follows: "Say whatyou will, the Secret Council is a Council of Two, and the Covenant acharter conferred upon the English-speaking peoples for the governmentof the world. The design--if it be a design--may be excellent, but it isnot relished by the other peoples. It is a less odious hegemony thanthat of imperialist Germany would have been, but it is a hegemony andodious. Surely in a quest of this kind after the most effectual means ofovercoming the difficulties and obviating the dangers of internationalintercourse, more even than in the choice of a political régime, theprinciple of self-determination should be allowed free play. Was thatnot to have been one of the choicest fruits of victory? But no; force isbeing set in motion, professedly for the good of all, but only as theirgood is understood by the 'all-powerful Two. ' And to all the others itis force and nothing more. Is it to be wondered at that there are somany discontented people or that some of them are already casting aboutfor an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon hegemony misnamed the Society ofNations?"

It cannot be gainsaid that the two predominant partners behavedthroughout as benevolent despots, to whom despotism came more easilythan benevolence. As we saw, they kept their colleagues of the lesserstates as much in the dark as the general public and claimed from themalso implicit obedience to all their behests. They went farther anddemanded unreasoning acquiescence in decisions to be taken in thefuture, and a promise of prompt acceptance of their injunctions--apretension such as was never before put forward outside the CatholicChurch, which, at any rate, claims infallibility. Asked why he had notput up a better fight for one of the states of eastern Europe, asharp-tongued delegate irreverently made answer, "What more could youexpect than I did, seeing that I was opposed by one colleague who looksupon himself as Napoleon and by another who believes himself to be theMessiah. "

Among the many epigrammatic sayings current in Paris about theConference, the most original was ascribed to the Emir Faissal, the sonof the King of the Hedjaz. Asked what he thought of the world'sareopagus, he is said to have answered: "It reminds me somewhat of oneof the sights of my own country. My country, as you know, is the desert. Caravans pass through it that may be likened to the armies of delegatesand experts at the Conference--caravans of great camels solemnlytrudging along one after the other, each bearing its own load. They allmove not whither they will, but whither they are led. For they have nochoice. But between the two there is this difference: that whereas thebig caravan in the desert has but one leader--a little ass--theConference in Paris is led by two delegates who are the great Ones ofthe earth. " In effect, the leaders were two, and no one can say whichof them had the upper hand. Now it seemed to be the British Premier, nowthe American President. The former scored the first victory, on thefreedom of the seas, before the Conference opened. The latter won thenext, when Mr. Wilson firmly insisted on inserting the Covenant in theTreaty and finally overrode the objections of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau, who scouted the idea for a while as calculated to impair thevalue of both charters. There was also a moment when the two werereported to have had a serious disagreement and Mr. Lloyd George, havingsuddenly quitted Paris for rustic seclusion, was likened to Achillessulking in his tent. But one of the two always gave way at the lastmoment, just as both had given way to M. Clemenceau at the outset. Whenthe difference between Japan and China cropped up, for example, theother delegates made Mr. Wilson their spokesman. Despite M. Clemenceau'sresolve that the public should not "be apprized that the head of onegovernment had ever put forward a proposal which was opposed by the headof another government, " it became known that they occasionally disagreedamong themselves, were more than once on the point of separating, andthat at best their unanimity was often of the verbal order, failing totake root in identity of views. To those who would fain predicatepolitical tact or statesmanship of the men who thus undertook to sethuman progress on a new and ethical basis, the story of thesebickerings, hasty improvisations, and amazing compromises isdistressing. The incertitude and suspense that resulted weredisconcerting. Nobody ever knew what was coming. A subcommission mightdeliver a reasoned judgment on the question submitted to it, and thismight be unanimously confirmed by the commission, but the Four or Threeor Two or even One could not merely quash the report, but also reversethe practical consequences that followed. This was done over and overagain. 

And there were other performances still more amazing. When, for example, the Polish problem became so pressing that it could not be safelypostponed any longer, the first delegates were at their wits' ends. Unable to agree on any of the solutions mooted, they conceived the ideaof obtaining further data and a lead from a special commission. Thecommission was accordingly appointed. Among its members were Sir EsméHoward, who has since become Ambassador in Rome, the American GeneralKernan, and M. Noulens, the ex-Ambassador of France in Petrograd. Theseenvoys and their colleagues set out for Poland to study the problem onthe spot. They exerted themselves to the utmost to gather data for aserious judgment, and returned to Paris after a sojourn of some twomonths, legitimately proud of the copious and well-sifted results oftheir research. And then they waited. Days passed and weeks, but nobodytook the slightest interest in the envoys. They were ignored. At lastthe chief of the commission, M. Noulens, taking the initiative, wrotedirect to M. Clemenceau, informing him that the task intrusted to himand his colleagues had been achieved, and requesting to be permitted tomake their report to the Conference. The reply was an order dissolvingthe commission unheard. 

Once when the relations between Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd George weresomewhat spiced by antagonism of purpose and incompatibility of methods, a political friend of the latter urged him to make a firm stand. But theBritish Premier, feeling, perhaps, that there were too manyunascertained elements in the matter, or identifying the President withthe United States, drew back. More than once, too, when a certaindelegate was stating his case with incisive emphasis Mr. Wilson, whowas listening with attention and in silence, would suddenly ask, "Isthis an ultimatum?" The American President himself never shrank frompresenting an ultimatum when sure of his ground and morally certain ofvictory. On one such occasion a proposal had been made to Mr. LloydGeorge, who approved it whole-heartedly. But it failed to receive the_placet_ of the American statesman. Thereupon the British Premier wasstrongly urged to stand firm. But he recoiled, his plea being that hehad received an ultimatum from his American colleague, who spoke ofquitting France and withdrawing the American troops unless the pointwere conceded. And Mr. Wilson had his way. One might have thought thatthis success would hearten the President to other and greaterachievements. But the leader who incarnated in his own person thehighest strivings of the age, and who seemed destined to acquirepontifical ascendancy in a regenerated world, lacked the energy to holdhis own when matters of greater moment and high principle were at stake. 

These battles waged within the walls of the palace on the Quai d'Orsaywere discussed out-of-doors by an interested and watchful public, andthe conviction was profound and widespread that the President, havingset his hand to the plow so solemnly and publicly, and having promised aharvest of far-reaching reforms, would not look back, howeverintractable the ground and however meager the crop. But confronted withserious obstacles, he flinched from his task, and therein, to mythinking, lay his weakness. If he had come prepared to assert hispersonal responsibility, to unfold his scheme, to have it amply andpublicly discussed, to reject pusillanimous compromise in the sphere ofexecution, and to appeal to the peoples of the world to help him tocarry it out, the last phase of his policy would have been worthy ofthe first, and might conceivably have inaugurated the triumph of theideas which the indolent and the men of little faith rejected asincapable of realization. To this hardy course, which would havechallenged the approbation of all that is best in the world, there wasan alternative: Mr. Wilson might have confessed that his judgment was atfault, mankind not being for the moment in a fitting mood to practisethe new tenets, that a speedy peace with the enemy was the first andmost pressing duty, and that a world-parliament should be convened for alater date to prepare the peoples of the universe for the new ordering. But he chose neither alternative. At first it was taken for granted thatin the twilight of the Conference hall he had fought valiantly for theprinciples which he had propounded as the groundwork of the newpolitico-social fabric, and that it was only when he found himselfconfronted with the insuperable antagonism of his colleagues of Franceand Britain that he reluctantly receded from his position and resolvedto show himself all the more unbending to the envoys of the lessercountries. But this assumption was refuted by State-Secretary Lansing, who admitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that thePresident's Fourteen Points, which he had vowed to carry out, were noteven discussed at the Conference. The outcome of this attitude--onecannot term it a policy--was to leave the best of the ideas which hestood for in solution, to embitter every ally except France and Britain, and to scatter explosives all over the world. 

To this dwarfing parliamentary view of world-policy Mr. Lloyd Georgelikewise fell a victim. But his fault was not so glaring. For it shouldin fairness be remembered that it was not he who first preached theadvent of the millennium. He had only given it a tardy and cold assent, qualified by an occasional sally of keen pleasantry. Down to the lastmoment, as we saw, he not only was unaware that the Covenant would beinserted in the Peace Treaty, but he was strongly of the opinion, asindeed were M. Pichon and others, that the two instruments wereincompatible. He also apparently inclined to the belief that spiritualand moral agencies, if not wholly impotent to bring about the requisitechanges in the politico-social world, could not effect thetransformation for a long while to come, and that in the interval itbehooved the governments to fall back upon the old system of so-calledequilibrium, which, after Germany's collapse, meant an informal kind ofAnglo-Saxon overlordship of the world and a _pax Britannica_ in Europe. As for his action at the Conference, in so far as it did not directlyaffect the well-being of the British Empire, which was his first andmain care, one might describe it as one of general agreement with Mr. Wilson. He actually threw it into that formula when he said thatwhenever the interests of the British Empire permitted he would like tofind himself at one with the United States. It was on that occasion thatthe person addressed warned him against identifying the President withthe people of the United States. 

In truth, it was difficult to follow the distinguished Americanidealist, because one seldom knew whither he would lead. Neither, apparently, did he himself. Some of his own countrymen in Paris heldthat he had always been accustomed to follow, never to guide. Certainlyat the Conference his practice was to meet the more powerful of hiscontradictors on their own ground and come to terms with them, so as toget at least a part of what he aimed at, and that he accepted, even whenthe instalment was accorded to him not as such, but as a finalsettlement. So far as one can judge by his public acts and by theadmissions of State-Secretary Lansing, he cannot have seriouslycontemplated staking the success of his mission on the realization ofhis Fourteen Points. The manner in which he dealt with his Covenant, with the French demand for concrete military guaranties and with secrettreaties, all afford striking illustrations of his easy temper. Beforequitting Paris for Washington he had maintained that the Covenant asdrafted was satisfactory, nay, he contended that "not even a periodcould be changed in the agreement. " The Monroe Doctrine, he held, neededno special stipulation. But as soon as Senator Lodge and others tookissue with him on the subject, he shifted his position and hedged thatdoctrine round with defenses which cut off a whole continent from thepurview of the League, which is nothing if not cosmic in itsfunctions. [115] Again, there was to be no alliance. The French Premierforetold that there would be one. Mr. Wilson, who was in England at thetime, answered him in a speech declaring that the United States wouldenter into no alliance which did not include all the world: "nocombination of power which is not a combination of all of us. " Well, since then he became a party to a kind of triple alliance and in thejudgment of many observers it constitutes the main result of theConference. In the words of an American press organ: "Clemenceau gotvirtually everything he asked. President Wilson virtually dropped hisown program, and adopted the French and British, both of themimperialistic. "[116]

Again, when the first commission of experts reported upon the frontiersof Poland, the British Premier objected to a section of the "corridor, "on the ground that as certain districts contained a majority of Germanstheir annexation would be a danger to the future peace and therefore toPoland herself, and also on the ground that it would run counter to oneof Mr. Wilson's fundamental points; the President, who at that timedissented from Mr. Lloyd George, rose and remarked that his principlesmust not be construed too literally. "When I said that Poland must berestored, I meant that everything indispensable to her restoration mustbe accorded. Therefore, if that should involve the incorporation of anumber of Germans in Polish territory, it cannot be helped, for it ispart of the restoration. Poland must have access to the sea by theshortest route, and everything else which that implies. " None the less, the British Premier, whose attitude toward the claims of the Poles wasmarked by a degree of definiteness and persistency which could hardly beanticipated in one who had never even heard of Teschen before the year1919, maintained his objections with emphasis and insistence, until Mr. Wilson and M. Clemenceau gave in. 

Or take the President's way of dealing with the non-belligerent states. Before leaving Paris for Washington, Mr. Wilson, officially questionedby one of his colleagues at an official sitting as to whether theneutrals would also sign the Covenant, replied that only the Allieswould be admitted to affix their signatures. "Don't you think it wouldbe more conducive to the firm establishment of the League if theneutrals were also made parties to it now?" insisted theplenipotentiary. "No, I do not, " answered the President. "I think thatit would be conferring too much honor on them, and they don't deserveit. " The delegate was unfavorably impressed by this reply. It seemedlacking in breadth of view. Still, it was tenable on certain narrow, formal grounds. But what he could not digest was the eagerness withwhich Mr. Wilson, on his return from Washington, abandoned his way ofthinking and adopted the opposite view. Toward the end of April thedelegates and the world were surprised to learn that not only wouldSpain be admitted to the orthodox fold, but that she would have a voicein the management of the flock with a seat in the Council. The chief ofthe Portuguese delegation[117] at once delivered a trenchant protestagainst this abrupt departure from principle, and as a jurisconsultstigmatized the promotion of Spain to a voice in the Council as anirregularity, and then retired in high dudgeon. 

Thus the grave reproach cannot be spared Mr. Wilson of having been weak, vague, and inconsistent with himself. He constituted himself the supremejudge of a series of intricate questions affecting the organization andtranquillity of the European Continent, as he had previously done in thecase of Mexico, with the results we know. This authority was accorded tohim--with certain reservations--in virtue of the exalted position whichhe held in a state disposing of vast financial and economic resources, shielded from some of the dangers that continually overhang Europeannations, and immune from the immediate consequences of the mistakes itmight commit in international politics. For every continental people inEurope is in some measure dependent on the good-will of the UnitedStates, and therefore anxious to deserve it by cultivating the mostfriendly relations with its chief. This predisposition on the part ofhis wards was an asset that could have been put to good account. It wasa guaranty of a measure of success which would have satisfied a generousambition; it would have enabled him to effect by a wise policy whatrevolution threatened to accomplish by violence, and to canalize andlead to fruitful fields the new-found strength of the proletarianmasses. 

The compulsion of working with others is often a wholesome corrective. It helps one to realize the need of accommodating measures to people'sneeds. But Mr. Wilson deliberately segregated himself from the nationsfor whose behoof he was laboring, and from some of their authorizedrepresentatives. And yet the aspirations and conceptions of a largesection of the masses differed very considerably from those of the twostatesmen with whom he was in close collaboration. His avowed aims wereat the opposite pole to those of his colleagues. To reconcileinternationalism and nationalism was sheer impossible. Yet instead ofupholding his own, taking the peoples into his confidence, and sowingthe good seed which would certainly have sprouted up in the fullness oftime, he set himself, together with his colleagues, to weldcontradictories and contributed to produce a synthesis composed ofdisembodied ideas, disintegrated communities, embittered nations, conflicting states, frenzied classes, and a seething mass of discontentthroughout the world. 

Mr. Wilson has fared ill with his critics, who, when in quest ofexplanations of his changeful courses, sought for them, as is the wontof the average politician, in the least noble parts of human nature. Inhis case they felt especially repelled by his imperial aloofness, thesecrecy of his deliberations, and the magisterial tone of his judgments, even when these were in flagrant contradiction with one another. Obstinacy was also included among the traits which were commonlyascribed to him. As a matter of fact he was a very good listener, anintelligent questioner, and amenable to argument whenever he felt freeto give practical effect to the conclusions. When this was not the case, arguments necessarily failed of their effect, and on these occasionsconsiderations of expediency proved a lever sufficient to sway hisdecision. But, like his more distinguished colleagues, he had to relyupon counsel from outside, and in his case, as in theirs, the officialadviser was not always identical with the real prompter. He, too, as wesaw, set aside the findings of the commissions when they disagreed withhis own. In a word, Mr. Wilson's fatal stumble was to have sacrificedessentials in order to score on issues of secondary moment; for whilesuccess enabled him to obtain his paper Covenant from his co-delegatesin Paris, and to bring back tangible results to Washington, it lost himthe leadership of the world. The cost of this deplorable weakness tomankind can be estimated only after its worst effects have been added upand appraised. 

In matters affecting the destinies of the lesser states Mr. Wilson wasfirm as a rock. Prom the position once taken up nothing could move him. Their economic dependence on his own country rendered their argumentspointless and lent irresistible force to his injunctions. Greece'sdispute with Bulgaria was a classic instance. The Bulgars repaired toParis more as claimants in support of indefeasible rights than asvanquished enemies summoned to learn the conditions imposed on them bythe nations which they had betrayed and assailed. Victory alone couldhave justified their territorial pretensions; defeat made themgrotesque. All at once, however, it was bruited abroad that PresidentWilson had become Bulgaria's intercessor and favored certain of herexorbitant claims. One of these was for the annexation of part of thecoast of western Thrace, together with a seaport at the expense of theGreeks, the race which had resided on the seaboard for twenty-fivehundred consecutive years. M. Venizelos offered them instead onecommercial outlet[118] and special privileges in another, and theplenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Japan considered theoffer adequate. 

But Mr. Wilson demurred. A commercial outlet through foreign territory, he said, might possibly be as good as a direct outlet through one's ownterritory in peace-time, but not in time of war, and, after all, onemust bear in mind the needs of a country during hostilities. In themouth of the champion of universal peace that was an unexpectedargument. It had been employed by Italy in favor of her claim to Fiume. Mr. Wilson then met it by invoking the economic requirements ofJugoslavia, and by declaring that the Treaty was being devised forpeace, not for war, that the League of Nations would hinder wars, or atthe very least supply the deficiencies of those states which hadsacrificed strategical positions for humanitarian aims. But in the caseof Bulgaria he was taking what seems the opposite position andtransgressing his own principle of nationality in order to maintain it. 

Mr. Wilson, pursuing his line of argument, further pointed out that theSupreme Council had not accepted as sufficient for Poland an outletthrough German territory, but had created the city-state of Dantzig inorder to confer a greater degree of security upon the Polish republic. To that M. Venizelos replied that there was no parity between the twoinstances. Poland had no outlet to the sea except through Dantzig, andcould not, therefore, allow that one to remain in the hands of anunfriendly nation, whereas Bulgaria already possessed two verycommodious ports, Varna and Burgas, on the Black Sea, which becomes afree sea in virtue of the internationalization of the straits. Thepossession of a third outlet on the Ægean could not, therefore, betermed a vital question for his protégée. Thus the comparison withPoland was irrelevant. 

If Poland, which is a very much greater state than Bulgaria, can liveand prosper with a single port, and that not her own--if Rumania, whichis also a much more numerous and powerful nation, can thrive with asingle issue to the sea, by what line of argument, M. Venizelos asked, can one prove that little Bulgaria requires three or four exits, andthat her need justifies the abandonment to her tender mercies of sevenhundred and fifty thousand Greeks and the violation of one of thefundamental principles underlying the new moral ordering. 

Compliance with Bulgaria's demand would prevent Greece from includingwithin her boundaries the three-quarters of a million Greeks who havedwelt in Thrace for twenty-five centuries, preserving their nationalityintact through countless disasters and tremendous cataclysms. Further, the Greek Premier, taking a leaf from Wilson's book, turned to theaspect which the problem would assume in war-time. Bulgaria, he argued, is essentially a continental state, whose defense does not depend uponnaval strength, whereas Greece contains an island population of nearly amillion and a half and looks for protection against aggression chieflyto naval precautions. In case of war, Bulgaria, if her claim to an issueon the Ægean were allowed, could with her submarines delay or hinder thetransport and concentration in Macedonia of Greek forces from theislands and thus place Greece in a position of dangerous inferiority. 

Lastly, if Greece's claims in Thrace were rejected, she would have apopulation of 1, 790, 000 souls outside her national boundaries--that isto say, more than one-third of the population which is within her state. Would this be fair? Of the total population of Bulgarian and TurkishThrace the Turks and Greeks together form 85 per cent. , the Bulgars only6 per cent. , and the latter nowhere in compact masses. Moreover--andthis ought to have clinched the matter--the Hellenic population formedan absolute as well as a relative majority in the year 1919. 

These arguments and various other considerations drawn from theinordinate ambitions, the savage cruelty, [119] and the Punic faith ofthe Bulgars convinced the British, French, and Japanese delegates of thesoundness of Greece's pleas, and they sided with M. Venizelos. But Mr. Wilson clung to his idea with a tenacity which could not be justified byargument, and was concurrently explained by motives irrelevant to themerits of the case. Whether the influence of Bulgarophil Americanmissionaries and strong religious leanings were at the root of hisinsistence, as was generally assumed, or whether other considerationsweighed with him, is immaterial. And yet it is worth recording that aBulgarian journal[120] announced with the permission of the governmentalcensor that the American missionaries in Bulgaria and the professors ofRobert College of Constantinople had so primed the American delegates atthe Conference on the question of Thrace, and generally on the Bulgarianproblem, that all M. Venizelos's pains to convince them of the justiceof his contention would be lost labor. "[121]

However this may be, Mr. Wilson's attitude was the subject of adversecomment throughout Europe. His implied claim to legislate for the worldand to take over its moral leadership earned for him the epithet of"Dictator, " and provoked such epigrammatic comments among his owncountrymen and the French as this: "Louis XIV said, 'I am the state!'Mr. Wilson, outdoing him, exclaimed, 'I am all the states!'"

The necessity of winning over dissentient colleagues to his grandiosescheme of world reorganization and of satisfying their demands, whichwere of a nature to render that scheme abortive, was the mostinfluential agency in impairing his energies and upsetting his plans. This remark assumes what unhappily seems a fact, that those plans weremainly mechanical. It is certain that they made no provision fordirectly influencing the masses, for giving them sympathetic guidance, and enabling them to suffuse with social sentiments the aspirations andstrivings which were chiefly of the materialistic order, with a view tobringing about a spiritual transformation of the social basis. Indeed wehave no evidence that the need of such a transformation of the basis ofpolitical thought, which was still rooted in the old order, was graspedby any of those who set their hand to the legislative part of the work. 

These unfavorable impressions were general. Almost every stepsubsequently taken by the Conference confirmed them, and long before theTreaty was presented to the Germans, public confidence was gone in theability of the Supreme Council to attain any of the moral victories overmilitarism, race-hatred, and secret intrigues which its leaders hadencouraged the world to expect. 

"The leaders of the Conference, " wrote an influential press organ, [122]"are under suspicion. They may not know it, but it is true. Thesuspicion is doubtless unjust, but it exists. What exists is a fact; andmen who ignore facts are not statesmen. The only way to deal with factsis to face them. The more unpleasant they are the more they need to befaced. 

"Some of the Conference leaders are suspected of having, at varioustimes and in various circumstances, thought more of their own personaland political positions and ambitions than of the rapid and practicalmaking of peace. They are suspected, in a word, of a tendency tosubordinate policy to politics. 

"In regard to some important matters they are suspected of having nopolicy. They are also suspected of unwillingness to listen to their owncompetent advisers, who could lay down for them a sound policy. Some ofthem are even suspected of being under the spell of some benumbinginfluence that paralyzes their will and befogs their minds, when highresolve and clear visions are needful. "

Another accusation of the same tenor was thus formulated: "In variousdegrees[123] and with different qualities of guilt all the Allied andAssociated leaders have dallied with dishonesty. While professing toseek naught save the welfare of mankind, they have harbored thoughts ofself-interest. The result has been a progressive loss of faith in themby their own peoples severally, and by the Allied, Associated, andneutral peoples jointly. The tide of public trust in them has reachedits lowest ebb. "

At the Conference, as we saw, the President of the United Statespossessed what was practically a veto on nearly all matters which leftthe vital interests of Britain and France intact. And he frequentlyexercised it. Thus the dispute about the Thracian settlement lay notbetween Bulgaria and Greece, nor between Greece and the Supreme Council, but between Greece and Mr. Wilson. In the quarrel over Fiume and theDalmatian coast it was the same. When the Shantung question came up forsettlement it was Mr. Wilson alone who dealt with it, his colleagues, although bound by their promises to support Japan, having made him theirmouthpiece. The rigor he displayed in dealing with some of the smallercountries was in inverse ratio to the indulgence he practised toward theGreat Powers. Not only were they peremptorily bidden to obey withoutdiscussion the behests which had been brought to their cognizance, butthey were ordered, as we saw, to promise to execute other injunctionswhich might be issued by the Supreme Council on certain matters in thefuture, the details of which were necessarily undetermined. 

In order to stifle any velleities of resistance on the part of theirgovernments, they were notified that America's economic aid, of whichthey were in sore need, would depend on their docility. It is importantto remember that it was the motive thus clearly presented thatdetermined their formal assent to a policy which they deprecated. ARussian statesman summed up the situation in the words: "It is anillustration of one of our sayings, 'Whose bread I eat, his songs Ising. '" Thus it was reported in July that an agreement come to by thefinancial group Morgan with an Italian syndicate for a yearly advance toItaly of a large sum for the purchase of American food and raw stuffswas kept in abeyance until the Italian delegation should accept such asolution of the Adriatic problem as Mr. Wilson could approve. TheRussian and anti-Bolshevists were in like manner compelled to give theirassent to certain democratic dogmas and practices. It is also fair, however, to bear in mind that whatever one may think of the wisdom ofthe policy pursued by the President toward these peoples, the motivesthat actuated it were unquestionably admirable, and the end in view wastheir own welfare, as he understood it. It is all the more to beregretted that neither the arguments nor the example of the autocraticdelegates were calculated to give these the slightest influence over thethought or the unfettered action of their unwilling wards. Thearrangements carried out were entirely mechanical. 

In the course of time after the vital interests of Britain, France, andJapan had been disposed of, and only those of the "lesser states, " inthe more comprehensive sense of this term, remained, President Wilsonexercised supreme power, wielding it with firmness and encountering nogainsayer. Thus the peace between Italy and Austria was put off frommonth to month because he--and only he--among the members of the SupremeCouncil rejected the various projects of an arrangement. Into the meritsof this dispute it would be unfruitful to enter. That there was much tobe said for Mr. Wilson's contention, from the point of view of theLeague of Nations, and also from that of the Jugoslavs, will not bedenied. That some of the main arguments to which he trusted his casewere invalidated by the concessions which he had made to other countrieswas Italy's contention, and it cannot be thrust aside as untenable. 

At last Mr. Wilson ventured on a step which challenged the attention andstirred the disquietude of his friends. He despatched a note[124] toTurkey, warning her that if the massacres of Armenians were notdiscontinued he would withdraw the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, whichprovides for the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over undeniableTurkish territories. The intention was excellent, but the necessaryeffects of his action were contrary to what the President can have aimedat. He had not consulted the Conference on the important change which hewas about to make respecting a point which was supposed to be part ofthe groundwork of the new ordering. This from the Conference point ofview was a momentous decision, which could be taken only with theconsent of the Supreme Council. Even as a mere threat it was worthlessif it did not stand for the deliberate will of that body which thePresident had deemed it superfluous to consult. As it happened, theBritish authorities were just then organizing a body of gendarmes topolice the Turkish territories in question, and they were engaged inthis work with the knowledge and approval of the Supreme Council. Mr. Wilson's announcement could therefore only be construed--and wasconstrued--as the act of an authority superior to that of theCouncil. [125] The Turks, who are shrewd observers, must have drawn theobvious conclusion from these divergent measures as to the degree ofharmony prevailing among the Allied and Associated Powers. 

M. Clemenceau had a conversation on the subject with Mr. Polk, whoexplained that the note was informal and given verbally, and conveyedthe idea only of one nation in connection with the Armenian situation. This explanation, accepted by the French government, did not commenditself to public opinion, either in France or elsewhere. Moreover, theFrench were struck by another aspect of this arbitrary exercise ofsupreme power. "President Wilson, " wrote an eminent French publicist, "throws himself into the attitude of a man who can bind and loose theTurkish Empire at the very moment when the Senate appears opposed toaccepting any mandate, European or Asiatic, at the moment when Mr. Lansing declares to the Congress that the government of which he is amember does not desire to accept any mandate. But is it not obvious thatif Mr. Wilson sovereignly determines the lot of Turkey he can be held inconsequence to the performance of certain duties? We have often had todeplore the absence of policy common to the Allies. But has each one ofthem, considered separately, at least a policy of its own? Does it takeaction otherwise than at haphazard, yielding to the impulse of ageneral, a consul, or a missionary?"[126]

It soon became manifest even to the most obtuse that whenever theSupreme Council, following its leaders and working on such lines asthese, terminated its labors, the ties between the political communitiesof Europe would be just as flimsy as in the unregenerate days of secretdiplomacy, secret alliances, and secret intrigues, unless in themeanwhile the peoples themselves intervened to render them stronger andmore enduring. It would, however, be the height of unfairness to makeMr. Wilson alone answerable for this untoward ending to a far resonantbeginning. He had been accused by the press of most countries ofenwrapping personal ambition in the attractive covering ofdisinterestedness and altruism, just as many of his foreign colleagueswere said to go in fear of the "malady of lost power. " But charges ofthis nature overstep the bounds of legitimate criticism. Motive ishardly ever visible, nor is it often deducible from deliberate action. If, for example, one were to infer from the vast territorialreadjustments and the still vaster demands of the various belligerentsat the Conference, the motives that had determined them to enter thewar, the conclusion--except in the case of the American people, whosedisinterestedness is beyond the reach of cavil--would indeed bedistressing. The President of the United States merited well of allnations by holding up to them an ideal for realization, and the mereannouncement of his resolve to work for it imparted an appreciable ifinadequate incentive to men of good-will. The task, however, was sogigantic that he cannot have gaged its magnitude, discerned the defectsof the instruments, nor estimated aright the force of the hindrancesbefore taking the world to witness that he would achieve it. Even withthe hearty co-operation of ardent colleagues and the adoption of a soundmethod he could hardly have hoped to do more than clear theground--perhaps lay the foundation-stone--of the structure he dreamt of. But with the partners whom circumstance allotted him, and the gainsayerswhom he had raised up and irritated in his own country, failure was aforegone conclusion from the first. The aims after which most of theEuropean governments strove were sheer incompatible with his own. Doubtless they all were solicitous about the general good, but theirlove for it was so general and so diluted with attachment to others'goods as to be hardly discernible. The reproach that can hardly bespared to Mr. Wilson, however, is that of pusillanimity. If his faith inthe principles he had laid down for the guidance of nations were asintense as his eloquent words suggested, he would have spurned the offerof a sequence of high-sounding phrases in lieu of a resettlement of theworld. And his appeal to the peoples would most probably have beenheard. The beacon once lighted in Paris would have been answered inalmost every capital of the world. One promise he kept religiously: hedid not return to Washington without a paper covenant. Is it more? Is itmerely a paradox to assert that as war was waged in order to make warimpossible, so a peace was made that will render peace impossible?

FOOTNOTES:

[91] In March. 

[92] Quoted by _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 10, 1919. 

[93] Delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on March 4, 1919. 

[94] _The New York Herald_, March 19, 1919 (Paris edition). 

[95] Cf. _The New York Herald_, July 8, 1919. 

[96] The semi-official journals manifested a steady tendency to leantoward the Republican opposition in the United States, down to the monthof August, when the amendments proposed by various Senators bade fair tojeopardize the Treaties and render the promised military succordoubtful. 

[97] _Journal de Genève_, May 18, 1919. 

[98] _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), August 14, 1919. 

[99] Cf. Paris papers of February 2, 1919, and _The Public Ledger_(Philadelphia), February 4, 1919. 

[100] Cf. _L'Echo de Paris_, April 19, 1919. 

[101] In April, 1919. 

[102] About April 10, 1919. 

[103] On March 19, 1919. 

[104] Cf. My cablegram published in _The Public Ledger_ (Philadelphia), January 12, 1919. 

[105] Cf. _The Public Ledger_ (Philadelphia), February 5, 1919. 

[106] Doctor Bunke, Councilor at the court of Dantzig, endeavors in _TheDantzig Neueste Nachrichten_ to prove that the problem of Dantzig wassolved exclusively in the interests of the Naval Powers, America andBritain, who need it as a basis for their commerce with Poland, Russia, and Germany. Cf. Also _Le Temps_, August 23, 1919

[107] _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), March 1, 1919. 

[108] Lysis, author of _Demain_, and many other remarkable studies ofeconomic problems, and editor of _Le Démocratie Nouvelle_, May 30, 1919. 

[109] For an account of analogous bargainings with Bela Kuhn, see theChapter on Rumania. 

[110] Bearing the number 3882. 

[111] On October 12, 1918, and February 1, 1919

[112] On February 4, 1919. 

[113] _La Démocratie Nouvelle_, May 30, 1919

[114] See his admirable article in _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition)of May 21, 1919, from which the following extract is worth quoting: "Ihave said that certain great forces have steadily and occultly workedfor a German peace. But I mean, in fact, one force--an internationalfinance to which all other forces hostile to the freedom of nations andof the individual soul are contributory. The influence of this financehad permeated the Conference, delaying the decisions as long aspossible, increasing divisions between people and people, between classand class, between peace-makers and peace-makers, in order to achievetwo definite ends, which two ends are one and the same. 

"The first end was so to manipulate the minds of the peace-makers, oftheir hordes of retainers and 'experts, ' as to bring about, if possible, a peace that would not be destructive to industrial Germany. The secondend was so to delay the Russian question, so to complicate and thwartevery proposed solution, that, at last, either during or after the PeaceConference, a recognition of the Bolshevist power as the _de facto_government of Russia would be the only possible solution. "

[115] "What confidence can be commanded by men who, asserting one weekthat the ultimate of human wisdom has been attained in a document, confess the next week that the document is frail? When are we to believethat their confessions are at an end?"--_The Chicago Tribune_ (Parisedition), August 23, 1919. 

[116] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), July 31, 1919. 

[117] M. Affonso Costa, who shortly before had succeeded the Minister ofForeign Affairs, M. Monas Egiz. 

[118] Dedeagatch. 

[119] See _Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Interalliée sur lesViolations du droit des gens commises en Macédoine Orientale par lesarmées bulgares_. The conclusion of the report is one of the mostterrible indictments ever drawn up by impartial investigators againstwhat is practically a whole people. 

[120] _Zora_, August 11th. Cf. _Le Temps_, August 28, 1919. 

[121] Mr. Charles House published a statement in the press of Salonikito the effect that the Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missionsforbids missionaries to take an active part in politics. He added thatif this injunction was transgressed--and in Paris the current belief wasthat it had been--it would not be tolerated by the Missionary Board, norrecognized by the American government. 

[122] _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), March 31, 1919. 

[123] _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), April 6, 1919. 

[124] Somewhere between August 17 and 20, 1919. It was transmitted byAdmiral Bristol, American member of the Inter-Allied Inquiry Mission atSmyrna. 

[125] Cf. _L'Echo de Paris_, August 28, 1919. Article by Pertinax. 

[126] _L'Echo de Paris_, August 28, 1919. Article by Pertinax. 

VI

THE LESSER STATES

Before the Anglo-Saxon statesmen thus set themselves to rearrange thecomplex of interests, forces, policies, nationalities, rights, andclaims which constituted the politico-social world of 1919, they wereexpected to deal with all the Allied and Associated nations, withoutfavor or prejudice, as members of one family. This expectation was notfulfilled. It may not have been warranted. From the various discussionsand decisions of which we have knowledge, a number of delegates drew theinference that France was destined for obvious reasons to occupy theleading position in continental Europe, under the protection ofAnglo-Saxondom; and that a privileged status was to be conferred on theJews in eastern Europe and in Palestine, while the other states were tobe in the leading-strings of the Four. This view was not lightlyexpressed, however inadequately it may prove to have been then supportedby facts. As to the desirability of forming this rude hierarchy ofstates, the principal plenipotentiaries were said to have been ingeneral agreement, although responding to different motives. There wasbut one discordant voice--that of France--who was opposed to the variouslimitations set to Poland's aggrandizement, and also to the clauseplacing the Jews under the direct protection of the League of Nations, and investing them with privileges in which the races among whom theyreside are not allowed to participate. Bulgaria had a position uniquein her class, for she was luckier than most of her peers in havingenlisted on her side the American delegation and Mr. Wilson as leadingcounsel and special pleader for her claim to an outlet to the Ægean Sea. 

At the Conference each state was dealt with according to its class. Entirely above the new law, as we saw, stood its creators, theAnglo-Saxons. To all the others, including the French, the Wilsoniandoctrine was applied as fully as was compatible with its author's mainobject, the elaboration of an instrument which he could take back withhim to the United States as the great world settlement. Within theselimits the President was evidently most anxious to apply his FourteenPoints, but he kept well within these. Thus he would, perhaps, have beenquite ready to insist on the abandonment by Britain of her supremacy onthe seas, on a radical change in the international status of Egypt andIreland, and much else, had these innovations been compatible with hisown special object. But they were not. He was apparently minded to testthe matter by announcing his resolve to moot the problem of the freedomof the seas, but when admonished by the British government that it wouldnot even brook its mention, he at once gave it up and, presumablydrawing the obvious inference from this downright refusal, applied it tothe Irish, Egyptian, and other issues, which were forthwith eliminatedfrom the category of open or international problems. But France'sinsistent demand, on the other hand, for the Rhine frontier met with anemphatic refusal. [127]

The social reformer is disheartened by the one-sided and inexorable wayin which maxims proclaimed to be of universal application wererestricted to the second-class nations. 

Russia's case abounds in illustrations of this arbitrary, unjust, andimpolitic pressure. The Russians had been our allies. They had foughtheroically at the time when the people of the United States were, according to their President, "too proud to fight. " They were essentialfactors in the Allies' victory, and consequently entitled to theadvantages and immunities enjoyed by the Western Powers. In no caseought they to have been placed on the same level as our enemies, and inlieu of recompense condemned to punishment. And yet this latterconception of their deserts was not wholly new. Soon after theirdefection, and when the Allies were plunged in the depths ofdespondency, a current of opinion made itself felt among certainsections of the Allied peoples tending to the conclusion of peace on thebasis of compensations to Germany, to be supplied by the cession ofRussian territory. This expedient was advocated by more than onestatesman, and was making headway when fresh factors arose which badefair to render it needless. 

At the Paris Conference the spirit of this conception may still havesurvived and prompted much that was done and much that was leftunattempted. Russia was under a cloud. If she was not classed as anenemy she was denied the consideration reserved for the Allies and theneutrals. Her integrity was a matter of indifference to her formerfriends; almost every people and nationality in the Russian state whichasked for independence found a ready hearing at the Supreme Council. Andsome of them before they had lodged any such claim were encouraged tolose no time in asking for separation. In one case a large sum of moneyand a mission were sent to "create the independent state of theUkraine, " so impatient were peoples in the West to obtain a substitutefor the Russian ally whom they had lost in the East, and great was theirconsternation when their protégés misspent the funds and made commoncause with the Teutons. 

Disorganized Russia was in some ways a godsend to the world'sadministrators in Paris. To the advocate of alliances, territorialequilibrium, and the old order of things it offered a facile means ofacquiring new helpmates in the East by emancipating its various peoplesin the name of right and justice. It held out to the capitalists whodeplored the loss of their milliards a potential source whence part ofthat loss might be made good. [128] To the zealots of the League ofNations it offered an unresisting body on which all the requisiteoperations from amputation to trepanning might be performed without theuse of anesthetics. 

The various border states of Russia were thus quietly lopped off withouteven the foreknowledge, much less the assent, of the patient, andwithout any pretense at plebiscites. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Georgiawere severed from the chaotic Slav state offhandedly, and the warrantwas the doctrine propounded by President Wilson--that every people shallbe free to choose its own mode of living and working. Every people?Surely not, remarked unbiased onlookers. The Egyptians, the Irish, theAustrians, the Persians, to name but four among many, are disqualifiedfor the exercise of these indefeasible rights. Perhaps with good reason?Then modify the doctrine. Why this difference of treatment? theyqueried. Is it not because the supreme judge knows full well that GreatBritain would not brook the discussion of the Egyptian or the Irishproblem, and that France, in order to feel quite secure, must hinder theAustrian-Germans from coalescing with their brethren of the Reich? Butif Britain and France have the right to veto every self-denying measurethat smacks of disruption or may involve a sacrifice, why is Russiabereft of it? If the principle involved be of any value at all, itsapplication must be universal. To an equal all-round distribution ofsacrifice the only alternative is the supremacy of force in the serviceof arbitrary rule. And to this force, accordingly, the Supreme Councilhad recourse. The only cases in which it seriously vindicated the rightsof oppressed or dissatisfied peoples to self-determination against thewill of the ruling race or nation were those in which that race ornation was powerless to resist. Whenever Britain or France's interestswere deemed to be imperiled by the putting in force of any of theFourteen Points, Mr. Wilson desisted from its application. Thus it cameabout that Russia was put on the same plane with Germany and receivedsimilar, in some respects, indeed, sterner, treatment. The Germans wereat least permitted to file objections to the conditions imposed and topoint out flaws in the arrangements drafted, and their representationssometimes achieved their end. It was otherwise with the Russians. Theywere never consulted. And when their representatives in Parisrespectfully suggested that all such changes as might be decided upon bythe Great Powers during their country's political disablement should betaken to be provisional and be referred for definite settlement to thefuture constituent assembly, the request was ignored. 

Of psychological rather than political interest was Mr. Wilson'sconscientious hesitation as to whether the nationalities which he waspreparing to liberate were sufficiently advanced to be intrusted withself-government. As stated elsewhere, his first impulse would seem tohave been to appoint mandatories to administer the territories severedfrom Russia. The mandatory arrangement under the ubiquitous League issaid to have been his own. Presumably he afterward acquired the beliefthat the system might be wisely dispensed with in the case of some ofRussia's border states, for they soon afterward received promises ofindependence and implicitly of protection against future encroachmentsby a resuscitated Russia. 

In this connection a scene is worth reproducing which was enacted at thePeace Table before the system of administering certain territories byproxy was fully elaborated. At one of the sittings the delegates setthemselves to determine what countries should be thus governed, [129] andit was understood that the mandatory system was to be reserved for theGerman colonies and certain provinces of the Turkish Empire. But in thecourse of the conversation Mr. Wilson casually made use of theexpression, "The German colonies, the territories of the Turkish Empireand other territories. " One of the delegates promptly put the question, "What other territories?" to which the President replied, unhesitatingly, "Those of the late Russian Empire. " Then he added by wayof explanation: "We are constantly receiving petitions from peoples wholived hitherto under the scepter of the Tsars--Caucasians, CentralAsiatic peoples, and others--who refuse to be ruled any longer by theRussians and yet are incapable of organizing viable independent statesof their own. It is meet that the desires of these nations should beconsidered. " At this the Czech delegate, Doctor Kramarcz, flared up andexclaimed: "Russia? Cut up Russia? But what about her integrity? Is thatto be sacrificed?" But his words died away without evoking a response. "Was there no one, " a Russian afterward asked, "to remind thoserepresentatives of the Great Powers of their righteous wrath withGermany when the Brest-Litovsk treaty was promulgated?"

Toward Italy, who, unlike Russia, was not treated as an enemy, but asrelegated to the category of lesser states, the attitude of PresidentWilson was exceptionally firm and uncompromising. On the subject ofFiume and Dalmatia he refused to yield an inch. In vain the Italiandelegation argued, appealed, and lowered its claims. Mr. Wilson wasadamant. It is fair to admit that in no other way could he havecontrived to get even a simulacrum of a League. Unless the weak stateswere awed into submitting to sacrifices for the great aim which he hadmade his own, he must return to Washington as the champion of amanifestly lost cause. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that histhesis was not destitute of arguments to support it. Accordingly thedeadlock went on for months, until the Italian Cabinet fell and peoplewearied of the Adriatic problems. 

Poland was another of the communities which had to bend beforeAnglo-Saxon will, represented in her case mainly by Mr. Lloyd George, not, however, without the somewhat tardy backing of his colleague fromWashington. It is important for the historian and the political studentto observe that as the British Premier was not credited with anyprofound or original ideas about the severing or soldering of eastEuropean territories, the authorship of the powerful and successfulopposition to the allotting of Dantzig to Poland was rightly or wronglyascribed not to him, but to what is euphemistically termed"international finance" lurking in the background, whose interest inPoland was obviously keen, and whose influence on the Supreme Council, although less obvious, was believed to be far-reaching. The sameexplanation was currently suggested for the fixed resolve of Mr. LloydGeorge not to assign Upper Silesia to Poland without a plebiscite. Hisown account of the matter was that although the inhabitants werePolish--they are as two to one compared with the Germans--it wasconceivable that they entertained leanings toward the Germans, and mighttherefore desire to throw in their lot with these. When one comparesthis scrupulous respect for the likes and dislikes of the inhabitants ofthat province with the curt refusal of the same men at first to give earto the ardent desire of the Austrians to unite with the Germans, or toabide by a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Fiume or Teschen, one isbewildered. The British Premier's wish was opposed by the official bodyof experts appointed to report on the matter. Its members had nomisgivings. The territory, they said, belonged of right to Poland, thegreat majority of its population was unquestionably Polish, and thepractical conclusion was that it should be handed over to the Polishgovernment as soon as feasible. Thereupon the staff of the commissionwas changed and new members were substituted for the old. [130] But thatwas not enough. The British Premier still encountered such oppositionamong his foreign colleagues that it was only by dint of wordy warfareand stubbornness that he finally won his point. 

The stipulation for which the first British delegate toiled thuslaboriously was that within a fortnight after the ratification of theTreaty the German and Polish forces should evacuate the districts inwhich the plebiscite was to be held, that the Workmen's Councils thereshould be dissolved, and that the League of Nations should take over thegovernment of the district so as to allow the population to give fullexpression to its will. But the League of Nations did not exist andcould not be constituted for a considerable time. It was thereforedecided[131] that some temporary substitute for the League should beformed at once, and the Supreme Council decided that Inter-Allied troopsshould occupy the districts. That was the first instalment of the priceto be paid for the British Premier's tenderness for plebiscites, whichthe expert commissions deprecated as unnecessary, and which, as eventsproved in this case, were harmful. 

In the meanwhile Bolshevist--some said German--agents were stirring upthe population by suasion and by terrorism until it finally began toferment. Thousands of working-men responded to the goad, "turned down"their tools and ceased work. Thereupon the coal-fields of Upper Silesia, the production of which had already dropped by 50 per cent, since thepreceding November, ceased to produce anything. This consummationgrieved the Supreme Council, which turned for help to the Inter-Alliedarmies. For the Silesian coal-fields represented about one-third ofGermany's production, and both France and Italy were looking to Germanyfor part of their fuel-supply. The French press pertinently askedwhether it would not have been cheaper, safer, and more efficacious tohave forgone the plebiscite and relied on the Polish troops from theoutset. [132] For, however ideal the intentions of Mr. Lloyd George mayhave been, the net result of his insistence on a plebiscite was toenable an ex-newspaper vender named Hoersing, who had undertaken toprevent the detachment of Upper Silesia from Germany, to set hismachinery for agitation in motion and cause general unrest in theSilesian and Dombrova coal-mining districts. When the strike wasdeclared the workmen, who are Poles to a man, rejected all suggestionsthat they should refer their grievances to arbitration courts. For thesetribunals were conducted by Germans. The consequence of Mr. LloydGeorge's spirited intervention was, in the words of an unbiasedobserver, to "raise the specters of starvation, freezing and Bolshevismin eastern Europe" during the ensuing winter--a heavy price to pay forpedantic adherence to the letter of an irrelevant ordinance, at a momentwhen the spirit of basic principles was being allowed to evaporate. 

Rumania was chastened and qualified in severer fashion for admission tothe sodality of nations until her delegates quitted the Conference indisgust, struck out their own policy, and courteously ignored the GreatPowers. Then the Supreme Council changed its note for the moment andabandoned the position which it had taken up respecting the armisticewith Hungary, to revert to it shortly afterward. [133] The joy with whichthe upshot of this revolt was hailed by all the lesser states was anevil omen. For their antipathy toward the Supreme Council had longbefore hardened into a sentiment much more intense, and any stick seemedgood enough to break the rod of the self-constituted governors of theplanet. 

The concrete result of this tinkering and cobbling could only be aramshackle structure, built without any reference to the canons ofpolitical architecture. It was shaped neither by the Fourteen Points norby the canons of the balance of power and territory. It was hardly morethan an abortive attempt to make a synthesis of the two. Created byforce, it could be perpetuated only by force; but if symptoms are to betrusted, it is more likely to be broken up by force. As an Americanpress organ remarked in August: "The Council of Five complains that noone now condescends to recognize the League of Nations. Even the smallnations are buying war material, quite oblivious of the fact that thereare to be no more wars, now that the League is there to prevent them. Sweden is buying large supplies from Germany, and Spain is sending acommission to Paris to negotiate for some of France's warequipment. "[134]

Belgium, too, was treated with scant consideration. The praise lavishedon her courageous people during the war was apparently deemed anadequate recompense for the sacrifices she had made and the losses sheendured. For the revision of the treaties of 1839, indispensable to theeconomic development of the country, no diplomatic preparation was madedown to May, and among the Treaty clauses then drafted Belgium's shareof justice was so slight and insufficient that the unbiased presspublished sharp strictures on the forgetfulness or egotism of theSupreme Council. "The little that has leaked out of the decisions takenregarding the conditions which affect Belgium, " wrote one journal, "hascaused not only bitter disappointment in Belgium, but also indignationeverywhere. . . . The Allies having decided not to accord moralsatisfaction to Belgium (they chose Geneva as the capital of the Leagueof Nations), it was perhaps to be expected that they would not accordher material satisfaction. And such expectations are being fulfilled. The Limburg province, annexed to Holland in 1839, the province whichgave the retreating enemy unlawful refuge in 1918, a rank violation ofDutch neutrality, is apparently not to be restored to Belgium. Even theright, vital to the safety and welfare of Belgium, the right ofunimpeded navigation of the Scheldt between Antwerp and the sea, has notyet been conceded. And the raw material that is indispensable if Belgianindustry is to be revived is withheld; the Allies, however, are quitewilling to flood the country with manufactured articles. "[135]

And yet Belgium's demands were extremely modest. [136] They wereformulated, not as the guerdon for her heroic defense of civilization, but as a plain corollary flowing direct from each and every principleofficially recognized by the heads of the Conference--right, nationality, legitimate guarantees, and economic requirements. Tested byany or all of these accepted touchstones, everything asked for wasreasonable and fair in itself, and seemingly indispensable to thedurability of the new world-structure which the statesmen wereendeavoring to raise on the ruins of the old. Belgium's forlornpolitical and territorial plight embodied all the worst vices of the oldbalance of power stigmatized by President Wilson: the mutilation of thecountry; the forcible separation of sections of its population from eachother; the distribution of these lopped, ethnic fragments among alienstates and dynasties; the control of her waterways handed over tocommercial rivals; the transformation of cities and districts that wereobviously destined to figure among her sources of national well-beingand centers of culture into dead towns that paralyze her effort andhinder her progress. In a word, Belgium had had no political existencefor her own behoof. She was not an organic unit in the sodality ofnations, but a mere cog in the mechanism of European equilibrium. 

Ruined by the war, Belgium was sorely tried by the Peace Conference. Shecomplained of two open wounds which poisoned her existence, stunted hereconomic growth, and rendered her self-defense an impossibility: thevast gap of Limburg on the east and the blocking of the Scheldt on thewest. The great national _réduit_, Antwerp, cut off from the sea, inaccessible to succor in case of war, on the one side, and Limburgopening to Germany's armies the road through central Belgium, on theother--these were the two standing dangers which it was hoped would beremoved. How dangerous they are events had demonstrated. In October, 1914, Antwerp fell because Holland had closed the Scheldt and forbiddenthe entrance to warships and transports, and in November, 1918, a Germanarmy of over seventy thousand men eluded pursuit by the Allies bypassing through Dutch Limburg, carrying with them vast war materials andbooty. Militarily Belgium is exposed to mortal perils so long as thetreaties which ordained this preposterous division of territories aremaintained in vigor. 

Economically, too, the consequences, especially of the status of theScheldt, are admittedly baleful. To Holland the river is practicallyuseless--indeed, the only advantage it could confer would be the powerof impeding the growth and prosperity of Antwerp for the benefit of itsrival, Rotterdam. All that the Belgians desired there was the completecontrol of their national river, with the right of carrying out theworks necessary to keep it navigable. A like demand was put forward forthe canal of Terneuzen, which links the city of Ghent with the Scheldt;and the suppression of the checks and hindrances to Belgium's freecommunications with her hinterland--_i. E. _, the basins of the Meuse andthe Rhine. Prom every point of view, including that of internationallaw, the claims made were at once modest and grounded. But the SupremeCouncil had no time to devote to such subsidiary matters, and, like moremomentous issues, they were adjourned. 

The Belgian delegation did not ask that Holland's territory should becurtailed. On the contrary, they would have welcomed its increase by theaddition of territory inhabited by people of her own idiom, underGerman sway. [137] But the Dutch demurred, as Denmark had done in thematter of the third Schleswig zone, for fear of offending Germany. Andthe Supreme Council acquiesced in the refusal. Again, when issues wereunder discussion that turned upon the Rhine country and affected Belgianinterests, her delegates were never consulted. They were systematicallyignored by the Conference. When the capital of the League of Nations wasto be chosen, their hopes that Brussels would be deemed worthy of thehonor were blasted by President Wilson himself. One of the Americandelegates informed a foreign colleague "that the capital of the Leaguemust be situate in a tranquil country, must have a steady, settledpopulation and a really good climate. " "A good climate?" asked acontinental statesman. "Then why not choose Monte Carlo?"

But the decision in favor of Geneva was sent by courier from Switzerlandready made to President Wilson. The chief grounds which lent color tothe belief that religious bias played a larger part in the Conference'sdecisions than was apparent were the following: It was from Geneva thatthe spirit of religious and political liberty first went forth to beincarnated among the various nations of the world. It is to John Calvin, rather than to Martin Luther, that the birth of the Scotch Covenantersand of English Puritanism is traceable. Hence Geneva is the parent ofNew England. So, too, it was Rousseau--a true child of Calvin--who wasthe author of America's Declaration of Independence. Again, one of thefirst pacifists and advocates of international arbitration was born inGeneva. John Knox sat for two years at the feet of Calvin. Consequentlythe Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution, and the AmericanRevolution all had their springs in Geneva. 

These were the considerations which weighed with President Wilson whenhe refused to fix his choice on Brussels. In vain the Belgians arguedand pleaded, urging that if the Conference were to vote for London, Washington, or Paris, they would receive the announcement withrespectful acquiescence, but that among the lesser states they conceivedthat their country's claims were the best grounded. To the Americans whoobjected that Switzerland's mountains and lakes, being free from hatefulwar memories, offer more fitting surroundings for the capital of theLeague of Peace than Brussels, where vestiges of the odious strugglewill long survive, they answered that they could only regret thatBelgium's resistance to the lawless invaders should be taken todisqualify her for the honor. 

It is worth while pursuing this matter a step farther. The FederalCouncil in Berne having soon afterward officially recommended[138] thenation to enter the League which guarantees it neutrality, [139] anilluminating discussion ensued. And it was elicited that as there is anobligation imposed on all member-states to execute the decrees of theLeague for the coercion of rebellious fellow-members, it follows that insuch cases Switzerland, too, would be obliged to take an active part inthe struggle between the League and the recalcitrant country. Frommilitary operations, however, Switzerland is dispensed, but it wouldcertainly be bound to adopt economic measures of pressure, and to thisextent abandon its neutrality. Now not only would that attitude beconstrued by the disobedient nation as unfriendly, and the usualconsequences drawn from it, but as Switzerland is freed from militaryco-operation, it follows that the League could not fix the headquartersof its military command in its own capital, Geneva, as that wouldconstitute a violation of Swiss neutrality. And, if it did, Switzerlandwould in self-defense be bound to oppose the decision!

The Belgians were discouraged by the disdainful demeanor and grudgingdisposition of the Supreme Council, and irritated by the arbitrarinessof its decrees and the indefensible way in which it applied principlesthat were propounded as sacred. Before restoring the diminutive cantonsof Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium, for example, Mr. Wilson insisted onascertaining the will of the population by plebiscite. In itself themeasure was reasonable, but the position of these little districts wassubstantially on all-fours with Alsace-Lorraine, which was restored toFrance without any such test. In Fiume, also, the will of theinhabitants went for nothing, Mr. Wilson refusing to consult them. Further, Austria, whose people were known to favor union with Germany, was systematically jockeyed into ruinous isolation. "Now what, in thelight of these conflicting judgments, " asked the Belgians, "is the truemeaning of the principle of self-determination?" The only reply theyreceived was that Mr. Wilson was right when he told hisfellow-countrymen that his principles stood in need of interpretation, and that, as he was the sole authorized interpreter, his presence wasrequired in Europe. 

In money matters, too, the chief plenipotentiaries can hardly beacquitted of something akin to niggardliness toward the country whichhad saved theirs from a catastrophe. Down to the month of May, 1921, twoand a half milliard francs was the maximum sum allotted to Belgium bythe Supreme Council. And for the work of restoring the devastatedcountry, which the Great Powers had spontaneously promised toaccomplish, it was alleged by experts to be wholly inadequate. Otherfinancial grievances were ignored--for a time. Further, it was decidedthat Germany should surrender her African colonies to the Great Powers;yet Belgium, who contributed materially to their conquest, was not to beassociated with them. 

Irritated by this illiberality, the Belgian delegation, having consultedwith M. Renkin, to whose judgment in these matters special weightattached, resolved to make a firm stand, and refused to sign the Treatyunless at least certain modest financial, economic, and colonial claims, which ought to have been settled spontaneously, were accorded underpressure. And the Supreme Council, rather than be arraigned before theworld on the charge of behaving unjustly as well as ungenerously towardBelgium, ultimately gave way, leaving, however, an impression behindwhich seemed as indelible as it was profound. . . . 

The domination which is now being exercised by the principal Powers overthe remaining states of the world is fraught with consequences whichwere not foreseen, and have not yet been realized by those whoestablished it. Among the least momentous, but none the less real, isone to which Belgium is exposed. Hitherto there was a language problemin that heroic country which, being an internal controversy, could besettled without noteworthy perturbations by the good-will of theWalloons and the Flemings. The danger, which one fervently hopes will bewarded off, consists in the possible transformation of that dispute intoan international question, in consequence of possible accords of amilitary or economic nature. The subject is too delicate to be handledby a foreigner, and the Belgian people are too practical and law-lovingnot to avoid unwary steps that might turn a linguistic problem into aracial issue. 

The Supreme Council soon came to be looked upon as the prototype of thefuture League, and in that light its action was sharply scrutinized byall whom the League concerned. Foremost among these were therepresentatives of the lesser states, or, as they were termed, "stateswith limited interests. " This band of patriots had pilgrimaged to Parisfull of hope for their respective countries, having drunk in avidly theunstinted praise and promises which had served as pabulum for theirattachment to the Allied cause during the war. But their illusions wereshort-lived. At one of their first meetings with the delegates of theGreat Powers a storm burst which scattered their expectations to thewinds. When the sky cleared it was discovered that from indispensablefellow-workers they had shrunk to dwarfish protégées, mere units of aninferior category, who were to be told what to do and would beconstrained to do it thoroughly if not unmurmuringly. 

At the historic sitting of January 26th, the delegates of the lesserstates protested energetically against the purely decorative partassigned to them at a Conference in the decisions of which their peopleswere so intensely interested. The Canadian Minister, having spoken ofthe "proposal" of the Great Powers, was immediately corrected by M. Clemenceau, who brusquely said that it was not a proposal, but adecision, which was therefore definitive and final. Thereupon theBelgian delegate, M. Hymans, delivered a masterly speech, pleading forgenuine discussion in order to elucidate matters that so closelyconcerned them all, and he requested the Conference to allow the smallerbelligerent Allies more than two delegates. Their demand was curtlyrejected by the French Premier, who informed his hearers that theConference was the creation of the Great Powers, who intended to keepthe direction of its labors in their own hands. He added significantlythat the smaller nations' representatives would probably not have beeninvited at all if the special problem of the League of Nations had notbeen mooted. Nor should it be forgotten, he added, that the five GreatPowers represented no less than twelve million fighting-men. . . . Inconclusion, he told them that they had better get on with their work inlieu of wasting precious time in speechmaking. These words produced aprofound and lasting effect, which, however, was hardly the kindintended by the French statesman. 

"Conferential Tsarism" was the term applied to this magisterial methodby one of the offended delegates. He said to me on the morrow: "My replyto M. Clemenceau was ready, but fear of impairing the prestige of theConference prevented me from uttering it. I could have emphasized theneed for unanimity in the presence of vigilant enemies, ready tointroduce a wedge into every fissure of the edifice we are constructing. I could have pointed out that, this being an assembly of nations whichhad waged war conjointly, there is no sound reason why its membershipshould be diluted with states which never drew the sword at all. I mighthave asked what has become of the doctrine preached when victory wasstill undecided, that a league of nations must repose upon a freeconsent of all sovereign states. And above all things else I could haveinquired how it came to pass that the architect-in-chief of the societyof nations which is to bestow a stable peace on mankind should invokethe argument of force, of militarism, against the pacific peoples whovoluntarily made the supreme sacrifice for the cause of humanity and nowonly ask for a hearing. Twelve million fighting-men is an argument to beemployed against the Teutons, not against the peace-loving, law-abidingpeoples of Europe. 

"Premier Clemenceau seemed to lay the blame for the waste of time on ourshoulders, but the truth is that we were never admitted to thedeliberations until yesterday; although two and one-half months haveelapsed since the armistice was concluded, and although the progressmade by these leading statesmen is manifestly limited, he grudged usforty-five minutes to give vent to our views and wishes. 

"The French Tiger was admirable when crushing the enemies ofcivilization with his twelve million fighting-men; but gestures andactions which were appropriate to the battlefield become sources ofjarring and discord when imported into a concert of peoples. "

Much bitterness was generated by those high-handed tactics, whereuponcertain slight concessions were made in order to placate the offendeddelegates; but, being doled out with a bad grace, they failed of theeffect intended. Belgium received three delegates instead of two, andJugoslavia three; but Rumania, whose population was estimated atfourteen millions, was allowed but two. This inexplicable decisioncaused a fresh wound, which was kept continuously open by friction, although it might readily have been avoided. Its consequences may betraced in Rumania's singular relations to the Supreme Council before andafter the fall of Kuhn in Hungary. 

But even those drastic methods might be deemed warranted if the policyenforced were, in truth, conducive to the welfare of the nations on whomit was imposed. But hastily improvised by one or two men, who had noclaim to superior or even average knowledge of the problems involved, and who were constantly falling into egregious and costly errors, it wasinevitable that their intervention should be resented as arbitrary andmischievous by the leaders of the interested nations whoseacquaintanceship with those questions and with the interdependent issueswas extensive and precise. This resentment, however, might have beennot, indeed, neutralized, but somewhat mitigated, if the temper andspirit in which the Duumvirate discharged its self-set functions hadbeen free from hauteur and softened by modesty. But the magisterialwording in which its decisions were couched, the abruptness with whichthey were notified, and the threats that accompanied their impositionwould have been repellent even were the authors endowed withinfallibility. 

One of the delegates who unbosomed himself to me on the subject soonafter the Germans had signed the Treaty remarked: "The Big Three aresuperlatively unsympathetic to most of the envoys from the lesserbelligerent states. And it would be a wonder if it were otherwise, forthey make no effort to hide their disdain for us. In fact, it isdownright contempt. They never consult us. When we approach them theyshove us aside as importunate intruders. They come to decisions unknownto us, and carry them out in secrecy, as though we were enemies orspies. If we protest or remonstrate, we are imperialists and ungrateful. 

"Often we learn only from the newspapers the burdens or the restrictionsthat have been imposed on us. "

A couple of days previously M. Clemenceau, in an unofficial reply to aquestion put by the Rumanian delegation, directed them to consult thefinancial terms of the Treaty with Austria, forgetting that thedelegates of the lesser states had not been allowed to receive or readthose terms. Although communicated to the Austrians, they were carefullyconcealed from the Rumanians, whom they also concerned. At the sametime, the Rumanian government was called upon to take and announce adecision which presupposed acquaintanceship with those conditions, whereupon the Rumanian Premier telegraphed from Bucharest to Paris tohave them sent. But his _locum tenens_ did not possess a copy and had noright to demand one. [140] Incongruities of this character were frequent. 

One statesman in Paris, who enjoys a world-wide reputation, dissentedfrom those who sided with the lesser states. He looked at their protestsand tactics from an angle of vision which the unbiased historian, however emphatically he may dissent from it, cannot ignore. He said:"All the smaller communities are greedy and insatiable. If the chiefs ofthe World Powers had understood their temper and ascertained theiraspirations in 1914, much that has passed into history since then wouldnever have taken place. During the war these miniature countries werecourted, flattered, and promised the sun and the moon, earth and heaven, and all the glories therein. And now that these promises cannot beredeemed, they are wroth, and peevishly threaten the great states withdisobedience and revolt. This, it is true, they could not do if thelatter had not forfeited their authority and prestige by allowing theirinternal differences, hesitations, contradictions, and repentances tobecome manifest to all. To-day it is common knowledge that the GreatPowers are amenable to very primitive incentives and deterrents. If inthe beginning they had been united and said to their minor brethren:'These are your frontiers. These your obligations, ' the minor brethrenwould have bowed and acquiesced gratefully. In this way the boundaryproblems might have been settled to the satisfaction of all, for eachnew or enlarged state would have been treated as the recipient of a freegift from the World Powers. But the plenipotentiaries went about theirtask in a different and unpractical fashion. They began by recognizingthe new communities, and then they gave them representatives at theConference. This they did on the ground that the League of Nations mustfirst be founded, and that all well-behaved belligerents on the Alliedside have a right to be consulted upon that. And, finally, instead ofkeeping to their program and liquidating the war, they mingled theissues of peace with the clauses of the League and debated themsimultaneously. In these debates they revealed their own internaldifferences, their hesitancy, and the weakness of their will. And thelesser states have taken advantage of that. The general results havebeen the postponement of peace, the physical exhaustion of the CentralEmpires, and the spread of Bolshevism. "

It should not be forgotten that this mixture of the general and theparticular of the old order and the new was objected to on othergrounds. The Italians, for example, urged that it changed the status ofa large number of their adversaries into that of highly privilegedAllies. During the war they were enemies, before the peace discussionsopened they had obtained forgiveness, after which they entered theConference as cherished friends. The Italians had waged their warheroically against the Austrians, who inflicted heavy losses on them. Who were these Austrians? They were composed of the variousnationalities which made up the Hapsburg monarchy, and in especial ofmen of Slav speech. These soldiers, with notable exceptions, dischargedtheir duty to the Austrian Emperor and state conscientiously, accordingto the terms of their oath. Their disposition toward the Italians wasnot a whit less hostile than was that of the common German man againstthe French and the English. Why, then, argued the Italians, accord themprivileges over the ally who bore the brunt of the fight against them?Why even treat the two as equals? It may be replied that the bulk of thepeople were indifferent and merely carried out orders. Well, the sameholds good of the average German, yet he is not being spoiled by thevictorious World Powers. But the Croats and others suddenly became thefavorite children of the Conference, while the Germans andTeuton-Austrians, who in the meanwhile had accepted and fulfilledPresident Wilson's conditions for entry into the fellowship of nations, were not only punished heavily--which was perfectly just--but alsodisqualified for admission into the League, which was inconsistent. 

The root of all the incoherences complained of lay in the circumstancethat the chiefs of the Great Powers had no program, no method; Mr. Wilson's pristine scheme would have enabled him to treat the gallantSerbs and their Croatian brethren as he desired. But he had failed tomaintain it against opposition. On the other hand, the traditionalmethod of the balance of power would have given Italy all that she couldreasonably ask for, but Mr. Wilson had partially destroyed it. Nothingremained then but to have recourse to a _tertium quid_ which profoundlydissatisfied both parties and imperiled the peace of the world in daysto come. And even this makeshift the eminent plenipotentiaries wereunable to contrive single-handed. Their notion of getting the work donewas to transfer it to missions, commissions, and sub-commissions, andthen to take action which, as often as not, ran counter to therecommendations of these selected agents. Oddly enough, none of thesebodies received adequate directions. To take a concrete example: acentral commission was appointed to deal with the Polish frontierproblems, a second commission under M. Jules Cambon had to study thereport on the Polish Delimitation question, but although oftenconsulted, it was seldom listened to. Then there was a third commission, which also did excellent work to very little purpose. Now all thequestions which formed the subjects of their inquiries might beapproached from various sides. There were historical frontiers, ethnographical frontiers, political and strategical and linguisticfrontiers. And this does not exhaust the list. Among all these, then, the commissioners had to choose their field of investigation as thespirit moved them, without any guidance from the Supreme Council, whichpresumably did not know what it wanted. 

As an example of the Council's unmethodical procedure, and of itsslipshod way of tackling important work, the following brief sketch of adiscussion which was intended to be decisive and final, but ended inmere waste of time, may be worth recording. The topic mooted wasdisarmament. The Anglo-Saxon plenipotentiaries, feeling that they owedit to their doctrines and their peoples to ease the military burdens ofthe latter and lessen temptations to acts of violence, favored a measureby which armaments should be reduced forthwith. The Italian delegateshad put forward the thesis, which was finally accepted, that if Austria, for instance, was to be forbidden to keep more than a certain number oftroops under arms, the prohibition should be extended to all the statesof which Austria had been composed, and that in all these cases theratio between the population and the army should be identical. Accordingly, the spokesmen of the various countries interested weresummoned to take cognizance of the decision and intimate their readinessto conform to it. 

M. Paderewski listened respectfully to the decree, and then remarked:"According to the accounts received from the French militaryauthorities, Germany still has three hundred and fifty thousand soldiersin Silesia. " "No, " corrected M. Clemenceau, "only three hundredthousand. " "I accept the correction, " replied the Polish Premier. "Thedifference, however, is of no importance to my contention, which is thataccording to the symptoms reported we Poles may have to fight theGermans and to wage the conflict single-handed. As you know, we haveother military work on hand. I need only mention our strife with theBolsheviki. If we are deprived of effective means of self-defense, onthe one hand, and told to expect no help from the Allies, on the otherhand, the consequence will be what every intelligent observer foresees. Now three hundred thousand Germans is no trifle to cope with. If weconfront them with an inadequate force and are beaten, what then?""Undoubtedly, " exclaimed M. Clemenceau, "if the Germans were victoriousin the east of Europe the Allies would have lost the war. And that is aperspective not to be faced. "

M. Bratiano spoke next. "We too, " he said, "have to fight the Bolshevikion more than one front. This struggle is one of life and death to us. But it concerns, if only in a lesser degree, all Europe, and we arerendering services to the Great Powers by the sacrifices we thus offerup. Is it desirable, is it politic, to limit our forces withoutreference to these redoubtable tasks which await them? Is it notincumbent on the Powers to allow these states to grow to the dimensionsrequired for the discharge of their functions?" "What you advance istrue enough for the moment, " objected M. Clemenceau; "but you forgetthat our limitations are not to be applied at once. We fix a term afterthe expiry of which the strength of the armies will be reduced. We havetaken all the circumstances into account. " "Are you prepared to affirm, "queried the Rumanian Minister, "that you can estimate the time withsufficient precision to warrant our risking the existence of our countryon your forecast?" "The danger will have completely disappeared, "insisted the French Premier, "by January, 1921. " "I am truly glad tohave this assurance, " answered M. Bratiano, "for I doubt not that youare quite certain of what you advance, else you would not stake the fateof your eastern allies on its correctness. But as we who have not beentold the grounds on which you base this calculation are asked tomanifest our faith in it by incurring the heaviest conceivable risks, would it be too much to suggest that the Great Powers should show theirconfidence in their own forecast by guaranteeing that if by theinsurgence of unexpected events they proved to be mistaken and Rumaniawere attacked, they would give us prompt and adequate militaryassistance?" To this appeal there was no affirmative response; whereuponM. Bratiano concluded: "The limitation of armaments is highly desirable. No people is more eager for it than ours. But it has one limitationwhich must, I venture to think, be respected. So long as you have arestive or dubious neighbor, whose military forces are subjected neitherto limitation nor control, you cannot divest yourself of your own meansof self-defense. That is our view of the matter. "

Months later the same difficulty cropped up anew, this time in aconcrete form, and was dealt with by the Supreme Council in itscharacteristic manner. Toward the end of August Rumania's doings inHungary and her alleged designs on the Banat alarmed and angered thedelegates, whose authority was being flouted with impunity; and by wayof summarily terminating the scandal and preventing unpleasant surprisesM. Clemenceau proposed that all further consignments of arms to Rumaniashould cease. Thereupon Italy's chief representative, Signor Tittoni, offered an amendment. He deprecated, he said, any measure leveledspecially against Rumania, all the more that there existed already anenactment of the old Council of Four limiting the armaments of all thelesser states. The Military Council of Versailles, having been chargedwith the study of this matter, had reached the conclusion that the GreatPowers should not supply any of the governments with war material. Signor Tittoni was of the opinion, therefore, that those conclusionsshould now be enforced. 

The Council thereupon agreed with the Italian delegate, and passed aresolution to supply none of the lesser countries with war material. Anda few minutes later it passed another resolution authorizing Germany tocede part of her munitions and war material to Czechoslovakia and somemore to General Yudenitch![141]

When the commissions to which all the complex problems had to bereferred were being first created, [142] the lesser states were allowedonly five representatives on the Financial and Economic commissions, andwere bidden to elect them. The nineteen delegates of these Statesprotested on the ground that this arrangement would not give themsufficient weight in the councils by which their interests would bediscussed. These malcontents were headed by Senhor Epistacio Pessoa, thePresident-elect of the United States of Brazil. The Polish delegate, M. Dmowski, addressing the meeting, suggested that they should not proceedto an election, the results of which might stand in no relation to theinterests which the states represented had in matters of Europeanfinance, but that they should ask the Great Powers to appoint thedelegates. To this the President-elect of Brazil demurred, taking theground that it would be undignified for the lesser states to submit tohave their spokesman nominated by the greater. Thereupon they electedfive delegates, all of them from South American countries, to deal withEuropean finance, leaving the Europeans to choose five from amongthemselves. This would have given ten in all to the communities whoseinterests were described as limited, and was an affront to the GreatPowers. 

This comedy was severely judged and its authors reprimanded by the headsof the Conference, who, while quashing the elections, relented to theextent of promising that extra delegates might be appointed for thelesser nations later on. As a matter of fact, the number of commissionswas of no real consequence, because on all momentous issues theirfindings, unless they harmonized with the decisions of the chiefplenipotentiaries, were simply ignored. 

The curious attitude of the Supreme Council toward Rumania may becontemplated from various angles of vision. But the safest coign ofvantage from which to look at it is that formed by the facts. 

Rumania's grievances were many, and they began at the opening of theConference, when she was refused more than two delegates as against thefive attributed to each of the Great Powers and three each for Serbiaand Belgium, whose populations are numerically inferior to hers. Thenher treaty with Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the strength ofwhich she entered the war, was upset by its more powerful signatories assoon as the frontier question was mooted at the Conference. Further, theexistence of the Rumanian delegation was generally ignored by theSupreme Council. Thus, when the treaty with Germany was presented toCount von Brockdorff-Rantzau, a mere journalist[143] at the Conferencepossessed a complete copy, whereas the Rumanian delegation, headed bythe Prime Minister Bratiano, had cognizance only of an incompletesummary. When the fragmentary treaty was drafted for Austria, theRumanian delegation saw the text only on the evening before thepresentation, and, noticing inacceptable clauses, formulatedreservations. These reservations were apparently acquiesced in by themembers of the Supreme Council. That, at any rate, was the impression ofMM. Bratiano and Misu. But on the following day, catching a glimpse ofthe draft, they discovered that the obnoxious provisions had been leftintact. Then they lodged their reserves in writing, but to no purpose. One of the obligations imposed on Rumania by the Powers was a promise toaccept in advance any and every measure that the Supreme Council mightframe for the protection of minorities in the country, and for furtherrestricting the sovereignty of the state in matters connected with thetransit of Allied goods. And, lastly, the Rumanians complained that theaction of the Supreme Council was creating a dangerous ferment in theDobrudja, and even in Transylvania, where the Saxon minority, which hadwillingly accepted Rumanian sway, was beginning to agitate against it. In Bessarabia the non-Rumanian elements of the population were fiercelyopposing the Rumanians and invoking the support of the Peace Conference. The cardinal fact which, in the judgment of the Rumanians, dominated thesituation was the _quasi_ ultimatum presented to them in the spring, when they were summoned unofficially and privately to grant industrialconcessions to a pushing body of financiers, or else to abide by theconsequences, one of which, they were told, would be the loss ofAmerica's active assistance. They had elected to incur the threatenedpenalty after having carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantagesof laying the matter before President Wilson himself, and inquiringofficially whether the action in question was--as they felt sure it mustbe--in contradiction with the President's east European policy. For itwould be sad to think that abundant petroleum might have washed awaymany of the tribulations which the Rumanians had afterward to endure, and that loans accepted on onerous conditions would, as was hinted, havesoftened the hearts of those who had it in their power to render theexistence of the nation sour or sweet. [144] "Look out, " exclaimed aRumanian to me. "You will see that we shall be spurned as Laodiceans, or worse, before the Conference is over. " Rumania's external situationwas even more perilous than her domestic plight. Situated between Russiaand Hungary, she came more and more to resemble the iron between thehammer and the anvil. A well-combined move of the two anarchist statesmight have pulverized her. Alive to the danger, her spokesmen in Pariswere anxious to guard against it, but the only hope they had at themoment was centered in the Great Powers, whose delegates at theConference were discharging the functions which the League of Nationswould be called on to fulfil whenever it became a real institution. Andtheir past experience of the Great Powers' mode of action was notcalculated to command their confidence. It was the Great Powers which, for their own behoof and without the slightest consideration for theinterests of Rumania, had constrained that country to declare waragainst the Central Empires[145] and had made promises of effectivesupport in the shape of Russian troops, war material of every kind, officers, and heavy artillery. But neither the promises of help nor theassurances that Germany's army of invasion would be immobilized wereredeemed, and so far as one can now judge they ought never to have beenmade. For what actually came to pass--the invasion of the country byfirst-class German armies under Mackensen--might easily have beenforeseen, and was actually foretold. [146] The entire country was put tosack, and everything of value that could be removed was carried off toHungary, Germany, or Austria. The Allies lavished their verbalsympathies on the immolated nation, but did little else to succor it, and want and misery and disease played havoc with the people. 

After the armistice things became worse instead of better. TheHungarians were permitted to violate the conditions and keep a powerfularmy out of all proportion to the area which they were destined toretain, and as the Allies disposed of no countering force in easternEurope, their commands were scoffed at by the Budapest Cabinet. In thespring of 1919 the Bolshevists of Hungary waxed militant and threatenedthe peace of Rumania, whose statesmen respectfully sued for permissionto occupy certain commanding positions which would have enabled theirarmies to protect the land from invasion. But the Duumviri in Parisnegatived the request. They fancied that they understood the situationbetter than the people on the spot. Thereupon the Bolshevists, everready for an opportunity, seized upon the opening afforded them by theSupreme Council, attacked the Rumanians, and invaded their territory. Nothing abashed, the two Anglo-Saxon statesmen comforted M. Bratiano andhis colleagues with the expression of their regret and the promise thattranquillity would not again be disturbed. The Supreme Council would seeto that. But this promise, like those that preceded it, was broken. 

The Rumanians went so far as to believe that the Supreme Council eitherhad Bolshevist leanings or underwent secret influences--perhapsunwittingly--the nature of which it was not easy to ascertain. Insupport of these theories they urged that when the Rumanians were on thevery point of annihilating the Red troops of Kuhn, it was the SupremeCouncil which interposed its authority to save them, and did save themeffectually, when nothing else could have done it. That Kuhn was on thepoint of collapsing was a matter of common knowledge. A radio-telegramflashed from Budapest by one of his lieutenants contained thissignificant avowal: "He [Kuhn] has announced that the Hungarian forcesare in flight. The troops which occupied a good position at thebridgehead of Gomi have abandoned it, carrying with them the men whowere doing their duty. In Budapest preparations are going forward forequipping fifteen workmen's battalions. " In other words, the downfall ofBolshevism had begun. The Rumanians were on the point of achieving it. Their troops on the bank of the river Tisza[147] were preparing to marchon Budapest. And it was at that critical moment that the world-arbitersat the Conference who had anathematized the Bolshevists as the curse ofcivilization interposed their authority and called a halt. If they hadsolid grounds for intervening they were not avowed. M. Clemenceau sentfor M. Bratiano and vetoed the march in peremptory terms which did scantjustice to the services rendered and the sacrifices made by the Rumanianstate. Secret arrangements, it was whispered, had been come to betweenagents of the Powers and Kuhn. At the time nobody quite understood themotive of the sudden change of disposition evinced by the Allies towardthe Magyar Bolshevists. For it was assumed that they still regarded theBolshevist leaders as outlaws. One explanation was that they objected toallow the Rumanian army alone to occupy the Hungarian capital. But thatwould not account for their neglect to despatch an Inter-Alliedcontingent to restore order in the city and country. For they remainedabsolutely inactive while Kuhn's supporters were rallying andconsolidating their scattered and demoralized forces, and they kept theRumanians from balking the Bolshevist work of preparing another attack. As one of their French critics[148] remarked, they dealt exclusively innegatives--some of them pernicious enough, whereas a positive policywas imperatively called for. To reconstruct a nation, not to say aruined world, a series of contradictory vetoes is hardly sufficient. Butanother explanation of their attitude was offered which gainedwidespread acceptance. It will be unfolded presently. 

The dispersed Bolshevist army, thus shielded, soon recovered its nerve, and, feeling secure on the Rumanian front, where the Allies held theinvading troops immobilized, attacked the Slovaks and overran theircountry. For Bolshevism is by nature proselytizing. The Prague Cabinetwas dismayed. The new-born Czechoslovak state was shaken. A catastrophemight, as it seemed, ensue at any moment. Rumania's troops were on thewatch for the signal to resume their march, but it came not. TheCzechoslovaks were soliciting it prayerfully. But the weak-kneedplenipotentiaries in Paris were minded to fight, if at all, with weaponstaken from a different arsenal. In lieu of ordering the Rumanian troopsto march on Budapest, they addressed themselves to the Bolshevistleader, Kuhn, summoned him to evacuate the Slovak country, andvolunteered the promise that they would compel the Rumanians towithdraw. This amazing line of action was decided on by the secretCouncil of Three without the assent or foreknowledge of the nation towhose interests it ran counter and the head of whose government wasrubbing shoulders with the plenipotentiaries every day. But M. Bratiano's existence and that of his fellow-delegate was systematicallyignored. It is not easy to fathom the motives that inspired thissupercilious treatment of the spokesman of a nation which wassacrificing its sons in the service of the Allies as well as its own. Personal antipathy, however real, cannot be assumed without convincinggrounds to have been the mainspring. 

But there was worse than the contemptuous treatment of a colleague whowas also the chief Minister of a friendly state. If an order was to begiven to the Rumanian government to recall its forces from the frontwhich they occupied, elementary courtesy and political tact as well asplain common sense would have suggested its being communicated, in thefirst instance, to the chief of that government--who was then residentin Paris--as head of his country's delegation to the Conference. Butthat was not the course taken. The statesmen of the Secret Council hadrecourse to the radio, and, without consulting M. Bratiano, despatched amessage "to the government in Bucharest" enjoining on it the withdrawalof the Rumanian army. For they were minded scrupulously to redeem theirpromise to the Bolshevists. One need not be a diplomatist to realize theamazement of "the Rumanian government" on receiving this abrupt behest. The feelings of the Premier, when informed of these underhand doings, can readily be imagined. And it is no secret that the temper of a largesection of the Rumanian people was attuned by these petty freaks tosentiments which boded no good to the cause for which the Alliesprofessed to be working. In September M. Bratiano was reported as havingstigmatized the policy adopted by the Conference toward Rumania as beingof a "malicious and dangerous character. "[149]

The frontier to which the troops were ordered to withdraw had, as wesaw, just been assigned to Rumania[150] without the assent of hergovernment, and with a degree of secrecy and arbitrariness that gavedeep offense, not only to her official representatives, but also tothose parliamentarians and politicians who from genuine attachment orfor peace' sake were willing to go hand in hand with the Entente. "Ifone may classify the tree by its fruits, " exclaimed a Rumanian statesmanin my hearing, "the great Three are unconscious Bolshevists. They areundermining respect for authority, tradition, plain, straightforwarddealing, and, in the case of Rumania, are behaving as though theirstaple aim were to detach our nation from France and the Entente. Andthis aim is not unattainable. The Rumanian people were heart and soulwith the French, but the bonds which were strong a short while ago arebeing weakened among an influential section of the people, to the regretof all Rumanian patriots. "

The answer given by the "Rumanian government in Bucharest" to theperemptory order of the Secret Council was a reasoned refusal to comply. Rumania, taught by terrible experience, declined to be led once moreinto deadly peril against her own better judgment. Her statesmen, moreintimately acquainted with the Hungarians than were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Wilson, and M. Clemenceau, required guaranties which could besupplied only by armed forces--Rumanian or Allied. Unless and untilHungary received a government chosen by the free will of the people andcapable of offering guaranties of good conduct, the troops must remainwhere they were. For the line which they occupied at the moment could bedefended with four divisions, whereas the new one could not be held byless than seven or eight. The Council was therefore about to commitanother fateful mistake, the consequences of which it was certain toshift to the shoulders of the pliant people. It was then that Rumania'sleaders kicked against the pricks. 

To return to the dispute between Bucharest and Paris: the Rumaniangovernment would have been willing to conform to the desire of theSupreme Council and withdraw its troops if the Supreme Council wouldonly make good its assurance and guarantee Rumania effectually fromfuture attacks by the Hungarians. The proviso was reasonable, and as ameasure of self-defense imperative. The safeguard asked for was acontingent of Allied force. But the two supreme councilors in Parisdealt only in counters. All they had to offer to M. Bratiano were verbalexhortations before the combat and lip-sympathy after defeat, and thesethe Premier rejected. But here, as in the case of the Poles, therepresentatives of the "Allied and Associated" Powers insisted. Theywere profuse of promises, exhortations, and entreaties before passing tothreats--of guaranties they said nothing--but the Rumanian Premier, turning a deaf ear to cajolery and intimidation, remained inflexible. For he was convinced that their advice was often vitiated by grossignorance and not always inspired by disinterestedness, while the ordersthey issued were hardly more than the velleities of well-meaning gropersin the dark who lacked the means of executing them. 

The eminent plenipotentiaries, thus set at naught by a little state, ruminated on the embarrassing situation. In all such cases theirpractice had been to resign themselves to circumstances if they provedunable to bend circumstances to their schemes. It was thus thatPresident Wilson had behaved when British statesmen declined even tohear him on the subject of the freedom of the seas, when M. Clemenceaurefused to accept a peace that denied the Saar Valley and a pledge ofmilitary assistance to France, and when Japan insisted on theretrocession of Shantung. Toward Italy an attitude of firmness had beenassumed, because owing to her economic dependence on Britain and theUnited States she could not indulge in the luxury of nonconformity. Hence the plenipotentiaries, and in particular Mr. Wilson, assertedtheir will inexorably and were painfully surprised that one of thelesser states had the audacity to defy it. 

The circumstance that after their triumph over Italy the world'strustees were thus publicly flouted by a little state of eastern Europewas gall and wormwood to them. It was also a menace to the cause withwhich they were identified. None the less, they accepted the inevitablefor the moment, pitched their voices in a lower key, and decided toapprove the Rumanian thesis that Neo-Bolshevism in Hungary must be nolonger bolstered up, [151] but be squashed vicariously. They accordinglyinvited the representatives of the three little countries on which thehonor of waging these humanitarian wars in the anarchist east of Europewas to be conferred, and sounded them as to their willingness to puttheir soldiers in the field, and how many as to the numbers available. M. Bratiano offered eight divisions. The Czechoslovaks did not relishthe project, but after some delay and fencing around agreed to furnish acontingent, whereas the Jugoslavs met the demand with a plain negative, which was afterward changed to acquiescence when the Council promised tokeep the Italians from attacking them. As things turned out, none butthe Rumanians actually fought the Hungarian Reds. Meanwhile the membersof the American, British, and Italian missions in Hungary endeavored toreach a friendly agreement with the criminal gang in Budapest. 

The plan of campaign decided on had Marshal Foch for its author. It was, therefore, business-like. He demanded a quarter of a million men, [152]to which it was decided that Rumania should contribute 120, 000, Jugoslavia 50, 000, and Czechoslovakia as many as she could convenientlyafford. But the day before the preparations were to have begun, [153]Bela Kuhn flung his troops[154] against the Rumanians with initialsuccess, drove them across the Tisza with considerable loss, took upcommanding positions, and struck dismay into the members of the SupremeCouncil. The Semitic Dictator, with grim humor, explained to thecrestfallen lawgivers, who were once more at fault, that a wanton breachof the peace was alien to his thoughts; that, on the contrary, hismotive for action deserved high praise--it was to compel the rebelliousRumanians to obey the behest of the Conference and withdraw to theirfrontiers. The plenipotentiaries bore this gibe with dignity, anddecided to have recourse once more to their favorite, and, indeed, onlymethod--the despatch of exhortative telegrams. Of more efficacious meansthey were destitute. This time their message, which lacked a definiteaddress, was presumably intended for the anti-Bolshevist population ofHungary, whom it indirectly urged to overthrow the Kuhn Cabinet andreceive the promised reward--namely, the privilege of entering intoformal relations with the Entente and signing the death-warrant of theMagyar state. It is not easy to see how this solution alone could haveenabled the Supreme Council to establish normal conditions andtranquillity in the land. But the Duumvirate seemed utterly incapable ofdevising a coherent policy for central or eastern Europe. Even whenHungary had a government friendly to the Entente they never obtained anyadvantage from it. They had had no use for Count Karolyi. They hadallowed things to slip and slide, and permitted--nay, helped--Bolshevismto thrive, although they had brand-marked it as a virulent epidemic tobe drastically stamped out. Temper, education, and training disqualifiedthem for seizing opportunity and pressing the levers that stood readyto their hand. 

In consequence of the vacillation of the two chiefs, who seldom stoodfirm in the face of difficulties, the members of the predatory gangwhich concealed its alien origin under Magyar nationality and itscriminal propensities[155] under a political mask had been enabled to goon playing an odious comedy, to the disgust of sensible people and thedetriment of the new and enlarged states of Europe. For the cost of theSupreme Council's weakness had to be paid in blood and substance, littlethough the two delegates appeared to realize this. The extent to whichthe ruinous process was carried out would be incredible were it notestablished by historic facts and documents. 

The permanent agents of the Powers in Hungary, [156] preferringconciliation to force, now exhorted the Hungarians to rid themselves ofKuhn and promised in return to expel the Rumanians from Hungarianterritory once more and to have the blockade raised. At the close ofJuly some Magyars from Austria met Kuhn at a frontier station[157] andstrove to persuade him to withdraw quietly into obscurity, but he, confiding in the policy of the Allies and his star, scouted thesuggestion. It was at this juncture that the Rumanians, pushing on toBudapest, resolved, come what might, to put an end to the intolerablesituation and to make a clean job of it once for all. And theysucceeded. 

For Rumania's initial military reverse[158] was the result of asurprise attack by some eighty thousand men. But her troops rapidlyregained their warlike spirit, recrossed the river Tisza, shattered theNeo-Bolshevist regime, and reached the environs of Budapest. 

By the 1st of August the lawless band that was ruining the countryrelinquished the reins of power, which were taken over at first by aSocialist Cabinet of which an influential French press organ wrote: "Thenames of the new . . . Commissaries of the people tell us nothing, becausetheir bearers are unknown. But the endings of their names tell us thatmost of them are, like those of the preceding government, of Jewishorigin. Never since the inauguration of official communism did Budapestbetter deserve the appellation of Judapest, which was assigned to it bythe late M. Lueger, chief of the Christian Socialists of Vienna. That isan additional trait in common with the Russian Soviets. "[159]

The Rumanians presented a stiff ultimatum to the new Hungarian Cabinet. They were determined to safeguard their country and its neighbors from arepetition of the danger and of the sacrifices it entailed; in otherwords, to dictate the terms of a new armistice. The Powers demurred andordered them to content themselves with the old one concluded by theSerbian Voyevod Mishitch and General Henrys in November of the precedingyear and violated subsequently by the Magyars. But the objections tothis course were many and unanswerable. In fact they were largelyidentical with the objections which the Supreme Council itself hadoffered to the Polish-Ukrainian armistice. And besides these there wereothers. For example, the Rumanians had had no hand or part in draftingthe old armistice. Moreover it was clearly inapplicable to the freshcampaign which was waged and terminated nine months after it had beendrawn up. Experience had shown that it was inadequate to guaranteepublic tranquillity, for it had not hindered Magyar attacks on theRumanians and Czechoslovaks. The Rumanians, therefore, now that they hadworsted their adversaries, were resolved to disarm them and secure areal peace. They decided to leave fifteen thousand troops for themaintenance of internal order. [160] Rumania's insistence on the deliveryof live-stock, corn, agricultural machinery, and rolling-stock forrailways was, it was argued, necessitated by want and justified byequity. For it was no more than partial reparation for the immenselosses wantonly inflicted on the nation by the Magyars and their allies. Until then no other amends had been made or even offered. The Austrians, Hungarians, and Germans, during their two years' occupation of Rumania, had seized and carried off from the latter country two million fivehundred thousand tons of wheat and hundreds of thousands of head ofcattle, besides vast quantities of clothing, wool, skins, and rawmaterial, while thousands of Rumanian homes were gutted and theircontents taken away and sold in the Central Empires. Factories werestripped of their machinery and the railways of their engines andwagons. When Mackensen left there remained in Rumania only fiftylocomotives out of the twelve hundred which she possessed before thewar. The material, therefore, that Rumania removed from Hungary duringthe first weeks of the occupation represented but a small part of thequantities of which she had been despoiled during the war. 

It was further urged that at the beginning the Rumanian delegates wouldhave contented themselves with reparation for losses wantonly inflictedand for the restitution of the property wrongfully taken from them bytheir enemies, on the lines on which France had obtained this offset. They had asked for this, but were informed that their request could notbe complied with. They were not even permitted to send a representativeto Germany to point out to the Inter-Allied authorities the objects ofwhich their nation had been robbed, as though the plunderers wouldvoluntarily give up their ill-gotten stores! It was partly because ofthese restrictions that the Rumanian authorities resolved to take whatbelonged to them without more ado. And they could not, they said, affordto wait, because they were expecting an attack by the Russian Bolshevikiand it behooved them to have done with one foe before taking on another. These explanations irritated in lieu of calming the Supreme Council. 

"Possibly, " wrote the well-informed _Temps_, "Rumania would have beenbetter treated if she had closed with certain proposals of loans oncrushing terms or complied with certain demands for oilconcessions. "[161] Possibly. But surely problems of justice, equity, andright ought never to have been mixed up with commercial and industrialinterests, whether with the connivance or by the carelessness of theholders of a vast trust who needed and should have merited unlimitedconfidence. It is neither easy nor edifying to calculate the harm whichtransactions of this nature, whether completed or merely inchoate, arecapable of inflicting on the great community for whose moral as well asmaterial welfare the Supreme Council was laboring in darkness against somany obstacles of its own creation. Is it surprising that the stateswhich suffered most from these weaknesses of the potent delegates shouldhave resented their misdirection and endeavored to help themselves asbest they could? It may be blameworthy and anti-social, but it isunhappily natural and almost unavoidable. It is sincerely to beregretted that the art of stimulating the nations--about which thedelegates were so solicitous--to enthusiastic readiness to accept theCouncil as the "moral guide of the world" should have been exercised insuch bungling fashion. 

The Supreme Council then feeling impelled to assert its dignity againstthe wilfulness of a small nation decided on ignoring alike the serviceand the disservice rendered by Rumania's action. Accordingly, itproceeded without reference to any of the recent events except thedisappearance of the Bolshevist gang. Four generals were accordinglytold off to take the conduct of Hungarian affairs into their handsdespite their ignorance of the actual conditions of the problem. [162]They were ordered to disarm the Magyars, to deliver up Hungary's warmaterial to the Allies, of whom only the Rumanians and the Czechoslovakshad taken the field against the enemy since the conclusion of thearmistice the year before, and they were also to exercise theirauthority over the Rumanian victors and the Serbs, both of whom occupiedHungarian territory. The _Temps_ significantly remarked that the SupremeCouncil, while not wishing to deal with any Hungarian government but onequalified to represent the country, "seems particularly eager to seeresumed the importation of foreign wares into Hungary. Certain personsappear to fear that Rumania, by retaking from the Magyars wagons andengines, might check the resumption of this traffic. "[163]

What it all came to was that the Great Powers, who had left Rumania toher fate when she was attacked by the Magyars, intervened the moment theassailed nation, helping itself, got the better of its enemy, and thenthey resolved to balk it of the fruits of victory and of the safeguardsit would fain have created for the future. It was to rely upon theSupreme Council once more, to take the broken reed for a solid staff. That the Powers had something to urge in support of their interpositionwill not be denied. They rightly set forth that Rumania was notHungary's only creditor. Her neighbors also possessed claims that mustbe satisfied as far as feasible, and equity prompted the pooling of allavailable assets. This plea could not be refuted. But the credit whichthe pleaders ought to have enjoyed in the eyes of the Rumanian nationwas so completely sapped by their antecedents that no heed was paid totheir reasoning, suasion, or promises. 

Rumania, therefore, in requisitioning Hungarian property was formally inthe wrong. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that she, likeother nations, was exasperated by the high-handed action of the GreatPowers, who proceeded as though her good-will and loyalty were of noconsequence to the pacification of eastern Europe. 

After due deliberation the Supreme Council agreed upon the wording of aconciliatory message, not to the Rumanians, but to the Magyars, to bedespatched to Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli. The gist of it was the oldrefrain, "to carry out the terms of the armistice[164] and respect thefrontiers traced by the Supreme Council[165] and we will protect youfrom the Rumanians, who have no authority from us. We are sendingforthwith an Inter-Allied military commission[166] to superintend thedisarmament and see that the Rumanian troops withdraw. "

It cannot be denied that the Rumanian conditions were drastic. But itshould be remembered that the provocation amounted almost tojustification. And as for the crime of disobedience, it will not begainsaid that a large part of the responsibility fell on the shouldersof the lawgivers in Paris, whose decrees, coming oracularly fromOlympian heights without reference to local or other concretecircumstances, inflicted heavy losses in blood and substance on theill-starred people of Rumania. And to make matters worse, Rumania'sofficial representatives at the Conference had been not merely ignored, but reprimanded like naughty school-children by a harsh dominie andoccasionally humiliated by men whose only excuse was nervous tensenessin consequence of overwork combined with morbid impatience at beingcontradicted in matters which they did not understand. Other states hadcontemplated open rebellion against the big ferrule of the "bosses, " andmore than once the resolution was taken to go on strike unless certainconcessions were accorded them. Alone the Rumanians executed theirresolve. 

Naturally the destiny-weavers of peoples and nations in Paris weredismayed at the prospect and apprehensive lest the Rumanians should endthe war in their own way. They despatched three notes in quicksuccession to the Bucharest government, one of which reads like apeevish indictment hastily drafted before the evidence had been siftedor even carefully read. It raked up many of the old accusations that hadbeen leveled against the Rumanians, tacked them on to the crime ofinsubordination, and without waiting for an answer--assuming, in fact, that there could be no satisfactory answer--summoned them to provepublicly by their acts that they accepted and were ready to execute ingood faith the policy decided upon by the Conference. [167]

That note seemed unnecessarily offensive and acted on the Rumanians asa powerful irritant, [168] besides exposing the active members of theSupreme Council to scathing criticism. The Rumanians asked their Ententefriends in private to outline the policy which they were accused ofcountering, and were told in reply that it was beyond the power of themost ingenious hair-splitting casuist to define or describe. "As forus, " wrote one of the stanchest supporters of the Entente in Frenchjournalism, "who have followed with attention the labors and theutterances, written and oral, of the Four, the Five, the Ten, of theSupreme and Superior Councils, we have not yet succeeded in discoveringwhat was the 'policy decided by the Conference. ' We have indeed heard orread countless discourses pronounced by the choir-masters. They aboundin noble thought, in eloquent expositions, in protests, and in promises. But of aught that could be termed a policy we have not found atrace. "[169] This verdict will be indorsed by the historian. 

The Rumanians seemed in no hurry to reply to the Council's three notes. They were said to be too busy dealing out what they considered rough andready justice to their enemies, and were impatient of the interventionof their "friends. " They seized rolling-stock, cattle, agriculturalimplements, and other property of the kind that had been stolen fromtheir own people and sent the booty home without much ado. Work of thiskind was certain to be accompanied by excesses and the Conferencereceived numerous protests from the aggrieved inhabitants. But on thewhole Rumania, at any rate during the first few weeks of the occupation, had the substantial sympathy of the largest and most influentialsection of the world's press. People declared that they were glad tosee the haze of self-righteousness and cant at last dispelled by a whiffof wholesome egotism. From the outspoken comments of the most widelycirculating journals in France and Britain the dictators in Paris, whowere indignant that the counsels of the strong should carry so littleweight in eastern Europe, could acquaint themselves with the impressionwhich their efforts at cosmic legislation were producing among the sanerelements of mankind. 

In almost every language one could read words of encouragement to therecalcitrant Rumanians for having boldly burst the irksome bonds inwhich the peoples of the world were being pinioned. "It is our view, "wrote one firm adherent of the Entente, "that having proved incapable ofprotecting the Rumanians in their hour of danger, our alliance cannotto-day challenge the safeguards which they have won forthemselves. "[170]

"If liberty had her old influence, " one read in another popularjournal, [171] "the Great Powers would not be bringing pressure to bearon Rumania with the object of saving Hungary from richly deservedpunishment. " "Instead of nagging the Rumanians, " wrote an eminent Frenchpublicist, "they would do much better to keep the Turks in hand. If theTurks in despair, in order to win American sympathies, proclaimthemselves socialists, syndicalists, or laborists, will President Wilsonpermit them to renovate Armenia and other places after the manner ofJinghiz Khan?"[172]

But what may have weighed with the Supreme Council far more than thedisapproval of publicists were its own impotence, the undignified figureit was cutting, and the injury that was being done to the future Leagueof Nations by the impunity with which one of the lesser states couldthus set at naught the decisions of its creators and treat them withalmost the same disrespect which they themselves had displayed towardthe Rumanian delegates in Paris. They saw that once their energeticrepresentations were ignored by the Bucharest government they were atthe end of their means of influencing it. To compel obedience by forcewas for the time being out of the question. In these circumstances theonly issue left them was to make a virtue of necessity and veer round tothe Rumanian point of view as unobtrusively as might be, so as to tideover the transient crisis. And that was the course which they finallystruck out. 

Matters soon came to the culminating point. The members of the AlliedMilitary Mission had received full powers to force the commanders of thetroops of occupation to obey the decisions of the Conference, and whenthey were confronted with M. Diamandi, the ex-Minister to Petrograd, they issued their orders in the name of the Supreme Council. "We takeorders here only from our own government, which is in Bucharest, " wasthe answer they received. The Rumanians have a proverb which runs: "Evena donkey will not fall twice into the same quicksand, " and they may havequoted it to General Gorton when refusing to follow the Allies aftertheir previous painful experience. Then the mission telegraphed to Parisfor further instructions. [173] In the meanwhile the Rumanian governmenthad sent its answer to the three notes of the Council. And its tenor wasfirm and unyielding. Undeterred by menaces, M. Bratiano maintained thathe had done the right thing in sending troops to Budapest, imposingterms on Hungary and re-establishing order. As a matter of fact he hadrendered a sterling service to all Europe, including France andBritain. For if Kuhn and his confederates had contrived to overrunRumania, the Great Powers would have been morally bound to hasten to theassistance of their defeated ally. The press was permitted to announcethat the Council of Five was preparing to accept the Rumanian position. The members of the Allied Military Mission were informed that they werenot empowered to give orders to the Rumanians, but only to consult andnegotiate with them, whereby all their tact and consideration wereearnestly solicited. 

But the palliatives devised by the delegates were unavailing to heal thebreach. After a while the Council, having had no answer to its urgentnotes, decided to send an ultimatum to Rumania, calling on her torestore the rolling-stock which she had seized and to evacuate theHungarian capital. The terms of this document were described asharsh. [174] Happily, before it was despatched the Council learned thatthe Rumanian government had never received the communications norseventy others forwarded by wireless during the same period. Once moreit had taken a decision without acquainting itself of the facts. Thereupon a special messenger[175] was sent to Bucharest with a note"couched in stern terms, " which, however, was "milder in tone" than theultimatum. 

To go back for a moment to the elusive question of motive, which was notwithout influence on Rumania's conduct. Were the action and inaction ofthe plenipotentiaries merely the result of a lack of cohesion amongtheir ideas? Or was it that they were thinking mainly of the fleetinginterests of the moment and unwilling to precipitate their conceptionsof the future in the form of a constructive policy? The historian willdo well to leave their motives to another tribunal and confine himselfto facts, which even when carefully sifted are numerous and significantenough. 

During the progress of the events just sketched there were launchedcertain interesting accounts of what was going on below the surface, which had such impartial and well-informed vouchers that the chroniclerof the Conference cannot pass them over in silence. If true, as theyappear to be, they warrant the belief that two distinct elements lay atthe root of the Secret Council's dealings with Rumania. One of them wastheir repugnance to her whole system of government, with its survivalsof feudalism, anti-Semitism, and conservatism. Associated with this was, people alleged, a wish to provoke a radical and, as they thought, beneficent change in the entire régime by getting rid of its chiefs. This plan had been successfully tried against MM. Orlando and Sonnino inItaly. Their solicitude for this latter aim may have been whetted by apersonal lack of sympathy for the Rumanian delegates, with whom theAnglo-Saxon chiefs hardly ever conversed. It was no secret that theRumanian Premier found it exceedingly difficult to obtain an audience ofhis colleague President Wilson, from whom he finally parted almost asmuch a stranger as when he first arrived in Paris. 

It may not be amiss to record an instance of the methods of the SupremeCouncil, for by putting himself in the place of the Rumanian Premier thereader may the more clearly understand his frame of mind toward thatbody. In June the troops of Moritz (or Bela) Kuhn had inflicted a severedefeat on the Czechoslavs. Thereupon the Secret Council of Four or Five, whose shortsighted action was answerable for the reverse, decided toremonstrate with him. Accordingly they requested him to desist from theoffensive. Only then did it occur to them that if he was to withdrawhis armies behind the frontiers, he must be informed where thesefrontiers were. They had already been determined in secret by the threegreat statesmen, who carefully concealed them not merely from aninquisitive public, but also from the states concerned. The Rumanian, Jugoslav and Czechoslovak delegates were, therefore, as much in the darkon the subject as were rank outsiders and enemies. But as soon ascircumstances forced the hand of all the plenipotentiaries the secrethad to be confided to them all. [176] The Hungarian Dictator pleaded thatif his troops had gone out of bounds it was because the frontiers wereunknown to him. The Czechoslovaks respectfully demurred to one of theboundaries along the river Ipol which it was difficult to justify andeasy to rectify. But the Rumanian delegation, confronted with the map, met the decision with a frank protest. For it amounted to theabandonment of one of their three vital irreducible claims which theywere not empowered to renounce. Consequently they felt unable toacquiesce in it. But the Supreme Council insisted. The second delegate, M. Misu, was in consequence obliged to start at once for Bucharest toconsult with the King and the Cabinet and consider what action thecircumstances called for. In the meantime, the entire question, andtogether with it some of the practical consequences involved by thetentative solution, remained in suspense. 

When certain clauses of the Peace Treaty, which, although theymaterially affected Rumania, had been drafted without the knowledge ofher plenipotentiaries, were quite ready, the Rumanian Premier wassummoned to take cognizance of them. Their tenor surprised and irritatedhim. As he felt unable to assent to them, and as the document was to bepresented to the enemy in a day or two, he deemed it his duty to mentionhis objections at once. But hardly had he begun when M. Clemenceau aroseand exclaimed, "M. Bratiano, you are here to listen, not to comment. "Stringent measures may have been considered useful and dictatorialmethods indispensable in default of reasoning or suasion, but it wassurely incumbent on those who employed them to choose a form which woulddeprive them of their sting or make them less personally painful. 

For whatever one may think of the wisdom of the policy adopted by theSupreme Council toward the unprivileged states, it would be difficult tojustify the manner in which they imposed it. Patience, tact, and suasionare indispensable requisites in men who assume the functions of leadersand guides, yet know that military force alone is inadequate to shapethe future after their conception. The delegates could look only tomoral power for the execution of their far-reaching plans, yet theyspurned the means of acquiring it. The best construction one can putupon their action will represent it as the wrecking of the substance bythe form. By establishing a situation of force throughout Europe theCouncil created and sanctioned the principle that it must be maintainedby force. 

But the affronted nations did not stop at this mild criticism. Theyassailed the policy itself, cast suspicion on the disinterestedness ofthe motives that inspired it, and contributed thereby to generate anatmosphere of distrust in which the frail organism that was shortly tobe called into being could not thrive. Contemplated through thisdistorting medium, one set of delegates was taunted with aiming at amonopoly of imperialism and the other with rank hypocrisy. It issuperfluous to remark that the idealism and lofty aims of the Presidentof the United States were never questioned by the most recklessThersites. The heaviest charges brought against him were weakness ofwill, exaggerated self-esteem, impatience of contradiction, and a naiveyearning for something concrete to take home with him, in the shape of acovenant of peoples. 

The reports circulating in the French capital respecting vast commercialenterprises about to be inaugurated by English-speaking peoples andabout proposals that the governments of the countries interested shouldfacilitate them, were destructive of the respect due to statesmen whoseattachment to lofty ideals should have absorbed every other motive intheir ethico-political activity. Thus it was affirmed by responsiblepoliticians that an official representative of an English-speakingcountry gave expression to the view, which he also attributed to hisgovernment, that henceforth his country should play a much larger partin the economic life of eastern Europe than any other nation. This, headded, was a conscious aim which would be steadily pursued, and to theattainment of which he hoped the politicians and their people wouldcontribute. So far this, it may be contended, was perfectly legitimate. 

But it was further affirmed, and not by idle quidnuncs, that one ofRumania's prominent men had been informed that Rumania could count onthe good-will and financial assistance of the United States only if herPremier gave an assurance that, besides the special privileges to beconferred on the Jewish minority in his country, he would also grantindustrial and commercial concessions to certain Jewish groups and firmswho reside and do business in the United States. And by way of takingtime by the forelock one or more of these firms had already despatchedrepresentatives to Rumania to study and, if possible, earmark theresources which they proposed to exploit. 

Now, to expand the trade of one's country is a legitimate ambition, andto hold that Jewish firms are the best qualified to develop theresources of Rumania is a tenable position. But to mix up any commercialscheme with the ethical regeneration of Europe is, to put it mildly, impolitic. However unimpeachable the motives of the promoter of such aproject, it is certain to damage both causes which he has at heart. Butthe report does not leave the matter here. It goes on to state that avery definite proposal, smacking of an ultimatum, was finally presented, which set before the Rumanians two alternatives from which they were tochoose--either the concessions asked for, which would earn for them thefinancial assistance of the United States, or else no concessions and nohelp. 

At a Conference, the object of which was the uplifting of the life ofnations from the squalor of sordid ambitions backed by brutal force, toideal aims and moral relationship, haggling and chaffering such as thisseemed wholly out of place. It reminded one of "those that sold oxen andsheep and doves, and the changers of money sitting" in the temple ofJerusalem who were one day driven out with "a scourge of small cords. "The Rumanians hoped that the hucksters in the latter-day temple of peacemight be got rid of in a similar way; one of them suggested boldlyasking President Wilson himself to say what he thought of the policyunderlying the disconcerting proposal. . . . 

The other alleged element of the Supreme Council's attitude needs noqualification. The mystery that enwrapped the orders from the Conferencewhich suddenly arrested the march of the Rumanian and Allied troops, when they were nearing Budapest for the purpose of overthrowing BelaKuhn, never perplexed those who claimed to possess trustworthyinformation about the goings-on between certain enterprising officersbelonging some to the Allied Army of Occupation and others to theHungarian forces. One of these transactions is alleged to have takenplace between Kuhn himself, who is naturally a shrewd observer and hardbargain-driver, and a certain financial group which for obvious reasonsremained nameless. The object of the compact was the bestowal on thegroup of concessions in the Banat in return for an undertaking that theBolshevist Dictator would be left in power and subsequently honored byan invitation to the Conference. The plenipotentiaries' commandarresting the march against Kuhn and their conditional promise to summonhim to the Conference, dovetail with this contract. These undeniablecoincidences are humiliating. The nexus between them was discovered andannounced before the stipulations were carried out. 

The Banat had been an apple of discord ever since the close ofhostilities. The country, inhabited chiefly by Rumanians, but with aconsiderable admixture of Magyar and Saxon elements, is one of therichest unexploited regions in Europe. Its mines of gold, zinc, lead, coal, and iron offer an irresistible temptation to pushing capitalistsand their governments, who feel further attracted by the credibleannouncement that it also possesses oil in quantities large enough towarrant exploitation. It was partly in order to possess herself of theseabundant resources and create an accomplished fact that Serbia, who alsofounded her claim on higher ground, laid hands on the administration ofthe Banat. But the experiment was disappointing. The Jugoslavs havingfailed to maintain themselves there, the bargain just sketched wasentered into by officers of the Hungarian and Allied armies. Forconcession-hunters are not fastidious about the nationality or characterof those who can bestow what they happen to be seeking. 

This stroke of jobbery had political consequences. That was inevitable. For so long as the Banat remained in Rumania or Serbian hands it couldnot be alienated in favor of any foreign group. Therefore secession fromboth those states was a preliminary condition to economic alienation. The task was bravely tackled. An "independent republic" was suddenlyadded to the states of Europe. This amazing creation, which fitted inwith the Balkanizing craze of the moment, was the work of a fewwire-pullers in which the easy-going inhabitants had neither hand norpart. Indeed, they were hardly aware that the Republic of the Banat hadbeen proclaimed. The amateur state-builders were obliging officers ofthe two armies, and behind them were speculators and concession-hunters. It was obvious that the new community, as it contained a very smallpopulation for an independent state, would require a protector. Itssponsors, who had foreseen this, provided for it by promising to assignthe humanitarian rôle of protectress of the Banat Republic to democraticFrance. And French agents were on the spot to approve the arrangement. Thus far the story, of which I have given but the merest outline. [177]

In this compromising fashion then Bela Kuhn was left for the time beingin undisturbed power, and none of his friends had any fear that he wouldbe driven out by the Allies so long as he contrived to hit it off withthe Hungarians. Should these turn away from him, however, thecosmopolitan financiers, whose cardinal virtues are suppleness andadaptability, would readily work with his successor, whoever he mightbe. The few who knew of this quickening of high ideals with low intriguewere shocked by the light-hearted way in which under the ægis of theConference a discreditable pact was made with the "enemy of the humanrace, " a grotesque régime foisted on a simple-minded people withoutconsideration for the principle of self-determination, and the veryexistence of the Czechoslovak Republic imperiled. Indeed, for a briefwhile it looked as though the Bolshevist forces of the Ukraine andRussia would effect a junction with the troops of Bela Kuhn and shattereastern Europe to shreds. To such dangerous extent did the SupremeCouncil indirectly abet the Bolshevist peace-breakers against theRumanians and Czechoslovak allies. 

It was at this conjuncture that a Rumanian friend remarked to me: "Theapprehension which our people expressed to you some months ago when theyrejected the demand for concessions has been verified by events. Pleaseremember that when striking the balance of accounts. "

The fact could not be blinked that in the camp of the Allies there was aserious schism. The partizans of the Supreme Council accused theBucharest government of secession, and were accused in turn of havingmisled their Rumanian partners, of having planned to exploit themeconomically, of having favored their Bolshevist invaders, and pursued apolicy of blackmail. The rights and wrongs of this quarrel had best beleft to another tribunal. What can hardly be gainsaid is that in ageneral way the Rumanians--and not these alone--were implicitly classedas people of a secondary category, who stood to gain by every measurefor their good which the culture-bearers in Paris might devise. Theseinferior nations were all incarnate anachronisms, relics of dark ageswhich had survived into an epoch of democracy and liberty, and it nowbehooved them to readjust themselves to that. Their institutions must bemodernized, their Old World conceptions abandoned, and their peopletaught to imitate the progressive nations of the West. What thepopulations thought and felt on the subject was irrelevant, they beingless qualified to judge what was good for them than theirself-constituted guides and guardians. To the angry voices which theirspokesmen uplifted no heed need be paid, and passive resistance could beovercome by coercion. This modified version of Carlyle's doctrine wouldseem to be at the root of the Supreme Council's action toward the lessernations generally and in especial toward Rumania. 

POLAND AND THE SUPREME COUNCIL

This frequent misdirection by the Supreme Council, however one mayexplain it, created an electric state of the political atmosphere amongall nations whose interests were set down or treated as "limited, " andmore than one of them, as we saw, contemplated striking out a policy ofpassive resistance. As a matter of fact some of them timidly adopted itmore than once, almost always with success and invariably with impunity. It was thus that the Czechoslovaks--the most docile of themall--disregarding the injunctions of the Conference, took possession ofcontentious territory, [178] and remained in possession of it for severalmonths, and that the Jugoslavs occupied a part of the district ofKlagenfurt and for a long time paid not the slightest heed to the orderissued by the Supreme Council to evacuate it in favor of the Austrians, and that the Poles applied the same tactics to eastern Galicia. Thestory of this last revolt is characteristic alike of the ignorance andof the weakness of the Powers which had assumed the functions ofworld-administrators. During the hostilities between the Ruthenians ofGalicia and the Poles the Council, taunted by the press with thenumerous wars that were being waged while the world's peace-makers werechatting about cosmic politics in the twilight of the Paris conclave, issued an imperative order that an armistice must be concluded at once. But the Poles appealed to events, which swiftly settled the matter asthey anticipated. Neither the Supreme Council nor the agents it employedhad a real grasp of the east European situation, or of the rôledeliberately assigned to Poland by its French sponsors--that ofsuperseding Russia as a bulwark against Germany in the East--or of thelocal conditions. Their action, as was natural in these circumstances, was a sequence of gropings in the dark, of incongruous behests, exhortations, and prohibitions which discredited them in the eyes ofthose on whose trust and docility the success of their mission depended. 

Consciousness of these disadvantages may have had much to do with therigid secrecy which the delegates maintained before their desultorytalks ripened into discussions. In the case of Poland, as of Rumania, the veil was opaque, and was never voluntarily lifted. One day[179] themembers of the Polish delegation, eager to get an inkling of what hadbeen arranged by the Council of Four about Dantzig, requested M. Clemenceau to apprize them at least of the upshot if not of the details. The French Premier, who has a quizzing way and a keen sense of humor, replied, "On the 26th inst. You will learn the precise terms. " ButPoland's representative insisted and pleaded suasively for a hint ofwhat had been settled. The Premier finally consented and said, "Tell theGeneral Secretary of the Conference, M. Dutasta, from me, that he maymake the desired communication to you. " The delegate accordinglyrepaired to M. Dutasta, preferred his request, and received this reply:"M. Clemenceau may say what he likes. His words do not bind theConference. Before I consider myself released from secrecy I must havethe consent of all his colleagues as well. If you would kindly bring metheir express authorization I will communicate the information youdemand. " That closed the incident. 

When the Council finally agreed to a solution, the delegates wereconvoked to learn its nature and to make a vow of obedience to itsdecisions. During the first stage of the Conference the representativesof the lesser states had sometimes been permitted to put questions andpresent objections. But later on even this privilege was withdrawn. Thefollowing description of what went on may serve as an illustration ofthe Council's mode of procedure. One day the Polish delegation wassummoned before the Special Commission to discuss an armistice betweenthe Ruthenians of Galicia and the Polish Republic. The late GeneralBotha, a shrewd observer, whose valuable experience of politicalaffairs, having been confined to a country which had not much in commonwith eastern Europe, could be of little help to him in solving thecomplex problems with which he was confronted, was handicapped from theoutset. Unacquainted with any languages but English and Dutch, thegeneral had to surmount the additional difficulty of carrying on theconversation through an interpreter. The form it took was somewhat asfollows:

"It is the wish of the Supreme Council, " the chairman began, "thatPoland should conclude an armistice with the Ruthenians, and under newconditions, the old ones having lost their force. [180] Are you preparedto submit your proposals?" "This is a military matter, " replied thePolish delegate, "and should be dealt with by experts. One of our mostcompetent military authorities will arrive shortly in Paris with fullpowers to treat with you on the subject. In the meantime, I agree thatthe old conditions are obsolete and must be changed. I can also mentionthree provisos without which no armistice is possible: (1) The Polesmust be permitted to get into permanent contact with Rumania. Thatinvolves their occupation of eastern Galicia. The principal grounds forthis demand are that our frontier includes that territory and that theRumanians are a law-abiding, pacific people whose interests never clashwith ours and whose main enemy--Bolshevism--is also ours. (2) The Alliesshall purge the Ukrainian army of the Bolshevists, German and otherdangerous elements that now pervade it and render peace impossible. (3)The Poles must have control of the oil-fields were it only because theseare now being treated as military resources and the Germans arereceiving from Galicia, which contains the only supplies now open tothem, all the oil they require and are giving the Ruthenians munitionsin return, thus perpetuating a continuous state of warfare. You canrealize that we are unwilling to have our oil-fields employed to supplyour enemies with war material against ourselves. " General Botha asked, "Would you be satisfied if, instead of occupying all eastern Galicia atonce in order to get into touch with the Rumanians, the latter were toadvance to meet you?" "Quite. That would satisfy us as a provisionalmeasure. " "But now suppose that the Supreme Council rejects your threeconditions--a probable contingency--- what course do you propose totake?" "In that case our action would be swayed by events, one of whichis the hostility of the Ruthenians, which would necessitate measures ofself-defense and the use of our army. And that would bring back thewhole issue to the point where it stands to-day. "[181] To thesuggestions made by the Polish delegate that the question of thearmistice be referred to Marshal Foch, the answer was returned that theMarshal's views carried no authority with the Supreme Council. 

General Botha, thereupon adopting an emotional tone, said: "I have onelast appeal to make to you. It behooves Poland to lift the question fromits present petty surroundings and set it in the larger frame of worldissues. What we are aiming at is the overthrow of militarism and thecessation of bloodshed. As a civilized nation Poland must surely see eyeto eye with the Supreme Council how incumbent it is on the Allies to puta stop to the misery that warfare has brought down on the world and isnow inflicting on the populations of Poland and eastern Galicia. ""Truly, " replied the Polish delegate, "and so thoroughly does sherealize it that it is repugnant to her to be satisfied with a shampeace, a mere pause during which a bloodier war may be organized. Wewant a settlement that really connotes peace, and our intimate knowledgeof the circumstances enables us to distinguish between that and a meretruce. That is the ground of our insistence. "

"Bear well in mind, " insisted the Boer general, "the friendly attitudeof the great Allies toward your country at a critical period of itshistory. They restored it. They meant and mean to help it to preserveits status. It behooves the Poles to show their appreciation of thisfriendship in a practical way by deferring to their wishes. Everythingthey ordain is for your good. Realize that and carry out their schemes. ""For their help we are and will remain grateful, " was the answer, "andwe will go as far toward meeting their wishes as is feasible withoutactually imperiling their contribution to the restoration of our state. But we cannot blink the facts that their views are sometimes mistakenand their power to realize them generally imaginary. They have madenumerous and costly mistakes already, which they now frankly avow. Ifthey persisted in their present plan they would be adding another to thelist. And as to their power to help us positively, it is nil. Theirinitial omission to send a formidable military force to Poland was anirreparable blunder, for it left them without an executive in easternEurope, where they now can help none of their protégées against theirrespective enemies. Poles, Rumanians, Jugoslavs are all left tothemselves. From the Allies they may expect inspiriting telegrams, butlittle else. In fact, the utmost they can do is to issue decrees thatmay or may not be obeyed. Examples are many. They obtained for us by thearmistice the right of disembarking troops at Dantzig, and we wereunspeakably grateful to them. But they failed to make the Germansrespect that right and we had to resign ourselves to abandon it. Theyordered the Ukrainians to cease their numerous attacks on us and weappreciated their thoughtfulness. But the order was disobeyed; we wereassailed and had no one to look to for help but ourselves. Still we aremost thankful for all that they could do. But if we concluded thearmistice which you are pleading for, this is what would happen: weshould have the Ruthenians arrayed against us on one side and theGermans on the other. Now if the Ruthenians have brains, their forceswill attack us at the same time as those of the Germans do. That issound tactics. But if their strength is only on paper, they will giveadmission to the Bolsheviki. That is the twofold danger which you, inthe name of the Great Powers, are unwillingly endeavoring to conjure upagainst us. If you admit its reality you cannot blame our reluctance toincur it. On the other hand, if you regard the peril as imaginary, youwill draw the obvious consequences and pledge the word of the GreatPowers that they will give us military assistance against it should itcome?"

If clear thinking and straightforward action has counted for anything, the matter would have been settled satisfactorily then and there. Butthe Great Powers operated less with argument than with more forciblestimuli. Holding the economic and financial resources of the world intheir hands, they sometimes merely toyed with reasoning and proceeded tocoerce where they were unable to convince or persuade. One day the chiefdelegate of one of the states "with limited interests" said to me: "Theunvarnished truth is that we are being coerced. There is no milder termto signify this procedure. Thus we are told that unless we indorse thedecrees of the Powers, whose interests are unlimited like theirassurance, they will withhold from us the supplies of food, rawmaterials, and money without which our national existence isinconceivable. Necessarily we must give way, at any rate for the timebeing. " Those words sum up the relations of the lesser to the greaterPowers. 

In the case of Poland the conversation ended thus--General Botha, addressing the delegate, said: "If you disregard the injunctions of theBig Four, who cannot always lay before you the grounds of their policy, you run the risk of being left to your own devices. And you know whatthat means. Think well before you decide!" Just then, as it chanced, only a part of General Haller's soldiers in France had been transportedto their own country, [182] and the Poles were in mortal terror lest thework of conveying the remainder should be interrupted. This, then, wasan implicit appeal to which they could not turn a wholly deaf ear. "Well, what is it that the Big Four ask of us?" inquired the delegate. "The conclusion of an armistice with the Ruthenians, also thatPoland--as one of the newly created states--should allow the freetransit of all the Allied goods through her territory. " The delegateexpressed a wish to be told why this measure should be restricted to thenewly made states. The answer was because it was in the nature of anexperiment and should, therefore, not be tried over too large an area. "There is also another little undertaking which you are requested togive--namely, that you will accept and act upon the future decisions ofthe commission whatever they may be. " "Without an inkling of theircharacter?" "If you have confidence in us you need have no misgivings asto that. " In spite of the deterrents the Polish delegation at thatinterview met all these demands with a firm _non possumus_. It upheldthe three conditions of the armistice, rejected the free transitproposal, and demurred to the demand for a promise to bow to all futuredecisions of a fallible commission. "When the Polish dispute with theCzechoslovaks was submitted to a commission we were not asked in advanceto abide by its decision. Why should a new rule be introduced now?"argued the Polish delegates. And there the matter rested for a briefwhile. 

But the respite lasted only a few days, at the expiry of which an envoycalled on the members of the Polish delegation and reopened thediscussion on new lines. He stated that he spoke on behalf of the BigFour, of whose views and intentions he was the authorized exponent. Anddoubtless he thought he was. But as a matter of fact the Frenchgovernment had no cognizance of his visit or mission or of theconversation to which it led. He presented arguments before havingrecourse to deterrents. Poland's situation, he said, called forprudence. Her secular enemy was Germany, with whom it would bedifficult, perhaps impossible, ever to cultivate such terms as wouldconciliate her permanently. All the more reason, therefore, to deserveand win the friendship of her other neighbors, in particular of theRuthenians. The Polish plenipotentiary met the argument in the usualway, where upon the envoy exclaimed: "Well, to make a long story short, I am here to say that the line of action traced out for your countryemanates from the inflexible will of the Great Powers. To this you mustbend. If it should lead to hostilities on the part of your neighbors youcould, of course, rely on the help of your protectors. Will this notsatisfy you?" "If the protection were real it certainly would. But whereis it? Has it been vouchsafed at any moment since the armistice? Havethe Allied governments an executive in eastern Europe? Are they likelyto order their troops thither to assist any of their protégées? And ifthey issued such an order, would it be obeyed? They cannot protect us, as we know to our cost. That is why we are prepared, in ourinterests--also in theirs--to protect ourselves. "

This remarkable conversation was terminated by the announcement of thepenalty of disobedience. "If you persist in refusing the proposals Ihave laid before you, I am to tell you that the Great Powers willwithdraw their aid from your country and may even feel it to be theirduty to modify the advantageous status which they had decided to conferupon it. " To which this answer was returned: "For the assistance we arereceiving we are and will ever be truly grateful. But in order tobenefit by it the Polish people must be a living organism and yourproposals tend to reduce us to a state of suspended vitality. They alsoplace us at the mercy of our numerous enemies, the greatest of whom isGermany. "

But lucid intelligence, backed by unflagging will, was of no availagainst the threat of famine. The Poles had to give way. M. Paderewskipledged his word to Messrs. Lloyd George and Wilson that he would havean armistice concluded with the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia, and theDuumvirs rightly placed implicit confidence in his word as in his moralrectitude. They also felt grateful to him for having facilitated theirarduous task by accepting the inevitable. To my knowledge PresidentWilson himself addressed a letter to him toward the end of April, thanking him cordially for the broad-minded way in which he hadco-operated with the Supreme Council in its efforts to reconstitute hiscountry on a solid basis. Probably no other representative of a state"with limited interests" received such high mark of approval. 

M. Paderewski left Paris for Warsaw, there to win over the Cabinet. Butin Poland, where the authorities were face to face with the concreteelements of the problem, the Premier found no support. Neither theCabinet nor the Diet nor the head of the state found it possible toredeem the promise made in their name. Circumstance was stronger thanthe human will. M. Paderewski resigned. The Ruthenians delivered atimely attack on the Poles, who counter-attacked, captured the towns ofStyra, Tarnopol, Stanislau, and occupied the enemy country right up toRumania, with which they desired to be in permanent contact. Part of theRuthenian army crossed the Czech frontier and was disarmed, theremainder melted away, and there remained no enemy with whom to concludean armistice. 

For the "Big Four" this turn of events was a humiliation. The Ruthenianarmy, whose interests they had so taken to heart, had suddenly ceased toexist, and the future danger which it represented to Poland was seen tohave been largely imaginary. Their judgment was at fault and their powerineffectual. Against M. Paderewski's impotence they blazed withindignation. He had given way to their decision and promptly gone toWarsaw to see it executed, yet the conditions were such that his wordswere treated as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The PolishPremier, it is true, had tendered his resignation in consequence, but itwas refused--and even had it been accepted, what was the retirement of aMinister as compared with the indignity put upon the world's lawgiverswho represented power and interests which were alike unlimited? Angrytelegrams were flashed over the wires from Paris to Warsaw and thePolish Premier was summoned to appear in Paris without delay. He dulyreturned, but no new move was made. The die was cast. 

A noteworthy event in latter-day Polish history ensued upon thatmilitary victory over the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia. TheUkrainian[183] Minister at Vienna was despatched to request the Poles tosign a unilateral treaty with them after the model of that which wasarranged by the two Anglo-Saxon states in favor of France. The proposalwas that the Ukraine government would renounce all claims to easternGalicia and place their troops under the supreme command of the Polishgeneralissimus, in return for which the Poles should undertake toprotect the Ukrainians against all their enemies. This draft agreement, while under consideration in Warsaw, was negatived by the Polishdelegates in Paris, who saw no good reason why their people should bindthemselves to fight Russia one day for the independence of the Ukraine. Another inchoate state which made an offer of alliance to Poland wasEsthonia, but its advances were declined on similar grounds. It ismanifest, however, that in the new state system alliances are more invogue than in the old, although they were to have been banished from it. 

Throughout all the negotiations that turned upon the future status andthe territorial frontiers of Poland the British Premier unswervinglystood out against the Polish claims, just as the President of the UnitedStates inflexibly countered those of Italy, and both united to negativethose of the Rumanians. Whatever one may think of the merits of thesecontroversies--and various opinions have been put forward with obvioussincerity--there can be but one judgment as to the spirit in which theywere conducted. It was a dictatorial spirit, which was intolerant notmerely of opposition, but of enlightened and constructive criticism. Tothe representatives of the countries concerned it seemed made up ofbitter prejudice and fierce partizanship, imbibed, it was affirmed, fromthose unseen sources whence powerful and, it was thought, noxiouscurrents flowed continuously toward the Conference. For none of theaffronted delegates credited with a knowledge of the subject either Mr. Lloyd George, who had never heard of Teschen, or Mr. Wilson, whosesurvey of Corsican politics was said to be so defective. And yet to theactivity of men engaged like these in settling affairs of unprecedentedmagnitude it would be unfair to apply the ordinary tests of technicalfastidiousness. Their position as trustees of the world's greateststates, even though they lacked political imagination, knowledge, andexperience, entitled them to the high consideration which they generallyreceived. But it could not be expected to dazzle to blindness the eyesof superior men--and the delegates of the lesser states, Venizelos, Dmowski, and Benes, were undoubtedly superior in most of the attributesof statesmanship. Yet they were frequently snubbed and each one made tofeel that he was the fifth wheel in the chariot of the Conference. Nosacred fame, says Goethe, requires us to submit to contempt, and theywinced under it. The Big Three lacked the happy way of doing thingswhich goes with diplomatic tact and engaging manners, and theconsequence was that not only were their arguments mistrusted, but eventheir good faith was, as we saw, momentarily subjected to doubt. "Bitterprejudice, furious antipathy" were freely predicated of the twoAnglo-Saxon statesmen, who were rashly accused of attempting bycircuitous methods to deprive France of her new Slav ally in easternEurope. Sweeping recriminations of this character deserve notice only asindicating the spirit of discord--not to use a stronger term--prevailingat a Conference which was professedly endeavoring to knit together thepeoples of the planet in an organized society of good-fellowship. 

The delegates of the lesser states, to whom one should not look forimpartial judgments, formulated some queer theories to explain theAllies' unavowed policy and revealed a frame of mind in no wiseconducive to the attainment of the ostensible ends of the Conference. One delegate said to me: "I have no longer the faintest doubt that thefirm purpose of the 'Big Two' is the establishment of the hegemony ofthe Anglo-Saxon peoples, which in the fullness of time may betransformed into the hegemony of the United States of North America. Even France is in some respects their handmaid. Already she is bound tothem indissolubly. She is admittedly unable to hold her own withouttheir protection. She will become more dependent on them as the yearspass and Germany, having put her house in order, regains her economicpreponderance on the Continent. This decline is due to the operation ofa natural law which diplomacy may retard but cannot hinder. Numbers willcount in the future, and then France's rôle will be reduced. For thisreason it is her interest that her new allies in eastern Europe shouldbe equipped with all the means of growing and keeping strong instead ofbeing held in the leading-strings of the overlords. But perhaps thistutelage is reckoned one of those means?"

Against Britain in especial the Poles, as we saw, were wroth. Theycomplained that whenever they advanced a claim they found her firstdelegate on their path barring their passage, and if Mr. Wilson chancedto be with them the British Premier set himself to convert him to hisway of thinking or voting. Thus it was against Mr. Lloyd George that theeastern Galician problem had had to be fought at every stage. At theoutset the British Premier refused Galicia to Poland categorically andpurposed making it an entirely separate state under the League ofNations. This design, of which he made no secret, inspired theinsistence with which the armistice with the Ruthenians of Galicia waspressed. The Polish delegates, one of them a man of incisive speech, left no stone unturned to thwart that part of the English scheme, andthey finally succeeded. But their opponents contrived to drop a spoonfulof tar in Poland's pot of honey by ordering a plebiscite to take placein eastern Galicia within ten or fifteen years. Then came the questionof the Galician Constitution. The Poles proposed to confer on theRuthenians a restricted measure of home rule with authority to arrangein their own way educational and religious matters, localcommunications, and the means of encouraging industry and agriculture, besides giving them a proportionate number of seats in the statelegislature in Warsaw. But again the British delegates--experienced inproblems of home rule--expressed their dissatisfaction and insisted on aparliament or diet for the Ukraine invested with considerable authorityover the affairs of the province. The Poles next announced theirintention to have a governor of eastern Galicia appointed by thePresident of the Polish Republic, with a council to advise him. TheBritish again amended the proposal and asked that the governor should beresponsible to the Galician parliament, but to this the Poles demurredemphatically, and finally it was settled that only the members of hiscouncil should be responsible to the provincial legislature. The Poleshaving suggested that military conscription should be applied to easternGalicia on the same terms as to the rest of Poland, the British oncemore joined issue with them and demanded that no troops whatever shouldbe levied in the province. The upshot of this dispute was that aftermuch wrangling the British Commission gave way to the Poles, but made ita condition that the troops should not be employed outside the province. To this the Poles made answer that the massing of so many soldiers onthe Rumanian frontier might reasonably be objected to by theRumanians--and so the amoebean word-game went on in the subcommission. In a word, when dealing with the eastern Galician problem, Mr. LloydGeorge played the part of an ardent champion of complete home rule. 

To sum up, the Conference linked eastern Galicia with Poland, but madethe bonds extremely tenuous, so that they might be severed at any momentwithout involving profound changes in either country, and by thisarrangement, which introduced the provisional into the definitive, abroad field of operations was allotted to political agitation and revoltwas encouraged to rear its crest. 

The province of Upper Silesia was asked for on grounds which the Poles, at any rate, thought convincing. But Mr. Lloyd George, it was said, declared them insufficient. The subject was thrashed out one day in Junewhen the Polish delegates were summoned before their all-powerfulcolleagues to be told of certain alterations that had been recentlyintroduced into the Treaty which concerned them to know. They appearedbefore the Council of Five. [184] President Wilson, addressing the twodelegates, spoke approximately as follows: "You claim Silesia on theground that its inhabitants are Poles and we have given your demandcareful consideration. But the Germans tell us that the inhabitants, although Polish by race, wish to remain under German rule as heretofore. That is a strong objection if founded on fact. At present we are unableto answer it. In fact, nobody can answer it with finality but theinhabitants themselves. Therefore we must order a plebiscite amongthem. " One of the Polish delegates remarked: "If you had put thequestion to the inhabitants fifty years ago they would have expressedtheir wish to remain with the Germans because at that time they wereprofoundly ignorant and their national sentiment was dormant. Now it isotherwise. For since then many of them have been educated, and themajority are alive to the issue and will therefore declare for Poland. And if any section of the territory should still prefer German sway toPolish and their district in consequence of your plebiscite becomesGerman, the process of enlightenment which has already made such headwaywill none the less go on, and their children, conscious of their loss, will anathematize their fathers for having inflicted it. And then therewill be trouble. "

Mr. Wilson retorted: "You are assuming more than is meet. The frontierswhich we are tracing are provisional, not final. That is a considerationwhich ought to weigh with you. Besides, the League of Nations willintervene to improve what is imperfect. " "O League of Nations, whatblunders are committed in thy name!" the delegate may have muttered tohimself as he listened to the words meant to comfort him and hiscountrymen. 

Much might have been urged against this proffered solace if thedelegates had been in a captious mood. The League of Nations had as yetno existence. If its will, intelligence, and power could indeed bereckoned upon with such confidence, how had it come to pass that itscreators, Britain and the United States, deemed them dubious enough tocall for a reinforcement in the shape of a formal alliance for theprotection of France? If this precautionary measure, which shatters thewhole Wilsonian system, was indispensable to one Ally it was at leastequally indispensable to another. And in the case of Poland it was moreurgent than in the case of France, because if Germany were again toscheme a war of conquest the probability is infinitesimal that she wouldinvade Belgium or move forward on the western front. The line of leastresistance, which is Poland, would prove incomparably more attractive. And then? The absence of Allied troops in eastern Europe was one of theprincipal causes of the wars, tumults, and chaotic confusion that hadmade nervous people tremble for the fate of civilization in the intervalbetween the conclusion of the armistice and the ratification of theTreaty. In the future the absence of strongly situated Allies there, ifGermany were to begin a fresh war, would be more fatal still, and thePolish state might conceivably disappear before military aid from theAllied governments could reach it. Why should the safety of Poland andto some extent the security of Europe be made to depend upon what is atbest a gambler's throw?

But no counter-objections were offered. On the contrary, M. Paderewskiuttered the soft answer that turneth away wrath. He profoundly regrettedthe decision of the lawgivers, but, recognizing that it was immutable, bowed to it in the name of his country. He knew, he said, that thedelegates were animated by very friendly feelings toward his country andhe thanked them for their help. M. Paderewski's colleague, the lessmalleable M. Dmowski, is reported to have said: "It is my desire to bequite sincere with you, gentlemen. Therefore I venture to submit thatwhile you profess to have settled the matter on principle, you have notcarried out that principle thoroughly. Doubtless by inadvertence. Thusthere are places inhabited by a large majority of Poles which you haveallotted to Germany on the ground that they are inhabited by Germans. That is inconsistent. " At this Mr. Lloyd George jumped up from his placeand asked: "Can you name any such places?" M. Dmowski gave severalnames. "Point them out to me on the map, " insisted the British Premier. They were pointed out on the map. Twice President Wilson asked thedelegate to spell the name Bomst for him. [185] Mr. Lloyd George thensaid: "Well, those are oversights that can be rectified. " "Oh yes, "added Mr. Wilson, "we will see to that. "[186] M. Dmowski also questionedthe President about the plebiscite, and under whose auspices the votingwould take place, and was told that there would be an Inter-Alliedadministration to superintend the arrangements and insure perfectfreedom of voting. "Through what agency will that administration work?Is it through the officials?" "Evidently, " Mr. Wilson answered. "You aredoubtless aware that they are Germans?" "Yes. But the administrationwill possess the right to dismiss those who prove unworthy of theirconfidence. " "Don't you think, " insisted M. Dmowski, "that it would befairer to withdraw one half of the German bureaucrats and give theirplaces to Poles?" To which the President replied: "The administrationwill be thoroughly impartial and will adopt all suitable measures torender the voting free. " There the matter ended. 

The two potentates in council, tackling the future status of Lithuania, settled it in an offhand and singular fashion which at any rate bespoketheir good intentions. The principle of self-determination, or what wasfacetiously termed the Balkanization of Europe, was at first applied tothat territory and a semi-independent state created _in petto_ which wasto contain eight million inhabitants and be linked with Poland. Certainobstacles were soon afterward encountered which had not been foreseen. One was that all the Lithuanians number only two millions, or say at themost two millions and one hundred thousand. Out of these even theSupreme Council could not make eight millions. In Lithuania there aretwo and a half million Poles, one and a half million Jews, and theremainder are White Russians. [187] It was recognized that a communityconsisting of such disparate elements, situated where it now is, couldhardly live and strive as an independent state. The Lithuanian Jews, however, were of a different way of thinking, and they opposed thePolish claims with a degree of steadfastness and animation which woundedPoland's national pride and left rankling sores behind. 

It is worth noting that the representatives of Russia, who are supposedto clutch convulsively at all the states which once formed part of theTsardom, displayed a degree of political detachment in respect ofLithuania which came as a pleasant surprise to many. The RussianAmbassador in Paris, M. Maklakoff, in a remarkable address before alearned assembly[188] in the French capital, announced that Russia washenceforward disinterested in the status of Lithuania. 

That the Poles were minded to deal very liberally with the Lithuaniansbecame evident during the Conference. General Pilsudski, on his owninitiative, visited Vilna and issued a proclamation to the Lithuaniansannouncing that elections would be held, and asking them to make knowntheir desires, which would be realized by the Warsaw government. One ofthe many curious documents of the Conference is an official missivesigned by the General Secretary, M. Dutasta, and addressed to the firstPolish delegate, exhorting him to induce his government to come to termswith the Lithuanian government, as behooves two neighboring states. Unluckily for the soundness of that counsel there was no recognizedLithuanian state or Lithuanian government to come to terms with. 

As has been often enough pointed out, the actions and utterances of thetwo world-menders were so infelicitous as to lend color to thebelief--shared by the representatives of a number of humiliatednations--that greed of new markets was at the bottom of what purportedto be a policy of pure humanitarianism. Some of the delegates werecurrently supposed to be the unwitting instruments of elusivecapitalistic influences. Possibly they would have been astonished werethey told this: Great Britain was suspected of working for completecontrol of the Baltic and its seaboard in order to oust the Germans fromthe markets of that territory and to have potent levers for action inPoland, Germany, and Russia. The achievement of that end would meancommand of the Baltic, which had theretofore been a German lake. [189] Itwould also entail, it was said, the separation of Dantzig from Poland, and the attraction of the Finns, Esthonians, Letts, and Lithuanians fromGermany's orbit into that of Great Britain. In vain the friends of thedelegates declared that economic interests were not the mainspring oftheir deliberate action and that nothing was further from theirintention than to angle for a mandate for those countries. Theconviction was deep-rooted in the minds of many that each of the GreatPowers was playing for its own hand. That there was some apparentfoundation for this assumption cannot, as we saw, be gainsaid. Widelyand unfavorably commented was the circumstance that in the heat of thosediscussions at the Conference a man of confidence of the Allies put thissignificant and impolitic question to one of the plenipotentiaries: "Howwould you take it if England were to receive a mandate for Lithuania?"

"The Great Powers, " observed the most outspoken of the delegates of thelesser states, "are bandits, but as their operations are on a largescale they are entitled to another and more courteous name. Their gazeis fascinated by markets, concessions, monopolies. They are now makingpreparations for a great haul. At this politicians cannot affect to bescandalized. For it has never been otherwise since men came together inordered communities. But what is irritating and repellent is the perfumeof altruism and philanthropy which permeates this decomposition. We aretold that already they are purchasing the wharves of Dantzig, makingready for 'big deals' in Libau, Riga, and Reval, founding a bank inKlagenfurt and negotiating for oil-wells in Rumania. Although deeplyimmersed in the ethics of politics, they have not lost sight of theworldly goods to be picked up and appropriated on the wearisome journeytoward ideal goals. The atmosphere they have thus renewed is peculiarlyfavorable to the growth of cant, and tends to accelerate the process ofmoral and social dissolution. And the effects of this mephitic air mayprove more durable than the contribution of its creators to thepolitical reorganization of Europe. If we compare the high functionswhich they might have fulfilled in relation to the vast needs and theunprecedented tendencies of the new age with those which they haveunwittingly and deliberately performed as sophists of sentimentalmorality and destroyers of the wheat together with the tares, we shallhave to deplore one of the rarest opportunities missed beyond retrieve. "

In this criticism there is a kernel of truth. The ethico-social currentsto which the war gave rise had a profoundly moral aspect, and if rightlycanalized might have fertilized many lands and have led to a new andhealthy state-system. One indispensable condition, however, was that thepeoples of the world should themselves be directly interested in theprocess, that they should be consulted and listened to, and helped orpropelled into new grooves of thought and action. Instead of that thedelegates contented themselves with giving new names to old institutionsand tendencies which stood condemned, and with teaching lawlessdisrespect for every check and restraint except such as they chose toacknowledge. They were powerful advocates for right and justice, democracy and publicity, but their definitions of these abstract nounsmade plain-speaking people gasp. Self-interest and material power werethe idols which they set themselves to pull down, but the deities whichthey put in their places wore the same familiar looks as the idols, onlythey were differently colored. 

FOOTNOTES:

[127] In February, 1919. 

[128] The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pichon, undertook torecognize in principle the independence of Esthonia, provided thatEsthonia would take over her part of the Russian debt. 

[129] In the first version of the Covenant, Article XIX deals with thissubject. In the revised version it is Article XXI. 

[130] Cf. _L'Echo de Paris_, August 19, 1919. 

[131] In July, 1919. 

[132] _L'Echo de Paris_, August 19, 1919. 

[133] The armistice concluded with Hungary was grossly violated by theHungarians and had lost its force. The Rumanians, when occupying thecountry, demanded a new one, and drafted it. The Supreme Council atfirst demurred, and then desisted from dictation. But its attitudeunderwent further changes later. 

[134] _The New York Herald_, (Paris ed. ), August 20, 1919. 

[135] _Ibid. _, May 4, 1919. 

[136] I discussed Belgium's demands in a series of special articlespublished in _The London Daily Telegraph_ and _The Philadelphia PublicLedger_ in the months of January, February, and March, 1919. 

[137] In Frisia and Ghelderland. 

[138] In August, 1919. 

[139] By Article XXI of the Covenant and Article CCCCXXXV of the Treaty. 

[140] I was in possession of a complete copy. 

[141] Cf. _Corriere della Sera_, August 24, 1919. 

[142] In February. 

[143] Cf. Chapter, "Censorship and Secrecy. " The writer of these pageswas the journalist. 

[144] _Le Temps_, July 8, 1919. 

[145] At the close of August, 1916. 

[146] I was one of those who at the time maintained that even in theAllies' interests Rumania ought not to enter the war at thatconjuncture, and anticipation of that invasion was one of the reasons Iadduced. 

[147] Also known by the German name of Theiss. 

[148] Cf. _Le Temps_, July 28, 1919. 

[149] Cf. _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), September 5, 1919. 

[150] On June 13, 1919. 

[151] On July 11, 1919, some days later, the decision was suspended, owing to the opinion of General Bliss, who disagreed with Foch. 

[152] On July 17, 1919. 

[153] On July 20th. 

[154] Estimated at 85, 000. 

[155] Moritz Kuhn, who altered his name to Bela Kuhn, was a vulgarcriminal. Expelled from school for larceny, he underwent several termsof imprisonment, and is alleged to have pilfered from a fellow-prisoner. Even among some thieves there is no honor. 

[156] Italy was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli, who residedin Budapest; Britain, by Col. Sir Thomas Cunningham, who was in Vienna, as was also Prince Livio Borghese. Later on the Powers delegatedgenerals to be members of a military mission to the Hungarian capital. 

[157] At Bruck. 

[158] On July 20th. 

[159] _Le Journal des Débats_, August 4, 1919. 

[160] This is a larger proportion than was left to the Germans by theTreaty of Versailles. 

[161] _Le Temps_, July 8, 1919. 

[162] It was the habitual practice of the Conference to intrust missionsabroad to generals who knew nothing whatever about the countries towhich they were sent. 

[163] _Le Temps_, August 8, 1919. 

[164] Armistice of November 13, 1918, which had become void. 

[165] On June 13, 1919. 

[166] Composed of four members, one each for Britain, the United States, France, and Italy. 

[167] On July 20th. 

[168] Paris journals ascribed it to Mr. Balfour, although it does notbear the hall-mark of a diplomatist. 

[169] _Le Journal des Débats_, August 13, 1919. 

[170] Pertinax in _L'Echo de Paris_, August 10, 1919. 

[171] _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), August 10, 1919. 

[172] _Le Journal des Débats_, August 13, 1919. Article by AugusteGauvain. 

[173] General Gorton is the one who is said to have despatched thetelegram. 

[174] In the beginning of September, 1919. 

[175] The French government having prudently refused to furnish anenvoy, the British chose Sir George Clark. 

[176] On June 10, 1919. 

[177] The actors in this episode were not all officers and civilservants. They included some men in responsible positions. 

[178] In Teschen. 

[179] On Friday, April 18, 1919. 

[180] The Rumanians, on the contrary, had been ordered to keep to theold conditions, although they, too, had lost their force. 

[181] That is exactly what happened in the end. But the delegates wouldnot believe it until it became an accomplished fact. 

[182] About twenty-five thousand had already left France. 

[183] The Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Little Russians are racially thesame people, just as those who speak German in northwestern Germany, Dutch in Holland, and Flemish in Belgium are racially close kindred. Themain distinctions between the members of each branch are political. 

[184] The Messrs. Wilson, George, Clemenceau, Barons Makino and Sonnino. M. Clemenceau was the nominal chairman, but in reality it was PresidentWilson who conducted the proceedings. 

[185] Bomst is a canton in the former Province (Regierungs-besirk) ofPosen, with about sixty thousand inhabitants. 

[186] Minutes of this conversation exist. 

[187] An interesting Russian tribe, dwelling chiefly in the provinces ofMinsk and Grodno (excepting the extreme south), a small part of Suvalki, Vilna (excepting the northwest corner), the entire provinces of Vitebskand Moghileff, the west part of Smolensk, and a few districts ofTshernigoff. 

[188] La Société des Études Politiques. The discourse in question wasprinted and published. 

[189] In Germany and Russia the same view was generally taken of themotives that actuated the policy of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The mostelaborate attempt to demonstrate its correctness was made by Cr. Bunke, in _The Dantziger Neueste Nachrichten_, already mentioned in this book. 

VII

POLAND'S OUTLOOK IN THE FUTURE

Casting a parting glance at Poland as she looked when emerging from theConference in the leading-strings of the Great Western Powers, afterhaving escaped from the Bolshevist dangers that compassed her round, webehold her about to begin her national existence as a semi-independentnation, beset with enemies domestic and foreign. For it would be anabuse of terms to affirm that Poland, or, indeed, any of the lesserstates, is fully independent in the old sense of the word. The specialtreaty imposed on her by the Great Two obliges her to accord freetransit to Allied goods and certain privileges to her Jewish and otherminorities; to accept the supervision and intervention of the League ofNations, which the Poles contend means in their case anAnglo-Saxon-Jewish association; and, at the outset, at any rate, torecognize the French generalissimus as the supreme commander of hertroops. 

Poland's frontiers and general status ought, if the scheme of her Frenchprotectors had been executed, to have been accommodated to the peculiarfunctions which they destined her to fill in New Europe. France's planwas to make of Poland a wall between Germany and Russia. The markedtendency of the other two Conference leaders was to transform it into abridge between those two countries. And the outcome of the compromisebetween them has been to construct something which, without beingeither, combines all the disadvantages of both. It is a bridge forGermany and a wall for Bolshevist Russia. That is the verdict of a largenumber of Poles. Although the Europe of the future is to be a pacificand ethically constituted community, whose members will have theirdisputes and quarrels with one another settled by arbitration courts andother conciliatory tribunals, war and efficient preparation for it werenone the less uppermost in the minds of the circumspect lawgivers. Hencethe Anglo-Saxon agreement to defend France against unprovokedaggression. Hence, too, the solicitude displayed by the French to havethe Polish state, which is to be their mainstay in eastern Europe, equipped with every territorial and other guaranty necessary to qualifyit for the duties. But what the French government contrived to obtainfor itself it failed to secure for its new Slav ally. Nay, oddly enoughit voted with the Anglo-Saxon delegates for keeping all the lesserstates under the tutelage of the League. The Duumvirs, having made therequisite concessions to France, were resolved in Poland's case to avoida further recoil toward the condemned forms of the old system ofequilibrium. Hence the various plebiscites, home-rule charters, subdivisions of territory, and other evidences of a struggle for reformalong the line of least resistance, as though in the unavoidable futureconflict between timidly propounded theories and politico-social forcesthe former had any serious chance of surviving. In politics, as incoinage, it is the debased metal that ousts the gold from circulation. 

Poland's situation is difficult; some people would call it precarious. She is surrounded by potential enemies abroad and at home--Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Magyars, and Jews. A considerable number ofTeutons are incorporated in her republic to-day, and also a large numberof people of Russian race. Now, Russia and Germany, even if theyrenounce all designs of reconquering the territory which they misruledfor such a long span of time, may feel tempted one day to recover theirown kindred, and what they consider to be their own territory. Andirredentism is one of the worst political plagues for all the threeparties who usually suffer from it. If then Germany and Russia were tocombine and attack Poland, the consequences would be serious. Thatdemocratic Germany would risk such a wild adventure in the near futureis inconceivable. But history operates with long periods of time, and itbehooves statesmanship to do likewise. 

A Polish statesman would start from the assumption that, as Russia andGermany have for the time being ceased to be efficient members of theEuropean state-system, a good understanding may be come to with both ofthem, and a close intimacy cultivated with one. Resourcefulness andstatecraft will be requisite to this consummation. For some Russians arestill uncompromising, and would fain take back a part of what therevolutionary wave swept out of their country's grasp, but circumstancebids fair to set free a potent moderating force in the near future. Already it is incarnated in statesmen of the new type. In thisconnection it is instructive to pass in review the secret maneuvers bywhich the recognition of Poland's independence was, so to say, extortedfrom a Russian Minister, who was reputed at the time to be a Democrat ofthe Democrats. As some governments have now become champions ofpublicity, I venture to hope that this disclosure will be as helpful tothose whom it concerns as was the systematic suppression of my articlesand telegrams during the space of four years. [190]

On the outbreak of the Russian revolution Poland's representatives inBritain, who had been ceaselessly working for the restoration of theircountry, approached the British government with a request that theopportunity should be utilized at once, and the new democratic Cabinetin Petrograd requested to issue a proclamation recognizing theindependence of Poland. The reasons for this move having been propoundedin detail, orally and in writing, the Foreign Secretary despatched atonce a telegram to the Ambassador in the Russian capital, instructinghim to lay the matter before the Russian Foreign Minister and urge himto lose no time in establishing the claim of the Polish provisionalgovernment to the sympathies of the world, and the redress of its wrongsby Russia. Sir George Buchanan called on Professor Milyukoff, thenMinister of Foreign Affairs and President of the ConstitutionalDemocratic party, and propounded to him the views of the Britishgovernment, which agreed with those of France and Italy, and hoped hewould see his way to profit by the opportunity. The answer was promptand definite, and within forty-eight hours of Mr. Balfour's despatch itreached the Foreign Office. The gist of it was that the Minister ofForeign Affairs regretted his inability to deal with the problem at thatconjuncture, owing to its great complexity and various bearings, andalso because of his apprehension that the Poles would demand theincorporation of Russian lands in their reconstituted state. From thisanswer many conclusions might fairly be drawn respecting persons, parties, and principles on the surface of revolutionary Russia. But tohis credit, Mr. Balfour did not accept it as final. He again telegraphedto the British Ambassador, instructing him to insist upon therecognition of Poland, as the matter was urgent, and to exhort theprovisional government to give in good time the desired proof of thedemocratic faith that is to save Russia. Sir George Buchananaccomplished the task expeditiously. M. Milyukoff gave way, drafted andissued the proclamation. Mr. Bonar Law welcomed it in a felicitousspeech in the House of Commons, [191] and the Entente press lauded to theskies the generous spirit of the new Russian government. The Russianpeople and their leaders have traveled far since then, and have ridthemselves of much useless ballast. 

As Slavs the Poles might have been naturally predisposed to live inamity with the Russians, were it not for the specter of the past thatstands between them. But now that Russia is a democracy in fact as wellas in name, this is much more feasible than it ever was before, and itis also indispensable to the Russians. In the first place, it ispossible that Poland may have consolidated her forces before her mightyneighbor has recovered the status corresponding to her numbers andresources. If the present estimates are correct, and the frontiers, whendefinitely traced, leave Poland a republic with some thirty-five millionpeople, such is her extraordinary birth-rate and the territorial scopeit has for development, that in the not far distant future herpopulation may exceed that of France. Assuming for the sake of argumentthat armies and other national defenses will count in politics as muchas hitherto, Poland's specific weight will then be considerable. Shewill have become not indeed a world power (to-day there are only twosuch), but a European Great Power whose friendship will be well worthacquiring. 

In the meanwhile Polish statesmen--the Poles have one in RomanDmowski--may strike up a friendly accord with Russia, abandoningdefinitely and formally all claims to so-called historic Poland, disinteresting themselves in all the Baltic problems which concernRussia so closely, and envisaging the Ukraine from a point of view thatharmonizes with hers. And if the two peoples could thus find a commonbasis of friendly association, Poland would have solved at least one ofher Sphinx questions. 

As for the internal development of the nation, it is seemingly hamperedwith as many hindrances as the international. It may be likened to theworld after creation, bearing marks of the chaos of the eve. The GermanPoles differ considerably from the Austrian, while the Russian Poles aredifferentiated from both. The last-named still show traces of recentservitude in their everyday avocations. They lack the push and theenergy of purpose so necessary nowadays in the struggle for life. TheAustrian Poles in general are reputed to be likewise easy-going, lax, and more brilliant than solid, while their administrative qualities aresaid to be impaired by a leaning toward Oriental methods of transactingbusiness. The Polish inhabitants of the provinces hitherto under Germanyare people of a different temperament. They have assimilated some of thebest qualities of the Teuton without sacrificing those which areinherent in men of their own race. A thorough grasp of detail and a giftfor organization characterize their conceptions, and precision, thoroughness, and conscientiousness are predicated of their methods. Ifit be true that the first reform peremptorily called for in the newrepublic is an administrative purge, it follows that it can be mostsuccessfully accomplished with the whole-hearted co-operation of theGerman Poles, whose superior education fits them to conform theirschemes to the most urgent needs of the nation and the epoch. 

The next measure will be internal colonization. There are considerabletracts of land in what once was Russian Poland, the population of which, owing to the havoc of war, is abnormally sparse. Some districts, likethat of the Pripet marshes, which even at the best of times had but fivepersons to the kilometer, are practically deserts. For the Russian army, when retreating before the Germans, drove before it a huge populationcomputed at eight millions, who inhabited the territory to the east ofBrest-Litovsk and northward between Lida and Minsk. Of these eightmillions many perished on the way. A large percentage of the survivorsnever returned. [192] Roughly speaking, a couple of millions (mostlyPoles and Jews) went back to their ruined homes. Now the Poles, who areone of the most prolific races in Europe, might be encouraged to settleon these thinly populated lands, which they could convert intoethnographically Polish districts within a relatively short span oftime. These, however, are merely the ideas of a friendly observer, whoseopinion cannot lay claim to any weight. 

To-day Poland's hope is not, as it has been hitherto, the nobleman, theprofessor, and the publicist, but the peasant. The members of this classare the nucleus of the new nation. It is from their midst that Poland'sfuture representatives in politics, arts, and science will be drawn. Already the peasants are having their sons educated in high-schools anduniversities, of which the republic has a fair number well supplied withqualified teachers, [193] and they are resolute adversaries of everymovement tainted with Bolshevism. 

Thus the difficulties and dangers with which new Poland will have tocontend are redoubtable. But she stands a good chance of overcoming themand reaching the goal where lies her one hope of playing a noteworthypart in reorganized Europe. The indispensable condition of success isthat the current of opinion and sentiment in the country shall buoy upreforming statesmen. These must not only understand the requirements ofthe new epoch and be alive to the necessity of penetrating publicopinion, but also possess the courage to place high social aims at thehead of their life and career. Statesmen of this temper are rare to-day, but Poland possesses at least one of them. Her resources warrant theconviction which her chiefs firmly entertain that she may in arelatively near future acquire the economic leadership of easternEurope, and in population, military strength, and area equal France. 

Parenthetically it may be observed that the enthusiasm of the Poles forBritish institutions and for intimate relations with Great Britain hasperceptibly cooled. 

In the limitations to which she is now subjected, her more optimisticleaders discern the temporarily unavoidable condition of a beneficentprocess of working forward toward indefinite amelioration. Theirpeople's faith, that may one day raise the country above the highestsummit of its past historical development, if it does not reconcile themto the present, may nerve them to the effort which shall realize thathigh consummation in the future. 

FOOTNOTES:

[190] Most of my articles written during the last half of the war, andsome during the armistice, were held back on grounds which werepresumably patriotic. I share with those who were instrumental inkeeping them from the public the moral portion of the reward whichconsists in the assumption that some high purpose was served by thesuppression. 

[191] On April 26, 1917. 

[192] Mainly White Russians. 

[193] The Poles have universities in Cracow, Warsaw, Lvoff (Lemberg), Liublin, and will shortly open one in Posen. One Polish statesmanentertains a novel and useful idea which will probably be tested in theUniversity of Posen. Noticing that the greater the progress of technicalknowledge the less is the advance made in the knowledge of men, which isperhaps the most pressing need of the new age, this statesman proposesto create a new type of university, where there would be two principalsections, one for the study of natural sciences and mathematics, and theother for the study of men, which would include biology, psychology, ethnography, sociology, philology, history, etc. 

VIII

ITALY

Of all the problems submitted to the Conference, those raised by Italy'sdemands may truly be said to have been among the easiest. Whether placedin the light of the Fourteen Points or of the old system of the rightsof the victors, they would fall into their places almost automatically. But the peace criteria were identical with neither of those principles. They consisted of several heterogeneous maxims which were invokedalternately, Mr. Wilson deciding which was applicable to the particularcase under discussion. And from his judgment there was no appeal. 

It is of the essence of statesmanship to be able to put oneself in theplace--one might almost say in the skin--of the foreign peoples andgovernments with which one is called upon to deal. But the feat isarduous and presupposes a variety of conditions which the President wasunable to fulfil. His conception of Europe, for example, was much toosimple. It has been aptly likened to that of the American economist whoonce remarked to the manager of an English railway: "You Britishers arehandicapped by having to build your railway lines through cities andtowns. We go to work diligently: we first construct the road and createthe cities afterward. "

And Mr. Wilson happened just then to be in quest of a fulcrum on whichto rest his idealistic lever. For he had already been driven byegotistic governments from several of his commanding positions, andpeople were gibingly asking whether the new political gospel was beingpreached only as a foil for backslidings. Thus he abandoned the freedomof the seas . . . On which he had taken a determined stand before theworld. Although he refused the Rhine frontier to France, he hadreluctantly given way to M. Clemenceau in the matter of the Saar Valley, assenting to a monstrous arrangement by which the German inhabitants ofthat region were to be handed over to the French Republic against theirexpressed will, as a set-off for a sum in gold which Germany wouldcertainly be unable to pay. [194] He doubtless foresaw that he would alsoyield on the momentous issue of Shantung and the Chino-Japanese secrettreaty. In a word, some of his more important abstract tenets professedin words were being brushed aside when it came to acts, and his positionwas truly unenviable. Naturally, therefore, he seized the firstfavorable occasion to apply them vigorously and unswervingly. This wassupplied by the dispute between Italy and Jugoslavia, two nations whichhe held, so to say, in the hollow of his hand. 

The latter state, still in the making, depended for its frontiersentirely on the fiat of the American President backed by the Premiers ofBritain and France. And of this backing Mr. Wilson was assured. Italy, although more powerful militarily than Jugoslavia, was likewiseeconomically dependent upon the good-will of the two English-speakingcommunities, who were assured in advance of the support of the FrenchRepublic. If, therefore, she could not be reasoned or cajoled intoobeying the injunctions of the Supreme Council, she could easily be mademalleable by other means. In her case, therefore, Mr. Wilson's ethicalnotions might be fearlessly applied. That this was the idea whichunderlay the President's policy is the obvious inference from the calm, unyielding way in which he treated the Italian delegation. In thisconnection it should be borne in mind that there is no more importantdistinction between all former peace settlements and that of the ParisConference than the unavowed but indubitable fact that the latter restsupon the hegemony of the English-speaking communities of the world, whereas the former were based upon the balance of power. So immense achange could not be effected without discreetly throwing out as uselessballast some of the highly prized dogmas of the accepted politicalcreeds, even at the cost of impairing the solidarity of the Latin races. This was effected incidentally. As a matter of fact, the French are not, properly speaking, a Latin race, nor has their solidarity with Italy orSpain ever been a moving political force in recent times. Italy'srefusal to fight side by side with her Teuton allies against France andher backers may conceivably be the result of racial affinities, but ithas hardly ever been ascribed to that sentimental source. Sentiment inpolitics is a myth. In any case, M. Clemenceau discerned no pressingreason for making painful efforts to perpetuate the Latin union, whilesolicitude for national interests hindered him from making costlyconcessions to it. 

Naturally the cardinal innovation of which this was a corollary wasnever invoked as the ground for any of the exceptional measures adoptedby the Conference. And yet it was the motive for several, for althoughno allusion was made to the hegemony of Anglo-Saxondom, it was everoperative in the subconsciousness of the two plenipotentiaries. And inview of the omnipotence of these two nations, they temporarilysacrificed consistency to tactics, probably without conscientiousqualms, and certainly without political misgivings. That would seem tobe a partial explanation of the lengths to which the Conference went inthe direction of concessions to the Great Powers' imperialist demands. France asked to be recognized and treated as the personification of thatcivilization for which the Allied peoples had fought. And for manyreasons, which it would be superfluous to discuss here, a large part ofher claim was allowed. This concession was attacked by many as connotinga departure from principle, but the deviation was more apparent thanreal, for under all the wrappings of idealistic catchwords lay theprimeval doctrine of force. The only substantial difference between theold system and the new was to be found in the wielders of the force andthe ends to which they intended to apply it. Force remains the granitefoundation of the new ordering, as it had been of the old. But itsemployment, it was believed, would be different in the future from whatit had been in the past. Concentrated in the hands of theEnglish-speaking peoples, it would become so formidable a weapon that itneed never be actually wielded. Possession of overwhelmingly superiorstrength would suffice to enforce obedience to the decrees of itspossessors, which always will, it is assumed, be inspired by equity. Anactual trial of strength would be obviated, therefore, at least so longas the relative military and economic conditions of the world statesunderwent no sensible change. To this extent the war specter would beexorcised and trying abuses abolished. 

That those views were expressly formulated and thrown into the clausesof a secret program is unlikely. But it seems to be a fact that thegeneral outlines of such a policy were conceived and tacitly adhered to. These outlines governed the action of the two world-arbiters, not onlyin the dictatorial decrees issued in the name of political idealism andits Fourteen Points, which were so bitterly resented as oppressive byItaly, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Poland, and Greece, but likewise in thoseother concessions which scandalized the political puritans and gladdenedthe hearts of the French, the Japanese, the Jugoslavs, and the Jews. Thedictatorial decrees were inspired by the delegates' fundamental aims, the concessions by their tactical needs--the former, therefore, weremeant to be permanent, the latter transient. 

All other explanations of the Italian crisis, however well they may fitcertain of its phases, are, when applied to the pith of the matter, beside the mark. Even if it were true, as the dramatist, Sem Benelli, wrote, that "President Wilson evidently considers our people as on theplane of an African colony, dominated by the will of a few ambitiousmen, " that would not account for the tenacious determination with whichthe President held to his slighted theory. 

Italy's position in Europe was in many respects peculiar. Men stillliving remember the time when her name was scarcely more than ageographical expression which gradually, during the last sixty years, came to connote a hard-working, sober, patriotic nation. Only little bylittle did she recover her finest provinces and her capital, and eventhen her unity was not fully achieved. Austria still held many of hersons, not only in the Trentino, but also on the other shore of theAdriatic. But for thirty years her desire to recover these lost childrenwas paralyzed by international conditions. In her own interests, as wellas in those of peace, she had become the third member of an alliancewhich constrained her to suppress her patriotic feelings and allowed herto bend all her energies to the prevention of a European conflict. 

When hostilities broke out, the attitude of the Italian government was amatter of extreme moment to France and the Entente. Much, perhaps thefate of Europe, depended on whether they would remain neutral or throwin their lot with the Teutons. They chose the former alternative andliterally saved the situation. The question of motive is whollyirrelevant. Later on they were urged to move a step farther and take anactive part against their former allies. But a powerful body of opinionand sentiment in the country was opposed to military co-operation, onthe ground that the sum total of the results to be obtained byquiescence would exceed the guerdon of victory won by the side of theEntente. The correctness of this estimate depended upon manyincalculable factors, among which was the duration of the struggle. Theconsensus of opinion was that it would be brief, in which case the termsdangled before Italy's eyes by the Entente would, it was believed by theCabinet, greatly transcend those which the Central Powers were preparedto offer. Anyhow they were accepted and the compact was negotiated, signed, and ratified by men whose idealism marred their practical sense, and whose policy of sacred egotism, resolute in words and feeble inaction, merely impaired the good name of the government without bringingany corresponding compensation to the country. The world struggle lastedmuch longer than the statesmen had dared to anticipate; Italy'sobligations were greatly augmented by Russia's defection, she had tobear the brunt of all, instead of a part of Austria's forces, wherebythe sacrifices demanded of her became proportionately heavier. Altogether it is fair to say that the difficulties to be overcome andthe hardships to be endured before the Italian people reached their goalwere and still are but imperfectly realized by their allies. For theobstacles were gigantic, the effort heroic; alone the results shrank todisappointing dimensions. 

The war over, Italian statesmen confidently believed that thosesupererogatory exertions would be appropriately recognized by theAllies. And this expectation quickly crystallized into territorialdemands. The press which voiced them ruffled the temper ofAnglo-Saxondom by clamoring for more than it was ever likely to concede, and buoyed up their own nation with illusory hopes, the non-fulfilmentof which was certain to produce national discontent. Curiously enough, both the government and the press laid the main stress upon territorialexpansion, leaving economic advantages almost wholly out of account. 

It was at this conjuncture that Mr. Wilson made his appearance and threwall the pieces on the political chessboard into weird confusion. "You, "he virtually said, "have been fighting for the dismemberment of yoursecular enemy, Austria. Well, she is now dismembered and you have fullsatisfaction. Your frontiers shall be extended at her expense, but notat the expense of the new states which have arisen on her ruins. On thecontrary, their rights will circumscribe your claims and limit yourterritorial aggrandizement. Not only can you not have all the additionalterritory you covet, but I must refuse to allot even what has beenguaranteed to you by your secret treaty. I refuse to recognize thatbecause the United States government was no party to it, was, in fact, wholly unaware of it until recently. New circumstances have transformedit into a mere scrap of paper. "

This language was not understood by the Italian people. For them thesacredness of treaties was a dogma not to be questioned, and least ofall by the champion of right, justice, and good faith. They had welcomedthe new order preached by the American statesman, but were unable toreconcile it with the tearing up of existing conventions, therepudiation of legal rights, the dissolution of alliances. In particulartheir treaty with France, Britain, and Russia had contributedmaterially to the victory over the common enemy, had in fact saved theAllies. "It was Italy's intervention, " said the chief of the AustrianGeneral Staff, Conrad von Hoetzendorff, "that brought about thedisaster. Without that the Central Empires would infallibly have won thewar. "[195] And there is no reason to doubt his assertion. In truth Italyhad done all she had promised to the Allies, and more. She hadcontributed materially to save France--wholly gratuitously. It was alsoher neutrality, which she could have bartered, but did not, [196] thatturned the scale at Bucharest against the military intervention ofRumania on the side of the Teutons. [197] And without the neutrality ofboth these countries at the outset of hostilities the course of thestruggle and of European history would have been widely different fromwhat they have been. And now that the Allies had achieved their aim theywere to refuse to perform their part of the compact in the name, too, ofa moral principle from the operation of which three great Powers weredispensed. That was the light in which the matter appeared to theunsophisticated mind of the average Italian, and not to him alone. Others accustomed to abstract reasoning asked whether the bestpreparation for the future régime of right and justice, and all thatthese imply, is to transgress existing rights and violate ordinaryjustice, and what difference there is between the demoralizing influenceof this procedure and that of professional Bolshevists. There was butone adequate answer to this objection, and it consisted in thewhole-hearted and rigid application of the Wilsonian tenets to allnations without exception. But even the author of these tenets did notventure to make it. 

The essence of the territorial question lay in the disposal of theeastern shore of the Adriatic. [198] The Jugoslavs claimed all Istria andDalmatia, and based their claim partly on the principle of nationalitiesand partly on the vital necessity of having outlets on that sea, and inparticular Fiume, the most important of them all, which they describedas essentially Croatian and indispensable as a port. The Italiandelegates, joining issue with the Jugoslavs, and claiming a section ofthe seaboard and Fiume, argued that the greatest part of the EastAdriatic shore would still remain Croatian, together with all the portsof the Croatian coast and others in southern Dalmatia--in a word, twelveports, including Spalato and Ragusa, and a thousand kilometers ofseaboard. The Jugoslavs met this assertion with the objection that theoutlets in question were inaccessible, all except Fiume and Metkovitch. As for Fiume, [199] the Italian delegates contended that although notpromised to Italy by the Treaty of London, it was historically hers, because, having been for centuries an autonomous entity and having assuch religiously preserved its Italian character, its inhabitants hadexercised their rights to manifest by plebiscite their desire to beunited with the mother country. They further denied that it wasindispensable to the Jugoslavs because these would receive a dozen otherports and also because the traffic between Croatia and Fiume wasrepresented by only 7 per cent. Of the whole, and even that of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia combined by only 13 per cent. Further, Italywould undertake to give all requisite export facilities in Fiume to theJugoslavs. 

The latter traversed many of these statements, and in particular thatwhich described Fiume as a separate autonomous entity and as anessentially Italian city. Archives were ransacked by both parties, ancient documents produced, analyzed, condemned as forgeries or appealedto as authentic proofs, chance phrases were culled from various writersof bygone days and offered as evidence in support of each contention. Thus the contest grew heated. It was further inflamed by the attitude ofItaly's allies, who appeared to her as either covertly unfriendly or atbest lukewarm. 

M. Clemenceau, who maintained during the peace negotiations the epithet"Tiger" which he had earned long before, was alleged to have said in thecourse of one of those conversations which were misnamed private, "ForItaly to demand Fiume is to ask for the moon. "[200] Officially he tookthe side of Mr. Wilson, as did also the British Premier, and Italy's twoallies signified but a cold assent to those other claims which werecovered by their own treaty. But they made no secret of their desire tosee that instrument wholly set aside. Fiume they would not bestow ontheir ally, at least not unless she was prepared to offer an equivalentto the Jugoslavs and to satisfy the President of the United States. 

This advocacy of the claims of the Jugoslavs was bitterly resented bythe Italians. For centuries the two peoples had been rivals or enemies, and during the war the Jugoslavs fought with fury against the Italians. For Italy the arch-enemy had ever been Austria and Austria was largelySlav. "Austria, " they say, "was the official name given to the cruelenemy against whom we fought, but it was generally the Croatians andother Slavs whom our gallant soldiers found facing them, and it was theywho were guilty of the misdeeds from which our armies suffered. "Official documents prove this. [201] Orders of the day issued by theAustrian Command eulogize "the Serbo-Croatian battalions who vied withthe Austro-German and Hungarian soldiers in resisting the pitfalls dugby the enemy to cause them to swerve from their fidelity and take theroad to treason. [202] In the last battle which ended the existence ofthe Austro-Hungarian monarchy a large contingent of excellent Croatiantroops fought resolutely against the Italian armies. "

In Italy an impressive story is told which shows how this transformationof the enemy of yesterday into the ally of to-day sometimes worked out. The son of an Italian citizen who was fighting as an aviator was killedtoward the end of the war, in a duel fought in the air, by an Austriancombatant. Soon after the armistice was signed the sorrowing fatherrepaired to the place where his son had fallen. He there found anex-Austrian officer, the lucky victor and slayer of his son, wearing inhis buttonhole the Jugoslav _cocarde_, who, advancing toward him withextended hand, uttered the greeting, "You and I are now allies. "[203]The historian may smile at the naïveté of this anecdote, but thestatesman will acknowledge that it characterized the relations betweenthe inhabitants of the new state and the Italians. One can divine thefeelings of these when they were exhorted to treat their ex-enemies asfriends and allies. 

"Is it surprising, then, " the Italians asked, "that we cannot suddenlyconceive an ardent affection for the ruthless 'Austrians' of whosecruelties we were bitterly complaining a few months back? Is it strangethat we cannot find it in our hearts to cut off a slice of Italianterritory and make it over to them as one of the fruits of--our victoryover them? If Italy had not first adopted neutrality and then joined theAllies in the war there would be no Jugoslavia to-day. Are we now to payfor our altruism by sacrificing Italian soil and Italian souls to thesecular enemies of our race?" In a word, the armistice transformedItaly's enemy into a friend and ally for whose sake she was summoned toabandon some of the fruits of a hard-earned victory and a part of hersecular aspirations. What, asked the Italian delegates, would Franceanswer if she were told that the Prussians whom her matchless armiesdefeated must henceforth be looked upon as friends and endowed with somenew colonies which would otherwise be hers? The Italian dramatist SemBenelli put the matter tersely: "The collapse of Austria transformsitself therefore into a play of words, so much so that our people, whoare much more precise because they languished under the Austrian yokeand the Austrian scourge, never call the Austrians by this name; theycall them always Croatians, knowing well that the Croatians and theSlavs who constituted Austria were our fiercest taskmasters and mostcruel executioners. It is naïve to think that the ineradicablecharacteristics and tendencies of peoples can be modified by a change ofname and a new flag. "

But there was another way of looking at the matter, and the Allies, together with the Jugoslavs, made the most of it. The Slav character ofthe disputed territory was emphasized, the principle of nationalityinvoked, and the danger of incorporating an unfriendly foreign elementwhich could not be assimilated was solemnly pointed out. But wheresentiment actuates, reason is generally impotent. The policy of theItalian government, like that of all other governments, was franklynationalistic; whether it was also statesman-like may well bequestioned--indeed the question has already been answered by some ofItaly's principal press organs in the negative. [204] They accuse theCabinet of having deliberately let loose popular passions which itafterward vainly sought to allay, and the facts which they allege insupport of the charge have never been denied. 

It was certainly to Italy's best interests to strike up a friendlyagreement with the new state, if that were feasible, and some of the menin whose hands her destinies rested, feeling their responsibility, madea laudable attempt to come to an understanding. Signor Orlando, whosesagacity is equal to his resourcefulness, was one. In London he hadtalked the subject over with the Croatian leader, M. Trumbic, andfavored the movement toward reconciliation[205] which Baron Sonnino, hiscolleague, as resolutely discouraged. A congress was accordingly held inRome[206] and an accord projected. The reciprocal relations becameamicable. The Jugoslav committee in the Italian capital congratulatedSignor Orlando on the victory of the Piave. But owing to various causes, especially to Baron Sonnino's opposition, these inchoate sentiments ofneighborliness quickly lost their warmth and finally vanished. No traceof them remained at the Paris Conference, where the delegates of the twostates did not converse together nor even salute one another. 

President Wilson's visit to Rome, where, to use an Italian expression, he was welcomed by Delirium, seemed to brighten Italy's outlook on thefuture. Much was afterward made by the President's enemies of thesubsequent change toward him in the sentiments of the Italian people. This is commonly ascribed to his failure to fulfil the expectationswhich his words or attitude aroused or warranted. Nothing could well bemore misleading. Mr. Wilson's position on the subject of Italy's claimsnever changed, nor did he say or do aught that would justify a doubt asto what it was. In Rome he spoke to the Ministers in exactly the sameterms as in Paris at the Conference. He apprized them in January of whathe proposed to do in April and he even contemplated issuing adeclaration of his Italian policy at once. But he was earnestlyrequested by the Ministers to keep his counsel to himself and to make nopublic allusion to it during his sojourn in Italy. [207] It was not hisfault, therefore, if the Italian people cherished illusory hopes. InParis Signer Orlando had an important encounter with Mr. Wilson, [208]who told him plainly that the allotment of the northern frontiers tracedfor Italy by the London Treaty would be confirmed, while that of theterritory on the eastern Adriatic would be quashed. The division of thespoils of Austria there must, he added, be made congruously with a mapwhich he handed to the Italian Premier. It was proved on examination tobe identical with one already published by the _New Europe_. [209] SignorOrlando glanced at the map and in courteous phraseology unfolded thereasons why he could not entertain the settlement proposed. He addedthat no Italian parliament would ratify it. Thereupon the Presidentturned the discussion to politico-ethical lines, pointed out the harmwhich the annexation of an alien and unfriendly element could inflictupon Italy, the great advantages which cordial relations with her Slavneighbor would confer on her, and the ease with which she might gain themarkets of the new state. A young and small nation like the Jugoslavswould be grateful for an act of generosity and would repay it by lastingfriendship--a return worth far more than the contentious territories. "Ah, you don't know the Jugoslavs, Mr. President, " exclaimed SignorOrlando. "If Italy were to cede to them Dalmatia, Fiume, and easternIstria they would forthwith lay claim to Trieste and Pola and, afterTrieste and Pola, to Friuli and Gorizia. "

After some further discussion Mr. Wilson said: "Well, I am unable toreconcile with my principles the recognition of secret treaties, and asthe two are incompatible I uphold the principles. " "I, too, " rejoinedthe Italian Premier, "condemn secret treaties in the future when the newprinciples will have begun to regulate international politics. As forthose compacts which were concluded during the war they were all secret, not excluding those to which the United States was a party. " ThePresident demurred to this reservation. He conceived and put his casebriefly as follows: Italy, like her allies, had had it in her power toaccept the Fourteen Points, reject them, or make reserves. Britain andFrance had taken exception to those clauses which they were determinedto reject, whereas Italy signified her adhesion to them all. Thereforeshe was bound by the principles underlying them and had forfeited theright to invoke a secret treaty. The settlement of the issues turningupon Dalmatia, Istria, Fiume, and the islands must consequently betaken in hand without reference to the clauses of that instrument. Examined on their merits and in the light of the new arrangements, Italy's claims could not be upheld. It would be unfair to the Jugoslavswho inhabit the whole country to cut them off from their own seaboard. Nor would such a measure be helpful to Italy herself, whose interest itwas to form a homogeneous whole, consolidate her dominions, and preparefor the coming economic struggle for national well-being. The principleof nationality must, therefore, be allowed full play. 

As for Fiume, even if the city were, as alleged, an independent entityand desirous of being incorporated in Italy, one would still have to setagainst these facts Jugoslavia's imperative need of an outlet to thesea. Here the principle of economic necessity outweighs those ofnationality and free determination. A country must live, and thereforebe endowed with the wherewithal to support life. On these grounds, judgment should be entered for the Jugoslavs. 

The Italian Premier's answer was equally clear, but he could notunburden his mind of it all. His government had, it was true, adhered tothe Fourteen Points without reservation. But the assumptions on which itgave this undertaking were that it would not be used to upset pastcompacts, but would be reserved for future settlements; that even had itbeen otherwise the maxims in question should be deemed relevant inItaly's case only if applied impartially to all states, and that theentire work of reorganization should rest on this ethical foundation. Arégime of exceptions, with privileged and unprivileged nations, wouldobviously render the scheme futile and inacceptable. Yet this was thesystem that was actually being introduced. If secret treaties were to beabrogated, then let the convention between Japan and China be also putout of court and the dispute between them adjudicated upon its merits. If the Fourteen Points are binding, let the freedom of the seas beproclaimed. If equal rights are to be conferred upon all states, let theMonroe Doctrine be repealed. If disarmament is to become a reality, letBritain and America cease to build warships. Suppose for a moment thatto-morrow Brazil or Chile were to complain of the conduct of the UnitedStates, the League of Nations, in whose name Mr. Wilson speaks, would behindered by the Monroe Doctrine from intervening, whereas Britain andthe United States in analogous conditions may intermeddle in the affairsof any of the lesser states. When Ireland or Egypt or India uplifts itsvoice against Britain, it is but a voice in the desert which awakens noecho. If Fiume were inhabited by American citizens who, with a likeclaim to be considered a separate entity, asked to be allowed to liveunder the Stars and Stripes, what would President Wilson's attitude bethen? Would he turn a deaf ear to their prayer? Surely not. Why, in thecase of Italy, does he not do as he would be done by? What it all comesto is that the new ordering under the flag of equality is to consist ofsuperior and inferior nations, of which the former, who speak English, are to possess unlimited power over the latter, to decide what is goodfor them and what is bad, what is licit and what is forbidden. Andagainst their fiat there is to be no appeal. In a word, it is to be thehegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race. 

It is worth noting that Signor Orlando's arguments were all derived fromthe merits of the case, not from the terms or the force of the LondonTreaty. Fiume, he said, had besought Italy to incorporate it, and hadmade this request before the armistice, at a moment when it was risky toproclaim attachments to the kingdom. [210] The inhabitants had invokedMr. Wilson's own words: "National aspirations must be respected. . . . Self-determination is not a mere phrase. " "Peoples and provinces are notto be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they weremere chattels and pawns in a game. Every territorial settlement involvedin this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of thepopulations concerned, and not as a part of any adjustment forcompromise of claims among rival states. " And in his address at MountVernon the President had advocated a doctrine which is peculiarlyapplicable to Fiume--_i. E. _:

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis ofthe free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediatelyconcerned, and not upon the basis of material interest or advantage ofany other nation or people which may desire a different settlement, forthe sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. "[211] These maximslaid down by Mr. Wilson implicitly allot Fiume to Italy. 

Finally as to the objection that Italy's claims would entail theincorporation of a number of Slavs, the answer was that the percentagewas negligible as compared with the number of foreign elements annexedby other states. The Poles, it was estimated, would have some 30 percent. Of aliens, the Czechs not less, Rumania 17 per cent. , Jugoslavia11 per cent. , France 4 per cent. , and Italy only 3 per cent. 

In February the Jugoslavs made a strategic move, which many admired asclever, and others blamed as unwise. They proposed that all differencesbetween their country and Italy should be submitted to Mr. Wilson'sarbitration. Considering that the President's mind was made up on thesubject from the beginning, and that he had decided against Italy, itwas natural that the delegation in whose favor his decision was known toincline should be eager to get it accepted by their rivals. As neitherside was ignorant of what the result of the arbitration would be, onlyone of the two could be expected to close with the offer, and the mostit could hope by doing this was to embarrass the other. The Italiananswer was ingenious. Their dispute, they said, was not with Serbia, whoalone was represented at the Conference; it concerned Croatia, who hadno official standing there, and whose frontiers were not yet determined, but would in due time be traced by the Conference, of which Italy was amember. The decision would be arrived at after an exhaustive study, andits probable consequences to Europe's peace would be duly considered. Asextreme circumspection was imperative before formulating a verdict, fiveplenipotentiaries would seem better qualified than any one of them, eventhough he were the wisest of the group. To remove the question from thecompetency of the Conference, which was expressly convoked to deal withsuch issues, and submit it to an individual, would be felt as a slighton the Supreme Council. And so the matter dropped. 

Signor Orlando knew that if he had adopted the suggestion and made Mr. Wilson arbiter, Italy's hopes would have been promptly extinguished inthe name of the Fourteen Points, and her example held up for all thelesser states to imitate. The President was, however, convinced that theItalian people would have ratified the arrangement with alacrity. It isworth recording that he was so sure of his own hold on the Italianmasses that, when urging Signor Orlando to relinquish his demand forFiume and the Dalmatian coast, he volunteered to provide him with amessage written by himself to serve as the Premier's justification. Signor Orlando was to read out this document in Parliament in order tomake it clear to the nation that the renunciation had been demanded byAmerica, that it would most efficaciously promote Italy's bestinterests, and should for that reason be ratified with alacrity. SignorOrlando, however, declined the certificate and things took their course. 

In Paris the Italian delegation made little headway. Every one admired, esteemed, and felt drawn toward the first delegate, who, left tohimself, would probably have secured for his country advantageousconditions, even though he might be unable to add Fiume to those securedby the secret treaty. But he was not left to himself. He had to reckonwith his Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was as mute as an oyster andalmost as unsociable. Baron Sonnino had his own policy, which wasimmutable, almost unutterable. At the Conference he seemed unwilling topropound, much less to discuss it, even with those foreign colleagues onwhose co-operation or approval its realization depended. He actuallyshunned delegates who would fain have talked over their common interestsin a friendly, informal way, and whose business it was to strike up anagreement. In fact, results which could be secured only by persuadingindifferent or hostile people and capturing their good-will he expectedto attain by holding aloof from all and leading the life of a hermit, one might almost say of a misanthrope. One can imagine the feelings, ifone may not reproduce the utterances, of English-speaking officials, whose legitimate desire for a free exchange of views with Italy'sofficial spokesman was thwarted by the idiosyncrasies of her ownMinister of Foreign Affairs. In Allied circles Baron Sonnino wasdistinctly unpopular, and his unpopularity produced a marked effect onthe cause he had at heart. He was wholly destitute of friends. He had, it is true, only two enemies, but they were himself and the foreignelement who had to work with him. Italy's cause was thereforeinadequately served. 

Several months' trial showed the unwisdom of Baron Sonnino's attitude, which tended to defeat his own policy. Italy was paid back by her alliesin her own coin, aloofness for aloofness. After she had declined theJugoslavs' ingenious proposal to refer their dispute to Mr. Wilson thethree delegates[212] agreed among themselves to postpone her specialproblems until peace was signed with Germany, but Signor Orlando, havinggot wind of the matter, moved every lever to have them put into theforefront of the agenda. He went so far as to say that he would not signthe Treaty unless his country's claims were first settled, because thatdocument would make the League of Nations--and therefore Italy as amember of the League--the guarantor of other nations' territories, whereas she herself had no defined territories for others to guarantee. She would not undertake to defend the integrity of states which she hadhelped to create while her own frontiers were indefinite. But in the artof procrastination the Triumvirate was unsurpassed, and, as the timedrew near for presenting the Treaty to Germany, neither the Adriatic, the colonial, the financial, nor the economic problems on which Italy'sfuture depended were settled or even broached. In the meanwhile theplenipotentiaries in secret council, of whom four or five were wont todeliberate and two to take decisions, had disagreed on the subject ofFiume. Mr. Wilson was inexorable in his refusal to hand the city over toItaly, and the various compromises devised by ingenious weavers ofconflicting interests failed to rally the Italian delegates, whose inspirer was the taciturn Baron Sonnino. TheItalian press, by insisting on Fiume as a _sine qua non_ ofItaly's approval of the Peace Treaty and by announcingthat it would undoubtedly be accorded, had made itpractically impossible for the delegates to recede. Thecircumstance that the press was inspired by the government is immaterialto the issue. President Wilson, who had been frequently told that a wordfrom him to the peoples of Europe would fire their enthusiasm and carrythem whithersoever he wished, even against their own governments, nowpurposed wielding this unique power against Italy's plenipotentiaries. As we saw, he would have done this during his sojourn in Rome, but wasdissuaded by Baron Sonnino. His intention now was to compel thedelegates to go home and ascertain whether their inflexible attitudecorresponded with that of their people and to draw the people into thecamp of the "idealists. " He virtually admitted this during hisconversation with Signor Orlando. What he seems to have overlooked, however, is that there are time limits to every policy, and that onlythe same causes can be set in motion to produce the same results. InItaly the President's name had a very different sound in April from theclarion-like tones it gave forth in January, and the secret of hispopularity even then was the prevalent faith in his firm determinationto bring about a peace of justice, irrespective of all separateinterests, not merely a peace with indulgence for the strong and rigorfor the weak. The time when Mr. Wilson might have summoned the peoplesof Europe to follow him had gone by irrevocably. It is worth noting thatthe American statesman's views about certain of Italy's claims, althoughoriginally laid down with the usual emphasis as immutable, underwentconsiderable modifications which did not tend to reinforce hisauthority. Thus at the outset he had proclaimed the necessity ofdividing Istria between the two claimant nations, but, on furtherreflection, he gave way in Italy's favor, thus enabling Signor Orlandoto make the point that even the President's solutions neededcorrections. It is also a fact that when the Italian Premier insisted onhaving the Adriatic problems definitely settled before the presentationof the Treaty to the Germans[213] his colleagues of France and Britainassured him that this reasonable request would be complied with. Thecircumstance that this promise was disregarded did not tend to smoothmatters in the Council of Five. 

The decisive duel between Signor Orlando and Mr. Wilson was fought outin April, and the overt acts which subsequently marked their tenserelations were but the practical consequences of that. On the historicday each one set forth his program with a _ne varietur_ attached, andthe President of the United States gave utterance to an estimate ofItalian public opinion which astonished and pained the Italian Premier, who, having contributed to form it, deemed himself a more competentjudge of its trend than his distinguished interlocutor. But Mr. Wilsonnot only refused to alter his judgment, but announced his intention toact upon it and issue an appeal to the Italian nation. The gist of thisdocument was known to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. It has beenalleged, and seems highly probable, that the British Premier wasthroughout most anxious to bring about a workable compromise. Proposalswere therefore put forward respecting Fiume and Dalmatia, some of whichwere not inacceptable to the Italians, who lodged counter-proposalsabout the others. On the fate of these counter-proposals everythingdepended. 

On April 23d I was at the Hôtel Edouard VII, the headquarters of theItalian delegation, discussing the outlook and expecting to learn thatsome agreement had been reached. In an adjoining room the members of thedelegation were sitting in conference on the burning subject, painfullyaware that time pressed, that the Damocles's sword of Mr. Wilson'sdeclaration hung by a thread over their heads, and that a spirit oflarge compromise was indispensable. At three o'clock Mr. Lloyd George'ssecretary brought the reply of the Council of Three to Italy's maximumof concessions. Only one point remained in dispute, I was told, but thatpoint hinged upon Fiume, and, by a strange chance, it was not mentionedin the reply which the secretary had just handed in. The Italiandelegation at once telephoned to the British Premier asking him toreceive the Marquis Imperiali, who, calling shortly afterward, learnedthat Fiume was to be a free city and exempt from control. It was whenthe marquis had just returned that I took leave of my hosts and receivedthe assurance that I should be informed of the result. About half anhour later, on receipt of an urgent message, I hastened back to theItalian headquarters, where consternation prevailed, and I learned thathardly had the delegates begun to discuss the contentious clause when acopy of the _Temps_ was brought in, containing Mr. Wilson's appeal tothe Italian people "over the heads of the Italian government. "

The publication fell like a powerful explosive. The public were at aloss to fit in Mr. Wilson's unprecedented action with that of hisBritish and French colleagues. For if in the morning he sent his appealto the newspapers, it was asked, why did he allow his Italian colleaguesto go on examining a proposal on which he manifestly assumed that theywere no longer competent to treat? Moreover a rational desire to settleItaly's Adriatic frontiers, it was observed, ought not to have lessenedhis concern about the larger issues which his unwonted procedure wasbound to raise. And one of these was respect for authority, the loss ofwhich was the taproot of Bolshevism. Signor Orlando replied to theappeal in a trenchant letter which was at bottom a reasoned protestagainst the assumed infallibility of any individual and, in particular, of one who had already committed several radical errors of judgment. What the Italian Premier failed to note was the consciousness ofoverwhelming power and the will to use it which imparted its specificmark to the whole proceeding. Had he realized this element, hissubsequent tactics would perhaps have run on different lines. 

The suddenness with which the President carried out his purpose wasafterward explained as the outcome of misinformation. In various Italiancities, it had been reported to him, posters were appearing on the wallsannouncing that Fiume had been annexed. Moreover, it was added, therewere excellent grounds for believing that at Rome the Italian Cabinetwas about to issue a decree incorporating it officially, whereby thingswould become more tangled than ever. Some French journals gave credit tothese allegations, and it may well be that Mr. Wilson, believing them, too, and wanting to be beforehand, took immediate action. This, however, is at most an explanation; it hardly justifies the precipitancy withwhich the Italian plenipotentiaries were held up to the world as men whowere misrepresenting their people. As a matter of fact careful inquiryshowed that all those reports which are said to have alarmed thePresident were groundless. Mr. Wilson's sources of informationrespecting the countries on which he was sitting in judgment were oftenas little to be depended on as presumably were the decisions of thespecial commissions which he and Mr. Lloyd George so unceremoniouslybrushed aside. 

On the following morning Signori Orlando and Sonnino called on theBritish Premier in response to his urgent invitation. To their surprisethey found Mr. Wilson and M. Clemenceau also awaiting them, ready, as itmight seem, to begin the discussion anew, curious in any case to observethe effect of the declaration. But the Italian Premier burned his boatswithout delay or hesitation. "You have challenged the authority of theItalian government, " he said, "and appealed to the Italian people. Be itso. It is now become my duty to seek out the representatives of mypeople in Parliament and to call upon them to decide between Mr. Wilsonand me. " The President returned the only answer possible, "Undoubtedlythat is your duty. " "I shall inform Parliament then that we have alliesincapable of agreeing among themselves on matters that concern usvitally. " Disquieted by the militant tone of the Minister, Mr. LloydGeorge uttered a suasive appeal for moderation, and expressed the hopethat in his speech to the Italian Chamber, Signor Orlando would notforget to say that a satisfactory solution may yet be found. He wouldsurely be incapable of jeopardizing the chances of such a desirableconsummation. "I will make the people arbiters of the whole situation, "the Premier announced, "and in order to enable them to judge with fullknowledge of the data, I herewith ask your permission to communicate mylast memorandum to the Council of Four. It embodies the pith of thefacts which it behooves the Parliament to have before it. In themeantime, the Italian government withdraws from the Peace Conference. "On this the painful meeting terminated and the principal Italianplenipotentiaries returned to Rome. In France a section of the presssympathized with the Italians, while the government, and in particularM. Clemenceau, joined Mr. Wilson, who had promised to restore thesacredness of treaties[214] in exhorting Signor Orlando to give up theTreaty of London. The clash between Mr. Wilson and Signor Orlando andthe departure of the Italian plenipotentiaries coincided with thearrival of the Germans in Versailles, so that the Allies were faced withthe alternative of speeding up their desultory talks and improvising adefinite solution or giving up all pretense at unanimity in the presenceof the enemy. One important Paris journal found fault with Mr. Wilsonand his "Encyclical, " and protested emphatically against his way offilling every gap in his arrangements by wedging into it his League ofNations. "Can we harbor any illusion as to the net worth of the Leagueof Nations when the revised text of the Covenant reveals it shrunken tothe merest shadow, incapable of thought, will, action, or justice?. . . Too often have we made sacrifices to the Wilsonian doctrine. "[215] . . . Another press organ compared Fiume to the Saar Valley and sympathizedwith Italy, who, relying on the solidarity of her allies, expected tosecure the city. [216]

While those wearisome word-battles--in which the personal element playedan undue part--were being waged in the twilight of a secluded Valhalla, the Supreme Economic Council decided that the seized Austrian vesselsmust be pooled among all the Allies. When the untoward consequences ofthis decision were flashed upon the Italians and the Jugoslavs, therupture between them was seen to be injurious to both and profitable tothird parties. For if the Austrian vessels were distributed among allthe Allied peoples, the share that would fall to those two would be ofno account. Now for the first time the adversaries bestirred themselves. But it was not their diplomatists who took the initiative. Eager fortheir respective countries' share of the spoils of war, certainbusiness men on both sides met, [217] deliberated, and worked out anequitable accord which gave four-fifths of the tonnage to Italy and theremainder to the Jugoslavs, who otherwise would not have obtained asingle ship. [218] They next set about getting the resolution of theEconomic Council repealed, and went on with their conversations. [219]The American delegation was friendly, promised to plead for the repeal, and added that "if the accord could be extended to the Adriatic problemMr. Wilson would be delighted and would take upon himself to ratify it_even without the sanction of the Conference_. [220] Encouraged by thispromise, the delegates made the attempt, but as the Italian Premier hadfor some unavowed reason limited the intercourse of the negotiators to asingle day, on the expiry of which he ordered the conversation tocease, [221] they failed. Two or three days later the delegates inquestion had quitted Paris. 

What this exchange of views seems to have demonstrated to open-mindedItalians was that the Jugoslavs, whose reputation for obstinacy was adogma among all their adversaries and some of their friends, have chinksin their panoply through which reason and suasion may penetrate. 

When the Italian withdrew from the Conference he had ample reason forbelieving that in his absence peace could not be signed, and manythought that, by departing, he was giving Mr. Wilson a Roland for hisOliver. But this supposed tactical effect formed no part of Orlando'sdeliberate plan. It was a coincidence to be utilized, nothing more. Mr. Wilson had left him no choice but to quit France and solicit the verdictof his countrymen. But Mr. Wilson's colleagues were aghast at thethought that the Pact of London, by which none of the Allies mightconclude a separate peace, rendered it indispensable that Italy'srecalcitrant plenipotentiaries should be co-signatories, or at any rateconsenting parties. About this interpretation of the Pact there was notthe slightest doubt. Hence every one feared that the signing of thePeace Treaty would be postponed indefinitely because of the absence ofthe Italian plenipotentiaries from the Conference. That certainly wasthe belief of the remaining delegates. There was no doubt anywhere thatthe presence or the express assent of the Italians was a _sine qua non_of the legality of the Treaty. It certainly was the conviction of theFrench press, and was borne out by the most eminent jurists throughoutthe world. [222] That the Italian delegates might refuse to sign, asSignor Orlando had threatened, until Italy's affairs were arrangedsatisfactorily was taken for granted, and the remaining members of theinner Council set to work to checkmate this potential maneuver anddispense with her co-operation. This aim was attained during the absenceof the Italian delegation by the decree that the signature of any threeof the Allied and Associated governments would be deemed adequate. Thelegality and even the morality of this provision were challenged bymany. 

But it may be maintained that the imperative nature of the task whichconfronted the Conference demanded a chart of ideas and principlesdifferent from that by which Old World diplomacy had been guided andthat respect for the letter of a compact should not be allowed todestroy its spirit. There is much to be said for this contention, whichwas, however, rejected by Italian jurists as destructive of thesacredness of treaties. They also urged that even if it were permissibleto dash formal obstacles aside in order to clear the path for thefurtherance of a good cause, it is also indispensable that the resultshould be compassed with the smallest feasible sacrifice of principle. Hopes were accordingly entertained by the Italian delegates that, ontheir return to Paris, at least a formal declaration might be made thatItaly's signature was indispensable to the validity of the Treaty. Butthey were not, perhaps could not, be fulfilled at that conjuncture. 

Advantage was taken in other ways of the withdrawal of Italy'srepresentatives from the Conference. For example, a clause of the Treatywith Germany dealing with reparations was altered to Italy's detriment. Another which turned upon Austro-German relations was likewise modified. Before the delegates left for Rome it had been settled that Germanyshould be bound over to respect Austria's independence. This obligationwas either superfluous, every state being obliged to respect theindependence of every other, or else it had a cryptic meaning whichwould only reveal itself in the application of the clause. As soon asthe Conference was freed from the presence of the Italians the formulawas modified, and Germany was plainly forbidden to unite with Austria, even though Austria should expressly desire amalgamation. As thisenactment runs directly counter to the principle of self-determination, the Italian Minister Crespi raised his voice in energetic protestagainst this and the financial changes, [223] whereupon the Triumvirs, giving way on the latter point, consented to restore the primitive textof the financial condition. [224] Germany is obliged to supply Francewith seven million tons of coal every year by way of restitution fordamage done during the war. At the price of fifty francs a ton, themoney value of this tribute would be three hundred and fifty millionfrancs, of which Italy would be entitled to receive 30 per cent. Butduring the absence of the Italian representatives a supplementary clausewas inserted in the Treaty[225] conferring a special privilege on Francewhich renders Italy's claim of little or no value. It provides thatGermany shall deliver annually to France an amount of coal equal to thedifference between the pre-war production of the mines of Pas de Calaisand the Nord, destroyed by the enemy, and the production of the mines ofthe same area during each of the coming years, the maximum limit to betwenty million tons. As this contribution takes precedence of allothers, and as Germany, owing to insufficiency of transports and othercauses, will probably be unable to furnish it entirely, Italy's claim isconsidered practically valueless. 

The reception of the delegates in Rome was a triumph, their return toParis a humiliation. For things had been moving fast in the meanwhile, and their trend, as we said, was away from Italy's goal. Public opinionin their own country likewise began to veer round, and people askedwhether they had adopted the right tactics, whether, in fine, they werethe right men to represent their country at that crisis of its history. There was no gainsaying the fact that Italy was completely isolated atthe Conference. She had sacrificed much and had garnered in relativelylittle. The Jugoslavs had offered her an alliance--although this kind ofpartnership had originally been forbidden by the Wilsonian discipline;the offer was rejected and she was now certain of their lasting enmity. Venizelos had also made overtures to Baron Sonnino for an understanding, but they elicited no response, and Italy's relations with Greece lostwhatever cordiality they might have had. Between France and Italy thethreads of friendship which companionship in arms should have done muchto strengthen were strained to the point of snapping. And worst, perhaps, of all, the Italian delegates had approved the clauseforbidding Germany to unite with Austria. 

That the fault did not lie wholly in the attitude of the Allies isobvious. The Italian delegates' lack of method, one might say of unity, was unquestionably a contributory cause of their failure to makeperceptible headway at the Conference. A curious and characteristicincident of the slipshod way in which the work was sometimes doneoccurred in connection with the disposal of the Palace Venezia, in Rome, which had belonged to Austria, but was expropriated by the Italiangovernment soon after the opening of hostilities. The heirs of theHapsburg Crown put forward a claim to proprietary rights which wastraversed by the Italian government. As the dispute was to be laidbefore the Conference, the Roman Cabinet invited a _juris consult_versed in these matters to argue Italy's case. He duly appeared, unfolded his claim congruously with the views of his government, butsuddenly stopped short on observing the looks of astonishment on thefaces of the delegates. It appears that on the preceding day anotherdelegate of the Economic Conference, also an Italian, had unfolded anddefended the contrary thesis--namely, that Austria's heirs hadinherited her right to the Palace of Venezia. [226]

Passing to more momentous matters, one may pertinently ask whether toomuch stress was not laid by the first Italian delegation upon thenational and sentimental sides of Italy's interests, and too little onthe others. Among the Great Powers Italy is most in need of rawmaterials. She is destitute of coal, iron, cotton, and naphtha. Most ofthem are to be had in Asia Minor. They are indispensable conditions ofmodern life and progress. To demand a fair share of them as guerdon forhaving saved Europe, and to put in her claim at a moment when Europe wasbeing reconstituted, could not have been construed as imperialism. Theother Allies had possessed most of those necessaries in abundance longbefore the war. They were adding to them now as the fruits of a victorywhich Italy's sacrifices had made possible. Why, then, should she beleft unsatisfied? Bitterly though the nation was disappointed by failureto have its territorial claims allowed, it became still more deeplygrieved when it came to realize that much more important advantagesmight have been secured if these had been placed in the forefront of thenation's demands. Emigration ground for Italy's surplus population, which is rapidly increasing, coal and iron for her industries mightperhaps have been obtained if the Italian plan of campaign at theConference had been rightly conceived and skilfully executed. But thisrealistic aspect of Italy's interests was almost wholly lost sight ofduring the waging of the heated and unfruitful contests for thepossession of town and ports, which, although sacred symbols ofItalianism, could not add anything to the economic resources which willplay such a predominant part in the future struggle for materialwell-being among the new and old states. There was a marked propensityamong Italy's leaders at home and in Paris to consider each of theissues that concerned their country as though it stood alone, instead ofenvisaging Italy's economic, financial, and military position after thewar as an indivisible problem and proving that it behooved the Allies inthe interests of a European peace to solve it satisfactorily, and toprovide compensation in one direction for inevitable gaps in the other. This, to my thinking, was the fundamental error of the Italian andAllied statesmen for which Europe may have to suffer. That Italy'spolicy cannot in the near future return to the lines on which it ranever since the establishment of her national unity, whatever her alliesmay do or say, will hardly be gainsaid. Interests are decisive factorsof foreign policy, and the action of the Great Powers has determinedItaly's orientation. 

Italy undoubtedly gained a great deal by the war, into which she enteredmainly for the purpose of achieving her unity and securing strongfrontiers. But she signed the Peace Treaty convinced that she had notsucceeded in either purpose, and that her allies were answerable for herfailure. It was certainly part of their policy to build up a strongstate on her frontier out of a race which she regards as her adversaryand to give it command of some of her strategic positions. And the overtbearing manner in which this policy was sometimes carried out left asmuch bitterness behind as the object it aimed at. It is alleged that theItalian delegates were treated with an economy of consideration whichbordered on something much worse, while the arguments officially invokedto non-suit them appeared to them in the light of bitter sarcasms. President Wilson, they complained, ignored his far-resonant principleof self-determination when Japan presented her claim for Shantung, butrefused to swerve from it when Italy relied on her treaty rights inDalmatia. And when the inhabitants of Fiume voted for union with themother country, the President abandoned that principle and gave judgmentfor Jugoslavia on other grounds. He was right, but disappointing, theyobserved, when he told his fellow-citizens that his presence in Europewas indispensable in order to interpret his conceptions, for no otherrational being could have construed them thus. 

The withdrawal of the Italian delegates was construed as an act ofinsubordination, and punished as such. The Marquis de Viti de Varche hassince disclosed the fact that the Allied governments forthwith reducedthe credits accorded to Italy during hostilities, whereupon hardshipsand distress were aggravated and the peasantry over a large area of thecountry suffered intensely. [227] For Italy is more dependent on herallies than ever, owing to the sacrifices which she offered up duringthe war, and she was made to feel her dependence painfully. The militaryassistance which they had received from her was fraught with financialand economic consequences which have not yet been realized by theunfortunate people who must endure them. Italy at the close ofhostilities was burdened with a foreign debt of twenty milliards oflire, an internal debt of fifty millards, and a paper circulation fourtimes more than what it was in pre-war days. [228] Raw materials wereexhausted, traffic and production were stagnant, navigation had almostceased, and the expenditure of the state had risen to eleven milliardsa year. [229]

According to the figures published by the Statistical Society of Berne, the general rise in prices attributed to the war hit Italy much harderthan any of her allies. [230] The consequences of this and otherperturbations were sinister and immediate. The nation, bereft of what ithad been taught to regard as its right, humiliated in the persons of itschiefs, subjected to foreign guidance, insufficiently clad, underfed, and with no tangible grounds for expecting speedy improvement, wasseething with discontent. Frequent strikes merely aggravated the generalsuffering, which finally led to riots, risings, and the shedding ofblood. The economic, political, and moral crisis was unprecedented. Themen who drew Italy into the war were held up to public opprobriumbecause in the imagination of the people the victory had cost them moreand brought them in less than neutrality would have done. One of theprincipal orators of the Opposition, in a trenchant discourse in theItalian Parliament, said, "The Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet led Italy intothe war blindfolded. "[231]

After the return of the Italian delegation to Paris various freshcombinations were devised for the purpose of grappling with the Adriaticproblem. One commended itself to the Italians as a possible basis fordiscussion. In principle it was accepted. A declaration to this effectwas made by Signor Orlando and taken cognizance of by M. Clemenceau, whoundertook to lay the matter before Mr. Wilson, the sole arbitrator inItalian affairs. He played the part of Fate throughout. Days went byafter this without bringing any token that the Triumvirate wasinterested in the Adriatic. At last the Italian Premier reminded hisFrench colleague that the latest proposal had been accepted inprinciple, and the Italian plenipotentiaries were awaiting Mr. Wilson'spleasure in the matter. Accordingly, M. Clemenceau undertook to broachthe matter to the American statesman without delay. The reply, which waspromptly given, dismayed the Italians. It was in the form of one ofthose interpretations which, becoming associated with Mr. Wilson's name, shook public confidence in certain of the statesman-like qualities withwhich he had at first been credited. The construction which he now putupon the mode of voting to be applied to Fiume, including this city--ina large district inhabited by a majority of Jugoslavs--imparted to theproject as the Italians had understood it a wholly new aspect. Theyaccordingly declared it inacceptable. As after that there seemed to benothing more for the Italian Premier to do in Paris, he left, was soonafterward defeated in the Chamber, and resigned together with hisCabinet. The vote of the Italian Parliament, which appeared to thecontinental press in the light of a protest of the nation against theaims and the methods of the Conference, closed for the time being thechapter of Italy's endeavor to complete her unity, secure strongfrontiers, and perpetuate her political partnership with France and herintimate relations with the Entente. Thenceforward the English-speakingstates might influence her overt acts, compel submission to theirbehests, and generally exercise a sort of guardianship over her, becausethey are the dispensers of economic boons, but the union of hearts, themutual trust, the cement supplied by common aims are lacking. 

One of the most telling arguments employed by President Wilson todissuade various states from claiming strategic positions, and inparticular Italy from insisting on the annexation of Fiume and theDalmatian coast, was the effective protection which the League ofNations would confer on them. [232] Strategical considerations would, itwas urged, lose all their value in the new era, and territorialguaranties become meaningless and cumbersome survivals of a dead epoch. That was the principal weapon with which he had striven to parry thethrusts of M. Clemenceau and the touchstone by which he tested thesincerity of all professions of faith in his cherished project ofcompacting the nations of the world in a vast league of peace-loving, law-abiding communities. But the faith of France's leaders differedlittle from unbelief. Guaranties first and the protection of the Leagueafterward was the French formula, around which many fierce battles royalwere fought. In the end Mr. Wilson, having obtained the withdrawal ofthe demand for the Rhine frontier, gave in, and the Covenant wasreinforced by a compact which in the last analysis is a militaryundertaking, a unilateral Triple Alliance, Great Britain and the UnitedStates undertaking to hasten to France's assistance should her territorybe wantonly invaded by Germany. The case thus provided for is extremelyimprobable. The expansion of Germany, when the auspicious hour strikes, will presumably be inaugurated on wholly new lines, against whicharmies, even if they can be mobilized in time, will be of little avail. But if force were resorted to, it is almost certain to be used in thedirection where the resistance is least--against France's ally, Poland. This, however, is by the way. The point made by the Italians was thatthe League of Nations being thus admittedly powerless to discharge thefunctions which alone could render strategic frontiers unnecessary, canconsequently no longer be relied upon as an adequate protection againstthe dangers which the possession of the strongholds she claimed on theAdriatic would effectively displace. Either the League, it was argued, can, as asserted, protect the countries which give up commandingpositions to potential enemies, or it cannot. In the former hypothesisFrance's insistence on a military convention is mischievous andimmoral--in the latter Italy stands in as much need of the precautionsdevised as her neighbor. But her spokesmen were still plied with thethreadbare arguments and bereft of the countervailing corrective. Andfaith in the efficacy of the League was sapped by the very men who wereprofessedly seeking to spread it. 

The press of Rome, Turin, and Milan pointed to the loyalty of theItalian people, brought out, they said, in sharp relief by thediscontent which the exclusive character of that triple military accordengendered among them. As kinsmen of the French it was natural forItalians to expect that they would be invited to become a party to thisleague within the League. As loyal allies of Britain and France theyfelt desirous of being admitted to the alliance. But they were excluded. Nor was their exasperation allayed by the assurance of their press thatthis was no alliance, but a state of tutelage. An alliance, it wasexplained, is a compact by which two or more parties agree to render oneanother certain services under given conditions, whereas the conventionin question is a one-sided undertaking on the part of Britain and theUnited States to protect France if wantonly attacked, because she isunable efficaciously to protect herself. It is a benefaction. But thiscasuistry fell upon deaf ears. What the people felt was thedisesteem--the term in vogue was stronger--in which they were held bythe Allies, whom they had saved perhaps from ruin. 

By slow degrees the sentiments of the Italian nation underwent adisquieting change. All parties and classes united in stigmatizing thebehavior of the Allies in terms which even the literary eminence of thepoet d'Annunzio could not induce the censors to let pass. "The PeaceTreaty, " wrote Italy's most influential journal, "and its correlateforbode for the near future the Continental hegemony of Francecountersigned by the Anglo-American alliance. "[233] Another widelycirculated and respected organ described the policy of the Entente as asolvent of the social fabric, constructive in words, corrosive in acts, "mischievous if ever there was a mischievous policy. For while raisinghopes and whetting appetites, it does nothing to satisfy them; on thecontrary, it does much to disappoint them. In words--a struggle forliberty, for nations, for the equality of peoples and classes, for thewell-being of all; in acts--the suppression of the most elementary andconstitutional liberty, the overlordship of certain nations based on thehumiliation of others, the division of peoples into exploiters andexploited--the sharpening of social differences--the destruction ofcollective wealth, and its accumulation in a few blood-stained hands, universal misery, and hunger. "[234]

Although it is well understood that Italy's defeat at the Conference waslargely the handiwork of President Wilson, the resentment of the Italiannation chose for its immediate objects the representatives of France andBritain. The American "associates" were strangers, here to-day and goneto-morrow, but the Allies remain, and if their attitude toward Italy, itwas argued, had been different, if their loyalty had been real, shewould have fared proportionately as well as they, whatever the Americanstatesmen might have said or done. 

The Italian press breathed fiery wrath against its French ally, who sooften at the Conference had met Italy's solicitations with the odiousword "impossible. " Even moderate organs of public opinion gave free ventto estimates of France's policy and anticipations of its consequenceswhich disturbed the equanimity of European statesmen. "It isimpossible, " one of these journals wrote, "for France to become theabsolute despot of Europe without Italy, much less against Italy. Whattranscended the powers of Richelieu, who was a lion and fox combined, and was beyond the reach of Bonaparte, who was both an eagle and aserpent, cannot be achieved by "Tiger" Clemenceau in circumstances somuch less favorable than those of yore. We, it is true, are isolated, but then France is not precisely embarrassed by the choice of friends. "The peace was described as "Franco-Slav domination with its headquartersin Prague, and a branch office in Agram. " M. Clemenceau was openlycharged with striving after the hegemony of the Continent for hiscountry by separating Germany from Austria and surrounding her with aring of Slav states--Poland, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps thenon-Slav kingdom of Rumania. All these states would be in theleading-strings of the French Republic, and Austria would be linked toit in a different guise. And in order to effect this resuscitation ofthe Hapsburg state under the name of "Danubian federation, " Mr. Wilson, it was asserted, had authorized a deliberate violation of his ownprinciple of self-determination, and refused to Austria the right ofadopting the régime which she preferred. It was, in truth, an oddcompromise, these critics continued, for an idealist of the President'scaliber, on whose every political action the scrutinizing gaze of theworld was fixed. One could not account for it as a sacrifice made for ahigh ethical aim--one of those ends which, according to the old maxim, hallows the means. It seemed an open response to a secret instigation orimpulse which was unconnected with any recognized or avowable principle. Even the Socialist organs swelled the chorus of the accusers. _Avanti_wrote, "We are Socialists, yet we have never believed that the AmericanPresident with his Fourteen Points entered into the war for the highestaims of humanity and for the rights of peoples, any more than we believeat present that his opposition to the aspirations of the Italian stateon the Adriatic are inspired by motives of idealism. "[235]

The fate of the disputed territories on the Adriatic was to be theoutcome of self-determination. Poland's claims were to be left to theself-determination of the Silesian and Ruthenian populations. Rumaniawas told that her suit must remain in abeyance until it could be testedby the same principle, which would be applied in the form of aplebiscite. For self-determination was the cornerstone of the League ofNations, the holiest boon for which the progressive peoples of the worldhad been pouring out their life-blood and substance for nearly fiveyears. But when Italy invoked self-determination, she was promptlynon-suited. When Austria appealed to it she was put out of court. And tocrown all, the world was assured that the Fourteen Points had beentriumphantly upheld. This depravation of principles by the triumph ofthe little prudences of the hour spurred some of the more impulsivecritics to ascribe it to influences less respectable than those to whichit may fairly be attributed. 

The directing Powers were hypersensitive to the oft-repeated charge ofmeddling in the internal affairs of other nations. They were nevertired of protesting their abhorrence of anything that smacked ofinterference. Among the numerous facts, however, which they couldneither deny nor reconcile with their professions, the following wasbrought forward by the Italians, who had a special interest to drawpublic attention to it. It had to do with the abortive attempt torestore the Hapsburg monarchy in Hungary as the first step toward theformation of a Danubian federation. "It is certain, " wrote the principalItalian journal, "that the Archduke Joseph's _coup d'état_ did not takeplace, indeed (given the conditions in Budapest) could not take place, without the Entente's connivance. The official _communiqués_ of Budapestand Vienna, dated August 9th, recount on this point precise detailswhich no one has hitherto troubled to deny. The Peidl government wasscarcely three days in power, and, therefore, was not in a position todeserve either trust or distrust, when the heads of the 'order-lovingorganizations' put forward, to justify the need of a new crisis, thecomplaints of the heads of the Entente Missions as to the anarchyprevailing in Hungary and the urgency of finding 'some one' who couldsave the country from the abyss. Then a commission repaired to Alscuth, where it easily persuaded the Archduke to come to Budapest. Here he atonce visited all the heads of missions and spent the whole day innegotiations. '_As a result of negotiations with Ententerepresentatives, the Archduke Joseph undertook a solution of thecrisis_. ' He then called together the old state police and a volunteerarmy of eight thousand men. The Rumanian garrison was kept ready. ThePeidl government naturally did not resist at all. At 10 P. M. On August7th all the Entente Missions held a meeting, _to which the ArchdukeJoseph and the new Premier were invited_. General Gorton presided. _TheConference lasted two hours and reached an agreement on all questions. All the heads of Missions assured the new government of their warmestsupport_. "[236]

Another case of unwarranted interference which stirred the Italians tobitter resentment turned upon the obligation imposed on Austria torenounce her right to unite with Germany. "It is difficult to discern inthe policy of the Entente toward Austria anything more respectable thanobstinacy coupled with stupidity, " wrote the same journal. "But there issomething still worse. It is impossible not to feel indignant with acoalition which, after having triumphed in the name of the loftiestideas . . . Treats German-Austria no better than the Holy Alliance treatedthe petty states of Italy. But the Congress of Vienna acted in harmonywith the principle of legitimism which it avowed and professed, whereasthe Paris Conference violates without scruple the canons by which itclaims to be guided. 

"Not a whit more decorous is the intervention of the Supreme Council inthe internal affairs of Germany--a state which, according to the spiritand the letter of the Versailles Treaty, is sovereign and not aprotectorate. The Conference was qualified to dictate peace terms toGermany, but it wanders beyond the bounds of its competency when itconstrues those terms and arrogates to itself--on the strength of forcedand equivocal interpretations--the right of imposing upon a nation whichis neither militarily nor juridically an enemy a constitutional reform. Whether Germany violates the Treaty by her Constitution is a questionwhich only a judicial finding of the League of Nations can fairlydetermine. "[237]

It would be impolitic to overlook and insincere to belittle the effectsof this incoherency upon the relations between France and Italy. Publicopinion in the Peninsula characterized the attitude of Prance asdeliberately hostile. The Italians at the Conference eagerly scrutinizedevery act and word of their French colleagues, with a view todiscovering grounds for dispelling this view. But the search is reportedto have been worse than vain. It revealed data which, althoughsusceptible of satisfactory explanations, would, if disclosed at thatmoment, have aggravated the feeling of bitterness against France, whichwas fast gathering. Signor Orlando had recourse to the censor to preventindiscretions, but the intuition of the masses triumphed overrepression, and the existing tenseness merged into resentment. The wayin which Italians accounted for M. Clemenceau's attitude was this. Although Italy has ceased to be the important political factor she oncewas when the Triple Alliance was in being, she is still a strongcontinental Power, capable of placing a more numerous army in the fieldthan her republican sister, and her population continues to increase ata high rate. In a few years she will have outstripped her rival. France, too, has perhaps lost those elements of her power and prestige which shederived from her alliance with Russia. Again, the Slav ex-ally, Russia, may become the enemy of to-morrow. In view of these contingencies Francemust create a substitute for the Rumanian and Italian allies. And asthese have been found in the new Slav states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, she can afford to dispense with making painfulsacrifices to keep Italy in countenance. 

A trivial incident which affords a glimpse of the spirit prevailingbetween the two kindred peoples occurred at St. -Germain-en-Laye, wherethe Austrian delegates were staying. They had been made much of inVienna by the Envoy of the French Republic there, M. Allizé, whosemission it was to hinder Austria from uniting with the Reich. Italy'spolicy was, on the contrary, to apply Mr. Wilson's principle ofself-determination and allow the Austrians to do as they pleased in thatrespect. A fervent advocate of the French orthodox doctrine--apublicist--repaired to the Austrian headquarters at St. -Germain for thepurpose, it is supposed, of discussing the subject. Now intercourse ofany kind between private individuals and the enemy delegates wasstrictly forbidden, and when M. X. Presented himself, the Italianofficer on duty refused him admission. He insisted. The officer wasinexorable. Then he produced a written permit signed by the Secretary ofthe Conference, M. Dutasta. How and why this exception was made in hisfavor when the rule was supposed to admit of no exceptions was notdisclosed. But the Italian officer, equal to the occasion, took theground that a military prohibition cannot be canceled by a civilian, andexcluded the would-be visitor. 

The general trend of France's European policy was repugnant to Italy. She looked on it as a well-laid scheme to assume a predominant rôle onthe Continent. That, she believed, was the ultimate purpose of the vetoon the union of Austria and Germany, of the military arrangements withBritain and the United States, and of much else that was obnoxious toItaly. Austria was to be reconstituted according to the federative plansof the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to be made stronger than before asa counterpoise to Italy, and to be at the beck and call of France. Thusthe friend, ally, sister of yesterday became the potential enemy ofto-morrow. That was the refrain of most of the Italian journals, andnone intoned it more fervently than those which had been foremost inbringing their country into the war. One of these, a Conservative organof Lombardy, wrote: "Until yesterday, we might have considered that twopaths lay open before us, that of an alliance with France and that ofan independent policy. But we can think so no longer. To offer ourfriendship to-day to the people who have already chosen their own roadand established their solidarity with our enemies of yesterday andto-morrow would not be to strike out a policy, but to decide on anunseemly surrender. It would be tantamount to reproducing in anaggravated form the situation we occupied in the alliance with Germany. Once again we should be engaged in a partnership of which one of thepartners was in reality our enemy. France taking the place of Germany, and Jugoslavia that of Austria, the situation of the old Triple Alliancewould be not merely reproduced, but made worse in the reproduction, because the _Triplice_ at least guaranteed us against a conflict whichwe had grounds for apprehending, whereas the new alliance would tie ourhands for the sake of a little Balkan state which, single-handed, we arewell able to keep in its place. 

"We have had enough of a policy which has hitherto saddled us with allthe burdens of the alliance without bestowing on us any advantage--whichhas constrained us to favor all the peoples whose expansion dovetailedwith French schemes and to combat or neglect those others whoseconsolidation corresponded to our interests--which has led us to supporta great Poland and a great Bohemia and to combat the Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Spain, to whose destinies the French, but not we, were indifferent. "[238] A press organ of Bologna denounced the atrociousand ignominious sacrifice "which her allies imposed on Italy by means ofeconomic blackmailing and violence with a whip in one hand and a chunkof bread in the other. "[239]

Sharp comments were provoked by the heavy tax on strangers in Tunisiaimposed by the French government, [240] on strangers, mostly Italians, who theretofore had enjoyed the same rights as the French and Tunisians. "Suddenly, " writes the principal Italian journal, "and just when it washoped that the common sacrifices they had made had strengthened the tiesbetween the two nations, the governor of Tunisia issued certain orderswhich endangered the interests of foreigners and the effects of whichwill be felt mainly by Italians, of whom there are one hundred andtwenty thousand in Tunisia. [241] First there came an order forbiddingthe use of any language but French in the schools. Now the tax referredto in the House of Lords gives the Tunisian government power to levy animpost on the buying and selling of property in Tunisia. The new tax, which is to be levied over and above pre-existing taxes, ranged from 59per cent. Of the value when it is not assessed at a higher sum than onehundred thousand lire to 80 per cent. When its estimated value is morethan five hundred thousand lire. " The article terminates with the remarkthat boycotting is hardly a suitable epilogue to a war waged for commonideals and interests. 

These manifestations irritated the French and were taken to indicateItaly's defection. It was to no purpose that a few level-headed menpointed out that the French government was largely answerable for thestate of mind complained of. "Pertinax, " in the _Echo de Paris_, wrote"that the alliance, in order to subsist and flourish, should haveretained its character as an Anti-German League, whereas it fell intothe error of masking itself as a Society of Nations and arrogated toitself the right of bringing before its tribunal all the quarrels of theplanet. "[242] Italy's allies undoubtedly did much to forfeit hersympathies and turn her from the alliance. It was pointed out that whenthe French troops arrived in Italy the Bulletin of the Italian commandeulogized their efforts almost daily, but when the Italian troops wentto France, the _communiqués_ of the French command were most chary ofallusions to their exploits, yet the Italian army contributed more deadto the French front than did the French army to the Italian front. [243]At the Peace Conference, as we saw, when the terms with Germany werebeing drafted, Italy's problems were set aside on the grounds that therewas no nexus between them. The Allies' interests, which were dealt withas a whole during the war, were divided after the armistice intoessential and secondary interests, and those of Italy were relegated tothe latter class. Subsequently France, Britain, and the United States, without the co-operation or foreknowledge of their Italian friends, struck up an alliance from which they excluded Italy, thereby vitiatingthe only arguments that could be invoked in favor of such a coalition. When peace was about to be signed they one-sidedly revoked the treatywhich they had concluded in London, rendering the consent of all Alliesnecessary to the validity of the document, and decreed that Italy'sabstention would make no difference. When the instrument was finallysigned, Mr. Wilson returned to the United States, Mr. Lloyd George toEngland, and the Marquis of Saionji to Japan, without having settled anyof Italy's problems. Italy, her needs, her claims, and her policy thusappear as matters of little account to the Great Powers. Naturally, theItalian people were disappointed, and desirous of seeking new friends, the old ones having forsaken them. 

It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences which this attitudeof the Allies toward Italy may have on European politics generally. Hermost eminent statesman, Signor Tittoni, who succeeded Baron Sonnino, transcending his country's mortifications, exerted himself tactfully andnot unsuccessfully to lubricate the mechanism of the alliance, to easethe dangerous friction and to restore the tone. And he seems to haveaccomplished in these respects everything which a sagacious statesmancould do. But to arrest the operation of psychological laws is beyondthe power of any individual. In order to appreciate the Italian point ofview, it is nowise necessary to approve the exaggerated claims putforward by her press in the spring of 1919. It is enough to admit thatin the light of the Wilsonian doctrine they were not more incompatiblewith that doctrine than the claims made by other Powers and accorded bythe Supreme Council. 

To sum up, Italy acquired the impression that association with herrecent allies means for her not only sacrifices in their hour of need, but also further sacrifices in their hour of triumph. She becamereluctantly convinced that they regard interests which she deems vitalto herself as unconnected with their own. And that was unfortunate. Ifat some fateful conjuncture in the future her allies on their partshould gather the impression that she has adjusted her policy to thoseinterests which are so far removed from theirs, they will havethemselves to blame. 

FOOTNOTES:

[194] This clause, which figured in the draft Treaty, as presented tothe Germans, provoked such emphatic protests from all sides that it wasstruck out in the revised version. 

[195] In an interview given to the Correspondenz Bureau of Vienna byConrad von Hoetzendorff. Cf. _Le Temps_, July 19, 1919. 

[196] The Prime Minister, Salandra, declared that to have madeneutrality a matter of bargaining would have been to dishonor Italy. 

[197] King Carol was holding a crown council at the time. Bratiano hadspoken against the King's proposal to throw in the country's lot withGermany. Carp was strongly for carrying out Rumania's treatyobligations. Some others hesitated, but before it could be put to thevote a telegram was brought in announcing Italy's resolve to maintainneutrality. The upshot was Rumania's refusal to follow her allies. 

[198] On the eastern Adriatic, the Treaty of London allotted to Italythe peninsula of Istria, without Fiume, most of Dalmatia, exclusive ofSpalato, the chief Dalmatian islands and the Dodecannesus. 

[199] The present population of Fiume is computed at 45, 227 souls, ofwhom 33, 000 are Italians, 10, 927 Slavs, and 1, 300 Magyars. 

[200] Another delegate is reported to have answered: "As we need Italy'sfriendship, we should pay the moderate price asked and back her claim tohave the moon. "

[201] A number of orders of the day eulogizing individual Slav officersand collective military entities were quoted by the advocates of Italy'scause at the Conference. 

[202] Official _communiqué_ of June 17, 1918. 

[203] _Journal de Genève_, April 25, 1919. 

[204] Cf. _Il Corriere della Sera_ and _Il Secolo_ of May 26, 1919. 

[205] In the Senate he defended this attitude on March 4, 1919, andexpressed a desire to dispel the misunderstanding between the twopeoples. 

[206] In April, 1919. 

[207] This fact has since been made public by Enrico Ferri in aremarkable discourse pronounced in the parliament at Rome (July 9, 1919). It was Baron Sonnino who deprecated the publication of anystatement on the subject by President Wilson. Cf. _La Stampa_, July 10, 1919. 

[208] On January 10, 1919. 

[209] It gave eastern Friuli to Italy, including Gorizia, split Istriainto two parts, and assigned Trieste and Pola also to Italy, but undersuch territorial conditions that they would be exposed to enemyprojectiles in case of war. 

[210] The National Council of Fiume issued its proclamation before ithad become known that the battle of Vittorio Veneto was begun--_i. E. _, October 30, 1918. 

[211] Speech delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4, 1918. 

[212] Of the United States, France, and Great Britain. 

[213] Between April 5th and 12th. 

[214] In his address to the representatives of organized labor inJanuary, 1918. 

[215] _L'Echo de Paris_, April 29, 1919. 

[216] _Le Gaulois_, April 29, 1919. 

[217] These meetings were held from March 28 till April 23, 1919. 

[218] See Marco Borsa's article in _Il Secolo_, June 18, 1919; also_Corriere della Sera_, June 19, 1919. 

[219] From May 5 to 16, 1919. 

[220] _Il Secolo_, June 19, 1919. 

[221] On April 23, 1919. 

[222] "Can and will our allies treat our absence as a matter of nomoment? Can and will they violate the formal undertaking which forbidsthe belligerents to conclude a diplomatic peace?. . . The LondonDeclaration prohibits categorically the conclusion of any separate peacewith any enemy state. France and England cannot sign peace with Germanyif Italy does not sign it. . . . The situation is grave and abnormal, forour allies it is also grave and abnormal. Italy is isolated, andnations, especially those of continental Europe, which are not overrich, flee solitude as nature abhors a vacuum. "--_Corriere della Sera_, April26, 1919. Again: "'The Treaty of London' restrains France and Englandfrom concluding peace without Italy. And Italy is minded not to concludepeace with Germany before she herself has receivedsatisfaction. "--_Journal de Genève_, April 25, 1919. 

[223] On May 6, 1919, at Versailles. 

[224] Cf. _Corriere della Sera_, May 10, 1919. 

[225] Annex W of the Revised Treaty. 

[226] This incident was revealed by Enrico Ferri, in his remarkablespeech in the Italian Parliament on July 9, 1919. Cf. _La Stampa_, July10, 1919, page 2. 

[227] Cf. _The Morning Post_, July 9, 1919. 

[228] On July 10th the Italian Finance Minister, in his financialstatement, announced that the total cost of the war to Italy wouldamount to one hundred milliard lire. He added, however, that her shareof the German indemnity would wipe out her foreign debt, while aprogressive tax on all but small fortunes would meet her internalobligations. Cf. _Corriere della Sera_, July 11 and 12, 1919. 

[229] Cf. _Avanti_, July 19, 1919. 

[230] Shown in percentages, the rise in the cost of living was: UnitedStates, 220 per cent. ; England, 240 per cent. ; Switzerland, 257 percent. ; France, 368 per cent. ; Italy, 481 per cent. 

[231] Enrico Ferri, on July 9, 1919. Cf. _La Stampa_, July 10, 1919. 

[232] At a later date the President reiterated the grounds of hisdecision. In his Columbus speech (September 4, 1919) he asserted that"Italy desired Fiume for strategic military reasons, which the League ofNations would make unnecessary. " (_The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), September 6, 1919. ) But the League did not render strategic precautionsunnecessary to France. 

[233] _Corriere della Sera_, May 11, 1919. 

[234] _La Stampa_, July 16, 1919. 

[235] _Avanti_, April 27, 1919. Cf. _Le Temps_, April 28, 1919. 

[236] _Corriere della Sera_, August 9, 1919. 

[237] _Corriere della Sera_, September 3, 1919. 

[238] Quoted in _La Stampa_ of July 20, 1919. 

[239] _Ibidem_. 

[240] _Corriere d' Italia_, June 29, 1919. 

[241] Cf. _Modern Italy_, July 12, 1919 (page 298). 

[242] _Echo de Paris_, July 7, 1919. 

[243] Cf. "An Italian Exposé, " published by _The Morning Post_, July 5, 1919. 

IX

JAPAN

Among the solutions of the burning questions which exercised theingenuity and tested the good faith of the leading Powers at the PeaceConference, none was more rapidly reached there, or more bitterlyassailed outside, than those in which Japan was specially interested. The storm that began to rage as soon as the Supreme Council's decisionon the Shantung issue became known did not soon subside. Far from that, it threatened for a time to swell into a veritable hurricane. Thisproblem, like most of those which were submitted to the forum of theConference, may be envisaged from either of two opposite angles ofsurvey; from that of the future society of justice-loving nations, whosemembers are to forswear territorial aggrandizement, special economicprivileges, and political sway in, or at the expense of, othercountries; or from the traditional point of view, which has alwaysprevailed in international politics and which cannot be better describedthan by Signor Salandra's well-known phrase "sacred egotism. " Viewed inthe former light, Japan's demand for Shantung was undoubtedly as much astride backward as were those of the United States and France for theMonroe Doctrine and the Saar Valley respectively. But as the three GreatPowers had set the example, Japan was resolved from the outset to rebelagainst any decree relegating her to the second-or third-class nations. The position of equality occupied by her government among thegovernments of other Great Powers did not extend to the Japanese nationamong the other nations. But her statesmen refused to admit thisartificial inferiority as a reason for descending another step in theinternational hierarchy and they invoked the principle of which Britain, France, and America had already taken advantage. 

The Supreme Council, like Janus of old, possessed two faces, onealtruistic and the other egotistic, and, also like that son of Apollo, held a key in its right hand and a rod in its left. It applied to thevarious states, according to its own interest or convenience, theprinciples of the old or the new Covenant, and would fain havedispossessed Japan of the fruits of the campaign, and allotted to herthe rôle of working without reward in the vineyard of the millennium, were it not that this policy was excluded by reasons of presentexpediency and previous commitments. The expediency was represented byPresident Wilson's determination to obtain, before returning toWashington, some kind of a compact that might be described as theconstitution of the future society of nations, and by his belief thatthis instrument could not be obtained without Japan's adherence, whichwas dependent on her demand for Shantung being allowed. And the previouscommitments were the secret compacts concluded by Japan with Britain, France, Russia, and Italy before the United States entered the war. 

Nippon's rôle in the war and the circumstances that shaped it arescarcely realized by the general public. They have been purposely thrustin the background. And yet a knowledge of them is essential to those whowish to understand the significance of the dispute about Shantung, whichat bottom was the problem of Japan's international status. Beforeattempting to analyze them, however, it may not be amiss to remark thatduring the French press campaign conducted in the years 1915-16, withthe object of determining the Tokio Cabinet to take part in the militaryoperations in Europe, the question of motive was discussed with a degreeof tactlessness which it is difficult to account for. It was affirmed, for example, that the Mikado's people would be overjoyed if the Alliedgovernments vouchsafed them the honor of participating in the greatcivilizing crusade against the Central Empires. That was proclaimed tobe such an enviable privilege that to pay for it no sacrifice of men ormoney would be exorbitant. Again, the degree to which Germany is amenace to Japan was another of the texts on which Entente publicistsrelied to scare Nippon into drastic action, as though she needed to betold by Europeans where her vital interests lay, from what quarters theywere jeopardized, and how they might be safeguarded most successfully. So much for the question of tact and form. Japan has never accepted thedoctrine of altruism in politics which her Western allies have sozealously preached. Until means have been devised and adopted forsubstituting moral for military force in the relations of state withstate, the only reconstruction of the world in which the Japanese canbelieve is that which is based upon treaties and the pledged word. Thatis the principle which underlies the general policy and the presentstrivings of our Far Eastern ally. 

One of the characteristic traits of all Nippon's dealings with herneighbors is loyalty and trustworthiness. Her intercourse with Russiabefore and after the Manchurian campaign offers a shining example of allthe qualities which one would postulate in a true-hearted neighbor and astanch and chivalrous ally. I had an opportunity of watching thedevelopment of the relations between the two governments for many yearsbefore they quarreled, and subsequently down to 1914, and I can statethat the praise lavished by the Tsar's Ministers on their Japanesecolleagues was well deserved. And for that reason it may be taken as anaxiom that whatever developments the present situation may bring forth, the Empire of Nippon will carry out all its engagements with scrupulousexactitude, in the spirit as well as the letter. 

To be quite frank, then, the Japanese are what we should term realists. Consequently their foreign policy is inspired by the maxims whichactuated all nations down to the year 1914, and still move nearly all ofthem to-day. In fact, the only Powers that have fully andauthoritatively repudiated them as yet are Bolshevist Russia, and to alarge extent the United States. Holding thus to the old dispensation, Japan entered the war in response to a definite demand made by theBritish government. The day before Britain declared war against Germanythe British Ambassador at Tokio officially inquired whether hisgovernment could count upon the active co-operation of the Mikado'sforces in the campaign about to begin. On August 4th Baron Kato, havingin the meanwhile consulted his colleagues, answered in the affirmative. Three days later another communication reached Tokio from London, requesting the _immediate_ co-operation of Japan, and on the followingday it was promised. The motive for this haste was credibly asserted tobe Britain's apprehension lest Germany should transfer Kiaochow toChina, and reserve to herself, in virtue of Article V of the Conventionof 1898, the right of securing after the war "a more suitable territory"in the Middle Empire or Republic. Thereupon they began operations whichwere at first restricted to the China seas, but were afterward extendedto the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and finally to the Mediterranean. Theonly task that fell to their lot on land was that of capturing Kiaochow. But whatever they set their hands to they carried out thoroughly, andto the complete satisfaction of their European allies. 

For many years the people of Nippon have been wending slowly, but withtireless perseverance and unerring instinct, toward their far-off goal, which to the unbiased historian will seem not merely legitimate butpraiseworthy. Their intercourse with Russia was the story of one longlaborious endeavor to found a common concern which should enable Japanto make headway on her mission. Russia was just the kind of partnerwhose co-operation was especially welcome, seeing that it could be hadwithout the hitches and set-backs attached to that of most other GreatPowers. The Russians were never really intolerant in racial matters, nordangerous in commercial rivalry. They intermarried freely with all theso-called inferior races and tribes in the Tsardom, and put all on anequal footing before the law. Twenty-three years ago I paid a visit tomy friend General Tomitch, the military governor of Kars, and I foundmyself sitting at his table beside the Prefect of the city, who was aMohammedan. The individual Russian is generally free from racialprejudices; he has no sense of the "yellow peril, " and no objection toreceive the Japanese as a comrade, a colleague, or a son-in-law. 

And the advances made by Ito and others would have been reciprocated byWitte and Lamsdorff were it not that the Tsar, interested inBezobrazoff's Yalu venture, subordinated his policy to those vestedinterests, and compelled Japan to fight. The master-idea of the policyof Ito, with whom I had two interesting conversations on the subject, was to strike up a close friendship with the Tsardom, based on communityof durable interests, and to bespeak Russia's help for the hour of stormand stress which one day might strike. The Tsar's government wasinspired by analogous motives. Before the war was terminated I repairedto London on behalf of Russia, in order to propose to the Japanesegovernment, in addition to the treaty of peace which was about to bediscussed at Portsmouth, an offensive and defensive alliance, and to askthat Prince Ito be sent as first plenipotentiary, invested with fullpowers to conclude such a treaty. 

M. Izvolsky's policy toward Japan, frank and statesman-like, had anoffensive and a defensive alliance for its intended culmination, and thetreaties and conventions which he actually concluded with ViscountMotono, in drafting which I played a modest part, amounted almost tothis. The Tsar's opposition to the concessions which representedRussia's share of the compromise was a tremendous obstacle, which onlythe threat of the Minister's resignation finally overcame. AndIzvolsky's energy and insistence hastened the conclusion of a treatybetween them to maintain and respect the _status quo_ in Manchuria, and, in case it was menaced, to concert with each other the measures theymight deem necessary for the maintenance of the _status quo_. And it wasno longer stipulated, as it had been before, that these measures musthave a pacific character. They were prepared to go farther. And I maynow reveal the fact that the treaty had a secret clause, providing forthe action which Russia afterward took in Mongolia. 

These transactions one might term the first act of the internationaldrama which is still proceeding. They indicate, if they did not shape, the mold in which the bronze of Japan's political program was cast. Itnecessarily differed from other politics, although the maxims underlyingit were the same. Japan, having become a Great Power after her war withChina, was slowly developing into a world Power, and hoped to establishher claim to that position one day. It was against that day that shewould fain have acquired a puissant and trustworthy ally, and she leftnothing undone to deserve the whole-hearted support of Russia. In thehistoric year of 1914, many months before the storm-cloud broke, the WarMinister Sukhomlinoff transferred nearly all the garrisons from Siberiato Europe, because he had had assurances from Japan which warranted himin thus denuding the eastern border of troops. During the campaign, whenthe Russian offensive broke down and the armies of the enemy weredriving the Tsar's troops like sheep before them, Japan hastened to theassistance of her neighbor, to whom she threw open her militaryarsenals, and many private establishments as well. And when thePetrograd Cabinet was no longer able to meet the financial liabilitiesincurred, the Mikado's advisers devised a generous arrangement on lineswhich brought both countries into still closer and more friendlyrelations. 

The most influential daily press organ in the Tsardom, the _NovoyeVremya_, wrote: "The war with Germany has supplied our Asiatic neighborwith an opportunity of proving the sincerity of her friendly assurances. She behaves not merely like a good friend, but like a stanch militaryally. . . . In the interests of the future tranquil development of Japan amore active participation of the Japanese is requisite in the war of thenations against the world-beast of prey. An alliance with Russia for theattainment of this object would be an act of immense historicsignificance. "[244]

Ever since her entry into the community of progressive nations, Japan'smain aspiration and striving has been to play a leading and a civilizingpart in the Far East, and in especial to determine China by advice andorganization to move into line with herself, adopt Western methods andapply them to Far-Eastern aims. And this might well seem a legitimate aswell as a profitable policy, and a task as noble as most or those towhich the world is wont to pay a tribute of high praise. It appeared allthe more licit that the Powers of Europe, with the exception of Russia, had denied full political rights to the colored alien. He was placed ina category apart--an inferior class member of humanity. 

"In Japan, and as yet in Japan alone, do we find the Asiatic welcomingEuropean culture, in which, if a tree may fairly be judged by its fruit, is to be found the best prospect for the human personal liberty, in duecombination with restraints of law sufficient to, but not in excess of, the requirements of the general welfare. In this particulardistinctiveness of characteristic, which has thus differentiated thereceptivity of the Japanese from that of the continental Asiatic, we mayperhaps see the influence of the insular environment that has permittedand favored the evolution of a strong national personality; and in thesame condition we may not err in finding a promise of power to preserveand to propagate, by example and by influence, among those akin to her, the new policy which she has adopted, and by which she has profited, affording to them the example which she herself has found in thedevelopment of Eastern peoples. "[245]

Now that is exactly what the Japanese aimed at accomplishing. They weredesirous of contributing to the intellectual and moral advance of theChinese and other backward peoples of the Far East, in the same way asFrance is laudably desirous of aiding the Syrians, or Great Britain thePersians. And what is more, Japan undertook to uphold the principle ofthe open door, and generally to respect the legitimate interests ofEuropean peoples in the Far East. 

But the white races had economic designs of their own on China, and oneof the preliminary conditions of their execution was that Japan'saspirations should be foiled. Witte opened the campaign by inauguratingthe process of peaceful penetration, but his remarkable efforts wereneutralized and defeated by his own sovereign. The Japanese, after theManchurian campaign, which they had done everything possible to avoid, contrived wholly to eliminate Russian aggression from the Far East. Thefeat was arduous and the masterly way in which it was tackled andachieved sheds a luster on Japanese statesmanship as personified byViscount Motono. The Tsardom, in lieu of a potential enemy, wastransformed into a stanch and powerful friend and ally, on whom Nipponcould, as she believed, rely against future aggressors. Russia came tostand toward her in the same political relationship as toward France. Japanese statesmen took the alliance with the Tsardom as a solid anddurable postulate of their foreign policy. 

All at once the Tsardom fell to pieces like a house of cards, and thefragments that emerged from the ruins possessed neither the will nor thepower to stand by their Far Eastern neighbors. The fruits of twelveyears' statesmanship and heavy sacrifices were swept away by the Russianrevolution, and Japan's diplomatic position was therefore worse beyondcompare than that of the French Republic in July, 1917, because thelatter was forthwith sustained by Great Britain and the United States, with such abundance of military and economic resources as made up in thelong run for that of Russia. Japan, on the other hand, has as yet nosubstitute for her prostrate ally. She is still alone among Powers someof whom decline to recognize her equality, while others are ready tothwart her policy and disable her for the coming race. 

The Japanese are firm believers in the law of causality. Where theydesire to reap, there they first sow. They invariably strive to dealwith a situation while there is still time to modify it, and they takepains to render the means adequate to the end. Unlike the peoples ofwestern Europe and the United States, the Japanese show a profoundrespect for the principles of authority and inequality, and reserve thehigher functions in the community for men of the greatest ability andattainments. It is a fact, however, that individual liberty has madeperceptible progress in the population, and is still growing, owing tothe increase of economic well-being and the spread of general andtechnical education. But although socialism is likewise spreading fast, I feel inclined to think that in Japan a high grade of instruction andof social development on latter-day lines will be found compatible withthat extraordinary cohesiveness to which the race owes the positionwhich it occupies among the communities of the world. The soul of theindividual Japanese may be said to float in an atmosphere ofcollectivity, which, while leaving his intellect intact, sways hissentiments and modifies his character by rendering him impressible tomotives of an order which has the weal of the race for its object. 

Japan has borrowed what seemed to her leaders to be the best ofeverything in foreign countries. They analyzed the military, political, and industrial successes of their friends and enemies, satisfactorilyexplained and duly fructified them. They use the school as the seed-plotof the state, and inculcate conceptions there which the entire communityendeavors later on to embody in acts and institutions. And what theelementary school has begun, the intermediate, the technical, and thehigh schools develop and perfect, aided by the press, which isencouraged by the state. 

Japan's ideal cannot be offhandedly condemned as immoral, pernicious, orillegitimate. Its partizans pertinently invoke every principle whichtheir Allies applied to their own aims and strivings. And men of deeperinsight than those who preside over the fortunes of the Entente to-dayrecognize that Europeans of high principles and discerning minds, whoperceive the central issues, would, were they in the position of theJapanese statesmen, likewise bend their energies to the achievement ofthe same aims. 

The Japanese argue their case somewhat as follows:

"We are determined to help China to put herself in line with ourselves, and to keep her from falling into anarchy. And no one can honestly denyour qualifications. We and they have very much in common, and weunderstand them as no Anglo-Saxon or other foreign people can. On theone hand our own past experience resembles that of the Middle Kingdom, and on the other our method of adapting ourselves to the newinternational conditions challenged and received the ungrudgingadmiration of a world disposed to be critical. The Peking treaties ofMay, 1915, between China and Japan, and the pristine drafts of themwhich were modified before signature, enable the outsider to form afairly accurate opinion of Japan's economic and political program, whichamounts to the application of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine. 

"What we seek to obtain in the Far East is what the Western Powers havesecured throughout the remainder of the globe: the right to contributeto the moral and intellectual progress of our backward neighbors, and toprofit by our exertions. China needs the help which we are admittedlyable to bestow. To our mission no cogent objection has ever beenoffered. No Cabinet in Tokio has ever looked upon the Middle Realm as apossible colony for the Japanese. The notion is preposterous, seeingthat China is already over-populated. What Japan sorely needs aresources whence to draw coal and iron for industrial enterprise. She alsoneeds cotton and leather. "

In truth, the ever-ready command of these raw materials at theirsources, which must be neither remote nor subject to potential enemies, is indispensable to the success of Japan's development. But for themoment the English-speaking nations have a veto upon them, in virtue ofpossession, and the embargo put by the United States government upon theexport of steel during the war caused a profound emotion in Nippon. Forthe shipbuilding works there had increased in number from nine beforethe war to twelve in 1917, and to twenty-eight at the beginning of 1918, with one hundred slips capable of producing six hundred thousand tons ofnet register. The effect of that embargo was to shut down between 70 and80 per cent. Of the shipbuilding works of the country, and to menacewith extinction an industry which was bringing in immense profits. 

It was with these antecedents and aims that Japan appeared before theConference in Paris and asked, not for something which she lackedbefore, but merely for the confirmation of what she already possessed bytreaty. It must be admitted that she had damaged her cause by the mannerin which that treaty had been obtained. To say that she had intimidatedthe Chinese, instead of coaxing them or bargaining with them, would be atruism. The fall of Tsingtao gave her a favorable opportunity, and sheused and misused it unjustifiably. The demands in themselves were opento discussion and, if one weighs all the circumstances, would notdeserve a classification different from some of those--the protection ofminorities or the transit proviso, for example--imposed by the greateron the lesser nations at the Conference. But the mode in which they werepressed irritated the susceptible Chinese and belied the professionsmade by the Mikado's Ministers. The secrecy, too, with which the TokioCabinet endeavored to surround them warranted the worst construction. Yuan Shi Kai[246] regarded the procedure as a deadly insult to himselfand his country. And the circumstance that the Japanese governmentfailed either to foresee or to avoid this amazing psychological blunderlent color to the objections of those who questioned Japan'squalifications for the mission she had set herself. The wound inflictedon China by that exhibition of insolence will not soon heal. How itreacted may be inferred from the strenuous and well-calculatedopposition of the Chinese delegation at the Conference. 

Nor was that all. In the summer of 1916 a free fight occurred betweenChinese and Japanese soldiers in Cheng-cha-tun, the rights and wrongs ofwhich were, as is usual in such cases, obscure. But the Okuma Cabinet, assuming that the Chinese were to blame, pounced upon the incident andmade it the base of fresh demands to China, [247] two of which weremanifestly excessive. That China would be better off than she is or isotherwise likely to become under Japanese guidance is in the highestdegree probable. But in order that that guidance should be effective itmust be accepted, and this can only be the consequence of such a policyof cordiality, patience, and magnanimity as was outlined by my friend, the late Viscount Motono. [248]

At the Conference the policy of the Japanese delegates was clear-cut andcoherent. It may be summarized as follows: the Japanese delegationdecided to give its entire support to the Allies in all mattersconcerning the future relations of Germany and Russia, western Europe, the Balkans, the African colonies, as well as financial indemnities andreparations. The fate of the Samoan Archipelago must be determined inaccord with Britain and the United States. New Guinea should be allottedto Australia. As the Marshall, Caroline, and Ladrone Islands, althoughof no intrinsic value, would constitute a danger in Germany's hands, they should be taken over by Japan. Tsingtao and the port of Kiaochowshould belong to Japan, as well as the Tainan railway. Japan wouldco-operate with the Allies in maintaining order in Siberia, but no Powershould arrogate to itself a preponderant voice in the matter ofobtaining concessions or other interests there. Lastly, the principle ofthe open door was to be upheld in China, Japan being admittedly thePower which is the most interested in the establishment and maintenanceof peace in the Far East. 

At the Conference, when the Kiaochow dispute came up for discussion, theJapanese attitude, according to their Anglo-Saxon and French colleagues, was calm and dignified, their language courteous, their arguments wereput with studied moderation, and their resolve to have their treatyrights recognized was inflexible. Their case was simple enough, andunder the old ordering unanswerable. The only question was whether itwould be invalidated by the new dispensation. But as the United Stateshad obtained recognition for its Monroe Doctrine, Britain for thesupremacy of the sea, and France for the occupation of the Saar Valleyand the suspension of the right of self-determination in the case ofAustria, it was obvious that Japan had abundant and cogent arguments forher demands, which were that the Chinese territory once held by Germany, and since wrested from that Power by Japan, be formally retroceded toJapan, whose claim to it rested upon the right of conquest and alsoupon the faith of treaties which she had concluded with China. At thesame time she expressly and spontaneously disclaimed the intention ofkeeping that territory for herself. Baron Makino said at the PeaceTable:

"The acquisition of territory belonging to one nation which it is theintention of the country acquiring it to exploit to its sole advantageis not conducive to amity or good-will. " Japan, although by the fortuneof war Germany's heir to Kiaochow, did not purpose retaining it for theremaining term of the lease; she had, in fact, already promised torestore it to China. She maintained, however, that the conditions ofretrocession should form the subject of a general settlement betweenTokio and Peking. 

The Chinese delegation, which worked vigorously and indefatigably andwon over a considerable number of backers, argued that Kiaochow hadceased to belong to Germany on the day when China declared war on thatstate, inasmuch as all their treaties, including the lease of Kiaochow, were abrogated by that declaration, and the ownership of every rood ofChinese territory held by Germany reverted in law to China, and shouldtherefore be handed over to her, and not to Japan. To this plea BaronMakino returned the answer that with the surrender of Tsingtao to Japanin 1914[249] the whole imperial German protectorates of Shantung hadpassed to that Power, China being still a neutral. Consequently theentry of China into the war in 1917 could not affect the status of theprovince which already belonged to Nippon by right of conquest. As amatter of alleged fact, this capture of the protectorates by theJapanese had been specially desired by the British government, in orderto prevent Germany from ceding it to China. If that move meantanything, therefore, it meant that neither China nor Germany had orcould have any hold on the territory once it was captured by Japan. Further, this conquest was effected at the cost of vast sums of moneyand two thousand Japanese lives. 

Nor was that all. In the year 1915[250] China signed an agreement withJapan, undertaking "to recognize all matters that may be agreed uponbetween the Japanese government and the German government respecting thedisposition of all the rights, interests, and concessions which, invirtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses _vis-à-vis_ China, inrelation to the province of Shantung. " This treaty, the Chinesedelegates answered, was extorted by force. Japan, having vainly soughtto obtain it by negotiations that lasted nearly four months, finallypresented an ultimatum, [251] giving China forty-eight hours in which toaccept it. She had no alternative. But at least she made it known to theworld that she was being coerced. It was on the day on which thatdocument was signed that the Japanese representative in Peking sent aspontaneous declaration to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, promising to return the leased territory to China on condition that allKiaochow be opened as a commercial port, that a Japanese settlement beestablished, and also an international settlement, if the Powers desiredit, and that an arrangement be made beforehand between the Chinese andJapanese governments with regard to "the disposal of German publicestablishments and populations, and with regard to other conditions andprocedures. "

The Japanese further invoked another and later agreement, which was, they alleged, signed by the Chinese without demur. [252] This accord, coming after the entry of China into the war, was tantamount to therenunciation of any rights which China might have believed she possessedas a corollary of her belligerency. It also disposed, the Japaneseargued, of her contention that the territory in question isindispensable and vital to her--a contention which Japan met with thepromise to deliver it up--and which was invalidated by China's refusalto fight for it in the year 1914. This latter argument was controvertedby the Chinese assertion that they were ready and willing to declare waragainst Germany at the outset, but that their co-operation was refusedby the Entente, and subsequently by Japan. This allegation is credible, if we remember the eagerness exhibited by the British government thatJapan should lose no time in co-operating with her allies, therepresentations made by the British Ambassador to Baron Kato on thesubject, [253] and the alleged motive to prevent the retrocession ofShantung to China by the German government. 

The arguments of China and Japan were summarily put in the followingquestions by a delegate of each country: "Yes or no, does Kiaochow, whose population is exclusively Chinese, form an integral part of theChinese state? Yes or no, was Kiaochow brutally occupied by the Kaiserin the teeth of right and justice and to the detriment of the peace ofthe Far East, and it may be of the world? Yes or no, did Japan enter thewar against the aggressive imperialism of the German Empire, and for thepurpose of arranging a lasting peace in the Far East? Yes or no, wasKiaochow captured by the English and Japanese troops in 1914 with thesole object of destroying a dangerous naval base? Yes or no, was China'sco-operation against Germany, which was advocated and offered byPresident Yuan Shi Kai in August, 1914, refused at the instigation ofJapan?"[254]

The Japanese catechism ran thus: "Yes or no, was Kiaochow a Germanpossession in the year 1914? Yes or no, was the world, including theUnited States, a consenting party to the occupation of that province bythe Germans? Why did China, who to-day insists that that port isindispensable to her, cede it to Germany? Why in 1914 did she make noeffort to recover it, but leave this task to the Japanese army? Further, who can maintain that juridically the last war abolished _ipso facto_all the cessions of territory previously effected? Turkey formerly cededCyprus to Great Britain. Will it be argued that this cession isabrogated and that Cyprus must return to Turkey directly andunconditionally? The Conference announced repeatedly that it took itsstand on justice and the welfare of the peoples. It is in the name ofthe welfare of the peoples, as well as in the name of justice, that weassert our right to take over Kiaochow. The harvest to him whose handssoweth the seed. "[255]

If we add to all these conflicting data the circumstance that GreatBritain, France, and Russia had undertaken[256] to support Japan'sdemands at the Conference, and that Italy had promised to raise noobjection, we shall have a tolerable notion of the various factors ofthe Chino-Japanese dispute, and of its bearings on the Peace Treaty andon the principles of the Covenant. It was one of the many illustrationsof the incompatibility of the Treaty and the Covenant, the respectivescopes of which were radically and irreconcilably different. TheSupreme Council had to adjudicate upon the matter from the point of vieweither of the Treaty or of the Covenant; as part of a vulgar bargain ofthe old, unregenerate days, or as an example of the self-renunciation ofthe new ethical system. The majority of the Council was pledged to theformer way of contemplating it, and, having already promulgated a numberof decrees running counter to the Covenant doctrine in favor of theirown peoples, could not logically nor politically make an exception tothe detriment of Japan. 

What actually happened at the Peace Table is still a secret, andPresident Wilson, who knows its nature, holds that it is in the bestinterests of humanity that it should so remain! The little that has asyet been disclosed comes mainly from State-Secretary Lansing's answersto the questions put by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. America's second delegate, in answer to the questions with which he wasthere plied, affirmed that "President Wilson alone approved the Shantungdecision, that the other members of the American delegation made noprotest against it, and that President Wilson alone knows whether Japanhas guaranteed to return Shantung to China. "[257] Another eminentAmerican, who claims to have been present when President Wilson's actwas officially explained to the Chinese delegates, states that thePresident, disclosing to them his motives, pleaded that politicalexigencies, the menace that Japan would abandon the Conference, and therumor that England herself might withdraw, had constrained him to acceptthe Shantung settlement in order to save the League. [258] Rumors appearto have played an undue part in the Conference, influencing the judgmentor the decisions of the Supreme Council. The reader will remember thatit was a rumor to the effect that the Italian government had alreadypublished a decree annexing Fiume that is alleged to have precipitatedthe quarrel between Mr. Wilson and the first Italian delegation. It isworth noting that the alleged menace that Japan would quit theConference if her demands were rejected was not regarded by SecretaryLansing as serious. "Could Japan's signature to the League have beenobtained without the Shantung decision?" he was asked. "I think so, " heanswered. 

The decision caused tremendous excitement among the Chinese and theirnumerous friends. At first they professed skepticism and maintained thatthere must be some misunderstanding, and finally they protested andrefused to sign the Treaty. One of the American journals published inParis wrote: "Shantung was at least a moral explosion. It blew down thefront of the temple, and now everybody can see that behind the frontthere was a very busy market. The morals were the morals of a horsetrade. If the muezzin were loud and constant in his calls to prayer, itprobably was to drown the sound of the dickering in the market. There isno longer any obligation upon this nation to accept the Covenant as amoral document. It is not. "[259]

All that may be perfectly true, but it sounds odd that the discoveryshould not have been made until Japan's claim was admitted formally totake over Shantung, after she had solemnly promised to restore it toChina. The Covenant was certainly transgressed long before this, andmuch more flagrantly than by President Wilson's indorsement of Japan'sdemand for the formal retrocession of Shantung. But by those infractionsnobody seemed scandalized. _Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi. _ Debts ofgratitude had to be paid at the expense of the Covenant, and peopleclosed their eyes or their lips. It was not until the Japanese asked forsomething which all her European allies considered to be her right thatan outcry was raised and moral principles were invoked. 

The Japanese press was nowise jubilant over the finding of the SupremeCouncil. The journals of all parties argued that their country wasreceiving no more than had already been guaranteed to it by China, andratified by the Allies before the Peace Conference met, and to haveobtained what was already hers by rights of conquest and of treaties wasanything but a triumph. What Japan desired was to have herselfrecognized practically, not merely in theory, as the nation which is themost nearly interested in China, and therefore deserving of a specialstatus there. In other words, she aimed at the proclamation of somethingin the nature of a Far Eastern doctrine analogous to that of Monroe. Aspriority of interest had been conceded to her by the Ishii-LansingAgreement with the United States, it was in this sense that her presswas fain to construe the clause respecting non-interference with"regional understandings. "

That policy is open. The principles underlying it, always tenable, werenever more so than since the Peace Conference set the Great Powers todirect the lesser states. Moreover, Japan, it is argued, knows byexperience that China has always been a temptation to the Westernpeoples. They sent expeditions to fight her and divided her territoryinto zones of influence, although China was never guilty of anaggressive attitude toward them, as she was toward Japan. They wereactuated by land greed and all that that implies, and if China wereabandoned to her own resources to-morrow she would surely fall a prey toher Western protectors. In this connection they point to an incidentwhich took place during the Conference, when Signor Tittoni demandedthat Italy should receive the Austrian concession in Tientsin, whichadjoins the Italian concession. But Viscount Chinda protested and thedemand was ruled out. To sum up, the broad maxim underlying Japan'spolicy as defined by her own representatives is that in the resettlementof the world the principle adopted, whether the old or the new, shall beapplied fairly and impartially at least to all the Great Powers. 

Every world conflict has marked the close of one epoch and the openingof another. Into the melting-pot on the fire kindled by the war manymomentous problems have been flung, any one of which would have sufficedto bring about a new political, economic, and social constellation. Japan's advance along the road of progress is one of these far-ranginginnovations. She became a Great Power in the wars against China andRussia, and is qualifying for the part of a World Power to-day. And herstatesmen affirm that in order to achieve her purpose she will recoilfrom no sacrifice except those of honor and of truth. 

FOOTNOTES:

[244] _Novoye Vremya_, June 13-26, 1915. 

[245] Cf. _The Problem of Asia_ (Capt. A. T. Mahan), pp. 150-151. 

[246] The late President of the Chinese Republic. 

[247] These demands were (1) an apology from the Chinese authorities;(2) an indemnity for the killed and wounded; (3) the policing of certaindistricts of Manchuria by the Japanese; and (4) the employment ofJapanese officers to train Chinese troops in Manchuria. 

[248] Minister of Foreign Affairs. He repudiated his predecessor'spolicy. 

[249] November 8th. 

[250] May 25, 1915. 

[251] On May 6, 1915. 

[252] On September 24, 1918. 

[253] On August 7, 1914. 

[254] Cf. _Le Matin_, April 25, 1919. 

[255] _Le Matin_, April 23, 1919. 

[256] "His Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the requests ofthe Japanese Government for assurances that they will support Japan'sclaims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung, andpossessions in islands north of the Equator, on the occasion of a PeaceConference, it being understood that the Japanese Government will, inthe event of a peace settlement, treat in the same spirit GreatBritain's claims to German islands south of the Equator. " (Signed)Conyngham Greene, British Ambassador, Tokio, February 16, 1917. Francegave a similar assurance in writing on March 1, 1917, and the Russiangovernment had made a like declaration on February 20, 1917. 

[257] As a matter of fact, the entire world knew and knows that she hadguaranteed the retrocession. Baron Makino declared it at the Conference. Cf. _The_ (London) _Times_, February 13, 1919; also on May 5, 1919; andViscount Uchida confirmed it on May 17, 1919. It had also been stated inthe Japanese ultimatum to Germany, August 15, 1914, and repeated byViscount Uchida at the beginning of August, 1919. 

[258] Mr. Thomas Millard, some of whose letters were published by _TheNew York Times_. Cf. _Le Temps_, July 29, 1919. 

[259] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 20, 1919. 

X

ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA

In their dealings with Russia the principal plenipotentiariesconsistently displayed the qualities and employed the standards, maxims, and methods which had stood them in good stead as parliamentarypoliticians. The betterment of the world was an idea which took aseparate position in their minds, quite apart from the other politicalideas with which they usually operated. Overflowing with verbalaltruism, they first made sure of the political and economic interestsof their own countries, safeguarding or extending these sources ofpower, after which they proceeded to try their novel experiment oncommunities which they could coerce into obedience. Hence the aversionand opposition which they encountered among all the nations which had tosubmit to the yoke, and more especially among the Russians. 

Russia's opposition, widespread and deep-rooted, is natural, and historywill probably add that it was justified. It starts from the assumption, which there is no gainsaying, that the Conference was convoked to makepeace between the belligerents and that whatever territorial changes itmight introduce must be restricted to the countries of the defeatedpeoples. From all "disannexations" not only the Allies' territories, butthose of neutrals, were to be exempted. Repudiate this principle and thedemands of Ireland, Egypt, India to the benefits of self-determinationbecame unanswerable. Belgium's claim to Dutch Limburg and otherterritorial oddments must likewise be allowed. Indeed, the plea actuallyput forward against these was that the Conference was incompetent totouch any territory actually possessed by either neutral or Alliedstates. Ireland, Egypt, and Dutch Limburg Were all domestic matters withwhich the Conference had no concern. 

Despite this fundamental principle Russia, the whilom Ally, withoutwhose superhuman efforts and heroic sacrifices her partners would havebeen pulverized, was tacitly relegated to the category of hostile anddefeated peoples, and many of her provinces lopped off arbitrarily andwithout appeal. None of her representatives was convoked or consulted onthe subject, although all of them, Bolshevist and anti-Bolshevist, wereat one in their resistance to foreign dictation. 

The Conference repeatedly disclaimed any intention of meddling in theinternal affairs of any other state, and the Irish, the Egyptian, andseveral other analogous problems were for the purposes of the Conferenceincluded in this category. On what intelligible grounds, then, were theFinnish, the Lettish, the Esthonian, the Georgian, the Ukrainianproblems excluded from it? One cannot conceive a more flagrant violationof the sovereignty of a state than the severance and disposal of itsterritorial possessions against its will. It is a frankly hostile act, and as such was rightly limited by the Conference to enemy countries. Why, then, was it extended to the ex-Ally? Is it not clear that ifreconstituted Russia should regard the Allied states as enemies andchoose the potential enemies of these as its friends, it will belegitimately applying the principles laid down by the Allies themselves?No expert in international law and no person of average common sensewill seriously maintain that any of the decisions reached in Paris arebinding on the Russia of the future. No problem which concerns twoequal parties can be rightfully decided by only one of them. TheConference which declared itself incompetent to impose on Holland thecession to Belgium even of a small strip of territory on one of thebanks of the Belgian river Scheldt cannot be deemed authorized to signaway vast provinces that belonged to Russia. Here the plea of theself-determination of peoples possesses just as much or as littlecogency as in the case of Ireland and Egypt. 

President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had inaugurated their EastEuropean policy by publicly proclaiming that Russia was the key to theworld situation, and that the peace would be no peace so long as herhundred and fifty million inhabitants were left floundering in chaoticconfusion, under the upas shade of Bolshevism. They had also held outhopes to their great ex-ally of efficient help and practical counsel. And there ended what may be termed the constructive side of theirconceptions. 

It was followed by no coherent action. Discourses, promises, maneuvers, and counter-maneuvers were continuous and bewildering, but of systematicpolicy there was none. Statesmanship in the higher sense of the word wasabsent from every decision the delegates took and from every suggestionthey proffered. Nor was it only by omission that they sinned. Theirinvincible turn for circuitous methods, to which severer critics give aless sonorous name, was manifested _ad nauseam_. They worked out cunninglittle schemes which it was hard to distinguish from intrigues, andwhich, if they had not been foiled in time, would have made matters evenworse than they are. From the outset the British government was forsummoning Bolshevist delegates to the Conference. A note to this effectwas sent by the London Foreign Office to the Allied governments about afortnight before the delegates began their work of making peace. Butthe suggestion was withdrawn at the instance of the French, who doubtedwhether the services of systematic lawbreakers would materially conduceto the establishment of a new society of law-abiding states. Soonafterward another scheme cropped up, this time for the appointment of anInter-Allied committee to watch over Russia's destinies and serve as asort of board of Providence. The representatives of the anti-Bolshevistgovernments resented this notion bitterly. They remarked that they couldnot be fairly asked to respect decisions imposed on them exactly asthough they were vanquished enemies like the Germans. The British andAmerican delegates were swayed in their views mainly by the assumptionsthat all central Russia was in the power of Lenin; that his army waswell disciplined and powerful; that he might contrive to hold the reinsof government and maintain anarchism indefinitely, and that theso-called constructive elements were inclined toward reaction. 

In other words, the delegates accepted two sets of premises, from whichthey drew two wholly different sets of conclusions. Now they feltimpelled to act on the one, now on the other, but they could never makeup their minds to carry out either. They agreed that Bolshevism is apotent solvent of society, fraught with peril to all organizedcommunities, yet they could not resolve to use joint action to extirpateit. [260] They recognized that so long as it lasted there was no hope ofestablishing a community of nations, but they discarded militaryintervention on grounds of their own internal policy, and because it rancounter to the principle of self-determination. Over against thatprinciple, however, one had to set the circumstance that they werealready intermeddling in Russian affairs in Archangel, Murmansk, Odessa, and elsewhere, and that they ended by creating a new state andgovernment in northwestern Russia, against which Kolchak and Denikinvehemently protested. 

In mitigation of judgment it is only fair to take into account thetremendous difficulties that faced them; their unfamiliarity with theRussian problem; the want of a touchstone by which to test theoverwhelming mass of conflicting information which poured in upon them;their constitutional lack of moral courage, and the circumstance thatthey were striving to reconcile contradictories. Without chart orcompass they drifted into strange and sterile courses, beginning withthe Prinkipo incident and ending with the written examination to whichthey naïvely subjected Kolchak in order to legalize internationalrelations, which could not truly be described as either war or peace. Neither the causes of Bolshevism in its morbid manifestations nor theunformulated ideas underlying whatever positive aspect it may besupposed to possess, nor the conditions governing its slow butperceptible evolution, were so much as glanced at, much less studied, bythe statesmen who blithely set about dealing with it now by militaryforce, now by economic pressure, and fitfully by tentative forbearanceand hints to its leaders of forthcoming recognition. 

One cannot thus play fast and loose with the destinies of a communitycomposed of one hundred and fifty million people whose members are butslackly linked together by a few tenuous social bonds, withoutforfeiting the right to offer them real guidance. And a blind man is apoor guide to those who can see. Alone the Americans were equipped withcarefully tabulated statistics and huge masses of facts which theypoured out as lavishly as coal-heavers hurl the contents of their sacksinto the cellar. But they put them to no practical use. Losingthemselves in a labyrinth of details, they failed to get acomprehensive view of the whole. The other delegations lacked both dataand general ideas. And all the Allies were destitute of a powerful armyin the East, and therefore of the means of asserting the authority whichthey assumed. 

They one and all dealt in vague theories and deceptive analogies, payinglittle heed to the ever-shifting necessities of time, place, andpeoples, and indeed to the only conditions under which any new maximscould be fruitfully applied. And even such rules as they laid down wererestricted and modified in accordance with their own countries'interests or their unavowed aims, without specific warrant orexplanation. No account was taken of the historical needs or aspirationsof the people for whom they were legislating, as though all nations wereof the same age, capable of the same degree of culture, and impressibleto identical motives. It never seemed to have crossed their minds thatraces and peoples, like individuals, have a soul, or that what is meatto one may be poison to another. 

One of the most Ententophil and moderate press organs in France put thematter forcibly and plainly as follows: "The governments of Washingtonand of London are aware that we are immutably attached to the alliancewith them. But we owe them the truth. Far too often they make a badchoice of the agents whose business it is to keep them informed, andthey affect too much disdain for friendly suggestions which emanate fromany other source. American agents, in particular, civil as well asmilitary, explore Europe much as their forebears 'prospected' the FarWest, and they look upon the most ancient nations of Europe as Iroquois, Comanches, or Aztecs. They are astounded at not finding everything onthe old Continent as in New York or Chicago, and they set to work toreform Europe according to the rules in force in Oklahoma or Colorado. Now we venture respectfully to point out to them that methods differwith countries. In the United States the Colonists were wont to set fireto the forests in order to clear and fertilize the land. CertainAmerican agents recommend the employment in Europe of an analogousprocedure in political matters. They rejoice to behold the Russian andHungarian forests burst into flame. In Lenin, Trotzky, Bela Kuhn, theyappreciate useful pioneers of the new civilization. We crave theirpermission to view these things from another side. In old Europe onecannot set fire to the forests without at the same time burning villagesand cities. "[261]

Before and during the armistice I was in almost constant touch with allRussian parties within the country and without, and received detailedaccounts of the changing conditions of the people, which, althoughconflicting in many details, enabled me to form a tolerably correctpicture of the trend of things and to forecast what was coming. 

Among other communications I received proposals from Moscow with therequest that I should present them to one of the British delegates, whowas supposed to be then taking an active interest, or at any rateplaying a prominent part, in the reconstruction of Russia, less for herown sake than for that of the general peace. But as it chanced, theeminent statesman lacked the leisure to take cognizance of the proposal, the object of which was to hit upon such a _modus vivendi_ with Russiaas would enable her united peoples to enter upon a normal course ofnational existence without further delay. Incidentally it would have putan end to certain conversations then going forward with a view to afriendly understanding between Russia and Germany. It would also, I hadreason to believe, have divided the speculative Bolshevist group fromthe extreme bloodthirsty faction, produced a complete schism in theparty, and secured an armistice which would have prevented the Allies'subsequent defeats at Murmansk, Archangel, and Odessa. Truth prompts meto add that these desirable by-results, although held out as inducementsand characterized as readily attainable, were guaranteed only by theunofficial pledge of men whose good faith was notoriously doubtful. 

The document submitted to me is worth summarizing. It contained a lucid, many-sided, and plausible account of the Russian situation. Among otherthings, it was a confession of the enormity of the crimes perpetrated, on both sides, it said, which it ascribed largely to the brutalizingeffects of the World War, waged under disastrous conditions unknown inother lands. Myriads of practically unarmed men had been exposed duringthe campaign to wholesale slaughter, or left to die in slow agonieswhere they fell, or were killed off by famine and disease, for thetriumph of a cause which they never understood, but had recently beentold was that of foreign capitalists. In the demoralization that ensuedall restraints fell away. The entire social fabric, from groundwork tosummit, was rent, and society, convulsed with bestial passions, tore itsown members to pieces. Russia ran amuck among the nations. That was theheight of war frenzy. Since then, the document went on, passion hadabated sensibly and a number of well-intentioned men who had been sweptonward by the current were fast coming to their senses, while otherswere already sane, eager to stem it and anxious for moral sympathy fromoutside. 

From out of the revolutionary welter, the _exposé_ continued, certainhopeful phenomena had emerged symptomatic of a new spirit. Conditionsconducive to equality existed, although real equality was still asomewhat remote ideal. But the tendencies over the whole sphere ofRussian social, moral, and political life had undergone remarkable andinvigorating changes in the direction of "reasonable democracy. " Manywholesome reforms had been attempted, and some were partially realized, especially in elementary instruction, which was being spread clumsily, no doubt, as yet, but extensively and equally, being absolutelygratuitous. [262]

Various other so-called ameliorations were enumerated in this obviouslypartial _exposé_, which was followed by an apology for certain prominentindividuals, who, having been swept off their feet by the revolutionaryfloods, would gladly get back to firm land and help to extricate thenation from the Serbonian bog in which it was sinking. They admitted ashare of the responsibility for having set in motion a vast juggernautchariot, which, however, they had arrested, but hoped to expiate pasterrors by future zeal. At the same time they urged that it was not theywho had demoralized the army or abolished the death penalty or thrownopen the sluice-gates to anarchist floods. On the contrary, they claimedto have reorganized the national forces, reintroduced the severestdiscipline ever known, appointed experienced officers, and restoredcapital punishment. Nor was it they, but their predecessors, they added, who had ruined the transport service of the country and caused the foodscarcity. 

These individuals would, it was said, welcome peace and friendship withthe Entente, and give particularly favorable consideration to anyproposal coming from the English-speaking peoples, in whom they weredisposed to place confidence under certain simple conditions. The needfor these conditions would not be gainsaid by the British and Americangovernments if they recalled to mind the treatment which they hadtheretofore meted out to the Russian people. At that moment no Russianof any party regarded or could regard the Allies without groundedsuspicions, for while repudiating interference in domestic affairs, theFrench, Americans, and British were striving hard to influence everyparty in Russia, and were even believed to harbor designs on certainprovinces, such as the Caucasus and Siberia. Color was imparted to thesemisgivings by the circumstance that the Allied governments were openlycountenancing the dismemberment of the country by detaching non-Russianand even Russian elements from the main body. It behooved the Allies todissipate this mistrust by issuing a statement of their policy inunmistakable terms, repudiating schemes for territorial gains, renouncing interference in domestic affairs and complicity in the workof disintegrating the country. Russia and her affairs must be left toRussians, who would not grudge economic concessions as a reasonable_quid pro quo_. 

The proposal further insisted that the declaration of policy should beat once followed by the despatch of two or three well-known personsacquainted with Russia and Russian affairs, and enjoying the confidenceof European peoples, to inquire into the conditions of the country andmake an exhaustive report. This mission, it was added, need not beofficial, it might be intrusted to individuals unattached to anygovernment. 

If a satisfactory answer to this proposal were returned within afortnight, an armistice and suspension of the secret _pourparlers_ withGermany would, I was told, have followed. That this compact would haveled to a settlement of the Russian problems is more than any one, however well informed, could vouch for, but I had some grounds forbelieving the move to be genuine and the promises overdone. Noreasonable motive suggested itself for a vulgar hoax. Moreover, theoverture disclosed two important facts, one of which was known at thetime only to the Bolshevist government--namely, that secret_pourparlers_ were going forward between Berlin and Moscow for thepurpose of arriving at a workable understanding between the twogovernments, and that the Allied troops at Odessa, Archangel, andMurmansk were in a wretched plight and in direr need of an armisticethan the Bolsheviki. [263]

I mentioned the matter summarily to one of the delegates, who evinced acertain interest in it and promised to discuss it at length later onwith a view to action. Another to whom I unfolded it later thought itwould be well if I myself started, together with two or three others, for Moscow, Petrograd, Ekaterinodar, and other places, and reported onthe situation. But weeks went by and nothing was done. [264]

I had interesting talks with some influential delegates on the eve ofthe invitation issued to all _de facto_ governments of Russia toforgather at Prinkipo for a symposium. They admitted frankly at the timethat they had no policy and were groping in the dark, and one of themheld to the dogma that no light from outside was to be expected. Theygave me the impression that underlying the impending summons was theconviction that Bolshevism, divested of its frenzied manifestations, wasa rough and ready government calumniously blackened by unscrupulousenemies, criminal perhaps in its outbursts, but suited in its feasibleaims to the peculiar needs of a peculiar people, and therefore as worthyof being recognized as any of the others. It was urged that it hadalready lasted a considerable time without provoking a counter-movementworthy of the name; that the stories circulating about the horrors ofwhich it was guilty were demonstrably exaggerated; that many of thebloody atrocities were to be ascribed to crazy individuals on bothsides; that the witnesses against Lenin were partial and untrustworthy;that something should be done without delay to solve a pressing problem, and that the Conference could think of nothing better, nor, in fact, ofany alternative. 

To me the principal scheme seemed a sinister mistake, both in form andin substance. In form, because it nullified the motives which determinedthe help given to the Greeks, Poles, and Serbs, who were being urged tocrush the Bolshevists, and left the Allies without good grounds forkeeping their own troops in Archangel, Odessa, and northern Russia tostop the onward march of Bolshevism. Some governments had publiclystigmatized the Bolshevists as cutthroats; one had pledged itself neverto have relations with them, but the Prinkipo invitation bespoke aresolve to cancel these judgments and declarations and change their tackas an improvement on doing nothing at all. The scheme was also an errorin substance, because the sole motive that could warrant it was the hopeof reconciling the warring parties. And that hope was doomed todisappointment from the outset. 

According to the Prinkipo project, which was attributed to PresidentWilson, [265] an invitation was to be issued to all organized groupsexercising or attempting to exercise political authority or militarycontrol in Siberia and northern Russia, to send representatives toconfer with the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers onPrince's Islands. It is difficult to discuss the expedient seriously. One feels like a member of the little people of yore, who are reportedto have consulted an oracle to ascertain what they must do to keep fromlaughing during certain debates on public affairs. It exposed itsingenuous authors to the ridicule of the world and made it clear to thedullest apprehension that from that quarter, at any rate, the Russianpeople, as a whole, must expect neither light nor leading, norintelligent appreciation of their terrible plight. There is a sphere ofinfluence in the human intellect between the reason and the imagination, the boundary line of which is shadowy. That sphere would seem to be thesource whence some of the most extraordinary notions creep into theminds of men who have suddenly come into a position of power which theyare not qualified to wield--the _nouveaux puissants_ of the world ofpolitics. 

To the credit of the Supreme Council it never let offended dignity standbetween itself and the triumph of any of the various causes which itsuccessively took in hand. Time and again it had been addressed by theRussian Bolshevist government in the most opprobrious terms, and accusednot merely of clothing political expediency in the garb of spuriousidealism, but of giving the fore place in political life to sordidinterests, over which a cloak of humanitarianism had been deftly thrown. One official missive from the Bolshevist government to President Wilsonis worth quoting from:[266] "We should like to learn with more precisionhow you conceive the Society of Nations? When you insist on theindependence of Belgium, of Serbia, of Poland, you surely mean that themasses of the people are everywhere to take over the administration ofthe country. But it is odd that you did not also require theemancipation of Ireland, of Egypt, of India, and of the Philippines. . . . 

"As we concluded peace with the German Kaiser, for whom you have no moreconsideration than we have for you, so we are minded to make peace withyou. We propose, therefore, the discussion, in concert with our allies, of the following questions: (1) Are the French and English governmentsready to give up exacting the blood of the Russian people if this peopleconsent to pay them ransom and to compensate them in that way? (2) Ifthe answer is in the affirmative, what ransom would the Allies want(railway concessions, gold mines, or territories)?

"We also look forward to your telling us exactly whether the futureSociety of Nations will be a joint stock enterprise for the exploitationof Russia, and in particular--as your French allies require--for forcingRussia to refund the milliards which their bankers furnished to theTsarist government, or whether the Society of Nations will be somethingdifferent. . . . "

As soon as the Prinkipo motion was passed by the delegates I wasinformed by telephone, and I lost no time in communicating the tidingsto Russia's official representatives in Paris. The plan astounded them. They could hardly believe that, while hopefully negotiating with theanti-Bolshevists, the Conference was desirous at the same time ofopening _pourparlers_ with the Leninists, between whom and themantagonism was not merely political, but personal and vindictive, likethat of two Albanians in a blood feud. I suggested that the schemeshould be thwarted at its inception, and that for this purpose I shouldbe authorized by the representatives of the four[267] constructivegovernments in Russia to make known their decision. I was accordinglyempowered to announce to the world that they would categorically refuseto send any representatives to confer with the assassins of theirkinsmen and the destroyers of their country, and that under nocircumstances would they swerve from that attitude. Having received theauthorization, I cabled to the United States and Britain that theprojected meeting would come to naught, owing to the refusal of allconstructive elements to agree to any compromise with the Bolsheviki;that in the opinion of Russia's representatives in Paris the advancemade by the plenipotentiaries would strengthen the Bolshevist movement, render the civil war more merciless than before, and raise up formidabledifficulties to the establishment of the League of Nations. 

But the plenipotentiaries did not yet give up their cause as lost. Byway of "saving their face, " they unofficially approached the RussianMinisters in Paris, whom they had not deigned to consult on the subjectbefore making the plunge, and exhorted them to give at least a formalassent to the proposal, which would commit them to nothing and wouldenable them to withdraw without loss of dignity. They, on their part, undertook to smooth the road to the best of their ability. Thus it wouldbe unnecessary, they explained, for the Ministers of the constructivegovernments or their substitutes to come into contact with the slayersof their kindred; they would occupy different wings of the hotel atPrinkipo, and never meet their adversaries. The delegates would see tothat. "Then why should we go there at all if discussion be superfluous?"asked the Russians. "Because the Allied governments desire to ascertainthe condition of Russia and your conception of the measures that wouldcontribute to ameliorate it, " was the reply. "Prince's Islands is notthe right place to study the Russian situation, nor is it reasonable toexpect us to journey thither in order to tell subordinates, who have noknowledge of our country, what we can tell them and their principals inParis in greater detail and with confirmatory documents. Moreover, thedelegates you have appointed have no qualification to judge of Russia'splight and potentialities. They know neither the country nor itslanguage nor its people nor its politics, yet you want us to travel allthe way to Turkey to tell them what we think, in order that they shouldreturn from Turkey to Paris and report to your Ministers what we saidand what we could have unfolded directly to the Ministers themselveslong ago and are ready to propound to them to-day or to-morrow. 

"The project is puerile and your tactics are baleful. Your Ministersbranded the Bolshevists as criminals, and the French government publiclyannounced that it would enter into no relations with them. In spite ofthat, all the Allied governments have now offered to enter intorelations with them. Now you admit that you made a slip, and you promiseto correct it if only we consent to save your face and go on awild-goose chase to Prinkipo. But for us that journey would be arecantation of our principles. That is why we are unable to make it. "

The Prinkipo incident, which began in the region of high politics, endedin comedy. A number of more or less witty epigrams were coined at theexpense of the plenipotentiaries, the scheme, set in a stronger lightthan it was meant to endure, assumed a grotesque shape, and itspromoters strove to consign it as best they could to oblivion. But theSphinx question of Russia's future remained, and the penalties forfailure to solve it aright waxed more and more deterrent. The supremearbiters had cognizance of them, had, in fact, enumerated them whenproclaiming the impossibility of establishing a durable peace or a solidLeague of Nations as long as Russia continued to be a prey to anarchy. But even with the prizes and penalties before their eyes to entice andspur them, they proved unequal to the task of devising an intelligentpolicy. Fitful and incoherent, their efforts were either incapable ofbeing realized or, when feasible, were mischievous. Thus, by degrees, they hardened the great Slav nation against the Entente. 

The reader will be prepared to learn that the overtures made to theBolsheviki kindled the anger of the patriotic Russians at home, who hadbeen looking to the Western nations for salvation and making veritableholocausts in order to merit it. Every observer could perceive therepercussion of this sentiment in Paris, and I received ample proofs ofit from Siberia. There the leaders and the population unhesitatinglyturned for assistance to Japan. For this there were excellent reasons. The only government which throughout the war knew its own mind andpursued a consistent and an intelligible policy toward Russia was thatof Tokio. This point is worth making at a time when Japan is regarded asa Laodicean convert to the invigorating ideas of the Western peoples, atheart a backslider and a potential schismatic. She is charged withmaking interest the mainspring of her action in her intercourse withother nations. The charge is true. Only a Candide would expect to seeher moved by altruism and self-denial, in a company which penalizesthese virtues. Community of interests is the link that binds Japan toBritain. A like bond had subsisted between her and Tsarist Russia. Ihelped to create it. Her statesmen, who have no taste for sonorousphraseology, did not think it necessary to give it a more fashionablename. This did not prevent the Japanese from being chivalrously loyal totheir allies under the strain of powerful temptations, true to thespirit and the letter of their engagements. But although they made nopretense to lofty purpose, their political maxims differ nowise fromthose of the great European states, whose territorial, economic, andmilitary interests have been religiously safeguarded by the Treaty ofVersailles. True, the statesmen of Tokio shrink from the hybridcombination of two contradictions linked together by a sentimentalfallacy. Their unpopularity among Anglo-Saxons is the result ofspeculations about their future intentions; in other words, they arebeing punished, as certain of the delegates at the Conference have beeneulogized, not for what they actually did, but for what it is assumedthey are desirous of achieving. Toward Russia they played the same gamethat their allies were playing there and in Europe, only more franklyand systematically. They applied the two principal maxims which lie atthe root of international politics to-day--_do ut des_, and the nationthat is capable of leading others has the right and the duty to leadthem. And they established a valuable reputation for fulfilling theircompacts conscientiously. Nippon, then, would have helped her Russianneighbors, and she expected to be helped by them in return. Have not theAllies, she asked, compelled Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia topay them in cash for their emancipation?

Russians, who have no color prejudices, hit it off with the Japanese, bywhom they are liked in return. That the two peoples should feel drawn toeach other politically is, therefore, natural, and that they will strikeup economic agreements in the future seems to many inevitable andlegitimate. One such agreement was on the point of being signed betweenthem and the anti-Bolshevists of Omsk immediately after, and inconsequence of, the Allies' ill-considered invitation to Lenin andTrotzky to delegate representatives to Prinkipo. This convention, I havereason to believe, was actually drafted, and was about to be signed. Andthe adverse influence that suddenly made itself felt and hindered thecompact came not from Russia, but from western Europe. It would beunfruitful to dwell further on this matter here, beyond recording thebelief of many Russians that the zeal of the English-speaking peoplesfor the well-being of Siberia, where they intend to maintain troopsafter having withdrawn them from Europe, is the counter-move to Japan'scapacity and wish to co-operate with the population of that richcountry. This assumption may be groundless, but it will surprise onlythose who fail to note how often the flag of principle is unfurled overeconomic interests. 

The delegates were not all discouraged by their discomfiture over thePrinkipo project. Some of them still hankered after an agreement withthe Bolshevists which would warrant them in including the Russianproblem among the tasks provisionally achieved. President Wilsondespatched secret envoys to Moscow to strike up an accord withLenin, [268] but although the terms which Mr. Bullitt obtained were thosewhich had in advance been declared satisfactory, he drew back as soon asthey were agreed to. And he assigned no reason for this change ofattitude. Whether the brightening of the prospects of Kolchak andDenikin had modified his judgment on the question of expediency mustremain a matter of conjecture. It is hardly necessary, however, to pointout once more that this sudden improvisation of schemes which wereabandoned again at the last moment tended to lower the not particularlyhigh estimate set by the ethnic wards of the Anglo-Saxon peoples on themoral guidance of their self-constituted guardians. 

An ardent champion of the Allied nations in France wrote: "We have neverhad a Russian policy which was all of one piece. We have neversynthetized any but contradictory conceptions. This is so true that onemay safely affirm that if Russian patriotism has been sustained by ourvelleities of action, Russian destructiveness has been encouraged by ourvelleities of desertion. We joined, so to say, both camps, and ourvelleities of desertion occasionally getting the upper hand of ourvelleities of action . . . We carry out nothing. "[269]

Toward Kolchak and Denikin the attitude of the Supreme Council variedconsiderably. It was currently reported in Paris that the Admiral hadhad the misfortune to arouse the displeasure of the two Conferencechiefs by some casual manifestation of a frame of mind which wasresented, perhaps a movement of independence, to which distance or themedium of transmission imparted a flavor of disrespect. Anyhow, theRussian leader was for some time under a cloud, which darkened theprospects of his cause. And as for Denikin, he appeared to the othergreat delegate as a self-advertising braggart. 

These mental portraits were retouched as the fortune of war favored thepair. And their cause benefited correspondingly. To this improvementinfluences at work in London contributed materially. For theanti-Bolshevist currents which made themselves felt in certain statedepartments in that capital, where there were several irreconcilablepolicies, were powerful and constant. By the month of May the Conferencehad turned half-heartedly from Lenin and Trotzky to Kolchak and Denikin, but its mode of negotiating bore the mark peculiar to the diplomacy ofthe new era of "open covenants openly arrived at. " The delegates inParis communicated with the two leaders in Russia "over the heads" andwithout the knowledge of their authorized representatives in Paris, justas they had issued peremptory orders to "the Rumanian government atBucharest" over the heads of its chiefs, who were actually in the Frenchcapital. 

The proximate motives that determined several important decisions ofthe Secret Council, although of no political moment, are of sufficientpsychological interest to warrant mention. They shed a light on theconcreteness, directness, and simplicity of the workings of thestatesmen's minds when engaged in transacting international business. For example, the particular moment for the recognition of newcommunities as states was fixed by wholly extrinsical circumstances. Afood-distributer, for instance, or the Secretary of a Treasury, wanted areceipt for expenditure abroad from the people that benefited by it. Asa document of this character presupposes the existence of a state and agovernment, the official dispenser of food or money was loath to go tothe aid of any nation which was not a state or which lacked a properlyconstituted government. Hence, in some cases the Conference had tocreate both on the spur of the moment. Thus the reason why Finland'sindependence received the hall-mark of the Powers when it did wasbecause the United States government was generously preparing to giveaid to the Finns and had to get in return proper receipts signed bycompetent authorities representing the state. [270] Had it not been forthis immediate need of valid receipts, the act of recognition might havebeen postponed in the same way as was the marking off of the frontiers. And like considerations led to like results in other cases. Czechoslovakia's independence was formally recognized for the samereason, as one of its leading men frankly admitted. 

One of the serious worries of the Conference chiefs in their dealingswith Russia was the lack of a recognized government there, qualified tosign receipts for advances of money and munitions. And as they could notresolve to accord recognition to any of the existing administrations, they hit upon the middle course, that of promoting the anti-Bolsheviststo the rank of a community, not, indeed, sovereign or independent, butdeserving of every kind of assistance except the despatch of Alliedtroops. Assistance was already being given liberally, but the necessitywas felt for justifying it formally. And the two delegates went to workas though they were hatching some dark and criminal plot. Secretlydespatching a message to Admiral Kolchak, they put a number of questionsto him which he was not qualified to answer without first consulting hisofficial advisers in Paris. Yet these advisers were not apprised by theSecret Council of what was being done. Nay, more, the French ForeignOffice was not notified. By the merest chance I got wind of the matterand published the official message. [271] It summoned the Admiral to bindhimself to convene a Constituent Assembly as soon as he arrived inMoscow; to hold free elections; to repudiate definitely the old régimeand all that it implied; to recognize the independence of Poland andFinland, whose frontiers would be determined by the League of Nations;to avail himself of the advice and co-operation of the League in comingto an understanding with the border states, and to acquiesce in thedecision of the Peace Conference respecting the future status ofBessarabia. Kolchak's answer was described as clear when "decipherable, "and to his credit, he frankly declined to forestall the will of theConstituent Assembly respecting those border states which owed theirseparate existence to the initiative of the victorious governments. Butthe Secret Council of the Conference accepted his answer, and reliedupon it as an adequate reason for continuing the assistance which theyhad been giving him theretofore. 

About the person of Kolchak it ought to be superfluous to say more thanthat he is an upright citizen of energy and resolution, as patriotic asFabricius, as disinterested and unambitious as Cincinnatus. To hiscredit account, which is considerable, stands his wonder-working faithin the recuperative forces of his country when its fortunes were attheir lowest ebb. With buoyancy and confidence he set himself the taskof rescuing his fellow-countrymen when it looked as hopeless as that ofXenophon at Cunaxa. He created an army out of nothing, induced his menby argument, suasion, and example to shake off the virus of indisciplineand sacrifice their individual judgment and will to the well-being oftheir fellows. He enjoined nothing upon others that he himself was notready to undertake, and he exposed himself time and again to risksgreater far than any general should deliberately incur. Whether hesucceeds or fails in his arduous enterprise, Kolchak, by his preterhumanpatience and sustained energy and courage, has deserved exceptionallywell of his country, and could afford to ignore the current legends thatdepict him in the crying colors of a reactionary, even though they wereaccepted for the time by the most exalted among the Great Unversed inRussian affairs. One may dissent from his policy and object to some ofhis lieutenants and to many of his partizans, but from thesingle-minded, patriotic soldier one cannot withhold a large meed ofpraise. Kolchak's defects are mostly exaggerations of his qualities. Hisremarkable versatility is purchased at the price of fitfulness, hisenergy displays itself in spurts, and his impulsiveness impairs at timesthe successful execution of a plan which requires unflagging constancy. His judgment of men is sometimes at fault, but he would never hesitateto confer a high post upon any man who deserved it. He is democratic inthe current sense of the word, but neither a doctrinaire nor a faddist. A disciplinarian and a magnetic personality withal, he charms aseffectually as he commands his soldiers. He is enlightened enough, likethe great Western world-menders in their moments of theorizing, todiscountenance secrecy and hole-and-corner agreements, and, what isstill more praiseworthy, he is courageous enough to practise thedoctrine. 

When the revolution broke out Kolchak was at Sebastopol. The telegramconveying the sensational tidings of the outbreak was kept secret by allmilitary commanders--except himself. He unhesitatingly summoned thesoldiers and sailors, apprised them of what had taken place, gave theman insight into the true meaning of the violent upheaval, and asked themto join with him in a heroic endeavor to influence the course of things, in the direction of order and consolidation. He gaged aright thesignificance of the revolution and the impossibility of confining itwithin any bounds, political, moral, or geographical. But he reasonedthat a band of resolute patriots might contrive to wrest something forthe country from the hands of Fate. It was with this faith and hope thathe set to work, and soon his valiant army, the reclaimed provinces, andthe improved Russian outlook were eloquent witnesses to his worth, whosetestimony no legendary reports, however well received in the West, couldweaken. 

How ingrained in the plenipotentiaries was their proneness for what, forwant of a better word, may be termed conspirative and circuitous actionmay be inferred from the record of their official and unofficialconversations and acts. When holding converse with Kolchak's authorizedagents in Paris they would lay down hard conditions, which weredescribed as immutable; and yet when communicating with the Admiraldirect they would submit to him terms considerably less irksome, unknownto his Paris advisers, thus mystifying both and occasioning frictionbetween them. In many cases the contrast between the two sets of demandswas disconcerting, and in all it tended to cause misunderstandings andcomplicate the relations between Kolchak and his Paris agents. But hecontinued to give his confidence to his representatives, although theywere denied that of the delegates. It would, of course, be grosslyunfair to impute anything like disingenuousness to plenipotentiariesengaged upon issues of this magnitude, but it was an unfortunatecoincidence that they were known to regard some of the members of theRussian Council in Paris with disfavor, and would have been glad to seethem superseded. When Nansen's project to feed the starving populationof Russia was first mooted, Kolchak's Ministers in Paris were approachedon the subject, and the Allies' plan was propounded to them sodefectively or vaguely as to give them the impression that theco-operation of the Bolshevist government was part of the program. Theywere also allowed to think that during the work of feeding the peoplethe despatch of munitions and other military necessaries to Kolchak andhis army would be discontinued. Naturally, the scheme, weighted withthese two accompaniments, was unacceptable to Kolchak's representativesin Paris. But, strange to say, in the official notification which theplenipotentiaries telegraphed at the same time to the Admiral direct, neither of these obnoxious riders was included, so that the proposalassumed a different aspect. 

Another example of these singular tactics is supplied by their_pourparlers_ with the Admiral's delegates about the futureinternational status of Finland, whose help was then being solicited tofree Petrograd from the Bolshevist yoke. The Finns insisted on thepreliminary recognition of their complete independence by the Russians. Kolchak's representatives shrank from bartering any territories whichhad belonged to the state on their own sole responsibility. None theless, as the subject was being theoretically threshed out in all itsbearings, the members of the Russian Council in Paris inquired of theAllies whether the Finns had at least renounced their pretensions to theprovince of Karelia. But the spokesmen of the Conference repliedelusively, giving them no assurance that the claim had beenrelinquished. Thereupon they naturally concluded that the Finns eitherstill maintained their demand or else had not yet modified their formerdecision on the matter, and they deemed it their duty to report in thissense to their chief. Yet the plenipotentiaries, in their message on thesubject to Kolchak, which was sent about the same time, assured him thatthe annexation of Karelia was no longer insisted upon, and that theFinns would not again put forward the claim! One hardly knows what tothink of tactics like these. In their talks with the spokesmen ofcertain border states of Russia the official representatives of thethree European Powers at the Conference employed language that gave riseto misunderstandings which may have untoward consequences in the future. One would like to believe that these misunderstandings were caused bymere slips of the tongue, which should not have been taken literally bythose to whom they were addressed; but in the meanwhile they have becomenot only the source of high, possibly delusive, hopes, but the basis ofelaborate policies. For example, Esthonian and Lettish Ministers weregiven to understand that they would be permitted to send diplomaticlegations to Petrograd as soon as Russia was reconstituted, a mode ofintercourse which presupposes the full independence of all the countriesconcerned. A constitution was also drawn up for Esthonia by one of theGreat Powers, which started with the postulate that each people was tobe its own master. Consequently, the two nations in question werewarranted in looking forward to receiving that complete independence. And if such was, indeed, the intention of the Great Powers, there isnothing further to be said on the score of straightforwardness orprecision. But neither in the terms submitted to Kolchak nor in those towhich his Paris agents were asked to give their assent was theindependence of either country as much as hinted at. [272]

These may perhaps seem trivial details, but they enable us to estimatethe methods and the organizing arts of the statesmen upon whose skill inresource and tact in dealing with their fellows depended the newsynthesis of international life and ethics which they were engaged inrealizing. It would be superfluous to investigate the effect upon theRussians, or, indeed, upon any of the peoples represented in Paris, ofthe Secret Council's conspirative deliberations and circuitousprocedure, which were in such strong contrast to the "open covenantsopenly arrived at" to which in their public speeches they paid such hightribute. 

The main danger, which the Allies redoubted from failure to restoretranquillity in Russia, was that Germany might accomplish it and, owingto her many advantages, might secure a privileged position in thecountry and use it as a stepping-stone to material prosperity, militarystrength, and political ascendancy. This feat she could accomplishagainst considerable odds. She would achieve it easily if the Alliesunwittingly helped her, as they were doing. 

Unfortunately the Allied governments had not much hope of succeeding. If they had been capable of elaborating a comprehensive plan, they nolonger possessed the means of executing it. But they devised none. "Thefact is, " one of the Conference leaders exclaimed, "we have no policytoward Russia. Neither do we possess adequate data for one. "

They strove to make good this capital omission by erecting a paper wallbetween Germany and her great Slav neighbor. The plan was simple. TheTeutons were to be compelled to disinterest themselves in the affairs ofRussia, with whose destinies their own are so closely bound up. But theysoon realized that such a partition is useless as a breakwater againstthe tidal wave of Teutondom, and Germany is still destined to play thepart of Russia's steward and majordomo. 

How could it be otherwise? Germany and Russia are near neighbors. Theireconomic relations have been continuous for ages, and the Allies havemade them indispensable in the future; Russia is ear-marked as Germany'sbest colony. The two peoples are become interdependent. The Teuton willrecognize the Slav as an ally in economics, and will pay himselfpolitically. Who will now thwart or check this process? Russia mustlive, and therefore buy and sell, barter and negotiate. Can a parchmenttreaty hinder or invalidate her dealings? Can it prevent an admixture ofpolitics in commercial arrangements, seeing that they are but twoaspects of one and the same transaction? It is worthy of note that aquestion which goes to the quick of the matter was never mooted. It isthis: Is it an essential element of the future ordering of the worldthat Germany shall play no part whatever in its progress? Is it to beassumed that she will always content herself with being treated as theincorrigible enemy of civilization? And, if not, what do all thesechecks and barriers amount to?

In Russia there are millions of Germans conversant with the language, laws, and customs of the people. Many of them have been settled therefor generations. They are passionately attached to their race, andneither unfriendly nor useless to the country of their adoption. Thetrade, commerce, and industry of the European provinces are largely intheir hands and in those of their forerunners and helpers, the Jews. TheRusso-German and Jewish middlemen in the country have their faces everturned toward the Fatherland. They are wont to buy and sell there. Theyalways obtained their credit in Berlin, Dresden, or Frankfurt. Theyacted as commercial travelers, agents, brokers, bankers, for Russiansand Germans. They are constantly going and coming between the twocountries. How are these myriads to be fettered permanently and keptfrom eking out a livelihood in the future on the lines traced bynecessity or interest in the past? The Russians, on their side, mustlive, and therefore buy and sell. Has the Conference or the League theright or power to dictate to them the persons or the people with whomalone they may have dealings? Can it narrow the field of Russia'spolitical activities? Some people flatter themselves that it can. Inthis case the League of Nations must transform itself into an alliancefor the suppression of the German race. 

Burning indignation and moral reprobation were the sentiments arousedamong the high-minded Allies by the infamous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. For that mockery of a peace, even coming from an enemy, transcended thebounds of human vengeance. It was justly anathematized by all Ententepeoples as the loathsome creation of a frenzied people. But shortlyafterward the Entente governments themselves, their turn having come, wrought what Russians of all parties regard as a political patchwork ofvariegated injustice more odious far, because its authors claimed to beconsidered as the devoted friends of their victims and the champions ofright. Whereas the Brest-Litovsk Treaty provided for a federative Slavstate, with provincial diets and a federal parliament, the systemsubstituted by the Allies consisted in carving up Russia into anever-increasing number of separate states, some of which cannot live bythemselves, in debarring the inhabitants from a voice in the matter, increating a permanent agency for foreign intervention, and ignoringRussia's right to reparation from the common enemy. The Russians werenot asked even informally to say what they thought or felt about whatwas being done. This province and that were successively lopped off in alordly way by statesmen who aimed at being classed as impartialdispensers of justice and sowers of the seeds of peace, but wereunacquainted with the conditions and eschewed investigation. Here, atall events, the usual symptoms of hesitancy and procrastination wereabsent. Swift resolve and thoroughness marked the disintegrating actionby which they unwittingly prepared the battlefields of the future. 

Nobody acquainted with Russian psychology imagines that the feelings ofa high-souled people can be transformed by gifts of food, money, ormunitions made to some of their fellow-countrymen. How little likelyRussians are to barter ideal boons for material advantages may begathered from an incident worth noting that occurred in the months ofApril and May, when the fall of the capital into the hands of theanti-Bolshevists was confidently expected. 

At that time, as it chanced, the one thing necessary for their successagainst Bolshevism was the capture of Petrograd. If that city, which, despite its cosmopolitan character, still retained its importance as thecenter of political Russia, could be wrested from the tenacious graspof Lenin and Trotzky, the fall of the anarchist dictators was, peopleheld, a foregone conclusion. The friends of Kolchak accordingly pressedevery lever to set the machinery in motion for the march against Peter'scity. And as, of all helpers, the Finns and Esthonians were admittedlythe most efficacious, conversations were begun with their leaders. Theywere ready to drive a bargain, but it must be a hard and lucrative one. They would march on Petrograd for a price. The principal condition whichthey laid down was the express and definite recognition of theircomplete independence within frontiers which it would be unfruitful hereto discuss. The Kolchak government was ready to treat with the FinnishCabinet, as the _de facto_ government, and to recognize Finland'spresent status for what it is in international law; but as they couldnot give what they did not possess, their recognition must, theyexplained, be like their own authority, provisional. A similar reply wasmade to the Esthonians; to this those peoples demurred. The Russiansstood firm and the negotiations fell through. It is to be supposed thatwhen they have recovered their former status they will prove moreamenable to the blandishments of the Allies than they were to thepowerful bribe dangled before their eyes by the Esthonians and theFinns?

But if the improvised arrangements entailing dismemberment which theGreat Powers imposed on Russia during her cataleptic trance are revised, as they may be, whenever she recovers consciousness and strength, whatcourse will events then follow? If she seeks to regather under her wingsome of the peoples whose complete independence the League of Nationswas so eager to guarantee, will that body respond to the appeal of theseand fly to their assistance? Russia, who has not been consulted, willnot be as bound by the canons of the League, and one need not be aprophet to foretell the reluctance of Western armies to wage another warin order to prevent territories, of which some of the plenipotentiariesmay have heard as little as of Teschen, becoming again integral parts ofthe Slav state. Europe may then see its political axis once more shiftedand its outlook obscured. Thus the system of equilibrium, which wastheoretically abolished by the Fourteen Points, may be re-established bythe hundred and one economico-political changes which Russia's recoverywill contribute to bring about. 

A decade is but a twinkling in the history of a nation. Within a fewyears Russia may once more be united. The army that will have achievedthis feat will constitute a formidable weapon in the hands of the statethat wields it. As everything, even military strength, is relative, andas the armies of the rest of Europe will not be impatient to fight inthe East, and will therefore count for considerably less than theirnumbers, there will be no real danger of an invasion. Russia is acountry easy to get into, but hard to get out of, and military successagainst its armies there would in verity be a victory without glory, annexation, indemnities, or other appreciable gains. 

It is hard to believe that the distinguished statesmen of the Conferencetook these eventualities fully into account before attempting to reshapeamorphous Russia after their own vague ideal. But whether we assesstheir work by the standards of political science or of internationalethics, or explain it as a series of well-meant expedients begotten bythe practical logic of momentary convenience, we must confess that itsgifted authors lacked a direct eye for the wayward tides of national andinternational movements; were, in fact, smitten by political blindness, and did the best they could in these distressing circumstances. 

FOOTNOTES:

[260] From whatever angle this Russian business is viewed, the policy ofthe Allies, if it can be dignified with that name, seems to be acompound of weakness, ineptitude, and shilly-shally. "--Cf. _TheWestminster Gazette_, July 5, 1919. 

[261] Cf. _Journal des Débats_, August 13, 1919. Article by M. AugusteGauvain. 

[262] There can be no doubt that the Bolshevist government underLunatcharsky has made a point of furthering the arts, sciences, andelementary instruction. All reports from foreign travelers and fromeminent Russians--one of these my university fellow-student, nowperpetual secretary of the Academy--agree about this silver lining to adark cloud. 

[263] This latter fact was doubtless known to the British government, which decided as early as March to recall the British troops fromnorthern Russia. 

[264] I published the facts in _The Daily Telegraph_, April 21, and _ThePublic Ledger_ of Philadelphia, April 10, 1919. 

[265] Colonel House is said to have dissociated himself from thePresident on this occasion. 

[266] It was sent at the end of October, 1918, and to my knowledge wasnot published in full. 

[267] Omsk, Ekaterinodar, Archangel, and the Crimea. The last-nameddisappeared soon afterward. 

[268] See Chapter IV "Censorship and Secrecy, " p. 132. 

[269] Pertinax in _L'Echo de Paris_, July 5, 1919. 

[270] This admission was made to a distinguished member of theDiplomatic Corps. 

[271] In _The Daily Telegraph_, June 19, 1919, and in _The PublicLedger_ of Philadelphia. 

[272] In July M. Pichon told the Esthonian delegates that Francerecognized the independence of their country in principle. But thisdeclaration was not taken seriously, either by the Russians or by theFrench. 

XI

BOLSHEVISM

What is Bolshevism? A generic term that stands for a number of thingswhich have little in common. It varies with the countries where itappears. In Russia it is the despotism of an organized and unscrupulousgroup of men in a disorganized community. It might also be termed thefrenzy of a few epileptics running amuck among a multitude ofparalytics. It is not so much a political doctrine or a socialist theoryas a psychic disease of a section of the community which cannot be curedwithout leaving permanent traces and perhaps modifying certain organicfunctions of the society affected. For some students at a distance whomake abstraction from its methods--as a critic appreciating theperformance of "Hamlet" might make abstraction from the part of thePrince of Denmark--it is a modification of the theory of Karl Marx, thenewest contribution to latter-day social science. In Russia, at anyrate, the general condition of society from which it sprang wascharacterized not by the advance of social science, but by a psychicdisorder the germs of which, after a century of incubation, were broughtto the final phase of development by the war. In its origins it is apathological phenomenon. 

Four and a half years of an unprecedented campaign which drained toexhaustion the financial and economic resources of the Europeanbelligerents upset the psychical equilibrium of large sections of theirpopulations. Goaded by hunger and disease to lawless action, and nolonger held back by legal deterrents or moral checks, they followed theinstinct of self-preservation to the extent of criminal lawlessness. Familiarity with death and suffering dispelled the fear of humanpunishment, while numbness of the moral sense made them insensible tothe less immediate restraints of a religious character. These phenomenaare not unusual concomitants of protracted wars. History recordsnumerous examples of the homecoming soldiery turning the weaponsdestined for the foreign foe against political parties or social classesin their own country. In other European communities for some timepreviously a tendency toward root-reaching and violent change wasperceptible, but as the state retained its hold on the army it remaineda tendency. In the case of Russia--the country where the state, morethan ordinarily artificial and ill-balanced, was correspondinglyweak--Fate had interpolated a blood-stained page of red and white terrorin the years 1906-08. Although fitful, unorganized, and abortive, thatwild splutter was one of the foretokens of the impending cataclysm, andwas recognized as such by the writer of these pages. During theforegoing quarter of a century he had watched with interest the sowingof the dragon's teeth from which was one day to spring up a race ofarmed and frenzied men. Few observers, however, even in the Tsardom, gaged the strength or foresaw the effects of the anarchist propagandawhich was being carried on suasively and perseveringly, oftentimesunwittingly, in the nursery, the school, the church, the university, andwith eminent success in the army and the navy. Hence the widespreaderror that the Russian revolution was preceded by no such era ofpreparation as that of the encylopedists in France. 

Recently, however, publicists have gone to the other extreme andasserted that Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Gorky, and a host of other Russianwriters were apostles of the tenets which have since received the nameof Bolshevism, and that it was they who prepared the Russian upheavaljust as it was the authors of the "Encyclopedia" who prepared the FrenchRevolution. In this sweeping form the statement is misleading. Russianliterature during the reigns of the last three Tsars--with fewexceptions, like the writings of Leskoff--was unquestionably a vehiclefor the spread of revolutionary ideas. But it would be a grossexaggeration to assert that the end deliberately pursued was that formof anarchy which is known to-day as Bolshevism, or, indeed, genuineanarchy in any form. Tolstoy and Gorky may be counted among theforerunners of Bolshevism, but Dostoyevsky, whom I was privileged toknow, was one of its keenest antagonists. Nor was it only anarchism thathe combated. Like Leskoff, he was an inveterate enemy of politicalradicalism, and we university students bore him a grudge in consequence. In his masterly delineation[273] of a group of "reformers, " inparticular of Verkhovensky--whom psychic tendency, intellectual anarchy, and political crime bring under the category of Bolshevists--heforeshadowed the logical conclusion, and likewise the politicalconsummation, of the corrosive doctrines which in those days wereassociated with the name of Bakunin. In the year 1905-06, when theupshot of the conflict between Tsarism and the revolution was stilldoubtful, Count Witte and I often admired the marvelous intuition of thegreat novelist, whose gallery of portraits in the "Devils" seemed tohave become suddenly endowed with life, and to be conspiring, shooting, and bomb-throwing in the streets of Moscow, Petersburg, Odessa, andTiflis. The seeds of social revolution sown by the novelists, essayists, and professional guides of the nation were forced by the wars of 1904and 1914 into rapid germination. 

As far back as the year 1892, in a work published over a pseudonym, thepresent writer described the rotten condition of the Tsardom, andventured to foretell its speedy collapse. [274] The French historianMichelet wrote with intuition marred by exaggeration and acerbity: "Abarbarous force, a law-hating world, Russia sucks and absorbs all thepoison of Europe and then gives it off in greater quantity and deadlierintensity. When we admit Russia, we admit the cholera, dissolution, death. That is the meaning of Russian propaganda. Yesterday she said tous, 'I am Christianity. ' To-morrow she will say, 'I am socialism. ' It isthe revolting idea of a demagogy without an idea, a principle, asentiment, of a people which would march toward the west with the gaitof a blind man, having lost its soul and its will and killing at random, of a terrible automaton like a dead body which can still reach and slay. 

"It might commove Europe and bespatter it with blood, but that would nothinder it from plunging itself into nothingness in the abysmal ooze ofdefinite dissolution. "

Russia, then, led by domiciled aliens without a fatherland, may be trulysaid to have been wending steadily toward the revolutionary vortex longbefore the outbreak of hostilities. Her progress was continuous andperceptible. As far back as the year 1906 the late Count Witte andmyself made a guess at the time-distance which the nation still had totraverse, assuming the rate of progress to be constant, before reachingthe abyss. This, however, was mere guesswork, which one of the manypossibilities--and in especial change in the speed-rate--might belie. Ineffect, events moved somewhat more quickly than we anticipated, and itwas the World War and its appalling concomitants that precipitated thecatastrophe. 

As circumstances willed it, certain layers of the people of centralEurope were also possessed by the revolutionary spirit at the close ofthe World War. In their case hunger, hardship, disease, and moral shockwere the avenues along which it moved and reached them. This coincidencewas fraught with results more impressive than serious. The governmentsof both these great peoples had long been the mainstays of monarchictradition, military discipline, and the principle of authority. TheTeutons, steadily pursuing an ideal which lay at the opposite pole toanarchy, had risked every worldly and well-nigh every spiritualpossession to realize it. It was the hegemony of the world. Thisaspiration transfigured, possessed, fanaticized them. Teutondom becameto them what Islam is to Mohammedans of every race, even when they shakeoff religion. They eschewed no means, however iniquitous, that seemed tolead to the goal. They ceased to be human in order to force Europe tobecome German. Offering up the elementary principles of morality on thealtar of patriotism, they staked their all upon the single venture ofthe war. It was as the throw of a gambler playing for his soul with theEvil One. Yet the faith of these materialists waxed heroic withal, liketheir self-sacrifice. And in the fiery ardor of their enthusiasm, hardconcrete facts were dissolved and set floating as illusions in theambient mist. Their wishes became thoughts and their fears weredispelled as fancies. They beheld only what they yearned for, and whenat last they dropped from the dizzy height of their castles in cloudlandtheir whole world, era, and ideal was shattered. Unavailing remorse, impotent rage, spiritual and intense physical exhaustion completed theirdemoralization. The more harried and reckless among them becamefrenzied. Turning first against their rulers, then against one another, they finally started upon a work of wanton destruction relieved by nocreative idea. It was at this time-point that they endeavored to joinhands with their tumultuous Eastern neighbors, and that the one word"Bolshevism" connoted the revolutionary wave that swept over some of theSlav and German lands. But only for a moment. One may safely assert, asa general proposition, that the same undertaking, if the Germans and theRussians set their hands to it, becomes forthwith two separateenterprises, so different are the conceptions and methods of these twopeoples. Bolshevism was almost emptied of its contents by the Germans, and little left of it but the empty shell. 

Comparisons between the orgasms of collective madness which accompaniedthe Russian welter, on the one hand, and the French Revolution, on theother, are unfruitful and often misleading. It is true that at theoutset those spasms of delirium were in both cases violent reactionsagainst abuses grown well-nigh unbearable. It is also a fact that therevolutionists derived their preterhuman force from historic eventswhich had either denuded those abuses of their secular protection orinspired their victims with wonder-working faith in their power to sweepthem away. But after this initial stage the likeness vanishes. TheFrench Revolution, which extinguished feudalism as a system and thenobility as a privileged class, speedily ceased to be a mere dissolvent. In its latter phases it assumed a constructive character. Incidentallyit created much that was helpful in substance if not beautiful in form, and from the beginning it adopted a positive doctrine as old asChristianity, but new in its application to the political sphere. Thus, although it uprooted quantities of wheat together with the tares, itsgeneral effect was to prepare the ground for a new harvest. It had adistinctly social purpose, which it partially realized. Nor should itbe forgotten that in the psychological sphere it kindled a transientoutburst of quasi-religious enthusiasm among its partizans, imbued themwith apostolic zeal, inspired them with a marvelous spirit ofself-abnegation, and nerved their arms to far-resonant exploits. And theforces which the revolution thus set free changed many of the forms ofthe European world, but without reshaping it after the image of theideal. 

Has the withering blight known as Bolshevism any such redeeming traitsto its credit account? The consensus of opinion down to the presentmoment gives an emphatic, if summary, answer in the negative. Everyregion over which it swept is blocked with heaps of unsightly ruins, Ithas depreciated all moral values. It passed like a tornado, spending itsenergies in demolition. Of construction hardly a trace has beendiscerned, even by indulgent explorers. [275] One might liken it to aso-called possession by the spirit of evil, wont of yore to use thehuman organs as his own for words of folly and deeds of iniquity. Bolshevism has operated uniformly as a quick solvent of the socialorganism. Doubtless European society in 1917 sorely needed purging bydrastic means, but only a fanatic would say that it deservedannihilation. 

It has been variously affirmed that the political leaven of thesedestructive ferments in eastern and central Europe was wholesome. Slavsand Germans, it is argued, stung by the bankruptcy of their politicalsystems, resolved to alter them on the lines of universal suffrage andits corollaries, but were carried farther than they meant to go. Thismild judgment is based on a very partial survey of the phenomena. Theimprovement in question was the work, not of the Bolshevists, but oftheir adversaries, the moderate reformers. And the political strivingsof these had no organic nexus with the doctrine which emanated from thenethermost depths in which vengeful pariahs, outlaws, and benightednihilists were floundering before suffocating in the ooze of anarchism. Neither can one discern any degree of kinship between Spartacists likeEichhorn or Lenin and moderate reformers as represented, say, by TheodorWolff and Boris Savinkoff. The two pairs are sundered from each other bythe distance that separates the social and the anti-social instinct. Those are vulgar iconoclasts, these are would-be world-builders. Thatthe Russian, or, indeed, the German constitutional reformers should havehugged the delusion that while thrones were being hurled to the ground, and an epoch was passing away in violent convulsions, a few alterationsin the electoral law would restore order and bring back normalconditions to the agonizing nations, is an instructive illustration ofthe blurred vision which characterizes contemporary statesmen. TheAnglo-Saxon delegates at the Conference were under a similar delusionwhen they undertook to regenerate the world by a series of merelypolitical changes. 

No one who has followed attentively the work of the constitution-makersin Weimar can have overlooked their readiness to adopt and assimilatethe positive elements of a movement which was essentially destructive. In this respect they displayed a remarkable degree of open-mindednessand receptivity. They showed themselves avid of every contribution whichthey could glean from any source to the work of national reorganization, and even in Teutonized Bolshevism they apparently found helpful hints oftimely innovations. One may safely hazard the prediction that theseadaptations, however little they may be relished, are certain to spreadto the Western peoples, who will be constrained to accept them in thelong run, and Germany may end by becoming the economic leader ofdemocratic Europe. The law of politico-social interchange andassimilation underlying this phenomenon, had it been understood by thestatesmen of the Entente, might have rendered them less desirous ofseeing the German organism tainted with the germs of dissolution. Forwhat Germany borrows from Bolshevism to-day western Europe will borrowfrom Germany to-morrow. And foremost among the new institutions whichthe revolution will impose upon Europe is that of the Soviets, considerably modified in form and limited in functions. 

"In the conception of the Soviet system, " writes the most influentialJewish-German organ in Europe, "there is assuredly somethingserviceable, and it behooves us to familiarize ourselves therewith. Psychologically, it rests upon the need felt by the working-man to besomething more than a mere cog in the industrial mechanism. The firststep would consist in conferring upon labor committees juridicalfunctions consonant with latter-day requirements. These functions wouldextend beyond those exercised by the labor committees hitherto. How farthey could go without rendering the industrial enterprise impossible isa matter for investigation. . . . This is not merely a wish of theextremists; it is a psychological requirement, and therefore itnecessitates the establishment of a closer nexus between legislation andpractical life which unhappily is become so complicated. And this needis not confined to the laboring class. It is universal. Therefore, whatis good for the one is meet for the other. "[276]

The Soviet system adapted to modern existence is one--and probably thesole--legacy of Bolshevism to the new age. 

During the Peace Conference Bolshevism played a large part in theworld's affairs. By some of the eminent lawgivers there it was feared asa scourge; by others it was wielded as a weapon, and by a third set itwas employed as a threat. Whenever a delegate of one of the lesserstates felt that he was losing ground at the Peace Table, and that hiscountry's demands were about to be whittled down as extravagant, hewould point significantly to certain "foretokens" of an outbreak ofBolshevism in his country and class them as an inevitable consequence ofthe nation's disappointment. Thus the representative of nearly everystate which had a territorial program declared that that program must becarried out if Bolshevism was to be averted there. "This or elseBolshevism" was the peroration of many a delegate's _exposé_. Moreredoubtable than political discontent was the proselytizing activity ofthe leaders of the movement in Russia. 

Of the two pillars of Bolshevism one is a Russian, the other a Jew, theformer, Ulianoff (better known as Lenin), the brain; the other, Braunstein (called Trotzky), the arm of the sect. Trotzky is anunscrupulous despot, in whose veins flows the poison of malignity. Hiselement is cruelty, his special gift is organizing capacity. Lenin is aUtopian, whose fanaticism, although extensive, has well-defined limits. In certain things he disagrees profoundly with Trotzky. He resembles areligious preacher in this, that he created a body of veritabledisciples around himself. He might be likened to a pope with a collegeof international cardinals. Thus he has French, British, German, Austrian, Czech, Italian, Danish, Swedish, Japanese, Hindu, Chinese, Buryat, and many other followers, who are chiefs of proselytizingsections charged with the work of spreading the Bolshevik evangelthroughout the globe, and are working hard to discharge their duties. Lenin, however, dissatisfied with the measures of success alreadyattained, is constantly stimulating his disciples to more strenuousexertions. He shares with other sectarian chiefs who have played aprominent part in the world's history that indefinable quality whichstirs emotional susceptibility and renders those who approach him moreeasily accessible to ideas toward which they began by manifestingrepugnance. Lenin is credibly reported to have made several convertsamong his Western opponents. 

The plenipotentiaries, during the first four months, approachedBolshevism from a single direction, unvaried by the events which itgenerated or the modifications which it underwent. They tested it solelyby its accidental bearings on the one aim which they were intent onsecuring--a formal and provisional resettlement of Europe capable ofbeing presented to their respective parliaments as a fair achievement. With its real character, its manifold corollaries, its innovatingtendencies over the social, political, and ethnical domain, they werefor the time being unconcerned. Without the slightest reference to anyof these considerations they were ready to find a place for it in thenew state system with which they hoped to endow the world. More thanonce they were on the point of giving it official recognition. There wasno preliminary testing, sifting, or examining by these empiricists, who, finding Bolshevism on their way, and discerning no facile means ofdislodging or transforming it, signified their willingness under easyconditions to hallmark and incorporate it as one of the elements of thenew ordering. From the crimes laid to its charge they were prepared tomake abstraction. The barbarous methods to which it owed its veryexistence they were willing to consign to oblivion. And it was only afreak of circumstance that hindered this embodiment of despotism frombeginning one of their accepted means of rendering the world safe fordemocracy. 

Political students outside the Conference, going farther into thematter, inquired whether there was any kernel of truth in the doctrinesof Lenin, any social or political advantage in the practices ofBraunstein (Trotzky), and the conclusions which they reached werenegative. [277] But inquiries of this theoretical nature awakened nointerest among the empiricists of the Supreme Council. For themBolshevism meant nothing more than a group of politicians, who directed, or misdirected, but certainly represented the bulk of the Russianpeople, and who, if won over and gathered under the cloak of theConference, would facilitate its task and bear witness to its triumph. This inference, drawn by keen observers from many countries and parties, is borne out by the curious admissions and abortive acts of theprincipal plenipotentiaries themselves. 

In its milder manifestations on the social side Russian Bolshevismresembles communism, and may be described as a social revolutioneffected by depriving one set of people--the ruling and intelligentclass--of power, property, and civil rights, putting another and lessqualified section in their place, and maintaining the top-heavystructure by force ruthlessly employed. Far-reaching though this changeundoubtedly is, it has no nexus with Marxism or kindred theories. Itsproximate causes were many: such, for example, as the breakdown of atyrannical system of government, state indebtedness so vast that itswallowed up private capital, the depreciation of money, and thecorresponding appreciation of labor. It is fair, therefore, to say thata rise in the cost of production and the temporary substitution of oneclass for another mark the extent to which political forcesrevolutionized the social fabric. Beyond these limits they did not go. The notion had been widespread in most countries, and deep-rooted inRussia, that a political upheaval would effect a root-reaching andlasting alteration in the forces of social development. It was adoptedby Lenin, a fanatic of the Robespierre type, but far superior toRobespierre in will-power, insight, resourcefulness, and sincerity, who, having seized the reins of power, made the experiment. 

It is no easy matter to analyze Lenin's economic policy, because of theveil of mist that conceals so much of Russian contemporary history. Oursources are confined to the untrustworthy statements of a censored pressand travelers' tales. 

But it is common knowledge that the Bolshevist dictator requisitionedand "nationalized" the banks, took factories, workshops, and plants fromtheir owners and handed them over to the workmen, deprived landedproprietors of their estates, and allowed peasants to appropriate them. It is in the matter of industry, however, that his experiment is mostinteresting as showing the practical value of Marxism as a policy andthe ability of the Bolsheviki to deal with delicate social problems. Thehistoric decree issued by the Moscow government on the nationalizationof industry after the opening experiment had broken down contains dataenough to enable one to affirm that Lenin himself judged Marxisminapplicable even to Russia, and left it where he had found it--amongthe ideals of a millennial future. That ukase ordered the gradualnationalization of all private industries with a capital of not lessthan one million rubles, but allowed the owners to enjoy the gratuitoususufruct of the concern, provided that they financed and carried it onas before. Consequently, although in theory the business was transferredto the state, in reality the capitalist retained his place and hisprofits as under the old system. Consequently, the principal aims ofsocialism, which are the distribution of the proceeds of industry amongthe community and the retention of a certain surplus by the state, weremissed. In the Bolshevist procedure the state is wholly eliminatedexcept for the purpose of upholding a fiction. It receives nothing fromthe capitalist, not even a royalty. 

The Slav is a dreamer whose sense of the real is often defective. Heloses himself in vague generalities and pithless abstractions. Thus, before opening a school he will spin out a theory of universaleducation, and then bemoan his lack of resources to realize it. True, many of the chiefs of the sect--for it is undoubtedly a sect when it isnot a criminal conspiracy, and very often it is both--were not Slavs, but Jews, who, for the behoof of their kindred, dropped their Semiticnames and adopted sonorous Slav substitutes. But they were mostunscrupulous peculators, incapable of taking an interest in thescientific aspect of such matters, and hypnotized by the dreams of lucrewhich the opportunity evoked. One has only to call to mind some of theshabby transactions in which the Semitic Dictator of Hungary, Kuhn, orCohen, and Braunstein (Trotzky) of Petrograd, took an active part. Theformer is said to have offered for sale the historic crown of St. Stephen of Hungary--which to him was but a plain gold headgear adornedwith precious stones and a jeweled cross--to an old curiosity dealer ofMunich, [278] and when solemnly protesting that he was living only forthe Soviet Republic and was ready to die for it, he was activelyengaged in smuggling out of Hungary into Switzerland fifty millionkronen bonds, thirty-five kilograms of gold, and thirty chests filledwith objects of value. [279] His colleague Szamuelly's plunder is amatter of history. 

To such adventurers as those science is a drug. They are primitivebeings impressible mainly to concrete motives of the barest kind. Thedupes of Lenin were people of a different type. Many of them fanciedthat the great political clash must inevitably result in an equallygreat and salutary social upheaval. This assumption has not been borneout by events. 

Those fanatics fell into another error; they were in a hurry, and wouldfain have effected their great transformation as by the waving of amagician's wand. Impatient of gradation, they scorned to traverse thedistance between the point of departure and that of the goal, and by wayof setting up the new social structure without delay, they rolled awayall hindrances regardless of consequences. In this spirit of absolutismthey abolished the services of the national debt, struck out the claimsof Russia's creditors to their capital or interest, and turned the shopsand factories over to labor boards. That was the initial blunder whichthe ukase alluded to was subsequently issued to rectify. But it was toolate. The equilibrium of the forces of production had been definitelyupset and could no longer be righted. 

One of the basic postulates of profitable production is the equilibriumof all its essential factors--such as the laborer's wages, the cost ofthe machinery and the material, the administration. Bring discord intothe harmony and the entire mechanism is out of gear. 

The Russian workman, who is at bottom an illiterate peasant with the oldroots of serfdom still clinging to him, has seldom any bowels for hisneighbor and none at all for his employer. "God Himself commands us todespoil such gentry, " is one of his sayings. He is in a hurry to enrichhimself, and he cares about nothing else. Nor can he realize that tobeggar his neighbors is to impoverish himself. Hence he always takes andnever gives; as a peasant he destroys the forests, hewing trees andplanting none, and robs the soil of its fertility. On analogous lines hewould fain deal with the factories, exacting exorbitant wages that eatup all profit, and naïvely expecting the owner to go on paying them asthough he were the trustee of a fund for enriching the greedy. The onlypeople to profit by the system, and even they only transiently, were themanual laborers. The bulk of the skilled, intelligent, and educatedartisans were held up to contempt and ostracized, or killed as an odiousaristocracy. That, it has been aptly pointed out, [280] is far removedfrom Marxism. The Marxist doctrine postulates the adhesion ofintelligent workers to the social revolution, whereas the Russianexperimenters placed them in the same category as the capitalists, thearistocrats, and treated them accordingly. Another Marxist postulate notrealized in Russia was that before the state could profitably proceed tonationalization the country must have been in possession of awell-organized, smooth-running industrial mechanism. And this waspossible only in those lands in which capitalism had had a long andsuccessful innings, not in the great Slav country of husbandmen. 

By way of glozing over these incongruities Lenin's ukase proclaimed thatthe measures enacted were only provisional, and aimed at enabling Russiato realize the great transformation by degrees. But the impressionconveyed by the history of the social side of Lenin's activity is thatMarxism, whether as understood by its author or as interpreted andtwisted by its Russian adherents, has been tried and foundimpracticable. One is further warranted in saying that neither thevisionary workers who are moved by misdirected zeal for socialimprovement nor the theorists who are constantly on the lookout for newand stimulating ideas are likely to discover in Russian Bolshevism anyaspect but the one alluded to above worthy of their seriousconsideration. 

A much deeper mark was made on the history of the century by itsmethods. 

Compared with the soul-searing horrors let loose during the Bolshevistfit of frenzy, the worst atrocities recorded of Deputy Carrier and hisnoyades during the French Revolution were but the freaks ofcompassionate human beings. In Bolshevist Russia brutality assumed formsso monstrous that the modern man of the West shrinks from conjuring up afaint picture of them in imagination. Tens, perhaps hundreds, ofthousands were done to death in hellish ways by the orders of men and ofwomen. Eyes were gouged out, ears hacked off, arms and legs torn fromthe body in presence of the victims' children or wives, whose agony wasthus begun before their own turn came. Men and women and infants wereburned alive. Chinese executioners were specially hired to inflict theawful torture of the "thousand slices. "[281] Officers had their limbsbroken and were left for hours in agonies. Many victims are crediblyreported to have been buried alive. History, from its earliest dawn downto the present day, has recorded nothing so profoundly revolting as thenameless cruelties in which these human fiends reveled. One gruesomepicture of the less loathsome scenes enacted will live in history on alevel with the _noyades_ of Nantes. I have seen several movingdescriptions of it in Russian journals. The following account is fromthe pen of a French marine officer:

"We have two armed cruisers outside Odessa. A few weeks ago one of them, having an investigation to make, sent a diver down to the bottom. A fewminutes passed and the alarm signal was heard. He was hauled up andquickly relieved of his accoutrements. He had fainted away. When he cameto, his teeth were chattering and the only articulate sounds that couldbe got from him were the words: 'It is horrible! It is awful!' A seconddiver was then lowered, with the same procedure and a like result. Finally a third was chosen, this time a sturdy lad of iron nerves, andsent down to the bottom of the sea. After the lapse of a few minutes thesame thing happened as before, and the man was brought up. This time, however, there was no fainting fit to record. On the contrary, althoughpale with terror, he was able to state that he had beheld the sea-bedpeopled with human bodies standing upright, which the swaying of thewater, still sensible at this shallow depth, softly rocked as thoughthey were monstrous algæ, their hair on end bristling vertically, andtheir arms raised toward the surface. . . . All these corpses, anchored tothe bottom by the weight of stones, took on an appearance of eerie liferesembling, one might say, a forest of trees moved from side to side bythe wind and eager to welcome the diver come down among them. . . . Therewere, he added, old men, children numerous beyond count, so that onecould but compare them to the trees of a forest. "[282]

From published records it is known that the Bolshevist thugs, whentired of using the rifle, the machine-gun, the cord, and the bayonet, expedited matters by drowning their victims by hundreds in the BlackSea, in the Gulf of Finland, and in the great rivers. Submarinecemeteries was the name given to these last resting-places of some ofRussia's most high-minded sons and daughters. [283] It is not in theFrench Revolution that those deeds of wanton destruction and revoltingcruelty which are indissolubly associated with Bolshevism find aparallel, but in Chinese history, which offers a striking and curiousprefiguration of the Leninist structure. [284] Toward the middle of thetenth century, when the empire was plunged in dire confusion, a mysticalsect was formed there for the purpose of destroying by force everyvestige of the traditional social fabric, and establishing a system ofcomplete equality without any state organization whatever, after themanner advocated by Leo Tolstoy. Some of the dicta of these sectarianshave a decidedly Bolshevist flavor. This, for example: "Society restsupon law, property, religion, and force. But law is injustice andchicane; property is robbery and extortion; religion is untruth, andforce is iniquity. " In those days Chinese political parties were atstrife with each other, and none of them scorned any means, howeverbrutal, to worst its adversaries, but for a long while they were dividedamong themselves and without a capable chief. 

At last the Socialist party unexpectedly produced a leader, Wang NganShen, a man of parts, who possessed the gift of drawing and swaying themultitude. Of agreeable presence, he was resourceful and unscrupulous, soon became popular, and even captivated the Emperor, Shen Tsung, whoappointed him Minister. He then set about applying his tenets andrealizing his dreams. Wang Ngan Shen began by making commerce and tradea state monopoly, just as Lenin had done, "in order, " he explained, "tokeep the poor from being devoured by the rich. " The state was proclaimedthe sole owner of all the wealth of the soil; agricultural overseerswere despatched to each district to distribute the land among thepeasants, each of these receiving as much as he and his family couldcultivate. The peasant obtained also the seed, but this he was obligedto return to the state after the ingathering of the harvest. The powerof the overseer went farther; it was he who determined what crops thehusbandman might sow and who fixed day by day the price of every salablecommodity in the district. As the state reserved to itself the right tobuy all agricultural produce, it was bound in return to save up a partof the profits to be used for the benefit of the people in years ofscarcity, and also at other times to be employed in works needed by thecommunity. Wang Ngan Shen also ordained that only the wealthy should paytaxes, the proceeds of which were to be employed in relieving the wantsof the poor, the old, and the unemployed. The theory was smooth andattractive. 

For over thirty years those laws are said to have remained in force, atany rate on paper. To what extent they were carried out isproblematical. Probably a beginning was actually made, for during Wang'stenure of office confusion was worse confounded than before, and miserymore intense and widespread. The opposition to his régime increased, spread, and finally got the upper hand. Wang Ngan Shen was banished, together with those of his partizans who refused to accept the return tothe old system. Such would appear to have been the first appearance ofBolshevism recorded in history. 

Another less complete parallel, not to the Bolshevist theory, but to theplight of the country which it ruined, may be found in the Chineserebellion organized in the year 1850 by a peasant[285] who, havingbecome a Christian, fancied himself called by God to regenerate hispeople. He accordingly got together a band of stout-hearted fellows whomhe fanaticized, disciplined, and transformed into the nucleus of astrong army to which brigands, outlaws, and malcontents of every sociallayer afterward flocked. They overran the Yangtse Valley, invaded twelveof the richest provinces, seized six hundred cities and towns, and putan end to twenty million people in the space of twelve years by fire, sword, and famine. [286] To this bloody expedition Hung Sew Tseuen, amaster of modern euphemism, gave the name of Crusade of the Great Peace. For twelve years this "Crusade" lasted, and it might have endured muchlonger had it not been for the help given by outsiders. It was therethat "Chinese" Gordon won his laurels and accomplished a beneficentwork. 

There were politicians at the Conference who argued that Russia, beingin a position analogous to that of China in 1854, ought, like her, to behelped by the Great Powers. It was, they held, quite as much in theinterests of Europe as in hers. But however forcible their arguments, they encountered an insurmountable obstacle in the fear entertained bythe chiefs of the leading governments lest the extreme oppositionalparties in their respective countries should make capital out of themove and turn them out of office. They invoked the interests of thecause of which they were the champions for declining to exposethemselves to any such risk. It has been contended with warmth, andpossibly with truth, that if at the outset the Great Powers hadintervened they might with a comparatively small army have crushedBolshevism and re-established order in Russia. On the other hand, it wasobjected that even heavy guns will not destroy ideas, and that the mainideas which supplied the revolutionary movement with vital force weretoo deeply rooted to have been extirpated by the most formidable foreignarmy. That is true. But these ideas were not especially characteristicof Bolshevism. Far from that, they were incompatible with it: thebestowal of land on the peasants, an equitable reform of the relationsbetween workmen and employers, and the abolition of the hereditaryprinciple in the distribution of everything that confers an unfairadvantage on the individual or the class are certainly not postulates ofLenin's party. It is a tenable proposition that timely militaryassistance would have enabled the constructive elements of Russia torestore conditions of normal life, but the worth of timeliness was neverrealized by the heads of the governments who undertook to make laws forthe world. They ignored the maxim that a statesman, when applyingmeasures, must keep his eye on the clock, inasmuch as the remedy whichwould save a nation at one moment may hasten its ruin at another. 

The expedients and counter-expedients to which the Conference hadrecourse in their fitful struggles with Bolshevism were so manysurprises to every one concerned, and were at times redolent of comedy. But what was levity and ignorance on the part of the delegates meantdeath, and worse than death, to tens of thousands of their protégées. InRussia their agents zealously egged on the order-loving population torise up against the Bolsheviki and attack their strong positions, promising them immediate military help if they succeeded. But when, these exploits having been duly achieved, the agents were asked how soonthe foreign reinforcements might be expected, they replied, calling forpatience. After a time the Bolsheviki assailed the temporary victors, generally defeated them, and then put a multitude of defenseless peopleto the sword. Deplorable incidents of this nature, which are said tohave occurred several times during the spring of 1919, shook the creditof the Allies, and kindled a feeling of just resentment among allclasses of Russians. 

FOOTNOTES:

[273] In the _Biessy_ (Devils). 

[274] _Russian Characteristics_, by E. B. Lanin (Eblanin, a Russian wordwhich means native of Dublin, Eblana). 

[275] Educational reforms have been mentioned among its achievements andattributed to Lunatcharsky. That he exerted himself to spread elementaryinstruction must be admitted. But this progress and the effectiveprotection and encouragement which he has undoubtedly extended to artsand sciences would seem to exhaust the list of items in the creditaccount of the Bolshevist régime. 

[276] _Frankfurter Zeitung_, February 28, 1919. 

[277] A succinct but interesting study of this question appeared in the_Handels-Zeitung_ of the _Berliner Tageblatt_, over the signature of Dr. Felix Pinner, July 20, 1918. 

[278] Cf. _Bonsoir_, July 29, 1919. The price was not fixed, but theminimum was specified. It was one hundred thousand kronen. 

[279] Cf. _Der Tag_, Vienna, August 13, 1919. _L'Echo de Paris_, August15, 1919. 

[280] By Dr. F. Pinner, H. Vorst, and others. 

[281] The condemned man is tied to a post or a cross, his mouth gagged, and the execution is made to last several hours. It usually begins witha slit on the forehead and the pulling down of the skin toward the chin. After the lapse of a certain time the nose is severed from the face. Aninterval follows, then an ear is lopped off, and so the devilish workgoes on with long pauses. The skill of the executioner is displayed inthe length of time during which the victim remains conscious. 

[282] Cf. _Le Figaro_, February 18, 1919. 

[283] I do not suggest that these crimes were ordered by Lenin. But itwill not be gainsaid that neither he nor his colleagues punished themass murderers or even protested against their crimes. Neither can it bemaintained that massacres were confined to any one party. 

[284] This pre-Bolshevist movement is described in an interesting studyon the socialist movement and systems, down to the year 1848, by El. Luzatto. Cf. _Der Bund_, August 16, 1918. 

[285] Hung Sew Tseuen. The rebellion lasted from 1850 to 1864. 

[286] The superb city of Nankin, with its temples and porcelain towers, was destroyed. 

XII

HOW BOLSHEVISM WAS FOSTERED

The Allies, then, might have solved the Bolshevist problem by making uptheir minds which of the two alternative politics--war against, ortolerance of, Bolshevism--they preferred, and by taking suitable actionin good time. If they had handled the Russian tangle with skill andrepaid a great sacrifice with a small one before it was yet too late, they might have hoped to harvest in abundant fruits in the fullness oftime. But they belonged to the class of the undecided, whose memberscontinually suffer from the absence of a middle word between yes and no, connoting what is neither positive nor negative. They let theopportunity slip. Not only did they withhold timely succor to eitherside, but they visited some of the most loyal Russians in western Europewith the utmost rigor of coercion laws. They hounded them down asenemies. They cooped them up in cages as though they were Teutonenemies. They encircled them with barbed wire. They kept many of themhungry and thirsty, deprived them of life's necessaries for days, and insome cases reduced the discontented--and who in their place would not bediscontented?--to pick their food in dustbins among garbage and refuse. I have seen officers and men in France who had shed their blood joyfullyfor the Entente cause gradually converted to Bolshevism by the misdeedsof the Allied authorities. In whose interests? With what helpfulresults?

I watched the development of anti-Ententism among those Russians withpainful interest, and in favorable conditions for observation, and I saywithout hesitation that rancor against the Allies burns as vehementlyand intensely among the anti-Bolshevists as among their adversaries. "Mycountry as a whole is bitterly hostile to her former allies, " exclaimedan eminent Russian, "for as soon as she had rendered them inestimableservices, at the cost of her political existence, they turned theirbacks upon her as though her agony were no affair of theirs. To-day thenation is divided on many issues. Dissensions and quarrels have rivenand shattered it into shreds. But in one respect Russia is stillunited--in the vehemence of her sentiment toward the Allies, who firstdrained her life-blood and then abandoned her prostrate body to beastsof prey. Some part of the hatred engendered might have been mitigated ifrepresentatives of the provisional Russian government had been admittedto the Conference. A statesman would have insisted upon opening at leastthis little safety-valve. It would have helped and could not have harmedthe Allies. It would have bound the Russians to them. For Russia'sdelegates, the men sent or empowered by Kolchak and his colleagues torepresent them, would have been the exponents of a helpless communityhovering between life and death. They could and would have gone fartoward conciliating the world-dictators, to whose least palatabledecisions they might have hesitated to offer unbending opposition. Andthis acquiescence, however provisional, would have tended to relieve theAllies of a sensible part of their load of responsibility. It would alsohave linked the Russians, loosely, perhaps, but perceptibly, to theWestern Powers. It would have imparted a settled Ententophil directionto Kolchak's policy, and communicated it to the nation. In short, itmight have dispelled some of the storm-clouds that are gathering in theeast of Europe. "

But the Allies, true to their wont of drifting, put off all decisiveaction, and let things slip and slide, for the Germans to put in order. There were no Russians, therefore, at the Conference, and there lies noobligation on any political group or party in the anarchist Slav stateto hold to the Allies. But it would be an error to imagine that theyhave a white sheet of paper on which to trace their line of action andwrite the names of France and Britain as their future friends. They arefilled with angry disgust against these two ex-Allies, and of the twothe feeling against France is especially intense. [287]

It is a truism to repeat in a different form what Messrs. Lloyd Georgeand Wilson repeatedly affirmed, but apparently without realizing whatthey said: that the peace which they regard as the crowning work oftheir lives deserves such value as it may possess from the assumptionthat Russia, when she recovers from her cataleptic fit, will be the allyof the Powers that have dismembered her. If this postulate should proveerroneous, Germany may form an anti-Allied league of a large number ofnations which it would be invidious to enumerate here. But it ismanifest that this consummation would imperil Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, and sweep away the last vestiges of the peacesettlement. And although it would be rash to make a forecast of thepolicy which new Russia will strike out, it would be impolitic to blinkthe conclusions toward which recent events significantly point. 

In April a Russian statesman said to me: "The Allied delegates areunconsciously thrusting from them the only means by which they can stillrender peace durable and a fellowship of the nations possible. Unwittingly they are augmenting the forces of Bolshevism and raisingpolitical enemies against themselves. Consider how they are behavingtoward us. Recently a number of Russian prisoners escaped from Germanyto Holland, whereupon the Allied representatives packed them off byforce and against their will to Dantzig, to be conveyed thence to Libau, where they have become recruits of the Bolshevist Red Guards. Those menmight have been usefully employed in the Allied countries, to whosecause they were devoted, but so exasperated were they at their forcibleremoval to Libau that many of them declared that they would join theBolshevist forces. 

"Even our official representatives are seemingly included in thecategory of suspects. Our Minister in Peking was refused the right ofsending ciphered telegrams and our chargé d'affaires in a Europeancapital suffered the same deprivation, while the Bolshevist envoyenjoyed this diplomatic privilege. A councilor of embassy in one Alliedcountry was refused a passport visa for another until he declared thatif the refusal were upheld he would return a high order which forextraordinary services he had received from the government whose embassywas vetoing his visa. On the national festival of a certain Alliedcountry the chargé d'affaires of Russia was the only member of thediplomatic corps who received no official invitation. "

One day in January, when a crowd had gathered on the Quai d'Orsay, watching the delegates from the various countries--British, American, Italian, Japanese, Rumanian, etc. --enter the stately palace to safeguardthe interests of their respective countries and legislate for the humanrace, a Russian officer passed, accompanied by an illiterate soldier whohad seen hard service first under the Grand Duke Nicholas, and then in aRussian brigade in France. The soldier gazed wistfully at the palace, then, turning to the officer, asked, "Are they letting any of our peoplein there?" The officer answered, evasively: "They are thinking it over. Perhaps they will. " Whereupon his attendant blurted out: "Thinking itover! What thinking is wanted? Did we not fight for them till we weremowed down like grass? Did not millions of Russian bodies cover thefields, the roads, and the camps? Did we not face the German great gunswith only bayonets and sticks? Have we done too little for them? Whatmore could we have done to be allowed in there with the others? I foughtsince the war began, and was twice wounded. My five brothers were calledup at the same time as myself, and all five have been killed, and nowthe Russians are not wanted! The door is shut in our faces. . . . "

Sooner or later Russian anarchy, like that of China, will come to anend, and the leaders charged with the reconstitution of the country, ifmen of knowledge, patriotism, and character, will adopt a programconducive to the well-being of the nation. To what extent, one may ask, is its welfare compatible with the _status quo_ in eastern Europe, whichthe Allies, distracted by conflicting principles and fitful impulse, left or created and hope to perpetuate by means of a parchmentinstrument?

The zeal with which the French authorities went to work to prevent thegrowth of Bolshevism in their country, especially among the Russiansthere, is beyond dispute. Unhappily it proved inefficacious. Indeed, itis no exaggeration to say that it defeated its object and produced thecontrary effect. For attention was so completely absorbed by the aimthat no consideration remained over for the means of attaining it. A fewconcrete examples will bring this home to the reader. The followingnarratives emanate from an eminent Russian, who is devoted to theAllies. 

There were scores of thousands of Russian troops in France. Most of themfought valiantly, others half-heartedly, and a few refused to fight atall. But instead of making distinctions the French authorities, moved bythe instinct of self-preservation, and preferring prevention to cure, tarred them all with the same brush. "Give a dog a bad name and hanghim, " says the proverb, and it was exemplified in the case of theRussians, who soon came to be regarded as a _tertium quid_ betweenenemies of public order and suspicious neutrals. They were profoundlymistrusted. Their officers were deprived of their authority over theirown men and placed under the command of excellent French officers, whocannot be blamed for not understanding the temper of the Slavs nor forrubbing them against the grain. The privates, seeing their superiorsvirtually degraded, concluded that they had forfeited their claim torespect, and treated them accordingly. That gave the death-blow todiscipline. The officers, most of whom were devoted heart and soul tothe cause of the Allies, with which they had fondly identified theirown, lost heart. After various attempts to get themselves reinstated, their feelings toward the nation, which was nowise to blame for theexcessive zeal of its public servants, underwent a radical change. Blazing indignation consumed whatever affection they had originallynurtured for the French, and in many cases also for the other Allies, and they went home to communicate their animus to their countrymen. Thesoldiers, who now began to be taunted and vilipended as Boches, threwall discipline to the winds and, feeling every hand raised against them, resolved to raise their hands against every man. These were thebeginnings of the process of "bolshevization. "

This anti-Russian spirit grew intenser as time lapsed. Thousands ofRussian soldiers were sent out to work for private employers, not by theWar Ministry, but by the Ministry of Agriculture, under whom they wereplaced. They were fed and paid a wage which under normal circumstancesshould have contented them, for it was more than they used to receive inpre-war days in their own country. But the circumstances were notnormal. Side by side with them worked Frenchmen, many of whom wereunable physically to compete with the sturdy peasants from Perm andVyatka. And when propagandists pointed out to them that the Frenchworker was paid 100 per cent. More, they brooded over the inequality andlabeled it as they were told. For overwork, too, the rate of pay wasstill more unequal. One result of this differential treatment was theestrangement of the two races as represented by the two classes ofworkmen, and the growth of mutual dislike. But there was another. Whenthey learned, as they did in time, that the employer was selling theproduce of their labor at a profit of 400 and 500 per cent. , they had nohesitation about repeating the formulas suggested to them by socialistpropagandists: "We are working for bloodsuckers. The bourgeois must beexterminated. " In this way bitterness against the Allies and hatred ofthe capitalists were inculcated in tens of thousands of Russians who afew months before were honest, simple-minded peasants andwell-disciplined soldiers. Many of these men, when they returned totheir country, joined the Red Guards of Bolshevism with spontaneousardor. They needed no pressing. 

There was one young officer of the Guards, in particular, named G----, who belonged to a very good family and was an exceptionally culturedgentleman. Music was his recreation, and he was a virtuoso on theviolin. In the war he had distinguished himself first on the Russianfront and then on the French. He had given of his best, for he wasgrievously wounded, had his left hand paralyzed, and lost his power ofplaying the violin forever. He received a high decoration from theFrench government. For the English nation he professed and displayedgreat affection, and in particular he revered King George, perhapsbecause of his physical resemblance to the Tsar. And when King Georgewas to visit Paris he rejoiced exceedingly at the prospect of seeinghim. Orders were issued for the troops to come out and line theprincipal routes along which the monarch would pass. The Frenchnaturally had the best places, but the Place de l'Étoile was reservedfor the Allied forces. G----, delighted, went to his superior officerand inquired where the Russians were to stand. The general did not know, but promised to ascertain. Accordingly he put the question to the Frenchcommander, who replied: "Russian troops? There is no place for anyRussian troops. " With tears in his eyes G---- recounted this episode, adding: "We, who fought and bled, and lost our lives or were crippled, had to swallow this humiliation, while Poles and Czechoslovaks, who hadonly just arrived from America in their brand-new uniforms, and hadnever been under fire, had places allotted to them in the pageant. Isthat fair to the troops without whose exploits there would have been noPolish or Czechoslovak officers, no French victory, no triumphal entryof King George V into Paris?"

FOOTNOTE:

[287] It is right to say that during the summer months a considerablesection of the anti-Bolshevists modified their view of Britain's policy, and expressed gratitude for the aid bestowed on Kolchak, Denikin, andYudenitch, without which their armies would have collapsed. 

XIII

SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY

From the opening of the Conference fundamental differences sprang upwhich split the delegates into two main parties, of which one wassolicitous mainly about the resettlement of the world and its futuremainstay, the League of Nations, and the other about the furtherance ofnational interests, which, it maintained, was equally indispensable toan enduring peace. The latter were ready to welcome the League oncondition that it was utilized in the service of their nationalpurposes, but not if it countered them. To bridge the chasm between thetwo was the task to which President Wilson courageously set his hand. Unluckily, by way of qualifying for the experiment, he receded from hisown strong position, and having cut his moorings from one shove, failedto reach the other. His pristine idea was worthy of a world-leader; had, in fact, been entertained and advocated by some of the foremost spiritsof modern times. He purposed bringing about conditions under which thepacific progress of the world might be safeguarded in a very largemeasure and for an indefinite time. But being very imperfectlyacquainted with the concrete conditions of European and Asiaticpeoples--he had never before felt the pulsation of internationallife--his ideas about the ways and means were hazy, and his calculationsbore no real reference to the elements of the problem. Consequently, with what seemed a wide horizon and a generous ambition, his grasp wasneither firm nor comprehensive enough for such a revolutionaryundertaking. In no case could he make headway without the voluntaryco-operation of the nations themselves, who in their own best interestsmight have submitted to heavy sacrifices, to which their leaders, whomhe treated as true exponents of their will, refused their consent. Buthe scouted the notion of a world-parliament. Whenever, therefore, contemplating a particular issue, not as an independent question initself, but as an integral part of a larger problem, he made asuggestion seemingly tending toward the ultimate goal, his motionencountered resolute opposition in the face of which he frequentlyretreated. 

At the outset, on which so much depended, the peoples as distinguishedfrom the governments appeared to be in general sympathy with hisprincipal aim, and it seemed at the time that if appealed to on a clearissue they would have given him their whole-hearted support, providedalways that, true to his own principles, he pressed these to the fullestextent and admitted no such invidious distinctions as privileged andunprivileged nations. This belief was confirmed by what I heard from menof mark, leaders of the labor people, and three Prime Ministers. Theyassured me that such an appeal would have evoked an enthusiasticresponse in their respective countries. Convinced that the principleslaid down by the President during the last phases of the war would gofar to meet the exigencies of the conjuncture, I ventured to write onone of the occasions, when neither party would yield to the other: "Thevery least that Mr. Wilson might now do, if the deadlock continues, isto publish to the world the desirable objects which the United Statesare disinterestedly, if not always wisely, striving for, and leave thejudgment to the peoples concerned. "[288]

But he recoiled from the venture. Perhaps it was already too late. Inthe judgment of many, his assent to the suppression of the problem ofthe freedom of the seas, however unavoidable as a tactical expedient, knelled the political world back to the unregenerate days of strategicalfrontiers, secret alliances, military preparations, financial burdens, and the balance of power. On that day, his grasp on the banner relaxing, it fell, to be raised, it may be, at some future time by the peopleswhom he had aspired to lead. The contests which he waged after thatfirst defeat had little prospect of success, and soon the pith andmarrow of the issue completely disappeared. The utmost he could stillhope for was a paper covenant--- which is a different thing from agenuine accord--to take home with him to Washington. And this hiscolleagues did not grudge him. They were operating with a different castof mind upon a wholly different set of ideas. Their aims, which theypursued with no less energy and with greater perseverance than Mr. Wilson displayed, were national. Some of them implicitly took the groundthat Germany, having plunged the world in war, would persistindefinitely in her nefarious machinations, and must, therefore, in theinterests of general peace, be crippled militarily, financially, economically, and politically, for as long a time as possible, while herpotential enemies must for the same reason be strengthened to the utmostat her expense, and that this condition of things must be upheld throughthe beneficent instrumentality of the League of Nations. 

On these conflicting issues ceaseless contention went on from the start, yet for lack of a strong personality of sound, over-ruling judgment thecontest dragged on without result. For months the demon ofprocrastination seemed to have possessed the souls of the principaldelegates, and frustrated their professed intentions to get through thework expeditiously. Even unforeseen incidents led to dangerous delay. Every passing episode became a ground for postponing the vital issue, although each day lost increased the difficulties of achieving theprincipal object, which was the conclusion of peace. For example, thecommittee dealing with the question of reparations would reach adecision, say, that Germany must pay a certain sum, which would entail acentury of strenuous effort, accompanied with stringent thrift andself-denial; while the Economic Committee decided that her supply of rawmaterial should be restricted within such narrow limits as to put suchpayment wholly out of her power. And this difference of viewnecessitated a postponement of the whole issue. Mr. Hughes, the Premierof Australia, commenting on this shilly-shallying, said with truth:[289]"The minds of the people are grievously perturbed. The long delay, coupled with fears lest that the Peace Treaty, when it does come, shouldprove to be a peace unworthy, unsatisfactory, unenduring, has made thehearts of the people sick. We were told that the Peace Treaty would beready in the coming week, but we look round and see half a world engagedin war, or preparation for war. Bolshevism is spreading with therapidity of a prairie fire. The Allies have been forced to retreat fromsome of the most fertile parts of southern Russia, and Allied troops, mostly British, at Murmansk and Archangel are in grave danger ofdestruction. Yet we were told that peace was at hand, and that the worldwas safe for liberty and democracy. It is not fine phrases about peace, liberty, and making the world safe for democracy that the world wants, but deeds. The peoples of the Allied countries justifiably desire to bereassured by plain, comprehensible statements, instead oflong-drawn-out negotiations and the thick veil of secrecy in whichthese were shrouded. "

It requires an effort to believe that procrastination was raised to thelevel of a theory by men whose experience of political affairs wasregarded as a guarantee of the soundness of their judgment. Yet it is anincontrovertible fact that dilatory tactics were seriously suggested asa policy at the Conference. It was maintained that, far from runningrisks by postponing a settlement, the Entente nations were, on thecontrary, certain to find the ground better prepared the longer the dayof reckoning was put off. Germany, they contended, had recoveredtemporarily from the Bolshevik fever, but the improvement was fleeting. The process of decomposition was becoming intenser day by day, althoughthe symptoms were not always manifest. Lack of industrial production, offoreign trade and sound finances, was gnawing at the vitals of theTeuton Republic. The army of unemployed and discontented was swelling. Soon the sinister consequences of this stagnation would take the form ofrebellions and revolts, followed by disintegration. And this conjunctionwould be the opportunity of the Entente Powers, who could then step in, present their bills, impose their restrictions, and knead the Teutondough into any shape they relished. Then it would be feasible toprohibit the Austrian-Germans from ever entering the Republic as afederated state. In a word, the Allied governments need only command, and the Teutons would hasten to obey. It is hardly credible that men ofexperience in foreign politics should build upon such insecurefoundations as these. It is but fair to say the Conference rejected thissingular program in theory while unintentionally carrying it out. 

Although everybody admitted that the liquidation of the world conflictfollowed by a return to normal conditions was the one thing that pressedfor settlement, so intent were the plenipotentiaries on preventing warsamong unborn generations that they continued to overlook the pressingneeds of their contemporaries. It is at the beginning and end of anenterprise that the danger of failure is greatest, and it was theopening moves of the Allies that proved baleful to their subsequentundertakings. Germany, one would think, might have been deprivedsummarily of everything which was to be ultimately and justly taken fromher, irrespective of its final destination. The first and most importantoperation being the severance of the provinces allotted to otherpeoples, their redistribution might safely have been left untilafterward. And hardly less important was the despatch of an army toeastern Europe. Then Germany, broken in spirit, with Allied troops onboth her fronts, between the two jaws of a vise, could not have said nayto the conditions. But this method presupposed a plan which unluckilydid not exist. It assumed that the peace terms had been carefullyconsidered in advance, whereas the Allies prepared for war duringhostilities, and for peace during the negotiations. And they went aboutthis in a leisurely, lackadaisical way, whereas expedition was the keyto success. 

As for a durable peace, involving general disarmament, it should havebeen outlined in a comprehensive program, which the delegates had notdrawn up, and it would have become feasible only if the will to pursueit proceeded from principle, not from circumstances. In no case could itbe accomplished without the knowledge and co-operation of the peoplesthemselves, nor within the time-limits fixed for the work of theConference. For the abolition of war and the creation of a new ordering, like human progress, is a long process. It admits of a variety ofbeginnings, but one can never be sure of the end, seeing that itpresupposes a radical change in the temper of the peoples, one mightalmost say a remodeling of human nature. It can only be the effect of avariety of causes, mainly moral, operating over a long period of time. Peace with Germany was a matter for the governments concerned; theelimination of war could only be accomplished by the peoples. The onewas in the main a political problem, the other social, economical, andethical. 

Mr. Balfour asserted optimistically[290] that the work of concludingpeace with Germany was a very simple matter. None the less it took theConference over five months to arrange it. So desperately slow was theprogress of the Supreme Council that on the 213th day of the PeaceConference, [291] two months after the Germans had signed the conditions, not one additional treaty had been concluded, nay, none was even readyfor signature. The Italian plenipotentiary, Signor Tittoni, thereuponaddressed his colleagues frankly on the subject and asked them whetherthey were not neglecting their primary duty, which was to concludetreaties with the various enemies who had ceased to fight in November ofthe previous year and were already waiting for over nine months toresume normal life, and whether the delegates were justified in seekingto discharge the functions of a supreme board for the government of allEurope. He pointed out that nobody could hope to profit by the state ofdisorder and paralysis for which this procrastination was answerable, the economic effects making themselves felt sooner or later in everycountry. He added that the cost of the war had been calculated for everymonth, every week, every day, and that the total impressed every oneprofoundly; but that nobody had thought it worth his while to count upthe atrocious cost of this incredibly slow peace and of the waste ofwealth caused every week and month that it dragged on. Italy, helamented, felt this loss more keenly than her partners because her peacehad not yet been concluded. He felt moved, therefore, he said, to tellthem that the business of governing Europe to which the Conference hadbeen attending all those months was not precisely the work for which itwas convoked. [292]

This sharp and timely admonition was the preamble of a motion. TheConference was just then about to separate for a "well-earned holiday, "during which its members might renew their spent energies and return inOctober to resume their labors, the peoples in the meanwhile bearing thecost in blood and substance. The Italian delegate objected to any suchbreak and adjured them to remain at their posts. Why, he asked, shouldill-starred Italy, which had already sustained so many and such painfullosses, be condemned to sacrifice further enormous sums in order thatthe delegates who had been frittering away their time tacklingirrelevant issues, and endeavoring to rule all Europe, might have arest? Why should they interrupt the sessions before making peace withAustria, with Hungary, with Bulgaria, with Turkey, and enabling Italy toreturn to normal life? Why should time and opportunity be given to theTurks and Kurds for the massacre of Armenian men, women, and children?This candid reminder is said to have had a sobering effect on theversatile delegates yearning for a holiday. The situation that evoked itwill arouse the passing wonder of level-headed men. 

It is worth recording that such was the atmosphere of suspicion amongthe delegates that the motives for this holiday were believed by some tobe less the need of repose than an unavowable desire to give time tothe Hapsburgs to recover the Crown of St. Stephen as the first steptoward seizing that of Austria. [293] The Austrians desired exemptionfrom the obligation to make reparations and pay crushing taxes, and oneof the delegates, with a leaning for that country, was not averse to theidea. As the states that arose on the ruins of the Hapsburg monarchywere not considered enemies by the Conference, it was suggested thatAustria herself should enjoy the same distinction. But the Italianplenipotentiaries objected and Signor Tittoni asked, "Will it perhaps beasserted that there was no enemy against whom we Italians fought forthree years and a half, losing half a million slain and incurring a debtof eighty thousand millions?"

A French journal, touching on this Austrian problem, wrote:[294]"Austria-Hungary has been killed and now France is striving to raise itto life again. But Italy is furiously opposed to everything that mightlead to an understanding among the new states formed out of the oldpossessions of the Hapsburgs. That, in fact, is why our transalpineallies were so favorable to the union of Austria with Germany. France onher side, whose one overruling thought is to reduce her vanquished enemyto the most complete impotence, France who is afraid of being afraid, will not tolerate an Austria joined to the German Federation. " Here theprinciple of self-determination went for nothing. 

Before the Conference had sat for a month it was angrily assailed by thepeoples who had hoped so much from its love of justice--Egyptians, Koreans, Irishmen from Ireland and from America, Albanians, Frenchmenfrom Mauritius and Syria, Moslems from Aderbeidjan, Persians, Tartars, Kirghizes, and a host of others, who have been aptly likened to the haltand maimed among the nations waiting round the diplomatic Pool of Siloamfor the miracle of the moving of the waters that never came. [295]

These peoples had heard that a great and potent world-reformer hadarisen whose mission it was to redress secular grievances and conferliberty upon oppressed nations, tribes, and tongues, and they sent theirenvoys to plead before him. And these wandered about the streets ofParis seeking the intercession of delegates, Ministers, and journalistswho might obtain for them admission to the presence of the new Messiahor his apostles. But all doors were closed to them. One of thepetitioners whose language was vernacular English, as he was about toshake the dust of Paris from his boots, quoting Sydney Smith, remarked:"They, too, are Pharisees. They would do the Good Samaritan, but withoutthe oil and twopence. How has it come to pass that the Jews without anofficial delegate commanded the support--the militant support--of theSupreme Council, which did not hesitate to tyrannize eastern Europe fortheir sake?"

Involuntarily the student of politics called to mind the report writtento Baron Hager[296] by one of his secret agents during the Congress ofVienna: "Public opinion continues to be unfavorable to the Congress. Onall sides one hears it said that there is no harmony, that they are nolonger solicitous about the re-establishment of order and justice, butare bent only on forcing one another's hands, each one grabbing as muchas he can. . . . It is said that the Congress will end because it must, butthat it will leave things more entangled than it found them. . . . Thepeoples, who in consequence of the success, the sincerity, and thenoble-mindedness of this superb coalition had conceived such esteem fortheir leaders and such attachment to them, and now perceive how theyhave forgotten what they solemnly promised--justice, order, peacefounded on the equilibrium and legitimacy of their possessions--will endby losing their affection and withdrawing their confidence in theirprinciples and their promises. "

Those words, written a hundred and five years ago, might have beenpenned any day since the month of February, 1919. 

The leading motive of the policy pursued by the Supreme Council andembodied in the Treaty was aptly described at the time as the systematicprotection of France against Germany. Hence the creation of the powerfulbarrier states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Greater Rumania, andGreater Greece. French nationalists pleaded for further precautions morecomprehensive still. Their contention was that France's economic, strategic, financial, and territorial welfare being the cornerstone ofthe future European edifice, every measure proposed at the Conference, whether national or general, should be considered and shaped inaccordance with that, and consequently that no possibility should beaccorded to Germany of rising again to a commanding position because, ifshe once recovered her ascendancy in any domain whatsoever, Europe wouldinevitably be thrust anew into the horrors of war. Territorially, therefore, the dismemberment of Germany was obligatory; the annexationof the Saar Valley, together with its six hundred thousand Teutoninhabitants, was necessary to France, and either the annexation of theleft bank of the Rhine or its transformation into a detached state to beoccupied and administered by the French until Germany pays the lastfarthing of the indemnity. Further, Austria must be deprived of theright of determining her own mode of existence and constrained toabandon the idea of becoming one of the federated states of the GermanRepublic, and, if possible, northern Germany should be kept entirelyseparate from southern. The Allies should divide the Teutons in order tosway them. All Germany's other frontiers should be delimitated in a likespirit. And at the same time the work of knitting together the peoplesand nations of Europe and forming them into a friendly sodality was togo forward without interruption. 

"How to promote our interests in the Rhineland, " wrote M. MauriceBarrès, [297] "is a life-and-death question for us. We are going to carryto the Rhine our military and, I hope, our economic frontier. The restwill follow in its own good time. The future will not fail to secure forus the acquiescence of the population of the Rhineland, who will livefreely under the protection of our arms, their faces turned towardParis. "

Financially it was proposed that the Teutons should be forced toindemnify France, Belgium, and the other countries for all the damagethey had inflicted upon them; to pay the entire cost of the war, as wellas the pensions to widows, orphans, and the mutilated. And the militaryoccupation of their country should be maintained until this huge debt iswholly wiped out. 

A Nationalist organ, [298] in a leading article, stated with brevity andclearness the prevailing view of Germany's obligations. Here is acharacteristic passage: "She is rich, has reserves derived from manyyears of former prosperity; she can work to produce and repair all theevil she has done, rebuild all the ruins she has accumulated, andrestore all the fortunes she has destroyed, however irksome the burden. "After analyzing Doctor Helfferich's report published six years ago, thearticle concluded, "Germany must pay; she disposes of the means becauseshe is rich; if she refuses we must compel her without hesitation andwithout ruth. "

As France, whose cities and towns and very soil were ruined, could notbe asked to restore these places at her own expense and tax herselfdrastically like her allies, the Americans and British, the prior andprivileged right to receive payment on her share of the indemnity shouldmanifestly appertain to her. Her allies and associates should, it wasargued, accordingly waive their money claims until hers were satisfiedin full. Moreover, as France's future expenditure on her army ofoccupation, on the administration of her colonies and of the annexedterritories, must necessarily absorb huge sums for years to come, whichher citizens feel they ought not to be asked to contribute, and as herinternal debt was already overwhelming, it is only meet and just thather wealthier partners should pool their war debts with hers and sharetheir financial resources with her and all their other allies. This, itwas argued, was an obvious corollary of the war alliance. Economically, too, the Germans, while permitted to resume their industrial occupationson a sufficiently large scale to enable them to earn the wherewithal tolive and discharge their financial obligations, should be denied freescope to outstrip France, whose material prosperity is admittedlyessential to the maintenance of general peace and the permanence of thenew ordering. In this condition, it is further contended, our chivalrousally was entitled to special consideration because of her lowbirth-rate, which is one of the mainsprings of her difficulties. Thismay permanently keep her population from rising above the level of fortymillion, whereas Germany, by the middle of the century, will havereached the formidable total of eighty million, so that competitionbetween them would not be on a footing of equality. Hence the chancesshould be evenly balanced by the action of the Conference, to becontinued by the League. Discriminating treatment was therefore anecessity. And it should be so introduced that France should be free tomaintain a protective tariff, of which she had sore need for her foreigntrade, without causing umbrage to her allies. For they could not gainsaythat her position deserved special treatment. 

Some of the Anglo-Saxon delegates took other ground, feeling unable tocountenance the postulate underlying those demands, namely, that theTeuton race was to be forever anathema. They looked far enough ahead tomake due allowance for a future when conditions in Europe will be verydifferent from what they are to-day. The German race, they felt, beingnumerous and virile, will not die out and cannot be suppressed. And asit is also enterprising and resourceful it would be a mistake to renderit permanently hostile by the Allies overstepping the bounds of justice, because in this case neither national nor general interests would befurthered. You may hinder Germany, they argued, from acquiring thehegemony of the world, but not from becoming the principal factor inEuropean evolution. If thirty years hence the German population totalseighty million or more, will not their attitude and their sentimenttoward their neighbors constitute an all-important element of Europeantranquillity and will not the trend of these be to a large extent theoutcome of the Allies' policy of to-day? The present, therefore, is thetime for the delegates to deprive that sentiment of its venomous, anti-Allied sting, not by renouncing any of their countries' rights, butby respecting those of others. 

That was the reasoning of those who believed that national strivingshould be subordinated to the general good, and that the present timeand its aspirations should be considered in strict relation to thefuture of the whole community of nations. They further contended thatwhile Germany deserved to suffer condignly for the heinous crimes ofunchaining the war and waging it ruthlessly, as many of her own peopleconfessed, she should not be wholly crippled or enthralled in the hopethat she would be rendered thereby impotent forever. Such hope was vain. With her waxing strength her desire of vengeance would grow, andtogether with it the means of wreaking it. She might yet knead Russiainto such a shape as would make that Slav people a serviceableinstrument of revenge, and her endeavors might conceivably extendfarther than Russia. The one-sided resettlement of Europe charged withexplosives of such incalculable force would frustrate the most elaborateattempts to create not only a real league of nations, but even such arough approximation toward one as might in time and under favorablecircumstances develop into a trustworthy war preventive. They concludedthat a league of nations would be worse than useless if transformed intoa weapon to be wielded by one group of nations against another, or as anartificial makeshift for dispensing peoples from the observance ofnatural laws. 

At the same time all the governments of the Allies were sincere andunanimous in their desire to do everything possible to show theirappreciation of France's heroism, to recognize the vastness of hersacrifices, and to pay their debt of gratitude for her services tohumanity. All were actuated by a resolve to contribute in the measure ofthe possible to compensate her for such losses as were still reparableand to safeguard her against the recurrence of the ordeal from which shehad escaped terribly scathed. The only limits they admitted to thiswork of reparation were furnished by the aim itself and by the means ofattaining it. Thus Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd George held that toincorporate in renovated France millions or even hundreds of thousandsof Germans would be to introduce into the political organism the germsof fell disease, and on this ground they firmly refused to sanction theRhine frontier, which the French were thus obliged to relinquish. TheFrench delegates themselves admitted that if granted it could not beheld without a powerful body of international troops ever at the beckand call of the Republic, vigilantly keeping watch and ward on the banksof the Rhine and with no reasonable prospect of a term to thisservitude. For the real ground of this dependence upon foreign forces isthe disproportion between the populations of Germany and France andbetween the resources of the two nations. The ratio of the former is atpresent about six to four and it is growing perceptibly toward seven tofour. The organizing capacity in commerce and industry is said to beeven greater. If, therefore, France cannot stand alone to-day, stillless could she stand alone in ten or fifteen years, and the necessity ofprotecting her against aggression, assuming that the German people doesnot become reconciled to its status of forced inferiority, would be moreurgent and less practicable with the lapse of time. For, as we saw, itis largely a question of the birth-rate. And as neither the British northe American people, deeply though they are attached to their gallantcomrades in arms, would consent to this arrangement, which to them wouldbe a burden and to the Germans a standing provocation, theirrepresentatives were forced to the conclusion that it would be theheight of folly to do aught that would give the Teutons a convenienthandle for a war of revenge. Let there be no annexation of territory, they said, no incorporation of unwilling German citizens. The Americansfurther argued that an indefinite occupation of German territory by alarge body of international troops would be a direct encouragement tomilitarism. 

The indemnities for which the French yearned, and on which theirresponsible financiers counted, were large. The figures employed wereastronomical. Hundreds of milliards of francs were operated with byeminent publicists in an offhand manner that astonished the survivor ofthe expiring budgetary epoch and rejoiced the hearts of the Westerntaxpayers. For it was not only journalists who wrote as though a streamof wealth were to be turned into these countries to fertilize industryand commerce there and enable them to keep well ahead of their pushingcompetitors. Responsible Ministers likewise hall-marked these forecastswith their approval. Before the fortune of war had decided for theAllies, the finances of France had sorely embarrassed the Minister, M. Klotz, of whom his chief, M. Clemenceau, is reported to have said: "Heis the only Israelite I have ever known who is out of his element whendealing with money matters. " Before the armistice, M. Klotz, whentalking of the complex problem and sketching the outlook, exclaimed: "Ifwe win the war, I undertake to make both ends meet, far though they nowseem apart. For I will make the Germans pay the entire cost of the war. "After the armistice he repeated his promise and undertook not to levyfresh taxation. 

Thus, despite fitful gleams of idealism, the atmosphere of the ParisConclave grew heavy with interests, passions, and ambitions. Only peoplein blinkers could miss the fact that the elastic formulas launched andinterpreted by President Wilson were being stretched to thesnapping-point so as to cover two mutually incompatible policies. Thechasm between his original prospects and those of his foreign associatesthey both conscientiously endeavored to ignore, and after a time theyhit upon a _tertium quid_ between territorial equilibrium and asterilized league tempered by the Monroe Doctrine and a militarycompact. This composite resultant carried with it the concentrated evilsof one of these systems and was deprived of its redeeming features bythe other. At a conjuncture in the world's affairs which postulatedinternationalism of the loftiest kind, the delegates increased andmultiplied nations and states which they deprived of sovereignty andyoked to the first-class races. National ambitions took precedence oflarger interests; racial hatred was raised to its highest power. In aword, the world's state system was so oddly pieced together that onlyeconomic exhaustion followed by a speedy return to militarism couldinsure for it a moderate duration. 

Territorial self-sufficiency, military strength, and advantageousalliances were accordingly looked to as the mainstays of the newordering, even by those who paid lip tribute to the Wilsonian ideal. Theideal itself underwent a disfiguring change in the process ofincarnation. The Italians asked how the Monroe Doctrine could bereconciled with the charter of the League of Nations, seeing that theLeague would be authorized to intervene in the domestic affairs of othermember-states, and if necessary to despatch troops to keep Germany, Italy, and Poland in order; whereas if the United States were guilty oftyrannical aggression against Brazil, the Argentine Republic, or Mexico, the League, paralyzed by that Doctrine, must look on inactive. TheGermans, alleging capital defects in the Wilsonian Covenant, which wasadjusted primarily to the Allies' designs, went to Paris prepared with asubstitute which, it must in fairness be admitted, was considerablysuperior to that of their adversaries, and incidentally fraught withgreater promise to themselves. 

It is superfluous to add that the continental view prevailed, but Mr. Wilson imagined that, while abandoning his principles in favor ofBritain, France, and Bulgaria, he could readjust the balance by applyingthem with rigor to Italy and exaggerating them when dealing with Greece. He afterward communicated his reasons for this belief in a messagepublished in Washington. [299] The alliance--he was understood to havebeen opposed to all partial alliances on principle--which guaranteesmilitary succor to France, he had signed, he said, in gratitude to thatcountry, for he seriously doubted whether the American Republic couldhave won its freedom against Britain's opposition without the gallantand friendly aid of France. "We recently had the privilege of assistingin driving enemies, who also were enemies of the world, from her soil, but that does not pay our debt to her. Nothing can pay such a debt. " Hiscritics retorted that that is a sentimental reason which might withequal force have been urged by France and Britain in justification oftheir promises to Italy and Rumania, yet was rejected as irrelevant byMr. Wilson in the name of a higher principle. 

The President of the United States, it was further urged, is ahistorian, and history tells him that the help given to his countryagainst England neither came from the French people nor was actuated bysympathy for the American cause. It was the vindictive act of one ofthose kings whose functions Mr. Wilson is endeavoring to abolish. Themonarch who helped the Americans was merely utilizing a favorableopportunity for depriving with a minimum of effort his adversary oflucrative possessions. Moreover, the debt which nothing can pay wasalready due when in the years 1914-16 France was in imminent danger ofbeing crushed by a ruthless enemy. But at that time Mr. Wilson owed hisre-election largely to his refusal to extricate her from that peril. Instead of calling to mind the debt that can never be repaid he merelyannounced that he could not understand what the belligerents werefighting for and that in any case France's grateful debtor was too proudto fight. The motive which finally brought the United States into theWorld War may be the noblest that ever yet actuated any state, but nostudent of history will allow that Mr. Wilson has correctly describedit. 

The fact is that the French delegates and their supporters wereconsistent and, except in their demand for the Rhine frontier, unbending. They drew up a program and saw that it was substantiallycarried out. They declared themselves quite ready to accept Mr. Wilson'sproject, but only on condition that their own was also realized, heedless of the incompatibility of the two. And Mr. Wilson feltconstrained to make their position his own, otherwise he could not haveobtained the Covenant he yearned for. And yet he must have known thatacquiescence in the demands put forward by M. Clemenceau would lower thepractical value of his Covenant to that of a sheet of paper. 

A blunt American journal, commenting on the handiwork of the Conference, gave utterance to views which while making no pretense to courtlyphraseology are symptomatic of the way in which the average man thoughtand spoke of the Covenant which emanated from the Supreme Council. "Weare convinced, " it said, "that the elder statesmen of Europe, typifiedby Clemenceau, consider it a hoax. Clemenceau never before was soextremely bored by anything in his life as he was by the necessity ofmaking a pious pretense in the Covenant when what he wanted was theassurance of the Triple Alliance. He got that assurance, which, alongwith the French watch on the Rhine, the French in the Saar Valley andin Africa, with German money going into French coffers, makes himtolerably indulgent of the altruistic rhetoricians. 

"The English, the intelligent English, we know have their tongues intheir cheeks. The Italians are petulant imperialists, and Japan doesn'tcare what happens to the League so long as Japan says what shall happenin Asia. "[300]

Peace was at last signed, not on the basis of the Fourteen Points noryet entirely on the lines of territorial equilibrium, but on those of acompromise which, missing the advantages of each, combined many of theevils of both and of others which were generated by their conjunction, and laid the foundations of the new state fabric on quick-sands. Thatwas at bottom the view to which Italy, Rumania, and Greece gaveutterance when complaining that their claims were being dealt with onthe principle of self-denial, whereas those of France had been settledon the traditional basis of territorial guaranties and militaryalliances. Further, the Treaty failed to lay an ax to the roots of war, did, in fact, increase their number while purporting to destroy them. Far from that: germs of future conflicts not only between the latebelligerents, but also between the recent Allies, were plentifullyscattered and may sprout up in the fullness of time. 

The Paris press expressed its satisfaction with France's share of thefruits of victory. For the provisions of the Treaty went as far as anymerely political arrangement could go to check the natural inequality, numerical, economical, industrial, and financial, between the Teuton andFrench peoples. To many this problem seemed wholly insoluble, becauseits solution involved a suspension or a corrective of a law of nature. Take the birth-rate in France, for example. Before the war it had longbeen declining at a rate which alarmed thoughtful French patriots. And, according to official statistics, it is falling off still more rapidlyto-day, whereas the increase in other countries is greater than everbefore. [301] Thus, whereas in the year 1911 there were 73, 599 births inthe Seine Department, there were only 47, 480 in 1918. Wet nurses, too, are disappearing. Of these, in the year 1911, in the same territorythere were 1, 363, but in 1918 only 65. The mortality among foundlingsrose from 5 per cent. Before the war to 40 per cent. In the year1918. [302] M. Bertillon calculates that for France to increase merely atthe same rate as other nations--not to recover the place among themwhich she has already lost, but only to keep her present one--she needsfive hundred thousand more births than are registered at present. Astatistical table which he drew up of the birth-rate of four Europeannations during five decades, beginning with the year 1861, is unpleasantreading[303] for the friends of that heroic and artistic people. France, containing in round numbers 40, 000, 000 inhabitants, ought to increaseannually by 500, 000. Before the war the total number of births inGermany was computed at one million nine hundred and fifty thousand, buthardly more than one million of the children born were viable. [304] Thegeneral conclusion to be drawn from these figures and from thecircumstances that the falling off in the French population still goeson unchecked, is disquieting for those who desire to see the Frenchrace continue to play the leading part in continental Europe. One of theshrewdest observers in contemporary Germany--himself a distinguishedSemite--commented on this decisive fact as follows:[305] "Within tenyears Germany will contain seventy million inhabitants, and in thetorrent of her fecundity will drown anemic and exhausted France. . . . TheFrench nation is dying of exhaustion. There is no reason, however, forthe world to get alarmed . . . For before the French will have vanishedfrom the earth, other races, virile and healthy, will have come to theircountry to take their place. " That is what is actually happening, and itis impressively borne in upon the visitor to various French cities bythe vast number of exotic names over houses of business and in otherways. 

With this formidable obstacle, then, the three members of the SupremeCouncil strenuously coped by exercising to the fullest extent the powerconferred on the victors over the vanquished. And the result of theircombinations challenged and received the unstinted approval of all thosenumerous enemies of Teutondom who believe the Germans to be incapable ofcontributing materially to human progress, unless they are kept inleading-strings by one of the superior races. The Treaty represents thepotential realization of France's dream, achieved semi-miraculously bythe very statesmen on whom the Teutons were relying to dispel it. Defeated, disarmed, incapable of military resistance, and devoid offriends, Germany thought she could discern her sheet-anchor of salvationin the Wilsonian gospel, and it was the preacher of this gospel himselfwho implicitly characterized her salvation as more difficult than thepassage of a camel through the eye of a needle. The crimes perpetratedby the Teutons were unquestionably heinous beyond words, and nopunishment permitted by the human conscience is too drastic to atone forthem. How long this punishment should endure, whether it should beinflicted on the entire people as well as on their leaders, and whatform should be given to it, were among the questions confronting theSecret Council, and they implicitly answered them in the way we haveseen. 

People who consider the answer adequate and justified give as theirreason that it presupposes and attains a single object--the efficaciousprotection of France as the sentinel of civilization against anincorrigible arch-enemy. And in this they may be right. But if youenlarge the problem till it covers the moral fellowship of nations, andif you postulate that as a safeguard of future peace and neighborlinessin the world, then the outcome of the Treaty takes on a differentcoloring. Between France and Germany it creates a sea of bitternesswhich no rapturous exultation over the new ethical ordering can sweeten. The latter nation is assumed to be smitten with a fell moral disease, towhich, however, the physicians of the Conference have applied no moralremedy, but only measures of coercion, mostly powerful irritants. Thereformed state of Europe is consequently a state of latent war betweentwo groups of nations, of which one is temporarily prostrate and bothare naïvely exhorted to join hands and play a helpful part in an idyllicsociety of nations. This expectation is the delight of cynics and thedespair of those serious reformers who are not interested politicians. Heretofore the most inveterate optimists in politics were therevolutionaries. But they have since been outdone by the Parisworld-reformers, who tempt Providence by calling on it to accomplish bya miracle an object which they have striven hard and successfully torender impossible by the ordinary operation of cause and effect. Thusthe Covenant mars the Treaty, and the Treaty the Covenant. 

In Weimar and Berlin the Treaty was termed the death-sentence ofGermany, not only as an empire, but as an independent politicalcommunity. Henceforward her economic efforts, beyond a certain limit, will be struck with barrenness, her industry will be hindered fromoutstripping or overtaking that of the neighboring countries, and herpopulation will be indirectly kept within definite bounds. For, insteadof exporting manufactures, she will be obliged to export human beings, whose intellect and skill will be utilized by such rivals of her ownrace as vouchsafe to admit them. Already before the Conference was overthey began to emigrate eastward. And those who remain at home will notbe masters in their own house, for the doors will be open to variousforeign commissions. 

The assumption upon which the Treaty-framers proceeded is that theabominations committed by the German military and civil authorities wereconstructively the work of the entire nation, for whose reformationwithin a measurable period hope is vain. This view predominated amongthe ruling classes of the Entente peoples with few exceptions. If it becorrect, it seems superfluous to constrain the enemy to enter the leagueof law-abiding nations, which is to be cemented only by voluntaryadherence and by genuine attachment to liberty, right, and justice. Hence the Covenant, by being inserted in the Peace Treaty, necessarilylost its value as an eirenicon, and became subsequent to thatinstrument, and seems likely to be used as an anti-German safeguard. Buteven then its efficacy is doubtful, and manifestly so; otherwise thereformers, who at the start set out to abolish alliances as recognizedcauses of war, would not have ended by setting up a new TripleAlliance, which involves military, naval, and aerial establishments, andthe corresponding financial burdens inseparable from these. An allianceof this character, whatever one may think of its economic and financialaspects, runs counter to the spirit of the Covenant, but was an obviouscorollary of the Allies' attitude as mirrored in the Treaty. And thespirit of the Treaty destroys the letter of the Covenant. For the worldis there implicitly divided into two camps--the friends and the enemiesof liberty, right, and justice; and the main functions of the League asnarrowed by the Treaty will be to hinder or defeat the machinations ofthe enemies. Moreover, the deliberate concessions made by the Conferenceto such agencies of the old ordering as the grouping of two or threePowers into defensive alliances bids fair to be extended in time. Forthe stress of circumstance is stronger than the will of man. At thisrate the last state may be worse than the first. 

The world situation, thus formally modified, remained essentiallyunchanged, and will so endure until other forces are released. TheLeague of Nations forfeited its ideal character under the pressure ofnational interests, and became a coalition of victors against thevanquished. By the insertion of the Covenant in the Treaty the formerbecame a means for the execution of the latter. For even Mr. Wilson, faced with realities and called to practical counsel, affectionatelydismissed the high-souled speculative projects in which he delightedduring his hours of contemplation. Although the German delegates signedthe Treaty, no one can honestly say that he expects them to observe itlonger than constraint presses, however solemn the obligations imposed. 

In the press organ of the most numerous and powerful political party inGermany one might read in an article on the Germans in Bohemia annexedby Czechoslovakia: "Assuredly their destiny will not be determined forall time by the Versailles peace of violence. It behooves the Germannation to cherish its affection for its oppressed brethren, even thoughit be powerless to succor them immediately. What then can it do? Italyhas given it a marvelous lesson in the policy of irredentism, which shepursued in respect of the Trentino and Trieste. "[306]

With the Treaty as it stands, nationalist France of this generation hasreason to be satisfied. One of its framers, himself a shrewd businessman and politician, publicly set forth the grounds for thissatisfaction. [307] Alsace and Lorraine reunited to the metropolis, heexplained, will assist France materially with an industrious populationand enormous resources in the shape of mineral wealth and a fruitfulsoil. Germany's former colonies, Kamerun and Togoland, are becomeFrench, and will doubtless offer a vast and attractive field for theexpansion and prosperity of the French population. Morocco, freed fromGerman enterprise, can henceforth be developed by the French populationalone and without let or hindrance, for the benefit of the natives andin the true sense of Mr. Wilson's humanitarian ordinances. The potashdeposits, to which German agriculture largely owed its prosperity, willhenceforward be utilized in the service of French agriculture. "In ironore the wealth of France is doubled, and her productive capacity asregards pig-iron and steel immensely increased. Her production oftextiles is greater than before the war by about a third. "[308] In aword, a vast area of the planet inhabited by various peoples will lookto the French people for everything that makes their collective lifeworth living. 

The sole arrangement which for a time caused heart-burnings in Francewas that respecting the sums of money which Germany should have beenmade to pay to her victorious enemies. For the opinions on that subjectheld by the average man, and connived at or approved by the authorities, were wholly fantastic, just as were some of the expectations of otherAllied states. The French people differ from their neighbors in manyrespects--and in a marked way in money matters. They will sacrificetheir lives rather than their substance. They will leave a national debtfor their children and their children's children, instead of making aresolute effort to wipe it out or lessen it by amortization. In thisrespect the British, the Americans, and also the Germans differ fromthem. These peoples tax themselves freely, create sinking funds, andmake heavy sacrifices to pay off their money obligations. This habit isingrained. The contrary system is become second nature to the French, and one cannot change a nation's habits overnight. The education of thepeople might, however, have been undertaken during the war withconsiderable chances of satisfactory results. The government might havepreached the necessity of relinquishing a percentage of the war gains tothe state. It was done in Britain and Germany. The amount of moneyearned by individuals during the hostilities was enormous. Aconsiderable percentage of it should have been requisitioned by thestate, in view of the peace requirements and of the huge indebtednesswhich victory or defeat must inevitably bring in its train. But noMinister had the courage necessary to brave the multitude and risk hisshare of popularity or tolerance. And so things were allowed to slide. The people were assured that victory would recompense their efforts, notonly by positive territorial gains, but by relieving them of their newfinancial obligations. 

That was a sinister mistake. The truth is that the French nation, ifdefeated, would have paid any sum demanded. That was almost an axiom. Itwould and could have expected no ruth. But, victorious, it looked to theenemy for the means of refunding the cost of the war. The FinanceMinister--M. Klotz--often declared to private individuals that if theAllies were victorious he would have all the new national debt wiped outby the enemy, and he assured the nation that milliards enough would beextracted from Germany to balance the credit and debit accounts of theRepublic. And the people naturally believed its professional expert. Thus it became a dogma that the Teuton state was to provide all the costof the war. In that illusion the nation lived and worked and spent moneyfreely, nay, wasted it woefully. 

And yet M. Klotz should have known better. For he was supplied withdefinite data to go upon. In October, 1918, the French government, indoubt about the full significance of that one of Mr. Wilson's FourteenPoints which dealt with reparations, asked officially for explanations, and received from Mr. Lansing the answer by telegraph that it involvedthe making good by the enemy of all losses inflicted directly andlawlessly upon civilians, but none other. That surely was a plain answerand a just principle. But, in accordance with the practice of secrecy invogue among Allied European governments, the nation was not informed ofthese restrictive conditions, but was allowed to hug dangerousdelusions. 

But the Ministers knew them, and M. Klotz was a Minister. Not only, however, did he not reveal what he knew, but he behaved as though hisinformation was of a directly contrary tenor, and he also stated thatGermany must also refund the war indemnities of 1870, capitalized downto November, 1918, and he set down the sum at fifty milliards offrancs. This procedure was not what reasonably might have been expectedfrom the leader of a heroic nation stout-hearted enough to faceunpleasant facts. Some of the leading spirits in the country, despitethe intensity of their feelings toward Germany, disapproved this kind ofbookkeeping, but M. Klotz did not relinquish his method of keepingaccounts. He drew up a bill against the Teutons for one thousand andeighty-six milliards of francs. 

The Germans at the Conference maintained that if the wealth of theirnation were realized and liquid, it would amount at most to four hundredmilliards, but that to realize it would involve the stripping of thepopulation of everything--of its forests, its mines, its railways, itsfactories, its cattle, its houses, its furniture, and its ready money. They further pleaded that the territorial clauses of the Treaty deprivedthem of important resources, which would reduce their solvency to agreater degree than the Allies realized. These clauses dispossessed thenation of 21 per cent. Of the total crops of cereals and potatoes. Afurther falling off in the quantities of food produced would result fromthe restrictions on the importation of raw materials for the manufactureof fertilizers. Of her coal, Germany was forfeiting about one-third;three-fourths of her iron ore was also being taken away from her; hertotal zinc production would be cut down by over three-fifths. Add tothis the enormous shortage of tonnage, machinery, and man-power, thetotal loss of her colonies, the shrinkage of available raw stuffs, andthe depreciation of the mark. 

At the Conference the Americans maintained their ground. Invoking theprinciple laid down by Mr. Wilson and clearly formulated by Mr. Lansing, they insisted that reparations should be claimed only for damage done tocivilians directly and lawlessly. After a good deal of fencing, rendered necessary by the pledges given by European statesmen to theirelectors, it was decided that the criteria provided by that principleshould be applied. But even with that limitation the sums claimed werehuge. It was alleged by the Germans that some of the demands were foramounts that exceeded the total national wealth of the country filingthe claim. And as no formula could be devised that would satisfy all theclaimants, it was resolved in principle that, although Germany should beobliged to make good only certain classes of losses, the Conferencewould set no limits to the sums for which she would thus be liable. 

At this juncture M. Loucheur suggested that a minimum sum should bedemanded of the enemy, leaving the details to be settled by acommission. And this was the solution which was finally adopted. [309] Itwas received with protests and lamentations, which, however, soon madeplace for self-congratulations, official and private. 

The French Minister of Finances, for example, drew a bright picture inthe Chamber of the financial side of the Treaty, so far as it affectedhis country: "Within two years, " he announced, "independently of therailway rolling stock, of agricultural materials and restitutions, wereceive a part, still to be fixed, of the payment of twenty milliards ofmarks in gold; another share, also to be determined, of an emission ofbonds amounting to forty milliard gold marks, bearing interest at therate of 2 per cent. ; a third part, to be fixed, of German shipping anddyes; seven million tons of coal annually for a period of ten years, followed by diminishing quantities during the following years; therepayment of the expenses of occupation; the right of taking over a partof Germany's interests in Russia, in particular that of obtaining thepayment of pre-war debts at the pre-war rate of exchange, likewise themaintenance of such contracts as we may desire to maintain in force andthe return of Alsace-Lorraine free from all incumbrances. Nor is thatall. In Morocco we have the right to liquidate German property, totransfer the shares that represent Germany's interests in the Bank ofMorocco, and finally the allotment under a French mandate of a portionof the German colonies free from incumbrances of any kind. . . . We shallreceive four hundred and sixty-three milliard francs, payable inthirty-six years, without counting the restitutions which will have beeneffected. Nor should it be forgotten that already we have received eightmilliards' worth of securities stolen from French bearers. So do notconsider the Treaty as a misfortune for France. "[310]

Soon after the outburst of joy with which the ingathering of the fruitsof France's victory was celebrated, clouds unexpectedly drifted athwartthe cerulean blue of the political horizon, and dark shadows were flungacross the Allied countries. The second-and third-class nations fell outwith the first-class Powers. Italy, for example, whose population isalmost equal to that of her French sister, demanded compensation for thevast additions that were being made to France's extensive possessions. The grounds alleged were many. Compensation had been promised by thesecret treaty. The need for it was reinforced by the rejection ofItaly's claims in the Adriatic. The Italian people required, desired, and deserved a fair and fitting field for legitimate expansion. They areas numerous as the French, and have a large annual surplus population, which has to hew wood and draw water for foreign peoples. They areenterprising, industrious, thrifty, and hard workers. Their countrylacks some of the necessaries of material prosperity, such as coal, iron, and cotton. Why should it not receive a territory rich in some ofthese products? Why should a large contingent of Italy's population haveto go to the colonies of Spain, France, and Britain or to South Americanrepublics for a livelihood? The Italian press asked whether the SupremeCouncil was bent on fulfilling the Gospel dictum, "Whosoever hath, tohim shall be given. . . . "

One of the first demands made by Italy was for the port and town ofDjibouti, which is under French sway. It was rejected, curtly andemphatically. Other requests elicited plausible explanations why theycould not be complied with. In a word, Italy was treated as a poor andimportunate relation, and was asked to console herself with thereflection that she was working in the vineyard of idealism. In vaineminent publicists in Rome, Turin, and Milan pleaded their country'scause. Adopting the principle which Mr. Wilson had applied to France andBritain, they affirmed that even before the war France, with a largerpopulation and fewer possessions, had shown that she was incapable ofdischarging the functions which she had voluntarily taken upon herself. Tunis, they alleged, owed its growth and thriving condition to Italianemigrants. With all the fresh additions to her territories, thepopulation of the Republic would be utterly inadequate to the task. Tothe Supreme Council this line of reasoning was distinctly unpalatable. Nor did the Italians further their cause when, by way of giving emphaticpoint to their reasoning, their press quoted that eminent Frenchman, M. D'Estournelles de Constant, who wrote at that very moment: "France hastoo many colonies already--far more in Asia, in Africa, in America, inOceania than she can fructify. In this way she is immobilizingterritories, continents, peoples, which nominally she takes over. And itis childish and imprudent to take barren possession of them, when otherstates allege their power to utilize them in the general interest. Byacting in this manner, France, do what she may, is placing herself inopposition to the world's interests, and to those of the League ofNations. In the long run it is a serious business. Spain, Portugal, andHolland know this to their cost. Do what she would, France was not ablebefore the war to utilize all her immense colonial domain . . . For lackof population. She will be still less able after the war. . . . "[311]

The discussion grew dangerously animated. Epigrams were coined and sentfloating in the heavily charged air. A tactless comparison was madebetween the French nation and a _bon vivant_ of sixty-five who flattershimself that he can enjoy life's pleasures on the same scale as when hewas only thirty. Little arrows thus barbed with biting acid often makemore enduring mischief than sledge-hammer blows. Soon the estrangementbetween the two sister nations unhappily became wider and led to markeddivergences in their respective policies, which seem fraught with graveconsequences in the future. 

The Italy of to-day is not the Italy of May, 1915. She now knows exactlywhere she stands. When she unsheathed her sword to fight against theallies of the state that declared a treaty to be but a scrap of paper, she was heartened by a solemn promise given in writing by her comradesin arms. But when she had accomplished her part of the contract, thatdocument turned out to be little more than another scrap of paper. Thusit was one of the piquant ironies of Fate, Italian publicists said, thatthe people who had mostly clamored against that doctrine were indirectlyhelping it to triumph. Mr. Wilson, unwittingly sapping public faith inwritten treaties, was held up as one of the many pictures in which theConference abounded of the delegates refuting their words by acts. Theunbiased historian will readily admit that the secret treaties wereprofoundly immoral from the Wilsonian angle of vision, but that the onlyway of canceling them was by a general principle rigidly upheld andimpartially applied. And this the Supreme Council would not entertain. 

With her British ally, too, France had an unpleasant falling out aboutEastern affairs, and in especial about Syria and Persia. There was alsoa demand for the retrocession by Britain of the island of Mauritius, butit was not made officially, nor is it a subject for two such nations toquarrel over. The first rift in the lute was caused by the deposition ofEmir Faisal respecting the desires of the Arab population. Thispicturesque chief, the French press complained, had been too readilyadmitted to the Conference and too respectfully listened to there, whereas the Persian delegation tramped for months over the Paris streetswithout once obtaining a hearing. The Hedjaz, which had been independentfrom time immemorial, was formally recognized as a separate kingdomduring the war, and the Grand Sheriff of Mecca was suddenly raised tothe throne in the European sense by France and Britain. Since then hewas formally recognized by the five Powers. His representatives in Parisdemanded the annexation of all the countries of Arabic speech which wereunder Turkish domination. These included not only Mesopotamia, but alsoSyria, on which France had long looked with loving eyes and respectingwhich there existed an accord between her and Britain. The projectcommunity would represent a Pan-Arab federation of about eleven millionsouls, over which France would have no guardianship. And yet thewritten accord had never been annulled. Palestine was excluded fromthis Pan-Arabian federation, and Syria was to be consulted, and insteadof being handed over to France, as M. Clemenceau demanded, was to beallowed to declare its own wishes without any injunctions from theConference. Mesopotamia would be autonomous under the League of Nations, but a single mandatory was asked for by the king of the Hedjaz for theentire eleven million inhabitants. 

The comments of the French press on Britain's attitude, despite theirstudied reserve and conventional phraseology, bordered on recriminationand hinted at a possible cooling of friendship between the two nations, and in the course of the controversy the evil-omened word "Fashoda" waspronounced. The French _Temps's_ arguments were briefly these: Thepopulations claimed occupy such a vast stretch of territory that thesovereignty of the Hedjaz could hardly be more than nominal andsymbolical. In fact, they cover an area of one-half of the OttomanEmpire. These different provinces would, in reality, be under thedomination of the Great Power which was the real creator of this newkingdom, and the monarch of the Hedjaz would be a mere stalking-horse ofBritain. This, it was urged, would not be independence, but a maskedprotectorate, and in the name of the higher principles must beprevented. Syria must be handed over to France without consulting thepopulation. The financial resources of the Hedjaz are utterly inadequatefor the administration of such a vast state as was being compacted. Who, then, it was asked, would supply the indispensable funds? ObviouslyBritain, who had been providing the Emir Faisal with funds ever sincehis father donned the crown. If this political entity came intoexistence, it would generate continuous friction between France andBritain, separate comrades in arms, delight a vigilant enemy, andviolate a written compact which should be sacred. For these reasons itshould be rejected and Syria placed under the guardianship of France. 

The Americans took the position that congruously with the high ethicalprinciples which had guided the labors of the Conference throughout, itwas incumbent on its members, instead of bartering civilized peopleslike chattels, to consult them as to their own aspirations. If it weretrue that the Syrians were yearning to become the wards of France, therecould be no reasonable objection on the part of the French delegates toagree to a plebiscite. But the French delegates declined to entertainthe suggestion on the ground that Syria's longing for French guidancewas a notorious fact. 

After much discussion and vehement opposition on the part of the Frenchdelegates an Inter-Allied commission under Mr. Charles Crane was sent tovisit the countries in dispute and to report on the leanings of theirpopulations. After having visited forty cities and towns and more thanthree hundred villages, and received over fifteen hundred delegations ofnatives, the commission reported that the majority of the people "preferto maintain their independence, " but do not object to live under themandatory system for fifty years _provided the United States accepts_the mandate. "Syria desires to become a sovereign kingdom, and most ofthe population supports the Emir Faisal as king. [312] The commissionfurther ascertained that the Syrians, "who are singularly enlightened asto the policies of the United States, " invoked and relied upon aFranco-British statement of policy[313] which had been distributedbroadcast throughout their country, "promising complete liberation fromthe Turks and the establishment of free governments among the nativepopulation and recognition of these governments by France andBritain. "[314]

The result of the investigation by the Inter-Allied commission remindsone of the story of the two anglers who were discussing the merits oftwo different sauces for the trout which one of them had caught. As theywere unable to agree they decided to refer the matter to the trout, whoanswered: "Gentlemen, I do not wish to be eaten with any sauce. I desireto live and be free in my own element. " "Ah, now you are wandering fromthe question, " exclaimed the two, who thereupon struck up a compromiseon the subject of the sauce. 

The tone of this long-drawn-out controversy, especially in the press, was distinctly acrimonious. It became dangerously bitter when the Frenchpolitical world was apprised one day of the conclusion of a treatybetween Britain and Persia as the outcome of secret negotiations betweenLondon and Teheran. And excitement grew intenser when shortly afterwardthe authentic text of this agreement was disclosed. In France, Italy, Germany, Russia, and the United States the press unanimously declaredthat Persia's international status as determined by the new diplomaticinstrument could best be described by the evil-sounding words"protectorate" and the violation of the mandatory system adopted by theConference. 

This startling development shed a strong light upon the new ordering ofthe world and its relation to the Wilsonian gospel, complicated withsecret negotiations, protectorates without mandates, and the one-sidedabrogation of compacts. 

Persia is one of the original members of the League of Nations, [315] andas such was entitled, the French argued, to a hearing at theConference. She had grievances that called for redress: her neutralityhad been violated, many of her subjects had been put to death, and hertitles to reparation were undeniable. President Wilson, the comforter ofsmall states and oppressed nationalities, having proclaimed that theweakest communities would command the same friendly treatment as thegreatest, the Persian delegates repaired to Paris in the belief thatthis treatment would be accorded them. But there they weredisillusioned. For them there was no admission. Whether, if they hadbeen heard and helped by the Supreme Council, they would have contrivedto exist as an independent state is a question which cannot be discussedhere. The point made by the French was that on its own showing theConference was morally bound to receive the Persian delegation. Theutmost it obtained was that the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monalek, who was head of the delegation, had a private talk withPresident Wilson, Colonel House, and Mr. Lansing. These statesmenunhesitatingly promised to help Persia to secure full sovereign rights, or at any rate to enable her delegates to unfold their country's caseand file their protests before the Conference. The delegates werecomforted and felt sure of the success of their mission. They told theAmerican plenipotentiaries that the United States would be Persia'screditor for this help and that she would invite American financiers toput her money matters in order, American engineers to develop her miningindustries, and the American oil firms to examine and exploit her petroldeposits. [316] In a word, Persia would be Americanized. This naïveannouncement of the rôle reserved for American benefactors in the landof the Shah might have impressed certain commercial and financialinterests in the United States, but was wholly alien to the only orderof motives that could properly move the American plenipotentiaries tointerpose in favor of their would-be wards. 

The promises made by Messrs. Wilson, House, and Lansing came to nothing. For months the Persian envoys lived in hope which was strengthened bythe assurances of various members of the Conference that theintervention of Mr. Wilson would infallibly prove successful. But eventsbelied this forecast, whereupon the head of the Persian delegation, after several months of hopes deferred, quitted France forConstantinople, and his country's position among the nations was settledin detail by the new agreement. 

That position does undoubtedly resemble very closely Egypt's statusbefore the outbreak of the World War. And Egypt's status could hardly betermed independence. Henceforward Great Britain has a strong hold on thePersian customs, the control of the waterways and carriage routes, therights of railway construction, the oil-fields--these were oursbefore--the right to organize the army and direct the foreign policy ofthe kingdom. And it may fairly be argued that this arrangement may provea greater blessing to the Persians than the realization of their ownambitions. That, at any rate, is my own personal belief, which for manyyears I have held and expressed. None the less it runs diametricallycounter to the letter and the spirit of Wilsonianism, which is now seento be a wall high enough to keep out the dwarf states, but which thegiants can easily clear at a bound. 

Against this violation of the new humanitarian doctrine Frenchpublicists flared up. The glaring character of the transgressionrevolted them, the plight of the Persians touched them, and the right ofself-determination strongly appealed to them. Was it not largely for theassertion of that right that all the Allied peoples had for five yearsbeen making unheard-of sacrifices? What would become of the League ofNations if such secret and selfish doings were connived at? In a word, French sympathy for the victims of British hegemony waxed as strong asthe British fellow-feeling for the Syrians, who objected to be drawninto the orbit of the French. Those sharp protests and earnest appeals, it may be noted, were the principal, perhaps the only, symptoms oftenderness for unprotected peoples which were evoked by the greatethical movement headed by the Conference. 

The French further pointed out that the system of Mandates had beenspecially created for countries as backward and helpless as Persia wasassumed to be, and that the only agency qualified to apply it was eitherthe Supreme Council or the League of Nations. The British press answeredthat no such humiliating assumption about the Shah's people was beingmade, that the Foreign Office had distinctly disclaimed the intention ofestablishing a protectorate over Persia, who is, and will remain, asovereign and independent state. But these explanations failed toconvince our indignant Allies. They argued, from experience, that notrust was to be placed in those official assurances and euphemisticphrases which are generally belied by subsequent acts. [317] They furtherlamented that the long and secret negotiations which were going forwardin Teheran while the Persian delegation was wearily and vainly waitingin Paris to be allowed to plead its country's cause before the greatworld-dictators was not a good example of loyalty to the new cosmiclegislation. Had not Mr. Wilson proclaimed that peoples were no longerto be bartered and swapped as chattels? Here the Italians and Rumanianschimed in, reminding their kinsmen that it was the same Americanstatesmen who in the peace conditions first presented to CountBrockdorff-Rantzau made over the German population of the Saar Valley toFrance at the end of fifteen years as the fair equivalent of a sum ofmoney payable in gold, and that France at any rate had raised noobjection to the barter nor to the principle at the root of it. Theyreasoned that if the principle might be applied to one case it should bedeemed equally applicable to the other, and that the only persons orstates that could with propriety demur to the Anglo-Persian arrangementswere those who themselves were not benefiting by similar transactions. 

At last the Paris press, laying due weight on the alliance with Britain, struck a new note. "It seems that these last Persian bargainings offer atheme for conversations between our government and that of the Allies, "one influential journal wrote. [318] At once the amicable suggestion wastaken up by the British press. The idea was to join the Syrian with thePersian transactions and make French concessions on the other. Thiscompromise would compose an ugly quarrel and settle everything for thebest. For France's intentions toward the people of Syria were, it wascredibly asserted, to the full as disinterested and generous as those ofBritain toward Persia, and if the Syrians desired an English-speakingnation rather than the French to be their mentor, it was equally truethat the Persians wanted Americans rather than British to superintendand accelerate their progress in civilization. But instead of harkeningto the wishes of only one it would be better to ignore those of both. Bythis prudent compromise all the demands of right and justice, for whichboth governments were earnest sticklers, would thus be amply satisfied. 

Our American associates were less easily appeased. In sooth there wasnothing left wherewith to appease them. Their press condemned the"protectorate" as a breach of the Covenant. Secretary Lansing let it beknown[319] that the United States delegation had striven to obtain ahearing for the Persians at the Conference, but had "lost its fight. " APersian, when apprized of this utterance, said: "When the United Statesdelegation strove to hinder Italy from annexing Fiume and obtaining theterritories promised her by a secret treaty, they accomplished their aimbecause they refused to give way. Then they took care not to lose theirfight. When they accepted a brief for the Jews and imposed a Jewishsemi-state on Rumania and Poland, they were firm as the granite rock, and no amount of opposition, no future deterrents, made any impressionon their will. Accordingly, they had their way. But in the cause ofPersia they lost the fight, although logic, humanity, justice, and theordinances solemnly accepted by the Great Powers were all on theirside. " . . . One American press organ termed the Anglo-Persian accord "acoup which is a greater violation of the Wilsonian Fourteen Points thanthe Shantung award to Japan, as it makes the whole of Persia a mereprotectorate for Britain. "[320]

Generally speaking, illustrations of the meaning of non-intervention inthe home affairs of other nations were numerous and somewhat perplexing. Were it not that Mr. Wilson had come to Europe for the express purposeof interpreting as well as enforcing his own doctrine, one would havebeen warranted in assuming that the Supreme Council was frequentlytravestying it. But as the President was himself one of the leadingmembers of that Council, whose decisions were unanimous, the utmostthat one can take for granted is that he strove to impose his tenets onhis intractable colleagues and "lost the fight. "

Here is a striking instance of what would look to the average man verylike intervention in the domestic politics of another nation--well-meantand, it may be, beneficent intervention--were it not that we are assuredon the highest authority that it is nothing of the sort. It was devisedas an expedient for getting outside help for the capture of Petrograd bythe anti-Bolshevists. The end, therefore, was good, and the means seemedeffectual to those who employed them. The Kolchak-Denikin party could, it was believed, have taken possession of that capital long before, byobtaining the military co-operation of the Esthonians. But the priceasked by these was the recognition of their complete independence by thenon-Bolshevist government in the name of all Russia. Kolchak, to hiscredit, refused to pay this price, seeing that he had no powers to doso, and only a dictator would sign away the territory by usurping therequisite authority. Consequently the combined attack on Petrograd wasnot undertaken. The Admiral's refusal was justified by the circumstancesthat he was the spokesman only of a large section of the Russian people, and that a thoroughly representative assembly must be consulted on thesubject previous to action being taken. The military stagnation thatensued lasted for months. Then one day the press brought the tidingsthat the difficulty was ingeniously overcome. This is the shape in whichthe intelligence was communicated to the world: "Colonel Marsh, of theBritish army, who is representing General Gough, organized a republic innorthwest Russia at Reval, August 12th, _within forty-five minutes_, General Yudenitch being nominally the head of the new government, whichis affiliated with the Kolchak government. Northwest Russia opposes theEsthonian government only in principle because it wants guaranties thatthe Esthonians will not be the stepping-stone for some big Power likeGermany to control the Russian outlet through the Baltic. If theEsthonians give such guaranties, the northwestern Russians are perfectlywilling to let them become an independent state. "[321]

Here then was a "British colonel" who, in addition to his militaryduties, was, according to this account, willing and able to create anindependent republic without any Supreme Council to assist him, whereasprofessional diplomatists and military men of other nations had beentrying for months to found a Rhine republic under Dorten and had failed. Nor did he, if the newspaper report be correct, waste much time at thebusiness. From the moment of its inception until northwestern Russiastood forth an independent state, promulgating and executing gravedecisions in the sphere of international politics, only forty-fiveminutes are said to have elapsed. Forty-five minutes by the clock. Itwas almost as quick a feat as the drafting of the Covenant of Nations. Further, the resourceful statemaker forged a republic which wasqualified to transfer sovereignly Russian territory to unrecognizedstates without consulting the nation or obtaining authority from anyone. More marvelous than any other detail, however, is the circumstancethat he did his work so well that it never amounted tointervention. [322]

One cannot affect surprise if the distinction between this amazingexploit of diplomatico-military prestidigitation and intermeddling inthe internal affairs of another nation prove too subtle for the mentalgrasp of the average unpolitical individual. 

It is practices like these which ultimately determine the worth of thetreaties and the Covenant which Mr. Wilson was content to take back withhim to Washington as the final outcome of what was to have been the mostsuperb achievement of historic man. Of the new ethical principles, ofthe generous renunciation of privileges, of the righting of secularwrongs, of the respect that was to be shown for the weak, which were tohave cemented the union of peoples into one pacific if not blissfulfamily, there remained but the memory. No such bitter draught ofdisappointment was swallowed by the nations since the world first had apolitical history. Many of the resounding phrases that once foretokeneda new era of peace, right, and equity were not merely emptied of theircontents, but made to connote their opposites. Freedom of the seasbecame supremacy of the seas, which may possibly turn out to be ablessed consummation for all concerned, but should not have beensmuggled in under a gross misnomer. The abolition of war means, asBritish and American and French generals and admirals have since toldtheir respective fellow-citizens, thorough preparations for the nextwar, which are not to be confined, as heretofore, to the so-calledmilitary states, but are to extend over all Anglo-Saxondom. [323] "Opencovenants openly arrived at" signify secret conclaves and conspirativedeliberations carried on in impenetrable secrecy which cannot bedispensed with even after the whole business has passed intohistory. [324] The self-determination of peoples finds its limit in therights of every Great Power to hold its subject nationalities in thrallon the ground that their reciprocal relations appertain to the domesticpolicy of the state. It means, further, the privilege of those who wieldsuperior force to put irresistible pressure upon those who are weak, andthe lever which it places in their hands for the purpose is to be knownunder the attractive name of the protection of minorities. Abstentionfrom interference in the home affairs of a neighboring community is madeto cover intermeddling of the most irksome and humiliating character inmatters which have no nexus with international law, for if they had, therule would be applicable to all nations. The lesser peoples must harkento injunctions of the greater states respecting their mode of treatingalien immigrants and must submit to the control of foreign bodies whichare ignorant of the situation and its requirements. Nor is it enoughthat those states should accord to the members of the Jewish and otherraces all the rights which their own citizens enjoy--they must gofarther and invest them with special privileges, and for this purposerenounce a portion of their sovereignty. They must likewise allow theirmore powerful allies to dictate to them their legislation on matters oftransit and foreign commerce. [325] For the Great Powers, however, thislaw of minorities was not written. They are above the law. Their warrantis force. In a word, force is the trump card in the political game ofthe future as it was in that of the past. And M. Clemenceau's reminderto the petty states at the opening of the Conference that the wieldersof twelve million troops are the masters of the situation wasappropriate. Thus the war which was provoked by the transformation of asolemn treaty into a scrap of paper was concluded by the presentation oftwo scraps of paper as a treaty and a covenant for the moral renovationof the world. 

FOOTNOTES:

[288] _The Daily Telegraph_, March 28, 1919. 

[289] In a speech delivered at a dinner given in Paris on April 19, 1919, by the Commonwealth of Australia to Australian soldiers. 

[290] In March, 1919. 

[291] August 19, 1919. 

[292] Cf. _Corriere delta Sera_, August 20, 1919. 

[293] _Ibidem_ (_Corriere della Sera_, August 20, 1919). 

[294] _L'Humanité, _ May 21, 1919. 

[295] _The Nation_, August 23, 1919. 

[296] Chief of the Austrian police at Vienna Congress in the years1814-15. 

[297] In _L'Echo de Paris_, March 2, 1919. Cf. _The Daily Telegraph_, March 4th. 

[298] _Le Gaulois_, March 8, 1919. Cf. _The Daily Telegraph_, March10th. 

[299] Cf. _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 21, 1919. 

[300] Cf. _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 23, 1919

[301] Report of Dr. Jacques Bertillon. Cf. _L'Information_, January 20, 1919. 

[302] Cf. _Le Matin_, August 13, 1919. 

303: Excess of births over deaths (yearly average). --Cf. _L'Information, _ January 20, 1919:

 Germany Great Britain Italy France1861-70 408, 333 365, 499 183, 196 93, 5151871-80 511, 034 431, 436 191, 538 64, 0631881-90 551, 308 442, 112 307, 082 66, 9821891-1900 730, 265 430, 000 339, 409 23, 9611901-10 866, 338 484, 822 369, 959 46, 524

[304] Professor L. Marchand. Cf. _La Démocratie Nouvelle_, April 26, 1919. 

[305] Dr. Walter Rathenau, in a book entitled _The Death of France_. Ihave not been able to procure a copy of this book. The extracts givenabove are taken from a statement published by M. Brudenne in the _Matin_of February 16, 1919. 

[306] _Germania_, August 11, 1919. Cf. _Le Temps_, September 9, 1919. 

[307] M. André Tardieu in a speech delivered on August 17, 1919. Cf. Paris newspapers of following two days, and in particular _New YorkHerald_, August 19th. 

[308] Cf. Speech delivered by M. André Tardieu on August 17, 1919. 

[309] On this subject of reparations the _Journal de Genève_ publishedseveral interesting articles at various times, as, for example, on May15, 1919. 

[310] Speech of M. Klotz in the Chamber on September 5, 1919. Cf. _L'Echo de Paris_, September 6, 1919. 

[311] D'Estournelles de Constant. _Bulletin des Droits de l'Homme_, May15, 1919. 

[312] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 24, 1919. 

[313] Issued on November 9, 1918. 

[314] See _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 30, 1919. 

[315] An American Senator uncharitably conjectured that she receivedthis honorable distinction in order to contribute an additional vote tothe British. 

[316] Cf. Interview with a Persian official, published in the Parisedition of _The Chicago Tribune_, August 19, 1919. 

[317] "Unfortunately, Mr. Lloyd George, who has stripped the ForeignOffice of real power, has frequently given assurances of this nature, and his acts have always contradicted them. As a proof, his lastinterview with M. Clemenceau will serve. " Cf. _L'Echo de Paris_, August15, 1919, article by Pertinax. 

[318] _Le Journal des Débats_, August 15, 1919. 

[319] In Washington on August 16, 1919. 

[320] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 19, 1919. 

[321] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 24, 1919. 

[322] After the above was written, a French journal, the _Echo de Paris_of September 19, 1919, announced that General Marsh declares that hisagents acted without his instructions, but none the less it holds himresponsible for this Baltic policy. 

[323] Marshal Douglas Haig, Lord French, the American pacifist, SydneyBaker, Senator Chamberlain, Representative Kahn, and a host of othershave been preaching universal military training. The press, too, withconsiderable exceptions, favors the movement. "We want a democratizedarmy, which represents all the nation, and it can be found only inuniversal service. . . . Universal service is our best guaranty of peace. "Cf. _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 22, 1919. 

[324] President Wilson, when at the close of his conference with theSenate Committee on Foreign Relations--at the White House--asked how theUnited States had voted on the Japanese resolution in favor of raceequality, replied: "I am not sure of being free to answer the question, because it affects a large number of points that were discussed inParis, and in the interest of international harmony I think I had betternot reply. "--_The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), August 22, 1919. 

[325] In virtue of Article LX of the Treaty with Austria. 

XIV

THE TREATY WITH GERMANY

To discuss in detail the peace terms which after many months' desultorytalk were finally presented to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would transcendthe scope of these pages. Like every other act of the Supreme Council, they may be viewed from one of two widely sundered angles ofsurvey--either as the exercise by a victorious state of the powerderived from victory over the vanquished enemy, or as one of themeasures by which the peace of the world is to be enforced in thepresent and consolidated in the future. And from neither point of viewcan it command the approval of unbiased political students. At first theGermans, and not they alone, expected that the conditions would be basedon the Fourteen Points, while many of the Allies took it for grantedthat they would be inspired by the resolve to cripple Teutondom for alltime. And for each of these anticipations there were good formalgrounds. 

The only legitimate motive for interweaving the Covenant with the Treatywas to make of the latter a sort of corollary of the former and tomoderate the instincts of vengeance by the promptings of higherinterests. On this ground, and only on this, did the friends offar-ranging reform support Mr. Wilson in his contention that the twodocuments should be rendered mutually interdependent. Reparation for thedamage done in violation of international law and sound guarantiesagainst its recurrence are of the essence of every peace treaty thatfollows a decisive victory. But reparation is seldom this and nothingmore. The lower instincts of human nature, when dominant as they areduring a bloody war and in the hour of victory, generally outweighconsiderations not only of right, but also of enlightened egotism, leaving justice to merge into vengeance. And the fruits are treasuredwrath and a secret resolve on the part of the vanquished to pay out hisvictor at the first opportunity. The war-loser of to-day aims atbecoming the war-winner of to-morrow. And this frame of mind isincompatible with the temper needed for an era of moral fellowship suchas Mr. Wilson was supposed to be intent on establishing. Consequently, apeace treaty unmodified by the principles underlying the Covenant isnecessarily a negation of the main possibilities of a society of nationsbased upon right and a decisive argument against joining together thetwo instruments. 

The other kind of peace which Mr. Wilson was believed to have had atheart consisted not merely in the liquidation of the war, but in theuprooting of its permanent causes, in the renunciation by the variousnations of sanguinary conflicts as a means of determining rival claims, and in such an amicable rearrangement of international relations aswould keep such disputes from growing into dangerous quarrels. Right, oras near an approximation to it as is attainable, would then take theplace of violence, whereby military guaranties would become not onlysuperfluous, but indicative of a spirit irreconcilable with the mainpurpose of the League. Each nation would be entitled to equalopportunity within the limits assigned to it by nature and widened byits own mental and moral capacities. Thus permanently to forbid anumerous, growing, and territorially cramped nation to possess overseascolonies for its superfluous population while overburdening others withpossessions which they are unable to utilize, would constitute anegation of one of the basic principles of the new ordering. 

Those were the grounds which seemed to warrant the belief that theTreaty would be not only formally, but substantially and in its spiritan integral, part of the general settlement based on the FourteenPoints. 

This anticipation turned out to be a delusion. Wilsonianism proved to bea very different system from that of the Fourteen Points, and its authorplayed the part not only of an interpreter of his tenets, but also of asort of political pope alone competent to annul the force of lawsbinding on all those whom he should refuse to dispense from theirobservance. He had to do with patriotic politicians permeated with theold ideas, desirous of providing in the peace terms for the next war andstriving to secure the maximum of advantage over the foe presumptive, bydismembering his territory, depriving him of colonies, making himdependent on others for his supplies of raw stuffs, and artificiallychecking his natural growth. Nearly all of them had principles to invokein favor of their claims and some had nothing else. And it was thesetendencies which Mr. Wilson sought to combine with the ethical ideals tobe incarnated in the Society of Nations. Now this was an impossiblesynthesis. The spirit of vindictiveness--for that was well representedat the Conference--was to merge and lose itself in an outflow ofmagnanimity; precautions against a hated enemy were to be interwovenwith implicit confidence in his generosity; a military occupation wouldprovide against a sudden onslaught, while an approach to disarmamentwould bear witness to the absence of suspicion. Thus Poland woulddischarge the function of France's ally against the Teutons in the east, but her frontiers were to leave her inefficiently protected againsttheir future attacks from the west. Germany was dismembered, yet shewas credited with self-discipline and generosity enough to steel heragainst the temptation to profit by the opportunity of joining togetheragain what France had dissevered. The League of Nations was to be basedupon mutual confidence and good fellowship, yet one of its most powerfulfuture members was so distrusted as to be declared permanently unworthyto possess any overseas colonies. Germany's territory in the Saar Valleyis admittedly inhabited by Germans, yet for fifteen years there is to bea foreign administration there, and at the end of it the people are tobe asked whether they would like to cut the bonds that link them withtheir own state and place themselves under French sway, so that apremium is offered for French immigration into the Saar Valley. 

Those are a few of the consequences of the mixture of the twoirreconcilable principles. 

That Germany richly deserved her punishment cannot be gainsaid. Hercrime was without precedent. Some of its most sinister consequences areirremediable. Whole sections of her people are still unconscious notonly of the magnitude, but of the criminal character, of their misdeeds. None the less there is a future to be provided for, and one of thesafest provisions is to influence the potential enemy's will for evil ifhis power cannot be paralyzed. And this the Treaty failed to do. 

The Germans, when they learned the conditions, discussed them angrily, and the keynote was refusal to sign the document. The financial clauseswere stigmatized as masked slavery. The press urged that during the warless than one-tenth of France's territory had been occupied by theircountrymen and that even of this only a fragment was in the zone ofcombat. The entire wealth of France, they alleged, had been estimatedbefore the war at from three hundred and fifty milliard to four hundredmilliard francs, consequently for the devastated provinces hardly morethan one-twentieth of that sum could fairly be demanded as reparation, whereas the claim set forth was incomparably more. They objected to theloss of their colonies because the justification alleged--that they weredisqualified to administer them because of their former cruelties towardthe natives--was groundless, as the Allies themselves had admittedimplicitly by offering them the right of pre-emption in the case of thePortuguese and other overseas possessions on the very eve of the war. 

But the most telling objections turned upon the clauses that dealt withthe Saar Valley. Its population is entirely German, yet thetreaty-makers provided for its occupation by the French for a term offifteen years and its transference to them if, after that term, theGerman government was unable to pay a certain sum in gold for the coalmines it contained. If that sum were not forthcoming the population andthe district were to be handed over to France for all time, even thoughthe former should vote unanimously for reunion with Germany. CountBrockdorff-Rantzau remarked in his note on the Treaty "that in thehistory of modern times there is no other example of a civilized Powerobliging a state to abandon its people to foreign domination as anequivalent for a cash payment. " One of the most influential press organscomplained that the Treaty "bartered German men, women, and children forcoal; subjected some districts with a thoroughly German population to anobligatory plebiscite[326] under interested supervision; severed otherswithout any consultation from the Fatherland; delivered over theproceeds of German industry to the greed of foreign capitalists for anindefinite period; . . . Spread over the whole country a network of aliencommissions to be paid by the German nation; withdrew streams, rivers, railways, the air service, numerous industrial establishments, theentire economic system, from the sovereignty of the German state bymeans either of internationalization or financial control; conferred onforeign inspectors rights such as only the satraps of absolute monarchsin former ages were empowered to exercise; in a word, they put an end tothe existence of the German nation as such. Germany would become acolony of white slaves. . . . "[327]

Fortunately for the Allies, the reproach of exchanging human beings forcoal was seen by their leaders to be so damaging that they modified theodious clause that warranted it. Even the comments of the friendlyneutral press were extremely pungent. They found fault with the Treatyon grounds which, unhappily, cannot be reasoned away. "Why dissimulateit?" writes the foremost of these journals; "this peace is not what wewere led to expect. It dislodges the old dangers, but creates new ones. Alsace and Lorraine are, it is true, no longer in German hands, but . . . Irredentism has only changed its camp. In 1914 Germany put her faith inforce because she herself wielded it. But crushed down under a peacewhich appears to violate the promises made to her, a peace which in herheart of hearts she will never accept, she will turn toward force anew. It will stand out as the great misfortune of this Treaty that it hastainted the victory with a moral blight and caused the course of theGerman revolution to swerve. . . . The fundamental error of the instrumentlies in the circumstance that it is a compromise between twoincompatible frames of mind. It was feasible to restore peace to Europeby pulling down Germany definitely. But in order to accomplish this itwould have been necessary to crush a people of seventy millions and toincapacitate them from rising to their feet again. Peace could also havebeen secured by the sole force of right. But in this case Germany wouldhave had to be treated so considerately as to leave her no grievance tobrood over. M. Clemenceau hindered Mr. Wilson from displaying sufficientgenerosity to get the moral peace, and Mr. Wilson on his side preventedM. Clemenceau from exercising severity enough to secure the materialpeace. And so the result, which it was easy to foresee, is a régimedevoid of the real guaranties of durability. "[328]

The judge of the French syndicalists was still more severe. "TheVersailles peace, " exclaimed M. Verfeuil, "is worse than the peace ofBrest-Litovsk . . . Annexations, economic servitudes, overwhelmingindemnities, and a caricature of the Society of Nations--theseconstitute the balance of the new policy, "[329] The Deputy Marcel Cachinsaid: "The Allied armies fought to make this war the last. They foughtfor a just and lasting peace, but none of these boons has been bestowedon us. We are confronted with the failure of the policy of the one manin whom our party had put its confidence--President Wilson. The peaceconditions . . . Are inacceptable from various points of view, financial, territorial, economic, social, and human. "[330]

It is in this Treaty far more than in the Covenant that the principlesto which Mr. Wilson at first committed himself are in decisive issue. True, he was wont after every surrender he made during the Conference toinvoke the Covenant and its concrete realization--the League ofNations--as the corrective which would set everything right in thefuture. But the fact can hardly be blinked that it is the Treaty and itseffects that impress their character on the Covenant and not the otherway round. As an eminent Swiss professor observed: "No league of nationswould have hindered the Belgian people in 1830 from separating fromHolland. Can the future League of Nations hinder Germany fromreconstituting its geographical unity? Can it hinder the Germans ofBohemia from smiting the Czech? Can it prevent the Magyars, who atpresent are scattered, from working for their reunion?"[331]

These potential disturbances are so many dangers to France. For if warshould break out in eastern Europe, is it to be supposed that the UnitedStates, the British colonies, or even Britain herself will send troopsto take part in it? Hardly. Suppose, for instance, that the Austrians, who ardently desire to be merged in Germany, proclaim their union withher, as I am convinced they will one day, does any statesman believethat democratic America will despatch troops to coerce them back? If theGermans of Bohemia secede from the Czechoslovaks or the Croats from theSerbs, will British armies cross the sea to uphold the union which thosepeoples repudiate? And in the name of which of the Fourteen Points wouldthey undertake the task? That of self-determination? France's interests, and hers alone, would be affected by such changes. And France would beleft to fight single-handed. For what?

It is interesting to note how the conditions imposed upon Germany wereappreciated by an influential body of Mr. Wilson's American partizanswho had pinned their faith to his Fourteen Points. Their view isexpressed by their press organ as follows:[332]

"France remains the strongest Power on the Continent. With her militaryestablishment intact she faces a Germany without a general staff, without conscription, without universal military training, with astrictly limited amount of light artillery, with no air service, nofleet, with no domestic basis in raw materials for armament manufacture, with her whole western border fifty kilometers east of the Rhinedemilitarized. On top of this France has a system of military allianceswith the new states that touch Germany. On top of this she securedpermanent representation in the Council of the League, from whichGermany is excluded. On top of that economic terms which, while theycannot be fulfilled, do cripple the industrial life of her neighbor. With such a balance of forces France demands for herself a form ofprotection which neither Belgium, nor Poland, nor Czechoslovakia, norItaly is granted. "

FOOTNOTES:

[326] One of the three districts of Schleswig. A curious phenomenon wasthis zeal of the Supreme Council for Denmark's interests, as comparedwith Denmark's refusal to profit by it, the champions ofself-determination urging the Danes to demand a district, as Danish, which the Danes knew to be German!

[327] _Das Berliner Tageblatt_, June 4, 1919. 

[328] _Le Journal de Genève_, June 24, 1919. 

[329] Cf. _L'Echo de Paris_, May 12, 1919. 

[330] _Ibidem_. 

[331] In a monograph entitled _Plus Jamais_. 

[332] Cf. _The New Republic_, August 13, 1919, p. 43. 

XV

THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA

Among all the strange products of the many-sided outbursts of theleading delegates' reconstructive activity, the Treaty with Bulgariastands out in bold relief. It reveals the high-water mark reached bythose secret, elusive, and decisive influences which swayed so many ofthe mysterious decisions adopted by the Conference. As Bulgaria disposedof an abundant source of those influences, her chastisement partakes ofsome of the characteristics of a reward. Not only did she not fare asthe treacherous enemy that she showed herself, but she emerged from theordeal much better off than several of the victorious states. UnlikeSerbia, Rumania, France, and Belgium, she escaped the horrors of aforeign invasion and she possessed and fructified all her resources downto the day when the armistice was concluded. Her peasant population madehuge profits during the campaign and her armies despoiled Serbia, Rumania, and Greek Macedonia and sent home enormous booty. In a word, she is richer and more prosperous than before she entered the arenaagainst her protectors and former allies. 

For, owing to the intercession of her powerful friends, she was treatedwith a degree of indulgence which, although expected by all who wereinitiated into the secrets of "open diplomacy, " scandalized those whowere anxious that at least some simulacrum of justice should bemaintained. Germany was forced to sign a blank check which her enemieswill one day fill in. Austria was reduced to the status of a parasiteliving on the bounty of the Great Powers and denied the right ofself-determination. Even France, exhausted by five years' superhumanefforts, beholds with alarm her financial future entirely dependent uponthe ability or inability of Germany to pay the damages to which she wascondemned. 

But the Prussia of the Balkans, owing to the intercession of influentialanonymous friends, had no such consequences to deplore. Although shecontracted heavy debts toward Germany, she was relieved of the effort topay them. Her financial obligations were first transferred[333] to theAllies and then magnanimously wiped out by these, who then limited allher liabilities for reparations to two and a quarter milliard francs. AnInter-Allied commission in Sofia is to find and return the loot to itslawful owners, but it is to charge no indemnity for the damage done. Norwill it contain representatives of the states whose property the Bulgarsabstracted. Serbia is allowed neither indemnity nor reparation. She isto receive a share which the Treaty neglected to fix of the two and aquarter milliard francs on a date which has also been left undetermined. She is not even to get back the herds of cattle of which the Bulgarsrobbed her. The lawgivers in Paris considered that justice would be metby obliging the Bulgars to restore 28, 000 head of cattle in lieu of the3, 200, 000 driven off, so that even if the ill-starred Serbs shouldidentify, say, one million more, they would have no right to enforcetheir claim. [334]

Nor is that the only disconcerting detail in the Treaty. The SupremeCouncil, which sanctioned the military occupation of a part of Germanyas a guaranty for the fulfilment of the peace conditions, dispensesBulgaria from any such irksome conditions. Bulgaria's good faithappeared sufficient to the politicians who drafted the instrument. "Forreasons which one hardly dares touch upon, " writes an eminent Frenchpublicist, [335] "several of the Powers that constitute the famous worldareopagus count on the future co-operation of Bulgaria. We shrink indismay from the perspective thus opened to our gaze. "[336]

The territorial changes which the Prussia of the Balkans was condemnedto undergo are neither very considerable nor unjust. Rumania receives noBulgarian territory, the frontiers of 1913 remaining unaltered. Serbianets some on grounds which cannot be called in question, and a largepart of Thrace which is inhabited, not by Bulgars, but mainly by Greeksand Turks, was taken from Bulgaria, but allotted to no state inparticular. The upshot of the Treaty, as it appeared to most of theleading publicists on the Continent of Europe, was to leave Bulgaria, whose cruelty and destructiveness are described by official andunofficial reports as unparalleled, in a position of economicsuperiority to Serbia, Greece, and Rumania. And in the Inter-Alliedcommission Bulgaria is to have a representative, while Serbia, Greece, and Rumania, a part of whose stolen property the commission has torecover, will have none. 

A comparison between the indulgence lavished upon Bulgaria and theseverity displayed toward Rumania is calculated to disconcert thestanchest friends of the Supreme Council. The Rumanian government, in adignified note to the Conference, explained its refusal to sign theTreaty with Austria by enumerating a series of facts which amount to ascathing condemnation of the work of the Supreme Council. On the onehand the Council pleaded the engagements entered into between Japan andher European allies as a cogent motive for handing over Shantung toJapan. For treaties must be respected. And the argument is sound. On theother hand, they were bound by a similar treaty[337] to give Rumania thewhole Banat, the Rumanian districts of Hungary and the Bukovina as faras the river Pruth. But at the Conference they repudiated thisengagement. In 1916 they stipulated that if Rumania entered the war theywould co-operate with ample military forces. They failed to redeem theirpromise. And they further undertook that "Rumania shall have the samerights as the Allies in the peace preliminaries and negotiations andalso in discussing the issues which shall be laid before the PeaceConference for its decisions. " Yet, as we saw, she was denied theserights, and her delegates were not informed of the subjects underdiscussion nor allowed to see the terms of peace, which were in thehands of the enemies, and were only twice admitted to the presence ofthe Supreme Council. 

It has been observed in various countries and by the Allied and theneutral press that between the German view about the sacredness oftreaties and that of the Supreme Council there is no substantialdifference. [338] Comments of this nature are all the more distressingthat they cannot be thrust aside as calumnious. Again it will not bedenied that Rumania rendered inestimable services to the Allies. Shesacrificed three hundred thousand of her sons to their cause. Her soilwas invaded and her property stolen or ruined. Yet she has been deprivedof part of her sovereignty by the Allies to whom she gave this help. TheSupreme Council, not content with her law conferring equal rights onall her citizens, to whatever race or religion they may belong, orderedher to submit to the direction of a foreign board in everythingconcerning her minorities and demanded from her a promise of obediencein advance to their future decrees respecting her policy in matters ofinternational trade and transit. These stipulations constitute anoteworthy curtailment of her sovereignty. 

That any set of public men should be carried by extrinsical motives thusfar away from justice, fair play, and good faith would be a misfortuneunder any circumstances, but that at a conjuncture like the present itshould befall the men who set up as the moral guides of mankind andwield the power to loosen the fabric of society is indeed a diredisaster. 

FOOTNOTES:

[333] In June, 1919. 

[334] The comments on these terms, published by M. Gauvain in the_Journal des Débats_ (September 20, 1919), are well worth reading. 

[335] M. Auguste Gauvain. 

[336] _Le Journal des Débats_, September 20, 1919. 

[337] Concluded in the year 1916. 

[338] Cf. _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), September 21, 1919. 

XVI

THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES

In Mr. Wilson's scheme for the establishment of a society of nationsthere was nothing new but his pledge to have it realized. And thatpledge has still to be redeemed under conditions which he himself hasmade much more unfavorable than they were. The idea itself--floating inthe political atmosphere for ages--has come to seem less vague andunattainable since the days of Kant. The only heads of states who hadset themselves to embody it in institutions before President Wilson tookit up not only disappointed the peoples who believed in them, butdiscredited the idea itself. 

That a merely mechanical organization such as the American statesmanseems to have had in mind, formed by parliamentary politiciansdeliberating in secret, could bind nations and peoples together in moralfellowship, is conceivable in the abstract. But if we turn to thereality, we shall find that in that direction nothing durable can beeffected without a radical change in the ideas, aspirations, and temperof the leaders who speak for the nations to-day, and, indeed, in thoseof large sections of the nations themselves. For to organize society onthose unfamiliar lines is to modify some of the deepest-rooted instinctsof human nature. And that cannot be achieved overnight, certainly not inthe span of thirty minutes, which sufficed for the drafting of theCovenant. The bulk of mankind might not need to be converted, but wholeclasses must first be educated, and in some countries re-educated, whichis perhaps still more difficult. Mental and moral training mustcomplement and reinforce each other, and each political unit be broughtto realize that the interests of the vaster community take precedenceover those of any part of it. And to impress these novel views upon thepeoples of the world takes time. 

An indispensable condition of success is that the compact binding themembers together must be entered into by the peoples, not merely bytheir governments. For it is upon the masses that the burden of the warlies heaviest. It is the bulk of the population that supplies thesoldiers, the money, and the work for the belligerent states, andendures the hardships and makes the sacrifices requisite to sustain it. Therefore, the peoples are primarily interested in the abolition of theold ordering and the forging of the new. Moreover, as latter-daycampaigns are waged with all the resources of the warring peoples, andas the possession of certain of these resources is often both the causeof the conflict and the objective of the aggressor, it follows that nomere political enactments will meet contemporary requirements. Anassociation of nations renouncing the sword as a means of settlingdisputes must also reduce as far as possible the surface over whichfriction with its neighbors is likely to take place. And nowadays mostof that surface is economic. The possession of raw materials is a morepotent attraction than territorial aggrandizement. Indeed, the latter iscoveted mainly as a means of securing or safeguarding the former. Onthese and other grounds, in drawing up a charter for a society ofnations, the political aspect should play but a subsidiary part. InParis it was the only aspect that counted for anything. 

A parliament of peoples, then, is the only organ that can impartviability to a society of nations worthy of the name. By joining theCovenant with the Peace Treaty, and turning the former into aninstrument for the execution of the latter, thus subordinating the idealto the egotistical, Mr. Wilson deprived his plan of its solejustification, and for the time being buried it. The philosopherLichtenberg[339] wrote, "One man brings forth a thought, another holdsit over the baptismal font, the third begets offspring with it, thefourth stands at its deathbed, and the fifth buries it. " Mr. Wilson hasdischarged the functions of gravedigger to the idea of a pacific societyof nations, just as Lenin has done to the system of Marxism, the onlydifference being that Marxism is as dead as a door-nail, whereas thesociety of nations may rise again. 

It was open, then, to the three principal delegates to insure the peaceof the world by moral means or by force. Having eschewed the former byadopting the doctrines of Monroe, abandoning the freedom of the seas, and by according to France strategic frontiers and other privileges ofthe militarist order, they might have enlarged and systematized theseconcessions to expediency and forged an alliance of the three states orof two, and undertaken to keep peace on the planet against all marplots. I wrote at the time: "The delegates are becoming conscious of theexistence of a ready-made league of nations in the shape of theAnglo-Saxon states, which, together with France, might hinder wars, promote good-fellowship, remold human destinies; and they are delightedthus to possess solid foundations on which a noble edifice can be raisedin the fullness of time. Tribunals will be created, with full powers toadjudge disputes; facilities will be accorded to litigious states, andeven an obligation will be imposed to invoke their arbitration. And thesum total of these reforms will be known to contemporary annals as aninchoate League of Nations. The delegates are already modestlydisavowing the intention of realizing the ideal in all its parts. Thatmust be left to coming generations; but what with the exhaustion of thepeoples, their aversion from warfare, and the material obstacles to therenewal of hostilities in the near future, it is calculated that thepeace will not soon be violated. Whether more salient results will beattained or attempted by the Conference nobody can foretell. "[340]

This expedient, even had it been deliberately conceived and skilfullywrought out, would not have been an adequate solution of the world'sdifficulties, nor would it have commended itself to all the statesconcerned. But it would at least have been a temporary makeshift capableof being transmuted under favorable circumstances into something lessmaterial and more durable. But the amateur world-reformers could notmake up their minds to choose either alternative. And the result is oneof the most lamentable failures recorded in human history. 

I placed my own opinion on record at the time as frankly as thecensorship which still existed for me would permit. I wrote: "What everydelegate with sound political instinct will ask himself is, whether theLeague of Nations will eliminate wars in future, and, if not, he willfeel conscientiously bound to adopt other relatively sure means ofproviding against them, and these consist of alliances, strategicfrontiers, and the permanent disablement of the potential enemy. On oneor other of these alternative lines the resettlement must be devised. Tocombine them would be ruinous. Now of what practical use is a league ofnations devoid of supernational forces and faced by a numerous, virile, and united race, smarting under a sense of injustice, thirsting for theopportunities for development denied to it, but granted to nations whichit despises as inferior? Would a league of nations combine militarilyagainst the gradual encroachments or sudden aggression of that Poweragainst its weaker neighbors? Nobody is authorized to answer thisquestion affirmatively. To-day the Powers cannot agree to interveneagainst Bolshevism, which they deem a scourge of the world, nor can theyagree to tolerate it. 

"In these circumstances, what compelling motives can be laid beforethose delegates who are asked to dispense with strategic frontiers andrely upon a league of nations for their defense? Take France's outlook. Peace once concluded, she will be confronted with a secular enemy whonumbers some seventy millions to her forty-five millions. In ten yearsthe disproportion will be still greater. Discontented Russia is almostcertain to be taken in hand by Germany, befriended, reorganized, exploited, and enlisted as an ally. "[341]

Conscious of these reefs and shoals, the French government, which was atfirst contemptuous of the Wilsonian scheme, discerned the use it mightbe put to as a military safeguard, and sought to convert it into that. "The French, " wrote a Francophil English journal published in Paris, "would like the League to maintain what may be called a permanentmilitary general staff. The duties of this organization would be to keepa hawklike eye on the misdemeanors, actual or threatened, of any stateor group of states, and to be empowered with authority to call intoinstant action a great international military force for the frustrationor suppression of such aggression. The French have frankly in mind thepossibility that an unrepentant and unregenerate Germany is the mostlikely menace not only to the security of France, but to the peace ofthe world in general. "[342]

And other states cherished analogous hopes. The spirit of right andjustice was to be evoked like the spirit that served Aladdin, and to becompelled to enter the service of nationalism and militarism, andaccomplish the task of armies. 

The paramount Powers prescribed the sacrifices of sovereignty whichmembership of the League necessitated, and forthwith dispensedthemselves from making them. The United States government maintained itsMonroe Doctrine for America--nay, it went farther and identified itsinterests with the Hay doctrine for the Far East. [343] It decided toconstruct a powerful navy for the defense of these political assets, andto give the youth of the country a semi-military training. [344] Defensepresupposes attack. War, therefore, is not excluded--nay, it is admittedby the world-reformers, and preparations for it are indispensable. Equally so are the burdens of taxation. But if liberty of defense be oneof the rights of two or three Powers, by what law is it confined to themand denied to the others? Why should the other communities beconstrained to remain open to attack? Surely they, too, deserve to liveand thrive, and make the most of their opportunities. Now if in lieu ofa misnamed League of Nations we had an Anglo-Saxon board for the bettergovernment of the world, these unequal weights and measures would beintelligible on the principle that special obligations andresponsibilities warrant exceptional rights. But no such plea can beadvanced under an arrangement professing to be a society of freenations. All that can with truth be said is what M. Clemenceau told thedelegates of the lesser states at the opening of the Conference--thatthe three great belligerents represent twelve million soldiers and thattheir supreme authority derives from that. The rôle of the other peoplesis to listen to the behests of their guardians, and to accept andexecute them without murmur. Might is still a source of right. 

It is fair to say that the disclosure of the true base of the newordering, as blurted out by M. Clemenceau at that historic meeting, caused little surprise among the initiated. For there was no reason toassume that he, or, indeed, the bulk of the continental statesmen, wereconverts to a doctrine of which its own apostle accepted only thosefragments which commended themselves to his country or his party. Hadnot the French Premier scoffed at the League in public as in private?Had he not said in the Chamber: "I do not believe that the Society ofNations constitutes the necessary conclusion of the present war. I willgive you one of my reasons. It is this: if to-morrow you were to proposeto me that Germany should enter into this society I would notconsent. "[345]

"I am certain, " wrote one of the ablest and most ardent champions of theLeague in France, Senator d'Estournelles de Constant--"I am certain thathe [M. Clemenceau] made an effort against himself, against his entirepast, against his whole life, against all his convictions, to serve theSociety of Nations. And his Minister of Foreign Affairs followedhim. "[346] Exactly. And as with M. Clemenceau, so it was with themajority of European statesmen; most of them made strenuous and, onemay add, successful efforts against their convictions. And the resultwas inevitable. 

"The governments, " we read in the organ of syndicalists, who hadsupported Mr. Wilson as long as they believed him determined to redeemhis promises--"the governments have acquiesced in the FourteenPoints. . . . Hypocrisy. Each one cherished mental reservations. Virtue wasexalted and vice practised. The poltroon eulogized heroism; theimperialist lauded the spirit of justice. For the past month we havebeen picking up ideas about the worth of the adhesions to the FourteenPoints, and never before has a more sinister or a more odious comedybeen played. Territorial demands have been heaved one upon the other;contempt of the rights of peoples--the only right that we canrecognize--has been expressed in striking terms; the last restraintshave vanished; the masks have fallen. "[347]

From every country in Europe the same judgment came pitched in varyingkeys. The Italian press condemned the proceedings of the Conference inlanguage to the full as strong as that of the German or Austrianjournals. The _Stampa_ affirmed that those who, like Bissolati, were inthe beginning for placing their trust in one of the two coteries at theConference were guilty of a fatal mistake. "The mistake lay in theirbelief in the ideal strivings of one of the parties, and in the horrorwith which the cupidity of the others was contemplated, whereas both ofthem were fighting for . . . Their interests. . . . In verity France was noless militarist or absolutist than Germany, nor was England less avidthan either. And the proof is enshrined in the peace treaties which havemasked the results of their respective victories. _Versailles is aBrest-Litovsk_, aggravated in the same proportion as the victory of theEntente over Germany, is more complete than was that of Germany overRussia. Cupidity does not alter its character, even when it seeks toconceal itself under a Phrugian cap rather than wear a helmet. "[348]

M. Clemenceau's opening utterance about the twelve million men, and theunlimited right which such formidable armies confer on their possessorsto sit in judgment on the tribes and peoples of the planet, was the truekeynote to the Conference. After that the leading statesmen trimmedtheir ship, touched the rudder, and sailed toward downright absolutism. 

The effect of such utterances and acts on the minds of the peoples aredistinctly mischievous. For they tend to obliterate the sense of publicright, which is the main foundation of international intercourse amongprogressive nations. 

And already it had been shaken and weakened by the campaigns of the pastfifty years, and in particular by the last war. In the relations ofnation to nation there were certain principles--derivatives of ethicsdiluted with maxims of expediency--which kept the various governmentsfrom too flagrant breaches of faith. These checks were the onlysubstitute for morality in politics. Their highest power was connoted bythe word Europeanism, which stood for a supposed feeling of solidarityamong all the peoples of the old Continent, and for a certain respectfor the treaties on which the state-system reposed. But it existedmainly among defeated nations when apprehensive of being isolated orchastised by their victors. None the less, the idea marked a certainadvance toward an ethical bond of union. 

Now this embryonic sense, together with respect for the binding force ofa nation's plighted troth, were numbered by the demoralizing influenceof the wars of the last fifty years. And one of the first and peremptoryneeds of the world was their restoration. This could be effected only bybringing the peoples, not merely of Europe, but of the world, moreclosely together, by engrafting on them a feeling of close solidarity, and impressing them with the necessity of making common cause in the onestruggle worth their while waging--resistance to the forces thatmilitate against human welfare and progress. The feeling was widespreadthat the way to effect this was by some form of internationalism, by thebroadening, deepening, and quickening all that was implied byEuropeanism, by co-ordinating the collective energies of all progressivepeoples, and causing them to converge toward a common and worthy goal. For the working classes this conception in a restricted form had longpossessed a commanding attraction. What they aimed at, however, was nomore than the catholicity of labor. They fancied that after the passageof the tidal wave of destructiveness the ground was cleared of most ofthe obstacles which had encumbered it, and that the forward advancemight begin forthwith. 

What they failed to take sufficiently into account was the _visinertiæ_, the survival of the old spirit among the ruling orders whosemembers continued to live and move in the atmosphere of use and wont, and the spirit of hate and bitterness infused into all the politicalclasses, to dispel which was a herculean task. It was exclusively to theleaders of those classes that Mr. Wilson confided the realization of theabstract idea of a society of nations, which he may at first havepictured to himself as a vast family conscious of common interests, benton moral and material self-betterment, and willing to eschew suchpartial advantages as might hinder or retard the general progress. But, judging by his attitude and his action, he had no real acquaintancewith the materials out of which it must be fashioned, no notion of thedifficulties to be met, and no staying power to encounter and surmountthem. And his first move entailed the failure of the scheme. 

As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilson came to the Conference with a home-madecharter for the Society of Nations, which, according to the evidence ofMr. Lansing, "was never pressed. " The State Secretary added that "thepresent league Covenant is superior to the American plan. " And as forthe Fourteen Points, "They were not even discussed at theConference. "[349] Suspecting as much, I wrote at the time:[350] "ThePresident has pinned himself down to no concrete scheme whatever. Hismethod is electric, choosing what is helpful and beneficent in theprojects of others, and endeavoring to obtain from the dissentients arenunciation of ideas belonging to the old national currents andadherence to the doctrines he deems salutary. It is, however, alreadyclear that the highest ideal now attainable is not a league of nationsas the masses understand it, which will abolish wars and likewise put anend to the costly preparations for them, but only a coalition ofvictorious nations, which may hope, by dint of economic inducements anddeterrents, to draw the enemy peoples into its camp in the not toodistant future. This result would fall very short of the expectationsaroused by the far-resonant promises made at the outset; but even itwill be unattainable without an international compact binding all themembers of the coalition to make war simultaneously upon the nation orgroup of nations which ventures to break the peace. I am disposed tobelieve that nothing less than such an express covenant will be regardedby the continental Powers of the Entente as an adequate substitute forcertain territorial readjustments which they otherwise consideressential to secure them from sudden attack. 

"Whether such a condition would prevent future wars is a question thatonly experience can answer. Personally, I am profoundly convinced, withMr. Taft, that a genuine league of nations must have teeth in the guiseof supernational, not international, forces. In these remarks I makeabstraction from the larger question which wholly absorbs this--namely, whether the masses for whose behoof the lavish expenditure of time, energy, and ingenuity is undertaken, will accept a coalition ofvictorious governments against unregenerate peoples as a substitute forthe Society of Nations as at first conceived. "

The supposed object of the League was the substitution of right forforce, by debarring each individual state from employing violenceagainst any of the others, and by the use of arbitration as a means ofsettling disputes. This entails the suppression of the right to declarewar and to prepare for it, and, as a corollary, a system of deterrentsto hinder, and of penalties to punish rebellion on the part of acommunity. That in those cases where the law is set at naughtefficacious means should be available to enforce it will hardly bedenied; but whether economic pressure would suffice in all cases isdoubtful. To me it seems that without a supernational army, under thedirect orders of the League, it might under conceivable circumstancesbecome impossible to uphold the decisions of the tribunal, and that, onthe other hand, the coexistence of such a military force with nationalarmaments would condemn the undertaking to failure. 

An analysis of the Covenant lies beyond the limits of my task, but itmay not be amiss to point out a few of its inherent defects. One of theprincipal organs of the League will be the Assembly and the Council. Theformer, a very numerous and mainly political body, will necessarily beout of touch with the peoples, their needs and their aspirations. Itwill meet at most three or four times a year. And its members alone willbe invested with all the power, which they will be chary of delegating. On the other hand, the Council, consisting at first of nine members, will meet at least once a year. The members of both bodies willpresumably be appointed by the governments, [351] who will certainly notrenounce their sovereignty in a matter that concerns them so closely. Such a system may be wise and conducive to the highest aims, but it canhardly be termed democratic. The military Powers who command twelvemillion soldiers will possess a majority in the Council. [352] TheSecretariat alone will be permanent, and will naturally be appointed bythe Great Powers. 

Instead of abolishing war, the Conference described its abolition asbeyond the power of man to compass. Disarmament, which was to have beenone of its main achievements, is eliminated from the Covenant. As thewar that was to have been the last will admittedly be followed byothers, the delegates of the Great Powers worked conscientiously, asbehooved patriotic statesmen, to obtain in advance all possibleadvantages for their respective countries by way of preparing for it. The new order, which in theory reposes upon right, justice, and moralfellowship, in reality depends upon powerful armies and navies. Francemust remain under arms, seeing that she has to keep watch on the Rhine. Britain and the United States are to go on building warships andaircraft, besides training their youth for the coming Armageddon. Thearticle of the Covenant which lays it down that "the members of theLeague recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reductionof national armaments to the lowest point consistent with nationalsafety, "[353] is, to use a Russian simile, written on water with a fork. Britain, France, and the United States are already agreed that they willcombine to repel unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. Thatevidently signifies that they will hold themselves in readiness tofight, and will therefore make due preparation. This arrangement is asubstitute for a supernational army, as though prevention were notbetter than cure; that it will prove efficacious in the long run veryfew believe. One clear-visioned Frenchman writes: "The inefficacy of theorganization aimed at by the Conference constrains France to live incontinual and increasing insecurity, owing to the falling off of herpopulation. "[354] He adds: "It follows from this abortive expedient--ifit is to remain definitive--that each member-state must protect itself, or come to terms with the more powerful ones, as in the past. Consequently we are in presence of the maintenance of militarism and therégime of armaments. "[355] This writer goes farther and accuses Mr. Wilson of having played into the hands of Britain. "President Wilson, "he affirms, "has more or less sacrificed to the English government thesociety of nations and the question of armaments, that of the coloniesand that of the freedom of the seas. . . . "[356] This, however, is anover-statement. It was not for the sake of Britain that the Americanstatesman gave up so much; it was for the sake of saving something ofthe Covenant. It was in the spirit of Sir Boyle Roche, whose attachmentto the British Constitution was such that, to save a part of it, he waswilling to sacrifice the whole. 

The arbitration of disputes is provided for by one of the articles ofthe Covenant;[357] but the parties may go to war three months later witha clear conscience and an appeal to right, justice, self-determination, and the usual abstract nouns. 

In a word, the directors of the Conference disciplined their politicalintelligence on lines of self-hypnotization, along which common sensefinds it impossible to follow them. There were also among the delegatesmen who thought and spoke in terms of reason and logic, but their voicesevoked no echo. One of them summed up his criticism somewhat as follows:

"During the war our professions of democratic principles were farresonant and emphatic. We were fighting for the nations of the world, especially for those who could not successfully fight for themselves. All the peoples, great and small, were exhorted to make the most painfulsacrifices to enable their respective governments to conquer the enemy. Victory unexpectedly smiled on us, and the peoples asked that thosepromises should be made good. Naturally, expectations ran high. What hashappened? The governments now answer in effect: 'We will promote yourinterests, but without your co-operation or assent. We will make thenecessary arrangements in secret behind closed doors. The machinery weare devising will be a state machinery, not a popular one. All that weask of you is implicit trust. You complain of our action in the past. You have good cause. You say that the same men are about to determineyour future. Again you are right. But when you affirm that we are sureto make the like mistakes, you are wrong, and we ask you to take ourword for it. You complain that we are politicians who feel the weight ofcertain commitments and the fetters of obsolete traditions from which wecannot free ourselves; that we are mainly concerned to protect andfurther the interests of our respective countries, and that it isinconceivable we should devise an organization which looks above andbeyond those interests. We ask you, are you willing, then, to abandonthe heritage of our fathers to the foreigner?'

"That the downtrodden peoples in Austria and Germany have beenemancipated is a moral triumph. But why has the beneficent principlethat is said to have inspired the deed been restricted in itsapplication? Why has the experiment been tried only in the enemies'countries? Or are things quite in order everywhere else? Is there noinjustice in other quarters of the globe? Are there no complaints? Ifthere be, why are they ignored? Is it because all acts of oppression areto be perpetuated which do not take place in the enemy's land? Whatabout Ireland and about a dozen other countries and peoples? Are theyskeletons not to be touched?

"By debarring the masses from participation in a grandiose scheme, thesuccess of which depends upon their assent, the governments areindirectly but surely encouraging secret combined opposition, and insome cases Bolshevism. The masses resent being treated as children afterhaving been appealed to as arbiters and rescuers. For four and a halfyears it was they who bore the brunt of the war, they who sacrificedtheir sons and their substance. In the future it is they to whom thestates will look for the further sacrifices in blood and treasure whichwill be necessary in the struggles which they evidently anticipate. Well, some of them refuse these sacrifices in advance. They challengethe right of the governments to retain the power of making war andpeace. That power they are working to get into their own hands and towield in their own way, or at any rate to have a say in its exercise. And in order to secure it, some sections of the peoples are makingcommon cause with the socialist revolutionaries, while others have gonethe length of Bolshevism. And that is a serious danger. The agitationnow going on among the people, therefore, starts with a grievance. Themasses have many other grievances besides the one just sketched--thesurvivals of the feudal age, the privileges of class, the inequality ofopportunity. And the kernel formed by these is the element of truth andequity which imparts force to all those underground movements, andenables them to subsist and extend. Error is never dangerous by itself;it is only when it has an admixture of truth that it becomes powerfulfor evil. And it seems a thousand pities that the governments, whose owninterests are at stake, as well as those of the communities they govern, should go out of their way to provide an explosive element forBolshevism and its less sinister variants. "

The League was treated as a living organism before it existed. All theproblems which the Supreme Councilors found insoluble were reserved forits judgment. Arduous functions were allotted to it before it had organsto discharge them. Formidable tasks were imposed upon it before themeans of achieving them were devised. It is an institution so elusiveand elastic that the French regard it as capable of being used as ahandy instrument for coercing the Teutons, who, in turn, look upon it asa means of recovering their place in the world; the Japanese hope it maybecome a bridge leading to racial equality, and the governments whichdevised it are bent on employing it as a lever for their ownpolitico-economic aims, which they identify with the progress of thehuman race. How the peoples look upon it the future will show. 

On the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the League of Nations the lesssaid the soonest mended. But one cannot well say less than this: thatany real society of peoples such as Mr. Wilson first conceived andadvocated is as incompatible with "regional understandings like theMonroe Doctrine" as are the maintenance of national armaments and thebartering of populations. It is immaterial whether one concludes that aSociety of Nations is therefore impossible in the present conjuncture orthat all those survivals of the old state system are obsolescent andshould be abolished. The two are unquestionably irreconcilable. 

It would be a mistake to infer from the unanimity with which Mr. Wilson's Covenant was finally accepted that it expressed the delegates'genuine conceptions or sentiments. Mr. Bullitt, one of the expertadvisers to the American Peace Delegation, testified before the Senatecommittee in Washington that State-Secretary Lansing remarked to him: "Iconsider the League of Nations at present as entirely useless. The GreatPowers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France, in particular, have gotten out of the Treatyeverything they wanted. The League of Nations can do nothing to alterany unjust clauses of the Treaty except by the unanimous consent of theLeague members. The Great Powers will never consent to changes in theinterests of weaker peoples. "[358]

This opinion which Mr. Bullitt ascribed to Mr. Lansing was, to myknowledge, that of a large number of the representatives of the nationsat the Conference. Among them all I have met very few who had a goodword to say of the scheme, and of the few one had helped to formulateit, another had assisted him. And the unfavorable judgments of theremainder were delivered after the Covenant was signed. 

One of those leaders, in conversation with several other delegates andmyself, exclaimed one day: "The League of Nations indeed! It is anabsurdity. Who among thinking men believes in its reality?" "I do, "answered his neighbor; "but, like the devils, I believe and tremble. Ihold that it is a corrosive poison which destroys much that is good andwill further much that is bad. " A statesman who was not a delegatedemurred. "In my opinion, " he said, "it is a response to a demand putforward by the peoples of the globe, and because of this originsomething good will ultimately come of it. Unquestionably it is verydefective, but in time it may be--nay, must be--changed for the better. "The first speaker replied: "If you imagine that the League will helpcontinental peoples, you are, I am convinced, mistaken. It took theUnited States three years to go to the help of Britain and France. Howlong do you suppose it will take her to mobilize and despatch troops tosuccor Poland, Rumania, or Czechoslovakia? I am acquainted with Britishcolonial public opinion and sentiment--too often misunderstood byforeigners--and I can tell you that they are misconstrued by those whofancy that they would determine action of that kind. If England tellsthe colonies that she needs their help, they will come, because theirpeople are flesh of her flesh and blood of her blood, and also becausethey depend for their defense upon her navy, and if she were to go underthey would go under, too. But the continental nations have no suchclaims upon the British colonies, which would not be in a hurry to makesacrifices in order to satisfy their appetites or their passions. "

The second speaker then said: "It is possible, but nowise certain, thatthe future League may help to settle these disputes which professionaldiplomatists would have arranged, and in the old way, but it will notaffect those others which are the real causes of wars. If a nationbelieves it can further its vital interest by breaking the peace, theLeague cannot stop it. How could it? It lacks the means. There will beno army ready. It would have to create one. Even now, when such an army, powerful and victorious, is in the field, the League--for the SupremeCouncil is that and more--cannot get its orders obeyed. How then willits behest be treated when it has no troops at its beck and call? It isredrawing the map of central and eastern Europe, and is very satisfiedwith its work. But, as we know, the peoples of those countries look uponits map as a sheet of paper covered with lines and blotches of color towhich no reality corresponds. "

The constitution of the League was termed by Mr. Wilson a Covenant, aword redolent of biblical and puritanical times, which accorded wellwith the motives that decided him to prefer Geneva to Brussels as theseat of the League, and to adopt other measures of a supposed politicalcharacter. The first draft of this document was, as we saw, completed inthe incredibly short space of some thirty hours, so as to enable thePresident to take it with him to Washington. As the Ententophil _Echo deParis_ remarked, "By a fixed date the merchandise has to be consigned onboard the _George Washington_. "[359]

The discussions that took place after the President's return from theUnited States were animated, interesting, and symptomatic. In April thecommission had several sittings, at which various amendments andalterations were proposed, some of which would cut deep intointernational relations, while others were of slight moment and gaverise to amusing sallies. One day the proposal was mooted that eachmember-state should be free to secede on giving two years' notice. M. Larnaude, who viewed membership as something sacramentally inalienable, seemed shocked, as though the suggestion bordered on sacrilege, andwondered how any government should feel tempted to take such a step. Signor Orlando was of a different opinion. "However precious theprivilege of membership may be, " he said, "it would be a comfort alwaysto know that you could divest yourself of it at will. I am shut up in myroom all day working. I do not go into the open air any oftener than aprisoner might. But I console myself with the thought that I can go outwhenever I take it into my head. And I am sure a similar reflection onmembership of the League would be equally soothing. I am in favor of themotion. "

The center of interest during the drafting of the Covenant lay in theclause proclaiming the equality of religions, which Mr. Wilson was benton having passed at all costs, if not in one form, then in another. Thisis one example of the occasional visibility of the religious threadwhich ran through a good deal of his personal work at the Conference. For it is a fact--not yet realized even by the delegatesthemselves--that distinctly religious motives inspired much that wasdone by the Conference on what seemed political or social grounds. Thestrategy adopted by the eminent American statesman to have hisstipulation accepted proceeded in this case on the lines of ahumanitarian resolve to put an end to sanguinary wars rather than onthose which the average reformer, bent on cultural progress, would havetraced. Actuality was imparted to this simple and yet thorny topic by aconcrete proposal which the President made one day. What he is reportedto have said is briefly this: "As the treatment of religious confessionshas been in the past, and may again in the future be, a cause ofsanguinary wars, it seems desirable that a clause should be introducedinto the Covenant establishing absolute liberty for creeds andconfessions. " "On what, Mr. President, " asked the first Polish delegate, "do you found your assertion that wars are still brought about by thedifferential treatment meted out to religions? Does contemporaryhistory bear out this statement? And, if not, what likelihood is therethat religious inequality will precipitate sanguinary conflicts in thefuture?" To this pointed question Mr. Wilson is said to have made thecharacteristic reply that he considered it expedient to assume thisnexus between religious inequality and war as the safest way of bringingthe matter forward. If he were to proceed on any other lines, he added, there would be truth and force in the objection which would doubtless beraised, that the Conference was intruding upon the domestic affairs ofsovereign states. As that charge would damage the cause, it must berebutted in advance. And for this purpose he deemed it prudent toapproach the subject from the side he had chosen. 

This reply was listened to in silence and unfavorably commented uponlater. The alleged relation between such religious inequality as hassurvived into the twentieth century and such wars as are waged nowadaysis so obviously fictitious that one can hardly understand the line ofreasoning that led to its assumption, or the effect which the fictioncould be supposed to have on the minds of those legislators who might beopposed to the measure on the ground that it involved undue interferencein the internal affairs of sovereign states. The motion was referred toa commission, which in due time presented a report. Mr. Wilson wasabsent when the report came up for discussion, his place being taken byColonel House. The atmosphere was chilly, only a couple of the delegatesbeing disposed to support the clause--Rumania's representative, M. Diamandi, was one, and another was Baron Makino, whose help ColonelHouse would gladly have dispensed with, so inacceptable was thecondition it carried with it. 

Baron Makino said that he entirely agreed with Colonel House and theAmerican delegates. The equality of religious confessions was not merelydesirable, but necessary to the smooth working of a Society of Nationssuch as they were engaged in establishing. He held, however, that itshould be extended to races, that extension being also a corollary ofthe principle underlying the new international ordering. He wouldtherefore move the insertion of a clause proclaiming the equality ofraces and religions. At this Colonel House looked pensive. Nearly allthe other opinions were hostile to Colonel House's motion. 

The reasons alleged by each of the dissenting lawgivers wereinteresting. Lord Robert Cecil surprised many of his colleagues byinforming them that in England the Catholics, who are fairly treated asthings are, could not possibly be set on a footing of perfect equalitywith their Protestant fellow-citizens, because the Constitution forbidsit. Nor could the British people be asked to alter their Constitution. He gave as instances of the slight inequality at present enforced thecircumstance that no Catholic can ascend the throne as monarch, nor siton the woolsack as Lord Chancellor in the Upper House. 

M. Larnaude, speaking in the name of France, stated that his country hadpassed through a sequence of embarrassments caused by legislation on therelations between the Catholics and the state, and that the introductionof a clause enacting perfect equality might revive controversies whichwere happily losing their sharpness. He considered it, therefore, inadvisable to settle this delicate matter by inserting the proposeddeclaration in the Covenant. Belgium's first delegate, M. Hymans, pointed out that the objection taken by his government was of adifferent but equally cogent character. There was reason to apprehendthat the Flemings might avail themselves of the equality clause to raiseawkward issues and to sow seeds of dissension. On those grounds hewould like to see the proposal waived. Signor Orlando half seriously, half jokingly, reminded his colleagues that none of their countries had, like his, a pope in their capital. The Italian government must, therefore, proceed in religious matters with the greatestcircumspection, and could not lightly assent to any measure capable ofbeing manipulated to the detriment of the public interest. Hence he wasunable to give the motion his support. It was finally suggested thatboth proposals be withdrawn. To this Colonel House demurred, on theground that President Wilson, who was unavoidably absent, attached verygreat weight to the declaration, to which he hoped the delegates wouldgive their most favorable consideration. One of the members then roseand said, "In that case we had better postpone the voting until Mr. Wilson can attend. " This suggestion was adopted. When the matter came upfor discussion at a subsequent sitting, the Japanese substituted"nations" for "races. "

In the meantime the usual arts of parliamentary emergency were practisedoutside the Conference to induce the Japanese to withdraw their proposalaltogether. They were told that to accept or refuse it would be todamage the cause of the future League without furthering their own. Butthe Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino refused to yield an inch of theirground. A conversation then took place between the Premier of Australia, on the one side, and Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, on the other, with a view to their reaching a compromise. For Mr. Hughes wasunderstood to be the leader of those who opposed any declaration ofracial equality. The Japanese statesmen showed him their amendment, andasked him whether he could suggest a modification that would satisfyhimself and them. The answer was in the negative. To the arguments ofthe Japanese delegates the Australian Premier is understood to havereplied: "I am willing to admit the equality of the Japanese as anation, and also of individuals man to man. But I do not admit theconsequence that we should throw open our country to them. It is notthat we hold them to be inferior to ourselves, but simply that we do notwant them. Economically they are a perturbing factor, because theyaccept wages much below the minimum for which our people are willing towork. Neither do they blend well with our people. Hence we do not wantthem to marry our women. Those are my reasons. We mean no offense. Ourrestrictive legislation is not aimed specially at the Japanese. Britishsubjects in India are affected by it in exactly the same way. It isimpossible that we should formulate any modifications of your amendment, because there is no modification conceivable that would satisfy usboth. "

The Japanese delegates were understood to say that they would maintaintheir motion, and that unless it passed they would not sign thedocument. Mr. Hughes retorted that if it should pass he would refuse tosign. Finally the Australian Premier asked Baron Makino whether he wouldbe satisfied with the following qualifying proviso: "This affirmation ofthe principle of equality is not to be applied to immigration ornationalization. " Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda both answered in thenegative and withdrew. 

The final act[360] is described by eye-witnesses as follows. Congruouslywith the order of the day, President Wilson having moved that the cityof Geneva be selected as the capital of the future League, obtained amajority, whereupon he announced that the motion had passed. 

Then came the burning question of the equality of nations. [361] ThePolish delegate arose and opposed it on the formal ground that nothingought to be inserted in the preamble which was not dealt with also inthe body of the Covenant, as otherwise it would be no more than anisolated theory devoid of organic connection with the whole. TheJapanese delegates delivered speeches of cogent argument and impressivedebating power. Baron Makino made out a very strong case for theequality of nations. Viscount Chinda followed in a trenchant discourse, which was highly appreciated by his hearers, nearly all of whomrecognized the justice of the Japanese claim. The Japanese delegatesrefused to be dazzled by the circumstances that Japan was to berepresented on the Executive Council as one of the five Great Powers, and that the rejection of the proposed amendment could not therefore beconstrued as a diminution of her prestige. This consideration, theyretorted, was wholly irrelevant to the question whether or no thenations were to be recognized as equal. They ended by refusing towithdraw their modified amendment and calling for a vote. The result wasa majority for the amendment. Mr. Wilson thereupon announced that amajority was insufficient to justify its adoption, and that nothing lessthan absolute unanimity could be regarded as adequate. At this adelegate objected: "Mr. Wilson, you have just accepted a majority foryour own motion respecting Geneva; on what grounds, may I ask, do yourefuse to abide by a majority vote on the amendment of the Japanesedelegation?" "The two cases are different, " was the reply. "On thesubject of the seat of the League unanimity is unattainable. " Thisclosed the official discussion. 

Some time later, it is asserted, the Rumanians, who had supported Mr. Wilson's motion on religious equality, were approached on the subject, and informed that it would be agreeable to the American delegates tohave the original proposal brought up once more. Such a motion, it wasadded, would come with especial propriety from the Rumanians, who, inthe person of M. Diamandi, had advocated it from the outset. But theRumanian delegates hesitated, pleading the invincible opposition of theJapanese. They were assured, however, that the Japanese would no longerdiscountenance it. Thereupon they broached the matter to Lord RobertCecil, but he, with his wonted caution, replied that it was a delicatesubject to handle, especially after the experience they had already had. As for himself, he would rather leave the initiative to others. Couldthe Rumanian delegates not open their minds to Colonel House, who tookthe amendment so much to heart? They acted on this suggestion and calledon Colonel House. He, too, however, declared that it was a momentous aswell as a thorny topic, and for that reason had best be referred to thehead of the American delegation. President Wilson, having originated theamendment, was the person most qualified to take direct action. It isfurther affirmed that they sounded the President as to the advisabilityof mooting the question anew, but that he declined to face another vote, and the matter was dropped for good--in that form. 

It was publicly asserted later on that the Japanese decided to abide bythe rejection of their amendment and to sign the Covenant as the resultof a bargain on the Shantung dispute. This report, however, waspulverized by the Japanese delegation, which pointed out that theintroduction of the racial clause was decided upon before the delegatesleft Japan, and when no difficulties were anticipated respectingJapan's claim to have that province ceded to her by Germany, and thatthe discussion on the amendment terminated on April 11th, consequentlybefore the Kiaochow issue came up for discussion. As a matter of fact, the Japanese publicly announced their intention to adhere to the Leagueof Nations two days[362] before a decision was reached respecting theirclaims to Kiaochow. 

This adverse note on Mr. Wilson's pet scheme to have religious equalityproclaimed as a means of hindering sanguinary wars brought to its climaxthe reaction of the Conference against what it regarded as a systematicendeavor to establish the overlordship of the Anglo-Saxon peoples in theworld. The plea that wars may be provoked by such religious inequalityas still survives was so unreal that it awakened a twofold suspicion inthe minds of many of Mr. Wilson's colleagues. Most of them believed thata pretext was being sought to enable the leading Powers to intervene inthe domestic concerns of all the other states, so as to keep them firmlyin hand, and use them as means to their own ends. And these ends werelooked upon as anything but disinterested. Unhappily this conviction wassubsequently strengthened by certain of the measures decreed by theSupreme Council between April and the close of the Conference. Themisgivings of other delegates turned upon a matter which at first sightmay appear so far removed from any of the pressing issues of thetwentieth century as to seem wholly imaginary. They feared that areligious--some would call it racial--bias lay at the root of Mr. Wilson's policy. It may seem amazing to some readers, but it is none theless a fact that a considerable number of delegates believed that thereal influences behind the Anglo-Saxon peoples were Semitic. 

They confronted the President's proposal on the subject of religiousinequality, and, in particular, the odd motive alleged for it, with themeasures for the protection of minorities which he subsequently imposedon the lesser states, and which had for their keynote to satisfy theJewish elements in eastern Europe. And they concluded that the sequenceof expedients framed and enforced in this direction were inspired by theJews, assembled in Paris for the purpose of realizing their carefullythought-out program, which they succeeded in having substantiallyexecuted. However right or wrong these delegates may have been, it wouldbe a dangerous mistake to ignore their views, seeing that they havesince become one of the permanent elements of the situation. The formulainto which this policy was thrown by the members of the Conference, whose countries it affected, and who regarded it as fatal to the peaceof eastern Europe, was this: "Henceforth the world will be governed bythe Anglo-Saxon peoples, who, in turn, are swayed by their Jewishelements. "

It is difficult to convey an adequate notion of the warmth offeeling--one might almost call it the heat of passion--which thissupposed discovery generated. The applications of the theory to many ofthe puzzles of the past were countless and ingenious. The illustrationsof the manner in which the policy was pursued, and the cajolery andthreats which were said to have been employed in order to insure itssuccess, covered the whole history of the Conference, and presented itthrough a new and possibly distorted medium. The morbid suspicionscurrent may have been the natural vein of men who had passed a greatpart of their lives in petty racial struggles; but according to commonaccount, it was abundantly nurtured at the Conference by the lack ofreserve and moderation displayed by some of the promoters of theminority clauses who were deficient in the sense of measure. What theEastern delegates said was briefly this: "The tide in our countries wasflowing rapidly in favor of the Jews. All the east European governmentswhich had theretofore wronged them were uttering their _mea culpa_, andhad solemnly promised to turn over a new leaf. Nay, they had alreadyturned it. We, for example, altered our legislation in order to meet byanticipation the legitimate wishes of the Conference and the pressingdemands of the Jews. We did quite enough to obviate decrees which mightimpair our sovereignty or lessen our prestige. Poland and Rumania issuedlaws establishing absolute equality between the Jews and their ownnationals. All discrimination had ceased. Immigrant Hebrews from Russiareceived the full rights of citizenship and became entitled to fill anyoffice in the state. In a word, all the old disabilities were abolishedand the fervent prayer of east European governments was that the Jewishmembers of their respective communities should be gradually assimilatedto the natives and become patriotic citizens like them. It was a newideal. It accorded to the Jews everything they had asked for. It wouldenable them to show themselves as the French, Italian, and Belgian Jewshad shown themselves, efficient citizens of their adopted countries. 

"But in the flush of their triumph, the Jews, or rather their spokesmenat the Conference, were not satisfied with equality. What they demandedwas inequality to the detriment of the races whose hospitality they wereenjoying and to their own supposed advantage. They were to have the samerights as the Rumanians, the Poles, and the other peoples among whomthey lived, but they were also to have a good deal more. Their religiousautonomy was placed under the protection of an alien body, the League, which is but another name for the Powers which have reserved tothemselves the governance of the world. The method is to oblige each ofthe lesser states to bestow on each minority the same rights as themajority enjoys, and also certain privileges over and above. Theinstrument imposing this obligation is a formal treaty with the GreatPowers which the Poles, Rumanians, and other small states were summonedto sign. It contains twenty-one articles. The first part of the documentdeals with minorities generally, the latter with the Jewish elements. The second clause of the Polish treaty enacts that every individual whohabitually resided in Poland on August 1, 1914, becomes a citizenforthwith. This is simple. Is it also satisfactory? Many Frenchmen andPoles doubt it, as we do ourselves. On August 1st numerous German andAustrian agents and spies, many of them Hebrews, resided habitually inPoland. Moreover, the foreign Jewish elements there, which haveimmigrated from Russia, having lost--like everybody else before thewar--the expectation of seeing Polish independence ever restored, haddefinitely thrown in their lot with the enemies of Poland. Now to putinto the hands of such enemies constitutional weapons is already asacrifice and a risk. The Jews in Vilna recently voted solidly againstthe incorporation of that city in Poland. [363] Are they to be treated asloyal Polish citizens? We have conceded the point unreservedly. But togive them autonomy over and above, to create a state within the state, and enable its subjects to call in foreign Powers at every hand's turn, against the lawfully constituted authorities--that is an expedient whichdoes not commend itself to the newly emancipated peoples. "

The Rumanian Premier Bratiano, whose conspicuous services to the Alliedcause entitled him to a respectful hearing, delivered a powerfulspeech[364] before the delegates assembled in plenary session on thisquestion of protecting ethnic and religious minorities. He coveredground unsurveyed by the framers of the special treaties, and hissincere tone lent weight to his arguments. Starting from the postulatethat the strength of latter-day states depends upon the widestparticipation of all the elements of the population in the government ofthe country, he admitted the peremptory necessity of abolishinginvidious distinctions between the various elements of the populationthere, ethnic or religious. So far, he was at one with the spokesmen ofthe Great Powers. Rumania, however, had already accomplished this by thedecree enabling her Jews to acquire full citizenship by expressing themere desire according to a simple formula. This act confers the fullrights of Rumanian citizens upon eight hundred thousand Jews. The Jewishpress of Bucharest had already given utterance to its entiresatisfaction. If, however, the Jews are now to be placed in a specialcategory, differentiated and kept apart from their fellow-citizens byhaving autonomous institutions, by the maintenance of the German-Yiddishdialect, which keeps alive the Teuton anti-Rumanian spirit, and by beingauthorized to regard the Rumanian state as an inferior tribunal, fromwhich an appeal always lies to a foreign body--the government of theGreat Powers--this would be the most invidious of all distinctions, andcalculated to render the assimilation of the German-Yiddish-speakingJews to their Rumanian fellow-citizens a sheer impossibility. Themajority and the minority would then be systematically and definitelyestranged from each other; and, seeing this, the elemental instincts ofthe masses might suddenly assume untoward forms, which the treaty, ifratified, would be unavailing to prevent. But, however baneful for thepopulation, foreign protection is incomparably worse for the state, because it tends to destroy the cement that holds the government andpeople together, and ultimately to bring about disintegration. A classicexample of this process of disruption is Russia's well-meant protectionof the persecuted Christians in Turkey. In this case the motive wasadmirable, the necessity imperative, but the result was thedismemberment of Turkey and other changes, some of which one would liketo forget. 

The delegation of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Poland upheld M. Bratiano's contentions in brief, pithy speeches. President Wilson'slengthy rejoinder, delivered with more than ordinary sweetness, deprecated M. Bratiano's comparison of the Allies' proposed interventionwith Russia's protection of the Christians of Turkey, and representedthe measure as emanating from the purest kindness. He said that theGreat Powers were now bestowing national existence or extensiveterritories upon the interested states, actually guaranteeing theirfrontiers, and therefore making themselves responsible for permanenttranquillity there. But the treatment of the minorities, he added, unless fair and considerate, might produce the gravest troubles and evenprecipitate wars. Therefore it behooved the Powers in the interests ofall Europe, as of each of its individual members, to secure harmoniousrelations, and, at any rate, to remove all manifest obstacles to theirestablishment. "We guarantee your frontiers and your territories. Thatmeans that we will send over arms, ships, and men, in case of necessity. Therefore we possess the right and recognize the duty to hinder thesurvival of a set of deplorable conditions which would render thisintervention unavoidable. "

To this line of reasoning M. Bratiano made answer that all the helpfulmaxims of good government are of universal application, and, therefore, if this protection of minorities were, indeed, indispensable ordesirable, it should not be restricted to the countries of easternEurope, but should be extended to all without exception. For it isinadmissible that two categories of states should be artificiallycreated, one endowed with full sovereignty and the other withhalf-sovereignty. Such an arrangement would destroy the equality whichshould lie at the base of a genuine League of Nations. 

But the Powers had made up their minds, and the special treaties wereimposed on the unwilling governments. Thereupon the Rumanian Premierwithdrew from the Conference, and neither his Cabinet nor that of theJugoslavs signed the treaty with Austria at St. -Germain. 

What happened after that is a matter of history. 

Few politicians are conscious of the magnitude of the issue concealed bythe involved diplomatic phraseology of the obnoxious treaties, or of thedangers to which their enactment will expose the minorities which theywere framed to protect, the countries whose hospitality those minoritiesenjoy, and possibly other lands, which for the time being are seeminglyimmune from all such perilous race problems. The calculable, to saynothing of the unascertained, elements of the question might well causeresponsible statesmen to be satisfied with the feasible. The Jewishelements in Europe, for centuries abominably oppressed, were justifiedin utilizing to the fullest the opportunity presented by theresettlement of the world in order to secure equality of treatment. Andit must be admitted that their organization is marvelous. For years Ichampioned their cause in Russia, and paid the penalty under thegovernments of Alexander II and III. [365] The sympathy of everyunbiased man, to whatever race or religion he may belong, will naturallygo out to a race or a nation which is trodden underfoot, as were theill-starred Jews of Russia ever since the partition of Poland. Butequality one would have thought sufficient to meet the grievance. Fullequality without reservation. That was the view taken by numerous Jewsin Poland and Rumania, several of whom called on me in Paris and urgedme to give public utterance to their hopes that the Conference wouldrest satisfied with equality and to their fear of the consequences of anattempt to establish a privileged status. Why this position should existonly in eastern Europe and not elsewhere, why it should not be extendedto other races with larger minorities in other countries, are questionsto which a satisfactory response could be given only by farther-reachingand fateful changes in the legislation of the world. 

One of the statesmen of eastern Europe made a forcible appeal to havethe minority clauses withdrawn. He took the ground that the principalaim pursued in conferring full rights on the Jews who dwell among us isto remove the obstacles that prevent them from becoming true and loyalcitizens of the state, as their kindred are in France, Italy, Britain, and elsewhere. "If it is reasonable, " he said, "that they should demandall the rights possessed by their Rumanian and Polish fellow-subjects, it is equally fair that they should take over and fulfil the correlateduties, as does the remainder of the population. For the gradualassimilation of all the ethnic elements of the community is our ideal, as it is the ideal of the French, English, Italian, and other states. 

"Isolation and particularism are the negative of that ideal, and operatelike a piece of iron or wood in the human body which produces ulcerationand gangrene. All our institutions should therefore be calculated toencourage assimilation. If we adopt the opposite policy, we inevitablyalienate the privileged from the unprivileged sections of the community, generate enmity between them, cause endless worries to theadministration and paralyze in advance our best-intentioned endeavors tofuse the various ethnic ingredients of the nation into a homogeneouswhole. 

"This argument applies as fully to the other national fragments in ourmidst as to the Jews. It is manifest, therefore, that the one certainresult of the minority clause will be to impose domestic enemies on eachof the states that submits to it, and that it can commend itself only tothose who approve the maxim, _Divide et impera_. 

"It also entails the noteworthy diminution of the sovereignty of thestate. We are to be liable to be haled before a foreign tribunalwhenever one of our minorities formulates a complaint against us. [366]How easily, nay, how wickedly such complaints were filed of late may beinferred from the heartrending accounts of pogroms in Poland, which havesince been shown by the Allies' own confidential envoys to be utterlyfictitious. Again, with whom are we to make the obnoxious stipulations?With the League of Nations? No. We are to bind ourselves toward theGreat Powers, who themselves have their minorities which complain invain of being continually coerced. Ireland, Egypt, and the negroes arethree striking examples. None of their delegates were admitted to theConference. If the principle which those Great Powers seek to enforce beworth anything, it should be applied indiscriminately to all minorities, not restricted to those of the smaller states, who already havedifficulties enough to contend against. "

The trend of continental opinion was decidedly opposed to this policy ofcontinuous control and periodic intervention. It would be unfruitful toquote the sharp criticisms of the status of the negroes in the UnitedStates. [367] But it will not be amiss to cite the views of two moderateFrench publicists who have ever been among the most fervent advocates ofthe Allied cause. Their comments deal with one of the articles[368] ofthe special Minority Treaty which Poland has had to sign. It runs thus:"Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes aviolation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under anydisability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or toperform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision, however, shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon allother Polish citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defense, or the preservation of public order. 

"Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permittingelections, whether general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor willregistration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to beperformed on a Saturday. "

M. Gauvain writes: "One may put the question, why respect for theSabbath is so peremptorily imposed when Sunday is ignored among severalof the Allied Powers. In France Christians are not dispensed fromappearing on Sundays before the assize courts. Besides, Poland isfurther obliged not to order or authorize elections on a Saturday. Whatprecautions these are in favor of the Jewish religion as compared withthe legislation of many Allied states which have no such ordinances infavor of Catholicism! Is the same procedure to be adopted toward theMoslems? Shall we behold the famous Mussulmans of India, so opportunelydrawn from the shade by Mr. Montagu, demanding the insertion of clausesto protect Islam? Will the Zionists impose their dogmas in Palestine? Isthe life of a nation to be suspended two, three, or four days a week inorder that religious laws may be observed? Catholicism has adapteditself in practice to laic legislation and to the exigencies of modernlife. It may well seem that Judaism in Poland could do likewise. InRumania, the Jews met with no obstacle to the exercise of theirreligion. Indeed, they had contrived in the localities to the north ofMoldavia, where they formed a majority, to impose their own customs onthe rest of the population. Jewish guardians of toll-bridges are knownto have barred the passage of these bridges on Saturdays, because, onthe one hand, their religion forbade them to accept money on that day, and, on the other hand, they could allow no one to pass without paying. The Big Four might have given their attention to matters more useful ormore pressing than enforcing respect for the Sabbath. 

"It is comprehensible that M. Bratiano should have refused to accept inadvance the conditions which the Four or the Five may dictate in favorof ethnic and religious minorities. Rumania before the war was a freecountry governed congruously with the most modern principles. Therestrictions which she had enacted respecting foreigners in general, andwhich were on the point of being repealed, did not exceed those whichthe United States and the Dominion of Australia still apply withremarkable tenacity. Why should the Cabinets of London and Washingtontake so much to heart the lot of ethnic and religious minorities incertain European countries while they themselves refuse to admit in theCovenant of the Society of Nations the principle of the equality ofraces? Their conduct is awakening among the states 'whose interests arelimited' the belief that they are the victims of an arbitrary policy. And that is not without danger. "[369]

Another eminent Frenchman, M. Denis Cochin, who until quite recently wasa Cabinet Minister, wrote: "The Conference, by imposing laws in favor ofminorities, has uselessly and unjustly offended our allies. These lawsoblige them to respect the usages of the Jews, to maintain schools forthem. . . . I have spent a large part of my career in demanding for FrenchCatholics exactly that which the Conference imposes elsewhere. TheCatholics pay taxes in money and taxes in blood. And yet there is nobudget for those schools in which their religion is taught; no libertyfor those schoolmasters who wear the ecclesiastical habit. I have seen adoctor in letters, fellow of the university, driven from his classbecause he was a Marist brother and did not choose to repudiate thevocation of his youth. He died of grief. I have seen young priests, after the long, laborious preparation necessary before they could takepart in the competition for a university fellowship, thrust aside at thelast moment and debarred from the competition because they wore the garbof priests. Yet a year later they were soldiers. I have seen FatherSchell presented unanimously by the Institute and the Professional Corpsas worthy to receive a chair at the Collège de France, and refused bythe Minister. Yet I hereby affirm that if foreigners, even though theywere allies, even friends, were to meddle with imposing on us theabrogation of these iniquitous laws, my protest would be upliftedagainst them, together with that of M. Combes. [370] I would exclaim, like Sganarelle's wife, 'And what if I wish to be beaten?' I holdtyranny in horror, but I hold foreign intervention in greater horrorstill. Let us combat bad laws with all our strength, but amongourselves. "[371]

The minority treaties tend to transform each of the states on which itis imposed into a miniature Balkans, to keep Europe in continuousturmoil and hinder the growth of the new and creative ideas from whichalone one could expect that union of collective energy with individualfreedom which is essential to peace and progress. Modern history affordsno more striking example of the force of abstract bias over theteachings of experience than this amateur legislation which isscattering seeds of mischief and conflict throughout Europe. 

 * * * * *

Casting a final glance at the results of the Conference, it would beungracious not to welcome as a precious boon the destruction of Prussianmilitarism, a consummation which we owe to the heroism of the armiesrather than to the sagacity of the lawgivers in Paris. The restorationof a Polish state and the creation or extension of the other freecommunities at the expense of the Central Empires are also most welcomechanges, which, however, ought never to have been marred by thedisruptive wedge of the minority legislation. Again, although the Leagueis a mill whose sails uselessly revolve, because it has no corn togrind, the mere fact that the necessity of internationalism was solemnlyproclaimed as the central idea of the new ordering, and that an effort, however feeble, was put forth to realize it in the shape of a covenantof social and moral fellowship, marks an advance from which there can beno retrogression. 

Actuality was thereby imparted to the idea, which is destined to remainin the forefront of contemporary politics until the peoples themselvesembody it in viable institutions. What the delegates failed to realizeis the truth that a program of a league is not a league. 

On the debit side much might be added to what has already been said. Theimportant fact to bear in mind--which in itself calls for neither praisenor blame--is that the world-parliament was at bottom an Anglo-Saxonassembly whose language, political conceptions, self-esteem, anddisregard of everything foreign were essentially English. When speaking, the faces of the principal delegates were turned toward the future, andwhen acting they looked toward the past. As a thoroughly English pressorgan, when alluding to the League of Nations, puts it: "We have donehomage to that entrancing ideal by spatchcocking the Convention into theTreaty. There it remains as a finger-post to point the way to a newheaven on earth. But we observe that the Treaty itself is a good oldeighteenth-century piece, drawing its inspiration from mundane andpractical considerations, and paying a good deal more than lip serviceto the principle of the balance of power. "[372]

That is a fair estimate of the work achieved by the delegates. But theysinned in their way of doing it. If they had deliberately andprofessedly aimed at these results, and had led the world to look fornone other, most of the criticisms to which they have renderedthemselves open would be pointless. But they raised hopes which theyrefused to realize, they weakened if they did not destroy faith inpublic treaties, they intensified distrust and race hatred throughoutthe world, they poured strong dissolvents upon every state on theEuropean Continent, and they stirred up fierce passions in Russia, andthen left that ill-starred nation a prey to unprecedented anarchy. In aword, they gathered up all the widely scattered explosives ofimperialism, nationalism, and internationalism, and, having added totheir destructiveness, passed them on to the peoples of the world asrepresented by the League of Nations. Some of them deplored the mess inwhich they were leaving the nations, without, however, admitting thecausal nexus between it and their own achievements. 

General Smuts, before quitting Paris for South Africa, frankly admittedthat the Peace Treaty will not give us the real peace which the peopleshoped for, and that peace-making would not begin until after the signingof the Treaty. The _Echo de Paris_ wrote: "As for us, we never believedin the Society of Nations. "[373] And again: "The Society of Nations isnow but a bladder, and nobody would venture to describe it as alantern. "[374] The Bolshevist dictator Lenin termed it "an organizationto loot the world. "[375]

The Allies themselves are at sixes and sevens. The French are suspiciousof the British. A large section of the American people is profoundlydissatisfied with the part played by the English and the French at theConference; Italy is stung to the quick by the treatment she receivedfrom France, Britain, and the United States; Rumania loathes the verynames of those for whom she staked her all and sacrificed so much; inPoland and Belgium the English have lost the consideration which theyenjoyed before the Conference; the Greeks are wroth with the Americandelegates; the majority of Russians literally execrate their ex-Alliesand turn to the Germans and the Japanese. 

"The resettlement of central Europe, " writes an American journal, [376]"is not being made for the tranquillity of the liberated principles, but for the purposes of the Great Powers, among whom France is theactive, and America and Britain the passive, partners. In Germany itspurpose is the permanent elimination of the German nation as a factor inEuropean politics. . . . We cannot save Europe by playing the sinister gamenow being played. There is no peace, no order, no security in it. . . . What it can do is to aggravate the mischief and intensify the schisms. "

A distinguished American, who is a consistent friend of England, [377] ina review article affirmed that the proposed League of Nations is slowlyundermining the Anglo-American Entente. "There is in America a growingsense of irritation that she should be forever entangled in thespider-web of European politics. " . . . And if the Senate in the supposedinterests of peace should ratify the League, he adds, "In my judgment nogreater harm could result to Anglo-American unity than such reluctantconsent. "[378]

Some of Mr. Wilson's fellow-countrymen who gave him their whole-heartedsupport when he undertook to establish a régime of right and justice sumup the result of his labors in Paris as follows:[379]

"His solemn warning against special alliances emerged as a specialalliance with Britain and France. His repeated condemnations of secrettreaties emerges as a recognition that 'they could not honorably bebrushed aside, ' even though they conflicted with equally binding publicengagements entered into after they had been written. Openly arrived atcovenants were not openly arrived at. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers was applied to German barriers, andaccompanied by the blockade of a people with whom we have never been atwar. The adequate guaranties to be given and taken as respects armamentswere taken from Germany and given to no one. The 'unhampered andunembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her ownpolitical development' promised to Russia, and defined as the 'acidtest, ' has been worked out by Mr. Wilson and others to a point where socautious a man as Mr. Asquith says he regards it with 'bewilderment andapprehension. ' The righting of the wrong done in 1871 emerges as aconcealed annexation of the boundary of 1814. The 'clearly recognizablelines of nationality' which Italy was to obtain has been wheedled intoannexations which have moved Viscount Bryce to denounce them. 'Thefreest opportunity of autonomous development' promised the peoples ofAustria-Hungary failed to define the Austrians as peoples. . . . "

Whatever the tests one applies to the work of the Conference--ethical, social, or political--they reveal it as a factor eminently calculated tosap high interests, to weaken the moral nerve of the present generation, to fan the flames of national and racial hatred, to dig an abyss betweenthe classes and the masses, and to throw open the sluice-gates to theinrush of the waves of anarchist internationalities. Truth, justice, equity, and liberty have been twisted and pressed into the service ofeconomico-political boards. In the United States the people who pridedthemselves on their aloofness are already fighting over Europeaninterests. In Europe every nation's hand is raised against itsneighbors, and every people's hand against its ruling class. Everygovernment is making its policy subservient to the needs of the futurewar which is universally looked upon as an unavoidable outcome of theVersailles peace. Imperialism and militarism are striking roots in soilwhere they were hitherto unknown. In a word, Prussianism, instead ofbeing destroyed, has been openly adopted by its ostensible enemies, andthe huge sacrifices offered up by the heroic armies of the foremostnations are being misused to give one half of the world just cause torise up against the other half. 

THE END

FOOTNOTES:

[339] A contemporary of Goethe. His works were republished by Herzog inthe year 1907. 

[340] _The Daily Telegraph_, January 28, 1919. 

[341] _The Daily Telegraph_, January 31, 1919. 

[342] _The Daily Mail_ (Paris edition), February 13, 1919. 

[343] State-Secretary Hay addressed a note to the Powers in September, 1899, setting forth America's attitude toward China. It is known as thedoctrine of the "open door. " In a subsequent note (July 3, 1900) heenlarged its scope and promulgated the integrity of China. But Russiaignored it and flew her flag over the Chinese customs in Newchwang. Itwas Japan who, on that occasion, asserted and enforced the doctrinewithout outside help. 

[344] General March intimated, when testifying before the House MilitaryCommittee, that President Wilson approved of universal training, indorsing the War Department's army program. --_New York Herald_ (Parisedition). 

[345] _Bulletin des Droits de l'Homme_, No. 10, May 15, 1919. 

[346] _Journal Officiel_, November 21, 1917. 

[347] _Le Populaire_, February 10, 1919. 

[348] _La Stampa_, June 11, 1919. Cf. _L'Humanité, _ June 13, 1919. 

[349] Cf. _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 27, 1919. 

[350] In _The Daily Telegraph_, February 8, 1919. 

[351] The Covenant leaves the mode of recruiting them undetermined. 

[352] Article IV. 

[353] Article VIII. 

[354] M. D'Estournelles de Constant, _Bulletin des Droits de l'Homme_, May 15, 1919, p. 450. 

[355] _Ibid. _

[356] _Ibid. _, p. 457. 

[357] Article XII. 

[358] Cf. _The New York Herald_ (Paris edition), September 14, 1919. 

[359] _L'Echo de Paris_, February 17, 1919. 

[360] On April 11, 1919. 

[361] The wording of the final Japanese amendment was: "By theendorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatmentof their nationals. "

[362] On April 28, 1919. 

[363] The Jewish coalition in Vilna inscribed on its program the unionof Vilna with Russia. . . . There was an overwhelming majority in favor ofits retention by Poland. --_Le Temps_, September 14, 1919. The electiontook place on September 7th. 

[364] On Saturday, May 31, 1919. 

[365] I published several series of articles in _The Daily Telegraph_, _The Fortnightly Review_, and other English as well as Americanperiodicals, and a long chapter in my book entitled _RussianCharacteristics_. 

[366] "Poland agrees that any member of the Council of the League ofNations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Councilany infraction, or _any danger of infraction_, of any of theseobligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action andgive such direction as it may deem proper and effective in thecircumstances. "--Article XII of the Special Treaty with Poland. 

[367] Cf. _La Gazette de Lausanne_, April 24, 1919. 

[368] Article XI of the Special Treaty, _L'Etoile Belge_, August 17, 1919. 

[369] _Le Journal des Débats_, July 7, 1919. 

[370] M. Emile Combes was the author of the laws which banishedreligious congregations from France. 

[371] _Le Figaro_, August 21, 1919. _L'Echo de Paris_, August 22, 1919. 

[372] _The Morning Post_, July 21, 1919. 

[373] _L'Echo de Paris_, April 29, 1919. 

[374] _Ibid. _, April 14, 1919. 

[375] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), September 17, 1919. 

[376] _The New Republic_, August 6, 1919. 

[377] Mr. James B. Beck. 

[378] _The North American Review_, June, 1919. 

[379] Cf. _The New Republic_, August 6, 1919, pp. 5, 6.