[Illustration: "_OLD IRONSIDES_"

The old frigate _Constitution_ as she appears today in her snugberth at the Boston Navy Yard where she is preserved as anhistorical relic. 

Photograph by N. L. Stebbins, Boston. ]

THE FIGHT FOR A FREE SEA

A CHRONICLE OF THE WAR OF 1812

BY RALPH D. PAINE

[Illustration]

VOLUME 17THE CHRONICLES OF AMERICA SERIESALLEN JOHNSON, EDITOR

1920

CONTENTS

I. "ON TO CANADA!"II. LOST GROUND REGAINEDIII. PERRY AND LAKE ERIEIV. EBB AND FLOW ON THE NORTHERN FRONTV. THE NAVY ON BLUE WATERVI. MATCHLESS FRIGATES AND THEIR DUELSVII. "DON'T GIVE UP THE SHIP!"VIII. THE LAST CRUISE OF THE ESSEXIX. VICTORY ON LAKE CHAMPLAINX. PEACE WITH HONOR

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTEINDEX

ILLUSTRATIONS

"OLD IRONSIDES"

The old frigate _Constitution_ as she appears today in her snug berth atthe Boston Navy Yard where she is preserved as an historical relic. Photograph by N. L. Stebbins, Boston. 

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS IN THE WAR OF 1812

Map by W. L. G. Joerg, American Geographical Society. 

OLIVER HAZARD PERRY AT THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. Reproduced by courtesy of the Municipal Art Commission ofthe City of New York. 

ISAAC CHAUNCEY

Painting in the Comptroller's Office, City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. Reproduced by courtesy of the Municipal Art Commission ofthe City of New York. 

COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR

Painting by Thomas Sully, 1811. In the Comptroller's Office, owned bythe City of New York. Reproduced by courtesy of the Art Commission ofthe City of New York. 

CONSTITUTION AND GUERRIÈRE

An old print, illustrating the moment in the action at which themainmast of the _Guerrière_, shattered by the terrific fire of theAmerican frigate, fell overside, transforming the former vessel into afloating wreck and terminating the action. The picture representsaccurately the surprisingly slight damage done the _Constitution_: notethe broken spanker gaff and the shot holes in her topsails. 

ISAAC HULL

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. 

WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. Reproduced by courtesy of the Municipal Art Commission ofthe City of New York. 

A FRIGATE OF 1812 UNDER SAIL

The _Constellation_, of which this is a photograph, is somewhat smallerthan the _Constitution_, being rated at 38 guns as against 44 for thelatter. In general appearance, however, and particularly in rig, the twotypes are very similar. Although the Constellation did not herself seeaction in the War of 1812, she is a good example of the heavily armedAmerican frigate of that day--and the only one of them still to be seenat sea under sail within recent years. At the present time the_Constellation_ lies moored at the pier of the Naval Training Station, Newport, R. I. Photograph by E. Müller, Jr. , Inc. , New York. 

JACOB BROWN

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. 

THOMAS MACDONOUGH

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. 

CHAPTER I

"ON TO CANADA!"

The American people of today, weighed in the balances of the greatestarmed conflict of all time and found not wanting, can afford to survey, in a spirit of candid scrutiny and without reviving an ancient grudge, that turbulent episode in the welding of their nation which is calledthe War of 1812. In spite of defeats and disappointments this war was, in the large, enduring sense, a victory. It was in this renewed defianceof England that the dream of the founders of the Republic and the idealsof the embattled farmers of Bunker Hill and Saratoga achieved theirgoal. Henceforth the world was to respect these States, not as so manycolonies bitterly wrangling among themselves, but as a sovereign andindependent nation. 

The War of 1812, like the American Revolution, was a valiant contestfor survival on the part of the spirit of freedom. It was essentiallyakin to the world-wide struggle of a century later, when sons of the oldfoemen of 1812--sons of the painted Indians and of the Kentucky pioneersin fringed buckskins, sons of the New Hampshire ploughboys clad inhomespun, sons of the Canadian militia and the red-coated regulars ofthe British line, sons of the tarry seamen of the _Constitution_ and the_Guerrière_--stood side by side as brothers in arms to save from brutalobliteration the same spirit of freedom. And so it is that in Flandersfields today the poppies blow above the graves of the sons of the menwho fought each other a century ago in the Michigan wilderness and atLundy's Lane. 

The causes and the background of the War of 1812 are presented elsewherein this series of Chronicles. [1] Great Britain, at death grips withNapoleon, paid small heed to the rights and dignities of neutralnations. The harsh and selfish maritime policy of the age, expressed inthe British Navigation Acts and intensified by the struggle withNapoleon, led the Mistress of the Seas to perpetrate indignity afterindignity on the ships and sailors which were carrying American commercearound the world. The United States demanded a free sea, which GreatBritain would not grant. Of necessity, then, such futile weapons asembargoes and non-intercourse acts had to give place to the musket, thebayonet, and the carronade. There could be no compromise between theclash of doctrines. It was for the United States to assert herself, regardless of the odds, or sink into a position of supine dependencyupon the will of Great Britain and the wooden walls of her invinciblenavy. 

[Footnote 1: See _Jefferson and His Colleagues_, by Allen Johnson (in_The Chronicles of America_). ]

"Free Trade and Sailors' Rights!" was the American war cry. It expressedthe two grievances which outweighed all others--the interference withAmerican shipping and the ruthless impressment of seamen from beneaththe Stars and Stripes. No less high-handed than Great Britain's wereNapoleon's offenses against American commerce, and there was just causefor war with France. Yet Americans felt the greater enmity towardEngland, partly as an inheritance from the Revolution, but chieflybecause of the greater injury which England had wrought, owing to hersuperior strength on the sea. 

There were, to be sure, other motives in the conflict. It is not to besupposed that the frontiersmen of the Northwest and Southwest, whohailed the war with enthusiasm, were ardently aroused to redress wrongsinflicted upon their seafaring countrymen. Their enmity towards GreatBritain was compounded of quite different grievances. Behind the recentIndian wars on the frontier they saw, or thought they saw, Britishpaymasters. The red trappers and hunters of the forest were bloodilydefending their lands; and there was a long-standing bond of interestbetween them and the British in Canada. The British were known to thetribes generally as fur traders, not "land stealers"; and the greattraffic carried on by the merchants of Montreal, not only in theCanadian wilderness but also in the American Northwest, naturally drewCanadians and Indians into the same camp. "On to Canada!" was the sloganof the frontiersmen. It expressed at once their desire to punish thehereditary foe and to rid themselves of an unfriendly power to thenorth. 

The United States was poorly prepared and equipped for military andnaval campaigns when, in June, 1812, Congress declared war on GreatBritain. Nothing had been learned from the costly blunders of theRevolution, and the delusion that readiness for war was a menace todemocracy had influenced the Government to absurd extremes. The regulararmy comprised only sixty-seven hundred men, scattered over an enormouscountry and on garrison service from which they could not be safelywithdrawn. They were without traditions and without experience in actualwarfare. Winfield Scott, at that time a young officer in the regulararmy, wrote:

 The old officers had very generally sunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking. .. . Many of the appointments were positively bad, and a majority of the remainder indifferent. Party spirit of that day knew no bounds, and was of course blind to policy. Federalists were almost entirely excluded from selection, though great numbers were eager for the field. .. . Where there was no lack of educated men in the dominant party, the appointments consisted generally of swaggerers, dependents, decayed gentlemen, and others "fit for nothing else, " which always turned out utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever. 

The main reliance was to be on militia and volunteers, an army of thefree people rushing to arms in defense of their liberties, as voiced byJefferson and echoed more than a century later by another spokesman ofdemocracy. There was the stuff for splendid soldiers in these farmersand woodsmen, but in many lamentable instances their regiments were nomore than irresponsible armed mobs. Until as recently as the War withSpain, the perilous fallacy persisted that the States should retaincontrol of their several militia forces in time of war and deny finalauthority to the Federal Government. It was this doctrine which sonearly wrecked the cause of the Revolution. George Washington hadlearned the lesson through painful experience, but his counsel waswholly disregarded; and, because it serves as a text and aninterpretation for much of the humiliating history which we are about tofollow, that counsel is here quoted in part. Washington wrote inretrospect:

 Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which by the continuance of the same men in service had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist or to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause. 

The War of 1812, besides being hampered by short enlistments, confusedauthority, and incompetent officers, was fought by a country and an armydivided against itself. When Congress authorized the enrollment of onehundred thousand militia, the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticutrefused to furnish their quotas, objecting to the command of UnitedStates officers and to the sending of men beyond the borders of theirown States. This attitude fairly indicated the feeling of New England, which was opposed to the war and openly spoke of secession. Moreover, the wealthy merchants and bankers of New England declined to subscribeto the national loans when the Treasury at Washington was bankrupt, andvast quantities of supplies were shipped from New England seaports tothe enemy in Canada. It was an extraordinary paradox that those Stateswhich had seen their sailors impressed by thousands and which hadsuffered most heavily from England's attacks on neutral commerce shouldhave arrayed themselves in bitter opposition to the cause and theGovernment. It was "Mr. Madison's War, " they said, and he could win orlose it--and pay the bills, for that matter. 

The American navy was in little better plight than the army. Englandflew the royal ensign over six hundred ships of war and was theundisputed sovereign of the seas. Opposed to this mighty armada werefive frigates, three ships, and seven brigs, which Monroe recommendedshould be "kept in a body in a safe port. " Not worth mention were thetwo hundred ridiculous little gunboats which had to stow the one cannonbelow to prevent capsizing when they ventured out of harbor. These craftwere a pet notion of Jefferson. "Believing, myself, " he said of them, "that gunboats are the only water defense which can be useful to us andprotect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, I am pleased witheverything which promises to improve them. "

A nation of eight million people, unready, blundering, rent by internaldissension, had resolved to challenge an England hardened by war andtremendously superior in military resources. It was not all madness, however, for the vast empire of Canada lay exposed to invasion, and inthis quarter the enemy was singularly vulnerable. Henry Clay spoke formost of his countrymen beyond the boundaries of New England when heannounced to Congress: "The conquest of Canada is in your power. I trustthat I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state that I verilybelieve that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to placeMontreal and Upper Canada at your feet. Is it nothing to the Britishnation; is it nothing to the pride of her monarch to have the lastimmense North American possession held by him in the commencement of hisreign wrested from his dominions?" Even Jefferson was deluded intopredicting that the capture of Canada as far as Quebec would be a merematter of marching through the country and would give the troopsexperience for the attack on Halifax and the final expulsion of Englandfrom the American continent. 

The British Provinces, extending twelve hundred miles westward to LakeSuperior, had a population of less than five hundred thousand; but athird of these were English immigrants or American Loyalists and theirdescendants, types of folk who would hardly sit idly and await invasion. That they should resist or strike back seems not to have been expectedin the war councils of the amiable Mr. Madison. Nor were other andmanifold dangers taken into account by those who counseled war. TheGreat Lakes were defenseless, the warlike Indians of the Northwest werein arms and awaiting the British summons, while the whole country beyondthe Wabash and the Maumee was almost unguarded. Isolated here and therewere stockades containing a few dozen men beyond hope of rescue, frontier posts of what is now the Middle West. Plans of campaign wereprepared without thought of the insuperable difficulties of transportthrough regions in which there were neither roads, provisions, towns, nor navigable rivers. Armies were maneuvered and victories won upon themaps in the office of the Secretary of War. Generals were selected bysome inscrutable process which decreed that dull-witted, pompousincapables should bungle campaigns and waste lives. 

It was wisely agreed that of all the strategic points along thisfar-flung and thinly held frontier, Detroit should receive the earliestattention. At all costs this point was to be safeguarded as a base forthe advance into Canada from the west. A remote trading post withingunshot of the enemy across the river and menaced by tribes of hostileIndians, Detroit then numbered eight hundred inhabitants and wasprotected only by a stout enclosure of logs. For two hundred miles tothe nearest friendly settlements in Ohio, the line of communications wasa forest trail which skirted Lake Erie for some distance and couldeasily be cut by the enemy. From Detroit it was the intention of theAmericans to strike the first blow at the Canadian post of Amherstburgnear by. 

The stage was now set for the entrance of General William Hull as one ofthe luckless, unheroic figures upon whom the presidential power ofappointment bestowed the trappings of high military command. He was byno means the worst of these. In fact, the choice seemed auspicious. Hullhad seen honorable service in the Revolution and had won the esteem ofGeorge Washington. He was now Governor of Michigan Territory. At sixtyyears of age he had no desire to gird on the sword. He was persuaded byMadison, however, to accept a brigadier general's commission and to leadthe force ordered to Detroit. His instructions were vague, but in June, 1812, shortly before the declaration of war, he took command of twothousand regulars and militia at Dayton, Ohio, and began the arduousadvance through the wilderness towards Detroit. The adventure waslaunched with energy. These hardy, reliant men knew how to cut roads, tobridge streams, and to exist on scanty rations. Until sickness began todecimate their ranks, they advanced at an encouraging rate and werealmost halfway to Detroit when the tidings of the outbreak ofhostilities overtook them. General Hull forthwith hurried his troops tothe Maumee River, leaving their camp equipment and heavy stores behind. He now committed his first crass blunder. Though the British controlledthe waters of Lake Erie, yet he sent a schooner ahead with all hishospital supplies, intrenching tools, official papers, and muster rolls. The little vessel was captured within sight of Detroit and the documentsproved invaluable to the British commander of Upper Canada, MajorGeneral Isaac Brock, who gained thereby a complete idea of the Americanplans and proceeded to act accordingly. Brock was a soldier of uncommonintelligence and resolution, acquitting himself with distinction, andcontrasting with his American adversaries in a manner rather painful tocontemplate. 

At length Hull reached Detroit and crossed the river to assume theoffensive. He was strongly hopeful of success. The Canadians appearedfriendly and several hundred sought his protection. Even the enemy'smilitia were deserting to his colors. In a proclamation Hull lookedforward to a bloodless conquest, informing the Canadians that they wereto be emancipated from tyranny and oppression and restored to thedignified station of freemen. "I have a force which will break down allopposition, " said he, "and that force is but the vanguard of a muchgreater. "

He soundly reasoned that unless a movement could be launched againstNiagara, at the other end of Lake Erie, the whole strength of theBritish might be thrown against him and that he was likely to be trappedin Detroit. There was a general plan of campaign, submitted by MajorGeneral Henry Dearborn before the war began, which provided for athreefold invasion--from Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario, fromNiagara, and from Detroit--in support of a grand attack along the routeleading past Lake Champlain to Montreal. Theoretically, it was goodenough strategy, but no attempt had been made to prepare the execution, and there was no leader competent to direct it. 

In response to Hull's urgent appeal, Dearborn, who was puttering aboutbetween Boston and Albany, confessed that he knew nothing about what wasgoing on at Niagara. He ranked as the commander-in-chief of the Americanforces and he awoke from his habitual stupor to ask himself this amazingquestion: "Who is to have the command of the operations in Upper Canada?I take it for granted that my command does not extend to that distantquarter. " If Dearborn did not know who was in control of the operationsat Niagara, it was safe to say that nobody else did, and Hull was leftto deal with the increasing forces in front of him and the hordes ofIndians in the rear, to garrison Detroit, to assault the fort atAmherstburg, to overcome the British naval forces on Lake Erie--and allwithout the slightest help or cooperation from his Government. 

Meanwhile Brock had ascertained that the American force at Niagaraconsisted of a few hundred militia with no responsible officer incommand, who were making a pretense of patrolling thirty-six miles offrontier. They were undisciplined, ragged, without tents, shoes, money, or munitions, and ready to fall back if attacked or to go home unlesssoon relieved. Having nothing to fear in that quarter, Brock gathered upa small body of regulars as he marched and proceeded to Amherstburg tofinish the business of the unfortunate Hull. 

That Hull deserves some pity as well as the disgrace which overwhelmedhim is quite apparent. Most of his troops were ill-equipped, unreliable, and insubordinate. Even during the march to Detroit he had to use aregular regiment to compel the obedience of twelve hundred mutinousmilitiamen who refused to advance. Their own officer could do nothingwith them. At Detroit two hundred of them refused to cross the river, onthe ground that they were not obliged to serve outside the UnitedStates. Granted such extenuation as this, however, Hull showed himselfso weak and contemptible in the face of danger that he could not expecthis fighting men to maintain any respect for him. 

His fatal flaw was lack of courage and promptitude. He did not know howto play a poor hand well. In the emergency which confronted him he waslike a dull sword in a rusty scabbard. While the enemy waited forreinforcements, he might have captured Amherstburg. He had the superiorforce, and yet he delayed and lost heart while his regiments dwindledbecause of sickness and desertion and jeered at his leadership. Thewatchful Indians, led by the renowned Tecumseh, learned to despise theAmericans instead of fearing them, and were eager to take the warpathagainst so easy a prey. Already other bands of braves were hasteningfrom Lake Huron and from Mackinac, whose American garrison had beenwiped out. 

Brooding and shaken, like an old man utterly undone, Hull abandoned hispretentious invasion of Canada and retreated across the river to shelterhis troops behind the log barricades of Detroit. He sent six hundred mento try to open a line to Ohio, but, after a sharp encounter with aBritish force, Hull was obliged to admit that they "could only opencommunication as far as the points of their bayonets extended. " His onlythought was to extricate himself, not to stand and fight a winningbattle without counting the cost. His officers felt only contempt forhis cowardice. They were convinced that the tide could be turned intheir favor. There were steadfast men in the ranks who were eager totake the measure of the redcoats. The colonels were in open mutiny and, determined to set General Hull aside, they offered the command toColonel Miller of the regulars, who declined to accept it. When Hullproposed a general retreat, he was informed that every man of the Ohiomilitia would refuse to obey the order. These troops who had been sofickle and jealous of their rights were unwilling to share the leader'sdisgrace. 

Two days after his arrival at Amherstburg, General Brock sent to theAmericans a summons to surrender, adding with a crafty discernment ofthe effect of the threat upon the mind of the man with whom he wasdealing: "You must be aware that the numerous body of Indians who haveattached themselves to my troops will be beyond my control the momentthe contest commences. " Hull could see only the horrid picture of amassacre of the women and children within the stockades of Detroit. Hefailed to realize that his thousand effective infantrymen could hold outfor weeks behind those log ramparts against Brock's few hundred regularsand volunteers. Two and a half years later, Andrew Jackson and hismilitia emblazoned a very different story behind the cypressbreastworks of New Orleans. Besides the thousand men in the fort, Hullhad detached five hundred under Colonels McArthur and Cass to attempt tobreak through the Indian cordon in his rear and obtain supplies. Thesehe now vainly endeavored to recall while he delayed a final reply toBrock's mandate. 

Indecision had doomed the garrison which was now besieged. Tecumseh'swarriors had crossed the river and were between the fort and McArthur'scolumn. Brock boldly decided to assault, a desperate venture, but hemust have known that Hull's will had crumbled. No more than sevenhundred strong, the little British force crossed the river just beforedaybreak on the 16th of August and was permitted to select its positionswithout the slightest molestation. A few small field pieces, posted onthe Canadian side of the river, hurled shot into the fort, killing fourof Hull's men, and two British armed schooners lay within range. 

Brock advanced, expecting to suffer large losses from the heavy gunswhich were posted to cover the main approach to the fort, but his menpassed through the zone of danger and found cover in which they madeready to storm the defenses of Detroit. As Brock himself walked forwardto take note of the situation before giving the final commands, a whiteflag fluttered from the battery in front of him. Without firing a shot, Hull had surrendered Detroit and with it the great territory ofMichigan, the most grievous loss of domain that the United States hasever suffered in war or peace. On the same day Fort Dearborn (Chicago), which had been forgotten by the Government, was burned by Indians afterall its defenders had been slain. These two disasters with the earlierfall of Mackinac practically erased American dominion from the westernempire of the Great Lakes. Visions of the conquest of Canada were thusrudely dimmed in the opening actions of the war. 

General Hull was tried by court-martial on charges of treason, cowardice, and neglect of duty. He was convicted on the last two chargesand sentenced to be shot, with a recommendation to the mercy of thePresident. The verdict was approved by Madison, but he remitted theexecution of the sentence because of the old man's services in theRevolution. Guilty though he was, an angry and humiliated people alsomade him the scapegoat for the sins of neglect and omission of whichtheir Government stood convicted. In the testimony offered at his trialthere was a touch, rude, vivid, and very human, to portray him in thefinal hours of the tragic episode at Detroit. Spurned by his officers, he sat on the ground with his back against the rampart while "heapparently unconsciously filled his mouth with tobacco, putting in quidafter quid more than he generally did; the spittle colored with tobaccojuice ran from his mouth on his neckcloth, beard, cravat, and vest. "

Later events in the Northwest Territory showed that the Britishsuccesses in that region were gained chiefly because of an unworthyalliance with the Indian tribes, whose barbarous methods of warfarestained the records of those who employed them. "Not more than seven oreight hundred British soldiers ever crossed the Detroit River, " saysHenry Adams, "but the United States raised fully twenty thousand men andspent at least five million dollars and many lives in expelling them. The Indians alone made this outlay necessary. The campaign ofTippecanoe, the surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacres at FortDearborn, the river Raisin, and Fort Meigs, the murders along thefrontier, and the campaign of 1813 were the prices paid for the Indianlands in the Wabash Valley. "

Before the story shifts to the other fields of the war, it seemslogical to follow to its finally successful result the bloody, wastefulstruggle for the recovery of the lost territory. This operation requiredlarge armies and long campaigns, together with the naval supremacy ofLake Erie, won in the next year by Oliver Hazard Perry, before thefugitive British forces fell back from the charred ruins of Detroit andAmherstburg and were soundly beaten at the battle of the Thames--the onedecisive, clean-cut American victory of the war on the Canadianfrontier. These events showed that far too much had been expected ofGeneral William Hull, who comprehended his difficulties but made noattempt to batter a way through them, forgetting that to die and win isalways better than to live and fail. 

CHAPTER II

LOST GROUND REGAINED

General William Henry Harrison, the hero of Tippecanoe and the Governorof Indiana Territory, whose capital was at Vincennes on the Wabash, possessed the experience and the instincts of a soldier. He had foreseenthat Hull, unless he received support, must either abandon Detroit or behopelessly hemmed in. The task of defending the western border wasardently undertaken by the States of Kentucky and Ohio. They believed inthe war and were ready to aid it with the men and resources of avigorous population of almost a million. When the word came that Hullwas in desperate straits, Harrison hastened to organize a reliefexpedition. Before he could move, Detroit had fallen. But a high tide ofenthusiasm swept him on toward an attempt to recover the lost empire. The Federal Government approved his plans and commissioned him ascommander of the Northwestern army of ten thousand men. 

In the early autumn of 1812, General Harrison launched his ambitious andimposing campaign, by which three separate bodies of troops were toadvance and converge within striking distance of Detroit, while a fourthwas to invade and destroy the nests of Indians on the Wabash andIllinois rivers. An active British force might have attacked anddefeated these isolated columns one by one, for they were beyondsupporting distance of each other; but Brock now needed his regulars forthe defense of the Niagara frontier. The scattered American army, including brigades from Virginia and Pennsylvania, was too strong to bechecked by Indian forays, but it had not reckoned with the obstacles ofan unfriendly wilderness and climate. In October, no more than a monthafter the bugles had sounded the advance, the campaign was halted, demoralized and darkly uncertain. A vast swamp stretched as a barrieracross the route and heavy rains made it impassable. 

Hull had crossed the same swamp with his small force in the favorablesummer season, but Harrison was unable to transport the food and warmaterial needed by his ten thousand men. A million rations wererequired at the goal of the Maumee Rapids, and yet after two months ofheartbreaking endeavor not a pound of provisions had been carried withinfifty miles of this place. Wagons and pack-trains floundered in the mudand were abandoned. The rivers froze and thwarted the use of flotillasof scows. Winter closed down, and the American army was forlornly miredand blockaded along two hundred miles of front. The troops at FortDefiance ate roots and bark. Typhus broke out among them, and they diedlike flies. For the failure to supply the army, the War Department waslargely responsible, and Secretary Eustis very properly resigned inDecember. This removed one glaring incompetent from the list but itfailed to improve Harrison's situation. 

It was not until the severe frosts of January, 1813, fettered the swampsthat Harrison was able to extricate his troops and forward supplies tothe shore of Lake Erie for an offensive against Amherstburg. First inmotion was the left wing of thirteen hundred Kentucky militia andregulars under General Winchester. This officer was an elderly planterwho, like Hull, had worn a uniform in the Revolution. He had no greataptitude for war and was held in low esteem by the Kentuckians of hiscommand--hungry, mutinous, and disgusted men, who were counting the daysbefore their enlistments should expire. The commonplace Winchester wasno leader to hold them in hand and spur their jaded determination. 

While they were building storehouses and log defenses, withindangerously easy distance of the British post at Amherstburg, thetempting message came that the settlement of Frenchtown, on the Raisin, thirty miles away and within the British lines, was held by only twocompanies of Canadian militia. Here was an opportunity for a dashingadventure, and Winchester ordered half his total force to march anddestroy this detachment of the enemy. The troops accordingly set out, drove home a brisk assault, cleared Frenchtown of its defenders, andheld their ground awaiting orders. 

Winchester then realized that he had leaped before he looked. He hadseriously weakened his own force while the column at Frenchtown was inperil from two thousand hostile troops and Indians only eighteen milesbeyond the river Raisin. The Kentuckians left with him decided mattersfor themselves. They insisted on marching to the support of theircomrades at Frenchtown. Meanwhile General Harrison had learned of thisfatuous division of strength and was hastening to the base at the fallsof the Maumee. There he found only three hundred men. All the others hadgone with Winchester to reinforce the men at Frenchtown. It was too lateto summon troops from other points, and Harrison waited with forebodingsof disaster. 

News reached him after two days. The Americans at the Raisin hadsuffered not only a defeat but a massacre. Nearly four hundred werekilled in battle or in flight. Those who survived were prisoners. Nomore than thirty had escaped of a force one thousand strong. The enemyhad won this extraordinary success with five hundred white troops andabout the same number of Indians, led by Colonel Procter, whom Brock hadplaced in command of the fort at Amherstburg. Procter's name is infamousin the annals of the war. The worst traditions of Indian atrocity, uncontrolled and even encouraged, cluster about his memory. He was laterpromoted in rank instead of being degraded, a costly blunder whichEngland came to regret and at last redeemed. A notoriously incompetentofficer, on this one occasion of the battle of the Raisin he acted withdecision and took advantage of the American blunder. 

The conduct of General Winchester after his arrival at Frenchtown isinexplicable. He did nothing to prepare his force for action even onlearning that the British were advancing from Amherstburg. A report ofthe disaster, after recording that no patrols or pickets were orderedout during the night, goes on:

 The troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such quarters on the west side of the river as might please him best, whilst the general took his quarters on the east side--not the least regard being paid to defense, order, regularity, or system in the posting of the different corps. .. . Destitute of artillery, or engineers, of men who had ever heard or seen the least of an enemy; and with but a very inadequate supply of ammunition--how he ever could have entertained the most distant hope of success, or what right he had to presume to claim it, is to me one of the strangest things in the world. 

At dawn, on the 21st of January, the British and Indians, having crossedthe frozen Detroit River the day before, formed within musket shot ofthe American lines and opened the attack with a battery ofthree-pounders. They might have rushed the camp with bayonet andtomahawk and killed most of the defenders asleep, but the cannonadealarmed the Kentuckians and they took cover behind a picket fence, usingtheir long rifles so expertly that they killed or wounded a hundred andeighty-five of the British regulars, who thereupon had to abandon theirartillery. Meanwhile, the American regular force, caught on open ground, was flanked and driven toward the river, carrying a militia regimentwith it. Panic spread among these unfortunate men and they fled throughthe deep snow, Winchester among them, while six hundred whooping Indiansslew and scalped them without mercy as they ran. 

But behind the picket fence the Kentuckians still squinted along thebarrels of their rifles and hammered home more bullets and patches. Three hundred and eighty-four of them, they showed a spirit that madetheir conduct the bright, heroic episode of that black day. Forgottenare their mutinies, their profane disregard of the Articles of War, their jeers at generals and such. They finished in style and covered themultitude of their sins. Unclothed, unfed, uncared for, dirty, andwretched, they proved themselves worthy to be called American soldiers. They fought until there was no more ammunition, until they weresurrounded by a thousand of the enemy, and then they honorablysurrendered. 

The brutal Procter, aware that the Indians would commit hideousoutrages if left unrestrained, nevertheless returned to Amherstburg withhis troops and his prisoners, leaving the American wounded to theirfate. That night the savages came back to Frenchtown and massacred thosehurt and helpless men, thirty in number. 

This unhappy incident of the campaign, not so much a battle as acatastrophe, delayed Harrison's operations. His failures had shakenpopular confidence, and at the end of this dismal winter, after sixmonths of disappointments in which ten thousand men had accomplishednothing, he was compelled to report to the Secretary of War:

 Amongst the reasons which make it necessary to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail in the western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater part of the militia which were with me through the winter. The new drafts from this State [Ohio] are entirely of another character and are not to be depended upon. I have no doubt, however, that a sufficient number of good men can be procured, and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Kentucky would furnish some regiments that would not be inferior to those that fought at the river Raisin; and these were, in my opinion, superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times. 

There was to be no immediate renewal of action between Procter andHarrison. Each seemed to have conceived so much respect for the forcesof the other that they proceeded to increase the distance between themas rapidly as possible. Fearing to be overtaken and greatly outnumbered, the British leader retreated to Canada while the American leader was ina state of mind no less uneasy. Harrison promptly set fire to hisstorehouses and supplies at the Maumee Rapids, his advanced base nearLake Erie. Thus all this labor and exertion and expense vanished insmoke while, in the set diction of war, he retired some fifteen miles. In such a vast hurry were the adversaries to be quit of each other thata day and a half after the fight at Frenchtown they were sixty milesapart. Harrison remained a fortnight on this back trail and collectedtwo thousand of his troops, with whom he returned to the ruins of hisforemost post and undertook the task all over again. 

The defensive works which he now built were called Fort Meigs. For thetime there was no more talk of invading Canada. The service of theKentucky and Ohio militia was expiring, and these seasoned regimentswere melting away like snow. Presently Fort Meigs was left with no morethan five hundred war-worn men to hold out against British operationsafloat and ashore. Luckily Procter had expended his energies atFrenchtown and seemed inclined to repose, for he made no effort toattack the few weak garrisons which guarded the American territory nearat hand. From January until April he neglected his opportunities whilemore American militia marched homeward, while Harrison was absent, whileFort Meigs was unfinished. 

At length the British offensive was organized, and a thousand whitesoldiers and as many Indians, led by Tecumseh, sallied out ofAmherstburg with a naval force of two gunboats. Heavy guns were draggedfrom Detroit to batter down the log walls, for it was the intention tosurround and besiege Fort Meigs in the manner taught by the militaryscience of Europe. Meanwhile Harrison had come back from a recruitingmission; and a new brigade of Kentucky militia, twelve hundred strong, under Brigadier General Green Clay, was to follow in boats down theAuglaize and Maumee rivers. Procter's guns were already pounding thewalls of Fort Meigs on the 5th of May when eight hundred troops of thisfresh American force arrived within striking distance. They dashed uponthe British batteries and took them with the bayonet in a wild, impetuous charge. It was then their business promptly to reform andprotect themselves, but through lack of training they failed to obeyorders and were off hunting the enemy, every man for himself. In themeantime three companies of British regulars and some volunteers tookadvantage of the confusion, summoned the Indians, and let loose avicious counter-attack. 

Within sight of General Harrison and the garrison of Fort Meigs, thesebold Kentuckians were presently driven from the captured guns, scattered, and shot down or taken prisoner. Only a hundred and seventyof them got away, and they lost even their boats and supplies. TheBritish loss was no more than fifty in killed and wounded. Again Procterinflamed the hatred and contempt of his American foes because forty ofhis prisoners were tomahawked while guarded by British soldiers. He madeno effort to save them and it was the intervention of Tecumseh, theIndian leader, which averted the massacre of the whole body of fivehundred prisoners. 

Across the river, Colonel John Miller, of the American regularinfantry, had attempted a gallant sortie from the fort and had taken abattery but this sally had no great effect on the issue of theengagement. Harrison had lost almost a thousand men, half his fightingforce, and was again shut up within the barricades and blockhouses ofFort Meigs. Procter continued the siege only four days longer, for hisIndian allies then grew tired of it and faded into the forest. He wasnot reluctant to accept this excuse for withdrawing. His own militiawere drifting away, his regulars were suffering from illness andexposure, and Fort Meigs itself was a harder nut to crack than he hadanticipated. Procter therefore withdrew to Amherstburg and made no moretrouble until June, when he sent raiding parties into Ohio and createdpanic among the isolated settlements. 

Harrison had become convinced that his campaign must be a defensive oneonly, until a strong American naval force could be mustered on LakeErie. He moved his headquarters to Upper Sandusky and Cleveland andconcluded to mark time while Perry's fleet was building. The outlook wassomber, however, for his thin line of garrisons and his supply bases. They were threatened in all directions, but he was most concerned forthe important depot which he had established at Upper Sandusky, no morethan thirty miles from any British landing force which should decide tocross Lake Erie. The place had no fortifications; it was held by a fewhundred green recruits; and the only obstacle to a hostile ascent of theSandusky River was a little stockade near its mouth, called FortStephenson. 

For the Americans to lose the accumulation of stores and munitions whichwas almost the only result of a year's campaign would have been a fatalblow. Harrison was greatly disturbed to hear that Tecumseh had gatheredhis warriors and was following the trail that led to Upper Sandusky andthat Procter was moving coastwise with his troops in a flotilla underoars and sail. Harrison was, or believed himself to be, in grave dangerof confronting a plight similar to that of William Hull, beset in front, in flank, in rear. His first thought was to evacuate the stockade ofFort Stephenson and to concentrate his force, although this would leavethe Sandusky River open for a British advance from the shore of LakeErie. 

An order was sent to young Major Croghan, who held Fort Stephenson withone hundred and sixty men, to burn the buildings and retreat as fast aspossible up the river or along the shore of Lake Erie. This officer, aKentuckian not yet twenty-one years old, who honored the regiment towhich he belonged, deliberately disobeyed his commander. By so doing hesounded a ringing note which was like the call of trumpets amidst thefailures, the cloudy uncertainties, the lack of virile leadership, thathad strewn the path of the war. In writing he sent this reply back toGeneral William Henry Harrison: "We have determined to maintain thisplace, and by Heaven, we will. "

It was a turning point, in a way, presaging more hopeful events, awarning that youth must be served and that the doddering oldsters wereto give place to those who could stand up under the stern and exactingtests of warfare. Such rash ardor was not according to precedent. Harrison promptly relieved the impetuous Croghan of his command and senta colonel to replace him. But Croghan argued the point so eloquentlythat the stockade was restored to him next day and he won his chance todo or die. Harrison consolingly informed him that he was to retreat ifattacked by British troops "but that to attempt to retire in the face ofan Indian force would be vain. "

Major Croghan blithely prepared to do anything else than retreat, whileGeneral Harrison stayed ten miles away to plan a battle againstTecumseh's Indians if they should happen to come in his direction. Onthe 1st of August, Croghan's scouts informed him that the woods swarmedwith Indians and that British boats were pushing up the river. Procterwas on the scene again, and no sooner had his four hundred regularsfound a landing place than a curt demand for surrender came to MajorCroghan. The British howitzers peppered the stockade as soon as therefusal was delivered, but they failed to shake the spirit of thedauntless hundred and sixty American defenders. On the following day, the 2d of August, Procter stupidly repeated his error of a directassault upon sheltered riflemen, which had cost him heavily at theRaisin and at Fort Meigs. He ordered his redcoats to carry FortStephenson. Again and again they marched forward until all the officershad been shot down and a fifth of the force was dead or wounded. American valor and marksmanship had proved themselves in the face ofheavy odds. At sunset the beaten British were flocking into their boats, and Procter was again on his way to Amherstburg. His excuse for thetrouncing laid the blame on the Indians:

 The troops, after the artillery had been used for some hours, attacked two faces and, impossibilities being attempted, failed. The fort, from which the severest fire I ever saw was maintained during the attack, was well defended. The troops displayed the greatest bravery, the much greater part of whom reached the fort and made every effort to enter; but the Indians who had proposed the assault and, had it not been assented to, would have ever stigmatized the British character, scarcely came into fire before they ran out of its reach. A more than adequate sacrifice having been made to Indian opinion, I drew off the brave assailants. 

The sound of Croghan's guns was heard in General Harrison's camp atSeneca, ten miles up the river. Harrison had nothing to say but this:"The blood be upon his own head. I wash my hands of it. " This was amisguided speech which the country received with marked disfavor whileit acclaimed young Croghan as the sterling hero of the western campaign. He could be also a loyal as well as a successful subordinate, for heably defended Harrison against the indignation which menaced his stationas commander of the army. The new Secretary of War, John Armstrong, ironically referred to Procter and Harrison as being always in terror ofeach other, the one actually flying from his supposed pursuer after hisfiasco at Fort Stephenson, the other waiting only for the arrival ofCroghan at Seneca to begin a camp conflagration and flight to UpperSandusky. 

The reconquest of Michigan and the Northwest depended now on theAmerican navy. Harrison wisely halted his inglorious operations by landuntil the ships and sailors were ready to cooperate. Because the Britishsway on the Great Lakes was unchallenged, the general situation of theenemy was immensely better than it had been at the beginning of thecampaign. During a year of war the United States had steadily lost inmen, in territory, in prestige, and this in spite of the fact that theopposing forces across the Canadian border were much smaller. 

That the men of the American navy would be prompt to maintain thetraditions of the service was indicated in a small way by an incident ofthe previous year on Lake Erie. In September, 1812, Lieutenant Jesse D. Elliott had been sent to Buffalo to find a site for building navalvessels. A few weeks later he was fitting out several purchasedschooners behind Squaw Island. Suddenly there came sailing in fromAmherstburg and anchored off Fort Erie two British armed brigs, the_Detroit_ which had been surrendered by Hull, and the _Caledonia_ whichhad helped to subdue the American garrison at Mackinac. Elliott had noships ready for action, but he was not to be daunted by such anobstacle. It so happened that ninety Yankee seamen had been sent acrosscountry from New York by Captain Isaac Chauncey. These worthy tars hadtrudged the distance on foot, a matter of five hundred miles, with theircanvas bags on their backs, and they rolled into port at noon, in thenick of time to serve Elliott's purpose. They were indubitably tired, but he gave them not a moment for rest. A ration of meat and bread and astiff tot of grog, and they turned to and manned the boats which were tocut out the two British brigs when darkness fell. 

Elliott scraped together fifty soldiers and, filling two cutters withhis amphibious company, he stole out of Buffalo and pulled toward FortErie. At one o'clock in the morning of the 9th of October they werealongside the pair of enemy brigs and together the bluejackets and theinfantry tumbled over the bulwarks with cutlass, pistols, and boardingpike. In ten minutes both vessels were captured and under sail for theAmerican shore. The _Caledonia_ was safely beached at Black Rock, whereElliott was building his little navy yard. The wind, however, was solight that the _Detroit_ was swept downward by the river current and hadto anchor under the fire of British batteries. These she fought with herguns until all her powder was shot away. Then she cut her cable, hoistedsail again, and took the bottom on Squaw Island, where both British andAmerican guns had the range of her. Elliott had to abandon her and setfire to the hull, but he afterward recovered her ordnance. 

What Elliott had in mind shows the temper of this ready naval officer. "A strong inducement, " he wrote, "was that with these two vessels andthose I have purchased, I should be able to meet the remainder of theBritish force on the Upper Lakes. " The loss of the _Detroit_ somewhatdisappointed this ambitious scheme but the success of the audaciousadventure foreshadowed later and larger exploits with far-reachingresults. Isaac Brock, the British general in Canada, had the genius tocomprehend the meaning of this naval exploit. "This event isparticularly unfortunate, " he wrote, "and may reduce us to incalculabledistress. The enemy is making every exertion to gain a naval superiorityon both lakes; which, if they accomplish, I do not see how we can retainthe country. " And to Procter, his commander at Detroit, he disclosedthe meaning of the naval loss as it affected the fortunes of the westerncampaign: "This will reduce us to great distress. You will have thegoodness to state the expedients you possess to enable us to replace, asfar as possible, the heavy loss we have suffered in the _Detroit_. "

But another year was required to teach the American Government thelesson that a few small vessels roughly pegged together of planks sawnfrom the forest, with a few hundred seamen and guns, might be far moredecisive than the random operations of fifty thousand troops. Thislesson, however, was at last learnt; and so, in the summer of 1813, General William Henry Harrison waited at Seneca on the Sandusky Riveruntil he received, on the 10th of September, the deathless despatch ofCommodore Oliver Hazard Perry: "We have met the enemy and they areours. " The navy had at last cleared the way for the army. 

Expeditiously forty-five hundred infantry were embarked and set ashoreonly three miles from the coveted fort at Amherstburg. A mountedregiment of a thousand Kentuckians, raised for frontier defense byRichard M. Johnson, moved along the road to Detroit. Harrison was aboutto square accounts with Procter, who had no stomach for a stubborndefense. Tecumseh, still loyal to the British cause, summonedthirty-five hundred of his warriors to the royal standard to stem thisAmerican invasion. They expected that Procter would offer a courageousresistance, for he had also almost a thousand hard-bitted Britishtroops, seasoned by a year's fighting. But Procter's sun had set anddisgrace was about to overtake him. To Tecumseh, a chieftain who hadwaged war because of the wrongs suffered by his own people, the thoughtof flight in this crisis was cowardly and intolerable. When Procterannounced that he proposed to seek refuge in retreat, Tecumseh told himto his face that he was like a fat dog which had carried its tail erectand now that it was frightened dropped its tail between its legs andran. The English might scamper as far as they liked but the Indianswould remain to meet the American invaders. 

It was a helter-skelter exodus from Amherstburg and Detroit. Allproperty that could not be moved was burned or destroyed, and Procterset out for Moraviantown, on the Thames River, seventy miles along theroad to Lake Ontario. Harrison, amazed at this behavior, reported:"Nothing but infatuation could have governed General Proctor's conduct. The day I landed below Malden [Amherstburg] he had at his disposalupward of three thousand Indian warriors; his regular force reinforcedby the militia of the district would have made his number nearly equalto my aggregate, which on the day of landing did not exceed forty-fivehundred. .. . His inferior officers say that his conduct has been a seriesof continued blunders. "

Procter had put a week behind him before Harrison set out fromAmherstburg in pursuit, but the British column was hampered in flight bythe women and children of the deserted posts, the sick and wounded, thewagon trains, the stores, and baggage. The organization had gone topieces because of the demoralizing example set by its leader. A hundredmiles of wilderness lay between the fugitives and a place of refuge. Overtaken on the Thames River, they were given no choice. It was fightor surrender. Ahead of the American infantry brigades moved Johnson'smounted Kentuckians, armed with muskets, rifles, knives, and tomahawks, and led by a resourceful and enterprising soldier. Procter was compelledto form his lines of battle across the road on the north bank of theThames or permit this formidable American cavalry to trample hisstraggling ranks under hoof. Tecumseh's Indians, stationed in a swamp, covered his right flank and the river covered his left. Harrison cameupon the enemy early in the afternoon of the 5th of October and formedhis line of battle. The action was carried on in a manner "notsanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard of, " said Harrisonafterwards. This first American victory of the war on land was, indeed, quite irregular and unconventional. It was won by Johnson's mountedriflemen, who divided and charged both the redcoats in front and theIndians in the swamp. One detachment galloped through the first andsecond lines of the British infantry while the other drove the Indiansinto the American left wing and smashed them utterly. Tecumseh was amongthe slain. It was all over in one hour and twenty minutes. Harrison'sfoot soldiers had no chance to close with the enemy. The Americans lostonly fifteen killed and thirty wounded, and they took about five hundredprisoners and all Procter's artillery, muskets, baggage, and stores. 

Not only was the Northwest Territory thus regained for the United Statesbut the power of the Indian alliance was broken. Most of the hostiletribes now abandoned the British cause. Tecumseh's confederacy of Indiannations fell to pieces with the death of its leader. The British armyof Upper Canada, shattered and unable to receive reinforcements fromoverseas, no longer menaced Michigan and the western front of theAmerican line. General Harrison returned to Detroit at his leisure, andthe volunteers and militia marched homeward, for no more than tworegular brigades were needed to protect all this vast area. The strugglefor its possession was a closed episode. In this quarter, however, thewar cry "On to Canada!" was no longer heard. The United States wassatisfied to recover what it had lost with Hull's surrender and to riditself of the peril of invasion and the horrors of Indian massacresalong its wilderness frontiers. Of the men prominent in the struggle, Procter suffered official disgrace at the hands of his own Governmentand William Henry Harrison became a President of the United States. 

[Illustration: _OLIVER HAZARD PERRY AT THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE_

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. ]

[Illustration: _ISAAC CHAUNCEY_

Painting in the Comptroller's Office, City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. ]

CHAPTER III

PERRY AND LAKE ERIE

Amid the prolonged vicissitudes of these western campaigns, twosubordinate officers, the boyish Major Croghan at Fort Stephenson andthe dashing Colonel Johnson with his Kentucky mounted infantry, displayed qualities which accord with the best traditions of Americanarms. Of kindred spirit and far more illustrious was Captain OliverHazard Perry of the United States Navy. Perry dealt with and overcame, on a much larger scale, similar obstacles and discouragements--untrainedmen, lack of material, faulty support--but was ready and eager to meetthe enemy in the hour of need. If it is a sound axiom never to despisethe enemy, it is nevertheless true that excessive prudence has lost manyan action. Farragut's motto has been the keynote of the success of allthe great sea-captains, "_L'audace, et encore de l'audace, et toujoursde l'audace. _"

It was not until the lesson of Hull's surrender had aroused the civilauthorities that Captain Chauncey of the navy yard at New York receivedorders in September, 1812, "to assume command of the naval force onLakes Erie and Ontario and to use every exertion to obtain control ofthem this fall. " Chauncey was an experienced officer, forty years old, who had not rusted from inactivity like the elderly generals who hadbeen given command of armies. He knew what he needed and how to get it. Having to begin with almost nothing, he busied himself to such excellentpurpose that he was able to report within three weeks that he hadforwarded to Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario, "one hundred and fortyship carpenters, seven hundred seamen and marines, more than one hundredpieces of cannon, the greater part of large caliber, with musket, shot, carriages, etc. The carriages have nearly all been made and the shotcast in that time. Nay, I may say that nearly every article that hasbeen forwarded has been made. "

It was found impossible to divert part of this ordnance to Buffalobecause of the excessively bad roads, which were passable for heavytraffic only by means of sleds during the snows of winter. Thisobstacle spoiled the hope of putting a fighting force afloat on LakeErie during the latter part of 1812. Chauncey consequently establishedhis main base at Sackett's Harbor and lost no time in building andbuying vessels. In forty-five days from laying the keel he launched aship of the corvette class, a third larger than the ocean cruisers_Wasp_ and _Hornet_, "and nine weeks ago, " said he, "the timber that sheis composed of was growing in the forest. "

Lieutenant Elliott at the same time had not been idle in his little navyyard at Black Rock near Buffalo, where he had assembled a small brig andseveral schooners. In December Chauncey inspected the work and decidedto shift it to Presqu' Isle, now the city of Erie, which was much lessexposed to interference by the enemy. Here he got together the materialfor two brigs of three hundred tons each, which were to be the mainstrength of Perry's squadron nine months later. Impatient to return toLake Ontario, where a fleet in being was even more urgently needed, Chauncey was glad to receive from Commander Oliver Hazard Perry anapplication to serve under him. To Perry was promptly turned over theburden and the responsibility of smashing the British naval power onLake Erie. Events were soon to display the notable differences intemperament and capabilities between these two men. Though he hadgreater opportunities on Lake Ontario, Chauncey was too cautious andheld the enemy in too much respect; wherefore he dodged and parried andfought inconclusive engagements with the fleet of Sir James Yeo untildestiny had passed him by. He lives in history as a competent andenterprising chief of dockyards and supplies but not as a victoriousseaman. 

To Perry, in the flush of his youth at twenty-eight years, was grantedthe immortal spark of greatness to do and dare and the personality whichimpelled men gladly to serve him and to die for him. His difficultieswere huge, but he attacked them with a confidence which nothing coulddismay. First he had to concentrate his divided force. LieutenantElliott's flotilla of schooners at that time lay at Black Rock. It wasnecessary to move them to Erie at great risk of capture by the enemy, but vigilance and seamanship accomplished this feat. It then remained tofinish and equip the larger vessels which were being built. Two of thesewere the brigs ordered laid down by Chauncey, the _Lawrence_ and the_Niagara_. Apart from these, the battle squadron consisted of sevensmall schooners and the captured British brig, the _Caledonia_. In sizeand armament they were absurd cockleshells even when compared with amodern destroyer, but they were to make themselves superbly memorable. Perry's flagship was no larger than the ancient coasting schooners whichply today between Bangor and Boston with cargoes of lumber and coal. 

Through the winter and spring of 1813, the carpenters, calkers, andsmiths were fitting the new vessels together from the green timber andplanking which the choppers and sawyers wrought out of the forest. Theiron, the canvas, and all the other material had to be hauled by horsesand oxen from places several hundred miles distant. Late in July thesquadron was ready for active service but was dangerously short of men. This, however, was the least of Perry's concerns. He had reckoned thatseven hundred and forty officers and sailors were required to handle andfight his ships, but he did not hesitate to put to sea with a totalforce of four hundred and ninety. 

Of these a hundred were soldiers sent him only nine days before hesailed, and most of them trod a deck for the first time. Chauncey was soabsorbed in his own affairs and hazards on Lake Ontario that he was notlikely to give Perry any more men than could be spared. This reluctancecaused Perry to send a spirited protest in which he said: "The men thatcame by Mr. Champlin are a motley set, blacks, soldiers, and boys. Icannot think you saw them after they were selected. "

As the superior officer, Chauncey resented the criticism and repliedwith this warning reproof: "As you have assured the Secretary that youshould conceive yourself equal or superior to the enemy, with a force ofmen so much less than I had deemed necessary, there will be a great dealexpected from you by your country, and I trust they will not bedisappointed in the high expectations formed of your gallantry andjudgment. "

The quick temper of Perry flared at this. He was about to sail in searchof the British fleet with what men he had because he was unable toobtain more, and he had rightly looked to Chauncey to supply thedeficiency. Impulsively he asked to be relieved of his command and gaveexpression to his sense of grievance in a letter to the Secretary of theNavy in which he said, among other things: "I cannot serve under anofficer who has been so totally regardless of my feelings. .. . Thecritical state of General Harrison was such that I took upon myself theresponsibility of going out with the few young officers you had beenpleased to send me, with the few seamen I had, and as many volunteers asI could muster from the militia. I did not shrink from thisresponsibility but, Sir, at that very moment I surely did not anticipatethe receipt of a letter in every line of which is an insult. " Mostfortunately Perry's request for transfer could not be granted untilafter the battle of Lake Erie had been fought and won. The Secretaryanswered in tones of mild rebuke: "A change of commander under existingcircumstances, is equally inadmissible as it respects the interest ofthe service and your own reputation. It is right that you should reapthe harvest which you have sown. "

Perry's indignation seems excusable. He had shown a cheerful willingnessto shoulder the whole load and his anxieties had been greater than hissuperiors appeared to realize. Captain Barclay, who commanded theBritish naval force on Lake Erie and who had been hovering off Eriewhile the American ships were waiting for men, might readily have senthis boats in at night and destroyed the entire squadron. Perry had notenough sailors to defend his ships, and the regiment of Pennsylvaniamilitia stationed at Erie to guard the naval base refused to do duty onshipboard after dark. "I told the boys to go, Captain Perry, " explainedtheir worthless colonel, "but the boys won't go. "

Perry's lucky star saved him from disaster, however, and on the 2d ofAugust he undertook the perilous and awkward labor of floating hislarger vessels over the shallow bar of the harbor at Erie. Barclay'sblockading force had vanished. For Perry it was then or never. At anymoment the enemy's topsails might reappear, and the American ships wouldbe caught in a situation wholly defenseless. Perry first disposed hislight-draft schooners to cover his channel, and then hoisted out theguns of the _Lawrence_ brig and lowered them into boats. Scows, or"camels, " as they were called, were lashed alongside the vessel to lifther when the water was pumped out of them. There was no more than fourfeet of water on the bar, and the brig-of-war bumped and strandedrepeatedly even when lightened and assisted in every possible manner. After a night and a day of unflagging exertion she was hauled acrossinto deep water and the guns were quickly slung aboard. The _Niagara_was coaxed out of harbor in the same ingenious fashion, and on the 4thof August Perry was able to report that all his vessels were over thebar, although Barclay had returned by now and "the enemy had been insight all day. "

Perry endeavored to force an engagement without delay, but the Britishfleet retired to Amherstburg because Barclay was waiting for a new andpowerful ship, the _Detroit_, and he preferred to spar for time. TheAmerican vessels thereupon anchored off Erie and took on stores. Theyhad fewer than three hundred men aboard, and it was bracing news forPerry to receive word that a hundred officers and men under CommanderJesse D. Elliott were hastening to join him. Elliott became second incommand to Perry and assumed charge of the _Niagara_. 

For almost a month the Stars and Stripes flew unchallenged from themasts of the American ships. Perry made his base at Put-in Bay, thirtymiles southeast of Amherstburg, where he could intercept the enemypassing eastward. The British commander, Barclay, had also been troubledby lack of seamen and was inclined to postpone action. He wasnevertheless urged on by Sir George Prevost, the Governor General ofCanada, who told him that "he had only to dare and he would besuccessful. " A more urgent call on Barclay to fight was due to the lackof food in the Amherstburg region, where the water route was nowblockaded by the American ships. The British were feeding fourteenthousand Indians, including warriors and their families, and ifprovisions failed the red men would be likely to vanish. 

At sunrise of the 10th of September, a sailor at the masthead of the_Lawrence_ sighted the British squadron steering across the lake with afair wind and ready to give battle. Perry instantly sent his crews toquarters and trimmed sail to quit the bay and form his line in openwater. He was eager to take the initiative, and it may be assumed thathe had forgotten Chauncey's prudent admonition: "The first object willbe to destroy or cripple the enemy's fleet; but in all attempts upon thefleet you ought to use great caution, for the loss of a single vesselmay decide the fate of a campaign. "

Small, crude, and hastily manned as were the ships engaged in thisfamous fresh-water battle, it should be borne in mind that the provenprinciples of naval strategy and tactics used were as sound and true aswhen Nelson and Rodney had demonstrated them in mighty fleet actions atsea. In the final council in his cabin, Perry echoed Nelson's words insaying that no captain could go very far wrong who placed his vesselclose alongside those of the enemy. Chauncey's counsel, on the otherhand, would have lost the battle. Perry's decision to give and takepunishment, no matter if it should cost him a ship or two, won him thevictory. 

The British force was inferior, both in the number of vessels and theweight of broadsides, but this inferiority was somewhat balanced by thegreater range and hitting power of Barclay's longer guns. Each had whatmight be called two heavy ships of the line: the British, the _Detroit_and the _Queen Charlotte, _ and the Americans, the _Lawrence_ and the_Niagara_. Next in importance and fairly well matched were the _LadyPrevost_ under Barclay's flag and the _Caledonia_ under Perry's. Thereremained the light schooner craft of which the American squadron had sixand the British only three. Perry realized that if he could put shipagainst ship the odds would be largely in his favor, for, with hisbatteries of carronades which threw their shot but a short distance, hewould be unwise to maneuver for position and let the enemy pound him topieces at long range. His plan of battle was therefore governed entirelyby his knowledge of Barclay's strength and of the possibilities of hisown forces. 

With a light breeze and working to windward, Perry's ship moved tointercept the British squadron which lay in column, topsails aback andwaiting. The American brigs were fanned ahead by the air which breathedin their lofty canvas, but the schooners were almost becalmed and fourof them straggled in the rear, their crews tugging at the long sweeps oroars. Two of the faster of these, the _Scorpion_ and the _Ariel_, wereslipping along in the van where they supported the American flagship_Lawrence_, and Perry had no intention of delaying for the others tocome up. Shortly before noon Barclay opened the engagement with the longguns of the _Detroit_, but as yet Perry was unable to reach his opponentand made more sail on the _Lawrence_ in order to get close. 

The British gunners of the _Detroit_ were already finding the target, and Perry discovered that the _Lawrence_ was difficult to handle withmuch of her rigging shot away. He ranged ahead until his ship was nomore than two hundred and fifty yards from the _Detroit_. Even then thedistance was greater than desirable for the main battery of carronades. A good golfer can drive his tee shot as far as the space of water whichseparated these two indomitable flagships as they fought. It was adifferent kind of naval warfare from that of today in whichsuperdreadnaughts score hits at battle ranges of twelve and fourteenmiles. 

Perry's plans were now endangered by the failure of his other heavyship, the _Niagara_, to take care of her own adversary, the _QueenCharlotte_, which forged ahead and took a station where her broadsideshelped to reduce the _Lawrence_ to a mass of wreckage. A bitter disputewhich challenged the courage and judgment of Commander Elliott of the_Niagara_ was the aftermath of this flaw in the conduct of the battle. It was charged that he failed to go to the support of hiscommander-in-chief when the flagship was being destroyed under his eyes. The facts admit of no doubt: he dropped astern and for two hoursremained scarcely more than a spectator of a desperate action in whichhis ship was sorely needed, whereas if he had followed the order toclose up, the _Lawrence_ need never have struck to the enemy. 

In his defense he stated that lack of wind had prevented him fromdrawing ahead to engage and divert the _Queen Charlotte_ and that he hadbeen instructed to hold a certain position in line. At the time Perryfound no fault with him, merely setting down in his report that "athalf-past two, the wind springing up, Captain Elliott was enabled tobring his vessel, the _Niagara_, gallantly into close action. " LaterPerry formulated charges against his second in command, accusing him ofhaving kept on a course "which would in a few minutes have carried saidvessel entirely out of action. " These documents were pigeonholed and aCourt of Inquiry commended Elliott as a brave and skillful officer whohad gained laurels in that "splendid victory. "

The issue was threshed out by naval experts who violently disagreed, butthere was glory enough for all and the flag had suffered no stain. Certain it is that the battle would have lacked its most brilliantlydramatic episode if Perry had not been compelled to shift his pennantfrom the blazing hulk of the _Lawrence_ and, from the quarter-deck ofthe _Niagara_, to renew the conflict, rally his vessels, and snatch atriumph from the shadow of disaster. It was one of the great moments inthe storied annals of the American navy, comparable with a John PaulJones shouting "_We have not yet begun to fight!_" from the deck of theshattered, water-logged _Bon Homme Richard_, or a Farragut lashed in therigging and roaring "_Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!_"

Because of the failure of Elliott to bring the _Niagara_ into action atonce, as had been laid down in the plan of battle, Perry found himselfin desperate straits aboard the beaten _Lawrence_. Her colors still flewbut she could fire only one gun of her whole battery, and more than halfthe ship's company had been killed or wounded--eighty-three men out ofone hundred and forty-two. It was impossible to steer or handle her andshe drifted helpless. Then it was that Perry, seeing the laggard_Niagara_ close at hand, ordered a boat away and was transferred to aship which was still fit and ready to continue the action. As soon as hehad left them, the survivors of the _Lawrence_ hauled down their flag intoken of surrender, for there was nothing else for them to do. 

As soon as he jumped on deck, Perry took command of the _Niagara_, sending Elliott off to bring up the rearmost schooners. There was nolagging or hesitation now. With topgallant sails sheeted home, the_Niagara_ bore down upon the _Detroit_, driven by a freshening breeze. Barclay's crippled flagship tried to avoid being raked and so fouled herconsort, the _Queen Charlotte_. The two British ships lay lockedtogether while the American guns pounded them with terrific fire. Presently they got clear of each other and pluckily attempted to carryon the fight. But the odds were hopeless. The officer whose painfulduty it was to signal the surrender of the _Detroit_ said of thisBritish flagship: "The ship lying completely unmanageable, every bracecut away, the mizzen-topmast and gaff down, all the other masts badlywounded, not a stay left forward, hull shattered very much, a number ofguns disabled, and the enemy's squadron raking both ships ahead andastern, none of our own in a position to support us, I was under thepainful necessity of answering the enemy to say we had struck, the_Queen Charlotte_ having previously done so. "

It was later reported of the _Detroit_ that it was "impossible to placea hand upon that broadside which had been exposed to the enemy's firewithout covering some portion of a wound, either from grape, round, canister, or chain shot. " The crew had suffered as severely as thevessel. The valiant commander of the squadron, Captain Barclay, was afighting sailor who had lost an arm at Trafalgar. In the battle of LakeErie he was twice wounded and had to be carried below. His firstlieutenant was mortally hurt and in the critical moments the ship wasleft in charge of the second lieutenant. In this gallant manner didPerry and Barclay, both heirs of the bulldog Anglo-Saxon strain, wagetheir bloody duel without faltering and thus did the British sailorkeep his honor bright in defeat. 

The little American schooners played a part in smashing the enemy. The_Ariel_ and _Scorpion_ held their positions in the van and their longguns helped deal the finishing blows to the _Detroit_, while the otherscame up when the breeze grew stronger and engaged their severalopponents. The _Caledonia_ was effective in putting the _QueenCharlotte_ out of action. When the larger British ships surrendered, thesmaller craft were compelled to follow the example, and the squadronyielded to Perry after three hours of battle. It was in no boastfulstrain but as the laconic fact that he sent his famous message to thenation. He had met the enemy and they were all his. It wasleadership--brilliant and tenacious--which had employed makeshiftvessels, odd lots of guns, and crews which included militia, sick men, and "a motley set of blacks and boys. " Barclay had labored underhandicaps no less heavy, but it was his destiny to match himself againsta superior force and a man of unquestioned naval genius. Oliver HazardPerry would have made a name for himself, no doubt, if his career hadled him to blue water and the command of stately frigates. 

On Lake Ontario, Chauncey dragged his naval campaign through twoseasons and then left the enemy in control. Perry, by opening the wayfor Harrison, rewon the Northwest for the United States because hesagaciously upheld the doctrine of Napoleon that "war cannot be wagedwithout running risks. " Behind his daring, however, lay tireless, painstaking preparation and a thorough knowledge of his trade. 

CHAPTER IV

EBB AND FLOW ON THE NORTHERN FRONT

The events of the war by land are apt to be as confusing in narration asthey were in fact. The many forays, skirmishes, and retreats along theCanadian frontier were campaigns in name only, ambitiously conceived butmost haltingly executed. Major General Dearborn, senior officer of theAmerican army, had failed to begin operations in the center and on theeastern flank in time to divert the enemy from Detroit; but in theautumn of 1812 he was ready to attempt an invasion of Canada by way ofNiagara. The direct command was given to Major General Stephen VanRensselaer of the New York State militia, who was to advance as soon assix thousand troops were assembled. At first Dearborn seemed hopeful ofsuccess. He predicted that "with the militia and other troops there oron the march, they will be able, I presume, to cross over into Canada, carry all the works in Niagara, and proceed to the other posts in thatprovince in triumph. "

The fair prospect soon clouded, however, and Dearborn, who was of adoubtful, easily discouraged temperament, partly due to age andinfirmities, discovered that "a strange fatality seemed to have pervadedthe whole arrangements. " Yet this was when the movement of troops andsupplies was far brisker and better organized than could have beenexpected and when the armed strength was thrice that of Brock, theBritish general, who was guarding forty miles of front along the NiagaraRiver with less than two thousand men. At Queenston which was theobjective of the first American attack there were no more than twocompanies of British regulars and a few militia, in all about threehundred troops. The rest of Brock's forces were at Chippawa and FortErie, where the heavy assaults were expected. 

An American regular brigade was on the march to Buffalo, but itscommander, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, was not subordinate to VanRensselaer, and the two had quarreled. Smyth paid no attention to arequest for a council of war and went his own way. On the night of the10th of October Van Rensselaer attempted to cross the Niagara River, but there was some blunder about the boats and the disgruntled troopsreturned to camp. Two nights later they made another attempt but foundthe British on the alert and failed to dislodge them from the heights ofQueenston. A small body of American regulars, led by gallant youngCaptain Wool, managed to clamber up a path hitherto regarded asimpassable. There they held a precarious position and waited for help. Brock, who was commanding the British in person, was instantly killedwhile storming this hillside at the head of reinforcements. In him theenemy lost its ablest and most intrepid leader. 

The forenoon wore on and Captain Wool, painfully wounded, still clung tothe heights with his two hundred and fifty men. A relief column whichcrossed the river found itself helpless for lack of artillery andintrenching tools and was compelled to fall back. Van Rensselaer forgothis bickering with General Smyth and sent him urgent word to hasten tothe rescue. Winfield Scott, then a lieutenant colonel, came forward as avolunteer and took command of young Captain Wool's forlorn hope. Gradually more men trickled up the heights until the ground was defendedby three hundred and fifty regulars and two hundred and fifty militia. 

Meanwhile the British troops were mustering up the river at Chippawa, and the red lines of their veterans were descried advancing from FortGeorge below. Bands of Indians raced by field and forest to screen theBritish movements and to harass the American lines. The tragic turn ofevents appears to have dazed General Van Rensselaer. The failure to savethe beleaguered and outnumbered Americans on the heights he blamed uponhis troops, reporting next day that his reinforcements embarked veryslowly. "I passed immediately over to accelerate them, " said he, "but tomy utter astonishment I found that at the very moment when completevictory was in our hands the ardor of the unengaged troops had entirelysubsided. I rode in all directions, urged the men by every considerationto pass over; but in vain. "

The candid fact seems to be that this general of militia had made asorry mess of the whole affair, and his men had lost all faith in hisability to turn the adverse tide. He stood and watched six hundredvaliant American soldiers make their last stand on the rocky eminencewhile the British hurled more and more men up the slope. One concertedattack by the idle American army would have swept them away like chaff. But there was only one Winfield Scott in the field, and his lot wascast with those who fought to the bitter end as a sacrifice tostupidity. The six hundred were surrounded. They were pushed back byweight of opposing numbers. Still they died in their tracks, until thesurvivors were actually pushed over a cliff and down to the bank of theriver. 

There they surrendered, for there were no boats to carry them across. The boatmen had fled to cover as soon as the Indians opened fire onthem. Winfield Scott was among the prisoners together with a brigadiergeneral and two more lieutenant colonels who had been bagged earlier inthe day. Ninety Americans were killed and many more wounded, while atotal of nine hundred were captured during the entire action. VanRensselaer had lost almost as many troops as Hull had lost at Detroit, and he had nothing to show for it. He very sensibly resigned his commandon the next day. 

The choice of his successor, however, was again unfortunate. BrigadierGeneral Alexander Smyth had been inspector general in the regular armybefore he was given charge of an infantry brigade. He had a mostflattering opinion of himself, and promotion to the command of an armyquite turned his head. The oratory with which he proceeded to bombardfriend and foe strikes the one note of humor in a chapter that isotherwise depressing. Through the newspapers he informed his troops thattheir valor had been conspicuous "but the nation has been unfortunate inthe selection of some of those who have directed it. .. The cause ofthese miscarriages is apparent. The commanders were popular men, 'destitute alike of theory and experience' in the art of war. " "In a fewdays, " he announced, "the troops under my command will plant theAmerican standard in Canada. They are men accustomed to obedience, silence, and steadiness. They will conquer or they will die. Will youstand with your arms folded and look on this interesting struggle?. .. Has the race degenerated? Or have you, under the baneful influence ofcontending factions, forgot your country?. .. Shame, where is thy blush?No!"

This invasion of Canada was to be a grim, deadly business; no moretrifling. His heroic troops were to hold their fire until they werewithin _five paces_ of the enemy, and then to charge bayonets withshouts. They were to think on their country's honor torn, her rightstrampled on, her sons enslaved, her infants perishing by the hatchet, not forgetting to be strong and brave and to let the ruffian power ofthe British King cease on this continent. 

Buffalo was the base of this particular conquest of Canada. The advanceguard would cross the Niagara River from Black Rock to destroy theenemy's batteries, after which the army was to move onward, threethousand strong. The first detachments crossed the river early in themorning on the 28th of November and did their work well and bravely andcaptured the guns in spite of heavy loss. The troops then began toembark at sunrise, but by noon only twelve hundred were in boats. Upstream they moved at a leisurely pace and went ashore for dinner. Theremainder of the three thousand, however, had failed to appear, andSmyth refused to invade unless he had the full number. Altogether, fourthousand troops, all regulars, had been sent to Niagara but many of themhad been disabled by sickness. 

General Smyth then called a council of war, shifted the responsibilityfrom his own shoulders, and decided to delay the invasion. Again hechanged his mind and ordered the men into the boats two days later. Fifteen hundred men answered the summons. Again the general marched themashore after another council of war, and then and there he abandonedhis personal conquest of Canada. His army literally melted away, "aboutfour thousand men without order or restraint discharging their musketsin every direction, " writes an eyewitness. They riddled the general'stent with bullets by way of expressing their opinion of him, and he leftthe camp not more than two leaps ahead of his earnest troops. Herequested permission to visit his family, after the newspapers hadbranded him as a coward, and the visit became permanent. His name wasdropped from the army rolls without the formality of an inquiry. Itseemed rather too much for the country to bear that, in the first yearof the war, its armies should have suffered from the failures of Hull, Van Rensselaer, and Smyth. 

It had been hoped that General Dearborn might carry out his own idea ofan operation against Montreal at the same time as the Niagara campaignwas in progress. On the shore of Lake Champlain, Dearborn was in commandof the largest and most promising force under the American flag, including seven regiments of the regular army. Taking personal charge atPlattsburg, he marched this body of troops twenty miles in the directionof the Canadian border. Here the militia refused to go on, and hemarched back again after four days in the field. Beset with rheumatismand low spirits, he wrote to the Secretary of War: "I had anticipateddisappointment and misfortune in the commencement of the war, but I didby no means apprehend such a deficiency of regular troops and such aseries of disasters as we have witnessed. " Coupled with this complaintwas the request that he might be allowed "to retire to the shades ofprivate life and remain a mere but interested spectator of passingevents. "

The Government, however, was not yet ready to release Major GeneralDearborn but instructed him to organize an offensive which should obtaincontrol of the St. Lawrence River and thereby cut communication betweenUpper and Lower Canada. This was the pet plan of Armstrong when hebecame Secretary of War, and as soon as was possible he set the militarymachinery in motion. In February, 1813, Armstrong told Dearborn toassemble four thousand men at Sackett's Harbor, on Lake Ontario, andthree thousand at Buffalo. The larger force was to cross the lake in thespring, protected by Chauncey's fleet, capture the important navalstation of Kingston, then attack York (Toronto), and finally join thecorps at Buffalo for another operation against the British on theNiagara River. But Dearborn was not eager for the enterprise. Heexplained that he lacked sufficient strength for an operation againstKingston. With the support of Commodore Chauncey he proposed a differentoffensive which should be aimed first against York, then againstNiagara, and finally against Kingston. This proposal reversedArmstrong's programme, and he permitted it to sway his decision. Thusthe war turned westward from the St. Lawrence. 

The only apparent success in this campaign occurred at York, the capitalof Upper Canada, where on the 27th of April one ship under constructionwas burned and another captured after the small British garrison hadbeen driven inland. The public buildings were also destroyed by fire, though Dearborn protested that this was done against his orders. In thenext year, however, the enemy retaliated by burning the Capitol atWashington. The fighting at York was bloody, and the American forcescounted a fifth killed or wounded. They remained on the Canadian sideonly ten days and then returned to disembark at Niagara. Here Dearbornfell ill, and his chief of staff, Colonel Winfield Scott, was left invirtual control of the army. 

In May, 1813, most of the troops at Plattsburg and Sackett's Harborwere moved to the Niagara region for the purpose of a grand movement totake Fort George, at the mouth of that river, from the rear and thusredeem the failure of the preceding campaign. Commodore Chauncey withhis Ontario fleet was prepared to cooperate and to transport the troops. Three American brigadiers, Boyd, Winder, and Chandler, effected alanding in handsome fashion, while Winfield Scott led an advancedivision. Under cover of the ships they proceeded along the beach andturned the right flank of the British defenses. Fort George wasevacuated, but most of the force escaped and made their way toQueenston, whence they continued to retreat westward along the shore ofLake Ontario. Vincent, the British general, reported his losses inkilled and wounded and missing as three hundred and fifty-six. TheAmericans suffered far less. It was a clean-cut, workmanlike operation, and, according to an observer, "Winfield Scott fought nine-tenths of thebattle. " But the chief aim had been to destroy the British force, and inthis the adventure failed. 

General Dearborn was not at all reconciled to letting the garrison ofFort George get clean away from him, and he therefore sent GeneralWinder in pursuit with a thousand men. These were reinforced by as manymore; and together they followed the trail of the retreating British toStony Creek and camped there for the night. Vincent and his sixteenhundred British regulars were in bivouac ten miles beyond. The mishap atFort George had by no means knocked the fight out of them. Vincenthimself led six hundred men back in the middle of a black night (the 6thof June) and fell upon the American camp. A confused battle followed. The two forces intermingled in cursing, stabbing, swirling groups. TheAmerican generals, Chandler and Winder, walked straight into the enemy'sarms and were captured. The British broke through and took the Americanbatteries but failed to keep them. At length both parties retired, badlypunished. The Americans had lost all ardor for pursuit and on thefollowing day retreated ten miles and were soon ordered to return toFort George. 

General Dearborn was much distressed by this unlucky episode and was insuch feeble health that he again begged to be relieved. He was, he said, "so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. " GeneralMorgan Lewis took temporary command at Niagara, but, being soon calledto Sackett's Harbor, he was succeeded by General Boyd, whom Lewis waskind enough to describe, by way of recommendation, in these terms: "Acompound of ignorance, vanity, and petulance, with nothing to recommendhim but that species of bravery in the field which is vaporing, boisterous, stifling reflection, blinding observation, and betteradapted to the bully than the soldier. "

In order to live up to this encomium, Boyd sent Colonel Boerstler on the24th of June, with four hundred infantry and two guns, to bombard andtake an annoying stone house a day's march from Fort George. But twohundred hostile Indians so alarmed Boerstler that he attempted toretreat. Thirty hostile militia then caused him to halt the retreat andsend for reinforcements. The reinforcements came to the number of ahundred and fifty, but the British also appeared with forty-seven moremen. Colonel Boerstler thereupon surrendered his total of five hundredand forty soldiers. General Dearborn, still the nominal commander of theforces, sadly mentioned the disaster as "an unfortunate andunaccountable event. "

There is a better account to be given, however, of events at Sackett'sHarbor in this same month of May. The operations on the Niagara fronthad stripped this American naval base of troops and of the protection ofChauncey's fleet. Sir George Prevost, the Governor in Chief of Canada, could not let the opportunity slip, although he was not notable forenergy. He embarked with a force of regulars, eight hundred men, on SirJames Yeo's ships at Kingston and sailed across Lake Ontario. 

Sackett's Harbor was defended by only four hundred regulars of severalregiments and about two hundred and fifty militia from Albany. Couriersrode through the countryside as soon as the British ships were sighted, and several hundred volunteers came straggling in from farm and shop andmill. In them was something of the old spirit of Lexington and BunkerHill, and to lead them there was a real man and a soldier with his twofeet under him, Jacob Brown, a brigadier general of the state militia, who consented to act in the emergency. He knew what to do and how tocommunicate to his men his own unshaken courage. On the beach of thebeautiful little harbor he posted five hundred of his militia andvolunteers to hamper the British landing. His second line was composedof regulars. In rear were the forts with the guns manned. 

The British grenadiers were thrown ashore at dawn on the 28th of Mayunder a wicked fire from American muskets and rifles, but theirdisciplined ranks surged forward, driving the militia back at the pointof the bayonet and causing even the regulars to give ground. Theregulars halted at a blockhouse, where they had also the log barracksand timbers of the shipyard for a defense, and there they stayed inspite of the efforts of the British grenadiers to dislodge them. JacobBrown, stout-hearted and undismayed, rallied his militia in newpositions. Of the engagement a British officer said: "I do notexaggerate when I tell you that the shot, both of musketry and grape, was falling about us like hail. .. Those who were left of the troopsbehind the barracks made a dash out to charge the enemy; but the firewas so destructive that they were instantly turned by it, and theretreat was sounded. Sir George, fearless of danger and disdaining torun or to suffer his men to run, repeatedly called out to them to retirein order; many, however, made off as fast as they could. "

Before the retreat was sounded, the British expedition had sufferedseverely. One man in three was killed or wounded, and the rest of themnarrowly escaped capture. Jacob Brown serenely reported to GeneralDearborn that "the militia were all rallied before the enemy gave wayand were marching perfectly in his view towards the rear of his rightflank; and I am confident that even then, if Sir George had not retiredwith the utmost precipitation to his boats, he would have been cut off. "

Though he had given the enemy a sound thrashing, Jacob Brown found hisrighteous satisfaction spoiled by the destruction of the naval barracks, shipping, and storehouses. This was the act of a flighty lieutenant ofthe American navy who concluded too hastily that the battle was lost andtherefore set fire to the buildings to keep the supplies and vessels outof the enemy's hands. Jacob Brown in his straightforward fashionemphatically placed the blame where it belonged:

 The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous a transaction as ever occurred among military men. The fire was set as the enemy met our regulars upon the main line; and if anything could have appalled these gallant men it would have been the flames in their rear. We have all, I presume, suffered in the public estimation in consequence of this disgraceful burning. The fact is, however, that the army is entitled to much higher praise than though it had not occurred. The navy alone are responsible for what happened on Navy Point and it is fortunate for them that they have reputations sufficient to sustain the shock. 

A few weeks later General Dearborn, after his repeated failures toshake the British grip on the Niagara front and the misfortunes whichhad darkened his campaigns, was retired according to his wish. But theAmerican nation was not yet rid of its unsuccessful generals. JamesWilkinson, who was inscrutably chosen to succeed Dearborn, was a man ofbad reputation and low professional standing. "The selection of thisunprincipled imbecile, " said Winfield Scott, "was not the blunder ofSecretary Armstrong. " Added to this, Wilkinson was a man of brokenhealth. He was shifted from command at New Orleans because the SouthernSenators insisted that he was untrustworthy and incompetent. The regulararmy regarded him with contempt. 

Secretary Armstrong endeavored to mend matters by making his ownheadquarters at Sackett's Harbor, where the next offensive, directedagainst Montreal, was planned under his direction. Success hung upon thecooperation and junction of two armies moving separately, the one underWilkinson descending the St. Lawrence, the other under Wade Hamptonsetting out from Plattsburg on Lake Champlain. The fact that these twoofficers had hated each other for years made a difficult problem noeasier. Hampton possessed uncommon ability and courage, but he was proudand sensitive, as might have been expected in a South Carolinagentleman, and he loathed Wilkinson with all his heart. That he shouldyield the seniority to one whom he considered a blackguard was to himintolerable, and he accepted the command on Lake Champlain with theunderstanding that he would take no orders from Wilkinson until the twoarmies were combined. 

The expedition from Sackett's Harbor was ready to advance by way of theSt. Lawrence in October, 1813, and comprised seven thousand effectivetroops. Even then the commanding general and the Secretary of War hadbegun to regard the adventure as dubious and were accusing each other ofdodging the responsibility. Said Wilkinson to Armstrong: "It isnecessary to my justification that you should, by the authority of thePresident, direct the operations of the army under my commandparticularly against Montreal. " Said Armstrong to Wilkinson: "I speakconjecturally, but should we surmount every obstacle in descending theriver we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayedagainst us and in case of misfortune having no retreat, the army mustsurrender at discretion. " This was scarcely the spirit to inspire aconquering army. As though to clinch his lack of faith in theenterprise, the Secretary of War ordered winter quarters built for tenthousand men many miles this side of Montreal, explaining in later yearsthat he had suspected the campaign would terminate as it did, "with thedisgrace of doing nothing. "

On the 17th of October the army embarked in bateaux and coasted alongLake Ontario to the entrance of the St. Lawrence. After being delayed bystormy weather, the flotilla passed the British guns across fromOgdensburg and halted twenty miles below. There Wilkinson called acouncil of war to decide whether to proceed or retreat. Four generalsvoted to attack Montreal and two were reluctant but could see "no otheralternative. " Wilkinson then became ill and was unable to leave his boator to give orders. Several British gunboats evaded Chauncey's blockadeand annoyed the rear of the expedition. Eight hundred British infantryfrom Kingston followed along shore and peppered the boats with musketryand canister wherever the river narrowed. Finally it became necessaryfor the Americans to land a force to drive the enemy away. Jacob Browntook a brigade and cleared the bank in advance of the flotilla whichfloated down to a farm called Chrystler's and moored for the night. 

General Boyd, who had been sent back with a strong force to protect therear, reported next morning that the enemy was advancing in column. Hewas told to turn back and attack. This he did with three brigades. Itwas a brilliant opportunity to capture or destroy eight hundred Britishtroops led by a dashing naval officer, Captain Mulcaster. Boyd lived upto his reputation, which was such that Jacob Brown had refused to serveunder him. At this engagement of Chrystler's Farm, with two thousandregulars at his disposal, he was unmercifully beaten. Both Wilkinson andMorgan Lewis were flat on their backs, too feeble to concern themselveswith battles. The American troops fought without a coherent plan andwere defeated and broken in detail. Almost four hundred of them werekilled, wounded, or captured. Their conduct reflected the half-heartedattitude of their commanding general and some of his subordinates. Thebadly mauled brigades hastily took to the boats and ran the rapids, stopping at the first harbor below. There Wilkinson received tidingsfrom Wade Hampton's army which caused him to abandon the voyage downthe St. Lawrence, and it is fair to conjecture that he shed no tears ofdisappointment. 

In September Hampton had led his forces, recruited to four thousandinfantry and a few dragoons, from Lake Champlain to the Canadian borderin faithful compliance with his instructions to join the movementagainst Montreal. His line of march was westward to the ChateauguayRiver where he took a position which menaced both Montreal and thatvital artery, the St. Lawrence. Building roads and bringing up supplies, he waited there for Wilkinson to set his own undertaking in motion. Wordcame from Secretary Armstrong to advance along the river, hold the enemyin check, and prepare to unite with Wilkinson's army. Hampton actedpromptly and alarmed the British at Montreal, who foresaw graveconsequences and assembled troops from every quarter. Hampton thenlearned that his army faced an enemy which was of vastly superiorstrength and which had every advantage of natural defense, while hehimself was becoming convinced that Wilkinson was a broken reed and thatno further support could be expected from the Government. GeneralPrevost's own reports and letters showed that he had collected in theMontreal district and available for defense at least fifteen thousandrank and file, including the militia which had been mustered to repelHampton's advance. The American position at Chateauguay was not lessperilous than that of Harrison on the Maumee and far more so than thatwhich had cost Dearborn so many disasters at Niagara. 

Hampton moved forward half-heartedly. He had received a message from theWar Department that his troops were to prepare winter quarters and theseorders confirmed his suspicions that no attempt against Montreal wasintended. "These papers sunk my hopes, " he wrote in reply, "and raisedserious doubts of that efficacious support that had been anticipated. Iwould have recalled the column, but it was in motion and the darkness ofthe night rendered it impracticable. "

The last words refer to a collision with a small force of Canadianmilitia, led by Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry, who had come forward toimpede the American advance. These Canadians had obstructed the roadwith fallen trees and abatis, falling back until they found favorableground where they very pluckily intrenched themselves. The intrepidparty was comprised of a few Glengarry Fencibles and three hundredFrench-Canadian Voltigeurs. Colonel de Salaberry was a trained soldier, and he now displayed brilliant courage and resourcefulness. Two Americandivisions attacking him were unable to carry his breastworks and weredriven along the river bank and routed. Hampton's troops abandoned muchof their equipment, and returned to camp with a loss of about fifty men. 

There was great rejoicing in Canada and rightly so, for a victory hadbeen handsomely won without the aid of British regulars; and Colonel deSalaberry's handful of French Canadians received the credit forthwarting the American plans against Montreal. But, without belittlingthe signal valor of the achievement, the documentary evidence goes toprove that Hampton's failure was largely due to the neglect of hisGovernment. His state of mind at this time was such that he wrote:"Events have no tendency to change my opinion of the destiny intendedfor me, nor my determination to retire from a service where I can feelneither security nor expect honor. "

With this tame conclusion the armies of Wilkinson and Hampton tuckedthemselves into log huts for the winter. Both accused the Secretary ofWar of leading them into an impossible venture and of then desertingthem, while he in his turn accepted their resignations from the army. The fiasco was a costly one in quite another direction, for the Niagarasector had been overlooked in the elaborate attempt to capture Montreal. The few American troops who had gained a foothold on the Canadian side, at Fort George and the village of Niagara, were left unsupported whileall the available regulars were sent to the armies of Wilkinson andHampton. As soon as the British comprehended that the grand invasion hadcrumbled, they bethought themselves of the tempting opportunity torecover their forts at Niagara. 

Wilkinson advised that the Americans evacuate Fort George, which theydid on the 10th of December, when five hundred British soldiers weremarching to retake it. There was no effort to reinforce the garrison, although at the time ten thousand American troops were idle in winterquarters. Fort Niagara, on the American side, still flew the Stars andStripes, but on the night of the 18th of December Colonel Murray withfive hundred and fifty British regulars rushed the fort, surprised thesentries, and lost only eight men in capturing this stronghold and itsthree hundred and fifty defenders. It was more like a massacre. Sixty-seven Americans were killed by the bayonet. A few nights laterthe Indian allies were loosed against Buffalo and Black Rock and ravagedthirty miles of frontier. The settlements were helpless. The Governmenthad made not the slightest attempt to protect or defend them. 

The war had come to the end of its second year, and by land the UnitedStates had done no more than to regain what Hull lost at Detroit. Theconquest of Canada was a shattered illusion, a sorry tale of wastedenergy, misdirected armies, sordid intrigue, lack of organization. A fewworthless generals had been swept into the rubbish heap where theybelonged, and this was the chief item on the credit side of the ledger. The state militia system had been found wanting; raw levies, defyingauthority and miserably cared for, had been squandered against a fewthousand disciplined British regulars. The nation, angry and bewildered, was taking these lessons to heart. The story of 1814 was to contain farbrighter episodes. 

CHAPTER V

THE NAVY ON BLUE WATER

It has pleased the American mind to regard the War of 1812 as a maritimeconflict. This is natural enough, for the issue was the freedom of thesea, and the achievements of Yankee ships and sailors stood out inbrilliant relief against the somber background of the inefficiency ofthe army. The offensive was thought to be properly a matter for the landforces, which had vastly superior advantages against Canada, while thenavy was compelled to act on the defensive against overwhelming odds. The truth is that the navy did amazingly well, though it could notprevent the enemy's squadrons from blockading American ports or raidingthe coasts at will. A few single ship actions could not vitallyinfluence the course of the war; but they served to create animperishable renown for the flag and the service, and to deal astaggering blow to the pride and prestige of an enemy whose ancientboast it was that Britannia ruled the waves. 

The amazing thing is that the navy was able to accomplish anything atall, neglected and almost despised as it was by the same opinion whichhad suffered the army system to become a melancholy jest. During thedecade in which Great Britain captured hundreds of American merchantships in time of peace and impressed more than six thousand Americanseamen, the United States built two sloops-of-war of eighteen guns andallowed three of her dozen frigates to hasten to decay at their mooringbuoys. Officers in the service were underpaid and shamefully treated bythe Government. Captain Bainbridge, an officer of distinction, asked forleave that he might earn money to support himself, giving as a reason:"I have hitherto refused such offers on the presumption that my countrywould require my services. That presumption is removed, and even doubtsentertained of the permanency of the naval establishment. "

But, though Congress refused to build more frigates or to formulate aprogramme for guarding American shores and commerce, the tiny navy keptalive the spark of duty and readiness, while the nation driftedinevitably towards war. There was no scarcity of capable seamen, forthe merchant marine was an admirable training-school. In those far-offdays the technique of seafaring and sea fighting was comparativelysimple. The merchant seaman could find his way about a frigate, for inrigging, handling, and navigation the ships were very much alike. Andthe American seamen of 1812 were in fighting mood; they had been whettedby provocation to a keen edge for war. They understood the meaning of"Free Trade and Sailors' Rights, " if the landsmen did not. There werestrapping sailors in every deep-water port to follow the fife and drumof the recruiting squad. The militia might quibble about "rights, " butall the sailors asked was the weather gage of a British man-of-war. Theyhad no patience with such spokesmen as Josiah Quincy, who said thatMassachusetts would not go to war to contest the right of Great Britainto search American vessels for British seamen. They had neitherforgotten nor forgiven the mortal affront of 1807, when their frigate_Chesapeake_, flying the broad pennant of Commodore James Barron, refused to let the British _Leopard_ board and search her, and was firedinto without warning and reduced to submission, after twenty-one of theAmerican crew had been killed or wounded. 

That shameful episode was in keeping with the attitude of the Britishnavy toward the armed ships of the United States, "a few fir-builtthings with bits of striped bunting at their mast-heads, " as GeorgeCanning, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, described them. Long before the declaration of war British squadrons hovered off theport of New York to ransack merchant vessels or to seize them as prizes. In the course of the Napoleonic wars England had met and destroyed thenavies of all her enemies in Europe. The battles of Copenhagen, theNile, Trafalgar, and a hundred lesser fights had thundered to the worldthe existence of an unconquerable sea power. 

Insignificant as it was, the American naval service boasted a historyand a high morale. Its ships had been active. The younger officersserved with seniors who had sailed and fought with Biddle and Barney andPaul Jones in the Revolution. Many of them had won promotions forgallantry in hand-to-hand combats in boarding parties, for following thebold Stephen Decatur in 1804 when he cut out and set fire to the_Philadelphia_, which had fallen into the hands of pirates at Tripoli, and helping Thomas Truxtun in 1799-1800 when the _Constellation_ whippedthe Frenchmen, _L'Insurgente_ and _La Vengeance_. In wardroom orsteerage almost every man could tell of engagements in which he hadbehaved with credit. Trained in the school of hard knocks, the sailorknew the value of discipline and gunnery, of the smart ship and thewilling crew, while on land the soldier rusted and lost his zeal. 

The bluejackets were volunteers, not impressed men condemned to brutalservitude, and they had fought to save their skins in merchant vesselswhich made their voyages, in peril of privateer, pirate, and picaroon, from the Caribbean to the China Sea. The American merchant marine was atthe zenith of its enterprise and daring, attracting the pick and flowerof young manhood, and it offered incomparable material for the navalservice and the fleets of swift privateers which swarmed out to harryEngland's commerce. [2]

[Footnote 2: For an account of the privateers of 1812, see _The OldMerchant Marine_, by Ralph D. Paine (in _The Chronicles of America_). ]

The American frigates which humbled the haughty Mistress of the Seasbeyond all precedent were superior in speed and hitting power toanything of their class afloat. It detracts not at all from the glorythey won to remember that in every instance they were larger and ofbetter design and armament than the British frigates which they shot topieces with such methodical accuracy. 

When war was declared, the American Government was not quite clear as towhat should be done with the navy. In New York harbor was a squadron offive ships under Commodore John Rodgers, including two of the heavierfrigates or forty-fours, the _President_ and the _United States_. Rodgers had also the lighter frigate _Congress_, the brig _Argus_, andthe sloop _Hornet_. His orders were to look for British cruisers whichwere annoying commerce off Sandy Hook, chase them away, and then returnto port for "further more extensive and particular orders. " One hourafter receiving these instructions the eager Rodgers put out to sea, with Captain Stephen Decatur as a squadron commander. The quarry was thefrigate _Belvidera_, the most offensive of the British blockading force. This warship was sighted by the _President_ and overtaken withinforty-eight hours. An unlucky accident then occurred. Instead of runningalongside, the _President_ began firing at a distance and was hullingthe enemy's stern when a gun on the forecastle burst, and killed orwounded sixteen American sailors. Commodore Rodgers was picked up with abroken leg. Meanwhile the _Belvidera_ cast overboard her boats andanchors, emptied the fresh water barrels to better her sailing trim, and, crowding on every stitch of canvas, drew away and was lost to view. Rodgers then forgot his orders to return to New York and went off insearch of the great convoy of British merchant vessels homeward boundfrom Jamaica, which was called the plate fleet. He sailed as far as theEnglish Channel before quitting the chase and then cruised back toBoston. 

Meanwhile Captain Isaac Hull of the _Constitution_ had taken on a crewand stores at Annapolis and was bound up the coast to New York. Hull'sluck appeared to be no better than Rodgers's. Off Barnegat he sailedalmost into a strong British squadron, which had been sent from Halifax. The escape from this grave predicament was an exploit of seamanshipwhich is among the treasured memories of the service. It was thebeginning of the career of the _Constitution_, whose name is still themost illustrious on the American naval list and whose commanders, Hulland Bainbridge, are numbered among the great captains. It is a privilegeto behold today, in the Boston Navy Yard, this gallant frigate preservedas a heritage, her tall masts and graceful yards soaring above the grim, gray citadels that we call battleships. True it is that a single modernshell would destroy this obsolete, archaic frigate which once swept theseas like a meteor, but the very image of her is still potent to thrillthe hearts and animate the courage of an American seaman. 

On that luckless July morning, at break of day, off the New Jerseycoast, it seemed as though the _Constitution_ would be flying Britishcolors ere she had a chance to fight. On her leeward side stood twoEnglish frigates, the _Guerrière_ and the _Belvidera_, with the_Shannon_ only five miles astern, and the rest of the hostile fleetlifting topsails above the southern horizon. 

Not a breath of wind stirred. Captain Hull called away his boats, andthe sailors tugged at the oars, towing the _Constitution_ very slowlyahead. Captain Broke of the _Shannon_ promptly followed suit andsignaled for all the boats of the squadron. In a long column theytrailed at the end of the hawser; and the _Shannon_ crept closer. Catspaws of wind ruffled the water, and first one ship and then theother gained a few hundred yards as upper tiers of canvas caught thefaint impulse. The _Shannon_ was a crack ship, and there was no bettercrew in the British navy, as Lawrence of the _Chesapeake_ afterwardslearned to his mortal sorrow. Gradually the _Shannon_ cut down theintervening distance until she could make use of her bow guns. 

At this Captain Hull resolved to try kedging his ship along, sending aboat half a mile ahead with a light anchor and all the spare rope onboard. The crew walked the capstan round and hauled the ship up to theanchor, which they then lifted, carried ahead, and dropped again. The_Constitution_ kept two kedges going all through that summer day, butthe _Shannon_ was playing the same game, and the two ships maintainedtheir relative positions. They shot at each other at such long rangethat no damage was done. Before dusk the _Guerrière_ caught a slant ofbreeze and worked nearer enough to bang away at the _Constitution_, which was, indeed, between the devil and the deep sea. 

Night came on. The sailors, British and American, toiled until theydropped in their tracks, pulling at the kedge anchors and hawsers orbending to the sweeps of the cutters which towed at intervals and wereexposed to the spatter of shot. It seemed impossible that the_Constitution_ could slip clear of this pack of able frigates whichtrailed her like hounds. Toward midnight the fickle breeze awoke andwafted the ships along under studding sails and all the light clothsthat were wont to arch skyward. For two hours the men slept on decklike logs while those on watch grunted at the pump-brakes and the hosewetted the canvas to make it draw better. 

The breeze failed, however, and through the rest of the night it waskedge and tow again, the _Shannon_ and the _Guerrière_ hanging ondoggedly, confident of taking their quarry. Another day dawned, hot andwindless, and the situation was unchanged. Other British ships hadcrawled or drifted nearer, but the _Constitution_ was always just beyondrange of their heavy guns. We may imagine Isaac Hull striding across thepoop and back again, ruddy, solid, composed, wearing a cocked hat and agold-laced coat, lifting an eye aloft, or squinting through his brasstelescope, while he damned the enemy in the hearty language of the sea. He was a nephew of General William Hull, but it would have been unfairto remind him of it. 

Near sunset of the second day of this unique test of seamanship andendurance, a rain squall swept toward the _Constitution_ and obscuredthe ocean. Just before the violent gust struck the ship her seamenscampered aloft and took in the upper sails. This was all that safetyrequired, but, seeing a chance to trick the enemy, Hull ordered thelower sails double-reefed as though caught in a gale of wind. TheBritish ships hastily imitated him before they should be overtaken inlike manner and veered away from the chase. Veiled in the rain and dusk, the _Constitution_ set all sail again and foamed at twelve knots on hercourse toward a port of refuge. Though two of the British frigates werein sight next morning, the _Constitution_ left them far astern andreached Boston safely. 

Seafaring New England was quick to recognize the merit of this escape. Even the Federalists, who opposed and hampered the war by land, wereenthusiastic in praise of Captain Hull and his ship. They had outsailedand outwitted the best of the British men-of-war on the American coast, and a general feeling of hopelessness gave way to an ardent desire totry anew the ordeal of battle. With this spirit firing his officers andcrew, Hull sailed again a few days later on a solitary cruise to theeastward with the intention of vexing the enemy's merchant trade andhopeful of finding a frigate willing to engage him in a duel. FromNewfoundland he cruised south until a Salem privateer spoke him on the18th of August and reported a British warship close by. The_Constitution_ searched until the afternoon of the next day and thensighted her old friend, the _Guerrière_. 

To retell the story of their fight in all the vanished sea lingo of thatday would bewilder the land-man and prove tedious to those familiar withthe subject. The boatswains piped the call, "all hands clear ship foraction"; the fife and drum beat to quarters; and four hundred men stoodby the tackles of the muzzle-loading guns with their clumsy woodencarriages, or climbed into the tops to use their muskets or trim sail. Decks were sanded to prevent slipping when blood flowed. Boys ran aboutstacking the sacks of powder or distributing buckets of pistols readyfor the boarding parties. And against the masts the cutlasses and pikesstood ready. 

Captain John Dacres of the ill-fated _Guerrière_ was an Englishgentleman as well as a gallant officer. But he did not know hisantagonist. Like his comrades of the service he had failed to grasp thefact that the _Constitution_ and the other American frigates of herclass were the most formidable craft afloat, barring ships of the line, and that they were to revolutionize the design of war-vessels for half acentury thereafter. They were frigates, or cruisers, in that theycarried guns on two decks, but the main battery of longtwenty-four-pound guns was an innovation, and the timbers and plankingwere stouter than had ever been built into ships of the kind. So stout, indeed, were the sides that shot rebounded from them more than once andthus gave the _Constitution_ the affectionate nickname of "OldIronsides. "

Sublimely indifferent to these odds, Captain Dacres had already sent achallenge, with his compliments, to Commodore Rodgers of the UnitedStates frigate _President_, saying that he would be very happy to meethim or any other American frigate of equal force, off Sandy Hook, "forthe purpose of having a few minutes' tête-à-tête. " It was therefore withthe utmost willingness that the _Constitution_ and the _Guerrière_hoisted their battle ensigns and approached each other warily for anhour while they played at long bowls, as was the custom, each hoping todisable the other's spars or rigging and so gain the advantage ofmovement. Finding this sort of action inconclusive, however, Hull setmore sail and ran down to argue it with broadsides, coolly biding histime, although Morris, his lieutenant, came running up again and againto beg him to begin firing. Men were being killed beside their guns asthey stood ready to jerk the lock strings. The two ships were abreastof each other and no more than a few yards apart before the_Constitution_ returned the cannonade that thundered from every gun portof her adversary. 

Within ten minutes the _Guerrière's_ mizzenmast was knocked over theside and her hull was shattered by the accurate fire of the Yankeegunners, who were trained to shoot on the downward roll of their shipand so smash below the water line. Almost unhurt, the _Constitution_moved ahead and fearfully raked the enemy's deck before the ships fouledeach other. They drifted apart before the boarders could undertake theirbloody business, and then the remaining masts of the British frigatetoppled overside and she was a helpless wreck. Seventy-nine of her crewwere dead or wounded and the ship was sinking beneath their feet. Captain Isaac Hull could truthfully report: "In less than thirty minutesfrom the time we got alongside of the enemy she was left without a sparstanding, and the hull cut to pieces in such a manner as to make itdifficult to keep her above water. "

Captain Dacres struck his flag, and the American sailors who went aboardfound the guns dismounted, the dead and dying scattered amid a wildtangle of spars and rigging, and great holes blown through the sidesand decks. The _Constitution_ had suffered such trifling injury that shewas fit and ready for action a few hours later. Of her crew only sevenmen were killed and the same number hurt. She was the larger ship, andthe odds in her favor were as ten to seven, reckoned in men and guns, for which reasons Captain Hull ought to have won. The significance ofhis victory was that at every point he had excelled a British frigateand had literally blown her out of the water. His crew had been togetheronly five weeks and could fairly be called green while the _Guerrière_, although short-handed, had a complement of veteran tars. The Britishnavy had never hesitated to engage hostile men-of-war of superior forceand had usually beaten them. Of two hundred fights between single ships, against French, Spanish, Italian, Russian, Danish, and Dutch, theEnglish had lost only five. The belief of Captain Dacres that he couldbeat the _Constitution_ was therefore neither rash nor ill-founded. 

The English captain had ten Americans in his crew, but he would notcompel them to fight against their countrymen and sent them below, although he sorely needed every man who could haul at a gun-tackle orlay out on a yard. Wounded though he was and heartbroken by thedisaster, his chivalry was faultless, and he took pains to report: "Ifeel it my duty to state that the conduct of Captain Hull and hisofficers toward our men has been that of a brave and generous enemy, thegreatest care being taken to prevent our men losing the smallest trifleand the greatest attention being paid to the wounded. "

When the Englishman was climbing up the side of the _Constitution_ as aprisoner, Isaac Hull ran to help him, exclaiming, "Give me your hand, Dacres. I know you are hurt. " No wonder that these two captains becamefast friends. It is because sea warfare abounds in such manly incidentsas these that the modern naval code of Germany, as exemplified in theacts of her submarine commanders, was so peculiarly barbarous andrepellent. 

On board the _Guerrière_ was Captain William B. Orne, of the Salemmerchant brig _Betsy_, which had been taken as a prize. His story of thecombat is not widely known and seems worth quoting in part:

 At two P. M. We discovered a large sail to windward bearing about north from us. We soon made her out to be a frigate. She was steering off from the wind, with her head to the southwest, evidently with the intention of cutting us off as soon as possible. Signals were soon made by the _Guerrière_, but as they were not answered the conclusion was, of course, that she was either a French or American frigate. Captain Dacres appeared anxious to ascertain her character and after looking at her for that purpose, handed me his spyglass, requesting me to give him my opinion of the stranger. I soon saw from the peculiarity of her sails and from her general appearance that she was, without doubt, an American frigate, and communicated the same to Captain Dacres. He immediately replied that he thought she came down too boldly for an American, but soon after added, "The better he behaves, the more honor we shall gain by taking him. "

 When the strange frigate came down to within two or three miles' distance, he hauled upon the wind, took in all his light sails, reefed his topsails, and deliberately prepared for action. It was now about five o'clock in the afternoon when he filled away and ran down for the _Guerrière_. At this moment Captain Dacres politely said to me: "Captain Orne, as I suppose you do not wish to fight against your own countrymen, you are at liberty to go below the water-line. " It was not long after this before I retired from the quarter-deck to the cock-pit; of course I saw no more of the action until the firing ceased, but I heard and felt much of its effects; for soon after I left the deck the firing commenced on board the _Guerrière_, and was kept up almost incessantly until about six o'clock when I heard a tremendous explosion from the opposing frigate. The effect of her shot seemed to make the _Guerrière_ reel and tremble as though she had received the shock of an earthquake. 

 Immediately after this, I heard a tremendous crash on deck and was told that the mizzen-mast was shot away. In a few moments afterward, the cock-pit was filled with wounded men. After the firing had ceased I went on deck and there beheld a scene which it would be difficult to describe: all the _Guerrière's_ masts were shot away and, as she had no sails to steady her, she lay rolling like a log in the trough of the sea. Many of the men were employed in throwing the dead overboard. The decks had the appearance of a butcher's slaughter-house; the gun tackles were not made fast and several of the guns got loose and were surging from one side to the other. 

 Some of the petty officers and seamen, after the action, got liquor and were intoxicated; and what with the groans of the wounded, the noise and confusion of the enraged survivors of the ill-fated ship rendered the whole scene a perfect hell. 

Setting the hulk of the _Guerrière_ on fire, Captain Hull sailed forBoston with the captured crew. The tidings he bore were enough to amazean American people which expected nothing of its navy, which allowed itsmerchant ships to rot at the wharves, and which regarded the operationsof its armies with the gloomiest forebodings. New England went wild withjoy over a victory so peculiarly its own. Captain Hull and his officerswere paraded up State Street to a banquet at Faneuil Hall while cheeringthousands lined the sidewalks. A few days earlier had come the news ofthe surrender of Detroit, but the gloom was now dispelled. Americanscould fight, after all. Popular toasts of the day were:

OUR INFANT NAVY--_We must nurture the young Hercules in his cradle, ifwe mean to profit by the labors of his manhood. _

THE VICTORY WE CELEBRATE--_An invaluable proof that we are able todefend our rights on the ocean. _

Handbills spread the news through the country, and artillery salutesproclaimed it from Carolina to the Wabash. Congress voted fifty thousanddollars as prize money to the heroes of the _Constitution_ and medals toher officers. The people of New York gave them swords, and Captain Hulland Lieutenant Morris received pieces of plate from the patriots ofPhiladelphia. Federalists laid aside for the moment their opposition tothe war and proclaimed that their party had founded and supported thenavy. The moral effect of the victory was out of all proportion to itsstrategic importance. It was like sunshine breaking through a fog. Suchrejoicing had been unknown, even in the decisive moments of the War ofthe Revolution. It served to show how deep-seated had been the Americanconviction that Britain's mastery of the sea was like a spell whichcould not be broken. 

[Illustration: _COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR_

Painting by Thomas Sully, 1811. In the Comptroller's Office, owned bythe City of New York. ]

[Illustration: _"CONSTITUTION" AND "GUERRIÈRE"_

An old print, illustrating the moment in the action at which themainmast of the _Guerrière_, shattered by the terrific fire of theAmerican frigate, fell overside, transforming the former vessel into afloating wreck and terminating the action. The picture representsaccurately the surprisingly slight damage done the _Constitution_; notethe broken spanker gaff and the shot holes in her topsails. ]

CHAPTER VI

MATCHLESS FRIGATES AND THEIR DUELS

It was soon made clear that the impressive victory over the _Guerrière_was neither a lucky accident nor the result of prowess peculiar to the_Constitution_ and her crew. Ship for ship, the American navy was betterthan the British. This is a truth which was demonstrated withsensational emphasis by one engagement after another. During the firsteight months of the war there were five such duels, and in everyinstance the enemy was compelled to strike his colors. In tavern andbanquet hall revelers were still drinking the health of Captain IsaacHull when the thrilling word came that the _Wasp_, an eighteen-gun shipor sloop, as the type was called in naval parlance, had beaten the_Frolic_ in a rare fight. The antagonists were so evenly matched inevery respect that there was no room for excuses, and on both sides weredisplayed such stubborn hardihood and a seamanship so dauntless as tomake an Anglo-Saxon proud that these foemen were bred of a common stock. 

The _Wasp_ had sailed from the Delaware on the 13th of October, headingsoutheast to look for British merchantmen in the West India track. Hercommander was Captain Jacob Jones, a name revived in modern days by adestroyer of the Queenstown fleet in the arduous warfare against theGerman submarines. Shattered by a torpedo, the _Jacob Jones_ sank inseven minutes, and sixty-four of the officers and crew perished, doingtheir duty to the last, disciplined, unafraid, so proving themselvesworthy of the American naval service and of the memory of theunflinching captain of 1812. 

The little _Wasp_ ran into a terrific gale which blew her sails away andwashed men overboard. But she made repairs and stood bravely after aBritish convoy which was escorted by the eighteen-gun brig _Frolic_, Captain Thomas Whinyates. The _Frolic_, too, had been battered by theweather, and the cargo ships had been scattered far and wide. The _Wasp_sighted several of them in the moonlight but, fearing they might be warvessels, followed warily until morning revealed on her leeward side the_Frolic_. Jacob Jones promptly shortened sail, which was the nauticalmethod of rolling up one's sleeves, and steered close to attack. 

It seemed preposterous to try to fight while the seas were stillmonstrously swollen and their crests were breaking across the decks ofthese vessels of less than five hundred tons burden. Wildly they rolledand pitched, burying their bows in the roaring combers. The merchantships which watched this audacious defiance of wind and wave were havingall they could do to avoid being swept or dismasted. Side by sidewallowed _Wasp_ and _Frolic_, sixty yards between them, while the cannonrolled their muzzles under water and the gunners were blinded withspray. Britisher and Yank, each crew could hear the hearty cheers of theother as they watched the chance to ply rammer and sponge and fire whenthe deck lifted clear of the sea. 

Somehow the _Wasp_ managed to shoot straight and fast. They were of thetrue webfooted breed in this hard-driven sloop-of-war, but there were nofair-weather mariners aboard the _Frolic_, and they hit the target muchtoo often for comfort. Within ten minutes they had saved Captain JacobJones the trouble of handling sail, for they shot away his upper mastsand yards and most of his rigging. The _Wasp_ was a wreck aloft but the_Frolic_ had suffered more vitally, for as usual the American guncaptains aimed for the deck and hull; and they had been carefullydrilled at target practice. The British sailors suffered frightfullyfrom this storm of grape and chain shot, but those who were left alivestill fought inflexibly. It looked as though the _Frolic_ might getaway, for the masts of the _Wasp_ were in danger of tumbling over theside. With this mischance in mind, Captain Jacob Jones shifted helm andclosed in for a hand-to-hand finish. 

For a few minutes the two ships plunged ahead so near each other thatthe rammers of the American sailors struck the side of the _Frolic_ asthey drove the shot down the throats of their guns. It was literallymuzzle to muzzle. Then they crashed together and the _Wasp's_ jib-boomwas thrust between the _Frolic's_ masts. In this position the Britishdecks were raked by a murderous fire as Jacob Jones trumpeted the order, "Boarders away!" Jack Lang, a sailor from New Jersey, scrambled out onthe bowsprit, cutlass in his fist, without waiting to see if hiscomrades were with him, and dropped to the forecastle of the _Frolic_. Lieutenant Biddle tried it by jumping on the bulwark and climbing to theother ship as they crashed together on the next heave of the sea, but adoughty midshipman, seeking a handy purchase, grabbed him by the coattails and they fell back upon their own deck. Another attempt and Biddlejoined Jack Lang by way of the bowsprit. These two thus captured the_Frolic_, for as they dashed aft the only living men on deck were theundaunted sailor at the wheel and three officers, including CaptainWhinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, who were so severely wounded that theycould not stand without support. They tottered forward and surrenderedtheir swords, and Lieutenant Biddle then leaped into the rigging andhauled the British ensign down. 

Of the _Frolic's_ crew of one hundred and ten men only twenty wereunhurt, and these had fled below to escape the dreadful fire from the_Wasp_. The gun deck was strewn with bodies, and the waves which brokeover the ship swirled them to and fro, the dead and the woundedtogether. Not an officer had escaped death or injury. The _Wasp_ wasmore or less of a tangle aloft but her hull was sound and only five ofher men had been killed and five wounded. No sailors could have foughtmore bravely than Captain Whinyates and his British crew, but they hadbeen overwhelmed in three-quarters of an hour by greater skill, coolness, and judgment. 

No sea battle of the war was more brilliant than this, but Captain JacobJones was delayed in sailing home to receive the plaudits due him. Hisprize crew was aboard the _Frolic_, cleaning up the horrid mess andfitting the beaten ship for the voyage to Charleston, and the _Wasp_ wasstanding by when there loomed in sight a towering three-decker--aBritish ship of the line--the _Poictiers_. The _Wasp_ shook out hersails to make a run for it, but they had been cut to ribbons and she wassoon overhauled. Now an eighteen-gun ship could not argue with amajestic seventy-four. Captain Jacob Jones submitted with as much graceas he could muster, and _Wasp_ and _Frolic_ were carried to Bermuda. TheAmerican crew was soon exchanged, and Congress applied balm to theinjured feelings of these fine sailormen by filling their pockets to theamount of twenty-five thousand dollars in prize money. 

It was only a week later that the navy vouchsafed an encore to adelighted nation. This time the sport royal was played between statelyfrigates. On the 8th of October Commodore Rodgers had taken his squadronout of Boston for a second cruise. After four days at sea the _UnitedStates_ was detached, and Captain Stephen Decatur ranged off to theeastward in quest of diversion. A fortnight of monotony was ended by astrange sail which proved to be the British thirty-eight-gun frigate_Macedonian_, newly built. Her commander, Captain Carden, had thehighest opinion of his ship and crew, and one of his officers testifiedthat "the state of discipline on board was excellent; in no British shipwas more attention paid to gunnery. Before this cruise the ship had beenengaged almost every day with the enemy; and in time of peace the crewwere constantly exercised at the great guns. "

The _United States_ was a sister frigate of the _Constitution_, builtfrom the same designs and therefore more formidable than her Britishopponent as three is to two. Captain Carden had no misgivings, however, and instantly set out in chase of the American frigate. But he wasunfortunate enough to pit himself against one of the ablest officersafloat, and his own talent was mediocre. The result was partlydetermined by this personal equation in an action in which the_Macedonian_ was outgeneraled as well as outfought. And again gunnerywas a decisive factor. Observers said that the broadsides of the_United States_ flamed with such rapidity that the ship looked as thoughshe were on fire. 

Early in the fight Captain Carden bungled an opportunity to pass closeahead of the _United States_ and so rake her with a destructive attack. Then rashly coming to close quarters, the _Macedonian_ was swept by theheavy guns of the American frigate and reduced to wreckage in ninetyminutes. The weather was favorable for the Yankee gun crews, and the waroffered no more dramatic proof of their superbly intelligent training. The _Macedonian_ had received more than one hundred shot in her hull, several below the water line, one mast had been cut in two, and theothers were useless. More than a hundred of her officers and men weredead or injured. The _United States_ was almost undamaged, a few ropesand small spars were shot away, and only twelve of her men were on thecasualty list. Captain Decatur rightfully boasted that he had as fine acrew as ever walked a deck, American sailors who had been schooled forthe task with the greatest care. English opinion went so far as toconcede this much: "As a display of courage the character of our servicewas nobly upheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to admitthat the comparative expertness of the crews in gunnery was equallysatisfactory. Now taking the difference of effect as given by CaptainCarden, we must draw this conclusion--that the comparative loss inkilled and wounded, together with the dreadful account he gives of thecondition of his own ship, while he admits that the enemy's vessel wasin comparatively good order, must have arisen from inferiority ingunnery as well as in force. "

Decatur sent the _Macedonian_ to Newport as a trophy of war andforwarded her battle flag to Washington. It arrived just when a greatnaval ball was in progress to celebrate the capture of the _Guerrière_, whose ensign was already displayed from the wall. It was a great momentfor the young lieutenant of the _United States_, who had been assignedthis duty, when he announced his mission and, amid the cheers of thePresident, the Cabinet, and other distinguished guests, proudlyexhibited the flag of another British frigate to decorate the ballroom!

Meanwhile the _Constitution_ had returned to sea to spread her royals tothe South Atlantic trades and hunt for lumbering British East-Indiamen. Captain Isaac Hull had gracefully given up the command in favor ofCaptain William Bainbridge, who was one of the oldest and most respectedofficers of his rank and who deserved an opportunity to win distinction. Bainbridge had behaved heroically at Tripoli and was logically in lineto take over one of the crack frigates. The sailors of the_Constitution_ grumbled a bit at losing Isaac Hull but soon regainedtheir alert and willing spirit as they comprehended that they hadanother first-rate "old man" in William Bainbridge. Henry Adams haspointed out that the average age of Bainbridge, Hull, Rodgers, andDecatur was thirty-seven, while that of the four generals mostconspicuous in the disappointments of the army, Dearborn, Wilkinson, William Hull, and Wade Hampton, was fifty-eight. The difference isnotable and is mentioned for what it may be worth. 

Through the autumn of 1812 the frigate cruised beneath tropic suns, muchof the time off the coast of Brazil. Today the health and comfort of thebluejacket are so scrupulously provided for in every possible way that abattleship is the standard of perfection for efficiency in organization. It is amazing that in such a ship as the _Constitution_ four hundred mencould be cheerful and ready to fight after weeks and even months at sea. They were crowded below the water line, without proper heat, plumbing, lighting, or ventilation, each man being allowed only twenty-eightinches by eight feet of space in which to sling his hammock against thebeams overhead. Scurvy and other diseases were rampant. As many asseventy of the crew of the _Constitution_ were on the sick list shortlybefore she fought the _Guerrière_. The food was wholesome for ruggedmen, but it was limited solely to salt beef, hard bread, dried peas, cheese, pork, and spirits. 

Such conditions, however, had not destroyed the vigor of those hardyseamen of the _Constitution_ when, on the 29th of December and withinsight of the Brazilian coast, the lookout at the masthead sang out toCaptain Bainbridge that a heavy ship was coming up under easy canvas. Itturned out to be His Britannic Majesty's frigate _Java_, Captain HenryLambert, who, like Carden, made the mistake of insisting upon a combat. His reasons were sounder than those of Dacres or Carden, however, forthe _Java_ was only a shade inferior to the _Constitution_ in guns andcarried as many men. In every respect they were so evenly matched thatthe test of battle could have no aftermath of extenuation. 

The _Java_ at once hastened in pursuit of the American ship which drewoff the coast as though in flight, the real purpose being to get clearof the neutral Brazilian waters. The _Constitution_ must have been apicture to stir the heart and kindle the imagination, her black hullheeling to the pressure of the tall canvas, the long rows of gunsfrowning from the open ports, while her bunting rippled a gloriousdefiance, with a commodore's pennant at the mainmast-head, the Stars andStripes streaming from the mizzen peak and main-topgallant mast, and aUnion Jack at the fore. The _Java_ was adorned as bravely, and CaptainLambert had lashed an ensign in the rigging on the chance that his othercolors might be shot away. 

The two ships began the fray at what they called long range, which wouldbe about a mile, and then swept onward to pass on opposite tacks. It wasthe favorite maneuver of trying to gain the weather gage, and while theywere edging to windward a round shot smashed the wheel of the_Constitution_ which so hampered her for the moment that CaptainLambert, handsomely taking advantage of the mishap, let the _Java_ runpast his enemy's stern and poured in a broadside which hit several ofthe American seamen. Both commanders displayed, in a high degree, theart of handling ships under sail as they luffed or wore and tenaciouslyjockeyed for position, while the gunners fought in the smoke thatdrifted between the frigates. 

At length Captain Lambert became convinced that he had met his master atthis agile style of warfare and determined to come to close quartersbefore the _Java_ was fatally damaged. Her masts and yards were crashingto the deck and the slaughter among the crew was already appalling. Marines and seamen gathered in the gangways and upon the forecastle headto spring aboard the _Constitution_, but Captain Bainbridge drove hisship clear very shortly after the collision and continued to pound the_Java_ to kindling-wood with his broadsides. The fate of the action wasno longer in doubt. The British frigate was on fire, Captain Lambert wasmortally wounded, and all her guns had been silenced. The _Constitution_hauled off to repair damages and stood back an hour later to administerthe final blow. But the flag of the _Java_ fluttered down, and thelieutenant in command surrendered. 

The _Constitution_ had again crushed the enemy with so little damage toherself that she was ready to continue her cruise, with a loss of onlynine killed and twenty-five wounded. The _Java_ was a fine ship utterlydestroyed, a sinking, dismasted hulk, with a hundred and twenty-four ofher men dead or suffering from wounds. It is significant to learn thatduring six weeks at sea they had fired but six practice broadsides, ofblank cartridges, although there were many raw hands in the crew, whilethe men of the _Constitution_ had been incessantly drilled in firinguntil their team play was like that of a football eleven. There was noshooting at random. Under Hull and Bainbridge they had been taught theirtrade, which was to lay the gun on the target and shoot as rapidly aspossible. 

For the diminutive American navy, the year of 1812 came to its closewith a record of success so illustrious as to seem almost incredible. Itis more dignified to refrain from extolling our own exploits and torecall the effects of these sea duels upon the minds of the people, thestatesmen, and the press of the England of that period. Their outburstsof wrathful humiliation were those of a maritime race which cared littleor nothing about the course of the American war by land. Theirs was thesalty tradition, virile and perpetual, which a century later and in afriendlier guise was to create a Grand Fleet which should keep watch andward in the misty Orkneys and hold the Seven Seas safe against thenaval power of Imperial Germany. Then, as now, the English nationbelieved that its armed ships were its salvation. 

It is easier to understand, bearing this in mind, why after the fight ofthe _Guerrière_ the London _Times_ indulged in such frenziedlamentations as these:

 We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over high and honorable minds. .. . Never before in the history of the world did an English frigate strike to an American, and though we cannot say that Captain Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for this act, yet we do say there are commanders in the English navy who would a thousand times rather have gone down with their colors flying than to have set their fellow sailors so fatal an example. 

 Good God! that a few short months should have so altered the tone of British sentiments! Is it true, or is it not, that our navy was accustomed to hold the Americans in utter contempt? Is it true, or is it not, that the _Guerrière_ sailed up and down the American coast with her name painted in large characters on her sails in boyish defiance of Commodore Rodgers? Would any captain, however young, have indulged such a foolish piece of vain-boasting if he had not been carried forward by the almost unanimous feeling of his associates?

 We have since sent out more line-of-battle ships and heavier frigates. Surely we must now mean to smother the American navy. A very short time before the capture of the _Guerrière_ an American frigate was an object of ridicule to our honest tars. Now the prejudice is actually setting the other way and great pains seems to be taken by the friends of ministers to prepare the public for the surrender of a British seventy-four to an opponent lately so much contemned. 

It was when the news reached England that the _Java_ had been destroyedby the _Constitution_ that indignation found a climax in the outcry ofthe _Pilot_, a foremost naval authority:

 The public will learn, with sentiments which we shall not presume to anticipate, that a third British frigate has struck to an American. This is an occurrence that calls for serious reflection, --this, and the fact stated in our paper of yesterday, that Lloyd's list contains notices of upwards of five hundred British vessels captured in seven months by the Americans. Five hundred merchantmen and three frigates! Can these statements be true; and can the English people hear them unmoved? Any one who would have predicted such a result of an American war this time last year would have been treated as a madman or a traitor. He would have been told, if his opponents had condescended to argue with him, that long ere seven months had elapsed the American flag would have been swept from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States annihilated, and their maritime arsenals rendered a heap of ruins. Yet down to this moment not a single American frigate has struck her flag. They insult and laugh at our want of enterprise and vigor. They leave their ports when they please and return to them when it suits their convenience; they traverse the Atlantic; they beset the West India Islands; they advance to the very chops of the Channel; they parade along the coasts of South America; nothing chases, nothing intercepts, nothing engages them but to yield them triumph. 

It was to be taken for granted that England would do something more thanscold about the audacity of the American navy. Even after thedeclaration of war her most influential men hoped that the repeal of theobnoxious Orders-in-Council might yet avert a solution of the Americanproblem by means of the sword. There was hesitation to apply the utmostmilitary and naval pressure, and New England was regarded with feelingsalmost friendly because of its opposition to an offensive warfareagainst Great Britain and an invasion of Canada. 

Absorbed in the greater issue against Napoleon, England was neverthelessaroused to more vigorous action against the United States and devisedstrong blockading measures for the spring of 1813. Unable to operateagainst the enemy's ships in force or to escape from ports which weresealed by vigilant squadrons, the American navy to a large extent wascondemned to inactivity for the remainder of the war. Occasional actionswere fought and merit was justly won, but there was nothing like theglory of 1812, which shone undimmed by defeat and which gave to theannals of the nation one of its great chapters of heroic and masterfulachievement. It was singularly apt that the noble and victoriousAmerican frigates should have been called the _Constitution_ and the_United States_. They inspired a new respect for the flag with thestripes and the stars and for all that it symbolized. 

[Illustration: _ISAAC HULL_

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. ]

[Illustration: _WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE_

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. ]

CHAPTER VII

"DON'T GIVE UP THE SHIP!"

The second year of the war by sea opened brilliantly enough to satisfythe American people, who were now in a mood to expect too much of theirnavy. In February the story of the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_ was repeatedby two ships of precisely the same class. The American sloop-of-war_Hornet_ had sailed to South America with the _Constitution_ and wasdetached to blockade, in the port of Bahia, the British naval sloop_Bonne Citoyenne_, which contained treasure to the amount of half amillion pounds in specie. Captain James Lawrence of the _Hornet_ sent ina challenge to fight, ship against ship, pledging his word that the_Constitution_ would not interfere, but the British commander, perhapsmindful of his precious cargo, declined the invitation. Instead of this, he sensibly sent word to a great seventy-four at Rio de Janeiro, beggingher to come and drive the pestiferous _Hornet_ away. 

The British battleship arrived so suddenly that Captain Lawrence wascompelled to dodge and flee in the darkness. By a close shave he gainedthe open sea and made off up the coast. For several weeks the _Hornet_idled to and fro, vainly seeking merchant prizes, and then off theDemerara River on February 24, 1813, she fell in with the British brig_Peacock_, that flew the royal ensign. The affair lasted no more thanfifteen minutes. The _Peacock_ was famous for shining brass work, spotless paint, and the immaculate trimness of a yacht, but her gunneryhad been neglected, for which reason she went to the bottom in sixfathoms of water with shot-holes in her hull and thirty-seven of hercrew put out of action. The sting of the _Hornet_ had been prompt andfatal. Captain Lawrence had only one man killed and two wounded, and hisship was as good as ever. Crowding his prisoners on board and beingshort of provisions and water, he set sail for a home port and anchoredin New York harbor. He was in time to share with Bainbridge the carnivalof salutes, processions, dinners, addresses of congratulation, votes ofthanks, swords, medals, prize money, promotion--every possible tributeof an adoring and grateful people. 

One of the awards bestowed upon Lawrence was the command of the frigate_Chesapeake_. Among seamen she was rated an unlucky ship, and Lawrencewas confidently expected to break the spell. Her old crew had left herafter the latest voyage, which met with no success, and other sailorswere reluctant to join her. Privateering had attracted many of them, andthe navy was finding it difficult to recruit the kind of men it desired. Lawrence was compelled to sign on a scratch lot, some Portuguese, a fewBritish, and many landlubbers. Given time to shake them together in hardservice at sea, he would have made a smart crew of them no doubt, asIsaac Hull had done in five weeks with the men of the _Constitution_, but destiny ordered otherwise. 

In the spring of 1813 the harbor of Boston was blockaded by thethirty-eight-gun British frigate _Shannon_, Captain Philip Vere Broke, who had been in this ship for seven years. In the opinion of CaptainMahan, "his was one of those cases where singular merit as an officerand an attention to duty altogether exceptional had not yet obtainedopportunity for distinction. It would probably be safe to say that nomore thoroughly efficient ship of her class had been seen in the Britishnavy during the twenty years' war with France. "

Captain Broke was justly confident in his own leadership and in theefficiency of a ship's company, which had retained its identity oforganization through so many years of his personal and energeticsupervision. Indeed, the captain of the British flagship on the Americanstation wrote: "The _Shannon's_ men were trained and understood gunnerybetter than any men I ever saw. " Every morning the men were exercised attraining the guns and in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, musket, and pike. Twice each week the crew fired at targets with greatguns and musketry and the sailor who hit the bull's eye received a poundof tobacco. Without warning Captain Broke would order a cask tossedoverboard and then suddenly order some particular gun to sink it. Inbrief, the _Shannon_ possessed those qualities which had been notable inthe victorious American frigates and which were lamentably deficient inthe _Chesapeake_. 

Lawrence's men were unknown to each other and to their officers, andthey had never been to sea together. The last draft came aboard, infact, just as the anchor was weighed and the _Chesapeake_ stood out tomeet her doom. Even most of her officers were new to the ship. They hadno chance whatever to train or handle the rabble between decks. NowCaptain Broke had been anxious to fight this American frigate asmatching the _Shannon_ in size and power. He had already addressed toCaptain Lawrence a challenge whose wording was a model of courtesy butwhich was provocative to the last degree. A sailor of Lawrence's heroictemper was unlikely to avoid such a combat, stimulated as he was by theunbroken success of his own navy in duels between frigates. 

On the first day of June, Captain Broke boldly ran into Boston harborand broke out his flag in defiance of the _Chesapeake_ which was ridingat anchor as though waiting to go to sea. Instantly accepting theinvitation, Captain Lawrence hoisted colors, fired a gun, and musteredhis crew. In this ceremonious fashion, as gentlemen were wont to meetwith pistols to dispute some point of honor, did the _Chesapeake_ sailout to fight the waiting _Shannon_. The news spread fast and wide andthousands of people, as though they were bound to the theater, hastenedto the heights of Malden, to Nahant, and to the headlands of Salem andMarblehead, in hopes of witnessing this famous sight. They assumed thatvictory was inevitable. Any other surmise was preposterous. 

These eager crowds were cheated of the spectacle, however, for the_Chesapeake_ bore away to the eastward after rounding Boston Light anddropped hull down until her sails were lost in the summer haze, with the_Shannon_ in her company as if they steered for some rendezvous. Theywere firing when last seen and the wind bore the echo of the guns, faintand far away. It was most extraordinary that three weeks passed beforethe people would believe the tidings of the disaster. A pilot who hadleft the _Chesapeake_ at five o'clock in the afternoon reported that hewas still near enough an hour later to see the two ships locked side byside, that a fearful explosion had happened aboard the _Chesapeake_, andthat through a rift in the battle smoke he had beheld the British flagflying above the American frigate. 

This report was confirmed by a fishing boat from Cape Ann and by thepassengers in a coastwise packet, but the public doubted and still hopeduntil the newspapers came from Halifax with an account of the arrival ofthe _Chesapeake_ as prize to the _Shannon_ and of the funeral honorspaid to the body of Captain James Lawrence. The tragic defeat came at anextremely dark moment of the war when almost every expectation had beendisappointed and the future was clouded. Richard Rush, the Americandiplomatist, wrote, recalling the event:

 I remember--what American does not!--the first rumor of it. I remember the startling sensation. I remember at first the universal incredulity. I remember how the post-offices were thronged for successive days by anxious thousands; how collections of citizens rode out for miles on the highway, accosting the mail to catch something by anticipation. At last, when the certainty was known, I remember the public gloom; funeral orations and badges of mourning bespoke it. "Don't give up the ship"--the dying words of Lawrence--were on every tongue. 

It was learned that the _Chesapeake_ had followed the _Shannon_ untilfive o'clock, when the latter luffed and showed her readiness to beginfighting. Lawrence was given the choice of position, with a westerlybreeze, but he threw away this advantage, preferring to trust to hisguns with a green crew rather than the complex and delicate business ofmaneuvering his ship under sail. He came bowling straight down at the_Shannon_, luffed in his turn, and engaged her at a distance of fiftyyards. The breeze was strong and the nimble American frigate forgedahead more rapidly than Lawrence expected, so that presently herbroadside guns had ceased to bear. 

While Lawrence was trying to slacken headway and regain the desiredposition, the enemy's shot disabled his headsails, and the _Chesapeake_came up into the wind with canvas all a-flutter. It was a mishap which acrew of trained seamen might have quickly mended, but the frigate wastaken aback--that is, the breeze drove her stern foremost toward the_Shannon_ and exposed her to a deadly cannonade which the Americangunners were unable to return. The hope of salvation lay in getting theship under way again or in boarding the _Shannon_. It was in this momentthat the battle was won and lost, for every gun of the British broadsidewas sweeping the American deck diagonally from stern to bow, while themarines in the tops of the _Shannon_ picked off the officers and seamenof the _Chesapeake_, riddling them with musket balls. It was like theswift blast of a hurricane. Lawrence fell, mortally wounded. Ludlow, hisfirst lieutenant, was carried below. The second lieutenant was stationedbetween decks, and the third forsook his post to assist those who werecarrying Lawrence below to the gun deck. Not an officer remained on thespar deck and not a living man was left on the quarter deck when the_Chesapeake_ drifted against the _Shannon_ after four minutes of thisinfernal destruction. As the ships collided, Captain Broke dashedforward and shouted for boarders, leading them across to the Americandeck. No more than fifty men followed him and three hundred Yankeesailors should have been able to wipe the party out, but most of the_Chesapeake_ crew were below, and, demoralized by lack of discipline andleadership, they refused to come up and stand the gaff. Brave resistancewas made by the few who remained on deck and a dozen more followed thesecond lieutenant, George Budd, as he rushed up to rally a forlorn hope. 

It was a desperate encounter while it lasted, and Captain Broke wasslashed by a saber as he led a charge to clear the forecastle. Yet twominutes sufficed to clear the decks of the _Chesapeake_, and the fewvisible survivors were thrown down the hatchways. The guns ceasedfiring, and the crew below sent up a message of surrender. The frigateshad drifted apart, leaving Broke and his seamen to fight withoutreinforcement, but before they came together again the day was won. Thiswas the most humiliating phase of the episode, that a handful of Britishsailors and marines should have carried an American frigate by boarding. 

It must not be inferred that the _Chesapeake_ inflicted no damageduring the fifteen minutes of this famous engagement. Thirty-seven ofthe British boarding party were killed or wounded and the Americanmarines--"leather-necks" then and "devil-dogs" now--fought in accordancewith the spirit of a corps which had won its first laurels in theRevolution. Such broadsides as the _Chesapeake_ was able to deliver wereaccurately placed and inflicted heavy losses. The victory cost the_Shannon_ eighty-two men killed and wounded, while the American frigatelost one hundred and forty-seven of her crew, or more than one-third ofher complement. Even in defeat the _Chesapeake_ had punished the enemyfar more severely than the _Constitution_ had been able to do. 

Lawrence lay in the cockpit, or hospital, when his men began to swarmdown in confusion and leaderless panic. Still conscious, he was awarethat disaster had overtaken them and he muttered again and again withhis dying breath, "Don't give up the ship. Blow her up. " Thus passed toan honorable fame an American naval officer of great gallantry andpersonal charm. Although he brought upon his country a bitterhumiliation, the fact that he died sword in hand, his last thought forhis flag and his service, has atoned for his faults of rashness andoverconfidence. The odds were against him, and ill-luck smashed hischance of overcoming them. He was no more disgraced than Dacres when hesurrendered the _Guerrière_ to a heavier ship, or than Lambert, dying onhis own deck, when he saw the colors of the _Java_ hauled down. 

The _Shannon_ took her prize to Halifax, and when the news came backthat the captain of the _Chesapeake_ lay dead in a British port, thebronzed sea-dogs of the Salem Marine Society resolved to fetch his bodyhome in a manner befitting his end. Captain George Crowninshieldobtained permission from the Government to sail with a flag of truce forHalifax, and he equipped the brig _Henry_ for the sad and solemnmission. Her crew was picked from among the shipmasters of Salem, someof them privateering skippers, every man of them a proven deep-watercommander. It was such a crew as never before or since took a vessel outof an American port. When they returned to Salem with the remains ofCaptain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow, the storied old seaport sawtheir funeral column pass through the quiet and crowded streets. Thepall-bearers bore names to thrill American hearts today--Hull, Stewart, Bainbridge, Blakely, Creighton, and Parker, all captains of the navy. ASalem newspaper described the ceremonies simply and with an unconsciouspathos:

 The day was unclouded, as if no incident should be wanting to crown the mind with melancholy and woe--the wind from the same direction and the sea presented the same unruffled surface as was exhibited to our anxious view when on that memorable first day of July we saw the immortal Lawrence proudly conducting his ship to action. .. . The brig _Henry_ containing the precious relics lay at anchor in the harbor. They were placed in barges and, preceded by a long procession of boats filled with seamen uniformed in blue jackets and trousers, with a blue ribbon on their hats bearing the motto of "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights, " were rowed by minute strokes to the end of India Wharf, where the bearers were ready to receive the honored dead. From the time the boats left the brig until the bodies were landed, the United States brig _Rattlesnake_ and the brig _Henry_ alternately fired minute guns. .. On arriving at the meeting-house the coffins were placed in the centre of the church by the seamen who rowed them ashore and who stood during the ceremony leaning upon them in an attitude of mourning. The church was decorated with cypress and evergreen, and the names of Lawrence and Ludlow appeared in gilded letters on the front of the pulpit. 

It was wholly reasonable that the exploit of the _Shannon_ should arousefervid enthusiasm in the breast of every Briton. The wounds inflictedby Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge still rankled, but they were nowforgotten and the loud British boastings equaled all the tales of Yankeebrag. A member of Parliament declared that the "action which Brokefought with the _Chesapeake_ was in every respect unexampled. It wasnot--and he knew it was a bold assertion which he made--to be surpassedby any other engagement which graced the naval annals of Great Britain. "Admiral Warren was still in a peevish humor at the hard knocks inflictedon the Royal Navy when he wrote, in congratulating Captain Broke: "Atthis critical moment you could not have restored to the British navalservice the preeminence it has always preserved, or contradicted in amore forcible manner the foul aspersions and calumnies of a conceited, boasting enemy than by the brilliant act you have performed. Therelation of such an event restores the history of ancient times and willdo more good to the service than it is possible to conceive. "

Captain Broke was made a baronet and received other honors and awardswhich he handsomely deserved, but the wound he had suffered at the headof his boarding party disabled him for further sea duty. If theinfluence of the _Constitution_ and the _United States_ was far-reachingin improving the efficiency of the American navy, it can be said alsothat the victory of the _Shannon_ taught the British service the valueof rigorous attention to gunnery and a highly trained and disciplinedpersonnel. 

American chagrin was somewhat softened a few weeks later when two verysmall ships, the _Enterprise_ and the _Boxer_, met in a spirited combatoff the harbor of Portland, Maine, like two bantam cocks, and theBritisher was beaten in short order on September 5, 1813. The_Enterprise_ had been a Yankee schooner in the war with Tripoli but hadbeen subsequently altered to a square rig and had received more guns andmen to worry the enemy's privateers. The brig-of-war was a kind ofvessel heartily disliked by seamen and now vanished from blue water. Theimmortal Boatswain Chucks of Marryat proclaimed that "they wouldcertainly damn their inventor to all eternity" and that "their common, low names, 'Pincher, ' 'Thrasher, ' 'Boxer, ' 'Badger, ' and all that sort, are quite good enough for them. "

Commanding the _Enterprise_ was Captain William Burrows, twenty-eightyears old, who had seen only a month of active service in the war. Captain Samuel Blyth of the _Boxer_ had worked his way up to thisunimportant post after many years of arduous duty in the British navy. He might have declined a tussel with the _Enterprise_ for his crewnumbered only sixty-six men against a hundred and twenty, but he nailedhis colors to the mainmast and remarked that they would never come downwhile there was any life in him. 

The day was calm, the breeze fitful, and the little brigs drifted abouteach other until they lay within pistol shot. Then both loosed theirbroadsides, while the sailors shouted bravely, and both captains fell, Blyth killed instantly and Burrows mortally hurt but crying out that theflag must never be struck. There was no danger of this, for the_Enterprise_ raked the British brig through and through until resistancewas hopeless. Captain Blyth was as good as his word. He did not live tosee his ensign torn down. Great hearts in little ships, these twocaptains were buried side by side in a churchyard which overlooks CascoBay, and there you may read their epitaphs today. 

The grim force of circumstances was beginning to alter the naval policyof the United States. Notwithstanding the dramatic successes, her flagwas almost banished from the high seas by the close of the year 1813. The frigates _Constellation_, _United States_, and _Macedonian_ werehemmed in port by the British blockade; the _Adams_ and the_Constitution_ were laid up for repairs; and the only formidable shipsof war which roamed at large were the _President_, the _Essex_, and the_Congress_. The smaller vessels which had managed to slip seaward andwhich were of such immense value in destroying British commerce foundthat the system of convoying merchantmen in fleets of one hundred or twohundred sail had left the ocean almost bare of prizes. It was the habitof these convoys, however, to scatter as they neared their home ports, every skipper cracking on sail and the devil take the hindmost--afailing which has survived unto this day, and many a wrathful officer ofan American cruiser or destroyer in the war against Germany couldheartily echo the complaint of Nelson when he was a captain, "behavingas all convoys that ever I saw did, shamefully ill, and parting companyevery day. "

This was the reason why American naval vessels and privateers left theirown coasts and dared to rove in the English Channel, as Paul Jones haddone in the _Ranger_ a generation earlier. It was discovered that enemymerchantmen could be snapped up more easily within sight of their ownshores than thousands of miles away. First to emphasize this fact in theWar of 1812 was the naval brig _Argus_, Captain William H. Allen, whichmade a summer crossing and cruised for a month on end in the Irish Seaand in the chops of the Channel with a gorgeous recompense for hershameless audacity. England scolded herself red in the face while thesaucy _Argus_ captured twenty-seven ships and took her pick of theirvaluable cargoes. Her course could be traced by the blazing hulls thatshe left in her wake and this was how the British gun brig _Pelican_finally caught up with her. 

Although the advantage of size and armament was with the _Pelican_, itwas to be expected that the _Argus_ would prove more than a match forher. The American commander, Captain Allen, had played a distinguishedpart in several of the most famous episodes of the navy. As thirdlieutenant of the _Chesapeake_, in 1807, he had picked up a live coal inthe cook's galley, held it in his fingers, and so fired the only gundischarged against the _Leopard_ in that inglorious surprise andsurrender. As first officer of the frigate _United States_ he receivedcredit for the splendid gunnery which had overwhelmed the _Macedonian_, and he enjoyed the glory of bringing the prize to port. It was as areward of merit that he was given command of the _Argus_. Alas, in thisfight off the coast of Wales he lost both his ship and his life, andEngland had scored again. There was no ill-luck this time--nothing toplead in excuse. The American brig threw away a chance of victorybecause her shooting was amazingly bad, and instead of defending thedeck with pistol, pike, and musket, when the boarders came over the bowthe crew lowered the flag. 

It was an early morning fight, on August 14, 1813, in which CaptainAllen had his leg shot off within five minutes after the two brigs hadengaged. He refused to be taken below, but loss of blood soon made himincapable of command, and presently his first lieutenant was stunned bya grapeshot which grazed his scalp. The ship was well sailed, however, and gained a position for raking the _Pelican_ in deadly fashion, butthe shot went wild and scarcely any harm was done. The British captainchose his own range and methodically made a wreck of the _Argus_ intwenty minutes of smashing fire, working around her at will while not agun returned his broadsides. Then he sheered close and was prepared tofinish it on the deck of the _Argus_ when she surrendered withtwenty-three of her crew out of action. The _Pelican_ was so littlepunished that only two men were killed. The officer left in command ofthe _Argus_ laid this unhappy conclusion to "the superior size and metalof our opponent, and the fatigue which the crew underwent from a veryrapid succession of prizes. " There were those on board who blamed it tothe casks of Oporto wine which had been taken out of the latest prizeand which the sailors had secretly tapped. Honesty is the best policy, even in dealing with an enemy. The affair of the _Argus_ and the_Pelican_ was not calculated to inflate Yankee pride. 

To balance this, however, came two brilliant actions by small ships. Thenew _Peacock_, named for the captured British brig, under Captain LewisWarrington, stole past the blockade of New York. Off the Florida coaston the 29th of April she sighted a convoy and attacked the escort brigof eighteen guns, the _Epervier_. In this instance the behavior of theAmerican vessel and her crew was supremely excellent and not a flawcould be found. They hulled the British brig forty-five times and made ashambles of her deck and did it with the loss of one man. 

Even more sensational was the last cruise of the _Wasp_, CaptainJohnston Blakely, which sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in Mayand roamed the English Channel to the dismay of all honest Britishmerchantmen. The brig-of-war _Reindeer_ endeavored to put an end to hercareer but nineteen minutes sufficed to finish an action in which the_Wasp_ slaughtered half the British crew and thrice repelled boarders. This was no light task, for as Michael Scott, the British author of _TomCringle's Log_, candidly expressed it:

 In the field, or grappling in mortal combat on the blood-slippery deck of an enemy's vessel, a British soldier or sailor is the bravest of the brave. No soldier or sailor of any other country, saving and excepting those damned Yankees, can stand against them. .. I don't like Americans. I never did and never shall like them. I have no wish to eat with them, drink with them, deal with or consort with them in any way; but let me tell the whole truth, --_nor fight_ with them, were it not for the laurel to be acquired by overcoming an enemy so brave, determined, and alert, and every way so worthy of one's steel as they have always proved. 

Refitting in a French port, the dashing Blakely took the _Wasp_ to seaagain and encountered a convoy in charge of a huge, lumbering ship ofthe line. Nothing daunted, the _Wasp_ flitted in among the timidmerchant ships and snatched a valuable prize laden with guns andmilitary stores. Attempting to bag another, she was chased away by theindignant seventy-four and winged it in search of other quarry until shesighted four strange sails. Three of them were British war brigs in hotpursuit of a Yankee privateer, and Johnston Blakely was delighted toplay a hand in the game. He selected his opponent, which happened to bethe _Avon_, and overtook her in the darkness of evening. Before a strongwind they foamed side by side, while the guns flashed crimson beneaththe shadowy gleam of tall canvas. Thus they ran for an hour and a half, and then the _Avon_ signaled that she was beaten, with five gunsdismounted, forty-two men dead or wounded, seven feet of water in thehold, the magazine flooded, and the spars and rigging almost destroyed. 

Blakely was about to send a crew aboard when another hostile brig, forsaking the agile Yankee privateer, came up to help the _Avon_. The_Wasp_ was perfectly willing to take on this second adversary, but justthen a third British ship loomed through the obscurity, and the oceanseemed a trifle overpopulated for safety. Blakely ran off before thewind, compelled to abandon his prize. The _Avon_, however, was so badlybattered that she went to the bottom before the wounded seamen could beremoved from her. Thence the _Wasp_ went to Madeira and was laterreported as spoken near the Cape Verde Islands, but after that shevanished from blue water, erased by some tragic fate whose mystery wasnever solved. To the port of missing ships she carried brave Blakely andhis men after a meteoric career which had swept her from one victory toanother. 

Of the frigates, only three saw action during the last two years of thewar, and of these the _President_ and the _Essex_ were compelled tostrike to superior forces of the enemy. The _Constitution_ was luckyenough to gain the open sea in December, 1814, and fought her farewellbattle with the frigate _Cyane_ and the sloop-of-war _Levant_ on the20th of February. In this fight Captain Charles Stewart showed himself agallant successor to Hull and Bainbridge. Together the two British shipswere stronger than the _Constitution_, but Stewart cleverly hammered theone and then the other and captured both. Honor was also due the pluckylittle _Levant_, which, instead of taking to her heels, stood by toassist her larger comrade like a terrier at the throat of a wolf. It isinteresting to note that the captains, English and American, hadreceived word that peace had been declared, but without officialconfirmation they preferred to ignore it. The spirit which lent to navalwarfare the spirit of the duel was too strong to let the opportunitypass. 

The _President_ was a victim of a continually increased naval strengthby means of which Great Britain was able to strangle the seafaring tradeand commerce of the United States as the war drew toward its close. Captain Decatur, who had taken command of this frigate, remarked "thegreat apprehension and danger" which New York felt, in common with theentire seaboard, and the anxiety of the city government that the crew ofthe ship should remain for defense of the port. Coastwise navigation wasalmost wholly suspended, and thousands of sloops and schooners feared toundertake voyages to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Charleston. Instead ofthese, canvas-covered wagons struggled over the poor highways incontinuous streams between New England and the Southern coast towns. This awkward result of the blockade moved the sense of humor of theYankee rhymsters who placarded the wagons with such mottoes as "FreeTrade and Oxen's Rights" and parodied _Ye Mariners of England_ with thelines:

 Ye wagoners of Freedom Whose chargers chew the cud, Whose wheels have braved a dozen years The gravel and the mud; Your glorious hawbucks yoke again To take another jag, And scud through the mud Where the heavy wheels do drag, Where the wagon creak is long and low And the jaded oxen lag. 

 Columbia needs no wooden walls, No ships where billows swell; Her march is like a terrapin's, Her home is in her shell. To guard her trade and sailor's rights, In woods she spreads her flag. 

Such ribald nonsense, however, was unfair to a navy which had donemagnificently well until smothered and suppressed by sheer weight ofnumbers. It was in January, 1815, that Captain Decatur finally sailedout of New York harbor in the hope of taking the _President_ past theblockading division which had been driven offshore by a heavy northeastgale. The British ships were struggling back to their stations when theyspied the Yankee frigate off the southern coast of Long Island. It was astern chase, Decatur with a hostile squadron at his heels and unable toturn and fight because the odds were hopeless. The frigate _Endymion_was faster than her consorts and, as she came up alone, the _President_delayed to exchange broadsides before fleeing again with every sail set. Her speed had been impaired by stranding as she came out past SandyHook, else she might have out-footed the enemy. But soon the _Pomone_and the _Tenedos_, frigates of the class of the _Shannon_ and the_Guerrière_, were in the hunt. Decatur was cornered, but his guns wereserved until a fifth of the crew were disabled, the ship was crippled, and a force fourfold greater than his own was closing in to annihilatehim at its leisure. "I deemed it my duty to surrender, " said he, and anoble American frigate, more formidable than the _Constitution_, wasadded to the list of the Royal Navy. 

[Illustration: _A FRIGATE OF 1812 UNDER SAIL_

The _Constellation_, of which this is a photograph, is somewhat smallerthan the _Constitution_, being rated at 38 guns as against 44 for thelatter. In general appearance, however, and particularly in rig, the twotypes are very similar. Although the _Constellation_ did not herself seeaction in the War of 1812, she is a good example of the heavily armedAmerican frigate of that day--and the only one of them still to be seenat sea under sail within recent years. At the present time the_Constellation_ lies moored at the pier of the Naval Training Station, Newport, R. I. 

Photograph by E. Müller, Jr. , Inc. , New York. ]

CHAPTER VIII

THE LAST CRUISE OF THE ESSEX

The last cruise of the _Essex_ frigate, although an ill-fated one, makesa story far less mournful than that of the _President_. She was thefirst man-of-war to display the American flag in the wide waters of thePacific. Her long and venturesome voyage is still regarded as one of thefinest achievements of the navy, and it made secure the fame of CaptainDavid Porter. The _Essex_ has a peculiar right to be held inaffectionate memory, apart from the very gallant manner of her ending, because into her very timbers were builded the faith and patriotism ofthe people of the New England seaport which had framed and launched heras a loan to the nation in an earlier time of stress. 

At the end of the eighteenth century France had been the maritime enemymore hotly detested than England, and unofficial war existed with the"Terrible Republic. " This situation was foreshadowed as early as 1798by James McHenry, Secretary of War, when he indignantly announced toCongress: "To forbear under such circumstances from taking naval andmilitary measures to secure our trade, defend our territories in case ofinvasion, and to prevent or suppress domestic insurrection would be tooffer up the United States a certain prey to France and exhibit to theworld a sad spectacle of national degradation and imbecility. "

Congress thereupon resolved to build two dozen ships which should teachFrance to mend her manners on the high seas, but the Treasury was toopoor to pay the million dollars which this modest navy was to cost. Subscription lists were therefore opened in several shipping towns, andprivate capital advanced the funds to put the needed frigates afloat. The _Essex_ was promptly contributed by Salem, and the advertisement ofthe master builder is brave and resonant reading:

 To Sons of Freedom! All true lovers of Liberty of your Country! Step forth and give your assistance in building the frigate to oppose French insolence and piracy. Let every man in possession of a white oak tree be ambitious to be foremost in hurrying down the timber to Salem where the noble structure is to be fabricated to maintain your rights upon the seas and make the name of America respected among the nations of the world. Your largest and longest trees are wanted, and the arms of them for knees and rising timber. Four trees are wanted for the keel which altogether will measure 146 feet in length and hew sixteen inches square. 

The story of the building of the _Essex_ is that of an aroused andreliant people. The great timbers were cut in the wood lots of the townsnear by and were hauled through the snowy streets of Salem on ox-sledswhile the people cheered them as they passed. The _Essex_ was a Salemship from keel to truck. Her cordage was made in three ropewalks. Captain Jonathan Haraden, the most famous Salem privateersman of theRevolution, made the rigging for the mainmast in his loft. The sailswere cut from duck woven for the purpose in the mill on Broad Street andthe ironwork was forged by Salem shipsmiths. When the huge hempen cableswere ready to be conveyed to the frigate, the workmen hoisted them upontheir shoulders and in procession marched to the music of fife and drum. In 1799, six months after the oak timbers had been standing trees, the_Essex_ slid from the stocks into the harbor of old Salem. She was thehandsomest and fastest American frigate of her day and when turned overto the Government, she cost what seemed at that day the veryconsiderable amount of seventy-five thousand dollars. 

Peace was patched up with France, however, and the _Essex_ was compelledto pursue more humdrum paths, now in the Indian Ocean and again with theMediterranean squadron, until war with England began in 1812. It wasintended that Captain Porter should rendezvous with the _Constitution_and the _Hornet_ in South American waters for a well-planned cruiseagainst British commerce, but other engagements detained Bainbridge, notably his encounter with the _Java_, and so they missed each other bya thousand miles or so. Since he had no means of communication, it wascharacteristic of Porter to conclude to strike out for himself insteadof wandering about in an uncertain search for his friends. 

Porter conceived the bold plan of rounding the Horn and playing havocwith the British whaling fleet. This adventure would take him tenthousand miles from the nearest American port, but he reckoned that hecould capture provisions enough to feed his crew and supplies to refitthe ship. As a raid there was nothing to match this cruise until the_Alabama_ ran amuck among the Yankee clippers and whaling barks half acentury later. It was the wrong time of year to brave the foul weatherof Cape Horn, however, and the _Essex_ was battered and swept by onefurious gale after another. But at last she won through, stout ship thatshe was, and her weary sailors found brief respite in the harbor ofValparaiso on March 14, 1813. Thence Porter headed up the coast, disguising the trim frigate so that she looked like a lubberly, high-pooped Spanish merchantman. 

The luck of the navy was with the American captain for, as he wentpoking about the Galapagos Islands, he surprised three fine, largeBritish whaling ships, all carrying guns and too useful to destroy. Toone of them, the _Georgiana_, he shifted more guns, put a crew of fortymen aboard under Lieutenant John Downes, ran up the American flag, andcommissioned his prize as a cruiser. The other two he also manned--andnow behold him, if you please, sailing the Pacific with a squadron offour good ships! Soon he ran down and captured two Britishletter-of-marque vessels, well armed and in fighting trim, and in atrice he had not a squadron but a fleet under his command, seven shipsin all, mounting eighty guns and carrying three hundred and forty menand eighty prisoners. Two of these prizes he discovered to be crammedto the hatches with cordage, paint, tar, canvas, and fresh provisions. The list could not have been more acceptable if Captain David Porterhimself had signed the requisition in the New York Navy Yard. 

Lieutenant Downes was now sent off cruising by himself, and so well didhe profit by his captain's example and precepts that in a little whilehe had bagged a squadron of his own, three ships with twenty-seven gunsand seventy-five men. When he rejoined the flagship in a harbor of themainland, Porter rewarded him by calling his cruiser the _Essex, Junior_, promoting him to the rank of commander, and increasing hisarmament. They then resumed cruising in two squadrons, finding moreBritish ships and sending them into the neutral harbor of Valparaiso orhome to the United States with precious cargoes of whale oil and bone. Within a few months he swept the Southern Pacific almost clean ofBritish merchantmen, whalers, and privateers. Winter coming on, Porterthen sailed to the pleasant Marquesas Islands and laid the _Essex_ upfor a thorough overhauling. The enemy had furnished all needful suppliesand even the money to pay the wages of the officers and crew. 

Fit for sea again, the _Essex_ and the _Essex, Junior_, betookthemselves to Valparaiso where they received information that thethirty-six-gun frigate _Phoebe_ of the British navy was earnestlylooking for them. She had been sent out from England to proceed to thenorthwest American coast and destroy the fur station at the mouth of theColumbia River. At Rio de Janeiro Captain Hillyar had heard reports ofthe ravages of the _Essex_ and he considered it his business to huntdown this defiant Yankee. To make sure of success, he took thesloop-of-war _Cherub_ along with him and, doubling the Horn, they madestraight for Valparaiso. David Porter got wind of the pursuit butassumed that the _Phoebe_ was alone. He made no attempt to avoid ameeting but on the contrary rather courted a fight with his old friendHillyar, whom he had known socially on the Mediterranean station. For anofficer of Porter's temper and training the capture of British whalerswas a useful but by no means glorious employment. He believed the realvocation of a frigate of the American navy was to engage the enemy. 

The _Phoebe_ and the _Cherub_ sailed into the Chilean roadstead inFebruary, 1814, and found the _Essex_ there. As Captain Hillyar waspassing in to seek an anchorage, the mate of a British merchantmanclimbed aboard to tell him that the _Essex_ was unprepared for attackand could be taken with ease. Her officers had given a ball the nightbefore in honor of the Spanish dignitaries of Valparaiso, and the deckswere still covered with awnings and gay with bunting and flags. Reluctant to forego such a tempting opportunity, Captain Hillyar ran inand luffed his frigate within a few yards of the Essex. To hisdisappointed surprise, the American fighting ship was ready for actionon the instant. Though the punctilious restraints of a neutral portshould have compelled them to delay battle, Porter was vigilant and tookno chances. The liberty parties had been recalled from shore, the deckshad been cleared, the gunners were sent to quarters with matcheslighted, and the boarders were standing by the hammock nettings withcutlasses gripped. Making the best of this unexpected turn of events, the English captain shouted a greeting to David Porter and politelyconveyed his compliments, adding that his own ship was also ready foraction. So close were the two frigates at this moment that the jib-boomof the _Phoebe_ hung over the bulwarks of the _Essex_, and Porter calledout sharply that if so much as a rope was touched he would reply with abroadside. The urbane Captain Hillyar, perceiving his disadvantage, exclaimed, "I had no intention of coming so near you. I am very sorryindeed. " With that he moved his ship to a respectful distance. Later hehad a chat with Captain Porter ashore and, when asked if he intended tomaintain the neutrality of the port, made haste to protest, "Sir, youhave been so careful to observe the rules that I feel myself bound inhonor to do the same. "

After a few days the _Phoebe_ and the _Cherub_ left the harbor andwatchfully waited outside, enforcing a strict blockade and determined torender the _Essex_ harmless unless she should choose to sally out andfight. David Porter was an intrepid but not a reckless sailor. He hadthe faster frigate but he had unluckily changed her battery from thelong guns to the more numerous but shorter range carronades. He was notafraid to risk a duel with the _Phoebe_ even with this handicap inarmament, but the sloop-of-war _Cherub_ was a formidable vessel for hersize and the _Essex, Junior_, which was only a converted merchantman, was of small account in a hammer-and-tongs action between naval ships. 

For his part, Captain Hillyar had no intention of letting the Yankeefrigate escape him. "He was an old disciple of Nelson, " observes Mahan, "fully imbued with the teaching that the achievement of success and notpersonal glory must dictate action. Having a well established reputationfor courage and conduct, he intended to leave nothing to the chances offortune which might decide a combat between equals. He therefore wouldaccept no provocation to fight without the _Cherub_. His duty was todestroy the _Essex_ with the least possible loss. "

Porter endured this vexatious situation for six weeks and then, learningthat other British frigates were on his trail, determined to escape tothe open sea. This decision involved waiting for the most favorablemoment of wind and weather, but Porter found his hand forced on the 28thof March by a violent southerly gale which swept over the exposed bay ofValparaiso and dragged the _Essex_ from her anchorage. One of her cablesparted while the crew struggled to get sail on her. As she driftedseaward, Porter decided to seize the emergency and take the long chanceof running out to windward of the _Phoebe_ and the _Cherub_. Hetherefore cut the other cable, and the _Essex_ plunged into the windunder single-reefed topsails to claw past the headland. Just as she wasabout to clear it, a whistling squall carried away the maintopmast. This accident was a grave disaster, for the disabled frigate was nowunable either to regain a refuge in the bay or to win her way past theBritish ship. 

As a last resort Captain Porter turned and ran along the coast, withinpistol shot of it, far inside the three-mile limit of neutral water, andcame to an anchor about three miles north of the city. Captain Hillyarhad no legal right to molest him, but in his opinion the end justifiedthe means and he resolved to attack. Deliberately the _Phoebe_ and_Cherub_ selected their stations and, late in this stormy afternoon, bombarded the crippled _Essex_ without mercy. Porter with his carronadeswas unable to repay the damage inflicted by the broadsides of the longerguns, nor could he handle his ship to close in and retrieve the day inthe desperate game of boarding. He tried this ultimate venture, nevertheless, and let go his cables. But the ship refused to move ahead. Her sheets, tacks, and halliards had been shot away. The canvas washanging loose. 

Porter's guns were by no means silent, however, even in this hopelesssituation, and few crews have died harder or fought more grimly thanthese seamen of the _Essex_. Among them was a little midshipman, woundedbut still at his post, a mere child of thirteen years whose name wasDavid Farragut. His fortune it was to link those early days of theAmerican navy with a period half a century later when he won his renownas the greatest of American admirals. 

In many a New England seaport were told the tales of this last fight ofthe _Essex_ until they became almost legendary--of Seaman John Ripley, who cried, after losing his leg, "Farewell, boys, I can be of no moreuse to you, " and thereupon flung himself overboard out of a bow port; ofJames Anderson, who died encouraging his comrades to fight bravely indefense of liberty; of Benjamin Hazen, who dressed himself in a cleanshirt and jerkin, told his messmates that he could never submit to beingtaken prisoner by the English and forthwith leaped into the sea and wasdrowned. Such incidents help us to descry, amid the smoke and slaughterof that desperate encounter, the spirit of the gallant David Porter. Never was the saying, "It's not the ships but the men in them, " betterexemplified. To Porter was granted greatness in defeat, a lot that comesto few. 

For two hours he and his men endured such dreadful punishment as notmany ships have suffered. Again he attempted to work his way nearer theenemy, until he had not enough men left unhurt to serve the guns or tohaul at the pitifully splintered spars. In the last extremity, Portermade an effort to destroy his vessel and to save her people fromcaptivity by letting the _Essex_ drive ashore. A kedge anchor was letgo, and a dozen sailors tramped around the capstan while the chantey manpiped up a tune, but again fortune seemed against him for the hawsersnapped, and the wind began to blow the frigate into deeper water. Whathappened then is best recalled in the simple words of Captain DavidPorter himself:

 I now sent for the officers of division to consult them and what was my surprise to find only acting Lieutenant Stephen Decatur M'Knight remaining. .. . I was informed that the cockpit, the steerage, the wardroom, and the berth deck could contain no more wounded, that the wounded were killed while the surgeons were dressing them, and that if something was not speedily done to prevent it, the ship would soon sink from the number of shot holes in her bottom. On sending for the carpenter he informed me that all his crew had been killed or wounded. 

 The enemy, from the impossibility of reaching him with our carronades and the little apprehension that was excited by our fire, which had now become much slackened, was enabled to take aim at us as at a target; his shot never missed our hull and my ship was cut up in a manner which was perhaps never before witnessed; in fine, I saw no hope of saving her, and at twenty minutes after 6 P. M. I gave the painful order to strike the colors. Seventy-five men including officers were all that remained of my whole crew after the action, many of them severely wounded, some of whom have since died. 

 The enemy still continued his fire and my brave, though unfortunate companions were still falling about me. I directed an opposite gun to be fired to show them we intended no further resistance but they did not desist. Four men were killed at my side and others at different parts of the ship. I now believed he intended to show us no quarter, that it would be as well to die with my flag flying as struck, and was on the point of again hoisting it when about ten minutes after hauling down the colors he ceased firing. 

 . .. We have been unfortunate but not disgraced--the defense of the _Essex_ has not been less honorable to her officers and crew than the capture of an equal force; and I now consider my situation less unpleasant than that of Captain Hillyar, who in violation of every principle of honor and generosity, and regardless of the rights of nations, attacked the _Essex_ in her crippled state within pistol shot of a neutral shore, when for six weeks I had daily offered him fair and honorable combat on terms greatly to his advantage. 

The behavior of Captain Hillyar after the surrender, however, was mosthumane and courteous, and lapse of time has dispelled somewhat of thebitterness of the American opinion of him. If he was not as chivalrousas his Yankee foemen had expected, it must be remembered that there wasa heavy grudge and a long score to pay in the havoc wrought amongBritish merchantmen and whalers and that in those days the rights ofSouth American neutrals were rather lightly regarded. 

CHAPTER IX

VICTORY ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN

Spectacular as were the exploits of the American navy on the sea, theywere of far less immediate consequence in deciding the destinies of thewar than were the naval battles fought on fresh water between hastilyimprovised squadrons. On Lake Erie Perry's victory had recovered a lostempire and had made the West secure against invasion. Macdonough'shandful of little vessels on Lake Champlain compelled the retreat of tenthousand British veterans of Wellington's campaigns who had marched downfrom Canada with every promise of crushing American resistance. This wasthe last and most formidable attempt on the part of the enemy to conquerterritory and to wrest a decision by means of a sustained offensive. Itscollapse marked the beginning of the end, and such events as the captureof Washington and the battle of New Orleans were in the nature ofepisodes. 

That September day of 1814, when Macdonough won his niche in the navalhall of fame, was also the climax and the conclusion of the longstruggle of the American armies on the northern frontier, a confusedrecord of defeat, vacillation, and crumbling forces, which was redeemedtowards the end by troops who had learned how to fight and by newleaders who restored the honor of the flag at Chippawa and Lundy's Lane. Although the ambitious attempts against Canada, so often repeated, wereso much wasted effort until the very end, they ceased to be inglorious. The tide turned in the summer of 1814 with the renewal of the strugglefor the Niagara region where the British had won a foothold uponAmerican soil. 

In command of a vigorous and disciplined American army was General JacobBrown, that stout-hearted volunteer who had proved his worth when theenemy landed at Sackett's Harbor. He was not a professional soldier buthis troops had been trained and organized by Winfield Scott who was nowa brigadier. After two years of dismal reverses, the United States waslearning how to wage war. Incompetency was no longer the badge of highmilitary rank. A general was supposed to know something about his tradeand to have a will of his own. 

With thirty-five hundred men, Jacob Brown made a resolute advance tofind and join battle with the British forces of General Riall whichgarrisoned the forts of St. George's, Niagara, Erie, Queenston, andChippawa. Early in the morning of July 3, 1814, the American troops intwo divisions crossed the river and promptly captured Fort Erie. Theythen pushed ahead fifteen miles until they encountered the Britishdefensive line on the Chippawa River where it flows into the Niagara. 

The field was like a park, with open, grassy spaces and a belt ofwoodland which served as a green curtain to screen the movements of botharmies. Riall boldly assumed the offensive, although he was aware thathe had fewer men. His instructions intimated that liberties might betaken with the Americans which would seem hazardous "to a military manunacquainted with the character of the enemy he had to contend with, orwith the events of the last two campaigns on that frontier. " Thededuction was unflattering but very much after the fact. 

The British attack was unlooked for. It was the Fourth of July and incelebration Winfield Scott had given his men the best dinner that thecommissary could supply and was marching them into a meadow in the coolof the summer afternoon for drill and review. The celebration, however, was interrupted by firing and confusion among the militia who happenedto be in front, and Scott rushed his brigade forward to take the bruntof the heavy assault. General Jacob Brown rode by at a gallop, wavinghis hat and cheerily shouting, "You will have a battle. " He was hurryingto bring up his other forces, but meanwhile Scott's column crossed abridge at the double-quick and faced the enemy's batteries. 

Exposed, taken by surprise, and outnumbered, Winfield Scott and hisregiments were nevertheless equal to the occasion. A battalion was sentto cover one flank in the dense woodland, while the main body drovestraight for the columns of British infantry and then charged withbayonets at sixty paces. The American ranks were steady and unbrokenalthough they were pelted with musketry fire, and they smashed a Britishcounter-charge by three regiments before it gained momentum. Handsomelyfought and won, it was not a decisive battle and might be called no morethan a skirmish but its significance was highly important, for atChippawa there was displayed a new spirit in the American army. 

Riall retreated with his red-coated regulars to a stronger line atQueenston, while Jacob Brown was sending anxious messages to CommodoreChauncey begging him to use his fleet in cooperation and so break thepower of the enemy in Upper Canada. "For God's sake, let me see you, " heimplored. But again the American ships on Lake Ontario failed to seizean opportunity, and in this instance Chauncey's inactivity dismayed notonly General Brown but also the Government at Washington. The fleetremained at Sackett's Harbor with excuses which appeared inadequate:certain changes were being made among the officers and crews, and again"the squadron had been prevented being earlier fitted for sea inconsequence of the delay in obtaining blocks and iron-work. " Chaunceysubsequently fell ill, which may have had something to do with his lapseof energy. The whole career of this naval commander on Lake Ontario haddisappointed expectations, even though the Secretary had commended his"zeal, talent, constancy, courage, and prudence of the highest order. "The trouble was that Chauncey let slip one chance after another to winthe control of Lake Ontario in pitched battle. Always too intent onbuilding more ships instead of fighting with those he had, he istherefore not remembered in the glorious companionship of Perry andMacdonough. 

This failure to act at the moment when Jacob Brown was so valiantlyendeavoring to wrest from the British the precious Niagara peninsula wasresponsible for the desperate and inconclusive battle of Lundy's Lane. Winfield Scott frankly blamed the unsuccessful result upon the freedomwith which the British troops and supplies were moved on Lake Ontario. For ten days Jacob Brown had remained in a painful state of suspense andperplexity, until finally the word came that nobody knew when theAmerican fleet would sail. As he had feared, the British command, ableto move its troops unmolested across the lake, planned to attack him inthe rear and to cut his communications on the New York side of theNiagara River. For this purpose two enemy brigs were filled with troopsand were sent over to Fort Niagara with more to follow. 

It was to parry this threat that Brown moved his forces and broughtabout the clash at Lundy's Lane. "As it appeared, " he explained, "thatthe enemy with his increased strength was about to avail himself of thehazard under which our baggage and stores were on our side of theNiagara, I conceived the most effectual method of recalling him from theobject was to put myself in motion towards Queenston. General Scott withhis brigade were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither. "

The action was fought about a mile back from the torrent of the Niagara, below the Falls, where the by-road known as Lundy's Lane joined the mainroad running parallel with the river. Here Scott's column came suddenlyupon a force of British redcoats led by General Drummond. Scotthesitated to attack, because the odds were against his one brigade, but, fearing the effect of a retreat on the divisions behind him, he sentword to Brown that he would hold his ground and try to turn the enemy'sleft toward the Niagara. It was late in the day and the sun had almostset. Gradually Scott forced the British wing back, and Brown threw inreinforcements until the engagement became general. The fight continuedfurious even after darkness fell and never have men employed in thebusiness of killing each other shown courage more stubborn. Both sideswere equally determined and they fought until exhaustion literallycompelled a halt. 

Later in the evening fresh troops were hurled in on both sides, andthey were at it again with the same impetuosity. A small hill, overwhich ran Lundy's Lane, was the goal the Americans fought for. Theyfinally stormed it, "in so determined a manner, " reported the enemy, "that our artillery men were bayoneted in the act of loading and themuzzles of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours. "Back and forth flowed the tide of battle in bloody waves, untilmidnight. Then sullenly and in good order the Americans retired threemiles to camp at Chippawa. Next day the enemy resumed the position andheld it unattacked. 

It is fair to call Lundy's Lane a drawn battle. The casualties weresomething more than eight hundred for each side, and the troops engagedwere about twenty-five hundred Americans and a like number of British. Both the shattered columns soon retired behind strong defenses. GeneralDrummond led the British troops into camp at Niagara Falls, and GeneralRipley, in temporary command of the American brigades, Scott and Brownhaving been wounded, occupied the unfinished works of Fort Erie, on theCanadian side, just where the waters of Lake Erie enter the NiagaraRiver. 

The British determined to bombard these walls and intrenchments withheavy guns and then carry them by infantry assault. But this plan faileddisastrously. On the 15th of August the British charged in three columnsthe bastions and batteries only to be savagely repulsed at every pointwith a loss of nine hundred men killed, wounded, or prisoners, while thedefenders had only eighty-five casualties. Then Drummond settled down tobesiege the place and succeeded in making it so uncomfortable that JacobBrown, now recovered from his wound, organized a sortie in force whichwas made on the 17th of September. In the action which followed, theBritish batteries were overwhelmed and the American militia displayedmagnificent steadiness and valor. Jacob Brown proudly informed theGovernor of New York that "the militia of New York have redeemed theircharacter--they behaved gallantly. Of those called out by the lastrequisition, fifteen hundred have crossed the state border to oursupport. This reinforcement has been of immense importance to us; itdoubled our effective strength, and their good conduct cannot but havethe happiest effect upon our nation. "

This bold stroke ended the Niagara campaign. The British fell back, andthe American army was in no condition for pursuit. In ten weeks JacobBrown had fought four engagements without defeat and, barring the battleof New Orleans, his brief campaign was the one operation of the land warupon which Americans could look back with any degree of satisfaction. 

The scene now shifted to Lake Champlain. The main work was the buildingup of an army to resist the menacing preparations for a British invasionfrom Montreal. Among the new American generals who had gained promotionby merit instead of favor was George Izard, trained in the militaryschools of England and Prussia, and an aide to Alexander Hamilton duringhis command of the army of the United States. Izard had been sent toPlattsburg in May, 1814, on the very eve of the great British campaign, and found everything in a deplorable state of unreadiness andinefficiency. While he was manfully struggling with these difficulties, Secretary Armstrong directed him to send four thousand of his men to theassistance of Jacob Brown on the Niagara front. General Izard obedientlyand promptly set out, although the defense of Lake Champlain was therebydeprived of this large body of troops. The expedition was almost barrenof results, however, and at a time when every trained soldier was neededto oppose the march of the British veterans, Izard was at Fort Erie, idle, waiting to build winter quarters and writing to the WarDepartment: "I confess I am greatly embarrassed. At the head of the mostefficient army the United States have possessed during this war, muchmust be expected of me; and yet I can discern no object which can beachieved at this point worthy of the risk which will attend itsattempt. "

Izard had already predicted that the withdrawal of his forces fromPlattsburg would leave northeastern New York at the mercy of the Britishand he spoke the truth. No sooner had his divisions started westwardthan the British army, ten thousand strong, under General Prevost, crossed the frontier and marched rapidly toward the Saranac River andthen straight on to Plattsburg. Possession of this trading town theBritish particularly desired because through it passed an enormousamount of illicit traffic with Canada. Both Izard and Prevost agreed inthe statement that the British army was almost entirely fed on suppliesdrawn from New York and Vermont by way of Lake Champlain. "Two thirds ofthe army in Canada are supplied with beef by American contractors, "wrote Prevost, and there were not enough highways to accommodate theherds of cattle which were driven across the border. 

To protect this source of supply by conquering the region was the taskassigned the splendid army of British regulars who had fought underWellington. The conclusion of the Peninsular campaign had released themfor service in America, and England was now able for the first time tothrow her military strength against the feeble forces of the UnitedStates. It was announced as the intention of the British Government totake and hold the lakes, from Champlain to Erie, as territorial watersand a permanent barrier. To oppose the large and seasoned army which wasto effect these projects, there was an American force of only fifteenhundred men, led by Brigadier General Alexander Macomb. All he could dowas to try to hold the defensive works at Plattsburg and to send forwardsmall skirmishing parties to annoy the British army which advanced insolid column, without taking the trouble to deploy. 

On the 6th of September Sir George Prevost with his army reachedPlattsburg and encamped just outside the town. From a ridge the Britishleader beheld the redoubts, strong field works, and blockhouses, and atanchor in the bay the little American fleet of Commodore ThomasMacdonough. To Prevost it looked like a costly business to attempt tocarry these defenses by assault and he therefore decided to await thearrival of the British ships of Captain George Downie. A combined attackby land and sea, he believed, should find no difficulty in wiping outAmerican resistance. 

Such was the situation and the weighty responsibility which confrontedMacdonough and his sailors. It was the most critical moment of the war. With a seaman's eye for defense Macdonough met it by stationing hisvessels in a carefully chosen position and prepared with a seaman'sforesight for every contingency. Plattsburg Bay is about two miles wideand two long and lies open to the southward, with a cape calledCumberland Head bounding it on the east. It was in this sheltered waterthat Macdonough awaited attack, his ships riding about a mile from theAmerican shore batteries. These guns were to be captured by the Britisharmy and turned against him, according to the plans of General Prevost, who was urging Captain Downie to hasten with his fleet and undertake ajoint action, for, as he said, "it is of the highest importance thatthe ships, vessels, and gunboats of your command should combine acooperation with the division of the army under my command. I only waitfor your arrival to proceed against General Macomb's last position onthe south bank of the Saranac. "

These demands became more and more insistent, although the largestBritish ship, the _Confiance_, had been launched only a few days beforeand the mechanics were still toiling night and day to fit her foraction. She was a formidable frigate, of the size of the American_Chesapeake_, and was expected to be more than a match for Macdonough'sentire fleet. Captain Downie certainly expected the support of the army, which he failed to receive, for he clearly stated his position beforethe naval battle. "When the batteries are stormed and taken possessionof by the British land forces, which the commander of the land forceshas promised to do at the moment the naval action commences, the enemywill be obliged to quit their position, whereby we shall obtain decidedadvantage over them during the confusion. I would otherwise preferfighting them on the lake and would wait until our force is in anefficient state but I fear they would take shelter up the lake and wouldnot meet me on equal terms. "

Compelled to seek and offer battle in Plattsburg Bay, the Britishvessels rounded Cumberland Head on the morning of the 11th of Septemberand hove to while Captain Downie went ahead in a boat to observe theAmerican position. He perceived that Macdonough had anchored his fleetin line in this order: the brig _Eagle_, twenty guns, the flagship_Saratoga_, twenty-six guns, the schooner _Ticonderoga_, seven guns, andthe sloop _Preble_, seven guns. There was also a considerable squadronof little gunboats, or galleys, propelled by oars and mounting one gun. Opposed to this force was the stately _Confiance_, with her threehundred men and thirty-seven guns, such a ship as might have dared toengage the _Constitution_ on blue water, and the _Chub_, _Linnet_, and_Finch_, much like Macdonough's three smaller vessels, besides aflotilla of the tiny, impudent gunboats which were like so many hornets. 

Macdonough was a youngster of twenty-eight years to whom was grantedthis opportunity denied the officers who had grown gray in the service. The navy, which was also very young, had set its own stamp upon him, andhis advancement he had won by sheer ability. Self-reliant andindomitable, like Oliver Hazard Perry, he had wrestled with obstaclesand was ready to meet the enemy in spite of them. His fame among navalmen outshines Perry's, and he is rated as the greatest fighting sailorwho flew the American flag until Farragut surpassed them all. 

The battle of Plattsburg Bay was contested straight from the shoulderwith little chance for such evolutions as seeking the weather gage orwearing ship. With one fleet at anchor, as Nelson demonstrated at theNile, the proper business of the other was to drive ahead and try tobreak the line or turn an end of it. This Captain Downie proceeded toattempt in a brave and highly skillful manner, with the _Confiance_leading into the bay and proposing to smash the _Eagle_ with her firstbroadsides. The wind failed, however, and the British frigate droppedanchor within close range of the _Saratoga_, which displayedMacdonough's pennant, and pounded this vessel so accurately that fortyAmerican seamen, or one-fifth of the crew, were struck down by the firstblast of the British guns. 

Meanwhile the _Linnet_ had reached her assigned berth and fought theAmerican _Eagle_ so successfully that the latter was disabled and had toleave the line. To balance this the _Chub_ was so badly damaged thatshe drifted helpless among the American ships and was compelled to hauldown her colors. The _Finch_ committed a blunder of seamanship and byfailing to keep close enough to the wind, which soon died away, shefinally went aground and took no part in the battle. The _Preble_ wasdriven from her anchorage and ran ashore under the Plattsburg batteries, and the _Ticonderoga_ played no heavier part than to beat off the littleBritish galleys. 

The decisive battle was therefore fought by four ships, the American_Saratoga_ and _Eagle_, and the British _Confiance_ and _Linnet_. It wasthen that Macdonough acquitted himself as a man who did not know when hewas beaten. The _Confiance_, which must have towered like a ship of theline, had so cruelly mauled the _Saratoga_ that she seemed doomed to beblown out of water. So many of his gunners were killed by thedouble-shotted broadsides that Macdonough jumped from the quarter-deck totake a hand himself and encourage the survivors. He was sighting a gunwhen a round shot cut the spanker boom, and a fragment of the heavy sparknocked him senseless. 

Recovering his wits, however, he returned to his gun. But another shottore off the head of the gun captain and flung it in Macdonough's facewith such force that he was hurled across the deck. At length all butone of the guns along the side exposed to the _Confiance_ had beensmashed or dismounted, and this last gun broke its fastening bolts, leaped from its carriage with the heavy recoil, and plunged into themain hatch. Silenced, shot through and through, her decks strewn withdead, the _Saratoga_ might then have struck her colors with honor. ButMacdonough had not begun to fight. Prepared for such an emergency, helet go a stern anchor, cut his bow cable, and "winded" or turned hisship around so that her other side with its uninjured row of guns waspresented to the _Confiance_. Captain Downie had by this time beenkilled, and the acting commander of the British flagship endeavored toexecute the same maneuver, but the _Confiance_ was too badly crippled tobe swung about. While she floundered, the Saratoga reduced her tosubmission. One of the surviving officers stated that "the ship'scompany declared they would no longer stand to their quarters nor couldthe officers with their utmost exertions rally them. " The ship wassinking, with more than a hundred ragged holes in her hull and fivescoremen dead or hurt. Fifteen minutes later the plucky _Linnet_ surrenderedafter a long and desperate duel with the _Eagle_. The British galleysescaped from the bay under sail and oar because no American ships werefit to chase them, but the Royal Navy had ceased to exist on LakeChamplain. For more than two hours the battle had been fought with abulldog endurance not often equaled in the grim pages of naval history. And more nearly than any other incident of the War of 1812 it could becalled decisive. 

The American victory made the position of Prevost's army whollyuntenable. With the control of Lake Champlain in Macdonough's hands, theBritish line of communication would be continually menaced. For the tenthousand veterans of Wellington's campaigns there was nothing to do butretreat, nor did they linger until they had marched across the Canadaborder. Though the way had lain open before them, they had not fought abattle, but were turned out of the United States, evicted, one mightsay, by a few small ships manned by several hundred American sailors. AsPerry had regained the vast Northwest for his nation so, moremomentously, did Macdonough avert from New York and New England a tideof invasion which could not otherwise have been stemmed. 

[Illustration: _THOMAS MACDONOUGH_

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. Reproduced by courtesy of the Municipal Art Commission ofthe City of New York. ]

[Illustration: _JACOB BROWN_

Painting by J. W. Jarvis. In the City Hall, New York, owned by theCorporation. Reproduced by courtesy of the Municipal Art Commission ofthe City of New York. ]

CHAPTER X

PEACE WITH HONOR

The raids of the British navy on the American sea-coast through the lasttwo years of the war were so many efforts to make effective the blockadewhich began with the proclamation of December, 1812, closing Chesapeakeand Delaware bays. Successive orders in 1813 closed practically all theseaports from New London, Connecticut, to the Florida boundary, and thelast sweeping proclamation of May, 1814, placed under strict blockade"all the ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands, and seacoasts of the United States. " It was the blockade of ports of theMiddle States which caused such widespread ruin among merchants andshippers and which finally brought the Government itself to the verge ofbankruptcy. 

The first serious alarm was caused in the spring of 1813 by theappearance of a British fleet, under command of Admiral Sir John BorlaseWarren and Rear-Admiral George Cockburn, in the Chesapeake and Delawarebays. Apparently it had not occurred to the people of the seaboard thatthe war might make life unpleasant for them, and they had undertaken nomeasures of defense. Unmolested, Cockburn cruised up Chesapeake Bay tothe mouth of the Susquehanna in the spring of 1813 and established apleasant camp on an island from which five hundred sailors and marinesharried the country at their pleasure, looting and burning suchprosperous little towns as Havre de Grace and Fredericktown. The men ofMaryland and Virginia proceeded to hide their chattels and to move theirfamilies inland. Panic took hold of these proud and powerfulcommonwealths. Cockburn had no scruples about setting the torch toprivate houses, "to cause the proprietors who had deserted them andformed part of the militia which had fled to the woods to understand andfeel what they were liable to bring upon themselves by building fortsand acting toward us with so much useless rancor. " Though Cockburn wasan officer of the British navy, he was also an unmitigated ruffian inhis behavior toward non-combatants, and his own countrymen could notregard his career with satisfaction. 

Admiral Warren had more justification in attacking Norfolk, which had anavy yard and forts and was therefore frankly belligerent. Unluckily forhim the most important battery was manned by a hundred sailors from the_Constellation_ and fifty marines. Seven hundred British seamen tried toland in barges, but the battery shattered three of the boats with heavyloss of life. Somewhat ruffled, Admiral Warren decided to go elsewhereand made a foray upon the defenseless village of Hampton during which hepermitted his men to indulge in wanton pillage and destruction. Part ofhis fleet then sailed up to the Potomac and created a most distressinghysteria in Washington. The movement was a feint, however, and afterfrightening Baltimore and Annapolis, the ships cruised and blockaded thebay for several months. 

In September of the following year another British division harassed thecoast of Maine, first capturing Eastport and then landing at Belfast, Bangor, and Castine, and extorting large ransoms in money and supplies. New England was wildly alarmed. In a few weeks all of Maine east of thePenobscot had been invaded, conquered, and formally annexed to NewBrunswick, although two counties alone might easily have furnishedtwelve thousand fighting men to resist the small parties of Britishsailors who operated in leisurely security. The people of the coastwisetowns gave up their sheep and bullocks to these rude trespassers, cutthe corn and dug the potatoes for them, handed over all their powder andfirearms, and agreed to finish and deliver schooners that were on thestocks. 

Cape Cod was next to suffer, for two men-of-war levied contributions ofthousands of dollars from Wellfleet, Brewster, and Eastham, and robbedand destroyed other towns. Farther south another fleet entered LongIsland Sound, bombarded Stonington, and laid it in ruins. The pretextfor all this havoc was a raid made by a few American troops who hadcrossed to Long Point on Lake Erie, May 15, 1814, and had burned someCanadian mills and a few dwellings. The expedition was promptly disownedby the American Government as unauthorized, but in retaliation theBritish navy was ordered to lay waste all towns on the Atlantic coastwhich were assailable, sparing only the lives of the unarmed citizens. 

Included in the British plan of campaign for 1814 was a coastal attackimportant enough to divert American efforts from the Canadian frontier. This was why an army under General Ross was loaded into transports atBermuda and escorted by a fleet to Chesapeake Bay. The raids againstsmall coastwise ports, though lucrative, had no military value beyondshaking the morale of the population. The objective of this largeroperation was undecided. Either Baltimore or Washington was tempting. But first the British had to dispose of the annoying gunboat flotilla ofCommodore Joshua Barney, who had made his name mightily respected as aseaman of the Revolution and who had never been known to shake in hisshoes at sight of a dozen British ensigns. He had found shelter for hisarmed scows, for they were no more than this, in the Patuxent River, butas he could not hope to defend them against a combined attack by Britishships and troops he wisely blew them up. This turn of affairs left afine British army all landed and with nothing else to do than promenadethrough a pleasant region with nobody to interfere. The generals andadmirals discussed the matter and decided to saunter on to Washingtoninstead of to Baltimore. In the heat of August the British regimentstramped along the highways, frequently halting to rest in the shade, until they were within ten miles of the capital of the nation. Therethey found the American outposts in a strong position on high ground, but these tarried not, and the invaders sauntered on another mile beforemaking camp for the night. It is difficult to regard the capture ofWashington with the seriousness which that lamentable episode deserves. The city was greatly surprised to learn that the enemy actually intendeda discourtesy so gross, and the Government was pained beyond expression. But beyond this display of emotion nothing was done. The war was now twoyears old but no steps whatever had been taken to defend Washington, although there was no room for doubt that a British naval force couldascend the river whenever it pleased. 

The disagreeable tidings that fifty of the enemy's ships had anchoredoff the Potomac, however, reminded the President and his advisers thatnot a single ditch or rampart had been even planned, that no troops wereat hand, that it was rather late for advice which seemed to be the onlyammunition that was plentiful. Quite harmoniously, the soldier incommand was General Winder who could not lose his head, even in thisdire emergency, because he had none to lose. His record for ineptitudeon the fighting front had, no doubt, recommended him for this place. Heran about Washington, ordering the construction of defenses which therewas no time to build, listening to a million frenzied suggestions, holding all manner of consultations, and imploring the Governors ofPennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to send militia. 

The British army was less than five thousand strong. To oppose themGeneral Winder hastily scrambled together between five and six thousandmen, mostly militia with a sprinkling of regulars and four hundredsailors from Barney's flotilla. During the night before the allegedbattle the camp was a scene of such confusion as may be imagined whilefutile councils of war were held. The troops when reviewed by PresidentMadison realized Jefferson's ideal of a citizen soldiery, unskilled butstrong in their love of home, flying to arms to oppose an invader. General Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott at Lundy's Lane, which was foughtwithin the same month, could have pointed out, in language quiteemphatic, that a large difference existed between the raw material andthe finished product. 

On the 24th of August the British army advanced to Bladensburg, fivemiles from Washington, where a bridge spanned the eastern branch of thePotomac. Here the hilly banks offered the Americans an excellent line ofdefense. The Cabinet had gone to the Washington Navy Yard, by requestof General Winder, to tell him what he ought to do, but this finalconference was cut short by the news that the enemy was in motion. TheAmerican forces were still mobilizing in helter-skelter fashion, andthere was a wild race to the scene of action by militiamen, volunteers, unattached regulars, sailors, generals, citizens at large, Cabinetmembers, and President Madison himself. 

Some Maryland militia hastily joined the Baltimore troops on the ridgebehind the village of Bladensburg, but part of General Winder's ownforces were still on the march and had not yet been assigned positionswhen the advance column of British light infantry were seen to rush downthe slope across the river and charge straight for the bridge. Theybothered not to seek a ford or to turn a flank but made straight for theAmerican center. It was here that Winder's artillery and his steadiestregiments were placed and they offered a stiff resistance, ripping upthe British vanguard with grapeshot and mowing men down right and left. But these hardened British campaigners had seen many worse days thanthis on the bloody fields of Spain, and they pushed forward, closing thegaps in their ranks, until they had crossed the bridge and could find abrief respite under cover of the trees which lined the stream. Advancingagain, they ingeniously discharged flights of rockets and with thesenovel missiles they not only disorganized the militia in front of thembut also stampeded the battery mules. Most of the American army promptlyfollowed the mules and endeavored to set a new record for a foot racefrom Bladensburg to Washington. The Cabinet members and other dignifiedspectators were swept along in the rout. 

Commodore Joshua Barney and his four hundred weather-beaten bluejacketsdeclined to join this speed contest. They were used to rolling decks andhad no aptitude for sprinting, besides which they held the simple-mindednotion that their duty was to fight. Up to this time they had been heldback by orders and now arrived just as the American lines broke in wildconfusion. With them were five guns which they dragged into positionacross the main highway and speedily unlimbered. The British werehastening to overtake the fleeing enemy when they encountered thisawkward obstacle. Three times they charged Barney's battery and werethree times repulsed by sailors and marines who fought them withmuskets, cutlasses, and handspikes, and who served those five guns withan efficiency which would have pleased Isaac Hull or Bainbridge. 

Unwilling to pay the price of direct attack, the British General Rosswisely ordered his infantry to surround Barney's stubborn contingent. The American troops who were presumed to support and protect this navalbattery failed to hold their ground and melted into the mob which wasswirling toward Washington. The sailors, though abandoned, continued tofight until the British were firing into them from the rear and fromboth flanks. Barney fell wounded and some of his gunners were bayonetedwith lighted fuses in their hands. Snarling, undaunted, the sailorsbroke through the cordon and saved themselves, the last to leave abattlefield upon which not one American soldier was visible. They hadused their ammunition to the end and they faced five thousand Britishveterans; wherefore they had done what the navy expected of them. On aday so shameful that no self-respecting American can read of it withoutblushing they had enacted the one redeeming episode. Commodore Barneydescribed this action in a manner blunt and unadorned:

 The engagement continued, the enemy advancing and our own army retreating before them, apparently in much disorder. At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road, in force, in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt. I reserved our fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an eighteen-pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward but all were destroyed. They then crossed into an open field and attempted to flank our right. He was met there by three twelve-pounders, the marines under Captain Miller, and my men acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred posted on a height on my right, from which I expected much support from their fine situation. 

Barney was made a prisoner, although his men stood by him until heordered them to retreat. Loss of blood had made him too weak to becarried from the field. General Ross and Admiral Cockburn saw to itpersonally that he was well cared for and paid him the greatest respectand courtesy. As for the other British officers, they, too, weresportsmen who admired a brave man, even in the enemy's uniform, andBarney reported that they treated him "like a brother. "

The American army had scampered to Washington with a total loss of tenkilled and forty wounded among the five thousand men who had beenassembled at Bladensburg to protect and save the capital. The Britishtried to pursue but the afternoon heat was blistering and the rapid paceset by the American forces proved so fatiguing to the invaders that manyof them were bowled over by sunstroke. To permit their men to runthemselves to death did not appear sensible to the British commanders, and they therefore sat down to gain their breath before the finalpromenade to Washington in the cool of the evening. They found ahelpless, almost deserted city from which the Government had fled andthe army had vanished. 

The march had been orderly, with a proper regard for the peacefulinhabitants, but now Ross and Cockburn carried out their orders toplunder and burn. At the head of their troops they rode to the Capitol, fired a volley through the windows, and set fire to the building. Twohundred men then sought the President's mansion, ransacked the rooms, and left it in flames. Next day they burned the official buildings andseveral dwellings and, content with the mischief thus wrought, abandonedthe forlorn city and returned to camp at Bladensburg. But more vexationfor the Americans was to follow, for a British fleet was working its wayup the Potomac to anchor off Alexandria. Here there was the samefrightened submission, with the people asking for terms and yielding upa hundred thousand dollars' worth of flour, tobacco, naval stores, andshipping. 

The British squadron then returned to Chesapeake Bay and joined the mainfleet which was preparing to attack Baltimore. The army of General Rosswas recalled to the transports and was set ashore at the mouth of thePatapsco River while the ships sailed up to bombard Fort McHenry, wherethe star-spangled banner waved. To defend Baltimore by land there hadbeen assembled more than thirteen thousand troops under command ofGeneral Samuel Smith. The tragical farce of Bladensburg, however, hadtaught him no lesson, and to oppose the five thousand toughened regularsof General Ross he sent out only three thousand green militia most ofwhom had never been under fire. They put up a wonderfully good fight anddeserved praise for it, but wretched leadership left them drawn up in anopen field, with both flanks unprotected, and they were soon drivenback. Next morning--the 13th of September--the British advanced butfound the roads so blocked by fallen trees and entanglements thatprogress was slow and laborious. The intrenchments which crowned thehills of Baltimore appeared so formidable that the British decided toawait action by the fleet and attempt a night assault. 

General Ross was killed during the advance, and this loss causedconfusion of council. The heavy ships were unable to lie withineffective range of the forts because of shoal water and a barrier ofsunken hulks, and Fort McHenry was almost undamaged by the bombardmentof the lighter craft. All through the night a determined fire wasreturned by the American garrison of a thousand men, and, although theBritish fleet suffered little, Vice-Admiral Cochrane concluded that asea attack was a hopeless enterprise. He so notified the army, whichthereupon retreated to the transports, and the fleet sailed downChesapeake Bay, leaving Baltimore free and unscathed. 

Among those who watched Fort McHenry by the glare of artillery firethrough this anxious night was a young lawyer from Washington, FrancisScott Key, who had been detained by the British fleet down the bay whileendeavoring to effect an exchange of prisoners. He had a turn forverse-making. Most of his poems were mediocre, but the sight of theStars and Stripes still fluttering in the early morning breeze inspiredhim to write certain deathless stanzas which, when fitted to the oldtune of _Anacreon in Heaven_, his country accepted as its nationalanthem. In this exalted moment it was vouchsafed him to sound a trumpetcall, clear and far-echoing, as did Rouget de Lisle when, with soulaflame, he wrote the _Marseillaise_ for France. If it was the destiny ofthe War of 1812 to weld the nation as a union, the spirit of theconsummation was expressed for all time in the lines which a hundredmillion of free people sing today:

 O! say can you see by the dawn's early light, What so proudly we hail'd at the twilight's last gleaming Whose broad stripes and bright stars through the perilous fight, O'er the ramparts we watch'd, were so gallantly streaming?

The luckless endeavor to capture Baltimore by sea and land was the lastBritish expedition that alarmed the Atlantic coast. The hostile army andnaval forces withdrew to Jamaica, from which base were planned andundertaken the Louisiana campaign and the battle of New Orleans. 

 * * * * *

The brilliant leadership and operations of Andrew Jackson were sodetached and remote from all other activities that he may be said tohave fought a private war of his own. It had seemed clear to Madisonthat, as a military precaution, the control of West Florida should bewrenched from Spain, whose neutrality was dubious and whose Gulfterritory was the rendezvous of privateers, pirates, and other lawlessgentry, besides offering convenient opportunity for British invasion bysea. As early as the autumn of 1812 troops were collected to seize andhold this region for the duration of the war. The people of theMississippi Valley welcomed the adventure with enthusiasm. It was to beaimed against a European power presumably friendly, but the sheer loveof conquest and old grudges to settle were motives which brushedargument aside. Andrew Jackson was the major general of the Tennesseemilitia, and so many hardy volunteers flocked to follow him that he hadto sift them out, mustering in at Nashville two thousand of whom hesaid: "They are the choicest of our citizens. They go at our call to dothe will of Government. No constitutional scruples trouble them. Nay, they will rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle onthe ramparts of Pensacola, Mobile, and Fort St. Augustine. "

Where the fiery Andrew Jackson led, there was neither delay norhesitation. At once he sent his backwoods infantry down river in boats, while the mounted men rode overland. Four weeks later the informationovertook him at Natchez that Congress had refused to sanction theexpedition. When the Secretary of War curtly told him that his corps was"dismissed from public service, " Andrew Jackson in a furious temperignored the order and marched his men back to Nashville instead ofdisbanding them. He was not long idle, however, for the powerfulconfederacy of the Creek Indians had been aroused by a visit of thegreat Tecumseh, and the drums of the war dance were sounding in sympathywith the tribes of the Canadian frontier. In Georgia and Alabama thepainted prophets and medicine men were spreading tales of Indianvictories over the white men at the river Raisin and Detroit. Britishofficials, moreover, got wind of a threatened uprising in the South andsecretly encouraged it. 

The Alabama settlers took alarm and left their log houses and clearingsto seek shelter in the nearest blockhouses and stockades. One of thesebelonged to Samuel Mims, a half-breed farmer, who had prudentlyfortified his farm on a bend of the Alabama River. A square stockadeenclosed an acre of ground around his house and to this refuge hastenedseveral hundred pioneers and their families, with their negro slaves, and a few officers and soldiers. Here they were surprised and massacredby a thousand naked Indians who called themselves Red Sticks because ofthe wands carried by their fanatical prophets. Two hundred and fiftyscalps were carried away on poles, and when troops arrived they foundnothing but heaps of ashes, mutilated bodies, and buzzards feeding onthe carrion. 

From Fort Mims the Indians overran the country like a frightful scourge, murdering and burning, until a vast region was emptied of its people. First to respond to the pitiful calls for help was Tennessee, and withina few weeks twenty-five hundred infantry and a thousand cavalry weremarching into Alabama, led by Andrew Jackson, who had not yet recoveredfrom a wound received in a brawl with Thomas H. Benton. Among Jackson'ssoldiers were two young men after his own heart, David Crockett andSamuel Houston. The villages of the fighting Creeks, at the HickoryGround, lay beyond a hundred and sixty miles of wilderness, but Jacksonwould not wait for supplies. He plunged ahead, living somehow on thecountry, until his men, beginning to break under the strain ofstarvation and other hardships, declared open mutiny. But Jacksoncursed, threatened, argued them into obedience again and again. Whensuch persuasions failed, he planted cannon to sweep their lines and toldthem they would have to pass over his dead body if they refused to goon. 

The failure of other bodies of troops to support his movements and adiscouraged Governor of Tennessee could not daunt his purpose. He wastold that the campaign had failed and that the struggle was useless. Tothis he replied that he would perish first and that energy and decision, together with the fresh troops promised him, would solve the crisis. Months passed, and the militia whose enlistments had expired went home, while the other broke out in renewed and more serious mutinies. The fewregulars sent to Jackson he used as police to keep the militia in order. The court-martialing and shooting of a private had a beneficial effect. 

With this disgruntled, unreliable, weary force, Jackson came, atlength, to a great war camp of the Creek Indians at a loop of theTallapoosa River called Horseshoe Bend. Here some ten hundred pickedwarriors had built defensive works which were worthy of the talent of atrained engineer. They also had as effective firearms as the whitetroops who assaulted the stronghold. Andrew Jackson bombarded them withtwo light guns, sent his men over the breastworks, and captured thebreastworks in hand-to-hand fighting in which quarter was neither askednor given. No more than a hundred Indians escaped alive, and dead amongthe logs and brushwood were the three famous prophets, gorgeous in warpaint and feathers, who had preached the doctrine of exterminating thepaleface. 

The name of Andrew Jackson spread far and wide among the hostile Indiantribes, and the fiercest chiefs dreaded it like a tempest. Some madesubmission, and others joined in signing a treaty of peace which Jacksondictated to them with terms as harsh as the temper of the man who hadconquered them. 

For his distinguished services Jackson was made a major general of theregular army. He was then ordered to Mobile, where his impetuous angerwas aroused by the news that the British had landed at Pensacola andhad pulled down the Spanish flag. The splendor of this ancient seaporthad passed away, and with it the fleets of galleons whose sailors heardthe mission bells and saw the brass guns gleam from the stout fortresseswhich in those earlier days guarded the rich commerce of the overlandtrade route to St. Augustine. 

Aforetime one of the storied and romantic ports of the Spanish Main, Pensacola now slumbered in unlovely decay and was no more than a villageto which resorted the smugglers of the Caribbean, the pirates of theGulf, and rascally men of all races and colors. The Spanish Governorstill lived in the palace with a few slovenly troops, but he could nomore than protest when a hundred royal marines came ashore from twoBritish sloops-of-war, and the commander, Major Nicholls, issued athunderous proclamation to the oppressed people of the American Statesadjoining, letting them know that he was ready to assist them inliberating their paternal soil from a faithless, imbecile Government. They were not to be alarmed at his approach. They were to rangethemselves under the standard of their forefathers or be neutral. 

Having fired this verbal blunderbuss, Major Nicholls sent a sloop-of-warto enlist the support of Jean and Pierre Lafitte, enterprising brotherswho maintained on Barataria Bay in the Gulf, some forty miles south ofNew Orleans, a most lucrative resort for pirates and slave traders. There they defied the law and the devil, trafficking in spoils filchedfrom honest merchantmen whose crews had walked the plank. Pierre Lafittewas a very proper figure of a pirate himself, true to the besttraditions of his calling. But withal he displayed certain gallantry toatone for his villainies, for he spurned British gold and persuasionsand offered his sword and his men to defend New Orleans as one faithfulto the American cause. 

If it was the purpose of Nicholls to divert Jackson's attention from NewOrleans which was to be the objective of the British expeditionpreparing at Jamaica, he succeeded admirably; but in deciding to attackJackson's forces at Mobile, he committed a grievous error. The worthyNicholls failed to realize that he had caught a Tartar in GeneralJackson--"Old Hickory, " the sinewy backwoodsman who would sooner fightthan eat and who was feared more than the enemy by his own men. As mighthave been expected, the garrison of one hundred and sixty soldiers whoheld Fort Bowyer, which dominated the harbor of Mobile, solemnly sworeamong themselves that they would never surrender until the ramparts weredemolished over their heads and no more than a corporal's guardsurvived. This was Andrew Jackson's way. 

Four British ships, with a total strength of seventy-eight guns, sailedinto Mobile Bay on the 15th of September and formed in line of battle, easily confident of smashing Fort Bowyer with its twenty guns, while thelanding force of marines and Indians took position behind the sand dunesand awaited the signal. The affair lasted no more than an hour. TheAmerican gunnery overwhelmed the British squadron. The _Hermes_sloop-of-war was forced to cut her cable and drifted under a raking fireuntil she ran aground and was blown up. The _Sophie_ withdrew afterlosing many of her seamen, and the two other ships followed her to seaafter delaying to pick up the marines and Indians who merely looked on. Daybreak saw the squadron spreading topsails to return to Pensacola. 

Andrew Jackson was eager to return the compliment but, not having troopsenough at hand to march on Pensacola, he had to wait and fret until hisforce was increased to four thousand men. Then he hurled them at theobjective with an energy that was fairly astounding. On the 3d ofNovember he left Mobile and three days later was demanding the surrenderof Pensacola. The next morning he carried the town by storm, waitedanother day until the British had evacuated and blown up Fort Barrancas, six miles below the city, and then returned to Mobile. Sickness laid himlow but, enfeebled as he was, he made the journey to New Orleans by easystages and took command of such American troops as he could hastilyassemble to ward off the mightiest assault launched by Great Britainduring the War of 1812. It was known, and the warning had been repeatedfrom Washington, that the enemy intended sending a formidable expeditionagainst Louisiana, but when Jackson arrived early in December theLegislature had voted no money, raised no regiments, devised no plan ofdefense, and was unprepared to make any resistance whatever. 

A British fleet of about fifty sail, carrying perhaps a thousand guns, had gathered for the task in hand. The decks were crowded with trainedand toughened troops, the divisions which had scattered the Americans atBladensburg with a volley and a shout, kilted Highlanders, famousregiments which had earned the praise of the Iron Duke in the SpanishPeninsula, and brawny negro detachments recruited in the West Indies. Itwas such an army as would have been considered fit to withstand thefinest troops in Europe. In command was one of England's most brilliantsoldiers, General Sir Edward Pakenham, of whom Wellington had said, "mypartiality for him does not lead me astray when I tell you that he isone of the best we have. " He was the idol of his officers, who agreedthat they had never served under a man whose good opinion they were sodesirous of having, "and to fall in his estimation would have been worsethan death. " In brief, he was a high-minded and knightly leader who hadseen twenty years of active service in the most important campaigns ofEurope. 

It was Pakenham's misfortune to be unacquainted with the highlyirregular and unconventional methods of warfare as practiced in America, where troops preferred to take shelter instead of being shot down whileparading across open ground in solid columns. Improvised breastworkswere to him a novelty, and the lesson of Bunker Hill had been forgotten. These splendidly organized and seasoned battalions of his were confidentof walking through the Americans at New Orleans as they had done atWashington, or as Pakenham himself had smashed the finest Frenchinfantry at Salamanca when Wellington told him, "Ned, d'ye see thosefellows on the hill? Throw your division into column; at them, and drivethem to the devil. "

Stranger than fiction was the contrast between the leaders and betweenthe armies that fought this extraordinary battle of New Orleans when, after the declaration of peace, the United States won its one famous butbelated victory on land. On the northern frontier such a man as AndrewJackson might have changed the whole aspect of the war. He was a greatgeneral with the rare attribute of reading correctly the mind of anopponent and divining his course of action, endowed with an unyieldingtemper and an iron hand, a relentless purpose, and the faculty ofinspiring troops to follow, obey, and trust him in the last extremity. He was one of them, typifying their passions and prejudices, theirfaults and their virtues, sharing their hardships as if he were a commonprivate, never grudging them the credit in success. 

In the light of previous events it is probable that any other Americangeneral would have felt justified in abandoning New Orleans without acontest. In the city itself were only eight hundred regulars newlyrecruited and a thousand volunteers. But Jackson counted on the arrivalof the hard-bitted, Indian-fighting regiments of Tennessee who weretoiling through the swamps with their brigadiers, Coffee and Carroll. The foremost of them reached New Orleans on the very day that theBritish were landing on the river bank. Gaunt, unshorn, untamed werethese rough-and-tumble warriors who feared neither God nor man but wereglad to fight and die with Andrew Jackson. In coonskin caps, buckskinshirts, fringed leggings, they swaggered into New Orleans, defiant ofdiscipline and impatient of restraint, hunting knives in their belts, long rifles upon their shoulders. There they drank with seamen as wildas themselves who served in the ships of Jackson's small naval force orhad offered to lend a hand behind the stockades, and with lean, long-legged Yankees from down East, swarthy outlaws who sailed forPierre Lafitte, Portuguese and Norwegian wanderers who had desertedtheir merchant vessels, and even Spanish adventurers from the WestIndies. 

The British fleet disembarked its army late in December after the mostlaborious difficulties because of the many miles of shallow bayou andtoilsome marsh which delayed the advance. A week was required to carryseven thousand men in small boats from the ships to the Isle aux Poixon Lake Borgne chosen as a landing base. Thence a brigade passed inboats up the bayou and on the 23d of December disembarked at a pointsome three miles from the Mississippi and then by land and canal pushedon to the river's edge. Here they were attacked at night by Jackson withabout two thousand troops, while a war schooner shelled the British leftfrom the river. It was a weird fight. Squads of Grenadiers, Highlanders, Creoles, and Tennessee backwoodsmen blindly fought each other in the fogwith knives, fists, bayonets, and musket butts. Jackson then fell backwhile the British brigade waited for more troops and artillery. 

On Christmas Day Pakenham took command of the forces at the front nowaugmented to about six thousand, but hesitated to attack. And well hemight hesitate, in spite of his superior numbers, for Jackson hademployed his time well and now lay entrenched behind a parapet, protected by a canal or ditch ten feet wide. With infinite exertion moreguns were dragged and floated to the front until eight heavy batterieswere in position. On the morning of the 1st of January the Britishgunners opened fire and felt serenely certain of destroying the rudedefenses of cotton bales and cypress logs. To their amazement theAmerican artillery was served with far greater precision and effect bythe sailors and regulars who had been trained under Jackson's direction. By noon most of the British guns had been silenced or dismounted and themen killed or driven away. "Never was any failure more remarkable orunlooked for than this, " said one of the British artillery officers. General Pakenham, in dismay, held a council of war. It is stated thathis own judgment was swayed by the autocratic Vice-Admiral Cochrane whotauntingly remarked that "if the army could not take those mud-banks, defended by ragged militia, he would undertake to do it with twothousand sailors armed only with cutlases and pistols. "

Made cautious by this overwhelming artillery reverse, the British armyremained a week in camp, a respite of which every hour was priceless toAndrew Jackson, for his mud-stained, haggard men were toiling with pickand shovel to complete the ditches and log barricades. They could hearthe British drums and bugles echo in the gloomy cypress woods while thecannon grumbled incessantly. The red-coated sentries were stalked andthe pickets were ambushed by the Indian fighters who spread alarm anduneasiness. Meanwhile Pakenham was making ready with every resourceknown to picked troops, who had charged unshaken through the slaughterof Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastian, and who were about tojustify once more the tribute to the British soldier: "Give him a plain, unconditional order--go and do _that_--and he will do it with a cool, self-forgetting pertinacity that can scarcely be too much admired. "

It was Pakenham's plan to hurl a flank attack against the right bank ofthe Mississippi while he directed the grand assault on the east side ofthe river where Jackson's strength was massed. To protect the flank, Commodore Patterson of the American naval force had built a waterbattery of nine guns and was supported by eight hundred militia. Earlyin the morning of the 8th of January twelve hundred men in boats, underthe British Colonel Thornton, set out to take this west bank as theopening maneuver of the battle. Their errand was delayed, although laterin the day they succeeded in defeating the militia and capturing thenaval guns. This minor victory, however, was too late to save Pakenham'sarmy which had been cut to pieces in the frontal assault. 

Jackson had arranged his main body of troops along the inner edge ofthe small canal extending from a levee to a tangled swamp. The legendarycotton bales had been blown up or set on fire during the artillerybombardment and protection was furnished only by a raw, unfinishedparapet of earth and a double row of log breastworks with red claytamped between them. It was a motley army that Jackson led. Next to thelevee were posted a small regiment of regular infantry, a company of NewOrleans Rifles, a squad of dragoons who were handling a howitzer, and abattalion of Creoles in bright uniforms. The line was extended by thefreebooters of Pierre Lafitte, their heads bound with crimson kerchiefs, a group of American bluejackets, a battalion of blacks from San Domingo, a few grizzled old French soldiers serving a brass gun, long rows oftanned, saturnine Tennesseans, more regulars with a culverin, and rankupon rank of homespun hunting shirts and long rifles, John Adair and hissavage Kentuckians, and, knee-deep in the swamp, the frontiersmen whofollowed General Coffee to death or glory. 

A spirit of reckless elation pervaded this bizarre and terrible littlearmy, although it was well aware that during two and a half years almostevery other American force had been defeated by an enemy far lessformidable. The anxious faces were those of the men of Louisiana whofought for hearth and home, with their backs to the wall. Many a brutaltale had they heard of these war-hardened British veterans whoseexcesses in Portugal were notorious and who had laid waste the harmlesshamlets of Maryland. All night Andrew Jackson's defenders stood on the_qui vive_ until the morning mist of the 8th of January was dispelledand the sunlight flashed on the solid ranks of British bayonets not morethan four hundred yards away. 

At the signal rocket the enemy swept forward toward the canal, withcompanies of British sappers bearing scaling ladders and fascines ofsugar cane. They moved with stolid unconcern, but the American cannonburst forth and slew them until the ditch ran red with blood. Withcheers the invincible British infantry tossed aside its heavy knapsacks, scrambled over the ditch, and broke into a run to reach the earthworksalong which flamed the sparse line of American rifles. Against suchmarksmen as these there was to be no work with the bayonet, for theassaulting column literally fell as falls the grass under the keenscythe. The survivors retired, however, only to join a fresh attackwhich was rallied and led by Pakenham himself. 

He died with his men, but once more British pluck attempted theimpossible, and the Highland brigade was chosen to lead this forlornhope. That night the pipers wailed _Lochaber no more_ for the mangleddead of the MacGregors, the MacLeans, and the MacDonalds who lay inwindrows with their faces to the foe. This was no Bladensburg holiday, and the despised Americans were paying off many an old score. Twothousand of the flower of Britain's armies were killed or wounded in thefew minutes during which the two assaults were so rashly attempted inparade formation. Coolly, as though at a prize turkey shoot on a taverngreen, the American riflemen fired into these masses of doomed men, andevery bullet found its billet. 

On the right of the line a gallant British onslaught led by ColonelRennie swept over a redoubt and the American defenders died to a man. But the British wave was halted and rolled back by a tempest of bulletsfrom the line beyond, and the broken remnant joined the general retreatwhich was sounded by the British trumpeters. An armistice was grantednext day and in shallow trenches the dead were buried, row on row, whilethe muffled drums rolled in honor of three generals, seven colonels, and seventy-five other officers who had died with their men. Behind thelog walls and earthworks loafed the unkempt, hilarious heroes of whomonly seventy-one had been killed or hurt, and no more than thirteen ofthese in the grand assault which Pakenham had led. "Old Hickory" hadtold them that they could lick their weight in wildcats, and they wereready to agree with him. 

Magnificent but useless, after all, excepting as a proud heritage forlater generations and a vindication of American valor against odds, wasthis battle of New Orleans which was fought while the Salem ship, _Astrea_, Captain John Derby, was driving home to the westward with thenews that a treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent. With a sense ofmutual relief the United States and England had concluded a war in whichneither nation had definitely achieved its aims. The treaty failed tomention such vital issues as the impressment of seamen and the injury tocommerce by means of paper blockades, while on the other hand Englandrelinquished its conquest of the Maine coast and its claim to militarydomination of the Great Lakes. English statesmen were heartily tired ofa war in which they could see neither profit nor glory, and even theDuke of Wellington had announced it as his opinion "that no militaryadvantage can be expected if the war goes on, and I would have greatreluctance in undertaking the command unless we made a serious effortfirst to obtain peace without insisting upon keeping any part of ourconquests. " The reverses of first-class British armies at Plattsburg, Baltimore, and New Orleans had been a bitter blow to English pride. Moreover, British commerce on the seas had been largely destroyed by ahost of Yankee privateers, and the common people in England weresuffering from scarcity of food and raw materials and from high pricesto a degree comparable with the distress inflicted by the Germansubmarine campaign a century later. And although the terms of peace wereunsatisfactory to many Americans, it was implied and understood that theflag and the nation had won a respect and recognition which shouldprevent a recurrence of such wrongs as had caused the War of 1812. Oneof the Peace Commissioners, Albert Gallatin, a man of large experience, unquestioned patriotism, and lucid intelligence, set it down as hisdeliberate verdict:

 The war has been productive of evil and of good, but I think the good preponderates. Independent of the loss of lives, and of the property of individuals, the war has laid the foundation of permanent taxes and military establishments which the Republicans had deemed unfavorable to the happiness and free institutions of our country. But under our former system we were becoming too selfish, too much attached exclusively to the acquisition of wealth, above all, too much confined in our political feelings to local and state objects. The war has renewed and reinstated the national feeling and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessening. The people have now more general objects of attachment, with which their pride and political opinions are connected. They are more Americans; they feel and act more as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby better secured. 

After a hundred years, during which this peace was unbroken, a commanderof the American navy, speaking at a banquet in the ancient Guildhall ofLondon, was bold enough to predict: "If the time ever comes when theBritish Empire is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is myopinion that you may count upon every man, every dollar, and every dropof blood of your kindred across the sea. "

The prediction came true in 1917, and traditional enmities wereextinguished in the crusade against a mutual and detestable foe. Thecandid naval officer became Vice-Admiral William S. Sims, commandingall the American ships and sailors in European waters, where the Starsand Stripes and the British ensign flew side by side, and the squadronstoiled and dared together in the finest spirit of admiration andrespect. Out from Queenstown sailed an American destroyer flotillaoperated by a stern, inflexible British admiral who was never known towaste a compliment. At the end of the first year's service he said tothe officers of these hard-driven vessels:

 I wish to express my deep gratitude to the United States officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and unfailing good nature which they have all so consistently shown and which qualities have so materially assisted in the war by enabling ships of the Allied Powers to cross the ocean in comparative freedom. 

 _To command you is an honor, to work with you is a pleasure, to know you is to know the finest traits of the Anglo-Saxon race. _

The United States waged a just war in 1812 and vindicated the principlesfor which she fought, but as long as the poppies blow in Flanders fieldsit is the clear duty, and it should be the abiding pleasure, of herpeople to remember, not those far-off days as foemen, but these latterdays as comrades in arms. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Of the scores of books that have been written about the War of 1812, many deal with particular phases, events, or personalities, and most ofthem are biased by partisan feeling. This has been unfortunately true ofthe textbooks written for American schools, which, by ignoring defeatsand blunders, have missed the opportunity to teach the lessons ofexperience. By all odds the best, the fairest, and the most completenarrative of the war as written by an American historian is themonumental work of Henry Adams, _History of the United States ofAmerica_, 9 vols. (1889-91). The result of years of scholarly research, it is also most excellent reading. 

Captain Mahan's _Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812_, 2 vols. (1905), is, of course, the final word concerning the naval events, buthe also describes with keen analysis the progress of the operations onland and fills in the political background of cause and effect. TheodoreRoosevelt's _The Naval War of 1812_ (1882) is spirited and accurate butmakes no pretensions to a general survey. Akin to such a briny book asthis but more restricted in scope is _The Frigate Constitution_ (1900)by Ira N. Hollis, or Rodney Macdonough's _Life of Commodore ThomasMacdonough_ (1909). Edgar Stanton Maclay in _The History of the Navy_, 3vols. (1902), has written a most satisfactory account, which containssome capital chapters describing the immortal actions of the Yankeefrigates. 

Benson J. Lossing's _The Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812_ (1868)has enjoyed wide popularity because of his gossipy, entertainingquality. The author gathered much of his material at first hand and hadthe knack of telling a story; but he is not very trustworthy. 

As a solemn warning, the disasters of the American armies have beenemployed by several military experts. The ablest of these was Bvt. MajorGeneral Emory Upton, whose invaluable treatise, _The Military Policy ofthe United States_ (1904), was pigeonholed in manuscript by the WarDepartment and allowed to gather dust for many years. He discusses indetail the misfortunes of 1812 as conclusive proof that the nationaldefense cannot be entrusted to raw militia and untrained officers. Of asimilar trend but much more recent are Frederic L. Huidekoper's _TheMilitary Unpreparedness of the United States_ (1915) and Major GeneralLeonard Wood's _Our Military History; Its Facts and Fallacies_ (1916). 

Of the British historians, William James undertook the most diligentaccount of them all, calling it _A Full and Correct Account of theMilitary Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and theUnited States of America_, 2 vols. (1818). It is irritating reading foran American because of an enmity so bitter that facts are willfullydistorted and glaring inaccuracies are accepted as truth. As a navalhistorian James undertook to explain away the American victories insingle-ship actions, a difficult task in which he acquitted himself withpoor grace. Theodore Roosevelt is at his best when he chastises Jamesfor his venomous hatred of all things American. 

To the English mind the War of 1812 was only an episode in the mightyand prolonged struggle against Napoleon, and therefore it finds butcursory treatment in the standard English histories. To Canada, however, the conflict was intimate and vital, and the narratives written fromthis point of view are sounder and of more moment than those producedacross the water. _The Canadian War of 1812_ (1906), published almost acentury after the event, is the work of an Englishman, Sir Charles P. Lucas, whose lifelong service in the Colonial Office and whose thoroughacquaintance with Canadian history have both been turned to the bestaccount. Among the Canadian authors in this field are Colonel Ernest A. Cruikshank and James Hannay. To Colonel Cruikshank falls the greatercredit as a pioneer with his _Documentary History of the Campaign uponthe Niagara Frontier_, 8 vols. (1896-). Hannay's _How Canada Was Heldfor the Empire; The Story of the War of 1812_ (1905) displays carefulstudy but is marred by the controversial and one-sided attitude whichthis war inspired on both sides of the border. 

Colonel William Wood has avoided this flaw in his _War with the UnitedStates_ (1915) which was published as a volume of the _Chronicles ofCanada_ series. As a compact and scholarly survey, this little book isrecommended to Americans who comprehend that there are two sides toevery question. The Canadians fought stubbornly and successfully todefend their country against invasion in a war whose slogan "Free Tradeand Sailors' Rights" was no direct concern of theirs. 

INDEX

Adair, John, 215Adams, Henry, quoted, 20, 117_Adams_ (ship), 141Alabama, Indians aroused in, 201_Alabama_ raids compared with those of _Essex_, 154Albany, militia at Sackett's Harbor from, 77Alexandria, British fleet at, 197Allen, Captain W. H. , 142, 143Amherstburg, Canadian post, 11; Hull plans assault, 11, 14, 16; Brock at, 17; defeat of British, 21, 42; Harrison against, 24, 25; Procter commands, 26; British advance from, 27Anderson, James, of the _Essex_, 162Annapolis, British fleet at, 187_Argus_ (brig), 94; and the _Pelican_, 142-44_Ariel_ (brig), 57, 62Armstrong, John, Secretary of War, 37, 175; plans offensive, 72, 80, 84; and Wilkinson, 81-82; orders winter quarters, 82Army, in 1812, 5-8; state control, 6-8; incapable officers, 10-11; at Niagara, 14-15; Hull's forces, 15; mutiny, 17; failure to supply, 24; forces under Winchester, 25; at New Orleans, 210-11_Astrea_ (ship), 218_Avon_ (British brig), fight with _Wasp_, 146-47Bainbridge, Captain William, 90, 95, 117, 121, 127, 136-137, 138Baltimore, British fleet at, 187; attack on, 197-99, 219Bangor (Me. ), British land at, 187Barclay, Captain R. H. , British officer, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 61Barney, Commodore Joshua, 92, 189, 193, 194; account of battle of Bladensburg, 195Barrancas, Fort, 208Barron, Commodore James, 91Belfast (Me. ), British at, 187_Belvidera_ (British frigate), 96; fight with _President_, 94-95Benton, T. H. , and Jackson, 202_Betsy_ (brig), 104Biddle, Lieutenant James, on the _Wasp_, 111-12Biddle, Captain Nicholas, 92Black Rock, navy yard at, 39, 48; Elliott at, 49; invasion of Canada from, 70; Indians against, 88Bladensburg, battle, 191-96Blakely, Captain Johnston, 137, 144, 145, 146, 147Blockade, 124-25, 148, 185Blyth, Captain Samuel, 140Boerstler, Colonel, 76_Bonne Citoyenne_ (British sloop-of-war), 126Bowyer, Fort, 206, 207_Boxer_, duel with _Enterprise_, 189-40Boyd, General J. P. , 74, 76, 83Brewster (Mass. ), war levy, 188Brock, Major General Isaac, British commander, 12-13, 14; against Hull, 15, 17; Hull surrenders Detroit to, 18-19; on Elliott's victory, 40; on Niagara River, 65; killed, 66Broke, Captain P. V. , of the _Shannon_, 96, 128-29, 130, 134, 138-39Brown, General Jacob, at Sackett's Harbor, 77, 78, 79; at Chrystler's Farm, 82-83; Niagara campaign, 167, 168, 169, 170; at Lundy's Lane, 171-72, 191Budd, George, second lieutenant on _Chesapeake_, 134Buffalo, Elliott at, 38; difficulty of taking supplies to, 47; American regulars sent to, 65; base of operations, 70, 72; Indians against, 88Burrows, Captain William, of the _Enterprise_, 139

Cabinet advises General Winder, 192

_Caledonia_ (British brig), 38-39; Elliott captures, 39; in American squadron, 49-50, 56Canada, "On to Canada!" slogan of frontiersmen, 4; vulnerable point in War of 1812, 9, 10; population and extent, 10; plans for invasion of, 13-14; Hull abandons invasion of, 16; Niagara campaign, 64 _et seq. _, 167-77Canning, George, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 92Carden, Captain J. S. , of the _Macedonian_, 114, 115, 116Cass, Colonel Lewis, 18Castine, British land at, 187Champlain, Lake, Dearborn on, 71; Hampton in command, 80, 81; Macdonough's victory, 166 _et seq. _Chandler, General John, 74, 75Chateauguay River, Hampton on, 84, 85Chauncey, Captain Isaac, leads sailors from New York to Buffalo, 39; in command of naval forces on Lakes Erie and Ontario, 47, 48; extreme caution, 49, 55, 56, 170-71; on Lake Ontario, 49, 50, 63; and Perry, 50-51, 55, 56; and Niagara campaign, 72, 73, 74, 77, 82, 170-71_Cherub_ (British sloop-of-war), 157, 159, 160, 161_Chesapeake_ (frigate), and _Leopard_, 91; Lawrence on, 96, 127-28; defeated by _Shannon_, 128-39; Allen on, 142Chesapeake Bay, blockade of 185; Cockburn in, 186; British army comes to, 189; British fleet in, 197Chippawa, Brock's forces at 65, 67; battle, 168-70Chrystler's Farm, battle, 83_Chub_ (British schooner), 180Clay, Brigadier General Green, 31Clay, Henry, on conquest of Canada, 9Cleveland, Harrison's headquarters at, 33Cochrane, Vice Admiral Alexander, 198, 218Cockburn, Rear Admiral George, 186, 195, 196Cod, Cape, British raids on, 188Coffee, General John, 211, 215_Confiance_ (British frigate), 179, 180Congress, declares war on Great Britain (1812), 4; and the navy, 90; votes prize money for _Constitution_, 107; prize money for _Wasp_, 113; and maritime trouble with France, 152; refuses to sanction Jackson's expedition, 201_Congress_ (frigate), 94, 141Connecticut, attitude toward War of 1812, 7_Constellation_ (frigate), 92, 141, 187_Constitution_ (frigate), 2, 125; Hull and, 95, 116, 128; now in Boston Navy Yard, 95-96; encounter with British squadron, 96-99; and _Guerrière_, 100-07, 108, 122-23; "Old Ironsides, " 101; under Bainbridge, 116-17; health conditions on, 117-18; encounter with _Java_, 118-21, 123-24, 154; Lawrence and, 126; influence, 139; in 1813, 141; gains open sea in 1814, 147Creek Indians, 201Creighton, Captain J. O. , 137Crockett, David, 202Croghan, Major George, at Fort Stephenson, 34-35, 36, 38, 46Crowninshield, Captain George, 136_Cyane_ (British frigate), 147

Dacres, Captain John, of the _Guerrière_, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104Dayton (O. ), Hull takes command at, 12Dearborn, Major General Henry, plans invasion of Canada, 13, 73; commander-in-chief of American forces, 14; incompetency, 14; and Niagara campaign, 64, 65, 74-75, 76; campaign against Montreal, 71-72; wishes to retire, 72, 75; Armstrong and, 72; Brown reports battle of Sackett's Harbor to, 78-79; retired, 80; age, 117Dearborn, Fort (Chicago), burned, 19; massacre, 20Decatur, Captain Stephen, 138; and the _Philadelphia_ (1804), 92; squadron commander, 94; on the _United States_, 114, 115; on the _President_, 148, 149;Defiance, Fort, 24Delaware Bay, blockade of, 185Derby, Captain John, 218Detroit, 64; first campaign from, 11, 14; Hull at, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; mutiny at, 15; surrender of, 17-18, 19, 20, 22, 106-07; in British hands, 31; Procter abandons, 42; Harrison returns to, 45_Detroit_ (brig), taken from Hull, 38; Elliott captures, 39-40_Detroit_ (British ship), 54, 56, 57, 60Downes, Lieutenant John, 155, 156Downie, Captain George, British officer, 178, 183Drummond, General Sir George Gordon, 172

_Eagle_ (brig), 180Eastham (Mass. ), war levy, 188Eastport (Me. ), captured, 187Elliott, Lieutenant J. D. , builds fleet on Lake Erie, 38, 48; captures _Caledonia_ and _Detroit_, 39-40; with Perry, 54, 58_Endymion_ (British frigate), 150_Enterprise_ (brig), encounter with _Boxer_, 139-40_Epervier_ (British brig), fight with _Peacock_, 144Erie, Barclay off, 52; _see also_ Presqu' IsleErie, Fort, Elliott captures ships near, 39; Brock at, 65; Americans capture, 168; Scott and Brown occupy, 173Erie, Lake, Hull's schooner captured on, 12; Perry on, 21, 40 _et seq. _; Harrison on shores of, 24, 30; Chauncey in command on, 47, 48_Essex_ (frigate), 141, 147; last cruise, 151 _et seq. _; building of, 153; capture by Hillyar, 161-65_Essex, Junior_ (cruiser), 156, 159Eustis, William, Secretary of War, 24

Faneuil Hall, banquet for Hull at, 106Farragut, Admiral D. G. , 181; motto, 46; cited, _59_; midshipman on _Essex_, 161-62_Finch_ (British schooner), 180Florida, West, Jackson and, 200France, American feeling toward, 3; as maritime enemy, 151-52, 154Fredericktown burned, 186"Free Trade and Sailors' Rights, " 3, 91, 137Frenchtown, _see_ Raisin River_Frolic_ (British brig), encounter with _Wasp_, 108-13

Galapagos Islands, _Essex_ at, 155Gallatin, Albert, quoted, 219-220George, Fort, British fort, 67; evacuated by British, 74-75; retaken, 87Georgia, Indians aroused in, 201_Georgiana_ (British whaling ship), _Essex_ captures, 155; renamed _Essex, Junior_, 156Great Britain, and free sea, 2-3; Indian wars, 4; war declared on (1812), 4; and Indians, 10; and Napoleon, 124; blockading measures, 124-25Great Lakes, British on, 38_Guerrière_ (British frigate), 2, 96; encounter with _Constitution_, 100-07, 108, 122-23; celebration of capture, 116

Hamilton, Alexander, Izard aide to, 175Hampton, General Wade, in campaign against Montreal, 80, 81, 83-84, 86; and Wilkinson, 80-81; cause of failure, 86; age, 117Hampton, British foray on village of, 187Haraden, Captain Jonathan, 153Harrison, General W. H. , campaign, 22 _et seq. _; report to Secretary of War, 29-30; Croghan and, 35; Armstrong on, 37-38; and Perry's victory, 41, 63; resumes campaign, 42; becomes President of United States, 45Havre de Grace burned, 186Hazen, Benjamin, of the _Essex, _ 162_Henry_ (brig), 186, 187_Hermes_ (British sloop-of-war), 207Hillyar, Captain James, British officer, 157, 158, 159-60, 161, 164-65_Hornet_ (sloop-of-war), 48, 94; Lawrence on, 126; and _Peacock_, 127; in South American waters, 154Horseshoe Bend, battle, 204Houston, Samuel, 202Hull, Captain Isaac, of the _Constitution_, 95, 128, 138; and British squadron, 96, 97, 98, 99; and _Guerrière_, 101, 102, 103, 106; and Dacres, 104; victory celebrated, 106, 107, 108; gives up command of _Constitution_, 116-17; at Lawrence's funeral, 136Hull, General William, 34, 68, 71, 88, 98; Detroit campaign, 11 _et seq. _; troops, 15, 17; surrender, 19; court-martial, 19-20; Harrison and, 22; age, 117

Impressment of seamen, 90Indian wars, enmity toward Great Britain because of, 4Indians, British and, 10, 55; against Americans, 16, 67, 76; in Canadian army, 17; Procter and, 26; abandon British cause, 44; ravage frontier, 88; massacre at Fort Mims, 202Izard, General George, 175, 176

Jackson, Andrew, at New Orleans, 17-18, 208 _et seq. _; and Florida expedition, 200-03; at Horseshoe Bend, 204; at Pensacola, 207-08_Jacob Jones_ (destroyer), 109_Java_ (British frigate), encounter with _Constitution_, 118-20, 154Jefferson, Thomas, and gunboats, 8-9; on conquest of Canada, 9-10Johnson, Allen, _Jefferson and his Colleagues_, cited, 2Johnson, Colonel R. M. , 41, 43, 44, 46;Jones, Captain, Jacob, of the _Wasp_, 109, 110, 111, 113;Jones, John Paul, cited, 59; American naval officers serve with, 92; on the _Ranger_, 141

Kentucky, defends western border, 22; militia, 24, 31Key, F. S. , _Star-Spangled Banner_, 198-99Kingston, plan to capture, 72, 73; Prevost embarks at, 77

_Lady Prevost_ (British schooner), 56Lafitte, Jean, 206Lafitte, Pierre, 206, 211, 215Lambert, Captain Henry, of the _Java_, 118Lang, Jack, sailor on the _Wasp_, 111_La Vengeance_ (French ship) and _Constellation_, 93Lawrence, Captain James, of the _Chesapeake_, 96, 127-28, 129-30; on the _Hornet_, 126, 127; fights _Shannon_, 130-136; death, 131, 133, 135; account of funeral, 136-37_Lawrence_ (brig), 49, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58_Leopard_ and _Chesapeake_, 91, 142_Levant_ (British sloop-of-war), fight with _Constitution_, 147Lewis, General Morgan, 75-76, 83_Linnet_ (British brig), 180_L'Insurgente_ (French ship) and _Constellation_, 92Long Island Sound, British fleet in, 188Ludlow, Lieutenant A. C, of the _Chesapeake_, 133, 136, 137Lundy's Lane, battle, 2, 171-173

McArthur, Colonel, 18Macdonough, Commodore Thomas, on Lake Champlain, 166, 167, 171, 178, 179-84_Macedonian_ (British frigate), Decatur captures, 114-16, 142; as American frigate, 141McHenry, Fort, 197, 198Mackinac, fall of, 19, 20Mackinaw, _see_ MackinacM'Knight, Lieutenant, S. D. , of the _Essex_, 163Macomb, Brigadier General Alexander, 177Madison, James, and Hull, 12, 19; reviews troops, 191; at battle of Bladensburg, 192; policy as to West Florida, 200Mahan, Captain A. T. , quoted, 128Maine, British raids, 187Malden (Amherstburg), 43; _see also_ AmherstburgMassachusetts, attitude toward War of 1812, 7, 91Maumee Rapids, Harrison at, 30Maumee River, Hull at, 12Meigs, Fort, massacre at, 20, 32; built, 30; Procter besieges, 31-32, 36; Harrison again at, 33Merchant marine, 93Miller, Captain, at battle of Bladensburg, 195Miller, Colonel John, 17, 33Mims, Samuel, 202Mims, Fort, massacre, 202Mississippi Valley and invasion of Florida, 200Mobile, Jackson at, 204, 206-207, 208Montreal, plan of attack, 14; campaign against, 71, 82-87Moraviantown, Procter goes to, 42Morris, Lieutenant Charles, on the _Constitution_, 101, 107Mulcaster, Captain W. H. , 83Murray, Colonel, British officer, 87

Napoleon, Great Britain and, 2; offenses against American commerce, 8Navy, 8-9, 38; on Lake Erie, 46 _et seq. _; on the sea, 89 _et seq. _; augmented by private subscriptions, 152; victory on Lake Champlain, 166 _et seq. _Nelson, Horatio, Viscount, quoted, 141New England, attitude toward War of 1812, 7-8; British raids in, 187-88New Orleans, battle of, 166, 175, 208-18, 219New York, apprehension in, 148Niagara, campaign planned, 13-14; American forces at, 14-15; campaign, 64 _et seq. _; renewal of struggle for region of (1814), 167-77_Niagara_ (brig), 49, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59Niagara, Fort, 87Nicholls, Major Edward, 205Norfolk, Warren attacks, 187Northwest Territory regained for United States, 44, 63

Ohio, Hull sends troops to, 16; defends western border, 22; militia, 31"Old Ironsides, " 101, see also _Constitution_Ontario, Lake, Chauncey in command on, 47, 48, 49, 50; battle at Sackett's Harbor, 77-79Orne, Captain W. B. , 104

Paine, R. D. , _The Old Merchant Marine_, cited, 93 (note)Pakenham, General Sir Edward, at New Orleans, 209-210, 212, 213, 214, 216-17Patterson, Commodore D. T. , at New Orleans, 214_Peacock_ (British brig) and _Hornet_, 127_Peacock_ (sloop-of-war), 144_Pelican_ (British brig), 142Pennsylvania, brigade in Western campaign from, 23; militia at Erie, 52-53Pensacola, British pull down Spanish flag at, 204-05; Jackson at, 207-08Perry, O. H. , 180-81; victory on Lake Erie, 21, 46 _et seq. _, 166; and Harrison, 41, 63; famous message, 41, 62_Philadelphia_ (frigate), 92_Phoebe_ (British frigate) and _Essex_, 157-65_Pilot_, The, on destruction of the _Java_, 123-24Plattsburg, Dearborn at, 71; troops moved from, 74, 80; Izard at, 175, 176; Prevost at, 176, 177, 178Plattsburg Bay, battle of, 177-184, 219_Poictiers_ (British ship), 113_Pomone_ (British frigate), 150Porter, Captain David, of the _Essex_, 151; raids on British whaling fleet, 154-56; _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ seek, 157-64; account of surrender of _Essex_, 163-64_President_ (frigate), 141, 147, 148, 149; encounters _Belvidera_, 94-95; Rodgers in command of, 101; captured, 150Presqu' Isle (Erie), navy yard at, 48; _see also_ EriePrevost, Sir George, Governor General of Canada, 54; crosses Lake Ontario, 77; defends Montreal, 84-85; goes to Plattsburg, 176, 177; quoted, 176-77, 178-79Privateers, 93Procter, Colonel Henry, battle of the Raisin, 26; character, 26; and Harrison, 30, 34, 37-38; at Fort Meigs, 31-32, 33; at Fort Stephenson, 36; blames Indians for defeat, 36-37; Brock reports to, 40-41; and Tecumseh, 42; official disgrace, 45Put-in Bay, Perry at, 54

_Queen Charlotte_ (British ship), 56, 58, 60Queenston, attack on, 65-67; British at, 168, 170Quincy, Josiah, 91

Raisin River, massacre at, 20, 26-30, 36; Winchester at Frenchtown, 25_Ranger_ (frigate), 141_Rattlesnake_ (brig), 137_Reindeer_ (British brig), 145Rennie, Colonel, British officer, 217Riall, General Phineas, 168, 170Ripley, General E. W. , 173Ripley, John, seaman on _Essex_, 162Rodgers, Commodore John, 94, 95, 101, 113-14Ross, General Robert, 188, 194; and Barney, 195; in Washington, 196; against Baltimore, 197; killed, 198Rush, Richard, quoted, 132

Sackett's Harbor, Lake Ontario, invasion of Canada planned from, 13-14; Chauncey, at, 47, 48; in Niagara campaign, 72, 74, 76-77; battle at, 77-79; campaign against Montreal, 80, 81; Brown at, 167; fleet at, 170St. Lawrence River, plan to gain control of, 72; Wilkinson's army descends, 80; Wilkinson abandons voyage down, 83-84Salaberry, Colonel de, 85, 86Salem contributes _Essex_ to navy, 152Salem Marine Society, 136_Saratoga_ (flagship), 180_Scorpion_ (brig), 57, 62Scott, Michael, _Tom Cringle's Log_, quoted, 145Scott, Winfield, quoted, 5; at Queenston, 66; at Chippawa, 68, 168-69; taken prisoner, 68; in control of army, 73; at Fort George, 74; on Wilkinson, 80; trains Brown's troops, 167; at Lundy's Lane, 171, 172, 191; wounded, 173Seneca, Harrison at, 37, 38, 41_Shannon_ (British frigate), encounter with _Constitution_, 96-99; defeats _Chesapeake_, 128-39Shipbuilding on Lake Erie, 50Sims, Vice-Admiral W. S. , 220-21Smith, General Samuel, 197Smyth, Brigadier General Alexander, 65, 66, 68-69, 70-71_Sophie_ (British ship), 207Spain and West Florida, 200Squaw Island, Elliott at, 38Stephenson, Fort, Harrison at, 34; Croghan at, 36, 46; Procter's defeat, 36, 37-38Stewart, Captain Charles, 136, 147Stonington, British bombard, 188Stony Creek, battle, 75

Tecumseh, 16, 18, 31, 32, 34, 42; death, 44; and Creek Indians, 201_Tenedos_ (British frigate), 150Thames River, Procter's defeat at, 43-44Thornton, Colonel Sir William, British officer, 214_Ticonderoga_ (schooner), 180_Times_, London, account of fight of _Guerrière_, 122-23Tippecanoe campaign, 20Toronto, _see_ YorkTransportation, effect of blockade on, 148

_United States_ (frigate), 94, 139; captures _Macedonian_, 114-116, 142; and blockade, 141Upper Sandusky, Harrison's headquarters, 33, 34

Valparaiso, _Essex_ at, 155, 156, 157; _Essex_ and _Phoebe_ at, 158 _et seq. _Van Rensselaer, Major General Stephen, 64, 65, 66, 68, 71Vincent, General John, British officer, 74, 75Virginia, brigades from, 23

War of 1812, a victory, 1; causes, 2-4; army, 5-8; "Mr. Madison's War, " 8; navy, 8-9, 89 _et seq. _; campaign in West, 11 _et seq. _; Perry and Lake Erie, 46 _et seq. _; the Northern Front, 64 _et seq. _; victory on Lake Champlain, 166 _et seq. _; peace with honor, 185 _et seq. _; bibliography, 223-25Warren, Admiral Sir J. B. , 138, 185, 187Warrington, Captain Lewis, of the _Peacock_, 144Washington, George, on need of regular army, 6-7; and Hull, 11Washington, Capitol burned, 73, 196; naval ball to celebrate capture of _Guerrière_, 116; British fleet causes consternation in, 187; British decide to attack, 189; capture of, 166, 190-96_Wasp_ (sloop-of-war), 48; encounter with _Frolic_, 108-13; last cruise, 144-47; disappearance, 147Wellfleet (Mass. ), war levy, 188Whinyates, Captain Thomas, of the _Frolic_, 109, 112Wilkinson, James, succeeds Dearborn, 80; character, 80; Hampton and, 81, 84; and Armstrong, 81; campaign, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87; age, 117Winchester, General James, as a leader, 24-25; at Raisin River, 25, 26-27, 28Winder, General W. H. , in Niagara campaign, 74, 75; at Washington, 190-91, 192Wool, Captain J. E. , at Queenston, 66

Yeo, Sir James, 49, 77York (Toronto), plans to capture, 72, 73 capture, 73