THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

THE CULMINATION OF MODERN HISTORY

BY RAMSAY MUIR

PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

SECOND EDITION

TO MY MOTHER

PREFACE

The purpose of this book is twofold. 

We realise to-day, as never before, that the fortunes of the world, andof every individual in it, are deeply affected by the problems ofworld-politics and by the imperial expansion and the imperial rivalriesof the greater states of Western civilisation. But when men who havegiven no special attention to the history of these questions try toform a sound judgment on them, they find themselves handicapped by thelack of any brief and clear resume of the subject. I have tried, inthis book, to provide such a summary, in the form of a broad survey, unencumbered with detail, but becoming fuller as it comes nearer to ourown time. That is my first purpose. In fulfilling it I have had tocover much well-trodden ground. But I hope I have avoided the aridityof a mere compendium of facts. 

My second purpose is rather more ambitious. In the course of mynarrative I have tried to deal with ideas rather than with mere facts. I have tried to bring out the political ideas which are implicit in, orwhich result from, the conquest of the world by Western civilisation;and to show how the ideas of the West have affected the outer world, how far they have been modified to meet its needs, and how they havedeveloped in the process. In particular I have endeavoured to directattention to the significant new political form which we have seencoming into existence, and of which the British Empire is the oldestand the most highly developed example--the world-state, embracingpeoples of many different types, with a Western nation-state as itsnucleus. The study of this new form seems to me to be a neglectedbranch of political science, and one of vital importance. Whether ornot it is to be a lasting form, time alone will show. Finally I havetried to display, in this long imperialist conflict, the strife of tworival conceptions of empire: the old, sterile, and ugly conceptionwhich thinks of empire as mere domination, ruthlessly pursued for thesole advantage of the master, and which seems to me to be most fullyexemplified by Germany; and the nobler conception which regards empireas a trusteeship, and which is to be seen gradually emerging andstruggling towards victory over the more brutal view, more clearly andin more varied forms in the story of the British Empire than in perhapsany other part of human history. That is why I have given a perhapsdisproportionate attention to the British Empire. The war isdetermining, among other great issues, which of these conceptions is todominate the future. 

In its first form this book was completed in the autumn of 1916; and itcontained, as I am bound to confess, some rather acidulated sentencesin the passages which deal with the attitude of America towardsEuropean problems. These sentences were due to the deep disappointmentwhich most Englishmen and most Frenchmen felt with the attitude ofaloofness which America seemed to have adopted towards the greateststruggle for freedom and justice ever waged in history. It was anindescribable satisfaction to be forced by events to recognise that Iwas wrong, and that these passages of my book ought not to have beenwritten as I wrote them. There is a sort of solemn joy in feeling thatAmerica, France, and Britain, the three nations which have contributedmore than all the rest of the world put together to the establishmentof liberty and justice on the earth, are now comrades in arms, fightinga supreme battle for these great causes. May this comradeship never bebroken. May it bring about such a decision of the present conflict aswill open a new era in the history of the world--a world now unified, as never before, by the final victory of Western civilisation which itis the purpose of this book to describe. 

Besides rewriting and expanding the passages on America, I have seizedthe opportunity of this new issue to alter and enlarge certain othersections of the book, notably the chapter on the vital period1878-1900, which was too slightly dealt with in the original edition. In this work, which has considerably increased the size of the book, Ihave been much assisted by the criticisms and suggestions of some of myreviewers, whom I wish to thank. 

Perhaps I ought to add that though this book is complete in itself, itis also a sort of sequel to a little book entitled Nationalism andInternationalism, and was originally designed to be printed along withit: that is the explanation of sundry footnote references. The twovolumes are to be followed by a third, on National Self-government, andit is my hope that the complete series may form a useful general surveyof the development of the main political factors in modern history. 

In its first form the book had the advantage of being read by my friendMajor W. L. Grant, Professor of Colonial History at Queen's UniversityKingston, Ontario. The pressure of the military duties in which he isengaged has made it impossible for me to ask his aid in the revision ofthe book. 

R. M. July 1917

CONTENTS

 Preface I. The Meaning and the Motives of Imperialism II. The Era of Iberian Monopoly III. The Rivalry of the Dutch, the French, and the English, 1588-1763 (a) The Period of Settlement, 1588-1660 (b) The Period of Systematic Colonial Policy, 1660-1713 (c) The Conflict of French and English, 1713-1763 IV. The Era of Revolution, 1763-1825 V. Europe and the Non-European World, 1815-1878 VI. The Transformation of the British Empire, 1815-1878 VII. The Era of the World States, 1878-1900 VIII. The British Empire amid the World-Powers, 1878-1914 IX. The Great Challenge, 1900-1914 X. What of the Night?

I

THE MEANING AND THE MOTIVES OF IMPERIALISM

One of the most remarkable features of the modern age has been theextension of the influence of European civilisation over the wholeworld. This process has formed a very important element in the historyof the last four centuries, and it has been strangely undervalued bymost historians, whose attention has been too exclusively centred uponthe domestic politics, diplomacies, and wars of Europe. It has beenbrought about by the creation of a succession of 'Empires' by theEuropean nations, some of which have broken up, while others survive, but all of which have contributed their share to the general result;and for that reason the term 'Imperialism' is commonly employed todescribe the spirit which has led to this astonishing andworld-embracing movement of the modern age. 

The terms 'Empire' and 'Imperialism' are in some respects unfortunate, because of the suggestion of purely military dominion which theyconvey; and their habitual employment has led to some unhappy results. It has led men of one school of thought to condemn and repudiate thewhole movement, as an immoral product of brute force, regardless of therights of conquered peoples. They have refused to study it, and havemade no endeavour to understand it; not realising that the movementthey were condemning was as inevitable and as irresistible as themovement of the tides--and as capable of being turned to beneficentends. On the other hand, the implications of these terms have perhapshelped to foster in men of another type of mind an unhealthy spirit ofpride in mere domination, as if that were an end in itself, and haveled them to exult in the extension of national power, without closelyenough considering the purposes for which it was to be used. Bothattitudes are deplorable, and in so far as the words 'Empire, ''Imperial, ' and 'Imperialism' tend to encourage them, they areunfortunate words. They certainly do not adequately express the fullsignificance of the process whereby the civilisation of Europe has beenmade into the civilisation of the world. 

Nevertheless the words have to be used, because there are no otherswhich at all cover the facts. And, after all, they are in some waysentirely appropriate. A great part of the world's area is inhabited bypeoples who are still in a condition of barbarism, and seem to haverested in that condition for untold centuries. For such peoples theonly chance of improvement was that they should pass under the dominionof more highly developed peoples; and to them a European 'Empire'brought, for the first time, not merely law and justice, but even therudiments of the only kind of liberty which is worth having, theliberty which rests upon law. Another vast section of the world'spopulation consists of peoples who have in some respects reached a highstage of civilisation, but who have failed to achieve for themselves amode of organisation which could give them secure order and equal laws. For such peoples also the 'Empire' of Western civilisation, even whenit is imposed and maintained by force, may bring advantages which willfar outweigh its defects. In these cases the word 'Empire' can be usedwithout violence to its original significance, and yet without apology;and these cases cover by far the greater part of the world. 

The words 'Empire' and 'Imperialism' come to us from ancient Rome; andthe analogy between the conquering and organising work of Rome and theempire-building work of the modern nation-states is a suggestive andstimulating analogy. The imperialism of Rome extended the modes of asingle civilisation, and the Reign of Law which was its essence, overall the Mediterranean lands. The imperialism of the nations to whichthe torch of Rome has been handed on, has made the Reign of Law, andthe modes of a single civilisation, the common possession of the wholeworld. Rome made the common life of Europe possible. The imperialexpansion of the European nations has alone made possible thevision--nay, the certainty--of a future world-order. For these reasonswe may rightly and without hesitation continue to employ these terms, provided that we remember always that the justification of any dominionimposed by a more advanced upon a backward or disorganised people is tobe found, not in the extension of mere brute power, but in theenlargement and diffusion, under the shelter of power, of those vitalelements in the life of Western civilisation which have been thesecrets of its strength, and the greatest of its gifts to the world:the sovereignty of a just and rational system of law, liberty ofperson, of thought, and of speech, and, finally, where the conditionsare favourable, the practice of self-government and the growth of thatsentiment of common interest which we call the national spirit. Theseare the features of Western civilisation which have justified itsconquest of the world[1]; and it must be for its success or failure inattaining these ends that we shall commend or condemn the imperial workof each of the nations which have shared in this vast achievement. 

[1] See the first essay in Nationalism and Internationalism, in whichan attempt is made to work out this idea. 

Four main motives can be perceived at work in all the imperialactivities of the European peoples during the last four centuries. Thefirst, and perhaps the most potent, has been the spirit of nationalpride, seeking to express itself in the establishment of its dominionover less highly organised peoples. In the exultation which follows theachievement of national unity each of the nation-states in turn, if thecircumstances were at all favourable, has been tempted to impose itspower upon its neighbours, [2] or even to seek the mastery of the world. From these attempts have sprung the greatest of the European wars. Fromthem also have arisen all the colonial empires of the European states. It is no mere coincidence that all the great colonising powers havebeen unified nation-states, and that their imperial activities havebeen most vigorous when the national sentiment was at its strongestamong them. Spain, Portugal, England, France, Holland, Russia: theseare the great imperial powers, and they are also the greatnation-states. Denmark and Sweden have played a more modest part, inextra-European as in European affairs. Germany and Italy only began toconceive imperial ambitions after their tardy unification in thenineteenth century. Austria, which has never been a nation-state, neverbecame a colonising power. Nationalism, then, with its eagerness fordominion, may be regarded as the chief source of imperialism; and ifits effects are unhappy when it tries to express itself at the expenseof peoples in whom the potentiality of nationhood exists, they are notnecessarily unhappy in other cases. When it takes the form of thesettlement of unpeopled lands, or the organisation and development ofprimitive barbaric peoples, or the reinvigoration and strengthening ofold and decadent societies, it may prove itself a beneficent force. Butit is beneficent only in so far as it leads to an enlargement of lawand liberty. 

[2] Nationalism and Imperialism, pp. 60, 64, 104. 

The second of the blended motives of imperial expansion has been thedesire for commercial profits; and this motive has played so prominenta part, especially in our own time, that we are apt to exaggerate itsforce, and to think of it as the sole motive. No doubt it has alwaysbeen present in some degree in all imperial adventures. But until thenineteenth century it probably formed the predominant motive only inregard to the acquisition of tropical lands. So long as Europecontinued to be able to produce as much as she needed of the food andthe raw materials for industry that her soil and climate were capableof yielding, the commercial motive for acquiring territories in thetemperate zone, which could produce only commodities of the same type, was comparatively weak; and the European settlements in these areas, which we have come to regard as the most important products of theimperialist movement, must in their origin and early settlement bemainly attributed to other than commercial motives. But Europe hasalways depended for most of her luxuries upon the tropics: gold andivory and gems, spices and sugar and fine woven stuffs, from a veryearly age found their way into Europe from India and the East, comingby slow and devious caravan routes to the shores of the Black Sea andthe Mediterranean. Until the end of the fifteenth century the Europeantrader had no direct contact with the sources of these preciouscommodities; the supply of them was scanty and the price high. Thedesire to gain a more direct access to the sources of this traffic, andto obtain control of the supply, formed the principal motive for thegreat explorations. But these, in their turn, disclosed fresh tropicalareas worth exploiting, and introduced new luxuries, such as tobaccoand tea, which soon took rank as necessities. They also brought acolossal increment of wealth to the countries which had undertakenthem. Hence the acquisition of a share in, or a monopoly of, theselucrative lines of trade became a primary object of ambition to all thegreat states. In the nineteenth century Europe began to be unable tosupply her own needs in regard to the products of the temperate zone, and therefore to desire control over other areas of this type; butuntil then it was mainly in regard to the tropical or sub-tropicalareas that the commercial motive formed the predominant element in theimperial rivalries of the nation-states. And even to-day it is overthese areas that their conflicts are most acute. 

A third motive for imperial expansion, which must not be overlooked, isthe zeal for propaganda: the eagerness of virile peoples to propagatethe religious and political ideas which they have adopted. But this isonly another way of saying that nations are impelled upon the imperialcareer by the desire to extend the influence of their conception ofcivilisation, their Kultur. In one form or another this motive hasalways been present. At first it took the form of religious zeal. Thespirit of the Crusaders was inherited by the Portuguese and theSpaniards, whose whole history had been one long crusade against theMoors. When the Portuguese started upon the exploration of the Africancoast, they could scarcely have sustained to the end that long andarduous task if they had been allured by no other prospect than thedistant hope of finding a new route to the East. They were buoyed upalso by the desire to strike a blow for Christianity. They expected tofind the mythical Christian empire of Prester John, and to join handswith him in overthrowing the infidel. When Columbus persuaded QueenIsabella of Castile to supply the means for his madcap adventure, itwas by a double inducement that he won her assent: she was to gainaccess to the wealth of the Indies, but she was also to be the means ofconverting the heathen to a knowledge of Christianity; and this doublemotive continually recurs in the early history of the Spanish Empire. France could scarcely, perhaps, have persisted in maintaining her farfrom profitable settlements on the barren shores of the St. Lawrence ifthe missionary motive had not existed alongside of the motives ofnational pride and the desire for profits: her great work ofexploration in the region of the Great Lakes and the Mississippi Valleywas due quite as much to the zeal of the heroic missionaries of theJesuit and other orders as to the enterprise of trappers and traders. In English colonisation, indeed, the missionary motive was never, untilthe nineteenth century, so strongly marked. But its place was taken bya parallel political motive. The belief that they were diffusing thefree institutions in which they took so much pride certainly formed anelement in the colonial activities of the English. It is both foolishand unscientific to disregard this element of propaganda in theimperialist movement, still more to treat the assertion of it by thecolonising powers as mere hypocrisy. The motives of imperial expansion, as of other human activities, are mixed, and the loftier elements inthem are not often predominant. But the loftier elements are alwayspresent. It is hypocrisy to pretend that they are alone or even chieflyoperative. But it is cynicism wholly to deny their influence. And ofthe two sins cynicism is the worse, because by over-emphasising itstrengthens and cultivates the lower among the mixed motives by whichmen are ruled. 

The fourth of the governing motives of imperial expansion is the needof finding new homes for the surplus population of the colonisingpeople. This was not in any country a very powerful motive until thenineteenth century, for over-population did not exist in any seriousdegree in any of the European states until that age. Many of thepolitical writers in seventeenth-century England, indeed, regarded thewhole movement of colonisation with alarm, because it seemed to bedrawing off men who could not be spared. But if the population wasnowhere excessive, there were in all countries certain classes forwhich emigration to new lands offered a desired opportunity. There werethe men bitten with the spirit of adventure, to whom the work of thepioneer presented an irresistible attraction. Such men are alwaysnumerous in virile communities, and when in any society their numbersbegin to diminish, its decay is at hand. The imperial activities of themodern age have more than anything else kept the breed alive in allEuropean countries, and above all in Britain. To this type belonged theconquistadores of Spain, the Elizabethan seamen, the French explorersof North America, the daring Dutch navigators. Again, there were theyounger sons of good family for whom the homeland presented smallopportunities, but who found in colonial settlements the chance ofcreating estates like those of their fathers at home, and carried outwith them bands of followers drawn from among the sons of theirfathers' tenantry. To this class belonged most of the planter-settlersof Virginia, the seigneurs of French Canada, the lords of the greatPortuguese feudal holdings in Brazil, and the dominant class in all theSpanish colonies. Again, there were the 'undesirables' of whom the homegovernment wanted to be rid--convicts, paupers, political prisoners;they were drafted out in great numbers to the new lands, often asindentured servants, to endure servitude for a period of years and thento be merged in the colonial population. When the loss of the Americancolonies deprived Britain of her dumping-ground for convicts, she hadto find a new region in which to dispose of them; and this led to thefirst settlement of Australia, six years after the establishment ofAmerican independence. Finally, in the age of bitter religiouscontroversy there was a constant stream of religious exiles seeking newhomes in which they could freely follow their own forms of worship. ThePuritan settlers of New England are the outstanding example of thistype. But they were only one group among many. Huguenots from France, Moravians from Austria, persecuted 'Palatines' and Salzburgers fromGermany, poured forth in an almost unbroken stream. It was natural thatthey should take refuge in the only lands where full religious freedomwas offered to them; and these were especially some of the Britishsettlements in America, and the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope. 

It is often said that the overflow of Europe over the world has been asort of renewal of the folk-wandering of primitive ages. That is amisleading view: the movement has been far more deliberate andorganised, and far less due to the pressure of external circumstances, than the early movements of peoples in the Old World. Not until thenineteenth century, when the industrial transformation of Europebrought about a really acute pressure of population, can it be saidthat the mere pressure of need, and the shortage of sustenance in theirolder homes, has sent large bodies of settlers into the new lands. Until that period the imperial movement has been due to voluntary andpurposive action in a far higher degree than any of the blind earlywanderings of peoples. The will-to-dominion of virile nations exultingin their nationhood; the desire to obtain a more abundant supply ofluxuries than had earlier been available, and to make profitstherefrom; the zeal of peoples to impose their mode of civilisationupon as large a part of the world as possible; the existence in theWestern world of many elements of restlessness and dissatisfaction, adventurers, portionless younger sons, or religious enthusiasts: thesehave been the main operative causes of this huge movement during thegreater part of the four centuries over which it has extended. And asit has sprung from such diverse and conflicting causes, it has assumedan infinite variety of forms; and both deserves and demands a morerespectful study as a whole than has generally been given to it. 

II

THE ERA OF IBERIAN MONOPOLY

During the Middle Ages the contact of Europe with the rest of the worldwas but slight. It was shut off by the great barrier of the IslamicEmpire, upon which the Crusades made no permanent impression; andalthough the goods of the East came by caravan to the Black Sea ports, to Constantinople, to the ports of Syria, and to Egypt, where they werepicked up by the Italian traders, these traders had no direct knowledgeof the countries which were the sources of their wealth. The threat ofthe Empire of Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century aroused theinterest of Europe, and the bold friars, Carpini and Rubruquis, madetheir way to the centres of that barbaric sovereign's power in theremote East, and brought back stories of what they had seen; later thePoli, especially the great Marco, undertook still more daring andlong-continued journeys, which made India and Cathay less unreal toEuropeans, and stimulated the desire for further knowledge. The latermediaeval maps of the world, like that of Fra Mauro (1459), [3] whichincorporate this knowledge, are less wildly imaginative than theirpredecessors, and show a vague notion of the general configuration ofthe main land-masses in the Old World. But beyond the fringes of theMediterranean the world was still in the main unknown to, andunaffected by, European civilisation down to the middle of thefifteenth century. 

[3] Simplified reproductions of this and the other early maps alludedto are printed in Philip's Students' Atlas of Modern History, whichalso contains a long series of maps illustrating the extra-Europeansactivities of the European states. 

Then, suddenly, came the great era of explorations, which were madepossible by the improvements in navigation worked out during thefifteenth century, and which in two generations incredibly transformedthe aspect of the world. The marvellous character of this revelationcan perhaps be illustrated by the comparison of two maps, that ofBehaim, published in 1492, and that of Schoener, published in 1523. Apart from its adoption of the theory that the earth was globular, notround and flat, Behaim's map shows little advance upon Fra Mauro, except that it gives a clearer idea of the shape of Africa, due to theearlier explorations of the Portuguese. But Schoener's map shows thatthe broad outlines of the distribution of the land-masses of bothhemispheres were already in 1523 pretty clearly understood. Thisastonishing advance was due to the daring and enterprise of thePortuguese explorers, Diaz, Da Gama, Cabral, and of the adventurers inthe service of Spain, Columbus, Balboa, Vespucci, and--greatest of themall--Magellan. 

These astonishing discoveries placed for a time the destinies of theouter world in the hands of Spain and Portugal, and the first period ofEuropean imperialism is the period of Iberian monopoly, extending to1588. A Papal award in 1493 confirmed the division of the non-Europeanworld between the two powers, by a judgment which the orthodox werebound to accept, and did accept for two generations. All the oceans, except the North Atlantic, were closed to the navigators of othernations; and these two peoples were given, for a century, theopportunity of showing in what guise they would introduce thecivilisation of Europe to the rest of the globe. Pioneers as they werein the work of imperial development, it is not surprising that theyshould have made great blunders; and in the end their foreign dominionsweakened rather than strengthened the home countries, and contributedto drag them down from the high place which they had taken among thenations. 

The Portuguese power in the East was never more than a commercialdominion. Except in Goa, on the west coast of India, no considerablenumber of settlers established themselves at any point; and the Goanesesettlement is the only instance of the formation of a mixed race, halfIndian and half European. Wherever the Portuguese power wasestablished, it proved itself hard and intolerant; for the spirit ofthe Crusader was ill-adapted to the establishment of good relationswith the non-Christian peoples. The rivalry of Arab traders in theIndian Ocean was mercilessly destroyed, and there was as little mercyfor the Italian merchants, who found the stream of goods that the Arabshad sent them by way of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf almost whollyintercepted. No doubt any other people, finding itself in the positionwhich the Portuguese occupied in the early sixteenth century, wouldhave been tempted to use their power in the same way to establish acomplete monopoly; but the success with which the Portuguese attainedtheir aim was in the end disastrous to them. It was followed by, if itdid not cause, a rapid deterioration of the ability with which theiraffairs were directed; and when other European traders began to appearin the field, they were readily welcomed by the princes of India andthe chieftains of the Spice Islands. In the West the Portuguesesettlement in Brazil was a genuine colony, or branch of the Portuguesenation, because here there existed no earlier civilised people to bedominated. But both in East and West the activities of the Portuguesewere from the first subjected to an over-rigid control by the homegovernment. Eager to make the most of a great opportunity for thenational advantage, the rulers of Portugal allowed no freedom to theenterprise of individuals. The result was that in Portugal itself, inthe East, and in Brazil, initiative was destroyed, and the brilliantenergy which this gallant little nation had displayed evaporated withina century. It was finally destroyed when, in 1580, Portugal and herempire fell under the dominion of Spain, and under all the reactionaryinfluences of the government of Philip II. By the time this heavy yokewas shaken off, in the middle of the seventeenth century, thePortuguese dominion had fallen into decay. To-day nothing of it remainssave 'spheres of influence' on the western and eastern coasts ofAfrica, two or three ports on the coast of India, the Azores, and theisland of Magao off the coast of China. 

The Spanish dominion in Central and South America was of a differentcharacter. When once they had realised that it was not a new route toAsia, but a new world, that Columbus had discovered for them, theSpaniards sought no longer mainly for the riches to be derived fromtraffic, but for the precious metals, which they unhappily discoveredin slight quantities in Hispaniola, but in immense abundance in Mexicoand Peru. It is impossible to exaggerate the heroic valour and daringof Cortez, Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, Orellana, and the rest of theconquistadores who carved out in a single generation the vast Spanishempire in Central and South America; but it is equally impossible toexaggerate their cruelty, which was born in part of the fact that theywere a handful among myriads, in part of the fierce traditions ofcrusading warfare against the infidel. Yet without undervaluing theirdaring, it must be recognised that they had a comparatively easy taskin conquering the peoples of these tropical lands. In the greaterislands of the West Indies they found a gentle and yielding people, whorapidly died out under the forced labour of the mines and plantations, and had to be replaced by negro slave-labour imported from Africa. InMexico and Peru they found civilisations which on the material sidewere developed to a comparatively high point, and which collapsedsuddenly when their governments and capitals had been overthrown; whiletheir peoples, habituated to slavery, readily submitted to a newservitude. It must be recognised, to the honour of the government ofCharles V. And his successors, that they honestly attempted tosafeguard the usages and possessions of the conquered peoples, and toprotect them in some degree against the exploitation of theirconquerors. But it was the protection of a subject race doomed to thecondition of Helotage; they were protected, as the Jews were protectedby the kings of mediaeval England, because they were a valuable assetof the crown. The policy of the Spanish government did not avail toprevent an intermixture of the races, because the Spaniards themselvescame from a sub-tropical country, and the Mexicans and Peruviansespecially were separated from them by no impassable gulf such asseparates the negro or the Australian bushman from the white man. Central and Southern America thus came to be peopled by a hybrid race, speaking Spanish, large elements of which were conscious of their owninferiority. This in itself would perhaps have been a barrier toprogress. But the concentration of attention upon the precious metals, and the neglect of industry due to this cause and to the employment ofslave-labour, formed a further obstacle. And in addition to all, theSpanish government, partly with a view to the execution of its nativepolicy, partly because it regarded the precious metals as the chiefproduct of these lands and wished to maintain close control over them, and partly because centralised autocracy was carried to its highestpitch in Spain, allowed little freedom of action to the localgovernments, and almost none to the settlers. It treated the trade ofthese lands as a monopoly of the home country, to be carried on underthe most rigid control. It did little or nothing to develop the naturalresources of the empire, but rather discouraged them lest they shouldcompete with the labours of the mine; and in what concerned theintellectual welfare of its subjects, it limited itself, as in Spain, to ensuring that no infection of heresy or freethought should reach anypart of its dominions. All this had a deadening effect; and thesurprising thing is, not that the Spanish Empire should have falleninto an early decrepitude, but that it should have shown suchcomparative vigour, tenacity, and power of expansion as it actuallyexhibited. Not until the nineteenth century did the vast naturalresources of these regions begin to undergo any rapid development; thatis to say, not until most of the settlements had discarded theconnection with Spain; and even then, the defects bred into the peopleby three centuries of reactionary and unenlightened government producedin them an incapacity to use their newly won freedom, and condemnedthese lands to a long period of anarchy. It would be too strong to saythat it would have been better had the Spaniards never come to America;for, when all is said, they have done more than any other people, savethe British, to plant European modes of life in the non-European world. But it is undeniable that their dominion afforded a far from happyillustration of the working of Western civilisation in a new field, andexercised a very unfortunate reaction upon the life of themother-country. 

The conquest of Portugal and her empire by Philip II. , in 1580, turnedSpain into a Colossus bestriding the world, and it was inevitable thatthis world-dominion should be challenged by the other European stateswhich faced upon the Atlantic. The challenge was taken up by threenations, the English, the French, and the Dutch, all the more readilybecause the very existence of all three and the religion of two of themwere threatened by the apparently overwhelming strength of Spain inEurope. As in so many later instances, the European conflict wasinevitably extended to the non-European world. From the middle of thesixteenth century onwards these three peoples attempted, withincreasing daring, to circumvent or to undermine the Spanish power, andto invade the sources of the wealth which made it dangerous to them;but the attempt, so far as it was made on the seas and beyond them, wasin the main, and for a long time, due to the spontaneous energies ofvolunteers, not to the action of governments. Francis I. Of France sentout the Venetian Verazzano to explore the American shores of the NorthAtlantic, as Henry VII. Of England had earlier sent the Genoese Cabots. But nothing came of these official enterprises. More effective were thepirate adventurers who preyed upon the commerce between Spain and herpossessions in the Netherlands as it passed through the Narrow Seas, running the gauntlet of English, French, and Dutch. More effectivestill were the attempts to find new routes to the East, not barred bythe Spanish dominions, by a north-east or a north-west passage; forsome of the earlier of these adventures led to fruitful unintendedconsequences, as when the Englishman Chancellor, seeking for anorth-east passage, found the route to Archangel and opened up a tradewith Russia, or as when the Frenchman Cartier, seeking for a north-westpassage, hit upon the great estuary of the St. Lawrence, and marked outa claim for France to the possession of the area which it drained. Mosteffective of all were the smuggling and piratical raids into thereserved waters of West Africa and the West Indies, and later into theinnermost penetralia of the Pacific Ocean, which were undertaken withrapidly increasing boldness by the navigators of all three nations, butabove all by the English. Drake is the supreme exponent of thesemethods; and his career illustrates in the clearest fashion the steadydiminution of Spanish prestige under these attacks, and the growingboldness and maritime skill of its attackers. 

From the time of Drake's voyage round the world (1577) and itsinsulting defiance of the Spanish power on the west coast of SouthAmerica, it became plain that the maintenance of Spanish monopoly couldnot last much longer. It came to its end, finally and unmistakably, inthe defeat of the Grand Armada. That supreme victory threw the oceanroads of trade open, not to the English only, but to the sailors of allnations. In its first great triumph the English navy had establishedthe Freedom of the Seas, of which it has ever since been the chiefdefender. Since 1588 no power has dreamt of claiming the exclusiveright of traversing any of the open seas of the world, as until thatdate Spain and Portugal had claimed the exclusive right of using theSouth Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. 

So ends the first period in the imperial expansion of the Westernpeoples, the period of Spanish and Portuguese monopoly. Meanwhile, unnoticed in the West, a remarkable eastward expansion was beingeffected by the Russian people. By insensible stages they had passedthe unreal barrier between Europe and Asia, and spread themselvesthinly over the vast spaces of Siberia, subduing and assimilating thefew and scattered tribes whom they met; by the end of the seventeenthcentury they had already reached the Pacific Ocean. It was a conquestmarked by no great struggles or victories, an insensible permeation ofhalf a continent. This process was made the easier for the Russians, because in their own stock were blended elements of the Mongol racewhich they found scattered over Siberia: they were only reversing theprocess which Genghis Khan had so easily accomplished in the thirteenthcentury. And as the Russians had scarcely yet begun to be affected byWestern civilisation, there was no great cleavage or contrast betweenthem and their new subjects, and the process of assimilation took placeeasily. But the settlement of Siberia was very gradual. At thebeginning of the eighteenth century the total population of this vastarea amounted to not more than 300, 000 souls, and it was not until thenineteenth century that there was any rapid increase. 

III

THE RIVALRY OF THE DUTCH, THE FRENCH AND THE ENGLISH, 1588-1763

The second period of European imperialism was filled with the rivalriesof the three nations which had in different degrees contributed to thebreakdown of the Spanish monopoly, the Dutch, the French, and theEnglish; and we have next to inquire how far, and why, these peopleswere more successful than the Spaniards in planting in the non-Europeanworld the essentials of European civilisation. The long era of theirrivalry extended from 1588 to 1763, and it can be most convenientlydivided into three sections. The first of these extended from 1588 toabout 1660, and may be called the period of experiment and settlement;during its course the leadership fell to the Dutch. The second extendedfrom 1660 to 1713, and may be called the period of systematic colonialpolicy, and of growing rivalry between France and England. The third, from 1713 to 1763, was dominated by the intense rivalry of these twocountries, decadent Spain joining in the conflict on the side ofFrance, while the declining power of the Dutch was on the whole rangedon the side of Britain; and it ended with the complete ascendancy ofBritain, supreme at once in the West and in the East. 

(a) The Period of Settlement, 1588-1660

The special interest of the first half of the seventeenth century isthat in the trading and colonial experiments of this period thecharacter of the work which was to be done by the three new candidatesfor extra-European empire was already very clearly and instructivelydisplayed. They met as rivals in every field: in the archipelago of theWest Indies, and the closely connected slaving establishments of WestAfrica, in the almost empty lands of North America, and in the tradingenterprises of the far East; and everywhere a difference of spirit andmethod appeared. 

The Dutch, who made a far more systematic and more immediatelyprofitable use of the opportunity than either of their rivals, regardedthe whole enterprise as a great national commercial venture. It wasconducted by two powerful trading corporations, the Company of the EastIndies and the Company of the West Indies; but though directed by themerchants of Amsterdam, these were genuinely national enterprises;their shareholders were drawn from every province and every class; andthey were backed by all the influence which the States-General of theUnited Provinces--controlled during this period mainly by thecommercial interest--was able to wield. 

The Company of the East Indies was the richer and the more powerful ofthe two, because the trade of the Far East was beyond comparison themost lucrative in the world. Aiming straight at the source of thegreatest profits--the trade in spices--the Dutch strove to establish amonopoly control over the Spice Islands and, in general, over the MalayArchipelago; and they were so successful that their influence remainsto-day predominant in this region. Their first task was to overthrowthe ascendancy of the Portuguese, and in this they were willing toco-operate with the English traders. But the bulk of the work was doneby the Dutch, for the English East India Company was poor in comparisonwith the Dutch, was far less efficiently organised, and, in especial, could not count upon the steady support of the national government. Itwas mainly the Dutch who built forts and organised factories, becausethey alone had sufficient capital to maintain heavy standing charges. Not unnaturally they did not see why the English should reap any partof the advantage of their work, and set themselves to establish amonopoly. In the end the English were driven out with violence. Afterthe Massacre of Amboyna (1623) their traders disappeared from theseseas, and the Dutch supremacy remained unchallenged until thenineteenth century. 

It was a quite intolerant commercial monopoly which they hadinstituted, but from the commercial point of view it was administeredwith great intelligence. Commercial control brought in its trainterritorial sovereignty, over Java and many of the neighbouringislands; and this sovereignty was exercised by the directors of thecompany primarily with a view to trade interests. It was a tradedespotism, but a trade despotism wisely administered, which gavejustice and order to its native subjects. On the mainland of India theDutch never attained a comparable degree of power, because the nativestates were strong enough to hold them in check. But in this periodtheir factories were more numerous and more prosperous than those ofthe English, their chief rivals; and over the island of Ceylon theyestablished an ascendancy almost as complete as that which they hadcreated in the archipelago. 

They were intelligent enough also to see the importance of goodcalling-stations on the route to the East. For this purpose theyplanted a settlement in Mauritius, and another at the Cape of GoodHope. But these settlements were never regarded as colonies. They werestations belonging to a trading company; they remained under itscomplete control, and were allowed no freedom of development, stillless any semblance of self-government. If Cape Colony grew into agenuine colony, or offshoot of the mother-country, it was in spite ofthe company, not by reason of its encouragement, and from first to lastthe company's relations with the settlers were of the most unhappykind. For the company would do nothing at the Cape that was notnecessary for the Eastern trade, which was its supreme interest, andthe colonists naturally did not take the same view. It was thisconcentration upon purely commercial aims which also prevented theDutch from making any use of the superb field for European settlementopened up by the enterprise of their explorers in Australia and NewZealand. These fair lands were left unpeopled, largely because theypromised no immediate trade profits. 

In the West the enterprises of the Dutch were only less vigorous thanin the East, and they were marked by the same feature of an intenseconcentration upon the purely commercial aspect. While the English and(still more) the French adventurers made use of the lesser West Indianislands, unoccupied by Spain, as bases for piratical attacks upon theSpanish trade, the Dutch, with a shrewd instinct, early deserted thispurely destructive game for the more lucrative business of carrying ona smuggling trade with the Spanish mainland; and the islands which theyacquired (such as Curayoa) were, unlike the French and English islands, especially well placed for this purpose. They established a sugarcolony in Guiana. But their main venture in this region was theconquest of a large part of Northern Brazil from the Portuguese (1624);and here their exploitation was so merciless, under the direction ofthe Company of the West Indies, that the inhabitants, though they hadbeen dissatisfied with the Portuguese government, and had at firstwelcomed the Dutch conquerors, soon revolted against them, and aftertwenty years drove them out. 

On the mainland of North America the Dutch planted a single colony--theNew Netherlands, with its capital at New Amsterdam, later New York. Their commercial instinct had once more guided them wisely. They hadfound the natural centre for the trade of North America; for by way ofthe river Hudson and its affluent, the Mohawk, New York commands theonly clear path through the mountain belt which everywhere shuts offthe Atlantic coast region from the central plain of America. Foundedand controlled by the Company of the West Indies, this settlement wasintended to be, not primarily the home of a branch of the Dutch nationbeyond the seas, but a trading-station for collecting the furs andother products of the inland regions. At Orange (Albany), which standsat the junction of the Mohawk and the Hudson, the Dutch traderscollected the furs brought in by Indian trappers from west and north;New Amsterdam was the port of export; and if settlers were encouraged, it was only that they might supply the men and the means and the foodfor carrying on this traffic. The Company of the West Indiesadministered the colony purely from this point of view. No powers ofself-government were allowed to the settlers; and, as in Cape Colony, the relations between the colonists and the governing company werenever satisfactory, because the colonists felt that their interestswere wholly subordinated. 

The distinguishing feature of French imperial activity during thisperiod was its dependence upon the support and direction of the homegovernment, which was the natural result of the highly centralisedregime established in France during the modern era. Only in onedirection was French activity successfully maintained by privateenterprise, and this was in the not very reputable field of West Indianbuccaneering, in which the French were even more active than theirprincipal rivals and comrades, the English. The word 'buccaneer' itselfcomes from the French: boucan means the wood-fire at which the piratesdried and smoked their meat, and these fires, blazing on desertedislands, must often have warned merchant vessels to avoid anever-present danger. The island of Tortuga, which commands the passagebetween Cuba and Hispaniola through which the bulk of the Spanishtraffic passed on its way from Mexico to Europe, was the most importantof the buccaneering bases, and although it was at first used by thebuccaneers of all nations, it soon became a purely French possession, as did, later, the adjoining portion of the island of Hispaniola (SanDomingo). The French did, indeed, like the English, plant sugarcolonies in some of the lesser Antilles; but during the first half ofthe seventeenth century they attained no great prosperity. 

For the greater enterprises of trade in the East and colonisation inthe West, the French relied almost wholly upon government assistance, and although both Henry IV. In the first years of the century, andRichelieu in its second quarter, were anxious to give what help theycould, internal dissensions were of such frequent occurrence in Franceduring this period that no systematic or continuous governmental aidwas available. Hence the French enterprises both in the East and in theWest were on a small scale, and achieved little success. The FrenchEast India Company was all but extinct when Colbert took it in hand in1664; it was never able to compete with its Dutch or even its Englishrival. 

But the period saw the establishment of two French colonies in NorthAmerica: Acadia (Nova Scotia) on the coast, and Canada, with Quebec asits centre, in the St. Lawrence valley, separated from one another onland by an almost impassable barrier of forest and mountain. These twocolonies were founded, the first in 1605 and the second in 1608, almostat the same moment as the first English settlement on the Americancontinent. They had a hard struggle during the first fifty years oftheir existence; for the number of settlers was very small, the soilwas barren, the climate severe, and the Red Indians, especially theferocious Iroquois towards the south, were far more formidable enemiesthan those who bordered on the English colonies. 

There is no part of the history of European colonisation more full ofromance and of heroism than the early history of French Canada; anincomparable atmosphere of gallantry and devotion seems to overhang it. From the first, despite their small numbers and their difficulties, these settlers showed a daring in exploration which was only equalledby the Spaniards, and to which there is no parallel in the records ofthe English colonies. At the very outset the great explorer Champlainmapped out the greater part of the Great Lakes, and thus reachedfarther into the continent than any Englishman before the end of theeighteenth century; and although this is partly explained by the factthat the St. Lawrence and the lakes afforded an easy approach to theinterior, while farther south the forest-clad ranges of the Alleghaniesconstituted a very serious barrier, this does not diminish the Frenchpre-eminence in exploration. Nor can anything in the history ofEuropean colonisation surpass the heroism of the French missionariesamong the Indians, who faced and endured incredible tortures in orderto bring Christianity to the barbarians. No serious missionaryenterprise was ever undertaken by the English colonists; thisdifference was in part due to the fact that the missionary aim wasdefinitely encouraged by the home government in France. From theoutset, then, poverty, paucity of numbers, gallantry, and missionaryzeal formed marked features of the French North American colonies. 

In other respects they very clearly reproduced some of the features ofthe motherland. Their organisation was strictly feudal in character. The real unit of settlement and government was the seigneurie, anestate owned by a Frenchman of birth, and cultivated by his vassals, who found refuge from an Indian raid, or other danger, in the stockadedhouse which took the place of a chateau, much as their remote ancestorshad taken refuge from the raids of the Northmen in the castles of theirseigneur's ancestors. And over this feudal society was set, as inFrance, a highly centralised government wielding despotic power, and inits turn absolutely subject to the mandate of the Crown at home. Thisdespotic government had the right to require the services of all itssubjects in case of need; and it was only the centralised government ofthe colony, and the warlike and adventurous character of its smallfeudalised society, which enabled it to hold its own for so longagainst the superior numbers but laxer organisation of its Englishneighbours. A despotic central power, a feudal organisation, and anentire dependence upon the will of the King of France and upon hissupport, form, therefore, the second group of characteristics whichmarked the French colonies. They were colonies in the strictest sense, all the more because they reproduced the main features of the homesystem. 

Nothing could have differed more profoundly from this system than themethods which the English were contemporaneously applying, without planor clearly defined aim, and guided only by immediate practical needs, and by the rooted traditions of a self-governing people. Theirenterprises received from the home government little direct assistance, but they throve better without it; and if there was little assistance, there was also little interference. In the East the English East IndiaCompany had to yield to the Dutch the monopoly of the Malayan trade, and bitterly complained of the lack of government support; but itsucceeded in establishing several modest factories on the coast ofIndia, and was on the whole prosperous. But it was in the West that thedistinctive work of the English was achieved during this period, by theestablishment of a series of colonies unlike any other Europeansettlements which had yet been instituted. Their distinctive featurewas self-government, to which they owed their steadily increasingprosperity. No other European colonies were thus managed on theprinciple of autonomy. Indeed, these English settlements were in 1650the only self-governing lands in the world, apart from England herself, the United Provinces, and Switzerland. 

The first English colony, Virginia, was planted in 1608 by a tradingcompany organised for the purpose, whose subscribers included nearlyall the London City Companies, and about seven hundred privateindividuals of all ranks. Their motives were partly political ('to puta bit in the ancient enemy's (Spain's) mouth'), and partly commercial, for they hoped to find gold, and to render England independent of themarine supplies which came from the Baltic. But profit was not theirsole aim; they were moved also by the desire to plant a new Englandbeyond the seas. They made, in fact, no profits; but they did create abranch of the English stock, and the young squires' and yeomen's sonswho formed the backbone of the colony showed themselves to beEnglishmen by their unwillingness to submit to an uncontrolleddirection of their affairs. In 1619, acting on instructions receivedfrom England, the company's governor summoned an assembly ofrepresentatives, one from each township, to consult on the needs of thecolony. This was the first representative body that had ever existedoutside Europe, and it indicated what was to be the character ofEnglish colonisation. Henceforth the normal English method of governinga colony was through a governor and an executive council appointed bythe Crown or its delegate, and a representative assembly, which wieldedfull control over local legislation and taxation. 'Our presenthappiness, ' said the Virginian Assembly in 1640, 'is exemplified by thefreedom of annual assemblies and by legal trials by juries in all civiland criminal causes. '

The second group of English colonies, those of New England, far to thenorth of Virginia, reproduced in an intensified form this note ofself-government. Founded in the years following 1620, these settlementswere the outcome of Puritan discontents in England. The commercialmotive was altogether subsidiary in their establishment; they existedin order that the doctrine and discipline of Puritanism might find ahome where its ascendancy would be secure. It was indeed under theguise of a commercial company that the chief of these settlements wasmade, but the company was organised as a means of safe-guarding thecolonists from Crown interference, and at an early date itsheadquarters were transferred to New England itself. Far from desiringto restrict this freedom, the Crown up to a point encouraged it. Winthrop, one of the leading colonists, tells us that he had learntfrom members of the Privy Council 'that his Majesty did not intend toimpose the ceremonies of the Church of England upon us; for that it wasconsidered that it was the freedom from such things that made peoplecome over to us. ' The contrast between this licence and the rigidorthodoxy enforced upon French Canada or Spanish America is veryinstructive. It meant that the New World, so far as it was controlledby England, was to be open as a place of refuge for those who dislikedthe restrictions thought necessary at home. The same note is to befound in the colony of Maryland, planted by the Roman Catholic LordBaltimore in 1632, largely as a place of refuge for hisco-religionists. He was encouraged by the government of Charles I. Inthis idea, and the second Lord Baltimore reports that his father 'hadabsolute liberty to carry over any from his Majesty's Dominions willingto go. But he found very few but such as . . . Could not conform to thelaws of England relating to religion. These declared themselves willingto plant in this province, if they might have a general tolerationsettled by law. ' Maryland, therefore, became the first place in theworld of Western civilisation in which full religious toleration wasallowed; for the aim of the New Englanders was not religious freedom, but a free field for the rigid enforcement of their own shade oforthodoxy. 

Thus, in these first English settlements, the deliberate encouragementof varieties of type was from the outset a distinguishing note, and thehome authorities neither desired nor attempted to impose a strictuniformity with the rules and methods existing in England. There was asgreat a variety in social and economic organisation as in religiousbeliefs between the aristocratic planter colonies of the south and thedemocratic agricultural settlements of New England. In one thing onlywas there uniformity: every settlement possessed self-governinginstitutions, and prized them beyond all other privileges. None, indeed, carried self-government to so great an extent as the NewEnglanders. They came out organised as religious congregations, inwhich every member possessed equal rights, and they took thecongregational system as the basis of their local government, andchurch membership as the test of citizenship; nor did any othercolonies attain the right, long exercised by the New Englanders, ofelecting their own governors. But there was no English settlement, noteven the little slave-worked plantations in the West Indian islands, like Barbados, which did not set up, as a matter of course, arepresentative body to deal with problems of legislation and taxation, and the home government never dreamt of interfering with this practice. Already in 1650, the English empire was sharply differentiated from theSpanish, the Dutch, and the French empires by the fact that itconsisted of a scattered group of self-governing communities, varyingwidely in type, but united especially by the common possession of freeinstitutions, and thriving very largely because these institutionsenabled local needs to be duly considered and attracted settlers ofmany types. 

(b) The Period of Systematic Colonial Policy, 1660-1713

The second half of the seventeenth century was a period of systematicimperial policy on the part of both England and France; for bothcountries now realised that in the profitable field of commerce, at anyrate, the Dutch had won a great advantage over them. 

France, after many internal troubles and many foreign wars, had at lastachieved, under the government of Louis XIV. , the boon of firmlyestablished order. She was now beyond all rivalry the greatest of theEuropean states, and her king and his great finance minister, Colbert, resolved to win for her also supremacy in trade and colonisation. Butthis was to be done absolutely under the control and direction of thecentral government. Until the establishment of the German Empire, therehas never been so marked an instance of the centralised organisation ofthe whole national activity as France presented in this period. TheFrench East India Company was revived under government direction, andbegan for the first time to be a serious competitor for Indian trade. An attempt was made to conquer Madagascar as a useful base for Easternenterprises. The sugar industry in the French West Indian islands wasscientifically encouraged and developed, though the full results ofthis work were not apparent until the next century. France began totake an active share in the West African trade in slaves and othercommodities. In Canada a new era of prosperity began; the populationwas rapidly increased by the dispatch of carefully selected parties ofemigrants, and the French activity in missionary work and inexploration became bolder than ever. Pere Marquette and the Sieur de laSalle traced out the courses of the Ohio and the Mississippi; Frenchtrading-stations began to arise among the scattered Indian tribes whoalone occupied the vast central plain; and a strong French claim wasestablished to the possession of this vital area, which was not onlythe most valuable part of the American continent, but would have shutoff the English coastal settlements from any possibility of westwardexpansion. These remarkable explorations led, in 1717, to thefoundation of New Orleans at the mouth of the great river, and theorganisation of the colony of Louisiana. But the whole of the intenseand systematic imperial activity of the French during this perioddepended upon the support and direction of government; and when Colbertdied in 1683, and soon afterwards all the resources of France werestrained by the pressure of two great European wars, the rapiddevelopment which Colbert's zeal had brought about was checked for ageneration. Centralised administration may produce remarkable immediateresults, but it does not encourage natural and steady growth. Meanwhilethe English had awakened to the fact that England had, almost by aseries of accidents, become the centre of an empire, and to thenecessity of giving to this empire some sort of systematicorganisation. It was the statesmen of the Commonwealth who first beganto grope after an imperial system. The aspect of the situation whichmost impressed them was that the enterprising Dutch were reaping mostof the trading profits which arose from the creation of the Englishcolonies: it was said that ten Dutch ships called at Barbados for everyEnglish ship. To deal with this they passed the Navigation Act of 1651, which provided that the trade of England and the colonies should becarried only in English or colonial ships. They thus gave a logicalexpression to the policy of imperial trade monopoly which had been inthe minds of those who were interested in colonial questions from theoutset; and they also opened a period of acute trade rivalry and warwith the Dutch. The first of the Dutch wars, which was waged by theCommonwealth, was a very even struggle, but it secured the success ofthe Navigation Act. Cromwell, though he hastened to make peace with theDutch, was a still stronger imperialist than his parliamentarypredecessors; he may justly be described as the first of the Jingoes. He demanded compensation from the Dutch for the half-forgotten outrageof Amboyna in 1623. He made a quite unprovoked attack upon the Spanishisland of Hispaniola, and though he failed to conquer it, gained acompensation in the seizure of Jamaica (1655). And he insisted upon theobedience of the colonies to the home government with a severity neverearlier shown. With him imperial aims may be said to have become, forthe first time, one of the ruling ends of the English government. 

But it was the reign of Charles II. Which saw the definite organisationof a clearly conceived imperial policy; in the history of Englishimperialism there are few periods more important. The chief statesmenand courtiers of the reign, Prince Rupert, Clarendon, Shaftesbury, Albemarle, were all enthusiasts for the imperial idea. They had aspecial committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, [4]and appointed John Locke, the ablest political thinker of the age, tobe its secretary. They pushed home the struggle against the maritimeascendancy of the Dutch, and fought two Dutch wars; and though thehistory-books, influenced by the Whig prejudice against Charles II. , always treat these wars as humiliating and disgraceful, while theytreat the Dutch war of the Commonwealth as just and glorious, the plainfact is that the first Dutch war of Charles II. Led to the conquest ofthe Dutch North American colony of the New Netherlands (1667), and sobridged the gap between the New England and the southern colonies. Theyengaged in systematic colonisation, founding the new colony of Carolinato the south of Virginia, while out of their Dutch conquests theyorganised the colonies of New York, New Jersey, and Delaware; and theend of the reign saw the establishment of the interesting and admirablymanaged Quaker colony of Pennsylvania. They started the Hudson BayCompany, which engaged in the trade in furs to the north of the Frenchcolonies. They systematically encouraged the East India Company, whichnow began to be more prosperous than at any earlier period, andobtained in Bombay its first territorial possession in India. 

[4] It was not till 1696, however, that this Board became permanent. 

More important, they worked out a new colonial policy, which was toremain, in its main features, the accepted British policy down to theloss of the American colonies in 1782. The theory at the base of thispolicy was that while the mother-country must be responsible for thedefence of all the scattered settlements, which in their weakness wereexposed to attack from many sides, in she might reasonably expect to beput in possession of definite trade advantages. Hence the NavigationAct of 1660 provided not only that inter-imperial trade should becarried in English or colonial vessels, but that certain 'enumeratedarticles, ' including some of the most important colonial products, should be sent only to England, so that English merchants should havethe profits of selling them to other countries, and the Englishgovernment the proceeds of duties upon them; and another Act providedthat imports to the colonies should only come from, or through, England. In other words, England was to be the commercial entrepot ofthe whole empire; and the regulation of imperial trade as a whole wasto belong to the English government and parliament. To the Englishgovernment also must necessarily fall the conduct of the relations ofthe empire as a whole with other powers. This commercial system wasnot, however, purely one-sided. If the colonies were to send theirchief products only to England, they were at the same time to have amonopoly, or a marked advantage, in English markets. Tobacco-growinghad been for a time a promising industry in England; it was prohibitedin order that it might not compete with the colonial product; anddifferential duties were levied on the competing products of othercountries and their colonies. In short, the new policy was one ofImperial Preference; it aimed at turning the empire into an economicunit, of which England should be the administrative and distributingcentre. So far the English policy did not differ in kind from thecontemporary colonial policy of other countries, though it left to thecolonies a greater freedom of trade (for example, in the'non-enumerated articles') than was ever allowed by Spain or France, orby the two great trading companies which controlled the foreignpossessions of Holland. 

But there is one respect in which the authors of this system differedvery widely from the colonial statesmen of other countries. Though theywere anxious to organise and consolidate the empire on the basis of atrade system, they had no desire or intention of altering itsself-governing character, or of discouraging the growth of a healthydiversity of type and method. Every one of the new colonies of thisperiod was provided with the accustomed machinery of representativegovernment: in the case of Carolina, the philosopher, John Locke, wasinvited to draw up a model constitution, and although his scheme wasquite unworkable, the fact that he was asked to make it affords astriking proof of the seriousness with which the problems of colonialgovernment were regarded. In several of the West Indian settlementsself-governing institutions were organised during these years. In theFrame of Government which Penn set forth on the foundation ofPennsylvania, in 1682, he laid it down that 'any government is freewhere the laws rule, and where the people are a party to these rules, 'and on this basis proceeded to organise his system. According to thisdefinition all the English colonies were free, and they were almost theonly free communities in the world. And though it is true that therewas an almost unceasing conflict between the government and the NewEngland colonies, no one who studies the story of these quarrels canfail to see that the demands of the New Englanders were oftenunreasonable and inconsistent with the maintenance of imperial unity, while the home government was extremely patient and moderate. Aboveall, almost the most marked feature of the colonial policy of CharlesII. Was the uniform insistence upon complete religious toleration inthe colonies. Every new charter contained a clause securing this vitalcondition. 

It has long been our habit to condemn the old colonial system as it wasdefined in this period, and to attribute to it the disruption of theempire in the eighteenth century. But the judgment is not a fair one;it is due to those Whig prejudices by which so much of the modernhistory of England has been distorted. The colonial policy ofShaftesbury and his colleagues was incomparably more enlightened thanthat of any contemporary government. It was an interestingexperiment--the first, perhaps, in modern history--in thereconciliation of unity and freedom. And it was undeniably successful:under it the English colonies grew and throve in a very striking way. Everything, indeed, goes to show that this system was well designed forthe needs of a group of colonies which were still in a state ofweakness, still gravely under-peopled and undeveloped. Evil resultsonly began to show themselves in the next age, when the colonies weregrowing stronger and more independent, and when the self-complacentWhigs, instead of revising the system to meet new conditions, actuallyenlarged and emphasised its most objectionable features. 

(c) The Conflict of French and English, 1713-1763

While France and England were defining and developing their sharplycontrasted imperial systems, the Dutch had fallen into the background, content with the rich dominion which they had already acquired; and theSpanish and Portuguese empires had both fallen into stagnation. Newcompetitors, indeed, now began to press into the field: the wildlyexaggerated notions of the wealth to be made from colonial ventureswhich led to the frenzied speculations of the early eighteenth century, John Law's schemes, and the South Sea Bubble, induced other powers totry to obtain a share of this wealth; and Austria, Brandenburg, andDenmark made fitful endeavours to become colonising powers. But theenterprises of these states were never of serious importance. Thefuture of the non-European world seemed to depend mainly upon Franceand England; and it was yet to be determined which of the two systems, centralised autocracy enforcing uniformity, or self-governmentencouraging variety of type, would prove the more successful and wouldplay the greater part. Two bodies of ideas so sharply contrasted werebound to come into conflict. In the two great wars between England andLouis XIV. (1688-1713), though the questions at issue were primarilyEuropean, the conflict inevitably spread to the colonial field; and inthe result France was forced to cede in 1713 the province of Acadia(which had twice before been in English hands), the vast basin ofHudson's Bay, and the island of Newfoundland, to which the fishermen ofboth nations had resorted, though the English had always claimed it. But these were only preliminaries, and the main conflict was fought outduring the half-century following the Peace of Utrecht, 1713-63. 

During this half-century Britain was under the rule of the Whigoligarchy, which had no clearly conceived ideas on imperial policy. Under the influence of the mercantile class the Whigs increased theseverity of the restrictions on colonial trade, and prohibited the riseof industries likely to compete with those of the mother-country. Butunder the influence of laziness and timidity, and of the desire quietanon movere, they made no attempt seriously to enforce either the new orthe old restrictions, and in these circumstances smuggling tradebetween the New England colonies and the French West Indies, indefiance of the Navigation Act and its companions, grew to suchdimensions that any serious interference with it would be felt as areal grievance. The Whigs and their friends later took credit for theirneglect. George Grenville, they said, lost the colonies because he readthe American dispatches; he would have done much better to leave thedispatches and the colonies alone. But this is a damning apology. Ifthe old colonial system, whose severity, on paper, the Whigs hadgreatly increased, was no longer workable, it should have been revised;but no Whig showed any sign of a sense that change was necessary. Yetthe prevalence of smuggling was not the only proof of the need forchange. There was during the period a long succession of disputesbetween colonial governors and their assemblies, which showed that therestrictions upon their political freedom, as well as those upon theireconomic freedom, were beginning to irk the colonists; and thatself-government was following its universal and inevitable course, anddemanding its own fulfilment. But the Whigs made no sort of attempt toconsider the question whether the self-government of the colonies couldbe increased without impairing the unity of the empire. The singledevice of their statesmanship was--not to read the dispatches. And, inthe meanwhile, no evil results followed, because the loyalty of thecolonists was ensured by the imminence of the French danger. Themother-country was still responsible for the provision of defence, though she was largely cheated of the commercial advantages which wereto have been its recompense. 

After 1713 there was a comparatively long interval of peace betweenBritain and France, but it was occupied by an acute commercial rivalry, in which, on the whole, the French seemed to be getting the upper hand. Their sugar islands in the West Indies were more productive than theBritish; their traders were rapidly increasing their hold over thecentral plain of North America, to the alarm of the British colonists;their intrigues kept alive a perpetual unrest in the recently conqueredprovince of Acadia; and away in India, under the spirited direction ofFrancois Dupleix, their East India Company became a more formidablecompetitor for the Indian trade than it had hitherto been. Hence theimperial problem presented itself to the statesmen of that generationas a problem of power rather than as a problem of organisation; and theintense rivalry with France dwarfed and obscured the need for areconsideration of colonial relations. At length this rivalry flamedout into two wars. The first of these was fought, on both sides, in astrangely half-hearted and lackadaisical way. But in the second (theSeven Years' War, 1756-63) the British cause, after two years ofdisaster, fell under the confident and daring leadership of Pitt, whichbrought a series of unexampled successes. The French flag was almostswept from the seas. The French settlements in Canada were overrun andconquered. With the fall of Quebec it was determined that the system ofself-government, and not that of autocracy, should control thedestinies of the North American continent; and Britain emerged in 1763the supreme colonial power of the world. The problem of power had beensettled in her favour; but the problem of organisation remainedunsolved. It emerged in an acute and menacing form as soon as the warwas over. 

During the course of these two wars, and in the interval between them, an extraordinary series of events had opened a new scene for therivalry of the two great imperial powers, and a new world began to beexposed to the influence of the political ideas of Europe. The vast andpopulous land of India, where the Europeans had hitherto been contentto play the part of modest traders, under the protection and control ofgreat native rulers, had suddenly been displayed as a field for theimperial ambitions of the European peoples. Ever since the firstappearance of the Dutch, the English, and the French in these regions, Northern India had formed a consolidated empire ruled from Delhi by thegreat Mogul dynasty; the shadow of its power was also cast over thelesser princes of Southern India. But after 1709, and still more after1739, the Mogul Empire collapsed, and the whole of India, north andsouth, rapidly fell into a condition of complete anarchy. A multitudeof petty rulers, nominal satraps of the powerless Mogul, rovingadventurers, or bands of Mahratta raiders, put an end to all order andsecurity; and to protect themselves and maintain their trade theEuropean traders must needs enlist considerable bodies of Indiantroops. It had long been proved that a comparatively small number oftroops, disciplined in the European fashion, could hold their ownagainst the loose and disorderly mobs who followed the standards ofIndian rulers. And it now occurred to the ambitious mind of theFrenchman Dupleix that it should be possible, by the use of thismilitary superiority, to intervene with effect in the unceasing strifeof the Indian princes, to turn the scale on one side or the other, andto obtain over the princes whose cause he embraced a commandinginfluence, which would enable him to secure the expulsion of hisEnglish rivals, and the establishment of a French trade monopoly basedupon political influence. 

This daring project was at first triumphantly successful. The Englishhad to follow suit in self-defence, but could not equal the ability ofDupleix. In 1750 a French protege occupied the most important throne ofSouthern India at Hyderabad, and was protected and kept loyal by aforce of French sepoys under the Marquis de Bussy, whose expenses weremet out of the revenues of large provinces (the Northern Sarkars)placed under French administration; while in the Carnatic, the coastalregion where all the European traders had their south-easternheadquarters, a second French protege had almost succeeded in crushinghis rival, whom the English company supported. But the genius of Clivereversed the situation with dramatic swiftness; the French authoritiesat home, alarmed at these dangerous adventures, repudiated and recalledDupleix (1754), and the British power was left to apply the methodswhich he had invented. When the Seven Years' War broke out (1756), theFrench, repenting of their earlier decision, sent a substantial forceto restore their lost influence in the Carnatic, but the result wascomplete failure. A British protege henceforward ruled in the Carnatic;a British force replaced the French at Hyderabad; and the revenues ofthe Northern Sarkars, formerly assigned for the maintenance of theFrench force, were handed over to its successor. Meanwhile in the richprovince of Bengal a still more dramatic revolution had taken place. Attacked by the young Nawab, Siraj-uddaula, the British traders atCalcutta had been forced to evacuate that prosperous centre (1756). ButClive, coming up with a fleet and an army from Madras, applied thelessons he had learnt in the Carnatic, set up a rival claimant to thethrone of Bengal, and at Plassey (1757) won for his puppet a completevictory. From 1757 onwards the British East India Company was the realmaster in Bengal, even more completely than in the Carnatic. It hadnot, in either region, conquered any territory; it had only supportedsuccessfully a claimant to the native throne. The native government, intheory, continued as before; the company, in theory, was its subjectand vassal. But in practice these great and rich provinces lay at itsmercy, and if it did not yet choose to undertake their government, thiswas only because it preferred to devote itself to its original businessof trade. 

Thus by 1763 the British power had achieved a dazzling double triumph. It had destroyed the power of its chief rival both in the East and inthe West. It had established the supremacy of the British peoples andof British methods of government throughout the whole continent ofNorth America; and it had entered, blindly and without any conceptionof what the future was to bring forth, upon the path which was to leadto dominion over the vast continent of India, and upon the tremendoustask of grafting the ideas of the West upon the East. 

Such was the outcome of the first two periods in the history ofEuropean imperialism. It left Central and South America under thestagnant and reactionary government of Spain and Portugal; the easterncoast of North America under the control of groups of self-governingEnglishmen; Canada, still inhabited by Frenchmen, under Britishdominance; Java and the Spice Islands, together with the smallsettlement of Cape Colony, in the hands of the Dutch; a medley ofEuropean settlements in the West Indian islands, and a string ofEuropean factories along the coast of West Africa; and the beginning ofan anomalous British dominion established at two points on the coast ofIndia. But of all the European nations which had taken part in thisvast process of expansion, one alone, the British, still retained itsvitality and its expansive power. 

IV

THE ERA OF REVOLUTION, 1763-1825

'Colonies are like fruits, ' said Turgot, the eighteenth-century Frencheconomist and statesman: 'they cling to the mother-tree only until theyare ripe. ' This generalisation, which represented a view very widelyheld during that and the next age, seemed to be borne out in the mostconclusive way by the events of the sixty years following the SevenYears' War. In 1763 the French had lost almost the whole of the empirewhich they had toilsomely built up during a century and a half. Withintwenty years their triumphant British rivals were forced to recognisethe independence of the American colonies, and thus lost the bulk ofwhat may be called the first British Empire. They still retained therecently conquered province of French Canada, but it seemed unlikelythat the French Canadians would long be content to live under an aliendominion: if they had not joined in the American Revolution, it was notbecause they loved the British, but because they hated the Americans. The French Revolutionary wars brought further changes. One result ofthese wars was that the Dutch lost Cape Colony, Ceylon, and Java, though Java was restored to them in 1815. A second result was that whenNapoleon made himself master of Spain in 1808, the Spanish colonies inCentral and South America ceased to be governed from themother-country; and having tasted the sweets of independence, and stillmore, the advantages of unrestricted trade, could never again bebrought into subordination. By 1825 nothing was left of the vastSpanish Empire save the Canaries, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the PhilippineIslands; nothing was left of the Portuguese Empire save a few decayingposts on the coasts of Africa and India; nothing was left of the DutchEmpire save Java and its dependencies, restored in 1815; nothing wasleft of the French Empire save a few West Indian islands; and what hadbeen the British American colonies were now the United States, a greatpower declaring to Europe, through the mouth of President Monroe, thatshe would resist any attempt of the European powers to restore the oldregime in South America. It appeared that the political control ofEuropean states over non-European regions must be short-lived and fullof trouble; and that the influence of Europe upon the non-Europeanworld would henceforth be exercised mainly through new independentstates imbued with European ideas. Imperial aspirations thus seemed tothat and the next generation at once futile and costly. 

Of all these colonial revolutions the most striking was that which toreaway the American colonies from Britain (1764-82); not only because itled to the creation of one of the great powers of the world, and was toafford the single instance which has yet arisen of a daughter-nationoutnumbering its mother-country, but still more because it seemed toprove that not even the grant of extensive powers of self-governmentwould secure the permanent loyalty of colonies. Indeed, from thestandpoint of Realpolitik, it might be argued that in the case ofAmerica self-government was shown to be a dangerous gift; for theAmerican colonies, which alone among European settlements had obtainedthis supreme endowment, were the first, and indeed the only, Europeansettlements to throw off deliberately their connection with themother-country. France and Holland lost their colonies by war, and eventhe Spanish colonies would probably never have thought of severingtheir relations with Spain but for the anomalous conditions created bythe Napoleonic conquest. 

The American Revolution is, then, an event unique at once in itscauses, its character, and its consequences; and it throws a mostimportant illumination upon some of the problems of imperialism. Itcannot be pretended that the revolt of the colonists was due tooppression or to serious misgovernment. The paltry taxes which were itsimmediate provoking cause would have formed a quite negligible burdenupon a very prosperous population; they were to have been spentexclusively within the colonies themselves, and would have been mainlyused to meet a part of the cost of colonial defence, the bulk of whichwas still to be borne by the mother-country. If the colonists had beenwilling to suggest any other means of raising the required funds, theirsuggestions would have been readily accepted. This was made plain atseveral stages in the course of the discussion, but the invitation tosuggest alternative methods of raising money met with no response. Theplain fact is that Britain, already heavily loaded with debt, wasbearing practically the whole burden of colonial defence, and was muchless able than the colonies themselves to endure the strain. As for thelong-established restrictions on colonial trade, which in fact thoughnot in form contributed as largely as the proposals of direct taxationto cause the revolt, they were far less severe, even if they had beenstrictly enforced, than the restrictions imposed upon the trade ofother European settlements. 

It is equally misleading to attribute the blame of the revolt wholly toGeorge III. And the ministers by whom he was served during the criticalyears. No doubt it is possible to imagine a more tactful man thanGeorge Grenville, a more far-seeing and courageous statesman than LordNorth, a less obstinate prince than George III. Himself. But it may bedoubted whether any change of men would have done more than postponethe inevitable. The great Whig apologists who have dictated theaccepted view of British history in the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies have laboured to create the impression that if only Burke, Chatham, and Charles Fox had had the handling of the issue, the tragedyof disruption would have been avoided. But there is no evidence thatany of these men, except perhaps Burke, appreciated the magnitude anddifficulty of the questions that had been inevitably raised in 1764, and must have been raised whoever had been in power; or that they wouldhave been able to suggest a workable new scheme of colonial governmentwhich would have met the difficulty. If they had put forward such ascheme, it would have been wrecked on the resistance of Britishopinion, which was still dominated by the theories and traditions ofthe old colonial system; and even if it had overcome this obstacle, itwould very likely have been ruined by the captious and litigious spiritto which events had given birth among the colonists, especially in NewEngland. 

The root of the matter was that the old colonial system, which hadsuited well enough the needs of the colonies as they were when it wasdevised by the statesmen of Charles II. 's reign, was no longer suitableto their condition now that they had become great and prosperouscommunities of freemen. They enjoyed self-government on a scale moregenerous than any other communities in the world outside of Britain;indeed, in one sense they enjoyed it on a more generous scale thanBritain herself, since political rights were much more widely exercisedin the colonies, owing to the natural conditions of a new andprosperous land, than they were to be, or could be, in Britain untilnearly a century later. No direct taxation had as yet been imposed uponthem without their own consent. They made the laws by which their ownlives were regulated. They were called upon to pay no tribute to thehome government, except the very indirect levy on goods passing throughEngland to or from their ports, and this was nearly balanced by theadvantages which they enjoyed in the British market, and far more thanbalanced by the protection afforded to them by the British fleet. Theywere not even required to raise troops for the defence of their ownfrontiers except of their own free will, and the main burden ofdefending even their landward frontier was borne by the mother-country. But being British they had the instinct of self-government in theirblood and bones, and they found that the control of their own affairswas qualified or limited in two principal ways. 

In the first place, the executive and judicial officers who carried outthe laws were not appointed by them but by the Crown in England: thecolonies were not responsible for the administration of their own laws. In the second place, the regulations by which their foreign trade wasgoverned were determined, not by themselves, but by the Britishparliament: they were not responsible for the control of their owntraffic with the outside world. It is true that the salaries of theexecutive officials and the judges depended upon their grant, and thatany governor who acted in the teeth of colonial opinion would find hisposition quite untenable, so that the colonists exercised a real ifindirect control over administration. It is true also that theyaccepted the general principles of the commercial system, and hadreaped great benefits from it. 

But it is the unfailing instinct of the citizens in a self-governingcommunity to be dissatisfied unless they feel that they have a full andequal share in the control of their own destinies. Deniedresponsibility, they are apt to become irresponsible; and when allallowance has been made for the stupidities of governors and for themistakes of the home authorities, it must be recognised that thethirteen American colonial legislatures often behaved in a veryirresponsible way, and were extremely difficult to handle. They refusedto vote fixed salaries to their judges in order to make their powerfelt, simply because the judges were appointed by the Crown, althoughin doing so they were dangerously undermining judicial independence. They refused in many cases to supply anything like adequate contingentsfor the war against the French and their Indian allies, partly becauseeach legislature was afraid of being more generous than the others, partly because they could trust to the home government to make goodtheir deficiencies. Yet at the same time they did nothing to check, butrather encouraged, the wholesale smuggling by which the traderegulations were reduced to a nullity, though these regulations werenot only accepted in principle by themselves, but afforded the onlycompensation to the mother-country for the cost of colonial defence. Itis as unscientific to blame the colonists and their legislatures forthis kind of action, as it is to blame the British statesmen for theirproposals. It was the almost inevitable result of the conditions amonga free, prosperous, and extremely self-confident people; it was, indeed, the proof that in this young people the greatest politicalideal of western civilisation, the ideal of self-government, had takenfirm root. The denial of responsibility was producing irresponsibility;and even if the Stamp Act and the Tea Duties had never been proposed, this state of things was bound to lead to increasing friction. Nor mustit be forgotten that this friction was accentuated by the contrastbetween the democratic conditions of colonial life, and thearistocratic organisation of English society. 

It ought to have been obvious, long before Grenville initiated his newpolicy in 1764, that the colonial system was not working well; and theone circumstance which had prevented serious conflict was the dangerwhich threatened the colonists in the aggressive attitude of the Frenchto the north and west. Since the individual colonies refused to raiseadequate forces for their own defence, or to co-operate with oneanother in a common scheme, they were dependent for their security uponthe mother-country. But as soon as the danger was removed, as it was in1763, this reason for restraint vanished; and although the greatmajority of the colonists were quite sincerely desirous of retainingtheir membership of the British commonwealth, the conditions wouldinevitably have produced a state of intensifying friction, unless thewhole colonial system had been drastically reconstructed. 

Reconstruction was therefore inevitable in 1764. The Whig policy ofsimply ignoring the issue and 'not reading the dispatches' could nolonger be pursued; it was indeed largely responsible for the mischief. George III. And Grenville deserve the credit of seeing this. But theirscheme of reconstruction not unnaturally amounted to little more than atightening-up of the old system. The trade laws were to be morestrictly enforced. The governors and the judges were to be made moreindependent of the assemblies by being given fixed salaries. Thecolonists were to bear a larger share of the cost of defence, whichfell so unfairly on the mother-country. If the necessary funds could beraised by means approved by the colonists themselves, well and good;but if not, then they must be raised by the authority of the imperialparliament. For the existing system manifestly could not continueindefinitely, and it was better to have the issue clearly raised, evenat the risk of conflict, than to go on merely drifting. 

When the colonists (without suggesting any alternative proposals)contented themselves with repudiating the right of parliament to taxthem, and proceeded to outrageous insults to the king's authority, andthe most open defiance of the trade regulations, indignation grew inBritain. It seemed, to the average Englishman, that the colonistsproposed to leave every public burden, even the cost of judges'salaries, on the shoulders of the mother-country, already loaded with adebt which had been largely incurred in defence of the colonies; but todisregard every obligation imposed upon themselves. A system whereunderthe colony has all rights and no enforcible duties, the mother-countryall duties and no enforcible rights, obviously could not work. That wasthe system which, in the view of the gentlemen of England, thecolonists were bent upon establishing; and, taking this view, theycannot be blamed for refusing to accept such a conclusion. There was noone, either in Britain or in America, capable of grasping theessentials of the problem, which were that, once established, self-government inevitably strives after its own fulfilment; that theseBritish settlers, in whom the British tradition of self-government hadbeen strengthened by the freedom of a new land, would never be contentuntil they enjoyed a full share in the control of their own affairs;and that although they seemed, even to themselves, to be fighting aboutlegal minutiae, about the difference between internal and externalduties, about the legality of writs of assistance, and so forth, thereal issue was the deeper one of the fulfilment of self-government. Could fully responsible self-government be reconciled with imperialunity? Could any means be devised whereby the units in a fellowship offree states might retain full control over their own affairs, and atthe same time effectively combine for common purposes? That was and isthe ultimate problem of British imperial organisation, as it was and isthe ultimate problem of international relations. But the problem, though it now presented itself in a comparatively simple form, wasnever fairly faced on either side of the Atlantic. For the mother andher daughters too quickly reached the point of arguing about theirlegal rights against one another, and when friends begin to argue abouttheir legal rights, the breach of their friendship is at hand. So thedreary argument, which lasted for eleven years (1764-75), led to thestill more dreary war, which lasted for seven years (1775-82); and theonly family of free self-governing communities existing in the worldwas broken up in bitterness. This was indeed a tragedy. For if thegreat partnership of freedom could have been reorganised on conditionsthat would have enabled it to hold together, the cause of liberty inthe world would have been made infinitely more secure. 

The Revolution gave to the Americans the glory of establishing thefirst fully democratic system of government on a national scale thathad yet existed in the world, and of demonstrating that by themachinery of self-government a number of distinct and jealouscommunities could be united for common purposes. The new AmericanCommonwealth became an inspiration for eager Liberals in the old worldas well as in the new, and its successful establishment formed thestrongest of arguments for the democratic idea in all lands. Unhappilythe pride of this great achievement helped to persuade the Americansthat they were different from the rest of the world, and unaffected byits fortunes. They were apt to think of themselves as the inventors andmonopolists of political liberty. Cut off by a vast stretch of oceanfrom the Old World, and having lost that contact with its affairs whichthe relation with Britain had hitherto maintained, they followed butdimly, and without much comprehension, the obscure and complexstruggles wherein the spirit of liberty was working out a new Europe, in the face of difficulties vastly greater than any with which theAmericans had ever had to contend. They had been alienated fromBritain, the one great free state of Europe, and had been persuaded bytheir reading of their own experience that she was a tyrant-power; andthey thus found it hard to recognise her for what, with all her faults, she genuinely was--the mother of free institutions in the modern world, the founder and shaper of their own prized liberties. All these thingscombined to persuade the great new republic that she not only might, but ought to, stand aloof from the political problems of the rest ofthe world, and take no interest in its concerns. This attitude, thenatural product of the conditions, was to last for more than a century, and was to weaken greatly the cause of liberty in the world. 

Although the most obvious features of the half-century following thegreat British triumph of 1763 were the revolt of the American coloniesand the apparently universal collapse of the imperialist ambitions ofthe European nations, a more deeply impressive feature of the periodwas that, in spite of the tragedy and humiliation of the greatdisruption, the imperial impetus continued to work potently in Britain, alone among the European nations; and to such effect that at the end ofthe period she found herself in control of a new empire more extensivethan that which she had lost, and far more various in its character. Having failed to solve one great imperial problem, she promptlyaddressed herself to a whole series of others even more difficult, andfor these she was to find more hopeful solutions. 

When the American revolt began, the Canadian colonies to the north werein an insecure and unorganised state. On the coast, in Nova Scotia andNewfoundland, there was a small British population; but the riverinecolony of Canada proper, with its centre at Quebec, was still purelyFrench, and was ruled by martial law. Accustomed to a despotic system, and not yet reconciled to the British supremacy, the French settlerswere obviously unready for self-government. But the Quebec Act of 1774, by securing the maintenance of the Roman Catholic religion and ofFrench civil law, ensured the loyalty of the French; and this Act isalso noteworthy as the first formal expression of willingness to admitor even welcome the existence, within the hospitable limits of theEmpire, of a variety of types of civilisation. In the new BritishEmpire there was to be no uniformity of Kultur. 

The close of the American struggle, however, brought a new problem. Many thousands of exiles from the revolting colonies, willing tosacrifice everything in order to retain their British citizenship, poured over the borders into the Canadian lands. They settled for thefirst time the rich province of Ontario, greatly increased thepopulation of Nova Scotia, and started the settlement of New Brunswick. To these exiles Britain felt that she owed much, and, despite her ownfinancial distress, expended large sums in providing them with themeans to make a good beginning in their new homes. But it wasimpossible to deny these British settlers, and the emigrants fromBritain who soon began to join them, the rights of self-government, towhich they were accustomed. Their advent, however, in a hitherto Frenchprovince, raised the very difficult problem of racial relationship. They might have been used as a means for Anglicising the earlier Frenchsettlers and for forcing them into a British mould; it may fairly besaid that most European governments would have used them in this way, and many of the settlers would willingly have fallen in with such aprogramme. But that would have been out of accord with the genius ofthe British system, which believes in freedom and variety. Accordingly, by the Act of 1791, the purely French region of Quebec or Lower Canadawas separated from the British region of Ontario or Upper Canada, andboth districts, as well as the coastal settlements, were endowed withself-governing institutions of the familiar pattern--an electedassembly controlling legislation and taxation, a nominated governor andcouncil directing the executive. Thus within eighteen years of theirconquest the French colonists were introduced to self-government. Andwithin nine years of the loss of the American colonies, a new group ofself-governing American colonies had been organised. They weresufficiently content with the system to resist with vigour and successan American invasion in 1812. While the American controversy wasproceeding, one of the greatest of British navigators, Captain Cook, was busy with his remarkable explorations. He was the first to surveythe archipelagoes of the Pacific; more important, he was the realdiscoverer of Australia and New Zealand; for though the Dutch explorershad found these lands more than a century earlier, they had nevertroubled to complete their explorations. Thus a vast new field, eminently suitable for European settlement, was placed at the disposalof Britain. It was utilised with extraordinary promptitude. The loss ofthe American colonies had deprived Britain of her chief dumping-groundfor convicts. In 1788, six years after the recognition of theirindependence, she decided to use the new continent for this purpose, and the penal settlement of Botany Bay began (under unfavourableauspices) the colonisation of Australia. 

But the most important, and the most amazing, achievement of Britain inthis period was the establishment and extension of her empire in India, and the planting within it of the first great gift of Westerncivilisation, the sovereignty of a just and impartial law. This was anovel and a very difficult task, such as no European people had yetundertaken; and it is not surprising that there should have been aperiod of bewildered misgovernment before it was achieved. That itshould have been achieved at all is one of the greatest miracles ofEuropean imperialism. 

By 1763 the East India Company had established a controlling influenceover the Nawabs of two important regions, Bengal and the Carnatic, andhad shown, in a series of struggles, that its control was not to beshaken off. But the company had not annexed any territory, or assumedany responsibility for the government of these rich provinces. Itsagents in the East, who were too far from London to be effectivelycontrolled, enjoyed power without responsibility. They were privilegedtraders, upon whom the native governments dared not imposerestrictions, and (as any body of average men would have done undersimilar circumstances) they gravely abused their position to build uphuge fortunes for themselves. During the fifteen years following thebattle of Plassey (1757) there is no denying that the political powerof the British in India was a mere curse to the native population, andled to the complete disorganisation of the already decrepit nativesystem of government in the provinces affected. It was vain for thedirectors at home to scold their servants. There were only two ways outof the difficulty. One was that the company should abandon India, whichwas not to be expected. The other was that, possessing power, of whichit was now impossible to strip themselves, they should assume theresponsibility for its exercise, and create for their subjects a justand efficient system of government. But the company would not see this. They had never desired political power, but had drifted into thepossession of it in spite of themselves. They honestly disliked theidea of establishing by force an alien domination over subject peoples, and this feeling was yet more strongly held by the most influentialpolitical circles in England. The company desired nothing but trade. Their business was that of traders, and they wanted only to be leftfree to mind their business. So the evils arising from power withoutresponsibility continued, and half-hearted attempts to amend them in1765 and in 1769 only made the conditions worse. The events of theyears from 1757 to 1772 showed that when the superior organisation ofthe West came in contact with the East, mere trading exploitation ledto even worse results than a forcibly imposed dominion; and the onlysolution lay in the wise adaptation of western methods of government toeastern conditions. 

Thus Britain found herself faced with an imperial problem of apparentlyinsuperable difficulty, which reached its most acute stage just at thetime when the American trouble was at its height. The Britishparliament and government intervened, and in 1773 for the first timeassumed some responsibility for the affairs of the East India Company. But they did not understand the Indian problem--how, indeed, shouldthey?--and their first solution was a failure. By a happy fortune, however, the East India Company had conferred the governorship ofBengal (1772) upon the greatest Englishman of the eighteenth century, Warren Hastings. Hastings pensioned off the Nawab, took over directresponsibility for the government of Bengal, and organised a system ofjustice which, though far from perfect, established for the first timethe Reign of Law in an Indian realm. His firm and straightforwarddealings with the other Indian powers still further strengthened theposition of the company; and when in the midst of the American war, ata moment when no aid could be expected from Britain, a combination ofthe most formidable Indian powers, backed by a French fleet, threatenedthe downfall of the company's authority, Hastings' resourceful andinspiring leadership was equal to every emergency. He not only broughtthe company with heightened prestige out of the war, but throughout itscourse no hostile army was ever allowed to cross the frontiers ofBengal. In the midst of the unceasing and desolating wars of India, theterritories under direct British rule formed an island of secure peaceand of justice. That was Hastings' supreme contribution: it was thefoundation upon which arose the fabric of the Indian Empire. Hastingswas not a great conqueror or annexer of territory; the only importantacquisition made during his regime was effected, in defiance of hisprotests, by the hostile majority which for a time overrode him in hisown council, and which condemned him for ambition. His work was to makethe British rule mean security and justice in place of tyranny; and itwas because it had come to mean this that it grew, after his time, withextraordinary rapidity. 

It was not by the desire of the directors or the home government thatit grew. They did everything in their power to check its growth, forthey shrank from any increase to their responsibilities. They evenprohibited by law all annexations, or the making of alliances withIndian powers. [5] But fate was too strong for them. Even a governorlike Lord Cornwallis, a convinced supporter of the policy ofnon-expansion and non-intervention, found himself forced into war, andcompelled to annex territories; because non-intervention wasinterpreted by the Indian powers as a confession of weakness and aninvitation to attack. Non-intervention also gave openings to theFrench, who, since the outbreak of the Revolution, had revived theirold Indian ambitions; and while Bonaparte was engaged in the conquestof Egypt as a half-way house to India (1797), French agents were busybuilding up a new combination of Indian powers against the company. 

[5] India Act of 1784

This formidable coalition was about to come to a head when, in 1798, there landed in India a second man of genius, sent by fate at thecritical moment. In five years, by an amazing series of swiftlysuccessful wars and brilliantly conceived treaties, the MarquessWellesley broke the power of every member of the hostile coalitions, except two of the Mahratta princes. The area of British territory wasquadrupled; the most important of the Indian princes became vassals ofthe company; and the Great Mogul of Delhi himself, powerless now, butalways a symbol of the over-lordship of India, passed under Britishprotection. When Wellesley left India in 1805, the East India Companywas already the paramount power in India south-east of the Sutlej andthe Indus. The Mahratta princes, indeed, still retained a restrictedindependence, and for an interval the home authorities declined topermit any interference with them, even though they were manifestlygiving protection to bands of armed raiders who terrorised anddevastated territories which were under British protection. But thetime came when the Mahrattas themselves broke the peace. Then theirpower also was broken; and in 1818 Britain stood forth as the sovereignruler of India. 

This was only sixty years after the battle of Plassey had establishedBritish influence, though not British rule, in a single province ofIndia; only a little over thirty years after Warren Hastings returnedto England, leaving behind him an empire still almost limited to thatsingle province. There is nothing in history that can be compared withthe swiftness of this achievement, which is all the more remarkablewhen we remember that almost every step in the advance was taken withextreme unwillingness. But the most impressive thing about thisastounding fabric of power, which extended over an area equal to halfof Europe and inhabited by perhaps one-sixth of the human race, was notthe swiftness with which it was created, but the results which flowedfrom it. It had begun in corruption and oppression, but it had grownbecause it had come to stand for justice, order, and peace. In 1818 itcould already be claimed for the British rule in India that it hadbrought to the numerous and conflicting races, religions, and castes ofthat vast and ancient land, three boons of the highest value: politicalunity such as they had never known before; security from the hithertounceasing ravages of internal turbulence and war; and, above all, thesupreme gift which the West had to offer to the East, the substitutionof an unvarying Reign of Law for the capricious wills of innumerableand shifting despots. This is an achievement unexampled in history, andit alone justified the imposition of the rule of the West over theEast, which had at first seemed to produce nothing but evil. It tookplace during the age of Revolution, when the external empires of Europewere on all sides falling into ruin; and it passed at the time almostunregarded, because it was overshadowed by the drama of theRevolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 

The construction of the Indian Empire would of itself suffice to makean age memorable, but it does not end the catalogue of the achievementsof British imperialism in this tremendous period. As a result of theparticipation of Holland in the war on the side of France, the Dutchcolony at the Cape of Good Hope was occupied by Britain. It was firstoccupied in 1798, restored for a brief period in 1801, reoccupied in1806, and finally retained under the treaty settlement of 1815. TheCape was, in fact, the most important acquisition secured to Britain bythat treaty; and it is worth noting that while the other great powerswho had joined in the final overthrow of Napoleon helped themselveswithout hesitation to immense and valuable territories, Britain, whichhad alone maintained the struggle from beginning to end withoutflagging, actually paid the sum of 2, 000, 000 pounds to Holland as acompensation for this thinly peopled settlement. She retained it mainlybecause of its value as a calling-station on the way to India. But itimposed upon her an imperial problem of a very difficult kind. As inCanada, she had to deal here with an alien race of European origin andproud traditions; but this racial problem was accentuated by thefurther problem of dealing with a preponderant and growing negropopulation. How were justice, peace, liberty, and equality of rights tobe established in such a field?

It was, then, an astonishing new empire which had grown up roundBritain during the period when the world was becoming convinced thatcolonial empires were not worth acquiring, because they could not last. It was an empire of continents or sub-continents--Canada, Australia, India, South Africa--not to speak of innumerable scattered islands andtrading-posts dotted over all the seas of the world, which had eithersurvived from an earlier period, or been acquired in order that theymight serve as naval bases. It was spread round the whole globe; itincluded almost every variety of soil, products, and climate; it wasinhabited by peoples of the most varying types; it presented aninfinite variety of political and racial problems. In 1825 this empirewas the only extra-European empire of importance still controlled byany of the historic imperial powers of Western Europe. And at theopening of the nineteenth century, when extra-European empires seemedto have gone out of fashion, the greatest of all imperial questions wasthe question whether the political capacity of the British peoples, having failed to solve the comparatively simple problem of finding amode of organisation which could hold together communities so closelyakin as those of America and the parent islands, would be capable ofachieving any land of effective organisation for this new astoundingfabric, while at the same time securing to all its members that libertyand variety of development which in the case of America had only beenfully secured at the cost of disruption. 

V

EUROPE AND THE NON-EUROPEAN WORLD 1815-1878

When the European peoples settled down, in 1815, after the long wars ofthe French Revolution, they found themselves faced by many problems, but there were few Europeans who would have included among theseproblems the extension of Western civilisation over the as yetunsubjugated portions of the world. Men's hearts were set upon theorganisation of permanent peace: that seemed the greatest of allquestions, and, for a time, it appeared to have obtained a satisfactorysolution with the organisation of the great League of Peace of 1815. But the peace was to be short-lived, because it was threatened by theemergence of a number of other problems of great complexity. Firstamong these stood the problem of nationality: the increasinglyclamorous demand of divided or subject peoples for unity and freedom. Alongside of this arose the sister-problem of liberalism: the demandraised from all sides, among peoples who had never known politicalliberty, for the institutions of self-government which had been provedpracticable by the British peoples, and turned into the object of afervent belief by the preachings of the French. These two causes wereto plunge Europe into many wars, and to vex and divide the peoples ofevery European country, throughout the period 1815-78. And to add tothe complexity, there was growing in intensity during all these yearsthe problem of Industrialism--the transformation of the very bases oflife in all civilised communities, and the consequent development ofwholly new, and terribly difficult, social issues. Preoccupied with allthese questions, the statesmen and the peoples of most European stateshad no attention to spare for the non-European world. They neglected itall the more readily because the events of the preceding period seemedto demonstrate that colonial empires were not worth the cost and labournecessary for their attainment, since they seemed doomed to fallasunder as soon as they began to be valuable. 

Yet the period 1815-78 was to see an extension of European civilisationin the non-European world more remarkable than that of any previousage. The main part in this extension was played by Britain, who foundherself left free, without serious rivalry in any part of the globe, toexpand and develop the extraordinary empire which she possessed in1815, and to deal with the bewildering problems which it presented. Somarked was the British predominance in colonial activity during thisage that it has been called the age of British monopoly, and so far astrans-oceanic activities were concerned, this phrase very nearlyrepresents the truth. But there were other developments of the periodalmost as remarkable as the growth and reorganisation of the BritishEmpire; and it will be convenient to survey these in the first instancebefore turning to the British achievement. 

The place of honour, as always in any great story of Europeancivilisation, belongs to France. Undeterred by the loss of her earlierempire, and unexhausted by the strain of the great ordeal through whichshe had just passed, France began in these years the creation of hersecond colonial empire, which was to be in many ways more splendid thanthe first. Within fifteen years of the fall of Napoleon, the Frenchflag was flying in Algiers. 

The northern coast of Africa, from the Gulf of Syrtis to the Atlantic, which has been in modern times divided into the three districts ofTunis, Algeria, and Morocco, forms essentially a single region, whosecharacter is determined by the numerous chains of the Atlas Mountains. This region, shut off from the rest of Africa not only by the Atlas butby the most impassable of all geographical barriers, the great Saharadesert, really belongs to Europe rather than to the continent of whichit forms a part. Its fertile valleys were once the homes of brilliantcivilisations: they were the seat of the Carthaginian Empire, and at alater date they constituted one of the richest and most civilisedprovinces of the Roman Empire. Their civilisation was wrecked by thatbarbarous German tribe, the Vandals, in the fifth century. It receivedonly a partial and temporary revival after the Mahomedan conquest atthe end of the seventh century, and since that date this once happyregion has gradually lapsed into barbarism. During the modern age itwas chiefly known as the home of ruthless and destructive pirates, whose chief headquarters were at Algiers, and who owned a merelynominal allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey. Ever since the time ofKhair-ed-din Barbarossa, in the early sixteenth century, the powers ofEurope have striven in vain to keep the Barbary corsairs in check. Charles V. , Philip II. , Louis XIV. Attacked them with only temporarysuccess: they continued to terrorise the trade of the Mediterranean, toseize trading-ships, to pillage the shores of Spain and Italy, and tocarry off thousands of Christians into a cruel slavery; RobinsonCrusoe, it may be recalled, was one of their victims. The powers atVienna endeavoured to concert action against them in 1815. They wereattacked by a British fleet in 1816, and by a combined British andFrench fleet in 1819. But all such temporary measures wereinsufficient. The only cure for the ill was that the headquarters ofthe pirate chiefs should be conquered, and brought under civilisedgovernment. 

This task France was rather reluctantly drawn into undertaking, as theresult of a series of insults offered by the pirates to the French flagbetween 1827 and 1830. At first the aim of the conquerors was merely tooccupy and administer the few ports which formed the chief centres ofpiracy. But experience showed that this was futile, since it involvedendless wars with the unruly clansmen of the interior. Gradually, therefore, the whole of Algeria was systematically conquered andorganised. The process took nearly twenty years, and was not completeduntil 1848. In all the records of European imperialism there has beenno conquest more completely justified both by the events which led upto it and by the results which have followed from it. Peace and Lawreign throughout a country which had for centuries been given over toanarchy. The wild tribesmen are unlearning the habits of disorder, andbeing taught to accept the conditions of a civilised life. The greatnatural resources of the country are being developed as never since thedays of Roman rule. No praise can be too high for the work of theFrench administrators who have achieved these results. And it is worthnoting that, alone among the provinces conquered by the Europeanpeoples, Algeria has been actually incorporated in the mother-country;it is part of the French Republic, and its elected representatives sitin the French Parliament. 

In the nature of things the conquest of Algeria could not stand alone. Algeria is separated by merely artificial lines from Tunis on the eastand Morocco on the west, where the old conditions of anarchy stillsurvived; and the establishment of order and peace in the middle areaof this single natural region was difficult, so long as the areas oneither side remained in disorder and war. In 1844 France found itnecessary to make war upon Morocco because of the support which it hadafforded to a rebellious Algerian chief, and this episode illustratedthe close connection of the two regions. But the troops were withdrawnas soon as the immediate purpose was served. France had not yet begunto think of extending her dominion over the areas to the east and westof Algeria. That was to be the work of the next period. 

Further south in Africa, France retained, as a relic of her olderempire, a few posts on the coast of West Africa, notably Senegal. Fromthese her intrepid explorers and traders began to extend theirinfluence, and the dream of a great French empire in Northern Africabegan to attract French minds. But the realisation of this dream alsobelongs to the next period. In the Far East, too, this was a period ofbeginnings. Ever since 1787--before the Revolution--the French hadpossessed a foothold on the coast of Annam, from which Frenchmissionaries carried on their labours among the peoples of Indo-China. Maltreatment of these missionaries led to a war with Annam in 1858, andin 1862 the extreme south of the Annamese Empire--the province ofCochin-China--was ceded to France. Lastly, the French obtained afoothold in the Pacific, by the annexation of Tahiti and the MarquesasIslands in 1842, and of New Caledonia in 1855. But in 1878 the Frenchdominions in the non-European world were, apart from Algeria, of slightimportance. They were quite insignificant in comparison with thefar-spreading realms of her ancient rival, Britain. 

On a much greater scale than the expansion of France was the expansionof the already vast Russian Empire during this period. The history ofRussia in the nineteenth century is made up of a series of alternationsbetween a regime of comparative liberalism, when the interest ofgovernment and people was chiefly turned towards the west, and a regimeof reaction, when the government endeavoured to pursue what was calleda 'national' or purely Russian policy, and to exclude all Westerninfluences. During these long intervals of reaction, attention wasturned eastward; and it was in the reactionary periods, mainly, thatthe Russian power was rapidly extended in three directions--over theCaucasus, over Central Asia, and in the Far East. 

Before this advance, the huge Russian Empire had been (everywhereexcept on the west, in the region of Poland) marked off by very clearlydefined barriers. The Caucasus presented a formidable obstacle betweenRussia and the Turkish and Persian Empires; the deserts of Central Asiaseparated her from the Moslem peoples of Khiva, Bokhara and Turkestan;the huge range of the Altai Mountains and the desert of Gobi cut offher thinly peopled province of Eastern Siberia from the Chinese Empire;while in the remote East her shores verged upon ice-bound andinhospitable seas. Hers was thus an extraordinarily isolated andself-contained empire, except on the side of Europe; and even on theside of Europe she was more inaccessible than any other state, beingall but land-locked, and divided from Central Europe by a belt offorests and marshes. 

The part she had played in the Napoleonic Wars, and in the events whichfollowed them, had brought her more fully into contact with Europe thanshe had ever been before. The acquisition of Poland and Finland, whichshe obtained by the treaties of 1815, had increased this contact, forboth of these states were much influenced by Western ideas. Russia hadpromised that their distinct national existence, and their nationalinstitutions, should be preserved; and this seemed to suggest that theRussian Empire might develop into a partnership of nations of varyingtypes, not altogether unlike the form into which the British Empire wasdeveloping. But this conception had no attraction for the Russian mind, or at any rate for the Russian government; and the reactionary orpure-Russian school, which strove to exclude all alien influences, wasinevitably hostile to it. Hence the period of reaction, and of eastwardconquest, saw also the denial of the promises made in 1815. Polandpreserved her distinct national organisation, in any full degree, onlyfor fifteen years; even in the faintest degree, it was preserved forless than fifty years. Finland was allowed a longer grace, but only, perhaps, because she was isolated and had but a small population: herturn for 'Russification' was to come in due course. The exclusion ofWestern influence, the segregation of Russia from the rest of theworld, and the repudiation of liberty and of varieties of type thusform the main features of the reactionary periods which filled thegreater part of this age; and the activity of Russia in eastwardexpansion was in part intended to forward this policy, by diverting theattention of the Russian people from the west towards the east, and bysubstituting the pride of dominion for the desire for liberty. Henceimperialism came to be identified, for the Russian people, with thedenial of liberty. 

But it is a very striking fact that each of the three main lines ofterritorial advance followed by Russia in Asia during this period ledher to overstep the natural barriers which had made her an isolated andself-dependent empire, brought her into relation with othercivilisations, and compelled her to play her part as one of the factorsin world-politics. 

Russia had begun the conquest of the wild Caucasus region as early as1802; after a long series of wars, she completed it by the acquisitionof the region of Kars in 1878. The mastery of the Caucasus brought herinto immediate relation with the Armenian province of the TurkishEmpire, which she henceforward threatened from the east as well as fromthe west. It brought her into contact also with the Persian Empire, over whose policy, from 1835 onwards, she wielded a growing influence, to the perturbation of Britain. And besides bringing her into farcloser relations with the two greatest Mahomedan powers, it gave her aconsiderable number of Mahomedan subjects, since some of the Caucasustribes belonged to that faith. 

Again, the conquest of Central Asia led her to overstep the barrier ofthe Kirghiz deserts. The wandering Kirghiz and Turkoman tribes of thisbarren region lived largely upon the pillage of caravans, and uponraids into neighbouring countries; they disposed of their spoil (whichoften included Russian captives) mainly in the bazars of Bokhara, Khiva, Samarkand and Khokand--Mahomedan Khanates which occupied themore fertile areas in the southern and south-eastern part of the desertregion. The attempt to control the Turkoman raiders brought Russia intoconflict with these outposts of Islam. Almost the whole of this regionwas conquered in a long series of campaigns between 1848 and 1876. These conquests (which covered an area 1200 miles from east to west and600 miles from north to south) made Russia a great Mahomedan power. They also brought her into direct contact with Afghanistan. Russianagents were at work in Afghanistan from 1838 onwards. The shadow of hervast power, looming over Persia and the Persian Gulf on the one hand, and over the mountain frontiers of India on the other, naturallyappeared highly menacing to Britain. It was the direct cause of theadvance of the British power from the Indus over North-Western India, until it could rest upon the natural frontier of the mountains--anadvance which took place mainly during the years 1839-49. And it formedthe chief source of the undying suspicion of Russia which was thedominant note of British foreign policy throughout the period. 

Another feature of these conquests was that, taken in conjunction withthe French conquest of Algeria and the British conquest of India, theyconstituted the first serious impact of European civilisation upon thevast realm of Islam. Until now the regions of the Middle East which hadbeen subjugated by the followers of Mahomed had repelled every attackof the West. More definite in its creed, and more exacting in itsdemands upon the allegiance of its adherents, than any other religion, Mahomedanism had for more than a thousand years been able to resistwith extraordinary success the influence of other civilisations; and ithad been, from the time of the Crusades onwards, the most formidableopponent of the civilisation of the West. Under the rule of the Turkthe Mahomedan world had become stagnant and sterile, and it had shutout not merely the direct control of the West (which would have beenlegitimate enough), but the influence of Western ideas. All theinnumerable schemes of reform which were based upon the retention ofthe old regime in the Turkish Empire have hopelessly broken down; andthe only chance for an awakening in these lands of ancient civilisationseemed to depend upon the breakdown of the old system under the impactof Western imperialism or insurgent nationalism. It has only beenduring the nineteenth century, as a result of Russian, French, andBritish imperialism, that the resisting power of Islam has begun togive way to the influence of Europe. 

The third line of Russian advance was on the Pacific coast, where inthe years 1858 and 1860 Russia obtained from China the Amur province, with the valuable harbour of Vladivostok. It was an almost empty land, but its acquisition made Russia a Pacific power, and brought her intovery close neighbourhood with China, into whose reserved markets, atthe same period, the maritime powers of the West were forcing anentrance. At the same time Russian relations with Japan, which were tohave such pregnant consequences, were beginning: in 1875 the Japanesewere forced to cede the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, andperhaps we may date from this year the suspicion of Russia whichdominated Japanese policy for a long time to come. 

Thus, while in Europe Russia was trying to shut herself off fromcontact with the world, her advances in Asia had brought her at threepoints into the full stream of world-politics. Her vast empire, thoughfor the most part very thinly peopled, formed beyond all comparison thegreatest continuous area ever brought under a single rule, since itamounted to between eight and nine million square miles; and when thenext age, the age of rivalry for world-power, began, this colossalfabric of power haunted and dominated the imaginations of men. 

A demonstration of the growing power of Western civilisation, even moreimpressive than the expansion of the Russian Empire, was affordedduring these years by the opening to Western influence of the ancient, pot-bound empires of the Far East, China and Japan. The opening ofChina began with the Anglo-Chinese War of 1840, which led to theacquisition of Hong-Kong and the opening of a group of treaty ports toEuropean trade. It was carried further by the combined Franco-Britishwar of 1857-58, which was ended by a treaty permitting the free accessof European travellers, traders, and missionaries to the interior, andproviding for the permanent residence of ambassadors of the signatorypowers at the court of Pekin. All the European states rushed to sharethese privileges, and the Westernising of China had begun. It did nottake place rapidly or completely, and it was accompanied by gravedisturbances, notably the Taiping rebellion, which was only suppressedby the aid of the British General Gordon, in command of a Chinese army. But though the process was slow, it was fully at work by 1878. Theexternal trade of China, nearly all in European hands, had assumedgreat proportions. The missionaries and schoolmasters of Europe andAmerica were busily at work in the most populous provinces. Shanghaihad become a European city, and one of the great trade-centres of theworld. In a lame and incompetent way the Chinese government wasattempting to organise its army on the European model, and to create anavy after the European style. Steamboats were plying on theYang-tse-kiang, and the first few miles of railway were open. Chinesestudents were beginning to resort to the universities and schools ofthe West; and although the conservatism of the Chinese mind was veryslow to make the plunge, it was already plain that this vast hive ofpatient, clever, and industrious men was bound to enter the orbit ofWestern civilisation. 

Meanwhile, after a longer and stiffer resistance, Japan had made up hermind to a great change with amazing suddenness and completeness. Therehad been some preliminary relations with the Western peoples, beginningwith the visits of the American Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854, and afew ports had been opened to European trade. But then came a sudden, violent reaction (1862). The British embassy was attacked; a number ofBritish subjects were murdered; a mixed fleet of British, French, Dutch, and American ships proved the power of Western arms, and Japanbegan to awaken to the necessity of adopting, in self-defence, themethods of these intrusive foreigners. The story of the internalrevolution in Japan, which began in 1866, cannot be told here; enoughthat it led to the most astounding change in history. Emerging from herage-long isolation and from her contentment with her ancient, unchanging modes of life, Japan realised that the future lay with therestless and progressive civilisation of the West; and with a nationalresolve to which there is no sort of parallel or analogy in history, decided that she must not wait to be brought under subjection, but mustadopt the new methods and ideas for herself, if possible withoutshedding too much of her ancient traditions. By a deliberate exerciseof the will and an extraordinary effort of organisation, she becameindustrial without ceasing to be artistic; she adopted parliamentaryinstitutions without abandoning her religious veneration for the personof the Mikado; she borrowed the military methods of the West withoutlosing the chivalrous and fatalist devotion of her warrior-caste; anddevised a Western educational system without disturbing the deeporientalism of her mind. It was a transformation almost terrifying, andto any Western quite bewildering, in its deliberation, rapidity, andcompleteness. Europe long remained unconvinced of its reality. But in1878 the work was, in its essentials, already achieved, and the onestate of non-European origin which has been able calmly to choose whatshe would accept and what she would reject among the systems andmethods of the West, stood ready to play an equal part with theEuropean nations in the later stages of the long imperial struggle. 

One last sphere of activity remains to be surveyed before we turn toconsider the development of the new British Empire: the expansion ofthe independent states which had arisen on the ruins of the firstcolonial empires in the New World. Of the Spanish and Portuguese statesof Central and South America it is not necessary to say much. They hadestablished their independence between 1815 and 1825. But the unhappytraditions of the long Spanish ascendancy had rendered them incapableof using freedom well, and Central and South America became the sceneof ceaseless and futile revolutions. The influence of the AmericanMonroe Doctrine forbade, perhaps fortunately, the intervention of anyof the European states to put an end to this confusion, and Americaherself made no serious attempt to restrain it. It was not until thelater years of our period that any large stream of immigration began toflow into these lands from other European countries than Spain andPortugal, and that their vast natural resources began to be developedby the energy and capital of Europe. But by 1878 the more fertile ofthese states, Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, were being enriched bythese means, were becoming highly important elements in thetrade-system of the world, and were consequently beginning to achieve amore stable and settled civilisation. In some regards this work (thoughit belongs mainly to the period after 1878) constitutes one of thehappiest results of the extra-European activities of the Europeanpeoples during the nineteenth century. It was carried on, in the main, not by governments or under government encouragement, but by theprivate enterprises of merchants and capitalists; and while a verylarge part in these enterprises was played by British and Americantraders and settlers, one of the most notable features of the growth ofSouth America was that it gave play to some of the European peoples, notably the Germans and the Italians, whose part in the politicaldivision of the world was relatively small. 

Far more impressive was the almost miraculous expansion which came tothe United States during this period. When the United States startedupon their career as an independent nation in 1782, their territory waslimited to the lands east of the Mississippi, excluding Florida, whichwas still retained by Spain. Only the eastern margin of this area wasat all fully settled; and the population numbered at most 2, 000, 000, predominantly of British blood. In 1803, by a treaty with Napoleon, theFrench colony of Louisiana, with vast and ill-defined claims to theterritory west of the Mississippi, was purchased from France. Meanwhilethe stream of immigrants from the eastern states, and in a less degreefrom Europe, was pouring over the Alleghany Mountains and occupying thegreat central plain; and by 1815 the population had risen to almost9, 000, 000, still mainly of British stock, though it also includedsubstantial French and German elements, as well as large numbers ofnegro slaves. In 1819 Florida was acquired by purchase from Spain. In1845-48 a revolution in Texas (then part of Mexico), followed by twoMexican wars, led to the annexation of a vast area extending from theGulf of Mexico to the Pacific coast, including the paradise ofCalifornia; while treaties with Britain in 1818 and 1846 determined thenorthern boundary of the States, and secured their control over theregions of Washington and Oregon. 

Thus the imperialist spirit was working as irresistibly in thedemocratic communities of the New World as in the monarchies of Europe. Not content with the possession of vast and almost unpeopled areas, they had spread their dominion from ocean to ocean, and built up anempire less extensive indeed than that of Russia, but even morecompact, far richer in resources, and far better suited to be the homeof a highly civilised people. Into this enormous area there began topour a mighty flood of immigration from Europe, as soon as theNapoleonic wars were over. By 1878 the population of the States hadrisen to about 50, 000, 000, and was greater than that of any Europeanstate save Russia. A new world-state of the first rank had arisen. Itwas made up of contributions from all the European peoples. Those ofBritish stock, especially the Irish, still predominated throughout thisperiod, but the Germans and the Scandinavians were becomingincreasingly numerous, and the Italians, Greeks, Poles, Czechs, RussianJews, and other stocks were beginning to form very substantialelements. It was a melting-pot of races, which had to be somehow weldedinto a nation by the moulding-power of the traditions implanted by theearlier British settlers. It may fairly be said that no community hasever had imposed upon it a more difficult task than the task imposed byFate upon the American people of creating a national unity out of thisheterogeneous material. The great experiment was, during this period, singularly successful. The strength of the national sentiment and ofthe tradition of freedom was very powerfully exhibited in the strain ofthe great Civil War (1861-65) which maintained at a great cost thethreatened unity of the republic, and brought about the emancipation ofthe negro slaves. And the Civil War produced in Abraham Lincoln anational hero, and an exponent of the national character and ideals, worthy to be set beside Washington. The America of Lincoln manifestlystood for Liberty and Justice, the fundamental ideals of Westerncivilisation. 

But in this great moulding tradition of freedom there was one dubiousand narrowing element. Accustomed to regard herself as having achievedliberty by shaking off her connection with the Old World, America wastempted to think of this liberty as something peculiar to herself, something which the 'effete monarchies' of the Old World did not, andcould not, fully understand or share, something which exempted her fromresponsibility for the non-American world, and from the duty of aidingand defending liberty beyond her own limits. In the aboundingprosperity of this fortunate land, liberty was apt to be too readilyidentified merely with the opportunity of securing material prosperity, and the love of liberty was apt to become, what indeed it too often iseverywhere, a purely self-regarding emotion. The distance of therepublic from Europe and its controversies, its economicself-sufficiency, its apparent security against all attack, fosteredand strengthened this feeling. While the peoples of the Old Worldstrove with agony and travail towards freedom and justice, or wrestledwith the task of sharing their own civilisation with the backward racesof the globe, the echo of their strivings penetrated but faintly intothe mind of America, like the noises of the street dimly heard throughthe shuttered windows of a warmed and lighted room. To the citizens ofthe Middle West and the Far West, especially, busy as they were withthe development of vast untapped resources, the affairs of the outerworld necessarily appeared remote and insignificant. Even theirnewspapers told them little about these far-off events. Naturally itappeared that the function of the republic in the progress of the worldwas to till its own garden, and to afford a haven of refuge to theoppressed and impoverished who poured in from all lands; and this ideawas strengthened by the great number of immigrants who were driven tothe New World by the failure of the successive European revolutions ofthe nineteenth century, and by the oppressive tyranny of the Habsburgmonarchy and the Russian despots. 

This attitude of aloofness from, and contempt, or, at the best, indifference, to the Old World was further encouraged by thetraditional treatment of American history. The outstanding event ofthat story was, of course, the breach with Britain, with which theindependent existence of the Republic began, and which constituted alsoalmost its only direct contact with the politics of the Old World. Theview of this conflict which was driven into the national mind by theschool-books, by the annual celebrations of the Fourth of July, and byincessant newspaper writing, represented the great quarrel not as adispute in a family of free communities, in which a new and verydifficult problem was raised, and in which there were faults on bothsides, but as one in which all the right was on one side, as a heroicresistance of free men against malevolent tyranny. This view has beenprofoundly modified by the work of American historians, whoseresearches during the last generation have transformed the treatment ofthe American Revolution. To-day the old one-sided view findsexpression, in books of serious pretensions, only in England; and it isto American scholars that we must have recourse for a more scientificand impartial treatment. But the new and saner view has scarcely yetmade its way into the school-books and the newspapers. If Britain, themother of political liberty in the modern world, the land from whichthese freemen had inherited their own liberties and the spirit whichmade them insist upon their enlargement, was made to appear a tyrantpower, how could it be expected that the mass of Americans, unversed inworld-politics, should follow with sympathy the progress of libertybeyond the limits of their own republic? It was in the light of thistraditional attitude that the bulk of Americans regarded not only thewars and controversies of Europe, but the vast process of Europeanexpansion. All these things did not appear to concern them; they seemedto be caused by motives and ideas which the great republic hadoutgrown, though, as we have already seen, and shall see again, therepublic had by no means outgrown them. The strength of thistraditional attitude, fostered as it was by every circumstance, naturally made the bulk of the American people slow to realise, whenthe great challenge of Germany was forced upon the world, that theproblems of world-politics were as vitally important for them as forall other peoples, and that no free nation could afford to beindifferent to the fate of liberty upon the earth. 

At one moment, indeed, almost at the beginning of the period, itappeared as if this narrow outlook was about to be abandoned. TheLeague of Peace of the great European powers of 1815[6] had, by 1822, developed into a league of despots for the suppression of revolutionarytendencies. They had intervened to crush revolutionary outbreaks inNaples and Piedmont; they had authorised France to enter Spain in orderto destroy the democratic system which had been set up in that countryin 1820. Britain alone protested against these interventions, claimingthat every state ought to be left free to fix its own form ofgovernment; and in 1822 Canning had practically withdrawn from theLeague of Peace, because it was being turned into an engine ofoppression. It was notorious that, Spain once subjugated, the monarchsdesired to go on to the reconquest of the revolting Spanish colonies inSouth America. Britain could not undertake a war on the Continentagainst all the Continental powers combined, but she could preventtheir intervention in America, and Canning made it plain that theBritish fleet would forbid any such action. To strengthen his hands, hesuggested to the American ambassador that the United States might takecommon action in this sense. The result was the famous message ofPresident Monroe to Congress in December 1823, which declared that theUnited States accepted the doctrine of non-intervention, and that theywould resist any attempt on the part of the European monarchs toestablish their reactionary system in the New World. 

[6] See "Nationalism and Internationalism, " p. 155 ff. 

In effect this was a declaration of support for Britain. It was soregarded by Monroe's most influential adviser, Thomas Jefferson. 'GreatBritain, ' he wrote, 'is the nation which can do us the most harm of anyone, or all, on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear thewhole world. With her, then, we should the most sedulously cherish acordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affectionthan to be fighting once more side by side hi the same cause. ' To befighting side by side with Britain in the same cause--the cause of thesecure establishment of freedom in the world--this seemed to theDemocrat Jefferson an object worth aiming at; and the promise of thisseemed to be the main recommendation of the Monroe Doctrine. It wasintended as an alliance for the defence of freedom, not as aproclamation of aloofness; and thus America seemed to be taking hernatural place as one of the powers concerned to strengthen law andliberty, not only within her own borders, but throughout the world. 

The Monroe Doctrine was rapidly accepted as expressing the fundamentalprinciple of American foreign policy. But under the influence of thepowerful tradition which we have attempted to analyse, its significancewas gradually changed; and instead of being interpreted as aproclamation that the great republic could not be indifferent to thefate of liberty, and would co-operate to defend it from attack in allcases where such co-operation was reasonably practicable, it came to beinterpreted by average public opinion as meaning that America had noconcern with the politics of the Old World, and that the states of theOld World must not be allowed to meddle in any of the affairs of eitherAmerican continent. The world of civilisation was to be divided intowater-tight compartments; as if it were not indissolubly one. Yet evenin this rather narrow form, the Monroe doctrine has on the whole beenproductive of good; it has helped to save South America from becomingone of the fields of rivalry of the European powers. 

But it may be doubted whether the mere enunciation of the doctrine, even in this precise and definite form, has of itself been sufficientto secure this end. There is good reason to believe that the doctrinewould not have been safe from challenge if it had not been safeguardedby the supremacy of the British Fleet. For throughout the lasthalf-century all the world has known that any defiance of thisdoctrine, and any attack upon America, would bring Britain into thefield. During all this period one of the factors of world-politics hasbeen the existence of an informal and one-sided alliance betweenBritain and America. The alliance has been informal, because it has notrested upon any treaty or even upon any definite understanding. It hasbeen one-sided, because while average opinion in America has beendistrustful of Britain, has been apt to put unfavourable constructionsupon British policy, and has generally failed to appreciate the valueand significance of the work which Britain has done in the outer world, Britain, on the other hand, has always known that America stood forjustice and freedom; and therefore, however difficult the relationsbetween the two powers might occasionally become, Britain hassteadfastly refused to consider the possibility of a breach withAmerica, and with rare exceptions has steadily given her support toAmerican policy. The action of the British squadron off the Philippinesin 1898, in quietly interposing itself between the threatening Germanguns and the American Fleet, has, in fact, been broadly typical of theBritish attitude. This factor has not only helped to preserve theMonroe Doctrine from challenge, it has indirectly contributed to deepenthe American conviction that it was possible, even in the changedconditions of the modern world, to maintain a complete isolation fromthe political controversies of the powers. 

During the period 1815-1878, then, while the greater part of Europe wasstill indifferent to extra-European affairs, America had developed intoa vast state wherein freedom and law were enthroned, a huge melting-potwherein diverse peoples were being gradually unified and turned into anew nation under the moulding power of a great tradition of liberty. But her geographical position, and certain elements in her tradition, had hitherto led her to abstain from, and even to repudiate, that greatpart in the shaping of the common destinies of civilisation to whichshe was manifestly called by her wealth, her numbers, her freedom, andher share in the traditions of all the European peoples. In the natureof things, whatever some Americans might think, this voluntaryisolation could not continue for ever. It was to be brought to an endby the fevered developments of the next era, and by the great challengeto the liberties of the world in which it culminated. 

VI

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1815-1878

Mighty as had been the achievements of other lands which have beensurveyed in the last section, the main part in the expansion ofEuropean civilisation over the world during the first three-quarters ofthe nineteenth century was played by Britain. For she was engaged inopening out new continents and sub-continents; and she was giving analtogether new significance to the word 'Empire. ' Above all, she washalf-blindly laying the foundations of a system whereby freedom and theenriching sense of national unity might be realised at once in the newand vacant lands of the earth, and among its oldest civilised peoples;she was feeling her way towards a mode of linking diverse and freestates in a common brotherhood of peace and mutual respect. There is nosection of the history of European imperialism more interesting thanthe story of the growth and organisation of the heterogeneous anddisparate empire with which Britain entered upon the new age. 

This development appeared, on the surface, to be quite haphazard, andto be governed by no clearly grasped theories or policy. It is indeedtrue that at all times British policy has not been governed by theory, but by the moulding force of a tradition of ordered freedom. The periodproduced in Britain no imperialist statesman of the first rank, nor didimperial questions play a leading part in the deliberations ofparliament. In fact, the growth of the British Empire and itsorganisation were alike spontaneous and unsystematic; their only guide(but it proved to be a good guide) was the spirit of self-government, existing in every scattered section of the people; and the part playedby the colonists themselves, and by the administrative officers inIndia and elsewhere, was throughout more important than the part playedby colonial secretaries, East Indian directors, parliamentarians andpublicists at home. For that reason the story is not easily handled ina broad and simple way. 

Enjoying almost a monopoly of oversea activity, Britain was free, inmost parts of the world, to expand her dominions as she thought fit. Her statesmen, however, were far from desiring further expansion: theyrightly felt that the responsibilities already assumed were greatenough to tax the resources of any state, however rich and populous. But, try as they would, they could not prevent the inevitable processof expansion. Several causes contributed to produce this result. Perhaps the most important was the unexampled growth of British trade, which during these years dominated the whole world; and the flag is aptto follow trade. A second cause was the pressure of economic distressand the extraordinarily rapid increase of population at home, leadingto wholesale emigration; in the early years of the century anextravagantly severe penal code, which inflicted the penalty of death, commonly commuted into transportation, for an incredible number ofoffences, gave an artificial impetus to this movement. The restless andadventurous spirit of the settlers in huge and unexplored new countriescontributed another motive for expansion. And in some cases, notably inIndia, political necessity seemed to demand annexations. Over amovement thus stimulated, the home authorities found themselves, withthe best will in the world, unable to exercise any effective restraint;and the already colossal British Empire continued to grow. It is nodoubt to be regretted that other European nations were not able duringthis period to take part in the development of the non-European worldin a more direct way than by sending emigrants to America or theBritish lands. But it is quite certain that the growth of Britishterritory is not to be attributed in any degree to the deliberatepolicy, or to the greed, of the home government, which did everythingin its power to check it. 

In India the Russian menace seemed to necessitate the adoption of apolicy towards the independent states of the North-West which broughtan extension of the frontier, between 1839 and 1849, to the greatmountain ranges which form the natural boundary of India in thisdirection; while a succession of intolerable and quite unprovokedaggressions by the Burmese led to a series of wars which resulted inthe annexation of very great territories in the east and north-east:Assam, Aracan, and Tenasserim hi 1825; Pegu and Rangoon in 1853;finally, in 1885-86, the whole remainder of the Burmese Empire. InNorth America settlers found their way across the Rocky Mountains orover the Isthmus of Panama into the region of British Columbia, whichwas given a distinct colonial organisation in 1858; and thecolonisation of the Red River Settlement, 1811-18, which became hi 1870the province of Manitoba, began the development of the great centralplain. In South Africa frontier wars with the Kaffirs, and the restlessmovements of Boer trekkers, brought about an expansion of the limits ofCape Colony, the annexation of Natal, and the temporary annexation ofthe Orange River Settlement and the Transvaal; but all these additionswere most reluctantly accepted; the Orange River Settlement and theTransvaal soon had their independence restored, though the former, atany rate, accepted it unwillingly. In Australia, drafts of new settlersplanting themselves at new points led to the organisation of sixdistinct colonies between 1825 and 1859; and this implied the definiteannexation of the whole continent. New Zealand was annexed in 1839, butonly because British traders had already established themselves in theislands, were in unhappy relations with the natives, and had to bebrought under control. 

But it was not the territorial expansion of the British Empire whichgave significance to this period in its history, but, in a far higherdegree, the new principles of government which were developed duringits course. The new colonial policy which gradually shaped itselfduring this age was so complete a departure from every precedent of thepast, and represented so remarkable an experiment in imperialgovernment, that its sources deserve a careful analysis. It was broughtinto being by a number of distinct factors and currents of opinionwhich were at work both in Britain and in the colonies. 

In the first place, there existed in Britain, as in other Europeancountries, a large body of opinion which held that all colonies weresure to demand and obtain their independence as soon as they becamestrong enough to desire it; that as independent states they could bequite as profitable to the mother-country as they could ever be whilethey remained attached to her, more especially if the parting tookplace without bitterness; and that the wisest policy for Britain topursue was therefore to facilitate their development, to place nobarrier in the way of the increase of their self-government, and toenable them at the earliest moment to start as free nations on theirown account. This was not, indeed, the universal, nor perhaps even thepreponderant, attitude in regard to the colonies in the middle of thenineteenth century. But it was pretty common. It appeared in the mostunexpected quarters, as when Disraeli said that the colonies were'millstones about our necks, ' or as when The Times advocated in aleading article the cession of Canada to the United States, on theground that annexation to the great Republic was the inevitable destinyof that colony, and that it was much better that it should be carriedout in a peaceable and friendly way than after a conflict. It isdifficult to-day to realise that men could ever have entertained suchopinions. But they were widely held; and it must at least be obviousthat the prevalence of these views is quite inconsistent with the ideathat Britain was deliberately following a policy of expansion andannexation in this age. Men who held these opinions (and they were tobe found in every party) regarded with resentment and alarm everyaddition to what seemed to them the useless burdens assumed by thenation, and required to be satisfied that every new annexation ofterritory was not merely justifiable, but inevitable. 

A second factor which contributed to the change of attitude towards thecolonies was the growing influence of a new school of economic thought, the school of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus. Their ideas had begunto affect national policy as early as the twenties, when Huskisson tookthe first steps on the way to free trade. In the thirties the bulk ofthe trading and industrial classes had become converts to these ideas, which won their definite victories in the budgets of Sir Robert Peel, 1843-46, and in those of his disciple Gladstone. The essence of thisdoctrine, as it affected colonial policy, was that the regulation oftrade by government, which had been the main object of the old colonialpolicy, brought no advantages, but only checked its free development. And for a country in the position which Britain then occupied, this wasundeniably true; so overwhelming was her preponderance in world-tradethat every current seemed to set in her direction, and the removal ofartificial barriers, originally designed to train the current towardsher shores, allowed it to follow its natural course. The onlyconsiderable opposition to this body of economic doctrine came fromthose who desired to protect British agriculture; but this motive had(at this period) no bearing upon colonial trade. The triumph of thedoctrine of free trade meant that the principal motive which hadearlier led to restrictions upon the self-government of thecolonies--the desire to secure commercial advantages for themother-country--was no longer operative. The central idea of the oldcolonial system was destroyed by the disciples of Adam Smith; and thereno longer remained any apparent reason why the mother-country shoulddesire to control the fiscal policy of the colonies. An even moreimportant result of the adoption of this new economic doctrine was thatit destroyed every motive which would lead the British government toendeavour to secure for British traders a monopoly of the traffic withBritish possessions. Henceforth all territories administered under thedirect control of the home government were thrown open as freely to themerchants of other countries as to those of Britain herself. The partwhich Britain now undertook in the undeveloped regions of her empire(except in so far as they were controlled by fully self-governingcolonies) was simply that of maintaining peace and law; and in theseregions she adopted an attitude which may fairly be described as theattitude, not of a monopolist, but of a trustee for civilisation. Itwas this policy which explains the small degree of jealousy with whichthe rapid expansion of her territory was regarded by the rest of thecivilised world. If the same policy had been followed, not necessarilyat home, but in their colonial possessions, by all the colonisingpowers, the motives for colonial rivalry would have been materiallydiminished, and the claims of various states to colonial territories, when the period of rivalry began, would have been far more easilyadjusted. 

These were negative forces, leading merely to the abandonment of theolder colonial theories. But there were also positive and constructiveforces at work. First among them may be noted a new body of definitetheory as to the function which colonies ought to play in the generaleconomy of the civilised world. It was held to be their function not(as in the older theory) to afford lucrative opportunities for trade tothe mother-country: so far as trade was concerned it seemed to matterlittle whether a country was a colony or an independent state. But themain object of colonisation was, on this view, the systematicdraining-off of the surplus population of the older lands. This, it wasfelt, could not safely be left to the operation of mere chance; and oneof the great advantages of colonial possessions was that they enabledthe country which controlled them to deal in a scientific way with itssurplus population, and to prevent the reproduction of unhealthyconditions in the new communities, which was apt to result if emigrantswere allowed to drift aimlessly wheresoever chance took them, andreceived no guidance as to the proper modes of establishing themselvesin their new homes. The great apostle of this body of colonial theorywas Edward Gibbon Wakefield; and his book, A View of the Art ofColonisation (1847), deserves to be noted as one of the classics of thehistory of imperialism. He did not confine himself to theory, but wastireless in organising practical experiments. They were carried out, ina curious revival of the methods of the seventeenth century, by meansof a series of colonising companies which Wakefield promoted. Thesettlement of South Australia, the first considerable settlement in theNorth Island of New Zealand, and the two admirably designed andexecuted settlements of Canterbury and Otago in the South Island of NewZealand, were all examples of his methods: with the exception of theNorth Island settlement, they were all very successful. Nor were thesethe only instances of organised and assisted emigration. In 1820 asubstantial settlement, financed by government, was made in the easternpart of Cape Colony, in the region of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, and this brought the first considerable body of British inhabitantsinto South Africa, hitherto almost exclusively Dutch. An unsuccessfulplantation at Swan River in West Australia may also be noted. Systematic and scientific colonisation was thus being studied inBritain during this period as never before. In the view of itsadvocates Britain was the trustee of civilisation for theadministration of the most valuable unpeopled regions of the earth, andit was her duty to see that they were skilfully utilised. So high adegree of success attended some of their efforts that it is impossiblenot to regret that they were not carried further. But they dependedupon Crown control of undeveloped lands. With the growth of fullself-government in the colonies the exercise of these Crown functionswas transferred from the ministry and parliament of Britain to theministries and parliaments of the colonies; and this transference putan end to the possibility of a centralised organisation and directionof emigration. 

A second constructive factor very potently at work during this age wasthe humanitarian spirit, which had become a powerful factor in Britishlife during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It hadreceived perhaps its most practical expression in the abolition of theslave-trade in 1806, and the campaign against the slave-trade in therest of the world became an important object of British policy fromthat time onwards. Having abolished the slave-trade, the humanitariansproceeded to advocate the complete abolition of negro slaverythroughout the British Empire. They won their victory in 1833, when theBritish parliament declared slavery illegal throughout the Empire, andvoted 20, 000, 000 pounds--at a time when British finance was stillsuffering from the burdens of the Napoleonic War--to purchase fromtheir masters the freedom of all the slaves then existing in theEmpire. It was a noble deed, but it was perhaps carried out a littletoo suddenly, and it led to grave difficulties, especially in the WestIndies, whose prosperity was seriously impaired, and in South Africa, where it brought about acute friction with the slave-owning Boerfarmers. But it gave evidence of the adoption of a new attitude towardsthe backward races, hitherto mercilessly exploited by all theimperialist powers. One expression of this attitude had already beenafforded by the organisation (1787) of the colony of Sierra Leone, onthe West African coast, as a place of refuge for freed slaves desiringto return to the land of their fathers. 

It was principally through the activity of missionaries that this newpoint of view was expressed and cultivated. Organised missionaryactivity in Britain dates from the end of the eighteenth century, butits range grew with extraordinary rapidity throughout the period. Andwherever the missionaries went, they constituted themselves theprotectors and advocates of the native races among whom they worked. Often enough they got themselves into bad odour with the Europeantraders and settlers with whom they came in contact. But through theirpowerful home organisations they exercised very great influence overpublic opinion and over government policy. The power of 'Exeter Hall, 'where the religious bodies and the missionary societies held theirmeetings in London, was at its height in the middle of the nineteenthcentury, and politicians could not afford to disregard it, even if theyhad desired to do so. This influence, supporting the trend ofhumanitarian opinion, succeeded in establishing it as one of theprinciples of British imperial policy that it was the duty of theBritish government to protect the native races against the exploitationof the European settlers, and to guide them gently into a civilised wayof life. It is a sound and noble principle, and it may fairly be saidthat it has been honestly carried out, so far as the powers of the homegovernment rendered possible. No government in the world controls agreater number or variety of subjects belonging to the backward racesthan the British; no trading nation has had greater opportunities forthe oppressive exploitation of defenceless subjects. Yet the graveabuse of these opportunities has been infrequent. There have been inthe history of modern British imperialism sporadic instances ofinjustice, like the forced labour of Kanakas in the Pacific. But therehave been no Congo outrages, no Putumayo atrocities, no Pequena slavescandals, no merciless slaughter like that of the Hereros in GermanSouth-West Africa. 

The principle of the protection of backward peoples has, however, sometimes had an unfortunate influence upon colonial policy; and therewas no colony in which it exercised a more unhappy effect than SouthAfrica. Here the Boer farmers still retained towards their nativeneighbours the attitude which had been characteristic of all theEuropean peoples in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: theyregarded the negro as a natural inferior, born to servitude. It is notsurprising that no love was lost between the Boers and themissionaries, who appeared as the protectors of the negroes, and whoserepresentations turned British opinion violently against the whole Boercommunity. This was in itself a sufficiently unfortunate result: itlies largely at the base of the prolonged disharmony which divided thetwo peoples in South Africa. The belief that the Boers could not betrusted to deal fairly with the natives formed, for a long period, thechief reason which urged the British Government to retain their controlover the Boers, even when they had trekked away from the Cape (1836)and established themselves beyond the Orange and the Vaal rivers; andthe conflict of this motive with the desire to avoid any increase ofcolonial responsibilities, and with the feeling that if the Boersdisliked the British system, they had better be left in freedom toorganise themselves in their own way, accounts for the curiousvacillation in the policy of the period on this question. At first thetrekkers were left to themselves; then the lands which they hadoccupied were annexed; then their independence was recognised; andfinally, when, at the end of the period, they seemed to be causing adangerous excitement among the Zulus and other native tribes, theTransvaal was once more annexed; with the result that revolt broke out, and the Majuba campaign had to be fought. 

Again, tenderness for the natives led to several curious and not verysuccessful experiments in organisation. The annexation of Natal waslong delayed because it was held that this area ought to form a nativereserve, and fruitless attempts were made to restrict the settlement ofEuropeans in this empty and fertile land. An attempt was also made toset up a series of native areas under British protection, from whichthe white settler was excluded. British Kaffraria, Griqualand East andGriqualand West were examples of this policy, which is stillrepresented, not unsuccessfully, by the great protected area ofBasutoland. But, on the whole, these experiments in the handling of thenative problem in South Africa did more harm than good. They wereunsuccessful mainly because South Africa was a white man's country, into which the most vigorous of the native races, those of the Bantustock (Kaffirs, Zulus, Matabili, etc. ), were more recent immigrantsthan the white men themselves. Owing to their warlike character andrapidly growing numbers they constituted for a long time a veryformidable danger; and neither the missionaries nor the homeauthorities sufficiently recognised these facts. 

Perhaps the most unhappy result of this friction over the nativequestion, apart from the alienation of Boer and Briton which itproduced, was the fact that it was the principal cause of the longdelay in establishing self-governing institutions in South Africa. Thehome government hesitated to give to the colonists full control overtheir own affairs, because it distrusted the use which they were likelyto make of their powers over the natives; even the normal institutionsof all British colonies were not established in Cape Colony till 1854, and in Natal till 1883. But although in this case the new attitudetowards the backward races led to some unhappy results, the spiritwhich inspired it was altogether admirable, and its growing strengthaccounts in part for the real degree of success which has been achievedby British administrators in the government of regions not suited forthe settlement of Europeans in large numbers. Indeed, this spirit hascome to be one of the outstanding features of modern Britishimperialism. 

It was not only in the treatment of backward races that thehumanitarian spirit made itself felt. It was at work also in thegovernment of the highly developed civilisations of India, where, during this period, British power began to be boldly used to put an endto barbarous or inhumane practices which were supported or tolerated bythe religious beliefs or immemorial social usages of India. Suchpractices as thagi, or meria sacrifices, or female infanticide, or, above all, sati, had been left undisturbed by the earlier rulers ofBritish India, because they feared that interference with them would beresented as an infraction of Indian custom or religion. They were nowboldly attacked, and practically abolished, without evil result. 

Alongside of this new courage in measures that seemed to be dictated bythe moral ideas of the West, there was to be seen growing throughoutthis period a new temper of respect for Indian civilisation and adesire to study and understand it, and to safeguard its best features. The study of early Indian literature, law, and religious philosophy hadindeed been begun in the eighteenth century by Sir William Jones andNathaniel Halhed, with the ardent encouragement of Warren Hastings. Butin this as in other respects Hastings was ahead of the politicalopinion of his time; the prevalent idea was that the best thing forIndia would be the introduction, so far as possible, of Britishmethods. This led to the absurdities of the Supreme Court, establishedin 1773 to administer English law to Indians. It led also to the greatblunder of Cornwallis's settlement of the land question in Bengal, which was an attempt to assimilate the Indian land-system to that ofEngland, and resulted in an unhappy weakening of the villagecommunities, the most healthy features of Indian rural life. In thenineteenth century this attitude was replaced by a spirit of respectfor Indian traditions and methods of organisation, and by a desire toretain and strengthen their best features. The new attitude was perhapsto be seen at its best in the work of Mountstuart Elphinstone, a greatadministrator who was also a profound student of Indian history, and avery sympathetic observer and friend of Indian customs and modes oflife. But the same spirit was exemplified by the whole of theremarkable generation of statesmen of whom Elphinstone was one. Theyestablished the view that it was the duty of the British power toreorganise India, indeed, but to reorganise it on lines in accordancewith its own traditions. Above all, the principle was in thisgeneration very definitely established that India, like other greatdependencies, must be administered in the interests of its own people, and not in the interests of the ruling race. That seems to us to-day aplatitude. It would not have seemed a platitude in the eighteenthcentury. It would not seem a platitude in modern Germany. And it maysafely be said that the enunciation of such a doctrine would haveseemed merely absurd in any of the earlier historical empires. In 1833an official report laid before the British parliament contained theseremarkable words: 'It is recognised as an indisputable principle, thatthe interests of the Native Subjects are to be consulted in preferenceto those of Europeans, wherever the two come in competition. ' In allthe records of imperialism it would be hard to find a parallel to thisformal statement of policy by the supreme government of a ruling race. When such a statement could be made, it is manifest that the meaning ofthe word Empire had undergone a remarkable transformation. No one canread the history of British rule in India during this period withoutfeeling that, in spite of occasional lapses, this was its real spirit. 

But the most powerful constructive element in the shaping of the newimperial policy of Britain was the strength of the belief in the ideaof self-government, as not only morally desirable but practicallyefficacious, which was to be perceived at work in the political circlesof Britain during this age. Self-government had throughout the modernage been a matter of habit and practice with the British peoples; nowit became a matter of theory and belief. And from this resulted a greatchange of attitude towards the problems of colonial administration. TheAmerican problem in the eighteenth century had arisen ultimately out ofthe demand of the Americans for unqualified and responsible controlover their own affairs: the attitude of the Englishman in reply to thisdemand (though he never clearly analysed it) was, in effect, thatself-government was a good and desirable thing, but that on the scaleon which the Americans claimed it, it would be fatal to the unity ofthe Empire, and the unity of the Empire must come first. Faced bysimilar problems in the nineteenth century, the Englishman's responsegenerally was that self-government on the fullest scale was the rightof all who were fit to exercise it, and the most satisfactory workingsolution of political problems. Therefore the right must be granted;and the unity of the Empire must take care of itself. No doubt thisattitude was more readily adopted because of the widespread belief thatin fact the colonies would all sooner or later cut their connectionwith the mother-country. But it was fully shared by men who did nothold this view, and who believed strongly in the possibility anddesirability of maintaining imperial unity. It was shared, for example, by Wakefield, a convinced imperialist if ever there was one, and bythat great colonial administrator, Sir George Grey. It was shared byLord Durham and by Lord John Russell, who were largely responsible forthe adoption of the new policy. Their belief and hope was that thecommon possession of free institutions of kindred types would in factform the most effective tie between the lands which enjoyed them. Thishope obtained an eloquent expression in the speech in which, in 1852, Russell introduced the bill for granting to the Australian coloniesself-government on such a scale as amounted almost to independence. Itis not true, as is sometimes said, that the self-governing institutionsof the colonies were established during this period owing to theindifference of the home authorities, and their readiness to put an endto the connection. The new policy of these years was deliberatelyadopted; and although its acceptance by parliament was rendered easierby the prevalence of disbelief in the permanence of the imperial tie, yet, on the part of the responsible men, it was due to far-sightedstatesmanship. 

The critical test of the new colonial policy, and the most dramaticdemonstration of its efficacy, were afforded by Canada, where, duringthe thirties, the conditions which preceded the revolt of the Americancolonies were being reproduced with curious exactness. Theself-governing institutions established in the Canadian colonies in1791 very closely resembled those of the American colonies before therevolution: they gave to the representative houses control overtaxation and legislation, but neither control over, nor responsibilityfor, the executive. And the same results were following. Incompleteself-government was striving after its own fulfilment: the denial ofresponsibility was producing irresponsibility. These was the sameunceasing friction between governors and their councils on the onehand, and the representative bodies on the other hand; and theassemblies were showing the same unreasonableness in refusing to meetmanifest public obligations. This state of things was becoming steadilymore acute in all the colonies, but it was at its worst in the provinceof Quebec, where the constitutional friction was embittered by a racialconflict, the executive body being British, while the great majority ofthe assembly was French; and the conflict was producing a verydangerous alienation between the two peoples. The French colonists hadquite forgotten the gratitude they had once felt for the maintenance oftheir religion and of their social organisation, and there was a strongparty among them who were bent upon open revolt, and hoped to be ableto establish a little isolated French community upon the St. Lawrence. This party of hotheads got the upper hand, and their agitationculminated in the rebellion of Papineau in 1837. In the other colonies, and especially in Upper Canada, the conditions were almost equallyominous; when Papineau revolted in Quebec, William Mackenzie led asympathetic rising in Ontario. The situation was quite as alarming asthe situation in the American colonies had been in 1775. It is truethat the risings were easily put down. But mere repression formed nosolution, any more than a British victory in 1775 would have formed asolution of the American question. 

Realising this, the Whig government sent out Lord Durham, one of theirown number, to report on the whole situation. Durham was one of themost advanced Liberals in Britain, a convinced believer in the virtuesof self-government, and he took out with him two of the ablestadvocates of scientific colonisation, Edward Gibbon Wakefield andCharles Buller. Durham's administrative work was not a success: hishigh-handed deportation of some of the rebel leaders was stronglycondemned, and he was very quickly recalled. But he had had time tostudy and understand the situation, and he presented a masterly Reporton Canada, which is one of the classics in the history of Britishimperialism. His explanation of the unhappy condition of Canadianpolitics was not (as some were tempted to say) that the colonists hadbeen given too much liberty, but that they had not been given enough. They must be made to feel their responsibility for the working of thelaws which they adopted, and for the welfare of the whole community. Asfor the conflict of races, its only cure was that both should be madeto feel their common responsibility for the destinies of the communityin which both must remain partners. 

Lord Durham's recommendations were fully carried into effect, partly inthe Canada Act of 1840, but more especially by a simple instructionissued to governors, that their ministries must henceforward be chosen, in the British fashion, on the ground that they commanded the supportof a majority in the elected house; and that the governors themselvesmust be guided by their advice. A crucial test of this new policy camein 1849, when the ministers and the parliamentary majority proposed tovote compensation for property destroyed in 1837. This to many seemedcompensation for rebels, and the indignant loyalists were urgent thatthe governor, Lord Elgin, should veto it. He firmly declined to do so;and thus gave an invaluable lesson to both parties. The Canadianpeople, acting through their representatives, were now responsible fortheir actions. If they chose to vote for irresponsible and dangerousdevices, they must henceforward realise that they must themselvesanswer for the consequences. 

Thus, within a few years of the outbreak of rebellion in two provinces, full power had been entrusted to the rebels themselves. It was a daringpolicy, only to be justified by a very confident belief in the virtuesof self-government. But it was completely and triumphantly successful. Henceforward friction between the Canadian colonies and themother-country ceased: if there were grounds for complaint in the stateof Canadian affairs, the Canadians must now blame their own ministers, and the remedy lay in their own hands. And what was the outcome? Twentyyears later the various colonies, once as full of mutual jealousies asthe American colonies had been before 1775, began to discuss thepossibility of federation. With the cordial approval and co-operationof the home government, they drew up a scheme for the formation of aunited Dominion of Canada, including distant British Columbia and thecoastal colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince EdwardIsland; and the adoption of this scheme, in 1867, turned Canada from abundle of separate settlements into a great state. To this state thehome government later made over the control of all the vast and richlands of the North-West, and so the destinies of half a continentpassed under its direction. It was a charge, the magnitude andchallenge of which could not but bring forth all that there was ofstatesmanship among the Canadian people; and it has not failed to do so. 

One feature of Canadian constitutional development remains to be noted. It might have been expected that the Canadians would have been temptedto follow the political model of their great neighbour the UnitedStates; and if their development had been the outcome of friction withthe mother-country, no doubt they would have done so. But theypreferred to follow the British model. The keynote of the Americansystem is division of power: division between the federal governmentand the state governments, which form mutual checks upon one another;division between the executive and the legislature, which areindependent of one another at once in the states and in the federalgovernment, both being directly elected by popular vote. The keynote ofthe British system is concentration of responsibility by thesubordination of the executive to the legislature. The Canadiansadopted the British principle: what had formerly been distinct coloniesbecame, not 'states' but 'provinces, ' definitely subordinated to thesupreme central government; and whether in the federal or in theprovincial system, the control of government by the representative bodywas finally established. This concord with the British system is a factof real import. It means that the political usages of the home-countryand the great Dominion are so closely assimilated that politicalco-operation between them is far easier than it otherwise might be; itincreases the possibility of a future link more intimate than that ofmere co-operation. 

Not less whole-hearted or generous than the treatment of the problemsof Canadian government was the treatment of the same problem inAustralia. Here, as a matter of course, all the colonies had beenendowed, at the earliest possible date, with the familiar system ofrepresentative but not responsible government. No such acute frictionas had occurred in Canada had yet shown itself, though signs of itsdevelopment were not lacking. But in 1852 an astonishing step was takenby the British parliament: the various Australian colonies wereempowered to elect single-chamber constituent assemblies to decide theforms of government under which they wished to live. They decided inevery case to reproduce as nearly as possible the British system:legislatures of two chambers, with ministries responsible to them. Thus, in Australia as in Canada, the daughter-peoples were made to feelthe community of their institutions with those of the mother-country, and the possibility of intimate and easy co-operation was increased. Two years later, in 1854, New Zealand was endowed with the same system. Among all the British realms in which the white man was predominant, only South Africa was as yet excluded from this remarkable development. The reasons for this exclusion we have already noted: its consequenceswill occupy our attention in later pages. 

Very manifestly the empire which was developing on such lines was notan empire in the old sense--a dominion imposed by force upon unwillingsubjects. That old word, which has been used in so many senses, wasbeing given a wholly new connotation. It was being made to mean a freepartnership of self-governing peoples, held together not by force, butin part by common interests, and in a still higher degree by commonsentiment and the possession of the same institutions of liberty. 

In the fullest sense, however, this new conception of empire appliedonly to the group of the great self-governing colonies. There were manyother regions, even before 1878, included within the British Empire, though as yet it had not incorporated those vast protectorates overregions peopled by backward races which have been added during the lastgeneration. There were tropical settlements like British Honduras, British Guiana, Sierra Leone, and Cape Coast Castle; there were manyWest Indian Islands, and scattered possessions like Mauritius andHong-Kong and Singapore and the Straits Settlements; there weregarrison towns or coaling-stations like Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, St. Helena. To none of these were the institutions of full responsibleself-government granted. Some of them possessed representativeinstitutions without responsible ministries; in others the governor wasassisted by a nominated council, intended to express local opinion, butnot elected by the inhabitants; in yet others the governor ruledautocratically. But in all these cases the ultimate control of policywas retained by the home government. And in this general category, asyet, the South African colonies were included. Why were thesedistinctions drawn? Why did the generation of British statesmen, whohad dealt so generously with the demand for self-government in Canadaand Australia, stop short and refuse to carry out their principles inthese other cases?

It is characteristic of British politics that they are never merely orfully logical, and that even when political doctrines seem to enjoy themost complete ascendancy, they are never put into effect withoutqualifications or exceptions. The exceptions already named to theestablishment of full self-government were due to many and varyingcauses. In the first place, there was in most of these cases noeffective demand for full self-government; and it may safely beasserted that any community in which there is no demand forself-governing institutions is probably not in a condition to work themwith effect. Some of these possessions were purely military posts, likeGibraltar and Aden, and were necessarily administered as such. Otherswere too small and weak to dream of assuming the full privileges. Butin the majority of cases one outstanding common feature will appear oncloser analysis. Nearly all these territories were tropical orsemi-tropical lands, whose British inhabitants were not permanentsettlers, but were present solely for the purposes of trade or otherexploitation, while the bulk of the population consisted of backwardpeoples, whose traditions and civilisation rendered their effectiveparticipation in public affairs quite impracticable. In such cases, tohave given full political power to the small and generally shiftingminority of white men would have been to give scope to many evils; andto have enfranchised, on a mere theory, the mass of the populationwould have been to produce still worse results. It would have sentencedthese communities to the sort of fate which has befallen the beautifulisland of Hayti, where the self-government of a population ofemancipated negro slaves has brought nothing but anarchy anddegradation. In such conditions the steady Reign of Law is the greatestboon that can be given to white settlers and coloured subjects alike;and the final authority is rightly retained by the home government, inspired, as British opinion has long required that it should be, bythe principle that the rights of the backward peoples must besafeguarded. Under this system, both law and a real degree of libertyare made possible; whereas under a doctrinaire application of thetheory of self-government, both would vanish. 

But there remains the vast dominion of India, which falls neither intothe one category nor into the other. Though there are many primitiveand backward elements among its vast population, there are also peoplesand castes whose members are intellectually capable of meeting on equalterms the members of any of the ruling races of the West. Yet duringthis age, when self-government on the amplest scale was being extendedto the chief regions of the British Empire, India, the greatestdominion of them all, did not obtain the gift of representativeinstitutions even on the most modest scale. Why was this?

It was not because the ruling race was hostile to the idea, or desiredmerely to retain its own ascendancy. On the contrary, both in Britainand among the best of the British administrators in India, it wasincreasingly held that the only ultimate justification for the Britishpower in India would be that under its guidance the Indian peoplesshould be gradually enabled to govern themselves. As early as 1824, when in Europe sheer reaction was at its height, this view was beingstrongly urged by one of the greatest of Anglo-Indian administrators, Sir Thomas Munro, a soldier of distinction, then serving as governor ofMadras. 'We should look upon India, ' he wrote, 'not as a temporarypossession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until thenatives shall have abandoned most of their superstitions andprejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regulargovernment for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Wheneversuch a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countriesthat the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn. Thatthe desirable change contemplated may in some after age be effected inIndia, there is no cause to despair. Such a change was at one time inBritain itself at least as hopeless as it is here. When we reflect howmuch the character of nations has always been influenced by that ofgovernments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk intobarbarism, while others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highestpoint of civilisation, we shall see no reason to doubt that if wepursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improvethe character of our Indian subjects as to make them able to govern andprotect themselves. '

In other words, self-government was the desirable end to be pursued inIndia as elsewhere; but in India there were many and grave obstacles toits efficient working, which could only slowly be overcome. In thefirst place, India is more deeply divided in race, language, andreligion than any other region of the world. Nowhere else is there sucha medley of peoples of every grade of development, from the almostsavage Bhil to the cultivated and high-bred Brahmin or Rajput orMahomedan chief. There are sharp regional differences, as great asthose between the European countries; but cutting across these thereare everywhere the rigid and impermeable distinctions of caste, whichhave no parallel anywhere else in the world. The experience of theAustro-Hungarian Empire, whose confusion of races is simplicity itselfin comparison with the chaos of India, affords a significantdemonstration of the fact that parliamentary institutions, if they areestablished among deeply divided peoples, must almost inevitably beexploited for the purpose of racial ascendancy by the most vigorous orthe best-organised elements among the people; and a very ugly tyrannyis apt to result, as it has resulted in Austro-Hungary. Thisconsequence would almost certainly follow the establishment of a fullrepresentative system in India. In the cities of mediaeval Italy, whenthe conflict of parties became so acute that neither side could expectjustice from the other, the practice grew up of electing a podesta fromsome foreign city to act as an impartial arbiter. The British power inIndia has played the part of a podesta in restraining and mediatingbetween the conflicting peoples and religions of India. 

But again (and this is even more fundamental), for thousands of yearsthe history of India has been one long story of conquests and tyranniesby successive ruling races. Always Might has been Right, so that thelover of righteousness could only pursue it, like the mediaevalascetic, by cutting himself off from the world, abjuring all socialties, and immolating the flesh in order to live by the spirit. AlwaysLaw had been, in the last resort, the Will of the Stronger, not thedecree of impartial justice. Always the master-races, the predatorybands, the ruling castes, had expected to receive, and the mass of thepeople had been accustomed to give, the most abject submission; andthese habits were difficult to overcome. 'In England, ' says Sir ThomasMunro, 'the people resist oppression, and it is their spirit whichgives efficacy to the law: in India the people rarely resistoppression, and the law intended to secure them from it can thereforederive no aid from themselves. . . . It is in vain to caution themagainst paying by telling them that the law is on their side, and willsupport them in refusing to comply with unauthorised demands. Allexhortations on this head are thrown away, and after listening to themthey will the very next day submit to extortion as quietly as before. 'How could representative institutions be expected to work under suchconditions? They would have lacked the very foundation upon which alonethey can firmly rest: respect for law, and public co-operation in theenforcement of it. Thus the supreme service which the government ofIndia could render to its people was the establishment and maintenanceof the Reign of Law, and of the liberty which it shelters. In suchconditions representative government would be liable to bring, notliberty, but anarchy and the renewal of lawless oppression. 

But although the extension of the representative system to Indianeither was nor could be attempted in this age, very remarkableadvances were made towards turning India in a real sense into aself-governing country. It ceased to be regarded or treated as asubject dominion existing solely for the advantage of its conquerors. That had always been its fate in all the long centuries of its history;and in the first period of British rule the trading company which hadacquired this amazing empire had naturally regarded it as primarily asource of profit. In 1833 the company was forbidden to engage in trade, and the profit-making motive disappeared. The shareholders stillcontinued to receive a fixed dividend out of the Indian revenues, butthis may be compared to a fixed debt-charge, an annual payment forcapital expended in the past; and it came to an end when the companywas abolished in 1858. Apart from this dividend, no sort of tribute wasexacted from India by the ruling power. India was not even required tocontribute to the upkeep of the navy, which protected her equally withthe rest of the Empire, or of the diplomatic service, which was oftenconcerned with her interests. She paid for the small army which guardedher frontiers; but if any part of it was borrowed for service abroad, its whole pay and charges were met by Britain. She paid the salariesand pensions of the handful of British administrators who conducted hergovernment, but this was a very small charge in comparison with thelavish outlay of the native princes whom they had replaced. India hadbecome a self-contained state, whose whole resources were expendedexclusively upon her own needs, and expended with the most scrupuloushonesty, and under the most elaborate safeguards. 

They were expended, moreover, especially during the later part of thisperiod, largely in equipping her with the material apparatus of moderncivilisation. Efficient police, great roads, a postal service cheaperthan that of any other country, a well-planned railway system, and, above all, a gigantic system of irrigation which brought undercultivation vast regions hitherto desert--these were some of the boonsacquired by India during the period. They were rendered possible partlyby the economical management of her finances, partly by the liberalexpenditure of British capital. Above all, the period saw the beginningof a system of popular education, of which the English language becamethe main vehicle, because none of the thirty-eight recognisedvernacular tongues of India either possessed the necessary literature, or could be used as a medium for instruction in modern science. In 1858three universities were established; and although their system wasill-devised, under the malign influence of the analogy of LondonUniversity, a very large and increasing number of young graduates, trained for modern occupations, began to filter into Indian society, and to modify its point of view. All speaking and writing English, andall trained in much the same body of ideas, they possessed a similarityof outlook and a vehicle of communication such as had never beforelinked together the various races and castes of India. This large andgrowing class, educated in some measure in the learning of the West, formed already, at the end of the period, a very important new elementin the life of India. They were capable of criticising the work oftheir government; they were not without standards of comparison bywhich to measure its achievements; and, aided by the large freedomgranted to the press under the British system, they were able to beginthe creation of an intelligent public opinion, which was apt, in itsfirst movements, to be ill-guided and rash, but which was neverthelessa healthy development. That this newly created class of educated menshould produce a continual stream of criticism, and that it should evenstimulate into existence public discontents, is by no means acondemnation of the system of government which has made thesedevelopments possible. On the contrary, it is a proof that the systemhas had an invigorating effect. For the existence and the expression ofdiscontent is a sign of life; it means that there is an end of thatutter docility which marks a people enslaved body and soul. India hasnever been more prosperous than she is to-day; she has never beforeknown so impartial a system of justice as she now possesses; and theseare legitimate grounds of pride to her rulers. But they may even morejustly pride themselves upon the fact that in all her history India hasnever been so frankly and incessantly critical of her government as sheis to-day; never so bold in the aspirations for the future which hersons entertain. 

The creation of the new class of Western-educated Indians alsofacilitated another development which the British government definitelyaimed at encouraging: the participation of Indians in the conduct ofadministration in their own land. The Act of 1833 had laid it down as afundamental principle that 'no native of the said territories . . . Shallby reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any ofthem, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment. ' Thegreat majority of the minor administrative posts had always been heldby Indians; but until 1833 it had been held that the maintenance ofBritish supremacy required that the higher offices should be reservedto members of the ruling race. This restriction was now abolished; butit was not until the development of the educational system had produceda body of sufficiently trained men that the new principle could produceappreciable results; and even then, the deficiencies of an undevelopedsystem of training, combined with the racial and religious jealousieswhich the government of India must always keep in mind, imposedlimitations upon the rapid increase of the number of Indians holdingthe higher posts. Still, the principle had been laid down, and wasbeing acted upon. And that also constituted a great step towardsself-government. 

India in 1878 was governed, under the terms of a code of law based uponIndian custom, by a small body of British officials, among whom leadingIndians were gradually taking their place, and who worked in detailthrough an army of minor officials, nearly all of Indian birth, andselected without regard to race or creed. She was a self-containedcountry whose whole resources were devoted to her own needs. She wasprospering to a degree unexampled in her history; she had achieved apolitical unity never before known to her; she had been given thesupreme boon of a just and impartial law, administered without fear orfavour; and she had enjoyed a long period of peace, unbroken by anyattack from external foes. Here also, as fully as in the self-governingcolonies, membership of the British Empire did not mean subjection tothe selfish dominion of a master, or the subordination to that master'sinterests of the vital interests of the community. It meant theestablishment among a vast population of the essential gifts of Westerncivilisation, rational law, and the liberty which exists under itsshelter. Empire had come to mean, not merely domination pursued for itsown sake, but trusteeship for the extension of civilisation. 

The period of practical British monopoly, 1815-1878, had thus broughtabout a very remarkable transformation in the character of the BritishEmpire. It had greatly increased in extent, and by every test of area, population, and natural resources, it was beyond comparison thegreatest power that had ever existed in the world. But its organisationwas of an extreme laxity; it possessed no real common government; andits principal members were united rather by a community of institutionsand ideas than by any formal ties. Moreover, it presented a moreamazing diversity of racial types, of religions, and of grades ofcivilisation, than any other political fabric which had existed inhistory. Its development had assuredly brought about a very greatexpansion of the ideas of Western civilisation over the face of theglobe, and, above all, a remarkable diffusion of the institutions ofpolitical liberty. But it remained to be proved whether this looselycompacted bundle of states possessed any real unity, or would becapable of standing any severe strain. The majority of observers, bothin Britain itself and throughout the world, would have been inclined, in 1878, to give a negative answer to these questions. 

VII

THE ERA OF THE WORLD-STATES, 1878-1900

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 marks the close of the era ofnationalist revolutions and wars in Europe. By the same date all theEuropean states had attained to a certain stability in theirconstitutional systems. With equal definiteness this year may be saidto mark the opening of a new era in the history of Europeanimperialism; an era of eager competition for the control of the stillunoccupied regions of the world, in which the concerns of remote landssuddenly became matters of supreme moment to the great European powers, and the peace of the world was endangered by questions arising in Chinaor Siam, in Morocco or the Soudan, or the islands of the Pacific. Thecontrol of Europe over the non-European world was in a singlegeneration completed and confirmed. And the most important of the manyquestions raised by this development was the question whether thespirit in which this world-supremacy of Europe was to be wielded shouldbe the spirit which long experience had inspired in the oldest of thecolonising nations, the spirit of trusteeship on behalf ofcivilisation; or whether it was to be the old, brutal, and sterilespirit of mere domination for its own sake. 

On a superficial view the most obvious feature of this strenuous periodwas that all the remaining unexploited regions of the world were eitherannexed by one or other of the great Western states, or were driven toadopt, with greater or less success, the modes of organisation of theWest. But what was far more important than any new demarcation of themap was that not only the newly annexed lands, but also thehalf-developed territories of earlier European dominions, were with anextraordinary devouring energy penetrated during this generation byEuropean traders and administrators, equipped with railways, steam-boats, and all the material apparatus of modern life, and ingeneral organised and exploited for the purposes of industry and trade. This astonishing achievement was almost as thorough as it was swift. And its result was, not merely that the political control of Europeover the backward regions of the world was strengthened and secured bythese means, but that the whole world was turned into a single economicand political unit, no part of which could henceforth dwell inisolation. This might have meant that we should have been broughtnearer to some sort of world-order; but unhappily the spirit in whichthe great work was undertaken by some, at least, of the nations whichparticipated in it has turned this wonderful achievement into a sourceof bitterness and enmity, and led the world in the end to the tragedyand agony of the Great War. 

The causes of this gigantic outpouring of energy were manifold. Themain impelling forces were perhaps economic rather than political. Butthe economic needs of this strenuous age might have been satisfiedwithout resort to the brutal arbitrament of war: their satisfactionmight even have been made the means of diminishing the danger of war. It was the interpretation of these economic needs in terms of anunhappy political theory which has led to the final catastrophe. 

On a broad view, the final conquest of the world by Europeancivilisation was made possible, and indeed inevitable, by the amazingdevelopment of the material aspects of that civilisation during thenineteenth century; by the progressive command over the forces ofnature which the advance of science had placed in the hands of man, bythe application of science to industry in the development ofmanufacturing methods and of new modes of communication, and by theintricate and flexible organisation of modern finance. These changeswere already in progress before 1878, and were already transforming theface of the world. Since 1878 they have gone forward with suchaccelerating speed that we have been unable to appreciate thesignificance of the revolution they were effecting. We have beencarried off our feet; and have found it impossible to adjust our moraland political ideas to the new conditions. 

The great material achievements of the last two generations have beenmainly due to an intense concentration and specialisation of functionsamong both men of thought and men of action. But the result of this hasbeen that there have been few to attempt the vitally important task ofappreciating the movement of our civilisation as a whole, and ofendeavouring to determine how far the political conceptions inheritedfrom an earlier age were valid in the new conditions. For under thepressure of the great transformation political forces also have beentransformed, and in all countries political thought is baffled andbewildered by the complexity of the problems by which it is faced. Tothis in part we owe the dimness of vision which overtook us as we wentwhirling together towards the great catastrophe. It is only in theglare of a world-conflagration that we begin to perceive, in somethinglike their true proportions, the great forces and events which havebeen shaping our destinies. In the future, if the huge soullessmechanism which man has created is not to get out of hand and destroyhim, we must abandon that contempt for the philosopher and thepolitical thinker which we have latterly been too ready to express, andwe must recognise that the task of analysing and relating to oneanother the achievements of the past and the problems of the present isat least as important as the increase of our knowledge and of ourdangerous powers by intense and narrow concentration within verylimited fields of thought and work. 

In the meantime we must observe (however briefly and inadequately), howthe dazzling advances of science and industry have affected theconquest of the world by European civilisation, and why it has comeabout that instead of leading to amity and happiness, they have broughtus to the most hideous catastrophe in human history. 

Science and industry, in the first place, made the conquest andorganisation of the world easy. In the first stages of the expansion ofEurope the material superiority of the West had unquestionably affordedthe means whereby its political ideas and institutions could be madeoperative in new fields. The invention of ocean-going ships, the use ofthe mariner's compass, the discovery of the rotundity of the earth, thedevelopment of firearms--these were the things which made possible thecreation of the first European empires; though these purely materialadvantages could have led to no stable results unless they had beenwielded by peoples possessing a real political capacity. In the sameway the brilliant triumphs of modern engineering have alone renderedpossible the rapid conquest and organisation of huge undeveloped areas;the deadly precision of Western weapons has made the Western peoplesirresistible; the wonderful progress of medical science has largelyovercome the barriers of disease which long excluded the white man fromgreat regions of the earth; and the methods of modern finance, organising and making available the combined credit of wholecommunities, have provided the means for vast enterprises which withoutthem could never have been undertaken. 

Then, in the next place, science has found uses for many commoditieswhich were previously of little value, and many of which are mainlyproduced in the undeveloped regions of the earth. Some of these, likerubber, or nitrates, or mineral and vegetable oils, have rapidly becomequite indispensable materials, consumed by the industrial countries onan immense scale. Accordingly, the more highly industrialised a countryis, the more dependent it must be upon supplies drawn from all parts ofthe world; not only supplies of food for the maintenance of its teemingpopulation, but, even more, supplies of material for its industries. The days when Europe, or even America, was self-sufficient are gone forever. And in order that these essential supplies may be available, ithas become necessary that all the regions which produce them should bebrought under efficient administration. The anarchy of primitivebarbarism cannot be allowed to stand in the way of access to thesevital necessities of the new world-economy. It is merely futile forwell-meaning sentimentalists to talk of the wickedness of invading theinalienable rights of the primitive occupants of these lands: for goodor for ill, the world has become a single economic unit, and itsprogress cannot be stopped out of consideration for the time-honouredusages of uncivilised and backward tribes. Of course it is our duty toensure that these simple folks are justly treated, led gently intocivilisation, and protected from the iniquities of a mere ruthlessexploitation, such as, in some regions, we have been compelled towitness. But Western civilisation has seized the reins of the world, and it will not be denied. Its economic needs drive it to undertake theorganisation of the whole world. What we have to secure is that itspolitical principles shall be such as will ensure that its control willbe a benefit to its subjects as well as to itself. But the developmentof scientific industry has made European control and civilisedadministration inevitable throughout the world. 

It did not, however, necessarily follow from these premises that thegreat European states which did not already possess extra-Europeanterritories were bound to acquire such lands. So far as their purelyeconomic needs were concerned, it would have been enough that theyshould have freedom of access, on equal terms with their neighbours, tothe sources of the supplies they required. It is quite possible, asevents have shown, for a European state to attain very great success inthe industrial sphere without possessing any political control over thelands from which its raw materials are drawn, or to which its finishedproducts are sold. Norway has created an immense shipping industrywithout owning a single port outside her own borders. The manufacturesof Switzerland are as thriving as these of any European country, thoughSwitzerland does not possess any colonies. Germany herself, the loudestadvocate of the necessity of political control as the basis of economicprosperity, has found it possible to create a vast and very prosperousindustry, though her colonial possessions have been small, and havecontributed scarcely at all to her wealth. Her merchants andcapitalists have indeed found the most profitable fields for theirenterprises, not in their own colonies, which they have on the wholetended to neglect, but in a far greater degree in South and CentralAmerica, and in India and the other vast territories of the BritishEmpire, which have been open to them as freely as to British merchants. All that the prosperity of European industry required was that thesources of supply should be under efficient administration, and thataccess to them should be open. And these conditions were fulfilled, before the great rush began, over the greater part of the earth. If in1878, when the European nations suddenly awoke to the importance of thenon-European world, they had been able to agree upon some simpleprinciple which would have secured equal treatment to all, howdifferent would have been the fate of Europe and the world! If it couldhave been laid down, as a principle of international law, that in everyarea whose administration was undertaken by a European state, the 'opendoor' should be secured for the trade of all nations equally, and thatthis rule should continue in force until the area concerned acquiredthe status of a distinctly organised state controlling its own fiscalsystem, the industrial communities would have felt secure, the littlestates quite as fully as the big states. Moreover, since, under theseconditions, the annexation of territory by a European state would nothave threatened the creation of a monopoly, but would have meant theassumption of a duty on behalf of civilisation, the acrimonies andjealousies which have attended the process of partition would have beenlargely conjured away. In 1878 such a solution would have presented fewdifficulties. For at that date the only European state which controlledlarge undeveloped areas was Britain; and Britain, as we have seen, hadon her own account arrived at this solution, and had administered, asshe still administers, all those regions of her Empire which do notpossess self-governing rights in the spirit of the principle we havesuggested. 

Why was it that this solution, or some solution on these lines, was notthen adopted, and had no chance of being adopted? It was because theEuropean states, and first and foremost among them Germany, were stilldominated by a political theory which forbade their taking such a view. We may call this theory the Doctrine of Power. It is the doctrine thatthe highest duty of every state is to aim at the extension of its ownpower, and that before this duty every other consideration must giveway. The Doctrine of Power has never received a more unflinchingexpression than it received from the German Treitschke, whose influencewas at its height during the years of the great rush for extra-Europeanpossessions. The advocate of the Doctrine of Power is not, and cannotbe, satisfied with equality of opportunity; he demands supremacy, hedemands monopoly, he demands the means to injure and destroy hisrivals. It would not be just to say that this doctrine was influentialonly in Germany; it was in some degree potent everywhere, especially inthis period, which was the period par excellence of 'imperialism' inthe bad sense of the term. But it is certainly true that no state hasever been so completely dominated by it as Germany; and no state lessthan Britain. It was in the light of this doctrine that the demands ofthe new scientific industry were interpreted. Hag-ridden by thisconception, when the statesmen of Europe awoke to the importance of thenon-European world, it was not primarily the economic needs of theircountries that they thought of, for these were, on the whole, notinadequately met: what struck their imagination was that, in paying noattention to the outer world, they had missed great opportunities ofincreasing their power. This oversight, they resolved, must berectified before it was too late. 

For when the peoples of Western and Central Europe, no longer engrossedby the problems of Nationalism and Liberalism, cast their eyes over theworld, lo! the scale of things seemed to have changed. Just as, in thefifteenth century, civilisation had suddenly passed from the stage ofthe city-state or the feudal principality to the stage of the greatnation-state, so now, while the European peoples were still strugglingto realise their nationhood, civilisation seemed to have stolen a marchupon them, and to have advanced once more, this time into the stage ofthe world-state. For to the east of the European nations lay the vastRussian Empire, stretching from Central Europe across Asia to thePacific; and in the west the American Republic extended from ocean toocean, across three thousand miles of territory; and between these andaround them spread the British Empire, sprawling over the whole face ofthe globe, on every sea and in every continent. In contrast with thesegiant empires, the nation-states of Europe felt themselves out ofscale, just as the Italian cities in the sixteenth century must havefelt themselves out of scale in comparison with the new nation-statesof Spain and France. To achieve the standard of the world-state, tomake their own nations the controlling factors in wide dominions whichshould include territories and populations of varied types, became theambition of the most powerful European states. A new political idealhad captivated the mind of Europe. 

These powerful motives were reinforced by others which arose from thedevelopment of affairs within Europe itself. In the first place, theleading European states had by 1878 definitely abandoned that tendencytowards free trade which had seemed to be increasing in strength duringthe previous generation; and, largely in the hope of combating theoverwhelming mercantile and industrial supremacy of Britain, hadadopted the fiscal policy of protection. The ideal of the protectionistcreed is national self-sufficiency in the economic sphere. But, as wehave seen, economic self-sufficiency was no longer attainable in theconditions of modern industry by any European state. Only by largeforeign annexations, especially in the tropical regions, did it seempossible of achievement. But when a protectionist state begins toacquire territory, the anticipation that it will use its power toexclude or destroy the trade of its rivals must drive other states tosafeguard themselves by still further annexations. It was, indeed, thisfear which mainly drove Britain, in spite of, or perhaps because of, her free trade theories, into a series of large annexations in regionswhere her trade had been hitherto predominant. 

Again, the most perturbing feature of the relations between theEuropean powers also contributed to produce an eagerness for colonialpossessions. Europe had entered upon the era of huge national armies;the example of Prussia, and the rancours which had been created by herpolicy, had set all the nations arming themselves. They had learned tomeasure their strength by their available man-power, and in two waysthe desire to increase the reserve of military manhood formed a motivefor colonisation. In the first place, the surplus manhood of a nationwas lost to it if it was allowed to pass under an alien flag byemigration. Those continental states from which emigration took placeon a large scale began to aspire after the possession of colonies oftheir own, where their emigrants could still be kept under control, andremain subject to the obligations of service. Germany, the state whichbeyond all others measures its strength by its fighting man-power, wasmost affected by this motive, which formed the chief theme of thecolonial school among her politicians and journalists, and continued tobe so even when the stream of her emigrants had dwindled to very smallproportions. In a less degree, Italy was influenced by the same motive. In the second place, conquered subjects even of backward races might bemade useful for the purposes of war. This motive appealed most stronglyto France. Her home population was stationary. She lived in constantdread of a new onslaught from her formidable neighbour; and she watchedwith alarm the rapid increase of that neighbour's population, and theincessant increases in the numbers of his armies. At a later dateGermany also began to be attracted by the possibility of drilling andarming, among the negroes of Central Africa, or the Turks of AsiaMinor, forces which might aid her to dominate the world. 

Thus the political situation in Europe had a very direct influence uponthe colonising activity of this period. The dominant fact of Europeanpolitics during this generation was the supreme prestige and influenceof Germany, who, not content with an unquestioned military superiorityto any other power, had buttressed herself by the formation (1879 and1882) of the most formidable standing alliance that has ever existed inEuropean history, and completely dominated European politics. France, having been hurled from the leadership of Europe in 1870, dreadednothing so much as the outbreak of a new European war, in which shemust be inevitably involved, and in which she might be utterly ruined. She strove to find a compensation for her wounded pride in colonialadventures, and therefore became, during the first part of the period, the most active of the powers in this field. She was encouraged toadopt this policy by Bismarck, partly in the hope that she might thusforget Alsace, partly in order that she might be kept on bad terms withBritain, whose interests seemed to be continually threatened by hercolonising activity. But she hesitated to take a very definite line inregard to territories that lay close to Europe and might involveEuropean complications. 

Bismarck himself took little interest in colonial questions, except inso far as they could be used as a means of alienating the other powersfrom one another, and so securing the European supremacy of Germany. Hetherefore at first made no attempt to use the dominant position ofGermany as a means of acquiring extra-European dominions. But theyounger generation in Germany was far from sharing this view. It wasdetermined to win for Germany a world-empire, and in 1884 and thefollowing years--rather late in the day, when most of the moredesirable territories were already occupied--it forced Bismarck toannex large areas. After Bismarck's fall, in 1890, this party got theupper hand in German politics, and the creation of a great world-empirebecame, as we shall see, the supreme aim of William II. And hisadvisers. The formidable and threatening power of Germany began to besystematically employed not merely for the maintenance of supremacy inEurope, which could be secured by peaceful means, but for theacquisition of a commanding position in the outer world; and since thiscould only be attained by violence, the world being now almostcompletely partitioned, the new policy made Germany the source ofunrest and apprehension, as she had earlier been, and still continuedto be, the main cause of the burden of military preparation in Europe. 

Among the other powers which participated in the great partition, Russia continued her pressure in two of the three directions which shehad earlier followed-south-eastwards in Central Asia, eastwards towardsChina. In both directions her activity aroused the nervous fears ofBritain, while her pressure upon China helped to bring Japan into theranks of the militant and aggressive powers. But Russia took nointerest in the more distant quarters of the world. Nor did Austria, though during these years her old ambition to expand south-eastwards atthe expense of Turkey and the Balkan peoples revived under Germanencouragement. Italy, having but recently achieved national unity andtaken her place among the Great Powers, felt that she could not be leftout of the running, now that extra-European possessions had come toappear an almost essential mark of greatness among states; and, disappointed of Tunis, she endeavoured to find compensation on theshores of the Red Sea. Spain and Portugal, in the midst of all theseeager rivalries, were tempted to furbish up their old and half-dormantclaims. Even the United States of America joined in the rush during thefevered period of the 'nineties. 

Lastly, Britain, the oldest and the most fully endowed of all thecolonising powers, was drawn, half unwilling, into the competition; andhaving an immense start over her rivals, actually acquired more newterritory than any of them. She was, indeed, like the other states, passing through an 'imperialist' phase in these years. The valueattached by other countries to oversea possessions awakened among theBritish people a new pride in their far-spread dominions. Disraeli, whowas in the ascendant when the period opened, had forgotten his oldopinion of the uselessness of colonies, and had become a prophet ofEmpire. An Imperial Federation Society was founded in 1878. The oldunwillingness to assume new responsibilities died out, or diminished;and the rapid annexations of other states, especially France, inregions where British influence had hitherto been supreme, and whosechieftains had often begged in vain for British protection, arousedsome irritation. The ebullient energy of the colonists themselves, especially in South Africa and Australia, demanded a forward policy. Above all, the fact that the European powers, now so eager for colonialpossessions, had all adopted the protectionist policy aroused a fearlest British traders should find themselves shut out from lands whosetrade had hitherto been almost wholly in their hands; and the militantand aggressive temper sometimes shown by the agents of these powersawakened some nervousness regarding the safety of the existing Britishpossessions. Hence Britain, after a period of hesitancy, became asactive as any of the other states in annexation. Throughout this periodher main rival was France, whose new claims seemed to come in conflictwith her own in almost every quarter of the globe. This rivalryproduced acute friction, which grew in intensity until it reached itsculminating point in the crisis of Fashoda in 1898, and was not removeduntil the settlement of 1904 solved all the outstanding difficulties. It would be quite untrue to say that Britain deliberately endeavouredto prevent or to check the rapid colonial expansion of France. Thetruth is that British trading interests had been predominant in many ofthe regions where the French were most active, and that theprotectionist policy which France had adopted stimulated into a newlife the ancient rivalry of these neighbour and sister nations. Towardsthe colonial ambitions of Germany, and still more of Italy, Britain wasfar more complaisant. 

It is difficult to give in a brief space a clear summary of theextremely complicated events and intrigues of this vitally importantperiod. But perhaps it will be easiest if we consider in turn theregions in which the strenuous rivalries of the powers displayedthemselves. The most important was Africa, which lay invitingly near toEurope, and was the only large region of the world which was still forthe most part unoccupied. Here all the competitors, save Russia, Japan, and America, played a part. Western Asia formed a second field, inwhich three powers only, Russia, Germany, and Britain, were immediatelyconcerned. The Far East, where the vast Empire of China seemed to befalling into decrepitude, afforded the most vexed problems of theperiod. Finally, the Pacific Islands were the scene of an active thoughless intense rivalry. 

It is a curious fact that Africa, the continent whose outline was thefirst outside of Europe itself to be fully mapped out by the Europeanpeoples, was actually the last to be effectively brought under theinfluence of European civilisation. This was because the coasts ofAfrica are for the most part inhospitable; its vast interior plateau isalmost everywhere shut off either by belts of desert land, or by swampyand malarious regions along the coast; even its great rivers do notreadily tempt the explorer inland, because their course is ofteninterrupted by falls or rapids not far from their mouths, where theydescend from the interior plateau to the coastal plain; and itsinhabitants, warlike and difficult to deal with, are also peoples offew and simple wants, who have little to offer to the trader. Henceeight generations of European mariners had circumnavigated thecontinent without seriously attempting to penetrate its central mass;and apart from the Anglo-Dutch settlements at the Southern extremity, the French empire in Algeria in the north, a few trading centres on theWest Coast, and some half-derelict Portuguese stations in Angola andMozambique, the whole continent remained available for Europeanexploitation in 1878. 

What trade was carried on, except in Egypt, in Algeria, and in theimmediate vicinity of the old French settlements on the West Coast, wasmainly in the hands of British merchants. Over the greater part of thecoastal belts only the British power was known to the native tribes andchieftains. Many of them (like the Sultan of Zanzibar and the chiefs ofthe Cameroons) had repeatedly begged to be taken under Britishprotection, and had been refused. During the two generations before1878 the interior of the continent had begun to be known. But except inthe north and north-west, where French explorers and a few Germans hadbeen active, the work had been mainly done by British travellers. Mostof the great names of African exploration--Livingstone, Burton, Speke, Baker, Cameron and the Anglo-American Stanley--were British names. These facts, of course, gave to Britain, already so richly endowed, nosort of claim to a monopoly of the continent. But they naturally gaveher a right to a voice in its disposal. Only the French had shownanything like the same activity, or had established anything like thesame interests; and they were far behind their secular rivals. 

But these facts bring out one feature which differentiated thesettlement of Africa from that of any other region of the non-Europeanworld. It was not a gradual, but an extraordinarily rapid achievement. It was based not upon claims established by work already done, but, forthe most part, upon the implicit assumption that extra-European empirewas the due of the European peoples, simply because they were civilisedand powerful. This was the justification, in a large degree, of all theEuropean empires in Africa. But it was especially so in the case of theempire which Germany created in the space of three years. This empirewas not the product of German enterprise in the regions included withinit; it was the product of Germany's dominating position in Europe, andthe expression of her resolve to create an external empire worthy ofthat position. 

Africa falls naturally into two great regions. The northern coast, separated from the main mass of the continent by the broad belt ofdeserts which runs from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, has always beenfar more ultimately connected with the other Mediterranean lands thanwith the rest of Africa. Throughout the course of history, indeed, thenorthern coast-lands have belonged rather to the realms of Western orof Asiatic civilisation than to the primitive barbarism of the sons ofHam. In the days of the Carthaginians and of the Roman Empire, allthese lands, from Egypt to Morocco, had known a high civilisation. Theywere racially as well as historically distinct from the rest of thecontinent. They had been in name part of the Turkish Empire, and anyEuropean interference in their affairs was as much a question ofEuropean politics as the problems of the Balkans. Two countries in thisarea fell under European direction during the period with which we areconcerned, and in each case the effects upon European politics werevery great. In 1881 France, with the deliberate encouragement ofBismarck, sent armies into Tunis, and assumed the protectorate of thatmisgoverned region. She had good grounds for her action. Not only hadshe large trade-interests in Tunis, but the country was separated fromher earlier dominion in Algeria only by an artificial line, and itsdisorders increased the difficulty of developing the efficientadministration which she had established there. Unhappily Italy alsohad interests in Tunis. There were more Italian than French residentsin the country, which is separated from Sicily only by a narrow belt ofsea. And Italy, who was beginning to conceive colonial ambitions, hadnot unnaturally marked down Tunis as her most obvious sphere ofinfluence. The result was to create a long-lived ill-feeling betweenthe two Latin countries. As a consequence of the annexation of Tunis, Italy was persuaded in the next year (1882) to join the TripleAlliance; and France, having burnt her fingers, became chary ofcolonial adventures in regions that were directly under the eye ofEurope. Isolated, insecure, and eternally suspicious of Germany, shecould not afford to be drawn into European quarrels. This is in a largedegree the explanation of her vacillating action in regard to Egypt. 

In Egypt the political influence of France had been preponderant eversince the time of Mehemet Ali; perhaps we should say, ever since thetime of Napoleon. And political influence had been accompanied bytrading and financial interests. France had a larger share of the tradeof Egypt, and had lent more money to the ruling princes of the country, than any other country save England. She had designed and executed theSuez Canal. But this waterway, once opened, was used mainly by Britishships on the way to India, Australia, and the Far East. It became apoint of vital strategic importance to Britain, who, though she hadopposed its construction, eagerly seized the chance of buying a greatblock of shares in the enterprise from the bankrupt Khedive. ThusFrench and British interests in Egypt were equally great; greater thanthose of all the rest of Europe put together. When the nativegovernment of Egypt fell into bankruptcy (1876), the two powers set upa sort of condominium, or joint control of the finances, in order toensure the payment of interest on the Egyptian debt held by theircitizens. To bankruptcy succeeded political chaos; and it becameapparent that if the rich land of Egypt was not to fall into utteranarchy, there must be direct European intervention. The two powersproposed to take joint action; the rest of Europe assented. But theSultan of Turkey, as suzerain of Egypt, threatened to makedifficulties. At the last moment France, fearful of the complicationsthat might result, and resolute to avoid the danger of European war, withdrew from the project of joint intervention. Britain went on alone;and although she hoped and believed that she would quickly be able torestore order, and thereupon to evacuate the country, found herselfdrawn into a labour of reconstruction that could not be dropped. Weshall in the next chapter have more to say on the British occupation ofEgypt, as part of the British achievement during this period. In themeanwhile, its immediate result was continuous friction between Franceand Britain. France could not forgive herself or Britain for theopportunity which she had lost. The embitterment caused by the Egyptianquestion lasted throughout the period, and was not healed till theEntente of 1904. It intensified and exacerbated the rivalry of the twocountries in other fields. It made each country incapable of judgingfairly the actions of the other. To wounded and embittered France, theperfectly honest British explanations of the reasons for delay inevacuating Egypt seemed only so many evidences of hypocrisy maskinggreed. To Britain the French attitude seemed fractious andunreasonable, and she suspected in every French forward movement inother fields--notably in the Eastern Soudan and the upper valley of theNile--an attempt to attack or undermine her. Thus Egypt, like Tunis, illustrated the influence of European politics in the extra-Europeanfield. The power that profited most was Germany, who had strengthenedherself by drawing Italy into the Triple Alliance, and had kept Franceat her mercy by using colonial questions as a means of alienating herfrom her natural friends. It was, in truth, only from this point ofview that colonial questions had any interest for Bismarck. He was, ashe repeatedly asserted almost to the day of his death, 'no colony man. 'But the time was at hand when he was to be forced out of this attitude. For already the riches of tropical Africa were beginning to attract theattention of Europe. 

The most active and energetic of the powers in tropical Africa wasFrance. From her ancient foothold at Senegal she was already, in thelate 'seventies, pushing inland towards the upper waters of the Niger;while further south her vigorous explorer de Brazza was penetrating thehinterland behind the French coastal settlements north of the Congomouth. Meanwhile the explorations of Livingstone and Stanley had giventhe world some conception of the wealth of the vast exterior. In 1876Leopold, King of the Belgians, summoned a conference at Brussels toconsider the possibility of setting the exploration and settlement ofAfrica upon an international basis. Its result was the formation of anInternational African Association, with branches in all the principalcountries. But from the first the branches dropped all serious pretenceof international action. They became (so far as they exercised anyinfluence) purely national organisations for the purpose of acquiringthe maximum amount of territory for their own states. And the centralbody, after attempting a few unsuccessful exploring expeditions, practically resolved itself into the organ of King Leopold himself, andaimed at creating a neutral state in Central Africa under hisprotection. In 1878 H. M. Stanley returned from the exploration of theCongo. He was at once invited by King Leopold to undertake theorganisation of the Congo basin for his Association, and set out againfor that purpose in 1879. But he soon found himself in conflict withthe active French agents under de Brazza, who had made their way intothe Congo valley from the north-west. And at the same time Portugal, reviving ancient and dormant claims, asserted that the Congo belongedto her. It was primarily to find a solution for these disputes that theBerlin Conference was summoned in December 1884. Meanwhile the rush forterritory was going on furiously in other regions of Africa. Not onlyon the Congo, but on the Guinea Coast and its hinterland, France wasshowing an immense activity, and was threatening to reduce to smallcoastal enclaves the old British settlements on this coast. Only theenergy shown by a group of British merchants, who formed themselvesinto a National African Company in 1881, and the vigorous action oftheir leader, Mr. (afterwards Sir) George Taubman Goldie, prevented theextrusion of British interests from the greater part of the Nigervalley, where they had hitherto been supreme. In Madagascar, too, theancient ambitions of France had revived. Though British trading andmissionary activities in the island were at this date probably greaterthan French, France claimed large rights, especially in the north-eastof the island. These claims drew her into a war with the native powerof the Hovas, which began in 1883, and ended in 1885 with a vaguerecognition of French suzerainty. Again, Italy had, in 1883, obtainedher first foothold in Eritrea, on the shore of the Red Sea. AndGermany, also, had suddenly made up her mind to embark upon the careerof empire. In 1883 the Bremen merchant, Luderitz, appeared inSouth-west Africa, where there were a few German mission stations andtrading-centres, and annexed a large area which Bismarck was persuadedto take under the formal protection of Germany. This region hadhitherto been vaguely regarded as within the British sphere, but thoughnative princes, missionaries, and in 1868 even the Prussian government, had requested Britain to establish a formal protectorate, she hadalways declined to do so. In the next year another German agent, Dr. Nachtigal, was commissioned by the German government to report onGerman trade interests on the West Coast, and the British governmentwas formally acquainted with his mission and requested to instruct itsagents to assist him. The real purpose of the mission was shown whenNachtigal made a treaty with the King of Togoland, on the Guinea Coast, whereby he accepted German suzerainty. A week later a similar treatywas made with some of the native chiefs in the Cameroons. In thisregion British interests had hitherto been predominant, and the chiefshad repeatedly asked for British protection, which had always beenrefused. A little later the notorious Karl Peters, with a fewcompanions disguised as working engineers, arrived at Zanzibar on theEast Coast, with a commission from the German Colonial Society to pegout German claims. In the island of Zanzibar British interests had longbeen overwhelmingly predominant; and the Sultan, who had large andvague claims to supremacy over a vast extent of the mainland, hadrepeatedly asked the British government to take these regions under itsprotectorate. He had always been refused. Peters' luggage consistedlargely of draft treaty-forms; and he succeeded in making treaties withnative princes (usually unaware of the meaning of the documents theywere signing) whereby some 60, 000 square miles were brought underGerman control. The protectorate over these lands had not been acceptedby the German government when the Conference of Berlin met. It wasformally accepted in the next year (1885). Far from being opposed byBritain, the establishment of German power in East Africa was actuallywelcomed by the British government, whose foreign secretary, EarlGranville, wrote that his government 'views with favour these schemes, the realisation of which will entail the civilisation of large tractsover which hitherto no European influence has been exercised. ' And whena group of British traders began to take action further north, in theterritory which later became British East Africa, and in which Petershad done nothing, the British government actually consulted the Germangovernment before licensing their action. Thus before the meeting ofthe Conference of Berlin the foundations of the German empire in Africawere already laid; the outlines of the vast French empire in the northhad begun to appear; and the curious dominion of Leopold of Belgium inthe Congo valley had begun to take shape. 

The Conference of Berlin (Dec. 1884-Feb. 1885), which marks the closeof the first stage in the partition of Africa, might have achievedgreat things if it had endeavoured to lay down the principles uponwhich European control over backward peoples should be exercised. Butit made no such ambitious attempt. It prescribed the rules of the gameof empire-building, ordaining that all protectorates should be formallynotified by the power which assumed them to the other powers, and thatno annexation should be made of territory which was not 'effectively'occupied; but evidently the phrase 'effective occupation' can be verylaxly interpreted. It provided that there should be free navigation ofthe Congo and Niger rivers, and freedom of trade for alienations withinthe Congo valley and certain other vaguely defined areas. But it madeno similar provision for other parts of Africa; and it whittled awaythe value of what it did secure by the definite proviso that shouldparts of these areas be annexed by independent states, the restrictionupon their control of trade should lapse. It recognised the illegalityof the slave-trade, and imposed upon annexing powers the duty ofhelping to suppress it; this provision was made much fuller and moredefinite by a second conference at Brussels in 1890, on the demand ofBritain, who had hitherto contended almost alone against the traffic inhuman flesh. But no attempt was made to define native rights, tosafeguard native customs, to prohibit the maintenance of forces largerthan would be necessary for the maintenance of order: in short, noattempt was made to lay down the doctrine that the function of a rulingpower among backward peoples is that of a trustee on behalf of itssimple subjects and on behalf of civilisation. That the partition ofAfrica should have been effected without open war, and that thequestions decided at Berlin should have been so easily and peacefullyagreed upon, seemed at the moment to be a good sign. But the spiritwhich the conference expressed was not a healthy spirit. 

After 1884 the activity of the powers in exploration, annexation anddevelopment became more furious than ever. Britain now began seriouslyto arouse herself to the danger of exclusion from vast areas where herinterests had hitherto been predominant; and it was during these yearsthat all her main acquisitions of territory in Africa were made:Rhodesia and Central Africa in the south, East Africa and Somaliland inthe East, Nigeria and the expansion of her lesser protectorates in theWest. To these years also belonged the definite, and most unfortunate, emergence of Italy as a colonising power. She had got a foothold inEritrea in 1883; in 1885 it was, with British aid, enlarged by theannexation of territory which had once been held by Egypt, but had beenabandoned when she lost the Soudan. But the Italian claims in Eritreabrought on conflict with the neighbouring native power of Abyssinia. Inspite of a sharp defeat at Dogali in 1887, she succeeded in holding herown in this conflict; and in 1889 Abyssinia accepted a treaty whichItaly claimed to be a recognition of her suzerainty. But theAbyssinians repudiated this interpretation; and in a new war, whichbegan in 1896, inflicted upon the Italians so disastrous a defeat atAdowa that they were constrained to admit the complete independence ofAbyssinia--the sole native state which has so far been able to hold itsown against the pressure of Europe. Meanwhile in 1889 and the followingyears Italy had, once more with the direct concurrence of Britain, marked out a new territory in Somaliland. 

The main features of the years from 1884 to 1900 were the rapidity withwhich the territories earlier annexed were expanded and organised, moreespecially by France. In the 'nineties her dominions extended from theMediterranean to the Guinea Coast, and she had conceived the ambitionof extending them also across Africa from West to East. This ambitionled her into a new and more acute conflict with Britain, who, havingundertaken the reconquest of the Egyptian Soudan and the upper valleyof the Nile, held that she could not permit a rival to occupy the upperwaters of the great river, or any part of the territory that belongedto it. Hence when the intrepid explorer, Marchand, after a toilsomeexpedition which lasted for two years, planted the French flag atFashoda in 1898, he was promptly disturbed by Kitchener, fresh from theoverthrow of the Khalifa and the reconquest of Khartoum, and wascompelled to withdraw. The tension was severe; no episode in thepartition of Africa had brought the world so near to the outbreak of aEuropean war. But in the end the dispute was settled by theAnglo-French agreement of 1898, which may be said to mark theconclusion of the process of partition. It was the last importanttreaty in a long series which filled the twenty years following 1878, and which had the result of leaving Africa, with the exception ofMorocco, Tripoli, and Abyssinia, completely divided among the chiefEuropean states. Africa was the main field of the ambitions andrivalries of the European powers during this period; the other fieldsmay be more rapidly surveyed. In Central Asia and the Near East themain features of the period were two. The first was the steady advanceof Russia towards the south-east, which awakened acute alarms inBritain regarding India, and led to the adoption of a 'forward policy'among the frontier tribes in the north-west of India. The second wasthe gradual and silent penetration of Turkey by German influence. Herethere was no partition or annexation, But Germany became the politicalprotector of the Turk; undertook the reorganisation of his armies;obtained great commercial concessions; bought up his railways, oustingthe earlier British and French concerns which had controlled them, andbuilt new lines. The greatest of these was the vitally importantproject of the Bagdad railway, which was taken in hand just before theclose of the period. It was a project whose political aims outweighedits commercial aims. And it provided a warning of the gigantic designswhich Germany was beginning to work out. But as yet, in 1900, themagnitude of these designs was unperceived. And the problems of theMiddle East were not yet very disturbing. The Turkish Empire remainedintact; so did the Persian Empire, though both were becoming morehelpless, partly owing to the decrepitude of their governments, partlyowing to the pressure of European financial and trading interests. Asyet the empires of the Middle East seemed to form a regioncomparatively free from European influence. But this was only seeming. The influence of Europe was at work in them; and it was probablyinevitable that some degree of European political tutelage shouldfollow as the only means of preventing the disintegration which mustresult from the pouring of new wine into the old bottles. 

In the Far East--in the vast empire of China--this result seemed to becoming about inevitably and rapidly. The ancient pot-bound civilisationof China had withstood the impact of the West in the mid-nineteenthcentury without breaking down; but China had made no attempt, such asJapan had triumphantly carried out, to adapt herself to the newconditions, and her system was slowly crumbling under the influence ofthe European traders, teachers, and missionaries whom she had beencompelled to admit. The first of the powers to take advantage of thissituation was France, who already possessed a footing in Cochin-China, and was tempted during the colonial enthusiasm of the 'eighties totransform it into a general supremacy over Annam and Tonking. As earlyas 1874 she had obtained from the King of Annam a treaty which sheinterpreted as giving her suzerain powers. The King of Annam himselfrepudiated this interpretation, and maintained that he was a vassal ofChina. China took the same view; and after long negotiations a warbetween France and China broke out. It lasted for four years, anddemanded a large expenditure of strength. But it ended (1885) with theformal recognition of French suzerainty over Annam, and a furtherdecline of Chinese prestige. 

Ten years later a still more striking proof of Chinese weakness wasafforded by the rapid and complete defeat of the vast, ill-organisedempire by Japan, the youngest of the great powers. The war gave toJapan Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, and added her to the list ofimperialist powers. She would have won more still--the Liao-tangPeninsula and a sort of suzerainty over Korea--but that the Europeanpowers, startled by the signs of China's decay, and perhaps desiring ashare of the plunder, intervened to forbid these annexations, on thepretext of defending the integrity of China. Russia, France and Germanycombined in this step; Britain stood aloof. Japan, unwillingly givingway, and regarding Russia as the chief cause of her humiliation, beganto prepare herself for a coming conflict. As for unhappy China, she wassoon to learn how much sincerity there was in the zeal of Europe forthe maintenance of her integrity. In 1896 she was compelled to permitRussia to build a railway across Manchuria; and to grant to France a'rectification of frontiers' on the south, and the right of building arailway through the province of Yunnan, which lies next to Tonking. Thepartition of China seemed to be at hand. Britain and America vainlyurged upon the other powers that China should be left free to directher own affairs subject to the maintenance of 'the open door' forEuropean trade. The other powers refused to listen, and in 1897 thebeginning of the end seemed to have come. Germany, seizing on thepretext afforded by the murder of two German missionaries, stretchedforth her 'mailed fist, ' and seized the strong place and admirableharbour of Kiao-chau, the most valuable strategic position on theChinese coast. That she meant to use it as a base for future expansionwas shown by her lavish expenditure upon its equipment andfortification. Russia responded by seizing the strong place of PortArthur and the Liao-Tang Peninsula, while every day her hold upon thegreat province of Manchuria was strengthened. Foreseeing a comingconflict in which her immense trading interests would be imperilled, Britain acquired a naval base on the Chinese coast by leasingWei-hai-Wei. Thus all the European rivals were clustered round thedecaying body of China; and in the last years of the century werealready beginning to claim 'spheres of influence, ' despite the protestsof Britain and America. But the outburst of the Boxer Rising in1900--caused mainly by resentment of foreign intervention--had theeffect of postponing the rush for Chinese territory. And when Britainand Japan made an alliance in 1902 on the basis of guaranteeing thestatus quo in the East, the overwhelming naval strength of the twoallies made a European partition of China impracticable; and China wasonce more given a breathing-space. Only Russia could attack the ChineseEmpire by land; and the severe defeat which she suffered at the handsof Japan in 1904-5 removed that danger also. The Far East was left witha chance of maintaining its independence, and of voluntarily adaptingitself to the needs of a new age. 

The last region in which territories remained available for Europeanannexation consisted of the innumerable archipelagoes of the PacificOcean. Here the preponderant influence had been in the hands of Britainever since the days of Captain Cook. She had made some annexationsduring the first three quarters of the century, but had on the wholesteadfastly refused the requests of many of the island peoples to betaken under her protection. France had, as we have seen, acquired NewCaledonia and the Marquesas Islands during the previous period, but heractivity in this region was never very great. The only other Europeanpower in possession of Pacific territories was Spain, who held thegreat archipelago of the Philippines, and claimed also the numerousminute islands (nearly six hundred in number) which are known asMicronesia. When the colonial enthusiasm of the 'eighties began, Germany saw a fruitful field in the Pacific, and annexed the BismarckArchipelago and the north-eastern quarter of New Guinea. Under pressurefrom Australia, who feared to see so formidable a neighbour establishedso near her coastline, Britain annexed the south-eastern quarter ofthat huge island. During the 'nineties the partition of the PacificIslands was completed; the chief participators being Germany, Britain, and the United States of America. 

The entry of America into the race for imperial possessions in its lastphase was too striking an event to pass without comment. Americaannexed Hawaii in 1898, and divided the Samoan group with Germany in1899. But her most notable departure from her traditional policy ofself-imposed isolation from world-politics came when in 1898 she wasdrawn by the Cuban question into a war with Spain. Its result was thedisappearance of the last relics of the Spanish Empire in the New Worldand in the Pacific. Cuba became an independent republic. Porto Rico wasannexed by America. In the Pacific the Micronesian possessions of Spainwere acquired by Germany. Germany would fain have annexed also thePhilippine Islands. But America resolved herself to assume the task oforganising and governing these rich lands; and in doing so made a gravebreach with her traditions. Her new possession necessarily drew herinto closer relations with the problems of the Far East; it gave heralso some acquaintance with the difficulty of introducing Westernmethods among a backward people. During these years of universalimperialist excitement the spirit of imperialism seemed to havecaptured America as it had captured the European states; and this wasexpressed in a new interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, put forth bythe Secretary of State during the Venezuela controversy of 1895. 'TheUnited States, ' said Mr. Olney, 'is practically sovereign on thiscontinent (meaning both North and South America), 'and its fiat is lawupon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. ' No suchgigantic imperial claim had ever been put forward by any Europeanstate; and it constituted an almost defiant challenge to theimperialist powers of Europe. It may safely be said that this dictumdid not represent the settled judgment of the American people. But itdid appear, in the last years of the century, as if the great republicwere about to emerge from her self-imposed isolation, and to take hernatural part in the task of planting the civilisation of the Westthroughout the world. Had she frankly done so, had she made it plainthat she recognised the indissoluble unity and the common interests ofthe whole world, it is possible that her influence might have eased thetroubles of the next period, and exercised a deterrent influence uponthe forces of disturbance which were working towards the greatcatastrophe. But her traditions were too strong; and after the briefimperialist excitement of the 'nineties, she gradually relapsed oncemore into something like her old attitude of aloofness. 

It is but a cursory and superficial view which we have been able totake of this extraordinary quarter of a century, during which almostthe whole world was partitioned among a group of mighty empires, andthe political and economic unity of the globe was finally andirrefragably established. Few regions had escaped the direct politicalcontrol of European powers; and most of these few were insensiblyfalling under the influence of one or other of the powers: Turkey underthat of Germany, Persia under that of Russia and Britain. No region ofthe earth remained exempt from the indirect influence of the Europeansystem. The civilisation of the West had completed the domination ofthe globe; and the interests of the great world-states were sointertwined and intermingled in every corner of the earth that thebalance of power among them had become as precarious as was theEuropean balance in the eighteenth century. The era of the world-stateshad very definitely opened. It remained to be seen in what spirit itwas to be used, and whether it was to be of long duration. These twoquestions are one; for no system can last which is based upon injusticeand the denial of right. 

At this point we may well stop to survey the new world-states which hadbeen created by this quarter of a century of eager competition. 

First among them, in extent and importance, stood the new empire ofFrance. It covered a total area of five million square miles, and insize ranked third in order, coming after the older empires of Russiaand Britain. It had been the result of the strenuous labours ofthree-quarters of a century, dating from the first invasion of Algiers;it included also some surviving fragments of the earlier French Empire. But overwhelmingly the greater part of this vast dominion had beenacquired during the short period which we have surveyed in thischapter; and its system of organisation and government had not yet hadtime to establish itself. It had been built only at the cost ofstrenuous labour, and many wars. Yet the French had shown in itsadministration that they still retained to the full that imaginativetact in the handling of alien peoples which had stood them in goodstead in India and America during the eighteenth century. Once theirrule was established the French had on the whole very little troublewith their subjects; and it is impossible to praise too highly thelabours of civilisation which French administrators were achieving. Sofar as their subjects were concerned, they may justly be said to haveregarded themselves as trustees. So far as the rest of the civilisedworld was concerned, the same praise cannot be given; for the Frenchpolicy in the economic administration of colonies was definitely one ofmonopoly and exclusion. The French Empire fell into three main blocks. First, and most important, was the empire of Northern Africa, extendingfrom Algiers to the mouth of the Congo, and from the Atlantic to thevalley of the Nile. Next came the rich island of Madagascar; lastly theeastern empire of Annam and Tonking, the beginnings of which dated backto the eighteenth century. A few inconsiderable islands in the Pacificand the West Indies, acquired long since, a couple of towns in India, memories of the dreams of Dupleix, and the province of French Guiana inSouth America, which dated back to the seventeenth century, completedthe list. For the most part a recent and rapid creation, itnevertheless had roots in the past, and was the work of a peopleexperienced in the handling of backward races. 

Next may be named the curious dominion of the Congo Free State, occupying the rich heart of the African continent. Nominally itbelonged to no European power, but was a recognised neutral territory. In practice it was treated as the personal estate of the Belgian king, Leopold II. Subject to closer international restrictions than any otherEuropean domain in the non-European world, the Congo was neverthelessthe field of some of the worst iniquities in the exploitation ofdefenceless natives that have ever disgraced the record of Europeanimperialism. International regulations are no safeguard againstmisgovernment; the only real sanction is the character and spirit ofthe government. For the Congo iniquities Leopold II. Must be heldguilty at the bar of posterity. When he went to his judgment in 1908this rich realm passed under the direct control of the Belgiangovernment and parliament, and an immediate improvement resulted. 

The least successful of the new world-states was that of Italy. Itsstory was a story of disaster and disappointment. It included some twohundred thousand square miles of territory; but they were hot and aridlands on the inhospitable shores of the Red Sea and in Somaliland. Italy had as yet no real opportunity of showing how she would deal withthe responsibilities of empire. 

The most remarkable, in many respects, of all these suddenly acquiredempires was that of Germany. For it was practically all obtained withina period of three years, without fighting or even serious friction. Itfell almost wholly within regions where Germany's interests had beenpreviously negligible, and British trade predominant. Yet its growthhad not been impeded, it had even been welcomed, by its rivals. Thiseasily-won empire was indeed relatively small, being not much over onemillion square miles, little more than one-fifth of the Frenchdominions. But it was five times as large as Germany itself, and itincluded territories which were, on the whole, richer than those ofFrance. The comparative smallness of its area was due to the fact thatGermany was actually the last to enter the race. She took no steps toacquire territory, she showed no desire to acquire it, before 1883; ifshe had chosen to begin ten years earlier, as she might easily havedone, or if she had shown any marked activity in exploring ormissionary work, without doubt she could have obtained a much largershare of African soil. 

These rich lands afforded to their new masters useful supplies of rawmaterials, which were capable of almost indefinite expansion. Theyincluded, in East and South-West Africa, areas well suited for whitesettlement; but German emigrants, despite every encouragement, refusedto settle in them. An elaborately scientific system of administration, such as might be expected from the German bureaucracy, was devised forthe colonies; officials and soldiers have from the beginning formed alarger proportion of their white population than in any other Europeanpossessions. Undoubtedly the government of the German colonies was inmany respects extremely efficient. But over-administration, which hasits defects even in an old and well-ordered country, is fatal to thedevelopment of a raw and new one. Although Germany has, in order toincrease the prosperity of her colonies, encouraged foreign trade, andfollowed a far less exclusive policy than France, not one of hercolonies, except the little West African district of Togoland, has everpaid its own expenses. In the first generation of its existence theGerman colonial empire, small though it is in comparison with theBritish or the French, actually cost the home government over100, 000, 000 pounds in direct outlay. 

The main cause of this was that from the first the Germans showedneither skill nor sympathy in the handling of their subjectpopulations. The uniformed official, with his book of rules, onlybewilders primitive folk, and arouses their resentment. But it was notonly official pedantry which caused trouble with the subject peoples;still more it was the ruthless spirit of mere domination, and the totaldisregard of native rights, which were displayed by the Germanadministration. The idea of trusteeship, which had graduallyestablished itself among the rulers of the British dominions, and inthe French colonies also, was totally lacking among the Germans. Theyruled their primitive subjects with the brutal intolerance of Zabern, with the ruthless cruelty since displayed in occupied Belgium. This waswhat made the rise of the German dominion a terrible portent in thehistory of European imperialism. The spirit of mere domination, regardless of the rights of the conquered, had often shown itself inother European empires; but it had always had to struggle againstanother and better ideal, the ideal of trusteeship; and, as we haveseen, the better ideal had, during the nineteenth century, definitelygot the upper hand, especially in the British realms, whose experiencehad been longest. But the old and bad spirit reigned without check inthe German realms. And even when, in 1907, it began to be seriouslycriticised, when its disastrous and unprofitable results began to beseen, the ground on which it was challenged in discussions in Germanywas mainly the materialist ground that it did not pay. 

The justification for these assertions is to be found in the history ofthe principal German colonies. In the Cameroons the native tribes, whohad been so ready to receive European government that they hadrepeatedly asked for British protection, were driven to such incessantrevolts that the annals of the colony seem to be annals of continuousbloodshed: forty-six punitive expeditions were chronicled in theseventeen years from 1891--long after the establishment of the Germansupremacy, which took place in 1884. The record of East Africa was evenmore terrible for the ferocity with which constant revolts weresuppressed. But worst of all was the story of South-West Africa. Therewere endless wars against the various tribes; but they culminated inthe hideous Herero war of 1903-6. The Hereros, driven to desperation bymaltreatment, had revolted and killed some white farmers. They werepunished by an almost complete annihilation. The spirit of this hideousslaughter is sufficiently expressed by the proclamation of thegovernor, General von Trotha, in 1904. 'The Herero people must nowleave the land. Within the German frontier every Herero, with orwithout weapon, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall takecharge of no more women and children, but shall drive them back totheir people, or let them be shot at. ' Ten thousand of these unhappypeople, mainly old men, women and children, were driven into thedesert, where they perished. There is no such atrocious episode in thehistory of European imperialism since Pizarro's slaughter of the Incas;if even that can be compared with it. 

The causes of these ceaseless and ruinous wars were to be found partlyin the total disregard of native custom, and in the hide-bound pedantrywith which German-made law and the Prussian system of regimentationwere enforced upon the natives; but it was to be found still more inthe assumption that the native had no rights as against his white lord. His land might be confiscated; his cattle driven away; even downrightslavery was not unknown, not merely in the form of forced labour, whichhas been common in German colonies, but in the form of the actual saleand purchase of negroes. Herr Dernburg, who became Colonial Secretaryin 1907, himself recorded that he met in East Africa a young farmer whotold him that he had just bought a hundred and fifty negroes; he alsodescribed the settlers' pleasing practice of sitting beside the wellswith revolvers, in order to prevent the natives from watering theircattle, and to force them to leave them behind; and he noted thatofficials nearly always carried negro whips with them. These practices, indeed, were condemned by the German Government itself, but only aftermany years, and mainly because they were wasteful. Governmentrepresentatives have told the Reichstag, as Herr Schleitwein did in1904, that they must pursue a 'healthy egoism, ' and forswear'humanitarianism and irrational sentimentality. ' 'The Hereros must beforced to work, and to work without compensation and for their foodonly. . . . The sentiments of Christianity and philanthropy with whichthe missionaries work must be repudiated with all energy. ' This is whatis called Realpolitik. 

Is it too much to say that the appearance of the spirit thus expressedwas a new thing in the history of European imperialism? Is it not plainthat if this spirit should triumph, the ascendancy of Europe over thenon-European world must prove to be, not a blessing, but an unmitigatedcurse? Yet the nation which had thus acquitted itself in the rich landswhich it had so easily acquired was not satisfied; it desired a widerfield for the exhibition of its Kultur, its conception of civilisation. 

From the beginning it was evident that the colonial enthusiasts ofGermany had no intention of resting satisfied with the considerabledominions they had won, but regarded them only as a beginning, as basesfor future conquests. The colonies were not ends in themselves, butmeans for the acquisition of further power; and it was this, even morethan the ruthlessness with which the subject peoples were treated, which made the growth of the German dominions a terrible portent. Forsince the whole world was now portioned out, new territories could onlybe acquired at the cost of Germany's neighbours. This was, indeed, atfirst the programme only of extremists; the mass of the German people, like Bismarck, took little interest in colonies. But the extremistsproved that they could win over the government to their view; theGerman people, most docile of nations, could be gradually indoctrinatedwith it. And because this was so, because the ugly spirit of dominationand of unbridled aggressiveness was in these years gradually masteringthe ruling forces of a very powerful state, and leading them towardsthe catastrophe which was to prove the culmination of Europeanimperialism, it is necessary to dwell, at what may seemdisproportionate length, upon the development of German policy duringthe later years of our period. 

Filled with pride in her own achievements, believing herself to be, beyond all rivalry, the greatest nation in the world, already theleader, and destined to be the controller, of civilisation, Germanycould not bring herself to accept a second place in the imperialsphere. She had entered late into the field, by no fault of her own, and found all the most desirable regions of the earth already occupied. Now that 'world-power' had become the test of greatness among states, she could be content with nothing short of the first rank amongworld-states; if this rank could not be achieved, she seemed to besentenced to the same sort of fate as had befallen Holland or Denmark:she might be ever so prosperous, as these little states were, but shewould be dwarfed by the vast powers which surrounded her. But theGerman world-state was not to be the result of a gradual and naturalgrowth, like the Russian, the British or the American world-states. Thepossibility of gradual growth was excluded by the fact that the wholeworld had been partitioned. Greatness in the non-European world mustbe, and might be, carved out in a single generation, as supremacy inEurope had been already attained, by the strong will, efficientorganisation, and military might of the German government. 

It was natural, perhaps inevitable, that a nation with the history ofthe German nation, with its ruling ideas, and with its apparentlywell-tried confidence in the power of its government to achieve itsends by force, should readily accept such a programme. The date atwhich this programme captured the government of Germany, and became thenational policy, can be quite clearly fixed: it was in 1890, whenBismarck, the 'no colony man, ' was driven from power, and the supremedirection of national affairs fell into the hands of the EmperorWilliam II. An impressionable, domineering and magniloquent prince, inflated by the hereditary self-assurance of the Hohenzollerns, andsharing to the full the modern German belief in German superiority andin Germany's imperial destiny, William II. Became the spokesman andleader of an almost insanely megalomaniac, but terribly formidablenation. During the first decade of his government the new ambitions ofGermany were gradually formulated, and became more distinct. They werenot yet very apparent to the rest of the world, in spite of the factthat they were expounded with vigour and emphasis in a multitude ofpamphlets and books. The world was even ready to believe the Emperor'sassertion that he was the friend of peace: he half believed it himself, because he would have been very ready to keep the peace if Germany's'rights' could be attained without war. But many episodes, such asKiao-Chau, and the Philippines, and the ceaseless warfare in the Germancolonies, and the restless enterprises of Pan-German intrigue, provideda commentary upon these pretensions which ought to have revealed thedangerous spirit which was conquering the German people. 

It is difficult, in the midst of a war forced upon the world by Germanambition, to take a sane and balanced view of the aims which Germanpolicy was setting before itself during these years of experiment andpreparation. What did average German opinion mean by the phraseWeltmacht, world-power, which had become one of the commonplaces of itspolitical discussions? We may safely assume that by the mass of men theimplications of the term were never very clearly analysed; and that, ifthey had been analysable, the results of the analysis would have beenwidely different in 1890 and in 1914, except for a few fanatics andextremists. Was the world-power at which Germany was aiming a realsupremacy over the whole world? In a vague way, no doubt, importantbodies of opinion held that such a supremacy was the ultimate destinyof Germany in the more or less distant future; and the existence ofsuch a belief, however undefined, is important because it helped tocolour the attitude of the German mind towards more immediatelypractical problems of national policy. But as a programme to beimmediately put into operation, world-power was not conceived in thissense by any but a few Pan-German fanatics; and even they would haverecognised that of course other states, and even other world-powers, would certainly survive the most successful German war, though theywould have to submit (for their own good) to Germany's will. Again, didthe demand for world-power mean no more than that Germany must haveextra-European territories, like Britain or France? She alreadypossessed such territories, though on a smaller scale than her rivals. Did the claim mean, then, that her dominions must be as extensive andpopulous as (say) those of Britain? Such an aim could only be obtainedif she could succeed in overthrowing all her rivals, at once or insuccession. And if she did that, she would then become, whatever herintentions, a world-power in the first and all-embracing sense. It isprobably true that the German people, and even the extreme Pan-Germans, did not definitely or consciously aim at world-supremacy. But they hadin the back of their minds the conviction that this was their ultimatedestiny, and in aiming at 'world-power' in a narrower sense, they sodefined their end as to make it impossible of achievement unless thecomplete mastery of Europe (which, as things are, means the mastery ofmost of the world) could be first attained. Certainly the rulingstatesmen of Germany must have been aware of the implications of theirdoctrine of world-power. They were aware of it in 1914, when theydeliberately struck for the mastery of Europe; they must have beenaware of it in 1890, when they began to lay numerous plans and projectsin all parts of the world, such as were bound to arouse the fears andsuspicions of their rivals. 

It is necessary to dwell for a little upon these plans and projects ofthe decade 1890-1900, because they illustrate the nature of the perilwhich was looming over an unconscious world. It would be an error tosuppose that all these schemes were systematically and continuouslypursued with the whole strength of the German state. They appealed todifferent bodies of opinion. Some of them were eagerly taken up for atime, and then allowed to fall into the background, though seldomwholly dropped. But taken as a whole they showed the existence of arestless and insatiable ambition without very clearly defined aims, andan eagerness to make use of every opening for the extension of power, which constituted a very dangerous frame of mind in a nation so strong, industrious, and persistent as the German nation. 

In spite of the disappointing results of colonisation in Africa, theGerman colonial enthusiasts hoped that something suitably grandiosemight yet be erected there: if the Belgian Congo could somehow beacquired, and if the Portuguese would agree to sell their largeterritories on the east and west coasts, a great empire of TropicalAfrica might be brought into being. This vision has not been abandoned:it is the theme of many pamphlets published during the course of thewar, and if Germany were to be able to impose her own terms, all thepeoples of Central Africa might yet hope to have extended to them theblessings of German government as they have been displayed in theCameroons and in the South-West. 

In the 'nineties there seemed also to be hope in South Africa, whereuse might be made of the strained relations between Britain and theBoer Republics. German South-West Africa formed a convenient base foroperations in this region: it was equipped with a costly system ofstrategic railways, far more elaborate than the commerce of the colonyrequired. There is no doubt that President Kruger was given reason toanticipate that he would receive German help: in 1895 (before theJameson Raid) Kruger publicly proclaimed that the time had come 'toform ties of the closest friendship between Germany and the Transvaal, ties such as are natural between fathers and children'; in 1896 (afterthe Jameson Raid) came the Emperor's telegram congratulating PresidentKruger upon having repelled the invaders 'without recourse to the aidof friendly powers'; in 1897 a formal treaty of friendship and commercewas made between Germany and the Orange Free State, with which theTransvaal had just concluded a treaty of perpetual alliance. Andmeanwhile German munitions of war were pouring into the Transvaalthrough Delagoa Bay. But when the crisis came, Germany did nothing. Shecould not, because the British fleet stood in the way. 

South America, again, offered a very promising field. There were manythousands of German settlers, especially in southern Brazil: thePan-German League assiduously laboured to organise these settlers, andto fan their patriotic zeal, by means of schools, books, andnewspapers. But the Monroe Doctrine stood in the way of South Americanannexations. Perhaps Germany might have been ready to see how far shecould go with the United States, the least military of great powers. But there was good reason to suppose that the British fleet would haveto be reckoned with; and a burglarious expedition to South America withthat formidable watchdog at large and unmuzzled was an uninvitingprospect. 

In the Far East the prospects of immediate advance seemed morefavourable, since the Chinese Empire appeared to be breaking up. Theseizure of Kiao-chau in 1897 was a hopeful beginning. But theAnglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 formed a serious obstacle to anyvigorous forward policy in this region. Once more the British fleetloomed up as a barrier. 

Yet another dream, often referred to by the pamphleteers though neverbrought to overt action by the government, was the dream that the richempire of the Dutch in the Malay Archipelago should be acquired byGermany. Holland herself, according to all the political ethnologistsof the Pan-German League, ought to be part of the German Empire; and ifso, her external dominions would follow the destiny of the rulingstate. But this was a prospect to be talked about, not to be worked foropenly. It would naturally follow from a successful European war. 

A more immediately practicable field of operations was to be found inthe Turkish Empire. It was here that the most systematic endeavourswere made during this period: the Berlin-Bagdad scheme, which was to bethe keystone of the arch of German world-power, had already taken shapebefore our period closed, though the rest of the world was strangelyblind to its significance. Abstractly regarded, a German dominion overthe wasted and misgoverned lands of the Turkish Empire would have meanta real advance of civilisation, and would have been no moreunjustifiable than the British control of Egypt or India. This feelingperhaps explained the acquiescence with which the establishment ofGerman influence in Turkey was accepted by most of the powers. They hadyet to realise that it was not pursued as an end in itself, but as ameans to further domination. 

But neither the great Berlin-Bagdad project, nor any of the otherdreams and visions, had been definitely put into operation during thedecade 1890-1900. Germany was as yet feeling the way, preparing theground, and building up her resources both military and industrial. Perhaps the main result which emerged from the tentative experiments ofthese years was that at every point the obstacle was the sprawlingBritish Empire, and the too-powerful British fleet. The conviction grewthat the overthrow of this fat and top-heavy colossus was the necessarypreliminary to the creation of the German world-state. 

This was a doctrine which had long been preached by the chief politicalmentor of modern Germany, Treitschke, who died in 1896. He was nevertired of declaring that Britain was a decadent and degenerate state, that her empire was an unreal empire, and that it would collapse beforethe first serious attack. It would break up because it was not basedupon force, because it lacked organisation, because it was a medley ofdisconnected and discordant fragments, worshipping an undisciplinedfreedom. That it should ever have come into being was one of theparadoxes of history; for it was manifestly not due to straightforwardbrute force, like the German Empire; and the modern German mind couldnot understand a state which did not rest upon power, but upon consent, which had not been built up, like Prussia, by the deliberate action ofgovernment, but which had grown almost at haphazard, through thespontaneous activity of free and self-governing citizens. Treitschkeand his disciples could only explain the paradox by assuming that sinceit had not been created by force, it must have been created by lowcunning; and they invented the theory that British statesmen had forcenturies pursued an undeviating and Machiavellian policy of keepingthe more virile states of Europe at cross-purposes with one another bymeans of the cunning device called the Balance of Power, while behindthe backs of these tricked and childlike nations Britain was meanlysnapping up all the most desirable regions of the earth. According tothis view it was in some mysterious way Britain's fault that France andGermany were not the best of friends, and that Russia had beenalienated from her ancient ally. But the day of reckoning would comewhen these mean devices would no longer avail, and the pampered, selfish, and overgrown colossus would find herself faced byhard-trained and finely tempered Germany, clad in her shining armour. Then, at the first shock, India would revolt; and the Dutch of SouthAfrica would welcome their German liberators; and the great colonies, to which Britain had granted a degree of independence that no virilestate would ever have permitted, would shake off the last shreds ofsubordination; and the ramshackle British Empire would fall to pieces;and Germany would emerge triumphant, free to pursue all her greatschemes, and to create a lasting world-power, based upon Force andSystem and upon 'a healthy egoism, ' not upon 'irrationalsentimentalities' about freedom and justice. 

These were the doctrines and calculations of Realpolitik. They werebecoming more and more prevalent in the 'nineties. They seem definitelyto have got the upper hand in the direction of national policy duringthe last years of the century, when Germany refused to consider theprojects of disarmament put forward at the Hague in 1899, when thecreation of the German navy was begun by the Navy Acts of 1898 and1900, and when the Emperor announced that the future of Germany layupon the water, and that hers must be the admiralty of the Atlantic. Atthe moment when the conquest of the world by European civilisation wasalmost complete, two conceptions of the meaning of empire, theconception of brutal domination pursued for its own sake, which hasnever been more clearly displayed than in the administration of theGerman colonies, and the conception of trusteeship, which had slowlyemerged during the long development of the British Empire, stood forthalready in sharp antithesis. 

The dreadful anticipation of coming conflict weighed upon the world. France, still suffering from the wounds of 1870, was always aware ofit. Russia, threatened by German policy in the Balkans, was more andmore clearly realising it. But Britain was extraordinarily slow toawaken to the menace. As late as 1898 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain wasadvocating an alliance between Britain, Germany, and America tomaintain the peace of the world; and Cecil Rhodes, when he devised hisplan for turning Oxford into the training-ground of British youth fromall the free nations of the empire, found a place in his scheme forGerman as well as for American students. The telegram to PresidentKruger in 1896 caused only a passing sensation. The first realillumination came with the extraordinary display of German venomagainst Britain during the South African war, and with the ominousdoubling of the German naval programme adopted in the midst of thatwar, in 1900. But even this made no profound impression. The majorityof the British people declined to believe that a 'great and friendlynation, ' or its rulers, could deliberately enter upon a scheme of suchunbridled ambition and of such unprovoked aggression. 

VIII

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AMID THE WORLD-POWERS, 1878-1914

Throughout the period of rivalry for world-power which began in 1878the British Empire had continued to grow in extent, and to undergo asteady change in its character and organisation. 

In the partition of Africa, Britain, in spite of the already immenseextent of her domains, obtained an astonishingly large share. Theprotectorates of British East Africa, Uganda, Nigeria, Nyasaland, andSomaliland gave her nearly 25, 000, 000 new negro subjects, and these, added to her older settlements of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, whose area was now extended, outnumbered the whole population of theFrench African empire. But besides these tropical territories sheacquired control over two African regions so important that theydeserve separate treatment: Egypt, on the one hand, and the variousextensions of her South African territories on the other. When thepartition of Africa was completed, the total share of Britain amountedto 3, 500, 000 square miles, with a population of over 50, 000, 000 souls, and it included the best regions of the continent: the British Empire, in Africa alone, was more than three times as large as the colonialempire of Germany, which was almost limited to Africa. 

It may well be asked why an empire already so large should have takenalso the giant's share of the last continent available for divisionamong the powers of Europe. No doubt this was in part due to thesentiment of imperialism, which was stronger in Britain during thisperiod than ever before. But there were other and more powerful causes. In the first place, during the period 1815-78 British influence andtrade had been established in almost every part of Africa save thecentral ulterior, and no power had such definite relations with variousnative tribes, many of which desired to come under the protectorate ofa power with whom the protection of native rights and customs was anestablished principle. In the second place, Britain was the onlycountry which already possessed in Africa colonies inhabited byenterprising European settlers, and the activity of these settlersplayed a considerable part in the extension of the British Africandominions. And in the third place, since the continental powers hadadopted the policy of fiscal protection, the annexation of a region byany of them meant that the trade of other nations might be restrictedor excluded; the annexation of a territory by Britain meant that itwould be open freely and on equal terms to the trade of all nations. For this reason the trading interests in Britain, faced by thepossibility of exclusion from large areas with which they had carriedon traffic, were naturally anxious that as much territory as possibleshould be brought under British supremacy, in order that it mightremain open to their trade. 

It is the main justification for British annexations that they openedand developed new markets for all the world, instead of closing them;and it was this fact chiefly which made the acquisition of such vastareas tolerable to the other trading powers. The extension of theBritish Empire was thus actually a benefit to all the non-imperialstates, especially to such active trading countries as Italy, Holland, Scandinavia, or America. If at any time Britain should reverse hertraditional policy, and reserve for her own merchants the trade of theimmense areas which have been brought under her control, nothing ismore certain than that the world would protest, and protest withreason, against the exorbitant and disproportionate share which hasfallen to her. Only so long as British control means the open door forall the world will the immense extent of these acquisitions continue tobe accepted without protest by the rest of the world. 

In the new protectorates of this period Britain found herself faced bya task with which she had never had to deal on so gigantic a scale, though she had a greater experience in it than any other nation: thetask of governing justly whole populations of backward races, amongwhom white men could not permanently dwell, and whom they visited onlyfor the purposes of commercial exploitation. The demands of industryfor the raw materials of these countries involved the employment oflabour on a very large scale; but the native disliked unfamiliar toil, and as his wants were very few, could easily earn enough to keep him inthe idleness he loved. Slavery was the customary mode of gettinguncongenial tasks performed in Africa; but against slavery Europeancivilisation had set its face. Again, the ancient unvarying customswhereby the rights and duties of individual tribesmen were enforced, and the primitive societies held together, were often inconsistent withWestern ideas, and tended to break down altogether on contact withWestern industrial methods. How were the needs of industry to bereconciled with justice to the subject peoples? How were their customsto be reconciled with the legal ideas of their new masters? How werethese simple folk to be taught the habits of labour? How were theresources of their land to be developed without interference with theirrights of property and with the traditional usages arising from them?These were problems of extreme difficulty, which faced the rulers ofall the new European empires. The attempt to solve them in ahigh-handed way, and with a view solely to the interests of the rulingrace, led to many evils: it produced the atrocities of the Congo; itproduced in the German colonies the practical revival of slavery, thetotal disregard of native customs, and the horrible sequence of warsand slaughters of which we have already spoken. In the Britishdominions a long tradition and a long experience saved the subjectpeoples from these iniquities. We dare not claim that there were noabuses in the British lands; but at least it can be claimed thatgovernment has always held it to be its duty to safeguard nativerights, and to prevent the total break-up of the tribal system whichcould alone hold these communities together. The problem was not fullysolved; perhaps it is insoluble. But at least the native populationswere not driven to despair, and were generally able to feel that theywere justly treated. 'Let me tell you, ' a Herero is recorded to havewritten from British South Africa to his kinsmen under German rule, 'Let me tell you that the land of the English is a good land, sincethere is no ill-treatment. White and black stand on the same level. There is much work and much money, and your overseer does not beat you, or if he does he breaks the law and is punished. ' There was a verystriking contrast between the steady peace which has on the wholereigned in all the British dominions, and the incessant warfare whichforms the history of the German colonies. The tradition of protectionof native rights, established during the period 1815-78, and theexperience then acquired, stood the British in good stead. During theordeal of the Great War it has been noteworthy that there has been noserious revolt among these recently conquered subjects; and one of themost touching features of the war has been the eagerness of chiefs andtheir peoples to help the protecting power, and the innumerable humblegifts which they have spontaneously offered. Much remains to be donebefore a perfect solution is found for the problems of these dominionsof yesterday. But it may justly be claimed that trusteeship, notdomination, has been the spirit in which they have been administered;and that this is recognised by their subjects, despite all the mistakesand defects to which all human governments must be liable in dealingwith a problem so complex. 

Administrative problems of a yet more complex kind were raised in thetwo greatest acquisitions of territory made by Britain during theseyears, in Egypt and the Soudan, and in South Africa. The eventsconnected with these two regions have aroused greater controversy thanthose connected with any other British dominions; the results of theseevents have been more striking, and in different ways more instructiveas to the spirit and methods of British imperialism, than thosedisplayed in almost any other field; and for these reasons we shall nothesitate to dwell upon them at some length. 

The establishment of British control over Egypt was due to the mostcurious chain of unforeseen and unexpected events which even therecords of the British Empire contain. Nominally a part of the TurkishEmpire, Egypt had been in fact a practically independent state, payingonly a small fixed tribute to the Sultan, ever since the remarkableAlbanian adventurer, Mehemet Ali, had established himself as its Pashain the confusion following the French occupation (1806). Mehemet Alihad been an extraordinarily enterprising prince. He had created aformidable army, had conquered the great desert province of the Soudanand founded its capital, Khartoum, and had nearly succeeded inoverthrowing the Turkish Empire and establishing his own power in itsstead: during the period 1825-40 he had played a leading role inEuropean politics. Though quite illiterate, he had posed as theintroducer of Western civilisation into Egypt; but his grandiose andexpensive policy had imposed terrible burdens upon the fellahin(peasantry), and the heavy taxation which was necessary to maintain hisarmies and the spurious civilisation of his capital was only raised bycruel oppressions. 

The tradition of lavish expenditure, met by grinding the peasantry, wasaccentuated by Mehemet's successors. It inevitably impoverished thecountry. Large loans were raised in the West, to meet increasingdeficits; and the European creditors in course of time found itnecessary to insist that specific revenues should be ear-marked as asecurity for their interest, and to claim powers of supervision overfinance. The construction of the Suez Canal (opened 1869), which wasdue to the enterprise of the French, promised to bring increasedprosperity to Egypt; but in the meanwhile it involved an immenseoutlay. At the beginning of our period Egypt was already on the vergeof bankruptcy, and the Khedive was compelled to sell his holding ofSuez Canal shares, which were shrewdly acquired for Britain by Disraeli. 

But financial chaos was not the only evil from which Egypt suffered. There was administrative chaos also, and this was not diminished by thespecial jurisdictions which had been allowed to the various groups ofEuropeans settled in the country. The army, unpaid and undisciplined, was ready to revolt; and above all, the helpless mass of the peasantrywere reduced to the last degree of penury, and exposed to the mercilessand arbitrary severity of the officials, who fleeced them of theirproperty under the lash. All the trading nations were affected by thisstate of anarchy in an important centre of trade; all the creditors ofthe Egyptian debt observed it with alarm. But the two powers mostconcerned were France and Britain, which between them held most of thedebt, and conducted most of the foreign trade, of Egypt; while toBritain Egypt had become supremely important, since it now controlledthe main avenue of approach to India. 

When a successful military revolt, led by Arabi Pasha, threatened tocomplete the disorganisation of the country (1882), France and Britaindecided that they ought to intervene to restore order, the other powersall agreeing. But at the last moment France withdrew, and the task wasundertaken by Britain single-handed. [7] In a short campaign Arabi wasoverthrown; and now Britain had to address herself to the task ofreconstructing the political and economic organisation of Egypt. It washer hope and intention that the work should be done as rapidly aspossible, in order that she might be able to withdraw from a difficultand thankless task, which brought her into very delicate relations withthe other powers interested in Egypt. But withdrawal was not easy. Thetask of reorganisation proved to be a much larger and more complicatedone than had been anticipated; and it was greatly increased when thestrange wave of religious fanaticism aroused by the preaching of theMahdi swept over the Soudan, raised a great upheaval, and led to thedestruction of the Egyptian armies of occupation. Britain had now todecide whether the revolting province should be reconquered orabandoned. Reconquest could not be effected by the utterly disorganisedEgyptian army; if it was to be attempted, it must be by means ofBritish troops. But this would not only mean a profitless expenditure, it would also indefinitely prolong the British occupation, whichBritain was desirous of bringing to an end at the earliest possiblemoment. 

[7] See above, p. 164

The romantic hero, Gordon, was therefore sent to Khartoum to carry outthe withdrawal from the Soudan of all the remaining Egyptian garrisons. On his arrival he came to the conclusion that the position was notuntenable, and took no steps to evacuate. There was much dangerousdelay and vacillation; and in the end Gordon was besieged in Khartoum, and killed by the bands of the Mahdi, before a relief force could reachhim. But this triumph of Mahdism increased its menace to Egypt. Thecountry could not be left to its own resources until this peril hadbeen removed, or until the Egyptian army had been fully reorganised. Sothe occupation prolonged itself, year after year. 

The situation was, in fact, utterly anomalous. Egypt was a province ofTurkey, ruled by a semi-independent Khedive. Britain's chief agent inthe country was in form only in the position of a diplomaticrepresentative. But the very existence of the country depended upon theBritish army of occupation, and upon the work of the British officerswho were reconstructing the Egyptian army. And its hope of futurestability depended upon the work of the British administrators, financiers, jurists, and engineers who were labouring to set itsaffairs in order. These officials, with Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer)at their head, had an extraordinarily difficult task to perform. Theirrelations with the native government, which they constantly had tooverrule, were difficult enough. But besides this, they had to dealwith the agents of the other European powers, who, as representing theEuropean creditors of the Egyptian debt, had the right to interfere inpractically all financial questions, and could make any logicalfinancial reorganisation, and any free use of the country's financialresources for the restoration of its prosperity, all but impossible. 

Yet in the space of a very few years an amazing work of restoration andreorganisation was achieved. Financial stability was re-established, while at the same time taxation was reduced. The forced labour whichhad been exacted from the peasantry was abolished; they were no longerrobbed of their property under the lash; they obtained a secure tenurein their land; and they found that its productive power was increased, by means of great schemes of irrigation. An impartial system of justicewas organised--for the first time in all the long history of Egyptsince the fall of the Roman Empire. The army was remodelled by Britishofficers. Schools of lower and higher grade were established in largenumbers. In short, Egypt began to assume the aspect of a prosperous andwell-organised modern community. And all this was the work, in themain, of some fifteen years. 

Meanwhile in the Soudan triumphant barbarism had produced an appallingstate of things. It is impossible to exaggerate the hideousness of theregime of Mahdism. A ferocious tyranny terrorised and reduced todesolation the whole of the upper basin of the Nile; and the populationis said to have shrunk from 12, 000, 000 to 2, 000, 000, although exactfigures are of course unattainable. One of the evil consequences ofthis regime was that it prevented a scientific treatment of the flow ofthe Nile, on which the very life of Egypt depended. Scientificirrigation had already worked wonders in increasing the productivity ofEgypt, but to complete this work, and to secure avoidance of thefamines which follow any deficiency in the Nile-flow, it was necessaryto deal with the upper waters of the great river. On this ground, andin order to remove the danger of a return of barbarism, which wasthreatened by frequent Mahdist attacks, and finally in order to rescuecaptives who were enduring terrible sufferings in the hands of theMahdi, it appeared that the reconquest of the Soudan must be undertakenas the inevitable sequel to the reorganisation of Egypt. It wasachieved, with a wonderful efficiency which made the name of Kitchenerfamous, in the campaigns of 1896-98. The reconquered province wasnominally placed under the joint administration of Britain and Egypt;but in fact the very remarkable work of civilisation which was carriedout in it during the years preceding the Great War was wholly directedby British agents and officers. 

The occupation of the Soudan necessitated a prolongation of the Britishoccupation of Egypt. But, indeed, such a prolongation was in any caseinevitable; for the beneficial reforms in justice, administration, finance, and the organisation of the country's resources, which hadbeen effected in half a generation, required to be carefully watchedand nursed until they should be securely rooted: to a certainty theywould have collapsed if the guardianship of Britain had been suddenlyand completely withdrawn. The growing prosperity of Egypt, however, andstill more the diffusion of Western education among its people, hasnaturally brought into existence a nationalist party, who resent whatthey feel to be a foreign dominance in their country, and aspire afterthe institutions of Western self-government. But it has to be notedthat the classes among whom this movement has sprung up are not theclasses who form the bulk of the population of Egypt--the fellahin, whofrom the time of the Pharaohs downwards have been exploited andoppressed by every successive conqueror who has imposed his rule on thecountry. This class, which has profited more than any other from theBritish regime, which has, under that regime, known for the first timejustice, freedom from tyranny, and the opportunity of enjoying a fairshare of the fruits of its own labour, is as yet unvocal. Accustomedthrough centuries to submission, accepting good or bad seasons, just orunjust masters, as the gods may send them, the fellah has not yet hadtime even to begin to have thoughts or opinions about his place insociety and his right to a share in the control of his own destinies;and if the rule which has endeavoured to nurture him into prosperityand self-reliance were withdrawn, he would accept with blindsubmissiveness whatever might take its place. The classes among whomthe nationalist movement finds its strength are the classes which havebeen in the past accustomed to enjoy some degree of domination; therelics of the conquering races, Arabs or Turks, who have succeeded oneanother in the rule of Egypt, the small traders and shopkeepers of thetowns, drawn from many different races, the students who have beeninfluenced by the knowledge and the political ideas of the West. It isnatural and healthy that a desire to share in the government of theircountry should grow up among these classes: it is in some degree aproof that the influence of the regime under which they live has beenstimulating. But it is also obvious that if these classes were at onceto reassume, under parliamentary forms, the dominance which theywielded so disastrously until thirty years ago, the result must beunhappy. They are being, under British guidance, gradually introducedto a share in public affairs. But the establishment of a system of fullself-government and national independence in Egypt, if it is to besuccessful, must wait until not only these classes, but also theclasses beneath them, have been habituated to the sense of self-respectand of civic obligation by a longer acquaintance with the working ofthe Reign of Law. 

Since the Great War broke out, the British position in Egypt has beenregularised by the proclamation of a formal British protectorate. Perhaps the happiest fate which can befall the country is that itshould make that gradual progress in political freedom, which is alonelasting, under the guidance of the power which has already given itprosperity, the ascendancy of an impartial law, freedom from arbitraryauthority, freedom of speech and thought, and emancipation from thethraldom of foreign financial interests; and in the end it may possiblybe the destiny of this ancient land, after so many vicissitudes, totake its place as one among a partnership of free nations in aworld-encircling British Commonwealth of self-governing peoples. 

The most vexed, difficult, and critical problems in the history of theBritish Empire since 1878--perhaps the most difficult in the wholecourse of its history--have been those connected with the South Africancolonies. In 1878 there were four distinct European provinces in SouthAfrica, besides protected native areas, like Basutoland. All four hadsprung from the original Anglo-Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope. In two of them--Cape Colony and Natal--the two European peoples, British and Dutch, dwelt side by side, the Dutch being in a majority inthe former, the British in the latter; but in both the difficulty oftheir relationship was complicated by the presence of large colouredpopulations, which included not only the native African peoples, Hottentots, Kaffirs, Zulus, and so forth, but also a large number ofAsiatics, Malays who had been brought in by the Dutch before theBritish conquest, and Indians who had begun to come in more recently inlarge numbers, especially to Natal. Difference of attitude towardsthese peoples between the British authorities and the Dutch settlershad been in the past, as we have seen, a main cause of friction betweenthe two European peoples, and had caused the long postponement of fullself-government. In the other two provinces, the Transvaal and theOrange Free State, the white inhabitants were, in 1878, almostexclusively Dutch. The native populations in these states were nolonger in a state of formal slavery, but they were treated asdefinitely subject and inferior peoples: a law of the Transvaal laid itdown that 'there shall be no equality in Church or State between whiteand black. ' Thus the mutual distrust originally aroused by the nativequestion still survived. It was intensified by ill-feeling between theBoers and British missionaries. When Livingstone, the Britishmissionary hero, reported the difficulties which the Boers had put inhis way, British opinion was made more hostile than ever. Of the twoBoer republics, the Orange Free State had enjoyed complete independencesince 1854; and no serious friction ever arose between it and theBritish government. But the Transvaal, which had been turbulent andrestless from the first, had been annexed in 1878, largely because itseemed to be drifting into a war of extermination with the Zulus. As aconsequence, Britain was drawn into a badly managed Zulu-War; and whenthis dangerous tribe had been conquered, the Transvaal revolted. TheBoers defeated a small British force at Majuba; whereupon, instead ofpursuing the struggle, the British government resolved to try theeffect of magnanimity, and conceded (1881 and 1884) full localindependence to the Transvaal, subject only to a vague recognition ofBritish suzerainty. 

This was the beginning of many ills. The Transvaal Boers, knowinglittle of the world, thought they had defeated Britain; and under thelead of Paul Kruger, a shrewd old farmer who henceforth directed theirpolicy with all but autocratic power, began to pursue the aim ofcreating a purely Dutch South Africa, and of driving the British intothe sea. Kruger's policy was one of pure racial dominance, not ofequality of rights. It was a natural aim, under all the conditions. Butit was the source of grave evils. Inevitably it stimulated a parallelmovement in Cape Colony, where Dutch and British were learning to livepeaceably together. The Boer extremists also began to look about forallies, and were tempted to hope for aid from Germany, who had justestablished herself in South-West Africa. Full of pride, theTransvaalers, though they already held a great and rich country whichwas very thinly peopled, began to push outwards, and especially tothreaten the native tribes in the barren region of Bechuanaland, whichlay between the Transvaal and the German territory. To this Britainreplied by establishing a protectorate over Bechuanaland (1884) at therequest of native chiefs: the motive of this annexation was, notsuspicion of Germany, for this suspicion did not yet exist, but thedesire to protect the native population. 

Kruger's vague project of a Dutch South Africa would probably havecaused little anxiety so long as his resources were limited to thestrength of the thinly scattered Boer farmers. But the situation wasfundamentally altered by the discovery of immense deposits first ofdiamonds and then of gold in South Africa, and most richly of all inthe Rand district of the Transvaal. These discoveries brought a rapidinrush of European miners, financiers, and their miscellaneouscamp-followers, and in a few years a very rich and populous Europeancommunity had established itself in the Transvaal, and had created asits centre the mushroom new city of Johannesburg (founded 1884). Theseimmigrants, who came from many countries, but especially from Britain, changed the situation in the Transvaal; it seemed as though themajority among the white men in that state would soon be British. 

A simple and primitive organisation of government, such as sufficed forthe needs of Boer farmers, was manifestly inadequate for the needs ofthe new population, which included, in the nature of things, manyundesirable elements; and it was natural that the mining populationshould desire to be brought under a more modern type of government, orto obtain an effective share in the control of their own affairs. Butthis was precisely what the Boers of Kruger's way of thinking weredetermined to refuse them. They were resolved that Boer ascendancy inthe Transvaal should not be weakened. They therefore denied to the newimmigrants all the rights of citizenship, and would not even permitthem to manage the local affairs of Johannesburg. At the same timeKruger imposed heavy taxation upon the gold industry and the people whoconducted it; and out of the proceeds he was able not only to pay theexpenses of government without burdening the Boer farmers, but to buildup the military power by means of which he hoped ultimately to carryout his great project. Thus the 'Uitlanders' found themselves treatedas an inferior race in the land which their industry was enriching. They practically paid the cost of the government, but had no share indirecting it. 

The policy of racial ascendancy has seldom been pursued in a moremischievous or dangerous form. One cannot but feel a certain sympathywith the Boers' desire to maintain Boer ascendancy in the land whichthey had conquered. Yet it must be remembered that they were themselvesvery recent immigrants: the whole settlement of the Transvaal had takenplace in Paul Kruger's lifetime. 

The diamonds and the gold of the recent discoveries had produced inSouth Africa a new element of power: the power of great wealth, wieldedby a small number of men. Some of these were, of course, mean andsordid souls, to whom wealth was an end in itself. But among them oneemerged who was more than a millionaire, who was capable of dreaminggreat dreams, and had acquired his wealth chiefly in order that hemight have the power to realise them. This was Cecil Rhodes, an almostunique combination of the financier and the idealist. If he wassometimes tempted to resort to the questionable devices that highfinance seems to cultivate, and if his ideals took on sometimes arather vulgar colour, reflected from his money-bags, neverthelessideals were the real governing factors in his life. 

He dreamed of a great united state of South Africa; it was to be aBritish South Africa; but it was to be British, not in the sense inwhich Kruger wished it to be Dutch, but in the sense that equality oftreatment between the white races should exist within it, as in all theBritish lands. He dreamed also of a great brotherhood of Britishcommunities, or communities governed by British ideals, girdling theworld, perhaps dominating it (for Rhodes was inclined to be achauvinist), and leading it to peace and liberty. As a lad fresh fromOxford, in long journeyings over the African veldt, he had in acurious, childlike way thought out a theology, a system of politics, and a mode of life for himself; having reached the conclusion that theBritish race had on the whole more capacity for leading the worldsuccessfully than any other, he had resolved that it should be hislife's business to forward and increase the influence of British ideasand of British modes of life; and he had systematically built up acolossal fortune in order that he might have the means to do this work. At the roots of this strange medley of poetry and chauvinism whichfilled his mind was an unchanging and deep veneration for theoutstanding memory of his youth, Oxford, which in his mind stood forall the august venerable past of England, and was the expression of hermoral essence. When he died, after a life of money-making and intrigue, in a remote and half-developed colony, it was found that most of hisimmense fortune had been left either to enrich the college where he hadspent a short time as a lad, or to bring picked youths from all theBritish lands, and from what he regarded as the two great sistercommunities of America and Germany, so that they might drink in thespirit of England, at Oxford, its sanctuary. 

His immediate task lay in South Africa, where, from the moment of hisentry upon public life, he became the leader of the British cause asKruger was the leader of the Dutch: millionaire-dreamer and shrewd, obstinate farmer, they form a strange contrast. The one stood for SouthAfrican unity based upon equality of the white races: the other alsofor unity, but for unity based upon the ascendancy of one of the whiteraces. In the politics of Cape Colony Rhodes achieved a remarkablesuccess: he made friends with the Dutch party and its leader Hofmeyr, who for a long time gave steady support to his schemes and maintainedhim in the premiership. It was a good beginning for the policy ofracial co-operation. But Rhodes's most remarkable achievement was theacquisition of the fertile upland regions of Mashonaland andMatabililand, now called Rhodesia in his honour. There were episodeswhich smelt of the shady practices of high finance in the events whichled up to this acquisition. But in the result its settlement was wellorganised, after some initial difficulties, by the Chartered Companywhich Rhodes formed for the purpose. Now one important result of theacquisition of Rhodesia was that it hemmed in the Transvaal on thenorth; and, joined with the earlier annexation of Bechuanaland, isolated and insulated the two Dutch republics, which were nowsurrounded, everywhere except on the east, by British territory. FromCape Town up through Bechuanaland and through the new territoriesRhodes drove a long railway line. It was a business enterprise, but forhim it was also a great imaginative conception, a link of empire, andhe dreamed of the day when it should be continued to join the linewhich was being pushed up the Nile from Cairo through the hot sands ofthe Soudan. 

But Rhodes's final and most unhappy venture was the attempt to force, by violent means, a solution of the Transvaal problem. He hoped thatthe Uitlanders might be able, by a revolution, to overthrow Kruger'sgovernment, and, perhaps in conjunction with the more moderate Boers, to set up a system of equal treatment which would make co-operationwith the other British colonies easy, and possibly bring about afederation of the whole group of South African States. He was tooimpatient to let the situation mature quietly. He forced the issue byencouraging the foolish Jameson Raid of 1895. This, like all wilfulresorts to violence, only made things worse. It alienated and angeredthe more moderate Boers in the Transvaal, who were not without sympathywith the Uitlanders. It aroused the indignation of the Cape ColonyBoers, and embittered racial feeling there. It put the British cause inthe wrong in the eyes of the whole world, and made the Boers appear asa gallant little people struggling in the folds of a mercilesspython-empire. It increased immensely the difficulty of the Britishgovernment in negotiating with the Transvaal for better treatment ofthe Uitlanders. It stiffened the backs of Kruger and his party. TheGerman Kaiser telegraphed his congratulations on the defeat of the Raid'without the aid of friendly powers, ' and the implication that this aidwould be forthcoming in case of necessity led the Boers to believe thatthey could count on German help in a struggle with Britain. So everyconcession to the Uitlanders was obstinately refused; and after threeyears more of fruitless negotiation, during which German munitions werepouring into the Transvaal, the South African War began. It may be thatthe war could have been avoided by the exercise of patience. It may bethat the imperialist spirit, which was very strong in Britain at thatperiod, led to the adoption of a needlessly high-handed tone. But itwas neither greed nor tyranny on Britain's part which brought about theconflict, but simply the demand for equal rights. 

The war was one in which all the appearances were against Britain, andthe whole world condemned British greed and aggression. It was a caseof Goliath fighting David, the biggest empire in the world attackingtwo tiny republics; yet the weaker side is not necessarily always inthe right. It seemed to be a conflict for the possession of gold-mines;yet Britain has never made, and never hoped to make, a penny of profitout of these mines, which remained after the war in the same hands asbefore it. It was a case of the interests of financiers andgold-hunters against those of simple and honest farmers; yet evenfinanciers have rights, and even farmers can be unjust. In reality theissue was a quite simple and straightforward one. It was the issue ofracial ascendancy against racial equality, and as her traditions badeher, Britain strove for racial equality. It was the issue ofself-government for the whole community as against the entrencheddominion of one section; and there was no question on which side thehistory of Britain must lead her to range herself. Whatever the rest ofthe world might say, the great self-governing colonies, which were freeto help or not as they thought fit, had no doubts at all. They all sentcontingents to take part in the war, because they knew it to be a warfor principles fundamental to themselves. 

The war dragged its weary course, and the Boers fought with suchheroism, and often with such chivalry, as to win the cordial respectand admiration of their enemies. It is always a pity when men fight;but sometimes a fight lets bad blood escape, and makes friendshipeasier between foes who have learnt mutual respect. Four years afterthe peace which added the Transvaal and the Orange Free State asconquered dominions to the British Empire, the British governmentestablished in both of these provinces the full institutions ofresponsible self-government. As in Canada sixty years earlier, the tworaces were bidden to work together and make the best of one another;because now their destinies were freely under their own control. Yetthis was even a bolder experiment than that of Canada, and showed amore venturesome confidence in the healing power of self-government. How has it turned out? Within five years more, the four dividedprovinces which had presented such vexed problems in 1878, werecombined in the federal Union of South Africa, governed by institutionswhich reproduced those of Britain and her colonies. 

In handing over to the now united states of South Africa theunqualified control of their own affairs, Britain necessarily left tothem the vexed problem of devising a just relation between the rulingraces and their subjects of backward or alien stocks; the problem whichhad been the source of most of the difficulties of South Africa for acentury past, and which had long delayed the concession of fullself-government. Nowhere in the world does this problem assume a moreacute form than in South Africa, where there is not only a majority ofnegroes, mostly of the vigorous Bantu stock, but also a large number ofimmigrants mainly from India, who as subjects of the British crownnaturally claim special rights. South Africa has to find her ownsolution for this complex problem; and she has not yet fully found it. But in two ways her association with the British Empire has helped, andwill help, her to find her way towards it. If the earlier policy of theBritish government, guided by the missionaries, laid too exclusive anemphasis upon native rights, and in various ways hampered thedevelopment of the colony by the way in which it interpreted theserights, at least it had established a tradition hostile to that policyof mere ruthless exploitation of which such an ugly illustration wasbeing given in German South-West Africa. An absolute parity oftreatment between white and black must be not only impracticable, butharmful to both sides. But between the two extremes of a visionaryequality and a white ascendancy ruthlessly employed for exploitation, athird term is possible--the just tutelage of the white man over theblack, with a reasonable freedom for native custom. 'A practice hasgrown up in South Africa, ' says the greatest of South Africanstatesmen, [8] 'of creating parallel institutions, giving the nativestheir own separate institutions on parallel lines with institutions forwhites. It may be that on these lines we may yet be able to solve aproblem which may otherwise be insoluble. ' It is a solution which owesmuch to the British experiments of the previous period; and theprinciple which inspires it was incorporated in the Act of Union. Thisis one of the innumerable fruitful experiments in government in whichthe British system is so prolific. Again, the problem of therelationship between Indian immigrants and white colonists is anacutely difficult one. It cannot be said to have been solved. But atleast the fact that the South African Union and the Indian Empire areboth partners in the same British commonwealth improves the chances ofa just solution. It helped to find at least a temporary adjustment in1914; in the future also it may contribute, in this as in many otherways, to ensure that a fair consideration is given to both sides of thethorny question of inter-racial relationship. 

[8] General Smuts, May 22, 1917. 

The events which led up to, and still more the events which followed, the South African War had thus brought a solution for the South Africanproblem, which had been a continuous vexation since the moment of theBritish conquest. It was solved by the British panacea ofself-government and equal rights. Who could have anticipated, twentyyears or fifty years ago, the part which has been played by SouthAfrica in the Great War? Is there any parallel to these events, whichshowed the gallant general of the Boer forces playing the part of primeminister in a united South Africa, crushing with Boer forces a revoltstirred up among the more ignorant Boers by German intrigue, and thenleading an army, half Boer and half British, to the conquest of GermanSouth-West Africa?

The South African War had proved to be the severest test which themodern British Empire had yet had to undergo. But it had emerged, notbroken, as in 1782, but rejuvenated, purged of the baser elements whichhad alloyed its imperial spirit, and confirmed in its faith in theprinciples on which it was built. More than that, on the first occasionon which the essential principles or the power of the empire had beenchallenged in war, all the self-governing colonies had voluntarilyborne their share. Apart from a small contingent sent from Australia tothe Soudan in 1885, British colonies had never before--indeed, noEuropean colony had ever before--sent men oversea to fight in a commoncause: and this not because their immediate interests were threatened, but for the sake of an idea. For that reason the South African Warmarks an epoch not merely in the history of the British Empire, but ofEuropean imperialism as a whole. 

The unity of sentiment and aim which was thus expressed had, however, been steadily growing throughout the period of European rivalry; anddoubtless in the colonies, as in Britain, the new value attached to theimperial tie was due in a large degree to the very fact of theeagerness of the other European powers for extra-European possessions. Imperialist sentiment began to become a factor in British politics justabout the beginning of this period: in 1878 the Imperial FederationSociety was founded, and about the same time Disraeli, who had oncespoken of the colonies as 'millstones around our necks, ' was makinghimself the mouthpiece of the new imperialist spirit. To this wave offeeling a very notable contribution was made by Sir John Seeley'sbrilliant book, "The Expansion of England. " Slight as it was, andcontaining no facts not already familiar, it gave a new perspective tothe events of the last four centuries of British history, and made thegrowth of the Empire seem something not merely casual and incidental, but a vital and most significant part of the British achievement. Itsdefect was, perhaps, that it concentrated attention too exclusivelyupon the external aspects of the wonderful story, and dwelt too littleupon its inner spirit, upon the force and influence of the instinct ofself-government which has been the most potent factor in Britishhistory. The powerful impression which it created was deepened by otherbooks, like Froude's "Oceana" and Sir Charles Dilke's "GreaterBritain, " the title of which alone was a proclamation and a prophecy. It was strengthened also by the wonderful imperial pageants, likenothing else ever witnessed in the world, which began with the twoJubilee celebrations of 1887 and 1897, and were continued in thefunerals of Queen Victoria and Edward VII. , the coronations of EdwardVII. And George V. , and the superb Durbars of Delhi. The imaginativeappeal of such solemn representations of a world-scattered fellowshipof peoples and nations and tongues must not be underestimated. At firstthere was perhaps a suggestion of blatancy, and of mere pride indominion, in the way in which these celebrations were received; thegraver note of Kipling's 'Recessional, ' inspired by the Jubilee of1897, was not unneeded. But after the strain and anxiety of the SouthAfrican War, a different temper visibly emerged. 

More important than the pageants were the conferences of imperialstatesmen which arose out of them. The prime ministers of the greatcolonies began to deliberate in common with the statesmen of Britain;and the discussions, though at first quite informal and devoid ofauthority, have become more intimate and vital as time has passed: abeginning at least has been made in the common discussion of problemsaffecting the Empire as a whole. And alongside of, and in consequenceof, all this, imperial questions have been treated with a newseriousness in the British parliament, and the offices which deal withthem have ceased to be, as they once were, reserved for statesmen ofthe second rank. The new attitude was pointedly expressed when in 1895Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the most brilliant politician of hisgeneration, who could have had almost any office he desired, deliberately chose the Colonial Office. His tenure of that office wasnot, perhaps, memorable for any far-reaching change in colonial policy, though he introduced some admirable improvements in the administrationof the tropical colonies; but it was most assuredly memorable for theincreased intensity of interest which he succeeded in arousing inimperial questions, both at home and in the colonies. The campaignwhich he initiated, after the South African War, for the institution ofan Imperial Zollverein or a system of Colonial Preference was afailure, and indeed was probably a blunder, since it implied an attemptto return to that material basis of imperial unity which had formed thecore of the old colonial system, and had led to the most unhappyresults in regard to the American colonies. But at least it was anattempt to realise a fuller unity than had yet been achieved, and inits first form included an inspiring appeal to the British people toface sacrifices, should they be necessary, for that high end. Whetherthese ideas contribute to the ultimate solution of the imperial problemor not, it was at least a good thing that the question should be raisedand discussed. 

One further feature among the many developments of this era must not beleft untouched. It is the rise of a definitely national spirit in thegreater members of the Empire. To this a great encouragement has beengiven by the political unity which some of these communities have forthe first time attained during these years. National sentiment in theDominion of Canada was stimulated into existence by the Federation of1867. The unification of Australia which was at length achieved in theFederation of 1900 did not indeed create, but it greatly strengthened, the rise of a similar spirit of Australian nationality. A nationalspirit in South Africa, merging in itself the hostile racial sentimentsof Boer and Briton, may well prove to be the happiest result of theUnion of South Africa. In India also a national spirit is coming tobirth, bred among a deeply divided people by the political unity, thepeace, and the equal laws, which have been the greatest gifts ofBritish rule; its danger is that it may be too quick to imagine thatthe unity which makes nationhood can be created merely by means ofresolutions declaring that it exists, but the desire to create it is analtogether healthy desire. On the surface it might appear that the riseof a national spirit in the great members of the Empire is a danger tothe ideal of imperial unity; but that need not be so, and if it wereso, the danger must be faced, since the national spirit is too valuablea force to be restricted. The sense of nationhood is the inevitableoutcome of the freedom and co-operation which the British systemeverywhere encourages; to attempt to repress it lest it should endangerimperial unity would be as short-sighted as the old attempt to restrictthe natural growth of self-government because it also seemed a dangerto imperial unity. The essence of the British system is the freedevelopment of natural tendencies, and the encouragement of variety oftypes; and the future towards which the Empire seems to be tending isnot that of a highly centralised and unified state, but that of abrotherhood of free nations, united by community of ideas andinstitutions, co-operating for many common ends, and above all for thecommon defence in case of need, but each freely following the naturaltrend of its own development. 

That is the conception of empire, unlike any other ever entertained bymen upon this planet, which was already shaping itself among theBritish communities when the terrible ordeal of the Great War came totest it, and to prove as not even the staunchest believer could haveanticipated, that it was capable of standing the severest trial whichmen or institutions have ever had to undergo. 

IX

THE GREAT CHALLENGE, 1900-1914

At the opening of the twentieth century the long process whereby thewhole globe has been brought under the influence of Europeancivilisation was practically completed; and there had emerged a groupof gigantic empires, which in size far surpassed the ancient Empire ofRome; each resting upon, and drawing its strength from, a unifiednation-state. In the hands of these empires the political destinies ofthe world seemed to rest, and the lesser nation-states appeared to bealtogether overshadowed by them. Among the vast questions which fatewas putting to humanity, there were none more momentous than these: Onwhat principles, and in what spirit, were these nation-empires going touse the power which they had won over their vast and varied multitudesof subjects? What were to be their relations with one another? Werethey to be relations of conflict, each striving to weaken or destroyits rivals in the hope of attaining a final world-supremacy? Or werethey to be relations of co-operation in the development ofcivilisation, extending to the whole world those tentative but far fromunsuccessful efforts after international co-operation which theEuropean states had long been endeavouring to work out amongthemselves?[9] At first it seemed as if the second alternative might beadopted, for these were the days of the Hague Conferences; but thedevelopment of events during the first fourteen years of the centuryshowed with increasing clearness that one of the new world-states wasresolute to make a bid for world-supremacy, and the gradual maturing ofthis challenge, culminating in the Great War, constitutes the supremeinterest of these years. 

[9] See the Essay on Internationalism (Nationalism andInternationalism, p. 124 ff. ). 

The oldest, and (by the rough tests of area, population, and naturalresources) by far the greatest of these new composite world-states, wasthe British Empire, which included 12, 000, 000 square miles, orone-quarter of the land-surface of the globe. It rested upon thewealth, vigour, and skill of a population of 45, 000, 000 in thehomeland, to which might be added, but only by their own consent, theresources of five young daughter-nations, whose population onlyamounted to about 15, 000, 000. Thus it stood upon a rather narrowfoundation. And while it was the greatest, it was also beyondcomparison the most loosely organised of all these empires. It wasrather a partnership of a multitude of states in every grade ofcivilisation than an organised and consolidated dominion. Five of itschief members were completely self-governing, and shared in the commonburdens only by their own free will. All the remaining members wereorganised as distinct units, though subject to the general control ofthe home government. The resources of each unit were employedexclusively for the development of its own welfare. They paid notribute; they were not required to provide any soldiers beyond theminimum needed for their own defence and the maintenance of internalorder. This empire, in short, was not in any degree organised formilitary purposes. It possessed no great land-army, and was, therefore, incapable of threatening the existence of any of its rivals. Itdepended for its defence firstly upon its own admirable strategicdistribution, since it was open to attack at singularly few pointsotherwise than from the sea; it depended mainly, for that reason, uponnaval power, and secure command of the sea-roads by which its memberswere linked was absolutely vital to its existence. Only by sea-power(which is always weak in the offensive) could it threaten itsneighbours or rivals; and its sea-power, during four centuries, hadalways, in war, been employed to resist the threatened domination ofany single power, and had never, in time of peace, been employed torestrict the freedom of movement of any of the world's peoples. On thecontrary, the Freedom of the Seas had been established by itsvictories, and dated from the date of its ascendancy. The life-blood ofthis empire was trade; its supreme interest was manifestly peace. Theconception of the meaning of empire which had been developed by itshistory was not a conception of dominion for dominion's sake, or of theexploitation of subjects for the advantage of a master. On thecontrary, it had come to mean (especially during the nineteenthcentury) a trust; a trust to be administered in the interests of thesubjects primarily, and secondarily in the interests of the wholecivilised world. That this is not the assertion of a theory or anideal, but of a fact and a practice, is sufficiently demonstrated bytwo unquestionable facts: the first that the units which formed thisempire were not only free from all tribute in money or men, but werenot even required to make any contribution towards the upkeep of thefleet, upon which the safety of all depended; the second that everyport and every market in this vast empire, so far as they were underthe control of the central government, were thrown open as freely tothe citizens of all other states as to its own. Finally, in this empirethere had never been any attempt to impose a uniformity of method oreven of laws upon the infinitely various societies which it included:it not merely permitted, it cultivated and admired, varieties of type, and to the maximum practicable degree believed in self-government. Because these were the principles upon which it was administered, thereal strength of this empire was far greater than it appeared. Butbeyond question it was ill-prepared and ill-organised for war; desiringpeace beyond all things, and having given internal peace to one-quarterof the earth's population, it was apt to be over-sanguine about themaintenance of peace. And if a great clash of empires should come, thiswas likely to tell against it. 

The second oldest--perhaps it ought to be described as the oldest--ofthe world-empires, and the second largest in area, was the RussianEmpire, which covered 8, 500, 000 square miles of territory. Its strengthwas that its vast domains formed a single continuous block, and thatits population was far more homogeneous than that of its rivals, threeout of four of its subjects being either of the Russian or of kindredSlavonic stock. Its weaknesses were that it was almost land-locked, nearly the whole of its immense coastline being either inaccessible, orice-bound during half of the year; and that it had not adopted modernmethods of government, being subject to a despotism, working through aninefficient, tyrannical, and corrupt bureaucracy. In the event of aEuropean war it was further bound to suffer from the facts that itsmeans of communication and its capacity for the movement of greatarmies were ill-developed; and that it was far behind all its rivals inthe control of industrial machinery and applied science, upon whichmodern warfare depends, and without which the greatest wealth ofman-power is ineffective. At the opening of the twentieth centuryRussia was still pursuing the policy of Eastward expansion at theexpense of China, which the other Western powers had been compelled toabandon by the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Able to bringpressure upon China from the landward side, she was not deterred by thenaval predominance which this alliance enjoyed, and she still hoped tocontrol Manchuria, and to dominate the policy of China. But these aimsbrought her in conflict with Japan, who had been preparing for theconflict ever since 1895. The outcome of the war (1904), which ended ina disastrous Russian defeat, had the most profound influence upon thepolitics of the world. It led to an internal revolution in Russia. Itshowed that the feet of the colossus were of clay, and that herbureaucratic government was grossly corrupt and incompetent. It forbadeRussia to take an effective part in the critical events of thefollowing years, and notably disabled her from checking the progress ofGerman and Austrian ascendancy in the Balkans. Above all it increasedthe self-confidence of Germany, and inspired her rulers with thedangerous conviction that the opposing forces with which they wouldhave to deal in the expected contest for the mastery of Europe could bemore easily overthrown than they had anticipated. To the Russian defeatmust be mainly attributed the blustering insolence of German policyduring the next ten years, and the boldness of the final challenge in1914. 

The third of the great empires was that of France, with 5, 000, 000square miles of territory, mostly acquired in very recent years, buthaving roots in the past. It rested upon a home population of only39, 000, 000, but these belonged to the most enlightened, the mostinventive, and the most chivalrous stock in Christendom. As France had, a hundred years before, raised the standard of human rights among theEuropean peoples, so she was now bringing law and justice and peace tothe backward peoples of Africa and the East; and was finding in thepride of this achievement some consolation for the brutality with whichshe had been hurled from the leadership of Europe. 

The fourth of the great empires was America, with some 3, 000, 000 squaremiles of territory, and a vague claim of suzerainty over the vast areaof Central and South America. Her difficult task of welding into anation masses of people of the most heterogeneous races had been madeyet more difficult by the enormous flood of immigrants, mainly from thenorthern, eastern, and south-eastern parts of Europe, which had pouredinto her cities during the last generation: they proved to be in manyways more difficult to digest than their predecessors, and they tended, in a dangerous way, to live apart and to organise themselves asseparate communities. The presence of these organised groups made itsometimes hard for America to maintain a quite clear and distinctiveattitude in the discussions of the powers, most of which had, as itwere, definite bodies of advocates among her citizens; and it wasperhaps in part for this reason that she had tended to fall back againto that attitude of aloofness towards the affairs of the non-Americanworld from which she seemed to have begun to depart in the later yearsof the last century. Although she had herself taken a hand in theimperialist activities of the 'nineties, the general attitude of hercitizens towards the imperial controversies of Europe was one ofcontempt or undiscriminating condemnation. Her old tradition ofisolation from the affairs of Europe was still very strong--still thedominating factor in her policy. She had not yet grasped (indeed, who, in any country, had?) the political consequences of the new era ofworld-economy into which we have passed. And therefore she could notsee that the titanic conflict of Empires which was looming ahead was ofan altogether different character from the old conflicts of theEuropean states, that it was fundamentally a conflict of principles, afight for existence between the ideal of self-government and the idealof dominion, and that it must therefore involve, for good or ill, thefortunes of the whole globe. She watched the events which led up to thegreat agony with impartial and deliberate interest. Even when the warbegan she clung with obstinate faith to the belief that her traditionof aloofness might still be maintained. It is not surprising, when weconsider how deep-rooted this tradition was, that it took two and ahalf years of carnage and horror to convert her from it. But it wasinevitable that in the end her still more deeply rooted tradition ofliberty should draw her into the conflict, and lead her at last to playher proper part in the attempt to shape a new world-order. 

We cannot stop to analyse the minor world-states, Italy and Japan; bothof which might have stood aside from the conflict, but that bothrealised its immense significance for themselves and for the world. 

Last among the world-states, both in the date of its foundation and inthe extent of its domains, was the empire of Germany, which coveredconsiderably less than 1, 500, 000 square miles, but rested upon a homepopulation of nearly 70, 000, 000, more docile, more industrious, andmore highly organised than any other human society. The empire ofGermany had been more easily and more rapidly acquired than any of theothers, yet since its foundation it had known many troubles, becausethe hard and domineering spirit in which it was ruled did not know howto win the affections of its subjects. A parvenu among the greatstates--having only attained the dignity of nationhood in themid-nineteenth century--Germany has shown none of that 'genius forequality' which is the secret of good manners and of friendship amongnations as among individuals. Her conversation, at home and abroad, hadthe vulgar self-assertiveness of the parvenu, and turned always andwholly upon her own greatness. And her conduct has been the echo of herconversation. She has persuaded herself that she has a monopoly ofpower, of wisdom, and of knowledge, and deserves to rule the earth. Ofthe magnitude and far-reaching nature of her imperialist ambitions, wehave said something in a previous chapter. She had as yet failed torealise any of these vaulting schemes, but she had not for that reasonabandoned any of them, and she kept her clever and insidiouspreparations on foot in every region of the world upon which heracquisitive eyes had rested. But the exasperation of her steady failureto achieve the place in the world which she had marked out as her duehad driven her rulers more and more definitely to contemplate, andprepared her people to uphold, a direct challenge to all her rivals. The object of this challenge was to win for Germany her due share inthe non-European world, her 'place in the sun. ' Her view of what thatshare must be was such that it could not be attained without theoverthrow of all her European rivals, and this would bring with it thelordship of the world. It must be all or nothing. Though not quiterealising this alternative, the mind of Germany was not afraid of it. She was in the mood to make a bold attempt, if need be, to grasp eventhe sceptre of world-supremacy. The world could not believe that anysane people could entertain such megalomaniac visions; not even theevents of the decade 1904-14 were enough to bring conviction; it neededthe tragedy and desolation of the war to prove at once their realityand their folly. For they were folly even if they could be momentarilyrealised. They sprang from the traditions of Prussia, which seemed todemonstrate that all things were possible to him who dared all, andscrupled nothing, and calculated his chances and his means withprecision. By force and fraud the greatness of Prussia had been built;by force and fraud Prussia-Germany had become the leading state ofEurope, feared by all her rivals and safe from all attack. Force andfraud appeared to be the determining factors in human affairs; even thephilosophers of Germany devoted their powers to justifying andglorifying them. By force and fraud, aided by science, Germany shouldbecome the leader of the world, and perhaps its mistress. Never has thedoctrine of power been proclaimed with more unflinching directness asthe sole and sufficient motive for state action. There was practicallyno pretence that Germany desired to improve the condition of the landsshe wished to possess, or that they were misgoverned, or that theexisting German territories were threatened: what pretence there was, was invented after war began. The sole and sufficient reason putforward by the advocates of the policy which Germany was pursuing wasthat she wanted more power and larger dominions; and what she wantedshe proposed to take. 

On the surface it seemed mere madness for the least and latest of thegreat empires to challenge all the rest, just as it had once seemedmadness for Frederick the Great, with his little state, to stand upagainst all but one of the great European powers. But Germany hadcalculated her chances, and knew that there were many things in herfavour. She knew that in the last resort the strength of theworld-states rested upon their European foundations, and here theinequality was much less. In a European struggle she could draw greatadvantage from her central geographical position, which she hadimproved to the highest extent by the construction of a great system ofstrategic railways. She could trust to her superbly organised militarysystem, more perfect than that of any other state, just because noother state has ever regarded war as the final aim and the highest formof state action. She commanded unequalled resources in all themechanical apparatus of war; she had spared no pains to build up herarmament works, which had, indeed, supplied a great part of the world;she had developed all the scientific industries in such a way thattheir factories could be rapidly and easily turned to war purposes; andhaving given all her thoughts to the coming struggle as no other nationhad done, she knew, better than any other, how largely it would turnupon these things. She counted securely upon winning an immenseadvantage from the fact that she would herself fix the date of war, andenter upon it with a sudden spring, fully prepared, against rivals who, clinging to the hope of peace, would be unready for the onset. Shehoped to sow jealousies among her rivals; she trusted to catch them ata time when they were engrossed in their domestic concerns, and in thisrespect fate seemed to play into her hands, since at the moment whichshe had predetermined, Britain, France, and Russia were all distractedby domestic controversies. She trusted also to her reading of the mindsand temper of her opponents; and here she went wildly astray, as mustalways be the fate of the nation or the man who is blinded byself-complacency and by contempt for others. 

But, above all, she put her trust in a vast political combination whichshe had laboriously prepared during the years preceding the greatconflict: the combination which we have learned to call Mittel-Europa. None of us realised to how great an extent this plan had been put inoperation before the war began. Briefly it depended on the possibilityof obtaining an intimate union with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, acontrol over the Turkish Empire, and a sufficient influence or controlamong the little Balkan states to ensure through communication. If thescheme could be carried out in full, it would involve the creation of apractically continuous empire stretching from the North Sea to thePersian Gulf, and embracing a total population of over 150, 000, 000. This would be a dominion worth acquiring for its own sake, since itwould put Germany on a level with her rivals. But it would have thefurther advantage that it would hold a central position in relation tothe other world-powers, corresponding to Germany's central position inrelation to the other nation-states of Europe. Russia could be struckat along the whole length of her western and south-western frontier;the British Empire could be threatened in Egypt, the centre of itsocean lines of communication, and also from the Persian Gulf in thedirection of India; the French Empire could be struck at the heart, inits European centre; and all without seriously laying open theattacking powers to the invasion of sea-power. 

It was a bold and masterful scheme, and it was steadily pursued duringthe years before the war. Austro-Hungary was easily influenced. Theascendancy of her ruling races--nay, the very existence of hercomposite anti-national empire--was threatened by the nationalistmovements among her subject-peoples, who, cruelly oppressed at home, were more and more beginning to turn towards their free brothers overthe border, in Serbia and Rumania; and behind these loomed Russia, thetraditional protector of the Slav peoples and of the Orthodox faith. Austro-Hungary, therefore, leant upon the support of Germany, and herdominant races would be very willing to join in a war which shouldremove the Russian menace and give them a chance of subjugating theSerbs. This latter aim suited the programme of Germany as well as itsuited that of Austria, since the railways to Constantinople andSalonika ran through Serbia. Serbia, therefore, was doomed; she stoodright in the path of the Juggernaut car. 

The acquisition of influence in Turkey was also comparatively easy. Constantinople is a city where lavish corruption can work wonders. Moreover Turkey was, in the last years of the nineteenth century, inbad odour with Europe; and Germany was able to earn in 1897 the lastinggratitude of the infamous Sultan Abdul Hamid by standing between himand the other European powers, who were trying to interfere with hisindulgence in the pastime of massacring the Armenians. Turkey had hadmany protectors among the European powers. She had never before had oneso complaisant about the murder of Christians. From that date Germanywas all-powerful in Turkey. The Turkish army was reorganised under herdirection, and practically passed under her control. Most of theTurkish railways were acquired and managed by German companies. Andpresently the great scheme of the Bagdad railway began to be carriedthrough. The Young Turk revolution in 1908 and the fall of Abdul Hamidgave, indeed, a shock to the German ascendancy; but only for a moment. The Young Turks were as amenable to corruption as their predecessors;and under the guidance of Enver Bey Turkey relapsed into Germansuzerainty. Thus the most important parts of the great scheme were in afair way of success by 1910. One of the merits of this scheme was thatas the Sultan of Turkey was the head of the Mahomedan religion, theGerman protectorate over Turkey gave a useful mode of appealing to thereligious sentiments of Mahomedans everywhere. Twice over, in 1898 andin 1904, the Kaiser had declared that he was the protector of allMahomedans throughout the world. Most of the Mahomedans were subjectseither of Britain, France, or Russia--the three rival empires that wereto be overthrown. As General Bernhardi put it, Germany in her strugglefor Weltmacht must supplement her material weapons with spiritualweapons. 

To obtain a similar ascendancy over the Balkan states was moredifficult; for the Turk was the secular enemy of all of them, andAustria was the foe of two of the four, and to bring these littlestates into partnership with their natural enemies seemed an all butimpossible task. Yet a good deal could be, and was, done. In two of thefour chief Balkan states German princes occupied the thrones, aHohenzollern in Rumania, a Coburger in Bulgaria; in a third, theheir-apparent to the Greek throne was honoured with the hand of theKaiser's own sister. Western peoples had imagined that the day had goneby when the policy of states could be deflected by such facts;especially as the Balkan states all had democratic parliamentaryconstitutions. But the Germans knew better than the West. They knewthat kings could still play a great part in countries where the bulk ofthe electorate were illiterate, and where most of the class ofprofessional politicians were always open to bribes. Their calculationswere justified. King Carol of Rumania actually signed a treaty ofalliance with Germany without consulting his ministers or parliament. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was able to draw his subjects into analliance with the Turks, who had massacred their fathers in 1876, against the Russians, who had saved them from destruction. KingConstantine of Greece was able to humiliate and disgrace the countryover which he ruled, in order to serve the purposes of hisbrother-in-law. These sovereigns may have been the unconsciousimplements of a policy which they did not understand. But they earnedtheir wages. 

There were, indeed, two moments when the great scheme came near beingwrecked. One was when Italy, the sleeping partner of the TripleAlliance, who was not made a sharer in these grandiose and vileprojects, attacked and conquered the Turkish province of Tripoli in1911, and strained to breaking-point the loyalty of the Turks toGermany. The other was when, under the guidance of the two greatstatesmen of the Balkans, Venizelos of Greece and Pashitch of Serbia, the Balkan League was formed, and the power of Turkey in Europe broken. If the League had held together, the great German project would havebeen ruined, or at any rate gravely imperilled. But Germany and Austriacontrived to throw an apple of discord among the Balkan allies at theConference of London in 1912, and then stimulated Bulgaria to attackSerbia and Greece. The League was broken up irreparably; its membershad been brought into a sound condition of mutual hatred; and Bulgaria, isolated among distrustful neighbours, was ready to become the tool ofGermany in order that by her aid she might achieve (fond hope!) thehegemony of the Balkans. This brilliant stroke was effected in1913--the year before the Great War. All that remained was to ruinSerbia. For that purpose Austria had long been straining at the leash. She had been on the point of making an attack in 1909, in 1912, in1913. In 1914 the leash was slipped. If the rival empires chose to lookon while Serbia was destroyed, well and good: in that case theBerlin-Bagdad project could be systematically developed andconsolidated, and the attack on the rival empires could come later. Ifnot, still it was well; for all was ready for the great challenge. 

We have dwelt at some length upon this gigantic project, because it hasformed during all these years the heart and centre of the Germandesigns, and even to-day it is the dearest of German hopes. Not untilshe is utterly defeated will she abandon it; because its abandonmentmust involve the abandonment of every hope of a renewed attempt atworld-supremacy, after an interval for reorganisation and recovery. Notuntil the German control over Austria and Turkey, more complete to-day, after two and a half years of war, than it has ever been before, hasbeen destroyed by the splitting up of Austria among the nationalitiesto which her territory belongs, and by the final overthrow of theTurkish Empire, will the German dream of world-dominion be shattered. 

But while this fundamentally important project was being worked out, other events, almost equally momentous in their bearing upon the comingconflict, were taking place elsewhere. It was the obvious policy ofGermany to keep her rivals on bad terms with one another. The traditionof Bismarck bade her isolate each victim before it was destroyed. Butthe insolence and the megalomania of modern Germany made thisdifficult. German writers were busily and openly explaining the fatemarked out for all the other powers. France was to be so crushed thatshe would 'never again be able to stand in our path. ' The bloated andunconsolidated empire of Britain was to be shattered. The Russianbarbarians were to be thrust back into Asia. And what the pamphleteersand journalists wrote was expressed with almost equal clearness in thetone of German diplomacy. In face of all this, the clumsy attempts ofthe German government to isolate their rivals met with small success, even though these rivals had many grounds of controversy amongthemselves. France knew what she had to fear; and the interpolation ofa few clumsy bids for her favour amid the torrent of insults againsther which filled the German press, were of no avail; especially as shehad to look on at the unceasing petty persecution practised in the lostprovinces of Alsace-Lorraine. Russia had been alienated by the firstevidences of German designs in the Balkans, and driven into a closealliance with France. Britain, hitherto obstinately friendly toGermany, began to be perturbed by the growing German programmes ofnaval construction from 1900 onwards, by the absolute refusal ofGermany to consider any proposal for mutual disarmament or retardationof construction, and above all by the repeated assertions of the headof the German state that Germany aspired to naval supremacy, that herfuture was on the sea, that the trident must be in her hands. Shouldthe trident fall into any but British hands, the existence of theBritish Empire, and the very livelihood of the British homeland, wouldrest at the mercy of him who wielded it. So, quite inevitably, thethree threatened empires drew together and reconciled their differencesin the Franco-British agreement of 1904 and the Russo-British agreementof 1907. 

These agreements dealt wholly with extra-European questions, andtherefore deserve some analysis. In the Franco-British agreement themain feature was that while France withdrew her opposition to theBritish position in Egypt, Britain on her side recognised the paramountpolitical interest of France in Morocco. It was the agreement aboutMorocco which counted for most; because it was the beginning of acontroversy which lasted for seven years, which was twice used byGermany as a means for testing, and endeavouring to break, thefriendship of her rivals, and which twice brought Europe to the vergeof war. 

Morocco is a part of that single region of mountainous North Africa ofwhich France already controlled the remainder, Tunis and Algeria. Peoples of the same type inhabited the whole region, but while in Tunisand Algeria they were being brought under the influence of law andorder, in Morocco they remained in anarchy. Only a conventional linedivided Morocco from Algeria, and the anarchy among the tribesmen onone side of the line inevitably had an unhappy effect upon the peopleon the other side of the line. More than once France had beencompelled, for the sake of Algeria, to intervene in Morocco. It isimpossible to exaggerate the anarchy which existed in the interior ofthis rich and wasted country. It was, indeed, the most lawless regionremaining in the world: when Mr. Bernard Shaw wished to find a scenefor a play in which the hero should be a brigand chief leading a bandof rascals and outlaws from all countries, Morocco presented the onlypossible scene remaining in the world. And this anarchy was the moreunfortunate, not only because the country was naturally rich and oughtto have been prosperous, but also because it lay in close proximity togreat civilised states, and on one of the main routes of commerce atthe entrance to the Mediterranean. In its ports a considerable trafficwas carried on by European traders, but this traffic was, owing to theanarchic condition of the country, nothing like as great as it ought tohave been. In 1905, 39 per cent. Of it was controlled by Frenchtraders, 32 per cent. By British traders, 12 per cent. By Germantraders, and 5 per cent. By Spanish traders. Manifestly this was aregion where law and order ought to be established, in the interests ofcivilisation. The powers most directly concerned were in the firstplace France, with her neighbouring territory and her preponderanttrade; in the second place Britain, whose strategic interests as wellas her trading interests were involved; in the third place Spain, whichdirectly faced the Morocco coast; while Germany had only tradinginterests involved, and so long as these were safeguarded, had noground of complaint. If any single power was to intervene, manifestlythe first claim was upon France. 

In 1900 France had directed the attention of Europe to the disorderlycondition of Morocco, and had proposed to intervene to restore order, on the understanding that she should not annex the country, orinterfere with the trading rights of other nations. Some states agreed;Germany made no reply, but made no objection. But owing to theopposition of Britain, who was then on bad terms with France and fearedto see an unfriendly power controlling the entrance to theMediterranean, no action was taken; and in the next years the chaos inMorocco grew worse. By the agreement of 1904 Britain withdrew herobjection to French intervention, and recognised the prior politicalrights of France in Morocco, on the condition that the existinggovernment of Morocco should be maintained, that none of its territoryshould be annexed, and that 'the open door' should be preserved for thetrade of all nations. But, of course, it was possible, and evenprobable, that the existing Moroccan government could not be madeefficient. In that case, what should happen? The possibility had to becontemplated by reasonable statesmen, and provided against. But to doso in a public treaty would have been to condemn beforehand theexisting system. Therefore a hypothetical arrangement was made for thispossible future event in a secret treaty, to which Spain was made aparty; whereby it was provided that if the arrangement should breakdown, and France should have to establish a definite protectorate, thevital part of the north coast should pass under the control of Spain. 

To the public part of these arrangements, which alone were of immediateimportance, no objection was made by any of the other powers, and theGerman Chancellor told the Reichstag that German interests were notaffected. France accordingly drew up a scheme of reforms in thegovernment of Morocco, which the Sultan was invited to accept. Butbefore he had accepted them the German Kaiser suddenly came to Tangierin his yacht, had an interview with the Sultan in which he urged him toreject the French demands, and made a public speech in which hedeclared himself the protector of the Mahomedans, asserted that noEuropean power had special rights in Morocco, and announced hisdetermination to support the 'independence and integrity' ofMorocco--which in existing circumstances meant the maintenance ofanarchy. What was the reason for this sudden and insolentintervention--made without any previous communication with France? Themain reason was that France's ally, Russia, had just been severelydefeated by Japan, and would not be able to take part in a Europeanwar. Therefore, it appeared, France might be bullied; Britain might notbe willing to risk war on such an issue; the Entente of 1904 might bedestroyed; the extension of French influence might be prevented; andthe preservation of a state of anarchy in Morocco would leave open thechance of a seizure of that country by Germany at a later date, thusenabling her to dominate the entrance to the Mediterranean, and tothreaten Algeria. But this pretty scheme did not succeed. The Ententeheld firm. Britain gave steady support to France, as indeed she wasbound in honour to do; and in the end a conference of the powers washeld at Algeciras (Spain). At this conference the predominating rightof France to political influence in Morocco was formally recognised;and it was agreed that the government of the Sultan should bemaintained, and that all countries should have equal trading rights inMorocco. This was, of course, the very basis of the Franco-Britishagreement. On every point at which she tried to score a success overFrance, Germany was defeated by the votes of the other powers, even herown ally, Italy, deserting her. 

But the German intervention had had its effect. The Sultan had refusedthe French scheme of reform. The elements of disorder in Morocco wereencouraged to believe that they had the protection of Germany, and theactivity of German agents strengthened this belief. The anarchy grewsteadily worse. In 1907 Sir Harry Maclean was captured by a brigandchief, and the British government had to pay 20, 000 pounds ransom forhis release. In the same year a number of European workmen engaged onharbour works at Casablanca were murdered by tribesmen; and the Frenchhad to send a force which had a year's fighting before it reduced thedistrict to order. In 1911 the Sultan was besieged in his capital(where there were a number of European residents) by insurgenttribesmen, and had to invite the French to send an army to his relief. 

This was seized upon by Germany as a pretext. Morocco was no longer'independent. ' The agreement of Algecras was dead. Therefore sheresumed her right to put forward what claims she pleased in Morocco. Suddenly her gunboat, the Panther, appeared off Agadir. It was meant asan assertion that Germany had as much right to intervene in Morocco asFrance. And it was accompanied by a demand that if France wanted to beleft free in Morocco, she must buy the approval of Germany. Thesettlement of Morocco was to be a question solely between France andGermany. The Entente of 1904, the agreement of 1906, the Moroccaninterests of Britain (much more important than those of Germany), andthe interests of the other powers of the Algeciras Conference, were tocount for nothing. Germany's voice must be the determining factor. ButGermany announced that she was willing to be bought off by largeconcessions of French territory elsewhere--provided that Britain wasnot allowed to have anything to say: provided, that is, that theagreement of 1904 was scrapped. This was a not too subtle way of tryingto drive a wedge between two friendly powers. It did not succeed. Britain insisted upon being consulted. There was for a time a realdanger of war. In the end peace was maintained by the cession by Franceof considerable areas in the Congo as the price of German abstentionfrom intervening in a sphere where she had no right to intervene. ButMorocco was left under a definite French protectorate. 

We have dwelt upon the Morocco question at some length, partly becauseit attracted a vast amount of interest during the years of preparationfor the war; partly because it affords an extraordinarily goodillustration of the difficulty of maintaining peaceable relations withGermany, and of the spirit in which Germany approached the delicatequestions of inter-imperial relationships--a spirit far removed indeedfrom that friendly willingness for compromise and co-operation by whichalone the peace of the world could be maintained; and partly because itillustrates the crudity and brutality of the methods by which Germanyendeavoured to separate her intended victims. It is improbable that sheever meant to go to war on the Moroccan question. She meant to go towar on whatever pretext might present itself when all her preparationswere ready; but in the meanwhile she would avoid war on all questionsbut one: and that one was the great Berlin-Bagdad project, the keystoneof her soaring arch of Empire. She would fight to prevent the ruin ofthat scheme. Otherwise she would preserve the peace, she would evenmake concessions to preserve the peace, until the right moment hadcome. In that sense Germany was a peace-loving power: in that sensealone. 

On the agreement between Russia and Britain in 1907 it is unnecessaryto dwell with such fulness. The agreement turned mainly upon theremoval of causes of friction in the Middle East--in Persia and thePersian Gulf, and in Tibet. These were in themselves interesting andthorny questions, especially the question of Persia, where the twopowers established distinct spheres of interest and a sort of jointprotectorate. But they need not detain us, because they had no directbearing upon the events leading up to the war, except in so far as, byremoving friction between two rivals of long standing, they made itpossible for them to co-operate for their common defence against amenace that became more and more apparent. 

From 1907 onwards Germany found herself confronted by united defensiveaction on the part of the three empires whose downfall she intended tocompass. It was not (except as regarded France and Russia) a formalalliance which bound these powers. There was no fixed agreement betweenthem as to military co-operation. France and Britain had indeed, in1906 and in 1911, consulted as to the military steps they should takeif they were drawn into war, as seemed likely in those years, butneither was in any way bound to help the other under all circumstances. France and Britain had also agreed that the French fleet should beconcentrated in the Mediterranean, the main British fleet in the NorthSea. This arrangement (which was universally known, and, indeed, couldnot be concealed) put Britain under a moral obligation to defend Franceagainst naval attack, but only if France were the object of aggression. It was, therefore, actually a safeguard of peace, since it ensured thatneither France nor, consequently, her ally, Russia, would begin a warwithout being sure of the concurrence of Britain, the most pacific ofpowers. As the diplomatic records show, at the opening of the Great Warthey were not sure of this concurrence, even for naval purposes, untilAugust 1, when the die was already cast. The Triple Entente, therefore, was not an alliance; it was only an agreement for common diplomaticaction in the hope of averting a terrible menace. 

Until 1911 Germany, or some elements in Germany, seem to have hopedthat she could get her own way by bullying and rattling her sabre, andthat by these means she could frighten her rivals, make them mutuallydistrustful, and so break up their combination and deal with them indetail. Those who held this view were the peace-party (so-called), andthey included the Kaiser and his Chancellor. They would probably notthemselves have accepted this description of their policy, but inpractice this is what it meant. But there was always a formidable andinfluential party in Germany which had no patience with thesehesitations, and was eager to draw the sabre. It included the men ofthe General Staff, backed by the numerous Pan-German societies andnewspapers. The issue of the Morocco question in 1911, which showedthat the policy of bullying had failed, played into the hands of themen of violence; and from this moment began the last strenuous burst ofmilitary preparation which preceded the war. In 1911 was passed thefirst of a series of Army Acts for the increase of the already immenseGerman army, and still more for the provision of vast equipment and thescientific apparatus of destruction; two further Acts for the samepurpose followed in 1912 and in 1913. In 1911 also was publishedGeneral Bernhardi's famous book, which defined and described the courseof future action, and the aim which Germany was henceforth to pursuewith all her strength: Weltmacht oder Niedergang, world-power ordownfall. 

The events in the Balkans in 1912 and 1913 completed the conversion ofthose who still clung to the policy of peaceful bullying. The formationand triumph of the Balkan League in 1912 formed a grave set-back forthe Berlin-Bagdad project, which would be ruined if these little statesbecame strong enough, or united enough, to be independent. The break-upof the Balkan League and the second Balkan War of 1913 improved thesituation from the German point of view. But they left Serbiaunsatisfactorily strong, and Serbia distrusted Austria, and controlledthe communications with Constantinople. Serbia must be destroyed;otherwise the Berlin-Bagdad project, and with it the world-power ofwhich it was to be the main pillar, would be always insecure. Austriawas for attacking Serbia at once in 1913. Germany held her back: thewidening of the Kiel Canal was not completed, and the fruits of thelatest Army Acts were not yet fully reaped. But all was ready in 1914;and the Great Challenge was launched. It would have been launched at orabout that time even if an unpopular Austrian archduke, significantlyunguarded by the Austrian police, had NOT been most opportunelymurdered by an Austrian subject on Austrian territory. The murder wasonly a pretext. The real cause of the war was the resolution of Germanyto strike for world-supremacy, and her belief that the time wasfavourable for the great adventure. 

Meanwhile, what had the threatened empires been doing during the yearsof strenuous German preparation which began in 1911? Their governmentscould not but be aware of the enormous activity which was taking placein that country--which was unthreatened on any side--though theyprobably did not know how thorough and how elaborate it was. What stepsdid they take to guard against the danger? Russia was busy constructingstrategic railways, to make the movement of troops easier; she waserecting new munition factories. But neither could be quickly gotready. France imposed upon the whole of her manhood the obligation ofserving for three instead of for two years in the army. Britainreorganised her small professional army, created the Territorial Force, and began the training of a large officer class in all the universitiesand public schools. But she did not attempt to create a national army. If she had done so, this would have been a signal for the precipitationof the war. Besides, Britain obstinately clung to the belief that somonstrous a crime as Germany seemed to be contemplating could never becommitted by a civilised nation; and she trusted mainly to her fleetfor her own security. 

But Britain unquestionably laboured with all her might to conjure awaythe nightmare. From 1906 onwards she had made, in vain, repeatedattempts to persuade Germany to accept a mutual disarmament orretardation of naval construction. In 1912 she resolved upon a moredefinite step. The German newspapers were full of talk about theBritish policy of 'encircling' Germany in order to attack and destroyher, which they attributed mainly to Sir Edward Grey. It was a manifestabsurdity, since the Franco-Russian alliance was formed in 1894, at atime when Britain was on bad terms with both France and Russia, and theagreements later made with these two countries were wholly devoted toremoving old causes of dispute between them. But the German peopleobviously believed it. Perhaps the German government also believed it?Britain resolved to remove this apprehension. Accordingly in 1912 LordHaldane was sent to Germany with a formal and definite statement, authorised by the Cabinet, to the effect that Britain had made noalliance or understanding which was aimed against Germany, and had nointention of doing so. That being so, since Germany need have no fearof an attack from Britain, why should not the two powers agree toreduce their naval expenditure? The German reply was that to stop thenaval programme was impossible, but that construction might be DELAYED, on one condition--that both powers should sign a formal agreement drawnup by Germany. Each power was to pledge itself to absolute neutralityin any European war in which the other was engaged. Each power was toundertake to make no new alliances. But this agreement was not toaffect existing alliances or the duties arising under them. Thisproposal was an obvious trap, and the German ministers who proposed itmust have had the poorest opinion of the intelligence of Englishstatesmen if they thought it was likely to be accepted. For observethat it left Germany, in conjunction with Austria, free to attackFrance and Russia. It left the formidable Triple Alliance unimpaired. But it tied the hands of Britain, who had no existing Europeanalliances, enforced neutrality upon her in such a war, and compelledher to look on idly and wait her turn. In the present war, Germanycould have pleaded that she was bound to take part by the terms of heralliance with Austria, who began it; but Britain would have beencompelled to stand aloof. A very convenient arrangement for Germany, but not an arrangement that promised well for the peace of the world!

Even this rebuff did not dishearten Britain. Feeling that Germany mighthave some reasonable ground of complaint in the fact that her share ofthe extra-European world was so much less than that of France or ofBritain herself, Britain attempted to come to an agreement on thishead, such as would show that she had no desire to prevent the imperialexpansion of Germany. A treaty was proposed and discussed, and wasready to be submitted to the proper authorities for confirmation inJune 1914. It has never been made public, because the war cancelled itbefore it came into effect, and we do not know its terms. But we doknow that the German colonial enthusiast, Paul Rohrbach, who has seenthe draft treaty, has said that the concessions made by Britain wereastonishingly extensive, and met every reasonable German demand. Thissounds as if the proposals of the treaty, whatever they were, had beenrecklessly generous. But this much is clear, that the government whichhad this treaty in its possession when it forced on the war was not tobe easily satisfied. It did not want merely external possessions. Itwanted supremacy; it wanted world-dominion. 

One last attempt the British government made in the frenzied days ofnegotiation which preceded the war. Sir Edward Grey had begged theGerman government to make ANY proposal which would make for peace, andpromised his support beforehand; he had received no reply. He hadundertaken that if Germany made any reasonable proposal, and France orRussia objected, he would have nothing further to do with France orRussia. Still there was no reply. Imagining that Germany might still behaunted by what Bismarck called 'the nightmare of coalition, ' and mightbe rushing into war now because she feared a war in the future undermore unfavourable conditions, he had pledged himself, if Germany wouldonly say the word which would secure the peace, to use every effort tobring about a general understanding among the great powers which wouldbanish all fears of an anti-German combination. It was of no use. Thereply was the suggestion that Britain should bind herself to neutralityin this war on the following conditions: (a) that Germany should begiven a free hand to violate the neutrality of Belgium (which Britainwas bound by treaty to defend), on the understanding that Belgiumshould be reinstated after she had served her purpose, if she hadoffered no resistance; Belgium, be it noted, being bound in honour tooffer resistance by the very treaty which Germany proposed to violate;and (b) that after France had been humiliated and beaten to the earthfor the crime of possessing territories which Germany coveted, sheshould be restored to independence, and Germany should be content toannex her 5, 000, 000 square miles of colonies. In return for thisundertaking Britain was to be--allowed to hold aloof from the war, andawait her turn. 

There is no getting over these facts. The aim of Germany had come to benothing less than world-supremacy. The destiny of the whole globe wasto be put to the test. Surely this was the very insanity of megalomania. 

X

WHAT OF THE NIGHT?

The gigantic conflict into which the ambitions of Germany have plungedthe world is the most tremendous event in human history, not merelybecause of the vast forces engaged, and the appalling volume ofsuffering which has resulted from it, but still more because of themagnitude of the principles for which it is being fought. It is a warto secure the right of communities which are linked together by thenational spirit to determine their own destinies; it is a war tomaintain the principles of humanity, the sanctity of formalundertakings between states, and the possibility of the co-operation offree peoples in the creation of a new and better world-order; it is awar between two principles of government, the principle of militaryautocracy and the principle of self-government. With all these aspectsof the mighty struggle we are not here immediately concerned, thoughthey have an intimate bearing upon our main theme: some of them havebeen analysed elsewhere. [10] But what does concern us most directly, and what makes this war the culmination of the long story which we haveendeavoured to survey, is that this is a war in which, as in no earlierwar, the whole fate and future of the now unified world is at stake. For just because the world is now, as never before, an indissolubleeconomic and political unity, the challenge of Germany, whatever viewwe may take of the immediate aims of the German state, inevitablyraises the whole question of the principles upon which this unifiedworld, unified by the victory of European civilisation, is to be infuture directed. And the whole world knows, if vaguely, that these vastissues are at stake, and that this is no merely European conflict. Thatis why we see arrayed upon the fields of battle not only French, British, Russian, Italian, Serbian, Belgian, Rumanian, Greek andPortuguese soldiers, but Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, SouthAfricans, Indians, Algerians, Senegalese, Cambodians; and now, alongside of all these, the citizens of the American Republic. That iswhy Brazil and other states are hovering on the edge of the fray; whyJapanese ships are helping to patrol the Mediterranean, why Arab armiesare driving the Turk from the holy places of Mahomedanism, why Africantribesmen are enrolled in new levies to clear the enemy out of hisfootholds in that continent. Almost the whole world is arrayed againstthe outlaw-power and her vassals. And the ultimate reason for this isthat the whole world is concerned to see this terrible debate rightlydetermined. 

[10] In Nationalism and Internationalism and in NationalSelf-Government. 

For the issue is as simple as this. Now that the world has been madeone by the victory of Western civilisation, in what spirit is thatsupremacy to be used? Is it to be in the spirit expressed in the GermanDoctrine of Power, the spirit of mere dominion, ruthlessly imposed andruthlessly exploited for the sole advantage of the master-power? Thatway ruin lies. Or is it to be in the spirit which has on the whole, andin spite of lapses, guided the progress of Western civilisation in thepast, the spirit of respect for law and for the rights of the weak, thespirit of liberty which rejoices in variety of type and method, andwhich believes that the destiny towards which all peoples should beguided is that of self-government in freedom, and the co-operation offree peoples in the maintenance of common interests? Britain, France, and America have been the great advocates and exponents of theseprinciples in the government of their own states: they are all rangedon one side to-day. Britain, also, as we have tried to show, has beenled by Fate to take a chief part in the extension of these principlesof Western civilisation to the non-European regions of the world; and, after many mistakes and failures, has in the direction of her own widedominions found her way to a system which reconciles freedom withunity, and learned to regard herself as being only the trustee ofcivilisation in the government of the backward peoples whom she rules. For the just and final determination of such gigantic issues not eventhe terrible price we are paying is too high. 

The issue of the great conflict lies still upon the lap of the gods. Yet one thing is, we may hope, already assured. Although at thebeginning of the war they came near to winning it, the Germans are notnow likely to win that complete victory upon which they had calculated, and which would have brought as its prize the mastery of the world. Wecan now form some judgment of the extent of the calamity which thiswould have meant for humanity. There would have remained in the worldno power capable of resisting this grim and ugly tyrant-state, with itsbrute strength and bestial cruelty as of a gorilla in the primaevalforest, reinforced by the cold and pitiless calculus of the man ofscience in his laboratory; unless, perhaps, Russia had in timerecovered her strength, or unless America had not merely thrown overher tradition of aloofness and made up her mind to intervene, but hadbeen allowed the time to organise her forces for resistance. Of thegreat empires which the modern age has brought into being, the Russianwould have survived as a helpless and blinded mammoth; the FrenchEmpire would have vanished, and the proud and noble land of Francewould have sunk into vassalage and despair; the British Empire wouldassuredly have dissolved into its component parts, for its strength isstill too much concentrated in the motherland for it to be able to holdtogether once her power was broken. After a few generations, that willno longer be the case; but to-day it is so, and the dream of apartnership of free nations which had begun to dawn upon us would havebeen shattered for ever by a complete German victory. Some of the atomsof what once was an empire might have been left in freedom, but theywould have been powerless to resist the decrees of the Master-state. There would have been one supreme world-power; and that a power whoseattitude towards backward races has been illustrated by the ruthlessmassacre of the Hereros; whose attitude towards ancient butdisorganised civilisations has been illustrated by the history ofKiao-chau and by the celebrated allocution of the Kaiser to hissoldiers on the eve of the Boxer expedition, when he bade them outdothe ferocity of Attila and his Huns; whose attitude towards kindredcivilisations on the same level as their own has been illustratedbefore the war in the treatment of Danes, Poles, and Alsatians, andduring the war in the treatment of Belgium, of the occupied districtsin France, of Poland and of Serbia. The world would have lain at themercy of an insolent and ruthless tyranny, the tyranny of a Kulturwhose ideal is the uniformity of a perfect mechanism, not the varietyof life. Such a fate humanity could not long have tolerated; yet beforethe iron mechanism could have been shattered, if once it had beenestablished, there must have been inconceivable suffering, andcivilisation must have fallen back many stages towards barbarism. Fromthis fate, we may perhaps claim, the world was saved from the momentwhen not Britain only, but the British Empire, refused to await itsturn according to the German plan, threw its whole weight into thescale, and showed that, though not organised for war, it was not theeffete and decadent power, not the fortuitous combination of discordantand incoherent elements, which German theory had supposed; but thatFreedom can create a unity and a virile strength capable ofwithstanding even the most rigid discipline, capable of enduring defeatand disappointment undismayed; but incapable of yielding to theinsolence of brute force. 

It is still possible that the war may end in what is called aninconclusive peace; and as it is certain that of all her unrighteousgains that to which Germany will most desperately cling will be herdomination over the Austrian and Turkish Empires, with the prospectwhich it affords of a later and more fortunate attempt at world-power, an inconclusive peace would mean that the whole world would live inconstant dread of a renewal of these agonies and horrors in a stillmore awful form. What the effect of this would be upon theextra-European dominions of powers which would be drained of theirmanhood and loaded with the burden of the past war and the burden ofpreparation for the coming war, it is beyond our power to imagine. Butit seems likely that the outer world would very swiftly begin to reviseits judgment as to the value of that civilisation which it has, uponthe whole, been ready to welcome; and chaos would soon come again. 

Finally, it is possible that the Evil Power may be utterly routed, andthe allied empires, tried by fire, may be given the opportunity and theobligation of making, not merely a new Europe, but a new world. If thatchance should come, how will they use it? One thing at least is clear. The task which will face the diplomats who take part in the comingpeace-congress will be different in kind as well as in degree from thatof any of their predecessors at any moment in human history. They willbe concerned not merely with the adjustment of the differences of a fewleading states, and not merely with the settlement of Europe: they willhave to deal with the whole world, and to decide upon what principlesand to what ends the leadership of the peoples of European stock overthe non-European world is to be exercised. Whether they realise it ornot, whether they intend it or not, they will create either aworld-order or a world-disorder. And it will inevitably be aworld-disorder which will result unless we do some hard thinking onthis gigantic problem which faces us, and unless we are prepared tolearn, from the history of the relations of Europe with the outerworld, what are the principles by which we ought to be guided. We aretoo prone, when we think of the problems of the future peace, to fixour attention almost wholly upon Europe, and, if we think of thenon-European world at all, to assume either that the problem is merelyone of power, or that the principles which will guide us in thesettlement of Europe can be equally applied outside of Europe. Both ofthese assumptions are dangerous, because both disregard the teachingsof the past which we have been surveying. 

If, on the one hand, we are content to regard the problem as merely oneof power, and to divide out the non-European world among the victors asthe spoils of victory, we shall indeed have been conquered by the veryspirit which we are fighting; we shall have become converts to theGerman Doctrine of Power, which has brought upon us all these ills, andmay bring yet more appalling evils in the future. The world will emergedivided among a group of vast empires which will overshadow the lesserstates. These empires will continue to regard one another with fear andsuspicion, and to look upon their subject-peoples merely as providingthe implements for a war of destruction, to be waged by cut-throatcommercial rivalry in time of peace, and by man-power and machine-powerin war. If that should be the result of all our agonies, the burdenwhich must be laid upon the peoples of these empires, and theintolerable anticipation of what is to come, will make their yoke seemindeed a heavy one; will probably bring about their disintegration; andwill end that ascendancy of Western civilisation over the world whichthe last four centuries have established. And justly; since Westerncivilisation will thus be made to stand not for justice and liberty, but for injustice and oppression. Such must be the inevitable result ofany settlement of the non-European world which is guided merely by theambitions of a few rival states and the Doctrine of Power. 

On the other hand, we are urged by enthusiasts for liberty, especiallyin Russia, to believe that imperialism as such is the enemy; that wemust put an end for ever to all dominion exercised by one people overanother; and that outside of Europe as within it we must trust to thesame principles for the hope of future peace--the principles ofnational freedom and self-government--and leave all peoples everywhereto control freely their own destinies. But this is a misreading of thefacts as fatal as the other. It disregards the value of the work thathas been done in the extension of European civilisation to the rest ofthe world by the imperial activities of the European peoples. It failsto recognise that until Europe began to conquer the world neitherrational law nor political liberty had ever in any real sense existedin the outer world, and that their dominion is even now far fromassured, but depends for its maintenance upon the continued tutelage ofthe European peoples. It fails to realise that the economic demands ofthe modern world necessitate the maintenance of civilisedadministration after the Western pattern, and that this can only beassured, in large regions of the earth, by means of the politicalcontrol of European peoples. Above all this view does not grasp theessential fact that the idea of nationhood and the idea ofself-government are both modern ideas, which have had their origin inEurope, and which can only be realised among peoples of a highpolitical development; that the sense of nationhood is but slowlycreated, and must not be arbitrarily defined in terms of race orlanguage; and that the capacity for self-government is only formed by along process of training, and has never existed except among peopleswho were unified by a strongly felt community of sentiment, and hadacquired the habit and instinct of loyalty to the law. Assuredly it isthe duty of Europe and America to extend these fruitful conceptions tothe regions which have passed under their influence. But the processmust be a very slow one, and it can only be achieved under tutelage. Itis the control of the European peoples over the non-European worldwhich has turned the world into an economic unit, brought it within asingle political system, and opened to us the possibility of making aworld-order such as the most daring dreamers of the past could neverhave conceived. This control cannot be suddenly withdrawn. For a verylong time to come the world-states whose rise we have traced mustcontinue to be the means by which the political discoveries of Europe, as well as her material civilisation, are made available for the restof the world. The world-states are such recent things that we have notyet found a place for them in our political philosophy. But unless wefind a place for them, and think in terms of them, in the future, weshall be in danger of a terrible shipwreck. 

If, then, it is essential, not only for the economic development of theworld, but for the political advancement of its more backward peoples, that the political suzerainty of the European peoples should survive, and as a consequence that the world should continue to be dominated bya group of great world-states, how are we to conjure away the nightmareof inter-imperial rivalry which has brought upon us the presentcatastrophe, and seems to threaten us with yet more appalling ruin inthe future? Only by resolving and ensuring, as at the great settlementwe may be able to do, that the necessary political control of Europeover the outer world shall in future be exercised not merely in theinterests of the mistress-states, but in accordance with principleswhich are just in themselves, and which will give to all peoples a fairchance of making the best use of their powers. But how are we todiscover these principles, if the ideas of nationality andself-government, to which we pin our faith in Europe, are to be heldinapplicable to the greater part of the non-European world? There isonly one possible source of instruction: our past experience, which hasnow extended over four centuries, and which we have in this bookendeavoured to survey. 

Now while it is undeniably true that the mere lust of power has alwaysbeen present in the imperial activities of the European peoples, it iscertainly untrue (as our study ought to have shown) that it has everbeen the sole motive, except, perhaps, in the great German challenge. And in the course of their experience the colonising peoples havegradually worked out certain principles in their treatment of subjectpeoples, which ought to be of use to us. The fullest and the mostvaried experience is that of the British Empire: it is the oldest ofall the world-states; it alone includes regions of the utmost varietyof types, new lands peopled by European settlers, realms of ancientcivilisation like India, and regions inhabited by backward andprimitive peoples. It would be absurd to claim that its methods areperfect and infallible. But they have been very varied, and quiteastonishingly successful. And it is because they seem to afford clearerguidance than any other part of the experiments which we have recordedthat we have studied them, especially in their later developments, withwhat may have seemed a disproportionate fulness. What are theprinciples which experience has gradually worked out in the BritishEmpire? They cannot be embodied in a single formula, because they varyaccording to the condition and development of the lands to which theyapply. 

But in the first place we have learnt by a very long experience that inlands inhabited by European settlers, who bring with them Europeantraditions, the only satisfactory solution is to be found in theconcession of the fullest self-governing rights, since these settlersare able to use them, and in the encouragement of that sentiment ofunity which we call the national spirit. And this involves arecognition of the fact that nationality is never to be defined solelyin terms of race or language, but can arise, and should be encouragedto arise, among racially divided communities such as Canada and SouthAfrica. Any attempt to interpret nationhood in terms of race is notmerely dangerous, but ruinous; and such endeavours to stimulate oraccentuate racial conflict, as Germany has been guilty of in Brazil, inSouth Africa, and even in America, must be, if successful, fatal to theprogress of the countries affected, and dangerous to the peace of theworld. 

In the second place we have learnt that in lands of ancientcivilisation, where ruling castes have for centuries been in the habitof exploiting their subjects, the supreme gift which Europe can offeris that of internal peace and a firmly administered and equal law, which will render possible the gradual rise of a sense of unity, andthe gradual training of the people in the habits of life that makeself-government possible. How soon national unity can be established, or self-government made practicable in any full sense, must be matterof debate. But the creation of these things is, or ought to be, theultimate aim of European government in such countries. And in themeantime, and until they become fully masters of their own fate, theselands, so our British experience tells us, ought to be treated asdistinct political units; they should pay no tribute; all theirresources should be devoted to their own development; and they shouldnot be expected or required to maintain larger forces than arenecessary for their own defence. At the same time, the ruling powershould claim no special privileges for its own citizens, but shouldthrow open the markets of such realms equally to all nations. In shortit should act not as a master, but as a trustee, on behalf of itssubjects and also on behalf of civilisation. 

In the third place we have learnt that in the backward regions of theearth it is the duty of the ruling power, firstly, to protect itsprimitive subjects from unscrupulous exploitation, to guard theirsimple customs, proscribing only those which are immoral, and to affordthem the means of a gradual emancipation from barbarism; secondly, todevelop the economic resources of these regions for the needs of theindustrial world, to open them up by modern communications, and to makethem available on equal terms to all nations, giving no advantage toits own citizens. 

In spite of lapses and defects, it is an undeniable historical factthat these are the principles which have been wrought out and appliedin the administration of the British Empire during the nineteenthcentury. They are not vague and Utopian dreams; they are a matter ofdaily practice. If they can be applied by one of the world-states, andthat the greatest, why should they not be applied by the rest? But ifthese principles became universal, is it not apparent that all dangerof a catastrophic war between these powers would be removed, sinceevery reason for it would have vanished? Thus the necessary andadvantageous tutelage of Europe over the non-European world, and thecontinuance of the great world-states, could be combined with theconjuring away of the ever-present terror of war, and with the gradualtraining of the non-European peoples to enjoy the political methods ofEurope; while the lesser states without extra-European dominions needno longer feel themselves stunted and reduced to economic dependenceupon their great neighbours. Thus, and thus alone, can the benefits ofthe long development which we have traced be reaped in full; thus alonecan the dominion of the European peoples over the world be made to meanjustice and the chance for all peoples to make the best of their powers. 

But it is not only the principles upon which particular areas outsideof Europe should be governed which we must consider. We must reflectalso upon the nature of the relations that should exist between thevarious members of these great world-empires, which must hence-forwardbe the dominating factors in the world's politics. And here the problemis urgent only in the case of the British Empire, because it alone isdeveloped to such a point that the problem is inevitably raised. Whatever else may happen, the war must necessarily bring a crisis inthe history of the British Empire. On a vastly greater scale thesituation of 1763 is being reproduced. Now, as then, the Empire willemerge from a war for existence, in which mother and daughter landsalike have shared. Now, as then, the strain and pressure of the warwill have brought to light deficiencies in the system of the Empire. Now, as then, the most patent of these deficiencies will be the factthat, generous as the self-governing powers of the great Dominions havebeen, they still have limits; and the irresistible tendency ofself-government to work towards its own fulfilment will once more showitself. For there are two spheres in which even the most fullyself-governing of the empire-nations have no effective control: they donot share in the determination of foreign policy, and they do not sharein the direction of imperial defence. The responsibility for foreignpolicy, and the responsibility, and with it almost the whole burden, oforganising imperial defence, have hitherto rested solely with Britain. Until the Great War, foreign policy seemed to be a matter of purelyEuropean interest, not directly concerning the great Dominions; nor didthe problems of imperial defence appear very pressing or urgent. Butnow all have realised that not merely their interests, but their veryexistence, may depend upon the wise conduct of foreign relations; andnow all have contributed the whole available strength of their manhoodto support a struggle in whose direction they have had no effectiveshare. These things must henceforth be altered; and they can be alteredonly in one or other of three ways. Either the great Dominions willbecome independent states, as the American colonies did, and pursue aforeign policy and maintain a system of defence of their own; or theEmpire must reshape itself as a sort of permanent offensive anddefensive alliance, whose external policy and modes of defence will bearranged by agreement; or some mode of common management of these andother questions must be devised. The first of these solutions isunlikely to be adopted, not only because the component members of theEmpire are conscious of their individual weakness, but still morebecause the memory of the ordeal through which all have passed mustform an indissoluble bond. Yet rashness or high-handedness in thetreatment of the great issue might lead even to this unlikely result. If either of the other two solutions is adopted, the question will atonce arise of the place to be occupied, in the league or in thereorganised super-state, of all those innumerable sections of theEmpire which do not yet enjoy, and some of which may never enjoy, thefull privileges of self-government; and above all, the place to betaken by the vast dominion of India, which though it is not, and maynot for a long time become, a fully self-governing state, is yet adefinite and vitally important unit in the Empire, entitled to have itsneeds and problems considered, and its government represented, on equalterms with the rest. The problem is an extraordinarily difficult one;perhaps the most difficult political problem that has ever faced thesons of men. But it is essentially the same problem which hascontinually recurred in the history of British imperialism, though itnow presents itself on a vastly greater scale, and in a far morecomplex form, than ever before: it is the problem of reconciling unitywith liberty and variety; of combining nationality and self-governmentwith imperialism, without impairing the rights of either. And beyondany doubt the most tremendous and fascinating political question whichnow awaits solution in the world, is the question whether the politicalinstinct of the British peoples, and the genius of self-government, will find a way out of these difficulties, as they have found a way outof so many others. Patience, mutual tolerance, willingness tocompromise, will be required in the highest measure if the solution isto be found; but these are the qualities which self-governmentcultivates. 

'A thing that is wholly a sham, ' said Treitschke, speaking of theBritish Empire, 'cannot in this world of ours, endure for ever. ' Whydid this Empire appear to Treitschke to be 'wholly a sham'? Was it notbecause it did not answer to any definition of the word 'Empire' to befound in German political philosophy; because it did not mean dominionand uniformity, but liberty and variety; because it did not rest uponForce, as, in his view, every firmly established state must do; becauseit was not governed by a single master, whose edicts all its subjectsmust obey? But for 'a thing that is wholly a sham' men do not lay downtheir lives, in thousands and in hundreds of thousands, not under thepressure of compulsion, but by a willing self-devotion; for the defenceof 'a thing that is wholly a sham' men will not stream in from all theends of the earth, abandoning their families and their careers, andoffering without murmur or hesitation themselves and all they have andare. There must be a reality in the thing that calls forth suchsacrifices, a reality of the kind to which Realpolitik, with itsconcentration upon purely material concerns, is wholly blind: it is thereality of an ideal of honour, and justice, and freedom. And if theGermans have been deceived in their calculations of Realpolitik, is itnot perhaps because they have learnt to regard honour, and justice, andfreedom as 'things that are wholly shams'?

This amazing political structure, which refuses to fall within any ofthe categories of political science, which is an empire and yet not anempire, a state and yet not a state, a super-nation incorporating initself an incredible variety of peoples and races, is not a structurewhich has been designed by the ingenuity of man, or created by thepurposive action of a government; it is a natural growth, the productof the spontaneous activity of innumerable individuals and groupsspringing from among peoples whose history has made liberty and thetolerance of differences their most fundamental instincts; it is theoutcome of a series of accidents, unforeseen, but turned to advantageby the unfailing and ever-new resourcefulness of men habituated toself-government. There is no logic or uniformity in its system, whichhas arisen from an infinite number of makeshifts and tentativeexperiments, yet in all of these a certain consistency appears, becausethey have been presided over by the genius of self-government. It isdistributed over every continent, is washed by every ocean, includeshalf the dust of islands that Nature has scattered about the seas ofthe world, controls almost all the main avenues of the world'ssea-going commerce, and is linked together by ten thousand shipsperpetually going to and fro. Weak for offensive purposes, because itsresources are so scattered, it is, except at a few points, almostimpregnable against attack, if its forces are well organised. Itincludes among its population representatives of almost every humanrace and religion, and every grade of civilisation, from the AustralianBushman to the subtle and philosophic Brahmin, from the African dwarfto the master of modern industry or the scholar of universities. Almostevery form of social organisation and of government known to man isrepresented in its complex and many-hued fabric. It embodies five ofthe most completely self-governing communities which the world hasknown, and four of these control the future of the great empty spacesthat remain for the settlement of white men. It finds place for thehighly organised caste system by which the teeming millions of Indiaare held together. It preserves the simple tribal organisation of theAfrican clans. To different elements among its subjects this empireappears in different aspects. To the self-governing Dominions it is abrotherhood of free nations, co-operating for the defence and diffusionof common ideas and of common institutions. To the ancientcivilisations of India or of Egypt it is a power which, in spite of allits mistakes and limitations, has brought peace instead of turmoil, lawinstead of arbitrary might, unity instead of chaos, justice instead ofoppression, freedom for the development of the capacities andcharacteristic ideas of their peoples, and the prospect of a steadygrowth of national unity and political responsibility. To the backwardraces it has meant the suppression of unending slaughter, thedisappearance of slavery, the protection of the rights and usages ofprimitive and simple folk against reckless exploitation, and the chanceof gradual improvement and emancipation from barbarism. But to allalike, to one quarter of the inhabitants of the world, it has meant theestablishment of the Reign of Law, and of the Liberty which can onlyexist under its shelter. In some degree, though imperfectly as yet, ithas realised within its own body all the three great political ideas ofthe modern world. It has fostered the rise of a sense of nationhood inthe young communities of the new lands, and in the old and decayingcivilisations of the most ancient historic countries. It has given afreedom of development to self-government such as history has neverbefore known. And by linking together so many diverse and contrastedpeoples in a common peace, it has already realised, for a quarter ofthe globe, the ideal of internationalism on a scale undreamt of by themost sanguine prophets of Europe. 

Truly this empire is a fabric so wonderful, so many-sided, and sovarious in its aspects, that it may well escape the rigid categories ofa German professor, and seem to him 'wholly a sham. ' Now is the crisisof its fate: and if the wisdom of its leaders can solve the riddle ofthe Sphinx which is being put to them, the Great War will indeed havebrought, for a quarter of the world, the culmination of modern history.