Transcriber's Note The punctuation and spelling from the original text have been faithfullypreserved. Only obvious typographical errors have been corrected. THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1783-1789 BY JOHN FISKE "I am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than during the war. " JAY TO WASHINGTON, _June_ 27, 1786. [Illustration] BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY The Riverside Press, Cambridge Copyright, 1888, BY JOHN FISKE. _All rights reserved. _ _The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass. , U. S. A. _ Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Co. To MY DEAR CLASSMATES, FRANCIS LEE HIGGINSON AND CHARLES CABOT JACKSON, _I DEDICATE THIS BOOK. _ PREFACE. This book contains the substance of the course of lectures given in theOld South Meeting-House in Boston in December, 1884, at the WashingtonUniversity in St. Louis in May, 1885, and in the theatre of theUniversity Club in New York in March, 1886. In its present shape it mayserve as a sketch of the political history of the United States from theend of the Revolutionary War to the adoption of the FederalConstitution. It makes no pretensions to completeness, either as asummary of the events of that period or as a discussion of the politicalquestions involved in them. I have aimed especially at grouping facts insuch a way as to bring out and emphasize their causal sequence, and itis accordingly hoped that the book may prove useful to the student ofAmerican history. My title was suggested by the fact of Thomas Paine's stopping thepublication of the "Crisis, " on hearing the news of the treaty of 1783, with the remark, "The times that tried men's souls are over. " Commentingupon this, on page 55 of the present work, I observed that so far fromthe crisis being over in 1783, the next five years were to be the mostcritical time of all. I had not then seen Mr. Trescot's "DiplomaticHistory of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, " on page 9 ofwhich he uses almost the same words: "It must not be supposed that thetreaty of peace secured the national life. Indeed, it would be morecorrect to say that the most critical period of the country's historyembraced the time between 1783 and the adoption of the Constitution in1788. " That period was preëminently the turning-point in the development ofpolitical society in the western hemisphere. Though small in their meredimensions, the events here summarized were in a remarkable degreegerminal events, fraught with more tremendous alternatives of futurewelfare or misery for mankind than it is easy for the imagination tograsp. As we now stand upon the threshold of that mighty future, in thelight of which all events of the past are clearly destined to seemdwindled in dimensions and significant only in the ratio of theirpotency as causes; as we discern how large a part of that future must bethe outcome of the creative work, for good or ill, of men of Englishspeech; we are put into the proper mood for estimating the significanceof the causes which determined a century ago that the continent of NorthAmerica should be dominated by a single powerful and pacific federalnation instead of being parcelled out among forty or fifty smallcommunities, wasting their strength and lowering their moral tone byperpetual warfare, like the states of ancient Greece, or by perpetualpreparation for warfare, like the nations of modern Europe. In my bookentitled "American Political Ideas, viewed from the Standpoint ofUniversal History, " I have tried to indicate the pacific influencelikely to be exerted upon the world by the creation and maintenance ofsuch a political structure as our Federal Union. The present narrativemay serve as a commentary upon what I had in mind on page 133 of thatbook, in speaking of the work of our Federal Convention as "the finestspecimen of constructive statesmanship that the world has ever seen. " Onsuch a point it is pleasant to find one's self in accord with astatesman so wise and noble as Mr. Gladstone, whose opinion is herequoted on page 223. To some persons it may seem as if the years 1861-65 were of morecardinal importance than the years 1783-89. Our civil war was indeed anevent of prodigious magnitude, as measured by any standard that historyaffords; and there can be little doubt as to its decisiveness. Themeasure of that decisiveness is to be found in the completeness of thereconciliation that has already, despite the feeble wails ofunscrupulous place-hunters and unteachable bigots, cemented the FederalUnion so powerfully that all likelihood of its disruption may be said tohave disappeared forever. When we consider this wonderful harmony whichso soon has followed the deadly struggle, we may well believe it to bethe index of such a stride toward the ultimate pacification of mankindas was never made before. But it was the work done in the years 1783-89that created a federal nation capable of enduring the storm and stressof the years 1861-65. It was in the earlier crisis that the pliant twigwas bent; and as it was bent, so has it grown; until it has becomeindeed a goodly and a sturdy tree. CAMBRIDGE, October 10, 1888. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. PAGE Fall of Lord North's ministry 1 Sympathy between British Whigs and the revolutionary party in America 2 It weakened the Whig party in England 3 Character of Lord Shelburne 4 Political instability of the Rockingham ministry 5, 6 Obstacles in the way of a treaty of peace 7, 8 Oswald talks with Franklin 9-11 Grenville has an interview with Vergennes 12 Effects of Rodney's victory 13 Misunderstanding between Fox and Shelburne 14 Fall of the Rockingham ministry 15 Shelburne becomes prime minister 16 Defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar 17 French policy opposed to American interests 18 The valley of the Mississippi; Aranda's prophecy 19 The Newfoundland fisheries 20 Jay detects the schemes of Vergennes 21 And sends Dr Vaughan to visit Shelburne 22 John Adams arrives in Paris and joins with Jay in insisting upon a separate negotiation with England 23, 24 The separate American treaty, as agreed upon: 1. Boundaries 25 2. Fisheries; commercial intercourse 26 3. Private debts 27 4. Compensation of loyalists 28-32 Secret article relating to the Yazoo boundary 33 Vergennes does not like the way in which it has been done 33 On the part of the Americans it was a great diplomatic victory 34 Which the commissioners won by disregarding the instructions of Congress and acting on their own responsibility 35 The Spanish treaty 36 The French treaty 37 Coalition of Fox with North 38-42 They attack the American treaty in Parliament 43 And compel Shelburne to resign 44 Which leaves England without a government, while for several weeks the king is too angry to appoint ministers 44 Until at length he succumbs to the coalition, which presently adopts and ratifies the American treaty 45 The coalition ministry is wrecked upon Fox's India Bill 46 Constitutional crisis ends in the overwhelming victory of Pitt in the elections of May, 1784 47 And this, although apparently a triumph for the king, was really a death-blow to his system of personal government 48, 49 CHAPTER II. THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. Cessation of hostilities in America 50 Departure of the British troops 51 Washington resigns his command 52 And goes home to Mount Vernon 53 His "legacy" to the American people 54 The next five years were the most critical years in American history 55 Absence of a sentiment of union, and consequent danger of anarchy 56, 57 European statesmen, whether hostile or friendly, had little faith in the stability of the Union 58 False historic analogies 59 Influence of railroad and telegraph upon the perpetuity of the Union 60 Difficulty of travelling a hundred years ago 61 Local jealousies and antipathies, an inheritance from primeval savagery 62, 63 Conservative character of the American Revolution 64 State governments remodelled; assemblies continued from colonial times 65 Origin of the senates in the governor's council of assistants 66 Governors viewed with suspicion 67 Analogies with British institutions 68 The judiciary 69 Restrictions upon suffrage 70 Abolition of primogeniture, entails, and manorial privileges 71 Steps toward the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade 72-75 Progress toward religious freedom 76, 77 Church and state in Virginia 78, 79 Persecution of dissenters 80 Madison and the Religions Freedom Act 81 Temporary overthrow of the church 82 Difficulties in regard to ordination; the case of Mason Weems 83 Ordination of Samuel Seabury by non-jurors at Aberdeen 84 Francis Asbury and the Methodists 85 Presbyterians and Congregationalists 86 Roman Catholics 87 Except in the instance of slavery, all the changes described in this chapter were favourable to the union of the states 88 But while the state governments, in all these changes, are seen working smoothly, we have next to observe, by contrast, the clumsiness and inefficiency of the federal government 89 CHAPTER III. THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. The several states have never enjoyed complete sovereignty 90 But in the very act of severing their connection with Great Britain, they entered into some sort of union 91 Anomalous character of the Continental Congress 92 The articles of confederation; they sought to establish a "league of friendship" between the states 93-97 But failed to create a federal government endowed with real sovereignty 98-100 Military weakness of the government 101-103 Extreme difficulty of obtaining a revenue 104, 105 Congress, being unable to pay the army, was afraid of it 106 Supposed scheme for making Washington king 107 Greene's experience in South Carolina 108 Gates's staff officers and the Newburgh address 109 The danger averted by Washington 110, 111 Congress driven from Philadelphia by mutinous soldiers 112 The Commutation Act denounced in New England 113 Order of the Cincinnati 114-117 Reasons for the dread which it inspired 118 Congress finds itself unable to carry out the provisions of the treaty with Great Britain 119 Persecution of the loyalists 120, 121 It was especially severe in New York 122 Trespass Act of 1784 directed against the loyalists 123 Character and early career of Alexander Hamilton 124-126 The case of Rutgers _v. _ Waddington 127, 128 Wholesale emigration of Tories 129, 130 Congress unable to enforce payment of debts to British creditors 131 England retaliates by refusing to surrender the fortresses on the northwestern frontier 132, 133 CHAPTER IV. DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. The barbarous superstitions of the Middle Ages concerning trade were still rife in the eighteenth century 134 The old theory of the uses of a colony 135 Pitt's unsuccessful attempt to secure free trade between Great Britain and the United States 136 Ship-building in New England 137 British navigation acts and orders in council directed against American commerce 138 John Adams tried in vain to negotiate a commercial treaty with Great Britain 139, 140 And could see no escape from the difficulties except in systematic reprisal 141 But any such reprisal was impracticable, for the several states imposed conflicting duties 142 Attempts to give Congress the power of regulating commerce were unsuccessful 143, 144 And the several states began to make commercial war upon one another 145 Attempts of New York to oppress New Jersey and Connecticut 146 Retaliatory measures of the two latter states 147 The quarrel between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the possession of the valley of Wyoming 148-150 The quarrel between New York and New Hampshire over the possession of the Green Mountains 151-153 Failure of American diplomacy because European states could not tell whether they were dealing with one nation or with thirteen 154, 155 Failure of American credit; John Adams begging in Holland 156, 157 The Barbary pirates 158 American citizens kidnapped and sold into slavery 159 Lord Sheffield's outrageous pamphlet 160 Tripoli's demand for blackmail 161 Congress unable to protect American citizens 162 Financial distress after the Revolutionary War 163, 164 State of the coinage 165 Cost of the war in money 166 Robert Morris and his immense services 167 The craze for paper money 168 Agitation in the southern and middle states 169-171 Distress in New England 172 Imprisonment for debt 173 Rag-money victorious in Rhode Island; the "Know Ye" measures 174-176 Rag-money defeated in Massachusetts; the Shays insurrection 177-181 The insurrection suppressed by state troops 182 Conduct of the neighbouring states 183 The rebels pardoned 184 Timidity of Congress 185, 186 CHAPTER V. GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. Creation of a national domain beyond the Alleghanies 187, 188 Conflicting claims to the western territory 189 Claims of Massachusetts and Connecticut 189, 190 Claims of New York 190 Virginia's claims 191 Maryland's novel and beneficent suggestion 192 The several states yield their claims in favour of the United States 193, 194 Magnanimity of Virginia 195 Jefferson proposes a scheme of government for the northwestern territory 196 Names of the proposed ten states 197 Jefferson wishes to prohibit slavery in the national domain 198 North Carolina's cession of western lands 199 John Sevier and the state of Franklin 200, 201 The northwestern territory 202 Origin of the Ohio company 203 The Ordinance of 1787 204-206 Theory of folkland upon which the ordinance was based 207 Spain, hearing of the secret article in the treaty of 1783, loses her temper and threatens to shut up the Mississippi River 208, 209 Gardoqui and Jay 210 Threats of secession in Kentucky and New England 211 Washington's views on the political importance of canals between east and west 212 His far-sighted genius and self-devotion 213 Maryland confers with Virginia regarding the navigation of the Potomac 214 The Madison-Tyler motion in the Virginia legislature 215 Convention at Annapolis, Sept 11, 1786 216 Hamilton's address calling for a convention at Philadelphia 217 The impost amendment defeated by the action of New York; last ounce upon the camel's back 218-220 Sudden changes in popular sentiment 221 The Federal Convention meets at Philadelphia, May, 1787 222 Mr. Gladstone's opinion of the work of the convention 223 The men who were assembled there 224, 225 Character of James Madison 226, 227 The other leading members 228 Washington chosen president of the convention 229 CHAPTER VI. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. Why the proceedings of the convention were kept secret for so many years 230 Difficulty of the problem to be solved 231 Symptoms of cowardice repressed by Washington's impassioned speech 232 The root of all the difficulties; the edicts of the federal government had operated only upon states, not upon individuals, and therefore could not be enforced without danger of war 233-233 The Virginia plan, of which Madison was the chief author, offered a radical cure 236 And was felt to be revolutionary in its character 237-239 Fundamental features of the Virginia plan 240, 241 How it was at first received 242 The House of Representatives must be directly elected by the people 243 Question as to the representation of states brings out the antagonism between large and small states 244 William Paterson presents the New Jersey plan; not a radical cure, but a feeble palliative 245 Straggle between the Virginia and New Jersey plans 246-249 The Connecticut compromise, according to which the national principle is to prevail in the House of Representatives, and the federal principle in the Senate, meets at first with fierce opposition 250, 251 But is at length adopted 252 And proves a decisive victory for Madison and his methods 253 A few irreconcilable members go home in dudgeon 254 But the small states, having been propitiated, are suddenly converted to Federalism, and make the victory complete 255 Vague dread of the future west 255 The struggle between pro-slavery and anti-slavery parties began in the convention, and was quieted by two compromises 256 Should representation be proportioned to wealth or to population? 257 Were slaves to be reckoned as persons or as chattels? 258 Attitude of the Virginia statesmen 259 It was absolutely necessary to satisfy South Carolina 260 The three fifths compromise, suggested by Madison, was a genuine English solution, if ever there was one 261 There was neither rhyme nor reason in it, but for all that, it was the best solution attainable at the time 262 The next compromise was between New England and South Carolina as to the foreign slave-trade and the power of the federal government over commerce 263 George Mason calls the slave-trade an "infernal traffic" 264 And the compromise offends and alarms Virginia 265 Belief in the moribund condition of slavery 266 The foundations of the Constitution were laid in compromise 267 Powers granted to the federal government 268 Use of federal troops in suppressing insurrections 269 Various federal powers 270 Provision for a federal city under federal jurisdiction 271 The Federal Congress might compel the attendance of members 272 Powers denied to the several states 272 Should the federal government he allowed to make its promissory notes a legal tender in payment of debts? powerful speech of Gouverneur Morris 273 Emphatic and unmistakable condemnation of paper money by all the leading delegates 274 The convention refused to grant to the federal government the power of issuing inconvertible paper, but did not think an express prohibition necessary 275 If they could have foreseen some recent judgments of the supreme court, they would doubtless have made the prohibition explicit and absolute 276 Debates as to the federal executive 277 Sherman's suggestion as to the true relation of the executive to the legislature 278 There was to be a single chief magistrate, but how should he be chosen? 279 Objections to an election by Congress 280 Ellsworth and King suggest the device of an electoral college, which is at first rejected 281 But afterwards adopted 282 Provisions for an election by Congress in the case of a failure of choice by the electoral college 283 Provisions for counting the electoral votes 284 It was not intended to leave anything to be decided by the president of the Senate 285 The convention foresaw imaginary dangers, but not the real ones 286 Hamilton's opinion of the electoral scheme 287 How it has actually worked 288 In this part of its work the convention tried to copy from the British Constitution 289 In which they supposed the legislative and executive departments to be distinct and separate 290 Here they were misled by Montesquieu and Blackstone 291 What our government would be if it were really like that of Great Britain 292-294 In the British government the executive department is not separated from the legislative 295 Circumstances which obscured the true aspect of the case a century ago 296-298 The American cabinet is analogous, not to the British cabinet, but to the privy council 299 The federal judiciary, and its remarkable character 300-301 Provisions for amending the Constitution 302 The document is signed by all but three of the delegates 303 And the convention breaks up 304 With a pleasant remark from Franklin 305 CHAPTER VII. CROWNING THE WORK. Franklin lays the Constitution before the legislature of Pennsylvania 306 It is submitted to Congress, which refers it to the legislatures of the thirteen states, to be ratified or rejected by the people in conventions 307 First American parties, Federalists and Antifederalists 308, 309 The contest in Pennsylvania 310 How to make a quorum 311 A war of pamphlets and newspaper squibs 312, 313 Ending in the ratification of the Constitution by Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey 314 Rejoicings and mutterings 315 Georgia and Connecticut ratify 316 The outlook in Massachusetts 317, 318 The Massachusetts convention meets 319 And overhauls the Constitution clause by clause 320 On the subject of an army Mr. Nason waxes eloquent 321 The clergymen oppose a religious test 322 And Rev. Samuel West argues on the assumption that all men are not totally depraved 323 Feeling of distrust in the mountain districts 324 Timely speech of a Berkshire farmer 325, 326 Attitude of Samuel Adams 326, 327 Meeting of mechanics at the Green Dragon 327 Charges of bribery 328 Washington's fruitful suggestion 329 Massachusetts ratifies, but proposes amendments 330 The Long Lane has a turning and becomes Federal Street 331 New Hampshire hesitates, but Maryland ratifies, and all eyes are turned upon South Carolina 332 Objections of Rawlins Lowndes answered by Cotesworth Pinckney 333 South Carolina ratifies the Constitution 334 Important effect upon Virginia, where thoughts of a southern confederacy had been entertained 335, 336 Madison and Marshall prevail in the Virginia convention, and it ratifies the Constitution 337 New Hampshire had ratified four days before 338 Rejoicings at Philadelphia; riots at Providence and Albany 339 The struggle in New York 340 Origin of the "Federalist" 341-343 Hamilton wins the victory, and New York ratifies 344 All serious anxiety is now at an end; the laggard states, North Carolina and Rhode Island 345 First presidential election, January 7, 1789; Washington is unanimously chosen 346 Why Samuel Adams was not selected for vice-president 347 Selection of John Adams 348 Washington's journey to New York, April 16-23 349 His inauguration 350 THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY. CHAPTER I. RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. [Sidenote: Sympathy between British Whigs and the revolutionary party inAmerica. ] The 20th of March, 1782, the day which witnessed the fall of LordNorth's ministry, was a day of good omen for men of English race on bothsides of the Atlantic. Within two years from this time, the treaty whichestablished the independence of the United States was successfullynegotiated at Paris; and at the same time, as part of the series ofevents which resulted in the treaty, there went on in England a rapiddissolution and reorganization of parties, which ended in theoverwhelming defeat of the king's attempt to make the forms of theconstitution subservient to his selfish purposes, and established theliberty of the people upon a broader and sounder basis than it had everoccupied before. Great indignation was expressed at the time, and hassometimes been echoed by British historians, over the conduct of thoseWhigs who never lost an opportunity of expressing their approval of theAmerican revolt. The Duke of Richmond, at the beginning of the contest, expressed a hope that the Americans might succeed, because they were inthe right. Charles Fox spoke of General Howe's first victory as "theterrible news from Long Island. " Wraxall says that the celebrated buffand blue colours of the Whig party were adopted by Fox in imitation ofthe Continental uniform; but his unsupported statement is open toquestion. It is certain, however, that in the House of Commons the Whigshabitually alluded to Washington's army as "our army, " and to theAmerican cause as "the cause of liberty;" and Burke, with characteristicvehemence, declared that he would rather be a prisoner in the Tower withMr. Laurens than enjoy the blessings of freedom in company with the menwho were seeking to enslave America. Still more, the Whigs did all intheir power to discourage enlistments, and in various ways so thwartedand vexed the government that the success of the Americans was by manypeople ascribed to their assistance. A few days before Lord North'sresignation, George Onslow, in an able defence of the prime minister, exclaimed, "Why have we failed so miserably in this war against America, if not from the support and countenance given to rebellion in this veryHouse?" [Sidenote: It weakened the Whigs in England. ] [Sidenote: Character of Lord Shelburne. ] Now the violence of party leaders like Burke and Fox owed much of itsstrength, no doubt, to mere rancorousness of party spirit. But, aftermaking due allowance for this, we must admit that it was essentiallybased upon the intensity of their conviction that the cause of Englishliberty was inseparably bound up with the defeat of the king's attemptupon the liberties of America. Looking beyond the quarrels of themoment, they preferred to have freedom guaranteed, even at the cost oftemporary defeat and partial loss of empire. Time has shown that theywere right in this, but the majority of the people could hardly beexpected to comprehend their attitude. It seemed to many that the greatWhig leaders were forgetting their true character as English statesmen, and there is no doubt that for many years this was the chief source ofthe weakness of the Whig party. Sir Gilbert Elliot said, with truth, that if the Whigs had not thus to a considerable extent arrayed thenational feeling against themselves, Lord North's ministry would havefallen some years sooner than it did. The king thoroughly understood theadvantage which accrued to him from this state of things; and with thatshort-sighted shrewdness of the mere political wire-puller, in which fewmodern politicians have excelled him, he had from the outset preferredto fight his battle on constitutional questions in America rather thanin England, in order that the national feeling of Englishmen might bearrayed on his side. He was at length thoroughly beaten on his ownground, and as the fatal day approached he raved and stormed as he hadnot stormed since the spring of 1778, when he had been asked to entrustthe government to Lord Chatham. Like the child who refuses to play whenhe sees the game going against him, George threatened to abdicate thethrone and go over to Hanover, leaving his son to get along with theWhig statesmen. But presently he took heart again, and began to resortto the same kind of political management which had served him so well inthe earlier years of his reign. Among the Whig statesmen, the Marquis ofBuckingham had the largest political following. He represented the oldWhig aristocracy, his section of the party had been first to urge therecognition of American independence, and his principal followers wereFox and Burke. For all these reasons he was especially obnoxious to theking. On the other hand, the Earl of Shelburne was, in a certain sense, the political heir of Lord Chatham, and represented principles far moreliberal than those of the Old Whigs. Shelburne was one of the mostenlightened statesmen of his time. He was an earnest advocate ofparliamentary reform and of free trade. He had paid especial attentionto political economy, and looked with disgust upon the whole barbaricsystem of discriminative duties and commercial monopolies which had beenso largely instrumental in bringing about the American Revolution. Butbeing in these respects in advance of his age, Lord Shelburne had butfew followers. Moreover, although a man of undoubted integrity, quiteexempt from sordid or selfish ambition, there was a cynical harshnessabout him which made him generally disliked and distrusted. He was sosuspicious of other men that other men were suspicious of him; so that, in spite of many admirable qualities, he was extremely ill adapted forthe work of a party manager. It was doubtless for these reasons that the king, when it became clearthat a new government must be formed, made up his mind that LordShelburne would be the safest man to conduct it. In his hands the Whigpower would not be likely to grow too strong, and dissensions would besure to arise, from which the king might hope to profit. The first placein the treasury was accordingly offered to Shelburne; and when herefused it, and the king found himself forced to appeal to LordRockingham, the manner in which the bitter pill was taken was quitecharacteristic of George III. He refused to meet Rockingham in person, but sent all his communications to him through Shelburne, who, thusconspicuously singled out as the object of royal preference, was certainto incur the distrust of his fellow ministers. [Sidenote: Political instability of the Rockingham ministry. ] The structure of the new cabinet was unstable enough, however, to havesatisfied even such an enemy as the king. Beside Rockingham himself, Lord John Cavendish, Charles Fox, Lord Keppel, and the Duke of Richmondwere all Old Whigs. To offset these five there were five New Whigs, theDuke of Grafton, Lords Shelburne, Camden, and Ashburton, and GeneralConway; while the eleventh member was none other than the Torychancellor, Lord Thurlow, who was kept over from Lord North's ministry. Burke was made paymaster of the forces, but had no seat in the cabinet. In this curiously constructed cabinet, the prime minister, LordRockingham, counted for little. Though a good party leader, he was belowmediocrity as a statesman, and his health was failing, so that he couldnot attend to business. The master spirits were the two secretaries ofstate, Fox and Shelburne, and they wrangled perpetually, while Thurlowcarried the news of all their quarrels to the king, and in cabinetmeetings usually voted with Shelburne. The ministry had not lasted fiveweeks when Fox began to predict its downfall. On the great question ofparliamentary reform, which was brought up in May by the young WilliamPitt, the government was hopelessly divided. Shelburne's party was infavour of reform, and this time Fox was found upon the same side, aswell as the Duke of Richmond, who went so far as to advocate universalsuffrage. On the other hand, the Whig aristocracy, led by Rockingham, were as bitterly opposed as the king himself to any change in the methodof electing parliaments; and, incredible as it may seem, even such a manas Burke maintained that the old system, rotten boroughs and all, was asacred part of the British Constitution, which none could handle rudelywithout endangering the country! But in this moment of reaction againstthe evil influences which had brought about the loss of the Americancolonies, there was a strong feeling in favour of reform, and Pitt'smotion was only lost by a minority of twenty in a total vote of threehundred. Half a century was to elapse before the reformers were again tocome so near to victory. But Lord Rockingham's weak and short-lived ministry was neverthelessremarkable for the amount of good work it did in spite of the king'sdogged opposition. It contained great administrative talent, which madeitself felt in the most adverse circumstances. To add to thedifficulty, the ministry came into office at the critical moment of agreat agitation in Ireland. In less than three months, not only was thetrouble successfully removed, but the important bills for disfranchisingrevenue officers and excluding contractors from the House of Commonswere carried, and a tremendous blow was thus struck at the corruptinfluence of the crown upon elections. Burke's great scheme ofeconomical reform was also put into operation, cutting down the pensionlist and diminishing the secret service fund, and thus destroying manysources of corruption. At no time, perhaps, since the expulsion of theStuarts, had so much been done toward purifying English political lifeas during the spring of 1782. But during the progress of these importantmeasures, the jealousies and bickerings in the cabinet became more andmore painfully apparent, and as the question of peace with America cameinto the foreground, these difficulties hastened to a crisis. [Sidenote: Obstacles in the way of a treaty of peace. ] From the policy which George III. Pursued with regard to Lord Shelburneat this time, one would suppose that in his secret heart the kingwished, by foul means since all others had failed, to defeat thenegotiations for peace and to prolong the war. Seldom has there been amore oddly complicated situation. Peace was to be made with America, France, Spain, and Holland. Of these powers, America and France wereleagued together by one treaty of alliance, and France and Spain byanother, and these treaties in some respects conflicted with one anotherin the duties which they entailed upon the combatants. Spain, though atwar with England for purposes of her own, was bitterly hostile to theUnited States; and France, thus leagued with two allies which pulled inopposite directions, felt bound to satisfy both, while pursuing her ownends against England. To deal with such a chaotic state of things, anorderly and harmonious government in England should have seemedindispensably necessary. Yet on the part of England the negotiation of atreaty of peace was to be the work of two secretaries of state who wereboth politically and personally hostile to each other. Fox, as secretaryof state for foreign affairs, had to superintend the negotiations withFrance, Spain, and Holland. Shelburne was secretary of state for homeand colonial affairs; and as the United States were still officiallyregarded as colonies, the American negotiations belonged to hisdepartment. With such a complication of conflicting interests, GeorgeIII. Might well hope that no treaty could be made. [Sidenote: Oswald talks with Franklin. ] The views of Fox and Shelburne as to the best method of concedingAmerican independence were very different. Fox understood that Francewas really in need of peace, and he believed that she would not makefurther demands upon England if American independence should once berecognized. Accordingly, Fox would have made this concession at once asa preliminary to the negotiation. On the other hand, Shelburne felt surethat France would insist upon further concessions, and he thought itbest to hold in reserve the recognition of independence as aconsideration to be bargained for. Informal negotiations began betweenShelburne and Franklin, who for many years had been warm friends. Inview of the impending change of government, Franklin had in March sent aletter to Shelburne, expressing a hope that peace might soon berestored. When the letter reached London the new ministry had alreadybeen formed, and Shelburne, with the consent of the cabinet, answered itby sending over to Paris an agent, to talk with Franklin informally, andascertain the terms upon which the Americans would make peace. Theperson chosen for this purpose was Richard Oswald, a Scotch merchant, who owned large estates in America, --a man of very frank disposition andliberal views, and a friend of Adam Smith. In April, Oswald had severalconversations with Franklin. In one of these conversations Franklinsuggested that, in order to make a durable peace, it was desirable toremove all occasion for future quarrel; that the line of frontierbetween New York and Canada was inhabited by a lawless set of men, whoin time of peace would be likely to breed trouble between theirrespective governments; and that therefore it would be well for Englandto cede Canada to the United States. A similar reasoning would apply toNova Scotia. By ceding these countries to the United States it would bepossible, from the sale of unappropriated lands, to indemnify theAmericans for all losses of private property during the war, and also tomake reparation to the Tories, whose estates had been confiscated. Bypursuing such a policy, England, which had made war on Americaunjustly, and had wantonly done it great injuries, would achieve notmerely peace, but reconciliation, with America; and reconciliation, saidFranklin, is "a sweet word. " No doubt this was a bold tone for Franklinto take, and perhaps it was rather cool in him to ask for Canada andNova Scotia; but he knew that almost every member of the Whig ministryhad publicly expressed the opinion that the war against America was anunjust and wanton war; and being, moreover, a shrewd hand at a bargain, he began by setting his terms high. Oswald doubtless looked at thematter very much from Franklin's point of view, for on the suggestion ofthe cession of Canada he expressed neither surprise nor reluctance. Franklin had written on a sheet of paper the main points of hisconversation, and, at Oswald's request, he allowed him to take the paperto London to show to Lord Shelburne, first writing upon it a noteexpressly declaring its informal character. Franklin also sent a letterto Shelburne, describing Oswald as a gentleman with whom he found itvery pleasant to deal. On Oswald's arrival in London, Shelburne did notshow the notes of the conversation to any of his colleagues, except LordAshburton. He kept the paper over one night, and then returned it toFranklin without any formal answer. But the letter he showed to thecabinet, and on the 23d of April it was decided to send Oswald back toParis, to represent to Franklin that, on being restored to the samesituation in which she was left by the treaty of 1763, Great Britainwould be willing to recognize the independence of the United States. Fox was authorized to make a similar representation to the Frenchgovernment, and the person whom he sent to Paris for this purpose wasThomas Grenville, son of the author of the Stamp Act. As all British subjects were prohibited from entering into negotiationswith the revolted colonies, it was impossible for Oswald to take anydecisive step until an enabling act should be carried throughParliament. But while waiting for this he might still talk informallywith Franklin. Fox thought that Oswald's presence in Paris indicated adesire on Shelburne's part to interfere with the negotiations with theFrench government; and indeed, the king, out of his hatred of Fox andhis inborn love of intrigue, suggested to Shelburne that Oswald "mightbe a useful check on that part of the negotiation which was in otherhands. " But Shelburne paid no heed to this crooked advice, and there isnothing to show that he had the least desire to intrigue against Fox. Ifhe had, he would certainly have selected some other agent than Oswald, who was the most straightforward of men, and scarcely close-mouthedenough for a diplomatist. He told Oswald to impress it upon Franklinthat if America was to be independent at all she must be independent ofthe whole world, and must not enter into any secret arrangement withFrance which might limit her entire freedom of action in the future. Tothe private memorandum which desired the cession of Canada for threereasons, his answers were as follows: "1. _By way ofreparation. _--Answer. No reparation can be heard of. 2. _To preventfuture wars. _--Answer. It is to be hoped that some more friendly methodwill be found. 3. _As a fund of indemnification to loyalists. _--Answer. No independence to be acknowledged without their being taken care of. "Besides, added Shelburne, the Americans would be expected to make somecompensation for the surrender of Charleston, Savannah, and the city ofNew York, still held by British troops. From this it appears thatShelburne, as well as Franklin, knew how to begin by asking more than hewas likely to get. [Sidenote: Grenville has an interview with Vergennes. ] While Oswald submitted these answers to Franklin, Grenville had hisinterview with Vergennes, and told him that, if England recognized theindependence of the United States, she should expect France to restorethe islands of the West Indies which she had taken from England. Whynot, since the independence of the United States was the sole avowedobject for which France had gone to war? Now this was on the 8th of May, and the news of the destruction of the French fleet in the West Indies, nearly four weeks ago, had not yet reached Europe. Flushed with thevictories of Grasse, and exulting in the prowess of the most formidablenaval force that France had ever sent out, Vergennes not only expectedto keep the islands which he had got, but was waiting eagerly for thenews that he had acquired Jamaica into the bargain. In this mood hereturned a haughty answer to Grenville. He reminded him that nationsoften went to war for a specified object, and yet seized twice as muchif favoured by fortune; and, recurring to the instance which rankledmost deeply in the memories of Frenchmen, he cited the events of thelast war. In 1756 England went to war with France over the disputedright to some lands on the Ohio River and the Maine frontier. Afterseven years of fighting she not only kept these lands, but all ofCanada, Louisiana, and Florida, and ousted the French from India intothe bargain. No, said Vergennes, he would not rest content with theindependence of America. He would not even regard such an offer as aconcession to France in any way, or as a price in return for whichFrance was to make a treaty favourable to England. As regards therecognition of independence, England must treat directly with America. [Sidenote: Effects of Rodney's victory. ] [Sidenote: Fall of the Rockingham ministry, July 1, 1782. ] Grenville was disappointed and chagrined by this answer, and theministry made up their minds that there would be no use in trying to getan honourable peace with France for the present. Accordingly, it seemedbetter to take Vergennes at his word, though not in the sense in whichhe meant it, and, by granting all that the Americans could reasonablydesire, to detach them from the French alliance as soon as possible. Onthe 18th of May there came the news of the stupendous victory of Rodneyover Grasse, and all England rang with jubilee. Again it had been shownthat "Britannia rules the wave;" and it seemed that, if America could beseparately pacified, the House of Bourbon might be successfully defied. Accordingly, on the 23d, five days after the news of victory, theministry decided "to propose the independence of America in the firstinstance, instead of making it the condition of a general treaty. " Uponthis Fox rather hastily maintained that the United States were put atonce into the position of an independent and foreign power, so that thebusiness of negotiating with them passed from Shelburne's departmentinto his own. Shelburne, on the other hand, argued that, as therecognition of independence could not take effect until a treaty ofpeace should be concluded, the negotiation with America still belongedto him, as secretary for the colonies. Following Fox's instructions, Grenville now claimed the right of negotiating with Franklin as well aswith Vergennes; but as his written credentials only authorized him totreat with France, the French minister suspected foul play, and turned acold shoulder to Grenville. For the same reason, Grenville foundFranklin very reserved and indisposed to talk on the subject of thetreaty. While Grenville was thus rebuffed and irritated he had a talkwith Oswald, in the course of which he got from that simple andhigh-minded gentleman the story of the private paper relating to thecession of Canada, which Franklin had permitted Lord Shelburne to see. Grenville immediately took offence; he made up his mind that somethingunderhanded was going on, and that this was the reason for the coldnessof Franklin and Vergennes; and he wrote an indignant letter about it toFox. From the wording of this letter, Fox got the impression thatFranklin's proposal was much more serious than it really was. Itnaturally puzzled him and made him angry, for the attitude of Americaimplied in the request for a cession of Canada was far different fromthe attitude presumed by the theory that the mere offer of independencewould be enough to detach her from her alliance with France. The plan ofthe ministry seemed imperilled. Fox showed Grenville's letter toRockingham, Richmond, and Cavendish; and they all inferred thatShelburne was playing a secret part, for purposes of his own. This wasdoubtless unjust to Shelburne. Perhaps his keeping the matter to himselfwas simply one more illustration of his want of confidence in Fox; or, perhaps he did not think it worth while to stir up the cabinet over aquestion which seemed too preposterous ever to come to anything. Fox, however, cried out against Shelburne's alleged duplicity, and made uphis mind at all events to get the American negotiations transferred tohis own department. To this end he moved in the cabinet, on the last dayof June, that the independence of the United States should beunconditionally acknowledged, so that England might treat as with aforeign power. The motion was lost, and Fox announced that he shouldresign his office. His resignation would probably of itself have brokenup the ministry, but, by a curious coincidence, on the next day LordRockingham died; and so the first British government begotten ofWashington's victory at Yorktown came prematurely to an end. [Sidenote: Shelburne prime minister. ] The Old Whigs now found some difficulty in choosing a leader. Burke wasthe greatest statesman in the party, but he had not the qualities of aparty leader, and his connections were not sufficiently aristocratic. Fox was distrusted by many people for his gross vices, and because ofhis waywardness in politics. In the dissipated gambler, who cast in hislot first with one party and then with the other, and who had shamefullyused his matchless eloquence in defending some of the worst abuses ofthe time, there seemed as yet but little promise of the great reformerof later years, the Charles Fox who came to be loved and idolized by allenlightened Englishmen. Next to Fox, the ablest leader in the party wasthe Duke of Richmond, but his advanced views on parliamentary reform puthim out of sympathy with the majority of the party. In thisembarrassment, the choice fell upon the Duke of Portland, a man of greatwealth and small talent, concerning whom Horace Walpole observed, "It isvery entertaining that two or three great families should persuadethemselves that they have a hereditary and exclusive right of giving usa head without a tongue!" The choice was a weak one, and played directlyinto the hands of the king. When urged to make the Duke of Portland hisprime minister, the king replied that he had already offered thatposition to Lord Shelburne. Hereupon Fox and Cavendish resigned, butRichmond remained in office, thus virtually breaking his connection withthe Old Whigs. Lord Keppel also remained. Many members of the partyfollowed Richmond and went over to Shelburne. William Pitt, nowtwenty-three years old, succeeded Cavendish as chancellor of theexchequer; Thomas Townshend became secretary of state for home andcolonies, and Lord Grantham became foreign secretary. The closing daysof Parliament were marked by altercations which showed how wide thebreach had grown between the two sections of the Whig party. Fox andBurke believed that Shelburne was not only playing a false part, but wasreally as subservient to the king as Lord North had been. In a speechridiculous for its furious invective, Burke compared the new primeminister with Borgia and Catiline. And so Parliament was adjourned onthe 11th of July, and did not meet again until December. [Sidenote: French policy opposed to American interests. ] The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by this changeof ministry and by the total defeat of the Spaniards and French atGibraltar in September. Six months before, England had seemed worsted inevery quarter. Now England, though defeated in America, was victoriousas regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France hadentered into alliance with the Americans was to secure the independenceof the United States, and this point was now substantially gained. Thechief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France wasto drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedlylost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spainshould recover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishingthis, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennestried to persuade England to cede the great stronghold in exchange forWest Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran orGuadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain atthe expense of the United States; and he did this the more willingly ashe had no love for the Americans, and did not wish to see them becometoo powerful. France had strictly kept her pledges; she had given usvaluable and timely aid in gaining our independence; and the sympathiesof the French people were entirely with the American cause. But theobject of the French government had been simply to humiliate England, and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of herthirteen colonies. [Sidenote: The valley of the Mississippi; Aranda's prophecy. ] The immense territory extending from the Alleghany Mountains to theMississippi River, and from the border of "West Florida to the GreatLakes, had passed from the hands of France into those of England at thepeace of 1763; and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared thesouthern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. At present the wholeterritory, from Lake Superior down to the southern boundary of what isnow Kentucky, belonged to the state of Virginia, whose backwoodsmen hadconquered it from England in 1779. In December, 1780, Virginia hadprovisionally ceded the portion north of the Ohio to the United States, but the cession was not yet completed. The region which is now Tennesseebelonged to North Carolina, which had begun to make settlements there aslong ago as 1758. The trackless forests included between Tennessee andWest Florida were still in the hands of wild tribes of Cherokees andChoctaws, Chickasaws and Creeks. Several thousand pioneers from NorthCarolina and Virginia had already settled beyond the mountains, and thewhite population was rapidly increasing. This territory the Frenchgovernment was very unwilling to leave in American hands. Thepossibility of enormous expansion which it would afford to the newnation was distinctly foreseen by sagacious men. Count Aranda, therepresentative of Spain in these negotiations, wrote a letter to hisking just after the treaty was concluded, in which he uttered thisnotable prophecy: "This federal republic is born a pygmy. A day willcome when it will be a giant, even a colossus, formidable in thesecountries. Liberty of conscience, the facility for establishing a newpopulation on immense lands, as well as the advantages of the newgovernment, will draw thither farmers and artisans from all the nations. In a few years we shall watch with grief the tyrannical existence ofthis same colossus. " The letter went on to predict that the Americanswould presently get possession of Florida and attack Mexico. Similararguments were doubtless used by Aranda in his interviews withVergennes, and France, as well as Spain, sought to prevent the growth ofthe dreaded colossus. To this end Vergennes maintained that theAmericans ought to recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to England allthe territory north of the Ohio River. The region south of this limitshould, he thought, be made an Indian territory, and placed under theprotection of Spain and the United States. A line was to be drawn fromthe mouth of the Cumberland River, following that stream about as faras the site of Nashville, thence running southward to the Tennessee, thence curving eastward nearly to the Alleghanies, and descendingthrough what is now eastern Alabama to the Florida line. The territoryto the east of this irregular line was to be under the protection of theUnited States; the territory to the west of it was to be under theprotection of Spain. In this division, the settlers beyond the mountainswould retain their connection with the United States, which would nottouch the Mississippi River at any point. Vergennes held that this wasall the Americans could reasonably demand, and he agreed with Arandathat they had as yet gained no foothold upon the eastern bank of thegreat river, unmindful of the fact that at that very moment thefortresses at Cahokia and Kaskaskia were occupied by American garrisons. [Illustration: MAP OF NORTH AMERICA, Showing the Boundaries of the UNITED STATES, CANADA, and the SPANISHPOSSESSIONS, according to the proposals of the Court of France in1782. ] [Sidenote: The Newfoundland fisheries. ] Upon another important point the views of the French government weredirectly opposed to American interests. The right to catch fish on thebanks of Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France andEngland; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the king of GreatBritain, had participated in this privilege. The matter was of verygreat importance, not only to New England, but to the United States ingeneral. Not only were the fisheries a source of lucrative trade to theNew England people, but they were the training-school of a splendid raceof seamen, the nursery of naval heroes whose exploits were by and by toastonish the world. To deprive the Americans of their share in thesefisheries was to strike a serious blow at the strength and resources ofthe new nation. The British government was not inclined to grant theprivilege, and on this point Vergennes took sides with England, in orderto establish a claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France insome other quarter. With these views, Vergennes secretly aimed atdelaying the negotiations; for as long as hostilities were kept up, hemight hope to extort from his American allies a recognition of theSpanish claims and a renouncement of the fisheries, simply bythreatening to send them no further assistance in men or money. In orderto retard the proceedings, he refused to take any steps whatever untilthe independence of the United States should first be irrevocablyacknowledged by Great Britain, without reference to the final settlementof the rest of the treaty. In this Vergennes was supported by Franklin, as well as by Jay, who had lately arrived in Paris to take part in thenegotiations. But the reasons of the American commissioners were verydifferent from those of Vergennes. They feared that, if they began totreat before independence was acknowledged, they would be unfairly dealtwith by France and Spain, and unable to gain from England theconcessions upon which they were determined. [Sidenote: Jay detects the schemes of Vergennes. ] Jay soon began to suspect the designs of the French minister. He foundthat he was sending M. De Rayneval as a secret emissary to LordShelburne under an assumed name; he ascertained that the right of theUnited States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he gothold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of legation atPhiladelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American claim to theNewfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned these facts, he sent hisfriend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him that it was greatly for the interest of Englandto dissolve the alliance between America and France, he declared himselfready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the recognition ofindependence, provided that Oswald's commission should speak of thethirteen United States of America, instead of calling them colonies andnaming them separately. This decisive step was taken by Jay on his ownresponsibility, and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had beenaverse to anything like a separate negotiation with England. It servedto set the ball rolling at once. After meeting the messengers from Jayand Vergennes, Lord Shelburne at once perceived the antagonism that hadarisen between the allies, and promptly took advantage of it. A newcommission was made out for Oswald, in which the British governmentfirst described our country as the United States; and early in Octobernegotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the part of England, the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey andFitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In the course of the monthJohn Adams arrived in Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens, whohad been exchanged for Lord Cornwallis and released from the Tower, wasadded to the company. Adams had a holy horror of Frenchmen in general, and of Count Vergennes in particular. He shared that common but mistakenview of Frenchmen which regards them as shallow, frivolous, andinsincere; and he was indignant at the position taken by Vergennes onthe question of the fisheries. In this, John Adams felt as all NewEnglanders felt, and he realized the importance of the question from anational point of view, as became the man who in later years was to earnlasting renown as one of the chief founders of the American navy. Hisbehaviour on reaching Paris was characteristic. It is said that he leftCount Vergennes to learn of his arrival through the newspapers. It wascertainly some time before he called upon him, and he took occasion, besides, to express his opinions about republics and monarchies in termswhich courtly Frenchmen thought very rude. [Sidenote: Franklin overruled by Jay and Adams. ] The arrival of Adams fully decided the matter as to a separatenegotiation with England. He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should bekept as far as possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of alliancebetween France and the United States had expressly stipulated thatneither power should ever make peace without the consent of the other, and in view of this Franklin was loth to do anything which might seemlike abandoning the ally whose timely interposition had alone enabledWashington to achieve the crowning triumph of Yorktown. In justice toVergennes, it should be borne in mind that he had kept strict faithwith us in regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated; andFranklin, who felt that he understood Frenchmen better than hiscolleagues, was naturally unwilling to seem behindhand in this respect. At the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated, Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it isundeniable that, without departing technically from the obligations ofthe alliance, Jay and Adams--two men as honourable as ever lived--playeda very sharp defensive game against him. The traditional French subtletywas no match for Yankee shrewdness. The treaty with England was notconcluded until the consent of France had been obtained, and thus theexpress stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed agreementwas reached as to what the purport of the treaty should be, while ournot too friendly ally was kept in the dark. The annals of moderndiplomacy have afforded few stranger spectacles. With the indispensableaid of France we had just got the better of England in fight, and now weproceeded amicably to divide territory and commercial privileges withthe enemy, and to make arrangements in which the ally was virtuallyignored. It ceases to be a paradox, however, when we remember that withthe change of government in England some essential conditions of thecase were changed. The England against which we had fought was thehostile England of Lord North; the England with which we were nowdealing was the friendly England of Shelburne and Pitt. For the moment, the English race, on both sides of the Atlantic, was united in its mainpurpose and divided only by questions of detail, while the rivalcolonizing power, which sought to work in a direction contrary to thegeneral interests of English-speaking people, was in great measuredisregarded. [Sidenote: The separate American treaty, as agreed upon: 1. Boundaries;] As soon as the problem was thus virtually reduced to a negotiationbetween the American commissioners and Lord Shelburne's ministry, theair was cleared in a moment. The principal questions had already beendiscussed between Franklin and Oswald. Independence being firstacknowledged, the question of boundaries came up for settlement. Englandhad little interest in regaining the territory between the Alleghaniesand the Mississippi, the forts in which were already held by Americansoldiers, and she relinquished all claim upon it. The Mississippi Riverthus became the dividing line between the United States and the Spanishpossessions, and its navigation was made free alike to British andAmerican ships. Franklin's suggestion of a cession of Canada and NovaScotia was abandoned without discussion. It was agreed that the boundaryline should start at the mouth of the river St. Croix, and, running to apoint near Lake Madawaska in the highlands separating the Atlanticwatershed from that of the St. Lawrence, should follow these highlandsto the head of the Connecticut River, and then descend the middle of theriver to the forty-fifth parallel, thence running westward and throughthe centre of the water communications of the Great Lakes to the Lake ofthe Woods, thence to the source of the Mississippi, which was supposedto be west of this lake. This line was marked in red ink by Oswald onone of Mitchell's maps of North America, to serve as a memorandumestablishing the precise meaning of the words used in the description. It ought to have been accurately fixed in its details by surveys madeupon the spot; but no commissioners were appointed for this purpose. Thelanguage relating to the northeastern portion of the boundary containedsome inaccuracies which were revealed by later surveys, and the map usedby Oswald was lost. Hence a further question arose between Great Britainand the United States, which was finally settled by the Ashburton treatyin 1842. [Sidenote: 2. Fisheries; commercial intercourse;] The Americans retained the right of catching fish on the banks ofNewfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but lost the right ofdrying their fish on the Newfoundland coast. On the other hand, nopermission was given to British subjects to fish on the coasts of theUnited States. As regarded commercial intercourse, Jay sought toestablish complete reciprocal freedom between the two countries, and aclause was proposed to the effect that "all British merchants andmerchant ships, on the one hand, shall enjoy in the United States, andin all places belonging to them, the same protection and commercialprivileges, and be liable only to the same charges and duties as theirown merchants and merchant ships; and, on the other hand, the merchantsand merchant ships of the United States shall enjoy in all placesbelonging to his Britannic Majesty the same protection and commercialprivileges, and be liable only to the same charges and duties as Britishmerchants and merchant ships, saving always to the chartered tradingcompanies of Great Britain such exclusive use and trade, and therespective ports and establishments, as neither the other subjects ofGreat Britain nor any the most favoured nation participate in. "Unfortunately for both countries, this liberal provision was rejected onthe ground that the ministry had no authority to interfere with theNavigation Act. [Sidenote: 3. Private debts;] Only two questions were now left to be disposed of, --the question ofpaying private debts, and that of compensating the American loyalistsfor the loss of property and general rough treatment which they hadsuffered. There were many old debts outstanding from American to Britishmerchants. These had been for the most part incurred before 1775, andwhile many honest debtors, impoverished during the war, felt unable topay, there were doubtless many others who were ready to take advantageof circumstances and refuse the payment which they were perfectly ableto make. It was scarcely creditable to us that any such question shouldhave arisen. Franklin, indeed, argued that these debts were more thanfully offset by damages done to private property by British soldiers:as, for example, in the wanton raids on the coasts of Connecticut andVirginia in 1779, or in Prevost's buccaneering march against Charleston. To cite these atrocities, however, as a reason for the non-payment ofdebts legitimately owed to innocent merchants in London and Glasgow wasto argue as if two wrongs could make a right. The strong sense of JohnAdams struck at once to the root of the matter. He declared "he had nonotion of cheating anybody. The questions of paying debts andcompensating Tories were two. " This terse statement carried the day, andit was finally decided that all private debts on either side, whetherincurred before or after 1775, remained still binding, and must bedischarged at their full value in sterling money. [Sidenote: 4. Compensation of loyalists. ] The last question of all was the one most difficult to settle. Therewere many loyalists in the United States who had sacrificed everythingin the support of the British cause, and it was unquestionably the dutyof the British government to make every possible effort to insure themagainst further injury, and, if practicable, to make good their lossesalready incurred. From Virginia and the New England states, where theywere few in number, they had mostly fled, and their estates had beenconfiscated. In New York and South Carolina, where they remained ingreat numbers, they were still waging a desultory war with the patriots, which far exceeded in cruelty and bitterness the struggle between theregular armies. In many cases they had, at the solicitation of theBritish government, joined the invading army, and been organized intocompanies and regiments. The regular troops defeated at King's Mountain, and those whom Arnold took with him to Virginia, were nearly allAmerican loyalists. Lord Shelburne felt that it would be wrong toabandon these unfortunate men to the vengeance of their fellowcountrymen, and he insisted that the treaty should contain an amnestyclause providing for the restoration of the Tories to their civilrights, with compensation for their confiscated property. Howeverdisagreeable such a course might seem to the victorious Americans, therewere many precedents for it in European history. It had indeed come tobe customary at the close of civil wars, and the effect of such a policyhad invariably been good. Cromwell, in his hour of triumph, inflicted nodisabilities upon his political enemies; and when Charles II. Wasrestored to the throne the healing effect of the amnesty act then passedwas so great that historians sometimes ask what in the world had becomeof that Puritan party which a moment before had seemed supreme in theland. At the close of the war of the Spanish Succession, the rebelliouspeople of Catalonia were indemnified for their losses, at the request ofEngland, and with a similar good effect. In view of such Europeanprecedents, Vergennes agreed with Shelburne as to the propriety ofsecuring compensation and further immunity for the Tories in America. John Adams insinuated that the French minister took this course becausehe foresaw that the presence of the Tories in the United States wouldkeep the people perpetually divided into a French party and an Englishparty; but such a suspicion was quite uncalled for. There is no reasonto suppose that in this instance Vergennes had anything at heart but theinterests of humanity and justice. On the other hand, the Americans brought forward very strong reasons whythe Tories should not be indemnified by Congress. First, as Franklinurged, many of them had, by their misrepresentations to the Britishgovernment, helped to stir up the disputes which led to the war; and asthey had made their bed, so they must lie in it. Secondly, such of themas had been concerned in burning and plundering defenceless villages, and wielding the tomahawk in concert with bloodthirsty Indians, deservedno compassion. It was rather for them to make compensation for themisery they had wrought. Thirdly, the confiscated Tory property hadpassed into the hands of purchasers who had bought it in good faith andcould not now be dispossessed, and in many cases it had been distributedhere and there and lost sight of. An estimate of the gross amount mightbe made, and a corresponding sum appropriated for indemnification. But, fourthly, the country was so impoverished by the war that its ownsoldiers, the brave men whose heroic exertions had won the independenceof the United States, were at this moment in sore distress for the wantof the pay which Congress could not give them, but to which its honourwas sacredly pledged. The American government was clearly bound to payits just debts to the friends who had suffered so much in its behalfbefore it should proceed to entertain a chimerical scheme for satisfyingits enemies. For, fifthly, any such scheme was in the present instanceclearly chimerical. The acts under which Tory property had beenconfiscated were acts of state legislatures, and Congress had nojurisdiction over such a matter. If restitution was to be made, it mustbe made by the separate states. The question could not for a moment beentertained by the general government or its agents. Upon these points the American commissioners were united and inexorable. Various suggestions were offered in vain by the British. Their troopsstill held the city of New York, and it was doubtful whether theAmericans could hope to capture it in another campaign. It was urgedthat England might fairly claim in exchange for New York a round sum ofmoney wherewith the Tories might be indemnified. It was further urgedthat certain unappropriated lands in the Mississippi valley might besold for the same purpose. But the Americans would not hear of buyingone of their own cities, whose independence was already acknowledged bythe first article of the treaty which recognized the independence of theUnited States and as for the western lands, they were wanted as a meansof paying our own war debts and providing for our veteran soldiers. Several times Shelburne sent word to Paris that he would break off thenegotiation unless the loyalist claims were in some way recognized. Butthe Americans were obdurate. They had one advantage, and knew it. Parliament was soon to meet, and it was doubtful whether Lord Shelburnecould command a sufficient majority to remain long in office. He was, accordingly, very anxious to complete the treaty of peace, or at leastto detach America from the French alliance, as soon as possible. TheAmerican commissioners were also eager to conclude the treaty. They hadsecured very favourable terms, and were loth to run any risk ofspoiling what had been done. Accordingly, they made a proposal in theform of a compromise, which nevertheless settled the point in theirfavour. The matter, they said, was beyond the jurisdiction of Congress, but they agreed that Congress should _recommend_ to the several statesto desist from further proceedings against the Tories, and to reconsidertheir laws on this subject; it should further recommend that personswith claims upon confiscated lands might be authorized to use legalmeans of recovering them, and to this end might be allowed to pass toand fro without personal risk for the term of one year. The Britishcommissioners accepted this compromise, unsatisfactory as it was, because it was really impossible to obtain anything better withoutthrowing the whole negotiation overboard. The constitutional difficultywas a real one indeed. As Adams told Oswald, if the point were furtherinsisted upon, Congress would be obliged to refer it to the severalstates, and no one could tell how long it might be before any decisiveresult could be reached in this way. Meanwhile, the state of war wouldcontinue, and it would be cheaper for England to indemnify the loyalistsherself than to pay the war bills for a single month. Franklin addedthat, if the loyalists were to be indemnified, it would be necessaryalso to reckon up the damage they had done in burning houses andkidnapping slaves, and then strike a balance between the two accounts;and he gravely suggested that a special commission might be appointedfor this purpose. At the prospect of endless discussion which thissuggestion involved, the British commissioners gave way and accepted theAmerican terms, although they were frankly told that too much must notbe expected from the recommendation of Congress. The articles weresigned on the 30th of November, six days before the meeting ofParliament. Hostilities in America were to cease at once, and upon thecompletion of the treaty the British fleets and armies were to beimmediately withdrawn from every place which they held within the limitsof the United States. A supplementary and secret article provided thatif England, on making peace with Spain, should recover Wept Florida, thenorthern boundary of that province should be a line running due eastfrom the mouth of the Yazoo River to the Chattahoochee. [Sidenote: Vergennes does not like the way in which it has been done. ] Thus by skilful diplomacy the Americans had gained all that couldreasonably be asked, while the work of making a general peace wasgreatly simplified. It was declared in the preamble that the articleshere signed were provisional, and that the treaty was not to take effectuntil terms of peace should be agreed on between England and France. Without delay, Franklin laid the whole matter, except the secretarticle, before Vergennes, who forthwith accused the Americans ofingratitude and bad faith. Franklin's reply, that at the worst theycould only be charged with want of diplomatic courtesy, has sometimesbeen condemned as insincere, but on inadequate grounds. He had consentedwith reluctance to the separate negotiation, because he did not wish togive France any possible ground for complaint, whether real orostensible. There does not seem, however, to have been sufficientjustification for so grave a charge as was made by Vergennes. If theFrench negotiations had failed until after the overthrow of theShelburne ministry; if Fox, on coming into power, had taken advantage ofthe American treaty to continue the war against France; and if undersuch circumstances the Americans had abandoned their ally, thenundoubtedly they would have become guilty of ingratitude and treachery. There is no reason for supposing that they would ever have done so, hadthe circumstances arisen. Their preamble made it impossible for themhonourably to abandon France until a full peace should be made, and morethan this France could not reasonably demand. The Americans had kept tothe strict letter of their contract, as Vergennes had kept to the strictletter of his, and beyond this they meted out exactly the same measureof frankness which they received. To say that our debt of gratitude toFrance was such as to require us to acquiesce in her scheme forenriching our enemy Spain at our expense is simply childish. Franklinwas undoubtedly right. The commissioners may have been guilty of abreach of diplomatic courtesy, but nothing more. Vergennes might besarcastic about it for the moment, but the cordial relations betweenFrance and America remained undisturbed. [Sidenote: A great diplomatic victory. ] On the part of the Americans the treaty of Paris was one of the mostbrilliant triumphs in the whole history of modern diplomacy. Had theaffair been managed by men of ordinary ability, some of the greatestresults of the Revolutionary War would probably have been lost; the newrepublic would have been cooped up between the Atlantic Ocean and theAlleghany Mountains; our westward expansion would have been impossiblewithout further warfare in which European powers would have beeninvolved; and the formation of our Federal Union would doubtless havebeen effectively hindered, if not, indeed, altogether prevented. To thegrand triumph the varied talents of Franklin, Adams, and Jay alikecontributed. To the latter is due the credit of detecting and bafflingthe sinister designs of France; but without the tact of Franklin thisprobably could not have been accomplished without offending France insuch wise as to spoil everything. It is, however, to the rarediscernment and boldness of Jay, admirably seconded by the sturdy Adams, that the chief praise is due. The turning-point of the whole affair wasthe visit of Dr. Vaughan to Lord Shelburne. The foundation of successwas the separate negotiation with England, and here there had stood inthe way a more formidable obstacle than the mere reluctance of Franklin. The chevalier Luzerne and his secretary Marbois had been busy withCongress, and that body had sent well-meant but silly and pusillanimousinstructions to its commissioners at Paris to be guided in all things bythe wishes of the French court. To disregard such instructions requiredall the lofty courage for which Jay and Adams were noted, and for themoment it brought upon them something like a rebuke from Congress, conveyed in a letter from Robert Livingston. As Adams said, in hisvehement way, "Congress surrendered their own sovereignty into the handsof a French minister. Blush! blush! ye guilty records! blush and perish!It is glory to have broken such infamous orders. " True enough; thecommissioners knew that in diplomacy, as in warfare, to the agent at adistance from his principal some discretionary power must be allowed. They assumed great responsibility, and won a victory of incalculablegrandeur. [Sidenote: The Spanish treaty. ] The course of the Americans produced no effect upon the terms obtainedby France, but it seriously modified the case with Spain. Unable toobtain Gibraltar by arms, that power hoped to get it by diplomacy; andwith the support of France she seemed disposed to make the cession ofthe great fortress an ultimatum, without which the war must go on. Shelburne, on his part, was willing to exchange Gibraltar for an islandin the West Indies; but it was difficult to get the cabinet to agree onthe matter, and the scheme was violently opposed by the people, for theheroic defence of the stronghold had invested it with a halo of romanceand endeared it to every one. Nevertheless, so persistent was Spain, andso great the desire for peace on the part of the ministry, that they hadresolved to exchange Gibraltar for Guadaloupe, when the news arrived ofthe treaty with America. The ministers now took a bold stand, andrefused to hear another word about giving up Gibraltar. Spain scolded, and threatened a renewal of hostilities, but France was unwilling togive further assistance, and the matter was settled by England'ssurrendering East Florida, and allowing the Spaniards to keep WestFlorida and Minorca, which were already in their hands. [Sidenote: The French treaty. ] By the treaty with France, the West India islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Christopher, Dominica, Nevis, and Montserrat were restoredto England, which in turn restored St. Lucia and ceded Tobago to France. The French were allowed to fortify Dunkirk, and received some slightconcessions in India and Africa; they retained their share in theNewfoundland fisheries, and recovered the little neighbouring islands ofSt. Pierre and Miquelon. For the fourteen hundred million francs whichFrance had expended in the war, she had the satisfaction of detachingthe American colonies from England, thus inflicting a blow which it wasconfidently hoped would prove fatal to the maritime power of her ancientrival; but beyond this short-lived satisfaction, the fallaciousness ofwhich events were soon to show, she obtained very little. On the 20th ofJanuary, 1783, the preliminaries of peace were signed between England, on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other. A truce was at thesame time concluded with Holland, which was soon followed by a peace, inwhich most of the conquests on either side were restored. [Sidenote: Coalition of Fox with North. ] A second English ministry was now about to be wrecked on the rock ofthis group of treaties. Lord Shelburne's government had at no time beena strong one. He had made many enemies by his liberal and reformingmeasures, and he had alienated most of his colleagues by his reserveddemeanour and seeming want of confidence in them. In December severalof the ministers resigned. The strength of parties in the House ofCommons was thus quaintly reckoned by Gibbon: "Minister 140; Reynard 90;Boreas 120; the rest unknown or uncertain. " But "Reynard" and "Boreas"were now about to join forces in one of the strangest coalitions everknown in the history of politics. No statesman ever attacked anothermore ferociously than Fox had attacked North during the past ten years. He had showered abuse upon him; accused him of "treachery andfalsehood, " of "public perfidy, " and "breach of a solemn specificpromise;" and had even gone so far as to declare to his face a hope thathe would be called upon to expiate his abominable crimes upon thescaffold. Within a twelvemonth he had thus spoken of Lord North and hiscolleagues: "From the moment when I shall make any terms with one ofthem, I will rest satisfied to be called the most infamous of mankind. Iwould not for an instant think of a coalition with men who, in everypublic and private transaction as ministers, have shown themselves voidof every principle of honour and honesty. In the hands of such men Iwould not trust my honour even for a moment. " Still more recently, whenat a loss for words strong enough to express his belief in thewickedness of Shelburne, he declared that he had no better opinion ofthat man than to deem him capable of forming an alliance with North. Wemay judge, then, of the general amazement when, in the middle ofFebruary, it turned out that Fox had himself done this very thing. An"ill-omened marriage, " William Pitt called it in the House of Commons. "If this ill-omened marriage is not already solemnized, I know a justand lawful impediment, and in the name of the public safety I hereforbid the banns. " Throughout the country the indignation was great. Many people had blamed Fox for not following up his charges by actuallybringing articles of impeachment against Lord North. That the twoenemies should thus suddenly become leagued in friendship seemed utterlymonstrous. It injured Fox extremely in the opinion of the country, andit injured North still more, for it seemed like a betrayal of the kingon his part, and his forgiveness of so many insults lookedmean-spirited. It does not appear, however, that there was really anystrong personal animosity between North and Fox. They were both men ofvery amiable character, and almost incapable of cherishing resentment. The language of parliamentary orators was habitually violent, and thehuge quantities of wine which gentlemen in those days used to drink mayhave helped to make it extravagant. The excessive vehemence of politicalinvective often deprived it of half its effect. One day, after Fox hadexhausted his vocabulary of abuse upon Lord George Germaine, Lord Northsaid to him, "You were in very high feather to-day, Charles, and I amglad you did not fall upon me. " On another occasion, it is said thatwhile Fox was thundering against North's unexampled turpitude, theobject of his furious tirade cosily dropped off to sleep. Gibbon, whowas the friend of both statesmen, expressly declares that they boreeach other no ill will. But while thus alike indisposed to harbourbitter thoughts, there was one man for whom both Fox and North felt anabiding distrust and dislike; and that man was Lord Shelburne, the primeminister. As a political pupil of Burke, Fox shared that statesman's distrust ofthe whole school of Lord Chatham, to which Shelburne belonged. In manyrespects these statesmen were far more advanced than Burke, but they didnot sufficiently realize the importance of checking the crown by meansof a united and powerful ministry. Fox thoroughly understood that muchof the mischief of the past twenty years, including the loss of America, had come from the system of weak and divided ministries, which gave theking such great opportunity for wreaking his evil will. He had himselfbeen a member of such a ministry, which had fallen seven months ago. When the king singled out Shelburne for his confidence, Fox naturallyconcluded that Shelburne was to be made to play the royal game, as Northhad been made to play it for so many years. This was very unjust toShelburne, but there is no doubt that Fox was perfectly honest in hisbelief. It seemed to him that the present state of things must bebrought to an end, at whatever cost. A ministry strong enough to curbthe king could be formed only by a coalescence of two out of the threeexisting parties. A coalescence of Old and New Whigs had been tried lastspring, and failed. It only remained now to try the effect of acoalescence of Old Whigs and Tories. Such was doubtless the chief motive of Fox in this extraordinary move. The conduct of North seems harder to explain, but it was probably due toa reaction of feeling on his part. He had done violence to his ownconvictions out of weak compassion for George III. , and had carried onthe American war for four years after he had been thoroughly convincedthat peace ought to be made. Remorse for this is said to have hauntedhim to the end of his life. When in his old age he became blind, he borethis misfortune with his customary lightness of heart; and one day, meeting the veteran Barré, who had also lost his eyesight, he exclaimed, with his unfailing wit, "Well, colonel, in spite of all our differences, I suppose there are no two men in England who would be gladder to _see_each other than you and I. " But while Lord North could jest about hisblindness, the memory of his ill-judged subservience to the king wassomething that he could not laugh away, and among his nearest friends hewas sometimes heard to reproach himself bitterly. When, therefore, in1783, he told Fox that he fully agreed with him in thinking that theroyal power ought to be curbed, he was doubtless speaking the truth. Noman had a better right to such an opinion than he had gained throughsore experience. In his own ministry, as he said to Fox, he took thesystem as he found it, and had not vigour and resolution enough to putan end to it; but he was now quite convinced that in such a country asEngland, while the king should be treated with all outward show ofrespect, he ought on no account to be allowed to exercise any realpower. Now this was in 1783 the paramount political question in England, justas much as the question of secession was paramount in the United Statesin 1861. Other questions could be postponed; the question of curbing theking could not. Upon this all-important point North had come to agreewith Fox; and as the principal motive of their coalition may be thusexplained, the historian is not called upon to lay too much stress uponthe lower motives assigned in profusion by their political enemies. Thisexplanation, however, does not quite cover the case. The mass of theTories would never follow North in an avowed attempt to curb the king, but they agreed with the followers of Fox, though not with Fox himself, in holy horror of parliamentary reform, and were alarmed by a recentdeclaration of Shelburne that the suffrage must be extended so as toadmit a hundred new county members. Thus while the two leaders wereurged to coalescence by one motive, their followers were largely swayedby another, and this added much to the mystery and generalunintelligibleness of the movement. In taking this step Fox made themistake which was characteristic of the Old Whig party. He gave toolittle heed to the great public outside the walls of the House ofCommons. The coalition, once made, was very strong in Parliament, but itmystified and scandalized the people, and this popular disapproval byand by made it easy for the king to overthrow it. [Sidenote: Fall of Shelburne's ministry. ] It was agreed to choose the treaty as the occasion for the combinedattack upon the Shelburne ministry. North, as the minister who hadconducted the unsuccessful war, was bound to oppose the treaty, in anycase. It would not do for him to admit that better terms could not havebeen made. The treaty was also very unpopular with Fox's party, and withthe nation at large. It was thought that too much territory had beenconceded to the Americans, and fault was found with the article on thefisheries. But the point which excited most indignation was the virtualabandonment of the loyalists, for here the honour of England was felt tobe at stake. On this ground the treaty was emphatically condemned byBurke, Sheridan, and Wilberforce, no less than by North. It was ablydefended in the Commons by Pitt, and in the Lords by Shelburne himself, who argued that he had but the alternative of accepting the terms asthey stood, or continuing the war; and since it had come to this, hesaid, without spilling a drop of blood, or incurring one fifth of theexpense of a year's campaign, the comfort and happiness of the Americanloyalists could be easily secured. By this he meant that, should Americafail to make good their losses, it was far better for England toindemnify them herself than to prolong indefinitely a bloody and ruinousstruggle. As we shall hereafter see, this liberal and enlightened policywas the one which England really pursued, so far as practicable, and herhonour was completely saved. That Shelburne and Pitt were quite rightthere can now be little doubt. But argument was of no avail against theresistless power of the coalition. On the 17th of February Lord JohnCavendish moved an amendment to the ministerial address on the treaty, refusing to approve it. On the 21st he moved a further amendmentcondemning the treaty. Both motions were carried, and on the 24th LordShelburne resigned. He did not dissolve Parliament and appeal to thecountry, partly because he was aware of his personal unpopularity, andpartly because, in spite of the general disgust at the coalition, therewas little doubt that on the particular question of the treaty thepublic opinion agreed with the majority in Parliament, and not with theministry. For this reason, Pitt, though personally popular, saw that itwas no time for him to take the first place in the government, and whenthe king proceeded to offer it to him he declined. [Sidenote: The king's wrath. ] [Sidenote: The treaty is adopted, after all, by the coalition ministry, which presently falls. ] For more than five weeks, while the treasury was nearly empty, and thequestion of peace or war still hung in the balance, England was withouta regular government, while the angry king went hunting for some one whowould consent to be his prime minister. He was determined not to submitto the coalition. He was naturally enraged at Lord North for turningagainst him. Meeting one day North's father, Lord Guilford, he went upto him, tragically wringing his hands, and exclaimed in accents of woe, "Did I ever think, my Lord Guilford, that your son would thus havebetrayed me into the hands of Mr. Fox?" He appealed in vain to LordGower, and then to Lord Temple, to form a ministry. Lord Gower suggestedthat perhaps Thomas Pitt, cousin of William, might be willing to serve. "I desired him, " said the king, "to apply to Mr. Thomas Pitt, or Mr. Thomas anybody. " It was of no use. By the 2d of April Parliament hadbecome furious at the delay, and George was obliged to yield. The Dukeof Portland was brought in as nominal prime minister, with Fox asforeign secretary, North as secretary for home and colonies, Cavendishas chancellor of the exchequer, and Keppel as first lord of theadmiralty. The only Tory in the cabinet, excepting North, was LordStormont, who became president of the council. The commissioners, Fitzherbert and Oswald, were recalled from Paris, and the Duke ofManchester and David Hartley, son of the great philosopher, wereappointed in their stead. Negotiations continued through the spring andsummer. Attempts were made to change some of the articles, especiallythe obnoxious article concerning the loyalists, but all to no purpose. Hartley's attempt to negotiate a mutually advantageous commercial treatywith America also came to nothing. The definitive treaty which wasfinally signed on the 3d of September, 1783, was an exact transcript ofthe treaty which Shelburne had made, and for making which the presentministers had succeeded in turning him out of office. No more emphaticjustification of Shelburne's conduct of this business could possiblyhave been obtained. The coalition ministry did not long survive the final signing of thetreaty. The events of the next few months are curiously instructive asshowing the quiet and stealthy way in which a political revolution maybe consummated in a thoroughly conservative and constitutional country. Early in the winter session of Parliament Fox brought in his famous billfor organizing the government of the great empire which Clive andHastings had built up in India. Popular indignation at the ministry hadbeen strengthened by its adopting the same treaty of peace for themaking of which it had assaulted Shelburne; and now, on the passage ofthe India Bill by the House of Commons, there was a great outcry. Manyprovisions of the bill were exceedingly unpopular, and its chief objectwas alleged to be the concentration of the immense patronage of Indiainto the hands of the old Whig families. With the popular feeling thuswarmly enlisted against the ministry, George III. Was now emboldened tomake war on it by violent means; and, accordingly, when the bill came upin the House of Lords, he caused it to be announced, by Lord Temple, that any peer who should vote in its favour would be regarded as anenemy by the king. Four days later the House of Commons, by a vote of153 to 80, resolved that "to report any opinion, or pretended opinion, of his majesty upon any bill or other proceeding depending in eitherhouse of Parliament, with a view to influence the votes of the members, is a high crime and misdemeanour, derogatory to the honour of the crown, a breach of the fundamental privileges of Parliament, and subversive ofthe constitution of this country. " A more explicit or emphatic defianceto the king would have been hard to frame. Two days afterward the Lordsrejected the India Bill, and on the next day, the 18th of December, George turned the ministers out of office. [Sidenote: Constitutional crisis, ending in the overwhelming victory ofPitt, May, 1784. ] In this grave constitutional crisis the king invited William Pitt toform a government, and this young statesman, who had consistentlyopposed the coalition, now saw that his hour was come. He was more thanany one else the favourite of the people. Fox's political reputation waseclipsed, and North's was destroyed, by their unseemly alliance. Peoplewere sick of the whole state of things which had accompanied theAmerican war. Pitt, who had only come into Parliament in 1780, was freefrom these unpleasant associations. The unblemished purity of his life, his incorruptible integrity, his rare disinterestedness, and histranscendent ability in debate were known to every one. As the worthyson of Lord Chatham, whose name was associated with the most gloriousmoment of English history, he was peculiarly dear to the people. Hisposition, however, on taking supreme office at the instance of a kingwho had just committed an outrageous breach of the constitution, wasextremely critical, and only the most consummate skill could have wonfrom the chaos such a victory as he was about to win. When he becamefirst lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, in December, 1783, he had barely completed his twenty-fifth year. All his colleaguesin the new cabinet were peers, so that he had to fight single-handed inthe Commons against the united talents of Burke and Sheridan, Fox andNorth; and there was a heavy majority against him, besides. In view ofthis adverse majority, it was Pitt's constitutional duty to dissolveParliament and appeal to the country. But Fox, unwilling to imperil hisgreat majority by a new election, now made the fatal mistake of opposinga dissolution; thus showing his distrust of the people and his dread oftheir verdict. With consummate tact, Pitt allowed the debates to go ontill March, and then, when the popular feeling in his favour had growninto wild enthusiasm, he dissolved Parliament. In the general electionwhich followed, 160 members of the coalition lost their seats, and Pittobtained the greatest majority that has ever been given to an Englishminister. [Sidenote: Overthrow of George III. 's system of personal government. ] Thus was completed the political revolution in England which was set onfoot by the American victory at Yorktown. Its full significance was onlygradually realized. For the moment it might seem that it was the kingwho had triumphed. He had shattered the alliance which had been formedfor the purpose of curbing him, and the result of the election hadvirtually condoned his breach of the constitution. This apparentvictory, however, had been won only by a direct appeal to the people, and all its advantages accrued to the people, and not to George III. Hisingenious system of weak and divided ministries, with himself forbalance-wheel, was destroyed. For the next seventeen years the realruler of England was not George III. , but William Pitt, who, with hisgreat popular following, wielded such a power as no English sovereignhad possessed since the days of Elizabeth. The political atmosphere wascleared of intrigue; and Fox, in the legitimate attitude of leader ofthe new opposition, entered upon the glorious part of his career. Therewas now set in motion that great work of reform which, hindered for awhile by the reaction against the French revolutionists, won itsdecisive victory in 1832. Down to the very moment at which American andBritish history begin to flow in distinct and separate channels, it isinteresting to observe how closely they are implicated with each other. The victory of the Americans not only set on foot the British revolutionhere described, but it figured most prominently in each of the politicalchanges that we have witnessed, down to the very eve of the overthrow ofthe coalition. The system which George III. Had sought to fasten uponAmerica, in order that he might fasten it upon England, was shaken offand shattered by the good people of both countries at almost the samemoment of time. CHAPTER II. THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. [Sidenote: Departure of the British troops, Nov. 25, 1783. ] [Sidenote: Washington resigns his command, Dec. 23. ] "The times that tried men's souls are over, " said Thomas Paine in thelast number of the "Crisis, " which he published after hearing that thenegotiations for a treaty of peace had been concluded. The preliminaryarticles had been signed at Paris on the 20th of January, 1783. The newsarrived in America on the 23d of March, in a letter to the president ofCongress from Lafayette, who had returned to France soon after thevictory at Yorktown. A few days later Sir Guy Carleton received hisorders from the ministry to proclaim a cessation of hostilities by landand sea. A similar proclamation made by Congress was formallycommunicated to the army by Washington on the 19th of April, the eighthanniversary of the first bloodshed on Lexington green. Since Wayne haddriven the British from Georgia, early in the preceding year, there hadbeen no military operations between the regular armies. Guerrillawarfare between Whig and Tory had been kept up in parts of SouthCarolina and on the frontier of New York, where Thayendanegea was stillalert and defiant; while beyond the mountains the tomahawk andscalping-knife had been busy, and Washington's old friend and comrade, Colonel Crawford, had been scorched to death by the firebrands of thered demons; but the armies had sat still, awaiting the peace which everyone felt sure must speedily come. After Cornwallis's surrender, Washington marched his army back to the Hudson, and established hisheadquarters at Newburgh. Rochambeau followed somewhat later, and inSeptember joined the Americans on the Hudson; but in December the Frencharmy marched to Boston, and there embarked for France. After the formalcessation of hostilities on the 19th of April, 1783, Washington grantedfurloughs to most of his soldiers; and these weather-beaten veteranstrudged homeward in all directions, in little groups of four or five, depending largely for their subsistence on the hospitality of thefarm-houses along the road. Arrived at home, their muskets were hungover the chimney-piece as trophies for grandchildren to be proud of, thestories of their exploits and their sufferings became household legends, and they turned the furrows and drove the cattle to pasture just as inthe "old colony times. " Their furloughs were equivalent to a fulldischarge, for on the 3d of September the definitive treaty was signed, and the country was at peace. On the 3d of November the army wasformally disbanded, and on the 25th of that month Sir Guy Carleton'sarmy embarked from New York. Small British garrisons still remained inthe frontier posts of Ogdensburg, Oswego, Niagara, Erie, Sandusky, Detroit, and Mackinaw, but by the terms of the treaty these places wereto be promptly surrendered to the United States. On the 4th of Decembera barge waited at the South Ferry in New York to carry GeneralWashington across the river to Paulus Hook. He was going to Annapolis, where Congress was in session, in order to resign his command. AtFraunces's Tavern, near the ferry, he took leave of the officers who solong had shared his labours. One after another they embraced theirbeloved commander, while there were few dry eyes in the company. Theyfollowed him to the ferry, and watched the departing boat with heartstoo full for words, and then in solemn silence returned up the street. At Philadelphia he handed to the comptroller of the treasury a neatlywritten manuscript, containing an accurate statement of his expenses inthe public service since the day when he took command of the army. Thesums which Washington had thus spent out of his private fortune amountedto $64, 315. For his personal services he declined to take any pay. Atnoon of the 23d, in the presence of Congress and of a throng of ladiesand gentlemen at Annapolis, the great general gave up his command, andrequested as an "indulgence" to be allowed to retire into private life. General Mifflin, who during the winter of Valley Forge had conspiredwith Gates to undermine the confidence of the people in Washington, wasnow president of Congress, and it was for him to make the reply. "Youretire, " said Mifflin, "from the theatre of action with the blessings ofyour fellow-citizens, but the glory of your virtues will not terminatewith your military command; it will continue to animate remotest ages. "The next morning Washington hurried away to spend Christmas at hispleasant home at Mount Vernon, which, save for a few hours in the autumnof 1781, he had not set eyes on for more than eight years. His estatehad suffered from his long absence, and his highest ambition was todevote himself to its simple interests. To his friends he offeredunpretentious hospitality. "My manner of living is plain, " he said, "andI do not mean to be put out of it. A glass of wine and a bit of muttonare always ready, and such as will be content to partake of them arealways welcome. Those who expect more will be disappointed. " ToLafayette he wrote that he was now about to solace himself with thosetranquil enjoyments of which the anxious soldier and the weary statesmanknow but little. "I have not only retired from all public employments, but I am retiring within myself, and shall be able to view the solitarywalk and tread the paths of private life with heartfelt satisfaction. Envious of none, I am determined to be pleased with all; and this, mydear friend, being the order of my march, I will move gently down thestream of life until I sleep with my fathers. " [Sidenote: His "legacy" to the American people, June 8, 1783. ] In these hopes Washington was to be disappointed. "All the world istouched by his republican virtues, " wrote Luzerne to Vergennes, "but itwill be useless for him to try to hide himself and live the life of aprivate man: he will always be the first citizen of the United States. "It indeed required no prophet to foretell that the American people couldnot long dispense with the services of this greatest of citizens. Washington had already put himself most explicitly on record as theleader of the men who were urging the people of the United States towardthe formation of a more perfect union. The great lesson of the war hadnot been lost on him. Bitter experience of the evils attendant upon theweak government of the Continental Congress had impressed upon his mindthe urgent necessity of an immediate and thorough reform. On the 8th ofJune, in view of the approaching disbandment of the army, he hadaddressed to the governors and presidents of the several states acircular letter, which he wished to have regarded as his legacy to theAmerican people. In this letter he insisted upon four things asessential to the very existence of the United States as an independentpower. First, there must be an indissoluble union of all the statesunder a single federal government, which must possess the power ofenforcing its decrees; for without such authority it would be agovernment only in name. Secondly, the debts incurred by Congress forthe purpose of carrying on the war and securing independence must bepaid to the uttermost farthing. Thirdly, the militia system must beorganized throughout the thirteen states on uniform principles. Fourthly, the people must be willing to sacrifice, if need be, some oftheir local interests to the common weal; they must discard their localprejudices, and regard one another as fellow-citizens of a commoncountry, with interests in the deepest and truest sense identical. [Sidenote: Absence of a sentiment of union, and consequent danger ofanarchy. ] The unparalleled grandeur of Washington's character, his heroicservices, and his utter disinterestedness had given him such a hold uponthe people as scarcely any other statesman known to history, saveperhaps William the Silent, has ever possessed. The noble and sensiblewords of his circular letter were treasured up in the minds of all thebest people in the country, and when the time for reforming the weak anddisorderly government had come it was again to Washington that menlooked as their leader and guide. But that time had not yet come. Onlythrough the discipline of perplexity and tribulation could the people bebrought to realize the indispensable necessity of that indissolubleunion of which Washington had spoken. Thomas Paine was sadly mistakenwhen, in the moment of exultation over the peace, he declared that thetrying time was ended. The most trying time of all was just beginning. It is not too much to say that the period of five years following thepeace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of theAmerican people. The dangers from which we were saved in 1788 were evengreater than the dangers from which we were saved in 1865. In the War ofSecession the love of union had come to be so strong that thousands ofmen gave up their lives for it as cheerfully and triumphantly as themartyrs of older times, who sang their hymns of praise even while theirflesh was withering in the relentless flames. In 1783 the love of union, as a sentiment for which men would fight, had scarcely come intoexistence among the people of these states. The souls of the men ofthat day had not been thrilled by the immortal eloquence of Webster, norhad they gained the historic experience which gave to Webster's wordstheir meaning and their charm. They had not gained control of all thefairest part of the continent, with domains stretching more than threethousand miles from ocean to ocean, and so situated in geographicalconfiguration and commercial relations as to make the very idea ofdisunion absurd, save for men in whose minds fanaticism for the momentusurped the place of sound judgment. The men of 1783 dwelt in a long, straggling series of republics, fringing the Atlantic coast, bordered onthe north and south and west by two European powers whose hostility theyhad some reason to dread. But nine years had elapsed since, in the firstContinental Congress, they had begun to act consistently andindependently in common, under the severe pressure of a common fear andan immediate necessity of action. Even under such circumstances the warhad languished and come nigh to failure simply through the difficulty ofinsuring concerted action. Had there been such a government that thewhole power of the thirteen states could have been swiftly andvigorously wielded as a unit, the British, fighting at such disadvantageas they did, might have been driven to their ships in less than a year. The length of the war and its worst hardships had been chiefly due towant of organization. Congress had steadily declined in power and inrespectability; it was much weaker at the end of the war than at thebeginning; and there was reason to fear that as soon as the commonpressure was removed the need for concerted action would quite cease tobe felt, and the scarcely formed Union would break into pieces. Therewas the greater reason for such a fear in that, while no strongsentiment had as yet grown up in favour of union, there was an intenselypowerful sentiment in favour of local self-government. This feeling wasscarcely less strong as between states like Connecticut and RhodeIsland, or Maryland and Virginia, than it was between Athens and Megara, Argos and Sparta, in the great days of Grecian history. A most wholesomefeeling it was, and one which needed not so much to be curbed as to beguided in the right direction. It was a feeling which was shared by someof the foremost Revolutionary leaders, such as Samuel Adams and RichardHenry Lee. But unless the most profound and delicate statesmanshipshould be forthcoming, to take this sentiment under its guidance, therewas much reason to fear that the release from the common adhesion toGreat Britain would end in setting up thirteen little republics, ripefor endless squabbling, like the republics of ancient Greece andmediæval Italy, and ready to become the prey of England and Spain, evenas Greece became the prey of Macedonia. [Sidenote: False historic analogies. ] As such a lamentable result was dreaded by Washington, so by statesmenin Europe it was generally expected, and by our enemies it was eagerlyhoped for. Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, was a far-sighted man inmany things; but he said, "As to the future grandeur of America, andits being a rising empire under one head, whether republican ormonarchical, it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions thatever was conceived even by writers of romance. The mutual antipathiesand clashing interests of the Americans, their difference ofgovernments, habitudes, and manners, indicate that they will have nocentre of union and no common interest. They never can be united intoone compact empire under any species of government whatever; a disunitedpeople till the end of time, suspicious and distrustful of each other, they will be divided and subdivided into little commonwealths orprincipalities, according to natural boundaries, by great bays of thesea, and by vast rivers, lakes, and ridges of mountains. " Such were theviews of a liberal-minded philosopher who bore us no ill-will. GeorgeIII. Said officially that he hoped the Americans would not suffer fromthe evils which in history had always followed the throwing off ofmonarchical government: which meant, of course, that he hoped they_would_ suffer from such evils. He believed we should get into such asnarl that the several states, one after another, would repent and begon their knees to be taken back into the British empire. Frederick ofPrussia, though friendly to the Americans, argued that the mere extentof country from Maine to Georgia would suffice either to break up theUnion, or to make a monarchy necessary. No republic, he said, had everlong existed on so great a scale. The Roman republic had beentransformed into a despotism mainly by the excessive enlargement of itsarea. It was only little states, like Venice, Switzerland, and Holland, that could maintain a republican government. Such arguments were commonenough a century ago, but they overlooked three essential differencesbetween the Roman republic and the United States. The Roman republic inCæsar's time comprised peoples differing widely in blood, in speech, andin degree of civilization; it was perpetually threatened on all itsfrontiers by powerful enemies; and representative assemblies wereunknown to it. The only free government of which the Roman knew anythingwas that of the primary assembly or town meeting. On the other hand, thepeople of the United States were all English in speech, and mainlyEnglish in blood. The differences in degree of civilization between suchstates as Massachusetts and North Carolina were considerable, but incomparison with such differences as those between Attika and Lusitaniathey might well be called slight. The attacks of savages on the frontierwere cruel and annoying, but never since the time of King Philip hadthey seemed to threaten the existence of the white man. A very smallmilitary establishment was quite enough to deal with the Indians. And tocrown all, the American people were thoroughly familiar with theprinciple of representation, having practised it on a grand scale forfour centuries in England, and for more than a century in America. Thegovernments of the thirteen states were all similar, and the politicalideas of one were perfectly intelligible to all the others. It wasessentially fallacious, therefore, to liken the case of the UnitedStates to that of ancient Rome. [Sidenote: Influence of railroad and telegraph upon perpetuity of theAmerican Union. ] But there was another feature of the case which was quite hidden fromthe men of 1783. Just before the assembling of the first ContinentalCongress James Watt had completed his steam-engine; in the summer of1787, while the Federal Convention was sitting at Philadelphia, JohnFitch launched his first steamboat on the Delaware River; andStephenson's invention of the locomotive was to follow in less than halfa century. Even with all other conditions favourable, it is doubtful ifthe American Union could have been preserved to the present time withoutthe railroad. But for the military aid of railroads our government wouldhardly have succeeded in putting down the rebellion of the southernstates. In the debates on the Oregon Bill in the United States Senate in1843, the idea that we could ever have an interest in so remote acountry as Oregon was loudly ridiculed by some of the members. It wouldtake ten months--said George McDuffie, the very able senator from SouthCarolina--for representatives to get from that territory to the Districtof Columbia and back again. Yet since the building of railroads to thePacific coast, we can go from Boston to the capital of Oregon in muchless time than it took John Hancock to make the journey from Boston toPhiladelphia. Railroads and telegraphs have made our vast country, bothfor political and for social purposes, more snug and compact than littleSwitzerland was in the Middle Ages or New England a century ago. [Sidenote: Difficulty of travelling a hundred years ago. ] At the time of our Revolution the difficulties of travelling formed animportant social obstacle to the union of the states. In our time thepersons who pass in a single day between New York and Boston by six orseven distinct lines of railroad and steamboat are numbered bythousands. In 1783 two stage-coaches were enough for all the travellers, and nearly all the freight besides, that went between these two cities, except such large freight as went by sea around Cape Cod. The journeybegan at three o'clock in the morning. Horses were changed every twentymiles, and if the roads were in good condition some forty miles would bemade by ten o'clock in the evening. In bad weather, when the passengershad to get down and lift the clumsy wheels out of deep ruts, theprogress was much slower. The loss of life from accidents, in proportionto the number of travellers, was much greater than it has ever been onthe railway. Broad rivers like the Connecticut and Housatonic had nobridges. To drive across them in winter, when they were solidly frozenover, was easy; and in pleasant summer weather to cross in a row-boatwas not a dangerous undertaking. But squalls at some seasons andfloating ice at others were things to be feared. More than one instanceis recorded where boats were crushed and passengers drowned, or savedonly by scrambling upon ice-floes. After a week or ten days ofdiscomfort and danger the jolted and jaded traveller reached New York. Such was a journey in the most highly civilized part of the UnitedStates. The case was still worse in the South, and it was not so verymuch better in England and France. In one respect the traveller in theUnited States fared better than the traveller in Europe: the danger fromhighwaymen was but slight. [Sidenote: Local jealousies and antipathies, an inheritance fromprimeval savagery. ] Such being the difficulty of travelling, people never made long journeyssave for very important reasons. Except in the case of the soldiers, most people lived and died without ever having seen any state but theirown. And as the mails were irregular and uncertain, and the rates ofpostage very high, people heard from one another but seldom. Commercialdealings between the different states were inconsiderable. Theoccupation of the people was chiefly agriculture. Cities were few andsmall, and each little district for the most part supported itself. Under such circumstances the different parts of the country knew verylittle about each other, and local prejudices were intense. It was notsimply free Massachusetts and slave-holding South Carolina, or EnglishConnecticut and Dutch New York, that misunderstood and ridiculed eachthe other; but even between such neighbouring states as Connecticut andMassachusetts, both of them thoroughly English and Puritan, and in alltheir social conditions almost exactly alike, it used often to be saidthat there was no love lost. These unspeakably stupid and contemptiblelocal antipathies are inherited by civilized men from that far-off timewhen the clan system prevailed over the face of the earth, and the handof every clan was raised against its neighbours. They are pale andevanescent survivals from the universal primitive warfare, and thesooner they die out from human society the better for every one. Theyshould be stigmatized and frowned down upon every fit occasion, just aswe frown upon swearing as a symbol of anger and contention. But the onlything which can finally destroy them is the widespread and unrestrainedintercourse of different groups of people in peaceful social andcommercial relations. The rapidity with which this process is now goingon is the most encouraging of all the symptoms of our moderncivilization. But a century ago the progress made in this direction hadbeen relatively small, and it was a very critical moment for theAmerican people. [Sidenote: Conservative character of the Revolution. ] The thirteen states, as already observed, had worked in concert for onlynine years, during which their coöperation had been feeble and halting. But the several state governments had been in operation since the firstsettlement of the country, and were regarded with intense loyalty by thepeople of the states. Under the royal governors the local political lifeof each state had been vigorous and often stormy, as befittedcommunities of the sturdy descendants of English freemen. Thelegislative assembly of each state had stoutly defended its libertiesagainst the encroachments of the governor. In the eyes of the people itwas the only power on earth competent to lay taxes upon them, it was assupreme in its own sphere as the British Parliament itself, and inbehalf of this rooted conviction the people had gone to war and wontheir independence from England. During the war the people of all thestates, except Connecticut and Rhode Island, had carefully remodelledtheir governments, and in the performance of this work had withdrawnmany of their ablest statesmen from the Continental Congress; but exceptfor the expulsion of the royal and proprietary governors, the work hadin no instance been revolutionary in its character. It was not so muchthat the American people gained an increase of freedom by theirseparation from England, as that they kept the freedom they had alwaysenjoyed, that freedom which was the inalienable birthright ofEnglishmen, but which George III. Had foolishly sought to impair. TheAmerican Revolution was therefore in no respect destructive. It was themost conservative revolution known to history, thoroughly English inconception from beginning to end. It had no likeness whatever to theterrible popular convulsion which soon after took place in France. Themischievous doctrines of Rousseau had found few readers and feweradmirers among the Americans. The principles upon which their revolutionwas conducted were those of Sidney, Harrington, and Locke. Inremodelling the state governments, as in planning the union of thestates, the precedents followed and the principles applied were almostpurely English. We must now pass in review the principal changes wroughtin the several states, and we shall then be ready to consider thegeneral structure of the Confederation, and to describe the remarkableseries of events which led to the adoption of our Federal Constitution. [Sidenote: State governments remodelled; assemblies continued fromcolonial times. ] It will be remembered that at the time of the Declaration ofIndependence there were three kinds of government in the colonies. Connecticut and Rhode Island had always been true republics, withgovernors and legislative assemblies elected by the people. Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland presented the appearance of limitedhereditary monarchies. Their assemblies were chosen by the people, butthe lords proprietary appointed their governors, or in some instancesacted as governors themselves. In Maryland the office of lordproprietary was hereditary in the Calvert family; in Delaware andPennsylvania, which, though distinct commonwealths with separatelegislatures, had the same executive head, it was hereditary in the Pennfamily. The other eight colonies were viceroyalties, with governorsappointed by the king, while in all alike the people elected thelegislatures. Accordingly in Connecticut and Rhode Island no change wasmade necessary by the Revolution, beyond the mere omission of the king'sname from legal documents; and their charters, which dated from themiddle of the seventeenth century, continued to do duty as stateconstitutions till far into the nineteenth. During the Revolutionary Warall the other states framed new constitutions, but in most essentialrespects they took the old colonial charters for their model. Thepopular legislative body remained unchanged even in its name. In NorthCarolina its supreme dignity was vindicated in its title of the House ofCommons; in Virginia it was called the House of Burgesses; in most ofthe states the House of Representatives. The members were chosen eachyear, except in South Carolina, where they served for two years. In theNew England states they represented the townships, in other states thecounties. In all the states except Pennsylvania a property qualificationwas required of them. [Sidenote: Origin of the senates. ] In addition to this House of Representatives all the legislatures exceptthose of Pennsylvania and Georgia contained a second or upper houseknown as the Senate. The origin of the senate is to be found in thegovernor's council of colonial times, just as the House of Lords isdescended from the Witenagemot or council of great barons summoned bythe Old-English kings. The Americans had been used to having the acts oftheir popular assemblies reviewed by a council, and so they retainedthis revisory body as an upper house. A higher property qualificationwas required than for membership of the lower house, and, except in NewHampshire, Massachusetts, and South Carolina, the term of service waslonger. In Maryland senators sat for five years, in Virginia and NewYork for four years, elsewhere for two years. In some states they werechosen by the people, in others by the lower house. In Maryland theywere chosen by a college of electors, thus affording a precedent for themethod of electing the chief magistrate of the union under the FederalConstitution. [Sidenote: Governors viewed with suspicion. ] Governors were unpopular in those days. There was too much flavour ofroyalty and high prerogative about them. Except in the two republics ofRhode Island and Connecticut, American political history during theeighteenth century was chiefly the record of interminable squabblesbetween governors and legislatures, down to the moment when the detestedagents of royalty were clapped into jail, or took refuge behind thebulwarks of a British seventy-four. Accordingly the new constitutionswere very chary of the powers to be exercised by the governor. InPennsylvania and Delaware, in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, thegovernor was at first replaced by an executive council, and thepresident of this council was first magistrate and titular ruler of thestate. His dignity was imposing enough, but his authority was merelythat of a chairman. The other states had governors chosen by thelegislatures, except in New York where the governor was elected by thepeople. No one was eligible to the office of governor who did notpossess a specified amount of property. In most of the states thegovernor could not be reëlected, he had no veto upon the acts of thelegislature, nor any power of appointing officers. In 1780, in a newconstitution drawn up by James Bowdoin and the two Adamses, Massachusetts led the way in the construction of a more efficientexecutive department. The president was replaced by a governor electedannually by the people, and endowed with the power of appointment and asuspensory veto. The first governor elected under this constitution wasJohn Hancock. In 1783 New Hampshire adopted a similar constitution. In1790 Pennsylvania added an upper house to its legislature, and vestedthe executive power in a governor elected by the people for a term ofthree years, and twice reëligible. He was intrusted with the power ofappointment to offices, with a suspensory veto, and with the royalprerogative of reprieving or pardoning criminals. In 1792 similarchanges were made in Delaware. In 1789 Georgia added the upper house toits legislature, and about the same time in several states thegovernor's powers were enlarged. Thus the various state governments were repetitions on a small scale ofwhat was then supposed to be the triplex government of England, with itsKing, Lords, and Commons. The governor answered to the king with hisdignity curtailed by election for a short period, and by narrowlylimited prerogatives. The senate answered to the House of Lords, exceptin being a representative and not a hereditary body. It was supposed torepresent more especially that part of the community which was possessedof most wealth and consideration; and in several states the senatorswere apportioned with some reference to the amount of taxes paid bydifferent parts of the state. The senate of New York, in directimitation of the House of Lords, was made a supreme court of errors. Onthe other hand, the assembly answered to the House of Commons, save thatits power was really limited by the senate as the power of the House ofCommons is not really limited by the House of Lords. But thispeculiarity of the British Constitution was not well understood acentury ago; and the misunderstanding, as we shall hereafter see, exerted a very serious influence upon the form of our federalgovernment, as well as upon the constitutions of the several states. [Sidenote: The judiciary. ] In all the thirteen states the common law of England remained in force, as it does to this day save where modified by statute. British andcolonial statutes made prior to the Revolution continued also in forceunless expressly repealed. The system of civil and criminal courts, theremedies in common law and equity, the forms of writs, the functions ofjustices of the peace, the courts of probate, all remained substantiallyunchanged. In Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey, the judges heldoffice for a term of seven years; in all the other states they heldoffice for life or during good behaviour. In all the states save Georgiathey were appointed either by the governor or by the legislature. It wasGeorgia that in 1812 first set the pernicious example of electing judgesfor short terms by the people, [1]--a practice which is responsible formuch of the degradation that the courts have suffered in many of ourstates, and which will have to be abandoned before a properadministration of justice can ever be secured. [Sidenote: The limited suffrage. ] In bestowing the suffrage, the new constitutions were as conservative asin all other respects. The general state of opinion in America at thattime, with regard to universal suffrage, was far more advanced than thegeneral state of opinion in England, but it was less advanced than theopinions of such statesmen as Pitt and Shelburne and the Duke ofRichmond. There was a truly English irregularity in the provisions whichwere made on this subject. In New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and South Carolina, all resident freemen who paid taxes could vote. InNorth Carolina all such persons could vote for members of the lowerhouse, but in order to vote for senators a freehold of fifty acres wasrequired. In Virginia none could vote save those who possessed such afreehold of fifty acres. To vote for governor or for senators in NewYork, one must possess a freehold of $250, clear of mortgage, and tovote for assemblymen one must either have a freehold of $50, or pay ayearly rent of $10. The pettiness of these sums was in keeping with thetime when two daily coaches sufficed for the traffic between our twogreatest commercial cities. In Rhode Island an unincumbered freeholdworth $134 was required; but in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania the eldestsons of qualified freemen could vote without payment of taxes. In allthe other states the possession of a small amount of property, eitherreal or personal, varying from $33 to $200, was the necessaryqualification for voting. Thus slowly and irregularly did the statesdrift toward universal suffrage; but although the impediments in the wayof voting were more serious than they seem to us in these days when thecommunity is more prosperous and money less scarce, they were still notvery great, and in the opinion of conservative people they barelysufficed to exclude from the suffrage such shiftless persons as had novisible interest in keeping down the taxes. [Sidenote: Abolition of primogeniture, entails, and manorialprivileges. ] At the time of the Revolution the succession to property was regulatedin New York and the southern states by the English rule ofprimogeniture. The eldest son took all. In New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the four New England states, the eldest son took a doubleshare. It was Georgia that led the way in decreeing the equaldistribution of intestate property, both real and personal; and between1784 and 1796 the example was followed by all the other states. At thesame time entails were either definitely abolished, or the obstacles tocutting them off were removed. In New York the manorial privileges ofthe great patroons were swept away. In Maryland the old manorial systemhad long been dying a natural death through the encroachments of thepatriarchal system of slavery. The ownership of all ungranted landswithin the limits of the thirteen states passed from the crown not tothe Confederacy, but to the several state governments. In Pennsylvaniaand Maryland such ungranted lands had belonged to the lords proprietary. They were now forfeited to the state. The Penn family was indemnified byPennsylvania to the amount of half a million dollars; but Maryland madeno compensation to the Calverts, inasmuch as their claim was presentedby an illegitimate descendant of the last Lord Baltimore. [Sidenote: Steps toward the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade. ] The success of the American Revolution made it possible for thedifferent states to take measures for the gradual abolition of slaveryand the immediate abolition of the foreign slave-trade. On this greatquestion the state of public opinion in America was more advanced thanin England. So great a thinker as Edmund Burke, who devoted muchthought to the subject, came to the conclusion that slavery was anincurable evil, and that there was not the slightest hope that the tradein slaves could be stopped. The most that he thought could be done byjudicious legislation was to mitigate the horrors which the poor negroesendured on board ship, or to prevent wives from being sold away fromtheir husbands or children from their parents. Such was the outlook toone of the greatest political philosophers of modern times justeighty-two years before the immortal proclamation of President Lincoln!But how vast was the distance between Burke and Bossuet, who haddeclared about eighty years earlier that "to condemn slavery was tocondemn the Holy Ghost!" It was equally vast between Burke and hiscontemporary Thurlow, who in 1799 poured out the vials of his wrath upon"the altogether miserable and contemptible" proposal to abolish theslave-trade. George III. Agreed with his chancellor, and resisted themovement for abolition with all the obstinacy of which his hard andnarrow nature was capable. In 1769 the Virginia legislature had enactedthat the further importation of negroes, to be sold into slavery, shouldbe prohibited. But George III. Commanded the governor to veto this act, and it was vetoed. In Jefferson's first-draft of the Declaration ofIndependence, this action of the king was made the occasion of a fiercedenunciation of slavery, but in deference to the prejudices of SouthCarolina and Georgia the clause was struck out by Congress. When GeorgeIII. And his vetoes had been eliminated from the case, it becamepossible for the states to legislate freely on the subject. In 1776negro slaves were held in all the thirteen states, but in all exceptSouth Carolina and Georgia there was a strong sentiment in favour ofemancipation. In North Carolina, which contained a large Quakerpopulation, and in which estates were small and were often cultivated byfree labour, the pro-slavery feeling was never so strong as in thesouthernmost states. In Virginia all the foremost statesmen--Washington, Jefferson, Lee, Randolph, Henry, Madison, and Mason--were opposed to thecontinuance of slavery; and their opinions were shared by many of thelargest planters. For tobacco-culture slavery did not seem soindispensable as for the raising of rice and indigo; and in Virginia thenegroes, half-civilized by kindly treatment, were not regarded withhorror by their masters, like the ill-treated and ferocious blacks ofSouth Carolina and Georgia. After 1808 the policy and the sentiments ofVirginia underwent a marked change. The invention of the cotton-gin, taken in connection with the sudden and prodigious development ofmanufactures in England, greatly stimulated the growth of cotton in theever-enlarging area of the Gulf states, and created an immense demandfor slave-labour, just at the time when the importation of negroes fromAfrica came to an end. The breeding of slaves, to be sold to theplanters of the Gulf states, then became such a profitable occupation inVirginia as entirely to change the popular feeling about slavery. Butuntil 1808 Virginia sympathized with the anti-slavery sentiment whichwas growing up in the northern states; and the same was true ofMaryland. Emancipation was, however, much more easy to accomplish in thenorth, because the number of slaves was small, and economiccircumstances distinctly favoured free labour. In the work of gradualemancipation the little state of Delaware led the way. In its newconstitution of 1776 the further introduction of slaves was prohibited, all restraints upon emancipation having already been removed. In theassembly of Virginia in 1778 a bill prohibiting the further introductionof slaves was moved and carried by Thomas Jefferson, and the samemeasure was passed in Maryland in 1783, while both these states removedall restraints upon emancipation. North Carolina was not ready to goquite so far, but in 1786 she sought to discourage the slave-trade byputting a duty of £5 per head on all negroes thereafter imported. NewJersey followed the example of Maryland and Virginia. Pennsylvania wentfarther. In 1780 its assembly enacted that no more slaves should bebrought in, and that all children of slaves born after that date shouldbe free. The same provisions were made by New Hampshire in its newconstitution of 1783, and by the assemblies of Connecticut and RhodeIsland in 1784. New York went farther still, and in 1785 enacted thatall children of slaves thereafter born should not only be free, butshould be admitted to vote on the same conditions as other freemen. In1788 Virginia, which contained many free negroes, enacted that anyperson convicted of kidnapping or selling into slavery any free personshould suffer death on the gallows. Summing up all these facts, we seethat within two years after the independence of the United States hadbeen acknowledged by England, while the two southernmost states had donenothing to check the growth of slavery, North Carolina had discouragedthe importation of slaves; Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Jerseyhad stopped such importation and removed all restraint uponemancipation; and all the remaining states, except Massachusetts, hadmade gradual emancipation compulsory. Massachusetts had gone stillfarther. Before the Revolution the anti-slavery feeling had beenstronger there than in any other state, and cases brought into court forthe purpose of testing the legality of slavery had been decided infavour of those who were opposed to the continuance of that barbarousinstitution. In 1777 an American cruiser brought into the port of Salema captured British ship with slaves on board, and these slaves wereadvertised for sale, but on complaint being made before the legislaturethey were set free. The new constitution of 1780 contained a declarationof rights which asserted that all men are born free and have an equaland inalienable right to defend their lives and liberties, to acquireproperty, and to seek and obtain safety and happiness. The supreme courtpresently decided that this clause worked the abolition of slavery, andaccordingly Massachusetts was the first of American states, within thelimits of the Union, to become in the full sense of the words a freecommonwealth. Of the negro inhabitants, not more than six thousand innumber, a large proportion had already for a long time enjoyed freedom;and all were now admitted to the suffrage on the same terms as othercitizens. [Sidenote: Progress toward freedom in religion. ] By the revolutionary legislation of the states some progress was alsoeffected in the direction of a more complete religious freedom. Pennsylvania and Delaware were the only states in which all Christiansects stood socially and politically on an equal footing. In RhodeIsland all Protestants enjoyed equal privileges, but Catholics weredebarred from voting. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, the old Puritan Congregationalism was the established religion. TheCongregational church was supported by taxes, and the minister, oncechosen, kept his place for life or during good behaviour. He could notbe got rid of unless formally investigated and dismissed by anecclesiastical council. Laws against blasphemy, which were virtuallylaws against heresy, were in force in these three states. InMassachusetts, Catholic priests were liable to imprisonment for life. Any one who should dare to speculate too freely about the nature ofChrist, or the philosophy of the plan of salvation, or to express adoubt as to the plenary inspiration of every word between the two coversof the Bible, was subject to fine and imprisonment. The tithing-manstill arrested Sabbath-breakers and shut them up in the town-cage in themarket-place; he stopped all unnecessary riding or driving on Sunday, and haled people off to the meeting-house whether they would or not. Such restraints upon liberty were still endured by people who had daredand suffered so much for liberty's sake. The men of Boston strove hardto secure the repeal of these barbarous laws and the disestablishment ofthe Congregational church; but they were outvoted by the delegates fromthe rural towns. The most that could be accomplished was the provisionthat dissenters might escape the church-rate by supporting a church oftheir own. The nineteenth century was to arrive before church and statewere finally separated in Massachusetts. The new constitution of NewHampshire was similarly illiberal, and in Connecticut no change wasmade. Rhode Island nobly distinguished herself by contrast when in 1784she extended the franchise to Catholics. In the six states just mentioned the British government had beenhindered by charter, and by the overwhelming opposition of the people, from seriously trying to establish the Episcopal church. The sure fateof any such mad experiment had been well illustrated in the time ofAndros. In the other seven states there were no such insuperableobstacles. The Church of England was maintained with languidacquiescence in New York. By the Quakers and Presbyterians of New Jerseyand North Carolina, as well as in half-Catholic, half-Puritan Maryland, its supremacy was unwillingly endured; in the turbulent frontiercommonwealth of Georgia it was accepted with easy contempt. Only inSouth Carolina and Virginia had the Church of England ever possessed anyreal hold upon the people. The Episcopal clergy of South Carolina, menof learning and high character, elected by their own congregationsinstead of being appointed to their livings by a patron, were thoroughlyindependent, and in the late war their powerful influence had beenmainly exerted in behalf of the patriot cause. Hence, while theyretained their influence after the close of the war, there was nodifficulty in disestablishing the church. It felt itself able to standwithout government support. As soon as the political separation fromEngland was effected, the Episcopal church was accordingly separatedfrom the state, not only in South Carolina, but in all the states inwhich it had hitherto been upheld by the authority of the Britishgovernment; and in the constitutions of New Jersey, Georgia, and the twoCarolinas, no less than in those of Delaware and Pennsylvania, it wasexplicitly provided that no man should be obliged to pay any church rateor attend any religious service save according to his own free andunhampered will. [Sidenote: Church and state in Virginia. ] The case of Virginia was peculiar. At first the Church of England hadtaken deep root there because of the considerable immigration of membersof the Cavalier party after the downfall of Charles I. Most of the greatstatesmen of Virginia in the Revolution--such as Washington, Madison, Mason, Jefferson, Pendleton, Henry, the Lees, and the Randolphs--weredescendants of Cavaliers and members of the Church of England. But for along time the Episcopal clergy had been falling into discredit. Many ofthem were appointed by the British government and ordained by theBishop of London, and they were affected by the irreligiouslistlessness and low moral tone of the English church in the eighteenthcentury. The Virginia legislature thought it necessary to pass speciallaws prohibiting these clergymen from drunkenness and riotous living. Itwas said that they spent more time in hunting foxes and betting onrace-horses than in conducting religious services or visiting the sick;and according to Bishop Meade, many dissolute parsons, discarded fromthe church in England as unworthy, were yet thought fit to be presentedwith livings in Virginia. To this general character of the clergy therewere many exceptions. There were many excellent clergymen, especiallyamong the native Virginians, whose appointment depended to some extentupon the repute in which they were held by their neighbours. But on thewhole the system was such as to illustrate all the worst vices of achurch supported by the temporal power. The Revolution achieved thediscomfiture of a clergy already thus deservedly discredited. Theparsons mostly embraced the cause of the crown, but failed to carrytheir congregations with them, and thus they found themselves arrayed inhopeless antagonism to popular sentiment in a state which containedperhaps fewer Tories in proportion to its population than any other ofthe thirteen. [Sidenote: Madison and the Religious Freedom Act, 1785. ] At the same time the Episcopal church itself had gradually come to be aminority in the commonwealth. For more than half a century Scotch andWelsh Presbyterians, German Lutherans, English Quakers, and Baptists, had been working their way southward from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and had settled in the fertile country west of the Blue Ridge. DanielMorgan, who had won the most brilliant battle of the Revolution, was oneof these men, and sturdiness was a chief characteristic of most of them. So long as these frontier settlers served as a much-needed bulwarkagainst the Indians, the church saw fit to ignore them and let thembuild meeting-houses and carry on religious services as they pleased. But when the peril of Indian attack had been thrust westward into theOhio valley, and these dissenting communities had waxed strong andprosperous, the ecclesiastical party in the state undertook to lay taxeson them for the support of the Church of England, and to compel them toreceive Episcopal clergymen to preach for them, to bless them inmarriage, and to bury their dead. The immediate consequence was a revoltwhich not only overthrew the established church in Virginia, but nearlyeffected its ruin. The troubles began in 1768, when the Baptists hadmade their way into the centre of the state, and three of theirpreachers were arrested by the sheriff of Spottsylvania. As theindictment was read against these men for "preaching the gospel contraryto law, " a deep and solemn voice interrupted the proceedings. PatrickHenry had come on horseback many a mile over roughest roads to listen tothe trial, and this phrase, which savoured of the religious despotismsof old, was quite too much for him. "May it please your worships, " heexclaimed, "what did I hear read? Did I hear an expression that thesemen, whom your worships are about to try for misdemeanour, are chargedwith preaching the gospel of the Son of God!" The shamefast silence andconfusion which ensued was of ill omen for the success of an undertakingso unwelcome to the growing liberalism of the time. The zeal of thepersecuted Baptists was presently reinforced by the learning and thedialectic skill of the Presbyterian ministers. Unlike the Puritans ofNew England, the Presbyterians were in favour of the total separation ofchurch from state. It was one of their cardinal principles that thecivil magistrate had no right to interfere in any way with matters ofreligion. By taking this broad ground they secured the powerful aid ofThomas Jefferson, and afterwards of Madison and Mason. The controversywent on through all the years of the Revolutionary War, while allVirginia, from the sea to the mountains, rang with fulminations andarguments. In 1776 Jefferson and Mason succeeded in carrying a billwhich released all dissenters from parish rates and legalized all formsof worship. At last in 1785 Madison won the crowning victory in theReligious Freedom Act, by which the Church of England was disestablishedand all parish rates abolished, and still more, all religious tests weredone away with. In this last respect Virginia came to the front amongall the American states, as Massachusetts had come to the front in theabolition of negro slavery. Nearly all the states still imposedreligious tests upon civil office-holders, from simply declaring ageneral belief in the infallibleness of the Bible to accepting thedoctrine of the Trinity. The Virginia statute, which declared that"opinion in matters of religion shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, oraffect civil capacities, " was translated into French and Italian, andwas widely read and commented on in Europe. It is the historian's unpleasant duty to add that the victory thushappily won was ungenerously followed up. Theological and politicalodium combined to overwhelm the Episcopal church in Virginia. Thepersecuted became persecutors. It was contended that the property of thechurch, having been largely created by unjustifiable taxation, ought tobe forfeited. In 1802 its parsonages and glebe lands were sold, itsparishes wiped out, and its clergy left without a calling. "A recklesssensualist, " said Dr. Hawks, "administered the morning dram to hisguests from the silver cup" used in the communion service. But in allthis there is a manifest historic lesson. That it should have beenpossible thus to deal with the Episcopal church in Virginia showsforcibly the moribund condition into which it had been brought throughdependence upon the extraneous aid of a political sovereignty from whichthe people of Virginia were severing their allegiance. The lesson ismost vividly enhanced by the contrast with the church of South Carolinawhich, rooted in its own soil, was quite able to stand alone whengovernment aid was withdrawn. In Virginia the church in which GeorgeWashington was reared had so nearly vanished by the year 1830 that ChiefJustice Marshall said it was folly to dream of reviving so dead athing. Nevertheless, under the noble ministration of its great bishop, William Meade, the Episcopal church in Virginia, no longer relying uponstate aid, but trusting in the divine persuasive power of spiritualtruth, was even then entering upon a new life and beginning to exercisea most wholesome influence. [Sidenote: Mason Weems and Samuel Seabury. ] [Sidenote: November 14, 1784. ] The separation of the English church in America from the English crownwas the occasion of a curious difficulty with regard to the ordinationof bishops. Until after the Revolution there were no bishops of thatchurch in America, and between 1783 and 1785 it was not clear howcandidates for holy orders could receive the necessary consecration. In1784 a young divinity student from Maryland, named Mason Weems, who hadbeen studying for some time in England, applied to the Bishop of Londonfor admission to holy orders, but was rudely refused. Weems then hadrecourse to Watson, Bishop of Llandaff, author of the famous reply toGibbon. Watson treated him kindly and advised him to get a letter ofrecommendation from the governor of Maryland, but after this had beenobtained he referred him to the Archbishop of Canterbury, who said thatnothing could be done without the consent of Parliament. As the lawstood, no one could be admitted into the ranks of the English clergywithout taking the oath of allegiance and acknowledging the king ofEngland as the head of the church. Weems then wrote to John Adams at theHague, and to Franklin at Paris, to see if there were any Protestantbishops on the Continent from whom he could obtain consecration. Arather amusing diplomatic correspondence ensued, and finally the king ofDenmark, after taking theological advice, kindly offered the services ofa Danish bishop, who was to perform the ceremony in Latin. Weems doesnot seem to have availed himself of this permission, probably becausethe question soon reached a more satisfactory solution. [2] About thesame time the Episcopal church in Connecticut sent one of its ministers, Samuel Seabury of New London, to England, to be ordained as bishop. Theoaths of allegiance and supremacy stood as much in the way of thelearned and famous minister as in that of the young and obscure student. Seabury accordingly appealed to the non-juring Jacobite bishops of theEpiscopal church of Scotland, and at length was duly ordained atAberdeen as bishop of the diocese of Connecticut. While Seabury was inEngland, the churches in the various states chose delegates to ageneral convention, which framed a constitution for the "ProtestantEpiscopal Church of the United States of America. " Advowsons wereabolished, some parts of the liturgy were dropped, and the tenure ofministers, even of bishops, was to be during good behaviour. At the sametime a friendly letter was sent to the bishops of England, urging themto secure, if possible, an act of Parliament whereby American clergymenmight be ordained without taking the oaths of allegiance and supremacy. Such an act was obtained without much difficulty, and three Americanbishops were accordingly consecrated in due form. The peculiarordination of Seabury was also recognized as valid by the generalconvention, and thus the Episcopal church in America was fairly startedon its independent career. [Sidenote: Francis Asbury and the Methodists. ] This foundation of a separate episcopacy west of the Atlantic wasaccompanied by the further separation of the Methodists as a distinctreligious society. Although John Wesley regarded the notion of anapostolical succession as superstitious, he had made no attempt toseparate his followers from the national church. He translated thetitles of "bishop" and "priest" from Greek into Latin and English, calling them "superintendent" and "elder, " but he did not deny theking's headship. Meanwhile during the long period of his preaching therehad begun to grow up a Methodist church in America. George Whitefieldhad come over and preached in Georgia in 1737, and in Massachusetts in1744, where he encountered much opposition on the part of the Puritanclergy. But the first Methodist church in America was founded in thecity of New York in 1766. In 1772 Wesley sent over Francis Asbury, a manof shrewd sense and deep religious feeling, to act as his assistant andrepresentative in this country. At that time there were not more than athousand Methodists, with six preachers, and all these were in themiddle and southern colonies; but within five years, largely owing tothe zeal and eloquence of Asbury, these numbers had increased sevenfold. At the end of the war, seeing the American Methodists cut loose from theEnglish establishment, Wesley in his own house at Bristol, with the aidof two presbyters, proceeded to ordain ministers enough to make apresbytery, and thereupon set apart Thomas Coke to be "superintendent"or bishop for America. On the same day of November, 1784, on whichSeabury was consecrated by the non-jurors at Aberdeen, Coke beganpreaching and baptizing in Maryland, in rude chapels built of logs orunder the shade of forest trees. On Christmas Eve a conference assembledat Baltimore, at which Asbury was chosen bishop by some sixty ministerspresent, and ordained by Coke, and the constitution of the Methodistchurch in America was organized. Among the poor white people of thesouthern states, and among the negroes, the new church rapidly obtainedgreat sway; and at a somewhat later date it began to assume considerableproportions in the north. [Sidenote: Presbyterians; Roman Catholics. ] Four years after this the Presbyterians, who were most numerous in themiddle states, organized their government in a general assembly, whichwas also attended by Congregationalist delegates from New England in thecapacity of simple advisers. The theological difference between thesetwo sects was so slight that an alliance grew up between them, and inConnecticut some fifty years later their names were often inaccuratelyused as if synonymous. Such a difference seemed to vanish whenconfronted with the newer differences that began to spring up soon afterthe close of the Revolution. The revolt against the doctrine of eternalpunishment was already beginning in New England, and among the learnedand thoughtful clergy of Massachusetts the seeds of Unitarianism weregerminating. The gloomy intolerance of an older time was beginning toyield to more enlightened views. In 1789 the first Roman Catholic churchin New England was dedicated in Boston. So great had been the prejudiceagainst this sect that in 1784 there were only 600 Catholics in all NewEngland. In the four southernmost states, on the other hand, there were2, 500; in New York and New Jersey there were 1, 700; in Delaware andPennsylvania there were 7, 700; in Maryland there were 20, 000; whileamong the French settlements along the eastern bank of the Mississippithere were supposed to be nearly 12, 000. In 1786 John Carroll, a cousinof Charles Carroll of Carrollton, was selected by the Pope as hisapostolic vicar, and was afterward successively made bishop of Baltimoreand archbishop of the United States. By 1789 all obstacles to theCatholic worship had been done away with in all the states. [Sidenote: Except in the instance of slavery, all these changes werefavourable to union. ] In this brief survey of the principal changes wrought in the severalstates by the separation from England, one cannot fail to be struck withtheir conservative character. Things proceeded just as they had donefrom time immemorial with the English race. Forms of government weremodified just far enough to adapt them to the new situation and nofarther. The abolition of entails, of primogeniture, and of such fewmanorial privileges as existed, were useful reforms of far less sweepingcharacter than similar changes would have been in England; and they wereaccordingly effected with ease. Even the abolition of slavery in thenorthern states, where negroes were few in number and chiefly employedin domestic service, wrought nothing in the remotest degree resembling asocial revolution. But nowhere was this constitutionally cautious andprecedent-loving mode of proceeding more thoroughly exemplified than inthe measures just related, whereby the Episcopal and Methodist churcheswere separated from the English establishment and placed upon anindependent footing in the new world. From another point of view it maybe observed that all these changes, except in the instance of slavery, tended to assimilate the states to one another in their political andsocial condition. So far as they went, these changes were favourable tounion, and this was perhaps especially true in the case of theecclesiastical bodies, which brought citizens of different states intocoöperation in pursuit of specific ends in common. At the same time this survey most forcibly reminds us how completelythe legislation which immediately affected the daily domestic life ofthe citizen was the legislation of the single state in which he lived. In the various reforms just passed in review the United Statesgovernment took no part, and could not from the nature of the case. Evento-day our national government has no power over such matters, and it isto be hoped it never will have. But at the present day our nationalgovernment performs many important functions of common concern, which acentury ago were scarcely performed at all. The organization of thesingle state was old in principle and well understood by everybody. Ittherefore worked easily, and such changes as those above described werebrought about with little friction. On the other hand, the principlesupon which the various relations of the states to each other were to beadjusted were not well understood. There was wide disagreement upon thesubject, and the attempt to compromise between opposing views was not atfirst successful. Hence, in the management of affairs which concernedthe United States as a nation, we shall not find the central machineryworking smoothly or quietly. We are about to traverse a period ofuncertainty and confusion, in which it required all the politicalsagacity and all the good temper of the people to save the half-builtship of state from going to pieces on the rocks of civil contention. CHAPTER III. THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. [Sidenote: The several states have never enjoyed complete sovereignty. ] That some kind of union existed between the states was doubted by noone. Ever since the assembling of the first Continental Congress in 1774the thirteen commonwealths had acted in concert, and sometimes mostgenerously, as when Maryland and South Carolina had joined in theDeclaration of Independence without any crying grievances of their own, from a feeling that the cause of one should be the cause of all. It hassometimes been said that the Union was in its origin a league ofsovereign states, each of which surrendered a specific portion of itssovereignty to the federal government for the sake of the commonwelfare. Grave political arguments have been based upon this allegedfact, but such an account of the matter is not historically true. Therenever was a time when Massachusetts or Virginia was an absolutelysovereign state like Holland or France. Sovereign over their owninternal affairs they are to-day as they were at the time of theRevolution, but there was never a time when they presented themselvesbefore other nations as sovereign, or were recognized as such. Under thegovernment of England before the Revolution the thirteen commonwealthswere independent of one another, and were held together, juxtaposedrather than united, only through their allegiance to the British crown. Had that allegiance been maintained there is no telling how long theymight have gone on thus disunited; and this, it seems, should be one ofour chief reasons for rejoicing that the political connection withEngland was dissolved when it was. A permanent redress of grievances, and even virtual independence such as Canada now enjoys, we mightperhaps have gained had we listened to Lord North's proposals after thesurrender of Burgoyne; but the formation of the Federal Union wouldcertainly have been long postponed, and when we realize the grandeur ofthe work which we are now doing in the world through the simple fact ofsuch a union, we cannot fail to see that such an issue would have beenextremely unfortunate. However this may be, it is clear that until theconnection with England was severed the thirteen commonwealths were notunited, nor were they sovereign. It is also clear that in the very actof severing their connection with England these commonwealths enteredinto some sort of union which was incompatible with their absolutesovereignty taken severally. It was not the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and so on through the list, that declared theirindependence of Great Britain, but it was the representatives of theUnited States in Congress assembled, and speaking as a single body inthe name of the whole. Three weeks before this declaration was adopted, Congress appointed a committee to draw up the "articles ofconfederation and perpetual union, " by which the sovereignty of theseveral states was expressly limited and curtailed in many importantparticulars. This committee had finished its work by the 12th of July, but the articles were not adopted by Congress until the autumn of 1777, and they were not finally put into operation until the spring of 1781. During this inchoate period of union the action of the United States wasthat of a confederation in which some portion of the severalsovereignties was understood to be surrendered to the whole. It was thebusiness of the articles to define the precise nature and extent of thissurrendered sovereignty which no state by itself ever exercised. In themean time this sovereignty, undefined in nature and extent, wasexercised, as well as circumstances permitted, by the ContinentalCongress. [Sidenote: The Continental Congress; its extraordinary character. ] A most remarkable body was this Continental Congress. For thevicissitudes through which it passed, there is perhaps no otherrevolutionary body, save the Long Parliament, which can be compared withit. For its origin we must look back to the committees of correspondencedevised by Jonathan Mayhew, Samuel Adams, and Dabney Carr. Firstassembled in 1774 to meet an emergency which was generally believed tobe only temporary, it continued to sit for nearly seven years before itspowers were ever clearly defined; and during those seven years itexercised some of the highest functions of sovereignty which arepossible to any governing body. It declared the independence of theUnited States; it contracted an offensive and defensive alliance withFrance; it raised and organized a Continental army; it borrowed largesums of money, and pledged what the lenders understood to be thenational credit for their repayment; it issued an inconvertible papercurrency, granted letters of marque, and built a navy. All this it didin the exercise of what in later times would have been called "impliedwar powers, " and its authority rested upon the general acquiescence inthe purposes for which it acted and in the measures which it adopted. Under such circumstances its functions were very inefficientlyperformed. But the articles of confederation, which in 1781 defined itspowers, served at the same time to limit them; so that for the remainingeight years of its existence the Continental Congress grew weaker andweaker, until it was swept away to make room for a more efficientgovernment. [Sidenote: The articles of confederation. ] John Dickinson is supposed to have been the principal author of thearticles of confederation; but as the work of the committee was done insecret and has never been reported, the point cannot be determined. InNovember, 1777, Congress sent the articles to the several statelegislatures, with a circular letter recommending them as containing theonly plan of union at all likely to be adopted. In the course of thenext fifteen months the articles were ratified by all the states exceptMaryland, which refused to sign until the states laying claim to thenorthwestern lands, and especially Virginia, should surrender theirclaims to the confederation. We shall by and by see, when we come toexplain this point in detail, that from this action of Maryland thereflowed beneficent consequences that were little dreamed of. It was firstin the great chain of events which led directly to the formation of theFederal Union. Having carried her point, Maryland ratified the articleson the first day of March, 1781; and thus in the last and most brilliantperiod of the war, while Greene was leading Cornwallis on his fatalchase across North Carolina, the confederation proposed at the time ofthe Declaration of Independence was finally consummated. According to the language of the articles, the states entered into afirm league of friendship with each other; and in order to secure andperpetuate such friendship, the freemen of each state were entitled toall the privileges and immunities of freemen in all the other states. Mutual extradition of criminals was established, and in each state fullfaith and credit was to be given to the records, acts, and judicialproceedings of every other state. This universal intercitizenship waswhat gave reality to the nascent and feeble Union. In all the commonbusiness relations of life, the man of New Hampshire could deal with theman of Georgia on an equal footing before the law. But this was almostthe only effectively cohesive provision in the whole instrument. Throughout the remainder of the articles its language was largelydevoted to reconciling the theory that the states were severallysovereign with the visible fact that they were already merged to someextent in a larger political body. The sovereignty of this larger bodywas vested in the Congress of delegates appointed yearly by the states. No state was to be represented by less than two or more than sevenmembers; no one could be a delegate for more than three years out ofevery six; and no delegate could hold any salaried office under theUnited States. As in colonial times the states had, to preserve theirself-government, insisted upon paying their governors and judges, instead of allowing them to be paid out of the royal treasury, so nowthe delegates in Congress were paid by their own states. In determiningquestions in Congress, each state had one vote, without regard topopulation; but a bare majority was not enough to carry any importantmeasure. Not only for such extraordinary matters as wars and treaties, but even for the regular and ordinary business of raising money to carryon the government, not a single step could be taken without the consentof at least nine of the thirteen states; and this provision well-nighsufficed of itself to block the wheels of federal legislation. TheCongress assembled each year on the first Monday of November, and couldnot adjourn for a longer period than six months. During its recess thecontinuity of government was preserved by an executive committee, consisting of one delegate from each state, and known as the "committeeof the states. " Saving such matters of warfare or treaty as the publicinterest might require to be kept secret, all the proceedings ofCongress were entered in a journal, to be published monthly; and theyeas and nays must be entered should any delegate request it. Theexecutive departments of war, finance, and so forth were intrusted atfirst to committees, until experience soon showed the necessity ofsingle heads. There was a president of Congress, who, as representingthe dignity of the United States, was, in a certain sense, the foremostperson in the country, but he had no more power than any other delegate. Of the fourteen presidents between 1774 and 1789, perhaps only Randolph, Hancock, and Laurens are popularly remembered in that capacity; Jay, St. Clair, Mifflin, and Lee are remembered for other things; Hanson, Griffin, and Boudinot are scarcely remembered at all, save by thestudent of American history. Between the Congress thus constituted and the several state governmentsthe attributes of sovereignty were shared in such a way as to produce aminimum of result with a maximum of effort. The states were prohibitedfrom keeping up any naval or military force, except militia, or fromentering into any treaty or alliance, either with a foreign power orbetween themselves, without the consent of Congress. No state couldengage in war except by way of defence against a sudden Indian attack. Congress had the sole right of determining on peace and war, of sendingand receiving ambassadors, of making treaties, of adjudicating alldisputes between the states, of managing Indian affairs, and ofregulating the value of coin and fixing the standard of weights andmeasures. Congress took control of the post-office on condition that nomore revenue should be raised from postage than should suffice todischarge the expenses of the service. Congress controlled the army, but was provided with no means of raising soldiers save throughrequisitions upon the states, and it could only appoint officers abovethe rank of colonel; the organization of regiments was left entirely inthe hands of the states. The traditional and wholesome dread of astanding army was great, but there was no such deep-seated jealousy of anavy, and Congress was accordingly allowed not only to appoint all navalofficers, but also to establish courts of admiralty. [Sidenote: The articles failed to create a federal government endowedwith real sovereignty. ] Several essential attributes of sovereignty were thus withheld from thestates; and by assuming all debts contracted by Congress prior to theadoption of the articles, and solemnly pledging the public faith fortheir payment, it was implicitly declared that the sovereignty hereaccorded to Congress was substantially the same as that which it hadasserted and exercised ever since the severing of the connection withEngland. The articles simply defined the relations of the states to theConfederation as they had already shaped themselves. Indeed, thearticles, though not finally ratified till 1781, had been known toCongress and to the people ever since 1776 as their expectedconstitution, and political action had been shaped in general accordancewith the theory on which they had been drawn up. They show thatpolitical action was at no time based on the view of the states asabsolutely sovereign, but they also show that the share of sovereigntyaccorded to Congress was very inadequate even to the purposes of aneffective confederation. The position in which they left Congress washardly more than that of the deliberative head of a league. For themost fundamental of all the attributes of sovereignty--the power oftaxation--was not given to Congress. It could neither raise taxesthrough an excise nor through custom-house duties; it could only makerequisitions upon the thirteen members of the confederacy in proportionto the assessed value of their real estate, and it was not provided withany means of enforcing these requisitions. On this point the articlescontained nothing beyond the vague promise of the states to obey. Thepower of levying taxes was thus retained entirely by the states. Theynot only imposed direct taxes, as they do to-day, but they laid dutieson exports and imports, each according to its own narrow view of itslocal interests. The only restriction upon this was that suchstate-imposed duties must not interfere with the stipulations of anyforeign treaties such as Congress might make in pursuance of treatiesalready proposed to the courts of France and Spain. Besides all this, the states shared with Congress the powers of coining money, of emittingbills of credit, and of making their promissory notes a legal tender fordebts. Such was the constitution under which the United States had begun todrift toward anarchy even before the close of the Revolutionary War, butwhich could only be amended by the unanimous consent of all the thirteenstates. The historian cannot but regard this difficulty of amendment asa fortunate circumstance; for in the troubles which presently arose itled the distressed people to seek some other method of relief, and thusprepared the way for the Convention of 1787, which destroyed the wholevicious scheme, and gave us a form of government under which we havejust completed a century unparalleled for peace and prosperity. Besidesthis extreme difficulty of amendment, the fatal defects of theConfederation were three in number. The first defect was the two thirdsvote necessary for any important legislation in Congress; under thisrule any five of the states--as, for example, the four southernmoststates with Maryland, or the four New England states with NewJersey--could defeat the most sorely needed measures. The second defectwas the impossibility of presenting a united front to foreign countriesin respect to commerce. The third and greatest defect was the lack ofany means, on the part of Congress, of enforcing obedience. Not only wasthere no federal executive or judiciary worthy of the name, but thecentral government operated only upon states, and not upon individuals. Congress could call for troops and for money in strict conformity withthe articles; but should any state prove delinquent in furnishing itsquota, there were no constitutional means of compelling it to obey thecall. This defect was seen and deplored at the outset by such men asWashington and Madison, but the only remedy which at first occurred tothem was one more likely to kill than to cure. Only six weeks after theratification of the articles, Madison proposed an amendment "to give tothe United States full authority to employ their force, as well by seaas by land, to compel any delinquent state to fulfil its federalengagements. " Washington approved of this measure, hoping, as he said, that "a knowledge that this power was lodged in Congress might be themeans to prevent its ever being exercised, and the more readily induceobedience. Indeed, " added Washington, "if Congress were unquestionablypossessed of the power, nothing should induce the display of it butobstinate disobedience and the urgency of the general welfare. " Madisonargued that in the very nature of the Confederation such a right ofcoercion was necessarily implied, though not expressed in the articles, and much might have been said in behalf of this opinion. TheConfederation explicitly declared itself to be perpetual, yet how couldit perpetuate itself for a dozen years without the right to coerce itsrefractory members? Practically, however, the remedy was one which couldnever have been applied without breaking the Confederation intofragments. To use the army or navy in coercing a state meant nothingless than civil war. The local yeomanry would have turned out againstthe Continental army with as high a spirit as that with which theyswarmed about the British enemy at Lexington or King's Mountain. Agovernment which could not collect the taxes for its yearly budgetwithout firing upon citizens or blockading two or three harbours wouldhave been the absurdest political anomaly imaginable. No such idea couldhave entered the mind of a statesman save from the hope that if onestate should prove refractory, all the others would immediately frownupon it and uphold Congress in overawing it. In such case the knowledgethat Congress had the power would doubtless have been enough to make itsexercise unnecessary. But in fact this hope was disappointed, for thedelinquency of each state simply set an example of disobedience for allthe others to follow; and the amendment, had it been carried, wouldmerely have armed Congress with a threat which everybody would havelaughed at. So manifestly hopeless was the case to Pelatiah Webster thatas early as May, 1781, he published an able pamphlet, urging thenecessity for a federal convention for overhauling the whole scheme ofgovernment from beginning to end. [Sidenote: Military weakness of the government. ] The military weakness due to this imperfect governmental organizationmay be illustrated by comparing the number of regular troops whichCongress was able to keep in the field during the Revolutionary War withthe number maintained by the United States government during the War ofSecession. A rough estimate, obtained from averages, will suffice toshow the broad contrast. In 1863, the middle year of the War ofSecession, the total population of the loyal states was about23, 491, 600, of whom about one fifth, or 4, 698, 320, were adult males ofmilitary age. Supposing one adult male out of every five to have beenunder arms at one time, the number would have been 939, 664. Now thetotal number of troops enlisted in the northern army during the fouryears of the war, reduced to a uniform standard, was 2, 320, 272, or anaverage of 580, 068 under arms in any single year. In point of fact, this average was reached before the middle of the war, and the numberswent on increasing, until at the end there were more than a million menunder arms, --at least one out of every five adult males in the northernstates. On the other hand, in 1779, the middle year of the RevolutionaryWar, the white population of the United States was about 2, 175, 000, ofwhom 435, 000 were adult males of military age. Supposing one out ofevery five of these to have been under arms at once, the number wouldhave been 87, 000. Now in the spring of 1777, when the ContinentalCongress was at the highest point of authority which it ever reached, when France was willing to lend it money freely, when its paper currencywas not yet discredited and it could make liberal offers of bounties, ademand was made upon the states for 80, 000 men, or nearly one fifth ofthe adult male population, to serve for three years or during the war. Only 34, 820 were obtained. The total number of men in the field in thatmost critical year, including the swarms of militia who came to therescue at Ridgefield and Bennington and Oriskany, and the Pennsylvaniamilitia who turned out while their state was invaded, was 68, 720. In1781, when the credit of Congress was greatly impaired, althoughmilitary activity again rose to a maximum and it was necessary for thepeople to strain every nerve, the total number of men in the field, militia and all, was only 29, 340, of whom only 13, 292 were Continentals;and it was left for the genius of Washington and Greene, working withdesperate energy and most pitiful resources, to save the country. Amore impressive contrast to the readiness with which the demands of thegovernment were met in the War of Secession can hardly be imagined. Hadthe country put forth its strength in 1781 as it did in 1864, an army of90, 000 men might have overwhelmed Clinton at the north and Cornwallis atthe south, without asking any favours of the French fleet. Had it putforth its full strength in 1777, four years of active warfare might havebeen spared. Mr. Lecky explains this difference by his favouritehypothesis that the American Revolution was the work of a fewultra-radical leaders, with whom the people were not generally insympathy; and he thinks we could not expect to see great heroism orself-sacrifice manifested by a people who went to war over what he callsa "money dispute. "[3] But there is no reason for supposing that theloyalists represented the general sentiment of the country in theRevolutionary War any more than the peace party represented the generalsentiment of the northern states in the War of Secession. There is noreason for supposing that the people were less at heart in 1781 infighting for the priceless treasure of self-government than they were in1864 when they fought for the maintenance of the pacific principlesunderlying our Federal Union. The differences in the organization of thegovernment, and in its power of operating directly upon the people, arequite enough to explain the difference between the languid conduct ofthe earlier war and the energetic conduct of the later. [Sidenote: Extreme difficulty of obtaining a revenue. ] Impossible as Congress found it to fill the quotas of the army, the taskof raising a revenue by requisitions upon the states was even morediscouraging. Every state had its own war-debt, and several wereapplicants for foreign loans not easy to obtain, so that none couldwithout the greatest difficulty raise a surplus to hand over toCongress. The Continental rag-money had ceased to circulate by the endof 1780, and our foreign credit was nearly ruined. The French governmentbegan to complain of the heavy demands which the Americans made upon itsexchequer, and Vergennes, in sending over a new loan in the fall of1782, warned Franklin that no more must be expected. To save Americancredit from destruction, it was at least necessary that the interest onthe public debt should be paid. For this purpose Congress in 1781 askedpermission to levy a five per cent. Duty on imports. The modest requestwas the signal for a year of angry discussion. Again and again it wasasked, If taxes could thus be levied by any power outside the state, whyhad we ever opposed the Stamp Act or the tea duties? The question wasindeed a serious one, and as an instance of reasoning from analogyseemed plausible enough. After more than a year Massachusetts consented, by a bare majority of two in the House and one in the Senate, reservingto herself the right of appointing the collectors. The bill was thenvetoed by Governor Hancock, though one day too late, and so it wassaved. But Rhode Island flatly refused her consent, and so did Virginia, though Madison earnestly pleaded the cause of the public credit. Forthe current expenses of the government in that same year $9, 000, 000 wereneeded. It was calculated that $4, 000, 000 might be raised by a loan, andthe other $5, 000, 000 were demanded of the states. At the end of the year$422, 000 had been collected, not a cent of which came from Georgia, theCarolinas, or Delaware. Rhode Island, which paid $38, 000, did the bestof all according to its resources. Of the Continental taxes assessed in1783, only one-fifth part had been paid by the middle of 1785. And theworst of it was that no one could point to a remedy for this state ofthings, or assign any probable end to it. [Sidenote: Dread of the army. ] [Sidenote: Supposed scheme for making Washington king. ] Under such circumstances the public credit sank at home as well asabroad. Foreign creditors--even France, who had been nothing if notgenerous with her loans--might be made to wait; but there were creditorsat home who, should they prove ugly, could not be so easily put off. Thedisbandment of the army in the summer of 1783, before the British troopshad evacuated New York, was hastened by the impossibility of paying thesoldiers and the dread of what they might do under such provocation. Though peace had been officially announced, Hamilton and Livingstonurged that, for the sake of appearances if for no other reason, the armyshould be kept together so long as the British remained in New York, ifnot until they should have surrendered the western frontier posts. ButCongress could not pay the army, and was afraid of it, --and not withoutsome reason. Discouraged at the length of time which had passed sincethey had received any money, the soldiers had begun to fear lest, nowthat their services were no longer needed, their honest claims would beset aside. Among the officers, too, there was grave discontent. In thespring of 1778, after the dreadful winter at Valley Forge, severalofficers had thrown up their commissions, and others threatened to dolikewise. To avert the danger, Washington had urged Congress to promisehalf-pay for life to such officers as should serve to the end of thewar. It was only with great difficulty that he succeeded in obtaining apromise of half-pay for seven years, and even this raised an outcrythroughout the country, which seemed to dread its natural defenders onlyless than its enemies. In the fall of 1780, however, in the generaldepression which followed upon the disasters at Charleston and Camden, the collapse of the paper money, and the discovery of Arnold's treason, there was serious danger that the army would fall to pieces. At thiscritical moment Washington had earnestly appealed to Congress, andagainst the strenuous opposition of Samuel Adams had at length extortedthe promise of half-pay for life. In the spring of 1782, seeing theutter inability of Congress to discharge its pecuniary obligations, manyofficers began to doubt whether the promise would ever be kept. It hadbeen made before the articles of confederation, which required theassent of nine states to any such measure, had been finally ratified. Itwas well known that nine states had never been found to favour themeasure, and it was now feared that it might be repealed or repudiated, so loud was the popular clamour against it. All this comes ofrepublican government, said some of the officers; too many cooks spoilthe broth; a dozen heads are as bad as no head; you do not know whosepromises to trust; a monarchy, with a good king whom all men can trust, would extricate us from these difficulties. In this mood, Colonel LouisNicola, of the Pennsylvania line, a foreigner by birth, addressed a longand well-argued letter to Washington, setting forth the troubles of thetime, and urging him to come forward as a saviour of society, and acceptthe crown at the hands of his faithful soldiers. Nicola was an aged man, of excellent character, and in making this suggestion he seemed to beacting as spokesman of a certain clique or party among theofficers, --how numerous is not known. Washington instantly replied thatNicola could not have found a person to whom such a scheme could be moreodious, and he was at a loss to conceive what he had ever done to haveit supposed that he could for one moment listen to a suggestion sofraught with mischief to his country. Lest the affair, becoming known, should enhance the popular distrust of the army, Washington said nothingabout it. But as the year went by, and the outcry against half-paycontinued, and Congress showed symptoms of a willingness to compromisethe matter, the discontent of the army increased. Officers and soldiersbrooded alike over their wrongs. "The army, " said General Macdougall, "is verging to that state which, we are told, will make a wise man mad. "The peril of the situation was increased by the well-meant butinjudicious whisperings of other public creditors, who believed that ifthe army would only take a firm stand and insist upon a grant ofpermanent funds to Congress for liquidating all public debts, the statescould probably be prevailed upon to make such a grant. Robert Morris, the able secretary of finance, held this opinion, and did not believethat the states could be brought to terms in any other way. His namesakeand assistant, Gouverneur Morris, held similar views, and gaveexpression to them in February, 1783, in a letter to General Greene, whowas still commanding in South Carolina. When Greene received the letter, he urged upon the legislature of that state, in most guarded andmoderate language, the paramount need of granting a revenue to Congress, and hinted that the army would not be satisfied with anything less. Theassembly straightway flew into a rage. "No dictation by a Cromwell!"shouted the members. South Carolina had consented to the five per cent. Impost, but now she revoked it, to show her independence, and Greene'seyes were opened at once to the danger of the slightest appearance ofmilitary intervention in civil affairs. [Sidenote: The dangerous Newburgh address, March 11, 1783. ] At the same time a violent outbreak in the army at Newburgh was barelyprevented by the unfailing tact of Washington. A rumour went about thecamp that it was generally expected the army would not disband until thequestion of pay should be settled, and that the public creditors lookedto them to make some such demonstration as would overawe the delinquentstates. General Gates had lately emerged from the retirement in whichhe had been fain to hide himself after Camden, and had rejoined the armywhere there was now such a field for intrigue. An odious aroma ofimpotent malice clings about his memory on this last occasion on whichthe historian needs to notice him. He plotted in secret with officers ofthe staff and others. One of his staff, Major Armstrong, wrote ananonymous appeal to the troops, and another, Colonel Barber, caused itto be circulated about the camp. It named the next day for a meeting toconsider grievances. Its language was inflammatory. "My friends!" itsaid, "after seven long years your suffering courage has conducted theUnited States of America through a doubtful and bloody war; and peacereturns to bless--whom? A country willing to redress your wrongs, cherish your worth, and reward your services? Or is it rather a countrythat tramples upon your rights, disdains your cries, and insults yourdistresses? . . . If such be your treatment while the swords you wear arenecessary for the defence of America, what have you to expect when thosevery swords, the instruments and companions of your glory, shall betaken from your sides, and no mark of military distinction left but yourwants, infirmities, and scars? If you have sense enough to discover andspirit to oppose tyranny, whatever garb it may assume, awake to yoursituation. If the present moment be lost, your threats hereafter will beas empty as your entreaties now. Appeal from the justice to the fears ofgovernment, and suspect the man who would advise to longerforbearance. " Better English has seldom been wasted in a worse cause. Washington, theman who was aimed at in the last sentence, got hold of the paper nextday, just in time, as he said, "to arrest the feet that stood waveringon a precipice. " The memory of the revolt of the Pennsylvania line, which had so alarmed the people in 1781, was still fresh in men's minds;and here was an invitation to more wholesale mutiny, which could hardlyfail to end in bloodshed, and might precipitate the perplexed andembarrassed country into civil war. Washington issued a general order, recognizing the existence of the manifesto, but overruling it so far asto appoint the meeting for a later day, with the senior major-general, who happened to be Gates, to preside. This order, which neitherdiscipline nor courtesy could disregard, in a measure tied Gates'shands, while it gave Washington time to ascertain the extent of thedisaffection. On the appointed day he suddenly came into the meeting, and amid profoundest silence broke forth in a most eloquent and touchingspeech. Sympathizing keenly with the sufferings of his hearers, andfully admitting their claims, he appealed to their better feelings, andreminded them of the terrible difficulties under which Congresslaboured, and of the folly of putting themselves in the wrong. He stillcounselled forbearance as the greatest of victories, and with consummateskill he characterized the anonymous appeal as undoubtedly the work ofsome crafty emissary of the British, eager to disgrace the army whichthey had not been able to vanquish. All were hushed by that majesticpresence and those solemn tones. The knowledge that he had refused allpay, while enduring more than any other man in the room, gave addedweight to every word. In proof of the good faith of Congress he beganreading a letter from one of the members, when, finding his sight dim, he paused and took from his pocket the new pair of spectacles which theastronomer David Rittenhouse had just sent him. He had never wornspectacles in public, and as he put them on he said, in his simplemanner and with his pleasant smile, "I have grown gray in your service, and now find myself growing blind. " While all hearts were softened hewent on reading the letter, and then withdrew, leaving the meeting toits deliberations. There was a sudden and mighty revulsion of feeling. Amotion was reported declaring "unshaken confidence in the justice ofCongress;" and it was added that "the officers of the American army viewwith abhorrence and reject with disdain the infamous proposals containedin a late anonymous address to them. " The crestfallen Gates, aschairman, had nothing to do but put the question and report it carriedunanimously; for if any still remained obdurate they no longer dared toshow it. Washington immediately set forth the urgency of the case in anearnest letter to Congress, and one week later the matter was settled byan act commuting half-pay for life into a gross sum equal to five years'full pay, to be discharged at once by certificates bearing interest atsix per cent. Such poor paper was all that Congress had to pay with, but it was all ultimately redeemed; and while the commutation wasadvantageous to the government, it was at the same time greatly for theinterest of the officers, while they were looking out for new means oflivelihood, to have their claims adjusted at once, and to receivesomething which could do duty as a respectable sum of money. [Sidenote: Congress driven from Philadelphia by mutinous soldiers, June21, 1783. ] Nothing, however, could prevent the story of the Newburgh affair frombeing published all over the country, and it greatly added to thedistrust with which the army was regarded on general principles. Whatmight have happened was forcibly suggested by a miserable occurrence inJune, about two months after the disbanding of the army had begun. Someeighty soldiers of the Pennsylvania line, mutinous from discomfort andwant of pay, broke from their camp at Lancaster and marched down toPhiladelphia, led by a sergeant or two. They drew up in line before thestate house, where Congress was assembled, and after passing the grogbegan throwing stones and pointing their muskets at the windows. Theydemanded pay, and threatened, if it were not forthcoming, to seize themembers of Congress and hold them as hostages, or else to break into thebank where the federal deposits were kept. The executive council ofPennsylvania sat in the same building, and so the federal governmentappealed to the state government for protection. The appeal wasfruitless. President Dickinson had a few state militia at his disposal, but did not dare to summon them, for fear they should side with therioters. The city government was equally listless, and the townsfolkwent their ways as if it were none of their business; and so Congressfled across the river and on to Princeton, where the college afforded itshelter. Thus in a city of thirty-two thousand inhabitants, the largestcity in the country, the government of the United States, the body whichhad just completed a treaty browbeating England and France, wasignominiously turned out-of-doors by a handful of drunken mutineers. Theaffair was laughed at by many, but sensible men keenly felt thedisgrace, and asked what would be thought in Europe of a governmentwhich could not even command the services of the police. The army becamemore unpopular than ever, and during the summer and fall manytown-meetings were held in New England, condemning the Commutation Act. Are we not poor enough already, cried the farmers, that we must be taxedto support in idle luxury a riotous rabble of soldiery, or create anaristocracy of men with gold lace and epaulets, who will presently plotagainst our liberties? The Massachusetts legislature protested; thepeople of Connecticut meditated resistance. A convention was held atMiddletown in December, at which two thirds of the towns in the statewere represented, and the best method of overruling Congress wasdiscussed. Much high-flown eloquence was wasted, but the conventionbroke up without deciding upon any course of action. The matter hadbecome so serious that wise men changed their minds, and disapproved ofproceedings calculated to throw Congress into contempt. Samuel Adams, who had almost violently opposed the grant of half-pay and had beendissatisfied with the Commutation Act, now came completely over to theother side. Whatever might be thought of the policy of the measures, hesaid, Congress had an undoubted right to adopt them. The army had beennecessary for the defence of our liberties, and the public faith hadbeen pledged to the payment of the soldiers. States were as much boundas individuals to fulfil their engagements, and did not the sacredScriptures say of an honest man that, though he sweareth to his ownhurt, he changeth not? Such plain truths prevailed in the Bostontown-meeting, which voted that "the commutation is wisely blended withthe national debt. " The agitation in New England presently came to anend, and in this matter the course of Congress was upheld. [Sidenote: Order of the Cincinnati. ] In order fully to understand this extravagant distrust of the army, wehave to take into account another incident of the summer of 1783, whichgave rise to a discussion that sent its reverberation all over thecivilized world. Men of the present generation who in childhood rummagedin their grandmothers' cosy garrets cannot fail to have come acrossscores of musty and worm-eaten pamphlets, their yellow pages crowdedwith italics and exclamation points, inveighing in passionate languageagainst the wicked and dangerous society of the Cincinnati. Just beforethe army was disbanded, the officers, at the suggestion of General Knox, formed themselves into a secret society, for the purpose of keeping uptheir friendly intercourse and cherishing the heroic memories of thestruggle in which they had taken part. With the fondness for classicalanalogies which characterized that time, they likened themselves toCincinnatus, who was taken from the plough to lead an army, and returnedto his quiet farm so soon as his warlike duties were over. They weremodern Cincinnati. A constitution and by-laws were established for theorder, and Washington was unanimously chosen to be its president. Itsbranches in the several states were to hold meetings each Fourth ofJuly, and there was to be a general meeting of the whole society everyyear in the month of May. French officers who had taken part in the warwere admitted to membership, and the order was to be perpetuated bydescent through the eldest male representatives of the families of themembers. It was further provided that a limited membership should fromtime to time be granted, as a distinguished honour, to able and worthycitizens, without regard to the memories of the war. A golden Americaneagle attached to a blue ribbon edged with white was the sacred badge ofthe order; and to this emblem especial favour was shown at the Frenchcourt, where the insignia of foreign states were generally, it is said, regarded with jealousy. No political purpose was to be subserved by thisorder of the Cincinnati, save in so far as the members pledged to oneanother their determination to promote and cherish the union between thestates. In its main intent the society was to be a kind of masonicbrotherhood, charged with the duty of aiding the widows and the orphanchildren of its members in time of need. Innocent as all this was, however, the news of the establishment of such a society was greetedwith a howl of indignation all over the country. It was thought that itsfounders were inspired by a deep-laid political scheme for centralizingthe government and setting up a hereditary aristocracy. The press teemedwith invective and ridicule, and the feeling thus expressed by thepenny-a-liners was shared by able men accustomed to weigh their words. Franklin dealt with it in a spirit of banter, and John Adams in a spiritof abhorrence; while Samuel Adams pointed out the dangers inherent inthe principle of hereditary transmission of honours, and in theadmission of foreigners into a secret association possessed of politicalinfluence in America. What! cried the men of Massachusetts. Have wethrown overboard the effete institutions of Europe, only to have themstraightway introduced among us again, after this plausible andsurreptitious fashion? At Cambridge it was thought that the generalsentiment of the university was in favour of suppressing the order byact of legislature. One of the members, who was a candidate for senatorin the spring of 1784, found it necessary to resign in order to save hischances for election. Rhode Island proposed to disfranchise such of hercitizens as belonged to the order, albeit her most eminent citizen, Nathanael Greene, was one of them. Ædanus Burke, a judge of the SupremeCourt of South Carolina, wrote a violent pamphlet against the society ofthe Cincinnati under the pseudonym of Cassius, the slayer of tyrants;and this diatribe, translated and amplified by Mirabeau, awakened dullechoes among readers of Rousseau and haters of privilege in all parts ofEurope. A swarm of brochures in rejoinder and rebutter issued from thepress, and the nineteenth century had come in before the controversy wasquite forgotten. It is easy for us now to smile at this outcry against the Cincinnati asmuch ado about nothing, seeing as we do that in the absence ofterritorial jurisdiction or especial political privileges an order ofnobility cannot be created by the mere inheritance of empty titles orbadges. For example, since the great revolution which swept away thelandlordship and fiscal exemptions of the French nobility, a marquisateor a dukedom in France is of scarcely more political importance than adoctorate of laws in a New England university. Men were nevertheless notto be blamed in 1783 for their hostility toward that ghost of thehereditary principle which the Cincinnati sought to introduce. In a freeindustrial society like that of America it had no proper place ormeaning; and the attempt to set up such a form might well have beencited in illustration of the partial reversion toward militancy whicheight years of warfare had effected. The absurdity of the situation wasquickly realized by Washington, and he prevailed upon the society, inits first annual meeting of May, 1784, to abandon the principle ofhereditary membership. The agitation was thus allayed, and in thepresence of graver questions the much-dreaded brotherhood graduallyceased to occupy popular attention. The opposition to the Cincinnati is not fully explained unless weconsider it in connection with Nicola's letter, the Newburgh address, and the flight of Congress to Princeton. The members of the Cincinnatiwere pledged to do whatever they could to promote the union between thestates; the object of the Newburgh address was to enlist the army inbehalf of the public creditors, and in some vaguely-imagined fashion toforce a stronger government upon the country; the letter of Nicola showsthat at least some of the officers had harboured the notion of amonarchy; and the weakness of Congress had been revealed in the moststartling manner by its flight before a squad of mutineers. It is one ofthe lessons of history that, in the virtual absence of a centralgovernment for which a need is felt, the want is apt to be supplied bythe strongest organization in the country, whatever that may happen tobe. It was in this way that the French army, a few years later, gotcontrol of the government of France and made its general emperor. In1783, if the impotence of Congress were to be as explicitly acknowledgedas it was implicitly felt, the only national organization left in thecountry was the army, and when this was disbanded it seemed neverthelessto prolong its life under a new and dangerous form in the secretbrotherhood of the Cincinnati. The cession of western lands to theconfederacy was, moreover, completed at about this time, and one of theuses to which the new territory was to be put was the payment of claimsdue to the soldiers. It was distinctly feared, as is shown in a letterfrom Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, that the members of the Cincinnatiwould acquire large tracts of western land under this arrangement, and, importing peasants from Germany, would grant farms to them on terms ofmilitary service and fealty, thus introducing into America the feudalsystem. In order to forestall any such movement, it was provided byCongress that in any new states formed out of the western territory noperson holding a hereditary title should be admitted to citizenship. [Sidenote: Congress finds itself unable to carry out the provisions ofthe treaty. ] [Sidenote: Persecution of Tories. ] From the weakness of Congress as illustrated in its inability to raisemoney to pay the public debt and meet the current expenses ofgovernment, and from the popular dread of military usurpation which wentalong with the uneasy consciousness of that weakness, we have now toturn to another group of affairs in which the same point is stillfurther illustrated and emphasized. We have seen how the commissionersof the United States in Paris had succeeded in making a treaty of peacewith Great Britain on extremely favourable terms. So unpopular was thetreaty in England, on account of the great concessions made to theAmericans, that, as we have seen, the fall of Lord Shelburne's ministrywas occasioned thereby. As an offset to these liberal concessions, ofwhich the most considerable was the acknowledgment of the American claimto the northwestern territory, our confederate government was pledged todo all in its power to effect certain concessions which were demanded byEngland. That the American loyalists, whose property had beenconfiscated by various state governments, should be indemnified fortheir losses was a claim which, whatever Americans might think of it, England felt bound in honour to urge. That private debts, due fromAmerican to British creditors, should be faithfully discharged was theplainest dictate of common honesty. Congress, as we have seen, was boundby the treaty to recommend to the several states to desist from thepersecution of Tories, and to give them an opportunity of recoveringtheir estates; and it had been further agreed that all private debtsshould be discharged at their full value in sterling money. It nowturned out that Congress was powerless to carry out the provisions ofthe treaty upon either of these points. The recommendations concerningthe Tories were greeted with a storm of popular indignation. Since thebeginning of the war these unfortunate persons had been treated withseverity both by the legislatures and by the people. Many had beenbanished; others had fled the country, and against these refugeesvarious harsh laws had been enacted. Their estates had been confiscated, and their return prohibited under penalty of imprisonment or death. Manyothers, who had remained in the country, were objects of suspicion anddislike in states where they had not, as in New York and the Carolinas, openly aided the enemy or taken part in Indian atrocities. Now, on theconclusion of peace, in utter disregard of Congress, fresh measures ofvengeance were taken against these "fawning spaniels, " as they werecalled, these "tools and minions of Britain. " An article in the"Massachusetts Chronicle" expressed the common feeling: "As Hannibalswore never to be at peace with the Romans, so let every Whig swear, byhis abhorrence of slavery, by liberty and religion, by the shades ofdeparted friends who have fallen in battle, by the ghosts of those ofour brethren who have been destroyed on board of prison-ships and inloathsome dungeons, never to be at peace with those fiends the refugees, whose thefts, murders, and treasons have filled the cup of woe. " Tons ofpamphlets, issued under the customary Latin pseudonyms, were filled withthis truculent bombast; and like sentiments were thundered from thepulpit by men who had quite forgotten for the moment their duty ofpreaching reconciliation and forgiveness of injuries. Why should notthese wretches, it was sarcastically asked, be driven at once from thecountry? Of course they could not desire to live under a free governmentwhich they had been at such pains to destroy. Let them go forthwith tohis majesty's dominions, and live under the government they preferred. It would never do to let them stay here, to plot treason at theirleisure; in a few years they would get control of all the states, andeither hand them over to Great Britain again, or set up a Tory despotismon American soil. Such was the rubbish that passed current as argumentwith the majority of the people. A small party of moderate Whigs saw itsabsurdity, and urged that the Tories had much better remain at home, where they had lost all political influence, than go and foundunfriendly colonies to the northward. The moderate Whigs were in favourof heeding the recommendation of Congress, and acting in accordancewith the spirit of the treaty; and these humane and sensible views wereshared by Gadsden and Marion in South Carolina, by Theodore Sedgwick inMassachusetts, and by Greene, Hamilton, and Jay. But any man who heldsuch opinions, no matter how conspicuous his services had been, ran therisk of being accused of Tory sympathies. "Time-serving Whigs" and"trimmers" were the strangely inappropriate epithets hurled at men who, had they been in the slightest degree time-servers, would have shrunkfrom the thankless task of upholding good sense and humanity in theteeth of popular prejudice. [Sidenote: The Trespass Act of New York, 1784. ] In none of the states did the loyalists receive severer treatment thanin New York, and for obvious reasons. Throughout the war the frontierhad been the scene of atrocities such as no other state, save perhapsSouth Carolina, had witnessed. Cherry Valley and Minisink were names ofhorror not easily forgotten, and the fate of Lieutenant Boyd andcountless other victims called loudly for vengeance. The sins of theButlers and their bloodthirsty followers were visited in robbery andinsult upon unoffending men, who were like them in nothing but in beinglabelled with the epithet "Tory. " During the seven years that the cityof New York had been occupied by the British army, many of theseloyalists had found shelter there. The Whig citizens, on the other hand, had been driven off the island, to shift as best they might in NewJersey, while their comfortable homes were seized and assigned bymilitary orders to these very Tories. For seven years the refugee Whigsfrom across the Hudson had looked upon New York with feelings like thosewith which the mediæval exile from Florence or Pisa was wont to regardhis native city. They saw in it the home of enemies who had robbed them, the prison-house of gallant friends penned up to die of wanton ill-usagein foul ships' holds in the harbour. When at last the king's troops leftthe city, it was felt that a great day of reckoning had arrived. InSeptember, 1783, two months before the evacuation, more than twelvethousand men, women, and children embarked for the Bahamas or for NovaScotia, rather than stay and face the troubles that were coming. Many ofthese were refined and cultivated persons, and not all had been activelyhostile to the American cause; many had simply accepted Britishprotection. Against those who remained in the city the returning Whigsnow proceeded with great severity. The violent party was dominant in thelegislature, and George Clinton, the governor, put himself conspicuouslyat its head. A bill was passed disfranchising all such persons as hadvoluntarily stayed in neighbourhoods occupied by the British troops;their offence was called misprision of treason. But the council vetoedthis bill as too wholesale in its operation, for it would have left somedistricts without voters enough to hold an election. An "iron-clad oath"was adopted instead, and no one was allowed to vote unless he couldswear that he had never in anywise abetted the enemy. It was voted thatno Tory who had left the state should be permitted to return; and a billwas passed known as the Trespass Act, whereby all persons who had quittheir homes by reason of the enemy's presence might recover damages inan action of trespass against such persons as had since taken possessionof the premises. Defendants in such cases were expressly barred frompleading a military order in justification of their possession. As therewas scarcely a building on the island of New York that had not thuschanged hands during the British occupation, it was easy to foresee whatconfusion must ensue. Everybody whose house had once been, for ever sofew days, in the hands of a Tory now rushed into court with his actionof trespass. Damages were rated at most exorbitant figures, and itbecame clear that the misdeeds of the enemy were about to be made theexcuse for a carnival of spoliation, when all at once the test case ofRutgers _v. _ Waddington brought upon the scene a sturdy defender oforder, an advocate who was soon to become one of the foremost personagesin American history. [Sidenote: Alexander Hamilton. ] Of all the young men of that day, save perhaps William Pitt, the mostprecocious was Alexander Hamilton. He had already given promise of agreat career before the breaking out of the war. He was born on theisland of Nevis, in the West Indies, in 1757. His father belonged tothat famous Scottish clan from which have come one of the most learnedmetaphysicians and one of the most original mathematicians of moderntimes. His mother was a French lady, of Huguenot descent, andbiographers have been fond of tracing in his character the variousqualities of his parents. To the shrewdness and persistence, theadministrative ability, and the taste for abstract reasoning which weare wont to find associated in the highest type of Scottish mind hejoined a truly French vivacity and grace. His earnestness, sincerity, and moral courage were characteristic alike of Puritan and of Huguenot. In the course of his short life he exhibited a remarkablemany-sidedness. So great was his genius for organization that in manyessential respects the American government is moving to-day along thelines which he was the first to mark out. As an economist he shared tosome extent in the shortcomings of the age which preceded Adam Smith, but in the special department of finance he has been equalled by noother American statesman save Albert Gallatin. He was a splendid oratorand brilliant writer, an excellent lawyer, and a clear-headed andindustrious student of political history. He was also eminent as apolitical leader, although he lacked faith in democratic government, anda generous impatience of temperament sometimes led him to prefer shortand arbitrary by-paths toward desirable ends, which can never besecurely reached save along the broad but steep and arduous road ofpopular conviction. But with all Hamilton's splendid qualities, nothingabout him is so remarkable as the early age at which these weredeveloped. At the age of fifteen a brilliant newspaper article broughthim into such repute in the little island of Nevis that he was sent toNew York to avail himself of the best advantages afforded by the King'sCollege, now known as Columbia. He had at first no definite intentionof becoming an American citizen, but the thrilling events of the timeappealed strongly to the earnest heart and powerful intelligence of thiswonderful boy. At a gathering of the people of New York in July, 1774, his generous blood warmed, till a resistless impulse brought him on hisfeet to speak to the assembled multitude. It was no company ofhalf-drunken idlers that thronged about him, but an assemblage of graveand responsible citizens, who looked with some astonishment upon thisboy of seventeen years, short and slight in stature, yet erect andCæsar-like in bearing, with firm set mouth and great, dark, earnesteyes. His eloquent speech, full of sense and without a syllable ofbombast, held his hearers entranced, and from that day AlexanderHamilton was a marked man. He began publishing anonymous pamphlets, which at first were attributed by some to Jay, and by others toLivingston. When their authorship was discovered, the loyalist partytried in vain to buy off the formidable youth. He kept up thepamphlet-war, in the course of which he wofully defeated Dr. Cooper, theTory president of the college; but shortly afterward he defended thedoctor's house against an angry mob, until that unpopular gentleman hadsucceeded in making his escape to a British ship. Hamilton served in thearmy throughout the war, for the most part as aid and secretary toWashington; but in 1781 he was a colonel in the line, and stormed aredoubt at Yorktown with distinguished skill and bravery. He married adaughter of Philip Schuyler, began the practice of law, and in 1782, atthe age of twenty-five, was chosen a delegate to Congress. [Sidenote: The case of Rutgers _v. _ Waddington. ] In 1784, when the Trespass Act threw New York into confusion, Hamiltonhad come to be regarded as one of the most powerful advocates in thecountry. In the test case which now came before the courts he played apart of consummate boldness and heroism. Elizabeth Rutgers was a widow, who had fled from New York after its capture by General Howe. Herconfiscated estate had passed into the hands of Joshua Waddington, arich Tory merchant, and she now brought suit under the Trespass Act forits recovery. It was a case in which popular sympathy was naturally andstrongly enlisted in behalf of the poor widow. That she should have beenturned out of house and home was one of the many gross instances ofwickedness wrought by the war. On the other hand, the disturbancewrought by the enforcement of the Trespass Act was already creatingfresh wrongs much faster than it was righting old ones; and it is forsuch reasons as this that both in the common law and in the law ofnations the principle has been firmly established that "the fruits ofimmovables belong to the captor as long as he remains in actualpossession of them. " The Trespass Act contravened this principle, and italso contravened the treaty. It moreover placed the state of New York inan attitude of defiance toward Congress, which had made the treaty andexpressly urged upon the states to suspend the legislation against theTories. On large grounds of public policy, therefore, the Trespass Actdeserved to be set aside by the courts, and when Hamilton was asked toserve as counsel for the defendant he accepted the odious task withouthesitation. There can be no better proof of his forensic ability thanhis winning a verdict, in such a case as this, from a hostile court thatwas largely influenced by the popular excitement. The decision nullifiedthe Trespass Act, and forthwith mass meetings of the people and an extrasession of the legislature condemned this action of the court. Hamiltonwas roundly abused, and his conduct was attributed to unworthy motives. But he faced the people as boldly as he had faced the court, andpublished a letter, under the signature of Phocion, setting forth in theclearest light the injustice and impolicy of extreme measures againstthe Tories. The popular wrath and disgust at Hamilton's course foundexpression in a letter from one Isaac Ledyard, a hot-headed pot-housepolitician, who signed himself Mentor. A war of pamphlets ensued betweenMentor and Phocion. It was genius pitted against dulness, reason againstpassion; and reason wielded by genius won the day. The more intelligentand respectable citizens reluctantly admitted that Hamilton's argumentswere unanswerable. A club of boon companions, to which Ledyard belonged, made the same admission by the peculiar manner in which it proposed tosilence him. It was gravely proposed that the members of the club shouldpledge themselves one after another to challenge Hamilton to mortalcombat, until some one of them should have the good fortune to kill him!The scheme met with general favour, but was defeated by the exertionsof Ledyard himself, whose zeal was not ardent enough to condonetreachery and murder. The incident well illustrates the intensebitterness of political passion at the time, as Hamilton's conduct showshim in the light of a most courageous and powerful defender of thecentral government. For nothing was more significant in the verdictwhich he had obtained than its implicit assertion of the rights of theUnited States as against the legislature of a single state. [Sidenote: Emigration of Tories. ] In spite of the efforts of such men as Hamilton, life was made veryuncomfortable for the Tories. In some states they were subjected to mobviolence. Instances of tarring and feathering were not uncommon. Thelegislature of South Carolina was honourably distinguished for the goodfaith with which it endeavoured to enforce the recommendation ofCongress; but the people, unable to forget the smoking ruins ofplundered homes, were less lenient. Notices were posted orderingprominent loyalists to leave the country; the newspapers teemed withsavage warnings; and finally, of those who tarried beyond a certaintime, many were shot or hanged to trees. This extremity of bitterness, however, did not long continue. The instances of physical violence weremostly confined to the first two or three years after the close of thewar. In most of the states the confiscating acts were after a whilerepealed, and many of the loyalists were restored to their estates. Butthe emigration which took place between 1783 and 1785 was very large. Ithas been estimated that 100, 000 persons, or nearly three per cent. Ofthe total white population, quit the country. Those from the southernstates went mostly to the Bahamas and Florida; while those from thenorth laid the foundation of new British states in New Brunswick andUpper Canada. Many of these refugees appealed to the British governmentfor indemnification for their losses, and their claims received promptattention. A parliamentary commission was appointed to inquire into thematter, and by the year 1790 some $16, 000, 000 had been distributed amongabout 4, 000 sufferers, while many others received grants of crown-lands, or half-pay as military officers, or special annuities, or appointmentsin the civil service. On the whole, the compensation which the refugeesreceived from Parliament seems to have been much more ample than thatwhich the ragged soldiers of our Revolutionary army ever received fromCongress. [Sidenote: Congress is unable to enforce payment of debts to Britishcreditors. England retaliates by refusing to surrender the westernposts. ] While the political passions resulting in this forced emigration ofloyalists were such as naturally arise in the course of a civil war, thehistorian cannot but regret that the United States should have beendeprived of the services of so many excellent citizens. In nearly allsuch cases of wholesale popular vengeance, it is the wrong individualswho suffer. We could well afford to dispense with the border-ruffianswho abetted the Indians in their carnival of burning and scalping, butthe refugees of 1784 were for the most part peaceful and unoffendingfamilies, above the average in education and refinement. The vicarioussuffering inflicted upon them set nothing right, but simply increasedthe mass of wrong, while to the general interests of the country theloss of such people was in every way damaging. The immediate politicaldetriment wrought at the time, though it is that which here most nearlyconcerns us, was perhaps the least important. Since Congress wasmanifestly unable to carry out the treaty, an excuse was furnished toEngland for declining to fulfil some of its provisions. In regard to theloyalists, indeed, the treaty had recognized that Congress possessed butan advisory power; but in the other provision concerning the payment ofprivate debts, which in the popular mind was very much mixed up with thequestion of justice to the loyalists, the faith of the United States wasdistinctly pledged. On this point also Congress was powerless to enforcethe treaty. Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina had all enacted laws obstructing the collection ofBritish debts; and in flat defiance of the treaty these statutesremained in force until after the downfall of the Confederation. Thestates were aware that such conduct needed an excuse, and one was soonforthcoming. Many negroes had left the country with the British fleet:some doubtless had sought their freedom; others, perhaps, had beenkidnapped as booty, and sold to planters in the West Indies. The numberof these black men carried away by the fleet had been magnified tenfoldby popular rumour. Complaints had been made to Sir Guy Carleton, but hehad replied that any negro who came within his lines was presumably afreeman, and he could not lend his aid in remanding such persons toslavery. Jay, as one of the treaty commissioners, gave it as his opinionthat Carleton was quite right in this, but he thought that where a lossof slaves could be proved, Great Britain was bound to make pecuniarycompensation to the owners. The matter was wrangled over for severalyears, in the state legislatures, in town and county meetings, atdinner-tables, and in bar-rooms, with the general result that, untilsuch compensation should be made, the statutes hindering the collectionof debts would not be repealed. In retaliation for this, Great Britainrefused to withdraw her garrisons from the western fortresses, which thetreaty had surrendered to the United States. This measure was verykeenly felt by the people. As an assertion of superior strength, it waspeculiarly galling to our weak and divided confederacy, and it alsowrought us direct practical injury. It encouraged the Indian tribes intheir depredations on the frontier, and it deprived American merchantsof an immensely lucrative trade in furs. In the spring of 1787 therewere advertised for sale in London more than 360, 000 skins, worth$1, 200, 000 at the lowest estimate; and had the posts been surrenderedaccording to the treaty, all this would have passed through the hands ofAmerican merchants. The London fur-traders were naturally loth to losetheir control over this business, and in the language of modern politicsthey brought "pressure" to bear on the government to retain thefortresses as long as possible. The American refusal to pay Britishcreditors furnished an excellent excuse, while the weakness of Congressmade any kind of reprisal impossible; and it was not until Washington'ssecond term as president, after our national credit had been restoredand the strength of our new government made manifest, that Englandsurrendered this chain of strongholds, commanding the woods and watersof our northwestern frontier. CHAPTER IV. DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. [Sidenote: Barbarous superstitions about trade. ] At the close of the eighteenth century the barbarous superstitions ofthe Middle Ages concerning trade between nations still flourished withscarcely diminished vitality. The epoch-making work of Adam Smith hadbeen published in the same year in which the United States declaredtheir independence. The one was the great scientific event, as the otherwas the great political event of the age; but of neither the one nor theother were the scope and purport fathomed at the time. Among theforemost statesmen, those who, like Shelburne and Gallatin, understoodthe principles of the "Wealth of Nations" were few indeed. The simpleprinciple that when two parties trade both must be gainers, or one wouldsoon stop trading, was generally lost sight of; and most commerciallegislation proceeded upon the theory that in trade, as in gambling orbetting, what the one party gains the other must lose. Hence towns, districts, and nations surrounded themselves with walls of legislativerestrictions intended to keep out the monster Trade, or to admit himonly on strictest proof that he could do no harm. On this barbaroustheory, the use of a colony consisted in its being a customer which youcould compel to trade with yourself, while you could prevent it fromtrading with anybody else; and having secured this point, you couldcunningly arrange things by legislation so as to throw all the loss uponthis enforced customer, and keep all the gain to yourself. In theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries all the commercial legislation ofthe great colonizing states was based upon this theory of the use of acolony. For effectiveness, it shared to some extent the characteristicfeatures of legislation for making water run up hill. It retardedcommercial development all over the world, fostered monopolies, made therich richer and the poor poorer, hindered the interchange of ideas andthe refinement of manners, and sacrificed millions of human lives inmisdirected warfare; but what it was intended to do it did not do. Thesturdy race of smugglers--those despised pioneers of a highercivilization--thrived in defiance of kings and parliaments; and as itwas impossible to carry out such legislation thoroughly without stoppingtrade altogether, colonies and mother countries contrived to increasetheir wealth in spite of it. The colonies, however, understood theanimus of the theory in so far as it was directed against them, and therevolutionary sentiment in America had gained much of its strength fromthe protest against this one-sided justice. In one of its most importantaspects, the Revolution was a deadly blow aimed at the old system oftrade restrictions. It was to a certain extent a step in realization ofthe noble doctrines of Adam Smith. But where the scientific thinkergrasped the whole principle involved in the matter, the practicalstatesmen saw only the special application which seemed to concern themfor the moment. They all understood that the Revolution had set themfree to trade with other countries than England, but very few of themunderstood that, whatever countries trade together, the one cannot hopeto benefit by impoverishing the other. This point is much better understood in England to-day than in theUnited States; but a century ago there was little to choose between thetwo countries in ignorance of political economy. England had gainedgreat wealth and power through trade with her rapidly growing Americancolonies. One of her chief fears, in the event of American independence, had been the possible loss of that trade. English merchants feared thatAmerican commerce, when no longer confined to its old paths bylegislation, would somehow find its way to France and Holland and Spainand other countries, until nothing would be left for England. TheRevolution worked no such change, however. The principal trade of theUnited States was with England, as before, because England could bestsupply the goods that Americans wanted; and it is such considerations, and not acts of Parliament, that determine trade in its natural andproper channels. In 1783 Pitt introduced into Parliament a bill whichwould have secured mutual unconditional free trade between the twocountries; and this was what such men as Franklin, Jefferson, andMadison desired. Could this bill have passed, the hard feelingsoccasioned by the war would soon have died out, the commercial progressof both countries would have been promoted, and the stupid measureswhich led to a second war within thirty years might have been prevented. But the wisdom of Pitt found less favour in Parliament than the densestupidity of Lord Sheffield, who thought that to admit Americans to thecarrying trade would undermine the naval power of Great Britain. Pitt'smeasure was defeated, and the regulation of commerce with America wasleft to the king in council. Orders were forthwith passed as if upon thetheory that America poor would be a better customer than America rich. [Sidenote: Ship-building in New England. ] [Sidenote: British navigation acts and orders in council directedagainst American commerce. ] The carrying trade to the West Indies had been one of the most importantbranches of American industry. The men of New England were famous forseamanship, and better and cheaper ships could be built in the seaportsof Massachusetts than anywhere in Great Britain. An oak vessel could bebuilt at Gloucester or Salem for twenty-four dollars per ton; a ship oflive-oak or American cedar cost not more than thirty-eight dollars perton. On the other hand, fir vessels built on the Baltic cost thirty-fivedollars per ton, and nowhere in England, France, or Holland could a shipbe made of oak for less than fifty dollars per ton. Often the cost wasas high as sixty dollars. It was not strange, therefore, that before thewar more than one third of the tonnage afloat under the British flag waslaunched from American dock-yards. The war had violently deprivedEngland of this enormous advantage, and now she sought to make theprivation perpetual, in the delusive hope of confining British trade toBritish keels, and in the belief that it was the height of wisdom toimpoverish the nation which she regarded as her best customer. In July, 1783, an order in council proclaimed that henceforth all trade betweenthe United States and the British West Indies must be carried on inBritish-built ships, owned and navigated by British subjects. A seriousblow was thus dealt not only at American shipping, but also at theinterchange of commodities between the states and the islands, which wasgreatly hampered by this restriction. During the whole of the eighteenthcentury the West India sugar trade with the North American colonies andwith Great Britain had been of immense value to all parties, and all hadbeen seriously damaged by the curtailment of it due to the war. Now thatthe artificial state of things created by the war was to be perpetuatedby legislation, the prospect of repairing the loss seemed indefinitelypostponed. Moreover, even in trading directly with Great Britain, American ships were only allowed to bring in articles produced in theparticular states of which their owners were citizens, --an enactmentwhich seemed to add insult to injury, inasmuch as it directed especialattention to the want of union among the thirteen states. Greatindignation was aroused in America, and reprisals were talked of, butefforts were first made to obtain a commercial treaty. [Sidenote: John Adams tries in vain to negotiate a commercial treaty. ] In 1785 Franklin returned from France, and Jefferson was sent asminister in his stead, while John Adams became the first representativeof the United States at the British court. Adams was at first verycourteously received by George III. , and presently set to work toconvince Lord Carmarthen, the foreign secretary, of the desirableness ofunrestricted intercourse between the two countries. But popular opinionin England was obstinately set against him. But for the Navigation Actand the orders in council, it was said, all ships would by and by cometo be built in America, and every time a frigate was wanted for the navythe Lords of Admiralty would have to send over to Boston or Philadelphiaand order one. Rather than do such a thing as this, it was thought thatthe British navy should content itself with vessels of inferiorworkmanship and higher cost, built in British dock-yards. Thirty yearsafter, England gathered an unexpected fruit of this narrow policy, when, to her intense bewilderment, she saw frigate after frigate outsailed anddefeated in single combat with American antagonists. Owing to herexclusive measures, the rapid improvement in American shipbuilding hadgone on quite beyond her ken, until she was thus rudely awakened to it. With similar short-sighted jealousy, it was argued that the Americanshare in the whale-fishery and in the Newfoundland fishery should becurtailed as much as possible. Spermaceti oil was much needed inEngland: complaints were rife of robbery and murder in the dimly lightedstreets of London and other great cities. But it was thought that ifAmerican ships could carry oil to England and salt fish to Jamaica, thesupply of seamen for the British navy would be diminished; andaccordingly such privileges must not be granted the Americans unlessvaluable privileges could be granted in return. But the government ofthe United States could grant no privileges because it could impose norestrictions. British manufactured goods were needed in America, andCongress, which could levy no duties, had no power to keep them out. British merchants and manufacturers, it was argued, already enjoyed allneedful privileges in American ports, and accordingly they asked nofavours and granted none. Such were the arguments to which Adams was obliged to listen. Thepopular feeling was so strong that Pitt could not have stemmed it if hewould. It was in vain that Adams threatened reprisals, and urged thatthe British measures would defeat their own purpose. "The end of theNavigation Act, " said he, "as expressed in its own preamble, is toconfine the commerce of the colonies to the mother country; but now weare become independent states, instead of confining our trade to GreatBritain, it will drive it to other countries:" and he suggested that theAmericans might make a navigation act in their turn, admitting toAmerican ports none but American-built ships, owned and commanded byAmericans. But under the articles of confederation such a threat wasidle, and the British government knew it to be so. Thirteen separatestate governments could never be made to adopt any such measure inconcert. The weakness of Congress had been fatally revealed in itsinability to protect the loyalists or to enforce the payment of debts, and in its failure to raise a revenue for meeting its current expenses. A government thus slighted at home was naturally despised abroad. England neglected to send a minister to Philadelphia, and while Adamswas treated politely, his arguments were unheeded. Whether in thisbehaviour Pitt's government was influenced or not by political as wellas economical reasons, it was certain that a political purpose wasentertained by the king and approved by many people. There was anintention of humiliating the Americans, and it was commonly said thatunder a sufficient weight of commercial distress the states would breakup their feeble union, and come straggling back, one after another, totheir old allegiance. The fiery spirit of Adams could ill brook thiscontemptuous treatment of the nation which he represented. Though hefavoured very liberal commercial relations with the whole world, hecould see no escape from the present difficulties save in systematicretaliation. "I should be sorry, " he said, "to adopt a monopoly, but, driven to the necessity of it, I would not do things by halves. . . . Ifmonopolies and exclusions are the only arms of defence againstmonopolies and exclusions, I would venture upon them without fear ofoffending Dean Tucker or the ghost of Dr. Quesnay. " That is to say, certain commercial privileges must be withheld from Great Britain, inorder to be offered to her in return for reciprocal privileges. It was amiserable policy to be forced to adopt, for such restrictions upon tradeinevitably cut both ways. Like the non-importation agreement of 1768and the embargo of 1808, such a policy was open to the objectionsfamiliarly urged against biting off one's own nose. It was injuringone's self in the hope of injuring somebody else. It was perpetuating intime of peace the obstacles to commerce generated by a state of war. Ina certain sense, it was keeping up warfare by commercial instead ofmilitary methods, and there was danger that it might lead to a renewalof armed conflict. Nevertheless, the conduct of the British governmentseemed to Adams to leave no other course open. But such "means ofpreserving ourselves, " he said, "can never be secured until Congressshall be made supreme in foreign commerce. " [Sidenote: Reprisal impossible; the states impose conflicting duties. ] It was obvious enough that the separate action of the states upon such aquestion was only adding to the general uncertainty and confusion. In1785 New York laid a double duty on all goods whatever imported inBritish ships. In the same year Pennsylvania passed the first of thelong series of American tariff acts, designed to tax the whole communityfor the alleged benefit of a few greedy manufacturers. Massachusettssought to establish committees of correspondence for the purpose ofentering into a new non-importation agreement, and its legislatureresolved that "the present powers of the Congress of the United States, as contained in the articles of confederation, are not fully adequate tothe great purposes they were originally designed to effect. " TheMassachusetts delegates in Congress--Gerry, Holton, and King--wereinstructed to recommend a general convention of the states for thepurpose of revising and amending the articles of confederation; but thedelegates refused to comply with their instructions, and set forth theirreasons in a paper which was approved by Samuel Adams, and caused thelegislature to reconsider its action. It was feared that a call for aconvention might seem too much like an open expression of a want ofconfidence in Congress, and might thereby weaken it still furtherwithout accomplishing any good result. For the present, as a temporaryexpedient, Massachusetts took counsel with New Hampshire, and the twostates passed navigation acts, prohibiting British ships from carryinggoods out of their harbours, and imposing a fourfold duty upon all suchgoods as they should bring in. A discriminating tonnage duty was alsolaid upon all foreign vessels. Rhode Island soon after adopted similarmeasures. In Congress a scheme for a uniform navigation act, to beconcurred in and passed by all the thirteen states, was suggested by oneof the Maryland delegates; but it was opposed by Richard Henry Lee andmost of the delegates from the far south. The southern states, having noships or seamen of their own, feared that the exclusion of Britishcompetition might enable northern ship-owners to charge exorbitant ratesfor carrying their rice and tobacco, thus subjecting them to a ruinousmonopoly; but the gallant Moultrie, then governor of South Carolina, taking a broader view of the case, wrote to Bowdoin, governor ofMassachusetts, asserting the paramount need of harmonious and unitedaction. In the Virginia assembly, a hot-headed member, named Thurston, declared himself in doubt "whether it would not be better to encouragethe British rather than the eastern marine;" but the remark was greetedwith hisses and groans, and the speaker was speedily put down. Amid suchmutual jealousies and misgivings, during the year 1785 acts were passedby ten states granting to Congress the power of regulating commerce forthe ensuing thirteen years. The three states which refrained from actingwere Georgia, South Carolina, and Delaware. The acts of the other tenwere, as might have been expected, a jumble of incongruities. NorthCarolina granted all the power that was asked, but stipulated that whenall the states should have done likewise their acts should be summed upin a new article of confederation. Connecticut, Pennsylvania, andMaryland had fixed the date at which the grant was to take effect, whileRhode Island provided that it should not expire until after the lapse oftwenty-five years. The grant by New Hampshire allowed the power to beused only in one specified way, --by restricting the duties imposable bythe several states. The grants of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Virginia were not to take effect until all the others should go intooperation. The only thing which Congress could do with these acts was torefer them back to the several legislatures, with a polite request totry to reduce them to something like uniformity. [Sidenote: Commercial war between different states. ] Meanwhile, the different states, with their different tariff and tonnageacts, began to make commercial war upon one another. No sooner had theother three New England states virtually closed their ports to Britishshipping than Connecticut threw hers wide open, an act which shefollowed up by laying duties upon imports from Massachusetts. Pennsylvania discriminated against Delaware, and New Jersey, pillaged atonce by both her greater neighbours, was compared to a cask tapped atboth ends. The conduct of New York became especially selfish andblameworthy. That rapid growth which was so soon to carry the city andthe state to a position of primacy in the Union had already begun. Afterthe departure of the British the revival of business went on with leapsand bounds. The feeling of local patriotism waxed strong, and in no onewas it more completely manifested than in George Clinton, theRevolutionary general, whom the people elected governor for ninesuccessive terms. From a humble origin, by dint of shrewdness anduntiring push, Clinton had come to be for the moment the most powerfulman in the state of New York. He had come to look upon the state almostas if it were his own private manor, and his life was devoted tofurthering its interests as he understood them. It was his first articleof faith that New York must be the greatest state in the Union. But hisconceptions of statesmanship were extremely narrow. In his mind, thewelfare of New York meant the pulling down and thrusting aside of allher neighbours and rivals. He was the vigorous and steadfast advocate ofevery illiberal and exclusive measure, and the most uncompromisingenemy to a closer union of the states. His great popular strength andthe commercial importance of the community in which he held sway madehim at this time the most dangerous man in America. The politicalvictories presently to be won by Hamilton, Schuyler, and Livingston, without which our grand and pacific federal union could not have beenbrought into being, were victories won by most desperate fightingagainst the dogged opposition of Clinton. Under his guidance, thehistory of New York, during the five years following the peace of 1783, was a shameful story of greedy monopoly and sectional hate. Of all thethirteen states, none behaved worse except Rhode Island. A single instance, which occurred early in 1787, may serve as anillustration. The city of New York, with its population of 30, 000 souls, had long been supplied with firewood from Connecticut, and with butterand cheese, chickens and garden vegetables, from the thrifty farms ofNew Jersey. This trade, it was observed, carried thousands of dollarsout of the city and into the pockets of detested Yankees and despisedJerseymen. It was ruinous to domestic industry, said the men of NewYork. It must be stopped by those effective remedies of the Sangradoschool of economic doctors, a navigation act and a protective tariff. Acts were accordingly passed, obliging every Yankee sloop which camedown through Hell Gate, and every Jersey market boat which was rowedacross from Paulus Hook to Cortlandt Street, to pay entrance fees andobtain clearances at the custom-house, just as was done by ships fromLondon or Hamburg; and not a cart-load of Connecticut firewood could bedelivered at the back-door of a country-house in Beekman Street until itshould have paid a heavy duty. Great and just was the wrath of thefarmers and lumbermen. The New Jersey legislature made up its mind toretaliate. The city of New York had lately bought a small patch ofground on Sandy Hook, and had built a light-house there. Thislight-house was the one weak spot in the heel of Achilles where ahostile arrow could strike, and New Jersey gave vent to her indignationby laying a tax of $1, 800 a year on it. Connecticut was equally prompt. At a great meeting of business men, held at New London, it wasunanimously agreed to suspend all commercial intercourse with New York. Every merchant signed an agreement, under penalty of $250 for the firstoffence, not to send any goods whatever into the hated state for aperiod of twelve months. By such retaliatory measures, it was hoped thatNew York might be compelled to rescind her odious enactment. But suchmeetings and such resolves bore an ominous likeness to the meetings andresolves which in the years before 1775 had heralded a state of war; andbut for the good work done by the federal convention another five yearswould scarcely have elapsed before shots would have been fired and seedsof perennial hatred sown on the shores that look toward ManhattanIsland. [Sidenote: Disputes about territory; disasters in the valley of Wyoming, 1784. ] To these commercial disputes there were added disputes about territory. The chronic quarrel between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the valleyof Wyoming was decided in the autumn of 1782 by a special federalcourt, appointed in accordance with the articles of confederation. Theprize was adjudged to Pennsylvania, and the government of Connecticutsubmitted as gracefully as possible. But new troubles were in store forthe inhabitants of that beautiful region. The traces of the massacre of1778 had disappeared, the houses had been rebuilt, new settlers had comein, and the pretty villages had taken on their old look of contentmentand thrift, when in the spring of 1784 there came an accumulation ofdisasters. During a very cold winter great quantities of snow hadfallen, and lay piled in huge masses on the mountain sides, until inMarch a sudden thaw set in. The Susquehanna rose, and overflowed thevalley, and great blocks of ice drifted here and there, carrying deathand destruction with them. Houses, barns, and fences were swept away, the cattle were drowned, the fruit trees broken down, the stores of fooddestroyed, and over the whole valley there lay a stratum of gravel andpebbles. The people were starving with cold and hunger, and PresidentDickinson urged the legislature to send prompt relief to the sufferers. But the hearts of the members were as flint, and their talk wasincredibly wicked. Not a penny would they give to help the accursedYankees. It served them right. If they had stayed in Connecticut, wherethey belonged, they would have kept out of harm's way. And with ablasphemy thinly veiled in phrases of pious unction, the desolation ofthe valley was said to have been contrived by the Deity with theexpress object of punishing these trespassers. But the cruelty of thePennsylvania legislature was not confined to words. A scheme was devisedfor driving out the settlers and partitioning their lands among acompany of speculators. A force of militia was sent to Wyoming, commanded by a truculent creature named Patterson. The ostensiblepurpose was to assist in restoring order in the valley, but thebehaviour of the soldiers was such as would have disgraced a horde ofbarbarians. They stole what they could find, dealt out blows to the menand insults to the women, until their violence was met with violence inreturn. Then Patterson sent a letter to President Dickinson, accusingthe farmers of sedition, and hinting that extreme measures werenecessary. Having thus, as he thought, prepared the way, he attacked thesettlement, turned some five hundred people out-of-doors, and burnedtheir houses to the ground. The wretched victims, many of them tenderwomen, or infirm old men, or little children, were driven into thewilderness at the point of the bayonet, and told to find their way toConnecticut without further delay. Heartrending scenes ensued. Many diedof exhaustion, or furnished food for wolves. But this was more than thePennsylvania legislature had intended. Patterson's zeal had carried himtoo far. He was recalled, and the sheriff of Northumberland County wassent, with a posse of men, to protect the settlers. Patterson disobeyed, however, and withdrawing his men to a fortified lair in the mountains, kept up a guerilla warfare. All the Connecticut men in the neighbouringcountry flew to arms. Men were killed on both sides, and presentlyPatterson was besieged. A regiment of soldiers was then sent fromPhiladelphia, under Colonel Armstrong, who had formerly been on Gates'sstaff, the author of the incendiary Newburgh address. On arriving in thevalley, Armstrong held a parley with the Connecticut men, and persuadedthem to lay down their arms; assuring them on his honour that theyshould meet with no ill treatment, and that their enemy, Patterson, should be disarmed also. Having thus fallen into this soldier'sclutches, they were forthwith treated as prisoners. Seventy-six of themwere handcuffed and sent under guard, some to Easton and some toNorthumberland, where they were thrown into jail. Great was the indignation in New England when these deeds were heard of. The matter had become very serious. A war between Connecticut andPennsylvania might easily grow out of it. But the danger was avertedthrough a very singular feature in the Pennsylvania constitution. Inorder to hold its legislature in check, Pennsylvania had a council ofcensors, which was assembled once in seven years in order to inquirewhether the state had been properly governed during the interval. Soonafter the troubles in Wyoming the regular meeting of the censors washeld, and the conduct of Armstrong and Patterson was unreservedlycondemned. A hot controversy ensued between the legislature and thecensors, and as the people set great store by the latter peculiarinstitution, public sympathy was gradually awakened for the sufferers. The wickedness of the affair began to dawn upon people's minds, andthey were ashamed of what had been done. Patterson and Armstrong werefrowned down, the legislature disavowed their acts, and it was orderedthat full reparation should be made to the persecuted settlers ofWyoming. [4] [Sidenote: Troubles in the Green Mountains, 1777-84. ] In the Green Mountains and on the upper waters of the Connecticut therehad been trouble for many years. In the course of the Revolutionary War, the fierce dispute between New York and New Hampshire for the possessionof the Green Mountains came in from time to time to influence mostcuriously the course of events. It was closely connected with theintrigues against General Schuyler, and thus more remotely with theConway cabal and the treason of Arnold. About the time of Burgoyne'sinvasion the association of Green Mountain Boys endeavoured to cut theGordian knot by declaring Vermont an independent state, and applying tothe Continental Congress for admission into the Union. The New Yorkdelegates in Congress succeeded in defeating this scheme, but theVermont people went on and framed their constitution. Thomas Chittenden, a man of rough manners but very considerable ability, a farmer andinnkeeper, like Israel Putnam, was chosen governor, and held thatposition for many years. New Hampshire thus far had not actively opposedthese measures, but fresh grounds of quarrel were soon at hand. Severaltowns on the east bank of the Connecticut River wished to escape fromthe jurisdiction of New Hampshire. They preferred to belong to Vermont, because it was not within the Union, and accordingly not liable torequisitions of taxes from the Continental Congress. It was convenientlyremembered that by the original grant, in the reign of Charles II. , NewHampshire extended only sixty miles from the coast. Vermont was at firstinclined to assent, but finding the scheme unpopular in Congress, andnot wishing to offend that body, she changed her mind. The towns on bothbanks of the river then tried to organize themselves into a middlestate, --a sort of Lotharingia on the banks of this New World Rhine, --tobe called New Connecticut. By this time New Hampshire was aroused, andshe called attention to the fact that she still believed herselfentitled to dominion over the whole of Vermont. Massachusetts now beganto suspect that the upshot of the matter would be the partition of thewhole disputed territory between New Hampshire and New York, and, ransacking her ancient grants and charters, she decided to set up aclaim on her own part to the southernmost towns in Vermont. Thus goadedon all sides, Vermont adopted an aggressive policy. She not only annexedthe towns east of the Connecticut River, but also asserted sovereigntyover the towns in New York as far as the Hudson. New York sent troops tothe threatened frontier, New Hampshire prepared to do likewise, and fora moment war seemed inevitable. But here, as in so many other instances, Washington appeared as peace-maker, and prevailed upon GovernorChittenden to use his influence in getting the dangerous claimswithdrawn. After the spring of 1784 the outlook was less stormy in theGreen Mountains. The conflicting claims were allowed to lie dormant, butthe possibilities of mischief remained, and the Vermont question was notfinally settled until after the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Meanwhile, on the debatable frontier between Vermont and New York theembers of hatred smouldered. Barns and houses were set on fire, andbelated wayfarers were found mysteriously murdered in the depths of theforest. [Sidenote: One nation or thirteen?] Incidents like these of Wyoming and Vermont seem trivial, perhaps, whencontrasted with the lurid tales of border warfare in older times betweenhalf-civilized peoples of mediæval Europe, as we read them in the pagesof Froissart and Sir Walter Scott. But their historic lesson is none theless clear. Though they lift the curtain but a little way, they show usa glimpse of the untold dangers and horrors from which the adoption ofour Federal Constitution has so thoroughly freed us that we can onlywith some effort realize how narrowly we have escaped them. It is fitthat they should be borne in mind, that we may duly appreciate thesignificance of the reign of law and order which has been established onthis continent during the greater part of a century. When reported inEurope, such incidents were held to confirm the opinion that theAmerican confederacy was going to pieces. With quarrels about trade andquarrels about boundaries, we seemed to be treading the old-fashionedpaths of anarchy, even as they had been trodden in other ages and otherparts of the world. It was natural that people in Europe should thinkso, because there was no historic precedent to help them in forming adifferent opinion. No one could possibly foresee that within five yearsa number of gentlemen at Philadelphia, containing among themselves agreater amount of political sagacity than had ever before been broughttogether within the walls of a single room, would amicably discuss thesituation and agree upon a new system of government whereby the dangersmight be once for all averted. Still less could any one foresee thatthese gentlemen would not only agree upon a scheme among themselves, butwould actually succeed, without serious civil dissension, in making thepeople of thirteen states adopt, defend, and cherish it. Historyafforded no example of such a gigantic act of constructivestatesmanship. It was, moreover, a strange and apparently fortuitouscombination of circumstances that were now preparing the way for it andmaking its accomplishment possible. No one could forecast the future. When our ministers and agents in Europe raised the question as to makingcommercial treaties, they were disdainfully asked whether Europeanpowers were expected to deal with thirteen governments or with one. Ifit was answered that the United States constituted a single governmentso far as their relations with foreign powers were concerned, then wewere forthwith twitted with our failure to keep our engagements withEngland with regard to the loyalists and the collection of privatedebts. Yes, we see, said the European diplomats; the United States areone nation to-day and thirteen to-morrow, according as may seem tosubserve their selfish interests. Jefferson, at Paris, was told againand again that it was useless for the French government to enter intoany agreement with the United States, as there was no certainty that itwould be fulfilled on our part; and the same things were said all overEurope. Toward the close of the war most of the European nations hadseemed ready to enter into commercial arrangements with the UnitedStates, but all save Holland speedily lost interest in the subject. JohnAdams had succeeded in making a treaty with Holland in 1782. Frederickthe Great treated us more civilly than other sovereigns. One of the lastacts of his life was to conclude a treaty for ten years with the UnitedStates; asserting the principle that free ships make free goods, takingarms and military stores out of the class of contraband, agreeing torefrain from privateering even in case of war between the two countries, and in other respects showing a liberal and enlightened spirit. [Sidenote: Failure of American credit; John Adams begging in Holland, 1784. ] This treaty was concluded in 1786. It scarcely touched the subject ofinternational trade in time of peace, but it was valuable as regardedthe matters it covered, and in the midst of the general failure ofAmerican diplomacy in Europe it fell pleasantly upon our ears. Ourdiplomacy had failed because our weakness had been proclaimed to theworld. We were bullied by England, insulted by France and Spain, andlooked askance at in Holland. The humiliating position in which ourministers were placed by the beggarly poverty of Congress was somethingalmost beyond credence. It was by no means unusual for thesuperintendent of finance, when hard pushed for money, to draw upon ourforeign ministers, and then sell the drafts for cash. This was not onlynot unusual; it was an established custom. It was done again and again, when there was not the smallest ground for supposing that the ministerupon whom the draft was made would have any funds wherewith to meet it. He must go and beg the money. That was part of his duty as envoy, --tosolicit loans without security for a government that could not raiseenough money by taxation to defray its current expenses. It wassickening work. Just before John Adams had been appointed minister toEngland, and while he was visiting in London, he suddenly learned thatdrafts upon him had been presented to his bankers in Amsterdam to theamount of more than a million florins. Less than half a million florinswere on hand to meet these demands, and unless something were done atonce the greater part of this paper would go back to America protested. Adams lost not a moment in starting for Holland. In these modern days ofprecision in travel, when we can translate space into time, the distancebetween London and Amsterdam is eleven hours. It was accomplished byAdams, after innumerable delays and vexations and no little danger, infifty-four days. The bankers had contrived, by ingenious excuses, tokeep the drafts from going to protest until the minister's arrival, butthe gazettes were full of the troubles of Congress and the bickeringsof the states, and everybody was suspicious. Adams applied in vain tothe regency of Amsterdam. The promise of the American government was notregarded as valid security for a sum equivalent to about three hundredthousand dollars. The members of the regency were polite, butinexorable. They could not make a loan on such terms; it wasunbusinesslike and contrary to precedent. Finding them immovable, Adamswas forced to apply to professional usurers and Jew brokers, from whom, after three weeks of perplexity and humiliation, he obtained a loan atexorbitant interest, and succeeded in meeting the drafts. It was onlytoo plain, as he mournfully confessed, that American credit was dead. Such were the trials of our American ministers in Europe in the darkdays of the League of Friendship. It was not a solitary, but a typical, instance. John Jay's experience at the unfriendly court of Spain wasperhaps even more trying. [Sidenote: The Barbary pirates. ] European governments might treat us with cold disdain, and Europeanbankers might pronounce our securities worthless, but there was onequarter of the world from which even worse measure was meted out to us. Of all the barbarous communities with which the civilized world has hadto deal in modern times, perhaps none have made so much trouble as theMussulman states on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. After thebreaking up of the great Moorish kingdoms of the Middle Ages, thisregion had fallen under the nominal control of the Turkish sultans aslords paramount of the orthodox Mohammedan world. Its miserablepopulations became the prey of banditti. Swarms of half-savagechieftains settled down upon the land like locusts, and out of such apandemonium of robbery and murder as has scarcely been equalled inhistoric times the pirate states of Morocco and Algiers, Tunis andTripoli, gradually emerged. Of these communities history has not onegood word to say. In these fair lands, once illustrious for the geniusand virtues of a Hannibal and the profound philosophy of St. Augustine, there grew up some of the most terrible despotisms ever known to theworld. The things done daily by the robber sovereigns were such as tomake a civilized imagination recoil with horror. One of these cheerfulcreatures, who reigned in the middle of the eighteenth century, and wascalled Muley Abdallah, especially prided himself on his peculiar skillin mounting a horse. Resting his left hand upon the horse's neck, as hesprang into the saddle he simultaneously swung the sharp scimiter in hisright hand so deftly as to cut off the head of the groom who held thebridle. From his behaviour in these sportive moods one may judge what hewas capable of on serious occasions. He was a fair sample of the Barbarymonarchs. The foreign policy of these wretches was summed up in piracyand blackmail. Their corsairs swept the Mediterranean and ventured farout upon the ocean, capturing merchant vessels, and murdering orenslaving their crews. Of the rich booty, a fixed proportion was paidover to the robber sovereign, and the rest was divided among the gang. So lucrative was this business that it attracted hardy ruffians fromall parts of Europe, and the misery they inflicted upon mankind duringfour centuries was beyond calculation. One of their favourite practiceswas the kidnapping of eminent or wealthy persons, in the hope ofextorting ransom. Cervantes and Vincent de Paul were among thecelebrated men who thus tasted the horrors of Moorish slavery; but itwas a calamity that might fall to the lot of any man, or woman, and itwas but rarely that the victims ever regained their freedom. [Sidenote: American citizens kidnapped. ] Against these pirates the governments of Europe contended in vain. Swiftcruisers frequently captured their ships, and from the days of Joan ofArc down to the days of Napoleon their skeletons swung from long rows ofgibbets on all the coasts of Europe, as a terror and a warning. Buttheir losses were easily repaired, and sometimes they cruised in fleetsof seventy or eighty sail, defying the navies of England and France. Itwas not until after England, in Nelson's time, had acquired supremacy inthe Mediterranean that this dreadful scourge was destroyed. Americans, however, have just ground for pride in recollecting that theirgovernment was foremost in chastising these pirates in their ownharbours. The exploits of our little navy in the Mediterranean at thebeginning of the present century form an interesting episode in Americanhistory, but in the weak days of the Confederation our commerce wasplundered with impunity, and American citizens were seized and sold intoslavery in the markets of Algiers and Tripoli. One reason for the longsurvival of this villainy was the low state of humanity among Europeannations. An Englishman's sympathy was but feebly aroused by the plunderof Frenchmen, and the bigoted Spaniard looked on with approval so longas it was Protestants that were kidnapped and bastinadoed. In 1783 LordSheffield published a pamphlet on the commerce of the United States, inwhich he shamelessly declared that the Barbary pirates were reallyuseful to the great maritime powers, because they tended to keep theweaker nations out of their share in the carrying trade. This, hethought, was a valuable offset to the Empress Catherine's device of thearmed neutrality, whereby small nations were protected; and on thiswicked theory, as Franklin tells us, London merchants had been heard tosay that "if there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while tobuild one. " It was largely because of such feelings that the greatstates of Europe so long persisted in the craven policy of payingblackmail to the robbers, instead of joining in a crusade and destroyingthem. [Sidenote: Tripoli demands blackmail, Feb. 1786. ] In 1786 Congress felt it necessary to take measures for protecting thelives and liberties of American citizens. The person who called himself"Emperor" of Morocco at that time was different from most of his kind. He had a taste for reading, and had thus caught a glimmering of theenlightened liberalism which French philosophers were preaching. Hewished to be thought a benevolent despot, and with Morocco, accordingly, Congress succeeded in making a treaty. But nothing could be done withthe other pirate states without paying blackmail. Few scenes in ourhistory are more amusing, or more irritating, than the interview of JohnAdams with an envoy from Tripoli in London. The oily-tongued barbarian, with his soft voice and his bland smile, asseverating that his onlyinterest in life was to do good and make other people happy, stands outin fine contrast with the blunt, straightforward, and truthful NewEnglander; and their conversation reminds one of the old story ofCoeur-de-Lion with his curtal-axe and Saladin with the blade that cutthe silken cushion. Adams felt sure that the fellow was either saint ordevil, but could not quite tell which. The envoy's love for mankind wasso great that he could not bear the thought of hostility between theAmericans and the Barbary States, and he suggested that everything mightbe happily arranged for a million dollars or so. Adams thought it betterto fight than to pay tribute. It would be cheaper in the end, as well asmore manly. At the same time, it was better economy to pay a milliondollars at once than waste many times that sum in war risks and loss oftrade. But Congress could do neither one thing nor the other. It was toopoor to build a navy, and too poor to buy off the pirates; and so forseveral years to come American ships were burned and American sailorsenslaved with utter impunity. With the memory of such wrongs deeplygraven in his heart, it was natural that John Adams, on becomingpresident of the United States, should bend his energies toward foundinga strong American navy. [Sidenote: Congress unable to protect American citizens. ] A government touches the lowest point of ignominy when it confesses itsinability to protect the lives and property of its citizens. Agovernment which has come to this has failed in discharging the primaryfunction of government, and forthwith ceases to have any reason forexisting. In March, 1786, Grayson wrote to Madison that several membersof Congress thought seriously of recommending a general convention forremodelling the government. "I have not made up my mind, " says Grayson, "whether it would not be better to bear the ills we have than fly tothose we know not of. I am, however, in no doubt about the weakness ofthe federal government. If it remains much longer in its present stateof imbecility, we shall be one of the most contemptible nations on theface of the earth. " "It is clear to me as A, B, C, " said Washington, "that an extension of federal powers would make us one of the mosthappy, wealthy, respectable, and powerful nations that ever inhabitedthe terrestrial globe. Without them we shall soon be everything which isthe direct reverse. I predict the worst consequences from ahalf-starved, limping government, always moving upon crutches andtottering at every step. " [Sidenote: Financial distress precipitates the political crisis. ] There is no telling how long the wretched state of things which followedthe Revolution might have continued, had not the crisis beenprecipitated by the wild attempts of the several states to remedy thedistress of the people by legislation. That financial distress waswidespread and deep-seated was not to be denied. At the beginning of thewar the amount of accumulated capital in the country had been verysmall. The great majority of the people did little more than get fromthe annual yield of their farms or plantations enough to meet thecurrent expenses of the year. Outside of agriculture the chief resourceswere the carrying trade, the exchange of commodities with England andthe West Indies, and the cod and whale fisheries; and in theseoccupations many people had grown rich. The war had destroyed all thesesources of revenue. Imports and exports had alike been stopped, so thatthere was a distressing scarcity of some of the commonest householdarticles. The enemy's navy had kept us from the fisheries. Before thewar, the dock-yards of Nantucket were ringing with the busy sound ofadze and hammer, rope-walks covered the island, and two hundred keelssailed yearly in quest of spermaceti. At the return of peace, the dockswere silent and grass grew in the streets. The carrying trade and thefisheries began soon to revive, but it was some years before the oldprosperity was restored. The war had also wrought serious damage toagriculture, and in some parts of the country the direct destruction ofproperty by the enemy's troops had been very great. To all these causesof poverty there was added the hopeless confusion due to aninconvertible paper currency. The worst feature of this financial deviceis that it not only impoverishes people, but bemuddles their brains bycreating a false and fleeting show of prosperity. By violentlydisturbing apparent values, it always brings on an era of wildspeculation and extravagance in living, followed by sudden collapse andprotracted suffering. In such crises the poorest people, those who earntheir bread by the sweat of their brows and have no margin ofaccumulated capital, always suffer the most. Above all men, it is thelabouring man who needs sound money and steady values. We have seen allthese points amply illustrated since the War of Secession. After the Warof Independence, when the margin of accumulated capital was so muchsmaller, the misery was much greater. While the paper money lasted therewas marked extravagance in living, and complaints were loud against thespeculators, especially those who operated in bread-stuffs. Washingtonsaid he would like to hang them all on a gallows higher than that ofHaman; but they were, after all, but the inevitable products of thisabnormal state of things, and the more guilty criminals were thedemagogues who went about preaching the doctrine that the poor man needscheap money. After the collapse of this continental currency in 1780, itseemed as if there were no money in the country, and at the peace therenewal of trade with England seemed at first to make matters worse. Thebrisk importation of sorely needed manufactured goods, which then began, would naturally have been paid for in the south by indigo, rice, andtobacco, in the middle states by exports of wheat and furs, and in NewEngland by the profits of the fisheries, the shipping, and the WestIndia trade. But in the southern and middle states the necessary revivalof agriculture could not be effected in a moment, and Britishlegislation against American shipping and the West India trade fell withcrippling force upon New England. Consequently, we had little else butspecie with which to pay for imports, and the country was soon drainedof what little specie there was. In the absence of a circulating mediumthere was a reversion to the practice of barter, and the revival ofbusiness was thus further impeded. Whiskey in North Carolina, tobacco inVirginia, did duty as measures of value; and Isaiah Thomas, editor ofthe Worcester "Spy, " announced that he would receive subscriptions forhis paper in salt pork. [Sidenote: State of the coinage. ] It is worth while, in this connection, to observe what this specie was, the scarcity of which created so much embarrassment. Until 1785 nonational coinage was established, and none was issued until 1793. English, French, Spanish, and German coins, of various and uncertainvalue, passed from hand to hand. Beside the ninepences andfourpence-ha'-pennies, there were bits and half-bits, pistareens, picayunes, and fips. Of gold pieces there were the johannes, or joe, thedoubloon, the moidore, and pistole, with English and French guineas, carolins, ducats, and chequins. Of coppers there were English pence andhalfpence and French sous; and pennies were issued at local mints inVermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. TheEnglish shilling had everywhere degenerated in value, but differently indifferent localities; and among silver pieces the Spanish dollar, fromLouisiana and Cuba, had begun to supersede it as a measure of value. InNew England the shilling had sunk from nearly one fourth to one sixth ofa dollar; in New York to one eighth; in North Carolina to one tenth. Itwas partly for this reason that in devising a national coinage the moreuniform dollar was adopted as the unit. At the same time the decimalsystem of division was adopted instead of the cumbrous English system, and the result was our present admirably simple currency, which we oweto Gouverneur Morris, aided as to some points by Thomas Jefferson. During the period of the Confederation, the chaotic state of thecurrency was a serious obstacle to trade, and it afforded endlessopportunities for fraud and extortion. Clipping and counterfeiting werecarried to such lengths that every moderately cautious person, in takingpayment in hard cash, felt it necessary to keep a small pair of scalesbeside him and carefully weigh each coin, after narrowly scrutinizingits stamp and deciphering its legend. [Sidenote: Cost of the war; Robert Morris and his immense services. ] In view of all these complicated impediments to business on the morrowof a long and costly war, it was not strange that the whole country wasin some measure pauperized. The cost of the war, estimated in cash, hadbeen about $170, 000, 000--a huge sum if we consider the circumstances ofthe country at that time. To meet this crushing indebtedness Mr. Hildreth reckons the total amount raised by the states, whether by meansof repudiated paper or of taxes, down to 1784, as not more than$30, 000, 000. No wonder if the issue of such a struggle seemed quitehopeless. In many parts of the country, by the year 1786, the payment oftaxes had come to be regarded as an amiable eccentricity. At onemoment, early in 1782, there was not a single dollar in the treasury. That the government had in any way been able to finish the war, afterthe downfall of its paper money, was due to the gigantic efforts of onegreat man, --Robert Morris, of Pennsylvania. This statesman was born inEngland, but he had come to Philadelphia in his boyhood, and had amassedan enormous fortune, which he devoted without stint to the service ofhis adopted country. Though opposed to the Declaration of Independenceas rash and premature, he had, nevertheless, signed his name to thatdocument, and scarcely any one had contributed more to the success ofthe war. It was he who supplied the money which enabled Washington tocomplete the great campaign of Trenton and Princeton. In 1781 he wasmade superintendent of finance, and by dint of every imaginable deviceof hard-pressed ingenuity he contrived to support the brilliant workwhich began at the Cowpens and ended at Yorktown. He established theBank of North America as an instrument by which government loans mightbe negotiated. Sometimes his methods were such as doctors call heroic, as when he made sudden drafts upon our ministers in Europe after themanner already described. In every dire emergency he was Washington'schief reliance, and in his devotion to the common weal he drew upon hisprivate resources until he became poor; and in later years--for shame beit said--an ungrateful nation allowed one of its noblest and mostdisinterested champions to languish in a debtor's prison. It was of illomen for the fortunes of the weak and disorderly Confederation that in1784, after three years of herculean struggle with impossibilities, thisstout heart and sagacious head could no longer weather the storm. Thetask of creating wealth out of nothing had become too arduous and toothankless to be endured. Robert Morris resigned his place, and it wastaken by a congressional committee of finance, under whose managementthe disorders only hurried to a crisis. [Sidenote: The craze for paper-money, 1786. ] By 1786, under the universal depression and want of confidence, alltrade had well-nigh stopped, and political quackery, with its cheap anddirty remedies, had full control of the field. In the very face ofmiseries so plainly traceable to the deadly paper currency, it may seemstrange that people should now have begun to clamour for a renewal ofthe experiment which had worked so much evil. Yet so it was. As starvingmen are said to dream of dainty banquets, so now a craze for fictitiouswealth in the shape of paper money ran like an epidemic through thecountry. There was a Barmecide feast of economic vagaries; only now itwas the several states that sought to apply the remedy, each in its ownway. And when we have threaded the maze of this rash legislation, weshall the better understand that clause in our federal constitutionwhich forbids the making of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The events of 1786 impressed upon men's minds more forcibly than everthe wretched and disorderly condition of the country, and went fartoward calling into existence the needful popular sentiment in favour ofan overruling central government. [Sidenote: Agitation in southern and middle states. ] The disorders assumed very different forms in the different states, andbrought out a great diversity of opinion as to the causes of thedistress and the efficacy of the proposed remedies. Only two states outof the thirteen--Connecticut and Delaware--escaped the infection, but, on the other hand, it was only in seven states that the paper moneyparty prevailed in the legislatures. North Carolina issued a largeamount of paper, and, in order to get it into circulation as quickly aspossible, the state government proceeded to buy tobacco with it, payingdouble the specie value of the tobacco. As a natural consequence, thepaper dollar instantly fell to seventy cents, and went on declining. InSouth Carolina an issue was tried somewhat more cautiously, but theplanters soon refused to take the paper at its face value. Coercivemeasures were then attempted. Planters and merchants were urged to signa pledge not to discriminate between paper and gold, and if any onedared refuse the fanatics forthwith attempted to make it hot for him. Akind of "Kuklux" society was organized at Charleston, known as the "HintClub. " Its purpose was to hint to such people that they had better lookout. If they did not mend their ways, it was unnecessary to inform themmore explicitly what they might expect. Houses were combustible then asnow, and the use of firearms was well understood. In Georgia thelegislature itself attempted coercion. Paper money was made a legaltender in spite of strong opposition, and a law was passed prohibitingany planter or merchant from exporting any produce without takingaffidavit that he had never refused to receive this scrip at its fullface value. But somehow people found that the more it was sought to keepup the paper by dint of threats and forcing acts, the faster its valuefell. Virginia had issued bills of credit during the campaign of 1781, but it was enacted at the same time that they should not be a legaltender after the next January. The influence of Washington, Madison, andMason was effectively brought to bear in favour of sound currency, andthe people of Virginia were but slightly affected by the craze of 1786. In the autumn of that year a proposition from two counties for an issueof paper was defeated in the legislature by a vote of eighty-five toseventeen, and no more was heard of the matter. In Maryland, after avery obstinate fight, a rag money bill was carried in the house ofrepresentatives, but the senate threw it out; and the measure was thuspostponed until the discussion over the federal constitution supersededit in popular interest. Pennsylvania had warily begun in May, 1785, toissue a million dollars in bills of credit, which were not made a legaltender for the payment of private debts. They were mainly loaned tofarmers on mortgage, and were received by the state as an equivalent forspecie in the payment of taxes. By August, 1786, even this carefullyguarded paper had fallen some twelve cents below par, --not a bad showingfor such a year as that. New York moved somewhat less cautiously. Amillion dollars were issued in bills of credit receivable for thecustom-house duties, which were then paid into the state treasury; andthese bills were made a legal tender for all money received in lawsuits. At the same time the New Jersey legislature passed a bill for issuinghalf a million paper dollars, to be a legal tender in all businesstransactions. The bill was vetoed by the governor in council. The agedGovernor Livingston was greatly respected by the people; and so the mobat Elizabethtown, which had duly planted a stake and dragged his effigyup to it, refrained from inflicting the last indignities upon the image, and burned that of one of the members of the council instead. At thenext session the governor yielded, and the rag money was issued. But anunforeseen difficulty arose. Most of the dealings of New Jersey peoplewere in the cities of New York and Philadelphia, and in both cities themerchants refused their paper, so that it speedily became worthless. The business of exchange was thus fast getting into hopeless confusion. It has been said of Bradshaw's Railway Guide, the indispensablecompanion of the traveller in England, that no man can study it for anhour without qualifying himself for an insane asylum. But Bradshaw ispellucid clearness compared with the American tables of exchange in1786, with their medley of dollars and shillings, moidores andpistareens. The addition of half a dozen different kinds of papercreated such a labyrinth as no human intellect could explore. No wonderthat men were counted wise who preferred to take whiskey and porkinstead. Nobody who had a yard of cloth to sell could tell how much itwas worth. But even worse than all this was the swift and certainrenewal of bankruptcy which so many states were preparing forthemselves. [Sidenote: Distress in New England. ] Nowhere did the warning come so quickly or so sharply as in New England. Connecticut, indeed, as already observed, came off scot-free. She hadissued a little paper money soon after the battle of Lexington, but hadstopped it about the time of the surrender of Burgoyne. In 1780 she hadwisely and summarily adjusted all relations between debtor and creditor, and the crisis of 1786 found her people poor enough, no doubt, but ableto wait for better times and indisposed to adopt violent remedies. Itwas far otherwise in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. These werepreëminently the maritime states of the Union, and upon them the blowsaimed by England at American commerce had fallen most severely. It wasthese two maritime states that suffered most from the cutting down ofthe carrying trade and the restriction of intercourse with the WestIndies. These things worked injury to shipbuilding, to the exports oflumber and oil and salted fish, even to the manufacture of Medford rum. Nowhere had the normal machinery of business been thrown out of gear soextensively as in these two states, and in Rhode Island there was theadded disturbance due to a prolonged occupation by the enemy's troops. Nowhere, perhaps, was there a larger proportion of the population indebt, and in these preëminently commercial communities private debtswere a heavier burden and involved more personal suffering than in thesomewhat patriarchal system of life in Virginia or South Carolina. Inthe time of which we are now treating, imprisonment for debt was common. High-minded but unfortunate men were carried to jail, and herded withthieves and ruffians in loathsome dungeons, for the crime of owing ahundred dollars which they could not promptly pay. Under suchcircumstances, a commercial disturbance, involving widespread debt, entailed an amount of personal suffering and humiliation of which, inthese kinder days, we can form no adequate conception. It tended to makethe debtor an outlaw, ready to entertain schemes for the subversion ofsociety. In the crisis of 1786, the agitation in Rhode Island andMassachusetts reached white heat, and things were done which alarmed thewhole country. But the course of events was different in the two states. In Rhode Island the agitators obtained control of the government, andthe result was a paroxysm of tyranny. In Massachusetts the agitatorsfailed to secure control of the government, and the result was aparoxysm of rebellion. [Sidenote: Rag money victorious in Rhode Island; the "Know Ye"measures. ] The debates over paper money in the Rhode Island legislature began in1785, but the advocates of a sound currency were victorious. These menwere roundly abused in the newspapers, and in the next spring electionmost of them lost their seats. The legislature of 1786 showed anoverwhelming majority in favor of paper money. The farmers from theinland towns were unanimous in supporting the measure. They could notsee the difference between the state making a dollar out of paper and adollar out of silver. The idea that the value did not lie in thegovernment stamp they dismissed as an idle crotchet, a wire-drawntheory, worthy only of "literary fellows. " What they could see was theglaring fact that they had no money, hard or soft; and they wantedsomething that would satisfy their creditors and buy new gowns for theirwives, whose raiment was unquestionably the worse for wear. On the otherhand, the merchants from seaports like Providence, Newport, and Bristolunderstood the difference between real money and the promissory notes ofa bankrupt government, but they were in a hopeless minority. Half amillion dollars were issued in scrip, to be loaned to the farmers on amortgage of their real estate. No one could obtain the scrip withoutgiving a mortgage for twice the amount, and it was thought that thissecurity would make it as good as gold. But the depreciation beganinstantly. When the worthy farmers went to the store for dry goods orsugar, and found the prices rising with dreadful rapidity, they were atfirst astonished, and then enraged. The trouble, as they truly said, waswith the wicked merchants, who would not take the paper dollars at theirface value. These men were thus thwarting the government, and must bepunished. An act was accordingly hurried through the legislature, commanding every one to take paper as an equivalent for gold, underpenalty of five hundred dollars fine and loss of the right of suffrage. The merchants in the cities thereupon shut up their shops. During thesummer of 1786 all business was at a standstill in Newport andProvidence, except in the bar-rooms. There and about the market-placesmen spent their time angrily discussing politics, and scarcely a daypassed without street-fights, which at times grew into riots. In thecountry, too, no less than in the cities, the goddess of discordreigned. The farmers determined to starve the city people intosubmission, and they entered into an agreement not to send any produceinto the cities until the merchants should open their shops and beginselling their goods for paper at its face value. Not wishing to losetheir pigs and butter and grain, they tried to dispose of them in Bostonand New York, and in the coast towns of Connecticut. But in all theseplaces their proceedings had awakened such lively disgust that placardswere posted in the taverns warning purchasers against farm produce fromRhode Island. Disappointed in these quarters, the farmers threw awaytheir milk, used their corn for fuel, and let their apples rot on theground, rather than supply the detested merchants. Food grew scarce inProvidence and Newport, and in the latter city a mob of sailorsattempted unsuccessfully to storm the provision stores. The farmers werethreatened with armed violence. Town-meetings were held all over thestate, to discuss the situation, and how long they might have talked tono purpose none can say, when all at once the matter was brought intocourt. A cabinet-maker in Newport named Trevett went into a meat-marketkept by one John Weeden, and selecting a joint of meat, offered paper inpayment. Weeden refused to take the paper except at a heavy discount. Trevett went to bed supperless, and next morning informed against theobstinate butcher for disobedience to the forcing act. Should the courtfind him guilty, it would be a good speculation for Trevett, for half ofthe five hundred dollars fine was to go to the informer. Hard-money menfeared lest the court might prove subservient to the legislature, sincethat body possessed the power of removing the five judges. The case wastried in September amid furious excitement. Huge crowds gathered aboutthe court-house and far down the street, screaming and cheering like acrowd on the night of a presidential election. The judges wereclear-headed men, not to be browbeaten. They declared the forcing actunconstitutional, and dismissed the complaint. Popular wrath then turnedupon them. A special session of the legislature was convened, four ofthe judges were removed, and a new forcing-act was prepared. This actprovided that no man could vote at elections or hold any office withouttaking a test oath promising to receive paper money at par. But this wasgoing too far. Many soft-money men were not wild enough to support sucha measure; among the farmers there were some who had grown tired ofseeing their produce spoiled on their hands; and many of the richestmerchants had announced their intention of moving out of the state. Thenew forcing act accordingly failed to pass, and presently the old onewas repealed. The paper dollar had been issued in May; in November itpassed for sixteen cents. These outrageous proceedings awakened disgust and alarm among sensiblepeople in all the other states, and Rhode Island was everywhere reviledand made fun of. One clause of the forcing act had provided that if adebtor should offer paper to his creditor and the creditor should refuseto take it at par, the debtor might carry his rag money to court anddeposit it with the judge; and the judge must thereupon issue acertificate discharging the debt. The form of certificate began with thewords "Know Ye, " and forthwith the unhappy little state was nicknamedRogues' Island, the home of Know Ye men and Know Ye measures. [Sidenote: Rag money defeated in Massachusetts; the Shays insurrection, Aug. 1786-Feb. 1787. ] While the scorn of the people was thus poured out upon Rhode Island, much sympathy was felt for the government of Massachusetts, which wascalled upon thus early to put down armed rebellion. The pressure of debtwas keenly felt in the rural districts of Massachusetts. It is estimatedthat the private debts in the state amounted to some $7, 000, 000, and thestate's arrears to the federal government amounted to some $7, 000, 000more. Adding to these sums the arrears of bounties due to the soldiers, and the annual cost of the state, county, and town governments, therewas reached an aggregate equivalent to a tax of more than $50 on everyman, woman, and child in this population of 379, 000 souls. Upon everyhead of a family the average burden was some $200 at a time when mostfarmers would have thought such a sum yearly a princely income. In thosedays of scarcity most of them did not set eyes on so much as $50 in thecourse of a year, and happy was he who had tucked away two or threegolden guineas or moidores in an old stocking, and sewed up the treasurein his straw mattress or hidden it behind the bricks of thechimney-piece. Under such circumstances the payment of debts and taxeswas out of the question; and as the same state of things made creditorsclamorous and ugly, the courts were crowded with lawsuits. The lawyersusually contrived to get their money by exacting retainers in advance, and the practice of champerty was common, whereby the lawyer did hiswork in consideration of a percentage on the sum which was at lastforcibly collected. Homesteads were sold for the payment of foreclosedmortgages, cattle were seized in distrainer, and the farmer himself wassent to jail. The smouldering fires of wrath thus kindled foundexpression in curses aimed at lawyers, judges, and merchants. The wickedmerchants bought foreign goods and drained the state of specie to payfor them, while they drank Madeira wine and dressed their wives in finevelvets and laces. So said the farmers; and city ladies, far kinder thanthese railers deemed them, formed clubs, of which the members pledgedthemselves to wear homespun, --a poor palliative for the deep-seated illsof the time. In such mood were many of the villagers when in the summerof 1786 they were overtaken by the craze for paper money. At the meetingof the legislature in May, a petition came in from Bristol County, praying for an issue of paper. The petitioners admitted that such moneywas sure to deteriorate in value, and they doubted the wisdom of tryingto keep it up by forcing acts. Instead of this they would have the rateof its deterioration regulated by law, so that a dollar might be worthninety cents to-day, and presently seventy cents, and by and by fiftycents, and so on till it should go down to zero and be thrown overboard. People would thus know what to expect, and it would be all right. Thedelicious _naïveté_ of this argument did not prevail with thelegislature of Massachusetts, and soft money was frowned down by a voteof ninety-nine to nineteen. Then a bill was brought in seeking toreëstablish in legislation the ancient practice of barter, and makehorses and cows legal tender for debts; and this bill was crushed byeighty-nine votes against thirty-five. At the same time this legislaturepassed a bill to strengthen the federal government by a grant ofsupplementary funds to Congress, and thus laid a further burden of taxesupon the people. There was an outburst of popular wrath. A convention at Hatfield inAugust decided that the court of common pleas ought to be abolished, that no funds should be granted to Congress, and that paper money shouldbe issued at once. Another convention at Lenox denounced such incendiarymeasures, approved of supporting the federal government, and declaredthat no good could come from the issue of paper money. But meanwhile theangry farmers had resorted to violence. The legislature, they said, hadits sittings in Boston, under the influence of wicked lawyers andmerchants, and thus could not be expected to do the will of the people. A cry went up that henceforth the law-makers must sit in some smallinland town, where jealous eyes might watch their proceedings. Meanwhilethe lawyers must be dealt with; and at Northampton, Worcester, GreatBarrington, and Concord the courts were broken up by armed mobs. AtConcord one Job Shattuck brought several hundred armed men into the townand surrounded the court-house, while in a fierce harangue he declaredthat the time had come for wiping out all debts. "Yes, " squeaked a nasalvoice from the crowd, --"yes, Job, we know all about them two farms youcan't never pay for!" But this repartee did not save the judges, whothought it best to flee from the town. At first the legislature deemedit wise to take a lenient view of these proceedings, and it even went sofar as to promise to hold its next session out of Boston. But theagitation had reached a point where it could not be stayed. In Septemberthe supreme court was to sit at Springfield, and Governor Bowdoin sent aforce of 600 militia under General Shepard to protect it. They wereconfronted by some 600 insurgents, under the leadership of Daniel Shays. This man had been a captain in the Continental army, and in his forcewere many of the penniless veterans whom Gates would fain have incitedto rebellion at Newburgh. Shays seems to have done what he could torestrain his men from violence, but he was a poor creature, wantingalike in courage and good faith. On the other hand the militia werelacking in spirit. After a disorderly parley, with much cursing andswearing, they beat a retreat, and the court was prevented from sitting. Fresh riots followed at Worcester and Concord. A regiment of cavalry, sent out by the governor, scoured Middlesex County, and, after a shortfight in the woods near Groton, captured Job Shattuck and dispersed hismen. But this only exasperated the insurgents. They assembled inWorcester to the number of 1, 200 or more, where they lived for twomonths at free quarters, while Shays organized and drilled them. [Sidenote: The insurrection suppressed by state troops. ] Meanwhile the habeas corpus act was suspended for eight months, andGovernor Bowdoin called out an army of 4, 400 men, who were placed undercommand of General Lincoln. As the state treasury was nearly empty, somewealthy gentlemen in Boston subscribed the money needed for equippingthese troops, and about the middle of January, 1787, they were collectedat Worcester. The rebels had behaved shamefully, burning barns andseizing all the plunder they could lay hands on. As their numbersincreased they found their military stores inadequate, and accordinglythey marched upon Springfield, with the intent to capture the federalarsenal there, and provide themselves with muskets and cannon. GeneralShepard held Springfield with 1, 200 men, and on the 25th of JanuaryShays attacked him with a force of somewhat more than 2, 000, hoping tocrush him and seize the arsenal before Lincoln could come to the rescue. But his plan of attack was faulty, and as soon as his men began fallingunder Shepard's fire a panic seized them, and they retreated in disorderto Ludlow, and then to Amherst, setting fire to houses and robbing theinhabitants. On the approach of Lincoln's army, three days later, Shaysretreated to Pelham, and planted his forces on two steep hills protectedat the bottom by huge snowdrifts. Lincoln advanced to Hadley and soughtto open negotiations with the rebels. They were reminded that a contestwith the state government was hopeless, and that they had alreadyincurred the penalty of death; but if they would now lay down their armsand go home, a free pardon could be obtained for them. Shays seemedwilling to yield, and Saturday, the 3d of February, was appointed for aconference between some of the leading rebels and some of the officers. But this was only a stratagem. During the conference Shays decamped andmarched his men through Prescott and North Dana to Petersham. Towardnightfall the trick was discovered, and Lincoln set his whole force inmotion over the mountain ridges of Shutesbury and New Salem. The day hadbeen mild, but during the night the thermometer dropped below zero andan icy, cutting snow began to fall. There was great suffering during thelast ten miles, and indeed the whole march of thirty miles in thirteenhours over steep and snow-covered roads was a worthy exploit for theseveterans of the Revolution. Shays and his men had not looked for such adisplay of energy, and as they were getting their breakfast on Sundaymorning at Petersham they were taken by surprise. A few minutes sufficedto scatter them in flight. A hundred and fifty, including Shays himself, were taken prisoners. The rest fled in all directions, most of them toAthol and Northfield, whence they made their way into Vermont. GeneralLincoln then marched his troops into the mountains of Berkshire, wheredisturbances still continued. On the 26th of February one CaptainHamlin, with several hundred insurgents, plundered the town ofStockbridge and carried off the leading citizens as hostages. He waspursued as far as Sheffield, defeated there in a sharp skirmish, with aloss of some thirty in killed and wounded, and his troops scattered. This put an end to the insurrection in Massachusetts. [Sidenote: Conduct of neighbouring states. ] During the autumn similar disturbances had occurred in the states to thenorthward. At Exeter in New Hampshire and at Windsor and Rutland inVermont the courts had been broken up by armed mobs, and at Rutlandthere had been bloodshed. When the Shays rebellion was put down, Governor Bowdoin requested the neighbouring states to lend their aid inbringing the insurgents to justice, and all complied with the requestexcept Vermont and Rhode Island. The legislature of Rhode Islandsympathized with the rebels, and refused to allow the governor to issuea warrant for their arrest. On the other hand, the governor of Vermontissued a proclamation out of courtesy toward Massachusetts, but hecaused it to be understood that this was but an empty form, as the stateof Vermont could not afford to discourage immigration! A feeling ofcompassion for the insurgents was widely spread in Massachusetts. InMarch the leaders were tried, and fourteen were convicted of treason andsentenced to death; but Governor Bowdoin, whose term was about toexpire, granted a reprieve for a few weeks. At the annual election inApril the candidates for the governorship were Bowdoin and Hancock, andit was generally believed that the latter would be more likely than theformer to pardon the convicted men. So strong was this feeling that, although much gratitude was felt toward Bowdoin, to whose energeticmeasures the prompt suppression of the rebellion was due, Hancockobtained a large majority. When the question of a pardon came up fordiscussion, Samuel Adams, who was then president of the senate, wasstrongly opposed to it, and one of his arguments was verycharacteristic. "In monarchies, " he said, "the crime of treason andrebellion may admit of being pardoned or lightly punished; but the manwho dares to rebel against the laws of a republic ought to sufferdeath. " This was Adams's sensitive point. He wanted the whole world torealize that the rule of a republic is a rule of law and order, and thatliberty does not mean license. But in spite of this view, for whichthere was much to be said, the clemency of the American temperamentprevailed, and Governor Hancock pardoned all the prisoners. Nothing in the history of these disturbances is more instructive thanthe light incidentally thrown upon the relations between Congress andthe state government. Just before the news of the rout at Petersham, Samuel Adams had proposed in the senate that the governor should berequested to write to Congress and inform that body of what was going onin Massachusetts, stating that "although the legislature are firmlypersuaded that . . . In all probability they will be able speedily andeffectively to suppress the rebellion, yet, if any unforeseen eventshould take place which may frustrate the measures of government, theyrely upon such support from the United States as is expressly andsolemnly stipulated by the articles of confederation. " A resolution tothis effect was carried in the senate, but defeated in the house throughthe influence of western county members in sympathy with the insurgents;and incredible as it may seem, the argument was freely used that it wasincompatible with the dignity of Massachusetts to allow United Statestroops to set foot upon her soil. When we reflect that the arsenal atSpringfield, where the most considerable disturbance occurred, wasitself federal property, the climax of absurdity might seem to have beenreached. [Sidenote: Congress afraid to interfere. ] It was left for Congress itself, however, to cap that climax. Theprogress of the insurrection in the autumn in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, as well as the troubles in Rhode Island, had alarmedthe whole country. It was feared that the insurgents in these statesmight join forces, and in some way kindle a flame that would run throughthe land. Accordingly Congress in October called upon the states for acontinental force, but did not dare to declare openly what it was to beused for. It was thought necessary to say that the troops were wantedfor an expedition against the northwestern Indians! National humiliationcould go no further than such a confession, on the part of our centralgovernment, that it dared not use force in defence of those veryarticles of confederation to which it owed its existence. Things hadcome to such a pass that people of all shades of opinion were beginningto agree upon one thing, --that something must be done, and done quickly. CHAPTER V. GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. [Sidenote: Creation of a national domain beyond the Alleghanies. ] While the events we have heretofore contemplated seemed to prophesy thespeedy dissolution and downfall of the half-formed American Union, aseries of causes, obscure enough at first, but emerging gradually intodistinctness and then into prominence, were preparing the way for thefoundation of a national sovereignty. The growth of this sovereigntyproceeded stealthily along such ancient lines of precedent as to takeready hold of people's minds, although few, if any, understood the fullpurport of what they were doing. Ever since the days when our Englishforefathers dwelt in village communities in the forests of northernGermany, the idea of a common land or folkland--a territory belonging tothe whole community, and upon which new communities might be organizedby a process analogous to what physiologists callcell-multiplication--had been perfectly familiar to everybody. Townshipsbudded from village or parish folkland in Maryland and Massachusetts inthe seventeenth century, just as they had done in England before thetime of Alfred. The critical period of the Revolution witnessed therepetition of this process on a gigantic scale. It witnessed thecreation of a national territory beyond the Alleghanies, --an enormousfolkland in which all the thirteen old states had a common interest, andupon which new and derivative communities were already beginning toorganize themselves. Questions about public lands are often regarded asthe driest of historical deadwood. Discussions about them in newspapersand magazines belong to the class of articles which the general readerusually skips. Yet there is a great deal of the philosophy of historywrapped up in this subject, and it now comes to confront us at a mostinteresting moment; for without studying this creation of a nationaldomain between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, we cannot understandhow our Federal Union came to be formed. [Sidenote: Conflicting claims to the western territory. ] When England began to contend with France and Spain for the possessionof North America, she made royal grants of land upon this continent, inroyal ignorance of its extent and configuration. But until the SevenYears' War the eastward and westward partitioning of these grants was oflittle practical consequence; for English dominion was bounded by theAlleghanies, and everything beyond was in the hands of the French. Inthat most momentous war the genius of the elder Pitt won the region eastof the Mississippi for men of English race, while the vast territory ofLouisiana, beyond, passed under the control of Spain. During theRevolutionary War, in a series of romantic expeditions, the state ofVirginia took military possession of a great part of the wilderness eastof the Mississippi, founding towns in the Ohio and Cumberland valleys, and occupying with garrisons of her state militia the posts at Cahokia, Kaskaskia, and Vincennes. We have seen how, through the skill of ourcommissioners at Paris, this noble country was secured for the Americansin the treaty of 1783, in spite of the reluctance of France and thehostility of Spain. Throughout the Revolutionary War the Americansclaimed the territory as part of the United States; but when once itpassed from under the control of Great Britain, into whose hands did itgo? To whom did it belong? To this question there were various andconflicting answers. North Carolina, indeed, had already takenpossession of what was afterward called Tennessee, and at the beginningof the war Virginia had annexed Kentucky. As to these points there couldbe little or no dispute. But with the territory north of the Ohio Riverit was very different. Four states laid claim either to the whole or toparts of this territory, and these claims were not simply conflicting, but irreconcilable. [Sidenote: Claims of Massachusetts and Connecticut. ] The charters of Massachusetts and Connecticut were framed at a time whenpeople had not got over the notion that this part of the continent wasnot much wider than Mexico, and accordingly these colonies had receivedthe royal permission to extend from sea to sea. The existence of aforeign colony of Dutchmen in the neighbourhood was a trifle about whichthese documents did not trouble themselves; but when Charles II. Conquered this colony and bestowed it upon his brother, the province ofNew York became a stubborn fact, which could not be disregarded. Massachusetts and Connecticut peaceably settled their boundary line withNew York, and laid no claims to land within the limits of that state;but they still continued to claim what lay beyond it, as far as theMississippi River, where the Spanish dominion now began. The regionsclaimed by Massachusetts have since become the southern halves of thestates of Michigan and Wisconsin. The region claimed by Connecticut wasa narrow strip running over the northern portions of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois; and we have seen how much trouble was occasionedin Pennsylvania by this circumstance. [Sidenote: Claims of New York. ] But New York laughed to scorn these claims of Connecticut. In theseventeenth century all the Algonquin tribes between Lake Erie and theCumberland Mountains had become tributary to the Iroquois; and duringthe hundred years' struggle between France and England for the supremacyof this continent the Iroquois had put themselves under the protectionof England, which thenceforth always treated them as an appurtenance toNew York. For a hundred years before the Revolution, said New York, shehad borne the expense of protecting the Iroquois against the French, andby various treaties she had become lawful suzerain over the Six Nationsand their lands and the lands of their Algonquin vassals. On suchgrounds New York claimed pretty much everything north of the Ohio andeast of the Miami. [Sidenote: Virginia's claims. ] But according to Virginia, it made little difference what Massachusettsand Connecticut and New York thought about the matter, for every acreof land, from the Ohio River up to Lake Superior, belonged to her. Wasnot she the lordly "Old Dominion, " out of which every one of the stateshad been carved? Even Cape Cod and Cape Ann were said to be in "NorthVirginia, " until, in 1614, Captain John Smith invented the name "NewEngland. " It was a fair presumption that any uncarved territory belongedto Virginia; and it was further held that the original charter of 1609used language which implicitly covered the northwestern territory, though, as Thomas Paine showed, in a pamphlet entitled "Public Good, "this was very doubtful. But besides all this, it was Virginia that hadactually conquered the disputed territory, and held every military postin it except those which the British had not surrendered; and who coulddoubt that possession was nine points in the law? [Sidenote: Maryland's novel and beneficent suggestion, Oct. 15, 1777. ] Of these conflicting claims, those of New York and Virginia were themost grasping and the most formidable, because they concerned a regioninto which immigration was beginning rapidly to pour. They were regardedwith strong disfavour by the small states, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, which were so situated that they never couldexpand in any direction. They looked forward with dread to a future inwhich New York and Virginia might wax powerful enough to tyrannize overtheir smaller neighbours. But of these protesting states it was onlyMaryland that fairly rose to the occasion, and suggested an idea whichseemed startling at first, but from which mighty and unforeseenconsequences were soon to follow. [5] It was on the 15th of October, 1777, just two days before Burgoyne's surrender, that this path-breakingidea first found expression in Congress. The articles of confederationwere then just about to be presented to the several states to beratified, and the question arose as to how the conflicting westernclaims should be settled. A motion was then made that "the United Statesin Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right and powerto ascertain and fix the western boundary of such states as claim to theMississippi, . . . And lay out the land beyond the boundary so ascertainedinto separate and independent states, from time to time, as the numbersand circumstances of the people may require. " To carry out such amotion, it would be necessary for the four claimant states to surrendertheir claims into the hands of the United States, and thus create adomain which should be owned by the confederacy in common. So bold astep towards centralization found no favour at the time. No other statebut Maryland voted for it. [Sidenote: The several states yield their claims in favour of the UnitedStates, 1780-85. ] But Maryland's course was well considered: she pursued it resolutely, and was rewarded with complete success. By February, 1779, all the otherstates had ratified the articles of confederation. In the following May, Maryland declared that she would not ratify the articles until sheshould receive some definite assurance that the northwestern territoryshould become the common property of the United States, "subject to beparcelled out by Congress into free, convenient, and independentgovernments. " The question, thus boldly brought into the foreground, wasearnestly discussed in Congress and in the state legislatures, until inFebruary, 1780, partly through the influence of General Schuyler, NewYork decided to cede all her claims to the western lands. This act ofNew York set things in motion, so that in September Congress recommendedto all states having western claims to cede them to the United States. In October, Congress, still pursuing the Maryland idea, went farther, and declared that all such lands as might be ceded should be sold inlots to immigrants and the money used for federal purposes, and that indue season distinct states should be formed there, to be admitted intothe Union, with the same rights of sovereignty as the original thirteenstates. As an inducement to Virginia, it was further provided that anystate which had incurred expense during the war in defending its westernpossessions should receive compensation. To this general invitationConnecticut immediately responded by offering to cede everything towhich she laid claim, except 3, 250, 000 acres on the southern shore ofLake Erie, which she wished to reserve for educational purposes. Washington disapproved of this reservation, but it was accepted byCongress, though the business was not completed until 1786. This partof the state of Ohio is still commonly spoken of as the "ConnecticutReserve. " Half a million acres were given to citizens of Connecticutwhose property had been destroyed in the British raids upon her coasttowns, and the rest were sold, in 1795, for $1, 200, 000, in aid ofschools and colleges. In January, 1781, Virginia offered to surrender all the territorynorthwest of the Ohio, provided that Congress would guarantee her in thepossession of Kentucky. This gave rise to a discussion which lastednearly three years, until Virginia withdrew her proviso and made thecession absolute. It was accepted by Congress on the 1st of March, 1784, and on the 19th of April, in the following year, --the tenth anniversaryof Lexington, --Massachusetts surrendered her claims; and the wholenorthwestern territory--the area of the great states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio (excepting the ConnecticutReserve)--thus became the common property of the half-formed nation. Maryland, however, did not wait for this. As soon as New York andVirginia had become thoroughly committed to the movement, she ratifiedthe articles of confederation, which thus went into operation on the 1stof March, 1781. [Sidenote: Magnanimity of Virginia. ] This acquisition of a common territory speedily led to results not atall contemplated in the theory of union upon which the articles ofconfederation were based. It led to "the exercise of nationalsovereignty in the sense of eminent domain, " as shown in the ordinancesof 1784 and 1787, and prepared men's minds for the work of the FederalConvention. Great credit is due to Maryland for her resolute course insetting in motion this train of events. It aroused fierce indignation atthe time, as to many people it looked unfriendly to the Union. Somehot-heads were even heard to say that if Maryland should persist anylonger in her refusal to join the confederation, she ought to besummarily divided up between the neighbouring states, and her nameerased from the map. But the brave little state had earned a better fatethan that of Poland. When we have come to trace out the results of heraction, we shall see that just as it was Massachusetts that took thedecisive step in bringing on the Revolutionary War when she threw thetea into Boston harbour, so it was Maryland that, by leading the waytoward the creation of a national domain, laid the corner-stone of ourFederal Union. Equal credit must be given to Virginia for hermagnanimity in making the desired surrender. It was New York, indeed, that set the praiseworthy example; but New York, after all, surrenderedonly a shadowy claim, whereas Virginia gave up a magnificent andprincely territory of which she was actually in possession. She mighthave held back and made endless trouble, just as, at the beginning ofthe Revolution, she might have refused to make common cause withMassachusetts; but in both instances her leading statesmen showed afar-sighted wisdom and a breadth of patriotism for which no words ofpraise can be too strong. In the later instance, as in the earlier, Thomas Jefferson played an important part. He, who in after years, aspresident of the United States, was destined, by the purchase ofLouisiana, to carry our western frontier beyond the Rocky Mountains, had, in 1779, done more than any one else to support the romanticcampaign in which General Clark had taken possession of the countrybetween the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. He had much to do with thegenerous policy which gave up the greater part of that country for anational domain, and on the very day on which the act of cession wascompleted he presented to Congress a remarkable plan for the governmentof the new territory, which was only partially successful because itattempted too much, but the results of which were in many ways notable. [Sidenote: Jefferson proposes a scheme of government for thenorthwestern territory, 1784. ] In this plan, known as the Ordinance of 1784, Jefferson proposed todivide the northwestern territory into ten states, or just twice as manyas have actually grown out of it. In each of these states the settlersmight establish a local government, under the authority of Congress; andwhen in any one of them the population should come to equal that of theleast populous of the original states, it might be admitted into theUnion by the consent of nine states in Congress. The new states were tohave universal suffrage; they must have republican forms of government;they must pay their shares of the federal debt; they must forever remaina part of the United States; and after the year 1800 negro slavery mustbe prohibited within their limits. The names of these ten states haveafforded much amusement to Jefferson's biographers. In those days theschoolmaster was abroad in the land after a peculiar fashion. Just as weare now in the full tide of that Gothic revival which goes back for itsbeginnings to Sir Walter Scott; as we admire mediæval things, and try tobuild our houses after old English models, and prefer words of whatpeople call "Saxon" origin, and name our children Roland and Herbert, orEdith and Winifred, so our great-grandfathers lived in a time ofclassical revival. They were always looking for precedents in Greek andRoman history; they were just beginning to try to make their woodenhouses look like temples, with Doric columns; they preferred words ofLatin origin; they signed their pamphlets "Brutus" and "Lycurgus, " andin sober earnest baptized their children as Cæsar, or Marcellus, orDarius. The map of the United States was just about to bloom forth withtowns named Ithaca and Syracuse, Corinth and Sparta; and on the OhioRiver, opposite the mouth of Licking Creek, a city had lately beenfounded, the name of which was truly portentous. "Losantiville" was thiswonderful compound, in which the initial _L_ stood for "Licking, " while_os_ signified "mouth, " _anti_ "opposite, " and _ville_ "town;" and thewhole read backwards as "Town-opposite-mouth-of-Licking. " In 1790General St. Clair, then governor of the northwest territory, changedthis name to Cincinnati, in honor of the military order to which hebelonged. With such examples in mind, we may see that the names of theproposed ten states, from which the failure of Jefferson's ordinance hasdelivered us, illustrated the prevalent taste of the time rather thanany idiosyncrasy of the man. The proposed names were Sylvania, Michigania, Chersonesus, Assenisipia, Metropotamia, Illinoia, Saratoga, Washington, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia. [Sidenote: He wishes to prohibit slavery in the national domain. ] It was not the nomenclature that stood in the way of Jefferson's scheme, but the wholesale way in which he tried to deal with the slaveryquestion. He wished to hem in the probable extension of slavery by animpassable barrier, and accordingly he not only provided that it shouldbe extinguished in the northwestern territory after the year 1800, butat the same time his anti-slavery ardour led him to try to extend thenational dominion southward. He did his best to persuade the legislatureof Virginia to crown its work by giving up Kentucky to the UnitedStates, and he urged that North Carolina and Georgia should also cedetheir western territories. As for South Carolina, she was shut inbetween the two neighbouring states in such wise that her western claimswere vague and barren. Jefferson would thus have drawn a north-and-southline from Lake Erie down to the Spanish border of the Floridas, and westof this line he would have had all negro slavery end with the eighteenthcentury. The policy of restricting slavery, so as to let it die anatural death within a narrowly confined area, --the policy to sustainwhich Mr. Lincoln was elected president in 1860, --was thus firstdefinitely outlined by Jefferson in 1784. It was the policy offorbidding slavery in the national territory. Had this policy succeededthen, it would have been an ounce of prevention worth many a pound ofcure. But it failed because of its largeness, because it had too manyelements to deal with. For the moment, the proposal to exclude slaveryfrom the northwestern territory was defeated, because of the two thirdsvote required in Congress for any important measure. It got only sevenstates in its favour, where it needed nine. This defeat, however, wasretrieved three years later, when the famous Ordinance of 1787prohibited slavery forever from the national territory north of the OhioRiver. But Jefferson's scheme had not only to deal with the nationaldomain as it was, but also to extend that domain southward to Florida;and in this it failed. Virginia could not be persuaded to give upKentucky until too late. When Kentucky came into the Union, after theadoption of the Federal Constitution, she came as a sovereign state, with all her domestic institutions in her own hands. With the westerndistricts of North Carolina the case was somewhat different, and thestory of this region throws a curious light upon the affairs of thatdisorderly time. [Sidenote: John Sevier, and the state of Franklin, 1784-87. ] In surrendering her western territory, North Carolina showedpraiseworthy generosity. But the frontier settlers were too numerous tobe handed about from one dominion to another, without saying somethingabout it themselves; and their action complicated the matter, until itwas too late for Jefferson's scheme to operate upon them. In June, 1784, North Carolina ceded the region since known as Tennessee, and allowedCongress two years in which to accept the grant. Meanwhile, her ownauthority was to remain supreme there. But the settlers grumbled andprotested. Some of them were sturdy pioneers of the finest type, butalong with these there was a lawless population of "white trash, "ancestors of the peculiar race of men we find to-day in rural districtsof Missouri and Arkansas. They were the refuse of North Carolina, gradually pushed westward by the advance of an orderly civilization. Crime was rife in the settlements, and, in the absence of courts, arough-and-ready justice was administered by vigilance committees. TheCherokees, moreover, were troublesome neighbours, and people lived indread of their tomahawks. Petitions had again and again gone up to thelegislature, urging the establishment of courts and a militia, but hadpassed unheeded, and now it seemed that the state had withdrawn herprotection entirely. The settlers did not wish to have their countrymade a national domain. If their own state could not protect them, itwas quite clear to them that Congress could not. What was Congress, anyway, but a roomful of men whom nobody heeded? So these backwoodsmen helda convention in a log-cabin at Jonesborough, and seceded from NorthCarolina. They declared that the three counties between the BaldMountains and the Holston River constituted an independent state, towhich they gave the name of Franklin; and they went on to frame aconstitution and elect a legislature with two chambers. For governorthey chose John Sevier, one of the heroes of King's Mountain, a man ofHuguenot ancestry, and such dauntless nature that he was generally knownas the "lion of the border. " Having done all this, the seceders, inspite of their small respect for Congress, sent a delegate to thatbody, requesting that the new state of Franklin might be admitted intothe Union. Before this business had been completed, North Carolinarepealed her act of cession, and warned the backwoodsmen to return totheir allegiance. This at once split the new state into two factions:one party wished to keep on as they had now started, the other wishedfor reunion with North Carolina. In 1786 the one party in each countyelected members to represent them in the North Carolina legislature, while the other party elected members of the legislature of Franklin. Everywhere two sets of officers claimed authority, civil dudgeon grewvery high, and pistols were freely used. The agitation extended into theneighbouring counties of Virginia, where some discontented people wishedto secede and join the state of Franklin. For the next two years therewas something very like civil war, until the North Carolina party grewso strong that Sevier fled, and the state of Franklin ceased to exist. Sevier was arrested on a warrant for high treason, but he effected anescape, and after men's passions had cooled down his great services andstrong character brought him again to the front. He sat in the senate ofNorth Carolina, and in 1796, when Tennessee became a state in the Union, Sevier was her first governor. These troubles show how impracticable was the attempt to create anational domain in any part of the country which contained aconsiderable population. The instinct of self-government was too strongto allow it. Any such population would have refused to submit toordinances of Congress. To obey the parent state or to set up for one'sself, --these were the only alternatives which ordinary men at that timecould understand. Experience had not yet ripened their minds forcomprehending a temporary condition of semi-independence, such as existsto-day under our territorial governments. The behaviour of theseTennessee backwoodsmen was just what might have been expected. The landon which they were living was not common land: it had been appropriated;it belonged to them, and it was for them to make laws for it. Such isthe lesson of the short-lived state of Franklin. It was because sheperceived that similar feelings were at work in Kentucky that Virginiadid not venture to loosen her grasp upon that state until it was fullyorganized and ready for admission into the Union. It was in no suchpartly settled country that Congress could do such a thing as carve outboundaries and prohibit slavery by an act of national sovereignty. Thereremained the magnificent territory north of the Ohio, --an empire initself, as large as the German Empire, with the Netherlands thrownin, --in which the collective wisdom of the American people, asrepresented in Congress, might autocratically shape the future; for itwas still a wilderness, watched by frontier garrisons, and save for theIndians and the trappers and a few sleepy old French towns on theeastern bank of the Mississippi, there were no signs of human life inall its vast solitude. Here, where there was nobody to grumble orsecede, Congress, in 1787, proceeded to carry out the work whichJefferson had outlined three years before. [Sidenote: Origin of the Ohio company. ] It is interesting to trace the immediate origin of the famous Ordinanceof 1787. At the close of the war General Rufus Putnam, from the mountainvillage of Rutland in Massachusetts, sent to Congress an outline of aplan for colonizing the region between Lake Erie and the Ohio withveterans of the army, who were well fitted to protect the border againstIndian attacks. The land was to be laid out in townships six milessquare, "with large reservations for the ministry and schools;" and byselling it to the soldiers at a merely nominal price, the pennilessCongress might obtain an income, and at the same time recognize theirservices in the only substantial way that seemed practicable. Washingtonstrongly favoured the scheme, but, in order to carry it out, it wasnecessary to wait until the cession of the territory by the variousclaimant states should be completed. After this had been done, a seriesof treaties were made with the Six Nations, as overlords, and theirvassal tribes, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Delawares, andShawnees, whereby all Indian claims to the lands in question wereforever renounced. The matter was then formally taken up by HoldenParsons of Connecticut, and Rufus Putnam, Manasseh Cutler, WinthropSargent, and others, of Massachusetts, and a joint-stock company wasformed for the purchase of lands on the Ohio River. A large number ofsettlers--old soldiers of excellent character, whom the war hadimpoverished--were ready to go and take possession at once; and in itspetition the Ohio company asked for nothing better than that itssettlers should be "under the immediate government of Congress in suchmode and for such time as Congress shall judge proper. " Such a proposal, affording a means at once of replenishing the treasury and satisfyingthe soldiers, could not but be accepted; and thus were laid thefoundations of a state destined within a century to equal in populationand far surpass in wealth the whole Union as it was at that time. Itbecame necessary at once to lay down certain general principles ofgovernment applicable to the northwestern territory; and the result wasthe Ordinance of 1787, which was chiefly the work of Edward Carringtonand Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, and Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, incommittee, following the outlines of a draft which is supposed to havebeen made by Manasseh Cutler. Jefferson was no longer on the ground, having gone on his mission to Paris, but some of the principles of hisproposed Ordinance of 1784 were adopted. [Sidenote: The Ordinance of 1787. ] It was provided that the northwestern territory should ultimately becarved into states, not exceeding five in number, and any one of thesemight be admitted into the Union as soon as its population should reach60, 000. In the mean time, the whole territory was to be governed byofficers appointed by Congress, and required to take an oath ofallegiance to the United States. Under this government there was to beunqualified freedom of religious worship, and no religious tests shouldbe required of any public official. Intestate property should descend inequal shares to children of both sexes. Public schools were to beestablished. Suffrage was not yet made universal, as a freehold infifty acres was required. No law was ever to be made which should impairthe obligation of contracts, and it was thoroughly agreed that thisprovision especially covered and prohibited the issue of paper money. The future states to be formed from this territory must make their lawsconform to these fundamental principles, and under no circumstancescould any one of them ever be separated from the Union. In such wise, the theory of peaceful secession was condemned in advance, so far as itwas possible for the federal government to do so. Jefferson's principle, that slavery should not be permitted in the national domain, was alsoadopted so far as the northwest was concerned; and it is interesting toobserve the names of the states which were present in Congress when thisclause was added to the ordinance. They were Georgia, the two Carolinas, Virginia, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts; and thevote was unanimous. No one was more active in bringing about this resultthan William Grayson of Virginia, who was earnestly supported by Lee. The action of Virginia and North Carolina at that time need not surpriseus. But the movements in favour of emancipation in these two states, andthe emancipation actually effected or going on at the north, had alreadymade Georgia and South Carolina extremely sensitive about slavery; andtheir action on this occasion can be explained only by supposing thatthey were willing to yield a point in this remote territory, in order byand by to be able to insist upon an equivalent in the case of theterritory lying west of Georgia. Nor would they have yielded at all hadnot a fugitive slave law been enacted, providing that slaves escapingbeyond the Ohio should be arrested and returned to their owners. Thesearrangements having been made, General St. Clair was appointed governorof the territory; surveys were made; land was put up for sale at sixtycents per acre, payable in certificates of the public debt; and settlersrapidly came in. The westward exodus from New England and Pennsylvanianow began, and only fourteen years elapsed before Ohio, the first of thefive states, was admitted into the Union. [Sidenote: Theory of folkland upon which the ordinance was based. ] "I doubt, " says Daniel Webster, "whether one single law of anylaw-giver, ancient or modern, has produced effects of more distinct, marked, and lasting character than the Ordinance of 1787. " Nothing couldhave been more emphatically an exercise of national sovereignty; yet, asMadison said, while warmly commending the act, Congress did it "withoutthe least colour of constitutional authority. " The ordinance was neversubmitted to the states for ratification. The articles of confederationhad never contemplated an occasion for such a peculiar assertion ofsovereignty. "A great and independent fund of revenue, " said Madison, "is passing into the hands of a single body of men, who can raise troopsto an indefinite number, and appropriate money to their support for anindefinite period of time. . . . Yet no blame has been whispered, no alarmhas been sounded, " even by men most zealous for state rights and mostsuspicious of Congress. Within a few months this argument was to becited with telling effect against those who hesitated to accept theFederal Constitution because of the great powers which it conferred uponthe general government. Unless you give a government specific powers, commensurate with its objects, it is liable on occasions of publicnecessity to exercise powers which have not been granted. Avoid thedreadful dilemma between dissolution and usurpation, urged Madison, byclothing the government with powers that are ample but clearly defined. In a certain sense, the action of Congress in 1787 was a usurpation ofauthority to meet an emergency which no one had foreseen, as in thecases of Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana and Lincoln's emancipation ofthe slaves. Each of these instances marked, in one way or another, abrilliant epoch in American history, and in each case the publicinterest was so unmistakable that the people consented and applauded. The theory upon which the Ordinance of 1787 was based was one whichnobody could fail to understand, though perhaps no one would then haveknown just how to put it into words. It was simply the thirteen states, through their delegates in Congress, dealing with the unoccupiednational domain as if it were the common land or folkland of astupendous township. [Sidenote: Spain, hearing of the secret article in the treaty of 1783, loses her temper and threatens to shut up the Mississippi River. ] The vast importance of the lands between the Alleghanies and theMississippi was becoming more apparent every year, as the westwardmovement of population went on. But at this time their value was muchmore clearly seen by the southern than by the northern states. In thenorth the westward emigration was only just beginning to pass theAlleghanies; in the south, as we have seen, it had gone beyond themseveral years ago. The southern states, accordingly, took a much sounderview than the northern states of the importance to the Union of the freenavigation of the Mississippi River. The difference was forciblyillustrated in the dispute with Spain, which came to a crisis in thesummer of 1786. It will be remembered that by the treaties which closedthe Revolutionary War the provinces of East and West Florida were cededby England to Spain. West Florida was the region lying between theAppalachicola and the Mississippi rivers, including the southernmostportions of the present states of Alabama and Mississippi. By the treatybetween Great Britain and the United States, the northern boundary ofthis province was described by the thirty-first parallel of latitude;but Spain denied the right of these powers to place the boundary so low. Her troops still held Natchez, and she maintained that the boundary mustbe placed a hundred miles farther north, starting from the Mississippiat the mouth of the Yazoo River, near the present site of Vicksburg. Nowthe treaty between Great Britain and the United States contained asecret article, wherein it was provided that if England could contriveto keep West Florida, instead of surrendering it to Spain, then theboundary should start at the Yazoo. This showed that both England andthe United States were willing to yield the one to the other a strip ofterritory which both agreed in withholding from Spain. Presently theSpanish court got hold of the secret article, and there was greatindignation. Here was England giving to the Americans a piece of landwhich she knew, and the Americans knew, was recently a part of WestFlorida, and therefore belonged to Spain! Castilian grandees went to bedand dreamed of invincible armadas. Congress was promptly informed that, until this affair should be set right, the Americans need not expect theSpanish government to make any treaty of commerce with them; andfurthermore, let no American sloop or barge dare to show itself on theMississippi below the Yazoo, under penalty of confiscation. When thesethreats were heard in America, there was great excitement everywhere, but it assumed opposite phases in the north and in the south. Themerchants of New York and Boston cared little more about the MississippiRiver than about Timbuctoo, but they were extremely anxious to see acommercial treaty concluded with Spain. On the other hand, thebackwoodsmen of Kentucky and the state of Franklin cared nothing for thetrade on the ocean, but they would not sit still while their corn andtheir pork were confiscated on the way to New Orleans. The people ofVirginia sympathized with the backwoodsmen, but her great statesmenrealized the importance of both interests and the danger of a conflictbetween them. [Sidenote: Gardoqui and Jay. ] [Sidenote: Threats of secession in Kentucky and in New England, 1786. ] The Spanish envoy, Gardoqui, arrived in the summer of 1784, and had manyinterviews with Jay, who was then secretary for foreign affairs. Gardoqui set forth that his royal master was graciously pleased to dealleniently with the Americans, and would confer one favour upon them, butcould not confer two. He was ready to enter into a treaty of commercewith us, but not until we should have renounced all claim to thenavigation of the Mississippi River below the Yazoo. Here the Spaniardwas inexorable. A year of weary argument passed by, and he had notbudged an inch. At last, in despair, Jay advised Congress, for the sakeof the commercial treaty, to consent to the closing of the Mississippi, but only for twenty-five years. As the rumour of this went abroad amongthe settlements south of the Ohio, there was an outburst of wrath, towhich an incident that now occurred gave added virulence. A NorthCarolinian trader, named Amis, sailed down the Mississippi with a cargoof pots and kettles and barrels of flour. At Natchez his boat and hisgoods were seized by the Spanish officers, and he was left to make hisway home afoot through several hundred miles of wilderness. The story ofhis wrongs flew from one log-cabin to another, until it reached thedistant northwestern territory. In the neighbourhood of Vincennes therewere Spanish traders, and one of them kept a shop in the town. The shopwas sacked by a band of American soldiers, and an attempt was made toincite the Indians to attack the Spaniards. Indignation meetings wereheld in Kentucky. The people threatened to send a force of militia downthe river and capture Natchez and New Orleans; and a more dangerousthreat was made. Should the northeastern states desert them and adoptJay's suggestion, they vowed they would secede, and throw themselvesupon Great Britain for protection. On the other hand, there was greatagitation in the seaboard towns of Massachusetts. They were disgustedwith the backwoodsmen for making such a fuss about nothing, and with thepeople of the southern states for aiding and abetting them; and duringthis turbulent summer of 1786, many persons were heard to declare that, in case Jay's suggestion should not be adopted, it would be high timefor the New England states to secede from the Union, and form aconfederation by themselves. The situation was dangerous in the extreme. Had the question been forced to an issue, the southern states wouldnever have seen their western territories go and offer themselves toGreat Britain. Sooner than that, they would have broken away from thenorthern states. But New Jersey and Pennsylvania now came over to thesouthern side, and Rhode Island, moving in her eccentric orbit, presently joined them; and thus the treaty was postponed for thepresent, and the danger averted. [Sidenote: Washington's views on the importance of canals between eastand west. ] [Sidenote: His far-sighted genius and self-devotion. ] This lamentable dispute was watched by Washington with feelings ofgravest concern. From an early age he had indulged in prophetic dreamsof the grandeur of the coming civilization in America, and had looked tothe country beyond the mountains as the field in which the nextgeneration was to find room for expansion. Few had been more efficientthan he in aiding the great scheme of Pitt for overthrowing the Frenchpower in America, and he understood better than most men of his time howmuch that scheme implied. In his early journeys in the wilderness he hadgiven especial attention to the possibilities of water connectionbetween the east and west, and he had bought for himself and surveyedmany extensive tracts of land beyond the mountains. The subject was afavourite one with him, and he looked at it from both a commercial and apolitical point of view. What we most needed, he said in 1770, were easytransit lines between east and west, as "the channel of conveyance ofthe extensive and valuable trade of a rising empire. " Just beforeresigning his commission in 1783 Washington had explored the routethrough the Mohawk Valley, afterward taken first by the Erie Canal, andthen by the New York Central Railroad, and had prophesied its commercialimportance in the present century. Soon after reaching his home at MountVernon, he turned his attention to the improvement of intercourse withthe west through the valley of the Potomac. The east and west, he said, must be cemented together by interests in common; otherwise they willbreak asunder. Without commercial intercourse they will cease tounderstand each other, and will thus be ripe for disagreement. It iseasy for mental habits, as well as merchandise, to glide down stream, and the connections of the settlers beyond the mountains all centre inNew Orleans, which is in the hands of a foreign and hostile power. Noone can tell what complications may arise from this, argued Washington;"let us bind these people to us by a chain that can never be broken;"and with characteristic energy he set to work at once to establish thatline of communication that has since grown into the Chesapeake and OhioCanal, and into the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. During the three yearspreceding the meeting of the Federal Convention he was largely occupiedwith this work. In 1785 he became president of a company for extendingthe navigation of the Potomac and James rivers, and the legislature ofVirginia passed an act vesting him with one hundred and fifty shares inthe stock of the company, in order to testify their "sense of hisunexampled merits. " But Washington refused the testimonial, and declinedto take any pay for his services, because he wished to arouse the peopleto the political importance of the undertaking, and felt that his wordswould have more weight if he were known to have no selfish interest init. His sole purpose, as he repeatedly said, was to strengthen thespirit of union by cementing the eastern and western regions together. At this time he could ill afford to give his services without pay, forhis long absence in war-time had sadly impaired his estate. But such wasWashington. [Sidenote: Maryland confers with Virginia regarding the navigation ofthe Potomac, 1785. ] In order to carry out the enterprise of extending the navigation of thePotomac, it became necessary for the two states Virginia and Maryland toact in concert; and early in 1785 a joint commission of the two statesmet for consultation at Washington's house at Mount Vernon. A compactinsuring harmonious coöperation was prepared by the commissioners; andthen, as Washington's scheme involved the connection of the head watersof the Potomac with those of the Ohio, it was found necessary to invitePennsylvania to become a party to the compact. Then Washington took theoccasion to suggest that Maryland and Virginia, while they were aboutit, should agree upon a uniform system of duties and other commercialregulations, and upon a uniform currency; and these suggestions weresent, together with the compact, to the legislatures of the two states. Great things were destined to come from these modest beginnings. Just asin the Yorktown campaign, there had come into existence a multifariousassemblage of events, apparently unconnected with one another, and allthat was needed was the impulse given by Washington's far-sighted geniusto set them all at work, surging, swelling, and hurrying straightforward to a decisive result. [Sidenote: Madison's motion; a step in advance, 1785. ] Late in 1785, when the Virginia legislature had wrangled itself intoimbecility over the question of clothing Congress with power over trade, Madison hit upon an expedient. He prepared a motion to the effect thatcommissioners from all the states should hold a meeting, and discuss thebest method of securing a uniform treatment of commercial questions; butas he was most conspicuous among the advocates of a more perfect union, he was careful not to present the motion himself. Keeping in thebackground, he persuaded another member--John Tyler, father of thepresident of that name, a fierce zealot for state rights--to make themotion. The plan, however, was "so little acceptable that it was notthen persisted in, " and the motion was laid on the table. But Madisonknew what was coming from Maryland, and bided his time. After some weeksit was announced that Maryland had adopted the compact made at MountVernon concerning jurisdiction over the Potomac. Virginia instantlyreplied by adopting it also. Then it was suggested, in the report fromMaryland, that Delaware, as well as Pennsylvania, ought to be consulted, since the scheme should rightly include a canal between the DelawareRiver and the Chesapeake Bay. And why not also consult with these statesabout a uniform system of duties? If two states can agree upon thesematters, why not four? And still further, said the Marylandmessage, --dropping the weightiest part of the proposal into asubordinate clause, just as women are said to put the quintessence oftheir letters into the postscript, --might it not be well enough, if weare going to have such a conference, to invite commissioners from allthe thirteen states to attend it? An informal discussion can hurtnobody. The conference of itself can settle nothing; and if four statescan take part in it, why not thirteen? Here was the golden opportunity. The Madison-Tyler motion was taken up from the table and carried. Commissioners from all the states were invited to meet on the firstMonday of September, 1786, at Annapolis, --a safe place, far removed fromthe influence of that dread tyrant, the Congress, and from wickedcentres of trade, such as New York and Boston. It was the governor ofVirginia who sent the invitations. It may not amount to much, wroteMadison to Monroe, but "the expedient is better than nothing; and, asthe recommendation of additional powers to Congress is within thepurview of the commission, it may possibly lead to better consequencesthan at first occur. " [Sidenote: Convention at Annapolis, Sept. 11, 1786. ] [Sidenote: Hamilton's address; a further step in advance. ] The seed dropped by Washington had fallen on fruitful soil. At first itwas to be just a little meeting of two or three states to talk about thePotomac River and some projected canals, and already it had come to be ameeting of all the states to discuss some uniform system of legislationon the subject of trade. This looked like progress, yet when theconvention was gathered at Annapolis, on the 11th of September, theoutlook was most discouraging. Commissioners were there from Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Massachusetts and NewHampshire, Rhode Island and North Carolina, had duly appointedcommissioners, but they were not there. It is curious to observe thatMaryland, which had been so earnest in the matter, had nevertheless nowneglected to appoint commissioners; and no action had been taken byGeorgia, South Carolina, or Connecticut. With only five statesrepresented, the commissioners did not think it worth while to go onwith their work. But before adjourning they adopted an address, writtenby Alexander Hamilton, and sent it to all the states. All thecommissioners present had been empowered to consider how far a uniformcommercial system might be essential to the permanent harmony of thestates. But New Jersey had taken a step in advance, and instructed herdelegates "to consider how far a uniform system in their commercialregulations _and other important matters_ might be necessary to thecommon interest and permanent harmony of the several states. " _And otherimportant matters_, --thus again was the weightiest part of the businessrelegated to a subordinate clause. So gingerly was the greatquestion--so dreaded, yet so inevitable--approached! This reference to"other matters" was pronounced by the commissioners to be a vastimprovement on the original plan; and Hamilton's address now urged thatcommissioners be appointed by all the states, to meet in convention atPhiladelphia on the second Monday of the following May, "to devise suchfurther provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render theconstitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of theUnion, and to report to Congress such an act as, when agreed to by them, and confirmed by the legislatures of every state, would effectuallyprovide for the same. " The report of the commissioners was broughtbefore Congress in October, in the hope that Congress would earnestlyrecommend to the several states the course of action therein suggested. But Nathan Dane and Rufus King of Massachusetts, intent upontechnicalities, succeeded in preventing this. According to King, aconvention was an irregular body, which had no right to propose changesin the organic law of the land, and the state legislatures could notproperly confirm the acts of such a body, or take notice of them. Congress was the only source from which such proposals could properlyemanate. These arguments were pleasing to the self-love of Congress, andit refused to sanction the plan of the Annapolis commissioners. [Sidenote: New York defeats the impost amendment. ] In an ordinary season this would perhaps have ended the matter, but thewinter of 1786-87 was not an ordinary season. All the troubles abovedescribed seemed to culminate just at this moment. The paper-money crazein so many of the states, the shameful deeds of Rhode Island, the riotsin Vermont and New Hampshire, the Shays rebellion in Massachusetts, thedispute with Spain, and the consequent imminent danger of separationbetween north and south had all come together; and the feeling ofthoughtful men and women throughout the country was one of realconsternation. The last ounce was now to be put upon the camel's back inthe failure of the impost amendment. In 1783, when the cessions ofwestern lands were creating a national domain, a promising plan had beendevised for relieving the country of its load of debt, and furnishingCongress with money for its current expenses. All the money coming fromsales of the western folkland was to be applied to reducing and wipingout the principal of the public debt. Then the interest of this debtmust be provided for; and to that end Congress had recommended animpost, or system of custom-house duties, upon liquors, sugars, teas, coffees, cocoa, molasses, and pepper. This impost was to be kept up fortwenty-five years only, and the collectors were to be appointed by theseveral states, each for its own ports. Then for the current expenses ofthe government, supplementary funds were needed; and these were to beassessed upon the several states, each of which might raise its quota asit saw fit. Such was the original plan; but it soon turned out that theonly available source of revenue was the national domain, which had thusbeen nothing less than the principal thread which had held the Uniontogether. As for the impost, it had never been possible to get asufficient number of states to agree upon it, and of the quotas forcurrent expenses, as we have seen, very little had found its way to thefederal treasury. Under these difficulties, it had been proposed that anamendment to the articles of confederation should endow Congress withthe power of levying customs-duties and appointing the collectors; andby the summer of 1786, after endless wrangling, twelve states hadconsented to the amendment. But, in order that an amendment should beadopted, unanimous consent was necessary. The one delinquent state, which thus blocked the wheels of the confederacy, was New York. She hadher little system of duties all nicely arranged for what seemed to beher own interests, and she would not surrender this system to Congress. Upon the neighbouring states her tariff system bore hard, and especiallyupon New Jersey. In 1786 this little state flatly refused to pay herquota until New York should stop discriminating against her trade. Nothing which occurred in that troubled year caused more alarm thanthis, for it could not be denied that such a declaration seemed littleless than an act of secession on the part of New Jersey. The argumentsof a congressional committee at last prevailed upon the state to rescindher declaration. At the same time there came the final struggle in NewYork over the impost amendment, against which Governor Clinton hadfirmly set his face. There was a fierce fight, in which Hamilton's moststrenuous efforts succeeded in carrying the amendment in part, but notuntil it had been clogged with a condition that made it useless. Congress, it was declared, might have the revenue, but New York mustappoint the collectors; she was not going to have federal officialsrummaging about her docks. The legislature well knew that to grant theamendment in such wise was not to grant it at all, but simply to reopenthe whole question. Such was the result. Congress expostulated in vain. On the 15th of February, 1787, the matter was reconsidered in the NewYork legislature, and the impost amendment was defeated. [Sidenote: Sudden changes in popular sentiment. ] Thus, only three months before the Federal Convention was to meet, ifindeed it was ever to meet, Congress was decisively informed that itwould not be allowed to take any effectual measures for raising arevenue. There now seemed nothing left for Congress to do but adopt therecommendation of the Annapolis commissioners, and give its sanction tothe proposed convention. Madison, however, had not waited for this, buthad prevailed upon the Virginia legislature to go on and appoint itsdelegates to the convention. The events of the year had worked a changein the popular sentiment in Virginia; people were more afraid ofanarchy, and not quite so much afraid of centralization; and now, underMadison's lead, Virginia played her trump card and chose GeorgeWashington as one of her delegates. As soon as this was known, there wasan outburst of joy throughout the land. All at once the people beganeverywhere to feel an interest in the proposed convention, and presentlyMassachusetts changed her attitude. Up to this time Massachusetts hadbeen as obstinate in her assertion of local independence, and asunwilling to strengthen the hands of Congress, as any of the thirteenstates, except New York and Rhode Island. But the Shays rebellion hadserved as a useful object-lesson. Part of the distress in Massachusettscould be traced to the inability of Congress to pay debts which it owedto her citizens. It was felt that the time had come when the question ofa national revenue must be seriously considered. Every week saw freshconverts to the party which called for a stronger government. Then camethe news that Virginia had chosen delegates, and that Washington was oneof them; then that New Jersey had followed the example; then thatPennsylvania, North Carolina, Delaware, had chosen delegates. It wastime for Massachusetts to act, and Rufus King now brought the matter upin Congress. His scruples as to the legality of the proceeding had notchanged, and accordingly he moved that Congress should of itself proposea convention at Philadelphia, identical with the one which the Annapoliscommissioners had already recommended. The motion was carried, and inthis way Congress formally approved and adopted what was going on. Massachusetts immediately chose delegates, and was followed by New York. In April, Georgia and South Carolina followed suit. Connecticut andMaryland came on in May, and New Hampshire, somewhat tardily, in June. Of the thirteen states, Rhode Island alone refused to take any part inthe proceedings. [Sidenote: The Federal Convention meets at Philadelphia, May 14-25, 1787. ] The convention held its meetings in that plain brick building inPhiladelphia already immortalized as the place from which theDeclaration of Independence was published to the world. The work whichthese men were undertaking was to determine whether that Declaration hadbeen for the blessing or the injury of America and of mankind. That theyhad succeeded in assembling here at all was somewhat remarkable, when wethink of the curious medley of incidents that led to it. At no time inthis distressed period would a frank and abrupt proposal for aconvention to remodel the government have found favour. Such proposals, indeed, had been made, beginning with that of Pelatiah Webster in 1781, and they had all failed to break through the crust of a truly Englishconservatism and dread of centralized power. Now, through what somemight have called a strange chapter of accidents, before the element ofcausal sequence in it all had become so manifest as it is to us to-day, this remarkable group of men had been brought together in a single room, while even yet but few of them realized how thoroughly and exhaustivelyreconstructive their work was to be. To most of them it was not clearwhether they were going merely to patch up the articles ofconfederation, or to strike out into a new and very different path. There were a few who entertained far-reaching purposes; the rest wereintelligent critics rather than constructive thinkers; the result wassurprising to all. It is worth our while to pause for a moment, andobserve the character and composition of one of the most memorableassemblies the world has ever seen. Mr. Gladstone says that just "as theBritish Constitution is the most subtle organism which has proceededfrom progressive history, so the American Constitution is the mostwonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purposeof man. "[6] Let us now see who the men were who did this wonderfulwork, --this Iliad, or Parthenon, or Fifth Symphony, of statesmanship. Weshall not find that they were all great geniuses. Such is never the casein such an assembly. There are not enough great geniuses to go around;and if there were, it is questionable if the result would besatisfactory. In such discussions the points which impress the moreordinary and less far-sighted members are sure to have great value;especially when we bear in mind that the object of such an assembly isnot merely to elaborate a plan, but to get the great mass of people, including the brick-layers and hod-carriers, to understand it wellenough to vote for it. An ideally perfect assembly of law-makers willtherefore contain two or three men of original constructive genius, twoor three leading spirits eminent for shrewdness and tact, a dozen ormore excellent critics representing various conflicting interests, and arank and file of thoroughly respectable, commonplace men, unfitted forshining in the work of the meeting, but admirably competent to proclaimits results and get their friends and neighbours to adopt them. And insuch an assembly, even if it be such as we call ideally perfect, we mustallow something for the presence of a few hot-headed and irreconcilablemembers, --men of inflexible mind, who cannot adapt themselves tocircumstances, and will refuse to play when they see the game goingagainst them. [Sidenote: The men who were assembled. ] All these points are well illustrated in the assemblage of men thatframed our Federal Constitution. In its composition, this group of menleft nothing to be desired. In its strength and in its weakness, it wasan ideally perfect assembly. There were fifty-five men, all of themrespectable for family and for personal qualities, --men who had beenwell educated, and had done something whereby to earn recognition inthese troubled times. Twenty-nine were university men, graduates ofHarvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, William and Mary, Oxford, Glasgow, and Edinburgh. Twenty-six were not university men, and among these wereWashington and Franklin. Of the illustrious citizens who, for theirpublic services, would naturally have been here, John Adams and ThomasJefferson were in Europe; Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Richard HenryLee disapproved of the convention, and remained at home; and thegreatest man of Rhode Island, Nathanael Greene, who--one likes tothink--might have succeeded in bringing his state into the convention, had lately died of a sun-stroke, at the early age of forty-four. [Sidenote: James Madison. ] Of the two most famous men present little need be said. The names ofWashington and Franklin stood for supreme intelligence and consummatetact. Franklin had returned to this country two years before, and wasnow president of Pennsylvania. He was eighty-one years of age, theoldest man in the convention, as Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, agedtwenty-six, was the youngest. The two most profound and originalthinkers in the company were but little older than Dayton. AlexanderHamilton was thirty, James Madison thirty-six. Among political writers, these two men must be ranked in the same order with Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Locke; and the "Federalist, " their joint production, isthe greatest treatise on government that has ever been written. JohnJay, who contributed a few pages to this immortal volume, had not beensent to the convention, because New York did not wish to have itsucceed. Along with Hamilton, New York sent two commonplace men, RobertYates and John Lansing, who were extreme and obstinate Antifederalists;and the action of Hamilton, who was thus prevented from carrying thevote of his own state for any measure which he might propose, was inthis way sadly embarrassed. For another reason, Hamilton failed toexert as much influence in the convention as one would have expectedfrom his profound thought and his brilliant eloquence. Scarcely any ofthese men entertained what we should now call extreme democratic views. Scarcely any, perhaps, had that intense faith in the ultimate good senseof the people which was the most powerful characteristic of Jefferson. But Hamilton went to the other extreme, and expressed his distrust ofpopular government too plainly. His views were too aristocratic and hispreference for centralization was too pronounced to carry conviction tohis hearers. The leading part in the convention fell, therefore, toJames Madison, a young man somewhat less brilliant than Hamilton, butsuperior to him in sobriety and balance of powers. Madison used to becalled the "Father of the Constitution, " and it is true that thegovernment under which we live is more his work than that of any otherone man. From early youth his life had been devoted to the study ofhistory and the practice of statesmanship. He was a graduate ofPrinceton College, an earnest student, familiar with all the bestliterature of political science from Aristotle down to his own time, andhe had given especial attention to the history of federal government inancient Greece, and in Switzerland and Holland. At the age oftwenty-five he had taken part in the Virginia convention whichinstructed the delegates from that state in Congress to bring forwardthe Declaration of Independence. During the last part of the war he wasan active and influential member of Congress, where no one equalled orapproached him for knowledge of English history and constitutional law. In 1784 he had returned to the Virginia legislature, and been foremostin securing the passage of the great act which gave complete religiousfreedom to the people of that state. No man understood better than hethe causes of the alarming weakness of the federal government, and ofthe commercial disturbances and popular discontent of the time; nor hadany one worked more zealously or more adroitly in bringing about themeeting of this convention. As he stood here now, a leader in thedebate, there was nothing grand or imposing in his appearance. He wassmall of stature and slight in frame, like Hamilton, but he had none ofHamilton's personal magnetism. His manner was shy and prim, and blushescame often to his cheeks. At the same time, he had that rare dignity ofunconscious simplicity which characterizes the earnest and disinterestedscholar. He was exceedingly sweet-tempered, generous, and kind, but veryhard to move from a path which, after long reflection, he had decided tobe the right one. He looked at politics judicially, and was so little ofa party man that on several occasions he was accused (quite wrongfully, as I hope hereafter to prove) of gross inconsistency. The position ofleadership, which he won so early and kept so long, he held by sheerforce of giant intelligence, sleepless industry, and an integrity whichno man ever doubted. But he was above all things a man of peace. When inafter years, as president of the United States, he was called upon tomanage a great war, he was out of place, and his reputation for supremeability was temporarily lowered. Here in the Federal Convention we areintroduced to him at the noblest and most useful moment of his life. [Sidenote: Other leading members. ] Of the fifty-five men here assembled, Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison were of the first order of ability. Many others in the roomwere gentlemen of more than ordinary talent and culture. There was JohnDickinson, who had moved from Pennsylvania into Delaware, and now cameto defend the equal rights of the smaller states. There was James Wilsonof Pennsylvania, born and educated in Scotland, one of the most learnedjurists this country has ever seen. Beside him sat the financier, RobertMorris, and his namesake Gouverneur Morris of Morrisania, near the cityof New York, the originator of our decimal currency, and one of thefar-sighted projectors of the Erie Canal. Then there was John Rutledgeof South Carolina, who ever since the Stamp Act Congress had been themainstay of his state; and with him were the two able and gallantPinckneys. Caleb Strong, afterward ten times governor of Massachusetts, was a typical Puritan, hard-headed and supremely sensible; hiscolleague, Rufus King, already distinguished for his opposition to negroslavery, was a man of brilliant attainments. And there were GeorgeWythe, the chancellor of Virginia, and Daniel Carroll of Maryland, whohad played a prominent part in the events which led to the creation of anational domain. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, afterward chiefjustice of the United States, was one of the ablest lawyers of histime; with him were Roger Sherman and William Johnson, the latter aFellow of the Royal Society, and afterward president of ColumbiaCollege. The New Jersey delegation, consisting of William Livingston, David Brearley, William Paterson, and Jonathan Dayton, was a very strongone; and as to New Hampshire, it is enough to mention the name of JohnLangdon. Besides all these there were some twenty of less mark, men whosaid little, but listened and voted. And then there were theirreconcilables, Yates and Lansing, the two Antifederalists from NewYork; and four men of much greater ability, who took an important partin the proceedings, but could not be induced to accept the result. Thesefour were Luther Martin of Maryland; George Mason and Edmund Randolph ofVirginia; and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. When these men had assembled in Independence Hall, they chose GeorgeWashington president of the convention. The doors were locked, and aninjunction of strict secrecy was put upon every one. The results oftheir work were known in the following September, when the draft of theFederal Constitution was published. But just what was said and done inthis secret conclave was not revealed until fifty years had passed, andthe aged James Madison, the last survivor of those who sat there, hadbeen gathered to his fathers. He kept a journal of the proceedings, which was published after his death, and upon the interesting story toldin that journal we have now to enter. CHAPTER VI. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. [Sidenote: Difficult problem before the convention. ] [Sidenote: Washington's solemn appeal. ] The Federal Convention did wisely in withholding its debates from theknowledge of the people. It was felt that discussion would be moreuntrammelled, and that its result ought to go before the country as thecollective and unanimous voice of the convention. There was likely to bewrangling enough among themselves; but should their scheme be unfolded, bit by bit, before its parts could be viewed in their mutual relations, popular excitement would become intense, there might be riots, and anend would be put to that attitude of mental repose so necessary for theconstructive work that was to be done. It was thought best that thescheme should be put forth as a completed whole, and that for severalyears, even, until the new system of government should have had a fairtrial, the traces of the individual theories and preferences concernedin its formation should not be revealed. For it was generally assumedthat a system of government new in some important respects would beproposed by the convention, and while the people awaited the result thewildest speculations and rumours were current. A few hoped, and manyfeared, that some scheme of monarchy would be established. Suchsurmises found their way across the ocean, and hopes were expressed inEngland that, should a king be chosen, it might be a younger son ofGeorge III. It was even hinted, with alarm, that, through gratitude toour recent allies, we might be persuaded to offer the crown to somemember of the royal family of France. No such thoughts were entertained, however, by any person present in the convention. Some of the delegatescame with the design of simply amending the articles of confederation bytaking away from the states the power of regulating commerce, andintrusting this power to Congress. Others felt that if the work were notdone thoroughly now another chance might never be offered; and these menthought it necessary to abolish the confederation, and establish afederal republic, in which the general government should act directlyupon the people. The difficult problem was how to frame a plan of thissort which people could be made to understand and adopt. At the veryoutset some of the delegates began to exhibit symptoms of that peculiarkind of moral cowardice which is wont to afflict free governments, andof which American history furnishes so many instructive examples. It wassuggested that palliatives and half measures would be far more likely tofind favour with the people than any thorough-going reform, whenWashington suddenly interposed with a brief but immortal speech, whichought to be blazoned in letters of gold, and posted on the wall of everyAmerican assembly that shall meet to nominate a candidate, or declare apolicy, or pass a law, so long as the weakness of human nature shallendure. Rising from his president's chair, his tall figure drawn up toits full height, he exclaimed in tones unwontedly solemn with suppressedemotion, "It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please thepeople, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterwarddefend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and thehonest can repair; the event is in the hand of God. " This outburst of noble eloquence carried conviction to every one, andhenceforth we do not hear that any attempt was avowedly made to avoidthe issues as they came up. It was a most wholesome tonic. It braced upthe convention to high resolves, and impressed upon all the delegatesthat they were in a situation where faltering or trifling was bothwicked and dangerous. From that moment the mood in which they workedcaught something from the glorious spirit of Washington. There was needof such high purpose, for two plans were presently laid before themeeting, which, for a moment, brought out one of the chief elements ofantagonism existing between the states, and which at first seemedirreconcilable. It was the happy compromise which united and harmonisedthese two plans that smoothed the further work of the convention, andmade it possible for a stable and powerful government to be constructed. [Sidenote: The root of all the difficulties. ] The first of these plans was known as the Virginia plan. It was agreedupon in a committee of the delegates of that state, and was broughtforward by Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, in the name of thestate, but its chief author was Madison. It struck instantly at the rootof the difficulties under which the country had been staggering eversince the Declaration of Independence. The federal government hadpossessed no means of enforcing obedience to its laws. Its edicts werewithout a sanction; and this was because they operated upon states, andnot upon individuals. When an individual defies the law, you can lockhim up in jail, or levy an execution upon his property. The immenseforce of the community is arrayed against him, and he is as helpless asa straw on the billows of the ocean. He cannot raise a militia toprotect himself. But when the law is defied by a state, it is quiteotherwise. You cannot put a state into jail, nor seize its goods; youcan only make war on it, and if you try that expedient you find that thestate is not helpless. Its local pride and prejudices are arousedagainst you, and its militia will turn out in full force to uphold theinfraction of law. Against this obstinate and exasperated military forcewhat superior force can you bring? Under some rare combination ofcircumstances you might get the military force of several of the otherstates; but ordinarily, when what you are trying to do is simply toenforce every-day laws, and when you simply represent a distrustedgeneral government in conflict with a local government, you cannot dothis. The other states will sympathize with the delinquent state; theywill feel that the very same condition of things which leads you toattack that state to-day will lead you to attack some other stateto-morrow. Hence you cannot get any military help, and you arepowerless. Such was the case with the Continental Congress. A novel and distrustedinstitution, it was called upon to enforce its laws uponlong-established communities, full of sturdy independence and obstinatelocal prejudices. It was able to act, though with clumsy slowness, aslong as there was an enemy in the field who was even more dreaded. Butas soon as this enemy had been beaten out of sight it could not act atall. This had been because it did not represent the American people, butonly the American states. The vital force which moved it was not theresistless force of a whole people, but only a shadowy semblance offorce, derived from a theoretical consent of thirteen corporate bodies, which in their corporate capacity could never be compelled to agreeabout anything under the sun; and unless compelled they would not agree. Four years of disturbance in every part of the country, in the course ofwhich troops had been called out in several states, and civil war hadbeen narrowly averted at least half a dozen times, had proved thisbeyond all cavil. With almost any other people than the Americans civilwar would have come already. With all the vast future interests thatwere involved in these quarrels looming up before their keen, sagaciousminds, it was a wonder that they had been kept from coming to blows. Such self-restraint had been greatly to their credit. It was the blessedfruit of more than a century of government by free discussion, while yetthese states were colonies, peopled by the very cream of Englishfreemen who had fought the decisive battle of civil and religiousfreedom for mankind in that long crisis when the Invincible Armada wasoverwhelmed and the Long Parliament won its triumphs. Suchself-restraint had this people shown in days of trial, under a viciousgovernment adopted in a time of hurry and sore distress. But late eventshad gone far to show that it could not endure. The words of Randolph's opening speech are worth quoting in thisconnection. "The confederation, " he said, "was made in the infancy ofthe science of constitutions, when the inefficiency of requisitions wasunknown; when no commercial discord had arisen among states; when norebellion like that in Massachusetts had broken out; when foreign debtswere not urgent; when the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen;when treaties had not been violated; and when nothing better could havebeen conceded by states jealous of their sovereignty. But it offered nosecurity against foreign invasion, for Congress could neither preventnor conduct a war, nor punish infractions of treaties or of the law ofnations, nor control particular states from provoking war. The federalgovernment has no constitutional power to check a quarrel betweenseparate states; nor to suppress a rebellion in any one of them; nor toestablish a productive impost; nor to counteract the commercialregulations of other nations; nor to defend itself against theencroachments of the states. From the manner in which it has beenratified in many of the states, it cannot be claimed to be paramount tothe state constitutions; so that there is a prospect of anarchy from theinherent laxity of the government. As the remedy, the government to beestablished must have for its basis the republican principle. " [Sidenote: The Virginia plan; a radical cure. ] Having thus tersely stated the whole problem, Randolph went on topresent the Virginia plan. To make the federal government operatedirectly upon individuals, one provision was absolutely necessary. Itdid not solve the whole problem, but it was an indispensable beginning. This was the proposal that there should be a national legislature, inwhich the American _people_ instead of the American states should berepresented. For the purposes of federal legislation, there must be anassembly elected directly by the people, and with its membersapportioned according to population. There must be such an assembly asour present House of Representatives, standing in the same immediaterelation to the people of the whole country as was sustained by theassembly of each separate state to the people of that state. Withoutsuch direct representation of the whole people in the Federal Congress, it would be impossible to achieve one secure step toward the radicalreform of the weaknesses and vices of the confederation. It was the onlyway in which the vexed question of one nation or thirteen could be madeto yield a satisfactory answer. At the same time it could not be deniedthat such a proposal was revolutionary in character. It paved the wayfor a national consolidation which might go further than any one couldforesee, and much further than was desirable. The moribund Congress ofthe Confederation, with its delegates chosen by the state assemblies, and casting its vote simply by states, had utterly failed to serve as anational legislature. There was a good deal of truth in what John Adamsonce said of it, that it was more a diplomatic than a legislative body. It was, indeed, because of this consciously felt diplomatic characterthat it was called a Congress, and not a Parliament. In its lack ofcoercive power it resembled the international congresses of Europerather than the supreme legislature of any country. To substituteabruptly for such a body a truly national legislature, based not uponstates but upon population, was quietly to inaugurate a revolution of noless magnitude than that which had lately severed us from Great Britain. So bold a step, while all-essential in order to complete thatrevolution, and make its victorious issue fortunate instead ofdisastrous to the American people, was sufficiently revolutionary toawaken the fears of many members of the Federal Convention. To thefamiliar state governments which had so long possessed their love andallegiance, it was super-adding a new and untried government, which itwas feared would swallow up the states and everywhere extinguish localindependence. Nor can it be said that such fears were unreasonable. Ourfederal government has indeed shown a strong tendency to encroach uponthe province of the state governments, especially since our late CivilWar. Too much centralization is our danger to-day, as the weakness ofthe federal tie was our danger a century ago. The rule of theFederalist party was needed in 1789 as the rule of the Republican partywas needed in 1861, to put a curb upon the centrifugal tendencies. Butafter Federalism had fairly done its great work, at the beginning of thenineteenth century, it was well that the administration of our nationalaffairs should pass into the hands of the party to which ThomasJefferson and Samuel Adams belonged, and which Madison, in his calmstatesmanlike wisdom, had come to join. And now that, in our own day, the disruptive forces have been even more thoroughly and effectuallyovercome, it is time for the principles of that party to be reassertedwith fresh emphasis. If the day should ever arrive (which God forbid!)when the people of the different parts of our country shall allow theirlocal affairs to be administered by prefects sent from Washington, andwhen the self-government of the states shall have been so far lost asthat of the departments of France, or even so far as that of thecounties of England, --on that day the progressive political career ofthe American people will have come to an end, and the hopes that havebeen built upon it for the future happiness and prosperity of mankindwill be wrecked forever. I do not think that the historian writing at the present day need fearany such direful calamity, for the past century has shown mostinstructively how, in such a society as ours, the sense of politicaldangers slowly makes its way through the whole mass of the people, untilmovements at length are made to avert them, and the pendulum swings inthe opposite direction. The history of political parties in the UnitedStates is especially rich in lessons of this sort. Compared with thestatesmen of the Federal Convention, we are at a great advantage instudying this question of national consolidation; and we have no excusefor failing to comprehend the attitude of the men who dreaded thecreation of a national legislature as the entering wedge which would byand by rend asunder the structure of our liberties. The great mind ofMadison was one of the first to entertain distinctly the nobleconception of two kinds of government operating at one and the same timeupon the same individuals, harmonious with each other, but each supremein its own sphere. Such is the fundamental conception of our partlyfederal, partly national, government, which appears throughout theVirginia plan as well as in the Constitution which grew out of it. Itwas a political conception of a higher order than had ever before beenentertained; it took a great deal of discussion to make it clear to theminds of the delegates generally; and the struggle over this initialmeasure of a national legislature was so bitter as to come near breakingup the convention. In its original shape the Virginia plan went much further towardnational consolidation than the Constitution as adopted. The reactionagainst the evils of the loose-jointed confederation, which Randolph soably summed up, was extreme. According to the Virginia plan, thenational legislature was to be composed of two houses, like thelegislatures of the several states. The members of the lower houseshould be chosen directly by the people; members of the upper house, orSenate, should be elected by the lower house out of persons nominated bythe state legislatures. In both the lower and the upper branches of thisnational legislature the votes were to be the votes of individuals, andno longer the votes of states, as in the Continental Congress. Under thearticles of confederation each state had an equal vote, and two thirdswere required for every important measure. Under the proposedConstitution each state was to have a number of representativesproportionate either to its wealth or to the number of its freeinhabitants, and a bare majority of votes was to suffice to pass allmeasures in the ordinary course of business; and these rules were toapply both to the lower house and to the Senate. To adopt such a planwould overthrow the equality of the states altogether. It would giveVirginia, the greatest state, sixteen representatives, where Georgia, the smallest state, had but one; and besides, as the votes were nolonger to be taken by states, individual members could combine in anyway they pleased, quite irrespective of state lines. It was not strangethat to many delegates in the convention such a beginning should haveseemed revolutionary. This impression was deepened when it was furtherproposed not only to clothe this national legislature with originalpowers of legislation in all cases to which the several states areincompetent, but also to allow it to set aside at discretion such statelaws as it might deem unconstitutional. It is interesting to findMadison, whose Federalism afterward came to be so moderate, nowappearing as the earnest defender of this extreme provision, soincompatible with state rights. But in Madison's mind at this moment, inthe actual presence of the anarchy of the confederation, the onlyalternative which seemed to present itself was that of armed coercion. "A negative on state laws, " he said, "is the mildest expedient that canbe devised for enforcing a national decree. Should no such precaution beengrafted, the only remedy would be coercion. The negative would renderthe use of force unnecessary. This prerogative of the general governmentis the great pervading principle that must control the centrifugaltendency of the states, which, without it, will continually fly out oftheir proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of the politicalsystem. " But these views were not destined to find favour with theconvention, which finally left the matter to be much more satisfactorilyadjusted through the medium of the federal judiciary. Such were the fundamental provisions of the Virginia plan with regard tothe national legislature. To carry out the laws, it was proposed thatthere should be a national executive, to be chosen by the nationallegislature for a short term, and ineligible a second time. Whether theexecutive power should be invested in a single person or in several wasnot specified. As will be seen hereafter, this was regarded as anextremely delicate point, with which it was thought best not toembarrass the Virginia plan at the outset. Passing lightly over this, itwas urged that, in order to complete the action of the government uponindividuals, there must be a national judiciary to determine casesarising under the Constitution, cases in admiralty, and cases in whichdifferent states or their citizens appear as parties. The judges were tobe chosen by the national legislature, to hold office during goodbehaviour. [Sidenote: First reception of the Virginia plan. ] Such, in its main outlines, was the plan which Randolph laid before theconvention, in the name of the Virginia delegation. An audacious scheme!exclaimed some of the delegates; it was enough to take your breath away. If they were going to begin like this, they might as well go home, forall discussion would be time wasted. They were not sent there to set onfoot a revolution, but to amend and strengthen the articles ofconfederation. But this audacious plan simply abolished theConfederation in order to substitute for it a consolidated nationalgovernment. Foremost in urging this objection were Yates and Lansing ofNew York, with Luther Martin of Maryland. Dickinson said it was pushingthings altogether too far, and his colleague, George Read, hinted thatthe delegation from Delaware might feel obliged to withdraw from theconvention if the election of representatives according to populationshould be adopted. By the tact of Madison and Gouverneur Morris thisquestion was postponed for a few days. After some animated discussion, the issues became so narrowed and defined that they could be taken upone by one. It was first decided that the national legislature shouldconsist of two branches. Then came a warm discussion as to whether themembers of the lower house should be elected directly by the people. Curiously enough, in a country where the principle of popular electionhad long since taken such deep root, where the assemblies of the severalstates had been chosen by the people from the very beginning, there wassome doubt as to whether the same principle could safely be applied tothe national House of Representatives. Gerry, with his head full of theShays rebellion and the "Know Ye" measures of the neighbouring state, thought the people could not be trusted. "The people do not wantvirtue, " said he, "but are the dupes of pretended patriots. " RogerSherman took a similar view, and was supported by Martin, Rutledge, andboth the Pinckneys; but the sounder opinion prevailed. On this pointHamilton was at one with Mason, Wilson, and Dickinson. The proposedassembly, said Mason, was to be, so to speak, our House of Commons, andought to know and sympathize with every part of the community. It oughtto have at heart the rights and interests of every class of the people, and in no other way could this end be so completely attained as bypopular election. "Yes, " added Wilson, "without the confidence of thepeople no government, least of all a republican government, can longsubsist. . . . The election of the first branch by the people is not thecorner-stone only, but the foundation of the fabric. " "It is essentialto the democratic rights of the community, " said Hamilton, "that thefirst branch be directly elected by the people. " Madison arguedpowerfully on the same side, and the question was finally decided infavour of popular election. [Sidenote: Antagonism between large states and small states. ] [Sidenote: The New Jersey plan; a feeble palliative. ] It was now the 4th of June, when the great question came up which nearlywrecked the convention before it was settled, after a whole month ofstormy debate. This was the question as to how the states should berepresented in the new Congress. On the Virginia plan, the smallerstates would be virtually swamped. Unless they could have equal votes, without regard to wealth or population, they would be at the mercy ofthe great states. In the division which ensued, the four most populousstates--Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and NorthCarolina--favoured the Virginia plan; and they succeeded in carryingSouth Carolina with them. Georgia, too, which, though weak at thatmoment, possessed considerable room for expansion, voted upon the sameside. On the other hand, the states of Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland--which were not only small in area, but were cutoff from further expansion by their geographical situation--were notinclined to give up their equal vote in either branch of the nationallegislature. At this stage of the proceedings the delegation from NewHampshire had not yet arrived upon the scene. On several occasions themajority of the Maryland delegation went with the larger states, butLuther Martin, always opposed to the Virginia plan, usually succeeded individing the vote of the delegation. Of the New York members, Yates andLansing, here as always, thwarted Hamilton by voting with the smallerstates. Their policy throughout was one of obstruction. The members fromConnecticut were disposed to be conciliatory; but New Jersey wasobstinate and implacable. She knew what it was to be tyrannized over bypowerful neighbours. The wrongs she had suffered from New York andPennsylvania rankled in the minds of her delegates. Accordingly, in thename of the smaller states, William Paterson laid before the conventionthe so-called "New Jersey plan" for the amendment of the articles ofconfederation. This scheme admitted a federal legislature, consisting ofa single house, an executive in the form of a council to be chosen byCongress, and likewise a federal judiciary, with powers less extensivethan those contemplated by the Virginia plan. It gave to Congress thepower to regulate foreign and domestic commerce, to levy duties onimports, and even to raise internal revenue by means of a Stamp Act. Butwith all this apparent liberality on the surface, the New Jersey planwas vicious at bottom. It did not really give Congress the power to actimmediately upon individuals. The federal legislature which it proposedwas to represent states, and not individuals, and the states were tovote equally, without regard to wealth or population. If things were tobe left in this shape, there was no security that the powers granted toCongress could ever be really exercised. Nay, it was almost certain thatthey could not be put into operation. It was easy enough on paper togive Congress the permission to levy duties and regulate commerce, butsuch a permission would amount to nothing unless Congress were armedwith the power of enforcing its decrees upon individuals. And it couldin no wise acquire such power unless as the creature of the people, andnot of the states. The New Jersey plan, therefore, furnished no realremedy for the evils which afflicted the country. It was vigorouslyopposed by Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, and King. Hamilton, indeed, tookthis occasion to offer a plan of his own, which, in addition toMadison's scheme of a purely national legislature, contained thefeatures of a tenure for life or good behaviour, for the executive andthe members of the upper house. But to most of the delegates this schemeseemed too little removed from a monarchy, and Hamilton's brilliantspeech in its favour, while applauded by many, was supported by none. The weighty arguments of Wilson, King, and Madison prevailed, and theNew Jersey plan lost its original shape when it was decided thatCongress should consist of two houses. The principle of equal staterepresentation, however, remained as a stumbling-block. Paterson, supported by his able colleague Brearley, as well as by Martin and thetwo irreconcilables from New York, stoutly maintained that to departfrom this principle would be to exceed the powers of the convention, which assuredly was not intended to remodel the government frombeginning to end. But Randolph answered, "When the salvation of therepublic is at stake, it would be treason to our trust not to proposewhat we find necessary;" and Hamilton pithily reminded the delegatesthat as they were there only for the purpose of recommending a schemewhich would have to be submitted to the states for acceptance, theyneed not be deterred by any false scruples from using their wits to thebest possible advantage. The debate on the merits of the question was anangry one. According to the Virginia plan, said Brearly, the threestates of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania will carryeverything before them. "It was known to him, from facts within NewJersey, that where large and small counties were united into a districtfor electing representatives for the district, the large counties alwayscarried their point, and consequently the large states would do so. . . . Was it fair, on the other hand, that Georgia should have an equal votewith Virginia? He would not say it was. What remedy, then? One only:that a map of the United States be spread out, that all the existingboundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made intothirteen equal parts. " "Yes, " said Paterson, "a confederacy supposessovereignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty supposesequality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all state distinctionsmust be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when anequal division is made then there may be fairly an equality ofrepresentation. " This argument was repeated with a triumphant air, asseeming to reduce the Virginia plan to absurdity. Paterson went on tosay that "there was no more reason that a great individual state, contributing much, should have more votes than a small one, contributinglittle, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes thanan indigent one. If the ratable property of A was to that of B as fortyto one, ought A, for that reason, to have forty times as many votes asB?. . . Give the large states an influence in proportion to theirmagnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their ambition will beproportionally increased, and the small states will have everything tofear. It was once proposed by Galloway [in the first ContinentalCongress] that America should be represented in the British Parliament, and then be bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled tomore than one third of the representatives which would fall to the shareof Great Britain: would American rights and interests have been safeunder an authority thus constituted?" Then, warming with the subject, heexclaimed, If the great states wish to unite on such a plan, "let themunite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authorityto compel the others to unite. . . . Shall I submit the welfare of NewJersey with five votes in a council where Virginia has sixteen?. . . Iwill never consent to the proposed plan. I will not only oppose it here, but on my return home will do everything in my power to defeat it there. Neither my state nor myself will ever submit to tyranny. " Paterson was ably answered by James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, who pointedout the absurdity of giving 180, 000 men in one part of the country asmuch weight in the national legislature as 750, 000 in another part. Itis unjust, he said. "The gentleman from New Jersey is candid. Hedeclares his opinions boldly. I commend him for it. I will be equallycandid. . . . I never will confederate on his principles. " The conventiongrew nervous and excited over this seemingly irreconcilable antagonism. The discussion was kept up with much learning and acuteness by Madison, Ellsworth, and Martin, and history was ransacked for testimony from theAmphiktyonic Council to Old Sarum, and back again to the Lykian League. Madison, rightly reading the future, declared that if once the proposedunion should be formed, the real danger would come not from the rivalrybetween large and small states, but from the antagonistic interests ofthe slave-holding and non-slaveholding states. Hamilton pointed out thatin the state of New York five counties had a majority of therepresentatives, and yet the citizens of the other counties were in nodanger of tyranny, as the laws have an equal operation upon all. RufusKing called attention to the fact that the rights of Scotland weresecure from encroachments, although her representation in Parliament wasnecessarily smaller than that of England. But New Jersey and Delaware, mindful of recent grievances, were not to be argued down or soothed. Gunning Bedford of Delaware was especially violent. "Pretences tosupport ambition, " said he, "are never wanting. The cry is, Where is thedanger? and it is insisted that although the powers of the generalgovernment will be increased, yet it will be for the good of the whole;and although the three great states form nearly a majority of the peopleof America, they never will injure the lesser states. _Gentlemen, I donot trust you. _ If you possess the power, the abuse of it could not bechecked; and what then would prevent you from exercising it to ourdestruction?. . . Sooner than be ruined, _there are foreign powers whowill take us by the hand_. I say this not to threaten or intimidate, butthat we should reflect seriously before we act. " This language calledforth a rebuke from Rufus King. "I am concerned, " said he, "for whatfell from the gentleman from Delaware, --_take a foreign power by thehand!_ I am sorry he mentioned it, and I hope he is able to excuse it tohimself on the score of passion. " [Sidenote: The Connecticut compromise. ] The situation had become dangerous. "The convention, " said Martin, "wason the verge of dissolution, scarce held together by the strength of ahair. " When things were looking darkest, Oliver Ellsworth and RogerSherman suggested a compromise. "Yes, " said Franklin, "when a joinerwishes to fit two boards, he sometimes pares off a bit from both. " Thefamous Connecticut compromise led the way to the arrangement which wasultimately adopted, according to which the national principle was toprevail in the House of Representatives, and the federal principle inthe Senate. But at first the compromise met with little favour. Neitherparty was willing to give way. "No compromise for us, " said LutherMartin. "You must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business isat an end. " "Then we are come to a full stop, " said Roger Sherman. "Isuppose it was never meant that we should break up without doingsomething. " When the question as to allowing equality of suffrage to thestates in the Federal Senate was put to vote, the result was a tie. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland--fivestates--voted in the affirmative; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina--five states--voted in the negative;the vote of Georgia was divided and lost. It was Abraham Baldwin, anative of Connecticut and lately a tutor in Yale College, a recentemigrant to Georgia, who thus divided the vote of that state, andprevented a decision which would in all probability have broken up theconvention. His state was the last to vote, and the house was hushed inanxious expectation, when this brave and wise young man yielded hisprivate conviction to what he saw to be the paramount necessity ofkeeping the convention together. All honour to his memory! The moral effect of the tie vote was in favour of the Connecticutcompromise; for no one could doubt that the little states, New Hampshireand Rhode Island, had they been represented in the division, would havevoted upon that side. The matter was referred to a committee asimpartially constituted as possible, with Elbridge Gerry as chairman;and On the 5th of July, after a recess of three days, the committeereported in favour of the compromise. Fresh objections on the part ofthe large states were now offered by Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, andgloom again overhung the convention. Gerry said that, while he did notfully approve of the compromise, he had nevertheless supported it, because he felt sure that if nothing were done war and confusion mustensue, the old confederation being already virtually at an end. GeorgeMason observed that "it could not be more inconvenient for anygentleman to remain absent from his private affairs than it was for him;but he would bury his bones in that city rather than expose his countryto the consequences of a dissolution of the convention. " Mason'ssubsequent behaviour was hardly in keeping with the promise of thisbrave speech, and in Gerry we shall observe like inconsistency. Atpresent a timely speech from Madison soothed the troubled waters; but itwas only after eleven days of somewhat more tranquil debate that thecompromise was adopted on the 16th of July. Even then it was butnarrowly secured. The ayes were Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina, --five states; the noes were Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia, --four states; Gerry and Strongagainst King and Gorham divided the vote of Massachusetts, which wasthus lost. New York, for reasons presently to be stated, was absent. Itis accordingly to Elbridge Gerry and Caleb Strong that posterity areindebted for here preventing a tie, and thus bringing the vexed questionto a happy issue. According to the compromise secured with so much difficulty, it wasarranged that in the lower house population was to be represented, andin the upper house the states, each of which, without regard to size, was forever to be entitled to two senators. In the lower house there wasto be one representative for every 40, 000 inhabitants, but atWashington's suggestion the number was changed to 30, 000, so as toincrease the house, which then seemed likely to be too small in numbers. Some one suggested that with the growth of population that rate wouldmake an unwieldy house within a hundred and fifty years from that time, whereat Gorham of Massachusetts laughed to scorn the idea that anysystem of government they could devise in that room could possibly lasta hundred and fifty years. The difficulty has been surmounted byenlarging from time to time the basis of representation. It now seemedinadvisable that the senators should be chosen by the lower house out ofpersons nominated by the state legislatures; and it was accordinglydecided that they should be not merely nominated, but elected, by thestate legislatures. Thus the Senate was made quite independent of thelower house. At the same time, the senators were to vote as individuals, and thus the old practice of voting by states, except in certainpeculiar emergencies, was finally done away with. [Sidenote: It was a decisive victory for Madison's scheme. ] [Sidenote: Irreconcilables go home. ] It is seldom, if ever, that a political compromise leaves things evenlybalanced. Almost every such arrangement, when once set working, weighsdown the scales decidedly to the one side or the other. The Connecticutcompromise was really a decisive victory for Madison and his party, although it modified the Virginia plan so considerably. They could wellafford to defer to the fears and prejudices of the smaller states in thestructure of the Senate, for by securing a lower house, whichrepresented the American people, and not the American states, they wonthe whole battle in so far as the question of radically reforming thegovernment was concerned. As soon as the foundation was thus laid for agovernment which should act directly upon individuals, it obviouslybecame necessary to abandon the articles of confederation, and work outa new constitution in all its details. The plan, as now reported, omitted the obnoxious adjective "national, " and spoke of the _federal_legislature and _federal_ courts. But to the men who were still blindlywedded to the old confederation this soothing change of phraseology didnot conceal their defeat. On the very day that the compromise wasfavourably reported by the committee, Yates and Lansing quit theconvention in disgust, and went home to New York. After the departure ofthese uncongenial colleagues, Hamilton might have acted with power, hadhe not known too well that the sentiment of his state did not supporthim. As a mere individual he could do but little, and accordingly hewent home for a while to attend to pressing business, returning just intime to take part in the closing scenes. His share in the work offraming the Federal Constitution was very small. About the time thatHamilton returned, Luther Martin, whose wrath had waxed hotter everyday, as he saw power after power extended to the federal government, atlength gave way and went back to Maryland, vowing that he would havenothing more to do with such high-handed proceedings. While the Connecticut compromise thus scattered a few scintillations ofdiscontent, and relieved the convention of some of its most discordantelements, its general effect was wonderfully harmonizing. The men whohad opposed the Virginia plan only through their dread of the largerstates were now more than conciliated. The concession of equalrepresentation in the Senate turned out to have been a master stroke ofdiplomacy. As soon as the little states were assured of an equal sharein the control of one of the two central legislative bodies, theysuddenly forgot their scruples about thoroughly overhauling thegovernment, and none were readier than they to intrust extensive powersto the new Congress. Paterson of New Jersey, the fiercest opponent ofthe Virginia plan, became from that time forth to the end of his lifethe most devoted of Federalists. [Sidenote: Other antagonisms; vague dread of the future west. ] [Sidenote: Antagonism between slave states and free states. ] That first step which proverbially gives the most trouble had now beenfairly taken. But other compromises were needed before the work ofconstruction could properly be carried out. As the antagonism betweengreat and small states disappeared from the scene, other antagonismsappeared. It is worth noting that just for a moment there was revealed aglimmering of jealousy and dread on the part of the eastern statestoward those of which the foundations were laid in the northwesternterritory. Many people in New England feared that their children wouldbe drawn westward in such numbers as to create immense states beyond theOhio; and thus it was foreseen that the relative political weight of NewEngland in the future would be diminished. To a certain extent thisprediction has been justified by events, but Roger Sherman rightlymaintained that it afforded no just grounds for dread. King and Gerryintroduced a most illiberal and mischievous motion, that the totalnumber of representatives from new states must never be allowed toexceed the total number from the original thirteen. Such an arrangement, which would surely have been enough to create that antagonism betweeneast and west which it sought to forestall and avoid, was supported byMassachusetts and Connecticut, with Delaware and Maryland; but it wasdefeated by the combination of New Jersey with the four states south ofMaryland. The ground was thus cleared for a very different kind ofsectional antagonism, --that which, as Madison truly said, would provethe most deep-seated and enduring of all, --the antagonism between northand south. The first great struggle between the pro-slavery andanti-slavery parties began in the Federal Convention, and it resulted inthe first two of the long series of compromises by which theirrepressible conflict was postponed until the north had waxed strongenough to confront the dreaded spectre of secession, and, summoning allits energies in one stupendous effort, exorcise it forever. From thismoment down to 1865 we shall continually be made to realize how theAmerican people had entered into the shadow of the coming Civil Warbefore they had fairly emerged from that of the Revolution; and as wepass from scene to scene of the solemn story, we shall learn how to beforever grateful for the sudden and final clearing of the air wrought bythat frightful storm which men not yet old can still so well remember. The first compromise related to the distribution of representativesbetween north and south. Was representation in the lower house ofCongress to be proportioned to wealth, or to population; and if thelatter, were all the inhabitants, or only all the free inhabitants, tobe counted? It was soon agreed that wealth was difficult to reckon andpopulation easy to count; and to an extent sufficient for all ordinarypurposes, population might serve as an index of wealth. A state with500, 000 inhabitants would be in most cases richer than one with 400, 000. In those days, when cities were few and small, this was approximatelytrue. In our day it is not at all true. A state with large commercialand manufacturing cities is sure to be much richer than a state in whichthe population is chiefly rural. The population of Massachusetts issomewhat smaller than that of Indiana; but her aggregate wealth is morethan double that of Indiana. Disparities like this, which do not troubleus to-day, would have troubled the Federal Convention. We no longerthink it desirable to give political representation to wealth, or toanything but persons. We have become thoroughly democratic, but ourgreat-grandfathers had not. To them it seemed quite essential thatwealth should be represented as well as persons; but they got over themain difficulty easily, because under the economic conditions of thattime population could serve roughly as an index to wealth, and it wasmuch easier to count noses than to assess the value of farms and stock. [Sidenote: Were slaves to be reckoned as persons or as chattels?] But now there was in all the southern states, and in most of thenorthern, a peculiar species of collective existence, which might bedescribed either as wealth or as population. As human beings the slavesmight be described as population, but in the eye of the law they werechattels. In the northern states slavery was rapidly disappearing, andthe property in negroes was so small as to be hardly worth considering;while south of Mason and Dixon's line this peculiar kind of property wasthe chief wealth of the states. But clearly, in apportioningrepresentation, in sharing political power in the federal assembly, thesame rule should have been applied impartially to all the states. Atthis point, Pierce Butler and Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolinainsisted that slaves were part of the population, and as such must becounted in ascertaining the basis of representation. A fierce andcomplicated dispute ensued. The South Carolina proposal suggested auniform rule, but it was one that would scarcely alter the politicalweight of the north, while it would vastly increase the weight of thesouth; and it would increase it most in just the quarter where slaverywas most deeply rooted. The power of South Carolina, as a member of theUnion, would be doubled by such a measure. Hence the northern delegatesmaintained that slaves, as chattels, ought no more to be reckoned aspart of the population than houses or ships. "Has a man in Virginia, "exclaimed Paterson, "a number of votes in proportion to the number ofhis slaves? And if negroes are not represented in the states to whichthey belong, why should they be represented in the generalgovernment?. . . If a meeting of the people were to take place in a slavestate, would the slaves vote? They would not. Why then should they berepresented in a federal government?" "I can never agree, " saidGouverneur Morris, "to give such encouragement to the slave-trade aswould be given by allowing the southern states a representation fortheir negroes. . . . I would sooner submit myself to a tax for paying forall the negroes in the United States than saddle posterity with such aconstitution. " [Sidenote: The three fifths compromise; a genuine English solution, ifever there was one. ] The attitude taken by Virginia was that of peace-maker. On the one hand, such men as Washington, Madison, and Mason, who were earnestly hoping tosee their own state soon freed from the curse of slavery, could not failto perceive that if Virginia were to gain an increase of politicalweight from the existence of that institution, the difficulty of gettingthe state legislature to abolish it would be enhanced. But on the otherhand, they saw that South Carolina was inexorable, and that her refusalto adopt the Constitution for this reason would certainly carry Georgiawith her, and probably North Carolina, also. Even had South Carolinaalone been involved, it was not simply a question of forming a Unionwhich should either include her or leave her out in the cold. The casewas much more complicated than that. It was really doubtful if, withoutthe cordial assistance of South Carolina, a Union could be formed atall. A Federal Constitution had not only to be framed, but it had to bepresented to the thirteen states for adoption. It was by no means clearthat enough states would ratify it to enable the experiment of the newgovernment to go into operation. New York and Rhode Island were known tobe bitterly opposed to it; Massachusetts could not be counted on assure; to add South Carolina to this list would be to endangereverything. The event justified this caution. We shall hereafter seethat it was absolutely necessary to satisfy South Carolina, and that butfor her ratification, coming just at the moment when it did, the work ofthe Federal Convention would probably have been done in vain. It was aclear perception of the wonderful complication of interests involved inthe final appeal to the people that induced the Virginia statesmen totake the lead in a compromise. Four years before, in 1783, when Congresswas endeavouring to apportion the quotas of revenue to be required ofthe several states, a similar dispute had arisen. If taxation were to bedistributed according to population, it made a great difference whetherslaves were to be counted as population or not. If slaves were to becounted, the southern states would have to pay more than their equitableshare into the federal treasury; if slaves were not to be counted, itwas argued at the north that they would be paying less than theirequitable share. Consequently, at that time the north had been inclinedto maintain that the slaves were population, while the south hadpreferred to regard them as chattels. Thus we see that in politics, aswell as in algebra, it makes all the difference in the world whether youstart with _plus_ or with _minus_. On that occasion Madison had offereda successful compromise, in which a slave figured as three fifths of afreeman; and Rutledge of South Carolina, who was now present in theconvention, had supported the measure. Madison now proposed the samemethod of getting over the difficulty about representation, and hiscompromise was adopted. It was agreed that in counting population, whether for direct taxation or for representation in the lower house ofCongress, five slaves should be reckoned as three individuals. [Sidenote: In other words, it was the best solution attainable under thecircumstances. ] All this was thoroughly illogical, of course; it left the questionwhether slaves are population or chattels for theorizers to wrangleover, and for future events to decide. It was easy for James Wilson toshow that there was neither rhyme nor reason in it: but he subscribed toit, nevertheless, just as the northern abolitionists, Rufus King andGouverneur Morris, joined with Washington and Madison, and with thepro-slavery Pinckneys, in subscribing to it, because they all believedthat without such a compromise the Constitution would not be adopted;and in this there can be little doubt that they were right. The evilconsequences were unquestionably very serious indeed. Henceforth, solong as slavery lasted, the vote of a southerner counted for more thanthe vote of a northerner; and just where negroes were most numerous thepower of their masters became greatest. In South Carolina there sooncame to be more blacks than whites, and the application of the ruletherefore went far toward doubling the vote of South Carolina in theHouse of Representatives and in the electoral college. Every fiveslaveholders down there were equal in political weight to not less thaneight farmers or merchants in the north; and thus this troublesome stateacquired a power of working mischief out of all proportion to her realsize. At a later date the operation of the rule in Mississippi wassimilar; and in general it was just the most backward and barbarousparts of the Union that were thus favoured at the expense of the mostcivilized parts. Admitting all this, however, it remains undeniable thatthe Constitution saved us from anarchy; and there can be little doubtthat slavery and every other remnant of barbarism in American societywould have thriven far more lustily under a state of chronic anarchythan was possible under the Constitution. Four years of concentratedwarfare, animated by an intense and lofty moral purpose, could not hurtthe character or mar the fortunes of the people, like a century ofaimless and miscellaneous squabbling over a host of petty localinterests. The War of Secession was a terrible ordeal to pass through;but when one tries to picture what might have happened in this fair landwithout the work of the Federal Convention, the imagination standsaghast. [Sidenote: Compromise between New England and South Carolina as to theforeign slave-trade. ] The second great compromise between northern and southern interestsrelated to the abolition of the foreign slave-trade and the power of thefederal government over commerce. All the states except South Carolinaand Georgia wished to stop the importation of slaves; but the physicalconditions of rice and indigo culture exhausted the negroes so fastthat these two states felt that their industries would be dried up atthe very source if the importation of fresh negroes were to be stopped. Cotesworth Pinckney accordingly declared that South Carolina wouldconsider a vote to abolish the slave-trade as simply a polite way oftelling her that she was not wanted in the Union. On the other hand, thethree New England states present in the convention had made up theirminds that it would not do to allow the several states any longer toregulate commerce each according to its own whim. It was of vitalimportance that this power should be taken from the states and lodged inCongress; otherwise, the Union would soon be rent in pieces bycommercial disputes. The policy of New York had thoroughly impressedthis lesson upon all the neighbouring states. But none of the southernstates were in favour of granting this power unreservedly to Congress. If a navigation act could be passed by a simple majority in Congress, itwas feared that the New Englanders would get all the carrying trade intotheir own hands, and then charge ruinous freights for carrying rice, indigo, and tobacco to the north and to Europe. On this point, accordingly, the southern delegates acted as a unit in insisting thatCongress should not be empowered to pass navigation acts, except by atwo thirds vote of both houses. This would have tied the hands of thefederal government most unfortunately; and the New Englanders, enlightened by their own interests, saw it to be so. Here were thematerials ready for a compromise, or, as the stout abolitionist, Gouverneur Morris, truly called it, a "bargain" between New England andthe far south. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut consentedto the prolonging of the foreign slave-trade for twenty years, or until1808; and in return South Carolina and Georgia consented to the clauseempowering Congress to pass navigation acts and otherwise regulatecommerce by a simple majority of votes. At the same time, as aconcession to rice and indigo, the New Englanders agreed that Congressshould be forever prohibited from taxing exports; and thus one remnantof mediæval political economy was neatly swept away. [Sidenote: This last compromise seems to make the adhesion of Virginiadoubtful. ] This compromise was carried against the sturdy opposition of Virginia. The language of George Mason of Virginia is worth quoting, for it wassuch as Theodore Parker might have used. He called the slave-trade "thisinfernal traffic. " "Slavery, " said he, "discourages arts andmanufactures. The poor despise labour when performed by slaves. Theyprevent the immigration of whites, who really strengthen and enrich acountry. They produce the most pernicious effect on manners. Everymaster of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment ofHeaven on a country. As nations cannot be rewarded or punished in thenext world, they must be in this. By an inevitable chain of causes andeffects, Providence punishes national sins by national calamities. " Butthese prophetic words were powerless against the combination of NewEngland with the far south. One thing was now made certain, --that thevast influence of Rutledge and the Pinckneys would be thrownunreservedly in behalf of the new Constitution. "I will confess, " saidCotesworth Pinckney, "that I had prejudices against the eastern statesbefore I came here, but I have found them as liberal and candid as anymen whatever. " But this compromise, which finally secured South Carolinaand Georgia, made Virginia for the moment doubtful; for Mason andRandolph were so disgusted at the absolute power over commerce concededto Congress that, when the Constitution was finished and engrossed onpaper, they refused to sign it. It is difficult to read this or any other episode in our history wherebynegro slavery was extended and fostered without burning indignation. Butthis is not the proper mood for the historian, whose aim is to interpretmen's actions by the circumstances of their time, in order to judgetheir motives correctly. In 1787 slavery was the cloud like unto a man'shand which portended a deluge, but those who could truly read the signswere few. From north to south, slavery had been slowly dying out fornearly fifty years. It had become extinct in Massachusetts, it wasnearly so in all the other northern states, and it had just been foreverprohibited in the national domain. In Maryland and Virginia there was astrong and growing party in favour of abolition. The movement had evengathered strength in North Carolina. Only the rice-swamps of the farsouth remained wedded to their idols. It was quite generally believedthat slavery was destined speedily to expire, to give place to a bettersystem of labour, without any great danger or disturbance; and thisopinion was distinctly set forth by many delegates in the convention. [7]Even Charles Pinckney went so far as to express a hope that SouthCarolina, if not too much meddled with, would by and by voluntarily rankherself among the emancipating states; but his older cousin declaredhimself bound in candour to acknowledge that there was very littlelikelihood indeed of so desirable an event. Not even these SouthCarolinians ventured to defend slavery on principle. This belief in themoribund condition of slavery prevented the convention from realizingthe actual effect of the concessions which were made. Scarcely anycotton was grown at that time, and none was sent to England. Theindustrial revolution about to be wrought by the inventions of Arkwrightand Hargreaves, Cartwright and Watt and Whitney, could not be foreseen. Nor could it be foreseen that presently, when there should thus arise agreat demand for slaves from Virginia as a breeding-ground, theabolitionist party in that state would disappear, leaving her to joinin the odious struggle for introducing slavery into the national domain. Though these things were so soon to happen, the wisest man in 1787 couldnot foresee them. The convention hoped that twenty years would see notonly the end of the foreign slave-trade, but the restriction anddiminution of slavery itself. It was in such a mood that they completedthe compromise by recommending a tariff of ten dollars a head upon allnegroes imported, while at the same time a clause was added for insuringthe recovery of fugitive slaves, quite similar to the clause in theordinance for the government of the northwestern territory. [Sidenote: The foundations of the Constitution were thus laid incompromise. ] It was the three great compromises here described that laid thefoundations of our Federal Constitution. The first compromise, byconceding equal representation to the states in the Senate, enlisted thesmall states in favour of the new scheme, and by establishing a nationalsystem of representation in the lower house, prepared the way for agovernment that could endure. This was Madison's great victory, securedby the aid of Sherman and Ellsworth, without which nothing could havebeen effected. The second compromise, at the cost of givingdisproportionate weight to the slave states, gained their support forthe more perfect union that was about to be formed. The thirdcompromise, at the cost of postponing for twenty years the abolition ofthe foreign slave-trade, secured absolute free-trade between the states, with the surrender of all control over commerce into the hands of thefederal government. After these steps had been taken, the most difficultand dangerous part of the road had been travelled; the remainder, thoughextremely important, was accomplished far more easily. It was mainly thetask of building on the foundations already laid. [Sidenote: Powers granted to the federal government. ] In the grants to the federal government of powers hitherto reserved tothe several states, the diversity of opinion among the members of theconvention was but slight compared to the profound antagonism which hadbeen allayed by the three initial compromises. It was admitted, as amatter of course, that the federal government alone could coin money, fix the standard of weights and measures, establish post-offices andpost-roads, and grant patents and copyrights. To it alone was naturallyintrusted the whole business of war and of international relations. Itcould define and punish felonies committed on the high seas; it couldmaintain a navy and issue letters of marque and reprisal; it couldsupport an army and provide for calling forth the militia to execute thelaws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions. But in relation to this question of the army and the militia there wassome characteristic discussion. It was at first proposed that Congressshould have the power "to subdue a rebellion in any state on theapplication of its legislature. " The Shays rebellion was then fresh inthe memory of all the delegates, and their arguments simply reflectedthe impression which that unpleasant affair had left upon them. CharlesPinckney, Gouverneur Morris, and John Langdon wished to have the powergiven to Congress unconditionally, without waiting for an applicationfrom the legislature. But Gerry, who had been on the ground, spokesturdily against such a needless infraction of state rights. He wasutterly opposed, he said, to "letting loose the myrmidons of the UnitedStates on a state without its own consent. The states will be the bestjudges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massachusettsin the late insurrection if the general authority had intermeddled. "Ellsworth suggested that Congress should use its discretion only incases where the legislature of the state could not meet; but Randolphforcibly replied that if Congress is to judge whether a statelegislature can or cannot meet, the difficulty is in no wise surmounted. Gerry's view at last prevailed, and in accordance therewith it wasdecided that the federal power should guarantee to every state arepublican form of government, and should protect each of them againstinvasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (ifthe legislature could not be convened), it should protect them againstdomestic violence. This arrangement did not fully provide against suchan emergency as that of rival and hostile executives in the same state, as under the so-called "carpet-bag" governments which followed after theWar of Secession, but it was doubtless as sound a provision as anygeneral constitution could make. The federal government was further empowered to borrow money on thecredit of the United States; and it was declared that all debtscontracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of thisconstitution should be as valid against the United States under thisconstitution as under the confederation. There was to be no repudiationor readjustment of debts on the ground of inability to pay. Congress wasfurther empowered to establish a uniform rule of naturalization and auniform law of bankruptcy. But it was prohibited from passing bills ofattainder or _ex post facto_ laws, or suspending the writ of _habeascorpus_, except under the stress of rebellion or invasion. It wasprovided that all duties, imposts, or excises should be uniformthroughout the United States. The federal government could not givepreference to one state over another in its commercial regulations. Itcould not tax exports. It could not draw money from the treasury save bydue process of appropriation, and all bills relating to the raising ofrevenue must originate in the lower house, which directly representedthe people. Congress was empowered to admit new states into the Union, but it was not allowed to interfere with the territorial areas of statesalready existing without the express consent of the local legislatures. To insure the independence of the federal government, it was providedthat senators and representatives should be paid out of the federaltreasury, and not by their respective states, as had been the case underthe confederation. Except for such offences as treason, felony, orbreach of the peace, they should be "privileged from arrest during theirattendance, at the session of their respective houses, and in going toor returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in eitherhouse" they were not to be "questioned in any other place. " It wasfurther provided that a territory not exceeding ten miles square shouldbe ceded to the United States, and set apart as the site of a federalcity, in which the general government should ever after hold itsmeetings, erect its buildings, and exercise exclusive jurisdiction. During the past four years the Continental Congress had skipped aboutfrom Philadelphia to Princeton, to Annapolis, to Trenton, to New York, until it had become a laughing-stock, and the newspapers were full ofsquibs about it. Verily, said one facetious editor, the Lord shall makethis government like unto a wheel, and keep it rolling back and forthbetwixt Dan and Beersheba, and grant it no rest this side of Jordan. This inconvenience was now to be remedied. Congress was hereafter tohave a federal police force at its disposal, and was never more to bereduced to the humiliation of a fruitless appeal to the protecting armof a state government, as at Philadelphia in the summer of 1783. Furthermore, the Continental Congress had of late years commanded solittle respect, and had offered so few temptations to able men in questof political distinction, that its meetings were often attended by nomore than eight or ten members. It was actually on the point of dying anatural death through sheer lack of public interest in it. To preventany possible continuance of such a disgraceful state of things, it wasagreed that the Federal Congress should be "authorized to compel theattendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penaltiesas each house may provide. " Had the political life of the countrycontinued to go on as under the confederation, it is very doubtfulwhether such a provision as this would have remedied the evil. But thenew Federal Congress, drawing its life directly from the people, wasdestined to afford far greater opportunities for a political career thanwere afforded by the feeble body of delegates which preceded it; and apenal clause, compelling members to attend its meetings, was hardlyneeded under the new circumstances which arose. [Sidenote: Powers denied to the states. ] [Sidenote: Emphatic condemnation of paper money. ] While the powers of the federal government were thus carefully defined, at the same time several powers were expressly denied to the states. Nostate was allowed, without explicit authority from Congress, to lay anytonnage or custom-house duties, "keep troops or ships of war in time ofpeace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with aforeign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in suchimminent danger as will not admit of delays. " The following clauseprovided against a recurrence of some of the worst evils which had beenfelt under the "league of friendship:" "No state shall enter into anytreaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque andreprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold andsilver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, _ex post facto_ law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; orgrant any title of nobility. " Henceforth there was to be no repetitionof such disgraceful scenes as had lately been witnessed in RhodeIsland. So far as the state legislatures were concerned, paper money wasto be ruled out forever. But how was it with the federal government? Bythe articles of confederation the United States were allowed to issuebills of credit, and make them a tender in payment of debts. In theFederal Convention the committee of detail suggested that thispermission might remain under the new constitution; but the suggestionwas almost unanimously condemned. All the ablest men in the conventionspoke emphatically against it. Gouverneur Morris urged that the federalgovernment, no less than the state governments, should be expresslyprohibited from issuing bills of credit, or in any wise making itspromissory notes a legal tender. He went over the history of the pastten years; he called attention to the obstinacy with which the wretcheddevice had been resorted to again and again, after its evils had beenthrust before everybody's eyes; and he proved himself a true prophetwhen he said that if the United States should ever again have a greatwar to conduct, people would have forgotten all about these things, andwould call for fresh issues of inconvertible paper, with similardisastrous results. Now was the time to stop it once for all. "Yes, "echoed Roger Sherman, "this is the favourable crisis for crushing papermoney. " "This is the time, " said his colleague, Ellsworth, "to shut andbar the door against paper money, which can in no case be necessary. Give the government credit, and other resources will offer. The powermay do harm, never good. " There was no way, he added, in which powerfulfriends could so soon be gained for the new constitution as bywithholding this power from the government. James Wilson took the sameview. "It will have the most salutary influence on the credit of theUnited States, " said he, "to remove the possibility of paper money. ""Rather than grant the power to Congress, " said John Langdon, "I wouldreject the whole plan. " "The words which grant this power, " said GeorgeRead of Delaware, "if not struck out, will be as alarming as the mark ofthe Beast, in the Apocalypse. " On none of the subjects that came up fordiscussion during that summer was the convention more nearly unanimousthan in its condemnation of paper money. The only delegate who venturedto speak in its favour was Mercer of Maryland. What Hamilton would havesaid, if he had been present that day, we may judge from his vigorouswords published some time before. The power to emit an inconvertiblepaper as a sign of value ought never hereafter to be used; for in itsvery nature, said he, it is "pregnant with abuses, and liable to be madethe engine of imposition and fraud, holding out temptations equallypernicious to the integrity of government and to the morals of thepeople. " Paterson called it "sanctifying iniquity by law. " The sameviews were entertained by Washington and Madison. There were a fewdelegates, however, who thought it unsafe to fetter Congress absolutely. To use Luther Martin's expression, they did not set themselves up to be"wise beyond every event. " George Mason said he "had a mortal hatred topaper money, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies, he wasunwilling to tie the hands of the legislature. The late war, " hethought, "could not have been carried on had such a prohibitionexisted. " Randolph spoke to the same effect. It was finally decided, bythe vote of nine states against New Jersey and Maryland, that the powerto issue inconvertible paper should not be granted to the federalgovernment. An express prohibition, such as had been adopted for theseparate states, was thought unnecessary. It was supposed that it wasenough to withhold the power, since the federal government would notventure to exercise it unless expressly permitted in the Constitution. "Thus, " says Madison, in his narrative of the proceedings, "the pretextfor a paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender, either for public or private debts, was cut off. " Nothing could be moreclearly expressed than this. As Mr. Justice Field observes, in his abledissenting opinion in the recent case of Juilliard _vs. _ Greenman, "ifthere be anything in the history of the Constitution which can beestablished with moral certainty, it is that the framers of thatinstrument intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes both bythe general government and by the states, and thus prevent interferencewith the contracts of private parties. " Such has been the opinion of ourablest constitutional jurists, Marshall, Webster, Story, Curtis, andNelson. There can be little doubt that, according to all soundprinciples of interpretation, the Legal Tender Act of 1862 was passed inflagrant violation of the Constitution. Could Ellsworth and Morris, Langdon and Madison, have foreseen the possibility of such extraordinaryjudgments as have lately emanated from the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, they would doubtless have insisted upon the express prohibition, instead of leaving it to posterity to root out the plague, as it willapparently some time have to do, by the cumbrous process of an amendmentto the Constitution. The work of the convention, as thus far considered, related to thelegislative department of the new government. While these discussionswere going on, much attention had been paid, from time to time, to thecharacteristics of the proposed federal executive. The debates on thisquestion, though long kept up, were far less acrimonious than thedebates on representation and the power of Congress over trade, becausehere there was no obvious clashing of local interests. But for this veryreason the convention had no longer so clear a chart to steer by. On thequestion of the slave-trade, the Pinckneys knew accurately just whatSouth Carolina wanted, how much it would do to claim, and how far itwould be necessary to yield. As to the regulation of commerce by a baremajority of votes in Congress, King and Sherman on the one hand, Masonand Randolph on the other, were able to pursue a thoroughly definitecourse of action in behalf of what were supposed to be the specialinterests of New England or of Virginia. Consequently, the debates keptclose to the point; the controversy was keen, and sometimes, as we haveseen, angry. [Sidenote: Debates as to the federal executive. ] It was very different with the question as to the federal executive. Upon this point the discussions were guided rather by generalspeculations as to what would be most likely to work well, andaccordingly they wandered far and wide. Some of the delegates seemed tothink we should sooner or later come to adopt a hereditary monarchy, andthat the chief thing to be done was to postpone the event as long aspossible. Many wild ideas were broached: such, for example, as atriple-headed executive, to represent the eastern, middle, and southernstates, somewhat as associated Roman emperors at times administeredaffairs in the different portions of an undivided empire. The Virginiaplan had not stated whether its proposed executive was to be single orplural, because the Virginia delegates could not agree. Madison wishedit to be single, to insure greater efficiency, but to Randolph and Masona tyranny seemed to lurk in such an arrangement. When James Wilson andCharles Pinckney suggested that the executive power should be intrustedinto the hands of one man, a profound silence fell upon the convention. No one spoke for several minutes, until Washington, from the chair, asked if he should put the question. Franklin then got up, and said itwas an interesting subject, and he should like to hear what the membershad to say; and so the ball was set rolling. Rutledge said there was noneed of their being so shy. A man might frankly express his opinions, and afterwards change them if he saw good reason for so doing. For hispart, he was in favour of vesting the executive power in a singleperson, to secure efficiency of administration and concentration ofresponsibility; but he would not give him the power to declare war andmake peace. Sherman then made the far-reaching suggestion, that theexecutive magistracy was really "nothing more than an institution forcarrying the will of the legislature into effect; that the person orpersons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the legislatureonly, which was the depository of the supreme will of the society. Asthey were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by theexecutive department, . . . He wished the number might not be fixed, butthat the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more, asexperience might dictate. " It would greatly have astonished theconvention had they been told that this suggestion of Sherman's was amove in the very same line of development which the British governmenthad been following for more than half a century; yet such, as we shallpresently see, was the case. Had this point been understood then as weunderstand it now, the proceedings of the convention could not havefailed to be profoundly affected by it. As it was, the suggestion didnot receive due attention, and the stream of discussion was turned intoa very different channel. Wilson argued powerfully in favour of a singlechief magistrate, and this view finally prevailed. [Sidenote: There should be a president, but how should he be elected. ] After it had been decided that there should be one man set in so high aposition, there was endless discussion as to whether he should beelected by the people or by Congress, and whether he should serve forone, or two, or three, or four, or ten, or fifteen years. "Better callit twenty, " said Rufus King, sarcastically; "it is the average reign ofprinces. " Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris would have had him chosen forlife, subject to removal for misbehaviour; but the preference for ashort term of service was soon manifest. As to the method of election, opinions oscillated back and forth for several weeks. Wilson said "hewas almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say, however, at least, that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in New York and Massachusetts, showed that anelection of the first magistrate by the people at large was both aconvenient and a successful mode. The objects of choice in such casesmust be persons whose merits have general notoriety. " Mason, Rutledge, and Strong agreed with Sherman that the executive should be chosen bythe legislature; but Washington, Madison, Gerry, and Gouverneur Morrisstrongly disapproved of this. Morris argued that an election by thenational legislature would be the work of intrigue and corruption, likethe election of the king of Poland by a diet of nobles; but Masondeclared, on the other hand, that "to refer the choice of a propercharacter for a chief magistrate to the people would be as unnatural asto refer a trial of colours to a blind man. " A decision was firstreached against an election by Congress, because it was thought that ifthe chief magistrate should prove himself thoroughly competent he oughtto be reëligible; but if reëligible he would be exposed to thetemptation of truckling to the most powerful party or cabal in Congress, in order to secure his reëlection. It did not occur to any one tosuggest that under ordinary circumstances the executive ought to followthe policy of the most powerful party in Congress, and that he might atthe same time preserve all needful independence by being clothed withthe power of dissolving Congress and making an appeal to the people in anew election. It is interesting to consider what might have come of sucha suggestion, following upon the heels of that made by Roger Sherman. Aswe shall presently see, it would have immeasurably simplified themachinery of our government, besides making the executive what it oughtto be, the arm of the legislature, instead of a separate and coördinatepower. Upon this point the minds of nearly all the members were so farunder the sway of an incorrect theory that such an idea occurred to noneof them. It was decided that the chief magistrate ought to bereëligible, and therefore should not be elected by Congress. [Sidenote: Suggestion of an electoral college. ] An immediate choice by the people, however, did not meet with generalfavour. To obviate the difficulty, Ellsworth and King suggested thedevice of an electoral college, in which the electors should be chosenby the state legislatures, and should hold a meeting at the federal cityfor the sole purpose of deciding upon a chief magistrate. It was thenobjected that it would be difficult to find competent men who would bewilling to undertake a long journey simply for such a purpose. Theobjection was felt to be a very grave one, and so the conventionreturned to the plan of an election by Congress, and again confrontedthe difficulty of the chief magistrate's intriguing to secure hisreëlection. Wilson thought to do away with this difficulty byintroducing the element of blind chance, as in some of the states ofancient Greece, and choosing the executive by a board of electors takenfrom Congress by lot; but the suggestion found little support. Dickinsonthought it would be well if the people of each state were to choose itsbest citizen, --in modern parlance, its "favourite son;" then out ofthese thirteen names a chief magistrate might be chosen, either byCongress or by a special board of electors. At length, on the 26th ofJuly, at the motion of Mason, the convention resolved that there shouldbe a national executive, to consist of a single person, to be chosen bythe national legislature for the term of seven years, and to beineligible for a second term. He was to be styled President of theUnited States of America. This decision remained until the very end of August, when the wholequestion was reopened by a motion of Rutledge that the two houses ofCongress, in electing the president, should proceed by "joint ballot. "The object of this motion was to prevent either house from exerting anegative on the choice of the other. It was carried in spite of theopposition of some of the smaller states, which might hope to exercise agreater relative influence upon the choice of presidents, if the Senatewere to vote separately. At this point the fears of Gouverneur Morris, that an election by Congress would result in boundless intrigue, wererevived; and in a powerful speech he persuaded the convention to returnto the device of the electoral college, which might be made equal innumber and similar in composition to the two houses of Congress sittingtogether. It need not be required of the electors, after all, that theyshould make a long journey to the seat of the federal government. Theymight meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for twopersons, one of whom must be an inhabitant of a different state. By thisprovision it was hoped to diminish the chances for extreme sectionalpartiality. A list of these votes might be sent under seal to thepresiding officer of the Senate, to be counted. Should no candidate turnout to have a majority of the votes, the Senate might choose a presidentfrom the five highest candidates on the list. The candidate having thenext highest number of votes might be declared vice-president, andpreserve the visible continuity of the government in case of the deathof the president during his term of office. By these changes the methodof electing the president, as finally decided upon, was nearlycompleted. But Mason, Randolph, Gerry, King, and Wilson were notsatisfied with the provision that the Senate might choose the presidentin case of a failure of choice on the part of the electoral college:they preferred to give this power to the House of Representatives. Itwas thought that the Senate would be likely to prove an aristocraticbody, somewhat removed from the people in its sympathies, and there wasa dread of intrusting to it too many important functions. Mason thoughtthat the sway of an aristocracy would be worse than an absolutemonarchy; and if the Senate might every now and then elect thepresident, there would be a risk that the dignity of his office mightdegenerate, until he should become a mere creature of the Senate. On theother hand, the small states, in order to have an equal voice with thelarge ones, in such an emergency as the failure of choice by theelectoral college, wished to keep the eventual choice in the hands ofthe Senate. Among the delegates from the small states, only Langdon andDickinson at first supported the change, and only New Hampshire votedfor it. At length Sherman proposed a compromise, which was carried. Itwas agreed that the eventual choice should be given to the House ofRepresentatives, and not to the Senate, but that in exercising thisfunction the vote in the House of Representatives should be taken bystates. Thus the humours of the delegates from the small states, and ofthose who dreaded the accumulation of powers into the hands of anoligarchy, were alike gratified. This arrangement was finally adopted bythe votes of ten states against Delaware. But in spite of all the minute and anxious care that was taken inguarding this point, the contingency of an election being thus throwninto the hands of the national legislature was not regarded as likelyoften to occur. In point of fact, it has hitherto happened only twice inthe century, in the elections of 1800 and of 1824. It was recognizedthat the work would ordinarily be done through the machinery of theelectoral college, and that thus the fear of intrigue between thepresident and Congress, as it had originally been felt by theconvention, might be set aside. To make assurance doubly sure, it wasprovided that "no person shall be appointed an elector who is a memberof the legislature of the United States, or who holds any office ofprofit or trust under the United States. " It then appeared that thearguments which had been alleged against the eligibility of thepresident for a second term had lost their force; and he was accordinglymade reëligible, while his term of service was reduced from seven yearsto four. [Sidenote: How to count the votes. ] The scheme had thus arrived substantially at its present shape, exceptthat the counting of the electoral vote still remained in the hands ofthe Senate. On the 6th of September this provision was altered, and itwas decided that "the president of the Senate shall, in the presence ofthe Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. " The object of this provision wasto take the office of counting away from the Senate alone, and give itto Congress as a whole; and while doing so, to guard against the failureof an election through the disagreement of the two houses. The method ofcounting was not prescribed, for it was thought that it might safely beleft to joint rules established by the two houses of Congressthemselves, after analogies supplied by the experience of the severalstate legislatures. The case of double returns, sent in by rivalgovernments in the same state, was not contemplated by the convention;and thus the door was left open for a danger considerably greater thanmany of those over which the delegates were agitated. It may safely besaid, however, that not even the wildest license of interpretation canfind any support for the ridiculous doctrine suggested by some personsblinded by political passion in 1877, that the business of counting thevotes and deciding upon the validity of returns belongs to the presidentof the Senate. No such idea was for a moment entertained by theconvention. Any such idea is completely negatived by their action of the6th of September. The express purpose of the final arrangement made onthat day was to admit the House of Representatives to activeparticipation in the office of determining who should have been electedpresident. It was expressly declared that this work was too important tobe left to the Senate alone. What, then, would the convention have saidto the preposterous notion that this work might safely be left to thepresiding officer of the Senate? The convention were keenly alive to anyimaginable grant of authority that might enable the Senate to grow intoan oligarchy. What would they have said to the proposal to create amonocrat _ad hoc_, an official permanently endowed by virtue of hisoffice with the function of king-maker? [Sidenote: The convention foresaw imaginary dangers, but not the realones. ] In this connection it is worth our while to observe that in no respecthas the actual working of the Constitution departed so far from theintentions of its framers as in the case of their provisions concerningthe executive. Against a host of possible dangers they guarded mostelaborately, but the dangers and inconveniences against which we haveactually had to contend they did not foresee. It will be observed thatWilson's proposal for a direct election of the president by the peoplefound little favour in the convention. The schemes that were seriouslyconsidered oscillated back and forth between an election by the nationallegislature and an election by a special college of electors. Theelectors might be chosen by a popular vote, or by the statelegislatures, or in any such wise as each state might see fit todetermine for itself. In point of fact, electors were chosen by thelegislature in New Jersey till 1816; in Connecticut till 1820; in NewYork, Delaware, and Vermont, and with one exception in Georgia, till1824; in South Carolina till 1868. Massachusetts adopted various plans, and did not finally settle down to an election by the people until 1828. Now there were several reasons why the Federal Convention was afraid totrust the choice of the president directly to the people. One was thatvery old objection, the fear of the machinations of demagogues, sincepeople were supposed to be so easily fooled. As already observed, thedemocratic sentiment in the convention was such as we should now callweak. Another reason shows vividly how wide the world seemed in thosedays of slow coaches and mail-bags carried on horseback. It was fearedthat people would not have sufficient data wherewith to judge of themerits of public men in states remote from their own. The electors, aseminent men exceptionally well informed, and screened from the sophismsof demagogues, might hold little conventions and select the bestpossible candidates, using in every case their own unfettered judgment. In this connection the words of Hamilton are worth quoting. In thesixty-eighth number of the "Federalist" he says: "The mode ofappointment of the chief magistrate of the United States is almost theonly part of the system which has escaped without severe censure, orwhich has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these who has appeared in print has even deignedto admit that the election of the president is well guarded. . . . It wasdesirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice ofthe person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. . . . It wasequally desirable that the immediate election should be made by mencapable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and actingunder circumstances favourable to deliberation and to a judiciouscombination of all the reasons and inducements that were proper togovern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by theirfellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possessthe information and discernment requisite to so complicated aninvestigation. . . . It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as littleopportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not leastto be dreaded in the election of a magistrate who was to have soimportant an agency in the administration of the government. " [Sidenote: Actual working of the electoral scheme. ] Such was the theory as set forth by a thinker endowed with rare abilityto follow out in imagination the results of any course of politicalaction. It is needless to say that the actual working of the scheme hasbeen very different from what was expected. In our very first greatstruggle of parties, in 1800, the electors divided upon party lines, with little heed to the "complicated investigation" for which they weresupposed to be chosen. Quite naturally, for the work of electing acandidate presupposes a state of mind very different from that of serenedeliberation. In 1800 the electors acted simply as automata recordingthe victory of their party, and so it has been ever since. In our owntime presidents and vice-presidents are nominated, not without elaborateintrigue, by special conventions quite unknown to the Constitution; thepeople cast their votes for the two or three pairs of candidates thuspresented, and the electoral college simply registers the results. Thesystem is thus fully exposed to all the dangers which our forefathersdreaded from the frequent election of a chief magistrate by the people. Owing to the great good-sense and good-nature of the American people, the system does not work so badly as might be expected. It has, indeed, worked immeasurably better than any one would have ventured to predict. It is nevertheless open to grave objections. It compels a change ofadministration at stated astronomical periods, whether any change ofpolicy is called for or not; it stirs up the whole country every fourthyear with a furious excitement that is often largely factitious; andtwice within the century, in 1801 and again in 1877, it has brought usto the verge of the most foolish and hopeless species of civil war, inview of that thoroughly monarchical kind of accident, a disputedsuccession. [8] [Sidenote: The convention supposed itself to be copying from the BritishConstitution. ] The most curious and instructive point concerning the peculiar executivedevised for the United States by the Federal Convention is the fact thatthe delegates proceeded upon a thoroughly false theory of what they weredoing. As already observed, in this part of its discussions theconvention had not the clearly outlined chart of local interests tosteer by. It indulged in general speculations and looked about forprecedents; and there was one precedent which American statesmen thenalways had before their eyes, whether they were distinctly aware of itor not. In creating an executive department, the members of theconvention were really trying to copy the only constitution of whichthey had any direct experience, and which most of them agreed inthinking the most efficient working constitution in existence, --asindeed it was. They were trying to copy the British Constitution, modifying it to suit their republican ideas: but curiously enough, whatthey copied in creating the office of president was not the real Englishexecutive or prime minister, but the fictitious English executive, thesovereign. And this was associated in their minds with another profoundmisconception, which influenced all this part of their work. Theythought that to keep the legislative and executive offices distinct andseparate was the very palladium of liberty; and they all took it forgranted, without a moment's question, that the British Constitution didthis thing. England, they thought, is governed by King, Lords, andCommons, and the supreme power is nicely divided between the three, sothat neither one can get the whole of it, and that is the safeguard ofEnglish liberty. So they arranged President, Senate, and Representativesto correspond, and sedulously sought to divide supreme power between thethree, so that they might operate as checks upon each other. If eitherone should ever succeed in acquiring the whole sovereignty, then theythought there would be an end of American liberty. [Sidenote: Influence of Montesquieu and Blackstone. ] Now in the earlier part of the work of the Federal Convention, indealing with the legislative department, the delegates were on firmground, because they were dealing with things of which they knewsomething by experience; but in all this careful separation of theexecutive power from the legislative they went wide of the mark, becausethey were following a theory which did not truly describe things as theyreally existed. And that was because the English Constitution was, andstill is, covered up with a thick husk of legal fictions which long agoceased to have any vitality. Blackstone, the great authority of theeighteenth century, set forth this theory of the division of powerbetween King, Lords, and Commons with clearness and force, and nobodythen understood English history minutely or thoroughly enough to see itsfallaciousness. Montesquieu also, the ablest and most elegant politicalwriter of the age, with whose works most of the statesmen in the FederalConvention were familiar, gave a similar description of the EnglishConstitution, and generalized from it as the ideal constitution for afree people. But Montesquieu and Blackstone, in their treatment of thispoint, had their eyes upon the legal fictions, and were blind to thereal machinery which was working under them. They gave elegantexpression to what the late Mr. Bagehot called the "literary theory" ofthe English Constitution. But the real thing differed essentially fromthe "literary theory" even in their day. In our own time the divergencehas become so conspicuous that it would not now be possible forwell-informed writers to make the mistake of Montesquieu and Blackstone. In our time it has come to be perfectly obvious that so far from theEnglish Constitution separating the executive power from thelegislative, this is precisely what it does not do. In Great Britain thesupreme power is all lodged in a single body, the House of Commons. Thesovereign has come to be purely a legal fiction, and the House of Lordsmaintains itself only by submitting to the Commons. The House of Commonsis absolutely supreme, and, as we shall presently see, it really bothappoints and dismisses the executive. The English executive, or chiefmagistrate, is ordinarily the first lord of the treasury, and iscommonly styled the prime minister. He is chairman of the mostimportant committee of the House of Commons, and his cabinet consists ofthe chairmen of other committees. [Sidenote: What our government would be if it were really like that ofGreat Britain. ] To make this perfectly clear, let us see what our machinery ofgovernment would be, if it were really like the English. The presence orabsence of the crowned head makes no essential difference; it is only akind of ornamental cupola. Suppose for a moment the presidencyabolished, or reduced to the political nullity of the crown in England;and postpone for a moment the consideration of the Senate. Suppose thatin our House of Representatives the committee of ways and means had twochairmen, --an upper chairman who looks after all sorts of business, anda lower chairman who attends especially to the finances. This upperchairman, we will say, corresponds to the first lord of the treasury, while the lower one corresponds to the chancellor of the exchequer. Sometimes, when the upper chairman is a great financier, and capable ofenormous labour, he will fill both places at once, as Mr. Gladstone waslately first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. Thechairmen of the other committees on foreign, military, and naval affairswill answer to the English secretaries of state for foreign affairs andfor war, the first lord of the admiralty, and so on. This group ofchairmen, headed by the upper chairman of the ways and means, will thenanswer to the English cabinet, with its prime minister. To complete theparallel, let us suppose that, after a new House of Representatives iselected, it chooses this prime minister, and he appoints the otherchairmen who are to make up his cabinet. Suppose, too, that he initiatesall legislation, and executes all laws, and stays in office three weeksor thirty years, or as long as he can get a majority of the house tovote for his measures. If he loses his majority, he can either resign ordissolve the house, and order a new election, thus appealing directly tothe people. If the new house gives him a majority, he stays in office;if it shows a majority against him, he steps down into the house, andbecomes, perhaps, the leader of the opposition. Now if this were the form of our government, it would correspond in allessential features to that of England. The likeness is liable to beobscured by the fact that in England it is the queen who is supposed toappoint the prime minister; but that is simply a part of the antiquated"literary theory" of the English Constitution. In reality the queen onlyacts as mistress of the ceremonies. Whatever she may wish, the primeminister must be the man who can command the best working majority inthe house. This is not only tested by the first vote that is taken, butit is almost invariably known beforehand so well that if the queenoffers the place to the wrong man he refuses to take it. Should he be sofoolish as to take it, he is sure to be overthrown at the first testvote, and then the right man comes in. Thus in 1880 the queen's manifestpreference for Lord Granville or Lord Hartington made no sort ofdifference. Mr. Gladstone was as much chosen by the House of Commons asif the members had sat in their seats and balloted for him. If the crownwere to be abolished to-morrow, and the house were henceforth, on theresignation of a prime minister, to elect a new one to serve as long ashe could command a majority, it would not be doing essentially otherwisethan it does now. The house then dismisses its minister when it rejectsone of his important measures. But while thus appointed and dismissed bythe house, he is in no wise its slave; for by the power of dissolutionhe has the right to appeal to the country, and let the general electiondecide the issue. The obvious advantages of this system are that itmakes anything like a deadlock between the legislature and the executiveimpossible; and it insures a concentration of responsibility. The primeminister's bills cannot be disregarded, like the president's messages;and thus, too, the house is kept in hand, and cannot degenerate into adebating club. [9] [Sidenote: In the British government, the executive department is notseparated from the legislative. ] A system so delicate and subtle, yet so strong and efficient, as thiscould no more have been invented by the wisest of statesmen than achemist could make albumen by taking its elements and mixing themtogether. In its practical working it is a much simpler system thanours, and still its principal features are not such as would be likelyto occur to men who had not had some actual experience of them. It isthe peculiar outgrowth of English history. As we can now see, its chiefcharacteristic is its not separating the executive power from thelegislative. As a member of Parliament, the prime minister introducesthe legislation which he is himself expected to carry into effect. Nordoes the English system even keep the judiciary entirely separate, forthe lord chancellor not only presides over the House of Lords, but sitsin the cabinet as the prime minister's legal adviser. It is somewhat asif the chief justice of the United States were _ex officio_ president ofthe Senate and attorney-general; though here the resemblance is somewhatsuperficial. Our Senate, although it does not represent landedaristocracy or the church, but the federal character of our government, has still a superficial resemblance to the House of Lords. It passes onall bills that come up from the lower house, and can originate bills onmost matters, but not for raising revenue. Its function as a high courtof impeachment, with the chief justice for its presiding officer, wasdirectly copied from the House of Lords. But here the resemblance ends. The House of Lords has no such veto upon the House of Commons as ourSenate has upon the House of Representatives. Between our upper andlower houses a serious deadlock is possible; but the House of Lords canonly reject a bill until it sees that the House of Commons is determinedto have it carried. It can only enter a protest. If it is obstinate andtries to do more, the House of Commons, through its prime minister, cancreate enough new peers to change the vote, --a power so formidable inits effects upon the social position of the peerage that it does notneed to be used. The knowledge that it exists is enough to bring theHouse of Lords to terms. [Sidenote: Circumstances which obscured the true aspect of the case acentury ago. ] These features of the English Constitution are so prominent since thereform of Parliament in 1832 as to be generally recognized. They havebeen gradually becoming its essential features ever since the Revolutionof 1688. Before that time the crown had really been the executive, andthere had really been a separation between the executive and legislativebranches of the government, which on several occasions, and notably inthe middle of the seventeenth century, had led to armed strife. What theRevolution of 1688 really decided was that henceforth in England theexecutive was to be the mighty arm of the legislature, and not aseparate and rival power. It ended whatever of reality there was in theold system of King, Lords, and Commons, and by the time of Sir RobertWalpole the system of cabinet government had become fairly established;but men still continued to use the phrases and formulas bequeathed fromformer ages, so that the meaning of the changes going on under theirvery eyes was obscured. There was also a great historical incident, after Walpole's time, which served further to obscure the meaning ofthese changes, especially to Americans. From 1760 to 1784, by means ofthe rotten borough system of elections and the peculiar attitude ofpolitical parties, the king contrived to make his will felt in theHouse of Commons to such an extent that it became possible to speak ofthe personal government of George III. The work of the Revolution of1688 was not really completed till the election of 1784 which made Pittthe ruler of England, and its fruits cannot be said to have been fullysecured till 1832. Now as our Revolutionary War was brought on by theattempts of George III. To establish his personal government, and as itwas actually he rather than Lord North who ruled England during thatwar, it was not strange that Americans, even of the highest education, should have failed to discover the transformation which the past centuryhad wrought in the framework of the English government. Nay, more, during this century the king had seemed even more of a real institutionto the Americans than to the British. He had seemed to them the onlylink which bound the different parts of the empire together. Throughoutthe struggles which culminated in the War of Independence, it had beenthe favourite American theory that while the colonial assemblies and theBritish Parliament were sovereign each in its own sphere, all alike owedallegiance to the king as visible head of the empire. To people who hadbeen in the habit of setting forth and defending such a theory, it wasimpossible that the crown should seem so much a legal fiction as it hadreally come to be in England. It is very instructive to note that whilethe members of the Federal Convention thoroughly understood theantiquated theory of the English Constitution as set forth byBlackstone, they drew very few illustrations from the modern working ofParliament, with which they had not had sufficient opportunities ofbecoming familiar. In particular they seemed quite unconscious of thevast significance of a dissolution of Parliament, although a dissolutionhad occurred only three years before under such circumstances as to worka revolution in British politics without a breath of disturbance. Theonly sort of dissolution with which they were familiar was that in whichDunmore or Bernard used to send the colonial assemblies home about theirbusiness whenever they grew too refractory. Had the significance of adissolution, in the British sense, been understood by the convention, the pregnant suggestion of Roger Sherman, above mentioned, could nothave failed to give a different turn to the whole series of debates onthe executive branch of the government. Had our Constitution been frameda few years later, this point would have had a better chance of beingunderstood. As it was, in trying to modify the English system so as toadapt it to our own uses, it was the archaic monarchical feature, andnot the modern ministerial feature, upon which we seized. The president, in our system, irremovable by the national legislature, does not answerto the modern prime minister, but to the old-fashioned king, with powersfor mischief curtailed by election for short terms. [Sidenote: The American cabinet is analogous not to the British cabinet, but to the privy council. ] The close parallelism between the office of president and that of kingin the minds of the framers of the Constitution was instructively shownin the debates on the advisableness of restraining the president'saction by a privy council. Gerry and Sherman urged that there was needof such a council, in order to keep watch over the president. It wassuggested that the privy council should consist of "the president of theSenate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the chief justiceof the supreme court, and the principal officer in each of fivedepartments as they shall from time to time be established; their dutyshall be to advise him in matters which he shall lay before them, buttheir advice shall not conclude him, or affect his responsibility. " Theplan for such a council found favour with Franklin, Madison, Wilson, Dickinson, and Mason, but did not satisfy the convention. When it wasvoted down Mason used strong language. "In rejecting a council to thepresident, " said he, "we are about to try an experiment on which themost despotic government has never ventured; the Grand Seignior himselfhas his Divan. " It was this failure to provide a council which led theconvention to give to the Senate a share in some of the executivefunctions of the president, such as the making of treaties, theappointment of ambassadors, consuls, judges of the supreme court, andother officers of the United States whose appointment was not otherwiseprovided for. As it was objected to the office of vice-president that heseemed to have nothing provided for him to do, he was disposed of bymaking him president of the Senate. No cabinet was created by theConstitution, but since then the heads of various executive departments, appointed by the president, have come to constitute what is called hiscabinet. Since, however, the members of it do not belong to Congress, and can neither initiate nor guide legislation, they really constitute aprivy council rather than a cabinet in the modern sense, thus furnishinganother illustration of the analogy between the president and thearchaic sovereign. [Sidenote: The federal judiciary. ] Concerning the structure of the federal judiciary little need be saidhere. It was framed with very little disagreement among the delegates. The work was chiefly done in committee by Ellsworth, Wilson, Randolph, and Rutledge, and the result did not differ essentially from the schemelaid down in the Virginia plan. It was indeed the indispensablecompletion of the work which was begun by the creation of a nationalHouse of Representatives. To make a federal government immediatelyoperative upon individual citizens, it must of course be armed withfederal courts to try and federal officers to execute judgment in allcases in which individual citizens were amenable to the national law. But for this system of United States courts extended throughout thestates and supreme within its own sphere, the federal constitution couldnever have been put into practical working order. In another respect thefederal judiciary was the most remarkable and original of all thecreations of that wonderful convention. It was charged with the duty ofinterpreting, in accordance with the general principles of common law, the Federal Constitution itself. This is the most noble as it is themost distinctive feature in the government of the United States. Itconstitutes a difference between the American and British systems morefundamental than the separation of the executive from the legislativedepartment. In Great Britain the unwritten constitution is administeredby the omnipotent House of Commons; whatever statute is enacted byParliament must stand until some future Parliament may see fit to repealit. But an act passed by both houses of Congress, and signed by thepresident, may still be set aside as unconstitutional by the supremecourt of the United States in its judgments upon individual casesbrought before it. It was thus that the practical working of our FederalConstitution during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century wasswayed to so great an extent by the profound and luminous decisions ofChief Justice Marshall, that he must be assigned a foremost place amongthe founders of our Federal Union. This intrusting to the judiciary thewhole interpretation of the fundamental instrument of government is themost peculiarly American feature of the work done by the convention, andto the stability of such a federation as ours, covering as it does thegreater part of a huge continent, it was absolutely indispensable. Thus, at length, was realized the sublime conception of a nation inwhich every citizen lives under two complete and well-rounded systems oflaws, --the state law and the federal law, --each with its legislature, its executive, and its judiciary moving one within the other, noiselessly and without friction. It was one of the longest reaches ofconstructive statesmanship ever known in the world. There never wasanything quite like it before, and in Europe it needs much explanationto-day even for educated statesmen who have never seen its workings. Yetto Americans it has become so much a matter of course that they, too, sometimes need to be told how much it signifies. In 1787 it was thesubstitution of law for violence between states that were partlysovereign. In some future still grander convention we trust the samething will be done between states that have been wholly sovereign, whereby peace may gain and violence be diminished over other lands thanthis which has set the example. Great as was the work which the Federal Convention had now accomplished, none of the members supposed it to be complete. After some discussion, it was decided that Congress might at any time, by a two thirds vote inboth houses, propose amendments to the constitution, or on theapplication of the legislatures of two thirds of the states might call aconvention for proposing amendments; and such amendments should becomepart of the constitution as soon as ratified by three fourths of thestates, either through their legislatures or through special conventionssummoned for the purpose. The design of this elaborate arrangement wasto guard against hasty or ill-considered changes in the fundamentalinstrument of government; and its effectiveness has been such that anamendment has come to be impossible save as the result of intenseconviction on the part of a vast majority of the whole American people. Finally it was decided that the Federal Constitution, as now completed, should be presented to the Continental Congress, and then referred tospecial conventions in all the states for ratification; and that whennine states, or two thirds of the whole number, should have ratified, itshould at once go into operation as between such ratifying states. [Sidenote: Signing the Constitution. ] When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur Morris, andwas all ready for the signatures, the aged Franklin produced a paper, which was read for him, as his voice was weak. Some parts of thisConstitution, he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to findit so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he wouldsacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every member of theconvention who still had objections would on this occasion doubt alittle of his own infallibility, and for the sake of unanimity put hisname to this instrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few members, hesaid, by refusing to sign, might do infinite mischief. No man's ideascould be more remote from the plan than his were known to be; but was itpossible for a true patriot to deliberate between anarchy andconvulsion, on the one side, and the chance of good to be expected fromthis plan, on the other? From these appeals, as well as fromWashington's solemn warning at the outset, we see how distinctly it wasrealized that the country was on the verge of civil war. Most of themembers felt so, but to some the new government seemed far too strong, and there were three who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph, and Gerry refused to sign, though Randolph sought toqualify his refusal by explaining that he could not yet make up hismind whether to oppose or defend the Constitution, when it should belaid before the people of Virginia. He wished to reserve to himself fullliberty of action in the matter. That Mason and Gerry, valuable as theirservices had been in the making of the Constitution, would now go homeand vigorously oppose it, there was no doubt. Of the delegates who werepresent on the last day of the convention, all but these three signedthe Constitution. In the signatures the twelve states which had takenpart in the work were all represented, Hamilton signing alone for NewYork. Thus after four months of anxious toil, through the whole of a scorchingPhiladelphia summer, after earnest but sometimes bitter discussion, inwhich more than once the meeting had seemed on the point of breaking up, a colossal work had at last been accomplished, the results of which weremost powerfully to affect the whole future career of the human race solong as it shall dwell upon the earth. In spite of the high-wroughtintensity of feeling which had been now and then displayed, gravedecorum had ruled the proceedings; and now, though few were reallysatisfied, the approach to unanimity was remarkable. When all was over, it is said that many of the members seemed awe-struck. Washington satwith head bowed in solemn meditation. The scene was ended by acharacteristic bit of homely pleasantry from Franklin. Thirty-threeyears ago, in the days of George II. , before the first mutterings of theRevolution had been heard, and when the French dominion in America wasstill untouched, before the banishment of the Acadians or the rout ofBraddock, while Washington was still surveying lands in the wilderness, while Madison was playing in the nursery and Hamilton was not yet born, Franklin had endeavoured to bring together the thirteen colonies in afederal union. Of the famous Albany plan of 1754, the first completeoutline of a federal constitution for America that ever was made, he wasthe principal if not the sole author. When he signed his name to theDeclaration of Independence in this very room, his years had rounded thefull period of threescore and ten. Eleven years more had passed, and hehad been spared to see the noble aim of his life accomplished. There wasstill, no doubt, a chance of failure, but hope now reigned in the oldman's breast. On the back of the president's quaint black armchair therewas emblazoned a half-sun, brilliant with its gilded rays. As themeeting was breaking up and Washington arose, Franklin pointed to thechair, and made it the text for prophecy. "As I have been sitting hereall these weeks, " said he, "I have often wondered whether yonder sun isrising or setting. But now I know that it is a rising sun!" CHAPTER VII. CROWNING THE WORK. [Sidenote: The new Constitution is laid before Congress and submittedforthwith to the several states for ratification. ] It was on the 17th of September, 1787, that the Federal Convention brokeup. For most of the delegates there was a long and tedious journey homebefore they could meet their fellow-citizens and explain what had beendone at Philadelphia during this anxious summer. Not so, however, withBenjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvania delegation. At eleven o'clock onthe next morning, radiant with delight at seeing one of the mostcherished purposes of his life so nearly accomplished, the venerablephilosopher, attended by his seven colleagues, presented to thelegislature of Pennsylvania a copy of the Federal Constitution, and in abrief but pithy speech, characterized by his usual homely wisdom, beggedfor it their most favourable consideration. His words fell upon willingears, for nowhere was the disgust at the prevailing anarchy greater thanin Philadelphia. But still it was not quite in order for the assembly toact upon the matter until word should come from the ContinentalCongress. Since its ignominious flight to Princeton, four years ago, that migratory body had not honoured Philadelphia with its presence. Ithad once flitted as far south as Annapolis, but at length had chosen forits abiding-place the city of New York, where it was now in session. ToCongress the new Constitution must be submitted before it was in orderfor the several states to take action upon it. On the 20th of Septemberthe draft of the Constitution was laid before Congress, accompanied by aletter from Washington. The forces of the opposition were promptlymustered. At their head was Richard Henry Lee, who eleven years ago hadmoved in Congress the Declaration of Independence. He was ably supportedby Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, and the delegation from New York wereunanimous in their determination to obstruct any movement toward acloser union of the states. Their tactics were vigorous, but themajority in Congress were against them, especially after the return ofMadison from Philadelphia. Madison, aided by Edward Carrington and youngHenry Lee, the famous leader of light horse, succeeded in every divisionin carrying the vote of Virginia in favour of the Constitution andagainst the obstructive measures of the elder Lee. The objection wasfirst raised that the new Constitution would put an end to theContinental Congress, and that in recommending it to the states forconsideration Congress would be virtually asking them to terminate itsown existence. Was it right or proper for Congress thus to have a handin signing its own death-warrant? But this flimsy argument was quicklyoverturned. Seven months before Congress had recognized the necessityfor calling the convention together; whatever need for its work existedthen, there was the same need now; and by refusing to take duecognizance of it Congress would simply stultify itself. The oppositionthen tried to clog the measure by proposing amendments, but they wereoutgeneralled, and after eight days' discussion it was voted that thenew Constitution, together with Washington's letter, "be transmitted tothe several legislatures, in order to be submitted to a convention ofdelegates in each state by the people thereof, in conformity to theresolves of the convention. " [Sidenote: First American parties, Federalists and Antifederalists. ] The submission of the Constitution to the people of the states was thesignal for the first formation of political parties on a truly nationalissue. During the war there had indeed been Whigs and Tories, but theirstrife had not been like the ordinary strife of political parties; itwas actual warfare. Irredeemably discredited from the outset, the Torieshad been overridden and outlawed from one end of the Union to the other. They had never been able to hold up their heads as a party inopposition. Since the close of the war there had been local parties inthe various states, divided on issues of hard and soft money, or theimpost, or state rights, and these issues had coincided in many of thestates. During the autumn of 1787 all these elements were segregatedinto two great political parties, whose character and views aresufficiently described by their names. Those who supported the newConstitution were henceforth known as Federalists; those who wereopposed to strengthening the bond between the states were calledAntifederalists. It was fit that their name should have this merelynegative significance, for their policy at this time was purely a policyof negation and obstruction. Care must be taken not to confound themwith the Democratic-Republicans, or _strict constructionists_, whoappear in opposition to the Federalists soon after the adoption of theConstitution. The earlier short-lived party furnished a great part ofits material to the later one, but the attitude of the strictconstructionists under the Constitution was very different from that ofthe Antifederalists. Madison, the second Republican president, was nowthe most energetic of Federalists; and Jefferson, soon to become thefounder of the Democratic-Republican party, wrote from Paris, saying, "The Constitution is a good canvas, on which some strokes only wantretouching. " He found the same fault with it that was found by many ofthe ablest and most patriotic men in the country, --that it failed toinclude a bill of rights; but at the same time he declared that while hewas not of the party of Federalists, he was much further from that ofthe Antifederalists. The Federal Convention he characterized as "anassembly of demi-gods. " [Sidenote: The contest in Pennsylvania. ] The first contest over the new Constitution came in Pennsylvania. TheFederalists in that state were numerous, but their opponents had onepoint in their favour which they did not fail to make the most of. Theconstitution of Pennsylvania was peculiar. Its legislature consisted ofa single house, and its president was chosen by that house. Therefore, said the Antifederalists, if we approve of a federal constitution whichprovides for a legislature of two houses and chooses a president by thedevice of an electoral college, we virtually condemn the stateconstitution under which we live. This cry was raised with no littleeffect. But some of the strongest immediate causes of opposition to thenew Constitution were wanting in Pennsylvania. The friends of papermoney were few there, and the objections to the control of the centralgovernment over commerce were weaker than in many of the other states. The Antifederalists were strongest in the mountain districts west of theSusquehanna, where the somewhat lawless population looked askance at anyplan that savoured of a stronger government and a more regularcollection of revenue. In the eastern counties, and especially inPhiladelphia, the Federalists could count upon a heavy majority. [Sidenote: How to make a quorum. ] The contest began in the legislature on the 28th of September, the veryday on which Congress decided to submit the Constitution to the states, and before the news of the action had reached Philadelphia. The zeal ofthe Federalists was so intense that they could wait no longer, and theyhurried the event with a high-handed vigour that was not altogetherseemly. The assembly was on the eve of breaking up, and a new electionwas to be held on the first Tuesday of November. The Antifederalistshoped to make a stirring campaign, and secure such a majority in the newlegislature as to prevent the Constitution from being laid before thepeople. But their game was frustrated by George Clymer, who had sat inthe Federal Convention, and now most unexpectedly moved that a stateconvention be called to consider the proposed form of government. Greatwas the wrath of the Antifederalists. Mr. Clymer was quite out of order, they said. Congress had not yet sent them the Constitution; and besides, no such motion could be made without notice given beforehand, nor couldit be voted on till it had passed three readings. Parliamentary usagewas doubtless on the side of the Antifederalists, but the majority wereclamorous, and overwhelmed them with cries of "Question, question!" Thequestion was then put, and carried, by 43 votes against 19, and thehouse adjourned till four o'clock. Before going to their dinners the 19held an indignation meeting, at which it was decided that they wouldfoil these outrageous proceedings by staying away. It took 47 to make aquorum, and without these malcontents the assembly numbered but 45. Whenthe house was called to order after dinner, it was found there were but45 members present. The sergeant-at-arms was sent to summon thedelinquents, but they defied him, and so it became necessary to adjourntill next morning. It was now the turn of the Federalists to uncork thevials of wrath. The affair was discussed in the taverns till aftermidnight, the 19 were abused without stint, and soon after breakfast, next morning, two of them were visited by a crowd of men, who broke intotheir lodgings and dragged them off to the state house, where they wereforcibly held down in their seats, growling and muttering curses. Thismade a quorum, and a state convention was immediately appointed for the20th of November. Before these proceedings were concluded, anexpress-rider brought the news from New York that Congress had submittedthe Constitution to the judgment of the states. And now there ensued such a war of pamphlets, broadsides, caricatures, squibs, and stump-speeches, as had never yet been seen in America. Catoand Aristides, Cincinnatus and Plain Truth, were out in full force. Whatwas the matter with the old confederation? asked the Antifederalists. Had it not conducted a glorious and triumphant war? Had it not set usfree from the oppression of England? That there was some trouble now inthe country could not be denied, but all would be right if people wouldonly curb their extravagance, wear homespun clothes, and obey the laws. There was government enough in the country already. This Philadelphiaconvention ought to be distrusted. Some of its members, such as JohnDickinson and Robert Morris, had opposed the Declaration ofIndependence. Pretty men these, to be offering us a new government! Youmight be sure there was a British cloven foot in it somewhere. Theirconvention had sat four months with closed doors, as if they were afraidto let people know what they were about. Nobody could tell what secretconspiracies against American liberty might not have been hatched in allthat time. One thing was sure: the convention had squabbled. Somemembers had gone home in a huff; others had refused to sign a documentfraught with untold evils to the country. And now came James Wilson, making speeches in behalf of this precious Constitution, and trying topull the wool over people's eyes and persuade them to adopt it. Who wasJames Wilson, any way? A Scotchman, a countryman of Lord Bute, a bornaristocrat, a snob, a patrician, Jimmy, James de Caledonia. Beware ofany form of government defended by such a man. And as to the othermembers of the convention, there was Roger Sherman, who had signed thearticles of confederation, and was now trying to undo his own work. Whatconfidence could be placed in a man who did not know his own mind anybetter than that? Then there were Hamilton and Madison, mere boys; andFranklin, an old dotard, a man in his second childhood. And as toWashington, he was doubtless a good soldier, but what did he know aboutpolitics? So said the more moderate of the malcontents, hesitating forthe moment to speak disrespectfully of such a man; but presently theirzeal got the better of them, and in a paper signed "Centinel" it wasboldly declared that Washington was a born fool! [Sidenote: Delaware ratifies the Constitution, Dec. 6, 1787;Pennsylvania, Dec. 12; New Jersey, Dec. 18. ] From the style and temper of these arguments one clearly sees that theAntifederalists in Pennsylvania felt from the beginning that the day wasgoing against them. Sixteen of the men who had seceded from theassembly, headed by Robert Whitehill of Carlisle, issued a manifestosetting forth the ill-treatment they had received, and sounding an alarmagainst the dangers of tyranny to which the new Constitution was alreadyexposing them. They were assisted by Richard Henry Lee, who published aseries of papers entitled "Letters from the Federal Farmer, " andscattered thousands of copies through the state of Pennsylvania. He didnot deny that the government needed reforming, but in the proposed planhe saw the seeds of aristocracy and of centralization. The chiefobjections to the Constitution were that it created a nationallegislature in which the vote was to be by individuals, and not bystates; that it granted to this body an unlimited power of taxation;that it gave too much power to the federal judiciary; that it providedfor paying the salaries of members of Congress out of the federaltreasury, and would thus make them independent of their own states; thatit required an oath of allegiance to the federal government; andfinally, that it did not include a bill of rights. These objections werevery elaborately set forth by the leading Antifederalists in the stateconvention; but the logic and eloquence of James Wilson bore down allopposition. The Antifederalists resorted to filibustering. Five days, itis said, were used up in settling the meanings of the two words"annihilation" and "consolidation. " In this way the convention was keptsitting for nearly three weeks, when news came from "the Delawarestate, " as it used then to be called in Pennsylvania. The concession ofan equal representation in the federal Senate had removed the onlyground of opposition in Delaware, and the Federalists had everythingtheir own way there. In a convention assembled at Dover, on the 6th ofDecember, the Constitution was ratified without a single dissentingvoice. Thus did this little state lead the way in the good work. Thenews was received with exultation by the Federalists at Philadelphia, and on the 12th Pennsylvania ratified the Constitution by a two thirdsvote of 46 to 23. The next day all business was quite at a standstill, while the town gave itself up to processions and merry-making. Theconvention of New Jersey had assembled at Trenton on the 11th, and oneweek later, on the 18th, it ratified the Constitution unanimously. A most auspicious beginning had thus been made. Three states, one thirdof the whole number required, had ratified almost at the same moment. Two of these, moreover, were small states, which at the beginning of theFederal Convention had been obstinately opposed to any fundamentalchange in the government. It was just here that the Federalists were nowstrongest. The Connecticut compromise had wrought with telling effect, not only in the convention, but upon the people of the states. When thenews from Trenton was received in Pennsylvania, there was greatrejoicing in the eastern counties, while beyond the Susquehanna therewere threats of armed rebellion. On the day after Christmas, as theFederalists of Carlisle were about to light a bonfire on the common andfire a salute, they were driven off the field by a mob armed withbludgeons, their rickety old cannon was spiked, and an almanac for thenew year, containing a copy of the Constitution, was duly cursed, andthen burned. Next day the Federalists, armed with muskets, came back, and went through their ceremonies. Their opponents did not venture tomolest them; but after they had dispersed, an Antifederalistdemonstration was made, and effigies of James Wilson and Thomas McKean, another prominent Federalist, were dragged to the common, and thereburned at the stake. [Sidenote: Georgia ratifies, Jan. 2, 1788; Connecticut, Jan. 9. Theoutlook in Massachusetts. ] The action of Delaware and New Jersey had shown that the Antifederalistscould not build any hopes upon the antagonism between large and smallstates. It was thought, however, that the southern states would unite inopposing the Constitution from their dread of becoming commerciallysubjected to New England. But the compromise on the slave-trade hadbroken through this opposition. On the 2d of January, 1788, theConstitution was ratified in Georgia without a word of dissent. One weeklater Connecticut ratified by a vote of 128 to 40, after a session ofonly five days. The hopes of the Antifederalists now rested uponMassachusetts, where the state convention assembled on the 9th ofJanuary, the same day on which that of Connecticut broke up. ShouldMassachusetts refuse to ratify, there would be no hope for theConstitution. Even should nine states adopt it without her, no onesupposed a Federal Union feasible from which so great a state should beexcluded. Her action, too, would have a marked effect upon other states. It could not be denied that the outlook in Massachusetts was far fromencouraging. The embers of the Shays rebellion still smouldered there, and in the mountain counties of Worcester and Berkshire were heard loudmurmurs of discontent. Laws impairing the obligation of contracts werejust what these hard-pressed farmers desired, and by the proposedConstitution all such laws were forever prohibited. The people of thedistrict of Maine, which had formed part of Massachusetts for nearly acentury, were anxious to set up an independent government forthemselves; and they feared that if they were to enter into the new andcloser Federal Union as part of that state, they might hereafter find itimpossible to detach themselves. For this reason half of the Mainedelegates were opposed to the Constitution. In none of the thirteenstates, moreover, was there a more intense devotion to state rights thanin Massachusetts. Nowhere had local self-government reached a higherdegree of efficiency; nowhere had the town meeting flourished with suchvigour. It was especially characteristic of men trained in the townmeeting to look with suspicion upon all delegated power, upon allauthority that was to be exercised from a distance. They believed it tobe all important that people should manage their own affairs, instead ofhaving them managed by other people; and so far had this principle beencarried that the towns of Massachusetts were like littlesemi-independent republics, and the state was like a league of suchrepublics, whose representatives, sitting in the state legislature, werelike delegates strictly bound by instructions rather than untrammelledmembers of a deliberative body. To men trained in such a school, itwould naturally seem that the new Constitution delegated altogether toomuch power to a governing body which must necessarily be remote frommost of its constituents. It was feared that some sort of tyranny mightgrow out of this, and such fears were entertained by men who were not inthe slightest degree infected with Shaysism, as the political disease ofthe inland counties was then called. Such fears were entertained by oneof the greatest citizens that Massachusetts has ever produced, the manwho has been well described as preëminently "the man of the townmeeting, "--Samuel Adams. The limitations of this great man, as well ashis powers, were those which belonged to him as chief among the men ofEnglish race who have swayed society through the medium of the ancientfolk mote. At this time he was believed by many to be hostile to the newConstitution, and his influence in Massachusetts was still greater thanthat of any other man. Besides this, it was thought that the governor, John Hancock, was half-hearted in his support of the Constitution, andit was in everybody's mouth that Elbridge Gerry had refused to set hisname to that document because he felt sure it would create a tyranny. Such symptoms encouraged the Antifederalists in the hope thatMassachusetts would reject the Constitution and ruin the plans of the"visionary young men"--as Richard Henry Lee called them--who had swayedthe Federal Convention. But there were strong forces at work in theopposite direction. In Boston and all the large coast towns, even thoseof the Maine district, the dominant feeling was Federalist. Allwell-to-do people had been alarmed by the Shays insurrection, andmerchants, shipwrights, and artisans of every sort were convinced thatthere was no prosperity in store for them until the federal governmentshould have control over commerce, and be enabled to make its strengthfelt on the seas and in Europe. In these views Samuel Adams shared sothoroughly that his attitude toward the Constitution at this moment wasreally that of a waverer rather than an opponent. Amid balancingconsiderations he found it for some time hard to make up his mind. In the convention which met on the 9th of January there sat Gorham, Strong, and King, who had taken part in the Federal Convention. Therewere also Samuel Adams and James Bowdoin; the revolutionary generals, Heath and Lincoln; and the rising statesmen, Sedgwick, Parsons, andFisher Ames, whose eloquence was soon to become so famous. There weretwenty-four clergymen, of various denominations, --men of soundscholarship, and several of them eminent for worldly wisdom andliberality of temper. Governor Hancock presided, gorgeous in crimsonvelvet and finest laces, while about the room sat many browned andweather-beaten farmers, among whom were at least eighteen who hardly ayear ago had marched over the pine-clad mountain ridges of Petersham, under the banner of the rebel Shays. It was a wholesome no less than agenerous policy that let these men come in and freely speak their minds. The air was thus the sooner cleared of discontent; the disease was thusthe more likely to heal itself. In all there were three hundred andfifty-five delegates present, --a much larger number than took part inany of the other state conventions. The people of all parts ofMassachusetts were very thoroughly represented, as befitted the statewhich was preëminent in the active political life of its town meetings, and the work done here was in some respects decisive in its effect uponthe adoption of the Constitution. [Sidenote: Debates in the Massachusetts convention. ] The convention began by overhauling that document from beginning to end, discussing it clause by clause with somewhat wearisome minuteness. Someof the objections seem odd to us at this time, with our largerexperience. It was several days before the minds of the country memberscould be reconciled to the election of representatives for so long aperiod as two years. They had not been wont to delegate power to anybodyfor so long a time, not even to their selectmen, whom they had alwaysunder their eyes. How much more dangerous was it likely to prove ifdelegated authority were to be exercised for so long a period at somedistant federal city, such as the Constitution contemplated! There was avague dread that in some indescribable way the new Congress mightcontrive to make its sittings perpetual, and thus become a tyrannicaloligarchy, which might tax the people without their consent. And then asto this federal city, there were some who did not like the idea. Adistrict ten miles square! Was not that a great space to give up to theuncontrolled discretion of the federal government, wherein it couldwreak its tyrannical will without let or hindrance? One of the delegatesthought he could be reconciled to the new Constitution if this districtcould only be narrowed down to one mile square. And then there was thepower granted to Congress to maintain a standing army, of which thepresident was to be _ex officio_ commander-in-chief. Did not this openthe door for a Cromwell? It was to be a standing army for at least twoyears, since this was the shortest period between elections. Why, eventhe British Parliament, since 1688, did not keep up a standing army formore than one year at a time, but renewed its existence annually underwhat was termed the Mutiny Act. But what need of a standing army at all?Would it not be sure to provoke needless disorders? Had they alreadyforgotten the Boston Massacre, in spite of all the orations that hadbeen delivered in the Old South Meeting-House? A militia, organizedunder the town-meeting system, was surely all-sufficient. Such a militiahad won glorious triumphs at Lexington and Bennington; and at King'sMountain, had not an army of militia surrounded and captured an army ofregulars led by one of England's most skilful officers? What more couldyou ask? Clearly this plan for a standing army foreboded tyranny. Uponthis point Mr. Nason, from the Maine district, had his say, in tones ofinimitable bombast. "Had I the voice of Jove, " said he, "I wouldproclaim it throughout the world; and had I an arm like Jove, I wouldhurl from the globe those villains that would dare attempt to establishin our country a standing army!" [Sidenote: Liberal attitude of the clergy. ] Next came the complaint that the Constitution did not recognize theexistence of God, and provided no religious tests for candidates forfederal offices. But, strange to say, this objection did not come fromthe clergy. It was urged by some of the country members, but theministers in the convention were nearly unanimous in opposing it. Therehad been a remarkable change of sentiment among the clergy of thisstate, which had begun its existence as a theocracy, in which none butchurch members could vote or hold office. The seeds of modern liberalismhad been planted in their minds. When Amos Singletary of Sutton declaredit to be scandalous that a Papist or an infidel should be as eligible tooffice as a Christian, --a remark which naively assumed that RomanCatholics were not Christians, --the Rev. Daniel Shute of Hingham repliedthat no conceivable advantage could result from a religious test. Yes, said the Rev. Philip Payson of Chelsea, "human tribunals for theconsciences of men are impious encroachments upon the prerogatives ofGod. A religious test, as a qualification for office, would have been agreat blemish. " "In reason and in the Holy Scripture, " said the Rev. Isaac Backus of Middleborough, "religion is ever a matter between Godand the individual; the imposing of religious tests hath been thegreatest engine of tyranny in the world. " With this liberal stand firmlytaken by the ministers, the religious objection was speedily overruled. Then the clause which allows Congress to regulate the times, places, andmanner of holding federal elections was severely criticised. It wasfeared that Congress would take advantage of this provision to destroythe freedom of elections. It was further objected that members ofCongress, being paid their salaries from the federal treasury, wouldbecome too independent of their constituents. Federal collectors ofrevenue, moreover, would not be so likely to act with moderation andjustice as collectors appointed by the state. Then it was very doubtfulwhether the people could support the expense of an elaborate federalgovernment. They were already scarcely able to pay their town, county, and state taxes; was it to be supposed they could bear the additionalburden with which federal taxation would load them? Then the compromiseon the slave-trade was fiercely attacked. They did not wish to have ahand in licensing this nefarious traffic for twenty years. But it wasurged, on the other hand, that by prohibiting the foreign slave-tradeafter 1808 the Constitution was really dealing a death-blow to slavery;and this opinion prevailed. During the whole course of the discussion, observed the Rev. Samuel Westof New Bedford, it seemed to be taken for granted that the federalgovernment was going to be put into the hands of crafty knaves. "Iwish, " said he, "that the gentlemen who have started so many _possible_objections would try to show us that what they so much deprecate is_probable_. . . . Because power _may_ be abused, shall we be reduced toanarchy? What hinders our state legislatures from abusing theirpowers?. . . May we not rationally suppose that the persons we shallchoose to administer the government will be, in general, good men?"General Thompson said he was surprised to hear such an argument from aclergyman, who was professionally bound to maintain that all men weretotally depraved. For his part he believed they were so, and he couldprove it from the Old Testament. "I would not trust them, " echoedAbraham White of Bristol, "though every one of them should be a Moses. " [Sidenote: Speech of a Berkshire farmer. ] The feeling of distrust was strongest among the farmers from themountain districts. As Rufus King said, they objected, not so much tothe Constitution as to the men who made it and the men who sang itspraises. They hated lawyers, and were jealous of wealthy merchants. "These lawyers, " said Amos Singletary, "and men of learning, and moneyedmen that talk so finely and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make uspoor illiterate people swallow the pill, expect to get into Congressthemselves. They mean to be managers of the Constitution. They mean toget all the money into their hands, and then they will swallow up uslittle folk, like the great Leviathan, Mr. President; yes, just as thewhale swallowed up Jonah. " Here a more liberal-minded farmer, JonathanSmith of Lanesborough, rose to reply with references to the Shaysrebellion, which presently called forth cries of "Order!" from some ofthe members. Samuel Adams said the gentleman was quite in order, --lethim go on in his own way. "I am a plain man, " said Mr. Smith, "and amnot used to speak in public, but I am going to show the effects ofanarchy, that you may see why I wish for good government. Last winterpeople took up arms, and then, if you went to speak to them, you had themusket of death presented to your breast. They would rob you of yourproperty, threaten to burn your houses, oblige you to be on your guardnight and day. Alarms spread from town to town, families were broken up;the tender mother would cry, 'Oh, my son is among them! What shall I dofor my child?' Some were taken captive; children taken out of theirschools and carried away. . . . How dreadful was this! Our distress was sogreat that we should have been glad to snatch at anything that lookedlike a government. . . . Now, Mr. President, when I saw this Constitution, I found that it was a cure for these disorders. I got a copy of it, andread it over and over. . . . I did not go to any lawyer, to ask hisopinion; we have no lawyer in our town, and we do well enough without. My honourable old daddy there [pointing to Mr. Singletary] won't thinkthat I expect to be a Congressman, and swallow up the liberties of thepeople. I never had any post, nor do I want one. But I don't think theworse of the Constitution because lawyers, and men of learning, andmoneyed men are fond of it. I am not of such a jealous make. They thatare honest men themselves are not apt to suspect other people. . . . Brother farmers, let us suppose a case, now. Suppose you had a farm of50 acres, and your title was disputed, and there was a farm of 5, 000acres joined to you that belonged to a man of learning, and his titlewas involved in the same difficulty: would you not be glad to have himfor your friend, rather than to stand alone in the dispute? Well, thecase is the same. These lawyers, these moneyed men, these men oflearning, are all embarked in the same cause with us, and we must allsink or swim together. Shall we throw the Constitution overboard becauseit does not please us all alike? Suppose two or three of you had been atthe pains to break up a piece of rough land and sow it with wheat: wouldyou let it lie waste because you could not agree what sort of a fence tomake? Would it not be better to put up a fence that did not please everyone's fancy, rather than keep disputing about it until the wild beastscame in and devoured the crop? Some gentlemen say, Don't be in a hurry;take time to consider. I say, There is a time to sow and a time to reap. We sowed our seed when we sent men to the Federal Convention, now is thetime to reap the fruit of our labour; and if we do not do it now, I amafraid we shall never have another opportunity. " [Sidenote: Attitude of Samuel Adams. ] It may be doubted whether all the eloquence of Fisher Ames could havestated the case more forcibly than it was put by this plain farmer fromthe Berkshire hills. Upon Ames, with King, Parsons, Bowdoin, and Strong, fell the principal work in defending the Constitution. For the first twoweeks, Samuel Adams scarcely opened his mouth, but listened with anxiouscare to everything that was said on either side. The convention was soevenly divided that there could be no doubt that his single voice woulddecide the result. Every one eagerly awaited his opinion. In the debateon the two years' term of members of Congress, he had asked CalebStrong the reason why the Federal Convention had decided upon so long aterm; and when it was explained as a necessary compromise between theviews of so many delegates, he replied, "I am satisfied. " "Will Mr. Adams kindly say that again?" asked one of the members. "I amsatisfied, " he repeated; and not another word was said on the subject inall those weeks. So profound was the faith of this intelligent andskeptical and independent people in the sound judgment and unswervingintegrity of the Father of the Revolution! As the weeks went by, and theissue seemed still dubious, the workingmen of Boston, shipwrights andbrass-founders and other mechanics, decided to express their opinion ina way that they knew Samuel Adams would heed. They held a meeting at theGreen Dragon tavern, passed resolutions in favour of the Constitution, and appointed a committee, with Paul Revere at its head, to make knownthese resolutions to the great popular leader. When Adams had read thepaper, he asked of Paul Revere, "How many mechanics were at the GreenDragon when these resolutions passed?" "More, sir, than the Green Dragoncould hold. " "And where were the rest, Mr. Revere?" "In the streets, sir. " "And how many were in the streets?" "More, sir, than there arestars in the sky. " [Sidenote: Washington's fruitful suggestion. ] Between Samuel Adams and Thomas Jefferson there were several points ofresemblance, the chief of which was an intense faith in the sound commonsense of the mass of the people. This faith was one of the strongestattributes of both these great men. It has usually been supposed thatit was this incident of the meeting at the Green Dragon that determinedAdams's final attitude in the state convention. Unquestionably, such ademonstration must have had great weight with him. But at the same timethe affair was taking such a turn as would have decided him, evenwithout the aid of this famous mass-meeting. The long delay in thedecision of the Massachusetts convention had carried the excitement tofever heat throughout the country. Not only were people from NewHampshire and New York and naughty Rhode Island waiting anxiously aboutBoston to catch every crumb of news they could get, but intrigues weregoing on, as far south as Virginia, to influence the result. On the 21stof January the "Boston Gazette" came out with a warning, headed byenormous capitals with three exclamation-points: "_Bribery andCorruption!!!_ The most diabolical plan is on foot to corrupt themembers of the convention who oppose the adoption of the newConstitution. Large sums of money have been brought from a neighbouringstate for that purpose, contributed by the wealthy. If so, is it notprobable there may be collections for the same accursed purpose nearerhome?" No adequate investigation ever determined whether this charge wastrue or not. We may hope that it was ill-founded; but our generalknowledge of human nature must compel us to admit that there wasprobably a grain of truth in it. But what was undeniable was thatRichard Henry Lee wrote a letter to Gerry, urging that Massachusettsshould not adopt the Constitution without insisting upon sundryamendments; and in order to consider these amendments, it was suggestedthat there should be another Federal Convention. At this anxious crisis, Washington suddenly threw himself into the breach with that infalliblejudgment of his which always saw the way to victory. "If another FederalConvention is attempted, " said Washington, "its members will be morediscordant, and will agree upon no general plan. The Constitution is thebest that can be obtained at this time. . . . The Constitution or disunionare before us to choose from. If the Constitution is our choice, aconstitutional door is open for amendments, and they may be adopted in apeaceable manner, without tumult or disorder. " [Sidenote: Massachusetts ratifies, proposing amendments, Feb. 6, 1788. ] When this advice of Washington's reached Boston, it set in motion atrain of events which soon solved the difficulty, both for Massachusettsand for the other states which had not yet made up their mind. Chiefamong the objections to the Constitution had been the fact that it didnot contain a bill of rights. It did not guarantee religious liberty, freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of the peoplepeacefully to assemble and petition the government for a redress ofgrievances. It did not provide against the quartering of soldiers uponthe people in time of peace. It did not provide against generalsearch-warrants, nor did it securely prescribe the methods by whichindividuals should be held to answer for criminal offences. It did noteven provide that nobody should be burned at the stake or stretched onthe rack, for holding peculiar opinions about the nature of God or theorigin of evil. That such objections to the Constitution seem strange tous to-day is partly due to the determined attitude of the men who, amidall the troubles of the time, would not consent to any arrangement fromwhich such safeguards to free thinking and free living should beomitted. The friends of the Constitution in Boston now proposed that theconvention, while adopting it, should suggest sundry amendmentscontaining the essential provisions of a bill of rights. It was notintended that the ratification should be conditional. Under thecircumstances, a conditional ratification might prove as disastrous asrejection. It might lead to a second Federal Convention, in which thegood work already accomplished might be undone. The ratification was tobe absolute, and the amendments were offered in the hope that actionwould be taken upon them as soon as the new government should go intooperation. There could be little doubt that the suggestion would beheeded, not only from the importance of Massachusetts in the Union, butalso from the fact that Virginia and other states would be sure tofollow her example in suggesting such amendments. This forecast provedquite correct, and it was in this way that the first ten amendmentsoriginated, which were acted on by Congress in 1790, and became part ofthe Constitution in 1791. As soon as this plan had been matured, Hancockproposed it to the convention; the hearty support of Adams wasimmediately insured, and within a week from that time, on the 6th ofFebruary, the Constitution was ratified by the narrow majority of 187votes against 168. On that same day Jefferson, in Paris, wrote toMadison: "I wish with all my soul that the nine first conventions mayaccept the new Constitution, to secure to us the good it contains; but Iequally wish that the four latest, whichever they may be, may refuse toaccede to it till a declaration of rights be annexed; but no objectionto the new form must produce a schism in our Union. " But as soon as heheard of the action of Massachusetts, he approved it as preferable tohis own idea, and he wrote home urging Virginia to follow the example. Massachusetts was thus the sixth state to ratify the Constitution. Onthat day the name of the Long Lane by the meeting-house where theconvention had sat was changed to Federal Street. The Boston people, said Henry Knox, had quite lost their senses with joy. The two countiesof Worcester and Berkshire had given but 14 yeas against 59 nays, butthe farmers went home declaring that they should cheerfully abide by thedecision of the majority. Not a murmur was heard from any one. [Sidenote: Maryland ratifies, April 28. ] [Sidenote: Debates in the South Carolina legislature. ] [Sidenote: South Carolina ratifies, May 23. ] About the time that the Massachusetts convention broke up, that of NewHampshire assembled at Exeter; but after a brief discussion it wasdecided to adjourn until June, in order to see how the other stateswould act. On the 21st of April the Maryland convention assembled atAnnapolis. All the winter Patrick Henry had been busily at work, withthe hope of inducing the southern states to establish a separateconfederacy; but he had made little headway anywhere, and none at all inMaryland, where his influence was completely counteracted by that ofWashington. Above all things, said Washington, do not let the conventionadjourn till the matter is decided, for the Antifederalists are takingno end of comfort from the postponement in New Hampshire. Their glee wasshort-lived, however. Some of Maryland's strongest men, such as LutherMartin and Samuel Chase, were Antifederalists; but their efforts were ofno avail. After a session of five days the Constitution was ratified bya vote of 63 to 11. Whatever damage New Hampshire might have done wasthus more than made good. The eyes of the whole country were now turnedupon the eighth state, South Carolina. Her convention was to meet atCharleston on the 12th of May, the anniversary of the day on whichGeneral Lincoln had surrendered that city to Sir Henry Clinton; butthere had been a decisive preliminary struggle in the legislature inJanuary. The most active of the Antifederalists was Rawlins Lowndes, whohad opposed the Declaration of Independence. Lowndes was betrayed intosilliness. "We are now, " said he, "under a most excellentconstitution, --a blessing from Heaven, that has stood the test of time[!!], and given us liberty and independence; yet we are impatient topull down that fabric which we raised at the expense of our blood. " Thiswas not very convincing to the assembly, most of the members knowingfull well that the fabric had not stood the test of time, but hadalready tumbled in by reason of its vicious construction. A moreeffective plea was that which referred to the slave-trade. "What causeis there, " said Lowndes, "for jealousy of our importing negroes? Whyconfine us to twenty years? Why limit us at all? This trade can bejustified on the principles of religion and humanity. They do not likeour having slaves because they have none themselves, and therefore wantto exclude us from this great advantage. " Cotesworth Pinckney replied:"By this settlement we have secured an unlimited importation of negroesfor twenty years. The general government can never emancipate them, forno such authority is granted, and it is admitted on all hands that thegeneral government has no powers but what are expressly granted by theConstitution. We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whateverpart of the country they may take refuge, which is a right we had notbefore. In short, considering all circumstances, we have made the bestterms in our power for the security of this species of property. Wewould have made better if we could; but, on the whole, I do not thinkthem bad. " Perhaps Pinckney would not have assumed exactly this tone atPhiladelphia, but at Charleston the argument was convincing. Lowndesthen sounded the alarm that the New England states would monopolize thecarrying-trade and charge ruinous freights, and he drew a harrowingpicture of warehouses packed to bursting with rice and indigo spoilingbecause the owners could not afford to pay the Yankee skippers' pricesfor carrying their goods to market. But Pinckney rejoined that a Yankeeshipmaster in quest of cargoes would not be likely to ruin his ownchances for getting them, and he called attention to the greatusefulness of the eastern merchant marine as affording material for anavy, and thus contributing to the defence of the country. FinallyLowndes put in a plea for paper money, but with little success. Theresult of the debate set the matter so clearly before the people that agreat majority of Federalists were elected to the convention. Among themwere Gadsden, the Rutledges and the Pinckneys, Moultrie, and WilliamWashington, who had become a citizen of the state from which he hadhelped to expel the British invader. The Antifederalists were largelyrepresented by men from the upland counties, belonging to a populationin which there was considerable likeness all along the Appalachian chainof mountains, from Pennsylvania to the southern extremity of the range. There were among them many "moonshiners, " as they werecalled, --distillers of illicit whiskey, --and they did not relish theidea of a federal excise. At their head was Thomas Sumter, a convert toPatrick Henry's scheme for a southern confederacy. Their policy was oneof delay and obstruction, but it availed them little, for on the 23d ofMay, after a session of eleven days, South Carolina ratified theConstitution by a vote of 149 against 73. [Sidenote: Important effect upon Virginia. ] [Sidenote: Debates in the Virginia Convention. ] [Sidenote: Madison and Marshall prevail and Virginia ratifies, June 25. ] The sound policy of the Federal Convention in adopting the odiouscompromise over the slave-trade was now about to bear fruit. In Virginiathere had grown up a party which favoured the establishment of aseparate southern confederacy. By the action of South Carolina all suchschemes were now nipped in the bud. Of the states south of Mason andDixon's line, three had now ratified the Constitution, so that anyseparate confederacy could now consist only of Virginia and NorthCarolina. The reason for this short-lived separatist feeling in Virginiawas to be found in the complications which had grown out of the attemptof Spain to close the Mississippi River. It will be remembered that onlytwo years before Jay had actually recommended to Congress that the rightto navigate the lower Mississippi be surrendered for twenty-five years, in exchange for a favourable commercial treaty with Spain. The NewEngland states, caring nothing for the distant Mississippi, supportedthis measure in Congress; and this narrow and selfish policy naturallycreated alarm in Virginia, which, in her district of Kentucky, touchedupon the great river. Thus to the vague dread of the southern states ingeneral, in the event of New England's controlling the commercial policyof the government, there was added, in Virginia's case, a specific fear. If the New England people were thus ready to barter away the vitalinterests of a remote part of the country, what might they not do? Wouldthey ever stop at anything so long as they could go on building up theircommerce? This feeling strongly influenced Patrick Henry in his desirefor a separate confederacy; and we have seen how Randolph and Mason, inthe Federal Convention, were so disturbed at the power given toCongress to regulate commerce by a simple majority of votes that theyrefused to set their names to the Constitution. They alleged furtherreasons for their refusal, but this was the chief one. They wanted a twothirds vote to be required, in order that the south might retain themeans of protecting itself. Under these circumstances the opposition tothe Constitution was very strong, and but for the action of SouthCarolina the party in favour of a separate confederacy might have beencapable of doing much mischief. As it was, since that party had activelyintrigued both in South Carolina and Maryland, the ratification of theConstitution by both these states was a direct rebuff. It quitedemoralized the advocates of secession. The paper-money men, moreover, were handicapped by the fact that two of the most powerfulAntifederalists, Mason and Lee, were determined opponents of a papercurrency, so that this subject had to be dropped or very gingerly dealtwith. The strength of the Antifederalists, though impaired by thesecauses, was still very great. The contest was waged with all the moreintensity of feeling because, since eight states had now adopted theConstitution, the verdict of Virginia would be decisive. The conventionmet at Richmond on the 2d of June, and Edmund Pendleton was chosenpresident. Foremost among the Antifederalists was Patrick Henry, whoseeloquence was now as zealously employed against the new government as ithad been in bygone days against the usurpations of Great Britain. He wassupported by Mason, Lee, and Grayson, as well as by Benjamin Harrisonand John Tyler, the fathers of two future presidents; and he could counton the votes of most of the delegates from the midland counties, fromthe south bank of the James River, and from Kentucky. But the unitedtalents of the opposition had no chance of success in a conflict withthe genius and tact of Madison, who at one moment crushed, at anotherconciliated, his opponent, but always won the day. To Madison, more thanany other man, the Federalist victory was due. But he was ably secondedby Governor Randolph, whom he began by winning over from the oppositeparty, and by the favourite general and eloquent speaker, "Light-HorseHarry. " Conspicuous in the ranks of Federalists, and unsurpassed indebate, was a tall and gaunt young man, with beaming countenance, eyesof piercing brilliancy, and an indescribable kingliness of bearing, whowas by and by to become chief justice of the United States, and by hismasterly and far-reaching decisions to win a place side by side withMadison and Hamilton among the founders of our national government. JohnMarshall, second to none among all the illustrious jurists of theEnglish race, was then, at the age of thirty-three, the foremost lawyerin Virginia. He had already served for several terms in the statelegislature, but his national career began in this convention, where hisarguments with those of Madison, reinforcing each other, bore down allopposition. The details of the controversy were much the same as in thestates already passed in review, save in so far as coloured by thepeculiar circumstances of Virginia. After more than three weeks ofdebate, on the 25th of June, the question was put to vote, and theConstitution was ratified by the narrow majority of 89 against 79. Amendments were offered, after the example of Massachusetts, which hadalready been followed by South Carolina and the minority in Maryland;and, as in Massachusetts, the defeated Antifederalists announced theirintention to abide loyally by the result. [Sidenote: New Hampshire had already ratified, June 21. ] The discussion had lasted so long that Virginia lost the distinction ofbeing the ninth state to ratify the Constitution. That honour had beenreserved for New Hampshire, whose convention had met on the anniversaryof Bunker Hill, and after a four days' session, on the 21st of June, hadgiven its consent to the new government by a vote of 57 against 46. Thecouriers from Virginia and those from New Hampshire, as they spurredtheir horses over long miles of dusty road, could shout to each otherthe joyous news in passing. Though the ratification of New Hampshire hadsecured the necessary ninth state, yet the action of Virginia was notthe less significant and decisive. Virginia was at that time, and for aquarter of a century afterward, the most populous state in the Union, and one of the greatest in influence. Even with the needed nine statesall in hand, it is clear that the new government could not have goneinto successful operation with the leading state, the home of Washingtonhimself, left out in the cold. The New Roof, as men were then fond ofcalling the Federal Constitution, must speedily have fallen in withoutthis indispensable prop. When it was known that Virginia had ratified, it was felt that the victory was won, and the success of the new schemeassured. The 4th of July, 1788, witnessed such loud rejoicings as haveperhaps never been seen before or since on American soil. InPhiladelphia there was a procession miles in length, in which everytrade was represented, and wagons laden with implements of industry oremblematic devices alternated with bands of music and gorgeous banners. There figured the New Roof, supported by thirteen columns, and there wasto be seen the Ship of State, the good ship Constitution, made out ofthe barge which Paul Jones had taken from the shattered andblood-stained Serapis, after his terrible fight. As for the old scowConfederacy, Imbecility master, it was proclaimed she had foundered atsea, and "the sloop Anarchy, when last heard from, was ashore on UnionRocks. " All over the country there were processions and bonfires, and insome towns there were riots. In Providence the Federalists prepared abarbecue of oxen roasted whole, but a mob of farmers, led by threemembers of the state legislature, attempted to disperse them, and werewith some difficulty pacified. In Albany the Antifederalists publiclyburned the Constitution, whereupon a party of Federalists brought outanother copy of it, and nailed it to the top of a pole, which theyplanted defiantly amid the ashes of the fire their opponents had made. Out of these proceedings there grew a riot, in which knives were drawn, stones were thrown, and blood was shed. [Sidenote: The struggle in New York. ] [Sidenote: The "Federalist. "] Such incidents might have served to remind one that the end had not yetcome. The difficulties were not yet surmounted, and the rejoicing was insome respects premature. It was now settled that the new government wasto go into operation, but how it was going to be able to get alongwithout the adhesion of New York it was not easy to see. It is true thatNew York then ranked only as fifth among the states in population, butcommercially and militarily she was the centre of the Union. She notonly touched at once on the ocean and the lakes, but she separated NewEngland from the rest of the country. It was rightly felt that the Unioncould never be cemented without this central state. So strongly werepeople impressed with this feeling that some went so far as to threatenviolence. It was said that if New York did not come into the Unionpeacefully and of her own accord, she should be conquered and draggedin. That she would come in peacefully seemed at first very improbable. When the state convention assembled at Poughkeepsie, on the 17th ofJune, more than two thirds of its members were avowed Antifederalists. At their head was the governor, George Clinton, hard-headed andresolute, the bitterest hater of the Constitution that could be foundanywhere in the thirteen states. Foremost among his supporters wereYates and Lansing, with Melanchthon Smith, a man familiar with politicalhistory, and one of the ablest debaters in the country. On theFederalist side were such eminent men as Livingston and Jay; but theherculean task of vanquishing this great hostile majority, andconverting it by sheer dint of argument into a majority on the rightside, fell chiefly upon the shoulders of one man. But for AlexanderHamilton the decision of New York would unquestionably have been adverseto the Constitution. Nay, more, it is very improbable that, but for him, the good work would have made such progress as it had in the otherstates. To get the people to adopt the Constitution, it was above allthings needful that its practical working should be expounded, inlanguage such as every one could understand, by some writer endowed inthe highest degree with political intelligence and foresight. Upon theirreturn from the Federal Convention, Yates and Lansing had done all intheir power to bring its proceedings into ill-repute. Pamphlets andbroadsides were scattered right and left. The Constitution was calledthe "triple-headed monster, " and declared to be "as deep and wicked aconspiracy as ever was invented in the darkest ages against theliberties of a free people. " It soon occurred to Hamilton that it wouldbe well worth while to explain the meaning of all parts of theConstitution in a series of short, incisive essays. He communicated hisplan to Madison and Jay, who joined him in the work, and the result wasthe "Federalist, " perhaps the most famous of American books, andundoubtedly the most profound and suggestive treatise on government thathas ever been written. Of the eighty-five numbers originally publishedin the "Independent Gazetteer, " under the common signature of "Publius, "Jay wrote five, Madison twenty-nine, and Hamilton fifty-one. Jay'spapers related chiefly to diplomatic points, with which his experienceabroad had fitted him to deal. The first number was written by Hamiltonin the cabin of a sloop on the Hudson, in October, 1787; and theycontinued to appear, sometimes as often as three or four in a week, through the winter and spring. Madison would have contributed a largershare than he did had he not been called early in March to Virginia tofight the battle of the Constitution in that state. The essays werewidely and eagerly read, and probably accomplished more toward insuringthe adoption of the Constitution than anything else that was said ordone in that eventful year. They were hastily written, --struck out atwhite heat by men full of their subject. Doubtless the authors did notrealize the grandeur of the literary work they were doing, and among themen of the time there were few who foresaw the immortal fame which theseessays were to earn. It is said of one of the senators in the firstCongress that he made the memorandum, "Get the 'Federalist, ' if I can, without buying it. It isn't worth it. " But for all posterity the"Federalist" must remain the most authoritative commentary upon theConstitution that can be found; for it is the joint work of theprincipal author of that Constitution and of its most brilliantadvocate. In nothing could the flexibleness of Hamilton's intellect, or thegenuineness of his patriotism, have been more finely shown than in thehearty zeal and transcendent ability with which he now wrote in defenceof a plan of government so different from what he would himself haveproposed. He made Madison's thoughts his own, until he set them forthwith even greater force than Madison himself could command. Yet noarguments could possibly be less chargeable with partisanship than thearguments of the "Federalist. " The judgment is as dispassionate as couldbe shown in a philosophical treatise. The tone is one of grave and loftyeloquence, apt to move even to tears the reader who is fully alive tothe stupendous issues that were involved in the discussion. Hamilton wassupremely endowed with the faculty of imagining, with all thecircumstantial minuteness of concrete reality, political situationsdifferent from those directly before him; and he put this rare power tonoble use in tracing out the natural and legitimate working of such aConstitution as that which the Federal Convention had framed. [Sidenote: Hamilton wins the victory, and New York ratifies, July 26. ] When it came to defending the Constitution before the hostile conventionat Poughkeepsie, he had before him as arduous a task as ever fell to thelot of a parliamentary debater. It was a case where political managementwas out of the question. The opposition were too numerous to besilenced, or cajoled, or bargained with. They must be converted. With aneloquence scarcely equalled before or since in America until Webster'svoice was heard, Hamilton argued week after week, till at lastMelanchthon Smith, the foremost debater of Clinton's party, broke away, and came to the Federalist side. It was like crushing the centre of ahostile army. After this the Antifederalist forces were confused andeasily routed. The decisive struggle was over the question whether NewYork could ratify the Constitution conditionally, reserving to herselfthe right to withdraw from the Union in case the amendments upon whichshe had set her heart should not be adopted. Upon this point Hamiltonreinforced himself with the advice of Madison, who had just returned toNew York. Could a state once adopt the Constitution, and then withdrawfrom the Union if not satisfied? Madison's reply was prompt anddecisive. No, such a thing could never be done. A state which had onceratified was in the federal bond forever. The Constitution could notprovide for nor contemplate its own overthrow. There could be no suchthing as a constitutional right of secession. When Melanchthon Smithdeserted the Antifederalists on this point, the victory was won, and onthe 26th of July, New York ratified the Constitution by the baremajority of 30 votes against 27. Rejoicings were now renewed throughoutthe country. In the city of New York there was an immense parade, and asthe emblematic federal ship was drawn through the streets, withHamilton's name emblazoned on her side, it was doubtless the proudestmoment of the young statesman's life. [Sidenote: The laggard states, North Carolina and Rhode Island. ] New York, however, dogged her acceptance by proposing, a few daysafterward, that a second Federal Convention be called for consideringthe amendments suggested by the various states. The proposal wassupported by the Virginia legislature, but Massachusetts andPennsylvania opposed it, as having a dangerous tendency to reopen thewhole discussion and unsettle everything. The proposal fell to theground. People were weary of the long dispute, and turned theirattention to electing representatives to the first Congress. With theadhesion of New York all serious anxiety came to an end. The newgovernment could be put in operation without waiting for North Carolinaand Rhode Island to make up their minds. The North Carolina conventionmet on the 21st of July, and adjourned on the 1st of August withoutcoming to any decision. The same objections were raised as in Virginia;and besides, the paper-money party was here much stronger than in theneighbouring state. In Rhode Island paper money was the chiefdifficulty; that state did not even take the trouble to call aconvention. It was not until the 21st of November, 1789, afterWashington's government had been several months in operation, that NorthCarolina joined the Federal Union. Rhode Island did not join till the29th of May, 1790. If she had waited but a few months longer, Vermont, the first state not of the original thirteen, would have come in beforeher. The autumn of 1788 was a season of busy but peaceful electioneering. That remarkable body, the Continental Congress, in putting an end to itstroubled existence, decreed that presidential electors should be chosenon the first Wednesday of January, 1789, that the electors should meetand cast their votes for president on the first Wednesday in February, and that the Senate and House of Representatives should assemble on thefirst Wednesday in March. This latter day fell, in 1789, on the 4th ofthe month, and accordingly, three years afterward, Congress took it fora precedent, and decreed that thereafter each new administration shouldbegin on the 4th of March. It was further decided, after some warmdebate, that until the site for the proposed federal city could beselected and built upon, the seat of the new government should be thecity of New York. [Sidenote: First presidential election, Jan. 7, 1789. ] In accordance with these decrees, presidential elections were held onthe first Wednesday in January. The Antifederalists were still potentfor mischief in New York, with the result that, just as that state hadnot joined in the Declaration of Independence until after it had beenproclaimed to the world, and just as she refused to adopt the FederalConstitution until after more than the requisite number of states hadratified it, so now she failed to choose electors, and had nothing to dowith the vote that made Washington our first president. The other tenstates that had ratified the Constitution all chose electors. But thingsmoved slowly and cumbrously at this first assembling of the newgovernment. The House of Representatives did not succeed in getting aquorum together until the 1st of April. On the 6th, the Senate choseJohn Langdon for its president, and the two houses in concert countedthe electoral votes. There were 69 in all, and every one of the 69 wasfound to be for George Washington of Virginia. For the second name onthe list there was nothing like such unanimity. It was to be expectedthat the other name would be that of a citizen of Massachusetts, as theother leading state in the Union. The two foremost citizens ofMassachusetts bore the same name, and were cousins. There would havebeen most striking poetic justice in coupling with the name ofWashington that of Samuel Adams, since these two men had beenindisputably foremost in the work of achieving the independence of theUnited States. But for the hesitancy of Samuel Adams in indorsing theFederal Constitution, he would very likely have been our firstvice-president and our second president. But the wave of federalism hadnow begun to sweep strongly over Massachusetts, carrying everythingbefore it, and none but the most ardent Federalists had a chance to meetin the electoral college. Voices were raised in behalf of Samuel Adams. While we honour the American Fabius, it was said, let us not forget theAmerican Cato. It was urged by some, with much truth, that but for hiswise and cautious action in the Massachusetts convention, the good shipConstitution would have been fatally wrecked upon the reefs of Shaysism. His course had not been that of an obstructionist, like that of his oldfriends Henry and Lee and Gerry; but at the critical moment--one of themost critical in all that wonderful crisis--he had thrown his vastinfluence, with decisive effect, upon the right side. All this is plainenough to the historian of to-day. But in the political fervour of theelection of 1789, the fact most clearly visible to men was that SamuelAdams had hesitated, and perhaps made things wait. These points came outmost distinctly on the issue of his election to the Federal Congress, in which he was defeated by the youthful Fisher Ames, whose eloquence inthe state convention had been so conspicuous and useful; but they serveto explain thoroughly why he was not put upon the presidential listalong with Washington. His cousin, John Adams, had just returned fromhis mission to England, weary and disgusted with the scanty respectwhich he had been able to secure for a feeble league of states thatcould not make good its own promises. His services during the Revolutionhad been of the most splendid sort: and after Washington, he was thesecond choice of the electoral college, receiving 34 votes, while JohnJay of New York, his nearest competitor, received only 9. John Adams wasaccordingly declared vice-president. [Sidenote: Inauguration of Washington, April 30. ] On the 14th of April Washington was informed of his election, and on thenext day but one he bid adieu again to his beloved home at Mount Vernon, where he had hoped to pass the remainder of his days in that rural peaceand quiet for which no one yearns like the man who is burdened withgreatness and fame unsought for. The position to which he was summonedwas one of unparalleled splendour, --how splendid we can now realize muchbetter than he, and our grandchildren will realize it better thanwe, --the position of first ruler of what was soon to become at once thestrongest and the most peace-loving people upon the face of the earth. As he journeyed toward New York, his thoughts must have been busy withthe arduous problems of the time. Already, doubtless, he had marked outthe two great men, Jefferson and Hamilton, for his chief advisers: theone to place us in a proper attitude before the mocking nations ofEurope; the other to restore our shattered credit, and enlist themoneyed interests of all the states in the success of the Federal Union. Washington's temperament was a hopeful one, as befitted a man of hisstrength and dash. But in his most hopeful mood he could hardly havedared to count upon such a sudden and wonderful demonstration ofnational strength as was about to ensue upon the heroic financialmeasures of Hamilton. His meditations on this journey we may wellbelieve to have been solemn and anxious enough. But if he could gatheradded courage from the often-declared trust of his fellow-countrymen, there was no lack of such comfort for him. At every town through whichhe passed, fresh evidences of it were gathered, but at one point on theroute his strong nature was especially wrought upon. At Trenton, as hecrossed the bridge over the Assunpink Creek, where twelve years ago, atthe darkest moment of the Revolution, he had outwitted Cornwallis in themost skilful of stratagems, and turned threatening defeat into gloriousvictory, --at this spot, so fraught with thrilling associations, he wasmet by a party of maidens dressed in white, who strewed his path withsweet spring flowers, while triumphal arches in softest green boreinscriptions declaring that he who had watched over the safety of themothers could well be trusted to protect the daughters. On the 23d hearrived in New York, and was entertained at dinner by Governor Clinton. One week later, on the 30th, came the inauguration. It was one of thosemagnificent days of clearest sunshine that sometimes make one feel inApril as if summer had come. At noon of that day Washington went fromhis lodgings, attended by a military escort, to Federal Hall, at thecorner of Wall and Nassau streets, where his statue has lately beenerected. The city was ablaze with excitement. A sea of upturned eagerfaces surrounded the spot, and as the hero appeared thousands of cockedhats were waved, while ladies fluttered their white handkerchiefs. Washington came forth clad in a suit of dark brown cloth of Americanmake, with white silk hose and shoes decorated with silver buckles, while at his side hung a dress-sword. For a moment all were hushed indeepest silence, while the secretary of the Senate held forth the Bibleupon a velvet cushion, and Chancellor Livingston administered the oathof office. Then, before Washington had as yet raised his head, Livingston shouted, --and from all the vast company came answeringshouts, --"Long live George Washington, President of the United States!" BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. The bibliography of the period covered in this book is most copiouslyand thoroughly treated in the seventh volume of Winsor's _Narrative andCritical History of America_, Boston, 1888. For the benefit of thereader who may not have ready access to that vast storehouse ofinformation, the following brief notes may be of service. The best account of the peace negotiations is to be found in chapter ii. Of Winsor's volume just cited, written by Hon. John Jay, who had alreadydiscussed the subject quite thoroughly in his _Address before the NewYork Historical Society on its Seventy-Ninth Anniversary_, Nov. 27, 1883. Of the highest value are Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's _Life of LordShelburne_, 3 vols. , London, 1875-76, and Adolphe de Circourt, _Histoirede l'action commune de la France et de l'Amérique, etc. _, tome iii. , _Documents originaux inédits_, Paris, 1876. See also Sparks, _DiplomaticCorrespondence of the American Revolution_, 12 vols. , Boston, 1829-30;Trescot's _Diplomacy of the American Revolution_, N. Y. , 1852; Lyman's_Diplomacy of the United States_, Boston, 1826; Elliot's _AmericanDiplomatic Code_, 2 vols. , Washington, 1834; Chalmers's _Collection ofTreaties_, 2 vols. , London, 1790; Lord Stanhope's _History of England_, vol. Vii. , London, 1853; Lecky's _History of England_, vol. Iv. , London, 1882; Lord John Russell's _Memorials of Fox_, 4 vols. , London, 1853-57;Albemarle's _Rockingham and his Contemporaries_, 2 vols. , London, 1852;Walpole's _Last Journals_, 2 vols. , London, 1859; Force's _AmericanArchives_, 4th series, 6 vols. , Washington, 1839-46; John Adams's_Works_, 10 vols. , Boston, 1850-56; Rives's _Life of Madison_, 3 vols. , Boston, 1859-68; Madison's _Letters and other Writings_, 4 vols. , Phila. , 1865; the lives of Franklin, by Bigelow and Parton; the livesof Jay, by Jay, Flanders, and Whitelocke; Morse's _John Adams_, Boston, 1885; _Correspondence of George III. With Lord North_, 2 vols. , London, 1867; Wharton's _Digest of International Law_, Washington, 1887, _Appendix_ to vol. Iii. ; Hale's _Franklin in France_, 2 vols. , Boston, 1888. The view of the treaty set forth in 1830 by Sparks, according towhich Jay and Adams were quite mistaken in their suspicions of theFrench court, we may now regard as disposed of by the evidence presentedby Circourt and Fitzmaurice. It has led many writers astray, and evenwith all the lights which Mr. Bancroft has had, the account in the lastrevision of his _History of the United States_, vol. V. , N. Y. , 1886, though in some respects one of the best to be found in the generalhistories, still leaves much to be desired. The general condition of the United States under the articles ofconfederation is well sketched in the sixth volume of Bancroft's finalrevision, and in Curtis's _History of the Constitution_, 2 vols. , N. Y. , 1861. An excellent summary is given in the first volume of Schouler's_History of the United States under the Constitution_, of which vols, i. -iii. (Washington, 1882-85) have appeared. Mr. Schouler's book issuggestive and stimulating. The work most rich in details is ProfessorMcMaster's _History of the People of the United States_, of which thefirst volume rather more than covers the period 1783-89. The author isespecially deserving of praise for the diligence with which he hassearched the newspapers and obscure pamphlets of the period. He has thusgiven much fresh life to the narrative, besides throwing valuable lightupon the thoughts and feelings of the men who lived under the "league offriendship. " I take pleasure in acknowledging my indebtedness toProfessor McMaster for several interesting illustrative details, chieflyin my third, fourth, and seventh chapters. At the same time one issorely puzzled at some of his omissions, as in the account of theFederal Convention, in which one finds no allusion whatever to theall-important question of the representation of slaves, or to thecompromise by which New England secured to Congress full power toregulate commerce by yielding to Georgia and South Carolina in thematter of the African slave-trade. So the discussion as to the nationalexecutive is carried on till July 26th, when it was decided that thepresident should be chosen by Congress for a single term of seven years;then the subject is dropped, and the reader is left to suppose that suchwas the final arrangement. Instances of what seems like carelessness aresufficiently numerous to make the book in some places an unsafe guide tothe general reader, but in spite of such defects, which a carefulrevision might remedy, its value is great. Further general informationas to the period of the Confederation may be found in Morse's admirable_Life of Alexander Hamilton_, 3d ed. , 2 vols. , Boston, 1882; J. C. Hamilton's _Republic of the United States_, 7 vols. , Boston, 1879;Frothingham's _Rise of the Republic_, Boston, 1872, chapter xii. ; VonHolst's _Constitutional History_, 5 vols. , Chicago, 1877-85, chapter i. ;Pitkin's _History of the United States_, 2 vols. , New Haven, 1828, vol. Ii. ; Marshall's _Life of Washington_, 5 vols. , Phila. , 1805-07;_Journals of Congress_, 13 vols. , Phila. , 1800; _Secret Journals ofCongress_, 4 vols. , Boston, 1820-21. On the loyalists and their treatment, the able essay by Rev. G. E. Ellis, in Winsor's seventh volume, is especially rich in bibliographicalreferences. See also Sabine's _Loyalists of the American Revolution_, 2vols. , Boston, 1864; Ryerson's _Loyalists of America_, 2 vols. , Toronto, 1880; Jones's _New York during the Revolution_, 2 vols. , N. Y. , 1879. Although chiefly concerned with events earlier than 1780, the _Journaland Letters of Samuel Curwen_, 4th ed. , Boston, 1864, and especially the_Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson_, 2 vols. , Boston, 1884-86, arevaluable in this connection. For the financial troubles the most convenient general survey is to befound in A. S. Bolles's _Financial History of the United States_, 1774-1789, N. Y. , 1879; Sparks's _Life of Gouverneur Morris_, 3 vols. , Boston, 1832; Pelatiah Webster's _Political Essays_, Phila. , 1791;Phillips's _Colonial and Continental Paper Currency_, 2 vols. , Roxbury, 1865-66; Varnum's _Case of Trevett v. Weeden_, Providence, 1787;Arnold's _History of Rhode Island_, 2 vols. , N. Y. , 1859-60. The bestaccount of the Shays rebellion is G. R. Minot's _History of theInsurrections in Massachusetts_, Worcester, 1788; see also Barry's_History of Massachusetts_, 3 vols. , Boston, 1855-57; Austin's _Life ofGerry_, 2 vols. , Boston, 1828-29. A new and interesting account of thenorthwestern cessions and the Ordinance of 1787 is B. A. Hinsdale's _OldNorthwest_, N. Y. , 1888; see also Dunn's _Indiana_, Boston, 1888;Cutler's _Life, Journal, and Correspondence of Manasseh Cutler_, 2vols. , Cincinnati, 1887. In the _Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and PoliticalScience_, the following articles bear especially upon subjects heretreated and are worthy of careful study: II. , v. , vi. , H. C. Adams, _Taxation in the United States_, 1789-1816; III. , i. , H. B. Adams, _Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States_; III. , ix. , x. , Davis, _American Constitutions_; IV. , v. , Jameson's_Introduction to the Constitutional and Political History of theIndividual States_; IV. , vii. -ix. , Shoshuke Sato's _History of the LandQuestion in the United States_. For the proceedings of the Federal Convention in framing theConstitution, and of the several state conventions in ratifying it, thegreat treasure-house of authoritative information is Elliot's _Debatesin the Conventions_, 5 vols. , originally published under the sanction ofCongress in 1830-45; new reprint, Phila. , 1888. The contents of thevolumes are as follows:-- I. Sundry preliminary papers, relating to the ante-revolutionary period, and the period of the Confederation; journal of the Federal Convention; Yates's minutes of the proceedings; the official letters of Martin, Yates, Lansing, Randolph, Mason, and Gerry, in explanation of their several courses; Jay's address to the people of New York; and other illustrative papers. II, III. , IV. Proceedings of the several state conventions; with other documents, including the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798, and data relating thereto. V. Madison's journal of debates in the Congress of the Confederation, Nov. 4, 1782-June 21, 1783, and Feb. 19-April 25, 1787; Madison's journal of the Federal Convention; letters from Madison to Washington, Jefferson, and Randolph, Sept. 1787-Nov. 1788; and other papers. The best edition of the "Federalist" is by H. C. Lodge, N. Y. , 1888. Seealso Story's _Commentaries on the Constitution_, 4th ed. , 3 vols. , Boston, 1873; the works of Daniel Webster, 6 vols. , Boston, 1851; Hurd's_Theory of our National Existence_, Boston, 1881. The above worksexpound the Constitution as not a league between sovereign states but afundamental law ordained by the people of the United States. Theopposite view is presented in _The Republic of Republics_, by P. C. Centz[Plain Common Sense, pseudonym of B. J. Sage of New Orleans], Boston, 1881; the works of Calhoun, 6 vols. , N. Y. , 1853-55; A. H. Stephens's _Warbetween the States_, 2 vols. , Phila. , 1868; Jefferson Davis's _Rise andFall of the Confederate Government_, 2 vols. , N. Y. , 1881. Several volumes of the "American Statesmen" contain interesting accountsof discussions in the various conventions, as Tyler's _Patrick Henry_, Hosmer's _Samuel Adams_, Lodge's _Hamilton_, Magruder's _Marshall_, Roosevelt's _Morris_. Gay's _Madison_ falls far below the generalstandard of this excellent and popular series. No satisfactory biographyof Madison has yet been written, though the voluminous work of W. C. Rives contains much good material. For judicial interpretations of theConstitution one may consult B. R. Curtis's _Digest of Decisions_, 1790-1854; Flanders's _Lives of the Chief Justices_, Phila. , 1858;Marshall's _Writings on the Federal Constitution_, ed. Perkins, Boston, 1839; see also Pomeroy's _Constitutional Law_, N. Y. , 1868; Wharton's_Commentaries_, Phila. , 1884; Von Holst's _Calhoun_, Boston, 1882;Tyler's _Letters and Times of the Tylers_, 2 vols. , Richmond, 1884-85. Among critical and theoretical works, Fisher's _Trial of theConstitution_, Phila. , 1862, and Lockwood's _Abolition of thePresidency_, N. Y. , 1884, are variously suggestive; Woodrow Wilson's_Congressional Government_, Boston, 1885, is a work of rare ability, pointing out the divergence which has arisen between the literary theoryof our government and its practical working. Walter Bagehot's _EnglishConstitution_, revised ed. , Boston, 1873, had already, in a mostprofound and masterly fashion, exhibited the divergence between theliterary theory and the actual working of the British government. Somepoints of weakness in the British system are touched in AlbertStickney's _True Republic_, N. Y. , 1879; see also his _DemocraticGovernment_, N. Y. , 1885. The constitutional history of England ispresented, in its earlier stages, with prodigious learning, by Dr. Stubbs, 3 vols. , London, 1873-78, and in its later stages by Hallam, 2vols. , London, 1842, and Sir Erskine May, 2 vols. , Boston, 1862-63; seealso Freeman's _Growth of the English Constitution_, London, 1872;_Comparative Politics_, London, 1873; _Some Impressions of the UnitedStates_, London, 1883; Rudolph Gneist, _History of the EnglishConstitution_, 2 vols. , London, 1886; J. S. Mill, _RepresentativeGovernment_, N. Y. , 1862; Sir H. Maine, _Popular Government_, N. Y. , 1886;S. R. Gardiner's _Introduction to the Study of English History_, London, 1881. In this connection I may refer to my own book, _American PoliticalIdeas_, N. Y. , 1885; and my articles, "Great Britain, " "House of Lords, "and "House of Commons, " in Lalor's _Cyclopædia of Political Science_, 3vols. , Chicago, 1882-84. It is always pleasant to refer to thatcyclopædia, because it contains the numerous articles on Americanhistory by Prof. Alexander Johnston. One must stop somewhere, and I willconclude by saying that I do not know where one can find anything morerichly suggestive than Professor Johnston's articles. MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. The names of those who for various reasons were absent when theConstitution was signed are given in italics; the names of those whowere present, but refused to sign, are given in small capitals. New Hampshire John Langdon. Nicholas Gilman. Massachusetts ELBRIDGE GERRY. Nathaniel Gorham. Rufus King. _Caleb Strong. _ Connecticut William Samuel Johnson. Roger Sherman. _Oliver Ellsworth. _ New York _Robert Yates. _ Alexander Hamilton. _John Lansing. _ New Jersey William Livingston. David Brearley. _William Churchill Houston. _ William Paterson. Jonathan Dayton. Pennsylvania Benjamin Franklin. Thomas Mifflin. Robert Morris. George Clymer. Thomas Fitzsimmons. Jared Ingersoll. James Wilson. Gouverneur Morris. Delaware George Read. Gunning Bedford. John Dickinson. Richard Bassett. Jacob Broom. Maryland James McHenry. Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer. Daniel Carroll. _John Francis Mercer. _ _Luther Martin. _ Virginia George Washington. EDMUND RANDOLPH. John Blair. James Madison. GEORGE MASON. _George Wythe. _ _James McClurg. _ North Carolina _Alexander Martin. _ _William Richardson Davie. _ William Blount. Richard Dobbs Spaight. Hugh Williamson. South Carolina John Rutledge. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. Charles Pinckney. Pierce Butler. Georgia William Few. Abraham Baldwin. _William Pierce. _ _William Houstoun. _ Of those who signed their names to the Federal Constitution, the sixfollowing were signers of the Declaration of Independence:-- Roger Sherman, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, George Clymer, James Wilson, George Read. The ten following were appointed as delegates to the FederalConvention, but never took their seats:-- New Hampshire John Pickering. Benjamin West. Massachusetts Francis Dana. New Jersey John Nelson. Abraham Clark. Virginia Patrick Henry (declined). North Carolina Richard Caswell (resigned). Willie Jones (declined). Georgia George Walton. Nathaniel Pendleton. No delegates were appointed by Rhode Island. In a letter addressed to"the Honourable the Chairman of the General Convention, " and dated"Providence, May 11, 1787, " several leading citizens of Rhode Islandexpressed their regret that their state should not be represented on somomentous an occasion. At the same time, says the letter, "the result ofyour deliberations . . . We still hope may finally be approved and adoptedby this state, for which we pledge our influence and best exertions. "The letter was signed by John Brown, Joseph Nightingale, Levi Hall, Philip Allen, Paul Allen, Jabez Bowen, Nicholas Brown, John Jinkes, Welcome Arnold, William Russell, Jeremiah Olney, William Barton, andThomas Lloyd Halsey. The letter was presented to the Convention on May28th by Gouverneur Morris, and, "being read, was ordered to lie on thetable for further consideration. " See Elliot's _Debates_, v. 125. The Constitution was ratified by the thirteen states, as follows:-- 1. Delaware Dec. 6, 1787. 2. Pennsylvania Dec. 12, 1787. 3. New Jersey Dec. 18, 1787. 4. Georgia Jan. 2, 1788. 5. Connecticut Jan. 9, 1788. 6. Massachusetts Feb. 6, 1788. 7. Maryland April 28, 1788. 8. South Carolina May 23, 1788. 9. New Hampshire June 21, 1788. 10. Virginia June 25, 1788. 11. New York July 26, 1788. 12. North Carolina Nov. 21, 1789. 13. Rhode Island May 29, 1790. PRESIDENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 1. Peyton Randolph of Virginia Sept. 5, 1774. 2. Henry Middleton of South Carolina Oct. 22, 1774. Peyton Randolph May 10, 1775. 3. John Hancock of Massachusetts May 24, 1775. 4. Henry Laurens of South Carolina Nov. 1, 1777. 5. John Jay of New York Dec. 10, 1778. 6. Samuel Huntington of Connecticut Sept. 28, 1779. 7. Thomas McKean of Delaware July 10, 1781. 8. John Hanson of Maryland Nov. 5, 1781. 9. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey Nov. 4, 1782. 10. Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania Nov. 3, 1783. 11. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia Nov. 30, 1784. 12. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts June 6, 1786. 13. Arthur St. Clair of Pennsylvania Feb. 2, 1787. 14. Cyrus Griffin of Virginia Jan. 22, 1788. INDEX. Acadians, 205. Adams, Herbert B. , 192. Adams, John, arrives in Paris, 22; his indignation at the pusillanimous instructions from Congress, 36; condemns the Cincinnati, 116; tries in vain to negotiate commercial treaty with Great Britain, 139-141; negotiates a treaty with Holland, 155; obtains a loan there, 156, 157; his interview with the envoy from Tripoli, 161; absent from the United States at the time of the Federal Convention, 223; elected vice-president of the United States, 348. Adams, Samuel, his devotion to local self-government, 57, 318; his committees of correspondence, 92; opposes Washington's proposal for pensioning officers, 106; but at length supports the Commutation Act, 114; condemns the Cincinnati, 116, 118; approves the conduct of the Massachusetts delegates, 143; opposes pardoning the ringleaders in the Shays insurrection, 184; not a delegate to the Federal Convention, 225; "the man of the town meeting, " 318; in the Massachusetts convention, 324, 326-328; why not selected for the vice-presidency, 347. Albany, riot in, 339. Amendments to Constitution, 302, 330, 338. Ames, Fisher, 319, 326, 348. Amis, North Carolinian trader, 210. Amphiktyonic council, 249. Annapolis convention, 216. Antagonisms between large and small states, 244-252; between east and west, 255; between north and south, 256-267. Antifederalist party, 309; in Pennsylvania, 310; in Massachusetts, 317, 324; in South Carolina, 334; in Virginia, 335-337; in New York, 340, 341, 346. Antipathies between states, 62. Aranda, Count, his prophecy, 19. Aristides, pseudonym, 312. Aristocracy, 283. Aristotle, 225. Arkwright, Sir Richard, 267. Armada, the Invincible, 235. Armstrong, John, 109, 150. Army, dread of, 105, 321. Arnold, Benedict, 28, 106, 151. Asbury, Francis, 85. Ashburton, Lord, 5. Ashburton treaty, 26. Assemblies, 65. Assunpink Creek, 349. Augustine, 158. Backus, Rev. Isaac, 322. Bagehot, Walter, 291. Baldwin, Abraham, 251. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 213. Baptists persecuted in Virginia, 80. Barbary pirates, 157-161. Barré, Isaac, 41. Bedford, Gunning, 249. Bennington, 321. Bernard, Sir Francis, 298. Biennial elections, 327. Bill of rights demanded, 329. Blackstone, Sir William, 290, 291, 297. Bossuet on slavery, 72. Boston Gazette, quoted, 328. Boundaries of United States as settled by the treaty, 25. Bowdoin, James, 143, 180-184, 319, 324. Boyd, Lieutenant, 122. Braddock, Edward, 305. Bradshaw's Railway Guide, 171. Brearley, David, 229, 246. Bribery, charges of, 328. British army departs, 51. British Constitution compared with American, 290-298. Buff and blue colours, 2. Burgesses, House of, in Virginia, 65. Burke, Ædanus, 116. Burke, Edmund, his sympathy with the Americans, 2; could not see the need for parliamentary reform, 6; his invective against Shelburne, 17; on the slave-trade, 72. Butler, Pierce, 258. Cabinet, the president's, 299. Cabinet government, growth of, in England, 296. Camden, Lord, 5. Canada, Franklin suggests that it should be ceded to the United States, 9, 14. Carleton, Sir Guy, 50, 131. Carlisle, Pa. , disturbances at, 315. Carpet-bag governments, 270. Carr, Dabney, 92. Carrington, Edward, 204, 307. Carroll, Daniel, 228. Carrying trade, 163, 263. Cartwright, Edmund, 267. Catalonian rebels indemnified, 29. Catholics in the United States, 87. Cato, pseudonym, 312. Cavendish, Lord John, 5, 16. Censors, council of, in Pennsylvania, 150. Centinel, pseudonym, 313. Cervantes, Miguel de, 159. Charles II. , 29. Chase, Samuel, 322. Chatham, Lord, 188. Cherry Valley, 122. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 213. Chittenden, Thomas, 121. Cincinnati, order of the, 114-118. Cincinnati, the city, original name of, 197. Cincinnatus, pseudonym, 312. Clan system, 62. Clergymen in the Massachusetts convention, 319; their liberal spirit, 322. Cleveland, Grover, his tariff message, 294. Clinton, George, favours persecution of Tories, 123; an enemy to closer union of the states, 145; defeats impost amendment, 220; opposes the Constitution, 340; entertains President Washington at dinner, 350. Clinton, Sir Henry, 322. Clymer, George, 311. Coalition ministry, 38-46. Coeur-de-Lion and Saladin, 161. Coinage, 165. Coke, Thomas, 86. Columbia College, 125. Commerce, control of, given to Congress, 263. Common law in the United States, 69. Commons, House of, in England, 68, 290-298; in North Carolina, 65. Compromises of the Federal Constitution, 250-267. Confederation, articles of, 92-98. Congress, Continental, its instructions to the commissioners at Paris, 35; its weakness, 56, 98, 102-113, 234; its anomalous character, 92; its presidents, 96; driven from Philadelphia by drunken soldiers, 112; flees to Princeton, 113; unable to enforce the provisions of the treaty, 119-131, 154; unable to regulate commerce, 140-144; afraid to interfere openly in the Shays rebellion, 185; passes ordinance for government of northwestern territory, 203-206; refuses to recommend a convention for reforming the government, 218; reconsiders its refusal, 221; in some respects a diplomatic rather than a legislative body, 237; its migrations, 271, 306; debates on the Constitution, 307; submits it to the states, 308; comes to an end, 345. Congress, Federal, powers granted to, 270; choice of president by, 282-284; counting electoral votes in, 284, 285, 289. Connecticut, government of, 65; quarrels with New York and Pennsylvania, 146-151; keeps almost entirely clear of paper money, 172; western claims of, 189, 194; ratifies the Constitution, 316. Connecticut compromise, the, 250-255. Conservative character of the American Revolution, 64. Constitution, emblematic federal ship, 339, 344. Convention, the Federal, 154, 222-305. Conway, Gen. Henry, 5. Cooper, Dr. Myles, 126. Cornwallis, Lord, 22, 51, 349. Council, privy, 299. Cowardice of American politicians, 231. Crawford, William, 51. Curtis, B. R. , 276. Cutler, Manasseh, 203. Dane, Nathan, 204, 217, 307. Dayton, Jonathan, 225, 229. Debt, imprisonment for, 173. Debts to British creditors, 27, 131. Delaware, government of, 65; ratifies the Constitution, 314. Democratic-Republican party, 309. Dickinson, John, 93, 112, 228, 242, 243, 281, 283, 299, 312. Dissolution of Parliament, 298. Dollar, the Spanish, 165. Dunmore, Lord, 298. Election by lot, 281; first presidential, 346-348. Electoral college in Maryland, 66; device adopted for choosing the president, 281-287; its practical working, 288. Elliot, Sir Gilbert, 3. Ellsworth, Oliver, 228, 249, 250, 267, 269, 274, 276, 280, 300. Embargo acts, 142. Eminent domain, 194. Episcopal church, 77-85. Erie Canal, 212, 228. Executive, federal, 241, 277; length of term, 279; how elected, 279-285; corresponds to sovereign, not to prime minister, 290, 299. Exports not to be taxed, 264, 270. "Federal, " the word preferred to "national, " 254. Federal city under federal jurisdiction, 271, 320. "Federal Farmer" (letters by R. H. Lee), 314. Federal Street in Boston, 331. "Federalist, " the, 235, 341-343. Federalist party, 238, 309. Field, S. J. , 275. Fisheries, question of, 20, 26, 37, 139, 163. Fitzherbert, Alleyne, 22, 45. Florida surrendered by Great Britain to Spain, 37; disputes about boundary of, 208. Folkland, 187, 207. Fox, C. J. , his sympathy with the Americans, 2; quarrels with Shelburne, 6, 14; resigns, 15; waywardness of his early career, 16; coalition with North, 38-42; mistake in opposing a dissolution, 48. France, treaty of 1783 with Great Britain, 37. Franklin, Benjamin, negotiates with Oswald, 9; overruled by Jay and Adams, 23; his arguments against compensating the loyalists, 30; ridicules the Cincinnati, 116; returns from France, 138; in the Federal Convention, 225, 250, 277, 299, 303, 305; lays the Constitution before the Pennsylvania legislature, 306; called a dotard by the Antifederalists, 313. Franklin, state of, 200, 209. Frederick the Great, on republics, 58. Free trade, 4, 134-139. French army embarks at Boston, 51. Froissart, 153. Frontier posts to be surrendered by Great Britain, 51; why not surrendered, 152. Fugitive slaves, 206, 267, 333. Fur trade, 132, 164. Gadsden, C. , 122, 334. Gallatin, A. , 125, 134. Galloway, Joseph, 248. Gardoqui, Diego, 209. Gates, Horatio, 108-111, 180. George III. Threatens to abdicate, 3; his disgust at the coalition, 44; rebuked by House of Commons, 46; his personal government overthrown, 48; hopes the Americans will repent of their folly, 58, 141; resists the movement for abolishing slave-trade, 72; his personal government, 297. Georgia takes the lead in making the judiciary elective, 69; abandons that evil practice, 69; issues paper money, 169; ratifies the Constitution, 316. Germaine, Lord George, 39. Gerry, Elbridge, 118, 229, 243, 251, 252, 256, 269, 279, 282, 298, 303, 304, 328, 347. Gibbon, Edward, 38, 39. Gibraltar, 17, 36. Gladstone, W. E. , 223, 292, 294. Gorham, Nathaniel, 252, 253, 319. Governors, colonial, unpopularity of, 67. Gower, Lord, 44. Grafton, Duke of, 5. Grantham, Lord, 17. Granville, Lord, 293. Grasse, Count, defeated by Rodney, 12, 13. Grayson, William, 162, 205, 337. Green Dragon tavern, 327. Greene, Nathanael, 94, 102, 108, 116, 122, 225. Grenville, Thomas, 11. Guadaloupe, 36. Guilford, Earl of, 44. Half-pay controversy, 106. Hamilton, Alexander, his early life, 124-126; attacks the Trespass Act, 128; calls for a federal convention, 217; advocates the impost amendment, 220; in the Federal Convention, 225, 226, 243, 244, 246, 249, 254, 279, 303, 304; on inconvertible paper, 274; on the electoral college, 287; called a boy by the Antifederalists, 313; authorship of the "Federalist, " 341-343; supports the Constitution in the New York convention, 343, 344; his financial measures, 349. Hancock, John, 104, 184, 318, 319, 330. Hannibal, 158. Hargreaves, James, 267. Harrington, James, 64. Harrison, Benjamin, 337. Hartington, Lord, 293. Hartley, David, 45. Hawks, F. L. , 82. Heath, Gen. William, 319. Henry, Patrick, 80, 225, 331, 335, 336, 347. Hint Club, 169. Impost amendment, 218-240. India bill, 46. Insurrections, suppression of, 269. Intercitizenship, 94. Iroquois league, 190. Irreconcilables in the Federal Convention, 225, 242, 244, 246, 254. Isolation of states a century ago, 62. Jay, John, thwarts Vergennes, 21, 35; tries to establish free trade between United States and Great Britain, 26; condemns persecution of Tories, 122; on compensation for slaves, 132; consents to the closing of the Mississippi River for twenty-five years, 210; why not sent as delegate to Federal Convention, 225; supports the Constitution in New York convention, 340; contributes articles to the "Federalist, " 341; receives nine electoral votes for the vice-presidency, 348. Jefferson, Thomas, opposed to slavery, 72; favours religious freedom, 81; minister to France, 138, 155; assists Gouverneur Morris in arranging our decimal currency, 166; his plan for the government of the northwestern territory, 196; wishes to prohibit slavery in the national domain, 198, 205; his purchase of Louisiana, 207; absent from United States at the time of the Federal Convention, 225; his faith in the people, 226, 337; his opinion of the Constitution, 309; approves the action of the Massachusetts convention, 331. Johnson, W. S. , 229. Johnston, Alexander, 223. Jones, Paul, 339. Jonesborough, convention at, 200. Judiciary, elective, 69; federal, 242, 300, 301. Juilliard _vs. _ Greenman, 275. Kentucky, 18, 189, 199, 202, 209, 210. Keppel, Lord, 5, 16, 45. King, Rufus, 217, 221, 228, 246, 249, 250, 256, 261, 276, 279, 282, 324, 326. King's Mountain, 28, 200, 321. Kings, election of, in Poland, 279. Know Ye men and Know Ye measures, 177, 243. Knox, Henry, 114. Lafayette, 50, 54. Langdon, John, 229, 269, 274, 276, 283, 346. Lansing, John, 225, 242, 244, 246, 254, 340, 341. Laurens, Henry, 2, 22. Lecky, W. , 103. Ledyard, Isaac, 128. Lee, Henry, 307, 337. Lee, Richard Henry, 57, 143, 204, 205, 225, 307, 313, 318, 328, 336, 337, 347. "Letters from a Federal Farmer, " by R. H. Lee, 314. Lexington, 50, 321. Lincoln, Abraham, 72, 198, 207. Lincoln, Benjamin, 181-183, 319, 332. Livingston, Robert, 36, 340, 350. Livingston, William, 171, 229. Locke, John, 64, 225. Long Lane becomes Federal Street, 331. Long Parliament, 92, 235. Lords, House of, 66, 68; contrasted with Senate, 295. Lowndes, Rawlins, 332-334. Loyalists, compensation of, 28-33; persecution of, 120-130; did not form, in any proper sense of the word, an opposition party, 308. Luzerne, Chevalier de, 35, 54. Lykian League, 249. Macdougall, Alexander, 107. McDuffle, George, 60. McKean, Thomas, 316. McMaster, J. B. , 151. Madison, James, and the Religious Freedom Act, 81; on right of coercion, 100; advocates five per cent. Impost, 104; on the ordinance of 1787, 206; moves that a convention be held to secure a uniform commercial policy, 214; succeeds in getting delegates appointed, 220; his character and appearance, 226, 227; his journal of the proceedings, 229; chief author of the Virginia plan, 233, 267; one of the first to arrive at the fundamental conception of our partly federal and partly national government, 239; approves at first of giving Congress the power to annul state laws, 241; opposes the New Jersey plan, 246; declares that the real antagonism is between slave states and free states, 249, 256; author of the three fifths compromise, 260, 261; condemns paper money, 275; disapproves of election of the executive by the legislature, 279; approves of a privy council, 299; supports the Constitution in Congress, 307; called a boy by the Antifederalists, 313; supports the Constitution in the Virginia convention, 337; part author of the "Federalist, " 341, 342; denies that there can be a constitutional right of secession, 344. Maine as part of Massachusetts, 317. Manchester, Duke of, 45. Marbois, François de Barbé, 22, 35. Marion, Francis, 122. Marshall, John, 82, 276, 301, 337. Martin, Luther, 229, 242-244, 246, 249, 250, 254, 275, 322. Maryland, government of, 65; insists upon cession of northwestern lands, 93, 192, 195; paper money in, 170; message to Virginia, 215; ratifies the Constitution, 332. Mason, George, 229, 243, 252, 264, 265, 275, 276, 277, 279, 281, 282, 283, 299, 303, 304, 335, 337. Massachusetts, government of, 67; abolishes slavery, 75; religious bigotry, 76; on the five per cent. Duty, 104; tries to propose a convention for increasing the powers of Congress, 142; lays claim to a small part of Vermont, 152; paper money in, 172-179; western claims of, 189; changes her attitude, 221; local self-government in, 317; debates on the Constitution, 320-330; ratifies it, suggesting amendments, 331. Massachusetts Chronicle, quoted, 120. Massacre, Boston, 321. Mayhew, Jonathan, 92. Meade, William, 79, 83. Mentor and Phocion, 128. Mercer, J. F. , 274. Methodists, 85. Middletown convention, 113. Mifflin, Thomas, 52. Minisink, 122. Mirabeau, Count de, 116. Mississippi River, attempt to close it, 209-211, 335; valley of the, 18, 188. Monroe, James, 216. Montesquieu, C. , 225, 291. Moonshiners, 334. Morris, Gouverneur, 108, 166, 228, 242, 251, 261, 264, 269, 273, 276, 279, 282, 303. Morris, Robert, 108, 167, 228, 312. Moultrie, William, 143, 334. Muley Abdallah, 158. Mutiny act, 321. Names of persons and places, fashions in, 197. Nantucket, 163. Nason, Samuel, 321. Naval eminence of New England, 20, 139. Navigation acts, 138-143, 164. Negroes carried away by British fleet, 131. Nelson, Samuel, 276. New Connecticut, 152. New Hampshire lays claim to Vermont, 151-153; riots in, 183; hesitates to ratify the Constitution, 331; ratifies it, 338. New Jersey quarrels with New York, 146; paper money in, 171; opposes the attempt to close the Mississippi, 211; instructs her delegates to the Annapolis convention, 217; her plan for amending the articles of confederation, 245; ratifies the Constitution, 315. New Roof, 338. New York passes navigation and tariff acts directed against neighbouring states, 146; lays claim to Vermont, 151-153; paper money in, 170; western claims of, 190, 193; defeats the impost amendment, 218-220; debates on the Constitution, 340-344; ratifies it, 344; asks for a second convention, 344; fails to choose electors, 346. New York Central Railroad, 212. Newburgh address, 108-112, 118. Nicola, Louis, his letter to Washington, 107, 118. Non-importation agreement, 142. North, Frederick, Lord, fall of his ministry, 1; coalition with Fox, 38-42; his blindness, 41; his proposals after Saratoga, 91; his subservience to the king, 297. North Carolina issues paper money, 169; cedes her western lands to the United States, 199; repeals the act of cession, 201; delays her ratification of the Constitution, 345. Ohio, 203-206. Old Sarum, 249. Old South Church, 321. Onslow, George, 2. Ordinance of 1787, 199, 203-206. Oregon, 60. Oswald, Richard, 9-14, 22-26, 32, 45. Paine, Thomas, 50, 55, 191. Paper currency, 163-179, 205, 218, 273-276. Parker, Theodore, 264. Parsons, Samuel Holden, 203. Parsons, Theophilus, 319, 324. Parties, formation of, 308. Paterson, William, 229, 245-248, 255, 258, 274. Patterson, militia officer in Wyoming, 149. Payson, Rev. Philip, 322. Pendleton, Edmund, 336. Pennsylvania, government of, 65; first tariff act, 142; quarrels with Connecticut, 148-150; paper money in, 170; opposes the closing of the Mississippi, 211; contest over the Constitution, 309-314; ratifies it, 315. Petersham, scene of Shays's defeat, 182, 319. Philadelphia, Congress driven from, 112; Federal Convention meets at, 222; unparliamentary proceedings in legislature, 311; celebrates ratification by ten states, 339. Phocion and Mentor, 128. Pinckney, Charles, 228, 243, 261, 265, 266, 269, 276, 277, 334. Pinckney, Cotesworth, 228, 243, 258, 261, 263, 265, 266, 276, 333, 334. Pitt, Thomas, 44. Pitt, William, chancellor of exchequer, 16; denounces the coalition, 39; defends the treaty, 43; refuses to form a ministry, 44; character, 47; prime minister, 47; wins a great political victory, 48; favours free trade with the United States, 136. Polish kings, election of, 279. Population as an index of wealth, 257. Portland, Duke of, 16, 45. Potomac, navigation of, 213-216. Poughkeepsie, convention at, 340-344. Powers granted to federal government, 268. Presbyterians, 81, 86. Presidents of Continental Congress, 96. Prevost's march against Charleston, 27. Prime minister contrasted with president, 292-294. Primogeniture, abolition of, 71. Proprietary governments, 65, 71. Providence, R. I. , barbecue and mob at, 339. Public lands, 188. Putnam, Israel, 151. Putnam, Rufus, 203. Quebec act, 18. Quesnay, François, 141. Quorum, how to make a, 311. Railroads, political influence of, 60. Randolph, Edmund, 229, 233, 235, 239, 242, 246, 265, 269, 275, 276, 277, 282, 300, 303, 335, 337. Rayneval, Gérard de, 21. Read, George, 242, 274. Reform, parliamentary, 6. Religious freedom, progress in, 76-87. Religious tests opposed by Massachusetts clergymen, 322. Representation of slaves, 258-262. Representatives, House of, 236, 252. Republican party, 238. Republics, old notion that they must be small in area, 59. Reserve, Connecticut's western, 194. Revenue bills, 270. Revere, Paul, 327. Revolution, American, its conservative character, 64; the French, 64, 118. Rhode Island, government of, 65; extends franchise to Catholics, 77; on the five per cent. Duty, 104; paper money in, 172-177; opposes the closing of the Mississippi, 211; does not send delegates to Philadelphia, 222; delays her ratification of the Constitution, 345. Richmond, Duke of, 2, 16. Rittenhouse, David, 111. Rockingham, Marquis of, 4; instability of his ministry, 5; its excellent work, 7; his death, 15. Rodney's victory over Grasse, 12, 13. Roman republic not like the United States, 59. Rousseau, J. J. , 64, 117. Rutgers, Elizabeth, 127. Rutledge, John, 228, 243, 261, 265, 278, 279, 281, 300, 334. St. Clair, Arthur, 197, 206. Saladin and Coeur-de-Lion, 161. Sandy Hook light-house, 147. Sargent, Winthrop, 203. Schuyler, Philip, 126, 146, 151, 193. Scott, Sir Walter, 153. Scottish representation in Parliament, 249. Seabury, Samuel, 84. Secession, threats of, 211, 218; no constitutional right of, 344. Secrecy of the debates in Federal Convention, 230. Sedgwick, Theodore, 122, 319. Self-government, 57, 63, 88. Senate, federal, made independent of lower house, 253; contrasted with House of Lords, 295. Senates, origin of, 66. Seven Years' War, 13, 188. Sevier, John, 200. Shattuck, Job, 180. Shays rebellion, 180-182, 218, 243, 316, 319, 325. Sheffield, Lord, protectionist, 137; on the Barbary pirates, 160. Shelburne, William, Earl of, his character, 4; his memorandum on proposed cession of Canada, 11; prime minister, 16; approached by Rayneval and Vaughan, 22; misjudged by Fox, 40; defends the treaty, 43; resigns, 44; his conduct justified by his enemies, 45; understood the principles of free trade, 4, 134. Shepard, William, 180, 181. Sherman, Roger, 229, 243, 250, 255, 267, 274, 276, 279, 283, 299, 313; his suggestion as to relations of the executive to the legislature, 278, 280, 298. Shillings, 165. Ship-building in New England, 137-139. Shute, Rev. Daniel, 322. Sidney, Algernon, 64. Singletary, Amos, 322, 324, 325. Six Nations, 190, 203. Slave-trade, foreign, permitted for twenty years, 264, 323, 333. Slavery in the several states, 72-75, 266; prohibited in northwestern territory, 205; discussions about it in Federal Convention, 257-267; condemned by George Mason, 264. Slaves, representation of, 258-262; numbers of, in the several states, 266. Small states converted to federalism by the Connecticut compromise, 255, 315. Smith, Adam, 125, 134, 135. Smith, Capt. John, 191. Smith, Jonathan, 324-326. Smith, Melanchthon, 340, 343, 344. Smugglers, 135. South Carolina, Episcopal church in, 78, 82; revokes five per cent. Impost, 108; issues paper money, 169; absolute need of conciliating her, 259, 260; makes bargain with New England states, 262-267; debates on the Constitution, 332-334; ratifies it, 334. Sovereignty never belonged to separate states, 90. Spain, treaty of 1783 with Great Britain, 36; attempts to close Mississippi River, 208-211, 218, 335. Spanish dollar, why it superseded English pound as unit of value in America, 166. Spermaceti oil, 139, 163. Springfield arsenal, 181, 185. States, powers denied to, 272. Stormont, Lord, 45. Story, Joseph, 276. Strachey, Sir Henry, 22. Strong, Caleb, 228, 252, 279, 324, 327. Succession disputed, 289. Suffrage, limitations upon, 70. Sugar trade, 138. Temple, Lord, 44, 46. Tennessee, 18, 189, 199. Thayendanegea, 50. Thomas, Isaiah, 165. Thompson, Gen. , in Massachusetts convention, 324. Thurlow, Lord, 5. Thurston, member of Virginia legislature, 144. Tithing-men in New England, 76. Tobacco as currency in Virginia, 165. Tories, American; see Loyalists. Tories, British, 42. Townshend, Thomas, 17. Trade, barbarous superstitions about, 134. Travelling, difficulties of, a century ago, 61. Treaty of 1783, difficulties in the way of, 8; strange character of, 24; provisions of, 25-33; a great diplomatic victory for the Americans, 34, 189; secret article relating to Florida boundary, 33, 208; adopted, 45; news arrives in America, 50; Congress unable to carry out its provisions, 119-132, 154. Trespass Act in New York. 123-128. Trevett _vs. _ Weeden, 176. Tucker, Josiah, 58, 141. Tyler, John, the elder, 214, 337. Union, sentiment of, 55. Unitarianism, 86. University men in Federal Convention, 224. Vaughan, Benjamin, 22, 35. Vergennes, Count de, 12; wishes to satisfy Spain at the expense of the United States, 18-21; thwarted by Jay, 22; accuses the Americans of bad faith, 33; tired of sending loans, 104. Vermont, troubles in, 151-153; riots in connection with the Shays rebellion, 183. Vice-presidency, 282. Victoria, Queen, 293. Vincennes, riot in, 210. Violence of political invective, 39. Virginia, church and state in, 78-85; on five per cent. Impost, 104; paper money in, 170; takes possession of northwestern territory, 188-191; cedes it to the United States, 194; plan for new federal government, 233-242; its reception by the convention, 242; compromise as to representation of slaves, 259-262; resents the compromise between South Carolina and the New England states, 265; debates on the Constitution, 335-337; ratifies it, 337. "Visionary young men, " i. E. , Hamilton, Madison, Gouverneur Morris, etc. , 318. Waddington, Joshua, 127. Walpole, Horace, 16. Walpole, Sir Robert, 296. War, the Civil, 55, 256, 262; contrast with Revolutionary, 101-103; cost of Revolutionary, 166. Washington, George, marches from Yorktown to the Hudson River, 51; disbands the army, 51; resigns his command, 52; goes home to Mount Vernon, 53; his "legacy" to the American people, 54; on the right of coercion, 100; urges half-pay for retired officers, 106; supposed scheme for making him king, 107; his masterly speech at Newburgh, 110; president of the Cincinnati, 115; on the weakness of the confederation, 162; wishes to hang speculators in bread-stuffs, 164; disapproves of Connecticut's reservation of a tract of western land, 193; approves of Ohio Company, 203; his views on the need for canals between east and west, 212; important meeting held at his house, 214; is chosen delegate to the Federal Convention, 221; president of the convention, 229; his solemn warning, 231, 303; his suggestion as to the basis of representation, 252; asks if he shall put the question on the motion of Wilson and Pinckney, 277; disapproves of electing executive by the legislature, 279; sends draft of the Constitution to Congress, 307; called a fool by the Antifederalists, 313; approves of amendments, but opposes a second convention, 329; unanimously chosen president of the United States, 346; his journey to New York, 349; his inauguration, 350. Washington, William, 334. Watson, Bishop of Llandaff, 83. Watt, James, 60, 267. Wayne, Anthony, 50. Wealth as a basis of representation, 257. Webster, Daniel, 56, 206, 276. Webster, Pelatiah, 101, 222. Weems, Mason, 83. Wesley, John, 85. West, Rev. Samuel, 322. West India trade, 138, 164. Whigs, British, sympathize with revolutionary party in America, 2. Whiskey as currency in North Carolina, 165. White, Abraham, 324. Whitefield, George, 85. Whitehill, Robert, 313. Whitney, Eli, 267. William the Silent, 55. Wilson, James, 228, 243, 246, 248, 251, 261, 274, 277, 279, 281, 282, 299, 300, 312, 313, 316. Witenagemot, 66. Worcester Spy, 165. Wraxall's Memoirs, 2. Wyoming, troubles in, 148-150. Wythe, George, 228. Yates, Robert, 225, 242, 244, 246, 254, 340, 341. Yazoo boundary, 33, 208. FOOTNOTES: [1] In recent years Georgia has been one of the first states to abandonthis bad practice. [2] I suppose it was this same Mason Weems that was afterward known inVirginia as Parson Weems, of Pohick parish, near Mount Vernon. See_Magazine of American History_, iii. 465-472; v. 85-90. At first aneccentric preacher, Parson Weems became an itinerant violin-player andbook-peddler, and author of that edifying work, _The Life of GeorgeWashington, with Curious Anecdotes equally Honourable to Himself andExemplary to his Young Countrymen_. On the title-page the authordescribes himself as "formerly rector of Mount Vernon Parish, "--whichBishop Meade calls preposterous. The book is a farrago of absurdities, reminding one, alike in its text and its illustrations, of an overgrownEnglish chap-book of the olden time. It has had an enormous sale, andhas very likely contributed more than any other single book towardforming the popular notion of Washington. It seems to have been thisfiddling parson that first gave currency to the everlasting story of thecherry-tree and the little hatchet. [3] _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, iii. 447. [4] A very interesting account of these troubles may be found in thefirst volume of Professor McMaster's _History of the People of theUnited States_. [5] This subject has been treated in a masterly manner by Mr. H. B. Adams, in an essay on Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to theUnited States, published in the Third Series of the admirable _JohnsHopkins University Studies in History and Politics_. I am indebted toMr. Adams for many valuable suggestions. [6] It would be in the highest degree erroneous, however, to supposethat the Constitution of the United States is not, as much as any other, an instance of evolution from precedents. See, in this connection, thevery able article by Prof. Alexander Johnston, _New Princeton Review_, Sept. , 1887, pp. 175-190. [7] The slave-population of the United States, according to the censusof 1700, was thus distributed among the states:-- _North. _ New Hampshire 158Vermont 17Massachusetts --Rhode Island 952Connecticut 2, 759New York 21, 324New Jersey 11, 423Pennsylvania 3, 737 ------ 40, 370 _South. _ Delaware 8, 887Maryland 103, 036Virginia 293, 427North Carolina 100, 572South Carolina 107, 094Georgia 29, 264Kentucky 11, 830Tennessee 3, 417 ------- 657, 527 Total 697, 897. [8] Since this was written, this last and most serious danger would seemto have been removed by the acts of 1886 and 1887 regulating thepresidential succession and the counting of electoral votes. [9] The history of President Cleveland's tariff message of 1887, however, shows that, where a wise and courageous president callsattention to a living issue, his party, alike in Congress and in thecountry, is in a measure compelled to follow his lead.