WORKS BY SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE

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[Illustration: _East View of_ Hell Gate, _in the Province of_ New York. 

_W A Williams Del. 1725_

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_2. The Gridiron. _ _4. The Mill Rock. _ _6. Bahanna's Island. _ _8. Hallet's Point. _ _10. The Hogs back. _]

 Decisive Events in American History

 THE

 CAMPAIGN OF TRENTON

 1776-77

 BY

 SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE

 BOSTON LEE AND SHEPARD PUBLISHERS 10 MILK STREET 1895

COPYRIGHT, 1895, BY LEE AND SHEPARD_All rights reserved_THE CAMPAIGN OF TRENTON

PRESS OFRockwell and ChurchillBOSTON, U. S. A. 

CONTENTS

 PRELUDE 7

 I--NEW YORK THE SEAT OF WAR 11

 II--PLANS FOR DEFENCE 19

 III--LONG ISLAND TAKEN 26

 IV--NEW YORK EVACUATED 33

 V--THE SITUATION REVIEWED 43

 VI--THE RETREAT THROUGH THE JERSEYS 50

 VII--LEE'S MARCH AND CAPTURE 59

 VIII--THE OUTLOOK 68

 IX--THE MARCH TO TRENTON 79

 X--TRENTON 89

 XI--THE FLANK MARCH TO PRINCETON 94

 XII--AFTER PRINCETON 108

PRELUDE

Seldom, in the annals of war, has a single campaign witnessed such aremarkable series of reverses as did that which began at Boston inMarch, 1776, and ended at Morristown in January, 1777. Only bysuccessive defeats did our home-made generals and our rustic soldierylearn their costly lesson that war is not a game of chance, or meremasses of men an army. 

Though costly, this sort of discipline, this education, gradually led toa closer equality between the combatants, as year after year they facedand fought each other. When the lesson was well learned our generalsbegan to win battles, and our soldiers to fight with a confidencealtogether new to them. In vain do we look for any other explanation ofthe sudden stiffening up of the backbone of the Revolutionary army, orof the equally sudden restoration of an apparently dead and buried causeafter even its most devoted followers had given up all as lost. As withexpiring breath that little band of hunted fugitives, miserable remnantof an army of 30, 000 men, turning suddenly upon its victorious pursuers, dealt it blow after blow, the sun which seemed setting in darkness, again rose with new splendor upon the fortunes of these infant States. 

Certainly the military, political, and moral effects of this brilliantfinish to what had been a losing campaign, in which almost eachsucceeding day ushered in some new misfortune, were prodigious. Butneither the importance nor the urgency of this masterly counter-stroketo the American cause can be at all appreciated, or even properlyunderstood, unless what had gone before, what in fact had produced acrisis so dark and threatening, is brought fully into light. Washingtonhimself says the act was prompted by a dire necessity. Coming from him, these words are full of meaning. We realize that the fate of theRevolution was staked upon this one last throw. If we would take thefull measure of these words of his, spoken in the fullest conviction oftheir being final words, we must again go over the whole field, strewedwith dead hopes, littered with exploded reputations, cumbered withcast-off traditions, over which the patriot army marched to its supremetrial out into the broad pathway which led to final success. 

The campaign of 1776 is, therefore, far too instructive to be studiedmerely with reference to its crowning and concluding feature. Inconsidering it the mind is irresistibly impelled toward one central, statuesque figure, rising high above the varying fortunes of the hour, like the Statue of Liberty out of the crash and roar of the surroundingstorm. 

Nowhere, we think, does Washington appear to such advantage as duringthis truly eventful campaign. Though sometimes troubled in spirit, he isalways unshaken. Though his army was a miserable wreck, driven about atthe will of the enemy, Washington was ever the rallying-point for thehandful of officers and men who still surrounded him. If the cause wasdoomed to shipwreck, we feel that he would be the last to leave thewreck. 

His letters, written at this trying period, are characterized by thatsame even tone, as they disclose in more prosperous times. He does notdare to be hopeful, yet he will not give up beaten. There is anatmosphere of stern, though dignified determination about him, at thistrying hour, which, in a man of his admirable equipoise, is a thing foran enemy to beware of. In a word, Washington driven into a corner wasdoubly dangerous. And it is evident that his mind, roused to unwontedactivity by the gravity of the crisis, the knowledge that all eyesturned to him, sought only for the opportune moment to show forth itsfull powers, and by a conception of genius dominate the storm ofdisaster around him. 

Washington never claimed to be a man of destiny. He never had anynicknames among his soldiers. Napoleon was the "Little Corporal, ""Marlborough" "Corporal John, " Wellington the "Iron Duke, " Grant the"Old Man, " but there seems to have been something about the personalityof Washington that forbade any thought of familiarity, even on the partof his trusty veterans. Yet their faith in him was such that, asWellington once said of his Peninsular army, they would have goneanywhere with him, and he could have done anything with them. 

THE CAMPAIGN OF TRENTON

NEW YORK THE SEAT OF WAR

[Sidenote: New views of the war. ]

Upon finding that what had at first seemed only a local rebellion wasspreading like wildfire throughout the length and breadth of thecolonies, that bloodshed had united the people as one man, and thatthese people were everywhere getting ready for a most determinedresistance, the British ministry awoke to the necessity of dealing withthe revolt, in this its newer and more dangerous aspect, as a fact to befaced accordingly, and its military measures were, therefore, no longerdirected to New England exclusively, but to the suppression of therebellion as a whole. For this purpose New York was very judiciouslychosen as the true base of operations. [1]

In the colonies, the news of great preparations then making in Englandto carry out this policy, inevitably led up to the same conclusions, butas the siege of Boston had not yet drawn to a close, very little couldbe done by way of making ready to meet this new and dangerous emergency. 

We must now first look at the ways and means. 

[Sidenote: The new Continental Army. ]

A new army had been enlisted in the trenches before Boston to take theplace of that first one, whose term of service expired with the newyear, 1776. On paper it consisted of twenty-eight battalions, with anaggregate of 20, 372 officers and men. By the actual returns, made upshortly before the army marched for New York, there were 13, 145 men ofall arms then enrolled, of whom not more than 9, 500 were reported as fitfor duty. These were all Continentals, [2] as the regular troops werethen called, to distinguish them from the militia. 

[Sidenote: It marches to New York. ]

Immediately upon the evacuation of Boston by the British (March 17, 1776), the army marched by divisions to New York, the last brigade, withthe commander-in-chief, leaving Cambridge on April 4. [3] This movedistinctly foreshadows the general opinion that the seat of war wasabout to be transferred to New York and its environs. 

There is no need to discuss the general proposition, so quickly acceptedby both belligerents, as regards the strategic value of New York forcombined operations by land and sea. Hence the Americans were naturallyunwilling to abandon it to the enemy. A successful defence was reallybeyond their abilities, however, against such a powerful fleet as wasnow coming to attack them, because this fleet could not be preventedfrom forcing its way into the upper bay without strong fortifications atthe Narrows to stop it, and these the Americans did not have. Once inpossession of the navigable waters, the enemy could cut offcommunication in every direction, as well as choose his own point ofattack. Afraid, however, of the moral effect of giving up the citywithout a struggle, the Americans were led into the fatal error ofsquandering their resources upon a defence which could end only in oneway, instead of holding the royal army besieged, as had been sosuccessfully done at Boston. 

Having arrived at New York, Washington's force was increased by the twoor three thousand men who had been hastily summoned for its defence, [4]and who were then busily employed in throwing up works at variouspoints, under the direction of the engineers. 

[Sidenote: Make-up of the army. ]

Now, it is usual to call such a large body of raw recruits, badly armed, and without discipline, an army, in the same breath as a well armed andthoroughly disciplined body. This one had done good service behindentrenchments, and in some minor operations at Boston had shown itselfpossessed of the best material, but the situation was now to be whollyreversed, the besiegers were to become the besieged, their mistakes wereto be turned against them, the experiments of inexperience were to betested at the risk of total failure, and the _morale_ severely tried bythe grumbling and discontent arising for the most part from laxity ofdiscipline, but somewhat so, too, from the wretched administration ofthe various civil departments of the army. [5] The officers did not knowhow to instruct their men, and the men could not be made to take propercare of themselves. In consequence of this state of things, inseparableperhaps from the existing conditions, General Heath tells us that by thefirst week of August the number of sick amounted to near 10, 000 men, whowere to be met with lying "in almost every barn, stable, shed, and evenunder the fences and bushes, " about the camps. This primary element ofdisintegration is always one of the worst possible to deal with in anarmy of citizen soldiers, and the present case proved no exception. 

Except a troop of Connecticut light-horse, who had been curtly andimprudently dismissed because they showed sufficient _esprit de corps_to demur against doing guard duty as infantry, and whose absence wasonly too soon to be dearly atoned for, there was no cavalry, not evenfor patrols, outposts, or vedettes. These being thus of necessity drawnfrom the infantry, it was usual to see them come back into camp with theenemy close at their heels, instead of giving the alarm in season to getthe troops under arms. 

As for the infantry, it was truly a motley assemblage. A few of theregiments, raised in the cities, were tolerably well armed andequipped, and some few were in uniform. But in general they wore thesame homespun in which they had left their homes, even to the fieldofficers, who were only distinguished by their red cockades. In fewregiments were the arms all of one kind, not a few had only a sprinklingof bayonets, while some companies, whom it had been found impracticableto furnish with fire-arms at the home rendezvous, carried theold-fashioned pikes of by-gone days. Among the good, bad, andindifferent, Washington had had two thousand militia poured in upon him, without any arms whatever. But these men could use pick and spade. 

The single regiment of artillery this "rabble army, " as Knox calls it, could boast was unquestionably its most reliable arm. Under Knox's abledirection it was getting into fairly good shape, though the guns were ofvery light metal. In the early conflicts around New York it was rathertoo lavishly used, and suffered accordingly, but its efficiency was somarked as to draw forth the admission from a British officer of rankthat the rebel artillery officers were at least equal to their own. 

These plain facts speak for themselves. If radical defects oforganization lay behind them, it was not the fault of Washington or thearmy, but is rather attributable to the want of any settled policy orfirm grasp of the situation on the part of the Congress. 

Washington had no illusions either with regard to himself or hissoldiers. His letters of this date prove this. He was as well aware ofhis own shortcomings as a general, as of those of his men as soldiers. There could, perhaps, be no greater proof of the solidity of hisjudgment than this capacity to estimate himself correctly, free from allthe prickings of personal vanity or popular praise. With reference tothe army he probably thought that if raw militia would fight so wellbehind breastworks at Bunker Hill, they could be depended upon to do soelsewhere, under the same conditions. His idea, therefore, was to fightonly in intrenched positions, and this was the general plan of campaignfor 1776. [6]

Footnotes:

[1] As will be seen farther on, New England had no strategic value inthis relation. 

[2] Continentals. This term, for want of a better, arose from thepractice of speaking of the colonies, as a whole, as the Continent, todistinguish them from this or that one, separately. 

[3] The last brigade to march at this time is meant. As a matter offact one brigade was left at Boston, as a guard against accidents. Lateron it joined Washington. 

[4] General Lee had been sent to New York as early as January. He tookmilitary possession of the city, with militia furnished by Connecticut. 

[5] In a private letter General Knox indignantly styles it "this rabblearmy. "

[6] "Being fully persuaded that it would be presumption to draw out ouryoung troops into open ground against their superiors, both in numbersand discipline, I have never spared the spade and pickaxe. "--_Letters. _

II

PLANS FOR DEFENCE

[Sidenote: Troops sent to Canada. ]

Washington's army had no sooner reached the Hudson than ten of the bestbattalions[1] were hurried off to Albany, if possible, to retrieve thedisasters which had recently overwhelmed the army of Canada, where threegenerals, two of whom, Montgomery and Thomas, were of the highestpromise, with upwards of 5, 000 men, had been lost. The departure ofthese seasoned troops made a gap not easily filled, and should not belost sight of in reckoning the effectiveness of what were left. 

[Sidenote: Strength of the army. ]

This large depletion was, however, more than made good, in numbers atleast, by the reinforcements now arriving from the middle colonies, who, with troops forming the garrison of the city, presently raised the wholeforce under Washington's orders[2] to a much larger number than wereever assembled in one body again. A very large proportion, however, were militiamen, called out for a few weeks only, who indeed served toswell the ranks, without adding much real strength to the army. 

[Sidenote: Plans for defence. ]

It being fully decided upon that New York should be held, two entirelydistinct sets of measures were found indispensable. First the city wascommanded by Brooklyn Heights, rising at short cannon-shot across theEast River. These heights were now being strongly fortified on thewater-side against the enemy's fleet, and on the land-side against apossible attack by his land forces. [3]

[Sidenote: New York in 1776. ]

The second measure looked to defending the city from an attack in therear. At this time New York City occupied only a very small section ofthe southern part of the island which it has since outgrown. A few farmsand country seats stretched up beyond Harlem, but the major part of theisland was to the city below as the country to the town, retaining allits natural features of hill and dale unimpaired. At this time, too, theonly exit from the island was by way of King's Bridge, [4] twelve milesabove the city, where the great roads to Albany and New England turnedoff, the one to the north, the other to the east, making this passagefully as important in a military sense, as was the heavy drawbridgethrown across the moat of some ancient castle. 

[Sidenote: Fort Washington. ]

Fort Washington[5] was, therefore, built on a commanding height two anda half miles below King's Bridge, with outworks covering the approachesto the bridge, either by the country roads coming in from the north orfrom Harlem River at the east. These works were never finished, but evenif they had been they could not solve the problem of a successfuldefence, because it lay always in the power of the strongest army to cutoff all communication with the country beyond--and that means thepassing in of reënforcements or supplies--by merely throwing itselfacross the roads just referred to. This done, the army in New York musteither be shut up in the island, or come out and fight, provided theenemy had not already put it out of their power to do so by promptlyseizing King's Bridge. And in that case there was no escape except bywater, under fire of the enemy's ships of war. 

One watchful eye, therefore, had to be kept constantly to the front, and another to the rear, between positions lying twelve to thirteenmiles apart, and separated by a wide and deep river. 

It thus appears that the defence of New York was a much more formidabletask than had, at first, been supposed, and that an army of 40, 000 menwas none too large for the purpose, especially as it was whollyimpracticable to reënforce King's Bridge from Brooklyn, or _vice versa_. But from one or another cause the army had fallen below 25, 000effectives by midsummer, counting also the militia, who formed afloating and most uncertain constituent of it. For the present, therefore, King's Bridge was held as an outpost, or until the enemy'splan of attack should be clearly developed; for whether Howe would firstassail the works at Brooklyn, Bunker Hill fashion, or land his troopsbeyond King's Bridge, bringing them around by way of Long Island Sound, were questions most anxiously debated in the American camp. 

However, the belief in a successful defence was much encouraged by therecent crushing defeat that the British fleet had met with inattempting to pass the American batteries at Charleston. Thrice welcomeafter the disasters of the unlucky Canada campaign, this success tendedgreatly to stiffen the backbone of the army, in the face of the steadyand ominous accumulation of the British land and naval forces in thelower bay. Then again, the Declaration of Independence, read to everybrigade in the army (July 9), was received with much enthusiasm. Now, for the first time since hostilities began, officers and men knewexactly what they were fighting for. There was at least an end tosuspense, a term to all talk of compromise, and that was much. 

[Sidenote: The British army. ]

Thus matters stood in the American camps, when the British army that hadbeen driven from Boston, heavily reënforced from Europe, and by callingin detachments from South Carolina, Florida, and the West Indies, sobringing the whole force in round numbers up to 30, 000 men, [6] castanchor in the lower bay. Never before had such an armament been seen inAmerican waters. Backed by this imposing display of force, royalcommissioners had come to tender the olive branch, as it were, on thepoint of the bayonet. They were told, in effect, that those who havecommitted no crime want no pardon. Washington was next approached. Asthe representative soldier of the new nation, he refused to be addressedexcept by the title it had conferred upon him. The etiquette of thecontest must be asserted in his person. Failing to find any commonground, upon which negotiations could proceed, resort was had to thebayonet again. 

Footnotes:

[1] These were Poor's, Patterson's, Greaton's, and Bond's Massachusettsregiments on April 21, two New Jersey, two Pennsylvania, and two NewHampshire battalions on the 26th. See _Burgoyne's Invasion_ of thisseries for an account of the Canada campaign. 

[2] The numbers are estimated by General Heath (_Memoirs_, p. 51) ashigh as 40, 000. He, however, deducts 10, 000 for the sick, present. Theywere published long after any reason for exaggeration existed. 

[3] The Brooklyn lines ran from Wallabout Bay (Navy Yard) on the left, to Gowanus Creek on the right, making a circuit of a mile and a half. All are now in the heart of the city. 

[4] King's Bridge was so named for William III. , of England. It crossesSpuyten Duyvil Creek. The bridge at Morrisania was not built until 1796. 

[5] Fort Washington stood at the present 183d street. Besides defendingthe approaches from King's Bridge, it also obstructed the passage of theenemy's ships up the Hudson, at its narrowest point below the Highlands. At the same time Fort Lee, first called Fort Constitution, was built onthe brow of the lofty Palisades, opposite, and a number of pontoonsfilled with stones were sunk in the river between. The enemy's ships ranthe blockade, however, with impunity. 

[6] The British regiments serving with Howe were the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Fortieth, Forty-second, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Forty-fifth, Forty-sixth, Forty-ninth, Fifty-second, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-fifth, Fifty-seventh, Sixty-third, Sixty-fourth, and Seventy-first, or thirty battalions withan aggregate of 24, 513 officers and men. To these should be added 8, 000Hessians hired for the war, bringing the army up to 32, 500 soldiers. Twenty-five per cent. Would be a liberal deduction for the sick, camp-guards, orderlies, etc. The navy was equally powerful in its way, though it did little service here. Large as it was, this army wasvirtually destroyed by continued attrition. 

III

LONG ISLAND TAKEN

[Sidenote: British move to L. Island. ]

Up to August 22, the British army made no move from its camps at StatenIsland. On their part, the Americans could only watch and wait. On thisday, however, active operations began with the landing of Howe's troops, in great force, on the Long Island shore, opposite. This forceimmediately spread itself out through the neighboring villages fromGravesend, to Flatbush and Flatlands, driving the American skirmishersbefore them into a range of wooded hills, [1] which formed their outerline of defence. Howe had determined to attack in front, clearing theway as he went. 

[Sidenote: Plan of attack. ]

As the enemy would have to force his way across these hills, before hecould reach the American intrenched lines around Brooklyn, all the roadsleading over them were strongly guarded, except out at the extremeleft, beyond Bedford village, where only a patrol was posted. [2] Thisfatal oversight, of which Howe was well informed, suggested the Britishplan of attack, which was quickly matured and successfully carried out. It included a demonstration on the American left, to draw attention tothat point, while another corps was turning the right, at its unguardedpoint. 

A third column was held in readiness to move upon the American centrefrom Flatbush, just as soon as the other attacks were well in progress. When the flanking corps was in position, these demonstrations were to beturned into real attacks, which, if successful, would throw theAmericans back upon the flanking column, which, in its turn, would cutoff their retreat to their intrenchments. 

This clever combination, showing a perfect knowledge of the ground, worked exactly as planned. 

By making a night march, the turning column got quite around theAmerican flank and rear unperceived, and on the morning of the 27th wasin position, near Bedford, at an early hour, waiting for thesignal-guns to announce the beginning of the battle at the British left. 

[Illustration: BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. ]

[Sidenote: Battle of Long Island. ]

Both columns then advanced to the attack. Being strongly posted, andwell commanded, the Americans made an obstinate resistance and did holdthe enemy in check for some hours at one end of the line, only to findthemselves cut off by the hurried retreat of all the troops posted atthe passes on their left; for as soon as the firing there showed thatthe turning column had come up in their rear, these troops, with greatdifficulty, fought their way back to the Brooklyn lines, leaving threegenerals and upwards of 1, 000 men in the enemy's hands. 

The resistance met with by the enemy's turning corps may be guessed fromwhat an officer[3] who took part has to say of it. "We have had, " hegoes on to relate, "what some call a battle, but if it deserves thatname it was the pleasantest I ever heard of, as we had not received morethan a dozen shots from the enemy, when they ran away with the utmostprecipitation. "

[Sidenote: Washington re-enforces. ]

Though not in personal command when the action began, Washington crossedover to Brooklyn in time to see his broken and dispirited battalionscome streaming back into their works. Fearing the worst, he had calleddown two of his best regiments (Shee's and Magaw's) from HarlemHeights, and Glover's from the city, to reënforce the troops thenengaged on Long Island, but as has already been pointed out, reënforcingin this manner was out of the question. By making a rapid march, theHarlem troops reached the ferry in the afternoon, after firing hadceased. They were, however, ferried across the next morning. 

[Sidenote: 28th and 29th. ]

These movements would indicate a resolution to hold the Brooklyn linesat all hazards, and were so regarded, but during the two days subsequentto the battle, while the enemy was closing in upon him, Washingtonchanged his mind, preparations were quietly made to withdraw the troops, while still keeping up a bold front to the enemy, and on the night ofthe 29th the army repassed the East River without accident ormolestation. 

Having thus cleared Long Island, the British extended themselves alongthe East River as far as Newtown, that river thus dividing the hostilecamps throughout its whole extent. And though New York now lay quite athis mercy, Howe refrained from cannonading it, for the same reason asWashington did from shelling Boston; namely, that of securing the cityintact a little later. 

In spite of this brilliant opening of the campaign, and outside of thenoisy subalterns who were making their _début_ in war, it was felt thatthe British army, fresh, numerous, and splendidly equipped, hadacquitted itself most ingloriously in permitting the Americans to maketheir retreat from the island as they had, when the event of an assaultmust probably have been most disastrous to them. 

[Sidenote: Losses so far. ]

On the other side defeat had seriously affected the _morale_ of theAmericans. Fifteen hundred men had been lost on Long Island. A greatmany more were now being lost through desertion. In Washington's ownwords the unruly militia left him by companies, half regiments or wholeregiments, leaving the infection of their evil example to work its willamong the well-disposed. 

[Sidenote: New York to be held. ]

Although the defence of New York had thus broken down at its vitalpoint, a majority of generals favored still holding the city. To thisend Washington now divided his forces, leaving 4, 000 in the city, posting 6, 500 at Harlem Heights, and 12, 000 at Fort Washington andKing's Bridge. Though furnished by a general officer, [4] these figuresreally include the sick, who were estimated at nearly 10, 000, as well asthe large number detached on extra duty. Washington, himself, vaguelyestimated his effective force at under 20, 000 at this time. 

As thus arranged, Harlem Heights, in the centre, became the armyheadquarters for the time being, Washington, by one of those littleaccidents that sometimes arrest a passing thought, occupying thehouse[5] of the same lady who had formerly refused the offer of his handin marriage, Miss Mary Phillipse, later to accept that of Colonel RogerMorris, his old companion in arms during Braddock's fatal campaign. 

Footnotes:

[1] This range of hills includes the present Prospect Park and GreenwoodCemetery. 

[2] This weak point was the approach from the east where the Jamaicaroad crossed the hills into Bedford village. By striking this roadsomewhat higher up, the enemy got to Bedford before the Americans, guarding the hills beyond, had notice of their approach. 

[3] Captain Harris, of the Fifth Foot. 

[4] General Glover's estimate. 

[5] The Morris House is still standing at 160th street, near 10thavenue, N. Y. , and is now occupied by Gen. Ferdinand P. Earle. 

IV

NEW YORK EVACUATED

Howe seems to have thought that so long as Washington remained in NewYork he might be bagged at leisure. In no other way can his dilatoryproceedings be accounted for. Sixteen days passed without anydemonstration on his part whatever. Meantime, however, the steadyextension of his lines toward Hell Gate had operated such a change ofopinion in the American camp that the decision to hold the city was nowreconsidered, and the evacuation fixed for September 15. It was seenthat the storm centre was now shifting over toward the Americancommunications, but just where it would break forth was still a matterof conjecture. 

Howe was fully informed of what was going on by his royalist friends inthe city, and like the cat watching the wounded mouse while it isrecovering its breath, he prepared to spring at the moment hisenfeebled adversary should show signs of returning animation. 

[Sidenote: British seize New York. ]

All being ready, on the very day fixed for the evacuation, Sir HenryClinton crossed the East River in boats from Newtown Bay to Kipp's Bay, with 4, 000 men, landed without opposition, owing to a disgraceful panicwhich seized the Americans posted there for just such an emergency, andthus thrust himself in between the Americans in the city and those atHarlem Heights. Thus cut off, it was only at the greatest risk ofcapture that the garrison below was saved, with the loss of muchartillery, tents, baggage, and stores, by marching out on one road whilethe enemy were marching in on another, [1] as Clinton had immediatelypushed on up the island, at the heels of the retreating Americans. 

A captain of British grenadiers describes what took place after thelanding, in the following animated style:

 "After landing in York Island we drove the Americans into their works beyond the eighth milestone from New York, and thus got possession of the best half of the island. We took post opposite to them, placed our pickets, borrowed a sheep, killed, cooked, and ate some of it, and then went to sleep on a gate, which we took the liberty of throwing off its hinges, covering our feet with an American tent, for which we should have cut poles and pitched had it not been so dark. Give me such living as we enjoy at present, such a hut and such company, and I would not care three farthings if we stayed all the winter, for though the mornings and evenings are cold, yet the sun is so hot as to oblige me to put up a blanket as a screen. "

[Sidenote: Great fire, September 21. ]

Each side now rested in possession of half the island, Washington of allabove Harlem Heights, Howe of all below. His conquest was, however, nearproving a barren one, at best, for within a week a third part of thecity was laid in ashes, some say by incendiaries, some by accident. 

The situation was now so far reversed that Washington seemed to beblockading Howe in the city. 

[Sidenote: Captain Hale hanged. ]

Though it had little bearing upon the result of the campaign, one otherevent is deserving of brief mention here. Clinton's descent had beencleverly managed, out of Washington's sight. What were the enemyproposing to do next? It was imperative to know. To ascertain this Capt. Nathan Hale volunteered to go over to Long Island. At his returning hewas arrested. The papers found upon him betrayed his purpose in goingwithin the enemy's lines, and he was forthwith hanged in a manner thatwould have disgraced Tyburn itself. 

Howe's next move was probably conceived with the twofold design, firstof cooping Washington up within the island, and second of capturing orbreaking up his entire army. 

[Sidenote: Howe's delays. ]

But again and again we are puzzled to account for Howe's delays. Hardfighter that he unquestionably was, he seemed never in a hurry to begin. There is even some ground for believing that in New York he had foundhis Capua. Be that as it may, it is certainly true that nearly a wholemonth passed by before the sluggard Sir William again drew sword. 

[Sidenote: Lands at Throg's Neck. ]

Leaving Lord Percy to defend the lines below Harlem with four brigades, at eight o'clock P. M. Of the 11th of October, General Clinton with thereserves, light infantry and 1, 500 Hessians, embarked on the East River, passed through Hell Gate, and landed at Throg's Neck, [2] in Westchester, early the next morning. 

[Illustration: STORMING OF FORT WASHINGTON. 

Explanation--E, American positions; A-C, British attacks by HarlemRiver; B, _via_ King's Bridge; D, from Harlem Plains. ]

[Sidenote: Washington moves to White Plains. ]

Here he lay inactive for six whole days, within six miles of the road onwhich Washington was moving out from King's Bridge to White Plains; forat the first notice given him of the enemy's movements, which indeed hadall along been anxiously expected, Washington had been drawing out hisforces from Harlem to King's Bridge, first sending forward some lighttroops to delay Howe as much as possible, until the army could get intoposition. It is evident that but for Howe's delays this purpose couldnot have been successfully accomplished. [3]

[Sidenote: Howe marches to give battle. ]

Meantime the enemy had been bringing up reënforcements, and on the 18th, finding the mainland too strongly held at Throg's Neck, for an advancefrom that point, they made another landing six miles beyond, whence theymarched toward New Rochelle. From here they again marched (22d) forWhite Plains, where Washington was found (27th) drawn up in order ofbattle behind the Bronx, waiting for them. 

[Sidenote: Battle of White Plains, October 28. ]

Here Washington attempted to make a stand, but his right[4] beingvigorously attacked and turned, he was forced to fall back upon a secondposition, in which he remained unmolested for several days, when(November 1) he moved still farther back, to the heights of NorthCastle, where he felt himself quite safe from attack. 

Howe had now manoeuvred Washington out of all his defences except FortWashington, which by General Greene's advice was to be defended, thoughnow cut off from all support. 

[Sidenote: Fort Washington taken. ]

Things remained in this situation until November 16, when the fort wasassaulted on three sides, with the result that the whole garrison ofabout 3, 000 men were made prisoners of war. [5] At some points theresistance was obstinate, notably at the north, and again at the east, where one of the attacking divisions attempted to gain the rocky shoreback of the Morris House, under Harlem Heights. A British officer, [6]there present, says of it that "before landing the fire of cannon andmusketry was so heavy that the sailors quitted their oars and lay downin the bottom of the boats, and had not the soldiers taken the oars andpulled on shore we must have remained in this situation. "

[Sidenote: Effect on the army. ]

[Sidenote: Washington and Lee. ]

The loss of the garrison of Fort Washington, 2, 000 of whom were regulartroops, was universally regarded as the most severe blow that theAmerican cause had yet sustained, and it had a most depressing effectboth in and out of the army, but more particularly in the army, as ittended to develop the growing antagonism between the commander-in-chiefand General Lee, who had ineffectually advocated the evacuation of FortWashington when the army was withdrawn from the island. Lee's militaryinsight had now been most decisively vindicated. His antipathy toserving as second in command became more and more pronounced, and wasmore or less reflected by his admirers, of whom he now had more thanever. Worse still, it was destined soon to have the most deplorableresults to the army, the cause, and even to Lee himself. 

Footnotes:

[1] A British brigade was sent down to the city in the course of theevening. 

[2] A contraction of Throgmorton's Neck. As this was an island at hightide, the Americans quickly barred the passage to the mainland bybreaking down the bridge. 

[3] On account of the want of wagons this was very slowly done, as thewagons had to be unloaded and sent back for what could not be broughtalong with the troops. 

[4] This rested on Chatterton's Hill, some distance in front of the mainline. Not having intrenched, the defenders were overpowered, though notuntil after making a sharp fight. 

[5] An excellent account of the operations at Fort Washington will befound in Graydon's _Memoirs_, p. 197 _et seq. _

[6] Lieut. Martin Hunter, of the Fifty-second Foot. 

V

THE SITUATION REVIEWED

[Sidenote: The new situation. ]

The dilemma now confronting Washington was hydra-headed. Either way itwas serious. On one side New England lay open to the enemy, on the otherNew Jersey. And an advance was also threatened from the North. If hestayed where he was, the enemy would overrun New Jersey at will. Shouldhe move his army into New Jersey, Howe could easily cut off itscommunications with New England, the chief resource for men andmunitions. Of course this was not to be thought of. On the other hand, the conquest of New Jersey, with Philadelphia as the ultimate prize, inall probability would be Howe's next object. At the present moment therewas nothing to prevent his marching to Philadelphia, arms at ease. Tothink of fighting in the open field was sheer folly. And there was notone fortified position between the Hudson and the Delaware where theenemy's triumphal march might be stayed. 

Forced by these adverse circumstances to attempt much more than twicehis present force would have encouraged the hope of doing successfully, Washington decided that he must place himself between the enemy andPhiladelphia, and at the same time hold fast to his communications withNew England and the upper Hudson. This could only be done by dividinghis greatly weakened forces into two corps, one of which should attemptthe difficult task of checking the enemy in the Jerseys, while the otherheld a strong position on the Hudson, until Howe's purposes should bemore fully developed. With Washington it was no longer a choice ofevils, but a stern obedience to imperative necessity. 

[Sidenote: The army divided. ]

[Sidenote: Washington in New Jersey. ]

Lee was now put in command of the corps left to watch Howe's movementeast of the Hudson, loosely estimated at 5, 000 men, and ordered backbehind the Croton. Heath, with 2, 000 men of his division, was ordered toPeekskill, to guard the passes of the Highlands, these two corps beingthus posted within supporting distance. With the other corps of 4, 000men Washington crossed into New Jersey, going into camp in theneighborhood of Fort Lee, where Greene's small force was united with hisown command. [1] Orders were also despatched to Ticonderoga, to forwardat once all troops to the main army that could be spared. Fort Lee hadthus become the last rallying-point for the troops under Washington'simmediate command, and in that sense, also, a menace to the full andfree control of the lower Hudson, which the guns of the fort in partcommanded at its narrowest point. Howe determined to brush away thislast obstruction without delay. 

[Sidenote: Fort Lee taken. ]

Regarding Fort Lee as no longer serving any important purpose, perhapsforeseeing that it would soon be attacked, Washington was getting readyto evacuate it, when on the night of November 19[2] Lord Cornwallis madea sudden dash across to the New Jersey side, passing Fort Leeunperceived, landed a little above the fort at a place that hadstrangely been left unguarded, climbed the heights unmolested, and wasonly prevented from making prisoners of the whole garrison by itshurried retreat across the Hackensack. Everything in the fort, even tothe kettles in which the men were cooking their breakfasts, was lost. 

As regards any further attempt to stay the tide of defeat, all was nowover. The enemy had obtained a secure foothold on the Jersey shore fromwhich to march across the State, when and how he pleased. Unpalatable asthe admission may be, the fact remains that the Americans had beeneverywhere out-generaled and out-fought. Nearly everything in the way ofwar material had been lost in the hurried evacuation of New York. [3]Confidence had been lost. Prestige had been lost. Clearly it was hightime to turn over a new leaf. With this lame affair the first divisionof the disastrous campaign of 1776 properly closes, and the secondproperly begins. It had been watched with alternate hope, doubt, anddespondency. Excuses are never wanting to bolster up failingreputations. The generals said they had no soldiers, the soldiersdeclared they had no generals; the people hung their heads and weresilent. 

[Illustration: AMERICAN POSITION BEHIND THE HACKENSACK. ]

Footnotes:

[1] The Eastern troops remained on the east bank of the Hudson, underLee's command, while those belonging to the Middle and Southern coloniescrossed the Hudson with Washington. This disposition may have beenbrought about by the belief that the soldiers of each section wouldfight best on their own ground, but the fact is notorious that a mostbitter animosity had grown up between them. 

[2] This movement is assigned to the 18th by Gordon and those who havefollowed him. The 19th is the date given by Captain Harris, who was withthe expedition. 

[3] An enumeration of these losses will be found in Gordon's _AmericanRevolution_, Vol. II. , p. 360. 

VI

THE RETREAT THROUGH THE JERSEYS

It was now the 20th of November. In a few weeks more, at farthest, theseason for active campaigning would be over. Thus far delay had been theonly thing that the Americans had gained; but at what a cost! YetWashington's last hopes were of necessity pinned to it, because therespite it promised was the only means of bringing another army into thefield in season to renew the contest, if indeed it should be renewed atall. 

[Sidenote: Strength of the army. ]

[Sidenote: State of public feeling. ]

Losses in battle, by sickness or desertion, or other causes, had broughthis dismembered forces down to a total of 10, 000 men, of whom 3, 500 onlywere now under his immediate command, the rest being with Lee and Heath. And the work of disintegration was steadily going on. Always hopeful solong as there was even a straw to cling to, Washington seems to haveexpected that the people of New Jersey would have flown to arms, uponhearing that the invader had actually set foot upon the soil of theirState. Vain hope! His appeal had fallen flat. The great and rich Stateof Pennsylvania was nearly, if not quite, as unresponsive. Disguise itas we may, the fire of '76 seemed all but extinct on its very earliestaltars, and in its stead only a few sickly embers glowed here and thereamong its ashes. The futility of further resistance was being openlydiscussed, and submission seemed only one step farther off. 

In one of his desponding moments Washington turned to his old comrade, Mercer, with the question, "What think you, if we should retreat to theback parts of Pennsylvania, would the Pennsylvanians support us?"

Though himself a Pennsylvanian by adoption, Mercer's answer was givenwith true soldierly frankness. "If the lower counties give up, the backcounties will do the same, " was his discouraging reply. 

"We must then retire to Augusta County in Virginia, " said Washington, with grave decision, "and if overpowered there, we must cross theAlleghanies. "

A volume would fail to give half as good an idea of the criticalcondition of affairs as that brief dialogue. 

[Sidenote: Cruelties to prisoners. ]

First and foremost among the many causes of the army's disruption wasits losses in prisoners. Not less than 5, 000 men were at that momentdying by slow torture in the foul prisons or pestilential floatingdungeons of New York. Turn from it as we may, there is no escaping theconviction that if not done with the actual sanction of Sir WilliamHowe, these atrocities were at least committed with his guiltyknowledge. [1] The calculated barbarities practised upon these poorprisoners, with no other purpose than to make them desert their cause, or if that failed, totally to unfit them for serving it more, are almosttoo shocking for belief. It was such acts as these that wrung from theindignant Napier the terrible admission that "the annals of civilizedwarfare furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war than theprison ships of England. "

This method of disposing of prisoners was none the less potent that itwas in some sort murder. Washington had not the prisoners to exchangefor them, Howe would not liberate them on parole, and when exchangeswere finally effected, the men thus released were too much enfeebled bydisease ever to carry a musket again. 

In brief, more of Washington's men were languishing in captivity in NewYork than he now had with him in the Jerseys. And he was not losingnearly so many by bullets as by starvation. 

[Sidenote: Affects recruiting. ]

We have emphasized this dark feature of the contest solely for thepurpose of showing its material influence upon it at this particulartime. The knowledge of how they would be treated, should they fall intothe enemy's hands, undoubtedly deterred many from enlisting. In abroader sense, it added a new and more aggravated complication to thegeneral question as to how the war was to be carried on by the twobelligerents, whether under the restraints of civilized warfare, or as awar to the knife. 

Thrown back upon his own resources, Washington must now bitterly haverepented leaving Lee in an independent command. If there was any secretforeboding on his part that Lee would play him false, we do not discoverit either in his orders or his correspondence. If there was secretantipathy, Washington showed himself possessed of almost superhumanpatience and self-restraint, for certainly if ever man's patience wastried Washington's was by the shuffling conduct of his lieutenant atthis time; but if aversion there was on Washington's part he resolutelyput it away from him in the interest of the common cause, feeling, nodoubt, that Lee was a good soldier who might yet do good service, andcaring little himself as to whom the honor might fall, so the true endwas reached. It was a great mind lowering itself to the level of alittle one. But Lee could only see in it a struggle for personal favorand preferment. 

[Sidenote: Retreat begins. ]

After the evacuation of Fort Lee, Lee was urged, unfortunately notordered, to cross his force into the Jerseys, and so bring it intocoöperation with the troops already there. The demonstrations thenmaking in his front decided Washington to fall back behind the Passaic, which he did on the 22d, and on the same day marched down that river toNewark. On the 24th Cornwallis, [2] who now had assumed control of alloperations in the Jerseys, was reënforced with two British brigades anda regiment of Highlanders. 

Before this force Washington had no choice but to give way in proportionas Cornwallis advanced, until Lee should join him, when some chance ofchecking the enemy might be improved. At any rate, such a junction wouldundoubtedly have made Cornwallis more circumspect. As Lee still hungback, Washington saw this slender hope vanishing. He for a momentlistened to the alternative of marching to Morristown, where the troopsfrom the Northern army would sooner join him; but as this plan wouldleave the direct road to Philadelphia open, it neither suitedWashington's temper nor his views, and he therefore adhered to hisformer one of fighting in retreat. And though he had failed to checkCornwallis at Newark he would endeavor to do so at New Brunswick. 

For New Brunswick, therefore, the remains of the army marched, just asthe enemy's rear-guard was entering Newark in hot pursuit. On findinghimself so close to the Americans, Cornwallis pushed on after them withhis light troops, but as Washington had broken down the bridge over theRaritan after passing it, the British were brought to a halt there. 

[Sidenote: New Brunswick evacuated. ]

Sustained by the vain hope of being reënforced here, either by Lee or bynew levies of militia coming up as he fell back toward Philadelphia, Washington meditated making a stand at New Brunswick, which should atleast show the exultant enemy that there was still some life left in hisjaded battalions, and perhaps delay pursuit, which was all that could behoped for with his small force. Instead, however, of the expectedreënforcement, the departure of the New Jersey and Maryland brigades, still so called by courtesy alone, since they were but the shadows ofwhat they had been, put this purpose out of the question. AgainWashington reluctantly turned his back to his enemy. 

Lee's troops were now the chief resource. What few militia joined thearmy one day melted away on the next. In Washington's opinion thecrisis had come. He therefore wrote to his laggard lieutenant, "Hastenyour march as much as possible or your arrival may be too late. "

[Sidenote: December 7. ]

Fortunately Cornwallis had orders not to advance beyond New Brunswick. He therefore halted there until he could receive new instructions, whichcaused a delay of six days before the pursuit was renewed. [3] On the 7thCornwallis moved on to Princeton, arriving there on the same day thatWashington left it. This was getting dangerously near, with a wide riverto cross, at only one short march beyond. 

In view of the actual state of things, this retreat must stand inhistory as a masterpiece of calculated temerity. Keeping only one day'smarch ahead of his enemy, Washington's rear-guard only moved off whenthe enemy's van came in sight. There is nowhere any hint of a disorderlyretreat, or any serious infraction of discipline, or any deviation fromthe strict letter of obedience to orders, such as usually follows in thewake of a beaten and retreating army. Washington simply let himself bepushed along when he found resistance altogether hopeless. In this firmhold on his soldiers, at such an hour, we recognize the leader. 

Footnotes:

[1] Captain Graydon (_Memoirs_) and Ethan Allen (_Narrative_), bothprisoners at this time, fix the responsibility where it belongs. 

[2] Cornwallis (Lord Brome) was squint-eyed from effects of a blow inthe eye received while playing hockey at Eton. His playmate who causedthe accident was Shute Barrington, afterwards Bishop of Durham. Heentered the army as an ensign in the Foot Guards. His first commissionis dated Dec. 8, 1756. 

[3] This delay is chargeable to Howe, who kept the troops halted untilhe could consult with Cornwallis in person as to future operations. Thequestion was, Should or should not the British army cross the Delaware?

VII

LEE'S MARCH AND CAPTURE

[Sidenote: December 2 and 3. ]

"Hasten your march or your arrival may be too late. " When this urgentappeal was penned Lee had not yet seen fit to cross the Hudson, nor wasit until Washington had reached Princeton that Lee's troops were at lastput in motion toward the Delaware. 

Hitherto Lee had been in some sort Washington's tutor, or at leastmilitary adviser, --a rôle for which, we are bound in common justice tosay, Lee was not unfitted. But from the moment of separation he appearsin the light of a rival and a critic, and not too friendly as either. Inthe beginning Washington had looked up to Lee. Lee now looked down uponWashington. Unquestionably the abler tactician of the two, Lee seemed tohave looked forward to Washington's fall as certain, and to so haveshaped his own course as to leave him master of the situation. In sodoing he cannot be acquitted of disloyalty to the cause he served, ifthat course threatened to wreck the cause itself. 

[Sidenote: Lee's plans. ]

It is only just to add that for troops taking the field in the dead ofwinter, Lee's were hardly better prepared than those they were going toassist. General Heath, who saw them march off, says that some of themwere as good soldiers as any in the service, but many were so destituteof shoes that the blood left on the rugged, frozen ground, in manyplaces, marked the route they had taken; and he adds that a considerablenumber, totally unable to march, were left behind at Peekskill. Thisbrings us face to face with the extraordinary and unlooked-for fact thatinstead of bending all his energies toward effecting a junction with thecommander-in-chief, east of the Delaware, in time to be of service, Leehad decided to adopt an entirely different line of conduct, more inaccord with his own ideas of how the remainder of the campaign should beconducted. Meantime, as a cloak to his intentions, he kept up a show ofobeying the spirit, if not the letter, of his instructions, leaving theimpression, however, that he would take the responsibility ofdisregarding them if he saw fit. If he had written to Washington, "Youhave had your chance and failed; mine has now come, " his words and actswould have been in exact harmony. [1]

[Sidenote: December 7 and 8. ]

On the 7th Lee was at Pompton. This day an express was sent off to himby Heath informing him of the arrival of Greaton's, Bond's, and Porter'sbattalions from Albany. Lee replied from Chatham directing them to marchto Morristown, where his own troops were then halted. The prospect ofthis reënforcement, which in all probability he had been expecting tointercept, may account both for the slowness of Lee's march, and for theclosing sentence of his reply to Heath. Here it is: "I am in hopes toreconquer (if I may so express myself) the Jerseys. It was really in thehands of the enemy before my arrival. "

[Sidenote: Washington crosses the Delaware. ]

[Sidenote: December 8. ]

In halting as he did Lee was deliberately forcing a crisis withWashington, who was all this time falling back upon his supplies, whilethe British, having to drag theirs after them, could only advance byspurts. Here was a rare opportunity for fighting in retreat being thrownaway, as Washington conceived, by Lee's dilatoriness in reënforcinghim. Reluctant to abandon his last chance of giving the enemy a check, Washington seems to have thought of doing so at Princeton (ignorant thatthis spot was so soon to be the field of more brilliant operations) as ameans of gaining time for the removal of his baggage across theDelaware. It was probably with no other purpose that his advance, whichhad reached Trenton as early as the 3d, was marched back to Princeton, which Lord Sterling was still holding with the rear-guard as late as the7th, when, as we have seen, Cornwallis made his forced march fromBrunswick to Princeton, in such force as to put resistance out of thequestion. Here he halted for seventeen hours, thus giving Washingtontime to reach Trenton, get his 2, 200 or 2, 400 men across the Delaware, and draw them up on the other side, out of harm's reach, just as hisbaffled pursuers arrived on the opposite bank. 

Cornwallis immediately began a search for the means of crossing in histurn. [2] Here, again, he was baffled by Washington's foresight, asevery boat for seventy miles up and down the Delaware had been removedbeyond his adversary's reach. 

On the day of this catastrophe, which seemed, in the opinion not only ofthe victors, but of the vanquished, to have given the finishing stroketo the American Revolution, Lee's force, augmented by the junction ofthe troops marching down to join him, was the sole prop and stay of thecause in the Jerseys. 

That force lay quietly at Morristown until the 12th of the month, whenit was again put in motion toward Vealtown, now Bernardsville. 

[Sidenote: Gates arrives. ]

[Sidenote: Lee taken. ]

At this time a second detachment from the army of the North, underGates, [3] was on the march across Sussex County to the Delaware. Beingcut off from communication with the commander-in-chief, Gates sentforward a staff officer to learn the condition of affairs, report hisown speedy appearance, and receive directions as to what route he shouldtake, Hearing that Lee was at Morristown, this officer pushed on insearch of him, and at four o'clock in the morning of the 13th, he foundLee quartered in an out-of-the-way country tavern at Baskingridge, three miles from his camp, and by just so much nearer the enemy, whosepatrols, since Washington had been disposed of, were now scouring theroads in every direction. One of these detachments surprised the houseLee was in, and before noon the crestfallen general was being hurriedoff a prisoner to Brunswick by a squadron of British light-horse. 

Lee's troops, now Sullivan's, with those of Gates, one or two marches inthe rear, freed from the crafty hand that had been leading them astray, now pressed on for the Delaware, and thus that concert of action, forwhich Washington had all along labored in vain, was again restoredbetween the fragments of his army, impotent when divided, but yetformidable as a whole. 

Lee's written and spoken words, if indeed his acts did not speak evenlouder, leave no doubt as to his purpose in amusing Washington by a showof coming to his aid, when, in fact, he had no intention of doing so. Henot only assumed the singular attitude, in a subordinate, of passingjudgment upon the propriety or necessity of his orders, --orders givenwith full knowledge of the situation, --but proceeded to thwart them ina manner savoring of contempt. Lee was Washington's Bernadotte. Neitherurging, remonstrance, nor entreaty could swerve him one iota from thecourse he had mapped out for himself. Conceiving that he held the key tothe very unpromising situation in his own hands, he had determined tomake the gambler's last throw, and had lost. 

Although Lee's conduct toward Washington cannot be justified, it is morethan probable that some such success as that which Stark afterwardsachieved at Bennington, under conditions somewhat similar, thoughessentially different as to motives, might, and probably would, havejustified Lee's conduct to the nation, and perhaps even have raised himto the position he coveted--of the head of the army, on the ruins ofWashington's military reputation. Could he even have cut the enemy'sline so as to throw it into confusion, his conduct might have escapedcensure. With this end in view he designed holding a position on theenemy's flank, [4] arguing, perhaps, that Washington would be compelledto reënforce him rather than see him defeated, with the troops nowbeyond the Delaware. Washington saw through Lee's schemes, refused to bedriven into doing what his judgment did not approve, and the tensionbetween the two generals was suddenly snapped by the imprudence or worseof Lee himself. 

Captain Harris, [5] who saw Lee brought to Brunswick a prisoner, has thisto say of him: "He was taken by a party of ours under Colonel Harcourt, who surrounded the house in which this arch-traitor was residing. Leebehaved as cowardly in this transaction as he had dishonorably in everyother. After firing one or two shots from the house, he came out andentreated our troops to spare his life. Had he behaved with properspirit I should have pitied him. I could hardly refrain from tears whenI first saw him, and thought of the miserable fate in which hisobstinacy has involved him. He says he has been mistaken in threethings: first, that the New England men would fight; second, thatAmerica was unanimous; and third, that she could afford two men for ourone. "[6]

Footnotes:

[1] Lee had expected the first place and had been given the second. Hissuccesses while acting in a separate command (at Charleston) toldheavily against Washington's reverses in this campaign; and hisoutspoken criticisms, frequently just, as the event proved, had producedtheir due impression on the minds of many, who believed Lee the bettergeneral of the two. Events had so shaped themselves, in consequence, asto raise up two parties in the army. And here was laid the foundation ofall those personal jealousies which culminated in Lee's dismissal fromthe army. While his abilities won respect, his insufferable egotism madehim disliked, and it is to be remarked of the divisions Lee's ambitionwas promoting, that the best officers stood firmly by thecommander-in-chief. 

[2] Cornwallis took no boats with him, as he might have done, fromBrunswick. A small number would have answered his purpose. 

[3] Ticonderoga being out of danger for the present, Washington hadordered Gates down with all troops that could be spared. 

[4] As Washington had been urged to do, instead of keeping betweenCornwallis and Philadelphia. 

[5] Lord George Harris, of the Fifth Foot. 

[6] It will be noticed that this account differs essentially from thatof Wilkinson, who, though present at Lee's capture, hid himself untilthe light-horse had left with their prisoner. 

VIII

THE OUTLOOK

To all intents the campaign of 1776 had now drawn its lengtheneddisasters to a close. It had indeed been protracted nearly to the pointof ruin, with the one result, that Philadelphia was apparently safe forthe present. But with Washington thrown back across the Delaware, Lee aprisoner, Congress fled to Baltimore, Canada lost, New York lost, theJerseys overrun, the royal army stretched out from the Hudson to theDelaware and practically intact, while the patriot army, dwindled to afew thousands, was expected to disappear in a few short weeks, thesituation had grown desperate indeed. 

So hopeless indeed was the outlook everywhere that the ominous cry of"Every one for himself"--that last despairing cry of thevanquished--began to be echoed throughout the colonies. We have seenthat even Washington himself seriously thought of retreating behind theAlleghanies, which was virtual surrender. Even he, if report be true, began to think of the halter, and Franklin's little witticism, onsigning the Declaration, of, "Come, gentlemen, we must all hang togetheror we shall hang separately, " was getting uncomfortably like inspiredprophecy. 

If we turn now to the people, we shall find the same apparent consentingto the inevitable, the same tendency of all intelligent discussiontoward the one result. One instance only of this feeling may be citedhere, as showing how the young men--always the least despondent portionof any community--received the news of the retreat through the Jerseys. 

Elkanah Watson sets down the following at Plymouth, Mass. : "We lookedupon the contest as near its close, and considered ourselves avanquished people. The young men present determined to emigrate, andseek some spot where liberty dwelt, and where the arm of British tyrannycould not reach us. Major Thomas (who had brought them the dispiritingnews from the army) animated our desponding spirits with the assurancethat Washington was not dismayed, but evinced the same serenity andconfidence as ever. Upon him rested all our hopes. "

[Sidenote: British plans. ]

At the British headquarters the contest, with good reason, was felt tobe practically over. Unless all signs failed one short campaign would, beyond all question, end it; for at no point were the Americans able toshow a respectable force. In the North a fresh army, under GeneralBurgoyne, was getting ready to break through Ticonderoga and come downthe Hudson with a rush, carrying all before them, as Cornwallis had donein the Jerseys. This would cut the rebellion in two. On the same daythat Washington crossed the Delaware, Clinton had seized Newport, without firing a shot. This would hold New England in check. In short, should Howe's plans for the coming season work, as there was everyreason to expect, then there would be little enough left of theRevolution in its cradle and stronghold, with the troops at New York, Albany, and Newport acting in well-devised combination. 

Brilliant only when roused by the presence of danger, Howe as easilyfell into his habitual indolence when the danger had passed by. Ineffect, what had he to fear? Washington was beyond the Delaware, withthe débris of the army he had lately commanded, which served him ratheras an escort than a defence. If let alone, even this would shortlydisappear. 

Under these circumstances Howe felt that he could well afford to givehimself and his troops a breathing-spell. This was now being put intrain. Cornwallis was about to sail for England, on leave of absence. The garrison of New York disposed itself to pass the winter in idleness, and even those detachments doing outpost duty in the Jerseys, afterhaving chased Washington until they were tired, turned their attentionexclusively to the disaffected inhabitants. The field had already beenreaped, and these troops were the gleaners. 

[Sidenote: Chain of posts. ]

To hold what had been gained a chain of posts was now stretched acrossthe Jerseys from Perth Amboy to the Delaware, with Trenton, Bordentown, and Burlington as the outposts and New Brunswick as the dépôt, the firstbeing well placed either for making an advance, or for checking anyattempts by the Americans to recross the river. Washington believed thatthe British would be in Philadelphia just as soon as the ice was strongenough to bear artillery. If the expected dissolution of his army hadhappened, no doubt the enemy's advanced troops would have takenpossession of the city at once. And it is even quite probable that thiscontingency was considered a foregone conclusion, since British agentswere now actively at work in Washington's own camp, undermining thefeeble authority which everybody believed was tottering to its fall. Bethat as it may, the fact remains that active operations were for thepresent wholly suspended. At the officers' messes or in the barracks allthe talk was of going home. Besides, if Howe had really wanted to takePhiladelphia there was nothing to prevent his doing so. There were nodefences. If saved at all, the city must be defended in the field, notin the streets. 

Bordentown being rather the most exposed, Count Donop was left therewith some 2, 000 Hessians, and Colonel Rall at Trenton with 1, 200 to1, 300 more. Both were veterans. As these Hessians were about equallyhated and feared, it was well reasoned that they would be all the morewatchful against a surprise. 

[Illustration: THE ATTACK ON TRENTON. ]

[Sidenote: Rall and Donop. ]

As soon as he had time to look about him, Donop at once extended hisoutposts down to Burlington, on the river, and to Black Horse, on theback-road leading south to Mt. Holly, thus establishing himself at thebase point of a triangle from which his outposts could be speedilyreënforced, either from Bordentown or each other. The post at Burlingtonwas only eighteen miles from Philadelphia. 

In order to understand the efforts subsequently made to break through itthis line should be carefully traced out on the map. In spots it wasweak, yet the long gaps, like that between Princeton and Trenton, andbetween Princeton and Brunswick, were thought sufficiently secured byoccasional patrols. 

To meet these dispositions of the enemy Washington stretched out theremnant of his force along the opposite bank of the Delaware, from aboveTrenton to below Bordentown, looking chiefly to the usual crossingplaces, which were being vigilantly watched. 

[Illustration: OPERATIONS IN THE JERSEYS. ]

Under date of December 16 a British officer writes home as follows:"Winter quarters are now fixed. Our army forms a chain of about ninetymiles in length from Fort Lee, where our baggage crossed, to Trenton onthe Delaware, which river, I believe, we shall not cross till nextcampaign, as General Howe is returning to New York. I understand we areto winter at a small village near the Raritan River, and are to form asort of advanced picket. There is mountainous ground very near this postwhere the rebels are still in arms, and are expected to be troublesomeduring the winter. "

[Sidenote: Cruelties of troops. ]

He then goes on to speak of the deplorable condition in which theinhabitants had been left by the rival armies, dividing the blame withimpartial hand, and moralizing a little, as follows: "A civil war is adreadful thing; what with the devastation of the rebels, and that of theEnglish and Hessian troops, every part of the country where the scene ofthe action has been looks deplorable. Furniture is broken to pieces, good houses deserted and almost destroyed, others burnt; cattle, horses, and poultry carried off; and the old plundered of their all. The rebelseverywhere left their sick behind, and most of them have died for wantof care. "

This telling piece of testimony is introduced here not only because itcomes from an eye-witness, but from an enemy. Beneath the uniform theman speaks out. But his omissions are still more eloquent. It was notso much the loss of property, bad as that was, as the namelessatrocities everywhere perpetrated by the royal troops upon the young, the helpless, and the innocent, that makes the tale too revolting to betold. In truth, all that part of the Jerseys held by the enemy had beengiven up to indiscriminate rapine and plunder. It was in vain that thevictims pleaded the king's protection. As vainly did they appeal to thehumanity of the invaders. The brutal soldiery defied the one and laughedat the other. Finding that the promised pardon and mercy were synonymouswith murder, arson, and rapine, such a revulsion of feeling had takenplace that the authors of these cruelties were literally sleeping on avolcano; and where patriotism had so lately been invoked in vain, hopeof revenge was now turning every man, woman, and child into either anopen or a secret foe to the despoilers of their homes. One little breathonly was wanting to fan the revolt to a flame; one little spark to firethe train. All eyes, therefore, were instinctively turned to the banksof the Delaware. 

IX

THE MARCH TO TRENTON

[Sidenote: Spirit of the officers. ]

[Sidenote: Post at Bristol. ]

Enough has been said to show that only heroic measures could now savethe American cause. Fortunately Washington was surrounded by a littleknot of officers of approved fidelity, whose spirit no reverses couldsubdue. And though a calm retrospect of so many disasters, with all thejealousies, the defections, and the terror which had followed in theirwake, might well have carried discouragement to the stoutest hearts, this little band of heroes now closed up around their careworn chief, and like the ever-famous Guard at Waterloo, were fully resolved to dierather than surrender. This was much. It was still more when Washingtonfound his officers inspired by the same hope of striking the enemyunawares which he himself had all along secretly entertained. The hopewas still further encouraged by a reënforcement of Pennsylvaniamilitia, whose pride had been aroused at seeing the invader's vedettesin sight of their capital. These were posted at Bristol, underCadwalader, [1] as a check to Count Donop, while what was left of the oldarmy was guarding the crossings above, as a check to Rall. 

To do something, and to do it quickly, were equally imperative, becausethe term of the regular troops would expire in a few days more, and noone realized better than the commander-in-chief that the militia couldnot long be held together inactive in camp. 

[Sidenote: Rall's danger. ]

The isolated situation of Rall and Donop seemed to invite attack. Theirfancied security seemed also to presage success. An inexorable necessitycalled loudly for action before conditions so favorable should bechanged by the freezing up of the Delaware when, if the enemy had anyenterprise whatever, the river would no longer prevent, but assist, hismarching into Philadelphia, and perhaps dictating a peace from the hallsof Congress. 

Donop being considerably nearer Philadelphia than Rall, was, as we haveseen, being closely watched by Cadwalader, whose force being largelydrawn from the city had the best reasons for wishing to be rid of sotroublesome a neighbor. 

[Sidenote: Gates sulking. ]

More especially in view of possible contingencies, which he could not beon the ground to direct, Washington sent his able adjutant-general, Reed, [2] down to aid Cadwalader. This action, too, removed a difficultywhich had arisen out of Gates' excusing himself from taking this commandon the plea of ill-health. 

[Sidenote: In Philadelphia. ]

Below Cadwalader, again, Putnam was in command at Philadelphia, with afluctuating force of local militia, only sufficiently numerous tofurnish guards for the public property, protect the friends, and watchthe enemies, of the cause, between whom the city was thought to be aboutequally divided. Most reluctantly the conclusion had been reached thatthe appearance of the British in force, on the opposite bank of theDelaware, would be the signal for a revolt. Here, then, was another rockof danger, upon which the losing cause was now steadilydrifting, --another warning not to delay action. 

It was then that Washington resolved on making one of those suddenmovements so disconcerting to a self-confident enemy. It had been sometime maturing, but could not be sooner put in execution on account ofthe wretched condition of Sullivan's (lately Lee's) troops, who had comeoff their long march, as Washington expresses it, in want of everything. 

[Sidenote: A first move. ]

Putnam was the first to beard the lion by throwing part of his forceacross the Delaware. [3] Whether this was done to mask any purposedmovement from above, or not, it certainly had that result. Aftercrossing into the Jerseys Griffin marched straight to Mt. Holly, wherehe was halted on the 22d, waiting for the reënforcements he had askedfor from Cadwalader. Donop having promptly accepted the challenge, marched against Griffin, who, having effected his purpose of drawingDonop's attention to himself, fell back beyond striking distance. 

It was Washington's plan to throw Cadwalader's and Ewing's[4] forces inbetween Donop and Rall, while Griffin or Putnam was threatening Donopfrom below; and he was striking Rall from above. Had these blows fallenin quick succession there is little room to doubt that a much greatermeasure of success would have resulted. 

Orders for the intended movement were sent out from headquarters on the23d. They ran to this effect:

[Sidenote: Rall the object. ]

Cadwalader at Bristol, Ewing at Trenton Ferry, and Washington himself atMcKonkey's Ferry, were to cross the Delaware simultaneously on the nightof the 25th and attack the enemy's posts in their front. Cadwalader andEwing having spent the night in vain efforts to cross their commands, returned to their encampments. It only remains to follow the movementsof the commander-in-chief, who was fortunately ignorant of thesefailures. 

Twenty-four hundred men, with eighteen cannon, were drawn up on the bankof the river at sunset. Tolstoi claims that the real problem of thescience of war "is to ascertain and formulate the value of the spirit ofthe men, and their willingness and eagerness to fight. " This little bandwas all on fire to be led against the enemy. No holiday march lay beforethem, yet every officer and man instinctively felt that the last hopeof the Republic lay in the might of his own good right arm. 

Did we need any further proof of the desperate nature of theseundertakings, it is found in the matchless group of officers that nowgathered round the commander-in-chief to stand or fall with him. Withsuch chiefs and such soldiers the fight was sure to be conducted withskill and energy. 

[Sidenote: Strong array of officers. ]

Greene, Sullivan, St. Clair, Sterling, Knox, Mercer, Stephen, Glover, Hand, Stark, Poor, and Patterson were there to lead these slendercolumns to victory. Among the subordinates who were treading this ruggedpathway to renown were Hull, Monroe, Hamilton, and Wilkinson. Rankdisappeared in the soldier. Major-generals commanded weak brigades, brigadiers, half battalions, colonels, broken companies. Some suddeninspiration must have nerved these men to face the dangers of thatterrible night. History fails to show a more sublime devotion to anapparently lost cause. 

[Sidenote: The Delaware crossed. ]

Boats being held in readiness the troops began their memorable crossing. Its difficulties and dangers may be estimated by the failure of the twocoöperating; corps to surmount them. Of this part of the work Glover[5]took charge. Again his Marblehead men manned the boats, as they had doneat Long Island; and though it was necessary to force a passage by mainstrength through the floating ice, which the strong current and highwind steadily drove against them, the transfer from the friendly to thehostile shore slowly went on in the thickening darkness and gloom of thewaiting hours. 

Little by little the group on the eastern shore began to grow larger asthe hours wore on. Washington was there wrapped in his cloak, and inthat inscrutable silence denoting the crisis of a lifetime. Did histhoughts go back to that eventful hour when he was guiding a frail raftthrough the surging ice of the Monongahela? Knox was there animating theutterly cheerless scene by his loud commands to the men in charge of hisprecious artillery, for which the shivering troops were impatientlywaiting. At three o'clock the last gun was landed. The crossing hadrequired three hours more than had been allowed for it. Nearly anotherhour was used up in forming the troops for the march of nine miles toTrenton, which could hardly be reached over such a wretched road, and insuch weather, in less than from three to four hours more. To makematters worse, rain, hail, and sleet began falling heavily, and freezingas it fell. 

To surround and surprise Trenton before daybreak was now out of thequestion. Nevertheless, Washington decided to push on as rapidly aspossible; and the troops having been formed in two columns, were now putin motion toward the enemy. 

The march was horrible. A more severe winter's night had never beenexperienced even by the oldest campaigners. To keep moving was the onlydefence against freezing. Enveloped in whirling snow-flakes, encompassedin blackest darkness, the little column toiled steadily on throughsludge ankle-deep, those in the rear judging by the quantity of snowlodged on the hats and coats of those in front, the load that theythemselves were carrying. Not a word, a jest, or a snatch of song brokethe silence of that fearful march. 

At a cross-road four and a half miles from Trenton the word was passedalong the line to halt. Here the columns divided. With one Greene filedoff on a road bearing to the left, which, after making a considerablecircuit, struck into Trenton more to the east. Washington rode with thisdivision. The other column kept the road on which it had been marching. Sullivan led this division with Stark in the van. At this momentSullivan was informed that the muskets were too wet to be depended upon. He instantly sent off an aid to Washington for further orders. The aidcame galloping back with the order to "go on, " delivered in a tone whichhe said he should never forget. With grim determination Sullivan againmoved forward, and the word ran through the ranks, "We have our bayonetsleft. "

All this time Ewing was supposed to be nearing Trenton from the south. In that case the town would be assaulted from three points at once, anda retreat to Bordentown be cut off. 

Footnotes:

[1] John Cadwalader, of Philadelphia. His services in this campaign wereboth timely and important. 

[2] Joseph Reed succeeded Gates as adjutant-general after Gates waspromoted. Reed's early life had been passed in New Jersey, though he hadmoved to Philadelphia before the war broke out. His knowledge of thecountry which became the seat of war was invaluable to Washington. 

[3] This force was under command of Colonel Griffin, Putnam'sadjutant-general. 

[4] James Ewing, brigadier-general of Pennsylvania militia, postedopposite to Bordentown. In some accounts he is called Irvine, Erwing, etc. 

[5] Col. John Glover commanded one of the best disciplined regiments inWashington's army. 

X

TRENTON

Very early in the evening there had been firing at Rall's outposts, butthe careless enemy hardly gave it his attention. Some lost detachmenthad probably fired on the pickets out of mere bravado. The night hadbeen spent in carousal, and the storm had quieted Rall's mind as regardsany danger of an attack. [1]

[Sidenote: The attack. ]

But in the gray dawn of that dark December morning the two assaultingcolumns, emerging like phantoms from the midst of the storm, wererapidly approaching the Hessian pickets. All was quiet. The newly fallensnow deadened the rumble of the artillery. The pickets were enjoying thewarmth of the houses in which they had taken post, half a mile out oftown, when the alarm was raised that the enemy were upon them. Theyturned out only to be swept away before the eager rush of theAmericans, who came pouring on after them into the town, as it seemedin all directions, shouting and firing at the flying enemy. That longnight of exposure, of suspense, the fatigue of that rapid march, wereforgotten in the rattle of musketry and the din of battle. 

[Sidenote: Street combats. ]

Roused by the uproar the bewildered Hessians ran out of their barracksand attempted to form in the streets. The hurry, fright, and confusionwere said to be like to that with which the imagination conjures up thesounding of the last trump. [2] Grape and canister cleared the streets inthe twinkling of an eye. The houses were then resorted to for shelter. From these the musketry soon dislodged the fugitives. Turned again intothe streets the Hessians were driven headlong through the town into anopen plain beyond it. Here they were formed in an instant, and Rall, brave enough in the smoke and flame of combat, even thought of forcinghis way back into the town. 

[Sidenote: Sullivan in action. ]

But Washington was again thundering away in their front with his cannon. In person he directed their fire like a simple lieutenant of artillery. Off at the right the roll of Sullivan's musketry announced his steadyadvance toward the bridge leading to Bordentown. The road to Princetonwas held by a regiment of riflemen. Those troops, whom Sullivan had beendriving before him, saved themselves by a rapid flight across theAssanpink. Why was not Ewing there to stop them! Sullivan promptlyseized the bridge in time to intercept a disorderly mass of Hessianinfantry, who had broken away from the main body in a panic, hoping tomake their escape that way. 

[Sidenote: Hessians surrender. ]

Not knowing which way to turn next, Rall held his ground, like a woundedboar brought to bay, until a bullet struck him to the ground with amortal wound. Finding themselves hemmed in on all sides, and seeing theAmerican cannoneers getting ready to fire with canister, at short range, the Hessian colors were lowered in token of surrender. 

A thousand prisoners, six cannon, with small-arms and ammunition inproportion, were the trophies of this brilliant victory. The work hadbeen well done. From highest to lowest the immortal twenty-four hundredhad behaved like men determined to be free. 

[Sidenote: The river recrossed. ]

Now, while in the fresh glow of triumph, Washington learned that neitherEwing nor Cadwalader had crossed to his assistance. He stood alone onthe hostile shore, within striking distance of the enemy at Bordentown, and at Princeton. Donop, reënforced by the fugitives from Trenton, outnumbered him three to two. Reënforced by the garrison at Princeton, the odds would be as two to one. All these enemies he would soon have onhis hands, with no certainty of any increase of his own force. 

His combinations had failed, and he must have time to look about himbefore forming new ones. There was no help for it. He must again put theDelaware behind him before being driven into it. 

Washington heard these tidings as things which the incompetence orjealousies of his generals had long habituated him to hear. Orders weretherefore given to repass the river without delay or confusion, and, after gathering up their prisoners and their trophies, the victorsretraced their painful march to their old encampment, where theyarrived the same evening, worn out with their twenty-four hours'incessant marching and fighting, but with confidence in themselves andtheir leaders fully restored. 

This little battle marked an epoch in the history of the war. It was nowthe Americans who attacked. Trenton had taught them the lesson that, manfor man, they had nothing to fear from their vaunted adversaries; andthat lesson, learned at the point of the bayonet, is the only one thatcan ever make men soldiers. The enemy could well afford to lose a town, but this rise of a new spirit was quite a different thing. Therefore, though a little battle, Trenton was a great fact, nowhere more fullyconfessed than in the British camp, where it was now gloomily spoken ofas the tragedy of Trenton. 

Footnotes:

[1] Harris says that Rall had intelligence of the intended attack, andkept his men under arms the whole night. Long after daybreak, a mostviolent snow-storm coming on, he thought he might safely permit his mento lie down, and in this state they were surprised by theenemy. --_Life_, p. 64. 

[2] General Knox's account is here followed. --_Memoir_, p. 38. 

XI

THE FLANK MARCH TO PRINCETON

[Sidenote: Cadwalader crosses. ]

The events of the next two days, apart from Washington's own movements, are a real comedy of errors. The firing at Trenton had been distinctlyheard at Cadwalader's camp and its reason guessed. Later, rumors of theresult threw the camps into the wildest excitement. Bitterly now thesemen regretted that they had not pushed on to the aid of their comrades. Supposing Washington still to be at Trenton, Cadwalader made a secondattempt to cross to his assistance at Bristol on the 27th, when, infact, Washington was then back in Pennsylvania. [1]

Cadwalader thus put himself into precisely the same situation from whichWashington had just hastened to extricate himself. But neither hadforeseen the panic which had seized the enemy on hearing of the surpriseof Trenton. 

[Sidenote: At Bordentown. ]

On getting over the river, Cadwalader learned the true state of things, which placed him in a very awkward dilemma as to what he should do next. As his troops were eager to emulate the brilliant successes of theircomrades, he decided, however, to go in search of Donop. He thereforemarched up to Burlington the same afternoon. The enemy had left it theday before. He then made a night march to Bordentown, which was alsofound deserted in haste. Crosswicks, another outpost lying towardPrinceton, was next seized by a detachment. That, too, had beenhurriedly abandoned. Cadwalader could find nobody to attack or to attackhim. The stupefied people only knew that their villages had beensuddenly evacuated. In short, the enemy's whole line had been swept awaylike dead leaves before an autumnal gale, under that one telling blow atTrenton. 

Even Washington himself seems not to have realized the full extent ofhis success until these astonishing reports came in in quick succession. As the elated Americans marched on they saw the inhabitants everywherepulling down the red rags which had been nailed to their doors, asbadges of loyalty. "Jersey will be the most whiggish colony on thecontinent, " writes an officer of this corps of Cadwalader's. "The veryQuakers declare for taking up arms. "[2]

[Sidenote: Trenton reoccupied. ]

In view of the facts here stated, Washington was strongly urged tosecure his hold on West Jersey before the enemy should have time torecover from their panic. The temper of the people seemed to justify theattempt, even with the meagre force at his command. On the 29th hetherefore reoccupied Trenton in force. At the same time orders were sentoff to McDougall at Morristown, and Heath in the Highlands, to showthemselves to the enemy, as if some concerted movement was in progressall along the line. [3]

[Sidenote: Princeton reënforced. ]

Meantime the alarm brought about by Donop's[4] falling back on Princetoncaused the commanding officer there to call urgently for reënforcements. None were sent, however, for some days, when the grenadiers and secondbattalion of guards marched in from New Brunswick. In evidence of thewholesome terror inspired by Washington's daring movements comes theaccount of the reception of this reënforcement by an eye-witness, Captain Harris, of the grenadiers, who writes of it: "You would havefelt too much to be able to express your feelings on seeing with what awarmth of friendship our children, as we call the light-infantry, welcomed us, one and all crying, 'Let them come! Lead us to them, we aresure of being supported. ' It gave me a pleasure too fine to attemptexpressing. "

Howe was now pushing forward all his available troops toward Princeton. Cornwallis hastened back to that place with the _élite_ of the army. While these heavy columns were gathering like a storm-cloud in his frontWashington and his generals were haranguing their men, entreating themto stay even for a few weeks longer. Such were the shifts to which thecommander-in-chief found himself reduced when in actual presence of thisoverwhelming force of the enemy. 

[Sidenote: Washington concentrates. ]

Through the efforts of their officers most of the New England troopsreënlisted for six weeks--Stark's regiment almost to a man. [5] And thesebattalions constituted the real backbone of subsequent operations. Hearing that the enemy was at least ready to move forward, Cadwalader'sand Mifflin's troops were called in to Trenton, and preparations madeto receive the attack unflinchingly. This force being all assembled onthe 1st of January, 1777, Washington posted it on the east side of theAssanpink, behind the bridge over which Rail's soldiers had made goodtheir retreat on the day of the surprise, with some thirty guns plantedin his front to defend the crossing. Washington and Rall had thussuddenly changed places. 

[Sidenote: His position, Jan. 2, 1777. ]

The American position was strong except on the right. It being higherground the artillery commanded the town, the Assanpink was not fordablein front, the bridge was narrow, and the left secured by the Delaware. The weak spot, the right, rested in a wood which was strongly held, andcapable of a good defence; but inasmuch as the Assanpink could be fordedtwo or three miles higher up, a movement to the right and rear of theposition was greatly to be feared. If successful it would necessarilycut off all retreat, as the Delaware was now impassable. 

On the 2d the enemy's advance came upon the American pickets postedoutside of Trenton, driving them through the town much in the samemanner as they had driven the Hessians. As soon as the enemy came withinrange, the American artillery drove them back under cover, firing beingkept up until dark. 

Having thus developed the American position, Cornwallis, astonished atWashington's temerity in taking it, felt sure of "bagging the fox, " ashe styled it, in the morning. 

The night came. The soldiers slept, but Washington, alive to the danger, summoned his generals in council. All were agreed that a battle would beforced upon them with the dawn of day--all that the upper fords couldnot be defended. And if they were passed, the event of battle would bebeyond all doubt disastrous. Cornwallis had only to hold Washington'sattention in front while turning his flank. Should, then, the patriotarmy endeavor to extricate itself by falling back down the river? Thereseems to have been but one opinion as to the futility of the attempt, inasmuch as there was no stronger position to fall back upon. As achoice of evils, it was much better to remain where they were than beforced into making a disorderly retreat while looking for some otherplace to fight in. 

Who, then, was responsible for putting the army into a position where itcould neither fight nor retreat? If neither of these things could bedone with any hope of success, there remained, in point of fact, but onealternative, to which the abandonment of the others as naturally led asconverging roads to a common centre. In all the history of the war amore dangerous crisis is not to be met with. It is, therefore, incredible that only one man should have seen this avenue of escape, though it may well be that even the boldest generals hesitated to be thefirst to urge so desperate an undertaking. 

[Sidenote: Washington's tactics. ]

In effect, the very danger to which the little army was exposed seems tohave suggested to Washington the way out of it. If the enemy could turnhis right, why could not he turn their left? If they could cut off hisretreat, why could not he threaten their's? This was sublimatedaudacity, with his little force; but safety here was only to be pluckedfrom the nettle danger. It was then and there that Washington[6]proposed making a flank march to Princeton that very night, boldlythrowing themselves upon the enemy's communications, defeating suchreënforcements as might be found in the way, and perhaps dealing such ablow as would, if successful, baffle all the enemy's plans. 

The very audacity of the proposal fell in with the temper of thegenerals, who now saw the knot cut as by a stroke of genius. This wouldnot be a retreat, but an advance. This could not be imputed to fear, butrather to daring. The proposal was instantly adopted, and the generalsrepaired to their respective commands. 

[Sidenote: Jan. 3, 1777. ]

[Sidenote: March to Princeton. ]

Replenishing the camp fires, and leaving the sentinels at their posts, at one o'clock the army filed off to the right in perfect silence andorder. The baggage and some spare artillery were sent off to Burlington, to still further mystify the enemy. By one of those sudden changes ofweather, not uncommon even in midwinter, the soft ground had become hardfrozen during the early part of the night, so that rapid marching waspossible, and rapid marching was the only thing that could save themovement from failure, as Cornwallis would have but twelve miles tomarch to Washington's seventeen, to overtake them--he by a good road, they by a new and half-worked one. Miles, therefore, counted for muchthat night, and though many of the men wore rags wrapped about theirfeet, for want of shoes, and the shoeless artillery horses had to bedragged or pushed along over the slippery places, to prevent theirfalling, the column pushed on with unflagging energy toward its goal. 

[Sidenote: British in pursuit. ]

Shortly after daybreak the British, at Trenton, heard the dull boomingof a distant cannonade. Washington, escaped from their snares, wassounding the reveille at Princeton. The British camp awoke and listened. Soon the rumor spread that the American lines were deserted. Drums beat, trumpets sounded, ranks were formed in as great haste as if the enemywere actually in the camps, instead of being at that moment a dozenmiles away. Cornwallis, who had gone to bed expecting to make short workof Washington in the morning, saw himself fairly outgeneralled. Hisrear-guard, his magazines, his baggage, were in danger, his line ofretreat cut off. There was not a moment to lose. Exasperated at thethought of what they would say of him in England, he gave the order topress the pursuit to the utmost. The troops took the direct route byMaidenhead to Princeton; and thus, for the second time, Trenton sawitself freed from enemies, once routed, twice disgraced, and thoroughlycrestfallen and stripped of their vaunted prestige. 

[Sidenote: Mercer's fight. ]

Three British battalions lay at Princeton the night before. [7] Two ofthem were on the march to Trenton when Washington's troops werediscovered approaching on a back road. Astonished at seeing troopscoming up from that direction, the leading battalion instantly turnedback to meet them. At the same time Washington detached Mercer to seizethe main road, while he himself pushed on with the rest of the troops. This movement brought on a spirited combat between Mercer and the strongBritish battalion, which had just faced about. [8] The fight was short, sharp, and bloody. After a few volleys, the British charged with thebayonet, broke through Mercer's ranks, scattered his men, and evendrove back Cadwalader's militia, who were coming up to their support. 

Other troops now came up. Washington himself rode in among Mercer'sdisordered men, calling out to them to turn and face the enemy. It wasone of those critical moments when everything must be risked. LikeNapoleon pointing his guns at Montereau, the commander momentarilydisappeared in the soldier; and excited by the combat raging around him, all the Virginian's native daring flashed out like lightning. Waving hisuplifted sword, he pushed his horse into the fire as indifferent todanger as if he had really believed that the bullet which was to killhim was not yet cast. 

Taking courage from his presence and example the broken troops re-formedtheir ranks. The firing grew brisker and brisker. Assailed with freshspirit, the British, in their turn, gave way, leaving the ground strewedwith their dead, in return for their brutal use of the bayonet among thewounded. Finding themselves in danger of being surrounded, that portionof this fighting British regiment[9] which still held togetherretreated as they could toward Maidenhead, after giving such an exampleof disciplined against undisciplined valor as won the admiration even oftheir foes. 

While this fight was going on at one point, the second British battalionwas, in its turn, met and routed by the American advance, under St. Clair. This battalion then fled toward Brunswick, part of the remainingbattalion did the same thing, and part threw themselves into the collegebuilding they had used as quarters, where a few cannon shot compelledthem to surrender. 

Three strong regiments had thus been broken in detail and put to flight. Two had been prevented from joining Cornwallis. Besides the killed andwounded they left two hundred and fifty prisoners behind them. TheAmerican loss in officers was, however, very severe. The brave Mercerwas mortally wounded, and that gallant son of Delaware, Colonel Haslet, killed fighting at his commander's side. 

After a short halt Washington again pushed on toward Brunswick, buttempting as the opportunity of destroying the dépôt there seemed to him, it had to be given up. His troops were too much exhausted, andCornwallis was now thundering in his rear. When Kingston was reached thearmy therefore filed off to the left toward[10] Somerset Court House, leaving the enemy to continue his headlong march toward Brunswick, whichwas not reached until four o'clock in the morning, with troopscompletely broken down with the rapidity of their fruitless chase. 

Washington could now say, "I am as near New York as they are toPhiladelphia. "

Footnotes:

[1] Cadwalader seems to have done all in his power to cross his troopsin the first place. His infantry mostly got over, but on finding itimpossible to land the artillery--ice being jammed against the shoresfor two hundred yards--the infantry were ordered back. Indeed, hisrear-guard could not get back until the next day. This was at Dunk'sFerry. The next and successful attempt took from nine in the morningtill three in the afternoon, when 3, 000 men crossed one mile aboveBristol. 

[2] Thomas Rodney's letter. 

[3] Heath was ordered to make a demonstration as far down as King'sBridge, in order to keep Howe from reënforcing the Jerseys. It proved aperfect flash-in-the-pan. 

[4] Part of Donop's force fell back even as far as New Brunswick. 

[5] Stark made a personal appeal with vigor and effect. His regiment hadcome down from Ticonderoga in time to be given the post of honor byWashington himself. 

[6] In a letter to his wife Knox gives the credit of this suggestion toWashington, without qualification. 

[7] These were the Seventeenth, Fortieth, and Fifty-first. 

[8] The hostile columns met on the slope of a hill just off the mainroad, near the buildings of a man named Clark, Mercer reaching theground first. 

[9] The Seventeenth regiment, Colonel Mawhood, carried off the honors ofthe day for the British. 

[10] The position at Morristown had been critically examined by Lee'sofficers during their halt there. Washington had therefore decided todefend the Jerseys from that position. 

XII

AFTER PRINCETON

It had taken Cornwallis a whole week to drive Washington from Brunswickto Trenton; Washington had now made Cornwallis retrace his steps insideof twenty-four hours. In the retreat through the Jerseys there had beenneither strategy nor tactics; nothing but a retreat, pure and simple. Inthe advance, strategy and tactics had placed the inferior force in theattitude menacing the superior, had saved Philadelphia, and were now ina fair way to recover the Jerseys without the expenditure even ofanother charge of powder. 

While Washington was looking for a vantage ground from which to holdwhat had been gained, everything on the British line was going to therear in confusion. Orders and counter orders were being given with arapidity which invariably accompanies the first moments of a panic, andwhich tend rather to increase than diminish its effects. 

What was passing at Brunswick has fortunately found a record in thediary of a British officer posted there when the news of Washington'scoming fell like a bombshell in their camp. It is given word for word:

 On the 3d we had repeated accounts that Washington had not only taken Princeton, but was in full march upon Brunswick. General Matthew (commanding at Brunswick) now determined to return to the Raritan landing-place, with everything valuable, to prevent the rebels from destroying the bridge there. We accordingly marched back to the bridge, one-half on one side, the remainder on the other, for its defence, never taking off our accoutrements that night. 

 On the 3d, Lord Cornwallis, hearing the fate of Princeton, returned to it with his whole force, but found the rebels had abandoned it, upon which he immediately marched back to Brunswick, arriving at break of day on the 4th. I then received orders to return to Sparkstown (Rahway?). Washington marched his army to Morristown and Springfield. At about the time I arrived at Sparkstown, a report was spread that the rebels had some designs upon Elizabethtown and Sparkstown. The whole regiment was jaded to death. Unpleasant this! Before day notice was brought to me by a patrol that he had heard some firing towards Elizabethtown, about seven miles off. I immediately jumped out of bed and directed my drums to beat to arms, as nothing else would have roused my men, they were so tired. Soon after this an express brought me positive orders to march immediately to Perth Amboy, with all my baggage. At between six and seven the rebels fired at some of my men that were quartered at two miles distance. I had before appointed a subaltern's guard for the protection of my baggage. This duty unluckily fell upon the lieutenant of my company, which left it without an officer, the ensign being sick at New York. I immediately directed my lieutenant, who was a volunteer on this occasion, to march with his guard, that was then formed, to the spot where the firing was, while I made all the haste I could to follow him with the battalion. 

 The lieutenant came up with them and fired upwards of twelve rounds, when, the rebels perceiving the battalion on the march, ran off as fast as they could. Had I pursued them I should perhaps have given a good account of them. 

The company baggage-wagon was, however, carried off by the Americans, driver and all. The garrison got to Perth Amboy that night. Elizabethtown was evacuated at the same time. The narrative goes on tosay:

 The only posts we now possess in the Jerseys are Paulus Hook, Perth Amboy, Raritan Landing, and Brunswick. Happy had it been if at first we had fixed on no other posts in this province. . . . Washington's success in this affair of the surprise of the Hessians has been the cause of this unhappy change in our affairs. It has recruited the rebel army and given them sufficient spirit to undertake a winter campaign. Our misfortune has been that we have held the enemy too cheap. We must remove the seat of war from the Jerseys now on account of the scarcity of forage and provisions. 

The writer shows the wholesome impressions his friends were under inthis closing remark: "The whole garrison is every morning under arms atfive o'clock to be ready for the scoundrels. "

In New York great pains were taken to prevent the truth about thevictories at Trenton and Princeton from getting abroad. False accountsof them were printed in the newspapers, over which a strict militarycensorship was established; but in spite of every precaution enoughleaked out through secret channels to put new life and hope in thehearts and minds of the long-suffering prisoners of war. 

It was one of the misfortunes of this most extraordinary campaign thatevery blow Washington had struck left his army exhausted. After eachsuccess it was necessary to recuperate. It was now being reorganized inthe shelter of its mountain fastness, strengthened by a simultaneousuprising of the people, who now took the redress of their wrongs intotheir own hands. No foraging party could show itself without beingattacked; no supplies be had except at the point of the sword. A host ofthe exasperated yeomanry constantly hovered around the enemy's advancedposts, which a feeling of pride alone induced him to hold. Putnam wasordered up to Princeton, Heath to King's Bridge, so that Howe was keptlooking all ways at once. Redoubts were thrown up at New Brunswick, leading Wayne to remark that the Americans had now thrown away the spadeand the British taken it up. Looking back over the weary months ofdisaster the change on the face of affairs seems almost too great forbelief. From the British point of view the campaign had ended in utterfailure and disgrace. In England, Edward Gibbon says that the Americanshad almost lost the name of rebels, and in America Sir William Howefound that he had to contend with a man in every way his superior. 

INDEX

American Army, 12, 17 _note_; marches to N. York, 12; its efficiency, 14; weakened by detachments, 19, 24 _note_; reënforced, 19, 20; effectives in summer of 1776, 22, 24 _note_; defeated at L. Island, 29; losses there, 31; how posted after the battle, 31, 32; driven from N. York, 39; fights at White Plains and Fort Washington, 40; losses there, 41; is divided into two corps, 44; dissension in, 49 _note_; reduced numbers, 50; summary of losses, 52, 53; reaches the Delaware, 57; in position there, 75; is reënforced, 79; time expiring, 80; reënlistments, 97. 

Bedford, L. I. , seized by British, 27. 

Bordentown, occupied by British troops, 71, 72; evacuated, 95. 

British Army of subjugation, 23; by regiments, 25 _note_; takes the field, 27; drives the Americans from L. Island, 27 _et seq. _; in winter quarters, 72, 76. 

Brooklyn Heights fortified, 20, 24 _note_; outer defences, 26; turned by British, 27, 28. 

Cadwalader, Col. John, 80, 87 _note_; fails to get his troops across the Delaware, 83; succeeds better in a second attempt, 94; and occupies Bordentown, 95. 

Clinton, Gen. Sir Henry, at N. York, 34; moves to Throg's Neck, 36; captures Newport, R. I. , 70. 

Cornwallis, Gen. Lord, surprises Fort Lee, 45; is reënforced, 55; pursues Washington, 55, 56, 57, 58 _note_; is unable to follow him beyond Trenton, 62, 67 _note_; has leave of absence, 71; hastens back to Trenton, 97; makes a forced march back to N. Brunswick, 106. 

Declaration of Independence, read to the army, 23. 

Donop, Col. Count, 72, 75; abandons Bordentown, 95. 

Ewing, Gen. James, 83, 87 _note_. 

Fort Lee, 24 _note_; evacuated, 45, 49 _note_. 

Fort Washington, built, 21, 24 _note_; assault and capture of, 40, 41, 42 _note_. 

Gates, Gen. Horatio, brings troops from Ticonderoga, 63, 67 _note_; refuses a command, 81. 

Glover, Gen. John, at L. Island, 30; at Trenton, 85, 88 _note_. 

Greene, Gen. Nathaniel, advises the holding of Fort Washington, 40; at Fort Lee, 45; heads a column at Trenton, 87. 

Griffin, Colonel, moves into the Jerseys, 82. 

Hale, Capt. Nathan, taken and hanged, 36. 

Harlem Heights, the army headquarters, 32, and _note_. 

Haslet, Col. John, at Princeton, 105. 

Heath, Gen. Wm. , put in command in the Highlands, 44, 96, 106 _note_. 

Howe, Gen. Sir William, lands at L. Island, 26; his delays, 36; moves into Westchester, 39; fights at White Plains, 40; and takes Fort Washington, 40; inhumanity to prisoners by his permission, 52; plans for next campaign, 70; takes things easy, 71; roused by Washington's bold strokes, 97. 

King's Bridge, importance of, to N. York, 20, 21; an outpost, 22, 24 _note_. 

Kipp's Bay, landing-place of British, 34; account by an eye-witness, 34, 35. 

Knox, Gen. Henry, improves the artillery service, 16, 17; at Trenton, 84, 85. 

Lee, Gen. Charles, sent to N. York, 18 _note_; ineffectually urges evacuation of Fort Washington, 41; a rival of Washington, 41; gets a separate command, 44; moves to join Washington, 59; his equivocal attitude, 50, 60; his troops, 60, 67 _note_; is reënforced, 61; halts at Morristown, and is captured, 63; probable aims, 65. 

Long Island, campaign opened at, 26; British plan of attack, 27; flank march, 27, 28; evacuated, 30. 

McDougall, Gen. Alexander, at Morristown, 96. 

Mercer, Gen. Hugh, at Princeton, 104, 105, 107 _note_. 

Mifflin, Gen. Thomas, at Trenton, 98. 

New Jersey, invaded, 50; apathy of people, 51; military situation in, 71; outrages perpetrated by the invaders, 77, 78; arouse the people, 78; mostly reconquered, 108, 112. 

New York, the seat of war, 11; its strategic value, 13; defence determined upon, 13; how effected, 20 _et seq. _; the city and island in 1776, 20; escapes bombardment, 30; dispositions for holding the city, 31, 32; evacuation ordered, 33; takes place, 34; partially burnt, 35. 

North Castle, Washington retreats to, 40. 

Percy, Gen. Lord Hugh, in command at Harlem, 36. 

Philadelphia, critical situation there, 81. 

Princeton, attacked by Washington, 103; losses at, 105. 

Putnam, Gen. Israel, commands at Philadelphia, 81; sends a force into the Jerseys, 82, 88 _note_. 

Rall or Rahl, Col. , 72; alarm of an attack, 89, 93 _note_; fights bravely, and is mortally hurt, 91. 

Reed, Joseph, 81, 87 _note_. 

St. Clair, Gen. Arthur, at Princeton, 105. 

Stark, Gen. John, at Trenton, 87, 106 _note_. 

Sterling or Stirling, Lord (William Alexander), at Princeton, 62. 

Sullivan, Gen. John, succeeds to command of Lee's corps, 64; leads a column at Trenton, 87. 

Throg's Neck, British land at, 39, 42 _note_. 

Trenton, occupied as a British outpost, 72; carried by assault, 89 _et seq. _; fruits of victory, 91; an epoch in the war, 93; first abandoned, 93; then reoccupied, 96. 

Washington, Gen. , at N. York, 12; decides to act on the defensive, 18 _note_; stands on his dignity, 24; not in command at L. Island, 29; orders its evacuation, 30; moves to White Plains, 39; rights there, but has to fall back, 40; his dilemma, 43; decides to divide his force, 44; crosses into N. Jersey, 45; manoeuvring for delay, 50; rises above partisanship, 54; directs Lee to join him, 54, 55; retreats to Newark, 55; to New Brunswick, 56; troops leave him, 56; at Princeton, 57; admirable retreat, 57; crosses the Delaware, 62; determines on striking the British outposts, 79, 80; his plan, 82, 83; marches on Trenton, 83 _et seq. _; carries Trenton by assault, but is obliged to recross the Delaware, 91, 92; but reoccupies Trenton, 96; takes post there, 98; steals a march on Cornwallis, 101, 107 _note_; fights at Princeton, 103; personal gallantry, 104; marches to Somerset C. H. , 106. 

White Plains, Washington concentrates at, 39, 42 _note_; action at, 40.