THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

by Theodore A. Dodge

To the members of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, ofwhose researches into the history of our Civil War the following pagesform but a modest part, this volume is, with Sincere Regard, Dedicatedby the author. 

Transcriber's Note:

Errata and other transcription notes are included as an appendix

As companion to this etext, I recommend maps available on the Internetfrom the History Department of the U. S. Military Academy:

 http://www. Dean. Usma. Edu/history

CONTENTS. 

 I. INTRODUCTION II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY XI. POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE XII. JACKSON'S MARCH AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS XV. SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK XVII. CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK XX. STONEWALL JACKSON XXI. POSITION AT FAIRVIEW XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE XXIV. THE NEW LINES XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARD HOOKER XXIX. SALEM CHURCH XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE APPENDIX. 

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

I. INTRODUCTION. 

It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of1861-65, that enough has already been written upon the campaign ofChancellorsville. And there are numerous brilliant essays, in thehistories now before the public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or lessaccurate of this ten-days' passage of arms. But none of these spreadbefore the reader facts sufficiently detailed to illustrate theparticular theory advanced by each to account for the defeat of the Armyof the Potomac on this field. 

The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and ofHoward, its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a smalldegree owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon Sedgwick for hisfailure to execute a practically impossible order; the truly remarkableblunders into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to lapse, in endeavoringto explain away his responsibility for the disaster; the bare fact, indeed, that the Army of the Potomac was here beaten by Lee, withone-half its force; and the very partial publication, thus far, of thedetails of the campaign, and the causes of our defeat, --may standas excuse for one more attempt to make plain its operations to thesurvivors of the one hundred and eighty thousand men who there borearms, and to the few who harbor some interest in the subject as merehistory. 

To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share inthis defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the memoryof a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done hiscountry signal service; and to avoid the imputation of baldly throwingdown the gauntlet of ungracious criticism. All reference to Gen. Hooker's skill or conduct in this, one of the best conceived and mostfatally mismanaged of the many unsuccessful advances of the Army ofthe Potomac, is made with sincere appreciation of his many admirablequalities, frankly, and untinged by bitterness. But it must beremembered, that Gen. Hooker has left himself on record as the author ofmany harsh reflections upon his subordinates; and that to mete out evenjustice to all requires unvarnished truth. 

The most uncalled-for slur upon the conduct of his lieutenants probablyoccurs in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Before withdrawing from the south side of the Rappahannock, after thedecisive events of the battle-field had cooped up the army betweenthe river and its intrenchments, Hooker called together all his corpscommanders, and requested their several opinions as to the advisabilityof attack or retreat. Whatever discussion may have then been had, it wasgenerally understood, in after-days, that all but one of these generalshad expressed himself freely for an immediate advance. In referringto this understanding, while denying its correctness, Hooker used thefollowing language:--

"So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers morevaliant after the fight than while it is pending; and, when a truthfulhistory of the Rebellion shall be written, it will be found that theArmy of the Potomac is not an exception. "

Merely to characterize as ungenerous this aspersion upon the courageof such men as then served under Hooker, savors of error on the side ofleniency. And, inasmuch as these words strike, as it were, the keynoteof all the statements which Hooker has vouchsafed with reference tothese events, they might be assumed fairly to open the door to unsparingcriticism. But it is hoped that this course has been avoided; and thatwhat censure is dealt out to Gen. Hooker in the succeeding pages willbe accepted, even by his advocates, in the kindly spirit in which it ismeant, and in which every soldier of the beloved old Army of the Potomacmust uniformly refer to every other. 

There is, moreover, no work on Chancellorsville which results fromresearch into all records now accessible. 

The work of Allan and Hotchkiss, of 1867, than which nothing can be moreeven-handed, or more admirable as far as it goes, adopts generally thestatements made in the reports of the Confederate generals: and theseare necessarily one-sided; reports of general officers concerning theirown operations invariably are. Allan and Hotchkiss wrote with only theRichmond records before them, in addition to such information from theFederal standpoint as may be found in general orders, the evidencegiven before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and newspapercorrespondence. At that time many of the Federal reports were not to behad: such as were at the War Department were hardly accessible. Reportshad been duly made by all superior officers engaged in and survivingthis campaign, excepting only the general in command; but, strangeto say, not only did Gen. Hooker refrain from making a report, but heretained in his personal possession many of the records of the Army ofthe Potomac covering the period of his command, and it is only since hisdeath that these records have been in part recovered by the Secretaryof War. Some are still missing, but they probably contain no importantmatter not fully given elsewhere. 

Although Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War: "Without an exception I forwarded to that office"--the WarDepartment--"all the reports and returns and information concerning thearmy, and furnished them promptly, and, as I think, as no other armycommander has done, " his memory had at the moment played him traitor, for a considerable part of these records were not disposed of as stated. It should be remarked, however, that Hooker is not singular in thisleaning towards the meum in the matter of records. 

The sources relied on for the facts herein given are the reports of theofficers engaged, both Federal and Confederate, added to many privatenotes, memoranda, and maps, made by them; the testimony beforethe Committee on the Conduct of the War, which included Hooker'sexamination; and the maps made by the Engineer Department of theUnited-States Army, and those of Capt. Hotchkiss. 

This latter officer was the topographical engineer of the Second Corpsof the Army of Northern Virginia, and made his surveys by order of Gen. Lee immediately after the campaign. They are of the greatest assistanceand value. 

Eighteen years have elapsed since North and South crossed swords uponthis memorable field; and it would seem that all Americans can nowcontemplate with unruffled heart the errors under which "the Army ofthe Potomac was here beaten without ever being fought, " as well as boastwith equal pride, not only of the abundant courage displayed by eitherside, but of the calm skill with which Gen. Lee wrested victory from asituation desperately compromised, and of the genius of that greatest ofhis lieutenants, Thomas J. Jackson, who here sealed with his blood hisfidelity to the cause he loved so well. 

It has been said that this campaign furnishes as much material for thepsychological as for the military student. And certainly nothing lessthan a careful analysis of Hooker's character can explain the abnormalcondition into which his mental and physical energy sank during thesecond act of this drama. He began with really masterly moves, speedilyplacing his wary adversary at the saddest disadvantage. But, havingattained this height, his power seemed to pass away as from anover-tasked mind. With twice the weight of arm, and as keen a blade, heappeared quite unable to parry a single lunge of Lee's, quite unable tothrust himself. He allowed his corps commanders to be beaten in detail, with no apparent effort to aid them from his abundant resources, thewhile his opponent was demanding from every man in his command the lastounce of his strength. And he finally retired, dazed and weary, acrossthe river he had so ably and boastingly placed behind him ten daysbefore, against the opinion of nearly all his subordinates; for in thiscase the conditions were so plain that even an informal council of waradvised a fight. 

With character-study, however, this sketch has nothing to do. It isconfined to describing events, and suggesting queries for the curious inmilitary history. 

II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS. 

The first two years of civil strife had closed. The American people, which so far had shown more aptness at learning than skill in wagingwar, may be said to have passed through its apprenticeship in arms. The broad plan of operations, intelligently but rudely conceived at theoutset by the greater spirits among our commanders, began to be moreclearly grasped. The political strategy of both contestants madeVirginia the field on which the left wing of the Federal armies pivoted, while the right swung farther and farther south and east, and theConfederates gallantly struggled for every foot of territory, yieldingonly to the inexorable. This right wing had already possession of theMississippi as far south as Vicksburg, around which place Grantwas preparing to tighten his coils; it had occupied the line of theTennessee River, and had rendered useless to the Confederates therailroad from Memphis to Chattanooga, which had been the great centralartery between Richmond and the trans-Mississippi States. The Southernpartisans, with Morgan and Forrest as typical chiefs, had up to thisperiod played, in the West especially, a very important part. They asmuch exceeded our cavalry in enterprise as they had advantage over it inknowledge of the country and in assistance from its population. Theyhad on more than one occasion tapped the too long and slender lines ofoperation of our foremost armies. They had sent Grant to the right-aboutfrom his first march on Vicksburg, thus neutralizing Sherman'sattempt at Chickasaw Bayou. They had compelled Buell to forfeit hishardly-earned footing, and to fall back from the Tennessee River toLouisville at the double-quick in order to beat Bragg in the racetowards the gate of the Northern States, which disaster was happilysoon retrieved by the latter's bloody check before Murfreesborough. Yet, despite these back-sets, the general course of events showed thatProvidence remained on the side of the heaviest battalions; and thespring of 1863 saw our armies extended from the pivot midway between therival capitals in a more or less irregular line, and interrupted by theAlleghany Mountains, to Vicksburg and the Father of Waters. 

Great as was the importance of success in Virginia, the Confederates hadappreciated the fact as had not the political soldiers at the head ofthe Federal department of war. Our resources always enabled us to keepmore men, and more and better material, on this battle-ground, than theConfederates could do; but this strength was constantly offset by theability of the Southern generals, and their independence of action, asopposed to the frequent unskilfulness of ours, who were not only neverlong in command, but were then tied hand and foot to some ideal plan forinsuring the safety of Washington. The political conditions under whichthe Army of the Potomac had so far constantly acted had never allowed itto do justice to its numbers, mobility, or courage; while Mr. Lincoln, who actually assumed the powers of commander-in-chief, technicallyintrusted to him by the Constitution, was swayed to and fro by hisown fears for the safety of his capital, and by political schemes andmilitary obtuseness at his elbow. 

Whether the tedious delays and deferred success, occasioned by thesecircumstances, were not eventually a benefit, in that they enabled thecountry to bring forth in the fulness of time the conditions leading tothe extinguishment of slavery, which an earlier close of the warmight not have seen; not to mention the better appreciation by eithercombatant of the value of the other, which a struggle to the bitter endalone could generate, --is a question for the political student. Butit will always remain in doubt whether the practical exhaustion ofthe resources of the South was not a condition precedent to ending thewar, --whether, in sooth, the "last ditch" was not actually reached whenLee surrendered at Appomattox. 

In the West, merit had by this time brought to the surface the generalswho later led us to successful victories. Their distance from thecentral controlling power resulted in their being let alone to work outtheir own salvation. Opposed to them had been some excellent but not thebest of the Confederate leaders; while Virginia boasted the elite of theSouthern troops, the strongest of the captains, and the most daring ofthe lieutenants, developed by the war. 

Since the Russian campaign of Bonaparte, no such vast forces had beenunder arms. To command these required not only the divine militaryspark, but hardly-acquired experience. And the mimic war which theelements of European army life always affords had been wanting toeducate our generals. It is not wonderful, then, that two years offruitless campaigning was needed to teach our leaders how to utilize onsuch difficult terrain material equally vast in extent and uncouth inquality. For, however apt the American to learn the trade of war, --orany other, --it is a moot-point whether his independence of characteris compatible with the perfect soldier, as typified in Friedrich'sregiments, or the Old Guard. 

But ability, native or acquired, forced its way to the front; and therequisite experience was gradually gained, for the school was one wherethe trade was quickly taught. Said Gen. Meade on one occasion, "The artof war must be acquired like any other. Either an officer must learn itat the academy, or he must learn it by experience in the field. Providedhe has learned it, I don't care whether he is a West-Pointer, or not. "

In the East, then, the army had been led by McDowell, McClellan, Pope, and Burnside, to victory and defeat equally fruitless. The oneexperiment so far tried, of giving the Army of the Potomac a leader fromthe West, culminating in the disaster of the second Bull Run, was notapt to be repeated within the year. That soldier of equal merit andmodesty, whom the Army of the Potomac had been gradually educating asits future and permanent leader, was still unpretentiously commanding acorps, and learning by the successes and failures of his superiors. Andwho shall say that the results accomplished by Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, and Meade, were not largely due to their good fortune in notbeing too early thrust to the front? "For, " as says Swinton, "it wasinevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation'signorance of war. "

In the South, the signs of exhaustion had not yet become grave. Theconscription act, passed in April, 1862, had kept the ranks full. Thehope of foreign intervention, though distant, was by no means whollyabandoned. Financial matters had not yet assumed an entirely desperatecomplexion. Nor had the belief in the royalty of cotton received itscoup de grace. The vigor and courage of the Confederacy were unabated, and the unity of parties in the one object of resistance to invasiondoubled its effective strength. Perhaps this moment was the flood-tideof Southern enthusiasm and confidence; which, after the Pennsylvaniacampaign, began to ebb. It is not intended to convey the idea that theSouth was prosperous. On the contrary, those who read the signs aright, saw and predicted its approaching decline. But, as far as its powerof resistance went, it was at its highest when compared with themomentarily lessened aggressiveness of the North. For the anti-war partywas doing its best to tie the hands of the administration; and, whilethis in no wise lessened the flow of men and material to the front, itproduced a grave effect upon the moral strength which our chiefs wereable to infuse into their method of conducting the war. 

III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The unfortunate course of events during the early winter of 1862-63 hadresulted in a grievous loss of morale in the Army of the Potomac. Theuseless slaughter of Marye's Heights was, after a few weeks, succeededby that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; andGen. Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to thesatisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personalregard, of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin wasshelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to thecommand. 

No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. Hehad forced himself upon its notice. From Bull Run, after which action heis said to have remarked to Mr. Lincoln that he knew more than any oneon that field; through Williamsburg, where he so gallantly held his ownagainst odds during the entire day, and with exhausted ammunition, untilrelieved by Kearney; before Richmond; during the Seven Days; in therailroad-cutting at Manassas; at Antietam, where he forced the fightingwith so much determination, if not wisdom, on the Union right; upto Fredericksburg, where, after a personal protest to his commandingofficer, he went in and fought his troops "until he thought he had lostas many men as he was ordered to lose, "--Hooker's character as man andsoldier had been marked. His commands so far had been limited; and hehad a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He wasin constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his appearancealways attracted attention; and he was as well known to almost everyregiment as its own commander. He was a representative man. 

It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washingtonpseudo-strategists who were his military advisers, could notdistinguish, in selecting a chief who should be capable of leading theArmy of the Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, whoachieves brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader, upon whose sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only theinstruction for health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, ofeach of his subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correctdecision and immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopicchanges of a campaign or a battle-field. It required more knowledge ofthe requisites of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, thanMr. Lincoln had had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of thearmy, to insure a happy choice. 

And, doubtless, Hooker's self-assertiveness, success as a brigade, division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability, shared equally in procuring his appointment. No one will deny Hooker'scapacity in certain directions, or up to a given test. His whole careershows an exceptional power in "riding to orders. " But he sadly lackedthat rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary to lead ahundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as Lee. 

Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than theodd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him atthe time of his appointment, here following:--

 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. , Jan. 26, 1863. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. 

General, --I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficientreasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are somethings in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believeyou to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I alsobelieve you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you areright. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if notan indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonablebounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during Gen. Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong tothe country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. Ihave heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying thatboth the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it wasnot for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I nowask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. TheGovernment will support you to the utmost of its ability, which isneither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, ofcriticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, willnow turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any goodout of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware ofrashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance goforward, and give us victories. 

 Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN. 

Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnestwords, took leave of the army. 

The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence, which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hookerwas to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of thisweather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at oncebegan to make, --for Hooker never lacked the power of organization, --wereaccepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeededspeedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. 

The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingledwith camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled withan entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomacto accomplish any thing, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at therate of two hundred a day, facilitated by relatives, who sent from homecivilian clothing to soldiers at the front. Hooker states that he found2, 922 officers, and 81, 964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rollsof the army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficientmeasures were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarmingdepletion of the ranks. Furloughs in reasonable quantity were allowed todeserving men and a limited number of officers. Work was found forthe rank and file in drill and outpost duty sufficient to prevent idlehabits. The commissariat was closely watched, and fresh rations morefrequently issued, which much improved the health of the army. Thesystem of picket-duty was more thoroughly developed, and so vigilantlycarried out as to impress its importance upon, as well as teach itsdetails to, the troops. 

The cavalry, hitherto distributed by regiments throughout the army, wasnow consolidated into one corps, and from this time became a valuableelement in the service, for it daily grew in efficiency. And suchopportunities of doing field-work as a body were afforded it ascircumstances allowed. 

The grand divisions of Burnside were abolished, and the army dividedinto seven infantry corps. 

The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concursin awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which heimproved the condition of the troops during the three months he was incommand prior to Chancellorsville. Himself says before the Committee onthe Conduct of the War: "During the season of preparation the army maderapid strides in discipline, instruction and morale, and early in Aprilwas in a condition to inspire the highest expectations. " And Swintonwell sums up: "Under Hooker's influence the tone of the army underwent achange which would appear astonishing had not its elastic vitality beenso often proved. "

On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive ofprovost-guard, consisted of about a hundred and thirty thousand menunder the colors, --"for duty equipped, " according to the morningreport, --distributed among the several army corps as follows:--

 { Wadsworth, } 1st Corps, Gen. Reynolds. . { Robinson, } 16, 908 { Doubleday, }

 { Hancock, } 2d Corps, Gen. Couch . . { Gibbon, } 16, 893 { French, }

 { Birney, } 3d Corps, Gen. Sickles. . { Berry, } 18, 721 { Whipple, }

 { Griffin, } 5th Corps, Gen. Meade. . { Humphreys, } 15, 724 { Sykes, }

 { Brooks, } 6th Corps, Gen. Sedgwick. . { Howe, } 23, 667 { Newton, }

 { Devens, } 11th Corps, Gen. Howard. . { Schurz, } 12, 977 { Steinwehr, }

 12th Corps, Gen. Slocum. . { Williams, } 13, 450 { Geary, }

 { Pleasonton, } Cavalry Corps, Gen. Stoneman. { Gregg, } 11, 541 { Averell, } { Buford, Reserve Brigade, }

 Artillery, Gen. Hunt, about 400 guns. Artillery reserve 1, 610 ------- Total. . . . . . . . . 131, 491

IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 

While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth, awaiting orders tomove, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks'sFord above, to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck) below Fredericksburg, aline some fifteen miles in length as the crow flies. The crests ofthe hills on which lay the Army of Northern Virginia were fromthree-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half back from, andsubstantially parallel to, the river. Rifle-pits commanded everyavailable crossing, which, being few and difficult, were easily guarded. Continuous lines of infantry parapets, broken by battery epaulementslocated for sweeping the wide approaches from the river, extended thewhole distance; while abattis strengthened every place which the natureof the ground allowed an attacking column to pass. 

The roads by which the various detachments of the army couldintercommunicate for concentration upon any given point were numerousand well kept up, and were familiar to all commanding and staffofficers. 

Lee's forces numbered about sixty thousand men, for duty, distributedin the following organizations. As the brigades nearly equalled ourdivisions in size, they are given by name. 

 { Mahone's brigade. } { Posey's " } { Anderson's { Wilcox's " } { division. { Perry's " } { { Wright's " } Part of Longstreet's { } 17, 000 1st Corps { { Kershaw's " } { McLaws' { Semmes's " } { division. { Wofford's " } { Barksdale's " }

 { Heth's " } { Pender's " } { A. P. Hill's { Archer's " } 11, 000 { division. { McGowan's " } { { Lane's " } { { Thomas's " } { { { Ramseur's " } { D. H. Hill's { Rodes's " } { division. { Dole's " } 9, 000 { { Iverson's " } { { Colquitt's " } Jackson's 2d Corps. { { { Colston's " } { Trimble's { Jones's " } 6, 000 { division. { Nichols's " } { { Paxton's " } { { { Gordon's " } { Early's { Hays's " } 7, 400 { division. { Smith's " } { { Hoke's " }

 Stuart's Cavalry { Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade . . 1, 800 division { W. H. F. Lee's ". . . 900

 Artillery, 170 pieces. . . . . . . . 5, 000 ------ Total. . . . . . . . . 58, 100

Hotchkiss and Allan state that there may have been three to fivethousand more men in line at the time of Hooker's attack. 

As will be noticed from the table, only part of Longstreet's corps waspresent. The main body had been sent, about Feb. 1, under command of itschief, to operate in the region between Petersburg and Suffolk, whereour forces under Peck were making a demonstration. This detail reducedLee's army by nearly one-quarter. 

During the winter, Lee's forces had been distributed as follows:--

The old battle-ground of Dec. 13 was occupied by the First Corps; whileJackson with his Second Corps held Hamilton's Crossing, and extended hislines down to Port Royal. Stuart's cavalry division prolonged the leftto Beverly Ford on the upper Rappahannock, and scoured the country asfar as the Pamunkey region. Hampton's brigade of cavalry had been sentto the rear to recruit, and Fitz Lee's had taken its place at Culpeper, from which point it extended so as to touch Lee's left flank at Banks'sFord. The brigade of W. H. F. Lee was on the Confederate right. Stuartretained command of the entire force, but had his headquarters atCulpeper. 

The supplies of the army were received by the Fredericksburg andRichmond Railroad from the capital, and from the depots on the VirginiaCentral. Lee had been assiduous in re-organizing his forces, incollecting an abundance of supplies, in checking desertions, and inprocuring re-enforcements. And the vigor with which the conscription waspushed swelled his strength so materially that in three months Jackson'scorps alone shows an increase from a force of twenty-five thousand up tothirty-three thousand men "for duty. " The staff of the army was createda separate organization. The cavalry had already been successfullyconsolidated. And now the artillery was embodied in a specialorganization under Gen. Pendleton, and an engineer regiment put on foot. 

The morale of the Army of Northern Virginia could not be finer. Theforced retreat of McClellan from before Richmond; the driving of Popefrom his vaunted positions in its front; the Maryland campaign with itsdeliberate withdrawal from an army of twice its strength; finally thebloody check to Burnside, --had furnished a succession of triumphs whichwould lend any troops self-confidence and high courage. But, in additionto all this, the average of the men of this army were older and morehardened soldiers than those of the Army of the Potomac. The earlyconscription acts of the Confederacy had made it difficult for men onceinured to the steady bearing and rough life of the soldier, and to thehard fare of camp-life, to withdraw from the ranks. 

In Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the Waroccurs this tribute to the Confederate infantry: "Our artillery hadalways been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to ourown, intellectually and physically, that army has, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed, in myjudgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rivalit, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebelarmies. "

The cavalry force was small, but energetic and enterprising to a degreeas yet by no means equalled by our own. The artillery was neither asgood, nor as well equipped or served, as ours, but was commanded withintelligence, and able to give a good account of itself. 

V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK. 

An attack of Lee's position in front, even had Burnside's experiencenot demonstrated its folly, seemed to promise great loss of life withoutcorresponding success. 

To turn his right flank required the moving of pontoon trains andartillery over the worst of roads for at least twenty miles, through acountry cut up by a multitude of streams running across the route tobe taken, and emptying into either the Potomac or Rappahannock; allrequiring more or less bridging. 

Lee's spy system was excellent. It has been claimed in Southern reports, that his staff had deciphered our signal code by watching a station atStafford. And Butterfield admits this in one of his despatches of May3. He would speedily ascertain any such movement, and could createformidable intrenchments on one side the river, as fast as we couldbuild or repair roads on which to move down, upon the other. Moreover, there was a thousand feet of stream to bridge at the first availableplace below Skenker's Neck. 

There remained nothing to do but to turn Lee's left flank; and thiscould only be accomplished by stratagem, for Lee had strengthened everypart of the river by which Hooker could attempt a passage. 

But this problem was, despite its difficulties, still possible ofsolution; and Hooker set himself to work to elucidate it. 

So soon as he had matured his plan, which he elaborated with thegreatest care, but kept perfectly secret from every one until themovements themselves developed it, although making use of the knowledgeand skill of all his generals both before and during its initiation, he speedily prepared for its vigorous execution. In May, the term ofservice of some twenty-two thousand nine-months and two-years men wouldexpire. These men he must seek to utilize in the campaign. 

The first intimation of a forward movement received by the army atlarge, apart from the Cavalry Corps, had been a circular of April 13, notifying commanding officers to have their troops supplied with eightdays' rations, and a hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, sixty to becarried by the soldiers, and the balance on the pack-mules. 

After the battle of Fredericksburg, the army had returned tosubstantially the same positions and quarters occupied before; and herethe men had housed themselves for the winter. The Mud March hadbroken up these cantonments; but after a few days' absence the severalregiments returned to their old camps, and the same huts had generallybeen re-occupied by the same men. But when Fighting Joe Hooker's ordersto march were issued, no one dreamed of any thing but victory; and theArmy of the Potomac burned its ships. Nothing was left standing but themud walls from which the shelter-tent roofs had been stripped, and anoccasional chimney. Many of the men (though contrary to orders) set fireto what was left, and the animus non revertendi was as universal asthe full confidence that now there lay before the Army of the Potomac acertain road, whatever might bar the path, to the long-wished-for goalof Richmond. 

VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID. 

Hooker proposed to open his flank attack by cutting Lee'scommunications. Accordingly, on April 12, Gen. Stoneman, commanding theCavalry Corps, received orders to march at seven A. M. Next day, withhis whole force except one brigade. He was to ascend the Rappahannock, keeping well out of view, and masking his movement with numerous smalldetachments, --alleging a chase of Jones's guerillas in the Shenandoahvalley, as his objective. The river was to be crossed west of the Orangeand Alexandria Railroad. At Culpeper he was to destroy or disperse FitzLee's brigade of some two thousand cavalry, and at Gordonsville theinfantry provost-guard; thence to push down the Virginia Central to theFredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying every thing along theroad. As the enemy would probably retreat by the latter route, he was toselect strong points on the roads parallel to it, intrench, and holdhis ground as obstinately as possible. If Lee retreated towardsGordonsville, he was to harass him day and night. The Confederates hadbut five thousand sabres to oppose him. "Let your watchword be, Fight!and let all your orders be, Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" exclaimed enthusiasticJoe Hooker in this order. The primary object was to keep theConfederates from retreating to Richmond; and Stoneman was to rely onHooker's being up with him in six days, or before his supplies wereexhausted. If possible, he was to detach at the most available pointsparties to destroy every thing in the direction of Charlottesville, andof the Pamunkey. 

The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton's brigade, which accompaniedHooker's headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the15th Stoneman threw a division across the river at Rappahannock station, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river. But a suddenrise in consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to return byswimming the horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check, that "theirefforts to establish themselves on the south side of the river weresuccessfully resisted by Stuart. " But the rise in the river was theactual cause. There was no crossing of swords. 

At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery weresent to Kelley's Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to holdthese crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstrationon the part of the enemy. 

The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point untilthe 27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under theorders of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between the15th and 27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker, remained incamp along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 

It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might nothave crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. Itcould not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly havebeen able to call Stuart's entire force away from Lee's army. Nor wasit impossible, in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Evento threaten Lee's communications would have seriously affected thesingleness of purpose he displayed in this campaign. 

But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon themanoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, as amatter almost apart from the one under consideration. 

And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the firsteffort of this ill-fated campaign. 

It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry forceof an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, isillustrated in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hookerleft himself but a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery, to do the scouting for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had heretained a sufficient force to march with the main body, there would nodoubt have been at least a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sentout to near Old Wilderness Tavern and along the Orange plank road tothe junction of the Brock road. Jackson's movements would then have beenfully known. 

The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corpswhen in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of anarmy. 

VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING. 

Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy'scommunications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy'sattention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across theriver on the right. 

As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent downthe river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to lightcamp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing whichhe returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourthMichigan, went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats. 

These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman'sraid, which at these dates should have been well on Lee's rear, and tounsettle Lee's firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker waspreparing to deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movementsfailed of much of their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson's corpswas drawn down to the vicinity, and remained there some days. 

On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, andSixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the Firstat Pollock's Mills Creek, and the Sixth at Franklin's Crossing, by 3. 30A. M. , on Wednesday; and the Third at a place enabling it to crossin support of either of the others at 4. 30 A. M. The troops to remainconcealed until the movement begins. Artillery to be posted by Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the army, to protect the crossing. Gen. Benham to have two bridges laid by 3. 30 A. M. At each crossing. Troops, as needed, to be detailed to aid his engineer brigade. 

Gen. Sedgwick to command the three corps, and make a demonstration infull force on Wednesday morning to secure the telegraph road. Should anyconsiderable force be detached to meet the movement of the right wing, Sedgwick is to carry the works at all hazards. Should the enemy retreattowards Richmond, he is to pursue on the Bowling-Green road, fightingwherever he reaches them, while Hooker will pursue on parallel roadsmore to the west. 

This order was punctually obeyed. Gen. Hunt placed forty-two guns atFranklin's, forty at Pollock's Mill, and sixteen at Traveller's Rest, amile below, a number more being held in reserve. Those in positionwere so disposed as to "enfilade the rifle-pits, crush the fire ofthe enemy's works on the hill, cover the throwing of the bridges, andprotect the crossing of the troops. " (Hunt. )

These three corps camped that night without fires, and the pontoons werecarried to the river by hand to insure secrecy. 

At daybreak, Wednesday, Russell's brigade crossed in boats at Franklin'swith little opposition. The bridges were then constructed; and Brooks'sdivision passed over with a battery, and established itself strongly onthe south side. 

At the lower crossing, Reynolds's attempts to throw the bridges earlyin the morning were defeated by sharpshooters and a supporting regiment. But about half-past eight, the fog, which had been quite dense, lifted;and under fire of the artillery the Confederates were driven away, andthe crossing made by Wadsworth. 

During Wednesday and Thursday the entire command was held in readinessto force a passage at any time, the bridge-heads being held by Brooksand Wadsworth respectively. 

VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING. 

Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent judgmentdisplayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of thearmy-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he hadbrought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact, that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued werecarried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was onhand at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, beconfined to orders given prior to the time when the fighting began. 

On April 26 the commanding officers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corpswere directed to march Monday morning, the 27th, towards Kelley's Ford, on the Rappahannock, --some fifteen miles above its junction with theRapidan, --Howard leading. 

As much secrecy as possible was enjoined, and the men were not to beallowed to go down to the river. Eight days' rations to be carried inthe haversacks. Each corps to take a battery and two ambulances to adivision, the pack-train for small ammunition, and a few wagons forforage only. The rest of the trains to be parked in the vicinity ofBanks's Ford out of sight. A sufficient detail, to be made from thetroops whose term was about to expire, to be left behind to guard camp, and do provost duty. 

Meade was ordered to march the Fifth Corps in connection with theEleventh and Twelfth, and equipped in similar manner. 

The three corps to be in camp at Kelley's Ford, in positions indicated, by four P. M. On Tuesday. 

The first day's march was to the vicinity of Hartwood Church. Next day, at four A. M. , the head of the column was in motion; and at four P. M. Thethree corps were in camp at Kelley's Ford. 

At six P. M. The pontoon-bridge was begun, under charge of Capt. Comstockof the engineers, by a detail mostly from the Eleventh Corps. Some fourhundred men of Buschbeck's brigade crossed in boats, and attacked theenemy's pickets, which retired after firing a single shot. About tenP. M. The bridge was finished, and the troops crossed; the Eleventh Corpsduring the night, and the Twelfth Corps next morning. The SeventeenthPennsylvania Cavalry Regiment was sent out as flankers to prevent theConfederate scouting-parties from annoying the column. In this theyfailed of entire success; as the rear of the Eleventh Corps was, duringthe day, shelled by a Confederate battery belonging to Stuart's horseartillery, and the Twelfth Corps had some slight skirmishing in itsfront with cavalry detachments from the same command. 

As soon as Hooker had seen to the execution of his first orders, he transferred his headquarters to Morrisville, five miles north ofKelley's Ford, and superintended the execution of the crossing andadvance. Urging Meade to equal celerity and secrecy in uncoveringUnited-States Ford, he instructed Slocum, should Meade's crossing atEly's be resisted, to push a column on the south side of the Rapidan toopen the latter ford. 

At Germania Ford, on the Rapidan, previously seized by an advance partyof three or four smart marching regiments, a small body of one hundredand twenty-five Confederate infantry, guarding the supplies for therebuilding of the bridge, then in progress, was captured. 

The cavalry and artillery crossed at once by the ford, as well as aportion of the infantry, the latter wading almost to the armpits. Butthe construction of the bridge was soon temporarily completed by Gens. Geary and Kane; and the rest of the troops and the pack-mules passedsafely, by the light of huge bonfires lighted on the banks. The men werein the highest possible spirits, and testified to their enjoyment of themarch by the utmost hilarity. 

At daylight the Twelfth Corps led the column, Geary in advance. Nearthe Wilderness, the head of column was attacked from the south by somecavalry and a couple of guns. Stuart had come up from Raccoon Ford theday previous. But a slight demonstration cleared the road; and Stuartretired, sending part of his force to Fredericksburg, and accompanyingthe rest to Spotsylvania Court House. 

About two P. M. , Thursday, these two corps, under command of Slocum, reached Chancellorsville, and found a portion of the Fifth Corps alreadyin position there. The Twelfth Corps was deployed south of the plankroad, with left at the Chancellor House, and the right near WildernessChurch, which line the Eleventh Corps prolonged to the vicinity ofHunting Creek. 

The Fifth Corps had marched to Kelley's Ford, and crossed in rear ofthe Twelfth Corps. From here, Sykes's and Griffin's divisions marchedtowards Ely's Ford, preceded by Col. Devin's Sixth New York Cavalry, which surprised the pickets at that place. The troops crossed by wading. Humphreys remained behind to cover the passage of the trains, and afterfollowed the column. 

On crossing the Rapidan, Sykes was pushed towards United-States Ford, to dislodge the Confederate force there, by thus taking in reverse theirposition, while Griffin marched to Chancellorsville. The whole corpssoon after united at the latter place, and was located with its rightjoining Slocum, and the left extending towards the river, facing MineRun. 

A skirmish of no particular moment had occurred between Griffin andAnderson, as the former reached Chancellorsville. Anderson hadbeen retiring before the Federal advance, on the plank road towardsFredericksburg. His rear guard made a short stand at the crossroads, butwithdrew after a few rounds; and Anderson took up a position near MineRoad, where numerous ravines, perpendicular to the river, affordedexcellent successive lines of defence. 

On reaching Chancellorsville, Slocum took command of the three corpsthere assembled. He was ordered to ascertain, by a cavalry party, whether the enemy were detaching any considerable force fromFredericksburg to meet his column. If not, an advance at all hazards wasto be made, and a position on the plank road which would uncover Banks'sFord to be secured. If the enemy were in strong force, Slocum was toselect a position, and compel his attack. Not a moment was to be lostuntil the troops were concentrated at Chancellorsville. "From thatmoment all will be ours, " said Hooker. 

The inconsistency of these orders can be explained only by markedignorance of the country. To secure a position which would uncoverBanks's Ford was certainly a great desideratum; but the possession ofChancellorsville was far from accomplishing this end, as we shall see. 

So admirably planned and executed were all orders up to this time, thaton Thursday, by two P. M. , three corps of nearly forty thousand men wereconcentrated on Lee's flank, while the latter was still unaware of thepresence of any considerable Federal force in this vicinity. 

On Monday Couch had been ordered to march two divisions of his (Second)corps to Banks' Ford, but to keep back from the river, and to show nomore than the usual pickets. One brigade and a battery to be sent toUnited-States Ford, there to relieve an equal detail of the EleventhCorps, which would rejoin its command. All their artillery to move withthese two divisions, and to be ready to cover a forced crossing. Thedivision whose camps at Falmouth were most easily seen by the enemy fromacross the river (it happened to be Gibbon's) to be left in camp to dopicket and provost duty. The Third Corps would be available in casethe enemy himself attempted a crossing. Gibbon to be ready to join thecommand at any time. 

On Thursday, as soon as Anderson withdrew Mahone's and Posey's brigadesfrom United-States Ford, which he did when Meade's crossing at Ely's hadflanked that position, Couch, whose bridge was all ready to throw, wasordered to cross, and march in support towards the heaviest firing. Thishe did, with French and Hancock, and reached Chancellorsville the sameevening. 

Swinton, rather grandiloquently, says, "To have marched a column offifty thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage and encumberedwith artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles in two days; to havebridged and crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with theloss of half a dozen men, one wagon, and two mules, --is an achievementwhich has few parallels, and which well deserves to rank with PrinceEugene's famous passage of the Adige. "

However exaggerated this praise may be, Hooker nevertheless deserveshigh encomiums on his management of the campaign so far. LeavingStoneman's delay out of the question, nothing had gone wrong or beenmismanaged up to the present moment. But soon Hooker makes his firstmistake. 

At 12. 30 on Thursday, the Third Corps, which lay near Franklin'sCrossing, on the north side of the river, received orders to proceed bythe shortest route, and concealed from the enemy, to United-States Ford, to be across the river by seven A. M. , Friday; in pursuance of whichorder, Sickles immediately started, in three columns, following theravines to Hamet's, at the intersection of the Warrenton pike andUnited-States Ford road. Here he bivouacked for the night. At five A. M. Friday he marched to the ford, and passed it with the head of his columnat seven A. M. , Birney leading, Whipple and Berry in the rear. LeavingMott's brigade and a battery to protect the trains at the ford, he thenpushed on, and reported at Chancellorsville at nine A. M. Under Hooker'sorders he massed his corps near the junction of the roads to Ely's andUnited-States Fords, in the open near Bullock's, sending a brigade and abattery to Dowdall's Tavern. 

Hooker, meanwhile, had arrived at Chancellorsville, and taken command. He at once issued this characteristic order:--

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA. , April 30, 1863. 

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 47. 

It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announcesto the army that the operations of the last three days have determinedthat our enemy must ingloriously fly, or come out from behindhis defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certaindestruction awaits him. 

The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been asuccession of splendid achievements. 

 By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Pleasonton, during Thursday, pushed out towards Fredericksburg andSpotsylvania Court House to observe the enemy. 

Fitz Hugh Lee had bivouacked this evening at Todd's Tavern. Stuart, withhis staff, had started towards Fredericksburg to report the condition ofaffairs to Gen. Lee. It was a bright moonlight night. A mile or two onthe road he ran against a party of Federal horsemen, the advance of theSixth New York Cavalry, under Lieut. -Col. McVicar. Sending back for theFifth Virginia Cavalry, Lee attacked the Federal troopers, leading inperson at the head of his staff; but, being repulsed, he sent forthe entire brigade to come up, with which he drove back McVicar'sdetachment. 

The combat lasted some time, and was interesting as being a nightaffair, in which the naked weapon was freely used. Its result was toprevent Pleasonton from reaching Spotsylvania Court House, where hemight have destroyed a considerable amount of stores. 

The position on Thursday evening was then substantially this. AtHamilton's Crossing there was no change. Each party was keenly scanningthe movements of the other, seeking to divine his purpose. Sedgwickand Reynolds were thus holding the bulk of Lee's army at and nearFredericksburg. Hooker, with four corps, and Sickles close by, lay atChancellorsville, with only Anderson's small force in his front, andwith his best chances hourly slipping away. For Lee, by this time awareof the real situation, hesitated not a moment in the measures to betaken to meet the attack of his powerful enemy. 

IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS. 

Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thusdiscovered check. 

Pollard says: "Lee calmly watched this" (Sedgwick's) "movement, as wellas the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated theenemy's design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division ofhis own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking theresult of fighting him in detail. "

Lossing states Lee's object as twofold: to retain Banks's Ford, so as todivide Hooker's army, and to keep his right wing in the Wilderness. 

Let us listen to Lee himself. In his report he says he was convinced onThursday, as Sedgwick continued inactive, that the main attack wouldbe made on his flank and rear. "The strength of the force which hadcrossed, and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that theprincipal effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter. "

He states that on April 14 he was informed that Federal cavalry wasconcentrating on the upper Rappahannock. On the 21st, that small bodiesof infantry had appeared at Kelley's Ford. These movements, and thedemonstrations at Port Royal, "were evidently intended to conceal thedesigns of the enemy, " who was about to resume active operations. 

The Federal pontoon bridges and troops below Fredericksburg "wereeffectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river's bedand the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the other sidecompletely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river. "

"As at the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to selectpositions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather thanincur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent hiscrossing. "

At the time of Hooker's flank movement, there were between theRappahannock and Rapidan no troops excepting some twenty-seven hundredcavalry under Stuart, forming Lee's extreme left. But Stuart made upfor his small numbers by his promptness in conveying to his chiefinformation of every movement and of the size of every column duringHooker's passage of the rivers. And the capture of a few prisonersfrom each of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps enabled him andhis superior to gauge the dimensions of the approaching army with fairaccuracy. 

But until Thursday night the plan of Hooker's attack was notsufficiently developed to warrant decisive action on the part of Lee. 

Of the bulk of the Confederate forces, Early's division was ahead atHamilton's Crossing, intrenched in an almost impregnable position. On Wednesday, April 29, the rest of Jackson's corps was moved up frombelow, where Doubleday's and Morrow's demonstrations had until now keptit. 

A. P. Hill's and Trimble's divisions were in the second and third lineson this wing; while Anderson and McLaws, the only troops of Longstreet'scorps left with the Army of Northern Virginia, held the intrenchmentsalong the river above Fredericksburg. Barksdale was in the town. Pendleton with the reserve artillery was at Massaponax. 

When, from Sedgwick's inactivity and the information received fromStuart, Lee, on Wednesday afternoon, had been led to suspect that themain attack might be from the columns crossing above, he had immediatelyordered Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville with Wright's brigade, andwith Mahone and Posey from United-States Ford, so soon as that positionwas compromised, leaving a few companies there to dispute its possessionas long as possible. 

We have seen how Anderson engaged Meade near Chancellorsville as thelatter advanced, and then retired to a position near Mine-Run road. Herewas the crest of a hill running substantially north and south. Gen. Leehad already selected this line; and Col. Smith, his chief engineer, haddrawn up a plan of intrenchments. Anderson detailed men, who, during thenight, threw up some strong field-works. 

Late Thursday night Lee appears first fully to have matured his plan forparrying Hooker's thrust. 

Barksdale's brigade was left at Fredericksburg, where during the winterit had been doing picket-duty, to form the left of the line remainingto oppose Sedgwick. Part of Pendleton's reserve artillery was near by;while Early, commanding this entire body, held Hamilton's Crossing. He had a force of eighty-five hundred muskets, and thirty pieces ofartillery. 

The rest of his army Lee at once took well in hand, and moved out tomeet the Army of the Potomac. McLaws was hurried forward to sustainthe line taken up by Anderson. He arrived on the ground by daylight ofFriday, and went into position in rifle-pits on the right about Smith'sHill. 

Jackson, equally alert, but having a longer distance to march from theextreme right along the military road, arrived about eight A. M. , tookcommand, and, as was his wont, ordered an immediate advance, throwingOwens's regiment of cavalry forward to reconnoitre. 

Posey and Wright followed Owens on the plank road, with Alexander'sbattalion of artillery. Mahone, and Jordan's battery detached fromAlexander, marched abreast of his right, on the pike. 

McLaws followed Mahone, and Wilcox and Perry were called from Banks'sFord to sustain this column, which McLaws directed; while Jackson, following on the plank road, watched the operations of the left. 

X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY. 

So far the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac had been at Falmouth, where still remained Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff. The lastorder from this point had been on Thursday to Gen. Sedgwick, whowas therein notified that headquarters would be that night atChancellorsville; that an advance would be made Friday morning alongthe plank road (meaning probably the pike) towards Fredericksburg, to uncover Banks's Ford, thus making a shorter communicationthrough Butterfield, who would still remain at Falmouth. This ordersubstantially recapitulates former instructions, and is full of theflash and vim of an active mind, till then intent on its work andabreast of the situation. It urges on Sedgwick co-operation with theright wing, and the most vigorous pushing of the enemy. It impresseson him that both wings will be within easy communication, and ready tospring to one another's assistance. 

Slower than his adversary, and failing to follow up with vigor hisadvantage already gained, Hooker assumes command in person, andreconnoitres the ground between himself and Fredericksburg. He thenorders Meade, with Griffin, followed by Humphreys, and with threebatteries, to march along the river road to some commanding pointbetween Mott and Colin Runs; his advance to be masked by throwing outsmall parties, and his command to be in position by two P. M. , whileSykes's division, supported by Hancock's division of the Second Corps, march out the turnpike to a corresponding distance, each force thendeploying towards the other, and engaging the enemy supposed to be inthat vicinity. 

A third column, consisting of the Twelfth Corps, he orders to march bythe plank road, and to be massed near Tabernacle Church, masked in likemanner; to be in position by midday, so that the Eleventh Corps can moveup to take position a mile in its rear as reserve, by two P. M. 

French's division of the Second Corps, and one battery, are orderedto Todd's Tavern, from which detachments are to be thrown out on thevarious roads. 

The unemployed troops are massed at Chancellorsville, out of the roads. Pleasonton holds his cavalry brigade there in readiness to move. Hookerannounces his headquarters at Tabernacle Church as soon as the movementopens. 

Immediately after (11. 30 A. M. , Friday, ) Sedgwick is directed to threatenan attack at one P. M. , in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing, toascertain whether the enemy is hugging his defences in full force. A corps is to be used with proper supports, but nothing more than ademonstration to be made. If certain that the enemy is there in force, Sedgwick is to make no attack. 

Sedgwick did not receive this order until about five P. M. , butnevertheless made a display in force of Reynolds's corps, with Newtonand Brooks in support. But a countermand was soon received, and thetroops withdrawn. 

As Hooker supposed his enemy to be in line somewhere midway betweenChancellorsville and Fredericksburg, the purpose of these orders toSedgwick is not plain. Meade, Sykes, and Slocum were ordered to attackthe enemy when met. Sedgwick could aid such an attack by pushing theforce in his front at Hamilton's. But a mere demonstration to find outwhether the heights were strongly held could have no effect upon thereal advance, nor procure Hooker any timely information. 

The movement of the three columns out of the Wilderness begins at elevenA. M. It is in accordance with the declared plans of Hooker, and withsound policy. For Chancellorsville is of all places the worst in whichto deliver or accept a general engagement, and every mile's advancetowards Fredericksburg brings the army into more open ground. 

Meade, with Griffin and Humphreys, advances on the river road to withina short distance of Banks's Ford, near Decker's farm. He can easilyseize the ford, the possession of which lessens the distance betweenthe wings by six miles. It is the objective Hooker has had in view eversince the movement began. He is preparing to deploy towards Sykes. 

Sykes, --to quote Warren, --"on gaining the ridge about a mile and aquarter from Chancellorsville, found the enemy advancing, and drivingback our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up andfiring almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, whichformed the enemy's advance. Gen. Sykes moved forward in double-quicktime, attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss, tillhe had gained the position assigned him. "

This is a crest in front of the heavy forest, and in range of Anderson'srifle-pits. The Federal skirmishers are the Seventeenth United-StatesInfantry, supported by Burbank's brigade. 

McLaws is in his front, and deploys across the pike, Semmes on the leftof the road, Mahone, Perry, and Wofford on the right. Jordan's batteryis posted on the Mine road. 

Sykes brings up Weed's battery, and opens on Semmes, and drives in hisskirmishers, but can make no serious impression on his line. McLawssends word to Jackson that Sykes is attacking in force, and that thecountry is favorable for a flank attack. 

Jackson orders Kershaw through the woods to join Semmes's left, andsends Wilcox up the Mine road to extend the Confederate right, and headoff a Federal advance from this direction. 

Sykes thus finds himself overlapped on both flanks. He throws Ayres'sregular brigade out on his left, and the One Hundred and Forty-sixth NewYork on his right. His position is difficult, but he determines to holdit as long as possible. 

It is noon. No sounds are heard from the parallel columns. Sykes hasto make his line very thin, but holds his ground. If supported, he canmaintain himself. 

But at this juncture he receives orders to fall back onChancellorsville, and slowly retires to McGee's; later to his oldposition, Hancock taking his place in the front line; and he nextmorning at daylight is also withdrawn, and takes up the line he retainsuntil Sunday morning. 

Slocum, in like manner on the plank road, meets Posey and Wright, and asmall affair occurs. But Wright is sent along the unfinished railroad, and outflanks him. He is also at this moment ordered to retire. 

Meade has had similar orders, and has likewise withdrawn; and Wilcox issent to Banks's Ford to hold it. 

Wright continues his movement along the railroad, as far as Welford's orCatherine's Furnace, when, finding himself beyond communication withhis superior, he, in connection with Stuart, who has been holding thispoint, determines to feel the Union line. Two regiments and abattery are thrown in along the road to Dowdall's Tavern, precededby skirmishers. Our pickets fall back, and through the dense wood theConfederates reach our line. But they are warmly received, and retire. This is six P. M. Wright now joins his division. 

Lee has arrived, and assumes command. 

Jackson's divisions, thus following up our retiring columns, bynightfall occupy a line from Mine road to Welford's Furnace. A regimentof cavalry is on the Mine road, and another on the river road asoutposts. Stuart remains at the Furnace. McLaws occupies the crest eastof Big-Meadow Swamp, and Anderson prolongs his lines westwardly. 

Let us now examine into these operations of Friday. 

This movement towards Fredericksburg was not a sudden idea of Hooker's, but the result of a carefully studied plan. In his order of April 3, to Sedgwick, he says that he proposes to assume the initiative, advancealong the plank road, and uncover Banks's Ford, and at once throwbridges across. Gen. Butterfield, in a communication to Sedgwick ofApril 30, says, "He (Hooker) expected when he left here, if he metwith no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburgto-morrow noon or shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrownight. " In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker says, "The problem was, to throw a sufficient force of infantryacross at Kelley's Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away theenemy's forces, holding the United-States and Banks's Ford, by attackingthem in the rear, and as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforcethe marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march uponthe flank of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, ifsuccessful, his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement onthe right, the left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his detaching an overwhelming force to his left. "

Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight nearBanks's Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that pointfrom below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick's crossing. 

There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness, in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville. This is, of all placesin that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the generalcommanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towardsFredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings, woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms. 

Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easiercommunication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, andadvanced against him, a retreat should have been made from imperativereasons alone. 

Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committeeon the Conduct of the War, thus: "They"--the forces on the turnpike andplank road--"had proceeded but a short distance when the head of thecolumn emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to beadvancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emergedfrom the forest at that moment" (this is a very imperfect statement ofthe facts); "but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, Iwas satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough toresist the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped indetail. " And in another place, "When I marched out on the morning of the1st of May I could get but few troops into position: the column had tomarch through narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast enoughto prevent their being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance. Onassuming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soonrepulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground. It could not live there. The roads through the forest were not unlikebridges to pass. A mile or more in advance of the position I had wouldhave placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior forces, theenemy would in all probability have been beaten. "

This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts. Listen to hissubordinates' statements. 

Gen. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with reference to this falling-back: "It was totally unexpected to me: Ithought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible. We had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them. " "AfterFriday I was apprehensive we should not have the success we hadexpected. " "I think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle aftersurprising the enemy. " "I think we should have attacked the enemyimmediately. " "I must give my opinion, since you ask me; for I have anopinion, as a military man, from the general facts I know, and that Isuppose I am obliged to express. My opinion is that we should not havebeen withdrawn, called back, on Friday afternoon. We had advanced alongthe road to Fredericksburg to attack the enemy: the troops were infine spirits, and we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to havefought the enemy there. They came out, and attacked one division of thecorps I belonged to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville. What caused Gen. Hooker to return after advancing some miles on thisgeneral position, which was about perpendicular to the plank roadleading to Fredericksburg, I am not able to say, because, being only adivision commander, the facts were not stated to me. But I have heardit said that he received some erroneous information about the enemy'sadvancing on his flank from the direction of Orange Court House. It wasmy opinion, we should have attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from the enemy. "

He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back toChancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerableconfusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got intoplace. 

Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground "produced among thesoldiers a feeling of uncertainty. "

Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:"I consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping atChancellorsville. . . . I believe, if all. . . Had pushed right down toBanks's Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. ButI have no doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen. Sedgwick. "

Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and mostuseful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on thiscampaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, whenthe latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker'sorders to retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters toexplain the importance of holding the position, which was formidable andhad great tactical advantages. Hooker yielded; but, before Warren couldget back to the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, andthe position lost. He says: "I never should have stopped atChancellorsville. I should have advanced and fought the enemy, insteadof waiting for him to attack me. The character of the country was thegreat reason for advancing. "

And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Armyof the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertaintyengendered by the withdrawal from Jackson's front on this unlucky day. 

A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Fridayevening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making theadvance again. Warren says: "I was in favor of advancing, and urged itwith more zeal than convincing argument. " But Hooker held to his ownopinion. He could not appreciate the weakness of assuming the defensivein the midst of the elan of a successful advance. 

It is not difficult to state what Hooker should have done. He had adefinite plan, which was to uncover and use Banks's Ford. He should havegone on in the execution of this plan until arrested by superior force, or until something occurred to show that his plan was inexpedient. Toretire from an enemy whom you have gone out to attack, and whom youhave already placed at a disadvantage, before striking a blow, is weakgeneralship indeed. 

Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville at noon Thursday. Lee was stillin Fredericksburg. The troops were able to march many miles fartherwithout undue taxing. They should have been pushed out that afternoonto the open ground and to Banks's Ford. To fail in this, was the firstgreat error of the campaign. There had not been a moment's delay allowedfrom the time the troops reached the river until they were massedat Chancellorsville, and the proposed movement nearly completed. Onecontinued pressure, never let up, had constantly been exerted by theheadquarters of the army. The troops had been kept in constant movementtowards Banks's Ford. Hooker had all but reached his goal. Suddenlyoccurred a useless, unexplained pause of twenty-four hours. And itwas during this unlucky gap of time that Lee occupied the ground whichHooker's cavalry could have seized, and which should have been held atall hazards. 

Nor is this error excusable from ignorance of the terrain. For Hookerhad shown his knowledge of the importance of celerity; and his owndeclared plan made Banks's Ford, still a half-dozen miles distant, hisone objective. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War, he thus refers to his plan: "As soon as Couch's divisions andSykes's corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, in thefirst instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks's Ford, whichwas six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closercommunication with the left wing of the army. " And if the troops hadneeded repose, a few hours would have sufficed; and, the succeedingnight being clear moonlight, a forward movement was then entirelyfeasible. 

Dating from this delay of Thursday, every thing seemed to go wrong. 

More curious still is Hooker's conduct on Friday, when his three columnscame into presence of the enemy. What every one would have expectedof Fighting Joe was, that at this supreme moment his energy would haverisen to its highest pitch. It was a slight task to hold the enemy for afew hours. Before ordering the columns back, Hooker should have gonein person to Sykes's front. Here he would have shortly ascertained thatJackson was moving around his right. What easier than to leave a strongenough force at the edge of the Wilderness, and to move by his lefttowards Banks's Ford, where he already had Meade's heavy column? Thiswould have kept his line of communication with United-States Fordopen, and, while uncovering Banks's Ford, would at the same time turnJackson's right. It is not as if such a movement carried him away fromhis base, or uncovered his communications. It was the direct way topreserve both. 

But at this point Hooker faltered. Fighting Joe had reached theculminating desire of his life. He had come face to face with his foe, and had a hundred and twenty thousand eager and well-disciplined menat his back. He had come to fight, and he--retreated without crossingswords. 

XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nordefence. The ground was not open enough for artillery, except downthe few roads, and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless. Infantry could not advance steadily in line. The ground was such inHooker's front, that Lee could manoeuvre or mass his troops unseen byhim. Our own troops were so located, that to re-enforce any portionof the line, which might be attacked, with sufficient speed, wasimpossible. 

Anderson (as has been stated) had been ordered by Lee to holdChancellorsville; but after examination of the ground, and consultationwith Mahone and Posey, he concluded to transcend his instructions, andretired to the junction of Mine Road and the turnpike. He assumed thatthe superiority of this latter ground would excuse his failure to holdhis position in the Wilderness. 

Gen. Hancock says: "I consider that the position at Chancellorsvillewas not a good one. It was a flat country, and had no local militaryadvantages. "

And the testimony of all our general officers is strongly to the sameeffect. 

The position to which Hooker retired was the same which the troops, wearied with their march of Thursday, had taken up without anyexpectation of fighting a battle there. Hooker had desired to contracthis lines somewhat after Friday's check; but the feeling that fartherretreat would still more dishearten the men, already wondering at thisunexplained withdrawal, and the assurance of the generals on the rightthat they could hold it against any force the enemy could bring againsttheir front, decided him in favor of leaving the line as it was, and ofstrengthening it by breastworks and abattis. 

Having established his troops in position, Hooker further strengthenedhis right wing at Chancellorsville to the detriment of his left belowFredericksburg; and at 1. 55 A. M. , Saturday, ordered all the bridges atFranklin's Crossing, and below, to be taken up, and Reynolds's corps tomarch at once, with pack-train, to report at headquarters. 

This corps reached him Saturday night, and was deployed upon the extremeright of the new position then being taken up by the army. 

The line as now established lay as follows:--

Meade held the left, extending from a small bluff near Scott's Dam onthe Rappahannock, and covering the roads on the river, along a crestbetween Mine and Mineral Spring Runs towards and within a short mile ofChancellorsville. 

This crest was, however, commanded from several points on the east, and, according to the Confederate authorities, appeared to have beencarelessly chosen. Meade's front, except at the extreme river-flank, wascovered by impenetrable woods. The Mine road intersected his left flank, and the River road was parallel to and a mile in his front. 

Couch joined Meade's right, and extended southerly to Chancellorsville, with Hancock thrown out on his front, and facing east, astride the Riverroad, and up to and across the old turnpike; his line being formed southof this road and of the Chancellor clearing. The division of French, ofCouch's corps, was held in reserve along the United-States Ford road. 

From here to Dowdall's Tavern the line made a southerly sweep outwards, like a bent bow, of which the plank road was the string. 

As far as Hazel Grove, at the centre of the bow, Slocum's Twelfth Corpsheld the line, Geary's division joining on to Couch, and Williams onthe right. From Slocum's right to the extreme right of the army, theEleventh Corps had at first been posted; but Hooker determined onSaturday morning that the line was too thin here, and thrust Birney'sdivision of the Third Corps in between Slocum and Howard. The rest ofthe Third Corps was in reserve, massed in columns of battalions, inBullock's clearing, north of the Chancellor house, with its batteries atthe fork of the roads leading to the United-States and Ely's Fords. 

Towards sunset of Friday, Birney had advanced a strong line ofskirmishers, and seized a commanding position in his front. Birney'sline then lay along the crest facing Scott's Run from Dowdall's toSlocum's right. 

Pleasonton's cavalry brigade was massed at headquarters, ready for dutyat any point. 

Howard held the line, from Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellor's) tobeyond Talley's farm on the old pike, with his right flank substantiallyin the air, and with two roads, the main thoroughfares from east towest, striking in on his right, parallel to his position. 

As will be noticed from the map, the right, being along the pike, wasslightly refused from the rest of the line, considering the latter asproperly lying along the road to headquarters. From Dowdall's west, the rise along the pike was considerable, and at Talley's the crest washigh. The whole corps lay on the watershed of the small tributaries ofthe Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. 

As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as theWilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstaclewhich superiority in numbers could not overcome. And a heavyforce, massed in the clearing at Dowdall's as a point d'appui, wasindispensable to safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the groundafforded nothing for this flank to lean upon. 

Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, havingwithdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, aftersurprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, earlyon Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in theforces under his command. 

The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of greatnatural strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangledunder-growth, behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis, and approached by few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And, whileit is true that the position was difficult to carry by direct assault, full compensation existed in other tactical advantages to the armytaking the offensive. It is not probable that Lee, in Hooker's place, would have selected such ground. "Once in the wood, it was difficultto tell any thing at one hundred yards. Troops could not march withoutinextricable confusion. " Despite which fact, however, the density ofthese very woods was the main cause of Lee's success. 

In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent. As in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, andpeculiarly so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, orbeen forced to choose by Friday's easily accepted check. There were nodebouches for throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume theoffensive. There was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were likea heavy curtain in his front. His left wing was placed so as to be ofabsolutely no value. His right flank was in the air. One of the roadson which he must depend for retreat was readily assailable by the enemy. And he had in his rear a treacherous river, which after a few hours'rain might become impassable, with but a single road and ford secured tohim with reasonable certainty. 

And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantableover-estimates of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not thisreason to allege for having retired to await Lee's attack. For he hadjust received excellent information from Richmond, to the effect thatLee's rations amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seenthat he told Slocum, on Thursday, that his column of nearly fortythousand men was much stronger than any force Lee could detach againsthim. Hooker acknowledges as much in his testimony before the Committeeon the Conduct of the War, when, in answer to the question, "Whatportion of the enemy lay between you and Gen. Sedgwick?" he replied:--

"Lee's army at Fredericksburg numbered sixty thousand, not including theartillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying theposts at Culpeper and Gordonsville. I think my information on this pointwas reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. Theenemy left eight thousand men to occupy the lines about Fredericksburg;Jackson marched off to my right with twenty-five thousand; and Lee hadthe balance between me and Sedgwick. "

It will be well to remember this acknowledgment, when we come to dealwith Hooker's theories of the force in his own front on Sunday andMonday. 

XII. JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE. 

Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plankroad, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw thatit was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by directassault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissancetowards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, nomention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of theFederal reports. 

It is not improbable that Lee received information, crude but useful, about this portion of our army, from some women belonging to Dowdall'sTavern. When the Eleventh Corps occupied the place on Thursday, a watchwas kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between thecorps breaking camp to move out to Slocum's support on Friday morning, and its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared. This fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard. 

However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtlessascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of makinga stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that itsposition was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasonedjustly that Hooker, in canvassing the events of Friday, would mostprobably look for an attack on his left or front. 

Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federalrations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed thesituation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested amovement with his entire corps around Hooker's right flank, to seizeUnited-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac. This hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mentionas Jackson's, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederateauthorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced withdash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave "the greatflanker" twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, hisassistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning report)with which to make a march which must at best take all day, constantlyexposing his own flank to the Federal assault. It separated for a stilllonger time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving Lee with onlyAnderson's and McLaws's divisions, --some seventeen thousand men, --withwhich to resist the attack of thrice that number, which Hooker, shouldhe divine this division of forces, could throw against him, the while hekept Jackson busy with the troops on his own right flank. 

On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting adefensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Armyof the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remainquiet during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee's engrossing hisattention by constant activity in his front, the stratagem mightsucceed. And in case of failure, each wing had open ground and goodroads for retreat, to form a junction towards Gordonsville. 

Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presenceof a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the veryaggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson's formerflank attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders toproceed to its immediate execution. 

For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twicehis strength, Lee is not entitled to commendation. It is justifiableonly--if at all--by the danger of the situation, which required adesperate remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it. Hadit resulted disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have beena serious blow to Lee's military prestige. The "nothing venture, nothinghave" principle applies to it better than any maxim of tactics. 

Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with somelocal guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with thegreatest speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at onHooker's right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, withRodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, in the advance, and A. P. Hillbringing up the rear. 

Jackson's route lay through the woods, along the road on which restedLee's line. His corps, since Friday's manoeuvres, was on the left; and, as he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fillthe gap, first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of theplank road, and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at theFurnace, Mahone's brigade. 

This wood-road led to Welford's or Catherine's Furnace, from which placea better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock(or Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches, each of which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart. 

Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, forthe passage of his artillery and trains. In many places the bottom, nonetoo reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, that it hadto be corduroyed to pull the guns through. But these men were used tomarches of unequalled severity, and their love for their leader made nowork too hard when "Old Jack" shared it with them. And although they hadalready been marching and fighting continuously for thirty hours, thiscircuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully done, with an alacritynothing but willing and courageous hearts, and a blind belief that theywere outwitting their enemy, could impart. 

His progress was masked by Stuart, who interposed his cavalry betweenJackson and the Union lines, and constantly felt of our skirmishers andpickets as he slowly kept abreast with the marching column. 

At the Furnace comes in another road, which, a short distance above, forks so as to lead to Dowdall's Tavern on the left, and to touch theUnion lines by several other branches on the right. It was this roaddown which Wright and Stuart had advanced the evening before in theirattack on our lines. 

Here, in passing Lewis's Creek (Scott's Run) and some elevated groundnear by, the column of Jackson had to file in full view of the Uniontroops, barely a mile and a half away. The movement was thus fullyobserved by us, hundreds of field-glasses pointing steadily at hiscolumns. 

It seems somewhat strange that Jackson should have made this march, intended to be quite disguised, across the Furnace-clearing. For therewas another equally short route, making a bend southward through thewoods, and, though possibly not so good as the one pursued, subsequentlyfound available for the passage of Jackson's trains, when driven fromthe Furnace by Sickles. It is probably explained, however, by the factthat this route, selected during the night, was unfamiliar to Jackson, and that his aides and guides had not thought of the point where thetroops were thus put en evidence. And Jackson may not have been with thehead of the column. 

So early as eight o'clock Birney of the Third Corps, whose division hadbeen thrust in between Howard and Slocum, reported to Sickles that amovement in considerable force was being made in our front. Sicklesconveyed the information to Hooker, who instructed him to investigatethe matter in person. Sickles pushed out Clark's rifled battery, witha sufficient support, to shell the passing column. This, says Sickles, obliged it to abandon the road. It was observed that the column wasa large one, and had a heavy train. Sickles considered it either amovement for attack on our right, or else one in retreat. If the former, he surmised at the time that he had arrested it; if the latter, that thecolumn had taken a more available route. 

It was while Rodes was filing past the Furnace that the first attack byClark's battery was made; and Col. Best, with the Twenty-third GeorgiaRegiment, was sent out beyond the Furnace to hold the road. Bestsubsequently took position in and about the Furnace buildings, andplaced some troops in the railroad cutting south. 

Sickles, meanwhile, had again reported to Hooker, and been instructedto strengthen his reconnoissance. But it was noon before this order wasgiven, and he was then advised to push out with great caution. He askedfor the whole of Birney's division, and another one in support. Withthese he thought to get possession of the road on which the enemy wasmoving, and, if it was a retreat, cut him off; if a flank movement, thrust himself in between the two bodies of the enemy. Hooker accordedthis request; and Birney was advanced a mile and a half through thewoods, bridging two or three arms of Scott's Run, and some marshyground, and making his way with great difficulty. Two regiments ofBerdan's sharpshooters were thrown out in front, and the TwentiethIndiana Infantry led Birney's division. Considerable oppositionwas encountered, say the reports of these regiments; but after someskirmishing, Berdan managed to surround Best's command, and capturednearly the entire force. 

Why Birney advanced through the woods is not readily understood; forthere was a good road close by his position, leading to the Furnace, byusing which many hours could have been saved. 

From the prisoners of the Twenty-third Georgia, and some othersintercepted, it was clearly ascertained, by two P. M. , that Jackson wasmoving towards our right flank, with, as the prisoners stated, someforty thousand men. 

These facts Sickles also reported to Hooker, requesting Pleasonton'scavalry, and his own third division, to cooperate in a flank attack, which he seems to have assumed he could make on Jackson. Hooker orderedWhipple up into supporting distance to Birney, with instructions toconnect the latter with Slocum; and directed Williams (Slocum's rightdivision) to cover the left of the advancing column, and if necessaryattack the enemy there. Howard received instructions from Capt. Moore, who had been announced in general orders as on Hooker's staff, tocover Birney's right; and he detached his reserve brigade, the best andlargest in the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Barlow, and led it out inperson to its position. 

Hooker subsequently denied having sent Capt. Moore to Howard, allegingthe order to have emanated from Sickles; but, as Capt. Moore was onHooker's staff, Howard certainly could do no less than he did, supposingthe order to be by authority from headquarters. 

Sickles now imagined that every thing promised the most brilliantsuccess. He was preparing to make his attack, as he supposed, --to judge, at least, from what he says, --on Jackson's flank. "McLaws's oppositionhad all but ceased, " says he; "and it was evident that in a few momentsfive or six regiments would be cut off, and fall into our hands. "

But Sickles had been deceived by a simple rear-guard of the enemy; whileJackson, by a long circuit, was not only far beyond his reach, but inposition to crush Howard, and cut off Sickles from communication withthe rest of the army. 

Pleasonton, whom Hooker had sent out to Sickles's aid, held his threeregiments and Martin's horse-battery, in the clearing at Scott's Run, being unable to operate to any advantage on the ground occupied byBirney. Three or four other Third-Corps batteries were also here for asimilar reason. 

When Sickles's attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-thirdGeorgia, was made, Col. Brown's battalion of Confederate artilleryhappened to be within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson, and placed on a cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting. Here, gathering a few detached companies in support, he opened smartly uponSickles. The latter, bearing in mind his orders impressing caution inhis advance, was for the moment checked, long enough, at all events, toenable Jackson's trains to get out of reach by the lower road. 

Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown's fire becamequite annoying. He accordingly placed Livingstone's, and afterwardsRandolph's, batteries in position, and spent some time in silencingthe Confederate guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward hisskirmishers, and occupied Welford's house, while Graham, with fourregiments, got possession of the railroad cutting. 

By this time Jackson's troops had passed a couple of miles beyond theFurnace; but on hearing of Sickles's attack, and the capture of anentire regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptlyretraced his steps with his own and Thomas's brigades, and supportedBrown's excellent work. So soon as the trains had got well along, thesetwo brigades rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard wasundertaken by Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson orderedout, and threw across his own left flank to engage the attention ofSickles's column. 

Jackson's divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles fromSickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force. Jacksonhad marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road. When he reached theOrange plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observethe position of the Union lines. Riding up alone, so as not to attractattention, after--as Cooke affirms--driving the Federal cavalry from thespot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was notyet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops fartheralong the Brock road to the old turnpike. 

But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Paxton, along theplank road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discoveredand met. 

By four P. M. He had reached the right and rear of the Union line;while Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortableheadquarters at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state, retaining just enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under thecircumstances, were the most unfortunate possible. 

For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow's brigade, the onlygeneral reserve of the "key of his position, " as himself has called it, and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple, and protected on the left by Williams; but about five P. M. He orderedGeary from his position on Slocum's left, to move forward, and make anattack down the plank road. This order Geary carried out in personwith several regiments. He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and wasconsiderably advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered toreturn to his position. 

Hooker's right flank, of less than ten thousand men, was thus isolatedfrom the rest of the army, with no supports within two miles. 

And yet the full evidence of Jackson's whereabouts was before him. Therehad been a constant feeling of the Union lines (by Stuart's cavalry andsome infantry skirmishers) all day, gradually working from east to west. This fact was noticed by many officers, and is particularly referred toby Pleasonton, Warren, and Howard. Jackson's columns and trains had beenstrongly reconnoitred, their force estimated, and their direction noted. The question as to what might be the objective of such a movement, hadbeen the main topic of discussion during the day throughout the right ofthe army. 

At noon a cavalry picket on the plank road was driven in, and gavenotice of the passing of a heavy column a mile beyond our lines. About3. 30 P. M. The leading divisions of Jackson's corps, arriving on the oldturnpike, sent a party forward to feel our lines, and a ten-minutes'skirmish resulted, when the Confederate party withdrew. There had been anumber of minor attacks on our outlying pickets, some of them occurringwhen Gen. Howard was present. All these facts were successively reportedto headquarters. 

About the same time two men, sent out as spies, came in, and reportedthe enemy crossing the plank road on our right, in heavy columns. These men were despatched by Howard to Hooker, with instructions to theofficer accompanying them to see that Hooker promptly received theirinformation. On the other hand, a half-hour before Jackson's attackcame, Howard sent a couple of companies of cavalry out the plank road toreconnoitre. These men, from negligence or cowardice, failed to go farenough to ascertain the presence of Jackson, and returned and reportedall quiet. This report was, however, not forwarded to Hooker. 

There was not an officer or man in the Eleventh Corps that afternoon whodid not discuss the possibility of an attack in force on our right, andwonder how the small body thrown across the road on the extreme flankcould meet it. And yet familiar with all the facts related, for thatthey were reported to him there is too much cumulative evidence todoubt, and having inspected the line so that he was conversant withits situation, Hooker allowed the key of his position to depend upon ahalf-brigade and two guns, facing the enemy, while the balance of thewing, absolutely in the air, turned its back upon the general whoseattack was never equalled for its terrible momentum during our war, orexcelled in any, and whose crushing blows had caused the brave old Armyof the Potomac more than once to stagger. 

Moreover, the "key of the position" was confided to a corps which wasnot properly part of the Army of the Potomac, and untried as yet. Fornot only had the Eleventh Corps, as a corps, seen no active service, butthe most of its regiments were made up of raw troops, and the elementsof which the corps was composed were to a degree incongruous. Of itselfthis fact should have caused Hooker to devote serious attention to hisright flank. 

XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES. 

Hooker and Sickles have both stated that the plan of the former was toallow this movement of Jackson's to develop itself: if it was a retreat, to attack the column at the proper time; if a tactical flank movement, to allow it to be completed, and then thrust himself between thetwo wings of Lee's army, and beat them in detail. This admirablegeneralization lacked the necessary concomitant of intelligent andspeedy execution. 

Now, Hooker had his choice between two theories of this movement ofJackson. It was a retreat from his front, either because Lee deemedhimself compromised, or for the purpose of making new strategiccombinations; or it was the massing of troops for a flank attack. Itcould mean nothing else. Let us, then, do Hooker all the justice thesituation will allow. 

All that had occurred during the day was fairly explainable on theformer hypothesis. If Jackson was passing towards Culpeper, he wouldnaturally send flanking parties out every road leading from the one hisown columns were pursuing, towards our lines, for strictly defensivepurposes. The several attacks of the day might have thus occurred. Thisassumption was quite justifiable. 

And this was the theory of Howard. He knew that Hooker had all theinformation obtained along the entire line, from prisoners and scouts. He naturally concluded, that if there was any reasonable suppositionthat an attack from the west was intended, Hooker would in some wayhave notified him. But, far from doing this, Hooker had inspected andapproved his position, and had ordered Howard's reserve away. To besure, early in the morning, Hooker had told him to guard againstan attack on the right: but since then circumstances had absolutelychanged; Barlow had been taken from him, and he conjectured that thedanger of attack had passed. How could he assume otherwise?

Had he suspected an attack down the pike, had he received half an hour'swarning, he could, and naturally would, assuming the responsibility ofa corps commander, have changed front to rear so as to occupy with hiscorps the line along the east side of the Dowdall's clearing, which hehad already intrenched, and where he had his reserve artillery. He didnot do so; and it is more easy to say that he was to blame, than to showgood cause for the stigma cast upon him for the result of this day. 

However much Hooker's after-wit may have prompted him to deny it, hisdespatch of 4. 10 P. M. , to Sedgwick, shows conclusively that he himselfhad adopted this theory of a retreat. "We know that the enemy isflying, " says he, "trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisionsare among them. "

And it is kinder to Hooker's memory to assume that he did not apprehenda flank attack on this evening. If he did, his neglect of his positionwas criminal. Let us glance at the map. 

We know how the Eleventh Corps lay, its reserve removed, with which itmight have protected a change of front, should this become necessary, and itself facing southerly. What was on its left, to move up to itssupport in case of an attack down the pike? Absolutely not a regimentbetween Dowdall's and Chancellorsville, and near the latter place onlyone division available. This was Berry's, still luckily massed in theopen north of headquarters. And to Sickles's very deliberate movementalone is due the fact that Berry was still there when the attack onHoward burst; for Sickles had bespoken Berry's division in support ofhis own advance just at this juncture. 

Birney, who was the prop of Howard's immediate left, had been advancednearly two miles through the thickets to the south to attack animaginary enemy. Whipple had followed him. Of Slocum's corps, Williamshad been sent out "two or three miles, " to sweep the ground in hisfront, and Geary despatched down the plank road "for the purpose ofcutting off the train of the enemy, who was supposed to be in retreattowards Gordonsville. " To oppose the attack of a column of not far fromtwenty-five thousand men, there was thus left a brigade front of foursmall regiments, and the flank of a corps of eight thousand men more, without reserves, and with no available force whatever for its support, should it be overwhelmed. 

Is any criticism needed upon this situation? And who should beresponsible for it?

In a defensive battle it is all-important that the general in commandshould hold his troops well in hand, especially when the movements ofthe enemy can be concealed by the terrain. The enemy is allowed hischoice of massing for an attack on any given point: so that theability to concentrate reserve troops on any threatened point is anindispensable element of safety. It may be assumed that Hooker was, atthe moment of Jackson's attack, actually taking the offensive. But onthis hypothesis, the feebleness of his advance is still more worthy ofcriticism. For Jackson was first attacked by Sickles as early as nineA. M. ; and it was six P. M. Before the latter was ready to move upon theenemy in force. Such tardiness as this could never win a battle. 

While all this had been transpiring on the right, Lee, to keep hisopponent busy, and prevent his sending re-enforcements to the flankJackson was thus threatening, had been continually tapping at the linesin his front. But, owing to the small force left with him, he confinedthis work to Hooker's centre, where he rightly divined his headquartersto be. About seven A. M. The clearing at Chancellorsville was shelled bysome of Anderson's batteries, obliging the trains there parked to go tothe rear into the woods. 

Hancock states that the enemy frequently opened with artillery, and madeinfantry assaults on his advanced line of rifle-pits, but was alwayshandsomely repulsed. "During the sharp contests of that day, the enemywas never able to reach my principal line of battle, so stoutly andsuccessfully did Col. Miles (who commanded the advanced line) contestthe ground. "

Col. Miles says his line was constantly engaged skirmishing with theenemy during the day. At about three P. M. The Confederates massed troopsin two columns, one on each side the road, flanked by a line some eighthundred yards long, in the woods. An impetuous charge was made to withintwenty yards of the abattis, but it was baffled by our sturdy front. 

Sickles, then still in reserve, had made a reconnoissance early onSaturday, in Hancock's front, with the Eleventh Massachusetts andTwenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, covered by some sharpshooters;had driven in the enemy's pickets, and found him, to all appearances, inforce. This was Anderson's line. 

The Twelfth Corps had also made a reconnoissance down the plank roadlater in the day, but with no immediate results. 

All that was accomplished was a mere feeling of the other's lines byeither force. Hooker vainly endeavored to ascertain Lee's strengthat various places in his front. Lee, to good purpose, strove to amuseHooker by his bustle and stir, to deceive him as to the weakness of hisforce, and to gain time. 

During the afternoon of Saturday, Hooker had a rare chance of redeeminghis error made, the day before, in withdrawing from the open country tothe Wilderness, and of dealing a fatal blow to his antagonist. He knewthat Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, was struggling throughdifficult roads towards his right. Whatever his object, the division ofLee's forces was a fact. He knew that there could be left in his frontnot more than an equal number. It was actually less than eighteenthousand men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee's strength, couldnot estimate it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation hecould make. Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready tomass on any given point. He ought to have known that Lee was tooastute a tactician seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson wasmanoeuvring to gain his right. And all Lee's conduct during the day waspalpable evidence that he was seeking to gain time. 

However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating, hewas bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as hedid Jackson's whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery. Had he thrown theentire Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above indicated, to arrest or retard an attack if made; had he drawn troops from Meadeon the extreme left, where half an hour's reconnoitring would have shownthat nothing was in his front, and from Couch's reserves in the centre;had he thrown heavy columns out where Birney was, to prevent there-union of Jackson and Lee, and to make a determined attack uponthe latter's left while Hancock pressed him in front, --half the vigordisplayed in the early days of this movement would have crushed theArmy of Northern Virginia beyond recovery for this campaign. Lee's onlysalvation would have lain in instant withdrawal from our front, and aretreat towards Gordonsville to re-unite with his lieutenant. 

However he might have disposed his forces for an attack on Saturdayafternoon, he could have committed no mistake as great as the half-waymeasures which have been narrated. And if the heavy fighting of Sundayhad been done the day before with any thing like the dispositionssuggested, it could have scarcely failed of brilliant success for theArmy of the Potomac. 

But six o'clock came: Hooker still lay listlessly awaiting an attack, with his forces disjointedly lodged, and with no common purpose ofaction; and Jackson had gathered for his mighty blow. 

It is but fair to give weight to every circumstance which shall moderatethe censure attributable to Hooker for his defeat in this campaign. Early in the morning, after his inspection of the lines on the right, which was made with thoroughness, and after receipt of the first newsof the movement of troops across our front, Hooker issued the followingcircular:--

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA. , May 2, 1863, 9. 30 A. M. 

MAJOR-GEN. SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GEN. HOWARD. 

I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that thedisposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a frontattack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, hewishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the positions youwill take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him inwhatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserveswell in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does notappear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming havebeen thrown up; and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at thatpoint, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as mightbe. 

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as maybe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach. 

 JAMES H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

Although addressed to Slocum as well as Howard, this order scarcelyapplied with much force to the former, who occupied the right centre ofthe army, with Birney lying between him and the Eleventh Corps. Howardcarried out his part of these instructions as well as circumstancesallowed. He posted Barlow's brigade, his largest and best, on theBuschbeck line, in position for a general reserve for the corps, andtook advantage of the ground in a manner calculated to strengthen hisflank, and to enable it to cover a change of front if necessary; heplaced his reserve artillery on the right of the rifle-pits runningacross the road at Dowdall's; he located several regiments on Dowdall'sclearing so as to wheel to the west or south as might be required;Major Hoffman was set to work, and spent the entire day locating andsupervising the construction of field-works; and generally, Howarddisposed the forces under his command after a fashion calculated tooppose a stubborn resistance to attacks down the pike, should they bemade. 

Later on in the day, we have seen how Hooker's aide, Capt. Moore, ordered this brigade of Barlow's away from its all-important position. We have seen Hooker's dispositions of the Third and Twelfth Corps. Wehave seen Hooker's 4. 10 P. M. Order to Sedgwick. No room is left to doubtthat Hooker's opinion, if he had any, underwent a change after issuingthese instructions, and that he gave up the idea of an attack upon theright. His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing Howard that hehad done so. 

But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during theafternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough? If hesupposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right, was it notthe duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the threatenedflank was properly protected, --that the above order was carried out ashe intended it should be? No attack sufficient to engross his attentionhad been made, or was particularly threatened elsewhere; anda ten-minutes' gallop would bring him from headquarters to thequestionable position. He had some excellent staff-officers--Gen. Warrenamong others--who could have done this duty; but there is no evidenceof any one having been sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that noinspection by, or by the order of, Gen. Hooker was made during the day, after the one in the early morning. 

It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended rightthe evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that positioncould be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true. But when half his enemy's forces, after this disposition was made, aremoved to and massed on his right, and have actually placed themselveswhere they can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to urge thisplea? Hooker claims that his "instructions were utterly and criminallydisregarded. " But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote militaryroutine, must hold him accountable for the removal of Barlow (for howcan a general shelter himself from the consequences of the acts of hissubordinates, when these acts are in pursuance of orders received fromhis own aide-de-camp?), and himself acknowledges the disposition made ofSickles and Slocum, can the facts be fairly said to sustain the charge?There was, moreover, so much bitterness exhibited after this campaign, that, had the facts in the slenderest degree warranted such action, formal charges would assuredly have been brought against Howard and hisdivision commanders, on the demand alike of the commander-in-chief and adisappointed public. 

XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. 

Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference toan attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike andthe plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs theturnpike, and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of theRappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the rightby some high and easily-defended ground near Talley's. 

Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He hasless than four thousand men under his command. Von Gilsa's brigade has, until this morning, been half a mile farther out the pike, and acrossthe road; but on receipt of Hooker's 9. 30 order has been withdrawn, andnow lies with two regiments astride and north of the pike, some distancebeyond Talley's, the rest skirting the south of it. His right regimentleans upon that portion of the Brock road which is the prolongation ofthe eastern branch, and which, after crossing the plank road and pike, bears north-westerly, and loses itself in the woods where formerly wasan old mill. McLean's brigade prolongs von Gilsa's line towards Schurz. Dieckman's battery has two pieces trained westerly down the pike, andfour on Devens's left, covering, near Talley's Hill, the approachesfrom the plank road. Devens has the Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth OhioVolunteers as a reserve, near the pike. 

Schurz's (third) division continues this line on the edge of the woodsto Dowdall's. His front hugs the eastern side of the clearing betweenthe pike and the plank road, thence along the latter to the fork. Schimmelpfennig's brigade is on the right, adjoining Devens;Krzyzanowski's on the left. Three regiments of the former are on theline, and two in reserve: the latter has two regiments on the line, andtwo in reserve. On Schurz's right wing, the troops are shut in betweenthick woods and their rifle-pits, with no room whatever to manoeuvreor deploy. This condition likewise applies to many of the regiments inDevens's line. The pike is the means of inter-communication, runningback of the woods in their rear. Dilger's battery is placed nearDowdall's, at the intersection of the roads. 

Steinwehr considers himself the reserve division. He is more or lessmassed near Dowdall's. Buschbeck's brigade is in the clearing southof the road, but has made a line of rifle-pits across the road, facingwest, at the edge of the open ground. Two regiments are deployed, andtwo are in reserve. His other brigade, Barlow's, has been sent outnearly two miles, to protect Birney's right, leaving no general reservewhatever for the corps. Wiederich's battery is on Steinwehr's right andleft, trained south. 

Three batteries are in reserve on the line of Buschbeck's rifle-pitsrunning north and south. Barlow had been, as above stated, massed as ageneral reserve of the corps on Buschbeck's right, --the only reserve thecorps could boast, and a most necessary one. 

Two companies, and some cavalry and artillery, have been sent to thepoint where the Ely's Ford road crosses Hunting Creek. 

Devens states that his pickets were kept out a proper distance, and thathe had constant scouting-parties moving beyond them. In his report herecapitulates the various attacks made during the day. Shortly afternoon, cavalry attacked his skirmishers, but drew off. This was Stuartprotecting Jackson's flank, and feeling for our lines. Then two men, sent out from Schimmelpfennig's front, came in through his, and weredespatched to Hooker with their report that the enemy was in great forceon our flank. Later, Lieut. Davis, of Devens's staff, with a cavalryscout, was fired upon by Confederate horse. Then von Gilsa's skirmisherswere attacked by infantry, --again Stuart seeking to ascertain ourposition: after which the pickets were pushed farther out. Cavalry wasafterwards sent out, and returned with information that some Confederatetroopers, and part of a battery, were in the woods on our right. 

But all this seems to have been explained as a retreat. "The unvaryingreport was, that the enemy is crossing the plank road, and movingtowards Culpeper. "

The ground about Dowdall's is a clearing of undulating fields, closed onthree sides, and open to the west. As you stand east of the fork of theroads, you can see a considerable distance down the plank road, leadingto Orange Court House. The pike bears off to the right, and runs up hillfor half a mile, to the eminence at Talley's. 

The dispositions recited were substantially the same as those made whenthe corps arrived here on Thursday. They were, early Saturday morning, inspected by Hooker in person, and pronounced satisfactory. As herode along the line with Howard, and with each division commander insuccession, he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. His exclamationto Howard, several times repeated, as he examined the position, --hismind full of the idea of a front attack, but failing to seize the dangerof the two roads from the west, --was: "How strong! How strong!"

An hour or two later, having ascertained the Confederate movement acrossour front, he had sent his circular to Howard and Slocum. Later still, as if certain that the enemy was on the retreat, he depleted Howard'sline by the withdrawal of Barlow, and made dispositions which createdthe gap of nigh two miles on Howard's left. 

Howard, during the day, frequently inspected the line, and alldispositions were approved by him. 

And, when Barlow was ordered out to the front, both Howard and Steinwehraccompanied him. They returned to Dowdall's Tavern just as Jacksonlaunched his columns upon the Eleventh Corps. 

XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK. 

It is now six o'clock of Saturday, May 2, 1863, a lovely spring evening. The Eleventh Corps lies quietly in position. Supper-time is at hand. Arms are stacked on the line; and the men, some with accoutrements hungupon the stacks, some wearing their cartridge-boxes, are mostly at thefires cooking their rations, careless of the future, in the highestspirits and most vigorous condition. Despite the general talk during theentire afternoon, among officers and rank and file alike, of a possibleattack down the pike, all but a few are happily unsuspicious of thethunder-cloud gathering on their flank. There is a general feeling thatit is too late to get up much of a fight to-day. 

The breastworks are not very substantial. They are hastily run up out ofrails from the fences, logs from barns in the vicinity, and newly felledtrees. The ditch skirting the road has been deepened for this temporarypurpose. Abattis, to a fair extent, has been laid in front. But thewhole position faces to the south, and is good for naught else. 

Nor were our men in those days as clever with the spade as we afterwardsbecame. This is clearly shown in the defences. 

There is some carelessness apparent. Ambulances are close by the line. Ammunition-wagons and the train of pack-mules are mixed up with theregiments. Even a drove of beeves is herded in the open close by. Allthese properly belong well to the rear. Officers' servants andcamp-gear are spread abroad in the vicinity of each command, rathermore comfortably ensconced than the immediate presence of the enemy maywarrant. 

The ground in the vicinity is largely clearing. But dense woods coverthe approaches, except in some few directions southerly. Down the roadsno great distance can be seen; perhaps a short mile on the plank road, not many hundred yards on the turnpike. 

Little Wilderness Church, in the rear of the position, looks desertedand out of place. Little did its worshippers on last sabbath day imaginewhat a conflict would rage about its walls before they again could meetwithin its peaceful precincts. 

There may be some absence of vigilance on the part of the pickets andscouts; though it is not traceable in the reports, nor do any ofthe officers concerned remember such. But the advanced line is notintrenched as Miles's line in front of Hancock has been. Less care, rather than more carelessness, is all that can be observed on thisscore. 

Meanwhile Jackson has ranged his corps, with the utmost precaution andsecrecy, in three lines, at right angles to the pike, and extendingabout a mile on either side. All orders are given in a low tone. Cheering as "Old Jack" passes along is expressly prohibited. 

Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, leads, with Iverson's andRodes's brigades to the left of the road, and Doles's and Colquitt's tothe right. Rodes's orders to his brigades are to push on steadily, tolet nothing delay or retard them. Should the resistance at Talley'sHill, which Rodes expects, render necessary the use of artillery, theline is to check its advance until this eminence is carried. But topress on, and let no obstacle stand in the way, is the watchword. 

Two hundred yards in rear of the first line, Colston, commandingTrimble's division, ranges his brigades, Nichols and Jones on the left, and Colston on the right of the road; Ramseur in support. 

A. P. Hill's division is not yet all up; but, as part reaches the line, it is formed in support of Colston, the balance following in column onthe pike. 

The second and third lines are ordered to re-enforce the first asoccasion requires. 

Two pieces of Stuart's horse-artillery accompany the first line on thepike. 

The regiments in the centre of the line appear to have been formed incolumns with intervals, each brigade advancing in line of columns byregiment. The troops are not preceded by any skirmishers. The line onthe wings is probably not so much massed. It is subsequently testifiedby many in the Eleventh Corps, that the centre of the line appears toadvance en echiquier, the front companies of each line of columns firingwhile the rear columns are advancing through the intervals. 

The march through the woods up to Dowdall's clearing has not disturbedthe lines so materially as to prevent the general execution of such amanoeuvre. 

But the Confederate reports show that the regiments were all in line andnot in column. The appearance of columns was due to the fact that thesecond and third lines, under Colston and A. P. Hill, were alreadypressing up close in the rear of the first under Rodes, thus makinga mass nine deep. The intervals between regiments were accidental, occasioned by the swaying of the line to and fro as it forced its waythrough the underbrush. 

It is perhaps no more than fair to say that whatever laxity was apparentat this hour in the Eleventh Corps was by no means incompatible with areadiness to give a good account of itself if an attack should be madeupon its front. 

XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK. 

Such is the situation at six P. M. Now Jackson gives the order toadvance; and a heavy column of twenty-two thousand men, the bestinfantry in existence, as tough, hardy, and full of elan, as they areill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-looking, descends upon the Eleventh Corps, whose only ready force is four regiments, the section of a battery, anda weak line of pickets. 

The game, in which these woods still abound, startled at the unusualvisitors, fly in the advance of Jackson's line towards and acrossthe Dowdall clearing, and many a mouth waters, as fur and feather intempting variety rush past; while several head of deer speedily clearthe dangerous ground, before the bead of willing rifles can be drawnupon them. 

This sudden appearance of game causes as much jollity as wonder. All arefar from imagining its cause. 

The next sound is that of bugles giving the command, and enabling theadvancing troops to preserve some kind of alignment. At this the waryprick up their ears. Surprise stares on every face. Immediately followsa crash of musketry as Rodes sweeps away our skirmish line as it were acobweb. Then comes the long and heavy roll of veteran infantry fire, ashe falls upon Devens's line. 

The resistance which this division can make is as nothing against theweighty assault of a line moving by battalions in mass. Many of theregiments do their duty well. Some barely fire a shot. This is franklyacknowledged in many of the reports. What can be expected of new troops, taken by surprise, and attacked in front, flank, and rear, at once?Devens is wounded, but remains in the saddle, nor turns over thecommand to McLean until he has reached the Buschbeck line. He haslost one-quarter of his four thousand men, and nearly all his superiorofficers, in a brief ten minutes. 

Schurz's division is roused by the heavy firing on the right, in whicheven inexperienced ears detect something more than a mere repetitionof the picket-fight of three hours gone. Its commanding officers are atonce alert. Regimental field and staff are in the saddle, and the menbehind the stacks, leaving canteens, haversacks, cups with the steamingevening coffee, and rations at the fires. Arms are taken. Regimentsare confusedly marched and counter-marched into the most availablepositions, to meet an emergency which some one should have anticipatedand provided for. The absence of Barlow is now fatal. 

On comes Jackson, pursuing the wreck of the First division. Some ofSchurz's regiments break before Devens has passed to the rear. Othersstand firm until the victorious Confederates are upon them withtheir yell of triumph, then steadily fall back, turning and firing atintervals; but nowhere a line which can for more than a brief spaceretard such an onset. 

Down the road towards Chancellorsville, through the woods, up every sideroad and forest path, pours a stream of fugitives. Ambulances and oxen, pack-mules and ammunition-wagons, officers' spare horses mounted byrunaway negro servants, every species of the impedimenta of camp-life, commissary sergeants on all-too-slow mules, teamsters on still-harnessedteam-horses, quartermasters whose duties are not at the front, riderlesssteeds, clerks with armfuls of official papers, non-combatants of allkinds, mixed with frighted soldiers whom no sense of honor can arrest, strive to find shelter from the murderous fire. 

No organization is left in the Eleventh Corps but one brigade ofSteinwehr's division. Buschbeck has been speedily formed by a changeof front, before Devens and Schurz have left the field, in the lineof intrenchments built across the road at Dowdall's at the edge of theclearing. No sooner in place than a scattering fire by the men is openedupon friends and foes alike. Dilger's battery trains some of its gunsdown the road. The reserve artillery is already in position at the northof this line, and uses spherical case with rapidity. Howard and hisstaff are in the thickest of the fray, endeavoring to stem the tide. Aswell oppose resistance to an avalanche. 

Buschbeck's line stubbornly holds on. An occasional squad, stillclinging to the colors of its regiment, joins itself to him, ashamed offalling thus disgracefully to the rear. Officers make frantic exertionsto rally their men; useless effort. In little less than half an hourthis last stand has been swept away, and the Eleventh Corps is inconfused retreat down the pike towards headquarters, or in whateverdirection affords an outlet from the remorseless hail. 

The general confusion which reigned can scarcely be more accuratelydescribed than by detailing the experience of a single regiment. The OneHundred and Nineteenth New York Volunteers was in Schurz's division. Itwas commanded by an officer of German birth, but long since an Americancitizen. No more gallant, intelligent man wore uniform, or one betterfitted for a pattern soldier. Well read in military matters, he hadnever yet been under fire, and was nervously anxious to win his spurs. The regiment was a good one; but only three or four officers, and asmall percentage of enlisted men, had seen service. 

This regiment faced south on the pike just west of the fork in theroads. Under arms in an instant, when the firing was heard on the right, it was soon ordered by one of Schurz's aides to throw itself across thefork, and hold it at all hazards. But the suddenness of the attack hadmomentarily robbed Col. Peissner of his steadiness, for he was a gooddrill-master. Instead of facing to the right, counter-marching, filingto the left across the road, and coming to a front, --the simplest iflongest movement being the best in times of such excitement, --he facedto the left because his left was nearest to the fork, filed to the left, and then, instead of coming on the left by file into line, he movedastride the roads, and ordered "Front!" This brought the regiment inline with its back to the enemy. The men instinctively came each to anabout-face, and the file closers broke through to the now rear. Therewas no time to correct the error. The regiment, which would have foughtwell under proper circumstances, from the start lost confidence in itsofficers and itself. Still it held its ground until it had burned almosttwenty rounds, and until the Confederate line was within fifty yards inits face, and had quite outflanked it. Then the raking volleys of sucha front as Jackson was wont to present, and, more than all, the fire ofBuschbeck's brigade in its immediate rear, broke it; and it melted away, leaving only a platoon's strength around the colors, to continue for abrief space the struggle behind the Buschbeck line, while the rest fleddown the road, or through the woods away from the deadly fire. Thisregiment lost its entire color-guard, and nearly one-half of itscomplement killed or wounded. 

There is much discrepancy as to the time during which the Eleventh Corpsmade resistance to Jackson's advance. All reliable authorities putthe time of the attack as six P. M. When the last gun was fired at theBuschbeck rifle-pits, it was dusk, at that season about quarter pastseven. It seems reasonably settled, therefore, that the corps retardedthe Confederate advance over about a mile of ground for exceedingan hour. How much more can be expected of ten thousand raw troopstelescoped by twenty-five thousand veterans?

Rodes, now quite mixed with Colston's line, still pressed on, andbetween Hooker's headquarters and his elated foe there was scarce anorganized regiment. Hooker's fatal inability to grasp the situation, and his ordering an advance of all troops on Howard's left as far as theSecond Corps, had made him almost defenceless. The troops which shouldhave been available to stem this adverse tide were blindly groping inthe woods, two miles in front, --in pursuit of Jackson. 

One cannot but wonder just where Sickles expected to find Jackson. Therecan be little doubt that he did think he was about to strike Jackson'sflank. His testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the Warconstantly refers to this belief; and he says that he "was about to openhis attack in full force, " was holding Pleasonton's cavalry in hand, desiring to lead the attack with his infantry, when the news of thedisaster to the Eleventh Corps was brought to him; and that every thingseemed to indicate the most brilliant success from thus throwing himselfupon Jackson's flank and rear. He refers to McLaws being in his front, but this is an error. McLaws was on Lee's right flank, three miles away. It was with Archer of Jackson's corps, and with Posey and Wright ofAnderson's division, that he had to do. 

The reports are by no means clear as to the details of these movements. Birney states in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War, that he found that he and Barlow "had got into the midst of therebel army, the supports on the left not having come up. " He thereforeformed his command into a huge square, with the artillery in the centre, holding the road over which Jackson had passed. "The fire upon his leftflank from musketry was galling. " This came from Anderson's brigades. 

Hayman, Graham and Ward were pushed out along the road, and "foundthe enemy in some force on three sides. " This apparently shows thatBirney, --who had the immediate command of the troops in front, --wasquite uncertain of what was before him, or just what he was expected todo. 

This much is, however, clear: Jackson's small rearguard had succeeded inholding the road which he had traversed, at some point near Welford's;and here this force remained until Jackson was well along towards theplank road. Then Anderson in his turn made a diversion on the other sideof Birney, which kept the latter busy for at least a couple of hours. 

Sickles's orders were to advance cautiously. This was Hooker's doing. Hence exception cannot fairly be taken to either Birney's or Sickles'sconduct for lack of energy. But the latter must have singularlyunderrated Jackson's methods, if he thought he could strike him at agiven point, so many hours after his passage. For Jackson was firstobserved near the Furnace about eight A. M. , and Sickles was just gettingready to attack him in this same place at six P. M. 

The errors of judgment on this entire day can scarcely be attributed toany one but the general commanding. He was the one to whom all reportswere sent. He had knowledge of every thing transpiring. He it was whowas responsible for some sensible interpretation of the informationbrought him, and for corresponding action in the premises. 

So much for Sickles's advance. It could not well have been moreill-timed and useless. But his gallant work of the coming night andmorrow, when Hooker left him almost alone to resist the fierce assaultsof our victorious and elated foe, was ample compensation for hissubordinate share in the triviality and fatal issue of Saturday'smanoeuvring. Nor can blame fall upon him in as full measure as uponHooker; although he seems illy to have construed what was transpiring inhis front, and what he reported may have seriously misled his chief. 

Perhaps no officers, during our Civil War, were placed in a morelamentably awkward position than Devens, and in a less degree Schurz, on this occasion. Having been fully convinced by the events of theafternoon that an attack down the pike was highly probable, havingcarefully reported all these events to his immediate commander, Devenswas left without inspection, counsel, or help. He might have gone inperson to Howard, but he did not dare leave his division. He might havesent messages which more urgently represented his own anxiety. But whenthe blow came, he did all that was possible, and remained, wounded, in command, and assisted in re-organizing some relics of his divisionbehind the Buschbeck works. 

Schurz was with Howard a good part of the day, and his opinions wereexpressed to that officer. To Schurz's personal bearing here, or on anyother occasion, no possible exception can be taken. 

XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. 

There can be no attempt to gainsay that the Eleventh Corps, onthis luckless Saturday, did not do its whole duty. That it waspanic-stricken, and that it decamped from a field where as a corps ithad not fought, is undeniable. But portions of the corps did fight, and the entire corps would doubtless have fought well under favorablecircumstances. It is but fair, after casting upon the corps theaspersion of flight from before the enemy, to do it what justice ispossible, and to palliate the bad conduct of the whole by bearingtestimony to the good conduct of some of its parts. 

It has been called a German corps. This is not quite exact. Of nearlythirteen thousand men in the corps, only forty-five hundred wereGermans. But it must be admitted that so many officers high in rankwere of that nationality, that the general tendency and feeling weredecidedly unlike the rest of the army. Moreover, there is not wantingtestimony to show that there were some who wore shoulder-straps in thecorps who gave evidence of having taken up the profession of arms tomake money, and not to fight. 

The artillery of the corps did well. Those general officers who mostseverely rebuke the conduct of the corps, all say a word in favor ofthe service of the guns. Dilger, on the road, just at Buschbeck's line, fired with his own hands from his last gun a round of canister when theConfederates were within a dozen yards. Most of the guns had been wellserved, but had been sent to the rear in time to save them from capture. 

The reserve artillery did its duty, nor limbered up until theConfederate line had outflanked its position, rendered it useless, andjeopardized its safety. 

All the guns that were saved were put into action an hour later, and dideffective service on the Fairview crest, in company with the artilleryof the Third and Twelfth Corps. 

At the time of the attack, which was made by Jackson without an advanceof skirmishers, Devens's reserve regiments were ordered up to supportvon Gilsa. There appears to have been something like a stand attempted;but the left wing of the Confederate line speedily enveloped von Gilsa'sfront, and showed in rear of his right flank, when his regiments meltedaway. 

Devens states in his report that a new line might have been formed onGen. Schurz's division, if the latter had maintained his ground, butacknowledges that the falling-back of his own troops "must undoubtedlyhave added to the difficulties encountered by the command of thatofficer. "

Schurz's report is very clear and good. This is partly attributableto the avalanche of abuse precipitated upon his division by the press, which called forth his detailed explanation, and an official request forpermission to publish his report. There existed a general understandingthat Schurz held the extreme right; and the newspapermen, to allappearance, took pleasure in holding a German responsible, in theirearly letters, for the origin of the panic. This error, together withthe fact of his having discussed the situation during the day with Gen. Howard, and of his having remained of the opinion that an attack on ourright was probable, accounts for the care exhibited in his statements. That he did harbor such fears is proved by his having, of his ownmotion, after the attack of three o'clock, placed the Fifty-Eighth NewYork, Eighty-Second Ohio, and Twenty-Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, nearHawkins's farm, in the north part of the Dowdall clearing, and facingwest. Still Schurz's report is only a careful summary of facts otherwisesubstantiated. He deals no more in his own opinions than a divisioncommander has a right to do. 

Schurz states that he strongly advised that the entire corps shouldtake up the Buschbeck line, not considering the woods a reliable pointd'appui. For they were thick enough to screen the manoeuvring of theenemy, but not, as the event showed, to prevent his marching throughthem to the attack. 

When the onset came, it was impossible quickly to change front. Schurz'sregiments were all hemmed in between the rifle-pits before them andthe woods in their rear. Still, more than half of the regiments of thisdivision appear to have maintained their credit, and the testimony wouldtend to show that the men burned from five to thirty rounds each. But without avail. They were telescoped. Their defences were rendereduseless. The enemy was on both sides of and perpendicular to them. Itis an open question whether, at that time, any two divisions of thearmy could have changed front and made a good defence under thesecircumstances. Later in the war our soldiers were more habituated, particularly in the West, to fighting on either side of theirbreastworks. But these were raw troops. And this was not the first, norwas it the last, panic in the Army of the Potomac. But the corps had, as ill-luck willed it, nothing in its rear to repair or conceal itsdiscomfiture. 

Buschbeck's brigade had better opportunities, and acted correspondinglybetter. It had time to occupy the rifle-pits facing west before theenemy had completed the destruction of the first and third divisions. Buschbeck's stand covered a full half-hour. He was re-enforced by manyfragments of broken regiments, holding together under such officers ashad escaped utter demoralization. The troops remained behind these worksuntil outflanked on right and left, for Jackson's front of over twomiles easily enveloped any line our little force could form. 

During the early part of the attack, Colquitt's brigade ran across thepickets of Devens's and Schurz's south front, which there had been notime to call in. Instead of joining in the advance, Colquitt remainedto engage these latter, deeming it essential to protect Jackson's right. This was the nucleus of one of the many detached engagements of thisday. Several bodies of Union troops thus isolated were captured enmasse. 

The reports of the officers concerned, as a rule, possess the merit offrankness. As an instance, Col. Hartung, of the Seventy-Fourth New York, relates that he had no opportunity to fire a shot until after he arrivedbehind the Buschbeck intrenchments. The facts would appear to be givenin an even-handed way, in all the reports rendered. 

Little remains to be said. The Eleventh Corps was panic-stricken, anddid run, instead of retreating. It was a mere disorganized mass in ahalf-hour from the beginning of the attack, with but a few isolatedregiments, and one brigade, retaining a semblance of orderliness. 

But was it so much the misbehavior of the troops as the faultiness ofthe position they occupied?

The corps was got together again before Sunday morning, in a conditionto do good service. Had it been tested, it would, in all probability, have fought well. 

The loss of the corps was one-quarter of its effective. 

Some time after the battle of Chancellorsville, a motion was made tobreak up the Eleventh Corps, and distribute its regiments among theothers; but it was not done. Hooker then remarked that he would yetmake that corps fight, and be proud of its name. And it subsequently didsterling service. Gen. Thomas remarked, in congratulating Hooker onhis victory at Lookout Mountain, that "the bayonet-charge of Howard'stroops, made up the side of a steep and difficult hill, over two hundredfeet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricadeson its top, . . . Will rank with the most distinguished feats of arms ofthis war. " And it is asserted that this encomium was well earned, andthat no portion of it need be set down to encouragement. 

In their evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hookerand Sickles both testify that the panic of the Eleventh Corps produceda gap in the line, and that this was the main cause of disaster on thisfield. But the fatal gap was made long before the Eleventh Corps wasattacked. It was Hooker's giddy blunder in ordering away, two miles intheir front, the entire line from Dowdall's to Chancellorsville, thatmade it. 

This was the gap which enabled Jackson to push his advance to within afew hundred yards of Chancellorsville before he could be arrested. Thiswas what made it possible for him to join his right to Lee's left wingnext day. Had Hooker but kept his troops in hand, so as to have moved upBirney sharply in support, to have thrown forward Berry and Whipple ifrequired, the Confederate advance would, in all human probability, have been checked at Dowdall's; Lee and Jackson would still have beenseparated by a distance of two miles; and of this perilous divisionexcellent advantage could have yet been taken at daylight Sunday by theArmy of the Potomac. 

Hooker's testimony includes the following attempt to disembarrasshimself of the onus of the faulty position of the Eleventh Corps andits consequences: "No pickets appear to have been thrown out; and I havereason to suppose that no effort was made by the commander of thecorps on the right to follow up and keep himself advised of Jackson'smovements, although made in broad daylight, and with his full knowledge. In this way the Eleventh Corps was lost to me, and more than that, because its bad conduct impaired the confidence that the corps of thearmy had in one another. I observed this fact during the night, from thefiring on the picket-lines, as well as from the general manner of thetroops, if a gun was fired by the enemy: after that, the whole linewould let off their pieces. The men seemed to be nervous; and duringthe coming-in of the Eleventh Corps I was fearful, at one time, thatthe whole army would be thrown into confusion by it. Some of mystaff-officers killed half a dozen of the men in trying to arrest theirflight. "

It is not intended, by what has been said, to exonerate Howard at theexpense of Hooker. To Howard will always be imputed, and justly, acertain part of the blame; for there were, during the afternoon, enough indications of a probable attack down the pike to make aprudent corps-commander either assume the responsibility of a changeof front, --as it could advantageously be made on the Buschbeck lineprolonged, --or else, at least, so strongly urge the facts on hissuperior that no blame could cling to his own skirts. But neithercan Hooker's larger share of blame he shifted off his own to Howard'sshoulders. While it may be said that the latter did not exhibit theactivity which the questionable aspect of affairs demanded, --for he didnot personally inspect his lines after the early morning hours, --it isequally true that the commander of the army utterly neglected his rightwing, though he had every circumstance relating to its danger reportedto him. 

XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY. 

The position of the Army of the Potomac is critical in the extreme. Butseveral circumstances come to the rescue. It is almost dark. The rebellines have become inextricably mixed. Colston, who has gradually movedup to Rodes's support, is so completely huddled together with thislatter's command, that there is no organization left. Still Jackson'sveterans press on, determined to crush our army beyond recovery, and drive it from United-States Ford. Stuart has in fact, at his ownsuggestion, got orders to move his cavalry division in that direction, and occupy the road to Ely's. A. P. Hill's division is still intact inrear of the two leading lines, now shuffled into one quite unmanageablemass, but still instinctively pushing forward. 

So faulty have Hooker's dispositions been, in advancing his entire rightcentre without filling the gap, that the only available troops to throwinto the breach, after the rapid destruction of the Eleventh Corps, areBerry's division of the old Third. These hardened soldiers are still inreserve on the clearing, north of headquarters. It is fortunate, indeed, that they are still there; for Sickles has just asked for their detailto join his own column out in the woods, and an hour ago Berry wouldcertainly have been sent. 

This division is at once thrown across the pike on the first crest belowFairview, west of Chancellorsville. The artillery of the Eleventh Corpsis in part re-assembled. Capt. Best, chief of artillery of the TwelfthCorps, has already trained his guns upon the advancing Confederatecolumns, to protect the new line. But Berry is almost alone. Hays'sbrigade of the Second Corps, on his right, is his only support. TheExcelsior brigade is rapidly pushed into the woods, north of the plankroad; the Fourth Excelsior and the First Massachusetts south. Carr'sbrigade is kept in second line, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. The men, with the instinctive pride of self-reliance, move up with thesteadiness of veterans on drill, regardless of the stream of fugitivesbreaking through their intervals. 

The flight of the Eleventh Corps has stampeded part of the Third Corpsartillery. But it is re-assembled in short order, and at once throwninto service. Capt. Best manages by seven P. M. To get thirty-four gunsinto line on the crest, well served. Himself is omnipresent. Dimick'sand Winslow's batteries under Osborn, Berry's chief of artillery, jointhis line on the hill, leaving a section of Dimick on the road. And suchpart of the disjecta membra of the Eleventh Corps as retains semblanceof organization is gathered in support of the guns. Capt. Best has begunto fire solid shot over the heads of Berry's men into the woods beyond;and, as Gen. Lee says, the Confederate advance is checked in front ofthis crest by the vigorous opposition encountered. 

Hurried orders are despatched to Geary to withdraw his attack, andre-occupy his breastworks. This he straightway accomplishes. Similarorders are carried to Williams. But, before the latter can retrace hissteps, Jackson's columns have reached the right of his late position. Anderson also advances against him; so that Williams is obliged to movecautiously by his left, and change front when he arrives where his linehad lately joined Geary's and, being unable to take up his old post, hegoes into position, and prolongs Berry, south of the pike. It is longafter dark before he ascertains his bearings, and succeeds in massinghis division where it is needed. 

Anxious as Jackson is to press on, --"Give me one hour more of daylight, and I will have United-States Ford!" cries he, --he finds that he mustre-establish order in his scattered forces before he can launch thisnight attack upon our newly formed but stubbornly maintained lines. 

Nor is the darkness the most potent influence toward this end. Illy asSickles's advance has resulted thus far, it is now a sovereign elementin the salvation of the Army of the Potomac. His force at the Furnace, Birney, Whipple, Barlow, and Pleasonton, amounts to fifteen thousandmen, and over forty guns. None of these officers are the men tostand about idle. No sooner has Sickles been persuaded by a secondcourier, --the first he would not credit, --that the Eleventh Corps hasbeen destroyed, and that Jackson is in his rear, than he comprehendsthat now, indeed, the time has come to batter Jackson's flank. Heorders his column to the right about, and moves up with all speed tothe clearing, where Pleasonton has held his cavalry, near Birney's oldfront. 

Howard, upon being attacked, had sent hurriedly for a cavalry regiment. Pleasonton, having received orders to send him one, instructed MajorHuey, commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to march to Dowdall'sand report to Howard. Huey set out by the wood road which leads throughHazel Grove into the plank road. From the testimony of the personschiefly concerned it would appear that, at the time this order wasgiven by Pleasonton to Huey, there was at Hazel Grove, where the cavalryregiments were drawn up, no sign whatever of the disaster to Howard. There were no fugitives nor any confusion. Nor does the evidence showthat Pleasonton ordered any charge on the enemy: it rather shows thatHuey was not directed to go at urgent speed. And he must have been verydeliberate in his movement, for by the time the cavalry had reached thevicinity of the plank road, Jackson had demolished the Eleventh Corps, and had advanced so far that the head of this cavalry column, marchingby twos, suddenly came upon the Confederate lines. The officers in thelead at once gave the order to charge, and right gallantly didthese intrepid horsemen ride down into the seething mass of exultantConfederate infantry. The shock was nobly given and home, but was, ofcourse, in the woods and against such odds, of no great effect. Thirtymen and three officers, including Major Keenan, were killed. Only oneConfederate report--Iverson's--mentions this charge. Its effect waslocal only. 

Three batteries of Whipple's division had remained in the Hazel Groveclearing while the infantry had advanced towards the Furnace. Whenthe rout of the Eleventh Corps became clear, these eighteen guns wereordered in battery, facing about north-west, by their commander, Capt. Huntington, and kept up a heavy fire upon the woods through whichJackson was pushing his way. Pleasonton, for his part, trained Martin'shorse-battery in the same direction. Other guns were later added tothese, and all expended a good deal of ammunition on the enemy's lines. But there was no fighting at Hazel Grove rising to the distinction ofa battle. The importance given to it by Sickles and Pleasonton is notborne out by the facts. There was no Federal loss, to speak of; nor dothe Confederate reports make any comment upon this phase of the battle. They probably supposed these guns to be an extension of the line ofbatteries at Fairview. As such they were, without question, of noinconsiderable use. 

Meanwhile Birney, sending word to Barlow that they run danger ofbeing cut off, and detailing the Twentieth Indiana and Sixty-thirdPennsylvania Volunteers as rearguard, rejoins Sickles and Pleasonton inthe clearing, and both move up to sustain his flank. 

So soon as Jackson's guns gave Lee the intimation of his assault, thelatter advanced upon the Union line with sufficient vigor to preventHooker from sending re-enforcements to his right. The attack was sharp;and a general inclination to the left was ordered, to connect withJackson's right as the latter brought his columns nearer. "Theseorders were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy'sintrenchments, while several batteries played with good effect upon hislines until prevented by increasing darkness. " (Lee. )

McLaws reports: "My orders were to hold my position, not to engageseriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that Gen. Jackson had attacked. . . When I ordered an advance along the whole lineto engage with the skirmishers, which were largely re-enforced, and tothreaten, but not attack seriously; in doing which Gen. Wofford becameso seriously engaged, that I directed him to withdraw, which was donein good order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to theirintrenchments. "

The movement of Anderson towards the left made a gap of considerabledistance in the Confederate line "but the skirmishers of Gen. Semmes, the entire Tenth Georgia, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy tohis intrenchments. "

These accounts vary in no wise from those of the Union generals, whoheld their positions in front of both Anderson and McLaws, and keptinside their field-works. 

Meade, whose line on the left of the army was not disturbed, sentSykes's division, so soon as the Eleventh Corps rout became known tohim, to the junction of the roads to Ely's and United-States Fords, tohold that point at all hazards, and form a new right flank. This wasdone with Sykes's accustomed energy. Nor was he reached by Jackson'sline, and before morning Reynolds fell in upon his right. 

XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK. 

When his troops had been summarily brought to a standstill by Berry'sfirm ranks and the heavy artillery fire, Jackson determined to withdrawhis first and second lines to Dowdall's clearing to reform, and orderedA. P. Hill forward to relieve them. 

While this manoeuvre, rendered extremely difficult by the nature of thewoods in which the fighting had been done, but which Hooker was in nocondition to interfere with, was in progress, Sickles and Pleasonton, whose position was considerably compromised, sought measures tore-establish communication with the headquarters of the army. 

Sickles despatched Col. Hart, with a cavalry escort, to Hooker, bearinga detailed statement of his situation. This officer experienced nolittle difficulty in reaching Chancellorsville. The roads being inpossession of the enemy, he was forced to make his way through the woodsand ravines. But after the lapse of a number of hours he succeeded inhis mission, and brought back word to hold on to the position gained. Sickles had so advised, and had, moreover, requested permission tomake a night attack, to recover some guns, caissons, and Whipple'sammunition-train, which had been left in the woods in Sickles's front, and to enable him to join his right to Slocum's new line, thrown out inprolongation of Berry. 

It will be observed that Sickles was now facing northerly, and that hisrear had no obstacle on which to rest, so as to save him from the attackof Lee, had the latter been aware of the weakness of his position. 

In view of this fact, a move was made somewhat to his right, where acrest was occupied near Hazel Grove. Here, says Pleasonton, "with thesupport of Gen. Sickles's corps we could have defeated the whole rebelarmy. " It was clearly a strong position; for it is thus referred to byStuart, after our troops had been next day withdrawn: "As the sun liftedthe mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge onthe extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. Iimmediately ordered thirty pieces to that point. The effect of thisfire upon the enemy's batteries was superb. " Its possession by theConfederates did, in fact, notably contribute to the loss of the newlines at Chancellorsville in Sunday morning's action. 

From this position, at precisely midnight, Sickles made a determinedonslaught upon the Confederate right. It was clear, full moonlight, andoperations could be almost as well conducted as during the daytime, inthese woods. 

Birney stationed Ward in the first line, and Hays in the second, one hundred yards in the rear. The regiments moved by the right ofcompanies, with pieces uncapped, and strict orders to rely solely uponthe bayonet. On the road from the Furnace north, parallel to which thecolumns moved, the Fortieth New York, Seventeenth Maine, and Sixty-ThirdPennsylvania Volunteers pushed in, in columns of companies at fulldistance. 

Berry had been notified to sustain this attack by a movement forwardfrom his lines, if it should strike him as advisable. 

The attack was made with consummate gallantry. Sickles states that hedrove the enemy back to our original lines, enabling us for the momentto re-occupy the Eleventh Corps rifle-pits, and to re-capture severalpieces of artillery, despite the fire of some twenty Confederate gunswhich had been massed at Dowdall's. 

Thus attacked in flank, though the Confederate right had been refusedat the time of Pleasonton's fight, and still remained so, Hill's linereplied by a front movement of his left on Berry, without being able, however, to break the latter's line. 

Slocum states that he was not aware that this advance was to be made bySickles across his front. Imagining it to be a movement by the enemy onWilliams, he ordered fire to be opened on all troops that appeared, and fears "that our losses must have been severe from our own fire. "Williams, however, does not think so much damage was done, and allegesthat he himself understood what the movement was, without, however, quoting the source of his information. 

The Confederate reports state that this attack was met and repulsedby the Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-third North-Carolinaregiments, with small difficulty or loss. 

It is, however, probable that these as much underrate the vigor andeffect of the attack, as Sickles may overstate it. It is not impossiblethat some portion of the Eleventh Corps position was actually reachedby these columns. The road down which the movement was made strikesthe plank road but a short distance east of the position of Buschbeck'sline. This ground was not held in force by Jackson's corps at themoment, and it was not difficult for Sickles to possess himselftemporarily of some portion of that position. But it must have been amomentary occupation. 

Birney retired to Hazel Grove after this sally, having recovered part ofWhipple's train, and one or two guns. 

There can be found in the Confederate and Union reports alike, numerousstatements which are not sustained by other testimony. As a sample, Gen. Lane of A. P. Hill's division states that a Lieut. Emack and four mencaptured an entire Pennsylvania regiment, under Lieut. -Col. Smith. Thenearest approach to this is found in the capture of Col. Mathews andtwo hundred men of the One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania, whileWilliams was moving by his left to regain his old ground. But it ishighly probable that it required more than five men to effect thecapture. 

A wise rebuke of careless statements in official reports is found inthe following indorsements on a report made of the operations of the OneHundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania:--

In forwarding this report, which I do merely as a matter of duty, it isincumbent upon me to say that it is a complete romance from beginning toend. Col. Collis has had his attention called to these errors, but hasrefused to correct them. 

 CHAS. K. GRAHAM, Brigadier General. 

 HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION THIRD CORPS, May 17, 1863. 

This paper is forwarded with attention called to Brig. -Gen. Graham'sindorsement. The officer is under arrest on charges of misbehaviorbefore the enemy. 

 D. B. BIRNEY, Brigadier General commanding Division. 

XX. STONEWALL JACKSON. 

It is probable that the wounding of Jackson at this juncture was themost effectual cause of the Confederate check on Saturday night. Itoccurred just after Jackson had concluded to withdraw his first andsecond lines to Dowdall's, there to re-form, and was making dispositionsto move up A. P. Hill to relieve them. Orders had been issued to thetroops not to fire unless at Union cavalry appearing in their front. Jackson, with some staff-officers and orderlies, had ridden out beyondhis lines, as was his wont, to reconnoitre. On his return he was firedat by his own men, being mistaken in the gloom for a Federal scout. Endeavoring to enter at another place, a similar error was made, thistime killing some of the party, and wounding Jackson in several places. He was carried to the rear. A few days after, he died of pneumoniabrought on by his injury, which aggravated a cold he was suffering fromat the time. 

A. P. Hill was wounded somewhat later that night. 

After the disabling of these two officers, Stuart was sent for, andpromptly assumed command. With Col. Alexander, chief artillery officerpresent for duty, (Gen. Crutchfield being wounded, ) he spent the nightrectifying the Confederate lines, and selecting positions for hisbatteries. It had been Jackson's plan to push forward at night, tosecure the speediest results of his victory. But Stuart, after theattacks upon his right by Sickles and Pleasonton, and having in view thedisorganized condition of his troops, thought wise to defer a generalassault until daylight. Having submitted the facts to Jackson, andreceived word from this officer to use his own discretion in thematter, he decided to afford his troops a few hours of rest. They wereaccordingly halted in line, and lay upon their arms, an ample force ofskirmishers thrown out in front. 

No better place than this will be found in which to say a few wordsabout the remarkable man who planned and led this movement aboutHooker's flank, --a manoeuvre which must have been condemned as foolhardyif unsuccessful, but whose triumph wove a final wreath to crown hisdying brows. 

Thomas J. Jackson entered West Point a poor boy, essentially a son ofthe people. He was a classmate of McClellan, Foster, Reno, Stoneman, Couch, Gibbon, and many other noted soldiers, as well those arrayedagainst as those serving beside him. His standing in his class was farfrom high; and such as he had was obtained by hard, persistent work, andnot by apparent ability. He was known as a simple, honest, unaffectedfellow, rough, and the reverse of social; but he commanded hiscompanions sincere respect by his rugged honesty, the while his uncouthbearing earned him many a jeer. 

He was graduated in 1846, and went to Mexico as second lieutenant of theFirst United-States Artillery. He was promoted to be first lieutenant"for gallant and meritorious services at Vera Cruz. " Twice mentionedin Scott's reports, and repeatedly referred to by Worth and Pillow forgallantry while with Magruder's battery, he emerged from that eventfulcampaign with fair fame and abundant training. 

We find him shortly afterwards professor at the Virginia MilitaryInstitute of Lexington. Here he was known as a rigid Presbyterian, anda "fatalist, " if it be fatalism to believe that "what will be willbe, "--Jackson's constant motto. 

Tall, gaunt, awkward, grave, brief, and business-like in all he did, Jackson passed for odd, "queer, "--insane almost, he was thought bysome, --rather than a man of uncommon reserve power. 

It was only when on parade, or when teaching artillery practice, that hebrightened up; and then scarcely to lose his uncouth habit, but only toshow by the light in his eye, and his wrapt attention in his work, wherelay his happiest tendencies. 

His history during the war is too well known to need to be more thanbriefly referred to. He was made colonel of volunteers, and sent toHarper's Ferry in May, 1861, and shortly after promoted to a brigade. He accompanied Joe Johnston in his retreat down the valley. At Bull Run, where his brigade was one of the earliest in the war to use the bayonet, he earned his soubriquet of "Stonewall" at the lips of Gen. Bee. But inthe mouths of his soldiers his pet name was "Old Jack, " and the term wasa talisman which never failed to inflame the heart of every man who borearms under his banner. 

Jackson possessed that peculiar magnetism which stirs the blood ofsoldiers to boiling-point. Few leaders have ever equalled him in hiscontrol of troops. His men had no questions to ask when "Old Jack" ledthe way. They believed in him as did he in his star; and the impossibleonly arrested the vigor of their onset, or put a term to their arduousmarches. 

His campaign in the valley against Fremont and Shields requires nopraise. And his movement about McClellan's flank at Mechanicsville, andhis still more sterling manoeuvre in Pope's campaign, need only to becalled to mind. 

In the field he was patient, hard-working, careless of self, and fullof forethought for his men; though no one could call for and get fromtroops such excessive work, on the march or in action. No one could askthem to forego rations, rest, often the barest necessaries of life, andyet cheerfully yield him their utmost efforts, as could "Old Jack. "

He habitually rode an old sorrel horse, leaning forward in a mostunmilitary seat, and wore a sun-browned cap, dingy gray uniform, and astock, into which he would settle his chin in a queer way, as he movedalong with abstracted look. He paid little heed to camp comforts, and slept on the march, or by snatches under trees, as he might findoccasion; often begging a cup of bean-coffee and a bit of hard breadfrom his men, as he passed them in their bivouacs, He was too uncertainin his movements, and careless of self, for any of his militaryfamily to be able to look after his physical welfare. In fact, a coldoccasioned by lending his cloak to one of his staff, a night or twobefore Chancellorsville, was the primary cause of the pneumonia, which, setting in upon his exhausting wounds, terminated his life. 

Jackson was himself a bad disciplinarian. Nor had he even average powersof organization. He was in the field quite careless of the minutiae ofdrill. But he had a singularly happy faculty for choosing men to do hiswork for him. He was a very close calculator of all his movements. He worked out his manoeuvres to the barest mathematical chances, andinsisted upon the unerring execution of what he prescribed; and aboveall be believed in mystery. Of his entire command, he alone knew whatwork he had cut out for his corps to do. And this was carried so farthat it is said the men were often forbidden to ask the names of theplaces through which they marched. "Mystery, " said Jackson, "mystery isthe secret of success in war, as in all transactions of human life. "

Jackson was a professing member of the Presbyterian Church, and whatis known as a praying man. By this is meant, that, while he neverintentionally paraded or obtruded upon his associates his belief in thepractical and immediate effect of prayer, he made no effort to hide hisfaith or practice from the eyes of the world. In action, while the wholeman was wrought up to the culminating pitch of enthusiasm, and whileevery fibre of his mind and heart was strained towards the achievementof his purpose, his hand would often be instinctively raised upwards;and those who knew him best, believed this to be a sign that his trustin the help of a Higher Power was ever present. 

Jackson was remarkable as a fighter. In this he stands with but one ortwo peers. Few men in the world's history have ever got so great resultsfrom armed men as he was able to do. But to judge rightly of his actualmilitary strength is not so easy as to award this praise. Unless ageneral has commanded large armies, it is difficult to judge of howfar he may be found wanting if tried in that balance. In the detachedcommands which he enjoyed, in the Valley and elsewhere, his strategicability was marked: but these commands were always more or less limited;and, unlike Lee or Johnston, Jackson did not live long enough to riseto the command of a large army upon an extended and independent field ofoperations. 

In Gen. Lee, Jackson reposed an implicit faith. "He is the only manI would follow blindfold, " said Jackson. And Lee's confidence in hislieutenant's ability to carry out any scheme he set his hand to, wasequally pronounced. Honestly, though with too much modesty, did Lee say:"Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of thecountry, to have been disabled in your stead. "

But, illy as Lee could spare Jackson, less still could the Army ofNorthern Virginia spare Robert E. Lee, the greatest in adversity of thesoldiers of our civil war. Still, after Jackson's death, it is certainthat Lee found no one who could attempt the bold manoeuvres on the fieldof battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined thename of Jackson to all posterity. 

It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to largercommands, he would have been found equal to the full exigencies ofthe situation. Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited butindependent scope, seems to testify to the fact that he was far fromhaving reached his limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done; andhe never appears to have been taxed to the term of his powers, in anyoperation which he undertook. 

Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice toaccount for Jackson's military success. But those alone who have servedunder his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his hassounded them: they only can testify to the full measure of the strengthof Stonewall Jackson. 

XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW. 

Gen. Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the Warcomprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by himwith reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a reportof operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it tosome extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsvilleis thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of theEleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap toarrest Jackson, "and if possible to seize, and at all hazards hold, thehigh ground abandoned by that corps, " he says:--

"Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reportedthat the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding myposition, and that he had been compelled to establish his line in thevalley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as thiswas communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to traceout a new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it thatnight, as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after theenemy should renew the attack the next morning. "

"The position" at Dowdall's "was the most commanding one in thevicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with hisartillery to enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps. ""To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries wereestablished upon it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it. " Slendercolumns of infantry were at this time among Hooker's pet ideas. 

"Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long aspracticable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate withthe movement which had been ordered to be made on our left. "

"The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o'clock in the morning, and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bringinto action until eleven o'clock, when orders were given for the armyto establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. Theposition I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and Ikept the troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enablingme to hear of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick. " Thus muchHooker. 

The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantiallythat to which the operation of Saturday had led. 

The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third andTwelfth Corps, supported by Whipple's Second brigade (Bowman's), infront to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry. 

In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-milefrom the Chancellor House, ) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crestless high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods inits front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear, deepening to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry's divisionheld this line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it hadfought over since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhatlater was Whipple's First brigade (Franklin's). Berdan's sharpshootersformed a movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrownout by Berry from his own troops. 

A section of Dimick's battery was trained down the road. 

Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plankroad, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular toit; while Mott's brigade was massed in rear of Williams's right. 

Near Williams's left flank, but almost at right angles to it, cameGeary's division, in the same intrenched line he had defended theday before; and on his left again, the Second Corps, which had notmaterially changed its position since Friday. 

The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards clearedfields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a highcrest, about six hundred yards from Fairview. 

At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until justbefore daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized asan almost impregnable point d'appui, and which, so long as it was held, practically prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee'ssevered wings, had lain Birney's and Whipple's divisions. This pointthey had occupied, (as already described, ) late the evening before, after Sickles and Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson'sright brigades. But Hooker was blind to the fact that the possessionof this height would enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade theother's lines; and before daybreak the entire force was ordered to moveback to Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp hadto be bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all butGraham had been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade byArcher of Hill's command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Groveheight; but it was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun andcaisson stalled in the swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, andwas directed to place his two divisions so as to strengthen the new lineat Fairview. 

Reynolds's corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhatblind instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, fromthe Rapidan to the junction of Ely's and United-States Ford roads, ina location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh andeager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into actionat all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his enforcedinactivity. 

The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relievedMeade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds's left, (having rapidlymoved to the cross roads at dusk on Saturday;) while Meade with the restof his corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into positionto support this entire line on the extreme right of the Army ofthe Potomac. Thus three strong army corps henceforth disappear fromeffective usefulness in the campaign. 

The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectifiedduring the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of A. P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archeron the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extendingtowards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was inreserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refusedfrom the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible driveSickles from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view toforcing a connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry bythe Catharpen road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with likepurpose. 

Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble's division; whileRodes, who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, nowmade the third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on theright of the line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grovecrest, and at Melzi Chancellor's, in the clearing, where the EleventhCorps had met its disaster. 

There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry's, Whipple's, and Birney's divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams's of theTwelfth, ) consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the wholeof Jackson's corps, now reduced to about the same effective; whileAnderson, on the left of the plank road, feeling out towards theFurnace, and McLaws on the right, with seventeen thousand men betweenthem, confronted our left centre, consisting of Geary of the Twelfth, and Hancock of the Second Corps, numbering not much above twelvethousand for duty. 

Owing to Hooker's ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability toconcentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contestin which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederatesuccess to offset our intrenchments. 

The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk andfreshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever, unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and Riverroads. 

Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker's confidence, thus explains hisunderstanding of the situation Saturday night: "The position of theThird Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson's cavalry" (?corps), "cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee'sright. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained onour side; and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisivebattle. By our leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing ofthe enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our forcewas to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect ofannihilating it. To render this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, (about twenty thousand strong, ) was to leave hisposition in front of the enemy's lines at Fredericksburg, and fall uponGen. Lee's rear at daylight. "

This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it wasimpracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee's rear by daylight. Thebalance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even ifunassisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success. 

To examine into its manner of execution. 

XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW. 

At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men, whohad been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave ordersfor a slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal orArcher and McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that Sickleswas being withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart's order wasinterpreted as a command for the anticipated general attack, and theadvancing columns soon provoked the fire of the expectant Federals. 

Seeing that the men were ready for their work, rations or no rations, Stuart wisely refrained from recalling them; and Berry and Williamsbetimes felt the shock of the strong line of A. P. Hill, which Alexanderseconded by opening with his artillery in full action. The Confederatesforged ahead with the watchword, "Charge, and remember Jackson!" Andthis appeal was one to nerve all hearts to the desperate task beforethem. 

Hotchkiss thus describes the field of operations of this morning: "Thefirst line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up inthe night, and was very formidable. The engineer division of theUnion Army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had beenunremittingly engaged in its construction. A vast number of trees hadbeen felled, and formed into a heavy rampart, all approach to which wasrendered extremely difficult by an abattis of limbs and brushwood. Onthe south side of the road this line is situated upon a ridge, on theChancellorsville side of Lewis Creek, one of the numerous head-waters ofthe Mattapony. It is intersected by the smaller branches of this creek, and the ravines in which they run. These ravines extended behindthe Federal lines, almost to the plank road, and afforded excellentpositions for successive stands. In the morning, Sickles extended to thewest of the creek, and held the elevated plateau at Hazel Grove. Thisis the most commanding point, except Fairview, in the vicinity. On thenorth of the plank road, the ground is more level. The line thus crossedseveral small branches, the origin of some small tributaries of theRappahannock, but the ravines on that side are not considerable. Fromthe ridge occupied by the first line, the ground falls away to theeast, until the valley of another branch of Lewis Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an abrupt slope to theFairview hill, which rises directly from it on the eastern side. Fromthe first line of the creek, extends on both sides of the road adense forest. From the latter point to Fairview heights, and toChancellorsville, on the south side of the road, the country is cleared. This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs from nearChancellorsville, between Fairview and the works occupied by Slocum. Itextends some distance on the north of the road. 

"Behind the front line of works, there were some defences in the valleynear the creek, not constituting a connecting line, however; and thesein turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which coveredthe Fairview heights, and were more strongly constructed even than thefirst. "

It was at just the time of Rodes's assault, that Birney had receivedorders to withdraw from his cardinal position at the angle made by Gearyand Williams, and to form as a second and third line near the plankroad, a duty there was an abundance of troops to fill. He retired, andployed into brigade columns by regiments, immediately beyond the crestof Fairview hill. Here, placing batteries in position, he shelled thefield from which he had just withdrawn. This crest, however, Archerspeedily occupied; and on its summit Stuart, with better foresight thanHooker, posted some thirty guns under Walker, which enfiladed our lineswith murderous effect during the remainder of the combat of Sunday, andcontributed largely to our defeat. 

The attack of the Confederates was made, "as Jackson usually did, inheavy columns" (Sickles), and was vigorous and effective. According totheir own accounts, the onset was met with equal cheerful gallantry. While Archer occupied Hazel Grove, McGowan and Lane assaulted the worksheld by Williams, carried them with an impetuous rush, and pushed ourtroops well back. This rapid success was largely owing to a seriousbreach made in the Union line by the decampment of the Third MarylandVolunteers, a full regiment of Knipe's brigade, which held the right ofWilliams's division on the plank road. The regiment was composed of newmen, no match for Jackson's veterans. They stood as well as raw troopscan, in the face of such an onslaught; but after a loss of about ahundred men, they yielded ground, and were too green to rally. Into thegap thus made, quickly poured a stream of Lane's men, thus takingboth Berry's and Williams's lines in reverse. The Second Brigade wascompelled to change front to meet this new attack: Mott was instantlythrown forward to fill the interval; and after a desperate hand-to-handstruggle he regained the lost ground, and captured eight stands ofcolors and about a thousand prisoners. This separated Archer fromthe main line, and took in their turn McGowan and Lane in reverse, precipitately driving them back, and enabling our columns to regain theground lost by the fierceness of the Confederate inroad. This sally inreverse likewise carried back Lane and Heth, the entire corps havingsuffered severely from the excellent service of the Federal guns. Butthe effect on Williams's division of this alternating gain and loss, had been to cause it to waver; while having for an instant captured ourworks, was encouragement to our foes. 

On the north of the road, Pender and Thomas had at first won equalfortune against Berry's works, but their success had been equallyshort-lived. For the falling-back of Jackson's right, and the cheeringof the Union line as its fire advanced in hot pursuit, gave at the samemoment notice to the Confederate left that it was compromised, andto our own brave boys the news of their comrades' fortune. Pender andThomas were slowly but surely forced back, under a withering fire, beyond the breastworks they had won. A second time did these veteransrally for the charge, and a second time did they penetrate a part ofour defences; only, however, to be taken in flank again by Berry's rightbrigade, and tumbled back to their starting-point. But their onsethad shown so great determination, that Ward was despatched to sustainBerry's right, lest he should be eventually over-matched. 

The Federal line on the north of the plank road had thus doggedlyresisted the most determined attacks of Jackson's men, and had lostno ground. And so hard pressed indeed was Pender by gallant Berry'slegions, that Colquitt's brigade was sent to his relief. Pender'smen had early expended all their ammunition, word whereof was sent toStuart, but merely to evoke renewal of that stubborn officer's orders tohold their ground with the bayonet, and at all hazards. And such ordersas these were wont to be obeyed by these hardened warriors. 

The three Confederate lines of attack had soon, as on yesternight, become one, as each pushed forward to sustain the other. The enemy"pressed forward in crowds rather than in any regular formation"(Sickles); but the momentum of these splendid troops was well-nighirresistible. Nichols's brigade of Trimble's division, and Iverson's andRodes's of Rodes's division, pressed forward to sustain the first lineon the north of the road, and repel the flank attack, constantly renewedby Berry. Another advance of the entire line was ordered. Rodes led hisold brigade in person. The Confederates seemed determined, for Jackson'ssake, to carry and hold the works which they had twice gained, and outof which they had been twice driven; for, with "Old Jack" at their head, they had never shown a sterner front. 

Now came the most grievous loss of this morning's conflict. GallantBerry, the life of his division, always in the hottest of the fire, reckless of safety, had fallen mortally wounded, before Ward's brigadecould reach his line. Gen. Revere assumed command, and, almost beforethe renewal of the Confederate attack, "heedless of their murmurs, " saysSickles's report, "shamefully led to the rear the whole of the SecondBrigade, and portions of two others, thus subjecting these proudsoldiers, for the first time, to the humiliation of being marched tothe rear while their comrades were under fire. Gen. Revere was promptlyrecalled with his troops, and at once relieved of command. " Reverecertainly gives no satisfactory explanation of his conduct; but heappears to have marched over to the vicinity of French of the SecondCorps, upon the White House clearing, and reported to him with a largeportion of his troops. Revere was subsequently courtmartialled forthis misbehavior, and was sentenced to dismissal; but the sentence wasrevoked by the President, and he was allowed to resign. 

Col. Stevens was speedily put in command in Revere's stead; but he, too, soon fell, leaving the gallant division without a leader, nearly halfof its number off the field, and the remainder decimated by the bloodycontest of the past four hours. Moreover, Gen. Hays, whose brigade ofFrench's division had been detached in support of Berry, where it haddone most gallant work, was at the same time wounded and captured by theenemy. 

It was near eight o'clock. The artillery was quite out of ammunition, except canister, which could not be used with safety over the heads ofour troops. Our outer lines of breastworks had been captured, andwere held by the enemy. So much as was left of Berry's division was inabsolute need of re-forming. Its supports were in equally bad plight. The death of Berry, and the present location of our lines in the lowground back of the crest just lost, where the undergrowth was so tangledand the bottom so marshy, that Ward, when he marched to Berry's relief, had failed to find him, obliged the Federals to fall back to theFairview heights, and form a new line at the western edge of theChancellor clearing, where the artillery had been so ably sustainingthe struggle now steadily in progress since daylight. Sickles himselfsupervised the withdrawal of the line, and its being deployed on its newposition. 

The receding of the right of the line also necessitated the falling-backof Williams. The latter officer had, moreover, been for some time quiteshort of ammunition; and though Graham had filled the place of a partof his line, and had held it for nearly two hours, repeatedly using thebayonet, Williams was obliged to give way before Stuart's last assault. But Graham was not the man readily to accept defeat; and, as Williams'sline melted away, he found himself isolated, and in great danger ofbeing surrounded. Gen. Birney fortunately became aware of the dangerbefore it was too late; and, hastily gathering a portion of Hayman'sbrigade, he gallantly led them to the charge in person; and, under coverof this opportune diversion, Graham contrived to withdraw in good order, holding McGowan severely in check. 

The Union troops now establish their second line near Fairview. TheConfederates' progress is arrested for the nonce. It is somewhatafter eight A. M. A lull, premonitory only of a still fiercer tempest, supervenes. 

But the lull is of short duration. Re-forming their ranks as well as maybe on the south of the road, the Confederates again assault the Unionsecond line, on the crest at Fairview. But the height is not readilycarried. The slope is wooded, and affords good cover for an assault. But the artillery on the summit can now use its canister; and the Uniontroops have been rallied and re-formed in good order. The onset is metand driven back, amid the cheers of the victorious Federals. 

Nor are Stuart's men easily discouraged. Failure only seems toinvigorate these intrepid legions to fresh endeavors. Colston's andJones's brigades, with Paxton's, Ramseur's, and Doles' of the thirdline, have re-enforced the first, and passed it, and now attack Williamswith redoubled fury in his Fairview breastworks, while Birney sustainshim with his last man and cartridge. The Confederate troops takeall advantage possible of the numerous ravines in our front; but thebatteries at Fairview pour a heavy and destructive fire of shell andcase into their columns as they press on. Every inch of ground iscontested by our divisions, which hold their footing at Fairview withunflinching tenacity. 

Meanwhile Doles, moving under cover of a hill which protects him fromthe Federal batteries, and up a little branch coming from the rear ofFairview, takes in reverse the left of Williams's line, which has becomesomewhat separated from Geary, (whose position is thus fastbecoming untenable, ) moves up, and deploys upon the open ground atChancellorsville. But he finds great difficulty in maintaining hisfooting, and would have at once been driven back, when Paxton's(old Stonewall) brigade comes up to his support on the double-quick. Jackson's spirit for a while seems to carry all before it; the charge ofthese two brigades against our batteries fairly bristles with audacity;but our guns are too well served, and the gallant lines are once againdecimated and hustled back to the foot of the crest. 

The seizure of Hazel Grove, from which Sickles had retired, had nowbegun to tell against us. It had enabled the Confederates not only toform the necessary junction of their hitherto separated wings, butto enfilade our lines in both directions. The artillery under Walker, Carter, Pegram, and Jones, was admirably served, and much better postedthan our own guns at Fairview. For this height absolutely commandedthe angle made by the lines of Geary and Williams, and every shot wentcrashing through heavy masses of troops. Our severest losses during thisday from artillery-fire emanated from this source, not to speak of thegrievous effect upon the morale of our men from the enfilading missiles. 

About eight A. M. , French, one of whose brigades, (Hays's, ) had beendetached in support of Berry, and who was in the rifle-pits on theEly's Ford road near White House, facing east, perceiving how hotly theconflict was raging in his rear, on the right of the Third Corps line, and having no enemy in his own front, assumed the responsibility ofplacing four regiments of Carroll's brigade in line on the clearing, facing substantially west, and formed his Third Brigade on their right, supporting the left batteries of the Fifth Corps. This was a completeabout-face. 

Soon after taking up this position, Hooker ordered him forward into thewoods, to hold Colquitt and Thomas in check, who were advancing beyondthe right of Sickles's position at Fairview, and compromising thewithdrawal to the new lines which was already determined upon. SaysFrench: "In a moment the order was given. The men divested themselvesof all but their fighting equipment, and the battalions marched in lineacross the plain with a steady pace, receiving at the verge of the woodsthe enemy's fire. It was returned with great effect, followed up by animpetuous charge. . . . The enemy, at first panic-stricken by the suddenattack on his flank, broke to the right in masses, leaving in our handsseveral hundred prisoners, and abandoning a regiment of one of our corpsin the same situation. "

But French had not driven back his antagonist to any considerabledistance before himself was outflanked on his right by a diversion ofPender's. To meet this new phase of the combat, he despatched an aide toCouch for re-enforcements; and soon Tyler's brigade appeared, and wentin on his right. This fight of French and Tyler effectually repelledthe danger menacing the White House clearing. It was, however, a smallaffair compared to the heavy fighting in front of Fairview. And, theyielding of Chancellorsville to the enemy about eleven A. M. Havingrendered untenable the position of these brigades, they were graduallywithdrawn somewhat before noon. 

Still Jackson's lines, the three now one confused mass, but withunwavering purpose, returned again and again to the assault. Ourregiments had become entirely depleted of ammunition; and, though Birneywas ordered to throw in his last man to Williams's support, it was toolate to prevent the latter from once more yielding ground. 

For, having resisted the pressure of Stuart's right for nearly fourhours, his troops having been for some time with empty cartridge-boxes, twenty-four hours without food, and having passed several nights withoutsleep, while intrenching, Williams now felt that he could no longer holdhis ground. The enemy was still pressing on, and the mule-train of smallammunition could not be got up under the heavy fire. His artillery hadalso exhausted its supplies; Sickles was in similar plight; Jackson'smen, better used to the bayonet, and possessing the momentum of success, still kept up their vigorous blows. Williams's line therefore slowlyfell to the rear, still endeavoring to lean on Sickles's left. 

Sickles, who had kept Hooker informed of the condition of affairs asthey transpired, and had repeatedly requested support, now sent amore urgent communication to him, asking for additional troops. MajorTremaine reached headquarters just after the accident to Hooker, andreceived no satisfaction. Nor had a second appeal better results. What should and could easily have been done at an earlier moment byHooker, --to wit, re-enforce the right centre (where the enemy was alltoo plainly using his full strength and making the key of the field), from the large force of disposable troops on the right and left, --it wasnow too late to order. 

Before nine A. M. , Sickles, having looked in vain for re-enforcements, deemed it necessary to withdraw his lines back of Fairview crest. Himself re-formed the divisions, except that portion withdrawn byRevere, and led them to the rear, where the front line occupied the lateartillery breastworks. Ammunition was at once re-distributed. 

We had doubtless inflicted heavy losses upon the Confederates. "Theirformation for attack was entirely broken up, and from my headquartersthey presented to the eye the appearance of a crowd, without definiteformation; and if another corps had been available at the moment to haverelieved me, or even to have supported me, my judgment was that not onlywould that attack of the enemy have been triumphantly repulsed, but thatwe could have advanced on them, and carried the day. " (Sickles. )

On the Chancellorsville open occurred another sanguinary struggle. Stuart still pressed on with his elated troops, although his men werebeginning to show signs of severe exhaustion. Franklin's and Mott'sbrigades, says Sickles, "made stern resistance to the impulsive assaultsof the enemy, and brilliant charges in return worthy of the Old Guard. "

But, though jaded and bleeding from this prolonged andstubbornly-contested battle, Jackson's columns had by no means relaxedtheir efforts. The blows they could give were feebler, but they werecontinued with the wonderful pertinacity their chief had taught them;and nothing but the Chancellor clearing, and with it the road toFredericksburg, would satisfy their purpose. 

And a half-hour later, Sickles, finding himself unsupported on rightand left, though not heavily pressed by the enemy, retired toChancellorsville, and re-formed on the right of Hancock, while portionsof three batteries held their ground, half way between Chancellorsvilleand Fairview, and fired their last rounds, finally retiring after nearlyall their horses and half their men had been shot, but still without theloss of a gun. 

With characteristic gallantry, Sickles now proposed to regain theFairview crest with his corps, attacking the enemy with the bayonet; andhe thinks it could have been done. But, Hooker having been temporarilydisabled, his successor or executive, Couch, did not think fit tolicense the attempt. And shortly after, Hooker recovered strengthsufficient to order the withdrawal to the new lines at White House; andChancellorsville was reluctantly given up to the enemy, who had won itso fairly and at such fearful sacrifice. 

In retiring from the Chancellor clearing, Sickles states that he took, instead of losing, prisoners and material. This appears to be true, andshows how Stuart had fought his columns to the utmost of their strength, in driving us from our morning's position. He says: "At the conclusionof the battle of Sunday, Capt. Seeley's battery, which was the lastbattery that fired a shot in the battle of Chancellorsville, hadforty-five horses killed, and in the neighborhood of forty men killedand wounded;" but "he withdrew so entirely at his leisure, that hecarried off all the harness from his dead horses, loading his cannoneerswith it. " "As I said before, if another corps, or even ten thousand men, had been available at the close of the battle of Chancellorsville, onthat part of the field where I was engaged, I believe the battle wouldhave resulted in our favor. " Such is the testimony of Hooker's warmestsupporter. And there is abundant evidence on the Confederate side toconfirm this assumption. 

The losses of the Third Corps in the battle of Sunday seem to have beenthe bulk of that day's casualties. 

There can be no limit to the praise earned by the mettlesome veterans ofJackson's corps, in the deadly fight at Fairview. They had continuouslymarched and fought, with little sleep and less rations, since Thursdaymorning. Their ammunition had been sparse, and they had been obligedto rely frequently upon the bayonet alone. They had fought undercircumstances which rendered all attempts to preserve organizationimpossible. They had charged through tangled woods againstwell-constructed field-works, and in the teeth of destructiveartillery-fire, and had captured the works again and again. Never hadinfantry better earned the right to rank with the best which ever borearms, than this gallant twenty thousand, --one man in every four of whomlay bleeding on the field. 

Nor can the same meed of praise be withheld from our own brave legions. Our losses had been heavier than those of the enemy. Generals andregimental commanders had fallen in equal proportions. Our forces had, owing to the extraordinary combinations of the general in command, beenoutnumbered by the enemy wherever engaged. While we had received theearly assaults behind breastworks, we had constantly been obliged torecapture them, as they were successively wrenched from our grasp, --andwe had done it. Added to the prestige of success, and the flush of thecharge, the massing of columns upon a line of only uniform strengthhad enabled the Confederates to repeatedly capture portions of ourintrenchments, and, thus taking the left and right in reverse, to driveback our entire line. But our divisions had as often done the same. And well may the soldiers who were engaged in this bloody encounterof Sunday, May 3, 1863, call to mind with equal pride that each met afoeman worthy of his steel. 

Say Hotchkiss and Allan: "The resistance of the Federal army had beenstubborn. Numbers, weight of artillery, and strength of position, hadbeen in its favor. Against it told heavily the loss of morale due to thedisaster of the previous day. "

XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE. 

While the bulk of the fighting had thus been done by the right centre, Anderson was steadily forcing his way towards Chancellorsville. He hadWright's, Posey's, and Perry's brigades on the left of the plank road, and Mahone's on the right, and was under orders to press on to theChancellor clearing as soon as he could join his left to Jackson'sright. He speaks in his report as if he had little fighting to do toreach his destination. Nor does Geary, who was in his front, mention anyheavy work until about nine A. M. ; for Geary's position was jeopardizedby the enfilading fire of Stuart's batteries on the Hazel-Grove hill, and by the advance of Stuart's line of battle, which found his rightflank in the air. He could scarcely be expected to make a stubborncontest under these conditions. 

While thus hemmed in, Geary "obeyed an order to retire, and form mycommand at right angles with the former line of battle, the rightresting at or near the Brick House, " (Chancellorsville). While in theexecution of this order, Hooker seems to have changed his purpose, andin person ordered him back to his original stand, "to hold it at allhazards. "

In some manner, accounted for by the prevalent confusion, Greene's andKane's brigades had, during this change of front, become separatedfrom the command, and had retired to a line of defence north of theChancellor House. But on regaining the old breastworks, Geary found tworegiments of Greene's brigade still holding them. 

Now ensued a thorough-going struggle for the possession of thesebreastworks, and they were tenaciously hung to by Geary with his smallforce, until Wright had advanced far beyond his flank, and had reachedthe Chancellor clearing; when, on instructions from Slocum, he withdrewfrom the unequal strife, and subsequently took up a position on the leftof the Eleventh Corps. 

Anderson now moved his division forward, and occupied the edge of theclearing, where the Union forces were still making a last stand aboutheadquarters. 

McLaws, meanwhile, in Couch's front, fought mainly his skirmishers andartillery. Hancock strengthened Miles's outpost line, who "held it noblyagainst repeated assaults. "

While this is transacting, Couch orders Hancock to move up to theUnited-States Ford road, which he imagines to be threatened by theenemy; but the order is countermanded when scarcely begun. There isassuredly a sufficiency of troops there. 

But Hancock is soon obliged to face about to ward off the advance ofthe enemy, now irregularly showing his line of battle upon theChancellorsville clearing, while Sickles and Williams slowly andsullenly retire from before him. 

The enemy is gradually forcing his way towards headquarters. Hancock'sartillery helps keep him in check for a limited period; but thebatteries of Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, all directing a convergingfire on the Chancellor House, make it, under the discouragingcircumstances, difficult for him to maintain any footing. 

When Couch had temporarily assumed command, Hancock, before Geary wasforced from his intrenchments by Anderson, disposed the Second Corps, with its eighteen pieces of artillery, in two lines, facing respectivelyeast and west, about one mile apart. But Geary's relinquishment ofthe rifle-pits allowed the flanks of both the lines to be exposed, andprevented these dispositions from answering their purpose. Hancock clungto his ground, however, until the enemy had reached within a few hundredyards. Then the order for all troops to be withdrawn within thenew lines was promulgated, and the removal of the wounded from theChancellor House was speedily completed, --the shelling by the enemyhaving set it on fire some time before. 

Hancock's artillery at the Chancellor House certainly suffered severely;for, during this brief engagement, Leppien's battery lost all itshorses, officers, and cannoneers, and the guns had to be removed by aninfantry detail, by hand. 

The Confederate army now occupied itself in refitting its shatteredranks upon the plain. Its organization had been torn to shreds, duringthe stubborn conflict of the morning, in the tangled woods and marshyravines of the Wilderness; but this had its full compensation in thepossession of the prize for which it had contended. A new line ofbattle was formed on the plank road west of Chancellorsville, and onthe turnpike east. Rodes leaned his right on the Chancellor House, andPender swung round to conform to the Federal position. Anderson andMcLaws lay east of Colston, who held the old pike, but were soon afterreplaced by Heth, with part of A. P. Hill's corps. 

In the woods, where Berry had made his gallant stand opposite the fierceassaults of Jackson, and where lay by thousands the mingled deadand wounded foes, there broke out about noon a fire in the dry andinflammable underbrush. The Confederates detailed a large force, andlabored bravely to extinguish the flames, equally exhibiting theirhumanity to suffering friend and foe; but the fire was hard to control, and many wounded perished in the flames. 

XXIV. THE NEW LINES. 

The new lines, prepared by Gens. Warren and Comstock, in which the Armyof the Potomac might seek refuge from its weaker but more active foe, lay as follows:--

Birney describes the position as a flattened cone. The apex touchedBullock's, (White House or Chandler's, ) where the Mineral-Spring road, along which the left wing of the army had lain, crosses the road fromChancellorsville to Ely's Ford. 

Bullock's lies on a commanding plateau, with open ground in its front, well covered by our artillery. This clearing is north of and largerthan the Chancellor open, and communicates with it. The position of thetroops on the left was not materially changed, but embraced the corpsof Howard and Slocum. The right lay in advance of and along the roadto Ely's, with Big Hunting Run in its front, and was still held byReynolds. At the apex were Sickles and Couch. 

The position was almost impregnable, and covered in full safety the lineof retreat to United-States Ford, the road to which comes into the Ely'sFord road a half-mile west of Bullock's. 

To these lines the Second, Third, and Twelfth Corps retired, unmolestedby the enemy, and filed into the positions assigned to each division. 

Only slight changes had been made in the situation of Meade sincehe took up his lines on the left of the army. He had, with wiseforethought, sent Sykes at the double-quick, after the rout of theEleventh Corps, to seize the cross-roads to Ely's and United-StatesFords. Here Sykes now occupied the woods along the road from Bullock'sto connect with Reynolds's left. 

Before daylight Sunday morning, Humphreys, relieved by a division of theEleventh Corps, had moved to the right, and massed his division in rearof Griffin, who had preceded him on the line, and had later moved toGeary's left, on the Ely's Ford road. At nine A. M. , he had sent Tyler'sbrigade to support Gen. French, and with the other had held the edge ofChancellorsville clearing, while the Third and Twelfth Corps retired tothe new lines. 

And, when French returned to these lines, he fell in on Griffin's left. 

About noon of Sunday, then, the patient and in no wise discouragedUnion Army lay as described, while in its front stood the weary Armyof Northern Virginia, with ranks thinned and leaders gone, but with thepride of success, hardly fought for and nobly earned, to reward it forall the dangers and hardships of the past few days. 

Gen. Lee, having got his forces into a passable state ofre-organization, began to reconnoitre the Federal position, with aview to another assault upon it. It was his belief that one more heartyeffort would drive Hooker across the river; and he was ready to makeit, at whatever cost. But, while engaged in the preparation for such anattempt, he received news from Fredericksburg which caused him to lookanxiously in that direction. 

XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE. 

The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles, furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having moreor less remote or immediate effect upon each other. 

The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantlycalled upon to manoeuvre explains "why the numerous bloody battlesfought between the armies of the Union and of the secessionists shouldhave been so indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, will help to relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequentlymade at home and abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops inbattle, --battles that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests, where artillery and cavalry could play no part; where the troops couldnot be seen by those controlling their movements; where the echoes andreverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall thestrongest hearts engaged, and yet the noise would often be scarcelyheard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the generals oneither side, shut out from sight and from hearing, had to trust to theunyielding bravery of their men till couriers from the different partsof the field, often extending for miles, brought word which way theconflict was resulting, before sending the needed support. We should notwonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual exhaustionof both contending forces, but rather, that, in all these struggles ofAmericans against Americans, no panic on either side gave victory to theother, like that which the French under Moreau gained over the Austriansin the Black Forest. " (Warren. )

The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz. , to drive theiropponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite theirright and left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road toFredericksburg, where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish thisend, they attacked the centre of Hooker's army, --the right centreparticularly, --which blocked their way towards both objects. 

It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it isabundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony alreadyquoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy's plans, he had acquiredfull knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart's corpswas still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought theevening before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially changedtheir position in front of Geary and Hancock. He could have ascertained, by an early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps-commanders didso on their own responsibility, ) that there was no enemy whatsoeverconfronting his right and left flanks, where three corps, the First, Fifth, and Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the foe. Andthe obvious thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to hold theseflanks, which were protected by almost insuperable natural obstacles, aswell as formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous troops wellin hand, as a central reserve, in the vicinity of headquarters, to belaunched against the attacking columns of the enemy, wherever occasiondemanded. 

Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses ofSaturday, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half thenumber. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was putto good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. Onthe other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely aquarter was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for dutywas given no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking theonset of the elated champions of the South. 

Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker's inertness. There was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with hisfresh and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front byHunting Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strongcolumn from his front, and take Stuart's line of battle in reverse. Indeed, a short march of three miles by the Ely's Ford, Haden's Ford, and Greenwood Gold Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy, would have enabled Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank, or seize Dowdall's clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negativeall Stuart's efforts in front of Fairview. Or an advance through theforest would have accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground wasdifficult, and cut up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground hadbeen, in this campaign, no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor wouldit have been to Reynolds, had he been given orders to execute such amanoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in his testimony: "The action ragedwith the greatest fury near us on our left. " "I thought that the simpleadvance of our corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be verybeneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds once or twice contemplatedmaking this advance on his own responsibility. Col. Stone made areconnoissance, showing it to be practicable. "

The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corpson the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine andRiver roads to attack McLaws's right flank. Barely three miles wouldhave sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operatingdistance of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fitfor such work, after its defeat of Saturday night. But testimony isabundant to show that the corps was fully able to do good service earlyon Sunday morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flightfrom Dowdall's had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hookerwas apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcelydeem them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meadeavailable for the work proposed. 

Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hookerconceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wingunder Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Herculesinstead of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculationswere that Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin's and Pollock'scrossings, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilizehis corps, pass the river, capture the heights, where in December a fewSouthern brigades had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, marcha dozen miles, and fall upon Lee's rear, all in the brief space of fouror five hours. And it was this plan he chose to put into execution, deeming others equal to the performance of impossibilities, whilehimself could not compass the easiest problems under his own eye. 

To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of theperformances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would bebut fair. But Sedgwick's execution of his orders must stand on its ownmerits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere. 

An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker's sluggishness, is thathe was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, betweennine and ten A. M. , on the porch of the Chancellor House, listeningto the heavy firing at the Fairview crest, when a shell struck anddislodged one of the pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck andstunned him; and he was doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitatedfor work. 

But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to haveentirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander, but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the generaldirection of affairs himself. 

And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker's thorough inability to graspthe situation, and handle the conditions arising from the responsibilityof so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at latest Fridaymorning. And from this time his enervation was steadily on the increase. For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday morning's conflictwas already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at early dawn so todispose his forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams if over-matched, or to broach some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy's attention to hisown safety. 

It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. But theodium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are guiltlessof the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the primesource of this fallacy has been Hooker's ever-ready self-exculpation bymisinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while his subordinateshave held their peace. And this is not alone for the purposeof vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and itscorps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired toreiterate what has already been said, --that it is in all appreciation ofHooker's splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in thiscampaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain Hooker'scourage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever commanded anarmy corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for. But Hookercould not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his predecessor, he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to himself. Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved theshifting of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of hissubordinates, --principally Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullestestimation of Hooker's brilliant conduct on other fields, is in no wiseincompatible with the freest censure for the disasters of this unhappyweek. For truth awards praise and blame with equal hand; and truth inthis case does ample justice to the brave old army, ample justice toHooker's noble aides. 

The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately theintentions of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Saturday night. It was self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held incheck, so long as Jackson's corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed, they would have necessarily remained on the defensive so long asisolated. Instead, then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one divisionof the Twelfth, to confront Jackson's magnificent infantry, had Hookerwithdrawn an entire additional corps, (he could have taken two, ) andthrown these troops in heavy masses at dawn on Stuart, while Birneyretained Hazel Grove, and employed his artillery upon the enemy's flank;even the dauntless men, whose victories had so often caused them to deemthemselves invincible, must have been crushed by the blows inflicted. 

But there is nothing at all, on this day, in the remotest degreeresembling tactical combination. And, long before the resistance of ourbrave troops had ceased, all chances of successful parrying of Lee'sskilful thrusts had passed away. 

Hooker's testimony is to the effect that he was merely lighting onSunday morning to retain possession of the road by which Sedgwick wasto join him, and that his retiring to the lines at Bullock's waspredetermined. 

The following extract from the records of the Committee on the Conductof the War, illustrates both this statement, and Hooker's method ofexculpating himself by crimination of subordinates. "Question to Gen. Hooker. --Then I understand you to say, that, not hearing from Gen. Sedgwick by eleven o'clock, you withdrew your troops from the positionthey held at the time you ordered Gen. Sedgwick to join you. 

"Answer. --Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantageI was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference incorps-commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone andcharacter to his corps. Some of our corps-commanders, and also officersof other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight. "

But, apart from the innuendo, all this bears the stamp of anafter-thought. If an army was ever driven from its position by fairfighting, our troops were driven from Chancellorsville. And it wouldseem, that, if there was any reasonable doubt on Saturday night thatthe Army of the Potomac could hold its own next day, it would have beenwiser to have at once withdrawn to the new lines, while waiting for thearrival of Sedgwick. For here the position was almost unassailable, andthe troops better massed; and, if Lee had made an unsuccessful assault, Hooker would have been in better condition to make a sortie upon thearrival of the Sixth Corps in his vicinity, than after the bloody anddisheartening work at Fairview. 

Still the inactivity of Hooker, when Sedgwick did eventually arrivewithin serviceable distance, is so entire a puzzle to the student ofthis campaign, that speculation upon what he did then actually assumeas facts, or how he might have acted under any other given conditions, becomes almost fruitless. 

XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS. 

Let us return to the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, whereoperations now demanded Lee's undivided skill. This was properly theleft wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstrationbelow Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to crossthe river above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It hadconsisted of three corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effectedits purpose, it will be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick'scommand both the First and Third Corps, leaving him with his own, theSixth, to guard the crossings of the river; while Gibbon's divisionof the Second Corps did provost duty at the camp at Falmouth, and helditself in readiness to move in any direction at a moment's notice. 

From this time on, the Sixth Corps may be more properly considered as adetached command, than as the left wing of the Army of the Potomac. 

And, beyond some demonstrations in aid of Hooker's manoeuvring, Sedgwickhad been called on to perform no actual service up to the evening of May2. 

On May 1, a demonstration in support of Hooker's advance fromChancellorsville had been ordered, and speedily countermanded, onaccount of the despatch having reached Sedgwick later than the hour setfor his advance. 

On the forenoon of May 2, Hooker had given Sedgwick discretionaryinstructions to attack the enemy in his front, "if an opportunitypresents itself with a reasonable expectation of success. "

Then came the despatch of 4. 10 P. M. , May 2, already quoted, and receivedby Sedgwick just before dark:--

"The general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick cross the river assoon as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with every thingin it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains: two of Sickles's divisions are among them. "

This despatch was immediately followed by another: "The major-generalcommanding directs you to pursue the enemy by the Bowling-Green road. "

In pursuance of these and previous orders, Sedgwick transferred thebalance of the Sixth Corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, onedivision being already there to guard the bridge-head. Sedgwick's ordersof May 1 contemplated the removal of the pontoons before his advance onthe Bowling-Green road, as he would be able to leave no sufficient forceto guard them. But these orders were received so late as daylight on the2d; and the withdrawal of the bridges could not well be accomplished inthe full view of the enemy, without prematurely developing our plans. 

The order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road having been againrepeated, Sedgwick put his command under arms, advanced his lines, andforced the enemy--Early's right--from that road and back into the woods. This was late in the evening of Saturday. 

On the same night, after the crushing of the Eleventh Corps, we haveseen how Hooker came to the conclusion that he could utilize Sedgwickin his operations at Chancellorsville. He accordingly sent him thefollowing order, first by telegraph through Gen. Butterfield, at thesame time by an aide-de-camp, and later by Gen. Warren:--

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 2, 1863, 9 P. M. GEN. BUTTERFIELD, The major-general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick crosses theRappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at oncetake up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connectwith us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with onthe road. He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train ofsmall ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He willprobably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and between us we will use him up. Send word to Gen. Gibbon to takepossession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by yourswiftest messenger. Send word that it is delivered to Gen. Sedgwick. 

 J. H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. (Copy sent Gen. Sedgwick ten P. M. )

At eleven P. M. , when this order of ten o'clock was received, Sedgwickhad his troops placed, and his dispositions taken, to carry out theorders to pursue, on the Bowling-Green road, an enemy indicated to himas in rapid retreat from Hooker's front; and was actually in bivouacalong that road, while a strong picket-line was still engagedskirmishing with the force in his front. By this time the vanguard ofhis columns had proceeded a distance variously given as from one tothree miles below the bridges in this direction; probably near theBernard House, not much beyond Deep Creek. 

It is to be presumed that the aide who bore the despatch, and reachedSedgwick later than the telegram, gave some verbal explanation of thissudden change of Hooker's purpose; but the order itself was of anature to excite considerable surprise, if not to create a feeling ofuncertainty. 

Sedgwick changed his dispositions as speedily as possible, and sent outhis orders to his subordinates within fifteen minutes after receiptof Hooker's despatch; but it was considerably after midnight before hecould actually get his command faced about, and start the new head ofcolumn toward Fredericksburg. 

Knowing the town to be occupied by the Confederates, Sedgwick wasobliged to proceed with reasonable caution the five or six miles whichseparated his command from Fredericksburg. And the enemy appears to havebeen sufficiently on the alert to take immediate measures to check hisprogress as effectually as it could with the troops at hand. 

Fredericksburg and the heights beyond were held by Early's division andBarksdale's brigade, with an adequate supply of artillery, --in all someeighty-five hundred men. Sedgwick speaks, in his testimony before theCommittee on the Conduct of the War, as if he understood at this timethat Early controlled a force as large as his own; but he had beenadvised by Butterfield that the force was judged to be much smaller thanit actually was. 

In his report, Early does not mention Sedgwick's advance on theBowling-Green road, nor is it probable that Sedgwick had done more thanto advance a strong skirmish-line beyond his column in that direction. Early's line lay, in fact, upon the heights back of the road, his rightat Hamilton's Crossing, and with no considerable force on theroad itself. So that Sedgwick's advance was skirmishing withscouting-parties, sent out to impede his march. 

Early had received general instructions from Lee, in case Sedgwickshould remove from his front, to leave a small force to holdthe position, and proceed up the river to join the forces atChancellorsville. About eleven A. M. On the 2d, this order was repeated, but by error in delivery (says Lee) made unconditional. Early, therefore, left Hays and one regiment of Barksdale at Fredericksburg, and, sending part of Pendleton's artillery to the rear, at once began tomove his command along the plank road to join his chief. 

As this manoeuvre was in progress, his attention was called to the earlymovements of Sedgwick, and, sending to Lee information on this point, hereceived in reply a correction of the misdelivered order. He thereforeabout-faced, and returned to his position at a rapid gait. 

It is doubtful whether by daylight, and without any considerableopposition, Sedgwick could have marched the fifteen miles toChancellorsville in the few hours allotted him. Nor is it claimed byHooker that it was possible for Sedgwick to obey the order of ten P. M. Literally; for it was issued under the supposition that Sedgwick wasstill on the north bank of the river. But Hooker does allege thatSedgwick took no pains to keep him informed of what he was doing; whencehis incorrect assumption. To recross the river for the purpose of againcrossing at Fredericksburg would have been a lame interpretation ofthe speedy execution of the order urged upon Sedgwick. He accordinglyshifted his command, and, in a very short time after receiving thedespatch, began to move by the flank on the Bowling-Green road towardsFredericksburg, Newton's division in the advance, Howe following, whileBrooks still held the bridge-head. 

It was a very foggy night; which circumstance, added to the fact thatSedgwick was, in common with all our generals, only imperfectly familiarwith the lay of the land, and that the enemy, active and well-informed, enveloped him with a curtain of light troops, to harass his movement inwhatever direction, materially contributed to the delay which ensued. 

And Sedgwick appears to have encountered Early's pickets, and to havedone some skirmishing with the head of his column, immediately afterpassing west of Franklin's Crossing, which, moreover, gave rise to somepicket-firing all along the line, as far as Deep Run, where Bartlettconfronted the enemy. As the outskirts of the town were entered, fourregiments of Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward againstthe rifle-pits of the enemy, and a gallant assault was made by them. Butit was repulsed, with some loss, by the Confederates, who, as on Dec. 13, patiently lay behind the stone wall and rifle-pits, and reservedtheir fire until our column was within twenty yards. Then the regimentsbehind the stone wall, followed by the guns and infantry on the heights, opened a fire equally sudden and heavy, and drove our columns back uponthe main body. The assault had been resolute, as the casualties testify, "one regiment alone losing sixty-four men in as many seconds" (Wheaton);but the darkness, and uncertainty of our officers with regard to theposition, made its failure almost a foregone conclusion. This was aboutdaylight. "The force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to showthat the intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost. "(Sedgwick. )

The officer by whom the order to Sedgwick had been sent, Capt. Raderitzchin, had not been regularly appointed in orders, but was merelya volunteer aide-de-camp on Gen. Hooker's staff. 

Shortly after he had been despatched, Gen. Warren requested leavehimself to carry a duplicate of the order to Sedgwick, (Capt. Raderitzchin being "a rather inexperienced, headlong young man, ") forWarren feared the "bad effect such an impossible order would have onGen. Sedgwick and his commanders, when delivered by him. " And, knowingWarren to be more familiar with the country than any other availableofficer, Hooker detached him on this duty, with instructions again toimpress upon Sedgwick the urgent nature of the orders. Warren, withan aide, left headquarters about midnight, and reached Sedgwick beforedawn. 

As daylight approached, Warren thought he could see that only twofield-pieces were on Marye's heights, and that no infantry was holdingthe rifle-pits to our right of it. But the stone-wall breastworks wereheld in sufficient force, as was demonstrated by the repulse of theearly assault of Shaler and Wheaton. 

And Warren was somewhat in error. Barksdale, who occupiedFredericksburg, had been closely scanning these movements of Sedgwick's. He had some fourteen hundred men under his command. Six field-pieceswere placed near the Marye house. Several full batteries were on Lee'shill, and near Howison's. And, so soon as Fredericksburg was occupied byour forces, Early sent Hays to re-enforce Barksdale; one regiment of hisbrigade remaining on Barksdale's right, and the balance proceeding toStansbury's. 

For, at daylight on Sunday, Early had received word from Barksdale, whose lines at Fredericksburg were nearly two miles in length, thatthe Union forces had thrown a bridge across the river opposite the Lacyhouse; and immediately despatched his most available brigade to sustainhim. 

Early's line, however, was thin. Our own was quite two and a half milesin length, with some twenty-two thousand men; and Early's eighty-fivehundred overlapped both our flanks. But his position sufficientlycounterbalanced this inequality. Moreover his artillery was wellprotected, while the Union batteries were quite without cover, and inGibbon's attempted advance, his guns suffered considerable damage. 

Brooks's division was still on the left of the Federal line, near thebridge-heads. Howe occupied the centre, opposite the forces on theheights, to our left of Hazel Run. Newton held the right as far as theTelegraph road in Fredericksburg. 

Gibbon's division had been ordered by Butterfield to cross toFredericksburg, and second Sedgwick's movement on the right. Gibbonstates that he was delayed by the opposition of the enemy to his layingthe bridge opposite the Lacy house, but this was not considerable. Heappears to have used reasonable diligence, though he did not get hisbridge thrown until daylight. Then he may have been somewhat tardy ingetting his twenty-five hundred men across. And, by the time he got hisbridge thrown, Sedgwick had possession of the town. 

It was seven A. M. When Gibbon had crossed the river with his division, and filed into position on Sedgwick's right. Gibbon had meanwhilereported in person to Sedgwick, who ordered him to attempt to turn theenemy's left at Marye's, while Howe should open a similar movement onhis right at Hazel Run. Gens. Warren and Gibbon at once rode forwardto make a reconnoissance, but could discover no particular force of theenemy in our front. Just here are two canals skirting the slope of thehill, and parallel to the river, which supply power to the factoriesin the town. The generals passed the first canal, and found the bridgeacross it intact. The planks of the second canal-bridge had beenremoved, but the structure itself was still sound. 

Gibbon at once ordered these planks to be replaced from the nearesthouses. But, before this order could be carried out, Warren states thathe saw the enemy marching his infantry into the breastworks on the hill, followed by a battery. This was Hays, coming to Barksdale's relief. Butthe breastworks contained a fair complement before. 

Gibbon's attempt was rendered nugatory by the bridge over the secondcanal being commanded from the heights, the guns on which opened uponour columns with shrapnel, while the gunners were completely protectedby their epaulements. And a further attempt by Gibbon to cross the canalby the bridge near Falmouth, was anticipated by the enemy extending hisline to our right. 

Gen. Warren states that Gen. Gibbon "made a very considerabledemonstration, and acted very handsomely with the small force hehad, --not more than two thousand men. But so much time was taken, thatthe enemy got more troops in front of him than he could master. "

Gen. Howe had been simultaneously directed to move on the left of HazelRun, and turn the enemy's right; but he found the works in his frontbeset, and the character of the stream between him and Newton precludedany movement of his division to the right. 

By the time, then, that Sedgwick had full possession of the town, andGibbon and Howe had returned from their abortive attempt to turn theenemy's flanks, the sun was some two hours high. As the works couldnot be captured by surprise, Sedgwick was reduced to the alternative ofassaulting them in regular form. 

It is not improbable that an earlier attack by Gibbon on Marye'sheights, might have carried them with little loss, and with so much lessexpense of time that Sedgwick could have pushed beyond Salem Church, without being seriously impeded by troops sent against him by Gen. Lee. 

And, as the allegation of all-but criminal delay on the part of Gen. Sedgwick is one of the cardinal points of Hooker's self-defence on thescore of this campaign, we must examine this charge carefully. 

Sedgwick asserts with truth, that all despatches to him assumed that hehad but a handful of men in his front, and that the conclusions as towhat he could accomplish, were founded upon utterly mistaken premises. Himself was well aware that the enemy extended beyond both his right andleft, and the corps knew by experience the nature of the intrenchmentson the heights. 

Moreover, what had misled Butterfield into supposing, and informingSedgwick, as he did, that the Fredericksburg heights had been abandoned, was a balloon observation of Early's march to join Lee under themistaken orders above alluded to. The enemy was found to be alertwherever Sedgwick tapped him, and his familiarity with every inch of theground enabled him to magnify his own forces, and make every man tell;while Sedgwick was groping his way through the darkness, knowinghis enemy's ability to lure him into an ambuscade, and taking hisprecautions accordingly. 

XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT. 

Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general assault, he can scarcelybe blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four monthsbefore, a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defencesagainst half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without carefuldispositions seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear tobe almost supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable timeconsumed in these precautions. 

There had been a more or less continuous artillery-fire, during theentire morning, from our batteries stationed on either side of theriver. This was now redoubled to prepare for the assault. Newton'sbatteries concentrated their fire on the stone wall, until our troopshad neared it, when they directed it upon the crest beyond; while likeaction was effected to sustain Howe. 

Instructions were issued to the latter, who at once proceeded to formthree storming columns under Gen. Neill, Col. Grant, and Col. Seaver, and supported them by the fire of his division artillery. 

Sedgwick at the same time ordered out from Newton's division two othercolumns, one under Col. Spear, consisting of two regiments, supported bytwo more under Gen. Shaler, and one under Col. Johns of equal size, tomove on the plank road, and to the right of it, flanked by a line underCol. Burnham, with four regiments, on the left of the plank road. Thisline advanced manfully at a double-quick against the rifle-pits, neitherhalting nor firing a shot, despite the heavy fire they encountered, until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works, whilethe columns pressed boldly forward to the crest, and carried the worksin their rear. All the guns and many prisoners were captured. This was amettlesome assault, and as successful as it was brief and determined. 

Howe's columns, in whose front the Confederate skirmishers occupiedthe railroad-cutting and embankment, while Hays and two regiments ofBarksdale were on Lee's and adjacent hills, as soon as the firing on hisright was heard, moved to the assault with the bayonet; Neill and Grantpressing straight for Cemetery hill, which, though warmly received, they carried without any check. They then faced to the right, and, withSeaver sustaining their left, carried the works on Marye's heights, capturing guns and prisoners wholesale. 

A stand was subsequently attempted by the Confederates on severalsuccessive crests, but without avail. 

The loss of the Sixth Corps in the assault on the Fredericksburg heightswas not far from a thousand men, including Cols. Spear and Johns, commanding two of the storming columns. 

The assault of Howe falls in no wise behind the one made by Newton. Thespeedy success of both stands out in curious contrast to the deadly workof Dec. 13. "So rapid had been the final movement on Marye's hill, thatHays and Wilcox, to whom application had been made for succor, had nottime to march troops from Taylor's and Stansbury's to Barksdale's aid. "(Hotchkiss and Allan. )

The Confederates were now cut in two: Wilcox and Hays were left north ofthe plank road, but Hays retreated round the head of Sedgwick's column, and rejoined Early. Wilcox, who, on hearing of Sedgwick's manoeuvresSunday morning, had hurried with a portion of his force to Barksdale'sassistance at Taylor's, but had arrived too late to participate in theaction, on ascertaining Sedgwick's purpose, retired slowly down theplank road, and skirmished with the latter's head of column. And he madeso determined a stand near Guest's, that considerable time was consumedin brushing it away before Sedgwick could hold on his course. 

Early appears to deem the carrying of the Fredericksburg heightsto require an excuse on his part. He says in his report about ourpreliminary assaults: "All his efforts to attack the left of my linewere thwarted, and one attack on Marye's hill was repulsed. The enemy, however, sent a flag of truce to Col. Griffin, of the EighteenthMississippi Regiment, who occupied the works at the foot of Marye'shill with his own and the Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment, which wasreceived by him imperfectly; and it had barely returned before heavycolumns were advanced against the position, and the trenches werecarried, and the hill taken. " "After this the artillery on Lee's hill, and the rest of Barksdale's infantry, with one of Hays's regiments, fellback on the Telegraph road; Hays with the remainder being compelled tofall back upon the plank road as he was on the left. " Later, "a line wasformed across the Telegraph road, at Cox's house, about two miles backof Lee's hill. "

Barksdale says, "With several batteries under the command of Gen. Pendleton, and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not lessthan three miles to defend, extending from Taylor's hill on the left, tothe foot of the hills in the rear of the Howison house. "

Gen. Wilcox, he goes on to state, from Banks's Ford, had come up withthree regiments as far as Taylor's, and Gen. Hays was also in thatvicinity; but "the distance from town to the points assailed was soshort, the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removingtroops from one part of the line to another was so great, that it wasutterly impossible for either Gen. Wilcox or Gen. Hays to reach thescene of action in time to afford any assistance whatever. It will thenbe seen that Marye's hill was defended by but one small regiment, threecompanies, and four pieces of artillery. "

Barksdale further states that, "upon the pretext of taking care of theirwounded, the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second assault atMarye's hill, which was granted by Col. Griffin; and thus the weaknessof our force at that point was discovered. "

The bulk of Early's division was holding the heights from Hazel Run toHamilton's Crossing; and the sudden assault on the Confederate positionsat Marye's, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity ofsustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfairuse was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale. 

The loss in this assault seems heavy, when the small force ofConfederates is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, inasmuch as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but theinfantry fire was very telling; and, as already stated, both colonelscommanding the assaulting columns on the right were among thecasualties. 

The enemy's line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks'sFord and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton'sCrossing, it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersedEarly's forces, and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. But orders precluded anything but an immediate advance. 

The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions, so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee'spressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it wasfeasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. If this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to assume that hecould have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early's attention and forestallattacks on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of hiscorps, the vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals werehardest pressed, say ten A. M. , and most needed a diversion in theirfavor. 

Not that Hooker's salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick's sodoing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. But it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground forfault-finding. 

Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick's whole manoeuvre is goodenough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, and would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more beenrequired of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of hisorders, it may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren--

"It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it doesa large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain forcewill stop him. "

"The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelvethousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kindof picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thingwithout their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, a little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At daylight, the head of Gen. Sedgwick's troops had got intoFredericksburg. I think some little attempt had been made to moveforward a skirmish-line, but that had been repulsed. The enemy hadconsiderable artillery in position. "

"My opinion was, that, under the circumstances, the most vigorous effortpossible ought to have been made, without regard to circumstances, because the order was peremptory. " But this statement is qualified, when, in his examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, to a question as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick's vigorousand energetic attempt to comply with Hooker's order would have led to adifferent result of the battle, Warren answered: "Yes, sir! and I willgo further, and say that I think there might have been more fightingdone at the other end of the line. I do not believe that if Gen. Sedgwick had done all he could, and there had not been harder fightingon the other end of the line, we would have succeeded. "

If, at eleven P. M. , when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediatelymarched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town, and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness ofthe night, but pushing on his men as best he might, it is not improbablethat he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle bydaylight. But is it not also probable that his corps would have beenin questionable condition for either a march or a fight? It wouldbe extravagant to expect that the organization of the corps could bepreserved in any kind of form, however slight the opposition. And, asdaylight came on, the troops would have scarcely been in condition tooffer brilliant resistance to the attack, which Early, fully apprisedof all their movements, would have been in position to make upon theirflank and rear. 

Keeping in view all the facts, --that Sedgwick was on unknown ground, with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and withSedgwick's every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where afew months before one man had been more than a match for ten; thatthe night was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares bythis order, --it seems that to expect him to carry the heights beforedaylight, savors of exorbitance. 

But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered insome of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorousconstruction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheatonand Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against theworks. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of theinstructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the canal, and Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the assaulting columns, after ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless. 

All this, however, in no wise whatsoever shifts any part of theresponsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker's toSedgwick's shoulders. The order of ten P. M. Was ill-calculated andimpracticable. Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick's corps as anelement in his problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville. 

Sedgwick's movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid thanthose of Sickles on Saturday, and no one has undertaken to criticise thelatter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attackingSedgwick in force until Monday at six P. M. , as will shortly be detailed, when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon onSunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, preciousas every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing toassault Sedgwick's position in front of Banks's Ford. 

In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show howunreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from Gen. Butterfield's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. "From the best information I had at the time the order came, there wasnot over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Thisinformation was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday byGen. Sedgwick. They told me they were left there with orders, that, ifthey did not receive re-enforcements by a certain time, to withdraw;that they did withdraw about eleven o'clock on Saturday night, but metre-enforcements coming up, and turned back and re-occupied the works. The statement may have been false, or may have been true. " It wasclearly Early's march under his mistaken instructions, which theprisoners referred to. "If true, it would show that a bold movementof Gen. Sedgwick's command on Saturday night, would have taken Marye'sheights, and put him well on the road towards Gen. Hooker beforedaylight. " To the question whether the order could have been actuallycarried out: "There was a force of the enemy there, but in my judgmentnot sufficient to have prevented the movement, if made with a determinedattack. Night attacks are dangerous, and should be made only with verydisciplined troops. But it seemed to me at the time that the order couldhave been executed. "

Gibbon, on the contrary, is of opinion that the strict execution of theorder was impracticable, but that probably an assault could have beenmade at daylight instead of at eleven A. M. He recollects being veryimpatient that morning about the delay, --not, however, being morespecific in his testimony. 

XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER. 

So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, he made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left inFredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side ofthe river, and to shield the bridges. 

"Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthestin the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place. " Brooks hadso extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdrawwith extreme caution. "This necessarily consumed a considerabletime, and before it was completed the sound of the cannonading atChancellorsville had ceased. " (Warren. )

This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under thestringency of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the thenleading division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate assistanceto Hooker at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming columnsassaulted Marye's heights, Hooker had already been driven into hislines at White House. And though none of his strictures upon Sedgwick'stardiness, as affecting his own situation, will bear the test ofexamination, time will not be considered wholly ill-spent in determiningwhere Sedgwick might have been more expeditious. It no doubt accordswith military precedents, to alternate in honoring the successivedivisions of a corps with the post of danger; but it may often be highlyimproper to arrest an urgent progress in order to accommodate thisprinciple. And it was certainly inexpedient in this case, despite thefact that Newton and Howe had fought their divisions, while Brooks hadnot yet been under fire. 

"The country being open, Gen. Brooks's division was formed in a columnof brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the frontand flank in advance, and the artillery on the road. " (Warren. ) The NewJersey brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett's brigade on theleft, of the road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might beattacked as soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoidthe usual manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, orfrom an extended order of march. 

Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This"greatly extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, and put it out of support, in a measure, of the division in advance. "(Warren. ) Howe brought up the rear. 

Meanwhile Wilcox, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest's, as long as hisslender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River roadnear Taylor's. But Sedgwick's cautious advance gave him the opportunityof sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish alongthe plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery bycross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. Herehe took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance toSedgwick, until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at thatplace, he withdrew to the position assigned him in the line of battlenow formed by that officer. 

When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plankroad, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring toreach the depots at Hamilton's, he concentrated at Cox's all his forces, now including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word toMcLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that hewould on the morrow attack Marye's heights with his right, and extendhis left over to join the main line. 

XXIX. SALEM CHURCH. 

It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had capturedhis stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever hiscommunications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Leeand Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that atfirst Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purposeto destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early. The nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, andthere is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. And itwas not long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out towards thebattle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilcox in his front. 

McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson's, wasaccordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilcox; whileAnderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns, was sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold thatimportant position. McLaws arrived about two P. M. , and found Wilcoxskirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a fewhundred yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilcox'sright, and Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late, as he had been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plankroads to guard them. McLaws's guns were concentrated on the road, butwere soon withdrawn for lack of ammunition. 

Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse nearby, in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederateline was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where aclearing lay at their back. 

When Sedgwick's column reached the summit along the road, about a milefrom Salem Church, Wilcox's cavalry skirmishers were met, and a sectionof artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, whereWilcox was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground wasquite open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are notconsiderable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, andas far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, andthe woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road. 

Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his divisionbeing on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, sosoon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries (Rigby, Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the road, notfar from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the caissons andlimbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling fire, and, passing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods where layWilcox and Semmes and Mahone. Wilcox's skirmishers and part of hisline gave way before Brooks's sturdy onset, which created no littleconfusion; but Wilcox and Semmes in person headed some reserveregiments, and led them to the charge. An obstinate combat ensues. Bartlett has captured the schoolhouse east of the church, advances, and again breaks for a moment the Confederate line. Wilcox throws in anAlabama regiment, which delivers a fire at close quarters, and makes acounter-charge, while the rest of his brigade rallies on its colors, and again presses forward. The church and the schoolhouse are fought forwith desperation, but only after a heroic defence can the Confederatesrecapture them. Bartlett withdraws with a loss of two-fifths of hisbrigade, after the most stubborn contest. The line on the north of theroad is likewise forced back. A series of wavering combats, over thisentire ground, continues for the better part of an hour; but the enemyhas the upper hand, and forces our line back towards the toll-house. 

Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks hadthus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a lossof nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton hasmeanwhile formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe'sdivision later falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorouslyfollowed up his retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister atshort range, the distance of our batteries from the woods being not muchover five hundred yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLawsstates, that it is impossible to make head against this new line; andthe Confederates sullenly retire to their position near the church, which they had so successfully held against our gallant assaults, followed, but not seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks's andNewton's regiments. 

Wheaton's brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position onthe right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford's line; butour left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advancedground from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile fromSalem Church. 

The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable toengage seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined tothe infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable sharein the day's work, and had earned their laurels well. 

It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle. 

Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line. 

The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg. 

Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, passes thefollowing comment upon this action:--

"Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved onabout three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but couldnot carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heightsdifferently, we might have won that place also. "

"Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enoughsupported by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was justone of those wavering things that a moment settles. If we had beenstronger at that moment, we would have won; not being so, they won. "

It is probable, that, had Brooks's attack been delayed until Newton andHowe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keeppossession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed. But it was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtfulwhether the capture of Salem heights would have materially altered theevent. It was the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing whichdetermined the result of this campaign. Sedgwick's corps could effectnothing by its own unaided efforts. 

XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY. 

So soon as Wilcox had retired from Banks's Ford to oppose Sedgwick'sadvance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, and established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who upto this time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, reaching Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, telegraphed Sedgwick as follows:--

"I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, andrepulsed the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attackhim to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack again inforce unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too faraway for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keepup communication with Gen. Benham at Banks's Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks's Fordwould bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would bebetter than falling back to Fredericksburg. "

And later:--

"I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that wecontracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed theenemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good position. Gen. Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise youhow to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at fiveP. M. Look to the safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, byway of Fredericksburg or Banks's Ford: the latter would enable you tojoin us more readily. "

The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P. M. Next day, and was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, inhis testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, ratherapologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on thescore of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflectsthe ideas of Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence, fathered by Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that therewas then no idea of retiring across the river. 

And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not, in tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick, either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his mindplainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet failings. And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in good-will, ability, or conduct, it is strange that there should not be someapparent expression of it. It was only when he was driven to extremityin explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit suggestedSedgwick as an available scapegoat. 

During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely ridhimself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker's defences. And, trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of hisopponent's lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson's remaining threebrigades to the forces opposing Sedgwick's wing, leaving only Jackson'scorps, now numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, withhis eighty thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himselfrepaired to the battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with theintention of driving Sedgwick across the river, so that he might againconcentrate all his powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville. 

By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox's, and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by onlya few of Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, andinstructed to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to joinMcLaws, feeling our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining theleft of our line to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down tothe plank road. 

At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge, that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cuthim off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as apossible outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early tothrow a force about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford;but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in thisaffair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall anyserious movement to cut him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had alreadyformed Howe's division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, from the river to the plank road. 

In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee onthe Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received fromSedgwick only general--in fact, vague--and rare instructions, as to thedispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particularmanoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, uponinformation, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line, over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men. 

The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in thiscondition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire acrossBanks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard adisastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick hadscarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five thousand, and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with theleft on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's Ford, running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the southside for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest whichWheaton had held the night before. This was a long, weak position, depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under thecircumstances, well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen. Newton's division held the right ofthis line, facing west; Gen. Brooks had Russell's brigade, also postedso as to face west, on the left of Newton, while Bartlett and Torbertfaced south, the former resting his left somewhere near Howe's rightbrigade. This portion of the line was, on Monday afternoon, re-enforcedby Wheaton's brigade of Newton's division, withdrawn from the extremeright; and here it rendered effective service at the time the attackwas made on Howe, and captured a number of prisoners. The bulk of Howe'sdivision lay facing east, from near Guest's house to the river. Thewhole line of battle may be characterized, therefore, as a rough convexorder, --or, to describe it more accurately, lay on three sides of asquare, of which the Rappahannock formed the fourth. This line protectedour pontoon-bridges at Scott's Dam, a mile below Banks's Ford. 

No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle wherehe lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks's Ford, and attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight. 

Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on tillnight, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker'scaution to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with theinformation that he could not expect to relieve him, and was too faraway to direct him with intelligence. 

Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, tillTuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later page. 

Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall'sbrigade of Gibbon's division was deployed as a skirmish-line, andoccasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicatedwith McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; butMcLaws, not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with thetroops Early and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival ofAnderson, whom he knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at SalemChurch. 

Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had beenmaking preparations for a demonstration against Hooker's left atChancellorsville, and had there amused himself by shelling a parkof supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at thecrossing of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived abouteleven A. M. At the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he wasgot into line on Early's left, while McLaws retained the crest he had sostubbornly defended against Brooks. 

Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps byone-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg. 

The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminaryreconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick's centre by a vigorous assault;and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touchof the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets inour front. 

"Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing tothe broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty ofascertaining the disposition of the enemy's forces. " (Lee. ) But moreor less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day, --to cover thedisposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately toascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held bySedgwick's divisions. 

Not until six were Lee's preparations completed to his satisfaction; butabout that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a generaladvance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of theline, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill onwhich Downman's house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up thehills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre. 

On Early's left came Anderson, whose brigades extended--in order, Wright, Posey, Perry--to a point nearly as far as, but not joining, McLaws's right at about Shed's farm; Mahone of Anderson's divisionremained on McLaws's extreme left, where he had been placed on accountof his familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilcoxoccupied his ground of Sunday. 

Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command theUnion artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws's line. It was Alexander's opening fire which was the signal for the generalassault. 

The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and washeld in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. "The speedyapproach of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the successof the attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river. " "His rightbrigades, under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in thedirection of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they couldonly join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasingthe obscurity, and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collisionbetween our own troops. Their movements were consequently slow. " (Lee. )

Early's assault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns, and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began, and Hays's and Hoke's brigades (says Early) were thrown into someconfusion by coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, belowGuest's house. Barksdale remained at Marye's hill, with Smith on hisleft in reserve. 

The weakness of Howe's long line, obliged that officer carefully tostudy his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to aninterior line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed hisreserves accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line, held by Gen. Neill's brigade, and two regiments of Grant's, was asmall covering of woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficientartillery, were concentrated. The main assault was made upon his leftby Hoke and Hays. Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe's firmfront, though made with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous attackupon his right was by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed back, and, by suddenly advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturingnearly all the Eighth Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by theover-advance of our eager troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon'sbrigade, which was enabled to move down a ravine in rear of Howe'sright, and compelled its hasty withdrawal. 

Meanwhile Neill's brigade, on Howe's left, was overpowered by Early'sfierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we hadlost nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to thepreviously selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hokeand Hays, the Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton's division andButler's regular battery, sent to Howe's support by Sedgwick, openedupon them so sharp a fire, that they retired in headlong confusion, largely increased by the approaching darkness. This terminated the fighton the left, and Howe's line was no further molested during the night. 

Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked byMcLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has beenlaid down. It is one of those frequent assertions, made in the best offaith, but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of arecent combat and from unreliable evidence. 

XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS. 

Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee's attack the necessity of contractinghis lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks's divisions andthe Light Brigade (Col. Burnham's), were ordered to fall rapidly backupon Banks's Ford, where they took position on the heights in thevicinity, and in Wilcox's rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, and disposed on Newton's right. 

In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Howe appears to think that he was unfairly dealt with by Sedgwick; infact, that his division was intentionally left behind to be sacrificed. But this opinion is scarcely justified by the condition of affairs andsubsequent events. 

Following are the important despatches which passed, during the latterpart of these operations, between Hooker and Sedgwick:--

 HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 9 A. M. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. 

I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured mycommunication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of theheights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday morningwas twenty-two thousand men. I do not know my losses, but they werelarge, probably five thousand men. I cannot use the cavalry. It dependsupon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustainmyself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BANKS'S FORD, VA. , May 4, 1863, 9. 45 A. M. GEN. HOOKER. 

The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the riverwherever (? whenever) necessary. 

 J. SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 4, 1863, 10. 30 A. M. GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps. 

The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, youreserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of theRappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow P. M. Pleaselet the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this bytelegraph from Banks's Ford as soon as possible. 

 S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA. , May 4, 1863, 11 A. M. MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK. 

The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish youto cross the river at Banks's Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The batteries at Banks's Ford command the position. If it is practicablefor you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, near Banks'sFord, you will do so. It is very important that we retain position atBanks's Ford. Gen. Tyler commands the reserve artillery there. 

 J. H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

 SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 11 A. M. MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD AND GEN. HOOKER. 

I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can holduntil night, I shall cross at Banks's Ford, under instructions from Gen. Hooker, given by Brig. -Gen. Warren. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863, 11. 15 A. M. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. 

The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad forsuch attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is notimprobable that bridges at Banks's Ford may be sacrificed. Can you helpme strongly if I am attacked?

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

P. S. --My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover themabove and below from attack, with the additional assistance of Gen. Benham's brigade alone. 

 J. S. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA. , May 4, 1863, 11. 50 A. M. MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK. 

If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shallbe of the character he anticipates, it is the intention of the generalto advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on thesouth side of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general coulddesire. It is for this reason he desires that your troops may not crossthe Rappahannock. 

 J. H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 4, 1863, 1. 20 P. M. GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps. 

I expect to advance to-morrow morning, which will be likely to relieveyou. You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing. Tell Gen. Benham to put down the other bridge if you desire it. 

 J. HOOKER, Major-General. 

 HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 1. 40 P. M. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. 

I occupy the same position as yesterday when Gen. Warren left me. Ihave no means of judging enemy's force about me--deserters say fortythousand. I shall take a position near Banks's Ford, and near the Taylorhouse, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren; officers have already gone toselect a position. It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg areoccupied by two divisions of the enemy. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 May 4, 1863. (Hour not stated. )MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK, Banks's Ford, Va. 

It is of vital importance that you should take a commanding positionnear Fredericksburg, which you can hold to a certainty till to-morrow. Please advise me what you can do in this respect. I enclose substance ofa communication sent last night. Its suggestions are highly important, and meet my full approval. There are positions on your side commandedby our batteries on the other side I think you could take and hold. Thegeneral would recommend as one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor's is situated. 

 GEN. HOOKER (?)

 May 4, 1863, 2. 15 P. M. 

GEN. HOOKER. 

I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of theRappahannock until to-morrow. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 BANKS'S FORD, VA. , May 4, 1863, 11. 50 P. M. (Received 1 A. M. , May 5. )

GEN. HOOKER, United-States Ford. 

My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the northside of Banks's Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I wouldwithdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopardit by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I mayfeel obliged to withdraw. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 BANKS'S FORD, VA. , May 5, 1863. (Received 1 A. M. )GEN. HOOKER. 

I shall hold my position as ordered on south of Rappahannock. 

 SEDGWICK. 

 HEADQUARTERS, May 5, 1863, 1 A. M. (Received 2 A. M. )GEN. SEDGWICK. 

Despatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and preventany force crossing. Acknowledge this. 

 By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. DANL. BUTTERFIELD

 HEADQUARTERS, May 5, 1863, 1. 20 A. M. GEN. SEDGWICK. 

Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdrawcountermanded. Acknowledge both. 

 GEN. HOOKER

 BANKS'S FORD, VA. , May 5, 1863, 2 P. M. (should be 2 A. M. ). MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD. 

Gen. Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

 HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, May 5, 1863, 7 A. M. 

GEN. BUTTERFIELD. 

I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am incamp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up. 

 JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. 

These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, withthe hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can beimputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the onecould not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of thedespatches is explained by the difficulty of communication betweenheadquarters and the Sixth Corps. 

The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt ofSedgwick's despatch saying he would hold the corps south of theriver, was received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which wasexceptionally delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circumstances, put into course of execution. 

As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander'sartillery began dropping shells in the neighborhood of the bridgesand river banks; and Gen. Wilcox, with his own and Kershaw's brigades, followed up Sedgwick's movements to the crossing, and used his artilleryfreely. 

When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwickwas taken aback by the receipt of Hooker's despatch of 1. 20 A. M. , countermanding the order to withdraw as above quoted. 

The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, thecorps could not now re-cross, except by forcing the passage, as theConfederates absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with aheavy body of troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid ofSedgwick, upon conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk ofhis army upon Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any eventhave successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice but togo into camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the ford, andguard the river. 

The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days' engagements were4, 925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags, fifteen guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundredprisoners, and lost no material. These captures are not conceded by theConfederate authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped insuch confusion as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements, and material of all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of allfacts, and the due weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothingwas lost by the Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the deadand wounded. 

Gibbon's division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of theriver, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy's was taken up. Warren says, "Gen. Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, andretreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsvillepretty nearly all day. " This Warren plainly esteems a poor sample ofgeneralship, and he does not understand why Hooker did not order anassault. "I think it very probable we could have succeeded if it hadbeen made. " "Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted, "--"'tired' wouldexpress it. "

Lee's one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so asto be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he couldnow again turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who laylistlessly expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently obliviousof his maxim enjoined upon Stoneman, "that celerity, audacity, andresolution are every thing in war. "

Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate linesat and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at onceordered back to the old battle-field. "They reached their destinationduring the afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm, which continued throughout the night, and most of the following day. "(Lee. )

Wilcox and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road;Mahone, Posey, and Perry, along the plank road. 

Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mineroads, and the latter rejoined his division. 

The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to assault Hooker'sposition at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by nomeans idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its details, was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to develop hisplans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the terrain wouldhave yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous blow would disablehis antagonist for this campaign, and he was unwilling to delay instriking it. 

XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS. 

Let us now examine into Hooker's various criticisms upon Sedgwick'sconduct. 

Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of theWar, baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised ofhis movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby fromintelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick thedespatch to join him at Chancellorsville, "it was written under theimpression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock. "But could Hooker rationally assume this to be the case when he had, fivehours before, ordered Sedgwick to cross and pursue a flying enemy, and well knew that he had a portion of his forces already guarding thebridge-heads on the Fredericksburg side?

"The night was so bright that. . . No special difficulty was apprehendedin executing the order. " In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, shortlyafter midnight, a fog appears to have arisen from the river, whichconsiderably impeded the movements of the Sixth Corps. This Hooker knewfrom Sedgwick's report, which he was bound to believe, unlessevidence existed to show the contrary. "As will be seen, the order wasperemptory, and would have justified him in losing every man of hiscommand in its execution. "

Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account ofhis familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter thenecessity of strict compliance with the order. 

"I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick'smen had shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would haveencountered less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, it was late when he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was inreadiness to attack the heights in rear of the town, which was abouteleven o'clock A. M. On the 3d, the enemy had observed his movement, andconcentrated almost their entire force at that point to oppose him. " "Hehad the whole force of the enemy there to run against in carrying theheights beyond Fredericksburg, but he carried them with ease; and, by his movements after that, I think no one would infer that he wasconfident in himself, and the enemy took advantage of it. I knew Gen. Sedgwick very well: he was a classmate of mine, and I had been through agreat deal of service with him. He was a perfectly brave man, and a goodone; but when it came to manoeuvring troops, or judging of positions forthem, in my judgment he was not able or expert. Had Gen. Reynolds beenleft with that independent command, I have no doubt the result wouldhave been very different. " "When the attack was made, it had to be uponthe greater part of the enemy's force left on the right: neverthelessthe troops advanced, carried the heights without heavy loss, andleisurely took up their line of march on the plank road, advancing twoor three miles that day. "

Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were allspread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon. No doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, toobey that order; but, as in "losing every man in his command" in itsexecution, he would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to hischief, he did the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion asto the method of attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker's assumptionthat Sedgwick was on the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, andnot Sedgwick's fault. Hooker might certainly have supposed that Sedgwickhad obeyed his previous orders, in part at least. 

Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:"I have understood that evidence has appeared before the Committeecensuring me very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, in accordance with the order of Gen. Hooker. I now affirm that it wasimpossible to have made the movement, if there had not been a rebelsoldier in front of me. "

"I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes time in taking theheights of Fredericksburg. "

Sedgwick did "shoulder arms and advance" as soon as he received theorder; but the reports show plainly enough that he encountered annoyingopposition so soon as he struck the outskirts of the town; that he threwforward assaulting columns at once; and that these fought as well as theconditions warranted, but were repulsed. 

It is not intended to convey the impression that there was no loss oftime on Sedgwick's part. On the contrary, he might certainly have beenmore active in some of his movements. No doubt there were other generalofficers who would have been. But it is no exaggeration to insist thathis dispositions were fully as speedy as those of any other portion ofthe army in this campaign. 

Hooker not only alleges that "in his judgment, Gen. Sedgwick did notobey the spirit of his order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it, "but quotes Warren as saying that Sedgwick "would not have moved at allif he [Warren] had not been there; and that, when he did move, it wasnot with sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre histroops. " It is very doubtful whether Warren ever put his opinion in sostrong a way as thus quoted by Hooker from memory. His report does speakof Gibbon's slowness in coming up, and of his thus losing the chance ofcrossing the canals and taking the breastworks before the Confederatesfiled into them. But beyond a word to the effect that giving the advanceto Brooks's division, after the capture of the heights, "necessarilyconsumed a considerable time, " Warren does not in his reportparticularly criticise Sedgwick's movements. And in another place hedoes speak of the order of ten P. M. As an "impossible" one. 

Gen. Warren's testimony on this subject is of the highest importance, as representing Gen. Hooker in person. As before stated, he carried aduplicate of Hooker's order of ten P. M. , to Sedgwick, with instructionsfrom the general to urge upon Sedgwick the importance of the utmostcelerity. Moreover, Warren knew the country better than any one else, and was more generally conversant with Hooker's plans, ideas, andmethods, being constantly at his side. "Gen. Sedgwick was ordered tobe in his position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could bethere. "

"If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we oughtto have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal uponhow hard the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with histwenty thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he becameisolated. "

Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: "Early in the campaign Ihad come to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would beimpossible to carry works by an assault in front, provided theywere properly constructed and properly manned;" and refers to theFredericksburg assault of Dec. 13, to illustrate this position, sayingthat they (the enemy) "could destroy men faster than I could throwthem on the works;" and, "I do not know of an instance when rifle-pits, properly constructed and properly manned, have been taken by frontassaults alone. "

And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly tothrow himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in hiscommand rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waitingproperly to dispose his men, or feel the enemy. 

As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we haveseen how Brooks's march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and howhis attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men. 

There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movementof the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately afterthe campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point andnothing more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to hissuperior. It has but one error of consequence, viz. , the assumption thatthe three divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under commandof Gen. Lee, attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks andNewton. It was Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade of Anderson, who attacked Howe. 

But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conductof the War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and containsserious errors. Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towardsChancellorsville was received "just after dark, say eight o'clock, "whereas it was not sent until nine P. M. From Chancellorsville, and tenP. M. From Falmouth; nor did Sedgwick receive it until eleven P. M. Howeevidently remembered the order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, as the one to march to Chancellorsville, --when speaking of time ofdelivery. The deductions Gen. Howe makes from errors like this arenecessarily somewhat warped. But let us give all due weight to thetestimony of an able soldier. He states that his attack on Marye'sheights was made on a mere notice from Sedgwick, that he was about toattack, and desired Howe to assist; that he received on Sunday eveninga bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the left of the corps mustbe protected, and that he consequently moved his own left round to theriver; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to strengthen his positionfor defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not properly look afterhis division. "Not receiving any instruction or assistance from Gen. Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of ourselves. It seemedto me, from the movements or arrangements made during the day, thatthere was a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of the positionwhich we held. " Sedgwick's entire confidence in Howe's ability to handlehis division, upon general instructions of the object to be attained, might account fully for a large part of this apparent vagueness. But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was, that nonecessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the river. 

Gen. Howe's testimony is very positive as to the possibility of theSixth Corps complying with Hooker's order as given. He thinks a nightattack could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that theycould have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on theroad to Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinionthat Brooks's division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, with proper support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooksmade to do this very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding tofailure. 

It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he hascertainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded onerrors of fact. 

The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe's before theCommittee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which thereport of the commander of a brigade is entitled, whose duties allowedhim to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. Though his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe's, he, too, mistakes the hourof the urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summonedbefore the Committee, unless as a partisan. 

"My object" (continues Hooker) "in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at thetime named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myselfat Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May. " This statement isnot only characteristic of Hooker's illogical method, but disingenuousto the degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, wasa strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armedand equipped, having in their front less than half their number ofConfederates. In view of Hooker's above-quoted opinion about rifle-pits;of the fact that in his testimony he says: "Throughout the Rebellion Ihave acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;" of the fact thatthe enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would so remain if heonly kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and Pleasonton, at theangle south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the fact that hehad unused reserves greater in number than the entire force of theenemy, --is it not remarkable that, in Hooker's opinion, nothing shortof a countermarch of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture offormidable and sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the Armyof Northern Virginia during an entire half year, ) and an advance ofnearly twelve miles, --all of which was to be accomplished between elevenand daylight of a day in May, --could operate to "relieve him from theposition in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May"?

"I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee'srear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville. "Well enough, but was Sedgwick's corps the only one to accomplish this?Where were Reynolds, and Meade, and Howard, forsooth?

There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick's authority towithdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for hisso doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwickhad really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasonsexisted, and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised himto do so. But Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwickretain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I mightleave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with thebalance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks's Ford, andturn the enemy's position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I wasthwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick towithdraw and cover Banks's Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one whobore the order countermanding the withdrawal. "

Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and holda position at Taylor's, the point where the Fredericksburg heightsapproach the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heightswere by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridgesthere, the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriouslyentertained, with two-thirds of Lee's whole army surrounding his onecorps, though he did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carryout his chief's suggestions. 

But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson's corps inhis front, --some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand, --to move uponhis enemy, "attack and destroy him, " and himself fall upon Lee's rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks's Ford? And Hooker had allSunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrangefor attempting this simplest of manoeuvres. 

It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a giganticpiece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, couldlack the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the oneindicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, andlet all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the inertiaand daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yetHooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfiedhimself that he did all that was to be expected of an active andintelligent commander. 

The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed amongmany of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before theCommittee on the Conduct of the War: "Question. --Can you tell why it wasnot ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his ThirdCorps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy?Answer. --I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered tore-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit ofthe officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not havewithdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gainedcertain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weakerthan we were. "

"Question. --Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army hadbeen ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained avictory there? Answer. --I think we should have taken the offensive whenthe enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick. "

Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on theright, " (i. E. , at Chancellorsville, ) "from one end of the line to theother, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attackhim successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made onhim behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believedhe could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I thenascertained. "

Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), hadhad nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true stateof facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of hissubordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southernpress. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson'scorps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had timeenough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuseshimself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them fourto one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said thatat the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men beforehim? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious andrevocatory evidence. 

Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we feltthe enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entiredivision made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great forceon our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have beendone with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what forceLee left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it isnot strange that the purposelessness of the commander should result inhalf-hearted work by the subordinates. 

The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before theCommittee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker's and theactual facts, shows palpably who is in the right. 

"At nine A. M. , May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: 'Iam occupying the same position as last night. I have secured mycommunication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of theheights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A. M. , was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they werelarge, probably five thousand men. I can't use the cavalry. It dependsupon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustainmyself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg. '

"Question. --When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you havereferred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army atChancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?

"Answer. --I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hookermight have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. Ithink I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hookerhad in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on theheights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would haveattacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A. M. Of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the bridges. This is the despatch: 'Despatch this momentreceived. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt. '

"This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, between three and four o'clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatchwas dated 1. 20 A. M. , and was received at 3. 20, as follows:--

"'Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdrawcountermanded. Acknowledge both. '

"In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker that I could hold the position. He received it after he hadordered me to cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I hadcommenced the movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken myforce over, when the order to cross was countermanded. To return atthat time was wholly impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker. "

To place in juxtaposition Hooker's testimony and Sedgwick's, in no wisemilitates against the latter. 

There is one broad criticism which may fairly he passed upon Sedgwick'swithdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge thathis remaining in position might be of some assistance to his chief, instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyonddanger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubbornflghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks's Ford, against even Leewith his twenty-four thousand. 

But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could havedestroyed his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, with the advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. Moreover, to demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, which, in this campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac wasable to make. 

Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, or himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, mighthave, accomplished so much. But if we assume, that having an eye to thenumbers and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well asto the character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick wasbound to dispute further the possession of Banks's Ford, in orderto lend a questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear bycomparison the conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the general commanding, bottled up behind their defences atChancellorsville!

XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS. 

Hooker states: "Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwickhad said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take someposition, and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediatefront. I proposed to leave troops enough where I was, to occupythe enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river, andre-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole of Lee's army, except that whichhad been left in front of Sedgwick, would be thrown off the road toRichmond, and my army would be on it. 

"As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeingno object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing itwould be more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy atFranklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the armyon the right was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the nightbetween the 5th and 6th of May. "

Now, the Franklin's Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried byBurnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it hadbeen fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginningthe Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve nopurpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made, is the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the opencountry he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1. 

"Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4thand 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a councilof war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what Iconsidered a desperate move against the enemy in our front. " Be itremembered that the "desperate move" was one of eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand more (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, againstat the outside forty-five thousand men, if Early should be ordered upto re-enforce Lee. And Hooker knew the force of Lee, or had as goodauthority for knowing it as he had for most of the facts he assumed, incondemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from the statements of prisoners we hadtaken, very nearly an exact estimate could be made of the then numbersof the Army of Northern Virginia. 

All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum, who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles;while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantageunder Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War, ) says: "I understood from him" (Couch) "always that he was infavor of fighting then. " Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat;but the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes toshow the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated. 

Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and, with one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack, in full force, --Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent tothis purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressedhimself, confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint. He allowed the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestlyrefrained from putting his opinion against that of men trained to theprofession of arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment. But he claimed, with some reason, that the political horizon was dark;that success by the Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidanceof disaster. If, he alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would bethe last one the country would raise. Washington might be captured; andthe effect of this loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to begreatly dreaded. The enemies of the administration were strong, anddaily gaining ground. It was necessary that the Army of the Potomacshould not run the risk of destruction. It was the last hold of theRepublican party in Virginia. Better re-cross and recuperate, and thenattempt another campaign, than run any serious risk now. Thesegrounds largely influenced him in agreeing with the general-in-chief'sdetermination to retire across the river. But there were other reasons, which Sickles states in his testimony. The rations with which the menhad started had given out, and there had been no considerable issuesince. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a rule, unusuallycareful in such matters, ) there had been no provision made for supplyingthe troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday noontill Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, withcommunications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for aten-days' absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look ofalmost a predetermination to accept defeat. 

Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing oversupplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm. Parts of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends ofthe others were under water, and their entire structure was liable atany moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware ofthese circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as hemight judge it better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from thepossibility of victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to crossagain so as to join the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be incondition to count on for heavy service. The Richmond papers, receivedalmost daily through channels more or less irregular, showed thatcommunications were still open, and that the operations of the CavalryCorps had not succeeded in interrupting them in any serious manner. Onthe coming Sunday, the time of service of thirty-eight regiments was up. Many of these conditions could have been eliminated from the problem, if measures had been seasonably taken; but they now became criticalelements in the decision to be made. And Hooker, despite his well-earnedreputation as a fighting man, was unable to arrive at any other thanthe conclusion which Falstaff so cautiously enunciated, from beneath hisshield, at the battle of Shrewsbury, that "the better part of valor isdiscretion. "

XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES. 

Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; andduring the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepareda new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, to secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. Capt. Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warrenon the east, of the United-States Ford road. "A continuous cover andabattis was constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam, aroundto the mouth of Hunting Run on the Rapidan. The roads were put in goodorder, and a third bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4. 30 P. M. , and lasted till late at night. The movement to re-cross was begun by theartillery, as per order, at 7. 30 and was suddenly interrupted by arise in the river so great as to submerge the banks at the ends of thebridges on the north bank, and the velocity of the current threatened tosweep them away. " "The upper bridge was speedily taken up, and usedto piece out the ends of the other two, and the passage was again madepracticable. Considerable delays, however, resulted from this cause. ""No troops took up position in the new line except the rearguard, composed of the Fifth Corps, under Gen. Meade, which was done aboutdaylight on the 6th. " "The proper dispositions were made for holdingthis line till all but the rearguard was past the river; and then itquietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing. " (Warren. ) The last of the armyre-crossed about eight A. M. , May 6. 

Testimony of Gen. Henry J. Hunt:--

"A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset, the general and his staffre-crossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in order tosee to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south side ofthe river, which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was lookingafter them, in the darkness, to see that they had been destroyed asdirected, an engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had beencarried away, or were being carried away, by the flood. I found thechief engineer, Capt. Comstock; and we proceeded together to examinethe bridges, and we found that they were all utterly impassable. I thenproceeded to Gen. Meade's camp, and reported the condition of affairs tohim. All communication with Gen. Hooker being cut off, Gen. Meade calledthe corps commanders together; and, as the result of that conference, Ibelieve, by order of Gen. Couch at any rate, I was directed to stop themovement of the artillery, which was withdrawn from the lines, and letthem resume their positions, thus suspending the crossing. On my returnto the bridges, I found that one had been re-established, and thebatteries that were down there had commenced re-crossing the river. Ithen sought Gen. Hooker up, on the north side of the river, and proposedto him to postpone the movement for one day, as it was certain we couldnot all cross over in a night. I stated to him that I doubted whetherwe could more than get the artillery, which was ordered to cross first, over before daylight: he refused to postpone the movement, and itproceeded. No opposition was made by the enemy, nor was the movementdisturbed, except by the attempt to place batteries on the points fromwhich our bridges could be reached, and to command which I had alreadyposted the necessary batteries on my own responsibility. A cannonadeensued, and they were driven off with loss, and one of their caissonsexploded: we lost three or four men killed, and a few horses, in thisaffair. That is about all that I remember. "

Gen. Barnes's brigade assisted in taking up the bridges; and all weresafely withdrawn by four P. M. On Wednesday, under superintendence ofMajor Spaulding of the engineer brigade. 

All who participated in this retreat will remember the precariousposition of the masses of troops, huddled together at the bridge-headsas in a cul-de-sac, during this eventful night, and the long-drawnbreath of relief as the hours after dawn passed, and no furtherdisposition to attack was manifested by Lee. This general was doubtlessprofoundly grateful that the Army of the Potomac should retire acrossthe Rappahannock, and leave his troops to the hard-earned rest theyneeded so much more than ourselves; but little thanks are due to Hooker, who was, it seems, on the north side of the river during these criticalmoments, that the casualties of the campaign were not doubled by a finalassault on the part of Lee, while we lay in this perilous situation, and the unmolested retreat turned into another passage of the Beresina. Providentially, the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia hadexpended almost its last round of ammunition previous to this time. 

But several hospitals of wounded, in care of a number of medicalofficers and stewards, were left behind, to be removed a few days laterunder a flag of truce. 

The respective losses of the two armies are thus officially given:--

 FEDERAL LOSS. 

 General Headquarters and Engineers. . . 9 First Corps . . . . . . . . 299 Second Corps. . . . . . . . 1, 923 Third Corps . . . . . . . . 4, 119 Fifth Corps . . . . . . . . 700 Sixth Corps . . . . . . . . 4, 610 Eleventh Corps. . . . . . . . 2, 412 Twelfth Corps. . . . . . . . 2, 822 Pleasonton's Brigade. . . . . . 202 Cavalry Corps under Stoneman. . . . 189 ------ 17, 285

 CONFEDERATE LOSS. 

 Jackson's Corps, -- Early's division. . . . . . . 851 A. P. Hill's division. . . . . . 2, 583 Trimble's (Colston) division. . . . 1, 868 D. H. Hill's (Rodes) division. . . . 2, 178

 Longstreet's Corps, -- Anderson's division. . . . . . 1, 180 McLaws's division . . . . . . 1, 379 Artillery. . . . . . . . . 227 Cavalry. . . . . . . . . 11 ------ 10, 277 Prisoners. . . . . . . . . 2, 000 ------ 12, 277

Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation asgeneral on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other. 

Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War: "I lost under those operations" (viz. , the Chancellorsvillecampaign) "one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and oneambulance. Of course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms andknapsacks. "

The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand fivehundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition. And, while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is asserted by them thatthey captured thirteen. 

The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of NorthernVirginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces tothe shelter of their old camps, need no comment. They are characteristicto a degree. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 6, 1863. GENERAL ORDERS NO. 49. 

The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations onthe achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplishedall that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It issufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen orprevented by human sagacity or resources. 

In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before deliveringa general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidenceof its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles itrepresents. 

By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, andconscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or declinebattle whenever its interests or honor may command it. 

By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage ofthe river were undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared tofollow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of everyofficer and soldier of the army to swell with pride. 

We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made longmarches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; andwhenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those wehave received. 

We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteencolors, captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed hors du combateighteen thousand of our foe's chosen troops. 

We have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores, damagedhis communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of hiscapital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. 

We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our bravecompanions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they havefallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle. 

By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. 

 S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 7, 1863. 

With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to thearmy his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and menduring the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged. 

Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again onthe hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valorthat has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seeksafety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles youto the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially calledupon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for thesignal deliverance He has wrought. 

It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sundaynext, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto His name. 

Let us not forget in our rejoicing the brave soldiers who have fallen indefence of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolveto emulate their noble example. 

The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one towhose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success. 

The following letter from the President of the Confederate States iscommunicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of theirsuccess:--

"I have received your despatch, and reverently unite with you in givingpraise to God for the success with which he has crowned our arms. In thename of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the troopsunder your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series ofgreat victories which our army has achieved. The universal rejoicingproduced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regretfor the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and thewounded. "

 R. E. LEE, General. 

The following is equally characteristic:--

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA. , May 13, 1863. To his Excellency, President of the United States. 

Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Order No. 49? If so, do not answer me. 

Jackson is dead, and Lee beats McClellan in his untruthful bulletins. 

 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. 

XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS. 

As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issuedorders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps ofthe Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeedingday for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. Theorder read as follows:--

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA. , April 12, 1863. Commanding Officer, Cavalry Corps. 

I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that youwill march at seven o'clock A. M. , on the 13th inst. , with all youravailable force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning theenemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command between himand Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to hisdiscomfiture and defeat. 

To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend theRappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view ofthe enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties tomask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy, bythe people in their interest living on this side of the river. To divertsuspicion it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are inpursuit of Jones's guerillas, as they are operating extensively in theShenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further suggeststhat you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock, some pointto the west of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can only bedetermined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of youradvance. 

In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run against Fitz HughLee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, whichit is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay toyour advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command. 

At Gordonsville, the enemy have a small provost-guard of infantry, whichit is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying yourforward movement. From there it is expected that you will push forwardto the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinityof Saxton's Junction, destroying along your whole route therailroad-bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, lines oftelegraphic communication, etc. The general directs that you go preparedwith all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually. 

As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortestone for the enemy to retire on, it is most probable that he will availhimself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side ofit, for this purpose; in which event you will select the strongestpositions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc. , inorder to check or prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall uponhis flanks, attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he isexhausted and out of supplies. 

Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit. 

If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you willendeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, on the march, and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from hiscolumn large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to takesmall ones. Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders beFight, Fight, FIGHT; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to thegeneral as the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels tooppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep themfrom Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands. 

The general desires you to understand that he considers the primaryobject of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication withRichmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over thoselines; and he wishes to make every thing subservient to that object. Hedesires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him. 

If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for youto detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, anddestroy depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of theAquia Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy bridges, etc. , or the crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our complete success. 

You may rely upon the general's being in communication with you beforeyour supplies are exhausted. 

Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable. 

A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock forKelly's Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United-States Fordand Banks's Ford, to threaten and hold those places. 

It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forwardmovement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command mustdepend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing inwar, and especially is it the case with the command you have, and theenterprise on which you are about to embark. 

 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

In pursuance of which order, the corps broke camp near Belle-Plain, andencamped on the evening of April 13, beyond Morrisville. On April 14, itmoved down to the vicinity of the bridge at Rappahannock station, which, after a slight skirmish by Gregg, was taken possession of. BeverlyFord, some miles above, was also examined, and the north bank occupied. Preparations for an early move on the morning of the 14th were made. Gen. Buford, commanding the cavalry reserve, remained at Kelly's Fordduring the 14th, in order to draw the attention of the Confederates tothat point, and indulged in a little artillery skirmish. 

During the night a heavy rain set in, and before morning the river wasno longer fordable by the artillery and pack-trains. 

As is well known, it takes no great rainfall to swell the Rappahannockand Rapidan rivers, and their tributaries, to the proportion oftorrents. Nor are more than a few hours necessary to raise these riversand runs, and even the dry ravines, to an impassable depth. Greggmentions in his report that a small stream, which, on the 13th, couldbe crossed at one step, had swelled to such a flood, that when, on the15th, a regiment was obliged to cross it, there were lost one man andtwo horses by drowning. 

So that, after crossing one division, Stoneman found that it wouldprobably be isolated on account of the impracticability of crossing therest of the corps, and consequently ordered its immediate return. Andthis was accomplished none too soon, by swimming the horses. 

On reporting all these facts to Hooker, Stoneman was ordered to go intocamp, where he remained, along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, untilthe 27th. 

The following letter is of interest, in this connection, as showing howkeen Mr. Lincoln's intuitions occasionally were. 

 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. , April 15, 1863. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. 

It is now 10. 15 P. M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter givesme considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to becalculated upon. Gen. S. Is not moving rapidly enough to make theexpedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two ofwhich were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance fromthe enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. Toreach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan)to cross; and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how manydays will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can bedone, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious. 

 Yours truly, A. LINCOLN. 

On the 28th, Stoneman received the following additional orders:--

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, MORRISVILLE, VA. , April 28, 1863. Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps. 

I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that theinstructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant, areso far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at suchpoints as you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock Fords, andfor a portion of your force to move in the direction of Raccoon Fordand Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying intoexecution that part of your original instructions, which relates to theenemy's forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and OrangeRailroad, and the line itself; the operations of this column to beconsidered as masking the column which is directed to move, by forcedmarches, to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and RichmondRailroad. 

You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns tounite; and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, or near thatline, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut offthe retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respectsyour instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same. 

You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that shall notbe practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown overbefore eight o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be toodeep for your pack-animals and artillery, they will be crossed over thebridge at Kelly's Ford. 

You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columnswith a copy of this, and of your original instructions. 

 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, WM. L. CANDLER, Captain and Aide-de-Camp. 

These two orders would appear to be specific enough. The first is notmodified by the second to any great extent; and the primary objectof both is unmistakably to interrupt, by a bold stroke, Lee's maincommunications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg and RichmondRailroad. 

The point on which the two columns, spoken of in the order of April 28, were to unite, was suggested as somewhere on the Pamunkey; and the onecolumn was to go at once about its work, while the other masked itsmarch, and after joined it. 

Under these orders, Stoneman proceeded to get the corps together, --thedistance of many outlying pickets delaying him almost a day, --andfinally crossed the Rappahannock by five P. M. Of the 29th, a portion ofhis troops using Kelly's Ford, in connection with Slocum's column. 

He then assembled his division and brigade commanders, spread his mapsbefore them, and made them acquainted with his orders and plans. 

Averell, with his own division, Davis's brigade of Pleasonton'sdivision, and Tidball's battery, was instructed to push for CulpeperCourt House; while Stoneman, with Gregg's division, Buford's reservebrigade, and Robertson's battery, moved on Stevensburg. 

It was expected that Averell would reach Brandy Station the same night(29th), driving before him the enemy, who was in very small force inhis front. And when Stoneman got well on his way, he despatched Capt. Drummond, with a squadron, from beyond Rocky Run, by crossroads, toBrandy Station, to bring intelligence of Averell's movements. The latterhad, however, not reached that place. And, learning later in the eveningthat he had leisurely gone into camp, close by the place where theforces had crossed, Stoneman sent him word that he must turn the enemyin his front over to him, while himself pushed on towards Richmond. 

This order read as follows:--

 HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, April 30, 1863. BRIG. -GEN. AVERELL, Commanding, etc. 

The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayedby high water, etc. , and that he desires you to push the enemy asvigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy overto you. 

 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. J. ALEXANDER, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

And Hooker justly claims that it was an entire misinterpretation of hisinstructions, which were to have Averell join Stoneman's column, so soonas he had masked the latter's movement towards the Aquia and RichmondRailroad. 

On May 3, Averell, who had done nothing but skirmish for a couple ofdays with a force of about one-fifth his own, and had then retired toEly's Ford, and gone into camp, was relieved, and Pleasonton placed incommand of his division. 

The pack-mules and lead-horses of Stoneman's column were left with themain army, till the expected junction should be made by its advancesouth of the Rappahannock. Stoneman had with him but five or six days'rations; but he relied upon Hooker's assurance that he would be up withhim before these rations were exhausted. Every officer and man, thegenerals and their staffs setting the example, took with them only whatthey could carry on their horses. Nor, despite the cold drenchingrain, which fell plentifully, were any camp-fires lighted the first fewnights. Stoneman seems to have been abundantly ambitious of doing hiswork thoroughly, and issued stirring orders to his subordinates, callingupon them for every exertion which they were capable of making. 

On reaching Raccoon Ford, over the Rapidan, Stoneman found it guarded bythe Confederate cavalry. He therefore sent Buford to a point six milesbelow, where he was able to cross, and, marching up the south bank, touncover Raccoon Ford. The main body was then put over. 

Stoneman's column was in the saddle by two A. M. Of the 31st. But itproved to be too foggy to push on: he had as yet no guides, and he wasobliged to wait for daylight. 

He then hurried Gregg on to Louisa Court House, which place was reachedduring the night of May 1, and details were speedily set to work tearingup the railroads. Buford was sent by way of the North Anna to the samepoint; and at ten A. M. , May 2, the entire force was at Louisa. 

From here a squadron was despatched towards Gordonsville, to ascertainthe meaning of the movement of several trains of troops, which hadpassed up from Richmond in that direction the evening previous. Partieswere also sent out to Tolersville and Frederickshall Stations, todestroy whatever material could be found there. Still another destroyedCarr's Bridge on the North Anna. 

The balance of the force was set to work to break up the VirginiaCentral; and for a distance of eighteen miles the telegraph, stations, tanks, and cars were burned, and the rails torn up, and bent and twistedover bonfires. 

The command then marched for Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and, arriving at Thompson's Cross-roads at ten P. M. Of May 2, headquarterswere established at this point. 

Here Stoneman seems to have become entirely oblivious of hisinstructions, and to have substituted for them ideas originating in hisown brain. He assembled his officers, and informed them that "we haddropped like a shell in that region of country, and he intended to burstit in every direction. "

Instead, therefore, of pressing with his main force for some point onthe Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and destroying it thoroughly, as he was particularly instructed to do, that being the one great objectto be achieved, he contented himself with sending Kilpatrick with theSecond New-York Cavalry, and Davis with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, tooperate, the former against the railroad-bridges over the Chickahominy, and the latter at Ashland and Atlee; and also despatched Wyndham, ofthe First New-Jersey Cavalry, to strike Columbia, and destroy thecanal-aqueduct over the Rivanna river, and if possible make a dash atthe railroad-bridge over the Appomattox; while two regiments under Greggwere to follow down the South Anna to destroy its bridges, followedby the Fifth United-States Cavalry to see that the destruction wascomplete. 

These parties were directed to rally on Stoneman, who was thus leftwith five hundred men of Buford's reserve, or else to push through toGloucester Point, or Yorktown, as circumstances should dictate. 

In pursuance of these orders, Gregg's column, which, on May 2, hadburned the depots at Orange Court House, on May 3, moved down the SouthAnna, as far as the bridge where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses thestream, and attempted to destroy it; but finding it protected by someinfantry, and a couple of guns, he seems to have decided not to attackthis force, and fell back upon the reserve. On the 5th, he destroyed thebridge at Yanceyville. 

Kilpatrick marched some distance by daylight on the 3d, kept himselfhidden through the day, marched again at nightfall, and reached HungaryStation at daylight the 4th. Here he destroyed the depot, and severalmiles of road, passed the Virginia Central at Meadow's Bridge, whichhe likewise burned, with all cars and material he could find in thevicinity, and camped at night in the rear of Hanover. 

On the 5th, he pushed into Gloucester Point, destroying on the way atrain of fifty-six wagons, and some twenty thousand bushels of corn indepots. He captured thirty prisoners, but paroled them. 

Capt. Merritt with the Second United-States Cavalry, demolished a numberof bridges and fords on the South Anna, and reached Ashland Station; butwas unable to destroy the bridge at this place, which was guarded by aninfantry force with part of a battery. 

Col. Davis, on May 3, also reached Ashland, burned the trestle south ofthe town, and tore up the telegraph-line. He captured and destroyed somewagon-trains, containing about a hundred wagons, fired the depot andsome material at Hanover, and bivouacked seven miles from Richmond. Hewas, however, precluded by his orders from trying to enter the capital, though he seems to have had a good opportunity for so doing. 

On May 4, at Tunstall, on the York and Richmond Railroad, he met someresistance from a force of Confederate infantry with a battery; but, retracing his steps, he turned up in due season at Gloucester Point. 

Col. Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a largeamount of stores, a number of canal-boats, and several bridges overthe James-River canal. For lack of blasting-materials he was unable todestroy the aqueduct over the Rivanna river. It was solid enough to havedelayed him at least forty-eight hours. The bridge over the James riverto Elk Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the canal asfar as possible. He returned to Thompson's Cross-roads the same day withW. H. Fitz Lee at his heels. 

Capt. Harrison, with a part of Buford's reserves, had, on May 4, somewhat of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming's Cross-roads; butwithout effect upon the movements of the command. And another squadroncrossed sabres with the enemy at Shannon's. 

Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroledat the time. A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent toRichmond in one party, with word that the Union cavalry was followingclose upon them. 

To quote Stoneman's own reasons, the six days' rations with which heleft camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that therehad been ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessaryfrom the stores destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vaguerumors having reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac;having accomplished, as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averellhaving been withdrawn, thus leaving Lee ready to attack him, --Stonemansent Buford with six hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity ofGordonsville, and a small party out the Bowling-Green road, and marchedhis main body to Orange Court House. 

At noon of the 6th, he assembled his entire command at Orange Springs;thence marched to Raccoon Ford, and crossed on the 7th. 

On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's, having toswim about twenty yards. 

Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he thenreturned to camp. 

During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, theroads had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th. 

Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid: "This failure isthe more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments ofcavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force underStoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country inrear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army wascollected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, withlittle or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one-fourth ofStoneman's force. "

And further:--

"Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies inthe country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate morethan a few days' rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interruptedhis communications for any length of time, would have imperilled hisarmy, or forced him to retreat. "

They also claim that this column seized all the property that could beof use, found in their line of march. "The citizens were in many casesentirely stripped of the necessaries of life. "

Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enoughto throw his main body in Lee's rear, so as substantially to cuthis communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. Toaccomplish this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, whichshould keep whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinityof Orange Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column wasbeyond their reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select arallying point on the Pamunkey, so as to be near the important sceneof operations. Every thing was to be subordinate to cutting theFredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. 

If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night andday for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, he might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee's lineof supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected hisstrength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor ofhis operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick. 

Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, toaccomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; butit would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen thedisastrous nature of the defeat, if no more. 

His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem tounderstand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with abody large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, toperform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable todestroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and acouple of guns. 

And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time theraiders got back to camp. 

Hooker's criticism in this instance is quite just: "On the 4th, thecavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party ofit, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; andthe fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and ourprisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent theenemy's communications had been interrupted. An examination of theinstructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the officialreport of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officerever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one everaccomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body ofcavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at thetime it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. Butinstead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extentwhich seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requestedthat it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable tosuppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, anddetermined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views andinclinations. "

XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN. 

Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before theCommittee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about thegeneral result of the movement:--

"I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated withthe battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My wholeloss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeenthousand. "

"I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost underthose operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, andone ambulance. " "In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard toChancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. Thetroops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men thanthe enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and great results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when thenation required a victory. " "I would like to speak somewhat further ofthis matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim ofsome of Gen. McClellan's admirers, and I do not know but of others, tocirculate erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned fromChancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I hadmore men than I could use; and I fought no general battle, for thereason that I could not get my men in position to do so; probably notmore than three or three and a half corps, on the right, were engaged inthat fight. "

And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: "Myimpression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on thesame road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I shouldadd in my testimony that before leaving Falmouth, to make this move, Ihad a million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had gunboatsin readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey River, in order toreplenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemycould, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When I gave the order to Gen. Sedgwick, I expected that Lee would bewhipped by manoeuvre. I supposed that he would be compelled to marchoff on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on theCulpeper and Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or sixty miles nearerRichmond than himself. "

Criticism upon such an eccentric summing-up of the results of thecampaign of Chancellorsville, is too unprofitable a task to reward theattempt. But assuredly the commander of the gallant Army of the Potomacstands alone in his measure of the importance of the movement, or of thedisastrous nature of the defeat. 

XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA. , May 5, 1863. To the Commanding Officer, Confederate Forces, Chancellorsville, Va. 

I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending aburial-party on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, andcare for the wounded officers and soldiers of my command. 

 Very respectfully, etc. , JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 6, 1863. MAJOR-GEN. J. HOOKER, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

General, --I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead andwounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret thattheir position is such, being immediately within our lines, that thenecessities of war forbid my compliance with your request, which, underother circumstances, it would give me pleasure to grant. I will accordto your dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon my own;but, if there is any thing which your medical director here requireswhich we cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive from yousuch medical supplies as you may think proper to furnish. Considerationfor your wounded prompts me to add, that, from what I learn, theircomfort would be greatly promoted by additional medical attendance andmedical supplies. 

 I have the honor to be, Respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 6, 1863, 4. 30 P. M. HIS EXCELLENCY A. LINCOLN, President of the United States. 

Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams ofeleven A. M. And 12. 30. The army had previously re-crossed the river, andwas on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies withit, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemya general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not toexceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For thewhole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write youat length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry haveat length turned up. One portion did nothing. 

 JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General. 

 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. , May 7, 1863. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. 

My dear Sir, --The recent movement of your army is ended withouteffecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of theenemy's communications. What next? If possible I would be very glad ofanother movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact ofthe enemy's communication being broken; but neither for this reason orany other do I wish any thing done in desperation or rashness. An earlymovement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recentone, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already inyour mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute itwithout interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so thatI, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of someplan for the army. 

 Yours, as ever, A. LINCOLN. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA. , May 7, 1863. 

His Excellency, President of the United States. 

I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, andin answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspendoperations on this line, from the reverse we have experienced inendeavoring to extricate the army from its present position. If in thefirst effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct ofthe small number of troops actually engaged, but from a cause whichcould not be foreseen, and could not be provided against. After itsoccurrence the chances of success were so much lessened, that I feltanother plan might be adopted in place of that we were engaged in, whichwould be more certain in its results. At all events, a failure would notinvolve a disaster, while in the other case it was certain to followthe absence of success. I may add that this consideration almost whollydetermined me in ordering the army to return to its old camp. As to thebest time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only decideafter an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of thetroops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no faultof theirs (if I may except one corps) that our last efforts were notcrowned with glorious victory. I suppose details are not wanted of me atthis time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in ournext effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this torecommend it: it will be one in which the operations of all thecorps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personalsupervision. 

 Very respectfully, etc. , JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 7, 1863. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

General, --The reasons that prevented me from complying with your requestwith reference to your wounded no longer existing, I have the honorto inform you that you can extend to them such attentions as they mayrequire. All persons whom it may be necessary to send within my linesfor this purpose will remain until the wounded are finally disposed of. The burial of your dead has already been provided for. 

I have directed that those of your wounded who desire it, shall beparoled and transferred within your lines, should you be willingto receive them; those in the vicinity of Chancellorsville at theUnited-States Mine Ford, and those on the battlefield of Salem Church atBanks's Ford or Fredericksburg. As your wounded generally occupy the fewhouses in the vicinity of the late battle-field, the transportation ofthis army cannot be employed in conveying them to the river until my ownwounded have been removed to a place of shelter. As soon as this canbe accomplished, I will cause such of your wounded as may desire tobe paroled, to be delivered at the points above indicated, upon beingadvised of your willingness to receive them. In the mean time they shallhave such care as is given to my own. 

I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter of yesterday in case theoriginal may not have reached you. 

 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA. , May 7, 1863, 8 P. M. GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Forces at Fredericksburg, Va. 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two communicationsof May 6 and 7 this moment. If agreeable to you, I would like to sendmedical supplies and attendance to my wounded, and, at such times as thestate of the stream will permit, send ambulances for them via the fordsdesignated in your communications, viz. , United-States and Banks'sFords. I will, with your consent, send parties to those fordswith supplies at an early hour to-morrow. The swollen state of theRappahannock probably preventing the crossing of any vehicles withsupplies, I shall have to depend upon you for transportation for them. Iwill receive the wounded at the points named as soon as it can bedone. I will send an officer to Chancellorsville, with your consent, toarrange the details, which, judging from your letter, with the stateof the river, cannot now be determined by correspondence. Upon anintimation from you as to any deficiency in your immediate necessitiesof medical supplies of your own, by reason of their use for my woundedor other causes, I shall with pleasure replace them. I would be obligedfor approximate information concerning the number of wounded, thata sufficient amount of supplies may be forwarded. I would be underobligations for an early reply. 

 Very respectfully, etc. , JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. (Copy furnished medical director. )

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA. , May 9, 1863. GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. 

The relatives and friends of several of the officers of this army whofell in the recent battles, have visited my headquarters with the view, if possible, of proceeding to the battle-fields to recover the bodies ofthose near to them. I therefore have the honor to ask whether any personwill be permitted to visit the battle-fields for the purpose indicated, or whether any arrangement can be made for sending to the lines of thisarmy the bodies of such of our fallen officers as may have friends hereseeking for them. 

 Very respectfully, etc. , JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. 

 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 10, 1863. 

MAJOR-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER, Commanding United-States Forces on the Rappahannock. 

General, --In reply to your communication of the 9th inst. , I have thehonor to state that it will give me pleasure to afford every facility torelatives and friends of officers killed in the late battles, torecover their bodies; but I have no means of identifying them, orof ascertaining the fields on which they fell. If you will have meinformed, I will cause search to be made. 

 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. 

APPENDIX. 

In February and March, 1886, there was delivered at the LowellInstitute, in Boston, a series of lectures upon the late civil war, bythe following gentlemen:--

 Feb. 16. Introduction. Gen. Charles Devens of Boston. Feb. 19. Pope's Campaign. Col. Jed. Hotchkiss of Staunton, Va. Feb. 23. Antietam. Gen. George H. Gordon of Boston. Feb. 26. Chancellorsville. Col. Theodore A. Dodge, U. S. Army. March 2. Stonewall Jackson. Col. W. Allan of McDonough, Md. March 5. Gettysburg. Gen. Francis A. Walker of Boston. March 9. The Northern Volunteer. Col. T. L. Livermore of Boston. March 12. The Southern Volunteer. Major H. Kyd Douglas of Hagerstown, Md. March 16. Chattanooga. Gen. William F. Smith of Wilmington, Del. March 19. The Wilderness. John C. Ropes, Esq. , of Boston. March 23. Franklin and Nashville. Col. Henry Stone of Boston. March 26. The Last Campaign. Col. Fred. C. Newhall of Philadelphia. 

These lecturers were well equipped for their task. Earnest studyof their respective subjects had been attested by numerous volumespublished by them relating to the war. The desire to have the truth toldwas apparent in the presence of three Confederate officers among thenumber; and the special feature of the course seemed to be, that notonly was the truth spoken in the most unvarnished manner, but that itwas listened to with marked approval by overflowing audiences. 

Perhaps the most invidious subject fell to my lot. What I said wasmerely a summary of the foregoing pages. But one point in my lecturearoused the ire of some of Gen. Hooker's partisans, and was made thesubject of attacks so bitter that virulence degenerated into puerility. The occasion of this rodomontade was a meeting of Third-Corps veterans, and its outcome was a series of resolutions aimed at the person who haddared to reflect on Gen. Hooker's capacity, and to refer to the questionof Gen. Hooker's habitual use of stimulants. The public mention of myname was as sedulously avoided as a reference to his satanic majesty iswont to be in the society of the superstitious; but the exuberance ofthe attack must have afforded unbounded satisfaction to its authors, asit very apparently did to the audience. 

Following are the resolutions, which are of mild flavor compared totheir accompanying seasoning of speeches:--

 RESOLUTIONS. 

The veterans of the Third Army Corps assembled here to-day, soldierswho served under Gen. Joseph Hooker in his division, corps, and army, re-affirm their lifelong affection for their old commander, theiradmiration for his brilliant achievements as one of the prominentgenerals of our armies, and protest against the recent revival of unjustassaults made on his conduct at Chancellorsville. Whether, after _oneof the most noted tactical victories of modern times_, having placed theArmy of the Potomac across the Rappahannock River on the flank of Lee, he might have gained a still farther advanced position; whether thefailure of the cavalry to fully accomplish what was expected of it;whether the disaster to the Eleventh Corps and the delay in the advanceof the Sixth Corps, --are to be attributed to errors of judgment ofGen. Hooker or of the subordinate commanders, are points which will bediscussed again and again with profit to the military student. But we, who witnessed his successful generalship at Williamsburg, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run, and Antietam, have no language at ourcommand strong enough to express our contempt for any one who, twentyyears after the war, affirms that on any occasion in battle, with thelives of his men and the cause of his country in his keeping, Gen. Hooker was incapacitated for performing his whole duty as an officer byeither the use of liquor or by the want of it. 

We protest against oft-repeated statements that "Fighting Joe Hooker, "while one of the bravest and ablest division commanders in the army, was possibly equal to handling a corps, but proved a failure as anindependent commander. Assigned to the Army of the Potomac inJanuary, 1863, after the disaster at Fredericksburg and the failure ofoft-repeated campaigns, our army demoralized by defeat, desertions, anddissensions, Gen. Hooker re-organized his forces, stopped desertions, brought back to their colors thousands of absentees, and in three monthsrevived confidence, re-established discipline, and enabled his army totake the field unsurpassed in loyalty, courage, and efficiency, aswas shown at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. We say Chancellorsvillebecause, although not a victory for us, the campaign _inflicted on theenemy losses at least equal to our own_; and we say also Gettysburgbecause that victory was won by the army Hooker had re-organized, andled with such matchless skill from Falmouth to the eve of the battle. 

Whatever ambition he may have had to command armies, it did not preventhis cheerfully serving his country under junior officers, giving themfaithful support, and his record shows no instance of his removal fromcommand by his superiors. 

Here in his native State, amid the homes of so many of his old brigade, the survivors of the Third Army Corps, all witnesses of his genius, valor, and devotion to duty, indorse his record as a soldier, as agentleman, and as a patriot, and sincerely believe that history willassign to Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker a place among the greatest commandersof the late civil war. 

The italics are mine. "One of the most noted tactical victories ofmodern times, " applied to Chancellorsville, is refreshing. Equally so isthe exultant claim that "we inflicted on the enemy losses at leastequal to our own. " The infliction of loss on the enemy has always beenunderstood by military men to be an incident rather than the object ofwar. 

The following reply in "The Boston Herald" of April 11, 1886, explainsitself:--

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD. 

In the call for the meeting of the Third Corps Gettysburg Re-unionAssociation, held at Music Hall on Fast Day, was the following clause:--

"Loyalty to the memory of our beloved commander, Major-Gen. JosephHooker, makes it a duty, on this occasion, to protest against unjust anduncalled-for criticisms on his military record as commander of the Armyof the Potomac. "

It having been intimated to me by some old brother officers of the ThirdCorps, that my late Lowell lecture on Chancellorsville was the occasionof this proposed protest, I wrote to the chairman of the committee whichcalled the meeting, asking for an opportunity to reply to this protest, within such bounds as even-handedness and the purposes of the meetingwould allow. The committee answered that it could not see the proprietyof turning the occasion into a public debate, and referred me to thepress. I do not object to their decision, made, no doubt, upon whatappeared to them sufficient grounds; but as the occasion was turned intoa public debate--one-sided, to be sure--I ask you for space, to reply inyour valued columns. 

As an old Third-Corps man, I attended the meeting at Music Hall. The treasurer did not object to selling me a ticket to the dinner. Iexpected to hear some new facts about Hooker and Chancellorsville. Iexpected to hear some new deductions from old facts. I do not considermyself beyond making an occasional lapse even in a carefully preparedpiece of work, and am always open to correction. But, to my surprise(with the exception of a conjecture that Lee's object in his march intoPennsylvania was to wreck the anthracite-coal industry), there was notone single fact or statement laid before the meeting, or the company atdinner, which has not already been, in its minutest details, canvassedand argued at a length covering hundreds of pages in the volumes onChancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and Allen, Swinton, Bates, the Comte deParis, Doubleday, and myself, not to speak of numberless and valuablebrochures by others. The bulk of the time devoted to talking on thisoccasion was used in denunciation of the wretch--in other words, myself--who alleged that Joseph Hooker was drunk at Chancellorsville, or at any other time. This denunciation began with a devout curse in thechaplain's prayer, culminated in a set of fierce resolutions, and endedwith the last after-dinner speech. 

One thing particularly struck me. There was no one, of all who spoke, who began to say as many things in favor of Joseph Hooker as I for yearshave done; and not in fleeting words, but printed chapters. There wasplenty of eulogy, in nine-tenths of which I joined with all my heart. But it was of the soldiers'-talk order, --cheering and honest and loyal, appealing to the sentiments rather than the intelligence. What I havesaid of Hooker has been solid praise of his soldierly worth, shown to beborne out by the facts. Barring, in all I say, the five fighting daysat Chancellorsville, I have yet to find the man who has publicly, andin print, eulogized Hooker as I have done; and no one among the veteransgathered together Fast Day applauded with more sincerity than I, allthe tributes to his memory. For though, as some one remarked, it is truethat I "fought mit Sigel, " and decamped from Chancellorsville with theEleventh Corps; it is also true that I passed through the fiery ordealof the Seven Days, and fought my way across the railroad-cutting atManassas, side by side with Joseph Hooker, under the gallant leadershipof that other hero Philip Kearney. It was very evident that but few ofthe speakers, as well as auditors, had themselves heard or read whatI actually said. The result of "coaching" for the occasion by somewire-puller was painfully apparent. Let us see what was said. I give theentire paragraph from my Lowell lecture:--

"It has been surmised that Hooker, during this campaign, wasincapacitated by a habit of which, at times, he had been the victim. There is, rather, evidence that he was prostrated by too muchabstemiousness, when a reasonable use of stimulants might have kept hisnervous system at its normal tension. It was certainly not the use ofalcohol, during this time, which lay at the root of his indecision. "

If that is an accusation that Hooker was then drunk, if it does notrather lean toward an exculpation from the charge of drunkenness, thenI can neither write nor read the English language. As is well known, thequestion of Hooker's sudden and unaccountable loss of power, duringthe fighting half of this campaign, coupled with the question ofdrunkenness, has been bandied to and fro for years. The mention aloneof Chancellorsville has been enough, ever since that day, to provokea query on this very subject, among civilians and soldiers alike. In alecture on the subject, I deemed it judicious to lay this ghost aswell as might be. Had I believed that Hooker was intoxicated atChancellorsville, I should not have been deterred by the fear ofopposition from saying so. Hooker's over-anxious friends have now turnedinto a public scandal what was generally understood as an exoneration, by intentionally distorting what was said into an implication thatHooker was so besotted as to be incapable of command. What I havewritten of his marching the army to this field and to the field ofGettysburg is a full answer to such unnecessary perversion. Let thesewould-be friends of Hooker remember that this calumny is of their ownmaking, not mine. I am as sorry for it, as they ought to be. If thecontempt expressed in the resolutions they passed had been silent, instead of boisterous, Hooker's memory would have suffered far lessdamage. 

Gens. Sickles and Butterfield are doubtless good witnesses, thoughthey sedulously refrained from any testimony on the subject, contentingthemselves with declamation. But they are not the only good witnesses. After the loss of a leg at Gettysburg, I was ordered to duty in the WarDepartment, where I served in charge of one or other bureau for sevenyears. I have heard this Hooker question discussed in all its bearings, in the office of the Secretary of War or Adjutant-General, by nearlyevery leading officer of the army, hundreds of whom had known Hookerfrom West Point up. I have had abundant opportunity of forming anopinion, and I have expressed it. Let him who garbles its meaning, bearthe blame. 

This action by many veterans of the Third Corps--even though procuredby design from their thoughtless and open soldier's nature--is, however, much more sweeping and important. To the world at large it is a generalcondemnation of every thing which can be said in criticism of Hooker. It will reach far and wide, and in this light I desire to say what Ido. The resolutions passed at the meeting explicitly protest against thestatement that Hooker proved a failure as an independent commander. This needs notice at greater length than the question of sobrietyor drunkenness. Few have studied the details of the campaign ofChancellorsville as carefully as I; but one other author has spread thefacts so fully before the reading public. No part of my recent criticismbefore the Lowell Institute was new. It was embodied at much greaterlength four years ago, in my "History of Chancellorsville;" thereception of which volume by press, public, and soldiers, has been itsown best excuse. Gen. Hooker, though making no report, has put on recordhis explanation of this campaign. Before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War, he stated his views as follows: "I may say here, the battle ofChancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle ofChancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand. . . . In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except toaccomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, exceptone corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation washigh, the army in splendid condition, and greater results were expectedfrom it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had foughtno battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought nogeneral battle, for the reason that I could not get my men in positionto do so. "

To speak thus of a passage of arms lasting a week and costing seventeenthousand men is, to say the least, abnormal. 

In trying to shift the onus of failure from his own shoulders he said:"Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appearto be unwilling to go into a fight. . . . So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight than whileit is pending, and when a truthful history of the Rebellion shallbe written, it will be found that the Army of the Potomac is not anexception. "

This slur is cast upon men like Reynolds, Meade, Couch, Sedgwick, Slocum, Howard, Hancock, Humphreys, Sykes, Warren, Birney, Whipple, Wright, Griffin, and many others equally gallant. To call it ungenerous, is a mild phrase. It certainly does open the door to unsparingcriticism. Hooker also concisely stated his military rule of action:"Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had aslarge a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result ofan encounter. " And in his initial orders to Stoneman, in opening thecampaign, came the true ring of the always gallant corps commander, "Letyour watchword be 'Fight!' and let all your orders be, 'Fight, fight, fight!'"

I might here say that the only attempt, on Fast Day, to exculpate Hookerfor the disaster of Chancellorsville was not of an order which can beanswered. When one speaker asks, "If Gen. Hooker tells us that it waswise to withdraw across the river, is not that enough for you and me, my comrades?" I can only say that history is not so easily satisfied. To another speaker, who states that when Hooker had planted himself inLee's flank by crossing the river, Lee ought, by all the rules ofwar, to have retreated, but when he didn't he upset all Hooker'scalculations; that when Jackson made his "extra hazardous" march aroundHooker's flank, he ought, by all rules of war, to have been destroyed, but when he was not he upset all Hooker's calculations, and thattherefore Hooker was forced to retreat, --it is quite beyond my abilityto reply. When Gen. Sickles throws the blame upon Howard for the defeatof the Eleventh Corps, by reading the 9. 30 A. M. Order, without sayingone word about Hooker's actions, change of plans, and despatches fromthat hour till the attack at 6 P. M. , he makes any thinking man questionseriously the sincerity of what he calls history. When Gen. Butterfieldindulges in innuendoes against Gen. Meade, whose chief of staff he was, and insults his memory in the effort to exculpate the Third Corps froma charge no one has ever made, or thought of making, against it, thefair-minded can only wonder why he goes out of his way to call any oneto task for criticising Hooker. Not one word was spoken on Fast Daywhich does not find its full and entire answer in the already publishedworks on Chancellorsville. It was all a mere re-hash, and poorly cookedat that. To rely on the four reasons given by the Committee on theConduct of the War as a purgation of Hooker from responsibility for ourdefeat at Chancellorsville, simply deserves no notice. It is all of apiece with the discussion of the Third-Corps fight at Gettysburg on July2. No one ever doubted that the Third Corps fought, as they always did, like heroes that day. What has been alleged is merely that Sickles didnot occupy and protect Little Round Top, as he would have done if he hadhad the military coup d'oeil. 

Now, I desire to compare with Hooker's recorded words, and theutterances of Fast Day, the actual performance, and see what "loyalty toHooker, " as voted in Music Hall, means. Chancellorsville bristleswith points of criticism, and there are some few points of possibledisagreement. Of the latter the principal ones upon which Hooker'sformal apologists rely, are the destruction of the Eleventh Corpsthrough Howard's alleged carelessness, and the failure of Sedgwickto perform the herculean task assigned to him in coming to Hooker'ssupport. Allowing, for the moment, that Howard and Sedgwick wereentirely at fault, and eliminating these two questions entirely from theissue, let us see what Hooker himself did, bearing in mind that he hasofficially acknowledged that he knew, substantially, the number of Lee'sarmy, and bearing also in mind that the following are facts which canbe disputed only by denying the truth and accuracy of all the reports, Federal and Confederate, taken as a body; and these happen to dovetailinto each other in one so consistent whole, that they leave to thecareful student none but entirely insignificant items open to doubt. 

From Saturday at 8 A. M. Till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours, Hooker with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the FirstCorps, nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wingsof Lee's army of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand menrespectively, being all the while cognizant of the facts. Had ever ageneral a better chance to whip his enemy in detail? And yet we werebadly beaten in this fight. Now, if loyalty to Hooker requires us tobelieve that his conduct of this campaign was even respectable, itfollows that the Army of the Potomac, respectably led, could be defeatedby the Army of Northern Virginia, two to one. Will the soldiers of theever-faithful army accept this as an explanation of our defeat?

Again: from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A. M. , twenty-one hours, Hooker, with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines bya force of twenty-seven thousand. If loyalty to Hooker requires us tobelieve that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that theArmy of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of NorthernVirginia, three to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of ourdefeat?

Again: from Monday at 9 A. M. Till Tuesday at 4 P. M. , thirty-one hours, against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch(the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army wouldbe defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eightythousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of nineteenthousand, while the rest turned upon and demolished Sedgwick. Ifloyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectablegeneralship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could bedefeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, four to one. Shall we acceptthis as an explanation of our defeat?

If there is in the world's military history a parallel to thisextraordinary generalship, for which any one who has even pretended tostudy the art of war is able to find an excuse, I have failed to findsuch an instance in the course of many years' reading, and shall behappy to have it pointed out to me. Hooker's wound cannot be alleged inextenuation. If he was disabled, his duty was to turn the command overto Couch, the next in rank. If he did not do this, he was responsiblefor what followed. And he retained the command himself, only using Couchas his mouthpiece. 

I have always maintained, that, man for man, the Army of the Potomac wasat any time the equal of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that, manfor man, the old Third Corps has proved itself good for Jackson's in itspalmiest days. When, therefore, the Army of the Potomac was, as here, defeated or bottled up by one-half, one-third, or one-quarter its forceof the enemy, my loyalty to that army demands that I seek a reason otherthan Hooker's alleged lack of heart of his subordinate officers. Andthis reason is only to be found in Hooker's inability to handle somany men. All the resolutions in the world, passed under a furore ofmisstatement and misconception, even by such a noble body of men asThird-Corps veterans, will not re-habilitate Joseph Hooker's militarycharacter during these five days, nor make him other than a morallyand intellectually impotent man from May 1 to May 5, 1863. Loyalty toHooker, so-called, is disloyalty to the grand old army, disloyalty tothe seventeen thousand men who fell, disloyalty to every comrade whofought at Chancellorsville. I begrudge no man the desire to blanketfacts and smother truth in order to turn a galling defeat into arespectable campaign; I begrudge no man his acceptance of Hooker'stheory that Chancellorsville was not a disaster; I begrudge no one hisfaith in Hooker as a successful battle-field commander of the Army ofthe Potomac. But let it be well understood that this faith of necessityimplies the fact that the Army of the Potomac was unable or unwilling tofight one-quarter its number of Lee's troops. I prefer my faith inthe stanch, patient army, in its noble rank and file, in its gallantofficers, from company to corps; and I refuse to accept Hooker's insultto his subordinates as any explanation for allowing the Army of thePotomac to "be here defeated without ever being fought. "

The Army of the Potomac was better than its commanders from first tolast. It was, beyond speaking, superior to its commander during thefighting days at Chancellorsville. As a corps commander, JosephHooker will always be a type and household word. In logistics, even ascommander of the Army of the Potomac, he deserves high praise. But whenit comes to fighting the army at Chancellorsville, let whoso will keephis loyalty to Hooker, without protest from me. I claim for myself andthe bulk of my comrades the right, equally without protest, sneers, orresolutions, to express my loyalty to the rank and file, my loyaltyto the officers, and my loyalty to the army as a whole. And I claim, moreover, the right, without protest, sneers, or resolutions, to showthat on this field it was the general commanding, and not the army, whose lapses caused defeat. Not that I object to these Fast-Dayresolutions. I believe that I can still struggle onward in life, evenunder the contempt of their authors. But partisanship in matters ofhistory is a boomerang which always flies back to whack its thrower. AndFast Day's performance was baldly partisan. 

I am satisfied to abide the verdict of all soldiers, of all citizens, who ever studied the facts of this campaign. What ever the action of anymeeting of old soldiers may be under partial knowledge of facts, under the influence of heated or sectional discussion, or under thewhipping-in of a member of Hooker's staff, I do not believe that withthe issue squarely put before them, and the facts plainly stated, anybut a very inconsiderable fraction, and that not the most intelligentone, of the men of the Army of the Potomac, will give their suffrageto what has been suddenly discovered to be loyalty due to Gen. JosephHooker, as against loyalty to the Army of the Potomac. 

The recent course of lectures at the Lowell Institute was intended tobe a purely military one. There was no intention of bringing politicsor sectional pride into the discussion, and it was thought that thelectures could to-day be delivered without rousing a breath of ancientanimosity. If there was any campaign during our civil war which wasespecially, in a military sense, a glorious one for the rebels, and anignominious one for us, it was Chancellorsville. It is indeed a pitythat the skill of the one side and the errors of the other cannot beonce again pointed out, that the true and only possible explanation ofHooker's one hundred and thirty thousand men being defeated by Lee'ssixty thousand cannot be once again stated, without eliciting froma body of veterans of the old Third Corps a set of condemnatoryresolutions. There has been some very heated criticism of the recentlectures, and not a little fault-finding with the lecturers. I presumethat none of the gentlemen who participated in the course would feellike denying the inference, so often suggested, that the censors mighthave done much better than they were able to do. Such censors generallycan. These dozen lecturers have all been earnest students of our civilwar, as is abundantly testified by the twenty odd volumes on the subjectpublished by them since the reports of operations became available; andthey keenly feel that modesty which is always bred of study. Such asthey had, they were glad to give the public; nor do they in any wiseshrink from generous disagreement or courteous criticism. I submit, however, that some of the carping which has been indulged in is scarcelyapt to lead to the correction of errors, or the elucidation of truth. It is passing strange, that, at this late day, one may not criticise themilitary operations without arousing the evil spirit of the war. Canwe not aim at truth, rather than self-gratulation, which will live nolonger than we do? Criticism has always been indulged in, always willbe. If a Frederick may be dissected by a Lloyd, if a Napoleon may be saton in judgment by a Lanfrey, may not the merest tyro in the art of warhe pardoned for reviewing Hooker? The gallant soldier who helped makehistory rarely writes history. The same spirit which sent him tothe front in 1861 generally keeps him busy to-day with the materialinterests of the country. Despite the certainly novel fling of Fast Dayat one who went into service as a mere boy, it remains a fact that rank, without the devoted study of years and a single eye to truth, will notenable any one to write history. It was proven beyond a peradventure onFast Day, that the command of a corps, let alone a division, will not ofitself breed a historian. Partisanship never will. 

Truth will get written some day. I myself prefer to write as anAmerican, forgetting North and South, and to pass down to those whowill write better than any of us, as one who tried to speak the truth, whomsoever it struck. It is not I who criticise, who condemn JosephHooker: it is the maxims of every master, of every authority on theart of war. Not one of Hooker's apologists can turn to the history of amaster's achievements, or to a volume of any accepted authority, withoutfinding his pet commander condemned, in every action, and on every page, for the faults of the fighting days at Chancellorsville. 

It was assumed on Fast Day that one should criticise only what he saw. I have never understood that Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the RomanEmpire" is any the less good because he did not live in the first fewcenturies of the Christian era, or that Jomini could write any lesswell of Frederick than of Napoleon. Service certainly helps a man in hisresearches or work, but it only helps. The best critic may be one whonever served. I think I was the first officer to whom the Secretary ofWar permitted free use of the rebel archives for study. I have had goodopportunities. How I have used them, I leave to others to say. It iseasy to capture a meeting of honest-hearted veterans by such lamentableprestidigitation as was exhibited on Fast Day, and to pass anyresolutions desired, by appealing to their enthusiasm. I prefer to bejudged by the sober after-thought of men who are neither partisans, nor ready to warp facts or make partial statements to sustain theirtheories. 

 THEODORE A. DODGE. BOSTON, April 10, 1886. 

Transcriber's Appendix: Transcription notes:

 The first edition of this book was published in 1881. The author's appendix was added in the second edition, in 1886, which is the source for this etext. 

 The following modifications were applied while transcribing the printed book to e-text:

 chapter 4 - table on p 19, fixed typo ("McGown", should be "McGowan")

 chapter 12 - p 71, para 1, fixed typo ("inititate")

 chapter 18 - p 111, para 1, fixed typo ("Pleasanton")

 chapter 27 - p 180, para 1, fixed "the the"

 Limitations imposed by converting to plain ASCII: - The words "manoeuvre", "manoeuvres" and "manoeuvring" are printed in the book using the "oe" ligature. The term "coup d'oeil" was also printed with the "oe" ligature, "minutiae" was printed using the "ae" ligature, and several other French terms (such as "elan" and "echelon") were printed with accented vowels. However, this does not seem enough to merit an 8-bit text. - Italics were printed for various non-English words and phrases, and occasionally for emphasis. For the most part, these were simply converted to plain text. However, I did use underscores to denote two italicized phrases in the author's appendix, where the use of italics was more significant. 

 I did not modify: - The phrases "on each side the road", "on both sides the road" - The first paragraph of chapter 22 contains the phrase "angle of refusal or Archer and McGowan" I believe "or" is incorrect and should be probably "for" or "of", but I don't know which. "or" is printed in both the 1881 and 1886 editions, so I left it as is.