THE CAMPAIGN of 1760 in CANADA

 A NARRATIVE ATTRIBUTED TO CHEVALIER JOHNSTONE. 

 Published under the Auspices of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec

 QUEBEC: PRINTED AT THE "MORNING CHRONICLE" OFFICE

 1887. 

[PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE LITERARY AND HISTORICAL SOCIETYOF QUEBEC. ]

ATTRIBUTED TO CHEVALIER JOHNSTONE. 

Hope that heavenly, healing balm, that gift from Providence, blendedwith persecutions to blunt the sharpness of their sting and hinder theunfortunate from being overwhelmed, and sinking under the load oftheir afflictions, never dies out--never abandons the distressed. "Wedon't believe in dangers, " says Machiavel, "until they are over ourheads; but we entertain hopes of escaping them when at a greatdistance. " Hope does not abandon the pale, dying man: in his agony hestill fells life, and in his thoughts he does not detach himself fromit. Death strikes, before his heart has realized that he could ceaseto live. Search in the prisons: hope dwells there with the wretch whonext day is to undergo his sentence of death. Every time the boltsrattle, he believes his deliverance entering with the jailer. Wholeyears of slavery have not been able to wear out this consolingsentiment. These contradictions, --these differences of seeing, --thesereturns, --this stormy flow and ebb, are so many effects of hope, whichplays upon us and never ceases. It is inherent in human nature to hopein adversity for a favorable change of fate, however the appearancesmay be ill-grounded of an end to its pain and suffering. 

The Canadians, without the least apparent reason, still flatteredthemselves to save their country, and did not lose the hope ofretaking Quebec, though without artillery and warlike stores. Allminds were occupied during the winter in forming projects of capturingthat town, which were entirely chimerical, void of common sense, andnowise practicable. No country ever hatched a greater number--neverprojects more ridiculous and extravagant; everybody meddled. Thecontagion spread even to my Lord Bishop and his seminary of priests, who gave their plan, which, like all the others, lacked only commonsense and judgment. In short, a universal insanity prevailed atMontreal. Amongst thousands of the productions of these distemperedbrains, that of surprising Quebec by a forced march in winter andtaking it by escalade, was the only one where there was the leastchance of success. This project was for some time agitated soseriously, that workmen were employed in making wooden ladders; buthaving always looked upon it as a wild and extravagant fancy ofpriests and old women, I constantly argued against it whenever theyspoke of it, and it was continually the topic of conversation. 

The Upper Town of Quebec lies upon the top of a rock, about twohundred feet high, almost perpendicular in some parts of it, andeverywhere extremely steep and inaccessible, excepting towards the_Hauteurs d'Abraham_, which is a continuation of the same hill, thatbegins at Quebec and ends at Cap Rouge, diminishing gradually inheight in the space of these three leagues. The Lower Town is a narrowpiece of ground, from a hundred to four or five paces[A] broad, between the foot of the rock and the St. Lawrence. 

There is a street which goes up to the Upper Town without acontinuation of houses; it is impossible to climb up the rock from theLower Town, as I was employed three weeks upon it with miners andother workmen, to render all the footpaths impracticable; we finishedonly a few days before the arrival of the English fleet (in 1759). Atown built upon a vast extent of ground, which would require an armyto defend it, such as Ghent in Flanders, and which might be approachedon all sides at the same time, in order to divide the troops of thegarrison equally over all the town, may be surprised and taken byescalade, and in our desperate situation might have been attempted byrisking all for all. A surprise in a dark night must naturally spreaduniversal terror, disorder and panic amongst those who are takenunawares, and must soon be communicated through all the quarters ofthe town. The soldiers are so much the more terrified that they knownot where they are most in danger; not like during a siege, where theplace for the assault is marked by the breach. Their heads turn, and, deprived of judgment, coolness and reflection, they think rather ofescaping the slaughter that ensues when a town is being captured inthis manner, than of defending the ramparts. But Quebec beingaccessible only on that side of it which faces the heights of Abraham, and having nothing to fear elsewhere, the moment an alarm is sounded, all the force of the garrison must naturally be there. Thus theEnglish having seven thousand men in the town--almost as many as ourarmy proposed for the escalade to invest all that part of the townopen to attack--it is likely that we should have lost the half of ourarmy in the attempt, and at last, after a horrible slaughter of men, have been obliged to return ignominiously from whence we came. Besides, supposing that we had even taken the Lower Town by escalade, we would not have been further advanced. The English, in half an hourafterwards, by burning it, by throwing down from the Upper Town uponthe roofs of the houses fire pots, shells and other combustiblematter, could have soon chased us out of it, or buried us under itsruins. This project, after having furnished for a long time matter forthe daily conversations of Montrealers, was at last considered by M. De Levis, and classed as it deserved, amongst the vagaries of bedlam;he substituting a scheme in its place which was reasonable, wellcombined, doing honor to his ability and talent. 

[Footnote A: The four or five paces of 1760 have now attained seven oreight acres. --(L)]

M. De Levis, in giving an account to the Court of the loss of all ourartillery and stores at Quebec, gave likewise all possible assurancesthat he would re-take the town in the spring and save the colony, provided they would send to him from Europe a ship loaded withfield-pieces and ammunition, to set sail from Europe in the month ofFebruary, in order to be in the St. Lawrence river before the arrivalof the English, and near Quebec in the month of April. He collectedour army as soon as the season permitted; got together about twelvepieces of old cannon, which had been laid aside for many years, andwith a small quantity of gunpowder and very few bullets, he set outfrom Montreal with his army towards the beginning of April, the snowbeing as yet upon the ground; and he conducted his march so well thatthe army arrived at Cap Rouge, three leagues from Quebec, without theenemy having any information of their having left Montreal. He did notflatter himself to be able to take Quebec with such a despicable trainof artillery, and his design was only to invest the town; to open thetrenches before it; to advance his approaches, and be in a position, the moment the ships he had asked from the Court should arrive, toland the cannon, placing them instantly upon the batteries ready toreceive them, and without loss of time to batter the town immediately. 

Fortune favored him to the height of his wishes, and if the ships hadarrived with the artillery he expected from France, that town couldscarce have held out for four and twenty hours, by which means hewould have had the glory of preserving to his country the colony ofCanada, then reduced to its last gasp. 

The English got the news of our army's being at Cap Rouge by a mostsingular accident, which greatly manifests the predominant power ofFortune in military operations, and shows that the greatest generalcannot guarantee success or put himself out of the reach of thoseevents which human understanding cannot foresee, whereby the bestcombined and well-formed schemes are frustrated in their execution. Inall appearance we would have taken Quebec by surprise had it not beenfor one of Fortune's caprices, that have often as much share in theevents of war as the genius and talents of the greatest generals. 

The Athenians were not in the wrong to paint Timotheus asleep, whilstFortune, in another part of the picture, was spreading nets over townsto take them for him. 

An artillery boat having been overturned and sunk by the sheets ofice, which the current of the St. Lawrence brought down with greatforce, an artilleryman saved himself on a piece of ice that floateddown the river with him upon it, without a possibility of his gettingto land, when he was opposite to the city. 

The English, so soon as they perceived that poor distressed man--movedwith humanity and compassion--sent out boats, who with difficultysaved him (the river being covered with fields of ice), and broughthim to town with scarce any sign of life. Having restored him withcordials, the moment he began to breathe and recover his senses, theyasked him from whence he came, and who he was? he answered, innocently, that he was a French cannonier from M. De Levis' army atCap Rouge. At first they imagined he raved, and that his sufferingsupon the river had turned his head; but, after examining him moreparticularly and his answers being always the same, they were soonconvinced of the truth of his assertions, and were not a littleconfounded to have the French army at three leagues from Quebec, without possessing the smallest information of the fact. All theircare proved ineffectual for the preservation of life; he expired themoment he had revealed this important secret. What a remarkable andvisible instance of fortune fighting for the English--equal at leastto the cloud of rain that saved General Wolfe's army the yearpreceding at his attack of 31st of July, at Montmorenci. Had it notbeen for this most unaccountable accident, to all appearance M. DeLevis would have captured all the English advanced posts, which weresaid to amount to fifteen hundred men, who retired to the townimmediately after setting fire to the magazine of powder in the churchof St. Foy, which ammunition they had not the time to carry with them. 

Nor would it have been surprising if M. De Levis, at the gates ofQuebec with his army, without being discovered, had taken it bysurprise. It is certain that luck has more or less share in all theevents of life, and this is more particularly visible in theoperations of war. Hazards may be constantly in the favor of a generalblindly protected by that goddess, against an adversary with farsuperior talents. Everybody must acknowledge Prince Eugene'ssuperiority of genius, when compared with the Duke of Marlborough; butMarlborough was always as fortunate in having continually unforeseenaccidents in his favor, as Prince Eugene was unlucky to have themagainst him to thwart and cross the execution of the best-combinedprojects, which extorted admiration, and seemed to have only need ofFortune's standing neuter to be successful. The fate of an army, --canit depend upon the personal good fortune of the General who commandsit? Cardinal Mazarin seemed to be of this opinion, since he neverfailed to ask those who recommended persons to him to headexpeditions, "is he lucky?"--_est-il heureux_? Can it be surmised thatfortune acts with her favorite sons at the head of armies, as she doesat gambling tables? However it may be, a great General will alwayswatch vigilantly the chapter of accidents--seize rapidly that which isfavorable to him, and, by his prudence, foresight and circumspection, will ward off and correct what is contrary to his interests. Thesmallest things are not unworthy of his attention; they often producethe greatest events, and the neglecting what at first view mightappear trivial, has often overturned the best-calculated schemes. Themost trifling of our actions becomes often a first cause whichproduces an endless chain of effects--linked to each other--of thegreatest importance. The boat sunk by the ice, at Cap Rouge, was afirst cause. The cannonier, by this accident, was upon a sheet of icein the middle of the St. Lawrence, opposite to Quebec; this inspiredwith pity the English to save his life. This humane action of theEnglish in saving the unhappy cannonier, saved Quebec from being takenby surprise, which probably would have been the case without hisinformation, that M. De Levis' army was at Cap Rouge. If taken by M. De Levis, it would have deterred the English from any further attemptupon Canada, and peace would have soon ensued. But by the cannonier'sdeclaration, it was not taken, and consequently the war was prolonged. 

Quebec in possession of the English rendered the conquest of Canadainevitable and sure. The possession of that vast country of Canada, after so much blood, and such immense expenses it had cost the Englishin these different expeditions, excited too much the cupidity of theEnglish to consent to a peace upon reasonable conditions, and inducedthem to extend their conquest to other French colonies. 

The possession of so many French and Spanish colonies by the Englishbrought about the shameful peace that France and Spain were obliged toreceive at the hands of the English, upon the hardest terms, as lawsof the conqueror. 

The boat upset and sunk at Cap Rouge was the primary cause and thefirst link of the chain which had the greatest influence over all theaffairs of Europe. If M. De Levis had saved the cannonier at CapRouge, what a multitude of events would have been nipped in the bud!Perhaps even Great Britain would have been forced to receive the peacefrom France instead of granting it on her own conditions. 

There is scarcely any human action that is not the beginning of achain of results. 

The French army took possession of the village of St. Foye the momentthe English went out of it, retiring to Quebec, and passed there thenight between the 27th and 28th of April. Next morning M. De Levisbeing informed that the English army was come out of the town, andthat they were drawn up in battle upon the same ground that the Frencharmy had occupied the year before at the battle of the 13th September, he drew out his men and advanced in order of battle to meet theEnglish army. Though fully persuaded that the English general wouldnot risk a battle out of his town, where he had a great deal to losein being beat, and could gain little by a victory, he was fullypersuaded that he would return at the approach of the French army. 

General Murray, who does the greatest honor to his country by hisgreat knowledge of the art of war, good sense and ability, had comeout of the town in order to cover that place with a retrenchment, which was very evident from the prodigious quantity of working toolsthat were taken by the French; and the vast rapidity with which theFrench army advanced in all appearance, deprived him of thepossibility of getting back into Quebec without leaving a part of themto be cut to pieces by the Canadians. 

The English army had the advantage of position. They were drawn up inbattle upon rising ground, their front armed with twenty-two brassfield-pieces--the Palace battery which De Ramsay refused to Send toM. De Montcalm. The engagement began by the attack of a house(Dumont's) between the right wing of the English army and the Frenchleft wing, which was alternately attacked and defended by the ScotchHighlanders and the French Grenadiers, each of them taking it andlosing it by turns. Worthy antagonists!--the Grenadiers, with theirbayonets in their hands, forced the Highlanders to get out of it bythe windows; and the Highlanders getting into it again by the door, immediately obliged the Grenadiers to evacuate it by the same road, with their daggers. Both of them lost and retook the house[B] severaltimes, and the contest would have continued whilst there remained aHighlander and a Grenadier, if both generals had not made them retire, leaving the house neuter ground. The Grenadiers were reduced tofourteen men--a company at most. No doubt the Highlanders lost inproportion. The left of the French army, which was in hollow ground, about forty paces from the English, was crushed to pieces by the fireof their artillery loaded with grape-shot. M. De Levis, perceivingtheir bad position, sent M. De La Pause, Adjutant of the GuienneRegiment, with orders for the army to retire some steps behind them, in order to occupy an eminence parallel to the rising ground occupiedby the English; but whether this officer did not comprehend M. DeLevis' intentions, or whether he delivered ill the orders to thedifferent regiments, by his stupidity the battle was very near beinglost irremediably. He ran along the line, ordering each regiment tothe right about, and to retire, without any further explanation of M. De Levis' orders. Some of the left of the French army being so near astwenty paces to the enemy, the best disciplined troops in that casecan scarce be expected to be able to retire without the greatestdisorder and confusion, or without exposing themselves evidently tobe defeated and slaughtered. Upon this movement, the English, believing them in flight, quitted their advantage of the rising groundin order to pursue them, complete their disorder, and break thementirely. M. Dalquier, who commanded the Bearn Regiment, with thetroops of the colony upon the left of the French army, a bold, intrepid old officer, turned about to his soldiers when La Pause gavehim M. De Levis' order to retire, and told them, "It is not time now, my boys, to retire when at twenty paces from the enemy; with yourbayonets upon your muskets, let us throw ourselves headlong amongstthem--that is better. " In an instant they fell upon the Englishimpetuously--with thrusts of bayonets hand to hand, got possession, like lightning, of their guns; and a ball which went throughDalquier's body, which was already quite covered with scars of oldwounds, did not hinder him from continuing giving his orders. Poularies, who was on the right flank of the army, with his regimentof Royal Roussillon, and some of the Canadian militia, seeing Dalquierstand firm, and all the troops of the centre having retired indisorder, leaving a space between the two wings, he caused hisregiment with the Canadians to wheel to the left, in order to fallupon the left flank of the English army, the French army extendingfurther to their right beyond the English left wing. The enemy nosooner perceived Poularies' movement, than they immediately fled withprecipitation and confusion, and were so panic-stricken that not anEnglish soldier could be rallied by their officers, several of whomwere taken prisoners. The French troops who had retired advancedimmediately, and all the French army pursued so hotly the English, that if the cry had not been raised to halt, it is very doubtful ifthey would not have got into Quebec pell-mell with the fugitives, being near the town-gates when this cry began. Thus Quebec would havebeen retaken in a most singular manner, [C] unforeseen andunpremeditated. I know nothing worse than ill-disciplined troops;certainly a brave militia, with its simple, ancient way of fighting, even not drilled, is preferable to a force having a crude notion ofdiscipline--a science entirely neglected in Canada amongst Frenchregular troops; so that the French regiments there might be lookedupon as differing very little from the Canadian militia. The method ofmanaging militia and well-disciplined regular troops appears to bequite as different as they differ in nature. A cool, phlegmatic, undaunted bravery is the fruit of an excellent discipline, renderingthe soldiers capable, when repulsed, to return several times to theassault, and rally of their own accord. But the strength and merit ofthe militia resembles a hot, ardent, raging fire, that must besuffered to blaze until it dies out of itself: it is a flash, anexplosion, that often works prodigies, and which, when stifled, thereis no possibility of preventing the immediate disorder that mustensue, nor any means of bringing it back a second time to face theenemy. 

NOTE. --The preceding winter had been employed in skirmishingaround Quebec. --(J. M. L. )

[Footnote B: Dumont's Mill. ]

[Footnote C: "On the night of the eighteenth of March, two hundredlight infantry were detached from the Garrison of Quebec, with threedays' provisions, and a company of Grenadiers, marched the next day toLorette Church, being the place of rendezvous. The whole proceeded toCalvaire, accompanied by a French deserter in a British uniform. Inthis route they surprised an advanced post of the French, and made theparty prisoners, consisting of a corporal and nine privates; havingsecured these, they pushed forward with the greatest speed, fearingthat a straggling peasant, whom they met, should mar their furtherviews by alarming the country. The light infantry having reached thewished for object, which was a strong camp or entrenchment of logs andtimber, with a house detached at a small distance from it, theycarried the dwelling house With their accustomed bravery, killed fourand took the rest, being twenty in number, some of whom were wounded. The main body of the French by this time had manned their works, whichwere breast high, and environed with an abattis of wood, to thedistance of about three hundred yards, whence they fired a few randomshots and shouted as usual. Capt. McDonald, who commanded thisdetachment, seeing the French advantageously situated, and perceivingtheir officers very active in encouraging their men, expected a warmdispute, and therefore made a disposition to attack them in form. Assoon, however, as the light infantry advanced to the charge, theFrench threw down their arms and took to flight, when near eighty ofthem were made prisoners. In the attack the English had only sixwounded; but the French lost five killed and thirteen wounded. Capt. McDonald destroyed the post, three corn-mills, granaries, and otherhouses contiguous thereto. The French prisoners were brought toQuebec, except the wounded, who were left in charge of the peasants, with directions to conduct them to Jacques Cartier. Near one hundredsoldiers of the English detachment were frost-bitten, and were broughtback to the garrison on sleighs. Capt. Herbin, the commanding officer, escaped; but his watch, hat, and feather, 'fille de joie, ' with a caskof wine and case of liqueurs, were taken. 

"The Governor of Quebec (General Murray) sent the Town Major to theMother Abbess of the Convent of Hotel Dieu, to acquaint her with thereasons that induced him to destroy their mills and tenements atCalvaire: namely, on account of her having transmitted intelligence tothe French, of the last detachment's being ordered to be in readinessto march out; for having actually carried on a correspondence with theFrench army in the whole course of the winter, whereby they wereinformed of all movements, proceedings, and every other occurrencethat happened within the walls: the Governor also signified to her, that if either she or her sisters should presume to correspond infuture with the French, either directly or indirectly, or in anyrespect act contrary to good faith and the duty they owed to the Kingof Great Britain, they should, without further ceremony, be banishedfrom Quebec, and their convent be converted into a barrack for thetroops. As Madame de St. Claude, who was sister to M. De Ramsay, andSuperior of the General Hospital, had always been inimical to theEnglish in propagating falsehoods, and in encouraging the Canadians toresist, General Murray sent the Brigade-Major to signify to this ladythat she should desist from such conduct; and that as she appeared totake a great interest in the affairs of this world, and seemed tiredof her seclusion, he would enlist her as a Grenadier, which from herstature (full six feet) she was qualified to be, and that he wouldpromote her the first opportunity that presented itself. "--(SMITH. )]

The French had about two thousand killed and wounded in this battle ofthe 27th (? 28th) of April, of which number there was an hundred andten officers of the regular troops, besides a great many officers ofthe Canadian militia: so they might say with Pyrrhus, the day of hisvictory over the Romans--"Again such another victory, and I would beundone!"

M. De Levis opened the trenches the same night before Quebec, and theywere carried on with such activity that his batteries were soon readyto receive the guns necessary to make a breach. 

But the most considerable of his bad pieces was a twelve pounder, which he mounted upon batteries, firing at times with the greatesteconomy, as he had but a small store of gunpowder. There needed onlythe arrival of a ship from France with artillery and ammunition tocrown M. De Levis with glory. The English in Quebec confessed that thefirst flag that would appear in the St. Lawrence would decide thequestion, if Canada should remain in possession of the English orreturn to the French. 

No ships arrived from France with artillery. The fate of Canada was atlast settled by the appearance of three English men-of-war, on the 7thof May. They ascended immediately the St. Lawrence without stopping atQuebec. They attacked the small French frigates--at the Ance duFoulon, about a mile above the town--which had passed the winter inCanada; took some of them, burned others, and, in short, destroyed inan instant all the French marine. This unlooked-for arrival, insteadof the vessel which M. De Levis expected from France, so astonishedand terrified the French army, that they immediately raised thesiege--and that without any necessity for it. They again left as apresent for the English their tents and their baggage, as they haddone previously on retiring from Beauport, after the battle of the13th September. Such was their consternation that, as if struck by athunderbolt, they fled with the utmost precipitation, as if theEnglish were pursuing them after the loss of a battle. De Vauquelinalone distinguished himself by a truly heroic bravery. He commandedone of the small French frigates of about sixteen guns, and foughtlike a lion against an English man-of-war of forty guns, until he hadno powder nor shot. He then sent all his crew ashore to M. De Levis, judging that they might be of use to him, and remained on board withthe wounded, his colors always flying. 

The English, after firing some time at his vessel, and receiving noanswer, approached in their boats and asked him why he did not fire, or lower his flag? De Vauquelin answered them fiercely that, had hehad any more powder he would not have been silent so long; that ifthey had a mind to take him, they might cut down his flag themselves, as hitherto his custom was not to strike his colors, but to makeothers--his country's enemies--do so. The English then went on boardof his ship, and took him prisoner, with his wounded men, and inconsideration of his determination--they having cut down hisflag--treated him with the regard which bravery can claim at the handsof a generous enemy. De Vauquelin had already made himself known tothe English by his undaunted courage at the siege of Louisburg. Hisintrepidity so delighted the English Admiral, that he begged him totell him freely how he could serve him. He answered the Admiral, "thatwhat he wished for of all things was to have his liberty andpermission to return to France. " The Admiral had so great aconsideration for him, that he caused a vessel to be immediatelyfitted out to carry him to Europe, ordering the English captain toobey De Vauquelin and land him in any French port he might ask for, leaving him at the same time to choose what French passengers wouldaccompany him. This noble and generous behaviour of the English didhonor to their nation, by rendering justice to, and discerning themerit of, an enemy, far beyond what De Vauquelin met with fromBerryer, the Secretary of the Navy, on his arrival in France. 

The unhappy situation of the colony was now past remedy, and may becompared to a man in the agonies of death, to whom the physiciancontinues to administer cordials, not from hopes of his recovery, butto allay and soften the violence of his sufferings. All that could nowbe expected was to obtain an honorable capitulation, favorable to itsinhabitants, the colony being at its last gasp. 

M. De Levis left two thousand men at Jacques Cartier, with orders toretire slowly according as the English advanced from Quebec, and toavoid an engagement with them, without losing sight of them. Thisretarded their march, and put off the evil hour as long as possible. He went with the rest of his army to Montreal. As there was noprovision in that town to be able to keep his army assembled, he wasobliged to disperse them, sending them back to their winter quarters, where each inhabitant was obliged to board a soldier at a very lowrate, which was paid by the munitionary general. 

M. De Bougainville was sent in the spring to command at Isle aux Noix, with eleven hundred men, of which number were the Regiment of Guienneand Berry. This island is situated in the River Chambly (Richelieu), about eight leagues in a straight line from Montreal, and two milesdistant from Lake Champlain. 

M. Bourlamarque, an officer of great knowledge in all the branches ofhis profession, decided upon that position for his retreat the yearbefore, when he evacuated Ticonderoga, having been forced to abandonto the English that lake. He fortified this island as well as waspossible in a sandy ground, in order to serve as a frontier on thatside of Canada, and hinder the English from coming down by the RiverRichelieu into the River St. Lawrence, by which means in a very shorttime they might have been in possession of Montreal and ThreeRivers, --a much easier way than by Lake Ontario, which is much longerand full of chicares (?) by the rapids in the St. Lawrence, andprolong their operations;--a very great advantage in a country wherethere are violent frosts during seven months of the year. This islandis about twelve hundred fathoms long, and from a hundred to twohundred broad. The entrenchments traced and conducted by M. Bourlamarque are regular, and a proof of his superior knowledge infortifications. He barred the two branches of the river which formedthe island with staccados, or chains of big trees, linked to oneanother at their ends by strong rings and circles of iron. Thisprevented the English boats from Lake Champlain to pass the island inthe night, to reach Montreal. But for the staccados the island musthave been taken by them before they could proceed any further. 

Some Iroquois, of the Five Nations, informed M. De Vaudreuil atMontreal, that General Amherst was marching to invade Canada with avery considerable army by the rapids and Lake Ontario, whilst GeneralMurray had orders to come up the river with his army from Quebec, andjoin Gen. Amherst at Montreal. But they had no knowledge of a thirdbody of troops, about four thousand men, that came by Lake Champlain, in the month of July, five weeks before the arrival of the other twoarmies at Montreal, and besieged Isle aux Noix with a veryconsiderable train of artillery, cannon, mortars, &c. , in profusion. 

They erected five batteries of guns on the south side of the river, with a bomb battery, which rendered our trenches useless, as they hada sight of us everywhere, back, face and sideways, and so near us thatat the south staccado they killed several of our soldiers by theirmusket shots. 

The sandy ground protected us from the effect of their shells, whichthey threw upon us in great numbers, with a continual fire from theirgun batteries. 

After sixteen days' siege with a most violent cannonade, without amoment's interruption, M. Nogaire, an officer in the Regiment of RoyalRoussillon, came to us from Montreal, having crossed directly throughthe woods, with some Indians for his guides, with two letters from DeBougainville, one of which was from him to Vaudreuil, and the otherfrom M. De Levis. It was a very critical conjuncture, having only twodays' provision for the garrison, which had subsisted until thearrival of the English troops by means of fishing-nets, that riverabounding with the most delicious fish, with seven or eight oxen, which had been kept as a reserve and killed by the enemy's cannon. M. De Vaudreuil's letter contained a permission to M. De Bougainville tocapitulate or retire from the island if it was possible. M. De Levis'letter was a positive order to defend that post to the last extremity. De Bougainville, notwithstanding his genius, good sense and learning, with personal courage, and who lacked only taste for the study of theart of war to distinguish himself, was nevertheless put to a nonplushow to act from the contradictory orders he received. In this dilemmahe shewed me the letters, asking at the same time my advice; and myanswer was:--"That in two days famine must oblige us to surrender tothe enemy at discretion. That the reinforcements of a thousand men atMontreal might be of the greatest importance, and help to make a goodcountenance when the English army had advanced in the neighborhood ofit. That it was M. De Vaudreuil who commanded-in-chief in Canada, andnot M. De Levis; and that there was yet a possibility of retiring withthe garrison towards the north side of the island, where the swampyground upon the border of the river had hindered the English fromestablishing a post. " De Bougainville immediately decided for aretreat, which was executed and combined with equal justness; and thesuccess answered exactly to the prudence, wisdom and good conduct thatDe Bougainville exhibited in preparing for it. It was then about tenin the morning when Nogaire arrived with the Indians, who--notaccustomed to such a terrible fire as was at that moment poured forthby the English batteries, very different from their way of fightingbehind trees--were not at all at ease, and furiously impatient to getout of the island. The hour of retreat was settled for ten thatnight. 

The north shore of Isle aux Noix, on the opposite side of the river, was marshy to the distance of three hundred paces from the river, covered with small trees where there was a rising ground, and therewas no English post nearer to it than at the Prairie de Boileau, distant half a mile down the river, so that the locality where theriver was fordable was a little below the north staccados. DeBougainville adopted every prudent measure imaginable to achievesuccess. He ordered all the boats to be mended and put in condition tobe used at a moment's warning. He also ordained that the boats, barkcanoes, and punts hewn out of a large tree, be removed a certaindistance from the river side, lest some soldier should desert andapprise the English of his design, such as had happened from the postsnear Quebec. He commanded that all the garrison should be in order ofbattle at ten at night, all observing a profound silence, without theleast clashing of arms or other noise, and be in readiness to march. He ordered M. Le Borgne, an officer in the colonial troops, to remainon the island with a detachment of forty men, to keep up a smart firefrom our battery, which consisted of seven or eight pieces of cannon, during the time we were employed in passing the river, in order tohinder the English from hearing us in our operations, and to continuefiring whilst ammunition lasted, and to conceal our retreat as long asit was possible to do so. 

We began to cross the river in two lighters, with some small boats, about ten at night. They plied continually to and fro until midnight, when all had crossed the river without the enemy perceiving or evensuspecting our operation, although so near to us were their posts ontheir left that we heard distinctly their voices. All was executedwithout the least noise, disorder, or confusion--a rare occurrence onsuch an occasion. Le Borgne acted well, and at the same timeeconomized his ammunition so well that he had wherewith to fire uponthe English at intervals until one in the morning. Imagining us thento be near Montreal, he hoisted the white flag to capitulate, and theEnglish, not having the smallest notion of our retreat, granted himimmediately very honorable terms. We had eighty men killed or woundedduring the siege--a very inconsiderable loss for a cannonade ofsixteen days' duration, from five batteries, besides a bomb battery, without an instant's intermission. Had it been a stony instead of asandy ground, we must have lost above one-half of the garrison, andcould not have resisted so long. 

So soon as everyone had passed the river, we set out for Montreal, crossing through the woods, which, in a straight line, is only eightleagues from Isle aux Noix, always half running one after the other, after having marched in this manner, from midnight until twelve atnoon, over fens, swamps, mosses, and sinking often up to the waist inmarshy ground, without reposing or halting one minute. Instead ofbeing near Montreal, as we imagined, we were thunderstruck on findingourselves, by the fault of our guides, to be only at the distance ofhalf a league from Isle aux Noix: our guide, not knowing the roadthrough the woods, had caused us to turn round continually for twelvehours without advancing!

We were so near an English post at the Prairie de Boileau, that agrenadier of the Regiment de Berry, seeing his commander, Cormier, sink down with fatigue, and not in a condition to go any further, carried off a horse from them which was upon the borders of the wood, and mounted his commander on it; otherwise he would have been leftaside and taken prisoner by the English, or scalped by the Indians. 

Having lost all hopes of going to Montreal through the woods, we tookthe road to Fort St. Jean, on the River Chambly, four leagues lowerthan Isle aux Noix, and five leagues by land to Montreal. My strengthwas so entirely spent, that it was with great difficulty I could drawone leg after the other. Nevertheless the fear of falling into thehands of the Indians, the idea of the horrible cruelties which theypractice on their prisoners, which shock human nature, prevented mefrom sinking down with pain, and gave me strength to push on. 

Arrived at a settlement at four in the afternoon, about a league and ahalf from St. John's Fort, where De Bougainville caused his detachmentto halt and repose themselves for the first time since midnight, thatthey left Isle aux Noix. I perceived there a boat going off to St. Jean, and I had only strength enough remaining to throw myself intoit. We lost in this march about eighty men: those who could not holdout were left behind, victims to the Indians. Arriving at St. John'sFort, the first person I saw there was Poularies, on the river side, who told me they had news of our retreat, and that he was sent withhis regiment to sustain us in case we had been pursued by the English. 

We were now shut up in the island of Montreal on all sides. TheEnglish were masters of the River Chambly by the possession of Isleaux Noix. General Amherst approached with his army from Lake Ontario;and General Murray was in march, coming up from Quebec, with sixthousand men that had passed through the winter there, and with somemen-of-war, one of which of about forty guns, on its arrival in sightof the town of Montreal, greatly astonished, and excited theadmiration of, the inhabitants, who, from the ignorance and negligenceof those persons charged with the sounding of the St. Lawrence, hadnever seen vessels arrive there of above sixty or seventy tons. 

General Murray conducted himself as an officer of great understanding, knowledge and capacity, and left nothing to do for General Amherst; heemployed five weeks in coming from Quebec to Montreal, which is onlysixty leagues, and did us during his march more harm by his policythan by his army. He stopped often in the villages; spoke kindly tothe inhabitants he found at home in their houses--whom hunger andfamine had obliged to fly from our army at Montreal; gave provisionsto those unhappy creatures perishing for want of subsistence. Heburned, in some cases, the houses of those who were absent from homeand in the French army at Montreal, publishing everywhere an amnestyand good treatment to all Canadians who would return to theirhabitations and live there peaceably. In short--flattering some andfrightening others--he succeeded so well, that at last there was nomore possibility of keeping them at Montreal. It is true we had nowonly need of them to make a good countenance. The three English armiesamounting to above twenty thousand men, it was impossible to make anyfurther resistance. 

Amherst's army appeared in sight from the town of Montreal, towardsthe gate of Lachine, on the 7th of September, about three in theafternoon. General Murray with his army, from Quebec, appeared twohours after at the opposite side of the town: thus a dark crisis wasat hand for the fate of Canada. Montreal was nowise susceptible ofdefence. It was surrounded with stone walls, built in the beginning ofthat colony, merely to preserve the inhabitants from the incursions ofthe Indians, few imagining at that time it would become the theatre ofa regular war, and that one day they would see formidable armies ofregular, well-disciplined troops before its walls. 

We were, however, all pent up in that miserable, bad place--withoutprovisions, a thousand times worse off than an advantageous positionin open fields--whose pitiful walls could not resist two hours'cannonade without being level with the ground, and where we would havebeen forced to surrender at discretion, if the English had insistedupon it. 

The night between the 7th and 8th September was passed in negotiatingfor the articles of capitulation. But in the morning all thedifficulties were removed, and General Amherst granted conditionsinfinitely more favourable than could be expected in ourcircumstances. 

Thus the Canadians, as brave as they are docile, and easy to begoverned, became subjects of Great Britain; and if they can thinkthemselves happy under that Government, by remembering their pastvexations, they will do so. 

M. (Col. ) Poularies and M. (Col. ) Dalquier, who were generallydistinguished in the French army by their high sense of honor, probity, and their bravery, experience and knowledge in the art ofwar, were both of them, on their arrival in France, broken ascommanders of a battalion--a grade which was abolished in the Frenchservice, in order to make the Major, as in the British service, command the regiment in absence of the Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel. Belcomb, Poularies' Adjt. Of Royal Roussillon, and Montgnary, Captainin the Regiment of Bearn which Dalquier commanded--(two very handsomemen, capable to attract the attention of the ladies of any court inEurope)--were made Colonels of Foot, without possessing any remarkablemilitary talent or capacity. 

Fortune manifested most cruelly her almighty power in the militarystate, where justice, punishments and rewards alone ought to be thebase of it. Men conduct themselves from the view either of honor orinterest; and there can be no emulation in a service where mediocrityof talents, intrigues, favor, and credit, override merit. 

Greatness of soul, joined to superiority of talent, ignores the art ofcringing; it is even impossible that merit can lead to fortune in acorrupted and venal country: on the contrary, it becomes a cause ofexclusion. Virtue elevates the soul, and can neither fawn nor buycredit, nor flatter vice and incapacity. "If such is the militaryconstitution of a State, " says M. Gaubert, in his Treatise ofTactics, "of which the Sovereign (the King of Prussia) is one of thegreatest men of the age, who instructs and commands his armies, andwhose armies form all the pomp of the court, what ought it to be inthose States where the Sovereign is not at all a military man; wherehe does not see his troops; where he seems to disdain or be ignorantof all that regards them; where the Court, who always obey theimpression of the Sovereign, is consequently not military; wherealmost all the great rewards are obtained by surprise, by intrigue;where the greater portion of favors are hereditary; where meritlanguishes for want of support; where favor can advance withouttalent; where to make a fortune no more implies acquiring areputation, but merely to heap up riches; where men may be, at one andthe same time, covered with orders and infamy--with grades andignorance, serve ill the State, and occupy the best places; be smearedwith the censure of the public, and enjoy the Sovereign's good graces?If, whilst all other sciences are becoming perfected, that of warremains in its infancy, it is the fault of the Governments, who do notattach to it sufficient importance; who do not make it an object ofpublic education; who fail to direct men of genius to that profession;who suffer them to find more glory and advantages in sciences triflingor less useful; who render the profession of arms an ungratefulemployment, where talents are outstripped by intrigue, and the prizesdistributed by Fortune. "

General Amherst, according to his statement in his letter to Mr. Pitt, then Secretary of State, lost in coming down the rapids--withoutmeeting there any opposition from the French or Indians--by drowning, eighty-four men. Twenty more of the regiments' boats were dashed topieces. Seven boats of the artillery, loaded with arms and ammunition, and one of his galleys, were also lost. 

If 900 Indians had been there, as they should have been, scattered inthe woods upon the borders of the river, with 1, 200 Canadians, whichthey had solicited earnestly from M. De Vaudreuil, to defend thosedifficult passes of the Rapids, but which this officer obstinatelyrefused, what would have become of General Amherst? How could he havegot out of the scrape? As it happened to Braddock, Amherst and hisarmy must have perished there; his expedition would have beenfruitless, and Canada would have been yet saved to France: but heavenwilled it otherwise. How long the English may preserve this conquestdepends on their own wise and prudent conduct. 

THE END. 

[The original of this manuscript is deposited in the French wararchives, in Paris: a copy was, with the permission of the FrenchGovernment, taken by P. L. Morin, Esq. , Draughtsman to the Crown LandsDepartment of Canada, about 1855, and deposited in the Library of theLegislative Assembly of Canada. The Literary and Historical Society ofQuebec, through the kindness of Mr. Todd, the Librarian, was permittedto have communication thereof. This document is supposed to have beenwritten some years after the return to France from Canada of thewriter, the Chevalier Johnstone, a Scotch Jacobite, who had fled toFrance after the defeat at Culloden, and had obtained from the Frenchmonarch, with several other Scotchmen, commissions in the Frencharmies. In 1748, says _Francisque Michel_, [D] he sailed from Rochefortas an Ensign with troops going to Cape Breton: he continued to servein America until he returned to France, in December, 1760, havingacted during the campaign of 1759, in Canada, as aide-de-camp toChevalier de Levis. On de Levis being ordered to Montreal, Johnstonewas detached and retained by General Montcalm on his staff, on accountof his thorough knowledge of the environs of Quebec, and particularlyof Beauport, where the principal works of defence stood, and where thewhole army, some 11, 000 men, were entrenched, leaving in Quebec merelya garrison of 1, 500. The journal is written in English, and is notremarkable for orthography or purity of diction: either Johnstone hadforgotten, or had never thoroughly known, the language. ]

[Footnote D: _Les Ecossais en France_, vol. Ii, p. 449. ]