THE BALKANS

A HISTORY OF BULGARIA--SERBIA--GREECE--RUMANIA--TURKEY

THE BALKANS

A HISTORY OF BULGARIA--SERBIA--GREECE--RUMANIA--TURKEY

BY NEVILL FORBES, ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, D. MITRANY, D. G. HOGARTH

PREFACE

The authors of this volume have not worked in conjunction. Widelyseparated, engaged on other duties, and pressed for time, we have had noopportunity for interchange of views. Each must be held responsible, therefore, for his own section alone. If there be any discrepancies in ourwritings (it is not unlikely in so disputed a field of history) we canonly regret an unfortunate result of the circumstances. Owing to rapidchange in the relations of our country to the several Balkan peoples, thetone of a section written earlier may differ from that of another writtenlater. It may be well to state that the sections on Serbia and Bulgariawere finished before the decisive Balkan developments of the past twomonths. Those on Greece and Rumania represent only a little later stage ofthe evolution. That on Turkey, compiled between one mission abroad andanother, was the latest to be finished. 

If our sympathies are not all the same, or given equally to friends andfoes, none of us would find it possible to indite a Hymn of Hate about anyBalkan people. Every one of these peoples, on whatever side he be fightingto-day, has a past worthy of more than our respect and interwoven in someintimate way with our history. That any one of them is arrayed against usto-day is not to be laid entirely or chiefly at its own door. They are allfine peoples who have not obtained their proper places in the sun. Thebest of the Osmanli nation, the Anatolian peasantry, has yet to make itsphysical and moral qualities felt under civilized conditions. As for therest--the Serbs and the Bulgars, who have enjoyed brief moments ofbarbaric glory in their past, have still to find themselves in that futurewhich shall be to the Slav. The Greeks, who were old when we were not asyet, are younger now than we. They are as incalculable a factor in apolitical forecast as another Chosen Race, the Jews. Their past is theworld's glory: the present in the Near East is theirs more than anypeople's: the future--despite the laws of corporate being and decline, dare we say they will have no part in it? Of Rumania what are we to think?Her mixed people has had the start of the Balkan Slavs in moderncivilization, and evidently her boundaries must grow wider yet. But thelimits of her possible expansion are easier to set than those of the rest. 

We hope we have dealt fairly with all these peoples. Mediaeval history, whether of the East or the West, is mostly a record of bloodshedding andcruelty; and the Middle Age has been prolonged to our own time in mostparts of the Balkans, and is not yet over in some parts. There are certainthings salutary to bear in mind when we think or speak of any part of thatcountry to-day. First, that less than two hundred years ago, England hadits highwaymen on all roads, and its smuggler dens and caravans, Scotlandits caterans, and Ireland its moonlighters. Second, that religious fervourhas rarely mitigated and generally increased our own savagery. Thirdly, that our own policy in Balkan matters has been none too wise, especiallyof late. In permitting the Treaty of Bucarest three years ago, we wereparties to making much of the trouble that has ensued, and will ensueagain. If we have not been able to write about the Near East underexisting circumstances altogether _sine ira et studio_, we have tried toremember that each of its peoples has a case. 

D. G. HOGARTH. 

_November_, 1915. 

CONTENTS

BULGARIA AND SERBIA. By NEVILL FORBES. 

 1. Introductory 2. The Balkan Peninsula in Classical Times 400 B. C. - A. D. 500 3. The Arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula, A. D. 500-650

BULGARIA. 

 4. The Arrival of the Bulgars in the Balkan Peninsula, 600-700 5. The Early Years of Bulgaria and the Introduction of Christianity, 700-893 6. The Rise and Fall of the First Bulgarian Empire, 893-972 7. The Rise and Fall of 'Western Bulgaria' and the Greek Supremacy, 963-1186 8. The Rise and Fall of the Second Bulgarian Empire, 1186-1258 9. The Serbian Supremacy and the Final Collapse, 1258-139310. The Turkish Dominion and the Emancipation, 1393-187811. The Aftermath, and Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 1878-8612. The Regeneration under Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, 1886-190813. The Kingdom, 1908-13

SERBIA. 

14. The Serbs under Foreign Supremacy, 650-116815. The Rise and Fall of the Serbian Empire and the Extinction of Serbian Independence, 1168-149616. The Turkish Dominion, 1496-179617. The Liberation of Serbia under Kara-George (1804-13) and Milo[)s] Obrenovi['c] (1815-30): 1796-183018. The Throes of Regeneration: Independent Serbia, 1830-190319. Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbo-Croats in Austria-Hungary, 1903-820. Serbia and Montenegro, and the two Balkan Wars, 1908-13

GREECE. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. 

1. From Ancient to Modern Greece2. The Awakening of the Nation3. The Consolidation of the State

RUMANIA: HER HISTORY AND POLITICS. By D. MITRANY

1. Introduction2. Formation of the Rumanian Nation3. The Foundation and Development of the Rumanian Principalities4. The Phanariote Rule5. Modern Period to 18666. Contemporary Period: Internal Development7. Contemporary Period: Foreign Affairs8. Rumania and the Present War

TURKEY. By D. G. HOGARTH

1. Origin of the Osmanlis2. Expansion of the Osmanli Kingdom3. Heritage and Expansion of the Byzantine Empire4. Shrinkage and Retreat5. Revival6. Relapse7. Revolution8. The Balkan War9. The Future

INDEX

MAPS

The Balkan Peninsula: EthnologicalThe Balkan PeninsulaThe Ottoman Empire

BULGARIA AND SERBIA

1

_Introductory_

The whole of what may be called the trunk or _massif_ of the Balkanpeninsula, bounded on the north by the rivers Save and Danube, on the westby the Adriatic, on the east by the Black Sea, and on the south by a veryirregular line running from Antivari (on the coast of the Adriatic) andthe lake of Scutari in the west, through lakes Okhrida and Prespa (inMacedonia) to the outskirts of Salonika and thence to Midia on the shoresof the Black Sea, following the coast of the Aegean Sea some miles inland, is preponderatingly inhabited by Slavs. These Slavs are the Bulgarians inthe east and centre, the Serbs and Croats (or Serbians and Croatians orSerbo-Croats) in the west, and the Slovenes in the extreme north-west, between Trieste and the Save; these nationalities compose the southernbranch of the Slavonic race. The other inhabitants of the Balkan peninsulaare, to the south of the Slavs, the Albanians in the west, the Greeks inthe centre and south, and the Turks in the south-east, and, to the north, the Rumanians. All four of these nationalities are to be found in varyingquantities within the limits of the Slav territory roughly outlined above, but greater numbers of them are outside it; on the other hand, there are aconsiderable number of Serbs living north of the rivers Save and Danube, in southern Hungary. Details of the ethnic distribution and boundarieswill of course be gone into more fully later; meanwhile attention may becalled to the significant fact that the name of Macedonia, the heart ofthe Balkan peninsula, has been long used by the French gastronomers todenote a dish, the principal characteristic of which is that its componentparts are mixed up into quite inextricable confusion. 

Of the three Slavonic nationalities already mentioned, the two first, theBulgarians and the Serbo-Croats, occupy a much greater space, geographically and historically, than the third. The Slovenes, barely oneand a half million in number, inhabiting the Austrian provinces ofCarinthia and Carniola, have never been able to form a political state, though, with the growth of Trieste as a great port and the persistentefforts of Germany to make her influence if not her flag supreme on theshores of the Adriatic, this small people has from its geographicalposition and from its anti-German (and anti-Italian) attitude achievedconsiderable notoriety and some importance. 

Of the Bulgars and Serbs it may be said that at the present moment theformer control the eastern, and the latter, in alliance with the Greeks, the western half of the peninsula. It has always been the ambition of eachof these three nationalities to dominate the whole, an ambition which hascaused endless waste of blood and money and untold misery. If the questionwere to be settled purely on ethnical considerations, Bulgaria wouldacquire the greater part of the interior of Macedonia, the most numerousof the dozen nationalities of which is Bulgarian in sentiment if not inorigin, and would thus undoubtedly attain the hegemony of the peninsula, while the centre of gravity of the Serbian nation would, as is ethnicallyjust, move north-westwards. Political considerations, however, have untilnow always been against this solution of the difficulty, and, even if itsolved in this sense, there would still remain the problem of the Greeknationality, whose distribution along all the coasts of the Aegean, bothEuropean and Asiatic, makes a delimitation of the Greek state on purelyethnical lines virtually impossible. It is curious that the Slavs, thoughmasters of the interior of the peninsula and of parts of its eastern andwestern coasts, have never made the shores of the Aegean (the White Sea, as they call it) or the cities on them their own. The Adriatic is the onlysea on the shore of which any Slavonic race has ever made its home. Inview of this difficulty, namely, the interior of the peninsula beingSlavonic while the coastal fringe is Greek, and of the approximately equalnumerical strength of all three nations, it is almost inevitable that theultimate solution of the problem and delimitation of political boundarieswill have to be effected by means of territorial compromise. It can onlybe hoped that this ultimate compromise will be agreed upon by the threecountries concerned, and will be more equitable than that which was forcedon them by Rumania in 1913 and laid down in the Treaty of Bucarest of thatyear. 

If no arrangement on a principle of give and take is made between them, the road to the East, which from the point of view of the Germanic powerslies through Serbia, will sooner or later inevitably be forced open, andthe independence, first of Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania, and later ofBulgaria and Greece, will disappear, _de facto_ if not in appearance, andboth materially and morally they will become the slaves of the centralempires. If the Balkan League could be reconstituted, Germany and Austriawould never reach Salonika or Constantinople. 

2

_The Balkan Peninsula in Classical Times_

400 B. C. - A. D. 500. 

In the earlier historical times the whole of the eastern part of theBalkan peninsula between the Danube and the Aegean was known as Thracia, while the western part (north of the forty-first degree of latitude) wastermed Illyricum; the lower basin of the river Vardar (the classicalAxius) was called Macedonia. A number of the tribal and personal names ofthe early Illyrians and Thracians have been preserved. Philip of Macedoniasubdued Thrace in the fourth century B. C. And in 342 founded the city ofPhilippopolis. Alexander's first campaign was devoted to securing controlof the peninsula, but during the Third century B. C. Thrace was invadedfrom the north and laid waste by the Celts, who had already visitedIllyria. The Celts vanished by the end of that century, leaving a fewplace-names to mark their passage. The city of Belgrade was known untilthe seventh century A. D. By its Celtic name of Singidunum. Naissus, themodern Nish, is also possibly of Celtic origin. It was towards 230 B. C. That Rome came into contact with Illyricum, owing to the piraticalproclivities of its inhabitants, but for a long time it only controlledthe Dalmatian coast, so called after the Delmati or Dalmati, an Illyriantribe. The reason for this was the formidable character of the mountainsof Illyria, which run in several parallel and almost unbroken lines thewhole length of the shore of the Adriatic and have always formed aneffective barrier to invasion from the west. The interior was only verygradually subdued by the Romans after Macedonia had been occupied by themin 146 B. C. Throughout the first century B. C. Conflicts raged with varyingfortune between the invaders and all the native races living between theAdriatic and the Danube. They were attacked both from Aquileia in thenorth and from Macedonia in the south, but it was not till the early yearsof our era that the Danube became the frontier of the Roman Empire. 

In the year A. D. 6 Moesia, which included a large part of the modernkingdom of Serbia and the northern half of that of Bulgaria between theDanube and the Balkan range (the classical Haemus), became an imperialprovince, and twenty years later Thrace, the country between the Balkanrange and the Aegean, was incorporated in the empire, and was made aprovince by the Emperor Claudius in A. D. 46. The province of Illyricum orDalmatia stretched between the Save and the Adriatic, and Pannonia laybetween the Danube and the Save. In 107 A. D. The Emperor Trajan conqueredthe Dacians beyond the lower Danube, and organized a province of Dacia outof territory roughly equivalent to the modern Wallachia and Transylvania, This trans-Danubian territory did not remain attached to the empire formore than a hundred and fifty years; but within the river line a vast beltof country, stretching from the head of the Adriatic to the mouths of theDanube on the Black Sea, was Romanized through and through. The EmperorTrajan has been called the Charlemagne of the Balkan peninsula; allremains are attributed to him (he was nicknamed the Wallflower byConstantine the Great), and his reign marked the zenith of Roman power inthis part of the world. The Balkan peninsula enjoyed the benefits of Romancivilization for three centuries, from the first to the fourth, but fromthe second century onwards the attitude of the Romans was defensive ratherthan offensive. The war against the Marcomanni under the Emperor MarcusAurelius, in the second half of this century, was the turning-point. Romewas still victorious, but no territory was added to the empire. The thirdcentury saw the southward movement of the Germanic peoples, who took theplace of the Celts. The Goths invaded the peninsula, and in 251 theEmperor Decius was killed in battle against them near Odessus on the BlackSea (the modern Varna). The Goths reached the outskirts of Thessalonica(Salonika), but were defeated by the Emperor Claudius at Naissus (Nish) in269; shortly afterwards, however, the Emperor Aurelian had definitively torelinquish Dacia to them. The Emperor Diocletian, a native of Dalmatia, who reigned from 284 to 305, carried out a redistribution of the imperialprovinces. Pannonia and western Illyria, or Dalmatia, were assigned to theprefecture of Italy, Thrace to that of the Orient, while the whole centreof the peninsula, from the Danube to the Peloponnese, constituted theprefecture of Illyria, with Thessalonica as capital. The territory to thenorth of the Danube having been lost, what is now western Bulgaria wasrenamed Dacia, while Moesia, the modern kingdom of Serbia, was made verymuch smaller. Praevalis, or the southern part of Dalmatia, approximatelythe modern Montenegro and Albania, was detached from that province andadded to the prefecture of Illyria. In this way the boundary between theprovince of Dalmatia and the Balkan peninsula proper ran from near thelake of Scutari in the south to the river Drinus (the modern Drina), whosecourse it followed till the Save was reached in the north. 

An event of far-reaching importance in the following century was theelevation by Constantine the Great of the Greek colony of Byzantium intothe imperial city of Constantinople in 325. This century also witnessedthe arrival of the Huns in Europe from Asia. They overwhelmed theOstrogoths, between the Dnieper and the Dniester, in 375, and theVisigoths, settled in Transylvania and the modern Rumania, movedsouthwards in sympathy with this event. The Emperor Valens lost his lifefighting against these Goths in 378 at the great battle of Adrianople (acity established in Thrace by the Emperor Hadrian in the second century). His successor, the Emperor Theodosius, placated them with gifts and madethem guardians of the northern frontier, but at his death, in 395, theyoverran and devastated the entire peninsula, after which they proceeded toItaly. After the death of the Emperor Theodosius the empire was divided, never to be joined into one whole again. The dividing line followed that, already mentioned, which separated the prefecture of Italy from those ofIllyria and the Orient, that is to say, it began in the south, on theshore of the Adriatic near the Bocche di Cattaro, and went due north alongthe valley of the Drina till the confluence of that river with the Save. It will be seen that this division had consequences which have lasted tothe present day. Generally speaking, the Western Empire was Latin inlanguage and character, while the Eastern was Greek, though owing to theimportance of the Danubian provinces to Rome from the military point ofview, and the lively intercourse maintained between them, Latin influencein them was for a long time stronger than Greek. Its extent is proved bythe fact that the people of modern Rumania are partly, and their languagevery largely, defended from those of the legions and colonies of theEmperor Trajan. 

Latin influence, shipping, colonization, and art were always supreme onthe eastern shores of the Adriatic, just as were those of Greece on theshores of the Black Sea. The Albanians even, descendants of the ancientIllyrians, were affected by the supremacy of the Latin language, fromwhich no less than a quarter of their own meagre vocabulary is derived;though driven southwards by the Romans and northwards by the Greeks, theyhave remained in their mountain fastnesses to this day, impervious to anyof the civilizations to which they have been exposed. 

Christianity spread to the shores of the peninsula very early; Macedoniaand Dalmatia were the parts where it was first established, and it tooksome time to penetrate into the interior. During the reign of Diocletiannumerous martyrs suffered for the faith in the Danubian provinces, butwith the accession of Constantine the Great persecution came to an end. Assoon, however, as the Christians were left alone, they started persecutingeach other, and during the fourth century the Arian controversy re-echoedthroughout the peninsula. 

In the fifth century the Huns moved from the shores of the Black Sea tothe plains of the Danube and the Theiss; they devastated the Balkanpeninsula, in spite of the tribute which they had levied on Constantinoplein return for their promise of peace. After the death of Attila, in 453, they again retreated to Asia, and during the second half of the centurythe Goths were once more supreme in the peninsula. Theodoric occupiedSingidunum (Belgrade) in 471 and, after plundering Macedonia and Greece, settled in Novae (the modern Svishtov), on the lower Danube, in 483, wherehe remained till he transferred the sphere of his activities to Italy tenyears later. Towards the end of the fifth century Huns of various kindsreturned to the lower Danube and devastated the peninsula several times, penetrating as far as Epirus and Thessaly. 

3

_The Arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula_, A. D. 500-650

The Balkan peninsula, which had been raised to a high level of securityand prosperity during the Roman dominion, gradually relapsed intobarbarism as a result of these endless invasions; the walled towns, suchas Salonika and Constantinople, were the only safe places, and the countrybecame waste and desolate. The process continued unabated throughout thethree following centuries, and one is driven to one of two conclusions, either that these lands must have possessed very extraordinary powers ofrecuperation to make it worth while for invaders to pillage them sofrequently, or, what is more probable, there can have been after some timelittle left to plunder, and consequently the Byzantine historians'accounts of enormous drives of prisoners and booty are much exaggerated. It is impossible to count the number of times the tide of invasion anddevastation swept southwards over the unfortunate peninsula. The emperorsand their generals did what they could by means of defensive works on thefrontiers, of punitive expeditions, and of trying to set the varioushordes of barbarians at loggerheads with each other, but, as they had atthe same time to defend an empire which stretched from Armenia to Spain, it is not surprising that they were not more successful. The growingriches of Constantinople and Salonika had an irresistible attraction forthe wild men from the east and north, and unfortunately the Greek citizenswere more inclined to spend their energy in theological disputes and theirleisure in the circus than to devote either the one or the other to thedefence of their country. It was only by dint of paying them huge sums ofmoney that the invaders were kept away from the coast. The departure ofthe Huns and the Goths had made the way for fresh series of unwelcomevisitors. In the sixth century the Slavs appear for the first time. Fromtheir original homes which were immediately north of the Carpathians, inGalicia and Poland, but may also have included parts of the modernHungary, they moved southwards and south-eastwards. They were presumablyin Dacia, north of the Danube, in the previous century, but they are firstmentioned as having crossed that river during the reign of the EmperorJustin I (518-27). They were a loosely-knit congeries of tribes withoutany single leader or central authority; some say they merely possessed theinstinct of anarchy, others that they were permeated with the ideals ofdemocracy. What is certain is that amongst them neither leadership norinitiative was developed, and that they lacked both cohesion andorganisation. The Eastern Slavs, the ancestors of the Russians, were onlywelded into anything approaching unity by the comparatively much smallernumber of Scandinavian (Varangian) adventurers who came and took charge oftheir affairs at Kiev. Similarly the Southern Slavs were never ofthemselves able to form a united community, conscious of its aim andcapable of persevering in its attainment. 

The Slavs did not invade the Balkan peninsula alone but in the company ofthe Avars, a terrible and justly dreaded nation, who, like the Huns, wereof Asiatic (Turkish or Mongol) origin. These invasions became morefrequent during the reign of the Emperor Justinian I (527-65), andculminated in 559 in a great combined attack of all the invaders onConstantinople under a certain Zabergan, which was brilliantly defeated bythe veteran Byzantine general Belisarius. The Avars were a nomad tribe, and the horse was their natural means of locomotion. The Slavs, on theother hand, moved about on foot, and seem to have been used as infantry bythe more masterful Asiatics in their warlike expeditions. Generallyspeaking, the Avars, who must have been infinitely less numerous than theSlavs, were settled in Hungary, where Attila and the Huns had been settleda little more than a century previously; that is to say, they were northof the Danube, though they were always overrunning into Upper Moesia, themodern Serbia. The Slavs, whose numbers were without doubt very large, gradually settled all over the country south of the Danube, the ruralparts of which, as a result of incessant invasion and retreat, had becomewaste and empty. During the second half of the sixth century all themilitary energies of Constantinople were diverted to Persia, so that theinvaders of the Balkan peninsula had the field very much to themselves. Itwas during this time that the power of the Avars reached its height. Theywere masters of all the country up to the walls of Adrianople andSalonika, though they did not settle there. The peninsula seems to havebeen colonized by Slavs, who penetrated right down into Greece; but theAvars were throughout this time, both in politics and in war, thedirecting and dominating force. During another Persian war, which brokeout in 622 and entailed the prolonged absence of the emperor fromConstantinople, the Avars, not satisfied with the tribute extorted fromthe Greeks, made an alliance against them with the Persians, and in 626collected a large army of Slavs and Asiatics and attacked Constantinopleboth by land and sea from the European side, while the Persians threatenedit from Asia. But the walls of the city and the ships of the Greeks provedinvincible, and, quarrels breaking out between the Slavs and the Avars, both had to save themselves in ignominious and precipitate retreat. 

After this nothing more was heard of the Avars in the Balkan peninsula, though their power was only finally crushed by Charlemagne in 799. InRussia their downfall became proverbial, being crystallized in the saying, 'they perished like Avars'. The Slavs, on the other hand, remained. Throughout these stormy times their penetration of the Balkan peninsulahad been peacefully if unostentatiously proceeding; by the middle of theseventh century it was complete. The main streams of Slavonic immigrationmoved southwards and westwards. The first covered the whole of the countrybetween the Danube and the Balkan range, overflowed into Macedonia, andfiltered down into Greece. Southern Thrace in the east and Albania in thewest were comparatively little affected, and in these districts theindigenous population maintained itself. The coasts of the Aegean and thegreat cities on or near them were too strongly held by the Greeks to beaffected, and those Slavs who penetrated into Greece itself were soonabsorbed by the local populations. The still stronger Slavonic stream, which moved westwards and turned up north-westwards, overran the wholecountry down to the shores of the Adriatic and as far as the sources ofthe Save and Drave in the Alps. From that point in the west to the shoresof the Black Sea in the east became one solid mass of Slavs, and has remained so ever since. The few Slavs who were left north of theDanube in Dacia were gradually assimilated by the inhabitants of thatprovince, who were the descendants of the Roman soldiers and colonists, and the ancestors of the modern Rumanians, but the fact that Slavonicinfluence there was strong is shown by the large number of words ofSlavonic origin contained in the Rumanian language. 

[Illustration: THE BALKAN PENINSULA ETHNOLOGICAL]

Place-names are a good index of the extent and strength of the tide ofSlav immigration. All along the coast, from the mouth of the Danube to thehead of the Adriatic, the Greek and Roman names have been retained thoughplaces have often been given alternative names by the Slavonic settlers. Thrace, especially the south-eastern part, and Albania have the fewestSlavonic place-names. In Macedonia and Lower Moesia (Bulgaria) very fewclassical names have survived, while in Upper Moesia (Serbia) and theinterior of Dalmatia (Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro) they haveentirely disappeared. The Slavs themselves, though their tribal names wereknown, were until the ninth century usually called collectively S(k)lavini([Greek: Sklabaenoi]) by the Greeks, and all the inland parts of thepeninsula were for long termed by them 'the S(k)lavonias' ([Greek:Sklabiniai]). 

During the seventh century, dating from the defeat of the Slavs and Avarsbefore the walls of Constantinople in 626 and the final triumph of theemperor over the Persians in 628, the influence and power of the Greeksbegan to reassert itself throughout the peninsula as far north as theDanube; this process was coincident with the decline of the might of theAvars. It was the custom of the astute Byzantine diplomacy to look on andspeak of lands which had been occupied by the various barbarian invadersas grants made to them through the generosity of the emperor; by thismeans, by dint also of lavishing titles and substantial incomes to theinvaders' chiefs, by making the most of their mutual jealousies, and alsoby enlisting regiments of Slavonic mercenaries in the imperial armies, thesupremacy of Constantinople was regained far more effectively than itcould have been by the continual and exhausting use of force. 

BULGARIA

4

_The Arrival of the Bulgars in the Balkan Peninsula, _ 600-700

The progress of the Bulgars towards the Balkan peninsula, and indeed alltheir movements until their final establishment there in the seventhcentury, are involved in obscurity. They are first mentioned by name inclassical and Armenian sources in 482 as living in the steppes to thenorth of the Black Sea amongst other Asiatic tribes, and it has beenassumed by some that at the end of the fifth and throughout the sixthcentury they were associated first with the Huns and later with the Avarsand Slavs in the various incursions into and invasions of the easternempire which have already been enumerated. It is the tendency of Bulgarianhistorians, who scornfully point to the fact that the history of Russiaonly dates from the ninth century, to exaggerate the antiquity of theirown and to claim as early a date as possible for the authentic appearanceof their ancestors on the kaleidoscopic stage of the Balkan theatre. Theyare also unwilling to admit that they were anticipated by the Slavs; theyprefer to think that the Slavs only insinuated themselves there thanks tothe energy of the Bulgars' offensive against the Greeks, and that as soonas the Bulgars had leisure to look about them they found all the bestplaces already occupied by the anarchic Slavs. 

Of course it is very difficult to say positively whether Bulgars were orwere not present in the welter of Asiatic nations which swept westwardsinto Europe with little intermission throughout the fifth and sixthcenturies, but even if they were, they do not seem to have settled down asearly as that anywhere south of the Danube; it seems certain that they didnot do so until the seventh century, and therefore that the Slavs weredefinitely installed in the Balkan peninsula a whole century before theBulgars crossed the Danube for good. 

The Bulgars, like the Huns and the Avars who preceded them, and like theMagyars and the Turks who followed them, were a tribe from eastern Asia, of the stock known as Mongol or Tartar. The tendency of all these peopleswas to move westwards from Asia into Europe, and this they did atconsiderable and irregular intervals, though in alarming and apparentlyinexhaustible numbers, roughly from the fourth till the fourteenthcenturies. The distance was great, but the journey, thanks to the flat, grassy, treeless, and well-watered character of the steppes of southernRussia which they had to cross, was easy. They often halted forconsiderable periods by the way, and some never moved further westwardsthan Russia. Thus at one time the Bulgars settled in large numbers on theVolga, near its confluence with the Kama, and it is presumed that theywere well established there in the fifth century. They formed a communityof considerable strength and importance, known as Great or White Bulgaria. These Bulgars fused with later Tartar immigrants from Asia and eventuallywere consolidated into the powerful kingdom of Kazan, which was onlycrushed by the Tsar Ivan IV in 1552. According to Bulgarian historians, the basins of the rivers Volga and Don and the steppes of eastern Russiaproved too confined a space for the legitimate development of Bulgarianenergy, and expansion to the west was decided on. A large number ofBulgars therefore detached themselves and began to move south-westwards. During the sixth century they seem to have been settled in the country tothe north of the Black Sea, forming a colony known as Black Bulgaria. Itis very doubtful whether the Bulgars did take part, as they are supposedto have done, in the ambitious but unsuccessful attack on Constantinoplein 559 under Zabergan, chief of another Tartar tribe; but it is fairlycertain that they did in the equally formidable but equally unsuccessfulattacks by the Slavs and Avars against Salonika in 609 and Constantinoplein 626. 

During the last quarter of the sixth and the first of the seventh centurythe various branches of the Bulgar nation, stretching from the Volga tothe Danube, were consolidated and kept in control by their prince Kubrat, who eventually fought on behalf of the Greeks against the Avars, and wasactually baptized in Constantinople. The power of the Bulgars grew as thatof the Avars declined, but at the death of Kubrat, in 638, his realm wasdivided amongst his sons. One of these established himself in Pannonia, where he joined forces with what was left of the Avars, and there theBulgars maintained themselves till they were obliterated by the irruptionof the Magyars in 893. Another son, Asparukh, or Isperikh, settled inBessarabia, between the rivers Prut and Dniester, in 640, and some yearslater passed southwards. After desultory warfare with Constantinople, from660 onwards, his successor finally overcame the Greeks, who were at thattime at war with the Arabs, captured Varna, and definitely establishedhimself between the Danube and the Balkan range in the year 679. From thatyear the Danube ceased to be the frontier of the eastern empire. 

The numbers of the Bulgars who settled south of the Danube are not known, but what happened to them is notorious. The well-known process, by whichthe Franks in Gaul were absorbed by the far more numerous indigenouspopulation which they had conquered, was repeated, and the Bulgars becamefused with the Slavs. So complete was the fusion, and so preponderatingthe influence of the subject nationality, that beyond a few personal namesno traces of the language of the Bulgars have survived. Modern Bulgarian, except for the Turkish words introduced into it later during the Ottomanrule, is purely Slavonic. Not so the Bulgarian nationality; as is so oftenthe case with mongrel products, this race, compared with the Serbs, whoare purely Slav, has shown considerably greater virility, cohesion, anddriving-power, though it must be conceded that its problems have beeninfinitely simpler. 

5

_The Early Years of Bulgaria and the Introduction of Christianity_, 700-893

From the time of their establishment in the country to which they havegiven their name the Bulgars became a thorn in the side of the Greeks, andever since both peoples have looked on one another as natural andhereditary enemies. The Bulgars, like all the barbarians who had precededthem, were fascinated by the honey-pot of Constantinople, and, though theynever succeeded in taking it, they never grew tired of making the attempt. 

For two hundred years after the death of Asparukh, in 661, the Bulgarswere perpetually fighting either against the Greeks or else amongstthemselves. At times a diversion was caused by the Bulgars taking the partof the Greeks, as in 718, when they 'delivered' Constantinople, at theinvocation of the Emperor Leo, from the Arabs, who were besieging it. Fromabout this time the Bulgarian monarchy, which had been hereditary, becameelective, and the anarchy of the many, which the Bulgars found when theyarrived, and which their first few autocratic rulers had been able tocontrol, was replaced by an anarchy of the few. Prince succeeded prince, war followed war, at the will of the feudal nobles. This internal strifewas naturally profitable to the Greeks, who lavishly subsidized the rivalfactions. 

At the end of the eighth century the Bulgars south of the Danube joinedforces with those to the north in the efforts of the latter against theAvars, who, beaten by Charlemagne, were again pressing south-eastwardstowards the Danube. In this the Bulgars were completely successful underthe leadership of one Krum, whom, in the elation of victory, they promptlyelected to the throne. Krum was a far more capable ruler than they hadbargained for, and he not only united all the Bulgars north and south ofthe Danube into one dominion, but also forcibly repressed the whims of thenobles and re-established the autocracy and the hereditary monarchy. Having finished with his enemies in the north, he turned his attention tothe Greeks, with no less success. In 809 he captured from them theimportant city of Sofia (the Roman Sardica, known to the Slavs asSredets), which is to-day the capital of Bulgaria. The loss of this citywas a blow to the Greeks, because it was a great centre of commerce andalso the point at which the commercial and strategic highways of thepeninsula met and crossed. The Emperor Nikiphóros, who wished to take hisrevenge and recover his lost property, was totally defeated by the Bulgarsand lost his life in the Balkan passes in 811. After further victories, atMesembria (the modern Misivria) in 812 and Adrianople in 813, Krumappeared before the capital, where he nearly lost his life in an ambushwhile negotiating for peace. During preparations for a final assault onConstantinople he died suddenly in 815. Though Krum cannot be said to haveintroduced civilisation into Bulgaria, he at any rate increased its powerand gave it some of the more essential organs of government. He framed acode of laws remarkable for their rigour, which was undoubtedly necessaryin such a community and beneficial in its effect. He repressed civilstrife, and by this means made possible the reawakening of commerce andagriculture. His successor, of uncertain identity, founded in 822 the cityof Preslav (known to the Russians as Pereyaslav), situated in easternBulgaria, between Varna and Silistria, which was the capital until 972. 

The reign of Prince Boris (852-88) is remarkable because it witnessed thedefinitive conversion to Christianity of Bulgaria and her ruler. It iswithin this period also that fell the activities of the two great'Slavonic' missionaries and apostles, the brothers Cyril and Methodius, who are looked upon by all Slavs of the orthodox faith as the founders oftheir civilisation. Christianity had of course penetrated into Bulgaria(or Moesia, as it was then) long before the arrival of the Slavs andBulgars, but the influx of one horde of barbarians after another wasnaturally not propitious to its growth. The conversion of Boris in 865, which was brought about largely by the influence of his sister, who hadspent many years in Constantinople as a captive, was a triumph for Greekinfluence and for Byzantium. Though the Church was at this time stillnominally one, yet the rivalry between Rome and Constantinople had alreadybecome acute, and the struggle for spheres of spiritual influence hadbegun. It was in the year 863 that the Prince of Moravia, anxious tointroduce Christianity into his country in a form intelligible to hissubjects, addressed himself to the Emperor Michael III for help. Romecould not provide any suitable missionaries with knowledge of Slavoniclanguages, and the German, or more exactly the Bavarian, hierarchy withwhich Rome entrusted the spiritual welfare of the Slavs of Moravia andPannonia used its greater local knowledge for political and not religiousends. The Germans exploited their ecclesiastical influence in ordercompletely to dominate the Slavs politically, and as a result the latterwere only allowed to see the Church through Teutonic glasses. 

In answer to this appeal the emperor sent the two brothers Cyril andMethodius, who were Greeks of Salonika and had considerable knowledge ofSlavonic languages. They composed the Slavonic alphabet which is to-dayused throughout Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, and in manyparts of Austria-Hungary and translated the gospels into Slavonic; it isfor this reason that they are regarded with such veneration by all membersof the Eastern Church. Their mission proved the greatest success (it mustbe remembered that at this time the various Slavonic tongues were probablyless dissimilar than they are now), and the two brothers were warmlywelcomed in Rome by Pope Adrian II, who formally consented to the use, forthe benefit of the Slavs, of the Slavonic liturgy (a remarkableconcession, confirmed by Pope John VIII). This triumph, however, wasshort-lived; St. Cyril died in 869 and St. Methodius in 885; subsequentPopes, notably Stephen V, were not so benevolent to the Slavonic cause;the machinations of the German hierarchy (which included, even in thosedays, the falsification of documents) were irresistible, and finally theinvasion of the Magyars, in 893, destroyed what was left of the SlavonicChurch in Moravia. The missionary brothers had probably passed throughBulgaria on their way north in 863, but without halting. Many of theirdisciples, driven from the Moravian kingdom by the Germans, came south andtook refuge in Bulgaria in 886, and there carried on in more favourablecircumstances the teachings of their masters. Prince Boris had found iteasier to adopt Christianity himself than to induce all his subjects to dothe same. Even when he had enforced his will on them at the price ofnumerous executions of recalcitrant nobles, he found himself only at thebeginning of his difficulties. The Greeks had been glad enough to welcomeBulgaria into the fold, but they had no wish to set up an independentChurch and hierarchy to rival their own. Boris, on the other hand, thoughno doubt full of genuine spiritual ardour, was above all impressed withthe authority and prestige which the basileus derived from the Church ofConstantinople; he also admired the pomp of ecclesiastical ceremony, andwished to have a patriarch of his own to crown him and a hierarchy of hisown to serve him. Finding the Greeks unresponsive, he turned to Rome, andPope Nicholas I sent him two bishops to superintend the ecclesiasticalaffairs of Bulgaria till the investiture of Boris at the hands of the HolySee could be arranged. These bishops set to work with a will, substitutedthe Latin for the Greek rite, and brought Bulgaria completely under Romaninfluence. But when it was discovered that Boris was aiming at theerection of an independent Church their enthusiasm abated and they wererecalled to Rome in 867. 

Adrian II proved no more sympathetic, and in 870, during the reign of theEmperor Basil I, it was decided without more ado that the Bulgarian Churchshould be directly under the Bishop of Constantinople, on the ground thatthe kingdom of Boris was a vassal-state of the basileus, and that from theByzantine point of view, as opposed to that of Rome, the State came firstand the Church next. The Moravian Gorazd, a disciple of Methodius, wasappointed Metropolitan, and at his death he was succeeded by his fellowcountryman and co-disciple Clement, who by means of the construction ofnumerous churches and monasteries did a great deal for the propagation oflight and learning in Bulgaria. The definite subjection of the BulgarianChurch to that of Byzantium was an important and far-reaching event. Borishas been reproached with submitting himself and his country to Greekinfluence, but in those days it was either Constantinople or Rome (therewas no third way); and in view of the proximity of Constantinople and theglamour which its civilization cast all over the Balkans, it is notsurprising that the Greeks carried the day. 

6

_The Rise and Fall of the First Bulgarian Empire_, 893-972

During the reign of Simeon, second son of Boris, which lasted from 893 to927, Bulgaria reached a very high level of power and prosperity. Simeon, called the Great, is looked on by Bulgarians as their most capable monarchand his reign as the most brilliant period of their history. He had spenthis childhood at Constantinople and been educated there, and he becamesuch an admirer of Greek civilization that he was nicknamed _Hèmiargos_. His instructors had done their work so well that Simeon remainedspellbound by the glamour of Constantinople throughout his life, and, although he might have laid the foundations of a solid empire in theBalkans, his one ambition was to conquer Byzantium and to be recognized asbasileus--an ambition which was not to be fulfilled. His first campaignagainst the Greeks was not very fruitful, because the latter summoned theMagyars, already settled in Hungary, to their aid and they attacked Simeonfrom the north. Simeon in return called the Pechenegs, another fierceTartar tribe, to his aid, but this merely resulted in their definiteestablishment in Rumania. During the twenty years of peace, which strangeto say filled the middle of his reign (894-913), the internal developmentof Bulgaria made great strides. The administration was properly organized, commerce was encouraged, and agriculture flourished. In the wars againstthe Greeks which occupied his last years he was more successful, andinflicted a severe defeat on them at Anchialo (the modern Ahiolu) in 917;but he was still unable to get from them what he wanted, and at last, in921, he was obliged to proclaim himself _basileus_ and _autocrat[=o]r_ ofall Bulgars and Greeks, a title which nobody else recognized. Hereappeared before Constantinople the same year, but effected nothing morethan the customary devastation of the suburbs. The year 923 witnessed asolemn reconciliation between Rome and Constantinople; the Greeks wereclever enough to prevent the Roman legates visiting Bulgaria on theirreturn journey, and thereby administered a rebuff to Simeon, who wasanxious to see them and enter into direct relations with Rome. In the sameyear Simeon tried to make an alliance with the Arabs, but the ambassadorsof the latter were intercepted by the Greeks, who made it worth theirwhile not to continue the journey to Bulgaria. 

In 924 Simeon determined on a supreme effort against Constantinople and asa preliminary he ravaged Macedonia and Thrace. When, however, he arrivedbefore the city the walls and the catapults made him hesitate, and heentered into negotiations, which, as usual, petered out and brought him noadequate reward for all his hopes and preparations. In the west his armswere more successful, and he subjected most of the eastern part of Serbiato his rule. From all this it can be seen that he was no diplomat, thoughnot lacking in enterprise and ambition. The fact was that while he madehis kingdom too powerful for the Greeks to subdue (indeed they werecompelled to pay him tribute), yet Constantinople with its impregnablewalls, well-organized army, powerful fleet, and cunning and experiencedstatesmen, was too hard a nut for him to crack. 

Simeon extended the boundaries of his country considerably, and hisdominion included most of the interior of the Balkan peninsula south ofthe Danube and east of the rivers Morava and Ibar in Serbia and of theDrin in Albania. The Byzantine Church greatly increased its influence inBulgaria during his reign, and works of theology grew like mushrooms. Thiswas the only kind of literature that was ever popular in Bulgaria, andalthough it is usual to throw contempt on the literary achievements ofConstantinople, we should know but little of Bulgaria were it not for theGreek historians. 

Simeon died in 927, and his son Peter, who succeeded him, was a lover ofpeace and comfort; he married a Byzantine princess, and during his reign(927-69) Greek influence grew ever stronger, in spite of several revoltson the part of the Bulgar nobles, while the capital Preslav became aminiature Constantinople. In 927 Rome recognized the kingdom andpatriarchate of Bulgaria, and Peter was duly crowned by the Papal legate. This was viewed with disfavour by the Greeks, and they still called Peteronly _arch[=o]n_ or prince (_knyaz_ in Bulgarian), which was the utmosttitle allowed to any foreign sovereign. It was not until 945 that theyrecognized Peter as _basileus_, the unique title possessed by their ownemperors and till then never granted to any one else. Peter's reign wasone of misfortune for his country both at home and abroad. In 931 theSerbs broke loose under their leader [)C]aslav, whom Simeon had capturedbut who effected his escape, and asserted their independence. In 963 aformidable revolt under one Shishman undermined the whole state fabric. Hemanaged to subtract Macedonia and all western Bulgaria, including Sofiaand Vidin, from Peter's rule, and proclaimed himself independent _tsar(tsar_ or _caesar_ was a title often accorded by Byzantium to relatives ofthe emperor or to distinguished men of Greek or other nationality, andthough it was originally the equivalent of the highest title, it had longsince ceased to be so: the emperor's designations were _basileus_ and_autocrat[=o]r_). From this time there were two Bulgarias--eastern andwestern. The eastern half was now little more than a Byzantine province, and the western became the centre of national life and the focus ofnational aspirations. 

Another factor which militated against the internal progress of Bulgariawas the spread of the Bogomil heresy in the tenth century. This remarkabledoctrine, founded on the dualism of the Paulicians, who had become animportant political force in the eastern empire, was preached in theBalkan peninsula by one Jeremiah Bogomil, for the rest a man of uncertainidentity, who made Philippopolis the centre of his activity. Its principalfeatures were of a negative character, and consequently it was verydifficult successfully to apply force against them. The Bogomilsrecognized the authority neither of Church nor of State; the validityneither of oaths nor of human laws. They refused to pay taxes, to fight, or to obey; they sanctioned theft, but looked upon any kind of punishmentas unjustifiable; they discountenanced marriage and were strictvegetarians. Naturally a heresy so alarming in its individualism shook toits foundations the not very firmly established Bulgarian society. Nevertheless it spread with rapidity in spite of all persecutions, and itspopularity amongst the Bulgarians, and indeed amongst all the Slavs of thepeninsula, is without doubt partly explained by political reasons. Thehierarchy of the Greek Church, which supported the ruling classes of thecountry and lent them authority at the same time that it increased itsown, was antipathetic to the Slavs, and the Bogomil heresy drew muchstrength from its nationalistic colouring and from the appeal which itmade to the character of the Balkan Slavs, who have always been intolerantof government by the Church. But neither the civil nor the ecclesiasticalauthorities were able to cope with the problem; indeed they were apt tominimize its importance, and the heresy was never eradicated till thearrival on the scene of Islam, which proved as attractive to theschismatics as the well-regulated Orthodox Church had been the reverse. 

The third quarter of the tenth century witnessed a great recrudescence ofthe power of Constantinople under the Emperor Nikiphóros Phokas, whowrested Cyprus and Crete from the Arabs and inaugurated an era ofprosperity for the eastern empire, giving it a new lease of vigorous andcombative life. Wishing to reassert the Greek supremacy in the Balkanpeninsula his first act was to refuse any further payment of tribute tothe Bulgarians as from 966; his next was to initiate a campaign againstthem, but in order to make his own success in this enterprise less costlyand more assured he secured the co-operation of the Russians underSvyatoslav, Prince of Kiev; this potentate's mother Olga had visitedConstantinople in 957 and been baptized (though her son and the bulk ofthe population were still ardent heathens), and commercial intercoursebetween Russia and Constantinople by means of the Dnieper and the BlackSea was at that time lively. Svyatoslav did not want pressing, andarriving with an army of 10, 000 men in boats, overcame northern Bulgariain a few days (967); they were helped by Shishman and the western Bulgars, who did not mind at what price Peter and the eastern Bulgars were crushed. Svyatoslav was recalled to Russia in 968 to defend his home from attacksby the Tartar Pechenegs, but that done, he made up his mind to return toBulgaria, lured by its riches and by the hope of the eventual possessionof Constantinople. 

The Emperor Nikiphóros was by now aware of the danger he had imprudentlyconjured up, and made a futile alliance with eastern Bulgaria; but inJanuary 969 Peter of Bulgaria died, and in December of the same yearNikiphóros was murdered by the ambitious Armenian John Tzimisces, [1] whothereupon became emperor. Svyatoslav, seeing the field clear of hisenemies, returned in 970, and in March of that year sacked and occupiedPhilippopolis. The Emperor John Tzimisces, who was even abler both asgeneral and as diplomat than his predecessor, quietly pushed forward hiswarlike preparations, and did not meet the Russians till the autumn, whenhe completely defeated them at Arcadiopolis (the modern Lule-Burgas). TheRussians retired north of the Balkan range, but the Greeks followed them. John Tzimisces besieged them in the capital Preslav, which he stormed, massacring many of the garrison, in April 972. Svyatoslav and hisremaining troops escaped to Silistria (the Durostorum of Trajan) on theDanube, where again, however, they were besieged and defeated by theindefatigable emperor. At last peace was made in July 972, the Russiansbeing allowed to go free on condition of the complete evacuation ofBulgaria and a gift of corn; the adventurous Svyatoslav lost his life atthe hands of the Pechenegs while making his way back to Kiev. The triumphof the Greeks was complete, and it can be imagined that there was not muchleft of the earthenware Bulgaria after the violent collision of these twomighty iron vessels on the top of it. Eastern Bulgaria (i. E. Moesia andThrace) ceased to exist, becoming a purely Greek province; John Tzimiscesmade his triumphal entry into Constantinople, followed by the two sons ofPeter of Bulgaria on foot; the elder was deprived of his regal attributesand created _magistros_, the younger was made a eunuch. 

[Footnote 1: John the Little. ]

7

_The Rise and Fall of 'Western Bulgaria' and the Greek Supremacy_, 963-1186

Meanwhile western Bulgaria had not been touched, and it was thither thatthe Bulgarian patriarch Damian removed from Silistria after the victory ofthe Greeks, settling first in Sofia and then in Okhrida in Macedonia, where the apostate Shishman had eventually made his capital. WesternBulgaria included Macedonia and parts of Thessaly, Albania, southern andeastern Serbia, and the westernmost parts of modern Bulgaria. It was fromthis district that numerous anti-Hellenic revolts were directed after thedeath of the Emperor John Tzimisces in 976. These culminated during thereign of Samuel (977-1014), one of the sons of Shishman. He was as capableand energetic, as unscrupulous and inhuman, as the situation he was calledupon to fill demanded. He began by assassinating all his relations andnobles who resented his desire to re-establish the absolute monarchy, wasrecognized as _tsar_ by the Holy See of Rome in 981, and then began tofight the Greeks, the only possible occupation for any self-respectingBulgarian ruler. The emperor at that time was Basil II (976-1025), who wasbrave and patriotic but young and inexperienced. In his early campaignsSamuel carried all before him; he reconquered northern Bulgaria in 985, Thessaly in 986, and defeated Basil II near Sofia the same year. Later heconquered Albania and the southern parts of Serbia and what is nowMontenegro and Hercegovina. In 996 he threatened Salonika, but first ofall embarked on an expedition against the Peloponnese; here he wasfollowed by the Greek general, who managed to surprise and completelyoverwhelm him, he and his son barely escaping with their lives. 

From that year (996) his fortune changed; the Greeks reoccupied northernBulgaria, in 999, and also recovered Thessaly and parts of Macedonia. TheBulgars were subjected to almost annual attacks on the part of Basil II;the country was ruined and could not long hold out. The final disasteroccurred in 1014, when Basil II utterly defeated his inveterate foe in apass near Seres in Macedonia. Samuel escaped to Prilip, but when he beheldthe return of 15, 000 of his troops who had been captured and blinded bythe Greeks he died of syncope. Basil II, known as Bulgaroctonus, orBulgar-killer, went from victory to victory, and finally occupied theBulgarian capital of Okhrida in 1016. Western Bulgaria came to an end, ashad eastern Bulgaria in 972, the remaining members of the royal familyfollowed the emperor to the Bosphorus to enjoy comfortable captivity, andthe triumph of Constantinople was complete. 

From 1018 to 1186 Bulgaria had no existence as an independent state; BasilII, although cruel, was far from tyrannical in his general treatment ofthe Bulgars, and treated the conquered territory more as a protectoratethan as a possession. But after his death Greek rule became much moreoppressive. The Bulgarian patriarchate (since 972 established at Okhrida)was reduced to an archbishopric, and in 1025 the see was given to a Greek, who lost no time in eliminating the Bulgarian element from positions ofimportance throughout his diocese. Many of the nobles were transplanted toConstantinople, where their opposition was numbed by the bestowal ofhonours. During the eleventh century the peninsula was invaded frequentlyby the Tartar Pechenegs and Kumans, whose aid was invoked both by Greeksand Bulgars; the result of these incursions was not always favourable tothose who had promoted them; the barbarians invariably stayed longer anddid more damage than had been bargained for, and usually left some oftheir number behind as unwelcome settlers. 

In this way the ethnological map of the Balkan peninsula became ever morevariegated. To the Tartar settlers were added colonies of Armenians andVlakhs by various emperors. The last touch was given by the arrival of theNormans in 1081 and the passage of the crusaders in 1096. The wholesaledepredations of the latter naturally made the inhabitants of the Balkanpeninsula anything but sympathetically disposed towards their cause. Oneof the results of all this turmoil and of the heavy hand of the Greeks wasa great increase in the vitality of the Bogomil heresy already referred to;it became a refuge for patriotism and an outlet for its expression. TheEmperor Alexis Comnenus instituted a bitter persecution of it, which onlyled to its growth and rapid propagation westwards into Serbia from itscentre Philippopolis. 

The reason of the complete overthrow of the Bulgarian monarchy by theGreeks was of course that the nation itself was totally lacking incohesion and organization, and could only achieve any lasting success whenan exceptionally gifted ruler managed to discount the centrifugaltendencies of the feudal nobles, as Simeon and Samuel had done. Otherdiscouraging factors wore the permeation of the Church and State byByzantine influence, the lack of a large standing army, the spread of theanarchic Bogomil heresy, and the fact that the bulk of the Slav populationhad no desire for foreign adventure or national aggrandizement. 

8

_The Rise and Fall of the Second Bulgarian Empire, _ 1186-1258

From 1186 to 1258 Bulgaria experienced temporary resuscitation, thebrevity of which was more than compensated for by the stirring nature ofthe events that crowded it. The exactions and oppressions of the Greeksculminated in a revolt on the part of the Bulgars, which had its centre inTirnovo on the river Yantra in northern Bulgaria--a position of greatnatural strength and strategic importance, commanding the outlets ofseveral of the most important passes over the Balkan range. This revoltcoincided with the growing weakness of the eastern empire, which, surrounded on all sides by aggressive enemies--Kumans, Saracens, Turks, and Normans--was sickening for one of the severe illnesses which precededits dissolution. The revolt was headed by two brothers who were Vlakh orRumanian shepherds, and was blessed by the archbishop Basil, who crownedone of them, called John Asen, as _tsar_ in Tirnovo in 1186. Their firstefforts against the Greeks were not successful, but securing the supportof the Serbs under Stephen Nemanja in 1188 and of the Crusaders in 1189they became more so; but there was life in the Greeks yet, and victoryalternated with defeat. John Asen I was assassinated in 1196 and wassucceeded after many internal discords and murders by his relative Kaloianor Pretty John. This cruel and unscrupulous though determined ruler soonmade an end of all his enemies at home, and in eight years achieved suchsuccess abroad that Bulgaria almost regained its former proportions. Moreover, he re-established relations with Rome, to the great discomfitureof the Greeks, and after some negotiations Pope Innocent III recognizedKaloian as _tsar_ of the Bulgars and Vlakhs (roi de Blaquie et de Bougrie, in the words of Villehardouin), with Basil as primate, and they were bothduly consecrated and crowned by the papal legate at Tirnovo in 1204. TheFrench, who had just established themselves in Constantinople during thefourth crusade, imprudently made an enemy of Kaloian instead of a friend, and with the aid of the Tartar Kumans he defeated them several times, capturing and brutally murdering Baldwin I. But in 1207 his career was cutshort; he was murdered while besieging Salonika by one of his generals whowas a friend of his wife. After eleven years of further anarchy he wassucceeded by John Asen II. During the reign of this monarch, which lastedfrom 1218 till 1241, Bulgaria reached the zenith of its power. He was themost enlightened ruler the country had had, and he not only waged warsuccessfully abroad but also put an end to the internal confusion, restored the possibility of carrying on agriculture and commerce, andencouraged the foundation of numerous schools and monasteries. Hemaintained the tradition of his family by making his capital at Tirnovo, which city he considerably embellished and enlarged. 

Constantinople at this time boasted three Greek emperors and one French. The first act of John Asen II was to get rid of one of them, namedTheodore, who had proclaimed himself _basileus_ at Okhrida in 1223. Thereupon he annexed the whole of Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirusto his dominions, and made Theodore's brother Manuel, who had married oneof his daughters, viceroy, established at Salonika. Another of hisdaughters had married Stephen Vladislav, who was King of Serbia from1233-43, and a third married Theodore, son of the Emperor John III, whoreigned at Nicaea, in 1235. This daughter, after being sought in marriageby the French barons at Constantinople as a wife for the Emperor BaldwinII, a minor, was then summarily rejected in favour of the daughter of theKing of Jerusalem; this affront rankled in the mind of John Asen II andthrew him into the arms of the Greeks, with whom he concluded an alliancein 1234. John Asen II and his ally, the Emperor John III, were, however, utterly defeated by the French under the walls of Constantinople in 1236, and the Bulgarian ruler, who had no wish to see the Greeks re-establishedthere, began to doubt the wisdom of his alliance. Other Bulgarian tsarshad been unscrupulous, but the whole foreign policy of this one pivoted ontreachery. He deserted the Greeks and made an alliance with the French in1237, the Pope Gregory IX, a great Hellenophobe, having threatened himwith excommunication; he went so far as to force his daughter torelinquish her Greek husband. The following year, however, he againchanged over to the Greeks; then again fear of the Pope and of hisbrother-in-law the King of Hungary brought him back to the side of BaldwinII, to whose help against the Greeks he went with a large army into Thracein 1239. While besieging the Greeks with indifferent success, he learnedof the death of his wife and his eldest son from plague, and incontinentlyreturned to Tirnovo, giving up the war and restoring his daughter to herlonely husband. This adaptable monarch died a natural death in 1241, andthe three rulers of his family who succeeded him, whose reigns filled theperiod 1241-58, managed to undo all the constructive work of theirimmediate predecessors. Province after province was lost and internalanarchy increased. This remarkable dynasty came to an inglorious end in1258, when its last representative was murdered by his own nobles, andfrom this time onwards Bulgaria was only a shadow of its former self. 

9

_The Serbian Supremacy and the Final Collapse, _ 1258-1393

From 1258 onwards Bulgaria may be said to have continued flickering untilits final extinction as a state in 1393, but during this period it neverhad any voice in controlling the destinies of the Balkan peninsula. Owingto the fact that no ruler emerged capable of keeping the distractedcountry in order, there was a regular _chassé-croisé_ of rival princelets, an unceasing tale of political marriages and murders, conspiracies andrevolts of feudal nobles all over the country, and perpetual ebb and flowof the boundaries of the warring principalities which tore the fabric ofBulgaria to pieces amongst them. From the point of view of foreignpolitics this period is characterized generally by the virtualdisappearance of Bulgarian independence to the profit of the surroundingstates, who enjoyed a sort of rotativist supremacy. It is especiallyremarkable for the complete ascendancy which Serbia gained in the Balkanpeninsula. 

A Serb, Constantine, grandson of Stephen Nemanja, occupied the Bulgarianthrone from 1258 to 1277, and married the granddaughter of John Asen II. After the fall of the Latin Empire of Constantinople in 1261, theHungarians, already masters of Transylvania, combined with the Greeksagainst Constantine; the latter called the Tartars of southern Russia, atthis time at the height of their power, to his help and was victorious, but as a result of his diplomacy the Tartars henceforward played animportant part in the Bulgarian welter. Then Constantine married, as hissecond wife, the daughter of the Greek emperor, and thus again gaveConstantinople a voice in his country's affairs. Constantine was followedby a series of upstart rulers, whose activities were cut short by thevictories of King Uro[)s] II of Serbia (1282-1321), who conquered allMacedonia and wrested it from the Bulgars. In 1285 the Tartars of theGolden Horde swept over Hungary and Bulgaria, but it was from the souththat the clouds were rolling up which not much later were to burst overthe peninsula. In 1308 the Turks appeared on the Sea of Marmora, and in1326 established themselves at Brussa. From 1295 to 1322 Bulgaria waspresided over by a nobleman of Vidin, Svetoslav, who, unmolested by theGreeks, grown thoughtful in view of the approach of the Turks, was able tomaintain rather more order than his subjects were accustomed to. After hisdeath in 1322 chaos again supervened. One of his successors had marriedthe daughter of Uro[)s] II of Serbia, but suddenly made an alliance withthe Greeks against his brother-in-law Stephen Uro[)s] III and dispatchedhis wife to her home. During the war which ensued the unwonted allies wereutterly routed by the Serbs at Kustendil in Macedonia in 1330. 

From 1331 to 1365 Bulgaria was under one John Alexander, a noble of Tartarorigin, whose sister became the wife of Serbia's greatest ruler, StephenDu[)s]an; John Alexander, moreover, recognized Stephen as his suzerain, and from thenceforward Bulgaria was a vassal-state of Serbia. Meanwhilethe Turkish storm was gathering fast; Suleiman crossed the Hellespont in1356, and Murad I made Adrianople his capital in 1366. After the death ofJohn Alexander in 1365 the Hungarians invaded northern Bulgaria, and hissuccessor invoked the help of the Turks against them and also against theGreeks. This was the beginning of the end. The Serbs, during an absence ofthe Sultan in Asia, undertook an offensive, but were defeated by the Turksnear Adrianople in 1371, who captured Sofia in 1382. After this the Serbsformed a huge southern Slav alliance, in which the Bulgarians refused tojoin, but, after a temporary success against the Turks in 1387, they werevanquished by them as the result of treachery at the famous battle ofKosovo in 1389. Meanwhile the Turks occupied Nikopolis on the Danube in1388 and destroyed the Bulgarian capital Tirnovo in 1393, exiling thePatriarch Euthymus to Macedonia. Thus the state of Bulgaria passed intothe hands of the Turks, and its church into those of the Greeks. ManyBulgars adopted Islam, and their descendants are the Pomaks or BulgarianMohammedans of the present day. With the subjection of Rumania in 1394 andthe defeat of an improvised anti-Turkish crusade from western Europe underSigismund, King of Hungary, at Nikopolis in 1396 the Turkish conquest wascomplete, though the battle of Varna was not fought till 1444, norConstantinople entered till 1453. 

10

_The Turkish Dominion and the Emancipation, _ 1393-1878

From 1393 until 1877 Bulgaria may truthfully be said to have had nohistory, but nevertheless it could scarcely have been called happy. National life was completely paralysed, and what stood in those days fornational consciousness was obliterated. It is common knowledge, and mostpeople are now reasonable enough to admit, that the Turks have manyexcellent qualities, religious fervour and military ardour amongst others;it is also undeniable that from an aesthetic point of view too much cannotbe said in praise of Mohammedan civilization. Who does not prefer theminarets of Stambul and Edirne[1] to the architecture of Budapest, notoriously the ideal of Christian south-eastern Europe? On the otherhand, it cannot be contended that the Pax Ottomana brought prosperity orhappiness to those on whom it was imposed (unless indeed they submergedtheir identity in the religion of their conquerors), or that its Influencewas either vivifying or generally popular. 

[Footnote 1: The Turkish names for Constantinople and Adrianople. ]

To the races they conquered the Turks offered two alternatives--serfdom orTurkdom; those who could not bring themselves to accept either of thesehad either to emigrate or take to brigandage and outlawry in themountains. The Turks literally overlaid the European nationalities of theBalkan peninsula for five hundred years, and from their own point of viewand from that of military history this was undoubtedly a very splendidachievement; it was more than the Greeks or Romans had ever done. From thepoint of view of humanitarianism also it is beyond a doubt that much lesshuman blood was spilt in the Balkan peninsula during the five hundredyears of Turkish rule than during the five hundred years of Christian rulewhich preceded them; indeed it would have been difficult to spill more. Itis also a pure illusion to think of the Turks as exceptionally brutal orcruel; they are just as good-natured and good-humoured as anybody else; itis only when their military or religious passions are aroused that theybecome more reckless and ferocious than other people. It was not the Turkswho taught cruelty to the Christians of the Balkan peninsula; the latterhad nothing to learn in this respect. 

In spite of all this, however, from the point of view of the Slavs ofBulgaria and Serbia, Turkish rule was synonymous with suffocation. If theTurks were all that their greatest admirers think them the history of theBalkan peninsula in the nineteenth century would have been very differentfrom what it has been, namely, one perpetual series of anti-Turkishrevolts. 

Of all the Balkan peoples the Bulgarians were the most completely crushedand effaced. The Greeks by their ubiquity, their brains, and their moneywere soon able to make the Turkish storm drive their own windmill; theRumanians were somewhat sheltered by the Danube and also by their distancefrom Constantinople; the Serbs also were not so exposed to the full blastof the Turkish wrath, and the inaccessibility of much of their countryafforded them some protection. Bulgaria was simply annihilated, and itspopulation, already far from homogeneous, was still further varied bynumerous Turkish and other Tartar colonies. 

For the same reasons already mentioned Bulgaria was the last Balkan stateto emancipate itself; for these reasons also it is the least trammelled byprejudices and by what are considered national predilections and racialaffinities, while its heterogeneous composition makes it vigorous andenterprising. The treatment of the Christians by the Turks was by no meansalways the same; generally speaking, it grew worse as the power of theSultan grew less. During the fifteenth century they were allowed topractise their religion and all their vocations in comparative liberty andpeace. But from the sixteenth century onwards the control of the Sultandeclined, power became decentralized, the Ottoman Empire grew ever moreanarchic and the rule of the provincial governors more despotic. 

But the Mohammedan conquerors were not the only enemies and oppressors ofthe Bulgars. The rôle played by the Greeks in Bulgaria during the Turkishdominion was almost as important as that of the Turks themselves. Thecontempt of the Turks for the Christians, and especially for theirreligion, was so great that they prudently left the management of it tothem, knowing that it would keep them occupied in mutual altercation. From1393 till 1767 the Bulgarians were under the Greco-Bulgarian Patriarchateof Okhrida, an organization in which all posts, from the highest to thelowest, had to be bought from the Turkish administration at exorbitant andever-rising prices; the Phanariote Greeks (so called because theyoriginated in the Phanar quarter at Constantinople) were the only ones whocould afford those of the higher posts, with the result that the Churchwas controlled from Constantinople. In 1767 the independent patriarchateswere abolished, and from that date the religious control of the Greeks wasas complete as the political control of the Turks. The Greeks did all theycould to obliterate the last traces of Bulgarian nationality which hadsurvived in the Church, and this explains a fact which must never beforgotten, which had its origin in the remote past, but grew morepronounced at this period, that the individual hatred of Greeks andBulgars of each other has always been far more intense than theircollective hatred of the Turks. 

Ever since the marriage of the Tsar Ivan III with the niece of the lastGreek Emperor, in 1472, Russia had considered itself the trustee of theeastern Christians, the defender of the Orthodox Church, and the directheir of the glory and prestige of Constantinople; it was not until theeighteenth century, however, after the consolidation of the Russian state, that the Balkan Christians were championed and the eventual possession ofConstantinople was seriously considered. Russian influence was firstasserted in Rumania after the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, in 1774. It wasonly the Napoleonic war in 1812 that prevented the Russians from extendingtheir territory south of the Danube, whither it already stretched. Serbiawas partially free by 1826, and Greece achieved complete independence in1830, when the Russian troops, in order to coerce the Turks, occupied partof Bulgaria and advanced as far as Adrianople. Bulgaria, being nearer toand more easily repressed by Constantinople, had to wait, and tentativerevolts made about this time were put down with much bloodshed and werefollowed by wholesale emigrations of Bulgars into Bessarabia andimportations of Tartars and Kurds into the vacated districts. The CrimeanWar and the short-sighted championship of Turkey by the western Europeanpowers checked considerably the development at which Russia aimed. Moldavia and Wallachia were in 1856 withdrawn from the semi-protectoratewhich Russia had long exercised over them, and in 1861 formed themselvesinto the united state of Rumania. In 1866 a German prince, Charles ofHohenzollern, came to rule over the country, the first sign of Germaninfluence in the Near East; at this time Rumania still acknowledged thesupremacy of the Sultan. 

During the first half of the nineteenth century there took place aconsiderable intellectual renascence in Bulgaria, a movement fostered bywealthy Bulgarian merchants of Bucarest and Odessa. In 1829 a history ofBulgaria was published by a native of that country in Moscow; in 1835 thefirst school was established in Bulgaria, and many others soon followed. It must be remembered that not only was nothing known at that time aboutBulgaria and its inhabitants in other countries, but the Bulgars hadthemselves to be taught who they were. The Bulgarian people in Bulgariaconsisted entirely of peasants; there was no Bulgarian upper or middle or'intelligent' or professional class; those enlightened Bulgars who existedwere domiciled in other countries; the Church was in the hands of theGreeks, who vied with the Turks in suppressing Bulgarian nationality. 

The two committees of Odessa and Bucarest which promoted the enlightenmentand emancipation of Bulgaria were dissimilar in composition and in aim;the members of the former were more intent on educational and religiousreform, and aimed at the gradual and peaceful regeneration of theircountry by these means; the latter wished to effect the immediatepolitical emancipation of Bulgaria by violent and, if necessary, warlikemeans. 

It was the ecclesiastical question which was solved first. In 1856 thePorte had promised religious reforms tending to the appointment ofBulgarian bishops and the recognition of the Bulgarian language in Churchand school. But these not being carried through, the Bulgarians took thematter into their own hands, and in 1860 refused any longer to recognizethe Patriarch of Constantinople. The same year an attempt was made tobring the Church of Bulgaria under that of Rome, but, owing to Russianopposition, proved abortive. In 1870, the growing agitation having at lastalarmed the Turks, the Bulgarian Exarchate was established. The BulgarianChurch was made free and national and was to be under an Exarch who shouldreside at Constantinople (Bulgaria being still a Turkish province). TheGreeks, conscious what a blow this would be to their supremacy, managedfor a short while to stave off the evil day, but in 1872 the Exarch wastriumphantly installed in Constantinople, where he resided till 1908. 

Meanwhile revolutionary outbreaks began to increase, but were always putdown with great rigour. The most notable was that of 1875, instigated byStambulóv, the future dictator, in sympathy with the outbreak inMontenegro, Hercegovina, and Bosnia of that year; the result of this andof similar movements in 1876 was the series of notorious Bulgarianmassacres in that year. The indignation of Europe was aroused andconcerted representations were urgently made at Constantinople. MidhatPasha disarmed his opponents by summarily introducing the Britishconstitution into Turkey, but, needless to say, Bulgaria's lot was notimproved by this specious device. Russia had, however, steadily beenmaking her preparations, and, Turkey having refused to discontinuehostilities against Montenegro, on April 24, 1877, war was declared by theEmperor Alexander II, whose patience had become exhausted; he was joinedby Prince Charles of Rumania, who saw that by doing so he would berewarded by the complete emancipation of his country, then still avassal-state of Turkey, and its erection into a kingdom. At the beginningof the war all went well for the Russians and Rumanians, who were soonjoined by large numbers of Bulgarian insurgents; the Turkish forces werescattered all over the peninsula. The committee of Bucarest transformeditself into a provisional government, but the Russians, who had undertakento liberate the country, naturally had to keep its administrationtemporarily in their own hands, and refused their recognition. The Turks, alarmed at the early victories of the Russians, brought up better generalsand troops, and defeated the Russians at Plevna in July. They failed, however, to dislodge them from the important and famous Shipka Pass inAugust, and after this they became demoralized and their resistancerapidly weakened. The Russians, helped by the Bulgarians and Rumanians, fought throughout the summer with the greatest gallantry; they tookPlevna, after a three months' siege, in December, occupied Sofia andPhilippopolis in January 1878, and pushed forward to the walls ofConstantinople. 

The Turks were at their last gasp, and at Adrianople, in March 1878, Ignatiyev dictated the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, by which aprincipality of Bulgaria, under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan, wascreated, stretching from the Danube to the Aegean, and from the Black Seato Albania, including all Macedonia and leaving to the Turks only thedistrict between Constantinople and Adrianople, Chalcidice, and the townof Salonika; Bulgaria would thus have regained the dimensions it possessedunder Tsar Simeon nine hundred and fifty years previously. 

This treaty, which on ethnological grounds was tolerably just, alarmed theother powers, especially Great Britain and Germany, who thought theyperceived in it the foundations of Russian hegemony in the Balkans, whileit would, if put into execution, have blighted the aspirations of Greeceand Serbia. The Treaty of Berlin, inspired by Bismarck and Lord Salisbury, anxious to defend, the former, the interests of (ostensibly)Austria-Hungary, the latter (shortsightedly) those of Turkey, replaced itin July 1878. By its terms Bulgaria was cut into three parts; northernBulgaria, between the Danube and the Balkans, was made an autonomousprovince, tributary to Turkey; southern Bulgaria, fancifully termedEastern Rumelia (Rumili was the name always given by the Turks to thewhole Balkan peninsula), was to have autonomous administration under aChristian governor appointed by the Porte; Macedonia was left to Turkey;and the Dobrudja, between the Danube and the Black Sea, was adjudged toRumania. 

11

_The Aftermath, and Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 1878-86_

The relations between the Russians and the Bulgarians were better beforethe liberation of the latter by the former than after; this may seemunjust, because Bulgaria could never have freed herself so decisively andrapidly alone, and Russia was the only power in whose interest it was tofree her from the Turks, and who could translate that interest so promptlyinto action; nevertheless, the laws controlling the relationships ofstates and nationalities being much the same as those which control therelationships of individuals, it was only to be expected. 

What so often happens in the relationships of individuals happened inthose between Russia and Bulgaria. Russia naturally enough expectedBulgaria to be grateful for the really large amount of blood and treasurewhich its liberation had cost Russia, and, moreover, expected itsgratitude to take the form of docility and a general acquiescence in allthe suggestions and wishes expressed by its liberator. Bulgaria was nodoubt deeply grateful, but never had the slightest intention of expressingits gratitude in the desired way; on the contrary, like most people whohave regained a long-lost and unaccustomed freedom of action or been putunder an obligation, it appeared touchy and jealous of its right to anindependent judgement. It is often assumed by Russophobe writers thatRussia wished and intended to make a Russian province of Bulgaria, butthis is very unlikely; the geographical configuration of the Balkanpeninsula would not lend itself to its incorporation in the RussianEmpire, the existence between the two of the compact and vigorous nationalblock of Rumania, a Latin race and then already an independent state, wasan insurmountable obstacle, and, finally, it is quite possible for Russiato obtain possession or control of Constantinople without owning all theintervening littoral. 

That Russia should wish to have a controlling voice in the destinies ofBulgaria and in those of the whole peninsula was natural, and it was justas natural that Bulgaria should resent its pretensions. The eventualresult of this, however, was that Bulgaria inevitably entered the sphereof Austrian and ultimately of German influence or rather calculation, acontingency probably not foreseen by its statesmen at the time, and whosefull meaning, even if it had, would not have been grasped by them. 

The Bulgarians, whatever the origin and the ingredients of theirnationality, are by language a purely Slavonic people; their ancestorswere the pioneers of Slavonic civilization as expressed in its monumentsof theological literature. Nevertheless, they have never been enthusiasticPan-Slavists, any more than the Dutch have ever been ardent Pan-Germans;it is as unreasonable to expect such a thing of the one people as it is ofthe other. The Bulgarians indeed think themselves superior to the Slavs byreason of the warlike and glorious traditions of the Tartar tribe thatgave them their name and infused the Asiatic element into their race, thusendowing them with greater stability, energy, and consistency than ispossessed by purely Slav peoples. These latter, on the other hand, andnotably the Serbians, for the same reason affect contempt for the mixtureof blood and for what they consider the Mongol characteristics of theBulgarians. What is certain is that between Bulgarians and Germans(including German Austrians and Magyars) there has never existed thatelemental, ineradicable, and insurmountable antipathy which exists betweenGerman (and Magyar) and Slav wherever the two races are contiguous, fromthe Baltic to the Adriatic; nothing is more remarkable than the way inwhich the Bulgarian people has been flattered, studied, and courted inAustria-Hungary and Germany, during the last decade, to the detriment ofthe purely Slav Serb race with whom it is always compared. The reason isthat with the growth of the Serb national movement, from 1903 onwards, Austria-Hungary and Germany felt an instinctive and perfectlywell-justified fear of the Serb race, and sought to neutralize thepossible effect of its growing power by any possible means. 

It is not too much to say, in summing up, that Russian influence, whichhad been growing stronger in Bulgaria up till 1877-8, has since beensteadily on the decline; Germany and Austria-Hungary, who reduced Bulgariato half the size that Count Ignatiyev had made it by the Treaty of SanStefano, reaped the benefit, especially the commercial benefit, of the warwhich Russia had waged. Intellectually, and especially as regards thereplenishment and renovation of the Bulgarian language, which, in spite ofnumerous Turkish words introduced during the Ottoman rule, is essentiallySlavonic both in substance and form, Russian influence was especiallypowerful, and has to a certain extent maintained itself. Economically, owing partly to geographical conditions, both the Danube and the mainoriental railway linking Bulgaria directly with Budapest and Vienna, partly to the fact that Bulgaria's best customers for its cereals are incentral and western Europe, the connexion between Bulgaria and Russia isinfinitesimal. Politically, both Russia and Bulgaria aiming at the samething, the possession of Constantinople and the hegemony of the Balkanpeninsula, their relations were bound to be difficult. 

The first Bulgarian Parliament met in 1879 under trying conditions. BothRussian and Bulgarian hopes had been dashed by the Treaty of Berlin. Russian influence was still paramount, however, and the viceroy controlledthe organization of the administration. An ultra-democratic constitutionwas arranged for, a fact obviously not conducive to the successfulgovernment of their country by the quite inexperienced Bulgarians. For aruler recourse had inevitably to be had to the rabbit-warren of Germanicprinces, who were still ingenuously considered neutral both in religionand in politics. The choice fell on Prince Alexander of Battenberg, nephewof the Empress of Russia, who had taken part in the campaign of theRussian army. Prince Alexander was conscientious, energetic, andenthusiastic, but he was no diplomat, and from the outset his honestyprecluded his success. From the very first he failed to keep on good termswith Russia or its representatives, who at that time were still numerousin Bulgaria, while he was helpless to stem the ravages of parliamentarygovernment. The Emperor Alexander III, who succeeded his father AlexanderII in 1881, recommended him to insist on being made dictator, which hesuccessfully did. But when he found that this only meant an increase ofRussian influence he reverted to parliamentary government (in September1883); this procedure discomfited the representatives of Russia, discredited him with the Emperor, and threw him back into the vortex ofparty warfare, from which he never extricated himself. 

Meanwhile the question of eastern Rumelia, or rather southern Bulgaria, still a Turkish province, began to loom. A vigorous agitation for thereunion of the two parts of the country had been going on for some time, and on September 18, 1885, the inhabitants of Philippopolis suddenlyproclaimed the union under Prince Alexander, who solemnly announced hisapproval at Tirnovo and triumphantly entered their city on September 21. Russia frowned on this independence of spirit. Serbia, under King Milan, and instigated by Austria, inaugurated the policy which has so often beenfollowed since, and claimed territorial compensation for Bulgaria'saggrandisement; it must be remembered that it was Bismarck who, by theTreaty of Berlin, had arbitrarily confined Serbia to its inadequate limitsof those day. 

On November 13 King Milan declared war, and began to march on Sofia, whichis not far from the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Prince Alexander, the bulkof whose army was on the Turkish frontier, boldly took up the challenge. On November 18 took place the battle of Slivnitsa, a small town abouttwenty miles north-west of Sofia, in which the Bulgarians were completelyvictorious. Prince Alexander, after hard fighting, took Pirot in Serbia onNovember 27, having refused King Milan's request for an armistice, and wasmarching on Nish, when Austria intervened, and threatened to send troopsinto Serbia unless fighting ceased. Bulgaria had to obey, and on March 3, 1886, a barren treaty of peace was imposed on the belligerents atBucarest. Prince Alexander's position did not improve after this, indeedit would have needed a much more skilful navigator to steer through themany currents which eddied round him. A strong Russophile party formeditself in the army; on the night of August 21, 1886, some officers of thisparty, who were the most capable in the Bulgarian army, appeared at Sofia, forced Alexander to resign, and abducted him; they put him on board hisyacht on the Danube and escorted him to the Russian town of Reni, inBessarabia; telegraphic orders came from St. Petersburg, in answer toinquiries, that he could proceed with haste to western Europe, and onAugust 26 he found himself at Lemberg. But those who had carried out this_coup d'état_ found that it was not at all popular in the country. Acounter-revolution, headed by the statesman Stambulóv, was immediatelyinitiated, and on September 3 Prince Alexander reappeared in Sofia amidsttumultuous applause. Nevertheless his position was hopeless; the EmperorAlexander III forced him to abdicate, and on September 7, 1886, he leftBulgaria for good, to the regret of the majority of the people. He died inAustria, in 1893, in his thirty-seventh year. At his departure a regencywas constituted, at the head of which was Stambulóv. 

12

_The Regeneration under Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, _ 1886-1908

Stambulóv was born at Tirnovo in 1854 and was of humble origin. He tookpart in the insurrection of 1876 and in the war of liberation, and in 1884became president of the Sóbraniye (Parliament). From 1886 till 1894 he wasvirtually dictator of Bulgaria. He was intensely patriotic and alsopersonally ambitious, determined, energetic, ruthlessly cruel andunscrupulous, but incapable of deceit; these qualities were apparent inhis powerful and grim expression of face, while his manner inspired theweak with terror and the strongest with respect. His policy in general wasdirected against Russia. At the general election held in October 1886 hehad all his important opponents imprisoned beforehand, while armedsentries discouraged ill-disposed voters from approaching theballot-boxes. Out of 522 elected deputies, there were 470 supporters ofStambulóv. This implied the complete suppression of the Russophile partyand led to a rupture with St. Petersburg. 

Whatever were Stambulóv's methods, and few would deny that they wereharsh, there is no doubt that something of the sort was necessary torestore order in the country. But once having started on this path hefound it difficult to stop, and his tyrannical bearing, combined with thedelay in finding a prince, soon made him unpopular. There were severalrevolutionary outbreaks directed against him, but these were all crushed. At length the, at that time not particularly alluring, throne of Bulgariawas filled by Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who was born in 1861 andwas the son of the gifted Princess Clémentine of Bourbon-Orleans, daughterof Louis-Philippe. This young man combined great ambition and tenacity ofpurpose with extreme prudence, astuteness, and patience; he was aconsummate diplomat. The election of this prince was viewed with greatdisfavour by Russia, and for fear of offending the Emperor Alexander IIInone of the European powers recognized him. 

Ferdinand, unabashed, cheerfully installed himself in Sofia with hismother in July 1886, and took care to make the peace with his suzerain, the Sultan Abdul Hamid. He wisely left all power in the hands of theunattractive and to him, unsympathetic prime minister, Stambulóv, till hehimself felt secure in his position, and till the dictator should havemade himself thoroughly hated. Ferdinand's clever and wealthy mother casta beneficent and civilizing glow around him, smoothing away manydifficulties by her womanly tact and philanthropic activity, and, thanksto his influential connexions in the courts of Europe and his attitude ofcalm expectancy, his prestige in his own country rapidly increased. In1893 he married Princess Marie-Louise of Bourbon-Parma. In May 1894, as aresult of a social misadventure in which he became involved, Stambulóvsent in his resignation, confidently expecting a refusal. To hismortification it was accepted; thereupon he initiated a violent presscampaign, but his halo had faded, and on July 15 he was savagely attackedin the street by unknown men, who afterwards escaped, and he died threedays later. So intense were the emotions of the people that his grave hadto be guarded by the military for two months. In November 1894 followedthe death of the Emperor Alexander III, and as a result of this doubleevent the road to a reconciliation with Russia was opened. Meanwhile theGerman Emperor, who was on good terms with Princess Clémentine, had pavedthe way for Ferdinand at Vienna, and when, in March 1896, the Sultanrecognized him as Prince of Bulgaria and Governor-General of easternRumelia, his international position was assured. Relations with Russiawere still further improved by the rebaptism of the infant Crown PrinceBoris according to the rites of the eastern Church, in February 1896, anda couple of years later Ferdinand and his wife and child paid a highlysuccessful state visit to Peterhof. In September 1902 a memorial churchwas erected by the Emperor Nicholas II at the Shipka Pass, and later anequestrian statue of the Tsar-Liberator Alexander II was placed oppositethe House of Parliament in Sofia. 

Bulgaria meanwhile had been making rapid and astonishing materialprogress. Railways were built, exports increased, and the generalcondition of the country greatly improved. It is the fashion to comparethe wonderful advance made by Bulgaria during the thirty-five years of itsnew existence with the very much slower progress made by Serbia during amuch longer period. This is insisted on especially by publicists inAustria-Hungary and Germany, but it is forgotten that even before the lastBalkan war the geographical position of Bulgaria with its seaboard wasmuch more favourable to its economic development than that of Serbia, which the Treaty of Berlin had hemmed in by Turkish and Austro-Hungarianterritory; moreover, Bulgaria being double the size of the Serbia of thosedays, had far greater resources upon which to draw. 

From 1894 onwards Ferdinand's power in his own country and his influenceabroad had been steadily growing. He always appreciated the value ofrailways, and became almost as great a traveller as the German Emperor. His estates in the south of Hungary constantly required his attention, andhe was a frequent visitor in Vienna. The German Emperor, though he couldnot help admiring Ferdinand's success, was always a little afraid of him;he felt that Ferdinand's gifts were so similar to his own that he would beunable to count on him in an emergency. Moreover, it was difficult toreconcile Ferdinand's ambitions in extreme south-eastern Europe with hisown. Ferdinand's relations with Vienna, on the other hand, and especiallywith the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, were both cordial and intimate. 

The gradual aggravation of the condition of the Turkish Empire, notably inMacedonia, the unredeemed Bulgaria, where since the insurrection of 1902-3anarchy, always endemic, had deteriorated into a reign of terror, and, also the unmistakably growing power and spirit of Serbia since theaccession of the Karageorgevich dynasty in 1903, caused uneasiness inSofia, no less than in Vienna and Budapest. The Young Turkish revolutionof July 1908, and the triumph of the Committee of Union and Progress, disarmed the critics of Turkey who wished to make the forcibleintroduction of reforms a pretext for their interference; but thepotential rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire which it foreshadowedindicated the desirability of rapid and decisive action. In September, after fomenting a strike on the Oriental Railway in eastern Roumelia(which railway was Turkish property), the Sofia Cabinet seized the linewith a military force on the plea of political necessity. At the same timeFerdinand, with his second wife, the Protestant Princess Eleonora ofReuss, whom he had married in March of that year, was received with regalhonours by the Emperor of Austria at Budapest. On October 5, 1908, atTirnovo, the ancient capital, Ferdinand proclaimed the completeindependence of Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia under himself as King (_Tsar_in Bulgarian), and on October 7 Austria-Hungary announced the annexationof Bosnia and Hercegovina, the two Turkish provinces administered by itsince 1879, nominally under Turkish suzerainty. 

13

_The Kingdom_, 1908-13

(cf. Chaps. 14, 20)

The events which have taken place in Bulgaria since 1908 hinge on theMacedonian question, which has not till now been mentioned. The Macedonianquestion was extremely complicated; it started on the assumption that thedisintegration of Turkey, which had been proceeding throughout thenineteenth century, would eventually be completed, and the question washow in this eventuality to satisfy the territorial claims of the threeneighbouring countries, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, claims bothhistorical and ethnological, based on the numbers and distribution oftheir 'unredeemed' compatriots in Macedonia, and at the same time avoidcausing the armed interference of Europe. 

The beginnings of the Macedonian question in its modern form do not gofarther back than 1885, when the ease with which eastern Rumelia (i. E. Southern Bulgaria) threw off the Turkish yoke and was spontaneously unitedwith the semi-independent principality of northern Bulgaria affected theimagination of the Balkan statesmen. From that time Sofia began to castlonging eyes on Macedonia, the whole of which was claimed as 'unredeemedBulgaria', and Stambulóv's last success in 1894 was to obtain from Turkeythe consent to the establishment of two bishops of the Bulgarian(Exarchist) Church in Macedonia, which was a heavy blow for the GreekPatriarchate at Constantinople. 

Macedonia had been envisaged by the Treaty of Berlin, article 23 of whichstipulated for reforms in that province; but in those days the BalkanStates were too young and weak to worry themselves or the European powersover the troubles of their co-religionists in Turkey; their hands weremore than full setting their own houses in some sort of order, and it wasin nobody's interest to reform Macedonia, so article 23 remained theexpression of a philanthropic sentiment. This indifference on the part ofEurope left the door open for the Balkan States, as soon as they hadenergy to spare, to initiate their campaign for extending their spheres ofinfluence in Macedonia. 

From 1894 onwards Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia increased, and theBulgarians were soon followed by Greeks and Serbians. The reason for thispassionate pegging out of claims and the bitter rivalry of the threenations which it engendered was the following: The population of Macedoniawas nowhere, except in the immediate vicinity of the borders of thesethree countries, either purely Bulgar or purely Greek or purely Serb; mostof the towns contained a percentage of at least two of thesenationalities, not to mention the Turks (who after all were still theowners of the country by right of conquest), Albanians, Tartars, Rumanians(Vlakhs), and others; the city of Salonika was and is almost purelyJewish, while in the country districts Turkish, Albanian, Greek, Bulgar, and Serb villages were inextricably confused. Generally speaking, thecoastal strip was mainly Greek (the coast itself purely so), the interiormainly Slav. The problem was for each country to peg out as large a claimas possible, and so effectively, by any means in their power, to make themajority of the population contained in that claim acknowledge itself tobe Bulgar, or Serb, or Greek, that when the agony of the Ottoman Empirewas over, each part of Macedonia would automatically fall into the arms ofits respective deliverers. The game was played through the appropriatemedia of churches and schools, for the unfortunate Macedonian peasants hadfirst of all to be enlightened as to who they were, or rather as to whothey were told they had got to consider themselves, while the Church, asalways, conveniently covered a multitude of political aims; when thosemethods flagged, a bomb would be thrown at, let us say, a Turkish officialby an _agent provocateur_ of one of the three players, inevitablyresulting in the necessary massacre of innocent Christians by theostensibly brutal but really equally innocent Turks, and an outcry in theEuropean press. 

Bulgaria was first in the field and had a considerable start of the othertwo rivals. The Bulgars claimed the whole of Macedonia, including Salonikaand all the Aegean coast (except Chalcidice), Okhrida, and Monastir;Greece claimed all southern Macedonia, and Serbia parts of northern andcentral Macedonia known as Old Serbia. The crux of the whole problem was, and is, that the claims of Serbia and Greece do not clash, while that ofBulgaria, driving a thick wedge between Greece and Serbia, and thus givingBulgaria the undoubted hegemony of the peninsula, came into irreconcilableconflict with those of its rivals. The importance of this point wasgreatly emphasized by the existence of the Nish-Salonika railway, which isSerbia's only direct outlet to the sea, and runs through Macedonia fromnorth to south, following the right or western bank of the river Vardar. Should Bulgaria straddle that, Serbia would be economically at its mercy, just as in the north it was already, to its bitter cost, at the mercy ofAustria-Hungary. Nevertheless, Bulgarian propaganda had been so effectualthat Serbia and Greece never expected they would eventually be able tojoin hands so easily and successfully as they afterwards did. 

The then unknown quantity of Albania was also a factor. This people, though small in numbers, was formidable in character, and had never beeneffectually subdued by the Turks. They would have been glad to have aboundary contiguous with that of Bulgaria (with whom they had no quarrel)as a support against their hereditary enemies, Serbs in the north andGreeks in the south, who were more than inclined to encroach on theirterritory. The population of Macedonia, being still under Turkish rule, was uneducated and ignorant; needless to say it had no nationalconsciousness, though this was less true of the Greeks than of the Slavs. It is the Slav population of Macedonia that has engendered so much heatand caused so much blood to be spilt. The dispute as to whether it israther Serb or Bulgar has caused interminable and most bitter controversy. The truth is that it _was_ neither the one nor the other, but that, theethnological and linguistic missionaries of Bulgaria having been first inthe field, a majority of the Macedonian Slavs had been so long and sopersistently told that they were Bulgars, that after a few years Bulgariacould, with some truth, claim that this fact was so. 

Macedonia had been successively under Greek, Bulgar, and Serb, beforeTurkish, rule, but the Macedonian Slavs had, under the last, been so cutoff both from Bulgars and Serbs, that ethnologically and linguisticallythey did not develop the characteristics of either of these two races, which originally belonged to the same southern Slav stock, but remained aprimitive neutral Slav type. If the Serbs had been first in the fieldinstead of the Bulgars, the Macedonian Slavs could just as easily havebeen made into Serbs, sufficiently plausibly to convince the most knowingexpert. The well-known recipe for making a Macedonian Slav village Bulgaris to add _-ov_ or _-ev_ (pronounced _-off, -yeff_) on to the names of allthe male inhabitants, and to make it Serb it is only necessary to addfurther the syllable _-ich, -ov_ and _-ovich_ being respectively theequivalent in Bulgarian and Serbian of our termination _-son, _ e. G. _Ivanov_ in Bulgarian, and _Jovanovit_ in Serbian = _Johnson_. 

In addition to these three nations Rumania also entered the lists, suddenly horrified at discovering the sad plight of the Vlakh shepherds, who had probably wandered with unconcern about Macedonia with their herdssince Roman times. As their vague pastures could not possibly ever beannexed to Rumania, their case was merely used in order to justify Rumaniain claiming eventual territorial compensation elsewhere at the final dayof reckoning. Meanwhile, their existence as a separate and authenticnationality in Turkey was officially recognized by the Porte in 1906. 

The stages of the Macedonian question up to 1908 must at this point bequite briefly enumerated. Russia and Austria-Hungary, the two 'mostinterested powers', who as far back as the eighteenth century had dividedthe Balkans into their respective spheres of interest, east and west, cameto an agreement in 1897 regarding the final settlement of affairs inTurkey; but it never reached a conclusive stage and consequently was neverapplied. The Macedonian chaos meanwhile grew steadily worse, and theserious insurrections of 1902-3, followed by the customary reprisals, thoroughly alarmed the powers. Hilmi Pasha had been appointedInspector-General of Macedonia in December 1902, but was not successful inrestoring order. In October 1903 the Emperor Nicholas II and the Emperorof Austria, with their foreign ministers, met at Mürzsteg, in Styria, andelaborated a more definite plan of reform known as the Mürzsteg programme, the drastic terms of which had been largely inspired by Lord Lansdowne, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the principal featurewas the institution of an international gendarmerie, the whole ofMacedonia being divided up into five districts to be apportioned among theseveral great powers. Owing to the procrastination of the Porte and to theextreme complexity of the financial measures which had to be elaborated inconnexion with this scheme of reforms, the last of the negotiations wasnot completed, nor the whole series ratified, until April 1907, though thegendarmerie officers had arrived in Macedonia in February 1904. 

At this point again it is necessary to recall the position in regard tothis question of the various nations concerned. Great Britain and Francehad no territorial stake in Turkey proper, and did their utmost to securereform not only in the _vilayets_ of Macedonia, but also in the realm ofOttoman finance. Italy's interest centred in Albania, whose eventual fate, for geographical and strategic reasons, could not leave it indifferent. Austria-Hungary's only care was by any means to prevent the aggrandizementof the Serb nationality and of Serbia and Montenegro, so as to secure thecontrol, if not the possession, of the routes to Salonika, if necessaryover the prostrate bodies of those two countries which defiantly barredGermanic progress towards the East. Russia was already fatally absorbed inthe Far Eastern adventure, and, moreover, had, ever since the war of 1878, been losing influence at Constantinople, where before its word had beenlaw; the Treaty of Berlin had dealt a blow at Russian prestige, and Russiahad ever since that date been singularly badly served by its ambassadorsto the Porte, who were always either too old or too easy-going. Germany, on the other hand, had been exceptionally fortunate or prudent in thechoice of its representatives. The general trend of German diplomacy inTurkey was not grasped until very much later, a fact which redounds to thecredit of the German ambassadors at Constantinople. Ever since thetriumphal journey of William II to the Bosphorus in 1889, Germaninfluence, under the able guidance of Baron von Radowitz, steadilyincreased. This culminated in the régime of the late Baron Marschall vonBieberstein, who was ambassador from 1897 to 1912. It was German policy toflatter, support, and encourage Turkey in every possible way, to refrainfrom taking part with the other powers in the invidious and perennialoccupation of pressing reforms on Abdul Hamid, and, above all, to give asmuch pocket-money to Turkey and its extravagant ruler as they asked for. Germany, for instance, refused to send officers or to have a districtassigned it in Macedonia in 1904, and declined to take part in the navaldemonstration off Mitylene in 1905. This attitude of Germany naturallyencouraged the Porte in its policy of delay and subterfuge, and Turkeysoon came to look on Germany as its only strong, sincere, anddisinterested friend in Europe. For the indefinite continuance of chaosand bloodshed in Macedonia, after the other powers had really bracedthemselves to the thankless task of putting the reforms into practice, Germany alone was responsible. 

The blow which King Ferdinand had inflicted on the prestige of the YoungTurks in October 1908, by proclaiming his independence, naturally lentlustre to the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia. Serbia, baffled by thesimultaneous Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and maddenedby the elevation of Bulgaria to the rank of a kingdom (its materialprogress had hitherto been discounted in Serbian eyes by the fact that itwas a mere vassal principality), seemed about to be crushed by the twoiron pots jostling it on either side. Its international position was atthat time such that it could expect no help or encouragement from westernEurope, while the events of 1909 (cf. P. 144) showed that Russia was notthen in a position to render active assistance. Greece, also screamingaloud for compensation, was told by its friends amongst the great powersthat if it made a noise it would get nothing, but that if it behaved likea good child it might some day be given Krete. Meanwhile Russia, rudelyawakened by the events of 1908 to the real state of affairs in the NearEast, beginning to realize the growth of German influence atConstantinople, and seeing the unmistakable resuscitation ofAustria-Hungary as a great power, made manifest by the annexation ofBosnia and Hercegovina, temporarily reasserted its influence in Bulgaria. From the moment when Baron Aehrenthal announced his chimerical scheme ofan Austrian railway through the _Sandjak_ of Novi Pazar in January 1908--everybody knows that the railway already built through Serbia along theMorava valley is the only commercially remunerative and strategicallypracticable road from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest to Salonika andConstantinople--Russia realized that the days of the Mürzsteg programmewere over, that henceforward it was to be a struggle between Slav andTeuton for the ownership of Constantinople and the dominion of the NearEast, and that something must be done to retrieve the position in theBalkans which it was losing. After Baron Aehrenthal, in January 1909, hadmollified the Young Turks by an indemnity, and thus put an end to theboycott, Russia in February of the same year liquidated the remains of theold Turkish war indemnity of 1878 still due to itself by skilfullyarranging that Bulgaria should pay off its capitalized tribute, owed toits ex-suzerain the Sultan, by very easy instalments to Russia instead. 

The immediate effects of the Young Turk revolution amongst the BalkanStates, and the events, watched benevolently by Russia, which led to theformation of the Balkan League, when it was joyfully realized that neitherthe setting-up of parliamentary government, nor even the overthrow ofAbdul Hamid, implied the commencement of the millennium in Macedonia andThrace, have been described elsewhere (pp. 141, 148). King Ferdinand andM. Venezelos are generally credited with the inception and realisation ofthe League, though it was so secretly and skilfully concerted that it isnot yet possible correctly to apportion praise for the remarkableachievement. Bulgaria is a very democratic country, but King Ferdinand, owing to his sagacity, patience, and experience, and also thanks to hisinfluential dynastic connexions and propensity for travel, has always beenvirtually his own foreign minister; in spite of the fact that he is alarge feudal Hungarian landlord, and has temperamental leanings towardsthe Central European Empires, it is quite credible that King Ferdinanddevoted all his undeniable talents and great energy to the formation ofthe League when he saw that the moment had come for Bulgaria to realizeits destiny at Turkey's expense, and that, if the other three BalkanStates could be induced to come to the same wise decision, it would be somuch the better for all of them. That Russia could do anything else thanwhole-heartedly welcome the formation of the Balkan League was absolutelyimpossible. Pan-Slavism had long since ceased to be the force it was, andnobody in Russia dreamed of or desired the incorporation of any Balkanterritory in the Russian Empire. It is possible to control Constantinoplewithout possessing the Balkans, and Russia could only rejoice if aGreco-Slavonic league should destroy the power of the Turks and therebymake impossible the further advance of the Germanic powers eastward. 

That Russia was ever in the least jealous of the military successes of theleague, which caused such gnashing of teeth in Berlin, Vienna, andBudapest, is a mischievous fiction, the emptiness of which was evident toany one who happened to be in Russia during the winter of 1912-13. 

The years 1908 to 1912 were outwardly uneventful in Bulgaria, though agreat deal of quiet work was done in increasing the efficiency of thearmy, and the material prosperity of the country showed no falling off. Relations with the other Balkan States, especially with Serbia andMontenegro, improved considerably, and there was ample room for suchimprovement. This was outwardly marked by frequent visits paid to eachother by members of the several royal families of the three Slavonickingdoms of the Balkans. In May 1912 agreements for the eventualdelimitation of the provinces to be conquered from Turkey in the event ofwar were signed between Bulgaria and Serbia, and Bulgaria and Greece. Themost controversial district was, of course, Macedonia. Bulgaria claimedcentral Macedonia, with Monastir and Okhrida, which was the lion's share, on ethnical grounds which have been already discussed, and it was expectedthat Greece and Serbia, by obtaining other acquisitions elsewhere, wouldconsent to have their territories separated by the large Bulgarian wedgewhich was to be driven between them. The exact future line of demarcationbetween Serbian and Bulgarian territory was to be left to arbitration. Thepossible creation of an independent Albania was not contemplated. 

In August 1912 the twenty-fifth anniversary of King Ferdinand's arrival inBulgaria was celebrated with much rejoicing at the ancient capital ofTirnovo, and was marred only by the news of the terrible massacre ofBulgars by Turks at Kochana in Macedonia; this event, however, opportunethough mournful, tended considerably to increase the volume of the wave ofpatriotism which swept through the country. Later in the same month CountBerchtold startled Europe with his 'progressive decentralization' schemeof reform for Macedonia. The manner in which this event led to the finalarrangements for the declaration of war on Turkey by the four BalkanStates is given in full elsewhere (cf. P. 151). 

The Bulgarian army was fully prepared for the fray, and the autumnmanoeuvres had permitted the concentration unobserved of a considerableportion of it, ready to strike when the time came. Mobilisation wasordered on September 30, 1912. On October 8 Montenegro declared war onTurkey. On October 13 Bulgaria, with the other Balkan States, replied tothe remonstrances of Russia and Austria by declaring that its patience wasat length exhausted, and that the sword alone was able to enforce propertreatment of the Christian populations in European Turkey. On October 17Turkey, encouraged by the sudden and unexpected conclusion of peace withItaly after the Libyan war, declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia, and onOctober 18 King Ferdinand addressed a sentimental exhortation to hispeople to liberate their fellow-countrymen, who were still groaning underthe Crescent. 

The number of Turkish troops opposing the Bulgarians in Thrace was about180, 000, and they had almost exactly the same number wherewith to opposethe Serbians in Macedonia; for, although Macedonia was considered by theTurks to be the most important theatre of war, yet the proximity of theBulgarian frontier to Constantinople made it necessary to retain a largenumber of troops in Thrace. On October 19 the Bulgarians took the frontiertown of Mustafa Pasha. On October 24 they defeated the Turks atKirk-Kilissé (or Lozengrad), further east. From October 28 to November 2raged the terrific battle of Lule-Burgas, which resulted in a complete andbrilliant victory of the Bulgarians over the Turks. The defeat andhumiliation of the Turks was as rapid and thorough in Thrace as it hadbeen in Macedonia, and by the middle of November the remains of theTurkish army were entrenched behind the impregnable lines of Chataldja, while a large garrison was shut up in Adrianople, which had been investedby the end of October. The Bulgarian army, somewhat exhausted by thisbrilliant and lightning campaign, refrained from storming the lines ofChataldja, an operation which could not fail to involve losses such as theBulgarian nation was scarcely in a position to bear, and on December 3 thearmistice was signed. The negotiations conducted in London for two monthsled, however, to no result, and on February 3, 1913, hostilities wereresumed. These, for the Bulgarians, resolved themselves into the moreenergetic prosecution of the siege of Adrianople, which had not beenraised during the armistice. To their assistance Serbia, being able tospare troops from Macedonia, sent 50, 000 men and a quantity of heavy siegeartillery, an arm which the Bulgarians lacked. On March 26, 1913, thefortress surrendered to the allied armies. 

The Conference of London, which took place during the spring of that year, fixed the new Turco-Bulgarian boundary by drawing the famous Enos-Midialine, running between these two places situated on the shores respectivelyof the Aegean and the Black Sea. This delimitation would have givenBulgaria possession of Adrianople. But meanwhile Greece and especiallySerbia, which latter country had been compelled to withdraw from theAdriatic coast by Austria, and was further precluded from ever returningthere by the creation of the independent state of Albania, determined toretain possession of all that part of Macedonia, including the wholevalley of the Vardar with its important railway, which they had conquered, and thus secure their common frontier. In May 1913 a military conventionwas concluded between them, and the Balkan League, the relations betweenthe members of which had been becoming more strained ever since January, finally dissolved. Bulgaria, outraged by this callous disregard of theagreements as to the partition of Macedonia signed a year previously byitself and its ex-allies, did not wait for the result of the arbitrationwhich was actually proceeding in Russia, but in an access of indignationrushed to arms. 

This second Balkan war, begun by Bulgaria during the night of June 30, 1913, by a sudden attack on the Serbian army in Macedonia, resulted in itsundoing. In order to defeat the Serbs and Greeks the south-eastern andnorthern frontiers were denuded of troops. But the totally unforeseenhappened. The Serbs were victorious, defeating the Bulgars in Macedonia, the Turks, seeing Thrace empty of Bulgarian troops, re-occupiedAdrianople, and the Rumanian army, determined to see fair play before itwas too late, invaded Bulgaria from the north and marched on Sofia. By theend of July the campaign was over and Bulgaria had to submit to fate. 

By the terms of the Treaty of Bucarest, which was concluded on August 10, 1913, Bulgaria obtained a considerable part of Thrace and easternMacedonia, including a portion of the Aegean coast with the seaport ofDedeagach, but it was forced to 'compensate' Rumania with a slice of itsrichest province (the districts of Dobrich and Silistria in north-easternBulgaria), and it lost central Macedonia, a great part of which it wouldcertainly have been awarded by Russia's arbitration. On September 22, 1913, the Treaty of Constantinople was signed by Bulgaria and Turkey; byits terms Turkey retained possession of Adrianople and of a far largerpart of Thrace than its series of ignominious defeats in the autumn of1912 entitled it to. 

In the fatal quarrel between Bulgaria and Serbia which caused thedisruption of the Balkan League, led to the tragic second Balkan war ofJuly 1913, and naturally left behind the bitterest feelings, it isdifficult to apportion the blame. Both Serbia and Bulgaria wereundoubtedly at fault in the choice of the methods by which they sought toadjust their difference, but the real guilt is to be found neither inSofia nor in Belgrade, but in Vicuna and Budapest. The Balkan Leaguebarred the way of the Germanic Powers to the East; its disruption weakenedBulgaria and again placed Serbia at the mercy of the Dual Monarchy. Afterthese trying and unremunerative experiences it is not astonishing that theBulgarian people and its ambitious ruler should have retired to the remoteinterior of their shell. 

 * * * * *

_Explanation of Serbian orthography_

c = ts[)c] = ch (as in _church_)['c] = " " " but softer[)s] = sh[)z] = zh (as z in _azure_)gj = g (as in _George_)j = y

[Illustration: THE BALKAN PENINSULA]

SERBIA

14

_The Serbs under Foreign Supremacy_, 650-1168

The manner of the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula, of that ofthe Bulgars, and of the formation of the Bulgarian nationality has alreadybeen described (cf. P. 26). The installation of the Slavs in the landsbetween the Danube, the Aegean, and the Adriatic was completed by aboutA. D. 650. In the second half of the seventh century the Bulgars settledthemselves in the eastern half of the peninsula and became absorbed by theSlavs there, and from that time the nationality of the Slavs in thewestern half began to be more clearly defined. These latter, split up intoa number of tribes, gradually grouped themselves into three main divisions:Serbs (or Serbians), Croats (or Croatians), and Slovenes. The Serbs, muchthe most numerous of the three, occupied roughly the modern kingdom ofSerbia (including Old Serbia and northern Macedonia), Montenegro, and mostof Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Dalmatia; the Croats occupied the more westernparts of these last three territories and Croatia; the Slovenes occupiedthe modern Carniola and southern Carinthia. Needless to say, none of thesegeographical designations existed in those days except Dalmatia, on thecoast of which the Latin influence and nomenclature maintained itself. TheSlovenes, whose language is closely akin to but not identical with Serbian(or Croatian), even to-day only number one and a half million, and do notenter into this narrative, as they have never played any political rôle inthe Balkan peninsula. 

The Serbs and the Croats were, as regards race and language, originallyone people, the two names having merely geographical signification. Incourse of time, for various reasons connected with religion and politics, the distinction was emphasized, and from a historical point of view theSerbo-Croatian race has always been divided into two. It is only withinthe last few years that a movement has taken place, the object of which isto reunite Serbs and Croats into one nation and eventually into one state. The movement originated in Serbia, the Serbs maintaining that they and theCroats are one people because they speak the same language, and thatracial and linguistic unity outweighs religious divergence. A very largenumber of Croats agree with the Serbs in this and support their views, buta minority for long obstinately insisted that there was a racial as wellas a religious difference, and that fusion was impossible. The formerbased their argument on facts, the latter theirs on prejudice, which isnotoriously difficult to overcome. Latterly the movement in favour offusion grew very much stronger among the Croats, and together with that inSerbia resulted in the Pan-Serb agitation which, gave the pretext for theopening of hostilities in July 1914. 

The designation Southern Slav (or Jugo-Slav, _jug_, pronounced yug, =_south_ in Serbian) covers Serbs and Croats, and also includes Slovenes;it is only used with reference to the Bulgarians from the point of view ofphilology (the group of South Slavonic languages including Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovene; the East Slavonic, Russian; and the WestSlavonic, Polish and Bohemian). 

In the history of the Serbs and Croats, or of the Serbo-Croatian race, several factors of a general nature have first to be considered, whichhave influenced its whole development. Of these, the physical nature ofthe country in which they settled, between the Danube and Save and theAdriatic, is one of the most important. It is almost everywheremountainous, and though the mountains themselves never attain as much as10, 000 feet in height, yet they cover the whole country with an intricatenetwork and have always formed an obstacle to easy communication betweenthe various parts of it. The result of this has been twofold. In the firstplace it has, generally speaking, been a protection against foreignpenetration and conquest, and in so far was beneficial. Bulgaria, furthereast, is, on the whole, less mountainous, in spite of the Balkan rangewhich stretches the whole length of it; for this reason, and also onaccount of its geographical position, any invaders coming from the northor north-east, especially if aiming at Constantinople or Salonika, werebound to sweep over it. The great immemorial highway from the north-westto the Balkan peninsula crosses the Danube at Belgrade and follows thevalley of the Morava to Nish; thence it branches off eastwards, goingthrough Sofia and again crossing all Bulgaria to reach Constantinople, while the route to Salonika follows the Morava southwards from Nish andcrosses the watershed into the valley of the Vardar, which flows into theAegean. But even this road, following the course of the rivers Morava andVardar, only went through the fringe of Serb territory, and left untouchedthe vast mountain region between the Morava and the Adriatic, which isreally the home of the Serb race. 

In the second place, while it has undoubtedly been a protection to theSerb race, it has also been a source of weakness. It has prevented awelding together of the people into one whole, has facilitated the rise ofnumerous political units at various times, and generally favoured thedissipation of the national strength, and militated against nationalorganization and cohesion. In the course of history this process has beenemphasized rather than diminished, and to-day the Serb race is split upinto six political divisions, while Bulgaria, except for those Bulgarsclaimed as 'unredeemed' beyond the frontier, presents a united whole. Itis only within the last thirty years, with the gradual improvement ofcommunications (obstructed to an incredible extent by the Austro-Hungariangovernment) and the spread of education, that the Serbs in the differentcountries which they inhabit have become fully conscious of theiressential identity and racial unity. 

No less important than the physical aspect of their country on thedevelopment of the Serbs has been the fact that right through the middleof it from south to north there had been drawn a line of division morethan two centuries before their arrival. Artificial boundaries areproverbially ephemeral, but this one has lasted throughout the centuries, and it has been baneful to the Serbs. This dividing line, drawn first bythe Emperor Diocletian, has been described on p. 14; at the division ofthe Roman Empire into East and West it was again followed, and it formedthe boundary between the dioceses of Italy and Dacia; the line is roughlythe same as the present political boundary between Montenegro andHercegovina, between the kingdom of Serbia and Bosnia; it stretched fromthe Adriatic to the river Save right across the Serb territory. TheSerbo-Croatian race unwittingly occupied a country that was cut in two bythe line that divides East from West, and separates Constantinople and theEastern Church from Rome and the Western. This curious accident has hadconsequences fatal to the unity of the race, since it has played into thehands of ambitious and unscrupulous neighbours. As to the extent of thecountry occupied by the Serbs at the beginning of their history it isdifficult to be accurate. 

The boundary between the Serbs in the west of the peninsula and theBulgars in the east has always been a matter of dispute. The presentpolitical frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria, starting in the north fromthe mouth of the river Timok on the southern bank of the Danube and goingsouthwards slightly east of Pirot, is ethnographically approximatelycorrect till it reaches the newly acquired and much-disputed territoriesin Macedonia, and represents fairly accurately the line that has dividedthe two nationalities ever since they were first differentiated in theseventh century. In the confused state of Balkan politics in the MiddleAges the political influence of Bulgaria often extended west of this lineand included Nish and the Morava valley, while at other times that ofSerbia extended east of it. The dialects spoken in these frontierdistricts represent a transitional stage between the two languages; eachof the two peoples naturally considers them more akin to its own, andresents the fact that any of them should be included in the territory ofthe other. Further south, in Macedonia, conditions are similar. Before theTurkish conquest Macedonia had been sometimes under Bulgarian rule, as inthe times of Simeon, Samuel, and John Asen II, sometimes under Serbian, especially during the height of Serbian power in the fourteenth century, while intermittently it had been a province of the Greek Empire, whichalways claimed it as its own. On historical grounds, therefore, each ofthe three nations can claim possession of Macedonia. From an ethnographicpoint of view the Slav population of Macedonia (there were always and arestill many non-Slav elements) was originally the same as that in the otherparts of the peninsula, and probably more akin to the Serbs, who are pureSlavs, than to the Slavs of Bulgaria, who coalesced with their Asiaticconquerors. In course of time, however, Bulgarian influences, owing to theseveral periods when the Bulgars ruled the country, began to make headway. The Albanians also (an Indo-European or Aryan race, but not of the Greek, Latin, or Slav families), who, as a result of all the invasions of theBalkan peninsula, had been driven southwards into the inaccessiblemountainous country now known as Albania, began to spread northwards andeastwards again during the Turkish dominion, pushing back the Serbs fromthe territory where they had long been settled. During the Turkishdominion neither Serb nor Bulgar had any influence in Macedonia, and theMacedonian Slavs, who had first of all been pure Slavs, like the Serbs, then been several times under Bulgar, and finally, under Serb influence, were left to themselves, and the process of differentiation between Serband Bulgar in Macedonia, by which in time the Macedonian Slavs would havebecome either Serbs or Bulgars, ceased. The further development of theMacedonian question is treated elsewhere (cf. Chap. 13). 

The Serbs, who had no permanent or well-defined frontier in the east, where their neighbours were the Bulgars, or in the south, where they werethe Greeks and Albanians, were protected on the north by the river Saveand on the west by the Adriatic. They were split up into a number oftribes, each of which was headed by a chief called in Serbian _[)z]upan_and in Greek _arch[=o]n_. Whenever any one of these managed, either byskill or by good fortune, to extend his power over a few of theneighbouring districts he was termed _veliki_ (=great) _[)z]upan_. Fromthe beginning of their history, which is roughly put at A. D. 650, untilA. D. 1196, the Serbs were under foreign domination. Their suzerains werenominally always the Greek emperors, who had 'granted' them the land theyhad taken, and whenever the emperor happened to be energetic and powerful, as were Basil I (the Macedonian, 867-86), John Tzimisces (969-76), BasilII (976-1025), and Manuel Comnenus (1143-80), the Greek supremacy was veryreal. At those times again when Bulgaria was very powerful, under Simeon(893-927), Samuel (977-1014), and John Asen II (1218-41), many of the moreeasterly and southerly Serbs came under Bulgarian rule, though it isinstructive to notice that the Serbs themselves do not recognize the WestBulgarian or Macedonian kingdom of Samuel to have been a Bulgarian state. The Bulgars, however, at no time brought all the Serb lands under theirsway. 

Intermittently, whenever the power of Byzantium or of Bulgaria waned, someSerb princeling would try to form a political state on a more ambitiousscale, but the fabric always collapsed at his death, and the Serbsreverted to their favourite occupation of quarrelling amongst themselves. Such wore the attempts of [)C]aslav, who had been made captive by Simeonof Bulgaria, escaped after his death, and ruled over a large part ofcentral Serbia till 960, and later of Bodin, whose father, Michael, waseven recognized as king by Pope Gregory VII; Bodin formed a state near thecoast, in the Zeta river district (now Montenegro), and ruled there from1081 to 1101. But as a rule the whole of the country peopled by the Serbswas split into a number of tiny principalities always at war with oneanother. Generally speaking, this country gradually became divided intotwo main geographical divisions: (1) the _Pomorje_, or country _by thesea_, which included most of the modern Montenegro and the southern halvesof Hercegovina and Dalmatia, and (2) the _Zagorje_, or country _behind thehills_, which included most of the modern Bosnia, the western half of themodern kingdom of Serbia, and the northern portions of Montenegro andHercegovina, covering all the country between the _Pomorje_ and the Save;to the north of the _Pomorje_ and _Zagorje_ lay Croatia. Besides theirneighbours in the east and south, those in the north and west played animportant part in Serbian history even in those early days. 

Towards the end of the eighth century, after the decline of the power ofthe Avars, Charlemagne extended his conquests eastwards (he made a greatimpression on the minds of the Slavs, whose word for king, _kral_ or_korol_, is derived directly from his name), and his son Louis conqueredthe Serbs settled in the country between the rivers Save and Drave. Thisis commemorated in the name of the mass of hill which lies between theDanube and the Save, in eastern Slavonia, and is to this day known as_Fru[)s]ka Gora_, or French Hill. The Serbs and Bulgars fought against theFranks, and while the Bulgars held their own, the Serbs were beaten, andthose who did not like the rule of the new-comers had to migratesouthwards across the Save; at the same time the Serbs between the riversMorava and Timok (eastern Serbia) were subjected by the Bulgars. With thearrival of the Magyars, in the ninth century, a wall was raised betweenthe Serbs and central and western Europe on land. Croatia and Slavonia(between the Save and the Drave) were gradually drawn into the orbit ofthe Hungarian state, and in 1102, on the death of its own ruler, Croatiawas absorbed by Hungary and has formed part of that country ever since. Hungary, aiming at an outlet on the Adriatic, at the same time subjectedmost of Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia. In the west Venice had been steadilygrowing in power throughout the tenth century, and by the end of it hadsecured control of all the islands off Dalmatia and of a considerable partof the coast. All the cities on the mainland acknowledged the supremacy ofVenice and she was mistress of the Adriatic. 

In the interior of the Serb territory, during the eleventh and twelfthcenturies, three political centres came into prominence and shapedthemselves into larger territorial units. These were: (1) Raska, which hadbeen Caslav's centre and is considered the birth-place of the Serbianstate (this district, with the town of Ras as its centre, included thesouth-western part of the modern kingdom of Serbia and what was theTurkish _sandjak_ or province of Novi-Pazar); (2) Zeta, on the coast (themodern Montenegro); and (3) Bosnia, so called after the river Bosna, whichruns through it. Bosnia, which roughly corresponded to the modern provinceof that name, became independent in the second half of the tenth century, and was never after that incorporated in the Serbian state. At times itfell under Hungarian influence; in the twelfth century, during the reignof Manuel Comnenus, who was victorious over the Magyars, Bosnia, like allother Serb territories, had to acknowledge the supremacy ofConstantinople. 

It has already been indicated that the Serbs and Croats occupied territorywhich, while the Church was still one, was divided between two dioceses, Italy and Dacia, and when the Church itself was divided, in the eleventhcentury, was torn apart between the two beliefs. The dividing line betweenthe jurisdictions of Rome and Constantinople ran from north to souththrough Bosnia, but naturally there has always been a certain vaguenessabout the extent of their respective jurisdictions. In later years theterms Croat and Roman Catholic on the one hand, and Serb and Orthodox onthe other, became interchangeable. Hercegovina and eastern Bosnia havealways been predominantly Orthodox, Dalmatia and western Bosniapredominantly Roman Catholic. The loyalty of the Croatians toAustria-Hungary has been largely owing to the influence of RomanCatholicism. 

During the first centuries of Serbian history Christianity made slowprogress in the western half of the Balkan peninsula. The Dalmatian coastwas always under the influence of Rome, but the interior was long pagan. It is doubtful whether the brothers Cyril and Methodius (cf. Chap. 5)actually passed through Serb territory, but in the tenth century theirteachings and writings were certainly current there. At the time of thedivision of the Churches all the Serb lands except the Dalmatian coast, Croatia, and western Bosnia, were faithful to Constantinople, and theGreek hierarchy obtained complete control of the ecclesiasticaladministration. The elaborate organisation and opulent character of theEastern Church was, however, especially in the hands of the Greeks, notcongenial to the Serbs, and during the eleventh and twelfth centuries theBogomil heresy (cf. Chap, 6), a much more primitive and democratic form ofChristianity, already familiar in the East as the Manichaean heresy, tookhold of the Serbs' imagination and made as rapid and disquieting progressin their country as it had already done in the neighbouring Bulgaria;inasmuch as the Greek hierarchy considered this teaching to besocialistic, subversive, and highly dangerous to the ecclesiasticalsupremacy of Constantinople, all of which indeed it was, adherence to itbecame amongst the Serbs a direct expression of patriotism. 

15

_The Rise and Fall of the Serbian Empire and the Extinction of SerbianIndependence_, 1168-1496

From 1168 the power of the Serbs, or rather of the central Serb state ofRaska, and the extent of its territory gradually but steadily increased. This was outwardly expressed in the firm establishment on the throne ofthe national Nemanja dynasty, which can claim the credit of having by itsenergy, skill, and good fortune fashioned the most imposing and formidablestate the Serb race has ever known. This dynasty ruled the countryuninterruptedly, but not without many quarrels, feuds, and rivalriesamongst its various members, from 1168 until 1371, when it became extinct. 

There were several external factors which at this time favoured the riseof the Serbian state. Byzantium and the Greek Empire, to which the EmperorManuel Comnenus had by 1168 restored some measure of its former greatnessand splendour, regaining temporary control, after a long war with Hungary, even over Dalmatia, Croatia, and Bosnia, after this date begandefinitively to decline, and after the troublous times of the fourthcrusade (1204), when for sixty years a Latin empire was established on theBosphorus, never again recovered as a Christian state the position in theBalkan peninsula which it had so long enjoyed. Bulgaria, too, after themeteoric glory of its second empire under the Asen dynasty (1186-1258), quite went to pieces, the eastern and northern parts falling under Tartar, the southern under Greek influence, while the western districts fell toSerbia. In the north, on the other hand, Hungary was becoming a dangerousand ambitious neighbour. During the thirteenth century, it is true, theattention of the Magyars was diverted by the irruption into anddevastation of their country by their unwelcome kinsmen from Asia, theTartars, who wrought great havoc and even penetrated as far as theAdriatic coast. Nevertheless Hungary was always a menace to Serbia;Croatia, Slavonia, and the interior of Dalmatia, all purely Serbterritories, belonged to the Hungarian crown, and Bosnia was under thesupremacy of the Magyars, though nominally independent. 

The objects of the Magyars were twofold--to attain the hegemony of theBalkan peninsula by conquering all the still independent Serb territories, and to bring the peninsula within the pale of Rome. They were notsuccessful in either of these objects, partly because their wars with theSerbian rulers always failed to reach a decision, partly because theirplans conflicted with those of the powerful Venetian republic. Therelations between Venice and Serbia were always most cordial, as theirambitions did not clash; those of Venice were not continental, while thoseof Serbia were never maritime. The semi-independent Slavonic city-republicof Ragusa (called Dubrovnik in Serbian) played a very important partthroughout this period. It was under Venetian supremacy, but wasself-governing and had a large fleet of its own. It was the great place ofexchange between Serbia and western Europe, and was really themeeting-place of East and West. Its relations with Serbia were by no meansalways peaceful; it was a Naboth's vineyard for the rulers and people ofthe inland kingdom, and it was never incorporated within their dominions. Ragusa and the other cities of the Dalmatian coast were the home duringthe Middle Ages of a flourishing school of Serbian literature, which wasinspired by that of Italy. The influence of Italian civilization and ofthe Italian Church was naturally strong in the Serb province, much ofwhich was under Venetian rule; the reason for this was that communicationby sea with Italy was easier and safer than that by land with Serbia. Thelong, formidable ranges of limestone mountains which divide the Serbianinterior from the Adriatic in almost unbroken and parallel lines havealways been a barrier to the extension of Serb power to the coast, and anobstacle to free commercial intercourse. Nevertheless Ragusa was a greattrade centre, and one of the factors which most contributed to theeconomic strength of the Serbian Empire. 

The first of the Nemanja dynasty was Stephen, whose title was still only_Veliki ['Z]upan_; he extended Serb territory southwards at the expense ofthe Greeks, especially after the death of Manuel Comnenus in 1180. He alsopersecuted the Bogomils, who took refuge in large numbers in the adjacentSerb state of Bosnia. Like many other Serbian rulers, he abdicated inlater life in favour of his younger son, Stephen, called Nemanjié (=Nemanya's son), and himself became a monk (1196), travelling for thispurpose to Mount Athos, the great monastic centre and home of theologicallearning of the Eastern Church. There he saw his youngest son, who someyears previously had also journeyed thither and entered a monastery, taking the name of Sava. 

It was the custom for every Serbian ruler to found a sort of memorialchurch, for the welfare of his own soul, before his death, and to decorateand endow it lavishly. Stephen and his son together superintended theerection in this sense of the church and monastery of Hilandar on MountAthos, which became a famous centre of Serbian church life. Stephen diedshortly after the completion of the building in 1199, and was buried init, but in 1207 he was reinterred in the monastery of Studenica, inSerbia, also founded by him. 

The reign of Stephen Nernanji['c] (1196-1223) opened with a quarrelbetween him and his elder brother, who not unnaturally felt he ought tohave succeeded his father; the Bulgarians profited by this and seized alarge part of eastern Serbia, including Belgrade, Nish, Prizren, andSkoplje. This, together with the fall of Constantinople and theestablishment of the Latin Empire in 1204, alarmed the Serbs and broughtabout a reconciliation between the brothers, and in 1207 Sava returned toSerbia to organise the Church on national lines. In 1219 he journeyed toNicaea and extracted from the Emperor Theodore Lascaris, who had fallen onevil days, the concession for the establishment of an autonomous nationalSerbian Church, independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Savahimself was at the head of the new institution. In 1220 he solemnlycrowned his brother King _(Kralj)_ of Serbia, the natural consequence ofhis activities in the previous year. For this reason Stephen Nemanji['c]is called 'The First-Crowned'. He was succeeded in 1223 by his son StephenRadoslav, and he in turn was deposed by his brother Stephen Vladislav in1233. Both these were crowned by Sava, and Vladislav married the daughterof Tsar John Asen II, under whom Bulgaria was then at the height of herpower. Sava journeyed to Palestine, and on his return paid a visit to theBulgarian court at Tirnovo, where he died in 1236. His body was brought toSerbia and buried in the monastery of Mile[)s]evo, built by Vladislav. This extremely able churchman and politician, who did a great deal for thepeaceful development of his country, was canonized and is regarded as thepatron saint of Serbia. 

The reign of Vladislav's son and successor, Stephen Uro[)s] I (1242-76), was characterized by economic development and the strengthening of theinternal administration. In external affairs he made no conquests, butdefeated a combination of the Bulgarians with Ragusa against him, andafter the war the Bulgarian ruler married his daughter. In his warsagainst Hungary he was unsuccessful, and the Magyars remained inpossession of a large part of northern Serbia. In 1276 he was deposed byhis son, Stephen Dragutin, who in his turn, after an unsuccessful waragainst the Greeks, again masters of Constantinople since 1261, wasdeposed and succeeded by his brother, Stephen Uro[)s] II, named Milutin, in 1282. This king ruled from 1282 till 1321, and during his reign thecountry made very great material progress; its mineral wealth especially, which included gold and silver mines, began to be exploited. He extendedthe boundaries of his kingdom in the north, making the Danube and the Savethe frontier. The usual revolt against paternal authority was made by hisson Stephen, but was unsuccessful, and the rebel was banished toConstantinople. 

It was the custom of the Serbian kings to give appanages to their sons, and the inevitable consequence of this system was the series of provincialrebellions which occurred in almost every reign. When the revoltsucceeded, the father (or brother) was granted in his turn a smallappanage. In this case it was the son who was exiled, but he was recalledin 1319 and a reconciliation took place. Milutin died in 1321 and wassucceeded by his son, Stephen Uro[)s] III, who reigned till 1331. He isknown as Stephen De[)c]anski, after the memorial church which he built atDe[)c]ani in western Serbia. His reign was signalized by a great defeat ofthe combined Bulgarians and Greeks at Kustendil in Macedonia in 1330. Thefollowing year his son, Stephen Du[)s]an, rebelled against him and deposedhim. Stephen Du[)s]an, who reigned from 1331 till 1355, was Serbia'sgreatest ruler, and under him the country reached its utmost limits. Provincial and family revolts and petty local disputes with such places asRagusa became a thing of the past, and he undertook conquest on a grandscale. Between 1331 and 1344 he subjected all Macedonia, Albania, Thessaly, and Epirus. He was careful to keep on good terms with Ragusa andwith Hungary, then under Charles Robert. He married the sister of theBulgarian ruler, and during his reign Bulgaria was completely underSerbian supremacy. The anarchy and civil war which had become perennial atConstantinople, and the weakening of the Greek Empire in face of thegrowing power of the Turks, no doubt to some extent explain the facilityand rapidity of his conquests; nevertheless his power was very formidable, and his success inspired considerable alarm in western Europe. This wasincreased when, in 1345, he proclaimed his country an empire. He firstcalled together a special Church council, at which the Serbian Church, anarchbishopric, whose centre was then at Pe['c] (in Montenegro, Ipek inTurkish), was proclaimed a Patriarchate, with Archbishop Joannice asPatriarch; then this prelate, together with the Bulgarian Patriarch, Simeon, and Nicholas, Archbishop of Okhrida, crowned Stephen Tsar of theSerbs, Bulgars, and Greeks. Upon this the Patriarch of Constantinople gavehimself the vain satisfaction of anathematizing the whole of Serbia, as apunishment for this insubordination. 

In 1353 the Pope, Innocent VI, persuaded King Louis of Hungary toundertake a crusade against Serbia in the name of Catholicism, but Stephendefeated him and re-established his frontier along the Save and Danube. Later he conquered the southern half of Dalmatia, and extended his empireas far north as the river Cetina. In 1354 Stephen Du[)s]an himselfapproached the Pope, offering to acknowledge his spiritual supremacy, ifhe would support him against the Hungarians and the Turks. The Pope senthim an embassy, but eventually Stephen could not agree to the papalconditions, and concluded an alliance, of greater practical utility, withthe Venetians. In 1355, however, he suddenly died, at the age offorty-six, and thus the further development and aggrandisement of hiscountry was prematurely arrested. 

Stephen Du[)s]an made a great impression on his contemporaries, both byhis imposing personal appearance and by his undoubted wisdom and ability. He was especially a great legislator, and his remarkable code of laws, compiled in 1349 and enlarged in 1354, is, outside his own country, hisgreatest title to fame. During Stephen Du[)s]an's reign the politicalcentre of Serbia, which had for many years gradually tended to shiftsouthwards towards Macedonia, was at Skoplje (Üsküb in Turkish), which hemade his capital. Stephen Du[)s]an's empire extended from the Adriatic inthe west to the river Maritsa in the east, from the Save and Danube in thenorth to the Aegean; it included all the modern kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and most of Greece, Dalmatia as far north as theriver Cetina, as well as the fertile Morava valley, with Nish andBelgrade--the whole eastern part of Serbia, which had for long been undereither Bulgar or Magyar control. It did not include the cities of Salonikaor Ragusa, nor any considerable part of the modern kingdom of Bulgaria, nor Bosnia, Croatia, North Dalmatia, nor Slavonia (between the Save andDrave), ethnologically all purely Serb lands. From the point of view ofnationality, therefore, its boundaries were far from ideal. 

Stephen Du[)s]an was succeeded by his son, known as Tsar Uro[)s], but hewas as weak as his father had been strong. Almost as soon as he succeededto the throne, disorders, rebellions, and dissensions broke out and theempire rapidly fell to pieces. With Serbia, as with Bulgaria, the empireentirely hinged on the personality of one man, and when he was gone chaosreturned. Such an event for Serbia at this juncture was fatal, as a farmore formidable foe than the ruler's rebellious relations was advancingagainst it. The Turkish conquests were proceeding apace; they had takenGallipoli in 1354 and Demotika and Adrianople in 1361. The Serbs, who hadalready had an unsuccessful brush with the advance guard of the newinvaders near Demotika in 1351, met them again on the Maritsa river in1371, and were completely defeated. Several of the upstart princes who hadbeen pulling Stephen Du[)s]an's empire to pieces perished, and TsarUro[)s] only survived the battle of the Maritsa two months; he wasunmarried, and with him died the Nemanja dynasty and the Serbian Empire. 

After this disaster the unity of the Serbian state was completelydestroyed, and it has never since been restored in the same measure. 

That part of the country to the south of Skoplje fell completely underTurkish control; it was here that the famous national hero, MarkoKraljevi['c] (or King's son), renowned for his prowess, ruled as a vassalprince and mercenary soldier of the Turks; his father was one of the rebelprinces who fell at the battle of the river Maritsa in 1371. North ofSkoplje, Serbia, with Kru[)s]evac as a new political centre, continued tolead an independent but precarious existence, much reduced in size andglory, under a native ruler, Prince Lazar; all the conquests of StephenDu[)s]an were lost, and the important coastal province of Zeta, whichlater developed into Montenegro, had broken away and proclaimed itsautonomy directly after the death of Tsar Uro[)s]. 

In 1375 a formal reconciliation was effected with the Patriarch ofConstantinople; the ban placed on the Serbian Church in 1352 was removedand the independence of the Serbian Patriarchate of Pe['c] (Ipek)recognised. Meanwhile neither Greeks, Bulgars, nor Serbs were allowed anypeace by the Turks. 

In 1389 was fought the great battle of Kosovo Polje, or the Field ofBlackbirds, a large plain in Old Serbia, at the southern end of which isSkoplje. At this battle Serbian armies from all the Serb lands, includingBosnia, joined together in defence of their country for the last time. Theissue of the battle was for some time in doubt, but was decided by thetreachery and flight at the critical moment of one of the Serb leaders, Vuk Brankovi['c], son-in-law of Prince Lazar, with a large number oftroops. Another dramatic incident was the murder of Sultan Murad in histent by another Serbian leader, Milo[)s] Obili['c], who, accused oftreachery by his own countrymen, vowed he would prove his good faith, wentover to the Turks and, pretending to be a traitor, gained admission to theSultan's presence and proved his patriotism by killing him. The momentarydismay was put an end to by the energetic conduct of Bayezid, son ofMurad, who rallied the Turkish troops and ultimately inflicted totaldefeat on the Serbians. From the effects of this battle Serbia neverrecovered; Prince Lazar was captured and executed; his wife, PrincessMilica, had to give her daughter to Bayezid in marriage, whose son thusultimately claimed possession of Serbia by right of inheritance. PrincessMilica and her son Stephen continued to live at Kru[)s]evac, but Serbiawas already a tributary of Turkey. In the north, Hungary profited by thecourse of events and occupied Belgrade and all northern Serbia, but in1396 the Turks defeated the Magyars severely at the battle of Nikopolis, on the Danube, making the Serbs under Stephen fight on the Turkish side. Stephen also had to help Sultan Bajazet against the Tartars, and fought atthe battle of Angora, in 1402, when Tamerlane captured Bayezid. 

After Stephen returned to Serbia he made an alliance with Hungary, whichgave him back Belgrade and northern Serbia; it was at this time (1403)that Belgrade first became the capital, the political centre having in thecourse of fifty years moved from the Vardar to the Danube. The disorderswhich followed the defeat of Bayezid gave some respite to the Serbs, butSultan Murad II (1421-51) again took up arms against him, and invadedSerbia as far as Kru[)s]evac. 

At the death of Stephen (Lazarevi['c]), in 1427, he was succeeded as_Despot_ by his nephew, George Brankovi['c]; but the Sultan, claimingSerbia as his own, immediately declared war on him. The Serbian ruler hadto abandon Belgrade to the Magyars, and Nish and Kru[)s]evac to the Turks. He then built and fortified the town of Smederevo (or Semendria) lowerdown on the Danube, in 1428, and made this his capital. He gave hisdaughter in marriage to the Sultan, but in spite of this war soon brokeout again, and in 1441 the Turks were masters of nearly the whole ofSerbia. Later George Brankovi['c] made another alliance with Hungary, andin 1444, with the help of John Hunyadi, defeated the Turks and liberatedthe whole of Serbia as far as the Adriatic, though he remained a tributaryof the Sultan. The same year, however, the Magyars broke the treaty ofpeace just concluded with the Turks, and marched against them under theirPolish king, Ladislas; this ended in the disastrous battle of Varna, onthe Black Sea, where the king lost his life. In 1451 Sultan Murad II diedand was succeeded by the Sultan Mohammed. In 1453 this sultan capturedConstantinople (Adrianople had until then been the Turkish capital); in1456 his armies were besieging Belgrade, but were defeated by JohnHunyadi, who, unfortunately for the Serbs, died of the plague shortlyafterwards. George Brankovi['c] died the same year, and at his deathgeneral disorder spread over the country. The Turks profited by this, overran the whole of Serbia, and in 1459 captured Smederevo, the lastSerbian stronghold. 

Meanwhile Bosnia had been for nearly a hundred years enjoying a falsesecurity as an independent Serb kingdom. Its rulers had hitherto beenknown by the title of _Ban_, and were all vassals of the King of Hungary;but in 1377 Ban Tvrtko profited by the embarrassments of his suzerain inPoland and proclaimed himself king, the neighbouring kingdom of Serbiahaving, after 1371, ceased to exist, and was duly crowned in Saint Sava'smonastery of Mile[)s]evo. The internal history of the kingdom was evenmore turbulent than had been that of Serbia. To the endemic troubles ofsuccession and alternating alliances and wars with foreign powers wereadded those of confession. Bosnia was always a no man's land as regardsreligion; it was where the Eastern and Western Churches met, andconsequently the rivalry between them there was always, as it is now, intense and bitter. The Bogomil heresy, too, early took root in Bosnia andbecame extremely popular; it was the obvious refuge for those who did notcare to become involved in the strife of the Churches. One of the kings ofBosnia, Stephen Thomas, who reigned from 1444 till 1461, was himself aBogomil, and when at the insistence of the Pope and of the King ofHungary, whose friendship he was anxious to retain, he renounced hisheresy, became ostensibly a Roman Catholic, and began to persecute theBogomils, he brought about a revolution. The rebels fled to the south ofBosnia, to the lands of one Stephen, who sheltered them, proclaimed hisindependence of Bosnia, and on the strength of the fact that Saint Sava'smonastery of Mile[)s]evo was in his territory, announced himself Herzog, or Duke (in Serbian Herceg, though the real Serb equivalent is _Vojvoda_)of Saint Sava, ever since when (1448) that territory has been calledHercegovina. In spite of many promises, neither the Pope nor the King ofHungary did anything to help Bosnia when the Turks began to invade thecountry after their final subjection of Serbia in 1459. In 1463 theyinvaded Bosnia and pursued, captured, and slew the last king; theirconquest of the country was complete and rapid. A great exodus of the Serbpopulation took place to the south, west, and north; but large numbers, especially of the landowning class, embraced the faith of their conquerorsin order to retain possession of their property. In 1482 a similar fatebefell Hercegovina. Albania had already been conquered after stubbornresistance in 1478. There remained only the mountainous coastal provinceof Zeta, which had been an independent principality ever since 1371. Justas inland Serbia had perished between the Turkish hammer and the Hungariananvil, so maritime Serbia was crushed between Turkey and Venice, only itsinsignificance and inaccessibility giving it a longer lease of independentlife. Ivan Crnojevi['c], one of the last independent rulers of Zeta, whohad to fly to Italy in 1480, abandoning his capital, [)Z]abljak, to theTurks, returned in 1481, when the death of Sultan Mohammed temporarilyraised the hopes of the mountaineers, and founded Cetinje and made it hiscapital. His son George, who succeeded him and ruled from 1490 till 1496, is famous as having set up the first Serbian printing-press there. Itsactivities were naturally not encouraged by the Turkish conquest, but itwas of great importance to the national Serbian Church, for which bookswere printed with it. 

In 1496, Venice having wisely made peace with the Sultan some yearspreviously, this last independent scrap of Serb territory was finallyincorporated in the Turkish dominions. At the end of the fifteenth centurythe Turks were masters of all the Serb lands except Croatia, Slavonia, andparts of Dalmatia, which belonged to Hungary, and the Dalmatian coast andislands, which were Venetian. The Turkish conquest of Serbia, which beganin 1371 at the battle of the Maritsa, and was rendered inevitable by thebattle of Kosovo Polje, in 1389, thus took a hundred and twenty-five yearsto complete. 

16

_The Turkish Dominion_, 1496-1796

The lot of the Serbs under Turkish rule was different from that of theirneighbours the Bulgars; and though it was certainly not enviable, it wasundoubtedly better. The Turks for various reasons never succeeded insubduing Serbia and the various Serb lands as completely as they hadsubdued, or rather annihilated, Bulgaria. The Serbs were spread over a farlarger extent of territory than were the Bulgars, they were furtherremoved from the Turkish centre, and the wooded and mountainous nature oftheir country facilitated even more than in the case of Bulgaria theformation of bands of brigands and rebels and militated against itssystematic policing by the Turks. The number of centres of national life, Serbia proper, Bosnia, Hercogovina, and Montenegro, to take them in thechronological order of their conquest by the Turks, had been notoriously asource of weakness to the Serbian state, as is still the case to-day, butat the same time made it more difficult for the Turks to stamp out thenational consciousness. What still further contributed to this difficultywas the fact that many Serbs escaped the oppression of Turkish rule byemigrating to the neighbouring provinces, where they found people of theirown race and language, even though of a different faith. The tide ofemigration flowed in two directions, westwards into Dalmatia andnorthwards into Slavonia and Hungary. It had begun already after the finalsubjection of Serbia proper and Bosnia by the Turks in 1459 and 1463, butafter the fall of Belgrade, which was the outpost of Hungary against theTurks, in 1521, and the battle of Mohacs, in 1526, when the Turkscompletely defeated the Magyars, it assumed great proportions. As theTurks pushed their conquests further north, the Serbs migrated before them;later on, as the Turks receded, large Serb colonies sprang up all oversouthern Hungary, in the Banat (the country north of the Danube and eastof the Theiss), in Syrmia (or Srem, in Serbian, the extreme eastern partof Slavonia, between the Save and the Danube), in Ba[)c]ka (the countrybetween the Theiss and Danube), and in Baranya (between the Danube and theDrave). All this part of southern Hungary and Croatia was formed by theAustrians into a military borderland against Turkey, and the Croats andimmigrant Serbs were organized as military colonists with specialprivileges, on the analogy of the Cossacks in southern Russia and Poland. In Dalmatia the Serbs played a similar rôle in the service of Venice, which, like Austria-Hungary, was frequently at war with the Turks. Duringthe sixteenth century Ragusa enjoyed its greatest prosperity; it paidtribute to the Sultan, was under his protection, and never rebelled. Ithad a quasi monopoly of the trade of the entire Balkan peninsula. It was asanctuary both for Roman Catholic Croats and for Orthodox Serbs, andsometimes acted as intermediary on behalf of its co-religionists with theTurkish authorities, with whom it wielded great influence. Intellectuallyalso it was a sort of Serb oasis, and the only place during the MiddleAges where Serbian literature was able to flourish. 

Montenegro during the sixteenth century formed part of the Turkishprovince of Scutari. Here, as well as in Serbia proper, northern Macedonia(known after the removal northwards of the political centre, in thefourteenth century, as Old Serbia), Bosnia, and Hercegovina, the Turkishrule was firmest, but not harshest, during the first half of the sixteenthcentury, when the power of the Ottoman Empire was at its height. Soonafter the fall of Smederevo, in 1459, the Patriarchate of Pe['c] (Ipek)was abolished, the Serbian Church lost its independence, was merged in theGreco-Bulgar Archbishopric of Okhrida (in southern Macedonia), and fellcompletely under the control of the Greeks. In 1557, however, through theinfluence of a Grand Vizier of Serb nationality, the Patriarchate ofPe['c] was revived. The revival of this centre of national life wasmomentous; through its agency the Serbian monasteries were restored, ecclesiastical books printed, and priests educated, and more fortunatethan the Bulgarian national Church, which remained under Greek management, it was able to focus the national enthusiasms and aspirations and keepalive with hope the flame of nationality amongst those Serbs who had notemigrated. 

Already, in the second half of the sixteenth century, people began tothink that Turkey's days in Europe were numbered, and they were encouragedin this illusion by the battle of Lepanto (1571). But the seventeenthcentury saw a revival of Turkish power; Krete was added to their empire, and in 1683 they very nearly captured Vienna. In the war which followedtheir repulse, and in which the victorious Austrians penetrated as farsouth as Skoplje, the Serbs took part against the Turks; but when laterthe Austrians were obliged to retire, the Serbs, who had risen against theTurks at the bidding of their Patriarch Arsen III, had to suffer terriblereprisals at their hands, with the result that another wholesaleemigration, with the Patriarch at its head, took place into theAustro-Hungarian military borderland. This time it was the very heart ofSerbia which was abandoned, namely, Old Serbia and northern Macedonia, including Pe['c] and Prizren. The vacant Patriarchate was for a timefilled by a Greek, and the Albanians, many of whom were Mohammedans andtherefore Turcophil, spread northwards and eastwards into lands that hadbeen Serb since the seventh century. From the end of the seventeenthcentury, however, the Turkish power began unmistakably to wane. The Treatyof Carlowitz (1699) left the Turks still in possession of Syrmia (betweenthe Danube and Save) and the Banat (north of the Danube), but during thereign of the Emperor Charles VI their retreat was accelerated. In 1717Prince Eugen of Savoy captured Belgrade, then, as now, a bulwark of theBalkan peninsula against invasion from the north, and by the Treaty ofPassarowitz (Po[)z]arevac, on the Danube), in 1718, Turkey not onlyretreated definitively south of the Danube and the Save, but left a largepart of northern Serbia in Austrian hands. By the same treaty Venicesecured possession of the whole of Dalmatia, where it had already gainedterritory by the Treaty of Curlowitz in 1699. 

But the Serbs soon found out that alien populations fare little betterunder Christian rule, when they are not of the same confession as theirrulers, than under Mohammedan. The Orthodox Serbs in Dalmatia sufferedthenceforward from relentless persecution at the hands of the RomanCatholics. In Austria-Hungary too, and in that part of Serbia occupied bythe Austrians after 1718, the Serbs discovered that the Austrians, whenthey had beaten the Turks largely by the help of Serbian levies, were verydifferent from the Austrians who had encouraged the Serbs to settle intheir country and form military colonies on their frontiers to protectthem from Turkish invasion. The privileges promised them when their helphad been necessary were disregarded as soon as their services could bedispensed with. Austrian rule soon became more oppressive than Turkish, and to the Serbs' other woes was now added religious persecution. Theresult of all this was that a counter-emigration set in and the Serbsactually began to return to their old homes in Turkey. Another war betweenAustria-Hungary and Turkey broke out in 1737, in which the Austrians wereunsuccessful. Prince Eugen no longer led them, and though the Serbs wereagain persuaded by their Patriarch, Arsen IV, to rise against the Turks, they only did so half-heartedly. By the Treaty of Belgrade, in 1739, Austria had to withdraw north of the Save and Danube, evacuating allnorthern Serbia in favour of the Turks. From this time onwards the lot ofthe Serbs, both in Austria-Hungary and in Turkey, went rapidly from bad toworse. The Turks, as the power of their empire declined, and in return forthe numerous Serb revolts, had recourse to measures of severe repression;amongst others was that of the final abolition of the Patriarchate of Peéin 1766, whereupon the control of the Serbian Church in Turkey passedentirely into the hands of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople. 

The Austrian Government similarly, perceiving now for the first time theelements of danger which the resuscitation of the Serbian nationalitywould contain for the rule of the Hapsburgs, embarked on a systematicpersecution of the Orthodox Serbs in southern Hungary and Slavonia. Duringthe reign of Maria Theresa (1740-80), whose policy was to conciliate theMagyars, the military frontier zone was abolished, a series of repressivemeasures was passed against those Serbs who refused to become RomanCatholics, and the Serbian nationality was refused official recognition. The consequence of this persecution was a series of revolts which were allquelled with due severity, and finally the emigration of a hundredthousand Serbs to southern Russia, where they founded New Serbia in1752-3. 

During the reigns of Joseph II (1780-90) and Leopold II (1790-2) theirtreatment at the hands of the Magyars somewhat improved. From thebeginning of the eighteenth century Montenegro began to assume greaterimportance in the extremely gradual revival of the national spirit of theSerbs. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it had formed partof the Turkish dominions, though, thanks to the inaccessible nature of itsmountain fastnesses, Turkish authority was never very forcibly asserted. It was ruled by a prince-bishop, and its religious independence thusconnoted a certain secular freedom of thought if not of action. In theseventeenth century warlike encounters between the Turks and theMontenegrins increased in frequency, and the latter tried to enlist thehelp of Venice on their side but with indifferent success. The fighting inMontenegro was often rather civil in character, being caused by theill-feeling which existed between the numerous Montenegrins who had becomeMohammedans and those who remained faithful to their national Church. Inthe course of the eighteenth century the rôle which fell to Montenegrobecame more important. In all the other Serb countries the families whichnaturally took a leading part in affairs were either extinct or in exile, as in Serbia, or had become Mohammedan, and therefore to all intents andpurposes Turkish, as in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Ragusa, since the greatearthquake in 1667, had greatly declined in power and was no longer ofinternational importance. In Montenegro, on the other hand, there hadsurvived both a greater independence of spirit (Montenegro was, after all, the ancient Zeta, and had always been a centre of national life) and anumber of at any rate eugenic if not exactly aristocratic Serb families;these families naturally looked on themselves and on their bishop asdestined to play an important part in the resistance to and the eventualoverthrow of the Turkish dominion. The prince-bishop had to be consecratedby the Patriarch of Pe['c], and in 1700 Patriarch Arsen III consecratedone Daniel, of the house (which has been ever since then and is now stillthe reigning dynasty of Montenegro) of Petrovi['c]-Njego[)s], to thisoffice, after he had been elected to it by the council of notables atCetinje. Montenegro, isolated from the Serbs in the north, and precludedfrom participating with them in the wars between Austria and Turkey by theintervening block of Bosnia, which though Serb by nationality was solidlyMohammedan and therefore pro-Turkish, carried on its feuds with the Turksindependently of the other Serbs. But when Peter the Great initiated hisanti-Turkish policy, and, in combination with the expansion of Russia tothe south and west, began to champion the cause of the Balkan Christians, he developed intercourse with Montenegro and laid the foundation of thatfriendship between the vast Russian Empire and the tiny Serb principalityon the Adriatic which has been a quaint and persistent feature of easternEuropean politics ever since. This intimacy did not prevent the Turksgiving Montenegro many hard blows whenever they had the time or energy todo so, and did not ensure any special protective clauses in favour of themountain state whenever the various treaties between Russia and Turkeywere concluded. Its effect was rather psychological and financial. Fromthe time when the _Vladika_ (= Bishop) Daniel first visited Peter theGreat, in 1714, the rulers of Montenegro often made pilgrimages to theRussian capital, and were always sure of finding sympathy as well aspecuniary if not armed support. Bishops in the Orthodox Church arecompulsorily celibate, and the succession in Montenegro always descendedfrom uncle to nephew. When Peter I Petrovi['c]-Njego[)s] succeeded, in1782, the Patriarchate of Pe['c] was no more, so he had to get permissionfrom the Austrian Emperor Joseph II to be consecrated by the Metropolitanof Karlovci (Carlowitz), who was then head of the Serbian national Church. 

About the same time (1787) an alliance was made between Russia andAustria-Hungary to make war together on Turkey and divide the spoilsbetween them. Although a great rising against Turkey was organised at thesame time (1788) in the district of [)S]umadija, in Serbia, by a number ofSerb patriots, of whom Kara-George was one and a certain Captain Ko[)c]a, after whom the whole war is called Ko[)c]ina Krajina (=Ko[)c]a's country), another, yet the Austrians were on the whole unsuccessful, and on thedeath of Joseph II, in 1790, a peace was concluded between Austria andTurkey at Svishtov, in Bulgaria, by which Turkey retained the whole ofBosnia and Serbia, and the Save and Danube remained the frontier betweenthe two countries. Meanwhile the Serbs of Montenegro had joined in thefray and had fared better, inflicting some unpleasant defeats on the Turksunder their bishop, Peter I. These culminated in two battles in 1796 (theMontenegrins, not being mentioned in the treaty of peace, had continuedfighting), in which the Turks were driven back to Scutari. With thistriumph, which the Emperor Paul of Russia signalized by decorating thePrince-Bishop Peter, the independence of the modern state of Montenegro, the first Serb people to recover its liberty, was _de facto_ established. 

17

_The Liberation of Serbia under Kara-George_ (1804-13) _and Milo[)s]Obrenovi['c]_ (1815-30): 1796-1830

The liberation of Serbia from the Turkish dominion and its establishmentas an independent state were matters of much slower and more arduousaccomplishment than were the same processes in the other Balkan countries. One reason for this was that Serbia by its peculiar geographical positionwas cut off from outside help. It was easy for the western powers to helpGreece with their fleets, and for Russia to help Rumania and, later, Bulgaria directly with its army, because communication between them waseasy. But Serbia on the one hand was separated from the sea, first byDalmatia, which was always in foreign possession, and then by Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the _sandjak_ (or province) of Novi-Pazar, all of whichterritories, though ethnically Serb, were strongholds of Turkish influenceowing to their large Mohammedan population. The energies of Montenegro, also cut off from the sea by Dalmatia and Turkey, were absorbed inself-defence, though it gave Serbia all the support which its sizepermitted. Communication, on the other hand, between Russia and Serbia wastoo difficult to permit of military help being rapidly and effectivelybrought to bear upon the Turks from that quarter. Bessarabia, Wallachia, and Moldavia were then still under Turkish control, and either they had tobe traversed or the Danube had to be navigated from its mouth upwardsthrough Turkish territory. The only country which could have helped Serbiawas Austria, but as it was against their best interests to do so, theAustrians naturally did all they could not to advance, but to retard theSerbian cause. As a result of all this Serbia, in her long struggleagainst the Turks, had to rely principally on its own resources, thoughRussian diplomacy several times saved the renascent country from disaster. 

Another reason for the slowness of the emancipation and development ofmodern Serbia has been the proneness of its people to internal dissension. There was no national dynasty on whom the leadership of the country wouldnaturally devolve after the first successful revolution against Turkishrule, there was not even any aristocracy left, and no foreign ruler wasever asked for by the Serbs or was ever imposed on them by the othernations as in the case of Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria. On the other handthe rising against Turkey was a rising of the whole people, and it wasalmost inevitable that as soon as some measure of independence was gainedthe unity the Serbs had shown when fighting against their oppressorsshould dissolve and be replaced by bitter rivalries and disputes amongstthe various local leaders who had become prominent during the rebellion. 

These rivalries early in the nineteenth century resolved themselves into ablood-feud between two families, the Karagjorgjevi['c] and theObrenovi['c], a quarrel that filled Serbian history and militated againstthe progress of the Serb people throughout the nineteenth century. 

The same reasons which restricted the growth of the political independenceof Serbia have also impeded, or rather made impossible, its economicdevelopment and material prosperity. Until recent years Austria-Hungaryand Turkey between them held Serbia territorially in such a position thatwhenever Serbia either demurred at its neighbours' tariffs or wished toretaliate by means of its own, the screw was immediately applied andeconomic strangulation threatened. Rumania and Bulgaria economically couldnever be of help to Serbia, because the products and the requirements ofall three are identical, and Rumania and Bulgaria cannot be expected tofacilitate the sale of their neighbours' live stock and cereals, whentheir first business is to sell their own, while the cost of transit ofimports from western Europe through those countries is prohibitive. 

After the unsuccessful rebellion of 1788, already mentioned, Serbiaremained in a state of pseudo-quiescence for some years. Meanwhile theauthority of the Sultan in Serbia was growing ever weaker and the realpower was wielded by local Turkish officials, who exploited the country, looked on it as their own property, and enjoyed semi-independence. Theirexactions and cruelties were worse than had been those of the Turks in theold days, and it was against them and their troops, not against those ofthe Sultan, that the first battles in the Serbian war of independence werefought. It was during the year 1803 that the Serbian leaders first madedefinite plans for the rising which eventually took place in the followingyear. The ringleader was George Petrovi['c], known as Black George, orKara-George, and amongst his confederates was Milo[)s] Obrenovi['c]. Thecentre of the conspiracy was at Topola, in the district of [)S]umadija incentral Serbia (between the Morava and the Drina rivers), the native placeof Kara-George. The first two years of fighting between the Serbians and, first, the provincial janissaries, and, later, the Sultan's forces, fullyrewarded the bravery and energy of the insurgents. By the beginning of1807 they had virtually freed all northern Serbia by their own unaidedefforts and captured the towns of Po[)z]arevac, Smederevo, Belgrade, and[)S]abac. The year 1804 is also notable as the date of the formal openingof diplomatic relations directly between Serbia and Russia. At this timethe Emperor Alexander I was too preoccupied with Napoleon to be able tothreaten the Sultan (Austerlitz took place in November 1805), but he gavethe Serbs financial assistance and commended their cause to the especialcare of his ambassador at Constantinople. 

In 1807 war again broke out between Russia and Turkey, but after the Peaceof Tilsit (June 1807) fighting ceased also between the Turks and theRussians and the Serbs, not before the Russians had won several successesagainst the Turks on the Lower Danube. It was during the two followingyears of peace that dissensions first broke out amongst the Serbianleaders; fighting the Turks was the sole condition of existence whichprevented them fighting each other. In 1809-10 Russia and the Serbs againfought the Turks, at first without success, but later with better fortune. In 1811 Kara-George was elected _Gospodar_, or sovereign, by a popularassembly, but Serbia still remained a Turkish province. At the end of thatyear the Russians completely defeated the Turks at Rustchuk in Bulgaria, and, if all had gone well, Serbia might there and then have achievedcomplete independence. 

But Napoleon was already preparing his invasion and Russia had to concludepeace with Turkey in a hurry, which necessarily implied that the Sultanobtained unduly favourable terms. In the Treaty of Bucarest between thetwo countries signed in May 1812, the Serbs were indeed mentioned, andpromised vague internal autonomy and a general amnesty, but all thefortified towns they had captured were to be returned to the Turks, andthe few Russian troops who had been helping the Serbs in Serbia had towithdraw. Negotiations between the Turks and the Serbs for the regulationof their position were continued throughout 1812, but finally the Turksrefused all their claims and conditions and, seeing the European powerspreoccupied with their own affairs, invaded the country from Bosnia in thewest, and also from the east and south, in August 1813. The Serbs, leftentirely to their own resources, succumbed before the superior forces ofthe Turks, and by the beginning of October the latter were again mastersof the whole country and in possession of Belgrade. Meanwhile Kara-George, broken in health and unable to cope with the difficulties of thesituation, which demanded successful strategy both against theoverwhelming forces of the Turks in the field and against the intrigues ofhis enemies at home, somewhat ignominiously fled across the river toSemlin in Hungary, and was duly incarcerated by the Austrian authorities. 

The news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipsic (October 1813) arrived just afterthat of the re-occupation of Belgrade by the Turks, damped _feu-de-joie_which they were firing at Constantinople, and made them rather moreconciliatory and lenient to the Serbian rebels. But this attitude did notlast long, and the Serbs soon had reason to make fresh efforts to regaintheir short-lived liberty. The Congress of Vienna met in the autumn of1814, and during its whole course Serbian emissaries gave the Russianenvoys no peace. But with the return of Napoleon to France in the springof 1815 and the break-up of the Congress, all that Russia could do was, through its ambassador at Constantinople, to threaten invasion unless theTurks left the Serbs alone. Nevertheless, conditions in Serbia became sointolerable that another rebellion soon took shape, this time underMilo[)s] Obrenovi['c]. This leader was no less patriotic than his rival, Kara-George, but he was far more able and a consummate diplomat. Kara-George had possessed indomitable courage, energy, and will-power, buthe could not temporize, and his arbitrary methods of enforcing disciplineand his ungovernable temper had made him many enemies. While the creditfor the first Serbian revolt (1804-13) undoubtedly belongs chiefly to him, the second revolt owed its more lasting success to the skill of Milo[)s]Obrenovi['c]. The fighting started at Takovo, the home of the Obrenovi['c]family, in April 1815, and after many astonishing successes against theTurks, including the capture of the towns of Rudnik, [)C]a[)c]ak, Po[)z]arevac, and Kraljevo, was all over by July of the same year. TheTurks were ready with large armies in the west in Bosnia, and also southof the Morava river, to continue the campaign and crush the rebellion, butthe news of the final defeat of Napoleon, and the knowledge that Russiawould soon have time again to devote attention to the Balkans, withheldtheir appetites for revenge, and negotiations with the successful rebelswere initiated. During the whole of this period, from 1813 onwards, Milo[)s] Obrenovi['c], as head of a district, was an official of theSultan in Serbia, and it was one of his principles never to breakirreparably with the Turks, who were still suzerains of the country. Atthe same time, owing to his skill and initiative he was recognized as theonly real leader of the movement for independence. From the cessation ofthe rebellion in 1815 onwards he himself personally conducted negotiationsin the name of his people with the various pashas who were deputed to dealwith him. While these negotiations went on and the armistice was in force, he was confronted, or rather harassed from behind, by a series of revoltsagainst his growing authority on the part of his jealous compatriots. 

In June 1817 Kara-George, who had been in Russia after being released bythe Austrians in 1814, returned surreptitiously to Serbia, encouraged bythe brighter aspect which affairs in his country seemed to be assuming. But the return of his most dangerous rival was as unwelcome to Milo[)s] asit was to the Turkish authorities at Belgrade, and, measures having beenconcerted between them, Kara-George was murdered on July 26, 1817, and thefirst act in the blood-feud between the two families thus committed. InNovember of the same year a _skup[)s]tina_, or national assembly, was heldat Belgrade, and Milo[)s] Obrenovi['c], whose position was alreadythoroughly assured, was elected hereditary prince (_knez_) of the country. 

Meanwhile events of considerable importance for the future of the Serbrace had been happening elsewhere. Dalmatia, the whole of which had beenin the possession of Venice since the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, passedinto the hands of Austria by the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, when theVenetian republic was extinguished by Napoleon. The Bocche di Cuttaro, aharbour both strategically and commercially of immense value, which had inthe old days belonged to the Serb principality of Zeta or Montenegro, andis its only natural outlet on the Adriatic, likewise became Venetian in1699 and Austrian in 1797, one year after the successful rebellion of theMontenegrins against the Turks. 

By the Treaty of Pressburg between France and Austria Dalmatia becameFrench in 1805. But the Montenegrins, supported by the Russians, resistedthe new owners and occupied the Bocche; at the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, however, this important place was assigned to France by Russia, andMontenegro had to submit to its loss. In 1806 the French occupied Ragusa, and in 1808 abolished the independence of the ancient Serb city-republic. In 1812 the Montenegrins, helped by the Russians and British, againexpelled the French and reoccupied Cattaro; but Austria was by now fullyalive to the meaning this harbour would have once it was in the possessionof Montenegro, and after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 took definitivepossession of it as well as of all the rest of Dalmatia, thus effectingthe complete exclusion of the Serb race for all political and commercialpurposes from the Adriatic, its most natural and obvious means ofcommunication with western Europe. 

Though Milo[)s] had been elected prince by his own people, it was longbefore he was recognized as such by the Porte. His efforts for theregularization of his position entailed endless negotiations inConstantinople; these were enlivened by frequent anti-Obrenovi['c] revoltsin Serbia, all of which Milo[)s] successfully quelled. The revolution inGreece in 1821 threw the Serbian question from the international point ofview into the shade, but the Emperor Nicholas I, who succeeded his brotherAlexander I on the Russian throne in 1825, soon showed that he took alively and active interest in Balkan affairs. Pan-Slavism had scarcelybecome fashionable in those days, and it was still rather as the protectorof its co-religionists under the Crescent that Russia intervened. In 1826Russian and Turkish delegates met at Akerman in Bessarabia, and inSeptember of that year signed a convention by which the Russianprotectorate over the Serbs was recognized, the Serbs were grantedinternal autonomy, the right to trade and erect churches, schools, andprinting-presses, and the Turks were forbidden to live in Serbia except ineight garrison towns; the garrisons were to be Turkish, and tribute wasstill to be paid to the Sultan as suzerain. These concessions, announcedby Prince Milo[)s] to his people at a special _skup[)s]tina_ held atKragujevac in 1827, evoked great enthusiasm, but the urgency of the Greekquestion again delayed their fulfilment. After the battle of Navarino onOctober 20, 1827, in which the British, French, and Russian fleetsdefeated the Turkish, the Turks became obstinate and refused to carry outthe stipulations of the Convention of Akerman in favour of Serbia. Thereupon Russia declared war on Turkey in April 1828, and the Russianarmies crossed the Danube and the Balkans and marched on Constantinople. 

Peace was concluded at Adrianople in 1829, and Turkey agreed to carry outimmediately all the stipulations of the Treaty of Bucarest (1812) and theConvention of Akerman (1826). The details took some time to settle, but inNovember 1830 the _hatti-sherif_ of the Sultan, acknowledging Milo[)s] ashereditary prince of Serbia, was publicly read in Belgrade. All theconcessions already promised were duly granted, and Serbia becamevirtually independent, but still tributary to the Sultan. Its territoryincluded most of the northern part of the modern kingdom of Serbia, between the rivers Drina, Save, Danube, and Timok, but not the districtsof Nish, Vranja, and Pirot. Turkey still retained Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, the _sandjak_ of Novi-Pazar, which separated Serbia fromMontenegro, and Old Serbia (northern Macedonia). 

18

_The Throes of Regeneration: Independent Serbia, _ 1830-1903

During his rule of Serbia, which lasted virtually from 1817 till 1839, Prince Milo[)s] did a very great deal for the welfare of his country. Heemancipated the Serbian Church from the trammels of the Greek Patriarchateof Constantinople in 1831, from which date onwards it was ruled by aMetropolitan of Serb nationality, resident at Belgrade. He encouraged thetrade of the country, a great deal of which he held in his own hands; hewas in fact a sort of prototype of those modern Balkan business-kings ofwhom King George of Greece and King Carol of Rumania were the most notableexamples. He raised an army and put it on a permanent footing, andorganized the construction of roads, schools, and churches. He was, however, an autocratic ruler of the old school, and he had no inclinationto share the power for the attainment of which he had laboured so manyyears and gone through so much. From his definite installation ashereditary prince discontent at his arbitrary methods of governmentamongst his ex-equals increased, and after several revolts he was forcedeventually to grant a constitution in 1835. This, however, remained a deadletter, and things went on as before. Later in the same year he paid aprolonged visit to his suzerain at Constantinople, and while he was therethe situation in Serbia became still more serious. After his return hewas, after several years of delay and of growing unpopularity, compelledto agree to another constitution which was forced on him, paradoxicallyenough, by the joint efforts of the Tsar and of the Sultan, who seemed totake an unnatural pleasure in supporting the democratic Serbians againsttheir successful colleague in autocracy, who had done so much for histurbulent subjects. Serbia even in those days was essentially anduncompromisingly democratic, but even so Milo[)s] obstinately refused tocarry out the provisions of the constitution or in any way to submit to acurtailment of his power, and in 1839 he left his ungrateful principalityand took refuge in Rumania, where he possessed an estate, abdicating infavour of his elder son Milan. This Prince Milan, known as Obrenovi['c]II, was seriously ill at the time of his accession, and died within amonth of it. He was succeeded by his younger brother Michael, known asObrenovi['c] III, who was then only sixteen years of age. This prince, though young, had a good head on his shoulders, and eventually proved themost gifted ruler modern Serbia has ever had. His first reign (1840-2), however, did not open well. He inaugurated it by paying a state visit toConstantinople, but the Sultan only recognized him as elective prince andinsisted on his having two advisers approved and appointed by the Porte. Michael on his return showed his determination to have nothing to do withthem, but this led to a rebellion headed by one of them, Vu[)c]i['c], and, though Michael's rule was not as arbitrary as his father's, he had to bowto the popular will which supported Vu[)c]i['c] and cross the river toSemlin. After a stormy interval, during which the Emperor Nicholas I triedto intervene in favour of Michael, Alexander Karagjorgjevi['c], son ofKara-George, was elected prince (1843). No sooner was this representativeof the rival dynasty installed, however, than rebellions in favour ofMichael occurred. These were thrown into the shade by the events of 1848, In that memorable year of revolutions the Magyars rose against Austria andthe Serbs in southern Hungary rose against the Magyars. Prince Alexanderresolved to send military help to his oppressed countrymen north of theSave and Danube, and, though the insurgents were unsuccessful, PrinceAlexander gained in popularity amongst the Serbs by the line of action hehad taken. During the Crimean War, on the other hand, Serbia remainedstrictly neutral, to the annoyance of the Tsar; at the Congress of Paris(1856) the exclusive protectorate of Russia was replaced by one of all thepowers, and Russian influence in the western Balkans was thereby weakened. Prince Alexander's prudence, moreover, cost him his popularity, and in1858 he in his turn had to bid farewell to his difficult countrymen. 

In December of the same year the veteran Prince Milo['s] Obrenovi['c] Iwas recalled to power as hereditary prince. His activities during hissecond reign were directed against Turkish influence, which was stillstrong, and he made efforts to have the Turkish populations removed fromthe eight garrison towns, including Belgrade, where they still lived inspite of the fact that their emigration had been stipulated for in 1830. Unfortunately he did not live long enough to carry out his plans, for hefell ill at Topchider, the summer palace near Belgrade, in the autumn of1860, and died a few days afterwards. He was again succeeded by his sonMichael Obrenovi['c] III, who was already thirty-six years of age. Thisable prince's second reign was brilliantly successful, and it was adisaster for which his foolish countrymen had to pay dearly, when, bytheir fault, it was prematurely cut short in 1868. His first act was withthe consent of a specially summoned _skup[)s]tina_ to abolish the law bywhich he could only appoint and remove his counsellers with the approvalof the Porte. Next he set about the organization and establishment of aregular army of 30, 000 men. In 1862 an anti-Turkish rebellion broke outamongst the Serbs in Hercegovina (still, with Bosnia, a Turkish province), and the Porte, accusing Prince Michael of complicity, made warlikepreparations against him. 

Events, however, were precipitated in such a way that, without waiting forthe opening of hostilities, the Turkish general in command of the fortressof Belgrade turned his guns on the city; this provoked the intervention ofthe powers at Constantinople, and the entire civilian Turkish populationhad to quit the country (in accordance with the stipulations of 1830), only Turkish garrisons remaining in the fortresses of [)S]abac, Belgrade, Smederevo, and Kladovo, along the northern river frontier, stilltheoretically the boundary of the Sultan's dominions. After this successPrince Michael continued his military preparations in order to obtainfinal possession of the fortresses when a suitable occasion should arise. This occurred in 1866, when Austria was engaged in the struggle withPrussia, and the policy of Great Britain became less Turcophil than it hadhitherto been. On April 6, 1867, the four fortresses, which had been inSerbian possession from 1804 to 1813, but had since then been garrisonedby the Turks, were delivered over to Serbia and the last Turkish soldierleft Serbian soil without a shot having been fired. Though Serbia afterthis was still a vassal state, being tributary to the Sultan, thesefurther steps on the road to complete independence were a great triumph, especially for Prince Michael personally. But this very triumph actuatedhis political opponents amongst his own countrymen, amongst whom wereundoubtedly adherents of the rival dynasty, to revenge, and blind to theinterests of their people they foolishly and most brutally murdered thisextremely capable and conscientious prince in the deer park near Topchideron June 10, 1868. The opponents of the Obrenovi['c] dynasty were, however, baulked in their plans, and a cousin of the late prince was elected to thevacant and difficult position. This ruler, known as Milan Obrenovi['c] IV, who was only fourteen years of age at the time of his accession (1868), was of a very different character from his predecessor. The first thingthat happened during his minority was the substitution of the constitutionof 1838 by another one which was meant to give the prince and the nationalassembly much more power, but which, eventually, made the ministerssupreme. 

The prince came of age in 1872 when he was eighteen, and he soon showedthat the potential pleasures to be derived from his position were far moreattractive to him than the fulfilment of its obvious duties. He found muchto occupy him in Vienna and Paris and but little in Belgrade. At the sametime the Serb people had lost, largely by its own faults, much of therespect and sympathy which it had acquired in Europe during PrinceMichael's reign. In 1875 a formidable anti-Turkish insurrection (the lastof many) broke out amongst the Serbs of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and allthe efforts of the Turks to quell it were unavailing. In June 1876 PrinceMilan was forced by the pressure of public opinion to declare war onTurkey in support of the 'unredeemed' Serbs of Bosnia, and Serbia wasjoined by Montenegro. The country was, however, not materially preparedfor war, the expected sympathetic risings in other parts of Turkey eitherdid not take place or failed, and the Turks turned their whole army on toSerbia, with the result that in October the Serbs had to appeal to theTsar for help and an armistice was arranged, which lasted till February1877. During the winter a conference was held in Constantinople to devisemeans for alleviating the lot of the Christians in Turkey, and a peace wasarranged between Turkey and Serbia whereby the _status quo ante_ wasrestored. But after the conference the heart of Turkey was again hardenedand the stipulations in favour of the Christians were not carried out. 

In 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey (cf. Chap. 10), and in the autumn ofthe same year Serbia joined in. This time the armies of Prince Milan weremore successful, and conquered and occupied the whole of southern Serbiaincluding the towns and districts of Nish, Pirot, Vranja, and Leskovac, Montenegro, which had not been included in the peace of the previouswinter, but had been fighting desperately and continuously against theTurks ever since it had begun actively to help the Serb rebels ofHercegovina in 1875, had a series of successes, as a result of which itobtained possession of the important localities of Nik['s]i['c], Podgorica, Budua, Antivari, and Dulcigno, the last three on the shore ofthe Adriatic. By the Treaty of San Stefano the future interests of bothSerbia and Montenegro were jeopardised by the creation of a GreatBulgaria, but that would not have mattered if in return they had beengiven control of the purely Serb provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which ethnically they can claim just as legitimately as Bulgaria claimsmost of Macedonia. The Treaty of San Stefano was, however, soon replacedby that of Berlin. By its terms both Serbia and Montenegro achievedcomplete independence and the former ceased to be a tributary state ofTurkey. The Serbs were given the districts of southern Serbia which theyhad occupied, and which are all ethnically Serb except Pirot, thepopulation of which is a sort of cross between Serb and Bulgar. The Serbsalso undertook to build a railway through their country to the Turkish andBulgarian frontiers. Montenegro was nearly doubled in size, receiving thedistricts of Nik['s]i['c], Podgorica, and others; certain places in theinterior the Turks and Albanians absolutely refused to surrender, and tocompensate for these Montenegro was given a strip of coast with thetownlets of Antivari and Dulcigno. The memory of Gladstone, who speciallyespoused Montenegro's cause in this matter, is held in the greatestreverence in the brave little mountain country, but unfortunately theports themselves are economically absolutely useless. Budua, higher up theDalmatian coast, which would have been of some use, was handed over toAustria, to which country, already possessed of Cattaro and all the restof Dalmatia, it was quite superfluous. Greatest tragedy of all for thefuture of the Serb race, the administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina washanded over 'temporarily' to Austria-Hungary, and Austrian garrisons werequartered throughout those two provinces, which they were able to occupyonly after the most bitter armed opposition on the part of theinhabitants, and also in the Turkish _sandjak_ or province of Novi-Pazar, the ancient Raska and cradle of the Serb state; this strip of mountainousterritory under Turkish administrative and Austrian military control wasthus converted into a fortified wedge which effectually kept the twoindependent Serb states of Serbia and Montenegro apart. After all theseevents the Serbs had to set to work to put their enlarged house in order. But the building of railways and schools and the organization of theservices cost a lot of money, and as public economy is not a Serbianvirtue the debt grew rapidly. In 1882 Serbia proclaimed itself a kingdomand was duly recognized by the other nations. But King Milan did not learnto manage the affairs of his country any better as time went on. He wastoo weak to stand alone, and having freed himself from Turkey he threwhimself into the arms of Austria, with which country he concluded a secretmilitary convention. In 1885, when Bulgaria and 'Eastern Rumelia'successfully coalesced and Bulgaria thereby received a considerableincrease of territory and power, the Serbs, prompted by jealousy, began togrow restless, and King Milan, at the instigation of Austria, foolishlydeclared war on Prince Alexander of Battenberg. This speedily ended in thedisastrous battle of Slivnitsa (cf. Chap. II); Austria had to intervene tosave its victim, and Serbia got nothing for its trouble but a largeincrease of debt and a considerable decrease of military reputation. Inaddition to all this King Milan was unfortunate in his conjugal relations;his wife, the beautiful Queen Natalie, was a Russian, and as he himselfhad Austrian sympathies, they could scarcely be expected to agree onpolitics. But the strife between them extended from the sphere ofinternational to that of personal sympathies and antipathies. King Milanwas promiscuous in affairs of the heart and Queen Natalie was jealous. Scenes of domestic discord were frequent and violent, and the effect ofthis atmosphere on the character of their only child Alexander, who wasborn in 1876, was naturally bad. 

The king, who had for some years been very popular with, his subjects withall his failings, lost his hold on the country after the unfortunate warof 1885, and the partisans of the rival dynasty began to be hopeful oncemore. In 1888 King Milan gave Serbia a very much more liberalconstitution, by which the ministers were for the first time made reallyresponsible to the _skup[)s]tina_ or national assembly, replacing that of1869, and the following year, worried by his political and domesticfailures, discredited and unpopular both at home and abroad, he resignedin favour of his son Alexander, then aged thirteen. This boy, who had beenbrought up in what may be called a permanent storm-centre, both domesticand political, was placed under a regency, which included M. Risti['c], with a radical ministry under M. Pa[)s]i['c], an extremely able andpatriotic statesman of pro-Russian sympathies, who ever since he firstbecame prominent in 1877 had been growing in power and influence. Buttrouble did not cease with the abdication of King Milan. He and his wifeplayed Box and Cox at Belgrade for the next four years, quarrelling andbeing reconciled, intriguing and fighting round the throne and person oftheir son. At last both parents agreed to leave the country and give theunfortunate youth a chance. King Milan settled in Vienna, Queen Natalie inBiarritz. In 1893 King Alexander suddenly declared himself of age andarrested all his ministers and regents one evening while they were diningwith him. The next year he abrogated the constitution of 1888, under whichparty warfare in the Serbian parliament had been bitter and uninterrupted, obstructing any real progress, and restored that of 1869. Ever since 1889(the date of the accession of the German Emperor) Berlin had taken moreinterest in Serbian affairs, and it has been alleged that it was WilliamII who, through the wife of the Rumanian minister at his court, who wassister of Queen Natalie, influenced King Alexander in his abrupt andill-judged decisions. It was certainly German policy to weaken anddiscredit Serbia and to further Austrian influence at Belgrade at theexpense of that of Russia. King Milan returned for a time to Belgrade in1897, and the reaction, favourable to Austria, which had begun in 1894, increased during his presence and under the ministry of Dr. VladanGjorgjevi['c], which lasted from 1897 till 1900. This state of repressioncaused unrest throughout the country. All its energies were absorbed infruitless political party strife, and no material or moral progress waspossible. King Alexander, distracted, solitary, and helpless in the midstof this unending welter of political intrigue, committed an extremelyimprudent act in the summer of 1900. Having gone for much-neededrelaxation to see his mother at Biarritz, he fell violently in love withher lady in waiting, Madame Draga Ma[)s]in, the divorced wife of a Serbianofficer. Her somewhat equivocal past was in King Alexander's eyes quiteeclipsed by her great beauty and her wit, which had not been impaired byconjugal infelicity. Although she was thirty-two, and he only twenty-four, he determined to marry her, and the desperate opposition of his parents, his army, his ministers, and his people, based principally on the factthat the woman was known to be incapable of child-birth, only precipitatedthe accomplishment of his intention. This unfortunate and headstrongaction on the part of the young king, who, though deficient in tact andintuition, had plenty of energy and was by no means stupid, might havebeen forgiven him by his people if, as was at first thought possible, ithad restored internal peace and prosperity in the country and therebyenabled it to prepare itself to take a part in the solution o£ thoseforeign questions which vitally affected Serb interests and were alreadylooming on the horizon. But it did not. In 1901 King Alexander grantedanother constitution and for a time attempted to work with a coalitionministry; but this failed, and a term of reaction with pro-Austriantendencies, which were favoured by the king and queen, set in. Thisreaction, combined with the growing disorganization of the finances andthe general sense of the discredit and failure which the follies of itsrulers had during the last thirty years brought on the country; completelyundermined the position of the dynasty and made a catastrophe inevitable. This occurred, as is well known, on June 10, 1903, when, as the result ofa military conspiracy, King Alexander, the last of the Obrenovi['c]dynasty, his wife, and her male relatives were murdered. This crime waspurely political, and it is absurd to gloss it over or to explain itmerely as the result of the family feud between the two dynasties. Thatcame to an end in 1868, when the murder of Kara-George in 1817 by theagency of Milo[)s] Obrenovi['c] was avenged by the lunatic assassinationof the brilliant Prince Michael Obrenovi['c] III. It is no exaggeration tosay that, from the point of view of the Serbian patriot, the onlysalvation of his country in 1903 lay in getting rid of the Obrenovi['c]dynasty, which had become pro-Austrian, had no longer the great giftspossessed by its earlier members, and undoubtedly by its vagaries hinderedthe progress of Serbia both in internal and external politics. Theassassination was unfortunately carried out with unnecessary cruelty, andit is this fact that made such a bad impression and for so long militatedagainst Serbia in western Europe; but it must be remembered thatcivilization in the Balkans, where political murder, far from being aproduct of the five hundred years of Turkish dominion, has always beenendemic, is not on the same level in many respects as it is in the rest ofEurope. Life is one of the commodities which are still cheap in backwardcountries. 

Although King Alexander and his wife can in no sense be said to havedeserved the awful fate that befell them, it is equally true that had anyother course been adopted, such as deposition and exile, the wire-pullingand intriguing from outside, which had already done the country so muchharm, would have become infinitely worse. Even so, it was long beforethings in any sense settled down. As for the alleged complicity of therival dynasty in the crime, it is well established that that did notexist. It was no secret to anybody interested in Serbian affairs thatsomething catastrophic was about to happen, and when the tragedy occurredit was natural to appeal to the alternative native dynasty to step intothe breach. But the head of that dynasty was in no way responsible for theplot, still less for the manner in which it was carried out, and it wasonly after much natural hesitation and in the face of his strongdisinclination that Prince Peter Karagjorgjevi['c] was induced to acceptthe by no means enviable, easy, or profitable task of guiding Serbia'sdestiny. The Serbian throne in 1903 was a source neither of glory nor ofriches, and it was notoriously no sinecure. 

After the tragedy, the democratic constitution of 1888 was first of allrestored, and then Prince Peter Karagjorgjevi['c], grandson ofKara-George, the leader of the first Serbian insurrection of 1804-13, whowas at that time fifty-nine years of age, was unanimously elected king. Hehad married in 1883 a daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro and sisterof the future Queen of Italy, but she had been dead already some years atthe time of his accession, leaving him with a family of two sons and adaughter. 

19

_Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbo-Croats in Austria-Hungary, _ 1903-8

It was inevitable that, after the sensation which such an event could notfail to cause in twentieth-century Europe, it should take the countrywhere it occurred some time to live down the results. Other powers, especially those of western Europe, looked coldly on Serbia and were in nohurry to resume diplomatic intercourse, still less to offer diplomaticsupport. The question of the punishment and exile of the conspirators wasalmost impossible of solution, and only time was able to obliterate theresentment caused by the whole affair. In Serbia itself a great changetook place. The new sovereign, though he laboured under the greatestpossible disadvantages, by his irreproachable behaviour, modesty, tact, and strictly constitutional rule, was able to withdraw the court ofBelgrade from the trying limelight to which it had become used. The publicfinances began to be reorganized, commerce began to improve in spite ofendless tariff wars with Austria-Hungary, and attention was again divertedfrom home to foreign politics. With the gradual spread of education andincrease of communication, and the growth of national self-consciousnessamongst the Serbs and Croats of Austria-Hungary and the two independentSerb states, a new movement for the closer intercourse amongst the variousbranches of the Serb race for south Slav unity, as it was called, gradually began to take shape. At the same time a more definitelypolitical agitation started in Serbia, largely inspired by the humiliatingposition of economic bondage in which the country was held byAustria-Hungary, and was roughly justified by the indisputable argument:'Serbia must expand or die. ' Expansion at the cost of Turkey seemedhopeless, because even the acquisition of Macedonia would give Serbia alarge alien population and no maritime outlet. It was towards the Adriaticthat the gaze of the Serbs was directed, to the coast which was ethnicallySerbian and could legitimately be considered a heritage of the Serb race. 

Macedonia was also taken into account, schools and armed bands began theireducative activity amongst those inhabitants of the unhappy province whowere Serb, or who lived in places where Serbs had lived, or who withsufficient persuasion could be induced to call themselves Serb; but theprincipal stream of propaganda was directed westwards into Bosnia andHercegovina. The antagonism between Christian and Mohammedan, Serb andTurk, was never so bitter as between Christian and Christian, Serb andGerman or Magyar, and the Serbs were clever enough to see that Bosnia andHercegovina, from every point of view, was to them worth ten Macedonias, though it would he ten times more difficult to obtain. Bosnia andHercegovina, though containing three confessions, were ethnicallyhomogeneous, and it was realised that these two provinces were asimportant to Serbia and Montenegro as the rest of Italy had been toPiedmont. 

It must at this time be recalled in what an extraordinary way the Serbrace had fortuitously been broken up into a number of quite arbitrarypolitical divisions. Dalmatia (three per cent. Of the population of whichis Italian and all the rest Serb or Croat, preponderatingly Serb andOrthodox in the south and preponderating Croat or Roman Catholic in thenorth) was a province of Austria and sent deputies to the Reichsrath atVienna; at the same time it was territorially isolated from Austria andhad no direct railway connexion with any country except a narrow-gaugeline into Bosnia. Croatia and Slavonia, preponderatingly Roman Catholic, were lands of the Hungarian crown, and though they had a provincialpseudo-autonomous diet at Agram, the capital of Croatia, they sentdeputies to the Hungarian parliament at Budapest. Thus what had in theMiddle Ages been known as the triune kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, andDalmatia, with a total Serbo-Croat population of three millions, wasdivided between Austria and Hungary. 

Further, there were about 700, 000 Serbs and Croats in the south of Hungaryproper, cast and north of the Danube, known as the Banat and Ba[)c]ka, adistrict which during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries wasthe hearth and home of Serb literature and education, but which laterwaned in importance in that respect as independent Serbia grew. TheseSerbs were directly dependent on Budapest, the only autonomy theypossessed being ecclesiastical. Bosnia and Hercegovina, still nominallyTurkish provinces, with a Slav population of nearly two million (850, 000Orthodox Serbs, 650, 000 Mohammedan Serbs, and the rest Roman Catholics), were to all intents and purposes already imperial lands ofAustria-Hungary, with a purely military and police administration; theshadow of Turkish sovereignty provided sufficient excuse to the _de facto_owners of these provinces not to grant the inhabitants parliamentarygovernment or even genuine provincial autonomy. The Serbs in Serbianumbered nearly three millions, those in Montenegro about a quarter of amillion; while in Turkey, in what was known as Old Serbia (the _sandjak_of Novi-Pasar between Serbia and Montenegro and the vilayet of Korovo), and in parts of northern and central Macedonia, there were scatteredanother half million. These last, of course, had no voice at all in themanagement of their own affairs. Those in Montenegro lived under thepatriarchal autocracy of Prince Nicholas, who had succeeded his uncle, Prince Danilo, in 1860, at the age of nineteen. Though no other form ofgovernment could have turned the barren rocks of Montenegro into fertilepastures, many of the people grew restless with the restrictedpossibilities of a career which the mountain principality offered them, and in latter years migrated in large numbers to North and South America, whither emigration from Dalmatia and Croatia too had already readiedserious proportions. The Serbs in Serbia were the only ones who couldclaim to be free, but even this was a freedom entirely dependent on theeconomic malevolence of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Cut up in this way bythe hand of fate into such a number of helpless fragments, it wasinevitable that the Serb race, if it possessed any vitality, shouldattempt, at any cost, to piece some if not all of them together and forman ethnical whole which, economically and politically, should be master ofits own destinies. It was equally inevitable that the policy ofAustria-Hungary should be to anticipate or definitively render any suchattempt impossible, because obviously the formation of a large south Slavstate, by cutting off Austria from the Adriatic and eliminating from thedual monarchy all the valuable territory between the Dalmatian coast andthe river Drave, would seriously jeopardize its position as a great power;it must be remembered, also, that Austria-Hungary, far from decomposing, as it was commonly assumed was happening, had been enormously increasingin vitality ever since 1878. 

The means adopted by the governments of Vienna and Budapest to nullify theplans of Serbian expansion were generally to maintain the political_émiettement_ of the Serb race, the isolation of one group from another, the virtually enforced emigration of Slavs on a large scale and theirsubstitution by German colonists, and the encouragement of rivalry anddiscord between Roman Catholic Croat and Orthodox Serb. No railways wereallowed to be built in Dalmatia, communication between Agram and any otherparts of the monarchy except Fiume or Budapest was rendered almostimpossible; Bosnia and Hercegovina were shut off into a watertightcompartment and endowed with a national flag composed of the inspiringcolours of brown and buff; it was made impossible for Serbs to visitMontenegro or for Montenegrins to visit Serbia except via Fiume, entailingthe bestowal of several pounds on the Hungarian state steamers andrailways. As for the _sandjak_ of Novi-Pazar, it was turned into averitable Tibet, and a legend was spread abroad that if any foreignerventured there he would be surely murdered by Turkish brigands; meanwhileit was full of Viennese ladies giving picnics and dances and tennisparties to the wasp-waisted officers of the Austrian garrison. Bosnia andHercegovina, on the other hand, became the model touring provinces ofAustria-Hungary, and no one can deny that their great natural beautieswere made more enjoyable by the construction of railways, roads, andhotels. At the same time this was not a work of pure philanthropy, and theemigration statistics are a good indication of the joy with which theBosnian peasants paid for an annual influx of admiring tourists. In spiteof all these disadvantages, however, the Serbo-Croat provinces ofAustria-Hungary could not be deprived of all the benefits of living withina large and prosperous customs union, while being made to pay for all theexpenses of the elaborate imperial administration and services; and thespread of education, even under the Hapsburg régime, began to tell intime. Simultaneously with the agitation which emanated from Serbia and wasdirected towards the advancement, by means of schools and religious andliterary propaganda, of Serbian influence in Bosnia and Hercegovina, amovement started in Dalmatia and Croatia for the closer union of those twoprovinces. About 1906 the two movements found expression in the formationof the Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serb coalition party, composed of thoseelements in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia which favoured closer unionbetween the various groups of the Serb race scattered throughout thoseprovinces, as well as in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Hercegovina, andTurkey. Owing to the circumstances already described, it was impossiblefor the representatives of the Serb race to voice their aspirationsunanimously in any one parliament, and the work of the coalition, exceptin the provincial diet at Agram, consisted mostly of conducting presscampaigns and spreading propaganda throughout those provinces. The mostimportant thing about the coalition was that it buried religiousantagonism and put unity of race above difference of belief. In this wayit came into conflict with the ultramontane Croat party at Agram, whichwished to incorporate Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Dalmatia with Croatia andcreate a third purely Roman Catholic Slav state in the empire, on a levelwith Austria and Hungary; also to a lesser extent with the intransigentSerbs of Belgrade, who affected to ignore Croatia and Roman Catholicism, and only dreamed of bringing Bosnia, Hercegovina, and as much of Dalmatiaas they could under their own rule; and finally it had to overcome thehostility of the Mohammedan Serbs of Bosnia, who disliked all Christiansequally, could only with the greatest difficulty be persuaded that theywere really Serbs and not Turks, and honestly cared for nothing but Islamand Turkish coffee, thus considerably facilitating the germanization ofthe two provinces. The coalition was wisely inclined to postpone theprogramme of final political settlement, and aimed immediately at theremoval of the material and moral barriers placed between the Serbs of thevarious provinces of Austria-Hungary, including Bosnia and Hercegovina. Ifthey had been sure of adequate guarantees they would probably have agreedto the inclusion of _all_ Serbs and Croats within the monarchy, becausethe constitution of all Serbs and Croats in an independent state (notnecessarily a kingdom) without it implied the then problematiccontingencies of a European war and the disruption of Austria-Hungary. Considering the manifold handicaps under which Serbia and its causesuffered, the considerable success which its propaganda met with in Bosniaand Hercegovina and other parts of Austria-Hungary, from 1903 till 1908, is a proof, not only of the energy and earnestness of its promoters and ofthe vitality of the Serbian people, but also, if any were needed, of theextreme unpopularity of the Hapsburg régime in the southern Slav provincesof the dual monarchy. Serbia had no help from outside. Russia wasentangled in the Far East and then in the revolution, and though the newdynasty was approved in St. Petersburg Russian sympathy with Serbia was atthat time only lukewarm. Relations with Austria-Hungary were of coursealways strained; only one single line of railway connected the twocountries, and as Austria-Hungary was the only profitable market, forgeographical reasons, for Serbian products, Serbia could be brought to itsknees at any moment by the commercial closing of the frontier. It was asymbol of the economic vassalage of Serbia and Montenegro that the postagebetween both of these countries and any part of Austria-Hungary was tencentimes, that for letters between Serbia and Montenegro, which had tomake the long détour through Austrian territory, was twenty-five. Butthough this opened the Serbian markets to Austria, it also incidentallyopened Bosnia, when the censor could be circumvented to propaganda bypamphlet and correspondence. Intercourse with western Europe wasrestricted by distance, and, owing to dynastic reasons, diplomaticrelations were altogether suspended for several years between this countryand Serbia. The Balkan States Exhibition held in London during the summerof 1907, to encourage trade between Great Britain and the Balkans, washardly a success. Italy and Serbia had nothing in common. With Montenegroeven, despite the fact that King Peter was Prince Nicholas's son-in-law, relations were bad. It was felt in Serbia that Prince Nicholas'sautocratic rule acted as a brake on the legitimate development of thenational consciousness, and Montenegrin students who visited Belgradereturned to their homes full of wild and unsuitable ideas. However, therevolutionary tendencies, which some of them undoubtedly developed, had nofatal results to the reigning dynasty, which continued as before to enjoythe special favour as well as the financial support of the Russian court, and which, looked on throughout Europe as a picturesque and harmlessinstitution, it would have been dangerous, as it was quite unnecessary, totouch. 

Serbia was thus left entirely to its own resources in the greatpropagandist activity which filled the years 1903 to 1908. The financialmeans at its disposal were exiguous in the extreme, especially whencompared with the enormous sums lavished annually by the Austrian andGerman governments on their secret political services, so that the effortsof its agents cannot be ascribed to cupidity. Also it must be admittedthat the kingdom of Serbia, with its capital Belgrade, thanks to theinternal chaos and dynastic scandals of the previous forty years, resulting in superficial dilapidation, intellectual stagnation, andgeneral poverty, lacked the material as well as the moral glamour which asuccessful Piedmont should possess. Nobody could deny, for instance, that, with all its natural advantages, Belgrade was at first sight not nearlysuch an attractive centre as Agram or Sarajevo, or that the qualitieswhich the Serbs of Serbia had displayed since their emancipation werehardly such as to command the unstinted confidence and admiration of theiras yet unredeemed compatriots. Nevertheless the Serbian propaganda infavour of what was really a Pan-Serb movement met with great success, especially in Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Old Serbia (northern Macedonia). 

Simultaneously the work of the Serbo-Croat coalition in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia made considerable progress in spite of clerical oppositionand desperate conflicts with the government at Budapest. Both the onemovement and the other naturally evoked great alarm and emotion in theAustrian and Hungarian capitals, as they were seen to be genuinely popularand also potentially, if not actually, separatist in character. In October1906 Baron Achrenthal succeeded Count Goluchowski as Minister for ForeignAffairs at Vienna, and very soon initiated a more vigorous andincidentally anti-Slav foreign policy than his predecessor. What was nowlooked on as the Serbian danger had in the eyes of Vienna assumed suchproportions that the time for decisive action was considered to havearrived. In January 1908 Baron Achrenthal announced his scheme for acontinuation of the Bosnian railway system through the _sandjak_ ofNovi-Pazar to link up with the Turkish railways in Macedonia. This planwas particularly foolish in conception, because, the Bosnian railwaysbeing narrow and the Turkish normal gauge, the line would have beenuseless for international commerce, while the engineering difficultieswere such that the cost of construction would have been prohibitive. Butthe possibilities which this move indicated, the palpable evidence itcontained of the notorious _Drang nach Osten_ of the Germanic powerstowards Salonika and Constantinople, were quite sufficient to fill theministries of Europe, and especially those of Russia, with extremeuneasiness. The immediate result of this was that concerted action betweenRussia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans was thenceforward impossible, and the Mürzsteg programme, after a short and precarious existence, cameto an untimely end (cf. Chap. 12). Serbia and Montenegro, face to facewith this new danger which threatened permanently to separate theirterritories, were beside themselves, and immediately parried with theproject, hardly more practicable in view of their international credit, ofa Danube-Adriatic railway. In July 1908 the nerves of Europe were stillfurther tried by the Young Turk revolution in Constantinople. Theimminence of this movement was known to Austro-German diplomacy, anddoubtless this knowledge, as well as the fear of the Pan-Serb movement, prompted the Austrian foreign minister to take steps towards thedefinitive regularization of his country's position in Bosnia andHercegovina--provinces whose suzerain was still the Sultan of Turkey. Theeffect of the Young Turk coup in the Balkan States was as any one whovisited them at that time can testify, both pathetic and intenselyhumorous. The permanent chaos of the Turkish empire, and the process ofwatching for years its gradual but inevitable decomposition, had createdamongst the neighbouring states an atmosphere of excited anticipation, which was really the breath of their nostrils; it had stimulated themduring the endless Macedonian insurrections to commit the most awfuloutrages against each other's nationals and then lay the blame at the doorof the unfortunate Turk; and if the Turk should really regenerate himself, not only would their occupation be gone, but the heavily-discountedlegacies would assuredly elude their grasp. At the same time, since thewhole policy of exhibiting and exploiting the horrors of Macedonia, and oforganizing guerilla bands and provoking intervention, was based on therefusal of the Turks to grant reforms, as soon as the ultra-liberalconstitution of Midhat Pasha, which, had been withdrawn after a brief andunsuccessful run in 1876, was restored by the Young Turks, there wasnothing left for the Balkan States to do but to applaud with as muchenthusiasm as they could simulate. The emotions experienced by the Balkanpeoples during that summer, beneath the smiles which they had to assume, were exhausting even for southern temperaments. Bulgaria, with itscharacteristic matter-of-factness, was the first to adjust itself to thenew and trying situation in which the only certainty was that somethingdecisive had got to be done with all possible celerity. On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand sprang on an astonished continent the news that herenounced the Turkish suzerainty (ever since 1878 the Bulgarianprincipality had been a tributary and vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, with all its astonishingly rapid progress and materialprosperity, a subject for commiseration in the kingdoms of Serbia andGreece) and proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria, with himself, as Tsarof the Bulgars, at its head. Europe had not recovered from this shock, still less Belgrade and Athens, when, two days later. Baron Aehrenthalannounced the formal annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the EmperorFrancis Joseph. Whereas most people had virtually forgotten the Treaty ofBerlin and had come to look on Austria as just as permanently settled inthese two provinces as was Great Britain in Egypt and Cyprus, yet theformal breach of the stipulations of that treaty on Austria's part, byannexing the provinces without notice to or consultation with the otherparties concerned, gave the excuse for a somewhat ridiculous hue and cryon the part of the other powers, and especially on that of Russia. Theeffect of these blows from right and left on Serbia was literallyparalysing. When Belgrade recovered the use of its organs, it started toscream for war and revenue, and initiated an international crisis fromwhich Europe did not recover till the following year. Meanwhile, almostunobserved by the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro, Austria had, in orderto reconcile the Turks with the loss of their provinces, good-naturedly, but from the Austrian point of view short-sightedly, withdrawn itsgarrisons from the _sandjak_ of Novi-Pazar, thus evacuating thelong-coveted corridor which was the one thing above all else necessary toSerbia and Montenegro for the realization of their plans. 

20

_Serbia and Montenegro, and the two Balkan Wars, _ 1908-13 (cf. Chap, 13)

The winter of 1908-9 marked the lowest ebb of Serbia's fortunes. Thesuccessive _coups_ and _faits accomplis_ carried out by Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria during 1908 seemed destined to destroy for good the Serbianplans for expansion in any direction whatever, and if these could not berealized then Serbia must die of suffocation. It was also well understoodthat for all the martial ardour displayed in Belgrade the army was in nocondition to take the field any more than was the treasury to bear thecost of a campaign; Russia had not yet recovered from the Japanese Warfollowed by the revolution, and indeed everything pointed to the certaintythat if Serbia indulged in hostilities against Austria-Hungary it wouldperish ignominiously and alone. The worst of it was that neither Serbianor Montenegro had any legal claim to Bosnia and Hercegovina: they hadbeen deluding themselves with the hope that their ethnical identity withthe people of these provinces, supported by the effects of theirpropaganda, would induce a compassionate and generous Europe at least toinsist on their being given a part of the coveted territory, and thus giveSerbia access to the coast, when the ambiguous position of these twovaluable provinces, still nominally Turkish but already virtuallyAustrian, came to be finally regularized. As a matter of fact, ever sinceBismarck, Gorchakóv, and Beaconsfield had put Austria-Hungary in theirpossession in 1878, no one had seriously thought that the Dual Monarchywould ever voluntarily retire from one inch of the territory which hadbeen conquered and occupied at such cost, and those who noticed it wereastonished at the evacuation by it of the _sandjak_ of Novi-Pazar. At thesame time Baron Achrenthal little foresaw what a hornet's nest he wouldbring about his ears by the tactless method in which the annexation wascarried out. The first effect was to provoke a complete boycott ofAustro-Hungarian goods and trading vessels throughout the Ottoman Empire, which was so harmful to the Austrian export trade that in January 1909Count Achrenthal had to indemnify Turkey with the sum of £2, 500, 000 forhis technically stolen property. Further, the attitude of Russia andSerbia throughout the whole winter remained so provocative and threateningthat, although war was generally considered improbable, the Austrian armyhad to be kept on a war footing, which involved great expense and muchpopular discontent. The grave external crisis was only solved at the endof March 1909; Germany had had to deliver a veiled ultimatum at St. Petersburg, the result of which was the rescue of Austria-Hungary from anawkward situation by the much-advertised appearance of its faithful allyin shining armour. Simultaneously Serbia had to eat humble pie anddeclare, with complete absence of truth, that the annexation of Bosnia andHercegovina had not affected its interests. 

Meanwhile the internal complications in the southern Slav provinces ofAustria-Hungary were growing formidable. Ever since the summer of 1908arrests had been going on among the members of the Croato-Serb coalition, who were accused of favouring the subversive Pan-Serb movement. The pressof Austria-Hungary magnified the importance of this agitation in order tojustify abroad the pressing need for the formal annexation of Bosnia andHercegovina. The fact was that, though immediate danger to the monarchy asa result of the Pan-Serb agitation was known not to exist, yet in theinterests of Austrian foreign policy, the Serbs had to be compromised inthe eyes of Europe, the Croato-Serb coalition within the Dual Monarchy hadto be destroyed to gratify Budapest in particular, and the religious andpolitical discord between Croat and Serb, on which the foundation of thepower of Austria-Hungary, and especially that of Hungary, in the southrested, and which was in a fair way of being eliminated through theefforts of the coalition, had to be revived by some means or other. It isnot possible here to go into the details of the notorious Agram hightreason trial, which was the outcome of all this. It suffices to say thatit was a monstrous travesty of justice which lasted from March tillOctober 1909, and though it resulted in the ostensible destruction of thecoalition and the imprisonment of many of its members, it defeated its ownends, as it merely fanned the flame of nationalistic feeling againstVienna and Budapest, and Croatia has ever since had to be governedvirtually by martial law. This was followed in December 1909 by the evenmore famous Friedjung trial. In March 1909 Count Achrenthal had begun inVienna a violent press campaign against Serbia, accusing the SerbianGovernment and dynasty of complicity in the concoction of nefariousdesigns and conspiracies against the integrity of Austria-Hungary. Thiscampaign was thought to be the means of foreshadowing and justifying theimmediate military occupation of Serbia. Unfortunately its instigator hadnot been sufficiently particular as to the choice of his tools and hismethods of using them. Among the contributors of the highly tendenciousarticles was the well-known historian Dr. Friedjung, who made extensiveuse of documents supplied him by the Vienna Foreign Office. Hisaccusations immediately provoked an action for libel on the part of threeleaders of the Croato-Serb coalition who were implicated, in December1909. The trial, which was highly sensational, resulted in the completevindication and rehabilitation both of those three Austrian subjects inthe eyes of the whole of Austria-Hungary and of the Belgrade ForeignOffice in those of Europe; the documents on which the charges were basedwere proven to be partly forgeries, partly falsified, and partly stolen byvarious disreputable secret political agents of the Austrian ForeignOffice, and one of the principal Serbian 'conspirators', a professor ofBelgrade University, proved that he was in Berlin at the time when he hadbeen accused of presiding over a revolutionary meeting at Belgrade. But italso resulted in the latter discrediting of Count Achrenthal as a diplomatand of the methods by which he conducted the business of the AustrianForeign Office, and involved his country in the expenditure of countlessmillions which it could ill afford. 

There never was any doubt that a subversive agitation had been going on, and that it emanated in part from Serbia, but the Serbian Foreign Office, under the able management of Dr. Milovanovi['c] and Dr. Spalajkovi['c](one of the principal witnesses at the Friedjung trial), was far tooclever to allow any of its members, or indeed any responsible person inSerbia, to be concerned in it, and the brilliant way in which the clumsyand foolish charges were refuted redounded greatly to the credit of theSerbian Government. Count Achrenthal had overreached himself, and moreoverthe wind had already been taken out of his sails by the public recantationon Serbia's part of its pretensions to Bosnia, which, as alreadymentioned, took place at the end of March 1909, and by the simultaneoustermination of the international crisis marked by Russia's acquiescence inthe _fait accompli_ of the annexation. At the same time the Serbian CrownPrince George, King Peter's elder son, who had been the leader of thechauvinist war-party in Serbia, and was somewhat theatrical in demeanourand irresponsible in character, renounced his rights of succession infavour of his younger brother Prince Alexander, a much steadier and moretalented young man. It is certain that when he realized how things weregoing to develop Count Achrenthal tried to hush up the whole incident, butit was too late, and Dr. Friedjung insisted on doing what he could to savehis reputation as a historian. In the end he was made the principalscapegoat, though the press of Vienna voiced its opinion of the AustrianForeign Office in no measured tones, saying, amongst other things, that ifthe conductors of its diplomacy must use forgeries, they might at any ratesecure good ones. Eventually a compromise was arranged, after thedefendant had clearly lost his case, owing to pressure being brought tobear from outside, and the Serbian Government refrained from carrying outits threat of having the whole question threshed out before the HagueTribunal. 

The cumulative effect of all these exciting and trying experiences was thegrowth of a distinctly more sympathetic feeling towards Serbia in Europeat large, and especially a rallying of all the elements throughout theSerb and Croat provinces of Austria-Hungary, except the extreme clericalsof Agram, to the Serbian cause; briefly, the effect was the exact oppositeof that desired by Vienna and Budapest. Meanwhile events had beenhappening elsewhere which revived the drooping interest and flagging hopesof Serbia in the development of foreign affairs. The attainment of powerby the Young Turks and the introduction of parliamentary government hadbrought no improvement to the internal condition of the Ottoman Empire, and the Balkan peoples made no effort to conceal their satisfaction at thefailure of the revolution to bring about reform by magic. Thecounter-revolution of April 1909 and the accession of the Sultan MohammedV made things no better. In Macedonia, and especially in Albania, they hadbeen going from bad to worse. The introduction of universal militaryservice and obligatory payment of taxes caused a revolution in Albania, where such innovations were not at all appreciated. From 1909 till 1911there was a state of perpetual warfare in Albania, with which the YoungTurks, in spite of cruel reprisals, were unable to cope, until, in thesummer of that year, Austria threatened to intervene unless order wererestored; some sort of settlement was patched up, and an amnesty wasgranted to the rebels by the new Sultan. This unfortunate man, after beingrendered almost half-witted by having been for the greater part of hislife kept a prisoner by his brother the tyrant Abdul Hamid, was now thecaptive of the Young Turks, and had been compelled by them to make astriumphal a progress as fears for his personal safety would allow throughthe provinces of European Turkey. But it was obvious to Balkan statesmenthat Turkey was only changed in name, and that, if its threatenedregeneration had slightly postponed their plans for its partition amongstthemselves, the ultimate consummation of these plans must be pursued with, if possible, even greater energy and expedition than before. It was alsoseen by the more perspicacious of them that the methods hitherto adoptedmust in future be radically altered. A rejuvenated though unreformedTurkey, bent on self-preservation, could not be despised, and it wasunderstood that if the revolutionary bands of the three Christian nations(Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria) were to continue indefinitely to cut eachothers' throats in Macedonia the tables might conceivably be turned onthem. 

From 1909 onwards a series of phenomena occurred in the Balkans whichought to have given warning to the Turks, whose survival in Europe hadbeen due solely to the fact that the Balkan States had never been able tounite. In the autumn of 1909 King Ferdinand of Bulgaria met Crown PrinceAlexander of Serbia and made an expedition in his company to MountKopaonik in Serbia, renowned for the beauty of its flora. This must havestruck those who remembered the bitter feelings which had existed betweenthe two countries for years and had been intensified by the events of1908. Bulgaria had looked on Serbia's failures with persistent contempt, while Serbia had watched Bulgaria's successful progress with speechlessjealousy, and the memory of Slivnitsa was not yet obliterated. In thesummer of 1910 Prince Nicholas of Montenegro celebrated the fiftiethanniversary of his reign and his golden wedding. The festivities wereattended by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and the Crown Prince Boris, by theCrown Prince Alexander of Serbia and his sister, grandchildren of PrinceNicholas, by his two daughters the Queen of Italy and the Grand DuchessAnastasia of Russia, and by their husbands, King Victor Emmanuel and theGrand Duke Nicholas. The happiness of the venerable ruler, who was asrespected throughout Europe as he was feared throughout his principality, was at the same time completed by his recognition as king by all thegovernments and sovereigns of the continent. The hopes that he wouldsimultaneously introduce a more liberal form of government amongst his ownpeople were unfortunately disappointed. 

The year 1911, it need scarcely be recalled, was extremely fateful for thewhole of Europe. The growing restlessness and irritability manifested bythe German Empire began to make all the other governments feel exceedinglyuneasy. The French expedition to Fez in April was followed by theAnglo-Franco-German crisis of July; war was avoided, and France wasrecognized as virtually master of Morocco, but the soreness of thediplomatic defeat rendered Germany a still more trying neighbour than ithad been before. The first repercussion was the war which broke out inSeptember 1911 between Italy and Turkey for the possession of Tripoli andCyrenaica, which Italy, with its usual insight, saw was vital to itsposition as a Mediterranean power and therefore determined to acquirebefore any other power had time or courage to do so. In the Balkans thiswas a year of observation and preparation. Serbia, taught by the bitterlesson of 1908 not to be caught again unprepared, had spent much money andcare on its army during the last few years and had brought it to a muchhigher state of efficiency. In Austria-Hungary careful observers woreaware that something was afoot and that the gaze of Serbia, which from1903 till 1908 had been directed westwards to Bosnia and the Adriatic, hadsince 1908 been fixed on Macedonia and the Aegean. The actual formation ofthe Balkan League by King Ferdinand and M. Venezelos may not have beenknown, but it was realized that action of some sort on the part of theBalkan States was imminent, and that something must be done to forestallit. In February 1912 Count Aehrenthal died, and was succeeded by CountBerchtold as Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In August ofthe same year this minister unexpectedly announced his new and startlingproposals for the introduction of reforms in Macedonia, which nobody inthe Balkans who had any material interest in the fate of that provincegenuinely desired at that moment; the motto of the new scheme was'progressive decentralization', blessed words which soothed the greatpowers as much as they alarmed the Balkan Governments. But already in May1912 agreements between Bulgaria and Greece and between Bulgaria andSerbia had been concluded, limiting their respective zones of influence inthe territory which they hoped to conquer. It was, to any one who has anyknowledge of Balkan history, incredible that the various Governments hadbeen able to come to any agreement at all. That arrived at by Bulgaria andSerbia divided Macedonia between them in such a way that Bulgaria shouldobtain central Macedonia with Monastir and Okhrida, and Serbia northernMacedonia or Old Serbia; there was an indeterminate zone between the twospheres, including Skoplje (Üsküb, in Turkish), the exact division ofwhich it was agreed to leave to arbitration at a subsequent date. 

The Macedonian theatre of war was by common consent regarded as the mostimportant, and Bulgaria here promised Serbia the assistance of 100, 000men. The Turks meanwhile were aware that all was not what it seemed beyondthe frontiers, and in August 1912 began collecting troops in Thrace, ostensibly for manoeuvres. During the month of September the patience ofthe four Governments of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, whichhad for years with the utmost self-control been passively watching theawful sufferings of their compatriots under Turkish misrule, graduallybecame exhausted. On September 28 the four Balkan Governments informedRussia that the Balkan League was an accomplished fact, and on the 30ththe representatives of all four signed the alliance, and mobilization wasordered in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. The population of Montenegro washabitually on a war footing, and it was left to the mountain kingdom fromits geographically favourable position to open hostilities. On October 8Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and after a series of brilliantsuccesses along the frontier its forces settled down to the wearisome andarduous siege of Scutari with its impregnable sentinel, Mount Tarabo[)s], converted into a modern fortress; the unaccustomed nature of these tasks, to which the Montenegrin troops, used to the adventures of irregularwarfare, were little suited, tried the valour and patience of the intrepidmountaineers to the utmost. By that time Europe was in a ferment, and bothRussia and Austria, amazed at having the initiative in the regulation ofBalkan affairs wrested from them, showered on the Balkan capitals threatsand protests, which for once in a way were neglected. 

On October 13 Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia replied that the offer ofoutside assistance and advice had come too late, and that they had decidedthemselves to redress the intolerable and secular wrongs of theirlong-suffering compatriots in Macedonia by force of arms. To their dismaya treaty of peace was signed at Lausanne about the same time betweenTurkey and Italy, which power, it had been hoped, would have distractedTurkey's attention by a continuance of hostilities in northern Africa, andat any rate immobilized the Turkish fleet. Encouraged by this successTurkey boldly declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia on October 17, hoping tofrighten Greece and detach it from the league; but on the 18th the GreekGovernment replied by declaring war on Turkey, thus completing thenecessary formalities. The Turks were confident of an early and easyvictory, and hoped to reach Sofia, not from Constantinople and Thrace, butpushing up north-eastwards from Macedonia. The rapid offensive of theSerbian army, however, took them by surprise, and they were completelyoverwhelmed at the battle of Kumanovo in northern Macedonia on October23-4, 1912. On the 31st King Peter made his triumphal entry into Skoplje(ex-Üsküb), the ancient capital of Serbia under Tsar Stephen Du[)s]an inthe fourteenth century. From there the Serbian army pursued the Turkssouthward, and at the battles of Prilep (November 5) and Monastir(November 19), after encountering the most stubborn opposition, finallyput an end to their resistance in this part of the theatre of war. OnNovember 9 the Greeks entered Salonika. 

Meanwhile other divisions of the Serbian army had joined hands with theMontenegrins, and occupied almost without opposition the long-coveted_sandjak_ of Novi-Pazar (the ancient Serb Ra[)s]ka), to the inexpressiblerage of Austria-Hungary, which had evacuated it in 1908 in favour of itsrightful owner, Turkey. At the same time a Serbian expeditionary corpsmarched right through Albania, braving great hardships on the way, and onNovember 30 occupied Durazzo, thus securing at last a foothold on theAdriatic. Besides all this, Serbia, in fulfilment of its treatyobligations, dispatched 50, 000 splendidly equipped men, together with aquantity of heavy siege artillery, to help the Bulgarians at the siege ofAdrianople. On December 3 an armistice was signed between thebelligerents, with the condition that the three besieged Turkishfortresses of Adrianople, Scutari, and Yanina must not be re-victualled, and on December 16, 1912, peace negotiations were opened betweenrepresentatives of the belligerent countries in London. Meanwhile theGermanic powers, dismayed by the unexpected victories of the Balkan armiesand humiliated by the crushing defeats in the field of the German-trainedTurkish army, had since the beginning of November been doing everything intheir power to support their client Turkey and prevent its finalextinction and at the same time the blighting of their ambitionseventually to acquire the Empire of the Near East. During the conferencein London between the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, parallelmeetings took place between the representatives of the great powers, whoserelations with each other were strained and difficult in the extreme. TheTurkish envoys prolonged the negotiations, as was their custom; theynaturally were unwilling to concede their European provinces to thedespised and hated Greek and Slavonic conquerors, but the delays impliedgrowing hardships for their besieged and starving garrisons in Thrace, Epirus, and Albania. On January 23, 1913, a quasi-revolution occurred inthe Turkish army, headed by Enver Bey and other Young Turk partisans, andapproved by the Austrian and German embassies, with the object ofinterrupting the negotiations and staking all on the result of a finalbattle. As a result of these events, and of the palpable disingenuousnessof the Turks in continuing the negotiations in London, the Balkandelegates on January 29 broke them off, and on February 3, 1913, hostilities were resumed. At length, after a siege of nearly five months, Adrianople, supplied with infinitely better artillery than the alliespossessed, was taken by the combined Serbian and Bulgarian forces on March26, 1913. The Serbian troops at Adrianople captured 17, 010 Turkishprisoners, 190 guns, and the Turkish commander himself, Shukri Pasha. 

At the outbreak of the war in the autumn of 1912 the Balkan States hadobserved all the conventions, disavowing designs of territorialaggrandizement and proclaiming their resolve merely to obtain guaranteesfor the better treatment of the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia; thepowers, for their part, duly admonished the naughty children ofsouth-eastern Europe to the effect that no alteration of the territorial_status quo ante_ would under any circumstances be tolerated. During thenegotiations in London, interrupted in January, and resumed in the springof 1913 after the fall of Adrianople, it was soon made clear that in spiteof all these magniloquent declarations nothing would be as it had beenbefore. Throughout the winter Austria-Hungary had been mobilizing troopsand massing them along the frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro, anyincrease in the size of which countries meant a crushing blow to thedesigns of the Germanic powers and the end to all the dreams embodied inthe phrase 'Drang nach Osten' ('pushing eastwards'). 

In the spring of 1913 Serbia and Montenegro, instead of being defeated bythe brave Turks, as had been confidently predicted in Vienna and Berlinwould be the case, found themselves in possession of the _sandjak_ ofNovi-Pazar, of northern and central Macedonia (including Old Serbia), andof the northern half of Albania. The presence of Serbian troops on theshore of the Adriatic was more than Austria could stand, and at therenewed conference of London it was decided that they must retire. In theinterests of nationality, in which the Balkan States themselves undertookthe war, it was desirable that at any rate an attempt should be made tocreate an independent state of Albania, though no one who knew the localconditions felt confident as to its ultimate career. Its creation assuagedthe consciences of the Liberal Government in Great Britain and at the sametime admirably suited the strategic plans of Austria-Hungary. It left thatcountry a loophole for future diplomatic efforts to disturb the peace ofsouth-eastern Europe, and, with its own army in Bosnia and its politicalagents and irregular troops in Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, even thoughenlarged as it was generally recognized they must be, would be held in avice and could be threatened and bullied from the south now as well asfrom the north whenever it was in the interests of Vienna and Budapest toapply the screw. The independence of Albania was declared at theconference of London on May 30, 1913. Scutari was included in it as beinga purely Albanian town, and King Nicholas and his army, after enjoying itscoveted flesh-pots for a few halcyon weeks, had, to their mortification, to retire to the barren fastnesses of the Black Mountain. Serbia, frustrated by Austria in its attempts, generally recognized as legitimate, to obtain even a commercial outlet on the Adriatic, naturally againdiverted its aims southwards to Salonika. The Greeks were already inpossession of this important city and seaport, as well as of the whole ofsouthern Macedonia. The Serbs were in possession of central and northernMacedonia, including Monastir and Okhrida, which they had at greatsacrifices conquered from the Turks. It had been agreed that Bulgaria, asits share of the spoils, should have all central Macedonia, with Monastirand Okhrida, although on ethnical grounds the Bulgarians have only veryslightly better claim to the country and towns west of the Vardar than anyof the other Balkan nationalities. But at the time that the agreement hadbeen concluded it had been calculated in Greece and Serbia that Albania, far from being made independent, would be divided between them, and thatSerbia, assured of a strip of coast on the Adriatic, would have nointerest in the control of the river Vardar and of the railway whichfollows its course connecting the interior of Serbia with the port ofSalonika. Greece and Serbia had no ground whatever for quarrel and nocause for mutual distrust, and they were determined, for political andcommercial reasons, to have a considerable extent of frontier from west toeast in common. The creation of an independent Albania completely alteredthe situation. If Bulgaria should obtain central Macedonia and thus securea frontier from north to south in common with the newly-formed state ofAlbania, then Greece would be at the mercy of its hereditary enemies theBulgars and Arnauts (Albanians) as it had previously been at the mercy ofthe Turks, while Serbia would have two frontiers between itself and thesea instead of one, as before, and its complete economic strangulationwould be rendered inevitable and rapid. Bulgaria for its own partnaturally refused to waive its claim to central Macedonia, well knowingthat the master of the Vardar valley is master of the Balkan peninsula. The first repercussion of the ephemeral treaty of London of May 30, 1913, which created Albania and shut out Serbia from the Adriatic, was, therefore, as the diplomacy of the Germanic powers had all along intendedit should be, the beginning of a feud between Greece and Serbia on the onehand, and Bulgaria on the other, the disruption of the Balkan League andthe salvation, for the ultimate benefit of Germany, of what was left ofTurkey in Europe. 

The dispute as to the exact division of the conquered territory inMacedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria had, as arranged, been referred toarbitration, and, the Tsar of Russia having been chosen as judge, thematter was being threshed out in St. Petersburg during June 1913. Meanwhile Bulgaria, determined to make good its claim to the chestnutswhich Greece and Serbia had pulled out of the Turkish fire, was secretlycollecting troops along its temporary south-western frontier[1] with theobject, in approved Germanic fashion, of suddenly invading and occupyingall Macedonia, and, by the presentation of an irrevocable _fait accompli_, of relieving the arbitrator of his invidious duties or at any rateassisting him in the task. 

[Footnote 1: This was formed by the stream Zletovska, a tributary of theriver Bregalnica, which in its turn falls into the Vardar on its left oreastern bank about 40 miles south of Skoplje (Üsküb). ]

On the other hand, the relations between Bulgaria and its two allies hadbeen noticeably growing worse ever since January 1913; Bulgaria feltaggrieved that, in spite of its great sacrifices, it had not been able tooccupy so much territory as Greece and Serbia, and the fact thatAdrianople was taken with Serbian help did not improve the feeling betweenthe two Slav nations. The growth of Bulgarian animosity put Greece andSerbia on their guard, and, well knowing the direction which an eventualattack would take, these two countries on June 2, 1913, signed a militaryconvention and made all the necessary dispositions for resisting anyaggression on Bulgaria's part. At one o'clock in the morning of June 30the Bulgarians, without provocation, without declaration of war, andwithout warning, crossed the Bregalnica (a tributary of the Vardar) andattacked the Serbs. A most violent battle ensued which lasted for severaldays; at some points the Bulgarians, thanks to the suddenness of theiroffensive, were temporarily successful, but gradually the Serbs regainedthe upper hand and by July 1 the Bulgarians were beaten. The losses werevery heavy on both sides, but the final issue was a complete triumph forthe Serbian army. Slivnitsa was avenged by the battle of the Bregalnica, just as Kosovo was by that of Kumanovo. After a triumphant campaign of onemonth, in which the Serbs were joined by the Greeks, Bulgaria had to bowto the inevitable. The Rumanian army had invaded northern Bulgaria, benton maintaining the Balkan equilibrium and on securing compensation forhaving observed neutrality during the war of 1912-13, and famine reignedat Sofia. A conference was arranged at Bucarest, and the treaty of thatname was signed there on August 10, 1913. By the terms of this treatySerbia retained the whole of northern and central Macedonia, includingMonastir and Okhrida, and the famous _sandjak_ of Novi-Pazar was dividedbetween Serbia and Montenegro. Some districts of east-central Macedonia, which were genuinely Bulgarian, were included in Serbian territory, asSerbia naturally did not wish, after the disquieting and costly experienceof June and July 1913, to give the Bulgarians another chance of separatingGreek from Serbian territory by a fresh surprise attack, and the furtherthe Bulgarians could be kept from the Vardar river and railway the lesslikelihood there was of this. The state of feeling in the Germaniccapitals and in Budapest after this ignominious defeat of their protégéBulgaria and after this fresh triumph of the despised and hated Serbianscan be imagined. Bitterly disappointed first at seeing the Turksvanquished by the Balkan League--their greatest admirers could not evenclaim that the Turks had had any 'moral' victories--their chagrin, whenthey saw the Bulgarians trounced by the Serbians, knew no bounds. That thesecretly prepared attack on Serbia by Bulgaria was planned in Vienna andBudapest there is no doubt. That Bulgaria was justified in feelingdisappointment and resentment at the result of the first Balkan War no onedenies, but the method chosen to redress its wrongs could only have beensuggested by the Germanic school of diplomacy. 

In Serbia and Montenegro the result of the two successive Balkan Wars, though these had exhausted the material resources of the two countries, was a justifiable return of national self-confidence and rejoicing such asthe people, humiliated and impoverished as it had habitually been by itsinternal and external troubles, had not known for very many years. At lastSerbia and Montenegro had joined hands. At last Old Serbia was restored tothe free kingdom. At last Skoplje, the mediaeval capital of Tsar StephenDu[)s]an, was again in Serbian territory. At last one of the mostimportant portions of unredeemed Serbia had been reclaimed. Amongst theSerbs and Croats of Bosnia, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, andsouthern Hungary the effect of the Serbian victories was electrifying. Military prowess had been the one quality with which they, and indeedeverybody else, had refused to credit the Serbians of the kingdom, and thetriumphs of the valiant Serbian peasant soldiers immediately imparted aheroic glow to the country whose very name, at any rate in central Europe, had become a byword, and a synonym for failure; Belgrade became thecynosure and the rallying-centre of the whole Serbo-Croatian race. ButVienna and Budapest could only lose courage and presence of mind for themoment, and the undeniable success of the Serbian arms merely sharpenedtheir appetite for revenge. In August 1913 Austria-Hungary, as is nowknown, secretly prepared an aggression on Serbia, but was restrained, partly by the refusal of Italy to grant its approval of such action, partly because the preparations of Germany at that time were not complete. The fortunate Albanian question provided, for the time being, a moreconvenient rod with which to beat Serbia. Some Serbian troops had remainedin possession of certain frontier towns and districts which were includedin the territory of the infant state of Albania pending the finalsettlement of the frontiers by a commission. On October 18, 1913, Austriaaddressed an ultimatum to Serbia to evacuate these, as its continuedoccupation of them caused offence and disquiet to the Dual Monarchy. Serbia meekly obeyed. Thus passed away the last rumble of the storms whichhad filled the years 1912-13 in south-eastern Europe. 

The credulous believed that the Treaty of Bucarest had at last broughtpeace to that distracted part of the world. Those who knew their centralEurope realized that Berlin had only forced Vienna to acquiesce in theTreaty of Bucarest because the time had not yet come. But come what might, Serbia and Montenegro, by having linked up their territory and by forminga mountain barrier from the Danube to the Adriatic, made it far moredifficult for the invader to push his way through to the East than itwould have been before the battles of Kumanovo and Bregalnica. 

GREECE

1

_From Ancient to Modern Greece_

The name of Greece has two entirely different associations in our minds. Sometimes it calls up a wonderful literature enshrined in a 'deadlanguage', and exquisite works of a vanished art recovered by the spade;at other times it is connected with the currant-trade returns quoted onthe financial page of our newspapers or with the 'Balance of Power'discussed in their leading articles. Ancient and Modern Greece both meanmuch to us, but usually we are content to accept them as independentphenomena, and we seldom pause to wonder whether there is any deeperconnexion between them than their name. It is the purpose of these pagesto ask and give some answer to this question. 

The thought that his own Greece might perish, to be succeeded by anotherGreece after the lapse of more than two thousand years, would have causedan Ancient Greek surprise. In the middle of the fifth century B. C. , Ancient Greek civilization seemed triumphantly vigorous and secure. Ageneration before, it had flung back the onset of a political power whichcombined all the momentum of all the other contemporary civilizations inthe world; and the victory had proved not merely the superiority of Greekarms--the Spartan spearman and the Athenian galley--but the superiorvitality of Greek politics--the self-governing, self-sufficing city-state. In these cities a wonderful culture had burst into flower--an artexpressing itself with equal mastery in architecture, sculpture, anddrama, a science which ranged from the most practical medicine to the mostabstract mathematics, and a philosophy which blended art, science, andreligion into an ever-developing and ever more harmonious view of theuniverse. A civilization so brilliant and so versatile as this seemed tohave an infinite future before it, yet even here death lurked in ambush. 

When the cities ranged themselves in rival camps, and squandered theirstrength on the struggle for predominance, the historian of thePeloponnesian war could already picture Athens and Sparta in ruins, [1] andthe catastrophe began to warp the soul of Plato before he had carriedGreek philosophy to its zenith. This internecine strife of freecommunities was checked within a century by the imposition of a singlemilitary autocracy over them all, and Alexander the Great crowned hisfather Philip's work by winning new worlds for Hellenism from the Danubeto the Ganges and from the Oxus to the Nile. The city-state and itsculture were to be propagated under his aegis, but this vision vanishedwith Alexander's death, and Macedonian militarism proved a disappointment. The feuds of these crowned condottieri harassed the cities more sorelythan their own quarrels, and their arms could not even preserve theHellenic heritage against external foes. The Oriental rallied and expelledHellenism again from the Asiatic hinterland, while the new cloud of Romewas gathering in the west. In four generations[2] of the most devastatingwarfare the world had seen, Rome conquered all the coasts of theMediterranean. Greek city and Greek dynast went down before her, and thepolitical sceptre passed irrevocably from the Hellenic nation. 

[Footnote 1: Thucydides, Book I, chap. 10. ]

[Footnote 2: 264-146 B. C. ]

Yet this political abdication seemed to open for Hellenic culture a futuremore brilliant and assured than ever. Rome could organize as well asconquer. She accepted the city-state as the municipal unit of the RomanEmpire, thrust back the Oriental behind the Euphrates, and promoted theHellenization of all the lands between this river-frontier and the Balkanswith much greater intensity than the Macedonian imperialists. Herpolitical conquests were still further counterbalanced by her spiritualsurrender, and Hellenism was the soul of the new Latin culture which Romecreated, and which advanced with Roman government over the vast untutoredprovinces of the west and north, bringing them, too, within the orbit ofHellenic civilization. Under the shadow of the Roman Empire, Plutarch, themirror of Hellenism, could dwell in peace in his little city-state ofChaeronea, and reflect in his writings all the achievements of theHellenic spirit as an ensample to an apparently endless posterity. 

Yet the days of Hellenic culture were also numbered. Even Plutarchlived[1] to look down from the rocky citadel of Chaeronea upon Teutonicraiders wasting the Kephisos vale, and for more than three centuriessuccessive hordes of Goths searched out and ravaged the furthest cornersof European Greece. Then the current set westward to sweep away[2] theRoman administration in the Latin provinces, and Hellenism seemed to havebeen granted a reprieve. The Greek city-state of Byzantium on the BlackSea Straits had been transformed into the Roman administrative centre ofConstantinople, and from this capital the Emperor Justinian in the sixthcentury A. D. Still governed and defended the whole Greek-speaking world. But this political glamour only threw the symptoms of inward dissolutioninto sharper relief. Within the framework of the Empire the municipalliberty of the city-state had been stifled and extinguished by the waxingjungle of bureaucracy, and the spiritual culture which the city-statefostered, and which was more essential to Hellenism than any politicalinstitutions, had been part ejected, part exploited, and wholly compromisedby a new gospel from the east. 

[Footnote 1: About A. D. 100]

[Footnote 2: A. D. 404-476]

While the Oriental had been compelled by Rome to draw his politicalfrontier at the Euphrates, and had failed so far to cross the river-line, he had maintained his cultural independence within sight of theMediterranean. In the hill country of Judah, overlooking the high roadbetween Antioch and Alexandria, the two chief foci of Hellenism in theeast which the Macedonians had founded, and which had grown to maturityunder the aegis of Rome, there dwelt a little Semitic community which haddefied all efforts of Greek or Roman to assimilate it, and had finallygiven birth to a world religion about the time that a Roman punitiveexpedition razed its holy city of Jerusalem to the ground. [1] Christianitywas charged with an incalculable force, which shot like an electriccurrent from one end of the Roman Empire to the other. Thehighly-organized society of its adherents measured its strength in severalsharp conflicts with the Imperial administration, from which it emergedvictorious, and it was proclaimed the official religious organization ofthe Empire by the very emperor that founded Constantinople. [2]

[Footnote 1: A. D. 70. ]

[Footnote 2: Constantine the Great recognized Christianity in A. D. 313 andfounded Constantinople in A. D. 328. ]

The established Christian Church took the best energies of Hellenism intoits service. The Greek intellectuals ceased to become lecturers andprofessors, to find a more human and practical career in the bishop'soffice. The Nicene Creed, drafted by an 'oecumenical' conference ofbishops under the auspices of Constantine himself, [1] was the last notableformulation of Ancient Greek philosophy. The cathedral of Aya Sophia, withwhich Justinian adorned Constantinople, was the last original creation ofAncient Greek art. [2] The same Justinian closed the University of Athens, which had educated the world for nine hundred years and more, since Platofounded his college in the Academy. Six recalcitrant professors went intoexile for their spiritual freedom, but they found the devoutZoroastrianism of the Persian court as unsympathetic as the devoutChristianity of the Roman. Their humiliating return and recantation brokethe 'Golden Chain' of Hellenic thought for ever. 

Hellenism was thus expiring from its own inanition, when the inevitableavalanche overwhelmed it from without. In the seventh century A. D. Therewas another religious eruption in the Semitic world, this time in theheart of Arabia, where Hellenism had hardly penetrated, and under theimpetus of Islam the Oriental burst his bounds again after a thousandyears. Syria was reft away from the Empire, and Egypt, and North Africa asfar as the Atlantic, and their political severance meant their culturalloss to Greek civilization. Between the Koran and Hellenism no fusion waspossible. Christianity had taken Hellenism captive, but Islam gave it noquarter, and the priceless library of Alexandria is said to have beencondemned by the caliph's order to feed the furnaces of the public baths. 

[Footnote 1: A. D. 325. ]

[Footnote 2: Completed A. D. 538. ]

While Hellenism was thus cut short in the east, a mortal blow was struckat its heart from the north. The Teuton had raided and passed on, but thelands he had depopulated were now invaded by immigrants who had come tostay. As soon as the last Goth and Lombard had gone west of the Isonzo, the Slavs poured in from the north-eastern plains of Europe through theMoravian gap, crossed the Danube somewhere near the site of Vienna, anddrifted down along the eastern face of the Alps upon the Adriaticlittoral. Rebuffed by the sea-board, the Slavonic migration was nextdeflected east, and filtered through the Bosnian mountains, scattering theLatin-speaking provincials before it to left and right, until it debouchedupon the broad basin of the river Morava. In this concentration-area itgathered momentum during the earlier part of the seventh century A. D. , andthen burst out with irresistible force in all directions, eastward acrossthe Maritsa basin till it reached the Black Sea, and southward down theVardar to the shores of the Aegean. 

Beneath this Slavonic flood the Greek race in Europe was engulfed. A fewfortified cities held out, Adrianople on the Maritsa continued to coverConstantinople; Salonika at the mouth of the Vardar survived a two hundredyears siege; while further south Athens, Korinth, and Patras escapedextinction. But the tide of invasion surged around their walls. The Slavsmastered all the open country, and, pressing across the Korinthian Gulf, established themselves in special force throughout the Peloponnesos. Thethoroughness of their penetration is witnessed to this day by the Slavonicnames which still cling to at least a third of the villages, rivers, andmountains in European Greece, and are found in the most remote as well asin the most accessible quarters of the land. [1]

[Footnote 1: For example: Tsimova and Panitsa in the Tainaron peninsula(Maina); Tsoupana and Khrysapha in Lakonia; Dhimitzana, Karytena, andAndhritsena in the centre of Peloponnesos, and Vostitsa on its north coast;Dobrena and Kaprena in Boiotia; Vonitza on the Gulf of Arta; Kardhitsa inthe Thessalian plain. ]

With the coming of the Slavs darkness descends like a curtain upon Greekhistory. We catch glimpses of Arab hosts ranging across Anatolia at willand gazing at Slavonic hordes across the narrow Bosphorus. But always theImperial fleet patrols the waters between, and always the triple defencesof Constantinople defy the assailant. Then after about two centuries thefloods subside, the gloom disperses, and the Greek world emerges into viewonce more. But the spectacle before us is unfamiliar, and most of the oldlandmarks have been swept away. 

By the middle of the ninth century A. D. , the Imperial Government hadreduced the Peloponnesos to order again, and found itself in the presenceof three peoples. The greater part of the land was occupied by 'Romaioi'--normal, loyal, Christian subjects of the empire--but in the hilly countrybetween Eurotas, Taygetos, and the sea, two Slavonic tribes stillmaintained themselves in defiant savagery and worshipped their Slavonicgods, while beyond them the peninsula of Tainaron, now known as Maina, sheltered communities which still clung to the pagan name of Hellene andknew no other gods but Zeus, Athena, and Apollo. Hellene and Slav need notconcern us. They were a vanishing minority, and the Imperial Governmentwas more successful in obliterating their individuality than in makingthem contribute to its exchequer. The future lay with the Romaioi. 

The speech of these Romaioi was not the speech of Rome. 'Romaikà, ' as itis still called popularly in the country-side, is a development of the'koinè' or 'current' dialect of Ancient Greek, in which the Septuagint andthe New Testament are written. The vogue of these books after the triumphof Christianity and the oncoming of the Dark Age, when they were the soleintellectual sustenance of the people, gave the idiom in which they werecomposed an exclusive prevalence. Except in Tzakonia--the iron-bound coastbetween Cape Malea and Nauplia Bay--all other dialects of Ancient Greekbecame extinct, and the varieties of the modern language are alldifferentiations of the 'koinè', along geographical lines which in no waycorrespond with those which divided Doric from Ionian. Yet though Romaicis descended from the 'koinè', it is almost as far removed from it asmodern Italian is from the language of St. Augustine or Cicero. AncientGreek possessed a pitch-accent only, which allowed the quantitative valuesof syllables to be measured against one another, and even to form thebasis of a metrical system. In Romaic the pitch-accent has transformeditself into a stress-accent almost as violent as the English, which hasdestroyed all quantitative relation between accented and unaccentedsyllables, often wearing away the latter altogether at the termination ofwords, and always impoverishing their vowel sounds. In the ninth centuryA. D. This new enunciation was giving rise to a new poetical techniquefounded upon accent and rhyme, which first essayed itself in folk-songsand ballads, [1] and has since experimented in the same variety of forms asEnglish poetry. 

[Footnote 1: The earliest products of the modern technique were called'city' verses, because they originated in Constantinople, which hasremained 'the city' _par excellence_ for the Romaic Greek ever since theDark Age made it the asylum of his civilization. ]

These humble beginnings of a new literature were supplemented by therudiments of a new art. Any visitor at Athens who looks at the three tinychurches [1] built in this period of first revival, and compares them withthe rare pre-Norman churches of England, will find the same promise ofvitality in the Greek architecture as in his own. The material--workedblocks of marble pillaged from ancient monuments, alternating with coursesof contemporary brick--produces a completely new aesthetic effect upon theeye; and the structure--a grouping of lesser cupolas round a central dome--is the very antithesis of the 'upright-and-horizontal' style whichconfronts him in ruins upon the Akropolis. 

[Footnote 1: The Old Metropolitan, the Kapnikaria, and St. Theodore. ]

These first achievements of Romaic architecture speak by implication ofthe characteristic difference between the Romaios and the Hellene. Thelinguistic and the aesthetic change were as nothing compared to the changein religion, for while the Hellene had been a pagan, the Romaios wasessentially a member of the Christian Church. Yet this new and determiningcharacteristic was already fortified by tradition. The Church triumphanthad swiftly perfected its organisation on the model of the Imperialbureaucracy. Every Romaios owed ecclesiastical allegiance, through ahierarchy of bishops and metropolitans, to a supreme patriarch atConstantinople, and in the ninth century this administrative segregationof the imperial from the west-European Church had borne its inevitablefruit in a dogmatic divergence, and ripened into a schism between theOrthodox Christianity of the east on the one hand and the Catholicism ofthe Latin world on the other. 

The Orthodox Church exercised an important cultural influence over itsRomaic adherents. The official language of its scriptures, creeds, andritual had never ceased to be the Ancient Greek 'koinè' and by keeping theRomaios familiar with this otherwise obsolete tongue it kept him in touchwith the unsurpassable literature of his Ancient Greek predecessors. Thevast body of Hellenic literature had perished during the Dark Age, whenall the energies of the race were absorbed by the momentary struggle forsurvival; but about a third of the greatest authors' greatest works hadbeen preserved, and now that the stress was relieved, the wreckage of theremainder was sedulously garnered in anthologies, abridgements, andencyclopaedias. The rising monasteries offered a safe harbourage both forthese compilations and for such originals as survived unimpaired, and intheir libraries they were henceforth studied, cherished, and above allrecopied with more or less systematic care. 

The Orthodox Church was thus a potent link between past and present, butthe most direct link of all was the political survival of the Empire. Here, too, many landmarks had been swept away. The marvellous system ofRoman Law had proved too subtle and complex for a world in the throes ofdissolution. Within a century of its final codification by Justinian'scommissioners) it had begun to fall into disuse, and was now replaced bymore summary legislation, which was as deeply imbued with Mosaicprinciples as the literary language with the Hebraisms of the NewTestament, and bristled with barbarous applications of the _Lex Talionis_. The administrative organization instituted by Augustus and elaborated byDiocletian had likewise disappeared, and the army-corps districts were theonly territorial units that outlasted the Dark Age. Yet the tradition oforder lived on. The army itself preserved Roman discipline and techniqueto a remarkable degree, and the military districts were already becomingthe basis for a reconstituted civil government. The wealth of Latintechnicalities incorporated in the Greek style of ninth-centuryofficialdom witnesses to this continuity with the past and to theconsequent political superiority of the Romaic Empire over contemporarywestern Europe. 

Within the Imperial frontiers the Romaic race was offered an apparentlysecure field for its future development. In the Balkan peninsula the Slavhad been expelled or assimilated to the south of a line stretching fromAvlona to Salonika. East of Salonika the empire still controlled littlemore in Europe than the ports of the littoral, and a military highwaylinking them with each other and with Constantinople. But beyond theBosphorus the frontier included the whole body of Anatolia as far asTaurus and Euphrates, and here was the centre of gravity both of theRomaic state and of the Romaic nation. 

A new Greek nation had in fact come into being, and it found itself intouch with new neighbours, whom the Ancient Greek had never known. Eastward lay the Armenians, reviving, like the Greeks, after the ebb ofthe Arab flood, and the Arabs themselves, quiescent within their naturalbounds and transfusing the wisdom of Aristotle and Hippokrates into theirnative culture. Both these peoples were sundered from the Orthodox Greekby religion[1] as well as by language, but a number of nationalitiesestablished on his opposite flank had been evangelized from Constantinopleand followed the Orthodox patriarch in his schism with Rome. The mostimportant neighbour of the Empire in this quarter was the Bulgariankingdom, which covered all the Balkan hinterland from the Danube and theBlack Sea to the barrier-fortresses of Adrianople and Salonika. It hadbeen founded by a conquering caste of non-Slavonic nomads from thetrans-Danubian steppes, but these were completely absorbed in the Slavonicpopulation which they had endowed with their name and had preserved bypolitical consolidation from the fate of their brethren further south. This Bulgarian state included a large 'Vlach' element descended from thoseLatin-speaking provincials whom the Slavs had pushed before them in theiroriginal migration; while the main body of the 'Rumans', whom the samethrust of invasion had driven leftwards across the Danube, had establisheditself in the mountains of Transylvania, and was just beginning to pushdown into the Wallachian and Moldavian plains. Like the Bulgars, thisRomance population had chosen the Orthodox creed, and so had the purelySlavonic Serbs, who had replaced the Rumans in the basin of the Morava andthe Bosnian hills, as far westward as the Adriatic coast. Beyond, theheathen Magyars had pressed into the Danubian plains like a wedge, and cutoff the Orthodox world from the Latin-Teutonic Christendom of the west;but it looked as though the two divisions of Europe were embarked upon thesame course of development. Both were evolving a system of strongly-knitnationalities, neither wholly interdependent nor wholly self-sufficient, but linked together in their individual growth by the ties of commonculture and religion. In both the darkness was passing. The future ofcivilization seemed once more assured, and in the Orthodox world the newGreek nation seemed destined to play the leading part. 

[Footnote 1: The Armenians split off from the Catholic Church fourcenturies before the schism between the Roman and Orthodox sections of thelatter. ]

His cultural and political heritage from his ancient predecessors gave theRomaic Greek in this period of revival an inestimable advantage over hiscruder neighbours, and his superiority declared itself in an expansion ofthe Romaic Empire. In the latter half of the tenth century A. D. The nestof Arab pirates from Spain, which had established itself in Krete andterrorized the Aegean, was exterminated by the Emperor Nikiphóros Phokas, and on the eastern marches Antioch was gathered within the frontier at theArabs' expense, and advanced posts pushed across Euphrates. In the firsthalf of the eleventh century Basil, 'Slayer of the Bulgars', destroyed theBalkan kingdom after a generation of bitter warfare, and brought the wholeinterior of the peninsula under the sway of Constantinople. His successorsturned their attention to the cast again, and attracted one Armenianprincipality after another within the Imperial protectorate. Nor was therevival confined to politics. The conversion of the Russians about A. D. 1000 opened a boundless hinterland to the Orthodox Church, and any one whoglances at a series of Greek ivory carvings or studies Greek history fromthe original sources, will here encounter a literary and artisticrenaissance remarkable enough to explain the fascination which thebarbarous Russian and the outlandish Armenian found in Constantinople. Yetthis renaissance had hardly set in before it was paralysed by anunexpected blow, which arrested the development of Modern Greece for sevencenturies. 

Modern, like Ancient, Greece was assailed in her infancy by a conquerorfrom the east, and, unlike Ancient Greece, she succumbed. Turkish nomadsfrom the central Asiatic steppes had been drifting into the Moslem worldas the vigour of the Arabs waned. First they came as slaves, then asmercenaries, until at last, in the eleventh century, the clan of Seljukgrasped with a strong hand the political dominion of Islam. As championsof the caliph the Turkish sultans disputed the infidels encroachment onthe Moslem border. They challenged the Romaic Empire's progress inArmenia, and in A. D. 1071--five years after the Norman founded at Hastingsthe strong government which has been the making of England--the SeljukTurk shattered at the battle of Melasgerd that heritage of stronggovernment which had promised so much to Greece. 

Melasgerd opened the way to Anatolia. The Arab could make no lodgementthere, but in the central steppe of the temperate plateau the Turk found aminiature reproduction of his original environment. Tribe after tribecrossed the Oxus, to make the long pilgrimage to these new marches whichtheir race had won for Islam on the west, and the civilization developedin the country by fifteen centuries of intensive and undisturbedHellenization was completely blotted out. The cities wore isolated fromone another till their commerce fell into decay. The elaboratelycultivated lands around them were left fallow till they were good fornothing but the pasturage which was all that the nomad required. The onlymonuments of architecture that have survived in Anatolia above ground arethe imposing khans or fortified rest-houses built by the Seljuk sultansthemselves after the consolidation of their rule, and they are the bestwitnesses of the vigorous barbarism by which Romaic culture was effaced. The vitality of the Turk was indeed unquestionable. He imposed hislanguage and religion upon the native Anatolian peasantry, as the Greekhad imposed his before him, and in time adopted their sedentary life, though too late to repair the mischief his own nomadism had wrought. Turkand Anatolian coalesced into one people; every mountain, river, lake, bridge, and village in the country took on a Turkish name, and a newnation was established for ever in the heart of the Romaic world, whichnourished itself on the life-blood of the Empire and was to prove thesupreme enemy, of the race. 

This sequel to Melasgerd sealed the Empire's doom. Robbed of its Anatoliangoverning class and its Anatolian territorial army, it ceased to beself-sufficient, and the defenders it attracted from the west were atleast as destructive as its eastern foes. The brutal régime of the Turksin the pilgrimage places of Syria had roused a storm of indignation inLatin Europe, and a cloud gathered in the west once more. It was heraldedby adventurers from Normandy, who had first served the Romaic Governmentas mercenaries in southern Italy and then expelled their employers, aboutthe time of Melasgerd, from their last foothold in the peninsula. Raidsacross the straits of Otranto carried the Normans up to the walls ofSalonika, their fleets equipped in Sicily scoured the Aegean, and, beforethe eleventh century was out, they had followed up these reconnoitringexpeditions by conducting Latin Christendom on its first crusade. Thecrusaders assembled at Constantinople, and the Imperial Government wasrelieved when the flood rolled on and spent itself further east. But onewave was followed by another, and the Empire itself succumbed to thefourth. In A. D. 1204, Constantinople was stormed by a Venetian flotillaand the crusading host it conveyed on board, and more treasures of AncientHellenism were destroyed in the sack of its hitherto inviolate citadelthan had ever perished by the hand of Arab or Slav. 

With the fall of the capital the Empire dissolved in chaos, Venice andGenoa, the Italian trading cities whose fortune had been made by thecrusades, now usurped the naval control of the Mediterranean which theEmpire had exercised since Nikiphóros pacified Krete. They seized allstrategical points of vantage on the Aegean coasts, and founded an'extra-territorial' community at Pera across the Golden Horn, tomonopolize the trade of Constantinople with the Black Sea. The Latinsfailed to retain their hold on Constantinople itself, for the puppetemperors of their own race whom they enthroned there were evicted within acentury by Romaic dynasts, who clung to such fragments of Anatolia as hadescaped the Turk. But the Latin dominion was less ephemeral in thesouthernmost Romaic provinces of Europe. The Latins' castles, moreconspicuous than the relics of Hellas, still crown many high hills inGreece, and their French tongue has added another strain, to the variednomenclature of the country. [1] Yet there also pandemonium prevailed. Burgundian barons, Catalan condottieri, and Florentine bankers snatchedthe Duchy of Athens from one another in bewildering succession, while theFrench princes of Achaia were at feud with their kindred vassals in thewest of the Peloponnesos whenever they were not resisting theencroachments of Romaic despots in the south and east. To complete theanarchy, the non-Romaic peoples in the interior of the Balkan peninsulahad taken the fall of Constantinople as a signal to throw off the Imperialyoke. In the hinterland of the capital the Bulgars had reconstituted theirkingdom. The Romance-speaking Vlachs of Pindus moved down into theThessalian plains. The aboriginal Albanians, who with their back to theAdriatic had kept the Slavs at bay, asserted their vitality and sent outmigratory swarms to the south, which entered the service of the warringprincelets and by their prowess won broad lands in every part ofcontinental Greece, where Albanian place-names are to this day only lesscommon than Slavonic. South-eastern Europe was again in the throes ofsocial dissolution, and the convulsions continued till they were stilledimpartially by the numbing hand of their ultimate author the Turk. 

[Footnote 1: e. G. Klemoutsi, Glarentsa (Clarence) and Gastouni--villagesof the currant district in Peloponnesos--and Sant-Omeri, the mountain thatoverlooks them. ]

The Seljuk sultanate in Anatolia, shaken by the crusades, had gone the wayof all oriental empires to make room for one of its fractions, whichshowed a most un-oriental faculty of organic growth. This was the extrememarch on the north-western rim of the Anatolian plateau, overlooking theAsiatic littoral of the Sea of Marmora. It had been founded by one ofthose Turkish chiefs who migrated with their clans from beyond the Oxus;and it was consolidated by Othman his son, who extended his kingdom to thecities on the coast and invested his subjects with his own name. In 1355the Narrows of Gallipoli passed into Ottoman hands, and opened a bridge tounexpected conquests in Europe. Serbia and Bulgaria collapsed at the firstattack, and the hosts which marched to liberate them from Hungary and fromFrance only ministered to Ottoman prestige by their disastrousdiscomfiture. Before the close of the fourteenth century the Ottomansultan had transferred his capital to Adrianople, and had becomeimmeasurably the strongest power in the Balkan peninsula. 

After that the end came quickly. At Constantinople the Romaic dynasty ofPalaiologos had upheld a semblance of the Empire for more than a centuryafter the Latin was expelled. But in 1453 the Imperial city fell beforethe assault of Sultan Mohammed; and before his death the conqueroreliminated all the other Romaic and Latin principalities from Peloponnesosto Trebizond, which had survived as enclaves to mar the uniformity of theOttoman domain. Under his successors the tide of Ottoman conquest rolledon for half a century more over south-eastern Europe, till it was stayedon land beneath the ramparts of Vienna, [1] and culminated on sea, afterthe systematic reduction of the Venetian strongholds, in the capture ofRhodes from the Knights of St. John. [2] The Romaic race, which had beensplit into so many fragments during the dissolution of the Empire, wasreunited again in the sixteenth century under the common yoke of the Turk. 

[Footnote 1: 1526. ]

[Footnote 2: 1522. ]

Even in the Dark Age, Greece had hardly been reduced to so desperate acondition as now. Through the Dark Age the Greek cities had maintained acontinuous life, but Mohammed II depopulated Constantinople to repeople itwith a Turkish majority from Anatolia. Greek commerce would naturally havebenefited by the ejection of the Italians from the Levant, had not theOttoman Government given asylum simultaneously to the Jews expelled fromSpain. These Sephardim established themselves at Constantinople, Salonika, and all the other commercial centres of the Ottoman dominion, and theirsuperiority in numbers and industry made them more formidable urban rivalsof the Greeks than the Venetians and Genoese had ever been. 

Ousted from the towns, the Greek race depended for its preservation on thepeasantry, yet Greece had never suffered worse rural oppression than underthe Ottoman régime. The sultan's fiscal demands were the least part of theburden. The paralysing land-tax, collected in kind by irresponsiblemiddlemen, was an inheritance from the Romaic Empire, and though it wasnow reinforced by the special capitation-tax levied by the sultan on hisChristian subjects, the greater efficiency and security of his governmentprobably compensated for the additional charge. The vitality of Greece waschiefly sapped by the ruthless military organization of the Ottoman state. The bulk of the Ottoman army was drawn from a feudal cavalry, bound toservice, as in the mediaeval Latin world, in return for fiefs or 'timaria'assigned to them by their sovereign; and many beys and agas havebequeathed their names in perpetuity to the richest villages on theMessenian and Thessalian plains, to remind the modern peasant that hisChristian ancestors once tilled the soil as serfs of a Moslem timariot. But the sultan, unlike his western contemporaries, was not content withirregular troops, and the serf-communes of Greece had to deliver up afifth of their male children every fourth year to be trained atConstantinople as professional soldiers and fanatical Moslems. This corpsof 'Janissaries'[1] was founded in the third generation of the Ottomandynasty, and was the essential instrument of its military success. Onerace has never appropriated and exploited the vitality of another in sodirect or so brutal a fashion, and the institution of 'tribute-children', so long as it lasted, effectually prevented any recovery of the Greeknation from the untimely blows which had stricken it down. 

[Footnote 1: Yeni Asker--New soldiery. ]

2

_The Awakening of the Nation_

During the two centuries that followed the Ottoman conquest ofConstantinople, the Greek race was in serious danger of annihilation. Itslife-blood was steadily absorbed into the conquering community--quiteregularly by the compulsory tribute of children and spasmodically by thevoluntary conversion of individual households. The rich apostasized, because too heavy a material sacrifice was imposed upon them by loyalty totheir national religion; the destitute, because they could not fail toimprove their prospects by adhering to the privileged faith. Even thesurviving organization of the Church had only been spared by the OttomanGovernment in order to facilitate its own political system--by bringingthe peasant, through the hierarchy of priest, bishop, and patriarch, underthe moral control of the new Moslem master whom the ecclesiasticshenceforth served. 

The scale on which wholesale apostasy was possible is shown by the case ofKrete, which was conquered by the Turks from Venice just after these twocenturies had closed, and was in fact the last permanent addition to theTurkish Empire. No urban or feudal settlers of Turkish blood were importedinto the island. To this day the uniform speech of all Kretans is theirnative Greek. And yet the progressive conversion of whole clans andvillages had transferred at least 20 per cent. Of the population to theMoslem ranks before the Ottoman connexion was severed again in 1897. 

The survival of the Greek nationality did not depend on any efforts of theGreeks themselves. They were indeed no longer capable of effort, but laypassive under the hand of the Turk, like the paralysed quarry of somebeast of prey. Their fate was conditional upon the development of theOttoman state, and, as the two centuries drew to a close, that stateentered upon a phase of transformation and of consequent weakness. 

The Ottoman organism has always displayed (and never more conspicuouslythan at the present moment) a much greater stability and vitality than anyof its oriental predecessors. There was a vein of genius in its creators, and its youthful expansion permeated it with so much European blood thatit became partly Europeanized in its inner tissues--sufficiently topartake, at any rate, in that faculty of indefinite organic growth whichhas so far revealed itself in European life. This acquired force hascarried it on since the time when the impetus of its original institutionsbecame spent--a time when purely oriental monarchies fall to pieces, andwhen Turkey herself hesitated between reconstruction and dissolution. Thatcritical period began for her with the latter half of the seventeenthcentury, and incidentally opened new opportunities of life to her subjectGreeks. 

Substantial relief from their burdens--the primary though negativecondition of national revival--accrued to the Greek peasantry from thedecay of Ottoman militarism in all its branches. The Turkish feudalaristocracy, which had replaced the landed nobility of the Romaic Empirein Anatolia and established itself on the choicest lands in conqueredEurope, was beginning to decline in strength. We have seen that it failedto implant itself in Krete, and its numbers were already stationaryelsewhere. The Greek peasant slowly began to regain ground upon his Moslemlord, and he profited further by the degeneration of the janissary corpsat the heart of the empire. 

The janissaries had started as a militant, almost monastic body, condemnedto celibacy, and recruited exclusively from the Christiantribute-children. But in 1566 they extorted the privilege of legalmarriage for themselves, and of admittance into the corps for the sons oftheir wedlock. The next century completed their transformation from astanding army into a hereditary urban militia--an armed and privileged_bourgeoisie_, rapidly increasing in numbers and correspondingly jealousof extraneous candidates for the coveted vacancies in their ranks. Theygradually succeeded in abolishing the enrolment of Christian recruitsaltogether, and the last regular levy of children for that purpose wasmade in 1676. Vested interests at Constantinople had freed the helplesspeasant from the most crushing burden of all. 

At the same moment the contemporary tendency in western Europe towardsbureaucratic centralization began to extend itself to the Ottoman Empire. Its exponents were the brothers Achmet and Mustapha Köprili, who held thegrand-vizierate in succession. They laid the foundations of a centralizedadministration, and, since the unadaptable Turk offered no promisingmaterial for their policy, they sought their instruments in the subjectrace. The continental Greeks were too effectively crushed to aspire beyondthe preservation of their own existence; but the islands had been lesssorely tried, and Khios, which had enjoyed over two centuries[1] ofprosperity under the rule of a Genoese chartered company, and exchanged itfor Ottoman sovereignty under peculiarly lenient conditions, could stillsupply Achmet a century later with officials of the intelligence andeducation he required, Khiots were the first to fill the new offices of'Dragoman of the Porte' (secretary of state) and 'Dragoman of the Fleet'(civil complement of the Turkish capitan-pasha); and they took care intheir turn to staff the subordinate posts of their administration with ahost of pushing friends and dependants. The Dragoman of the Fleet wieldedthe fiscal, and thereby in effect the political, authority over the Greekislands in the Aegean; but this was not the highest power to which the newGreek bureaucracy attained. Towards the beginning of the eighteenthcentury Moldavia and Wallachia--the two 'Danubian Provinces' now united inthe kingdom of Rumania--were placed in charge of Greek officials with therank of voivode or prince, and with practically sovereign power withintheir delegated dominions. A Danubian principality became the reward of asuccessful dragoman's career, and these high posts were rapidlymonopolized by a close ring of official families, who exercised theirimmense patronage in favour of their race, and congregated round the Greekpatriarch in the 'Phanari', [2] the Constantinopolitan slum assigned himfor his residence by Mohammed the Conqueror. 

[Footnote 1: 1346-1566. ]

[Footnote 2: 'Lighthouse-quarter. ']

The alliance of this parvenu 'Phanariot' aristocracy with the conservativeOrthodox Church was not unnatural, for the Church itself had greatlyextended its political power under Ottoman suzerainty. The OttomanGovernment hardly regarded its Christian subjects as integral members ofthe state, and was content to leave their civil government in the hands oftheir spiritual pastors to an extent the Romaic emperors would never havetolerated. It allowed the Patriarchate at Constantinople to become itsofficial intermediary with the Greek race, and it further extended theGreek patriarch's authority over the other conquered populations ofOrthodox faith--Bulgars, Rumans, and Serbs--which had never beenincorporated in the ecclesiastical or political organization of the RomaicEmpire, but which learnt under Ottoman rule to receive their priests andbishops from the Greek ecclesiastics of the capital, and even to callthemselves by the Romaic name. In 1691 Mustapha Köprili recognized andconfirmed the rights of all Christian subjects of the Sultan by a generalorganic law. 

Mustapha's 'New Ordinance' was dictated by the reverses which Christiansbeyond the frontier were inflicting upon the Ottoman arms, for pressurefrom without had followed hard upon disintegration within. Achmet'spyrrhic triumph over Candia in 1669 was followed in 1683 by his brotherMustapha's disastrous discomfiture before the walls of Vienna, and thesetwo sieges marked the turn of the Ottoman tide. The ebb was slow, yet theascendancy henceforth lay with Turkey's Christian neighbours, and theybegan to cut short her frontiers on every side. 

The Venetians had never lost hold upon the 'Ionian' chain of islands--Corfù, Cefalonia, Zante, and Cerigo--which flank the western coast ofGreece, and in 1685 they embarked on an offensive on the mainland, whichwon them undisputed possession of Peloponnesos for twenty years. [1] Venicewas far nearer than Turkey to her dissolution, and spent the last spasm ofher energy on this ephemeral conquest. Yet she had maintained the contactof the Greek race with western Europe during the two centuries of despair, and the interlude of her rule in Peloponnesos was a fitting culmination toher work; for, brief though it was, it effectively broke the Ottomantradition, and left behind it a system of communal self-government amongthe Peloponnesian Greeks which the returning Turk was too feeble to sweepaway. The Turks gained nothing by the rapid downfall of Venice, forAustria as rapidly stepped into her place, and pressed with fresh vigourthe attack from the north-west. North-eastward, too, a new enemy hadarisen in Russia, which had been reorganized towards the turn of thecentury by Peter the Great with a radical energy undreamed of by anyTurkish Köprili, and which found its destiny in opposition to the OttomanEmpire. The new Orthodox power regarded itself as the heir of the RomaicEmpire from which it had received its first Christianity and culture. Itaspired to repay the Romaic race in adversity by championing it againstits Moslem oppressors, and sought its own reward in a maritime outlet onthe Black Sea. From the beginning of the eighteenth century Russiarepeatedly made war on Turkey, either with or without the co-operation ofAustria; but the decisive bout in the struggle was the war of 1769-74. ARussian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean, raised an insurrection inPeloponnesos, and destroyed the Turkish squadron in battle. The Russianarmies were still more successful on the steppes, and the Treaty ofKutchuk Kainardji not only left the whole north coast of the Black Sea inRussia's possession, but contained an international sanction for therights of the sultan's Orthodox subjects. In 1783 a supplementarycommercial treaty extorted for the Ottoman Greeks the right to trade underthe Russian flag. The territorial sovereignty of Turkey in the Aegeanremained intact, but the Russian guarantee gave the Greek race a moresubstantial security than the shadowy ordinance of Mustapha Köprili. Theparalysing prestige of the Porte was broken, and Greek eyes werehenceforth turned in hope towards Petersburg. 

[Footnote 1: 1699-1718. ]

By the end of the eighteenth century the condition of the Greeks had infact changed remarkably for the better, and the French and Englishtravellers who now began to visit the Ottoman Empire brought away theimpression that a critical change in its internal equilibrium was at hand. The Napoleonic wars had just extinguished the Venetian Republic and sweptthe Ionian Islands into the struggle between England and France for themastery of the Mediterranean. England had fortified herself in Cefaloniaand Zante, France in Corfù, and interest centred on the opposite mainland, where Ali Pasha of Yannina maintained a formidable neutrality towardseither power. 

The career of Ali marked that phase in the decline of an Oriental empirewhen the task of strong government becomes too difficult for the centralauthority and is carried on by independent satraps with greater efficiencyin their more limited sphere. Ali governed the Adriatic hinterland withpractically sovereign power, and compelled the sultan for some years toinvest his sons with the pashaliks of Thessaly and Peloponnesos. Thegreater part of the Greek race thus came in some degree under his control, and his policy towards it clearly reflected the transition from the old tothe new. He waged far more effective war than the distant sultan uponlocal liberties, and, though the elimination of the feudal Turkishlandowner was pure gain to the Greeks, they suffered themselves from theloss of traditional privileges which the original Ottoman conquest hadleft intact. The Armatoli, a local Christian militia who kept order in themountainous mainland north of Peloponnesos where Turkish feudatories wererare, were either dispersed by Ali or enrolled in his regular army. And hewas ruthless in the extermination of recalcitrant communities, likeAgrapha on the Aspropotarno, which had never been inscribed on thetaxation-rolls of the Romaic or the Ottoman treasury, or Suli, a robberclan ensconced in the mountains Immediately west of Ali's capital. On theother hand, the administration of these pacified and consolidateddominions became as essentially Greek in character as the Phanariot régimebeyond the Danube. Ali was a Moslem and an Albanian, but the OrthodoxGreeks were in a majority among his subjects, and he knew how to takeadvantage of their abilities. His business was conducted by Greeksecretaries in the Greek tongue, and Yannina, his capital, was a Greekcity. European visitors to Yannina (for every one began the Levantine tourby paying his respects to Ali) were struck by the enterprise andintelligence of its citizens. The doctors were competent, because they hadtaken their education in Italy or France; the merchants were prosperous, because they had established members of their family at Odessa, Trieste, or even Hamburg, as permanent agents of their firm. A new Greek_bourgeoisie_ had arisen, in close contact with the professional life ofwestern Europe, and equally responsive to the new philosophical andpolitical ideas that were being propagated by the French Revolution. 

This intellectual ferment was the most striking change of all. Since thesack of Constantinople in 1204, Greek culture had retired into themonasteries--inaccessible fastnesses where the monks lived much the samelife as the clansmen of Suli or Agrapha. Megaspélaion, the great cavequarried in the wall of a precipitous Peloponnesian ravine; Metéora, suspended on half a dozen isolated pinnacles of rock in Thessaly, wherethe only access was by pulley or rope-ladder; 'Ayon Oros', theconfederation of monasteries great and small upon the mountain-promontoryof Athos--these succeeded in preserving a shadow of the old tradition, atthe cost of isolation from all humane influences that might have kepttheir spiritual inheritance alive. Their spirit was mediaeval, ecclesiastical, and as barren as their sheltering rocks; and the newintellectual disciples of Europe turned to the monasteries in vain. Thebiggest ruin on Athos is a boys' school planned in the eighteenth centuryto meet the educational needs of all the Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire, and wrecked on the reefs of monastic obscurantism. But its founder, theCorfiot scholar Evyénios Voulgáris, did not hesitate to break with thepast. He put his own educational ideas into practice at Yannina andConstantinople, and contributed to the great achievement of hiscontemporary, the Khiot Adhamandios Koráis, who settled in Paris and thereevolved a literary adaptation of the Romaic patois to supersede thelifeless travesty of Attic style traditionally affected by ecclesiasticalpenmen. But the renaissance was not confined to Greeks abroad. The schoolon Athos failed, but others established themselves before the close of theeighteenth century in the people's midst, even in the smaller towns andthe remoter villages. The still flourishing secondary school ofDhimitzána, in the heart of Peloponnesos, began its existence in thisperiod, and the national revival found expression in a new name. Itsprophets repudiated the 'Romaic' name, with its associations of ignoranceand oppression, and taught their pupils to think of themselves as'Hellenes' and to claim in their own right the intellectual and politicalliberty of the Ancient Greeks. 

This spiritual 'Hellenism', however, was only one manifestation ofreturning vitality, and was ultimately due to the concrete economicdevelopment with which it went hand in hand. The Greeks, who had foundculture in western Europe, had come there for trade, and their commercialno less than their intellectual activity reacted in a penetrating way upontheir countrymen at home. A mountain village like Ambelakia in Thessalyfound a regular market for its dyed goods in Germany, and the commercialtreaty of 1783 between Turkey and Russia encouraged communities whichcould make nothing of the land to turn their attention to the sea. Galaxhidi, a village on the northern shore of the Korinthian Gulf, whoseonly asset was its natural harbour, and Hydhra, Spetza, and Psarà, threebarren little islands in the Aegean, had begun to lay the foundations of amerchant marine, when Napoleon's boycott and the British blockade, whichleft no neutral flag but the Ottoman in the Mediterranean, presented theGreek shipmen that sailed under it with an opportunity they exploited tothe full. The whitewashed houses of solid stone, rising tier above tier upthe naked limestone mountainside, still testify to the prosperity whichchance thus suddenly brought to the Hydhriots and their fellow islanders, and did not withdraw again till it had enabled them to play a decisivepart in their nation's history. 

Their ships were small, but they were home-built, skilfully navigated, andprofitably employed in the carrying trade of the Mediterranean ports. Their economic life was based on co-operation, for the sailors, as well asthe captain and owner of the ship, who were generally the same person, took shares in the outlay and profit of each voyage; but their politicalorganization was oligarchical--an executive council elected by and fromthe owners of the shipping. Feud and intrigue were rife between family andfamily, class and class, and between the native community and the residentaliens, without seriously affecting the vigour and enterprise of thecommonwealth as a whole. These seafaring islands on the eve of the modernGreek Revolution were an exact reproduction of the Aigina, Korinth, andAthens which repelled the Persian from Ancient Greece. The germs of a newnational life were thus springing up among the Greeks in every direction--in mercantile colonies scattered over the world from Odessa to Alexandriaand from Smyrna to Trieste; among Phanariot princes in the DanubianProvinces and their ecclesiastical colleagues at Constantinople; in theislands of the Aegean and the Ionian chain, and upon the mountains of Suliand Agrapha. But the ambitions this national revival aroused were evengreater than the reality itself. The leaders of the movement did notmerely aspire to liberate the Greek nation from the Turkish yoke. Theywere conscious of the assimilative power their nationality possessed. TheSuliots, for example, were an immigrant Albanian tribe, who had learnt tospeak Greek from the Greek peasants over whom they tyrannized. TheHydhriot and Spetziot islanders were Albanians too, who had even clung totheir primitive language during the two generations since they took uptheir present abode, but had become none the less firmly linked to theirGreek-speaking neighbours in Peloponnesos by their common fellowship inthe Orthodox Church. The numerous Albanian colonies settled up and downthe Greek continent were at least as Greek in feeling as they. And whyshould not the same prove true of the Bulgarian population, in theBalkans, who had belonged from the beginning to the Orthodox Church, andhad latterly been brought by improvident Ottoman policy within the Greekpatriarch's fold? Or why should not the Greek administrators beyond theDanube imbue their Ruman subjects with a sound Hellenic sentiment? Infact, the prophets of Hellenism did not so much desire to extricate theGreek nation from the Ottoman Empire as to make it the ruling element inthe empire itself by ejecting the Moslem Turks from their privilegedposition and assimilating all populations of Orthodox faith. These dreamstook shape in the foundation of a secret society--the 'Philikì Hetairía'or 'League of Friends'--which established itself at Odessa in 1814 withthe connivence of the Russian police, and opened a campaign of propagandain anticipation of an opportunity to strike. 

The initiative came from the Ottoman Government itself. At the weakestmoment in its history the empire found in Sultan Mahmud a ruler ofpeculiar strength, who saw that the only hope of overcoming his dangerslay in meeting them half-way. The national movement of Hellenism wasgathering momentum in the background, but it was screened by the personalambitions of Ali of Yannina, and Mahmud reckoned to forestall both enemiesby quickly striking Ali down. 

In the winter of 1819-20 Ali was outlawed, and in the spring the invasionof his territories began. Both the Moslem combatants enlisted ChristianArmatoli, and all continental Greece was under arms. By the end of thesummer Ali's outlying strongholds had fallen, his armies were driven in, and he himself was closely invested in Yannina; but with autumn a deadlockset in, and the sultan's reckoning was thrown out. In November 1820 theveteran soldier Khurshid was appointed to the pashalik of Peloponnesos tohold the Greeks in check and close accounts with Ali. In March 1821, afterfive months spent in organizing his province, Khurshid felt secure enoughto leave it for the Yannina lines. But he was mistaken; for within a monthof his departure Peloponnesos was ablaze. 

The 'Philikì Hetairía' had decided to act, and the Peloponnesiansresponded enthusiastically to the signal. In the north Germanòs, metropolitan bishop of Patras, rallied the insurgents at the monastery ofMegaspélaion, and unfurled the monastic altar-cloth as a nationalstandard. In the south the peninsula of Maina, which had been the latestrefuge of ancient Hellenism, was now the first to welcome the new, and tothrow off the shadowy allegiance it had paid for a thousand years toRomaic archonts and Ottoman capitan-pashas. Led by Petros Mavromichalis, the chief of the leading clan, the Mainates issued from their mountains. This was in April, and by the middle of May all the open country had beenswept clear, and the hosts joined hands before Tripolitza, which was theseat of Ottoman government at the central point of the province. TheTurkish garrison attacked, but was heavily defeated at Valtetzi by thetactical skill of Theodore Kolokotrónis the 'klepht', who had becomeexperienced in guerrilla warfare through his alternate professions ofbrigand and gendarme--a career that had increased its possibilities asthe Ottoman system decayed. After Kolokotrónis's victory, the Greeks keptTripolitza under a close blockade. Early in October it fell amid frightfulscenes of pillage and massacre, and Ottoman dominion in the Peloponnesosfell with it. On January 22, 1822, Korinth, the key to the isthmus, passedinto the Greeks' hands, and only four fortresses--Nauplia, Patras, Koron, and Modhon--still held out within it against Greek investment. Not a Turksurvived in the Peloponnesos beyond their walls, for the slaughter atTripolitza was only the most terrible instance of what happened wherever aMoslem colony was found. In Peloponnesos, at any rate, the revolution hadbeen grimly successful. 

There had also been successes at sea. The merchant marine of the Greekislands had suffered grievously from the fall of Napoleon and thesettlement at Vienna, which, by restoring normal conditions of trade, haddestroyed their abnormal monopoly. The revolution offered newopportunities for profitable venture, and in April 1821 Hydhra, Spetza andPsarà hastened to send a privateering fleet to sea. As soon as the fleetcrossed the Aegean, Samos rid itself of the Turks. At the beginning ofJune the rickety Ottoman squadron issued from the Dardanelles, but it waschased back by the islanders under the lee of Mitylini. Memories ofRussian naval tactics in 1770 led the Psariots to experiment infire-ships, and one of the two Turkish ships of the line fell a victim tothis attack. Within a week of setting sail, the diminished Turkishsquadron was back again in the Dardanelles, and the islanders were leftwith the command of the sea. 

The general Christian revolution thus seemed fairly launched, and in thefirst panic the threatened Moslems began reprisals of an equally generalkind. In the larger Turkish cities there were massacres of Christianminorities, and the Government lent countenance to them by murdering itsown principal Christian official Gregorios, the Greek patriarch atConstantinople, on April 22, 1821. But Sultan Mahmud quickly recoveredhimself. He saw that his empire could not survive a racial war, anddetermined to prevent the present revolt from assuming such a character. His plan was to localize it by stamping out the more distant sparks withall his energy, before concentrating his force at leisure upon the mainconflagration. 

This policy was justified by the event. On March 6 the 'Philikì Hetairia'at Odessa had opened its own operations in grandiose style by sending afilibustering expedition across the Russo-Turkish frontier under commandof Prince Alexander Hypsilantis, a Phanariot in the Russian service. Hypsilantis played for a general revolt of the Ruman population in theDanubian Principalities and a declaration of war against Turkey on thepart of Russia. But the Rumans had no desire to assist the Greekbureaucrats who oppressed them, and the Tsar Alexander had been convertedby the experiences of 1812-13 to a pacifistic respect for the _statusquo_. Prince Hypsilantis was driven ignominiously to internment across theAustrian frontier, little more than a hundred days after his expeditionbegan; and his fiasco assured the Ottoman Government of two encouragingfacts--that the revolution would not carry away the whole Orthodoxpopulation but would at any rate confine itself to the Greeks; and thatthe struggle against it would be fought out for the present, at least, without foreign intervention. 

In the other direction, however, rebellion was spreading northward fromPeloponnesos to continental Greece. Galaxídhi revolted in April, and wasfollowed in June by Mesolonghi--a prosperous town of fishermen, impregnably situated in the midst of the lagoons at the mouth of theAspropotamo, beyond the narrows of the Korinthian Gulf. By the end of themonth, north-western Greece was free as far as the outposts of KhurshidPasha beyond the Gulf of Arta. 

Further eastward, again, in the mountains between the Gulf of Korinth andthe river Elládha (Sperkheiòs), the Armatoli of Ali's faction had heldtheir ground, and gladly joined the revolution on the initiative of theircaptains Dhiakos and Odhyssèvs. But the movement found its limits. TheTurkish garrison of Athens obstinately held out during the winter of1821-2, and the Moslems of Negrepont (Euboía) maintained their mastery inthe island. In Agrapha they likewise held their own, and, after oneseverely punished raid, the Agraphiot Armatoli were induced to re-enterthe sultan's service on liberal terms. The Vlachs in the gorges of theAspropotamo were pacified with equal success; and Dramali, Khurshid'slieutenant, who guarded the communications between the army investingYannina and its base at Constantinople, was easily able to crush allsymptoms of revolt in Thessaly from his head-quarters at Lárissa. Stillfurther east, the autonomous Greek villages on the mountainouspromontories of Khalkidhiki had revolted in May, in conjunction with thewell-supplied and massively fortified monasteries of the 'Ayon Oros'; butthe Pasha of Salonika called down the South Slavonic Moslem landownersfrom the interior, sacked the villages, and amnestied the monasticconfederation on condition of establishing a Turkish garrison in theirmidst and confiscating their arms. The monks' compliance was assisted bythe excommunication under which the new patriarch at Constantinople hadplaced all the insurgents by the sultan's command. 

The movement was thus successfully localised on the European continent, and further afield it was still more easily cut short. After thewithdrawal of the Turkish squadron, the Greek fleet had to look on at thesystematic destruction of Kydhonies, [1] a flourishing Greek industrialtown on the mainland opposite Mitylini which had been founded under thesultan's auspices only forty years before. All that the islanders could dowas to take off the survivors in their boats; and when they dispersed totheir ports in autumn, the Ottoman ships came out again from theDardanelles, sailed round Peloponnesos into the Korinthian Gulf, anddestroyed Galaxídhi. A still greater catastrophe followed the reopening ofnaval operations next spring. In March 1822 the Samians landed a force onKhios and besieged the Turkish garrison, which was relieved after threeweeks by the arrival of the Ottoman fleet. A month later the Greek fleetlikewise appeared on the scene, and on June 18 a Psariot captain, Constantine Kanaris, actually destroyed the Ottoman flag-ship by a daringfire-ship attack. Upon this the Ottoman fleet fled back as usual to theDardanelles; yet the only consequence was the complete devastation, inrevenge, of helpless Khios. The long-shielded prosperity of the island wasremorselessly destroyed, the people were either enslaved or massacred, andthe victorious fleet had to stand by as passively this time as at thedestruction of Kydhonies the season before. In the following summer, again, the same fate befell Trikéri, a maritime community on the Gulf ofVolo which had gained its freedom when the rest of Thessaly stirred invain; and so in 1823 the revolution found itself confined on sea, as wellas on land, to the focus where it had originated in April 1821. 

[Footnote 1: Turkish Aivali. ]

This isolation was a practical triumph for Sultan Mahmud. The maintenanceof the Ottoman Empire on the basis of Moslem ascendancy was therebyassured; but it remained to be seen whether the isolated area could now berestored to the _status quo_ in which the rest of his dominions had beenretained. 

During the whole season of 1821 the army of Khurshid had been held beforeYannina. But in February 1822 Yannina fell, Ali was slain, his treasureseized, and his troops disbanded. The Ottoman forces were liberated for acounterattack on Peloponnesos. Already in April Khurshid broke up his campat Lárissa, and his lieutenant Dramali was given command of the newexpedition towards the south. He crossed the Sperkheiòs at the beginningof July with an army of twenty thousand men. [1] Athens had capitulated toOdhyssèvs ten days before; but it had kept open the road for Dramali, andnorth-eastern Greece fell without resistance into his hands. The citadelof Korinth surrendered as tamely as the open country, and he was master ofthe isthmus before the end of the month. Nauplia meanwhile had beentreating with its besiegers for terms, and would have surrendered to theGreeks already if they had not driven their bargain so hard. Dramalihurried on southward into the plain to the fortress's relief, raised thesiege, occupied the town of Argos, and scattered the Greek forces into thehills. But the citadel of Argos held out against him, and the positionswere rapidly reversed. Under the experienced direction of Kolokotrónis, the Greeks from their hill-fastnesses ringed round the plain of Argos andscaled up every issue. Dramali's supplies ran out. An attempt of hisvanguard to break through again towards the north was bloodily repulsed, and he barely succeeded two days later in extricating the main body in ademoralized condition, with the loss of all his baggage-train. The Turkisharmy melted away, Dramali was happy to die at Korinth, and Khurshid wasexecuted by the sultan's command. The invasion of Peloponnesos had brokendown, and nothing could avert the fall of Nauplia. The Ottoman fleethovered for one September week in the offing, but Kanaris's fire-shipstook another ship of the line in toll at the roadsteads of Tenedos beforeit safely regained the Dardanelles. The garrison of Nauplia capitulated inDecember, on condition of personal security and liberty, and the captainof a British frigate, which arrived on the spot, took measures that thecompact should be observed instead of being broken by the customarymassacre. But the strongest fortress in Peloponnesos was now in Greekhands. 

[Footnote 1: Including a strong contingent of Moslem Slavs--BulgarianPomaks from the Aegean hinterland and Serbian Bosniaks from the Adriatic. ]

In the north-west the season had not passed so well. When the Turksinvested Ali in Yannina, they repatriated the Suliot exiles in theirnative mountains. But a strong sultan was just as formidable to theSuliots as a strong pasha, so they swelled their ranks by enfranchisingtheir peasant-serfs, and made common cause with their old enemy in hisadversity. Now that Ali was destroyed, the Suliots found themselves in aprecarious position, and turned to the Greeks for aid. But on July 16 theGreek advance was checked by a severe defeat at Petta in the plain ofArta. In September the Suliots evacuated their impregnable fortresses inreturn for a subsidy and a safe-conduct, and Omer Vrioni, the Ottomancommander in the west, [1] was free to advance in turn towards the south. On November 6 he actually laid siege to Mesolonghi, but here hisexperiences were as discomfiting as Dramali's. He could not keep open hiscommunications, and after heavy losses retreated again to Arta in January1823. 

[Footnote 1: He was a renegade officer of Ali's. ]

In 1823 the struggle seemed to be lapsing into stalemate. The liberatedPeloponnesos had failed to propagate the revolution through the remainderof the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman Government had equally failed toreconquer the Peloponnesos by military invasion. This season's operationsonly seemed to emphasize the deadlock. The Ottoman commander in the westraised an auxiliary force of Moslem and Catholic clansmen from northernAlbania, and attempted to reach Mesolonghi once more. But he penetrated nofurther than Anatolikòn--the Mesolonghiots' outpost village at the head ofthe lagoons--and the campaign was only memorable for the heroic death ofMarko Botzaris the Suliot in a night attack upon the Ottoman camp. At sea, the two fleets indulged in desultory cruises without an encounter, for theTurks were still timid and incompetent, while the growing insubordinationand dissension on the Greek ships made concerted action there, too, impossible. By the end of the season it was clear that the struggle couldonly definitively be decided by the intervention of a third party on oneside or the other--unless the Greeks brought their own ruin uponthemselves. 

This indeed was not unlikely to happen; for the new house of Hellenism hadhardly arisen before it became desperately divided against itself. Thevitality of the national movement resided entirely in the local communes. It was they that had found the fighting men, kept them armed and supplied, and by spontaneous co-operation expelled the Turk from Peloponnesos. Butif the co-operation was to be permanent it must have a centralorganization, and with the erection of this superstructure the troublesbegan. As early as June 1821 a 'Peloponnesian Senate' was constituted andat once monopolized by the 'Primates', the propertied class that had beenresponsible for the communal taxes under the Romaic and Ottoman régimesand was allowed to control the communal government in return. About thesame time two Phanariot princes threw in their lot with the revolution--Alexander Mavrokordatos and Demetrius, the more estimable brother of thefutile Alexander Hypsilantis. Both were saturated with the most recentEuropean political theory, and they committed the peasants and seamen ofthe liberated districts to an ambitious constitutionalism. In December1821 a 'National Assembly' met at Epidauros, passed an elaborate organiclaw, and elected Mavrokordatos first president of the Hellenic Republic. 

The struggle for life and death in 1822 had staved off the internalcrisis, but the Peloponnesian Senate remained obstinately recalcitranttowards the National Government in defence of its own vested interests;and the insubordination of the fleet in 1823 was of one piece with thepolitical faction which broke out as soon as the immediate danger fromwithout was removed. 

Towards the end of 1823 European 'Philhellenes' began to arrive in Greece. In those dark days of reaction that followed Waterloo, self-liberatedHellas seemed the one bright spot on the continent; but the idealists whocame to offer her their services were confronted with a sorry spectacle. The people were indifferent to their leaders, and the leaders at varianceamong themselves. The gentlemanly Phanariots had fallen into thebackground. Mavrokordatos only retained influence in north-western Greece. In Peloponnesos the Primates were all-powerful, and Kolokotrónis theklepht was meditating a popular dictatorship at their expense. In thenorth-east the adventurer Odhyssévs had won a virtual dictatorshipalready, and was suspected of intrigue with the Turks; and all thisfactious dissension rankled into civil war as soon as the contraction of aloan in Great Britain had invested the political control of the HellenicRepublic with a prospective value in cash. The first civil war was foughtbetween Kolokotrónis on the one side and the Primates of Hydhra andPeloponnesos on the other; but the issue was decided against Kolokotrónisby the adhesion to the coalition of Kolettis the Vlach, once physician toMukhtar Pasha, the son of Ali, and now political agent for all thenorthern Armatoli in the national service. The fighting lasted fromNovember 1823 to June 1824, and was followed by another outbreak inNovember of the latter year, when the victors quarrelled over the spoils, and the Primates were worsted in turn by the islanders and the Armatoli. The nonentity Kondouriottis of Hydhra finally emerged as President ofGreece, with the sharp-witted Kolettis as his principal wire-puller, butthe disturbances did not cease till the last instalment of the loan hadbeen received and squandered and there was no more spoil to fight for. 

Meanwhile, Sultan Mahmud had been better employed. Resolved to avertstalemate by the only possible means, he had applied in the course of 1823to Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt, a more formidable, though more distant, satrap than Ali of Yannina himself. Mohammed Ali had a standing army andnavy organized on the European model. He had also a son Ibrahim, who knewhow to manoeuvre them, and was ambitious of a kingdom. Mahmud hired thefather's troops and the son's generalship for the re-conquest ofPeloponnesos, under engagement to invest Ibrahim with the pashalik as soonas he should effectively make it his own. By this stroke of diplomacy apotential rebel was turned into a willing ally, and the preparations forthe Egyptian expedition went forward busily through the winter of 1823-4. 

The plan of campaign was systematically carried out. During the season ofrespite the Greek islanders had harried the coasts and commerce ofAnatolia and Syria at will. The first task was to deprive them of theiroutposts in the Aegean, and an advanced squadron of the Egyptian fleetaccordingly destroyed the community of Kasos in June 1824, while theOttoman squadron sallied out of the Dardanelles a month later and dealtout equal measure to Psarà. The two main flotillas then effected ajunction off Rhodes; and, though the crippled Greek fleet still venturedpluckily to confront them, it could not prevent Ibrahim from castinganchor safely in Soudha Bay and landing his army to winter in Krete. InFebruary 1825 he transferred these troops with equal impunity to thefortress of Modhon, which was still held for the sultan by an Ottomangarrison. The fire-ships of Hydhra came to harry his fleet too late, andon land the Greek forces were impotent against his trained soldiers. TheGovernment in vain promoted Kolokotrónis from captivity tocommandership-in-chief. The whole south-western half of Peloponnesospassed into Ibrahim's hands, and in June 1825 he even penetrated as far asthe mills of Lerna on the eastern coast, a few miles south of Argositself. 

At the same time the Ottoman army of the west moved south again under anew commander, Rashid Pasha of Yannina, and laid final siege on April 27to Mesolonghi, just a year after Byron had died of fever within its walls. The Greeks were magnificent in their defence of these frail mud-bastions, and they more than held their own in the amphibious warfare of thelagoons. The struggle was chequered by the continual coming and going ofthe Greek and Ottoman fleets. They were indeed the decisive factor; forwithout the supporting squadron Rashid would have found himself in thesame straits as his predecessors at the approach of autumn, while theslackness of the islanders in keeping the sea allowed Mesolonghi to beisolated in January 1826. The rest was accomplished by the arrival ofIbrahim on the scene. His heavy batteries opened fire in February; hisgunboats secured command of the lagoons, and forced Anatolikòn tocapitulate in March. In April provisions in Mesolonghi itself gave out, and, scorning surrender, the garrison--men, women, and children together--made a general sortie on the night of April 22. Four thousand fell, threethousand were taken, and two thousand won through. It was a glorious endfor Mesolonghi, but it left the enemy in possession of all north-westernGreece. 

The situation was going from bad to worse. Ibrahim returned toPeloponnesos, and steadily pushed forward his front, ravaging as steadilyas he went. Rashid, after pacifying the north-west, moved on to thenorth-eastern districts, where the national cause had been shaken by thefinal treachery and speedy assassination of Odhyssèvs. Siege was laid toAthens in June, and the Greek Government enlisted in vain the militaryexperience of its Philhellenes. Fabvier held the Akropolis, butGeneralissimo Sir Richard Church was heavily defeated in the spring of1827 in an attempt to relieve him from the Attic coast; Grand AdmiralCochrane saw his fleet sail home for want of payment in advance, when hesummoned it for review at Poros; and Karaiskakis, the Greek captain ofArmatoli, was killed in a skirmish during his more successful efforts toharass Rashid's communications by land. On June 5, 1827, the Greekgarrison of the Akropolis marched out on terms. 

It looked as if the Greek effort after independence would be completelycrushed, and as if Sultan Mahmud would succeed in getting his empire undercontrol. In September 1826 he had rid it at last of the mischief at itscentre by blowing up the janissaries in their barracks at Constantinople. Turkey seemed almost to have weathered the storm when she was suddenlyoverborne by further intervention on the other side. 

Tsar Alexander, the vaccillator, died in November 1825, and was succeededby his son Nicholas I, as strong a character and as active a will asSultan Mahmud himself. Nicholas approached the Greek question without anydisinclination towards a Turkish war; and both Great Britain and Francefound an immediate interest in removing a ground of provocation whichmight lead to such a rude disturbance of the European 'Balance of Power'. On July 6, 1827, a month after Athens surrendered, the three powersconcluded a treaty for the pacification of Greece, in which they boundover both belligerent parties to accept an armistice under pain ofmilitary coercion. An allied squadron appeared off Navarino Bay to enforcethis policy upon the Ottoman and Egyptian fleet which lay united there, and the intrusion of the allied admirals into the bay itself precipitatedon October 20 a violent naval battle in which the Moslem flotilla wasdestroyed. The die was cast; and in April 1828 the Russian and OttomanGovernments drifted into a formal war, which brought Russian armies acrossthe Danube as far as Adrianople, and set the Ottoman Empire at bay for thedefence of its capital. Thanks to Mahmud's reorganization, the empire didnot succumb to this assault; but it had no more strength to spare for thesubjugation of Greece. The Greeks had no longer to reckon with the sultanas a military factor; and in August 1828 they wore relieved of Ibrahim'spresence as well, by the disembarkation of 14, 000 French troops inPeloponnesos to superintend the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces. InMarch 1829 the three powers delimited the Greek frontier. The line raneast and west from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta, and assigned tothe new state no more and no less territory than the districts that hadeffectively asserted their independence against the sultan in 1821. Thissettlement was the only one possible under the circumstances; but it wasessentially transitory, for it neglected the natural line of nationalityaltogether, and left a numerical majority of the Greek race, as well asthe most important centres of its life, under the old régime of servitude. 

Even the liberated area was not at the end of its troubles. In the springof 1827, when they committed themselves into the hands of their foreignpatrons, the Greeks had found a new president for the republic in JohnKapodistrias, an intimate of Alexander the tsar. Kapodistrias was aCorfiote count, with a Venetian education and a career in the Russiandiplomatic service, and no one could have been more fantasticallyunsuitable for the task of reconstructing the country to which he wascalled. Kapodistrias' ideal was the _fin-de-siècle_ 'police-state'; but'official circles' did not exist in Greece, and he had no acquaintancewith the peasants and sailors whom he hoped to redeem by bureaucracy. Heinstituted a hierarchically centralized administration which made theabortive constitution of Mavrokordatos seem sober by comparison; hetrampled on the liberty of the rising press, which was the most hopefuleducational influence in the country; and he created superfluousministerial portfolios for his untalented brothers. In fact he reglamentedGreece from his palace at Aigina like a divinely appointed autocrat, fromhis arrival in January 1828 till the summer of 1831, when he provoked theHydhriots to open rebellion, and commissioned the Russian squadron inattendance to quell them by a naval action, with the result that Poros wassacked by the President's regular army and the national fleet wascompletely destroyed. After that, he attempted to rule as a militarydictator, and fell foul of the Mavromichalis of Maina. The Mainates knewbetter how to deal with the 'police-state' than the Hydhriots; and onOctober 9, 1831, Kapodistrias was assassinated in Nauplia, at the churchdoor, by two representatives of the Mavromichalis clan. 

The country lapsed into utter anarchy. Peloponnesians and Armatoli, Kolokotronists and Kolettists, alternately appointed and deposedsubservient national assemblies and governing commissions by nakedviolence, which culminated in a gratuitous and disastrous attack upon theFrench troops stationed in Peloponnesos for their common protection. Thethree powers realized that it was idle to liberate Greece from Ottomangovernment unless they found her another in its place. They decided onmonarchy, and offered the crown, in February 1832, to Prince Otto, ayounger son of the King of Bavaria. The negotiations dragged on manymonths longer than Greece could afford to wait. But in July 1832 thesultan recognized the sovereign independence of the kingdom of Hellas inconsideration of a cash indemnity; and in February 1833, just a year afterthe first overtures had been made, the appointed king arrived at Naupliawith a decorative Bavarian staff and a substantial loan from the allies. 

3

_The Consolidation of the State_

Half the story of Greece is told. We have watched the nation awake and putforth its newly-found strength in a great war of independence, and we havefollowed the course of the struggle to its result--the foundation of thekingdom of Hellas. 

It is impossible to close this chapter of Greek history without a sense ofdisappointment. The spirit of Greece had travailed, and only aprincipality was born, which gathered within its frontiers scarcelyone-third of the race, and turned for its government to a foreignadministration which had no bond of tradition or affinity with thepopulation it was to rule. And yet something had been achieved. An oasishad been wrested from the Turkish wilderness, in which Hellenism couldhenceforth work out its own salvation untrammelled, and extend its borderslittle by little, until it brought within them at last the whole of itsdestined heritage. The fleeting glamour of dawn had passed, but it hadbrought the steady light of day, in which the work begun could be carriedout soberly and indefatigably to its conclusion. The new kingdom, in fact, if it fulfilled its mission, might become the political nucleus and thespiritual ensample of a permanently awakened nation--an 'education ofHellas' such as Pericles hoped to see Athens become in the greatest daysof Ancient Greece. 

When, therefore, we turn to the history of the kingdom, our disappointmentis all the more intense, for in the first fifty years of its existencethere is little development to record. In 1882 King Otto's principalitypresented much the same melancholy spectacle as it did in 1833, when helanded in Nauplia Bay, except that Otto himself had left the scene. HisBavarian staff belonged to that reactionary generation that followed theoverthrow of Napoleon in Europe, and attempted, heedless of Kapodistrias'fiasco, to impose on Greece the bureaucracy of the _ancien régime_. TheBavarians' work was entirely destructive. The local liberties which hadgrown up under the Ottoman dominion and been the very life of the nationalrevival, were effectively repressed. Hydhriot and Spetziot, Suliot andMainate, forfeited their characteristic individuality, but none of thebenefits of orderly and uniform government were realized. The canker ofbrigandage defied all efforts to root it out, and in spite of the loanswith which the royal government was supplied by the protecting powers, thepublic finance was subject to periodical breakdowns. In 1837 King Otto, now of age, took the government into his own hands, only to have it takenout of them again by a revolution in 1843. Thereafter he reigned as aconstitutional monarch, but he never reconciled himself to the position, and in 1862 a second revolution drove him into exile, a scapegoat for theafflictions of his kingdom. Bavarian then gave place to Dane, yet theafflictions continued. In 1882 King George had been nineteen years on thethrone[1] without any happier fortune than his predecessor's. It is truethat the frontiers of the kingdom had been somewhat extended. GreatBritain had presented the new sovereign with the Ionian Islands as aninaugural gift, and the Berlin Conference had recently added the provinceof Thessaly. Yet the major part of the Greek race still awaited liberationfrom the Turkish yoke, and regarded the national kingdom, chronicallyincapacitated by the twin plagues of brigandage and bankruptcy, withincreasing disillusionment. The kingdom of Hellas seemed to have failed inits mission altogether. 

[Footnote 1: King George, like King Otto, was only seventeen years oldwhen he received his crown. ]

What was the explanation of this failure? It was that the very nature ofthe mission paralysed the state from taking the steps essential to itsaccomplishment. The phenomenon has been, unhappily, only too familiar inthe Nearer East, and any one who travelled in the Balkans in 1882, or evenso recently as 1912, must at once have become aware of it. 

Until a nation has completely vindicated its right to exist, it is hardfor it to settle down and make its life worth living. We nations ofwestern Europe (before disaster fell upon us) had learnt to take ourexistence for granted, and 'Politics' for us had come to mean an organizedeffort to improve the internal economy of our community. But a foreignerwho picked up a Greek newspaper would have found in it none of the matterwith which he was familiar in his own, no discussion of financial policy, economic development, or social reconstruction. The news-columns wouldhave been monopolized by foreign politics, and in the cafes he would haveheard the latest oscillation in the international balance of powercanvassed with the same intense and minute interest that Englishmen in arailway-carriage would have been devoting to Old Age Pensions, NationalHealth Insurance, or Land Valuation. He would have been amazed by adisplay of intimate knowledge such as no British quidnunc could havemustered if he had happened to stumble across these intricacies ofinternational competition, and the conversation would always haveterminated in the same unanswered but inconscionable challenge to thefuture: 'When will the oppressed majority of our race escape the Turkishyoke? If the Ottoman dominion is destroyed, what redistribution of itsprovinces will follow? Shall we then achieve our national unity, or willour Balkan neighbours encroach upon the inheritance which is justly ours?'

This preoccupation with events beyond the frontiers was not caused by anylack of vital problems within them. The army was the most conspicuousobject of public activity, but it was not an aggressive speculation, or aninvestment of national profits deliberately calculated to bring in one daya larger return. It was a necessity of life, and its efficiency was barelymaintained out of the national poverty. In fact, it was almost the onlypublic utility with which the nation could afford to provide itself, andthe traveller from Great Britain would have been amazed again at themiserable state of all reproductive public works. The railways were fewand far between, their routes roundabout, and their rolling-stock scanty, so that trains were both rare and slow. Wheel-roads were no commoner afeature in Greece than railways are here, and such stretches as had beenconstructed had often never come into use, because they had just failed toreach their goal or were still waiting for their bridges, so that theywere simply falling into decay and converting the outlay of capital uponthem into a dead loss. The Peiraeus was the only port in the country wheresteamers could come alongside a quay, and discharge their cargoes directlyon shore. Elsewhere, the vessel must anchor many cables' lengths out, anddepend on the slow and expensive services of lighters, for lack of pierconstruction and dredging operations. For example, Kalamata, the economicoutlet for the richest part of Peloponnesos, and the fifth largest port inthe kingdom, [1] was and still remains a mere open roadstead, where allships that call are kept at a distance by the silt from a mountaintorrent, and so placed in imminent danger of being driven, by the firststorm, upon the rocks of a neighbouring peninsula. 

[Footnote 1: The four chief ports being Peiraeus, Patras, Syra, andVolos. ]

These grave shortcomings were doubtless due in part to the geographicalcharacter of the country, though it was clear, from what had actually beenaccomplished, that it would have been both possible and profitable toattempt much more, if the nation's energy could have been secured for thework. But it is hard to tinker at details when you are kept in a perpetualfever by a question of life and death, and the great preliminary questionsof national unity and self-government remained still unsettled. 

Before these supreme problems all other interests paled, for they were nowill-o'-the-wisps of theoretical politics. It needs a long politicaleducation to appreciate abstract ideas, and the Greeks were still in theirpolitical infancy, but the realization of Greater Greece implied for themthe satisfaction of all their concrete needs at once. 

So long as the _status quo_ endured, they were isolated from the rest ofEurope by an unbroken band of Turkish territory, stretching from theAegean to the Adriatic Sea. What was the use of overcoming greatengineering difficulties to build a line of European gauge from Athensright up to the northern frontier, if Turkey refused to sanction theconstruction of the tiny section that must pass through her territorybetween the Greek railhead and the actual terminus of the European systemat Salonika? Or if, even supposing she withdrew her veto, she would haveit in her power to bring pressure on Greece at any moment by threateningto sever communications along this vital artery? So long as Turkey wasthere, Greece was practically an island, and her only communication withcontinental Europe lay through her ports. But what use to improve theports, when the recovery of Salonika, the fairest object of the nationaldreams, would ultimately change the country's economic centre of gravity, and make her maritime as well as her overland commerce flow along quiteother channels than the present?

Thus the Greek nation's present was overshadowed by its future, and itsactions paralysed by its hopes. Perhaps a nation with more power ofapplication and less of imagination would have schooled itself to thethought that these sordid, obtrusive details were the key to thesplendours of the future, and would have devoted itself to the systematicamelioration of the cramped area which it had already secured for its own. This is what Bulgaria managed to do during her short but wonderful periodof internal growth between the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and the declarationof war against Turkey in 1912. But Bulgaria, thanks to her geographicalsituation, was from the outset freer from the tentacles of the Turkishoctopus than Greece had contrived to make herself by her fifty years'start, while her temperamentally sober ambitions were not inflamed by suchpast traditions as Greece had inherited, not altogether to her advantage. Be that as it may, Greece, whether by fault or misfortune, had failedduring this half-century to apply herself successfully to the cure of herdefects and the exploitation of her assets, though she did not lackleaders strong-minded enough to summon her to the dull business of thepresent. Her history during the succeeding generation was a strugglebetween the parties of the Present and the Future, and the unceasingdiscomfiture of the former is typified in the tragedy of Trikoupis, thegreatest modern Greek statesman before the advent of Venezelos. 

Trikoupis came into power in 1882, just after the acquisition of the richagricultural province of Thessaly under the Treaty of Berlin had given thekingdom a fresh start. There were no such continuous areas of good arableland within the original frontiers, and such rare patches as there werehad been desolated by those eight years of savage warfare[1] which hadbeen the price of liberty. The population had been swept away by wholesalemassacres of racial minorities in every district; the dearth ofindustrious hands had allowed the torrents to play havoc with thecultivation-terraces on the mountain slopes; and the spectre of malaria, always lying in wait for its opportunity, had claimed the waterloggedplains for its own. During the fifty years of stagnation little attempthad been made to cope with the evil, until now it seemed almost pastremedy. 

[Footnote 1: 1821-28]

If, however, the surface of the land offered little prospect of wealth forthe moment, there were considerable treasures to be found beneath it. Ametalliferous bolt runs down the whole east coast of the Greek mainland, cropping up again in many of the Aegean islands, and some of the ores, ofwhich there is a great variety, are rare and valuable. The lack of transitfacilities is partly remedied by the fact that workable veins often lienear enough to the sea for the produce to be carried straight from mine toship, by an endless-chain system of overhead trolleys; so that, oncecapital is secured for installing the plant and opening the mine, profitable operations can be carried on irrespective of the generaleconomic condition of the country. Trikoupis saw how much potential wealthwas locked up in these mineral seams. The problem was how to attract thecapital necessary to tap it. The nucleus round which have accumulatedthose immense masses of mobilised capital that are the life-blood ofmodern European industry and commerce, was originally derived from thesurplus profits of agriculture. But a country that finds itself reduced, like Greece in the nineteenth century, to a state of agriculturalbankruptcy, has obviously failed to save any surplus in the process, sothat it is unable to provide from its own pocket the minimum outlay it sourgently needs in order to open for itself some new activity. If it is toobtain a fresh start on other lines, it must secure the co-operation ofthe foreign investor, and the capitalist with a ready market for his moneywill only put it into enterprises where he has some guarantee of itssafety. There was little doubt that the minerals of Greece would wellrepay extraction; the uncertain element was the Greek nation itself. Theburning question of national unity might break out at any moment into ablaze of war, and, in the probable case of disaster, involve the wholecountry and all interests connected with it in economic as well aspolitical ruin. Western Europe would not commit itself to Greek miningenterprise, unless it felt confident that the statesman responsible forthe government of Greece would and could restrain his country from itsinstinctive impulse towards political adventure. 

The great merit of Trikoupis was that he managed to inspire thisconfidence. Greece owes most of the wheelroads, railways, and mines ofwhich she can now boast to the dozen years of his more or less consecutiveadministration. But the roads are unfinished, the railway-networkincomplete, the mines exploited only to a fraction of their capacity, because the forces against Trikoupis were in the end too strong for him. It may be that his eye too rigidly followed the foreign investor's pointof view, and that by adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards thenational ideal, he might have strengthened his position at home withoutimpairing his reputation abroad; but his position was really madeimpossible by a force quite beyond his control, the irresponsible andoften intolerable behaviour which Turkey, under whatever régime, hasalways practised towards foreign powers, and especially towards thoseBalkan states which have won their freedom in her despite, while perforceabandoning a large proportion of their race to the protracted outrage ofTurkish misgovernment. 

Several times over the Porte, by wanton insults to Greece, wrecked theefforts of Trikoupis to establish good relations between the twogovernments, and played the game of the chauvinist party led by Trikoupis'rival, Deliyannis. Deliyannis' tenures of office were always brief, butduring them he contrived to undo most of the work accomplished byTrikoupis in the previous intervals. A particularly tense 'incident' withTurkey put him in power in 1893, with a strong enough backing from thecountry to warrant a general mobilization. The sole result was the ruin ofGreek credit. Trikoupis was hastily recalled to office by the king, buttoo late. He found himself unable to retrieve the ruin, and retiredaltogether from politics in 1895, dying abroad next year in voluntaryexile and enforced disillusionment. 

With the removal of Trikoupis from the helm, Greece ran straight upon therocks. A disastrous war with Turkey was precipitated in 1897 by events inKrete. It brought the immediate _débâcle_ of the army and the reoccupationof Thessaly for a year by Turkish troops, while its final penalties werethe cession of the chief strategical positions along the northern frontierand the imposition of an international commission of control over theGreek finances, in view of the complete national bankruptcy entailed bythe war. The fifteen years that followed 1895 were almost the blackestperiod in modern Greek history; yet the time was not altogether lost, andsuch events as the draining of the Kopais-basin by a British company, andits conversion from a malarious swamp into a rich agricultural area, marked a perceptible economic advance. 

This comparative stagnation was broken at last by the Young Turk_pronunciamiento_ at Salonika in 1908, which produced such momentousrepercussions all through the Nearer East. The Young Turks had struck inorder to forestall the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, but theopportunity was seized by every restive element within it to extricateitself, if possible, from the Turkish coils. Now, just as in 1897, Greecewas directly affected by the action of the Greek population in Krete. As aresult of the revolt of 1896-7, Krete had been constituted an autonomousstate subject to Ottoman suzerainty, autonomy and suzerainty alike beingguaranteed by four great powers. Prince George of Greece, a son of theKing of the Hellenes, had been placed at the head of the autonomousgovernment as high commissioner; but his autocratic tendency caused greatdiscontent among the free-spirited Kretans, who had not rid themselves ofthe Turkish régime in order to forfeit their independence again in anotherfashion. Dissension culminated in 1906, when the leaders of the oppositiontook to the mountains, and obtained such support and success in theguerrilla fighting that followed, that they forced Prince George to tenderhis resignation. He was succeeded as high commissioner by Zaimis, anothercitizen of the Greek kingdom, who inaugurated a more constitutionalrégime, and in 1908 the Kretans believed that the moment for realizing thenational ideal had come. They proclaimed their union with Greece, andelected deputies to the Parliament at Athens. But the guarantor powerscarried out their obligations by promptly sending a combined navalexpedition, which hauled down the Greek flag at Canea, and prevented thedeputies from embarking for Peiraeus. This apparently pedantic insistenceupon the _status quo_ was extremely exasperating to Greek nationalism. Itproduced a ferment in the kingdom, which grew steadily for nine months, and vented itself in July 1909 in the _coup d'état_ of the 'MilitaryLeague', a second-hand imitation of the Turkish 'Committee of Union andProgress'. The royal family was cavalierly treated, and constitutionalgovernment superseded by a junta of officers. But at this point the policyof the four powers towards Krete was justified. Turkey knew well that shehad lost Krete in 1897, but she could still exploit her suzerainty toprevent Greece from gaining new strength by the annexation of the island. The Young Turks had seized the reins of government, not to modify thepolicy of the Porte, but to intensify its chauvinism, and they accordinglyintimated that they would consider any violation of their suzerain rightsover Krete a _casus belli_ against Greece. Greece, without army or allies, was obviously not in a position to incur another war, and the 'MilitaryLeague' thus found that it had reached the end of its tether. There ensueda deadlock of another eight months, only enlivened by a naval mutiny, during which the country lay paralysed, with no programme whatsoeverbefore it. 

Then the man demanded by the situation appeared unexpectedly from thecentre of disturbance, Krete. Venezelos started life as a successfuladvocate at Canea. He entered Kretan politics in the struggle forconstitutionalism, and distinguished himself in the successful revolutionof 1906, of which he was the soul. Naturally, he became one of the leadingstatesmen under Zaimis' régime, and he further distinguished himself byresolutely opposing the 'Unionist' agitation as premature, and yetretaining his hold over a people whose paramount political preoccupationwas their national unity. The crisis of 1908-9 brought him into closerelations with the government of the Greek kingdom; and the king, who hadgauged his calibre, now took the patriotic step of calling in the man whohad expelled his son from Krete, to put his own house in order. It speaksmuch for both men that they worked together in harmony from the beginning. Upon the royal invitation Venezelos exchanged Kretan for Greekcitizenship, and took in hand the 'Military League'. After shortnegotiations, he persuaded it to dissolve in favour of a nationalconvention, which was able to meet in March 1910. 

Thus Greece became a constitutional country once more, and Venezelos thefirst premier of the new era. During five years of continuous office hewas to prove himself the good genius of his country. When he resigned hispost in April 1915, he left the work of consolidating the national stateon the verge of completion, and it will be his country's loss if he isbaulked of achievement. Results speak for themselves, and the remainder ofthis pamphlet will be little more than a record of his statesmanship; butbefore we pass on to review his deeds, we must say a word about thecharacter to which they are due. In March 1912 the time came for the firstgeneral election since Venezelos had taken office. Two years' experienceof his administration had already won him such popularity and prestige, that the old party groups, purely personal followings infected with allthe corruption, jingoism, and insincerity of the dark fifteen years, leagued themselves in a desperate effort to cast him out. Corruption on agrand scale was attempted, but Venezelos' success at the polls wassweeping. The writer happened to be spending that month in Krete. TheKretans had, of course, elected deputies in good time to the parliament atAthens, and once more the foreign warships stopped them in the act ofboarding the steamer for Peiraeus, while Venezelos, who was stillresponsible for the Greek Government till the new parliament met, haddeclared with characteristic frankness that the attendance of the Kretandeputies could not possibly be sanctioned, an opening of which hisopponents did not fail to take advantage. Meanwhile, every one in Kretewas awaiting news of the polling in the kingdom. They might have beenexpected to feel, at any rate, lukewarmly towards a man who had actuallytaken office on the programme of deferring their cherished 'union'indefinitely; but, on the contrary, they greeted his triumph with enormousenthusiasm. Their feeling was explained by the comment of an innkeeper. 'Venezelos!' he said: 'Why, he is a man who can say "No". He won't standany nonsense. If you try to get round him, he'll put you in irons. ' Andclearly he had hit the mark. Venezelos would in any case have done well, because he is a clever man with an excellent power of judgement; butacuteness is a common Greek virtue, and if he has done brilliantly, it isbecause he has the added touch of genius required to make the Greek take'No' for an answer, a quality, very rare indeed in the nation, whichexplains the dramatic contrast between his success and Trikoupis' failure. Greece has been fortunate indeed in finding the right man at the crucialhour. 

In the winter of 1911-12 and the succeeding summer, the foreign travellermet innumerable results of Venezelos' activity in every part of thecountry, and all gave evidence of the same thing: a sane judgement and itsinflexible execution. For instance, a resident in Greece had needed anescort of soldiers four years before, when he made an expedition into thewild country north-west of the Gulf of Patras, on account of the number ofcriminals 'wanted' by the government who were lurking in that region asoutlaws. In August 1912 an inquiry concerning this danger was met with asmile: 'Oh, yes, it was so, ' said the gendarme, 'but since then Venezeloshas come. He amnestied every one "out" for minor offences, and then caughtthe "really bad ones", so there are no outlaws in Akarnania now. ' And hespoke the truth. You could wander all about the forests and mountainswithout molestation. 

So far Venezelos had devoted himself to internal reconstruction, after theprecedent of Trikoupis, but he was not the man to desert the nationalidea. The army and navy were reorganized by French and British missions, and when the opportunity appeared, he was ready to take full advantage ofit. In the autumn of 1912, Turkey had been for a year at war with Italy;her finances had suffered a heavy drain, and the Italian command of thesea not only locked up her best troops in Tripoli, but interrupted suchimportant lines of communication between her Asiatic and Europeanprovinces as the direct route by sea from Smyrna to Salonika, and thedevious sea-passage thence round Greece to Scutari, which was the onlyalternative for Turkish troops to running the gauntlet of the Albanianmountaineers. Clearly the Balkan nations could find no better moment forstriking the blow to settle that implacable 'preliminary question. ' ofnational unity which had dogged them all since their birth. Their onlychance of success, however, was to strike in concert, for Turkey, handicapped though she was, could still easily outmatch them singly. Unless they could compromise between their conflicting claims, they wouldhave to let this common opportunity for making them good slip byaltogether. 

Of the four states concerned, two, Serbia and Montenegro, were of the sameSouth-Slavonic nationality, and had been drawn into complete accord witheach other since the formal annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary in1908, which struck a hard blow at their common national idea, whileneither of them had any conflicting claims with Greece, since the Greekand South-Slavonic nationalities are at no point geographically incontact. With Bulgaria, a nation of Slavonic speech and culture, thoughnot wholly Slavonic in origin, Serbia had quarrelled for years over theultimate destiny of the Üsküb district in north-western Macedonia, whichwas still subject to Turkey; but in the summer of 1912 the two statescompromised in a secret treaty upon their respective territorialambitions, and agreed to refer the fate of one debatable strip to thearbitration of Russia, after their already projected war with Turkey hadbeen carried through. There was a more formidable conflict of interestsbetween Bulgaria and Greece. These two nationalities are conterminous overa very wide extent of territory, stretching from the Black Sea on the eastto the inland Lake of Okhrida on the west, and there is at no point asharp dividing line between them. The Greek element tends to predominatetowards the coast and the Bulgar towards the interior, but there are broadzones where Greek and Bulgar villages are inextricably interspersed, whilepurely Greek towns are often isolated in the midst of purely Bulgar ruraldistricts. Even if the racial areas could be plotted out on a large-scalemap, it was clear that no political frontier could be drawn to followtheir convolutions, and that Greece and Bulgaria could only divide thespoils by both making up their minds to give and take. The actual linesthis necessary compromise would follow, obviously depended on the degreeof the allies' success against Turkey in the common war that was yet to befought, and Venezelos rose to the occasion. He had the courage to offerBulgaria the Greek alliance without stipulating for any definite minimumshare in the common conquests, and the tact to induce her to accept it onthe same terms. Greece and Bulgaria agreed to shelve all territorialquestions till the war had been brought to a successful close; and withthe negotiation of this understanding (another case in which Venezelosachieved what Trikoupis had attempted only to fail) the Balkan League wascomplete. 

The events that followed are common knowledge. The Balkan allies openedthe campaign in October, and the Turks collapsed before an impetuousattack. The Bulgarians crumpled up the Ottoman field armies in Thrace atthe terrific battle of Lule Burgas; the Serbians disposed of the forces inthe Macedonian interior, while the Greeks effected a junction with theSerbians from the south, and cut their way through to Salonika. Within twomonths of the declaration of war, the Turks on land had been driven out ofthe open altogether behind the shelter of the Chataldja and Gallipolilines, and only three fortresses--Adrianople, Yannina, and Scutari--heldout further to the west. Their navy, closely blockaded by the Greek fleetwithin the Dardanelles, had to look on passively at the successiveoccupation of the Aegean Islands by Greek landing-parties. With the wintercame negotiations, during which an armistice reigned at Adrianople andScutari, while the Greeks pursued the siege of Yannina and the Dardanellesblockade. The negotiations proved abortive, and the result of the renewedhostilities justified the action of the Balkan plenipotentiaries inbreaking them off. By the spring of 1913 the three fortresses had fallen, and, under the treaty finally signed at London, Turkey ceded to the BalkanLeague, as a whole, all her European territories west of a line drawn fromAinos on the Aegean to Midía on the Black Sea, including Adrianople andthe lower basin of the river Maritsa. 

The time had now come for Greece and Bulgaria to settle their account, andthe unexpected extent of the common gains ought to have facilitated theirdivision. The territory in question included the whole north coast of theAegean and its immediate hinterland, and Venezelos proposed to consider itin two sections. (1) The eastern section, conveniently known as Thrace, consisted of the lower basin of the Maritsa. As far as Adrianople thepopulation was Bulgar, but south of that city it was succeeded by a Greekelement, with a considerable sprinkling of Turkish settlements, as far asthe sea. Geographically, however, the whole district is intimatelyconnected with Bulgaria, and the railway that follows the course of theMaritsa down to the port of Dedeagatch offers a much-needed economicoutlet for large regions already within the Bulgarian frontier. Venezelos, then, was prepared to resign all Greek claims to the eastern section, inreturn for a corresponding concession by Bulgaria in the west. (2) Thewestern section, consisting of the lower basins of the Vardar and Struma, lay in the immediate neighbourhood of the former frontier of Greece; butthe Greek population of Salonika, [1] and the coast-districts east of it, could not be brought within the Greek frontier without including as well acertain hinterland inhabited mainly by Bulgarians. The cession of this wasthe return asked for by Venezelos, and he reduced it to a minimum byabstaining from pressing the quite well-founded claims of Greece in theMonastir district, which lay further inland still. 

[Footnote 1: The predominant element within the walls of Salonika itselfis neither Greek nor Bulgarian, but consists of about 80, 000 of thoseSpanish-speaking Jews who settled in Turkey as refugees during thesixteenth century. ]

But Venezelos' conciliatory proposals met with no response from theBulgarian Government, which was in an 'all or nothing' mood. It swallowedVenezelos' gift of Thrace, and then proceeded to exploit the Bulgarhinterland of Salonika as a pretext for demanding the latter city as well. This uncompromising attitude made agreement impossible, and it wasaggravated by the aggressive action of the Bulgarian troops in theoccupied territory, who persistently endeavoured to steal ground from theGreek forces facing them. In May there was serious fighting to the east ofthe Struma, and peace was only restored with difficulty. Bulgarianrelations with Serbia were becoming strained at the same time, though inthis case Bulgaria had more justice on her side. Serbia maintained thatthe veto imposed by Austria upon her expansion to the Adriatic, incoincidence with Bulgaria's unexpected gains on the Maritsa to whichSerbian arms had contributed, invalidated the secret treaty of theprevious summer, and she announced her intention of retaining the Monastirdistrict and the line of the Salonika railway as far as the futurefrontier of Greece. Bulgaria, on the other hand, shut her eyes to Serbia'snecessity for an untrammelled economic outlet to one sea-board or theother, and took her stand on her strictly legal treaty-rights. However thebalance of justice inclined, a lasting settlement could only have beenreached by mutual forbearance and goodwill; but Bulgaria put herselfhopelessly in the wrong towards both her allies by a treacherousnight-attack upon them all along the line, at the end of June 1913. Thisdisastrous act was the work of a single political party, which has sincebeen condemned by most sections of Bulgarian public opinion; but thepunishment, if not the responsibility for the crime, fell upon the wholenation. Greece and Serbia had already been drawn into an understanding bytheir common danger. They now declared war against Bulgaria in concert. The counter-strokes of their armies met with success, and the interventionof Rumania made Bulgaria's discomfiture certain. 

The results of the one month's war were registered in the Treaty ofBucarest. Many of its provisions were unhappily, though naturally, inspired by the spirit of revenge; but the Greek premier, at any rate, showed a statesmanlike self-restraint in the negotiations. Venezelosadvocated the course of taking no more after the war than had beendemanded before it. He desired to leave Bulgaria a broad zone of Aegeanlittoral between the Struma and Maritsa rivers, including ports capable ofsatisfying Bulgaria's pressing need for an outlet towards the south. But, in the exasperated state of public feeling, even Venezelos' prestigefailed to carry through his policy in its full moderation. King George hadjust been assassinated in his year of jubilee, in the streets of thelong-desired Salonika; and King Constantine, his son, flushed by thevictory of Kilkish and encouraged by the Machiavellian diplomacy of hisHohenzollern brother-in-law, insisted on carrying the new Greek frontieras far east as the river Mesta, and depriving Bulgaria of Kavala, thenatural harbour for the whole Bulgarian hinterland in the upper basins ofthe Mesta and Struma. 

It is true that Greece did not exact as much as she might have done. Bulgaria was still allowed to possess herself of a coastal strip east ofthe Mesta, containing the tolerable harbours of Porto Lagos andDedeagatch, which had been occupied during hostilities by the Greek fleet, and thus her need for an Aegean outlet was not left unsatisfied altogether;while Greece on her part was cleverly shielded for the future from thosedrawbacks involved in immediate contact with Turkish territory, which shehad so often experienced in the past. It is also true that the Kavaladistrict is of great economic value in itself--it produces the better partof the Turkish Régie tobacco crop--and that on grounds of nationalityalone Bulgaria has no claim to this prize, since the tobacco-growingpeasantry is almost exclusively Greek or Turk, while the Greek element hasbeen extensively reinforced during the last two years by refugees fromAnatolia and Thrace. 

Nevertheless, it is already clear that Venezelos' judgement was thebetter. The settlement at the close of the present war may even yet bringBulgaria reparation in many quarters. If the Ruman and South Slavonicpopulations at present included in the complexus of Austria-Hungary arefreed from their imprisonment and united with the Serbian and Rumaniannational states, Bulgaria may conceivably recover from the latter thoseBulgarian lands which the Treaty of Bucarest made over to them in centralMacedonia and the Dobrudja, while it would be still more feasible to oustthe Turk again from Adrianople, where he slipped back in the hour ofBulgaria's prostration and has succeeded in maintaining himself eversince. Yet no amount of compensation in other directions and no abstractconsideration for the national principle will induce Bulgaria to renounceher claim on Greek Kavala. Access to this district is vital to Bulgariafrom the geographical point of view, and she will not be satisfied herewith such rights as Serbia enjoys at Salonika--free use of the port andfree traffic along a railway connecting it with her own hinterland. Herheart is set on complete territorial ownership, and she will not composeher feud with Greece until she has had her way. 

So long, therefore, as the question of Kavala remains unsettled, Greecewill not be able to put the preliminary problem of 'nationalconsolidation' behind her, and enter upon the long-deferred chapter of'internal development'. To accomplish once for all this vital transition, Venezelos is taking the helm again into his hands, and it is his evidentintention to close the Greek account with Bulgaria just as Serbia andRumania hope to close theirs with the same state--by a bold territorialconcession conditional upon adequate territorial compensationelsewhere. [1]

[Footnote 1: The above paragraph betrays its own date; for, since it waswritten, the intervention of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powershas deferred indefinitely the hope of a settlement based upon mutualagreement. ]

The possibility of such compensation is offered by certain outstandingproblems directly dependent upon the issue of the European conflict, andwe must glance briefly at these before passing on to consider the newchapter of internal history that is opening for the Greek nation. 

The problems in question are principally concerned with the ownership ofislands. 

The integrity of a land-frontier is guaranteed by the whole strength ofthe nation included within it, and can only be modified by a struggle forexistence with the neighbor on whom it borders; but islands by theirgeographical nature constitute independent political units, easilydetached from or incorporated with larger domains, according to themomentary fluctuation in the balance of sea-power. Thus it happened thatthe arrival of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ at the Dardanelles in August1914 led Turkey to reopen promptly certain questions concerning theAegean. The islands in this sea are uniformly Greek in population, buttheir respective geographical positions and political fortunesdifferentiate them into several groups. 

1. The Cyclades in the south-west, half submerged vanguards of mountainranges in continental Greece, have formed part of the modern kingdom fromits birth, and their status has never since been called into question. 

2. Krete, the largest of all Greek islands, has been dealt with already. She enjoyed autonomy under Turkish suzerainty for fifteen years before theBalkan War, and at its outbreak she once more proclaimed her union withGreece. This time at last her action was legalized, when Turkey expresslyabandoned her suzerain rights by a clause in the Treaty of London. 

3. During the war itself, the Greek navy occupied a number of islandswhich had remained till then under the more direct government of Turkey, The parties to the Treaty of London agreed to leave their destiny to thedecision of the powers, and the latter assigned them all to Greece, withthe exception of Imbros and Tenedos which command strategically the mouthof the Dardanelles. 

The islands thus secured to Greece fall in turn into several sub-groups. 

Two of these are _(a)_ Thasos, Samothraki, and Lemnos, off the Europeancoast, and _(b)_ Samos and its satellite Nikarià, immediately off the westcoast of Anatolia; and these five islands seem definitely to have beengiven up by Turkey for lost. The European group is well beyond the rangeof her present frontiers; while Samos, though it adjoins the Turkishmainland, does not mask the outlet from any considerable port, and hadmoreover for many years possessed the same privileged autonomy as Krete, so that the Ottoman Government did not acutely feel its final severance. 

_(c)_ A third group consists of Mitylini and Khios, [1] and concerning thispair Greece and Turkey have so far come to no understanding. The Turkspointed out that the littoral off which these islands lie contains notonly the most indispensable ports of Anatolia but also the largestenclaves of Greek population on the Asiatic mainland, and they declaredthat the occupation of this group by Greece menaced the sovereignty of thePorte in its home territory. 'See', they said, 'how the two islands flankboth sides of the sea-passage to Smyrna, the terminus of all the railwayswhich penetrate the Anatolian interior, while Mitylini barricades Aivaliand Edremid as well. As soon as the Greek Government has converted theharbours of these islands into naval bases, Anatolia will be subject to aperpetual Greek blockade, and this violent intimidation of the Turkishpeople will be reinforced by an insidious propaganda among the disloyalGreek elements in our midst. ' Accordingly the Turks refused to recognizethe award of the powers, and demanded the re-establishment of Ottomansovereignty in Mitylini and Khios, under guarantee of an autonomy afterthe precedent of Krete and Samos. 

[Footnote 1: Including its famous satellite Psarà. ]

To these arguments and demands the Greeks replied that, next to Krete;these are the two largest, most wealthy, and most populous Greek islandsin the Aegean; that their inhabitants ardently desire union with thenational kingdom; and that the Greek Government would hesitate to use themas a basis for economic coercion and nationalistic propaganda againstTurkey, if only because the commerce of western Anatolia is almostexclusively in the hands of the Greek element on the Asiatic continent. Greek interests were presumably bound up with the economic prosperity andpolitical consolidation of Turkey in Asia, and the Anatolian Greeks wouldmerely have been alienated from their compatriots by any such impoliticmachinations. 'Greek sovereignty in Mitylini and Khios', the Greeksmaintained, 'does not threaten Turkish sovereignty on the Continent. Butthe restoration of Turkish suzerainty over the islands would mostseriously endanger the liberty of their inhabitants; for Turkish promisesare notoriously valueless, except when they are endorsed by the guaranteeof some physically stronger power. '

Negotiations were conducted between Greece and Turkey from theserespective points of view without leading to any result, and the twostandpoints were in fact irreconcilable, since either power required theother to leave vital national interests at the mercy of an ancient enemy, without undertaking to make corresponding sacrifices itself. The problemprobably would never have been solved by compromise; but meanwhile thesituation has been entirely transformed by the participation of Turkey inthe European War, and the issue between Greece and Turkey, like the issuebetween Greece and Bulgaria, has been merged in the general problem of theEuropean settlement. 

The Balkan War of 1912 doomed the Ottoman power in Europe, but left itsAsiatic future unimpaired. By making war against the Quadruple Entente, Turkey has staked her existence on both continents, and is threatened withpolitical extinction if the Central Powers succumb in the struggle. Inthis event Greece will no longer have to accommodate her régime in theliberated islands to the susceptibilities of a Turkey consolidated on theopposite mainland, but will be able to stretch out her hand over theAnatolian coast and its hinterland, and compensate herself richly in thisquarter for the territorial sacrifices which may still be necessary to alasting understanding with her Bulgarian neighbour. 

The shores that dominate the Dardanelles will naturally remain beyond hergrasp, but she may expect to establish herself on the western littoralfrom a point as far north as Mount Ida and the plain of Edremid. The Greekcoast-town of Aivali will be hers, and the still more important focus ofGreek commerce and civilization at Smyrna; while she will push herdominion along the railways that radiate from Smyrna towards the interior. South-eastward, Aidin will be hers in the valley of the Mendere(Maiandros). Due eastward she will re-baptize the glistening city of AlaShehr with its ancient name of Philadelphia, under which it held outheroically for Hellenism many years after Aidin had become the capital ofa Moslem principality and the Turkish avalanche had rolled past it to thesea. Maybe she will follow the railway still further inland, and plant herflag on the Black Castle of Afiun, the natural railway-centre of Anatoliahigh up on the innermost plateau. All this and more was once Hellenicground, and the Turkish incomer, for all his vitality, has never been ablehere to obliterate the older culture or assimilate the earlier population. In this western region Turkish villages are still interspersed with Greek, and under the government of compatriots the unconquerable minority wouldinevitably reassert itself by the peaceful weapons of its superior energyand intelligence. 

4. If Greece realizes these aspirations through Venezelos' statesmanship, she will have settled in conjunction her outstanding accounts with bothBulgaria and Turkey; but a fourth group of islands still remains forconsideration, and these, though formerly the property of Turkey, are nowin the hands of other European powers. 

_(a)_ The first of those in question are the Sporades, a chain of islandsoff the Anatolian coast which continues the line of Mitylini, Khios, andSamos towards the south-east, and includes Kos, Patmos, Astypalià, Karpathos, Kasos, and, above all, Rhodes. The Sporades were occupied byItaly during her war with Turkey in 1911-12, and she stipulated in thePeace of Lausanne that she should retain them as a pledge until the lastOttoman soldier in Tripoli had been withdrawn, after which she would makethem over again to the Porte. The continued unrest in Tripoli may or maynot have been due to Turkish intrigues, but in any case it deferred theevacuation of the islands by Italy until the situation was transformedhere also by the successive intervention of both powers in the EuropeanWar. The consequent lapse of the Treaty of Lausanne simplifies the statusof the Sporades, but it is doubtful what effect it will have upon theirdestiny. In language and political sympathy their inhabitants are ascompletely Greek as all the other islanders of the Aegean, and if theQuadruple Entente has made the principle of nationality its own, Italy ismorally bound, now that the Sporades are at her free disposal, to satisfytheir national aspirations by consenting to their union with the kingdomof Greece. On the other hand, the prospective dissolution of the OttomanEmpire has increased Italy's stake in this quarter. In the event of apartition, the whole southern littoral of Anatolia will probably fallwithin the Italian sphere, which will start from the Gulf of Iskanderun, include the districts of Adana and Adalia, and march with the newAnatolian provinces of Greece along the line of the river Mendere. Thiscontinental domain and the adjacent islands are geographicallycomplementary to one another, and it is possible that Italy may forstrategical reasons insist on retaining the Sporades in perpetuity if sherealizes her ambitions on the continent. This solution would be less idealthan the other, but Greece would be wise to reconcile herself to it, asItaly has reconciled herself to the incorporation of Corsica in France;for by submitting frankly to this detraction from her national unity shewould give her brethren in the Sporades the best opportunity of developingtheir national individuality untrammelled under a friendly Italiansuzerainty. 

_(b)_ The advance-guard of the Greek race that inhabits the great islandof Cyprus has been subject to British government since 1878, when theprovisional occupation of the island by Great Britain under a contractsimilar to that of Lausanne was negotiated in a secret agreement betweenGreat Britain and Turkey on the eve of the Conference at Berlin. Thecondition of evacuation was in this case the withdrawal of Russia fromKars, and here likewise it never became operative till it was abrogated bythe outbreak of war. Cyprus, like the Sporades, is now at the disposal ofits _de facto_ possessor, and on November 5, 1914, it was annexed to theBritish Empire. But whatever decision Italy may take, it is to be hopedthat our own government at any rate will not be influenced exclusively bystrategical considerations, but will proclaim an intention of allowingCyprus ultimately to realize its national aspirations by union withGreece. [1]

[Footnote 1: Since the above was written, this intention, under a certaincondition, has definitely been expressed. ]

The whole population of the island is Greek in language, while under anexcellent British administration its political consciousness has beenawakened, and has expressed itself in a growing desire for national unityamong the Christian majority. It is true that in Cyprus, as in Krete, there is a considerable Greek-speaking minority of Moslems[1] who preferthe _status quo_; but, since the barrier of language is absent, theirantipathy to union may not prove permanent. However important theretention of Cyprus may be to Great Britain from the strategical point ofview, we shall find that even in the balance of material interests it isnot worth the price of alienating the sympathy of an awakened andotherwise consolidated nation. 

[Footnote 1: In Cyprus about 22 per cent. ]

This rather detailed review of problems in the islands and Anatolia bringsout the fact that Greek nationalism is not an artificial conception oftheorists, but a real force which impels the most scattered anddown-trodden populations of Greek speech to travail unceasingly forpolitical unity within the national state. Yet by far the most strikingexample of this attractive power in Hellenism is the history of it in'Epirus'. [1]

[Footnote 1: The name coined to include the districts of Himarra, Argyrokastro, and Koritsà. ]

The Epirots are a population of Albanian race, and they still speak anAlbanian dialect in their homes; while the women and children, at anyrate, often know no other language. But somewhat over a century ago thepolitical organism created by the remarkable personality of Ali Pasha inthe hinterland of the Adriatic coast, and the relations of Great Britainand France with this new principality in the course of their struggle forthe Mediterranean, began to awaken in the Epirots a desire forcivilization. Their Albanian origin opened to them no prospects, for therace had neither a literature nor a common historical tradition; and theyaccordingly turned to the Greeks, with whom they were linked in religionby membership of the Orthodox Church, and in politics by subjection toAli's Government at Yannina, which had adopted Greek as its officiallanguage. 

They had appealed to the right quarter; for we have seen how Greek cultureaccumulated a store of latent energy under the Turkish yoke, and wasexpending it at this very period in a vigorous national revival. Thepartially successful War of Liberation in the 'twenties of the nineteenthcentury was only the political manifestation of the new life. It hasexpressed itself more typically in a steady and universal enthusiasm foreducation, which throughout the subsequent generations of politicalstagnation has always opened to individual Greeks commercial andprofessional careers of the greatest brilliance, and often led them tospend the fortunes so acquired in endowing the nation with furthereducational opportunities. Public spirit is a Greek virtue. There are fewvillages which do not possess monuments of their successful sons, and aschool is an even commoner gift than a church; while the State hassupplemented the individual benefactor to an extent remarkable wherepublic resources are so slender. The school-house, in fact, is generallythe most prominent and substantial building in a Greek village, and theadvantage offered to the Epirots by a _rapprochement_ with the Greeks isconcretely symbolized by the Greek schools established to-day in generousnumbers throughout their country. 

For the Epirot boy the school is the door to the future. The language helearns there makes him the member of a nation, and opens to him a worldwide enough to employ all the talent and energy he may possess, if heseeks his fortune at Patras or Peiraeus, or in the great Greek commercialcommunities of Alexandria and Constantinople; while, if he stays at home, it still affords him a link with the life of civilized Europe through themedium of the ubiquitous Greek newspaper. [1] The Epirot has thus becomeGreek in soul, for he has reached the conception of a national life moreliberal than the isolated existence of his native village through theavenue of Greek culture. 'Hellenism' and nationality have become for himidentical ideas; and when at last the hour of deliverance struck, hewelcomed the Greek armies that marched into his country from the south andthe east, after the fall of Yannina in the spring of 1913, with the sameenthusiasm with which all the enslaved populations of native Greek dialectgreeted the consummation of a century's hopes. 

[Footnote 1: There is still practically no literature printed in theAlbanian language. ]

The Greek troops arrived only just in time, for the 'Hellenism' of theEpirots had been terribly proved by murderous attacks from their Moslemneighbours on the north. The latter speak a variety of the same Albaniantongue, but were differentiated by a creed which assimilated them to theruling race. They had been superior to their Christian kinsmen by theweight of numbers and the possession of arms, which under the Ottomanrégime were the monopoly of the Moslem. At last, however, the yoke ofoppression was broken and the Greek occupation seemed a harbinger ofsecurity for the future. Unluckily, however, Epirus was of interest toothers besides its own inhabitants. It occupies an important geographicalposition facing the extreme heel of Italy, just below the narrowest pointin the neck of the Adriatic, and the Italian Government insisted that thecountry should be included in the newly erected principality of Albania, which the powers had reserved the right to delimit in concert by aprovision in the Treaty of London. 

Italy gave two reasons for her demand. First, she declared it incompatiblewith her own vital interests that both shores of the strait between Corfùand the mainland should pass into the hands of the same power, because thecombination of both coasts and the channel between them offered a site fora naval base that might dominate the mouth of the Adriatic. Secondly, shemaintained that the native Albanian speech of the Epirots proved theirAlbanian nationality, and that it was unjust to the new Albanian state toexclude from it the most prosperous and civilized branch of the Albaniannation. Neither argument is cogent. 

The first argument could easily be met by the neutralization of the Corfùstraits, [1] and it is also considerably weakened by the fact that theposition which really commands the mouth of the Adriatic from the easternside is not the Corfù channel beyond it but the magnificent bay of Avlonajust within its narrowest section, and this is a Moslem district to whichthe Epirots have never laid claim, and which would therefore in any casefall within the Albanian frontier. The second argument is almostludicrous. The destiny of Epirus is not primarily the concern of the otherAlbanians, of for that matter of the Greeks, but of the Epirotsthemselves, and it is hard to see how their nationality can be definedexcept in terms of their own conscious and expressed desire; for a nationis simply a group of men inspired by a common will to co-operate forcertain purposes, and cannot be brought into existence by the externalmanipulation of any specific objective factors, but solely by the inwardsubjective impulse of its constituents. It was a travesty of justice toput the Orthodox Epirots at the mercy of a Moslem majority (which had beenmassacring them the year before) on the ground that they happened to speakthe same language. The hardship was aggravated by the fact that all theroutes connecting Epirus with the outer world run through Yannina andSalonika, from which the new frontier sundered her; while great naturalbarriers separate her from Avlona and Durazzo, with which the samefrontier so ironically signalled her union. 

[Footnote 1: Corfù itself is neutralized already by the agreement underwhich Great Britain transferred the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863. ]

The award of the powers roused great indignation in Greece, but Venezeloswas strong enough to secure that it should scrupulously be respected; andthe 'correct attitude' which he inflexibly maintained has finally won itsreward. As soon as the decision of the powers was announced, the Epirotsdetermined to help themselves. They raised a militia, and asserted theirindependence so successfully, that they compelled the Prince of Wied, thefirst (and perhaps the last) ruler of the new 'Albania', to give them homerule in matters of police and education, and to recognise Greek as theofficial language for their local administration. They ensured observanceof this compact by the maintenance of their troops under arms. So matterscontinued, until a rebellion among his Moslem subjects and the outbreak ofthe European War in the summer of 1914 obliged the prince to depart, leaving Albania to its natural state of anarchy. The anarchy might haverestored every canton and village to the old state of contented isolation, had it not been for the religious hatred between the Moslems and theEpirots, which, with the removal of all external control, began to ventitself in an aggressive assault of the former upon the latter, andentailed much needless misery in the autumn months. 

The reoccupation of Epirus by Greek troops had now become a matter of lifeand death to its inhabitants, and in October 1914 Venezelos took theinevitable step, after serving due notice upon all the signatories to theTreaty of London. Thanks in part to the absorption of the powers in moremomentous business, but perhaps even in a greater degree to the confidencewhich the Greek premier had justly won by his previous handling of thequestion, this action was accomplished without protest or opposition. Since then Epirus has remained sheltered from the vicissitudes of civilwar within and punitive expeditions from without, to which the unhappyremnant of Albania has been incessantly exposed; and we may prophesy thatthe Epiroi, unlike their repudiated brethren of Moslem or Catholic faith, have really seen the last of their troubles. Even Italy, from whom theyhad most to fear, has obtained such a satisfactory material guarantee bythe occupation on her own part of Avlona, that she is as unlikely todemand the evacuation of Epirus by Greece as she is to withdraw her ownforce from her long coveted strategical base on the eastern shore of theAdriatic. In Avlona and Epirus the former rivals are settling down to aneighbourly contact, and there is no reason to doubt that the _de facto_line of demarcation between them will develop into a permanent andofficially recognized frontier. The problem of Epirus, though not, unfortunately, that of Albania, may be regarded as definitely closed. 

The reclamation of Epirus is perhaps the most honourable achievement ofthe Greek national revival, but it is by no means an isolated phenomenon. Western Europe is apt to depreciate modern 'Hellenism', chiefly becauseits ambitious denomination rather ludicrously challenges comparison with avanished glory, while any one who has studied its rise must perceive thatit has little more claim than western Europe itself to be the peculiarheir of ancient Greek culture. And yet this Hellenism of recent growth hasa genuine vitality of its own. It displays a remarkable power ofassimilating alien elements and inspiring them to an active pursuit of itsideals, and its allegiance supplants all others in the hearts of thoseexposed to its charm. The Epirots are not the only Albanians who have beenHellenized. In the heart of central Greece and Peloponnesus, on the plainof Argos, and in the suburbs of Athens, there are still Albanian enclaves, derived from those successive migrations between the fourteenth and theeighteenth centuries; but they have so entirely forgotten their originthat the villagers, when questioned, can only repeat: 'We can't say why wehappen to speak "Arvanitikà", but we are Greeks like everybody else. ' TheVlachs again, a Romance-speaking tribe of nomadic shepherds who havewandered as far south as Akarnania and the shores of the Korinthian Gulf, are settling down there to the agricultural life of the Greek village, sothat Hellenism stands to them for the transition to a higher social phase. Their still migratory brethren in the northern ranges of Pindus arealready 'Hellenes' in political sympathy, [1] and are moving under Greekinfluence towards the same social evolution. In distant Cappadocia, at theroot of the Anatolian peninsula, the Orthodox Greek population, submergedbeneath the Turkish flood more than eight centuries ago, has retainedlittle individuality except in its religion, and nothing of its nativespeech but a garbled vocabulary embedded in a Turkified syntax. Yet eventhis dwindling rear-guard has been overtaken just in time by the returningcurrent of national life, bringing with it the Greek school, and with theschool a community of outlook with Hellenism the world over. Whatever thefate of eastern Anatolia may be, the Greek element is now assured aprominent part in its future. 

[Footnote 1: Greece owed her naval supremacy in 1912-13 to the new cruiser_Georgios Averof_, named after a Vlach millionaire who made his fortune inthe Greek colony at Alexandria and left a legacy for the ship'sconstruction at his death. ]

These, moreover, are the peripheries of the Greek world; and at its centrethe impulse towards union in the national state readies a passionateintensity. 'Aren't you better off as you are?' travellers used to ask inKrete during the era of autonomy. 'If you get your "Union", you will haveto do two years' military service instead of one year's training in themilitia, and will be taxed up to half as much again. ' 'We have thought ofthat, ' the Kretans would reply, 'but what does it matter, if we are unitedwith Greece?'

On this unity modern Hellenism has concentrated its efforts, and afternearly a century of ineffective endeavour it has been brought by thestatesmanship of Venezelos within sight of its goal. Our review ofoutstanding problems reveals indeed the inconclusiveness of the settlementimposed at Bucarest; but this only witnesses to the wisdom of the Greeknation in reaffirming its confidence in Venezelos at the present juncture, and recalling him to power to crown the work which he has so brilliantlycarried through. Under Venezelos' guidance we cannot doubt that theheart's desire of Hellenism will be accomplished at the impending Europeansettlement by the final consolidation of the Hellenic national state. [1]

[Footnote 1: This paragraph, again, has been superseded by the dramaticturn of events; but the writer has left it unaltered, for the end is notyet. ]

Yet however attractive the sincerity of such nationalism may be, politicalunity is only a negative achievement. The history of a nation must bejudged rather by the positive content of its ideals and the positiveresults which it attains, and herein the Hellenic revival displays certaingrave shortcomings. The internal paralysis of social and economic life hasalready been noted and ascribed to the urgency of the 'preliminaryquestion'; but we must now add to this the growing embitterment which haspoisoned the relations of Greece with her Balkan neighbours during thecrises through which the 'preliminary question' has been worked out to itssolution. Now that this solution is at hand, will Hellenism prove capableof casting out these two evils, and adapt itself with strength renewed tothe new phase of development that lies before it?

The northern territories acquired in 1913 will give a much greater impetusto economic progress than Thessaly gave a generation ago; for theMacedonian littoral west as well as east of the Struma produces aconsiderable proportion of the Turkish Régie tobacco, while thepine-forests of Pindus, if judiciously exploited, will go far to remedythe present deficiency of home-grown timber, even if they do not providequantities sufficient for export abroad. If we take into account thecurrant-crop of the Peloponnesian plain-lands which already almostmonopolizes the world-market, the rare ores of the south-eastern mountainsand the Archipelago, and the vintages which scientific treatment mightbring into competition with the wines of the Peninsula and France, we cansee that Greece has many sources of material prosperity within her reach, if only she applies her liberated energy to their development. Yet theseare all of them specialized products, and Greece will never export anystaple commodity to rival the grain which Rumania sends in such quantitiesto central Europe already, and which Bulgaria will begin to send within afew years' time. Even the consolidated Greek kingdom will be too small inarea and too little compact in geographical outline to constitute anindependent economic unit, and the ultimate economic interests of thecountry demand co-operation in some organization more comprehensive thanthe political molecule of the national state. 

Such an association should embrace the Balkans in their widest extent--from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from the Carpathians to the Aegean;for, in sharp contrast to the inextricable chaos of its linguistic andecclesiastical divisions, the region constitutes economically ahomogeneous and indivisible whole, in which none of the parts can divestthemselves of their mutual interdependence. Greece, for example, hassecured at last her direct link with the railway system of the Europeancontinent, but for free transit beyond her own frontier she still dependson Serbia's good-will, just, as Serbia depends on hers for an outlet tothe Aegean at Salonika. The two states have provided for their respectiveinterests by a joint proprietorship of the section of railway betweenSalonika and Belgrade; and similar railway problems will doubtless bringRumania to terms with Serbia for access to the Adriatic, and both withBulgaria for rights of way to Constantinople and the Anatolian hinterlandbeyond. These common commercial arteries of the Balkans take no account ofracial or political frontiers, but link the region as a whole with otherregions in a common economic relation. 

South-eastern and central Europe are complementary economic areas in aspecial degree. The industries of central Europe will draw upon the rawproducts of the south-east to an increasing extent, and the south-eastwill absorb in turn increasing quantities of manufactured plant fromcentral Europe for the development of its own natural resources. The twoareas will become parties in a vast economic nexus, and, as in allbusiness transactions, each will try to get the best of the continuallyintensified bargaining. This is why co-operation is so essential to thefuture well-being of the Balkan States. Isolated individually and mutuallycompetitive as they are at present, they must succumb to the economicascendancy of Vienna and Berlin as inevitably as unorganized, unskilledlabourers fall under the thraldom of a well-equipped capitalist. CentralEurope will have in any event an enormous initial superiority over theBalkans in wealth, population, and business experience; and the Balkanpeoples can only hope to hold their own in this perilous but essentialintercourse with a stronger neighbour, if they take more active anddeliberate steps towards co-operation among themselves, and find inrailway conventions the basis for a Balkan zollverein. A zollverein shouldbe the first goal of Balkan statesmanship in the new phase of history thatis opening for Europe; but economic relations on this scale involve thepolitical factor, and the Balkans will not be able to deal with theirgreat neighbours on equal terms till the zollverein has ripened into afederation. The alternative is subjection, both political and economic;and neither the exhaustion of the Central Powers in the present strugglenor the individual consolidation of the Balkan States in the subsequentsettlement will suffice by themselves to avert it in the end. 

The awakening of the nation and the consolidation of the state, which wehave traced in these pages, must accordingly lead on to the confederationof the Balkans, if all that has been so painfully won is not to perishagain without result; and we are confronted with the question: Will Balkannationalism rise to the occasion and transcend itself?

Many spectators of recent history will dismiss the suggestion as Utopian. 'Nationality', they will say, 'revealed itself first as a constructiveforce, and Europe staked its future upon it; but now that we are committedto it, it has developed a sinister destructiveness which we cannot remedy. Nationality brought the Balkan States into being and led them to finalvictory over the Turk in 1912, only to set them tearing one another topieces again in 1913. In the present catastrophe the curse of the Balkanshas descended upon the whole of Europe, and laid bare unsuspected depthsof chaotic hatred; yet Balkan antagonisms still remain more ineradicablethan ours. The cure for nationality is forgetfulness, but Balkannationalism is rooted altogether in the past. The Balkan peoples havesuffered one shattering experience in common--the Turk, and the waters ofOttoman oppression that have gone over their souls have not been waters ofLethe. They have endured long centuries of spiritual exile by thepassionate remembrance of their Sion, and when they have vindicated theirheritage at last, and returned to build up the walls of their city and thetemple of their national god, they have resented each other'sneighbourhood as the repatriated Jew resented the Samaritan. The Greekdreams with sullen intensity of a golden age before the Bulgar was foundin the land, and the challenge implied in the revival of the Hellenicname, so far from being a superficial vanity, is the dominantcharacteristic of the nationalism which has adopted it for its title. Modern Hellenism breathes the inconscionable spirit of the _émigré_. '

This is only too true. The faith that has carried them to national unitywill suffice neither the Greeks nor any other Balkan people for the newera that has dawned upon them, and the future would look dark indeed, butfor a strange and incalculable leaven, which is already potently at workin the land. 

Since the opening of the present century, the chaotic, unneighbourly racesof south-eastern Europe, whom nothing had united before but the commonimpress of the Turk, have begun to share another experience in common--America. From the Slovak villages in the Carpathians to the Greek villagesin the Laconian hills they have been crossing the Atlantic in theirthousands, to become dockers and navvies, boot-blacks and waiters, confectioners and barbers in Chicago, St. Louis, Omaha, and all the othercities that have sprung up like magic to welcome the immigrant to thehospitable plains of the Middle West. The intoxication of his newenvironment stimulates all the latent industry and vitality of the Balkanpeasant, and he abandons himself whole-heartedly to American life; yet hedoes not relinquish the national tradition in which he grew up. In Americawork brings wealth, and the Greek or Slovak soon worships his God in afiner church and reads his language in a better-printed newspaper than heever enjoyed in his native village. The surplus flows home in remittancesof such abundance that they are steadily raising the cost of living in theBalkans themselves, or, in other words, the standard of materialcivilization; and sooner or later the immigrant goes the way of his moneyorders, for home-sickness, if not a mobilization order, exerts itscompulsion before half a dozen years are out. 

It is a strange experience to spend a night in some remotemountain-village of Greece, and see Americanism and Hellenism face toface. Hellenism is represented by the village schoolmaster. He wears ablack coat, talks a little French, and can probably read Homer; but hislongest journey has been to the normal school at Athens, and it has notaltered his belief that the ikon in the neighbouring monastery was made bySt. Luke and the Bulgar beyond the mountains by the Devil. On the otherside of you sits the returned emigrant, chattering irrepressibly in hisqueer version of the 'American language', and showing you the newspaperswhich are mailed to him every fortnight from the States. His clean linencollar and his well-made American boots are conspicuous upon him, and hewill deprecate on your behalf and his own the discomfort and squalor ofhis native surroundings. His home-coming has been a disillusionment, butit is a creative phenomenon; and if any one can set Greece upon a new pathit is he. He is transforming her material life by his American savings, for they are accumulating into a capital widely distributed in nativehands, which will dispense the nation from pawning its richest mines andvineyards to the European exploiter, and enable it to carry on theirdevelopment on its own account at this critical juncture when Europeansources of capital are cut off for an indefinite period by the disaster ofthe European War. The emigrant will give Greece all Trikoupis dreamed of, but his greatest gift to his country will be his American point of view. In the West he has learnt that men of every language and religion can livein the same city and work at the same shops and sheds and mills andswitch-yards without desecrating each other's churches or even suppressingeach other's newspapers, not to speak of cutting each other's throats; andwhen next he meets Albanian or Bulgar on Balkan ground, he may rememberthat he has once dwelt with him in fraternity at Omaha or St. Louis orChicago. This is the gospel of Americanism, and unlike Hellenism, whichspread downwards from the patriarch's residence and the merchant'scounting-house, it is being preached in all the villages of the land bythe least prejudiced and most enterprising of their sons (for it is thesewho answer America's call); and spreading upward from the peasant towardsthe professor in the university and the politician in parliament. 

Will this new leaven conquer, and cast out the stale leaven of Hellenismbefore it sours the loaf? Common sense is mighty, but whether it shallprevail in Greece and the Balkans and Europe lies on the knees of thegods. 

RUMANIA: HER HISTORY AND POLITICS

1

_Introduction_

The problem of the origin and formation of the Rumanian nation has alwaysprovided matter for keen disputation among historians, and the theorieswhich have been advanced are widely divergent. Some of these discussionshave been undertaken solely for political reasons, and in such casesexisting data prove conveniently adaptable. This elastic treatment of thehistorical data is facilitated by the fact that a long and importantperiod affecting the formation and the development of the Rumanian nation(270-1220) has bequeathed practically no contemporary evidence. By linkingup, however, what is known antecedent to that period with the precise dataavailable regarding the following it, and by checking the inferred resultswith what little evidence exists respecting the obscure epoch of Rumanianhistory, it has been possible to reconstruct, almost to a certainty, theevolution of the Rumanians during the Middle Ages. 

A discussion of the varying theories would be out of proportion, and outof place, in this essay. Nor is it possible to give to any extent adetailed description of the epic struggle which the Rumanians carried onfor centuries against the Turks. I shall have to deal, therefore, on broadlines, with the historical facts--laying greater stress only upon thethree fundamental epochs of Rumanian history: the formation of theRumanian nation; its initial casting into a national polity (foundation ofthe Rumanian principalities); and its final evolution into the actualunitary State; and shall then pass on to consider the more recent internaland external development of Rumania, and her present attitude. 

2

_Formation of the Rumanian Nation_

About the fifth century B. C. , when the population of the Balkan-Carpathianregion consisted of various tribes belonging to the Indo-European family, the northern portion of the Balkan peninsula was conquered by theThracians and the Illyrians. The Thracians spread north and south, and abranch of their race, the Dacians, crossed the Danube. The latterestablished themselves on both sides of the Carpathian ranges, in theregion which now comprises the provinces of Oltenia (Rumania), and Banatand Transylvania (Hungary). The Dacian Empire expanded till its boundariestouched upon those of the Roman Empire. The Roman province of Moesia(between the Danube and the Balkans) fell before its armies, and thecampaign that ensued was so successful that the Dacians were able tocompel Rome to an alliance. 

Two expeditions undertaken against Dacia by the Emperor Trajan (98-117)released Rome from these ignominious obligations, and brought Dacia underRoman rule (A. D. 106). Before his second expedition Trajan erected a stonebridge over the Danube, the remains of which can still be seen atTurnu-Severin, a short distance below the point where the Danube entersRumanian territory. Trajan celebrated his victory by erecting at AdamKlissi (in the province of Dobrogea) the recently discovered _TropaeumTraiani_, and in Rome the celebrated 'Trajan's Column', depicting inmarble reliefs various episodes of the Dacian wars. 

The new Roman province was limited to the regions originally inhabited bythe Dacians, and a strong garrison, estimated by historians at 25, 000 men, was left to guard it. Numerous colonists from all parts of the RomanEmpire were brought here as settlers, and what remained of the Dacianpopulation completely amalgamated with them. The new province quicklydeveloped under the impulse of Roman civilization, of which numerousinscriptions and other archaeological remains are evidence. It became oneof the most flourishing dependencies of the Roman Empire, and was spokenof as _Dacia Felix_. 

About a century and a half later hordes of barbarian invaders, coming fromthe north and east, swept over the country. Under the strain of thoseincursions the Roman legions withdrew by degrees into Moesia, and in A. D. 271 Dacia was finally evacuated. But the colonists remained, retiring intothe Carpathians, where they lived forgotten of history. 

The most powerful of these invaders were the Goths (271-375), who, comingfrom the shores of the Baltic, had shortly before settled north of theBlack Sea. Unaccustomed to mountain life, they did not penetrate beyondthe plains between the Carpathians and the Dnjester. They had consequentlybut little intercourse with the Daco-Roman population, and the totalabsence in the Rumanian language and in Rumanian place-names of words ofGothic origin indicates that their stay had no influence upon country orpopulation. Material evidence of their occupation is afforded, however, bya number of articles made of gold found in 1837 at Petroasa (Moldavia), and now in the National Museum at Bucarest. 

After the Goths came the Huns (375-453), under Attila, the Avars(566-799), both of Mongolian race, and the Gepidae (453-566), of Gothicrace--all savage, bloodthirsty raiders, passing and repassing over theRumanian regions, pillaging and burning everywhere. To avoid destructionthe Daco-Roman population withdrew more and more into the inaccessiblewooded regions of the mountains, and as a result were in no wiseinfluenced by contact with the invaders. 

But with the coming of the Slavs, who settled in the Balkan peninsulaabout the beginning of the seventh century, certain fundamental changestook place in the ethnical conditions prevailing on the Danube. TheRumanians were separated from the Romans, following the occupation by theSlavs of the Roman provinces between the Adriatic and the Black Sea. Suchpart of the population as was not annihilated during the raids of theAvars was taken into captivity, or compelled to retire southwards towardsmodern Macedonia and northwards towards the Dacian regions. 

Parts of the Rumanian country became dependent upon the new state foundedbetween the Balkans and the Danube in 679 by the Bulgarians, a people ofTuranian origin, who formerly inhabited the regions north of the Black Seabetween the Volga and the mouth of the Danube. 

After the conversion of the Bulgarians to Christianity (864) the Slovenianlanguage was introduced into their Church, and afterwards also into theChurch of the already politically dependent Rumanian provinces. [1] Thisfinally severed the Daco-Rumanians from the Latin world. The formerremained for a long time under Slav influence, the extent of which isshown by the large number of words of Slav origin contained in theRumanian language, especially in geographical and agriculturalterminology. 

[Footnote 1: The Rumanians north and south of the Danube embraced theChristian faith after its introduction into the Roman Empire byConstantine the Great (325), with Latin as religious language and theirchurch organization under the rule of Rome. A Christian basilica, datingfrom that period, has been discovered by the Rumanian; archaeologist, Tocilescu, at Adam Klissi (Dobrogea). ]

The coming of the Hungarians (a people of Mongolian race) about the end ofthe ninth century put an end to the Bulgarian domination in Dacia. While afew of the existing Rumanian duchies were subdued by Stephen the Saint, the first King of Hungary (995-1038), the 'land of the Vlakhs' (_TerraBlacorum_), in the south-eastern part of Transylvania, enjoyed under theHungarian kings a certain degree of national autonomy. The Hungarianchronicles speak of the Vlakhs as 'former colonists of the Romans'. Theethnological influence of the Hungarians upon the Rumanian population hasbeen practically nil. They found the Rumanian nation firmly established, race and language, and the latter remained pure of Magyarisms, even inTransylvania. Indeed, it is easy to prove--and it is only what might beexpected, seeing that the Rumanians had attained a higher state ofcivilization than the Hungarian invaders--that the Hungarians were largelyinfluenced by the Daco-Romans. They adopted Latin as their officiallanguage, they copied many of the institutions and customs of theRumanians, and recruited a large number of their nobles from among theRumanian nobility, which was already established on a feudal basis whenthe Hungarians arrived. 

A great number of the Rumanian nobles and freemen were, however, inimicalto the new masters, and migrated to the regions across the mountains. Thisthe Hungarians used as a pretext for bringing parts of Rumania under theirdomination, and they were only prevented from further extending it by thecoming of the Tartars (1241), the last people of Mongolian origin to harrythese regions. The Hungarians maintained themselves, however, in the partswhich they had already occupied, until the latter were united into theprincipality of the 'Rumanian land'. 

To sum up: 'The Rumanians are living to-day where fifteen centuries agotheir ancestors were living. The possession of the regions on the LowerDanube passed from one nation to another, but none endangered the Rumaniannation as a national entity. "The water passes, the stones remain"; thehordes of the migration period, detached from their native soil, disappeared as mist before the sun. But the Roman element bent their headswhile the storm passed over them, clinging to the old places until theadvent of happier days, when they were able to stand up and stretch theirlimbs. '[1]

[Footnote 1: Traugott Tamm, _Über den Ursprung der Rumänen, _, Bonn, 1891. ]

3

_The Foundation and Development of the Rumanian Principalities_

The first attempt to organize itself into a political entity was made bythe Rumanian nation in the thirteenth century, when, under the impulse ofthe disaffected nobles coming from Hungary, the two principalities of'Muntenia' (Mountain Land), commonly known as Wallachia and 'Moldavia', came into being. The existence of Rumanians on both sides of theCarpathians long before Wallachia was founded is corroborated bycontemporary chroniclers. We find evidence of it in as distant a source asthe _History of the Mongols, _ of the Persian chronicler, Rashid Al-Din, who, describing the invasion of the Tartars, says: 'In the middle ofspring (1240) the princes (Mongols or Tartars) crossed the mountains inorder to enter the country of the Bulares (Bulgarians) and of theBashguirds (Hungarians). Orda, who was marching to the right, passedthrough the country of the Haute (Olt), where Bazarambam met him with anarmy, but was beaten. Boudgek crossed the mountains to enter theKara-Ulak, and defeated the Ulak (Vlakh) people. '[1] Kara-Ulak means BlackWallachia; Bazarambam is certainly the corrupted name of the Ban Bassarab, who ruled as vassal of Hungary over the province of Oltenia, and whosedynasty founded the principality of Muntenia. The early history of thisprincipality was marked by efforts to free it from Hungarian domination, anatural development of the desire for emancipation which impelled theRumanians to migrate from the subdued provinces in Hungary. 

[Footnote 1: Xenopol, _Histoire des Roumains, _ Paris, 1896, i, 168. ]

The foundation of Moldavia dates from after the retreat of the Tartars, who had occupied the country for a century (1241-1345). They were drivenout by an expedition under Hungarian leadership, with the aid of Rumaniansfrom the province of Maramuresh. It was the latter who then founded theprincipality of Moldavia under the suzerainty of Hungary, the chroniclersmentioning as its first ruler the Voivod Dragosh. [1]

[Footnote 1: The legend as to the foundation of Moldavia tells us thatDragosh, when hunting one day in the mountains, was pursuing a bisonthrough the dense forest. Towards sunset, just when a successful shot fromhis bow had struck and killed the animal, he emerged at a point from whichthe whole panorama of Moldavia was unfolded before his astonished eyes. Deeply moved by the beauty of this fair country, he resolved to found astate there. It is in commemoration of this event that Moldavia bears thehead of a wild bison on her banner. ]

The rudimentary political formations which already existed before thefoundation of the principalities were swept away by the invasion of theTartars, who destroyed all trace of constituted authority in the plainsbelow the Carpathians. In consequence the immigrants from Transylvania didnot encounter any resistance, and were even able to impose obedience uponthe native population, though coming rather as refugees than asconquerors. These new-comers were mostly nobles (boyards). Theiremigration deprived the masses of the Rumanian population of Transylvaniaof all moral and political support--especially as a part of the nobilityhad already been won over by their Hungarian masters--and with time themasses fell into servitude. On the other hand the immigrating noblesstrengthened and secured the predominance of their class in the stateswhich were to be founded. In both cases the situation of the peasantrybecame worse, and we have, curiously enough, the same social fact broughtabout by apparently contrary causes. 

Though the Rumanians seem to have contributed but little, up to thenineteenth century, to the advance of civilization, their part in Europeanhistory is nevertheless a glorious one, and if less apparent, perhaps ofmore fundamental importance. By shedding their blood in the struggleagainst the Ottoman invasion, they, together with the other peoples ofOriental Europe, procured that security which alone made possible thedevelopment of western civilization. Their merit, like that of all withwhom they fought, 'is not to have vanquished time and again the followersof Mohammed, who always ended by gaining the upper hand, but rather tohave resisted with unparalleled energy, perseverance, and bravery theterrible Ottoman invaders, making them pay for each step advanced such aheavy price, that their resources were drained, they were unable to carryon the fight, and thus their power came to an end'. [1]

[Footnote 1: Xenopol, op. Cit. , i. 266. ]

From the phalanx of Christian warriors stand out the names of a few whowere the bravest of a time when bravery was common; but while it is atleast due that more tribute than a mere mention of their names should bepaid to the patriot princes who fought in life-long conflict againstTurkish domination, space does not permit me to give more than thebriefest summary of the wars which for centuries troubled the country. 

It was in 1389, when Mircea the Old was Prince of Wallachia, that theunited Balkan nations attempted for the first time to check Ottomaninvasion. The battle of Kosovo, however, was lost, and Mircea had toconsent to pay tribute to the Turks. For a short space after the battle ofRovine (1398), where Mircea defeated an invading Turkish army, the countryhad peace, until Turkish victories under the Sultan Mohammed resulted, in1411, in further submissions to tribute. 

It is worthy of mention that it was on the basis of tribute that therelations between Turkey and Rumania rested until 1877, the Rumanianprovinces becoming at no time what Hungary was for a century and a half, namely, a Turkish province. 

In a battle arising following his frustration--by means not unconnectedwith his name--of a Turkish plot against his person, Vlad the Impaler(1458-62) completely defeated the Turks under Mohammed II; but anunfortunate feud against Stephen the Great, Prince of Moldavia, put an endto the reign of Vlad--a fierce but just prince. 

A period of the most lamentable decadence followed, during which Turkishdomination prevailed more and more in the country. During an interval oftwenty-five years (1521-46) no less than eleven princes succeeded oneanother on the throne of Muntenia, whilst of the nineteen princes whoruled during the last three-quarters of the sixteenth century, only twodied a natural death while still reigning. 

In Moldavia also internal struggles were weakening the country. Notpowerful enough to do away with one another, the various aspirants to thethrone contented themselves with occupying and ruling over parts of theprovince. Between 1443-7 there were no less than three princes reigningsimultaneously, whilst one of them, Peter III, lost and regained thethrone three times. 

For forty-seven years (1457-1504) Stephen the Great fought for theindependence of Moldavia. At Racova, in 1475, he annihilated an Ottomanarmy in a victory considered the greatest ever secured by the Crossagainst Islam. The Shah of Persia, Uzun Hasan, who was also fighting theTurks, offered him an alliance, urging him at the same time to induce allthe Christian princes to unite with the Persians against the common foe. These princes, as well as Pope Sixtus IV, gave him great praise; but whenStephen asked from them assistance in men and money, not only did hereceive none, but Vladislav, King of Hungary, conspired with his brotherAlbert, King of Poland, to conquer and divide Moldavia between them. APolish army entered the country, but was utterly destroyed by Stephen inthe forest of Kosmin. 

Having had the opportunity of judging at its right value the friendship ofthe Christian princes, on his death-bed Stephen advised his son Bogdan tomake voluntary submission to the Turks. Thus Moldavia, like Wallachia, came under Turkish suzerainty. 

For many years after Stephen's death the Turks exploited the Rumaniancountries shamelessly, the very candidates for the throne having to paygreat sums for Turkish support. The country groaned under the resultanttaxation and the promiscuousness of the tribute exacted till, in 1572, John the Terrible ascended the Moldavian throne. This prince refused topay tribute, and repeatedly defeated the Turks. An army of 100, 000 menadvanced against John; but his cavalry, composed of nobles not over-loyalto a prince having the peasant cause so much at heart, deserted to theenemy, with the result that, after a gallant and prolonged resistance, hesuffered defeat. 

Michael the Brave, Prince of Muntenia (1593-1601), was the last of theVlakhs to stand up against Turkish aggression. This prince not onlysucceeded in crushing a Turkish army sent against him, but he invadedTransylvania, whose prince had leanings towards Turkey, pushed furtherinto Moldavia, and succeeded in bringing the three Rumanian countriesunder his rule. Michael is described in the documents of the time as'Prince of the whole land of Hungro-Wallachia, of Transylvania, and ofMoldavia'. He ruled for eight years. 'It was not the Turkish sword whichput an end to the exploits of Michael the Brave. The Magyars ofTransylvania betrayed him; the German emperor condemned him; and a Greekin Austria's service, General Basta, had him sabred: as though it werefated that all the enemies of the Rumanian race, the Magyar, the German, and the Greek, should unite to dip their hands in the blood of the Latinhero. '[1] The union of the Rumanian lands which he realized did not lastlong; but it gave form and substance to the idea which was from that dayonward to be the ideal of the Rumanian nation. 

[Footnote 1: Alfred Rumbaud, Introduction to Xenopol, op, cit. , i. Xix. ]

The fundamental cause of all the sufferings of the Rumanian principalitieswas the hybrid 'hereditary-elective' system of succession to the throne, which prevailed also in most of the neighbouring countries. All members ofthe princely family were eligible for the succession; but the right ofselecting among them lay with an assembly composed of the higher nobilityand clergy. All was well if a prince left only one successor. But if therewere several, even if illegitimate children, claiming the right to rule, then each endeavoured to gain over the nobility with promises, sometimes, moreover, seeking the support of neighbouring countries. This systemrendered easier and hastened the establishment of Turkish domination; andcorruption and intrigues, in which the Sultan's harem had a share, becamecapital factors in the choice and election of the ruler. 

Economically and intellectually all this was disastrous. The Rumanianswere an agricultural people. The numerous class of small freeholders(moshneni and razeshi), not being able to pay the exorbitant taxes, oftenhad their lands confiscated by the princes. Often, too, not being able tosupport themselves, they sold their property and their very selves to thebig landowners. Nor did the nobles fare better. Formerly free, quasi-feudal warriors, seeking fortune in reward for services rendered totheir prince, they were often subjected to coercive treatment on his partnow that the throne depended upon the goodwill of influential personagesat Constantinople. Various civil offices were created at court, eithernecessitated by the extension of the relations of the country or intendedto satisfy some favourite of the prince. Sources of social position andgreat material benefit, these offices were coveted greedily by theboyards, and those who obtained none could only hope to cheat fortune bydoing their best to undermine the position of the prince. 

4

_The Phanariote Rule_

These offices very presently fell to the lot of the Phanariotes (Greekmerchants and bankers inhabiting the quarter of Phanar), who had in someway or another assisted the princes to their thrones, these being nowpractically put up to auction in Constantinople. As a natural consequenceof such a state of affairs the thoughts of the Rumanian princes turned toRussia as a possible supporter against Ottoman oppression. A formalalliance was entered into in 1711 with Tsar Peter the Great, but a jointmilitary action against the Turks failed, the Tsar returned to Russia, andthe Porte threatened to transform Moldavia, in order to secure her againstincipient Russian influence, into a Turkish province with a pasha asadministrator. The nobles were preparing to leave the country, and thepeople to retire into the mountains, as their ancestors had done in timesof danger. It is not to be wondered at that, under the menace of losingtheir autonomy, the Rumanians 'welcomed the nomination of the dragoman ofthe Porte, Nicholas Mavrocordato, though he was a Greek. The peoplegreeted with joy the accession of the first Phanariote to the throne ofthe principality of Moldavia'[1] (1711). 

[Footnote 1: Xenopol, op. Cit. , ii. 138]

Knowledge of foreign languages had enabled the Phanariotes to obtainimportant diplomatic positions at Constantinople, and they ended byacquiring the thrones of the Rumanian principalities as a recompense fortheir services. But they had to pay for it, and to make matters moreprofitable the Turks devised the ingenious method of transferring theprinces from one province to another, each transference being consideredas a new nomination. From 1730 to 1741 the two reigning princesinterchanged thrones in this way three times. They acquired the throne bygold, and they could only keep it by gold. All depended upon how much theywore able to squeeze out of the country. The princes soon became pastmasters in the art of spoliation. They put taxes upon chimneys, and thestarving peasants pulled their cottages down and went to live in mountaincaves; they taxed the animals, and the peasants preferred to kill the fewbeasts they possessed. But this often proved no remedy, for we are toldthat the Prince Constantin Mavrocordato, having prescribed a tax ondomestic animals at a time when an epidemic had broken out amongst them, ordered the tax to be levied on the carcasses. 'The Administrative régimeduring the Phanariote period was, in general, little else than organizedbrigandage, ' says Xenopol[1]. In fact the Phanariote rule was instinctwith corruption, luxury, and intrigue. Though individually some of themmay not deserve blame, yet considering what the Phanariotes took out ofthe country, what they introduced into it, and to what extent theyprevented its development, their era was the most calamitous in Rumanianhistory. 

[Footnote 1: Ibid, op. Cit. , ii. 308]

The war of 1768 between Russia and Turkey gave the former power a vagueprotectorate over the Rumanian provinces (Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji). In1774 Austria acquired from the Turks, by false promises, the northern partof Moldavia, the pleasant land of Bucovina. During the new conflictbetween Turkey and Russia, the Russian armies occupied and battened uponthe Rumanian provinces for six years. Though they had again to abandontheir intention of making the Danube the southern boundary of theirempire--to which Napoleon had agreed by the secret treaty with TsarAlexander (Erfurt, September 27, 1808)--they obtained from Turkey thecession of Bessarabia (Treaty of Bucarest, May 28, 1812), together withthat part of Moldavia lying between the Dnjester and the Pruth, theRussians afterwards giving to the whole region the name of Bessarabia. 

5

_Modern Period to 1866_

In 1821 the Greek revolution, striving to create an independent Greece, broke out on Rumanian ground, supported by the princes of Moldavia andMuntenia. Of this support the Rumanians strongly disapproved, for, ifsuccessful, the movement would have strengthened the obnoxious Greekdomination; If unsuccessful, the Turks were sure to take a terriblerevenge for the assistance given by the Rumanian countries. The movement, which was started about the same time by the ennobled peasant, TudorVladimirescu, for the emancipation of the lower classes, soon acquired, therefore, an anti-Greek tendency. Vladimirescu was assassinated at theinstigation of the Greeks; the latter were completely checked by theTurks, who, grown suspicious after the Greek rising and confronted withthe energetic attitude of the Rumanian nobility, consented in 1822 to thenomination of two native boyards, Jonitza Sturdza and Gregory Ghica, recommended by their countrymen, as princes of Moldavia and Wallachia. Theiniquitous system of 'the throne to the highest bidder' had come to anend. 

The period which marks the decline of Greek influence in the Rumanianprincipalities also marks the growth of Russian influence; the first meanteconomic exploitation, the second was a serious menace to the veryexistence of the Rumanian nation. But if Russia seemed a possible futuredanger, Turkey with its Phanariote following was a certain and immediatemenace. When, therefore, at the outbreak of the conflict with Turkey in1828 the Russians once more passed the Pruth, the country welcomed them. Indeed, the Rumanian boyards, who after the rising of 1821 and the Turkishoccupation had taken refuge in Transylvania, had even more than onceinvited Russian intervention. [1] Hopes and fears alike were realized. Bythe Treaty of Adrianople (1829) the rights of Turkey as suzerain werelimited to the exaction of a monetary tribute and the right of investitureof the princes, one important innovation being that these last were to beelected by national assemblies for life. But, on the other hand, a Russianprotectorate was established, and the provinces remained in Russianmilitary occupation up to 1834, pending the payment of the war indemnityby Turkey. The ultimate aim of Russia may be open to discussion. Herimmediate aim was to make Russian influence paramount in theprincipalities; this being the only possible explanation of the anomalousfact that, pending the payment of the war indemnity, Russia herself wasoccupying the provinces whose autonomy she had but now forcibly retrievedfrom Turkey. The _Règlement Organique_, the new constitutional law givento the principalities by their Russian governor, Count Kisseleff, trulyreflected the tendency. From the administrative point of view it was meantto make for progress; from the political point of view it was meant tobind the two principalities to the will of the Tsar. The personal charm ofCount Kisseleff seemed to have established as it were an unbreakable linkbetween Russians and Rumanians. But when he left the country in 1834 'theliking for Russia passed away to be replaced finally by the two sentimentswhich always most swayed the Rumanian heart: love for their country, andaffection towards France'. 

[Footnote 1: Sec P. Eliade, _Histoire de l'Esprit Public en Roumanie_, i, p. 167 et seq. ]

French culture had been introduced into the principalities by thePhanariote princes who, as dragomans of the Porte, had to know thelanguage, and usually employed French secretaries for themselves andFrench tutors for their children. With the Russian occupation a freshimpetus was given to French culture, which was pre-eminent in Russia atthe time; and the Russian officials, not speaking the language of thecountry, generally employed French in their relations with the Rumanianauthorities, French being already widely spoken in Rumania. The contactwith French civilization, at an epoch when the Rumanians were striving tofree themselves from Turkish, Greek, and Russian political influence, roused in them the sleeping Latin spirit, and the younger generation, inconstantly increasing numbers, flocked to Paris in search of new forms ofcivilization and political life. At this turning-point in their historythe Rumanians felt themselves drawn towards France, no less by racialaffinity than by the liberal ideas to which that country had sopassionately given herself during several decades. 

By the Treaty of Adrianople the Black Sea was opened to the commercialvessels of all nations. This made for the rapid economic development ofthe principalities by providing an outlet for their agricultural produce, the chief source of their wealth. It also brought them nearer to westernEurope, which began to be interested in a nation whose spirit centuries ofsufferings had failed to break. Political, literary, and economic eventsthus prepared the ground for the Rumanian Renascence, and when in 1848 thegreat revolution broke out, it spread at once over the Rumanian countries, where the dawn of freedom had been struggling to break since 1821. TheRumanians of Transylvania rose against the tyranny of the Magyars; thoseof Moldavia and Muntenia against the oppressive influence of Russia. Themovement under the gallant, but inexperienced, leadership of a fewpatriots, who, significantly enough, had almost all been educated inFrance, was, however, soon checked in the principalities by the jointaction of Russian and Turkish forces which remained in occupation of thecountry. Many privileges were lost (Convention of Balta Liman, May 1, 1849); but the revolution had quickened the national sentiment of theyounger generation in all classes of society, and the expatriated leaders, dispersed throughout the great capitals of Europe, strenuously set to workto publish abroad the righteous cause of their country. In this theyreceived the enthusiastic and invaluable assistance of Edgar Quinet, Michelet, Saint-Marc Girardin, and others. 

This propaganda had the fortune to be contemporaneous and in agreementwith the political events leading to the Crimean War, which was enteredupon to check the designs of Russia. A logical consequence was the idea, raised at the Paris Congress of 1856, of the union of the Rumanianprincipalities as a barrier to Russian expansion. This idea found apowerful supporter in Napoleon III, ever a staunch upholder of theprinciple of nationality. But at the Congress the unexpected happened. Russia favoured the idea of union, 'to swallow the two principalities at agulp, ' as a contemporary diplomatist maliciously suggested; while Austriaopposed it strongly. So, inconceivably enough, did Turkey, whose attitude, as the French ambassador at Constantinople, Thouvenel, put it, 'was lessinfluenced by the opposition of Austria than by the approval ofRussia'. [1] Great Britain also threw in her weight with the powers whichopposed the idea of union, following her traditional policy of preservingthe European equilibrium. The treaty of March 30, 1856, re-incorporatedwith Moldavia the southern part of Bessarabia, including the delta of theDanube, abolished the Russian protectorate, but confirmed the suzeraintyof Turkey--not unnaturally, since the integrity of the Ottoman Empire hadbeen the prime motive of the war. By prohibiting Turkey, however, fromentering Rumanian territory, save with the consent of the great powers, itwas recognized indirectly that the suzerainty was merely a nominal one. Article 23 of the treaty, by providing that the administration of theprincipalities was to be on a national basis, implicitly pointed to theidea of union, as the organization of one principality independently ofthe other would not have been national. But as the main argument of Turkeyand Austria was that the Rumanians themselves did not desire the union, itwas decided to convene in both principalities special assemblies (divans_ad hoc_) representing all classes of the population, whose wishes were tobe embodied, by a European commission, in a report for consideration bythe Congress. 

[Footnote 1: A. Xenopol, _Unionistii si Separatistii_ (Paper read beforethe Rumanian Academy), 1909. ]

To understand the argument of the two powers concerned and the decision towhich it led, it must be borne in mind that the principalities were in theoccupation of an Austrian army, which had replaced the Russian armieswithdrawn in 1854, and that the elections for the assemblies were to bepresided over by Turkish commissaries. Indeed, the latter, incollaboration with the Austrian consuls, so successfully doctored theelection lists, [1] that the idea of union might once more have fallenthrough, had it not been for the invaluable assistance which Napoleon IIIgave the Rumanian countries. As Turkish policy was relying mainly onEngland's support, Napoleon brought about a personal meeting with QueenVictoria and Prince Albert, at Osborne (August 1857), the result of whichwas a compromise: Napoleon agreed to defer for the time being the idea ofan effective union of the two principalities, England undertaking, on theother hand, to make the Porte cancel the previous elections, and proceedto new ones after revision of the electoral lists. The corrupt Austrianand Turkish influence on the old elections was best demonstrated by thefact that only three of the total of eighty-four old members succeeded insecuring re-election. The assemblies met and proclaimed as imperativelynecessary to the future welfare of the provinces, their union, 'for nofrontier divides us, and everything tends to bring us closer, and nothingto separate us, save the ill-will of those who desire to see us disunitedand weak'; further, a foreign hereditary dynasty, because 'the accessionto the throne of princes chosen from amongst us has been a constantpretext for foreign interference, and the throne has been the cause ofunending feud among the great families of this country'. Moreover, if theunion of the two principalities was to be accomplished under a nativeprince, it is obvious that the competition would have become doubly keen;not to speak of the jealousies likely to be arousal between Moldavians andMuntenians. 

[Footnote 1: The edifying correspondence between the Porte and itscommissary Vorgoridès regarding the arrangements for the Rumanianelections fell into the hands of Rumanian politicians, and caused a greatsensation when it appeared in _L'Etoile du Danube_, published in Brusselsby Rumanian _émigrés_. ]

Such were the indisputable wishes of the Rumanians, based on knowledge ofmen and facts, and arising out of the desire to see their country wellstarted on the high road of progress. But Europe had called for theexpression of these wishes only to get the question shelved for themoment, as in 1856 everybody was anxious for a peace which should at allcosts be speedy. Consequently, when a second Congress met in Paris, in May1858, three months of discussion and the sincere efforts of France onlyresulted in a hybrid structure entitled the 'United Principalities'. Thesewere to have a common legislation, a common army, and a central committeecomposed of representatives of both assemblies for the discussion ofcommon affairs; but were to continue to form two separate states, withindependent legislative and executive institutions, each having to elect aprince of Rumanian descent for life. 

Disappointed in their hopes and reasonable expectations, the Rumaniansadopted the principle of 'help yourself and God will help you', andproceeded to the election of their rulers. Several candidates competed inMoldavia. To avoid a split vote the name of an outsider was put forwardthe day before the election, and on January 17, 1859, Colonel AlexanderIoan Cuza was unanimously elected. In Wallachia the outlook was veryuncertain when the assembly met, amid great popular excitement, onFebruary 5. The few patriots who had realized that the powers, seekingonly their own interests, were consciously and of set purpose hamperingthe emancipation of a long-suffering nation, put forth and urged theelection of Cuza, and the assembly unanimously adopted this spiritedsuggestion. By this master-stroke the Rumanians had quietly accomplishedthe reform which was an indispensable condition towards assuring a betterfuture. The political moment was propitious. Italy's military preparationprevented Austria from intervening, and, as usual when confronted with anaccomplished fact, the great powers and Turkey finished by officiallyrecognizing the action of the principalities in December 1861. The centralcommission was at once abolished, the two assemblies and cabinets mergedinto one, and Bucarest became the capital of the new state 'Rumania'. 

If the unsympathetic attitude of the powers had any good result, it was tobring home for the moment to the Rumanians the necessity for nationalunity. When the danger passed, however, the wisdom which it had evokedfollowed suit. Cuza cherished the hope of realizing various ideal reforms. Confronted with strong opposition, he did not hesitate to override theconstitution by dissolving the National Assembly (May 2, 1864) andarrogating to himself the right, till the formation of a new Chamber, toissue decrees which had all the force of law. He thus gave a dangerousexample to the budding constitutional polity; political passions were letloose, and a plot organized by the Opposition led to the forced abdicationof Cuza on February 23, 1866. The prince left the country for ever a fewdays later. No disturbance whatever took place, not one drop of blood wasshed. 

A series of laws, mostly adapted from French models, was introduced byCuza. Under the Education Act of 1864 all degrees of education were free, and elementary education compulsory. A large number of special andtechnical schools were founded, as well as two universities, one at Jassy(1860) and one at Bucarest (1864). After the _coup d'état_ of 1864universal suffrage was introduced, largely as an attempt to 'swamp' thefractious political parties with the peasant vote; while at the same timea 'senate' was created as a 'moderating assembly' which, composed as itwas of members by right and members nominated by the prince, by its verynature increased the influence of the crown. The chief reforms concernedthe rural question. Firstly, Cuza and his minister, Cogalniceanu, secularized and converted to the state the domains of the monasteries, which during the long period of Greek influence had acquired one-fifth ofthe total area of the land, and were completely in the hands of the Greekclergy (Law of December 13, 1863). More important still, as affectingfundamentally the social structure of the country, was the Rural Law(promulgated on August 26, 1864), which had been the cause of the conflictbetween Cuza and the various political factions, the Liberals clamouringfor more thorough reforms, the Conservatives denouncing Cuza's project asrevolutionary. As the peasant question is the most important problem leftfor Rumania to solve, and as I believe that, in a broad sense, it has aconsiderable bearing upon the present political situation in that country, it may not be out of place here to devote a little space to itsconsideration. 

Originally the peasant lived in the village community as a freeland-owner. He paid a certain due (one-tenth of his produce and threedays' labour yearly) to his leader (_cneaz_) as recompense for hisleadership in peace and war. The latter, moreover, solely enjoyed theprivilege of carrying on the occupations of miller and innkeeper, and thepeasant was compelled to mill with him. When after the foundation of theprincipalities the upper class was established on a feudal basis, thepeasantry were subjected to constantly increasing burdens. Impoverishedand having in many cases lost their land, the peasants were also deprivedat the end of the sixteenth century of their freedom of movement. By thattime the cneaz, from being the leader of the community, had become theactual lord of the village, and his wealth was estimated by the number ofvillages he possessed. The peasant owners paid their dues to him in labourand in kind. Those peasants who owned no land were his serfs, passing withthe land from master to master. 

Under the Turkish domination the Rumanian provinces became the granary ofthe Ottoman Empire. The value of land rose quickly, as did also the taxes. To meet these taxes--from the payment of which the boyards (thedescendants of the cneazi) were exempt--the peasant owners had frequentlyto sacrifice their lands; while, greedy after the increased benefits, theboyards used all possible means to acquire more land for themselves. Withthe increase of their lands they needed more labour, and they obtainedpermission from the ruler not only to exact increased labour dues from thepeasantry, but also to determine the amount of work that should be done ina day. This was effected in such a way that the peasants had, in fact, toserve three and four times the number of days due. 

The power to acquire more land from the freeholders, and to increase theamount of labour due by the peasants, was characteristic of thelegislation of the eighteenth century. By a decree of Prince Moruzi, in1805, the lords were for the first time empowered to reserve to their ownuse part of the estate, namely, one-fourth of the meadow land, and thisprivilege was extended in 1828 to the use of one-third of the arable land. The remaining two-thirds were reserved for the peasants, every youngmarried couple being entitled to a certain amount of land, in proportionto the number of traction animals they owned. When the Treaty ofAdrianople of 1829 opened the western markets to Rumanian corn, in whichmarkets far higher prices were obtainable than from the Turks, Rumanianagriculture received an extraordinary impetus. Henceforth the efforts ofthe boyards were directed towards lessening the amount of land to whichthe peasants were entitled. By the _Règlement Organique_ they succeeded inreducing such land to half its previous area, at the same time maintainingand exacting from the peasant his dues in full. It is in the same Act thatthere appears for the first time the fraudulent title 'lords of the land', though the boyards had no exclusive right of property; they had the use ofone-third of the estate, and a right to a due in labour and in kind fromthe peasant holders, present or prospective, of the other two-thirds. 

With a view to ensuring, on the one hand, greater economic freedom to theland-owners, and, on the other, security for the peasants from theenslaving domination of the upper class, the rural law of 1864 proclaimedthe peasant-tenants full proprietors of their holdings, and theland-owners full proprietors of the remainder of the estate. The originalintention of creating common land was not carried out in the Bill. Thepeasant's holding in arable land being small, he not infrequently ploughedhis pasture, and, as a consequence, had either to give up keeping beasts, or pay a high price to the land-owners for pasturage. Dues in labour andin kind were abolished, the land-owners receiving an indemnity which wasto be refunded to the state by the peasants in instalments within a periodof fifteen years. This reform is characteristic of much of the legislationof Cuza: despotically pursuing the realization of some ideal reform, without adequate study of and adaptation to social circumstances, his lawsprovided no practical solution of the problem with which they dealt. Inthis case, for example, the reform benefited the upper class solely, although generally considered a boon to the peasantry. Of ancient righttwo-thirds of the estate were reserved for the peasants; but the new lawgave them possession of no more than the strip they were holding, whichbarely sufficed to provide them with the mere necessaries of life. Theremainder up to two-thirds of the estate went as a gift, with fullproprietorship; to the boyard. For the exemption of their dues in kind andin labour, the peasants had to pay an indemnity, whereas the right oftheir sons to receive at their marriage a piece of land in proportion tothe number of traction animals they possessed was lost withoutcompensation. Consequently, the younger peasants had to sell their labour, contracting for periods of a year and upwards, and became a much easierprey to the spoliation of the upper class than when they had at least astrip of land on which to build a hut, and from which to procure theirdaily bread; the more so as the country had no industry which couldcompete with agriculture in the labour market. An investigation undertakenby the Home Office showed that out of 1, 265 labour contracts for 1906, chosen at random, only 39. 7 per cent, were concluded at customary wages;the others were lower in varying degrees, 13. 2 per cent. Of the casesshowing wages upwards of 75 per cent. Below the usual rates. 

Under these conditions of poverty and economic serfdom the peasantry wasnot able to participate in the enormous development of Rumanianagriculture, which had resulted from increased political security and theestablishment of an extensive network of railways. While the boyards foundan increasing attraction in politics, a new class of middlemen came intoexistence, renting the land from the boyards for periods varying generallyfrom three to five years. Owing to the resultant competition, rentsincreased considerably, while conservative methods of cultivation keptproduction stationary. Whereas the big cultivator obtained higher pricesto balance the increased cost of production, the peasant, who produced forhis own consumption, could only face such increase by a correspondingdecrease in the amount of food consumed. To show how much alive the ruralquestion is, it is enough to state that peasant risings occurred in 1888, 1889, 1894, 1900, and 1907; that new distributions of land took place in1881 and 1889; that land was promised to the peasants as well at the timeof the campaign of 1877 as at that of 1913; and that more or less happilyconceived measures concerning rural questions have been passed in almostevery parliamentary session. The general tendency of such legislationpartook of the 'free contract' nature, though owing to the socialcondition of the peasantry the acts in question had to embody protectivemeasures providing for a maximum rent for arable and pasture land, and aminimum wage for the peasant labourer. 

Solutions have been suggested in profusion. That a solution is possible noone can doubt. One writer, basing his arguments on official statisticswhich show that the days of employment in 1905 averaged only ninety-onefor each peasant, claims that only the introduction of circulating capitaland the creation of new branches of activity can bring about a change. Thesuggested remedy may be open to discussion; but our author is undoubtedlyright when, asking himself why this solution has not yet been attempted, he says: 'Our country is governed at present by an agrarian class. . . . Herwhole power rests in her ownership of the land, our only wealth. Theintroduction of circulating capital would result in the disintegration ofthat wealth, in the loss of its unique quality, and, as a consequence, inthe social decline of its possessors. '[1] This is the fundamental evilwhich prevents any solution of the rural question. A small class ofpoliticians, with the complicity of a large army of covetous andunscrupulous officials, live in oriental indolence out of the sufferingsof four-fifths of the Rumanian nation. Though elementary education iscompulsory, more than 60 per cent. Of the population are still illiterate, mainly on account of the inadequacy of the educational budget. Justice isa myth for the peasant. Of political rights he is, in fact, absolutelydeprived. The large majority, and by far the sanest part of the Rumaniannation, are thus fraudulently kept outside the political and social lifeof the country. It is not surmising too much, therefore, to say that theopportunity of emancipating the Transylvanians would not have beenwilfully neglected, had that part of the Rumanian nation in which the oldspirit still survives had any choice in the determination of their ownfate. 

[Footnote 1: St. Antim, _Cbestiunea Social[)a] [^i]n Rom[^a]nia, _ 1908, p. 214. ]

6

_Contemporary Period: Internal Development_

In order to obviate internal disturbances or external interference, theleaders of the movement which had dethroned Prince Cuza caused parliamentto proclaim, on the day of Cuza's abdication, Count Philip of Flanders--the father of King Albert of Belgium--Prince of Rumania. The offer was, however, not accepted, as neither France nor Russia favoured the proposal. Meanwhile a conference had met again in Paris at the instance of Turkeyand vetoed the election of a foreign prince. But events of deeperimportance were ripening in Europe, and the Rumanian politicians rightlysurmised that the powers would not enforce their protests if a candidatewere found who was likely to secure the support of Napoleon III, then'schoolmaster' of European diplomacy. This candidate was found in theperson of Prince Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, second son of the headof the elder branch of the Hohenzollerns (Catholic and non-reigning). Prince Carol was cousin to the King of Prussia, and related through hisgrandmother to the Bonaparte family. He could consequently count upon thesupport of France and Prussia, while the political situation fortunatelysecured him from the opposition of Russia, whose relations with Prussiawere at the time friendly, and also from that of Austria, whom Bismarckproposed to 'keep busy for some time to come'. The latter must have viewedwith no little satisfaction the prospect of a Hohenzollern occupying thethrone of Rumania at this juncture; and Prince Carol, allowing himself tobe influenced by the Iron Chancellor's advice, answered the call of theRumanian nation, which had proclaimed him as 'Carol I, Hereditary Princeof Rumania'. Travelling secretly with a small retinue, the prince secondclass, his suite first, Prince Carol descended the Danube on an Austriansteamer, and landed on May 8 at Turnu-Severin, the very place where, nearly eighteen centuries before, the Emperor Trajan had alighted andfounded the Rumanian nation. 

By independent and energetic action, by a conscious neglect of the will ofthe powers, which only a young constitutional polity would have dared, byan active and unselfish patriotism, Rumania had at last chosen and securedas her ruler the foreign prince who alone had a chance of putting a stopto intrigues from within and from without. And the Rumanians had beenextremely fortunate in their hasty and not quite independent choice. Aprince of Latin origin would probably have been more warmly welcomed tothe hearts of the Rumanian people; but after so many years of politicaldisorder, corrupt administration, and arbitrary rule, a prince possessedof the German spirit of discipline and order was best fitted to commandrespect and impose obedience and sobriety of principle upon the Rumanianpoliticians. 

Prince Carol's task was no easy one. The journal compiled by theprovisional government, which held the reins for the period elapsingbetween the abdication of Cuza and the accession of Prince Carol, depictsin the darkest colours the economic situation to which the faults, thewaste, the negligence, and short-sightedness of the previous régime hadreduced the country, 'the government being in the humiliating position ofhaving brought disastrous and intolerable hardship alike upon itscreditors, its servants, its pensioners, and its soldiers'. [1] Reformswere badly needed, and the treasury had nothing in hand but debts. Toincrease the income of the state was difficult, for the country was poorand not economically independent. Under the Paris Convention of 1858, Rumania remained bound, to her detriment, by the commercial treaties ofher suzerain, Turkey, the powers not being willing to lose the privilegesthey enjoyed under the Turkish capitulations. Moreover, she was speciallyexcluded from the arrangement of 1860, which allowed Turkey to increaseher import taxes. The inheritance of ultra-liberal measures from theprevious regime made it difficult to cope with the unruly spirit of thenation. Any attempt at change in this direction would have savoured ofdespotism to the people, who, having at last won the right to speak aloud, believed that to clamour against anything that meant 'rule' was the onlyreal and full assertion of liberty. And the dissatisfied were alwayscertain of finding a sympathetic ear and an open purse in theChancellories of Vienna and St. Petersburg. 

[Footnote 1: D. A. Sturdza, _Treizeci de ani de Domnie ai Regelui Carol, _1900, i. 82. ]

Prince Carol, not being sufficiently well acquainted with the conditionsof the country nor possessing as yet much influence with the governingclass, had not been in a position to influence at their inception theprovisions of the extremely liberal constitution passed only a few weeksafter his accession to the throne. The new constitution, which resembledthat of Belgium more nearly than any other, was framed by a constituentassembly elected on universal suffrage, and, except for slightmodifications introduced in 1879 and 1884, is in vigour to-day. Itentrusts the executive to the king and his ministers, the latter alonebeing responsible for the acts of the government. [1] The legislative poweris vested in the king and two assemblies--a senate and a chamber--theinitiative resting with any one of the three. [2] The budget and the yearlybills fixing the strength of the army, however, must first be passed bythe Chamber. The agreement of the two Chambers and the sanction of theking are necessary before any bill becomes law. The king convenes, adjourns, and dissolves parliament. He promulgates the laws and isinvested with the right of absolute veto. The constitution proclaims theinviolability of domicile, the liberty of the press and of assembly, andabsolute liberty of creed and religion, in so far as its forms ofcelebration do not come into conflict with public order and decency. Itrecognizes no distinction of class and privilege; all the citizens shareequally rights and duties within the law. Education is free in the stateschools, and elementary education compulsory wherever state schools exist. Individual liberty and property are guaranteed; but only Rumanian citizenscan acquire rural property. Military service is compulsory, entailing twoyears in the infantry, three years in the cavalry and artillery, one yearin all arms for those having completed their studies as far as theuniversity stage. Capital punishment does not exist, except for militaryoffences in time of war. 

[Footnote 1: There are at present nine departments: Interior, ForeignAffairs, Finance, War, Education and Religion, Domains and Agriculture, Public Works, Justice, and Industry and Commerce. The President of theCabinet is Prime Minister, with or without portfolio. ]

[Footnote 2: All citizens of full age paying taxes, with variousexemptions, are electors, voting according to districts and census. In thecase of the illiterate country inhabitants, with an income from land ofless than £12 a year, fifty of them choose one delegate having one vote inthe parliamentary election. The professorial council of the twouniversities of Jassy and Bucarest send one member each to the Senate, theheir to the throne and the eight bishops being members by right. ]

The state religion is Greek Orthodox. Up to 1864 the Rumanian Church wassubordinate to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In that year it wasproclaimed independent, national, and autocephalous, though this changewas not recognized by the Patriarchate till 1885, while the secularizationof the property of the monasteries put an end _de facto_ to the influenceof the Greek clergy. Religious questions of a dogmatic nature are settledby the Holy Synod of Bucarest, composed of the two metropolitans ofBucarest and Jassy and the eight bishops; the Minister for Education, withwhom the administrative part of the Church rests, having only adeliberative vote. The maintenance of the Church and of the clergy isincluded in the general budget of the country, the ministers being stateofficials (Law of 1893). 

Religion has never played an important part in Rumanian national life, andwas generally limited to merely external practices. This may be attributedlargely to the fact that as the Slavonic language had been used in theChurch since the ninth century and then was superseded by Greek up to thenineteenth century, the clergy was foreign, and was neither in a positionnor did it endeavour to acquire a spiritual influence over the Rumanianpeasant. There is no record whatever in Rumanian history of any religiousfeuds or dissensions. The religious passivity remained unstirred evenduring the domination of the Turks, who contented themselves with treatingthe unbelievers with contempt, and squeezing as much money as possible outof them. Cuza having made no provision for the clergy when he convertedthe wealth of the monasteries to the state, they were left for thirtyyears in complete destitution, and remained as a consequence outside thegeneral intellectual development of the country. Though the situation hasmuch improved since the Law of 1893, which incorporated the priests withthe other officials of the Government, the clergy, recruited largely fromamong the rural population, are still greatly inferior to the Rumanianpriests of Bucovina and Transylvania. Most of them take up Holy orders asa profession: 'I have known several country parsons who were thoroughatheists. '[1]

[Footnote 1: R. Rosetti, _Pentru ce s-au r[)a]sculat [t'][)a]ranii_, 1907, p. 600]

However difficult his task, Prince Carol never deviated from the strictlyconstitutional path: his opponents were free to condemn the prince'sopinions; he never gave them the chance of questioning his integrity. 

Prince Carol relied upon the position in which his origin and familyalliances placed him in his relations with foreign rulers to secure himthe respect of his new subjects. Such considerations impressed theRumanians. Nor could they fail to be aware of 'the differences between thepreviously elected princes and the present dynasty, and the improvedposition which the country owed to the latter'. [1]

[Footnote 1: Augenzeuge, _Aus dem Leben König Karls von Rum[)a]nien, 1894-1900, _ iii. 177. ]

To inculcate the Rumanians with the spirit of discipline the prince tookin hand with energy and pursued untiringly, in spite of all obstacles, theorganization of the army. A reliable and well-organized armed force wasthe best security against internal trouble-mongers, and the best argumentin international relations, as subsequent events amply proved. 

The Rumanian political parties were at the outset personal parties, supporting one or other of the candidates to the throne. When Greekinfluence, emanating from Constantinople, began to make itself felt, inthe seventeenth century, a national party arose for the purpose ofopposing it. This party counted upon the support of one of theneighbouring powers, and its various groups were known accordingly as theAustrian, the Russian, &c. , parties. With the election of Cuza theexternal danger diminished, and the politicians divided upon principles ofinternal reform. Cuza not being in agreement with either party, theyunited to depose him, keeping truce during the period preceding theaccession of Prince Carol, when grave external dangers wore threatening, and presiding in a coalition ministry at the introduction of the newconstitution of 1866. But this done, the truce was broken. Politicalstrife again awoke with all the more vigour for having been temporarilysuppressed. 

The reforms which it became needful to introduce gave opportunity for thedevelopment of strong divergence of views between the political parties. The Liberals--the Red Party, as they were called at the time--(led by C. A. Rosetti and Ioan Bratianu, both strong Mazzinists, both having taken animportant part in the revolutionary movements of 1848 and in that whichled to the deposition of Cuza) were advocating reforms hardly practicableeven in an established democracy; the Conservatives (led by LascarCatargiu) were striving to stem the flood of ideal liberal measures onwhich all sense of reality was being carried away. [1] In little more thana year there were four different Cabinets, not to mention numerous changesin individual ministers. 'Between the two extreme tendencies Prince Carolhad to strive constantly to preserve unity of direction, he himself beingthe only stable element in that ever unstable country. ' It was not withoutmany untoward incidents that he succeeded. His person was the subject ofmore than one unscrupulous attack by politicians in opposition, who didnot hesitate to exploit the German origin and the German sympathies of theprince in order to inflame the masses. These internal conflicts enteredupon an acute phase at the time of the Franco-German conflict of 1870. Whilst, to satisfy public opinion, the Foreign Secretary of the time, M. P. P. Carp, had to declare in parliament, that 'wherever the colours ofFrance are waving, there are our interests and sympathies', the princewrote to the King of Prussia assuring him that 'his sympathies will alwaysbe where the black and white banner is waving'. In these so strainedcircumstances a section of the population of Bucarest allowed itself to bedrawn into anti-German street riots. Disheartened and despairing of everbeing able to do anything for that 'beautiful country', whose people'neither know how to govern themselves nor will allow themselves to begoverned', the prince decided to abdicate. 

[Footnote 1: A few years ago a group of politicians, mainly ofthe old Conservative party, detached themselves and became theConservative-Democratic party under the leadership of M. Take Ionescu. ]

So strong was the feeling in parliament roused by the prince's decisionthat one of his most inveterate opponents now declared that it would be anact of high treason for the prince to desert the country at such a crisis. We have an inkling of what might have resulted in the letter written bythe Emperor of Austria to Prince Carol at the time, assuring him that 'myGovernment will eagerly seize any opportunity which presents itself toprove by deeds the interest it takes in a country connected by so manybonds to my empire'. Nothing but the efforts of Lascar Catargiu and thesound patriotism of a few statesmen saved the country from what would havebeen a real misfortune. The people were well aware of this, and cheerslasting several minutes greeted that portion of the message from thethrone which conveyed to the new parliament the decision of the prince tocontinue reigning. 

The situation was considerably strengthened during a period of five years'Conservative rule. Prince Carol's high principles and the dignifiedexample of his private life secured for him the increasing respect ofpoliticians of all colours; while his statesmanlike qualities, hispatience and perseverance, soon procured him an unlimited influence in theaffairs of the state. This was made the more possible from the fact that, on account of the political ignorance of the masses, and of the variedinfluence exercised on the electorate by the highly centralizedadministration, no Rumanian Government ever fails to obtain a majority atan election. Any statesman can undertake to form a Cabinet if the kingassents to a dissolution of parliament. Between the German system, wherethe emperor chooses the ministers independently of parliament, and theEnglish system, where the members of the executive are indicated by theelectorate through the medium of parliament, independently of the Crown, the Rumanian system takes a middle path. Neither the crown, nor theelectorate, nor parliament possesses exclusive power in this direction. The Government is not, generally speaking, defeated either by theelectorate or by parliament. It is the Crown which has the final decisionin the changes of régime, and upon the king falls the delicate task ofinterpreting the significance of political or popular movements. Thesystem--which comes nearest to that of Spain--undoubtedly has itsadvantages in a young and turbulent polity, by enabling its most stableelement, the king, to ensure a continuous and harmonious policy. But italso makes the results dangerously dependent on the quality of that sameelement. Under the leadership of King Carol it was an undoubted success;the progress made by the country from an economic, financial, and militarypoint of view during the last half-century is really enormous. Itsposition was furthermore strengthened by the proclamation of itsindependence, by the final settlement of the dynastic question, [1] and byits elevation on May 10, 1881, to the rank of kingdom, when upon the headof the first King of Rumania was placed a crown of steel made from one ofthe guns captured before Plevna from an enemy centuries old. 

[Footnote 1: In the absence of direct descendants and according to theconstitution, Prince Ferdinand (born 1865), second son of King Carol'selder brother, was named Heir Apparent to the Rumanian throne. He marriedin 1892 Princess Marie of Coburg, and following the death of King Carol in1914, he acceded to the throne as Ferdinand I. ]

From the point of view of internal politics progress has been lesssatisfactory. The various reforms once achieved, the differences ofprinciple between the political parties degenerated into mere opportunism, the Opposition opposing, the Government disposing. The parties, andespecially the various groups within the parties, are generally known bythe names of their leaders, these denominations not implying any definitepolitical principle or Government programme. It is, moreover, far fromedifying that the personal element should so frequently distort politicaldiscussion. 'The introduction of modern forms of state organization hasnot been followed by the democratization of all social institutions. . . . The masses of the people have remained all but completely outsidepolitical life. Not only are we yet far from government of the people bythe people, but our liberties, though deeply graven on the facade of ourconstitution, have not permeated everyday life nor even stirred in theconsciousness of the people. '[1]

[Footnote 1: C. Stere, _Social-democratizm sau Poporanizm_, Jassy. ]

It is strange that King Carol, who had the welfare of the people sincerelyat heart, should not have used his influence to bring about a solution ofthe rural question; but this may perhaps be explained by the fact that, from Cuza's experience, he anticipated opposition from all politicalfactions. It would almost seem as if, by a tacit understanding, andanxious to establish Rumania's international position, King Carol gave hisministers a free hand in the rural question, reserving for himself anequally free hand in foreign affairs. This seems borne out by the factthat, in the four volumes in which an 'eyewitness', making use of theking's private correspondence and personal notes, has minutely describedthe first fifteen years of the reign, the peasant question is entirelyignored. [1]

[Footnote 1: The 'eyewitness' was Dr. Schaeffer, formerly tutor to PrinceCarol. ]

Addressing himself, in 1871, to the Rumanian representative at the Porte, the Austrian ambassador, von Prokesch-Osten, remarked: 'If Prince Carolmanages to pull through without outside help, and make Rumania governable, it will be the greatest _tour de force_ I have ever witnessed in mydiplomatic career of more than half a century. It will be nothing lessthan a conjuring trick. ' King Carol succeeded; and only those acquaintedwith Rumanian affairs can appreciate the truth of the ambassador's words. 

_7_

_Contemporary Period: Foreign Affairs_

Up to 1866 Rumanian foreign politics may be said to have beennon-existent. The offensive or defensive alliances against the Turksconcluded by the Rumanian rulers with neighbouring princes during theMiddle Ages were not made in pursuance of any definite policy, but merelyto meet the moment's need. With the establishment of Turkish suzeraintyRumania became a pawn in the foreign politics of the neighbouring empires, and we find her repeatedly included in their projects of acquisition, partition, or compensation (as, for instance, when she was put forward aseventual compensation to Poland for the territories lost by that countryin the first partition). [1] Rumania may be considered fortunate in nothaving lost more than Bucovina to Austria (1775), Bessarabia to Russia(1812), and, temporarily, to Austria the region between the Danube and theAluta, called Oltenia (lost by the Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718; recoveredby the Treaty of Belgrade, 1739). 

[Footnote 1: See Albert Sorel, _The Eastern Question in the EighteenthCentury_ (Engl. Ed. ), 1898, pp. 141, 147 &c. ]

While her geographical position made of Rumania the cynosure of manycovetous eyes, it at the same time saved her from individual attack byexciting countervailing jealousies. Moreover, the powers came at last toconsider her a necessary rampart to the Ottoman Empire, whose dissolutionall desired but none dared attempt. Austria and Russia, looking to thefuture, were continually competing for paramount influence in Rumania, though it is not possible to determine where their policy of acquisitionended and that of influence began. 

The position of the principalities became more secure after the ParisCongress of 1858, which placed them under the collective guarantee of thegreat powers; but this fact, and the maintenance of Turkish suzerainty, coupled with their own weakness, debarred them from any independence intheir foreign relations. 

A sudden change took place with the accession of Prince Carol; aHohenzollern prince related to the King of Prussia and to Napoleon IIIcould not be treated like one of the native boyards. The situation calledfor the more delicacy of treatment by the powers in view of thepossibility of his being able to better those internal conditions whichmade Rumania 'uninteresting' as a factor in international politics. Infact, the prince's personality assured for Rumania a status which shecould otherwise have attained only with time, by a political, economic, and military consolidation of her home affairs; and the prince does notfail to remark in his notes that the attentions lavished upon him by othersovereigns were meant rather for the Hohenzollern prince than for thePrince of Rumania. Many years later even, after the war of 1878, while theRussians were still south of the Danube with their lines of communicationrunning through Rumania, Bratianu begged of the prince to give up aprojected journey on account of the difficulties which might at any momentarise, and said: 'Only the presence of your Royal Highness keeps them [theRussians] at a respectful distance. ' It was but natural under thesecircumstances that the conduct of foreign affairs should have devolvedalmost exclusively on the prince. The ascendancy which his high personalcharacter, his political and diplomatic skill, his military capacityprocured for him over the Rumanian statesmen made this situation a lastingone; indeed it became almost a tradition. Rumania's foreign policy since1866 may be said, therefore, to have been King Carol's policy. Whether oneagrees with it or not, no one can deny with any sincerity that it wasinspired by the interests of the country, as the monarch saw them. Rebuking Bismarck's unfair attitude towards Rumania in a questionconcerning German investors, Prince Carol writes to his father in 1875: 'Ihave to put Rumania's interests above those of Germany. My path is plainlymapped out, and I must follow It unflinchingly, whatever the weather. '

Prince Carol was a thorough German, and as such naturally favoured theexpansion of German influence among his new subjects. But if he desiredRumania to follow in the wake of German foreign policy, it was because ofhis unshaken faith in the future of his native country, because heconsidered that Rumania had nothing to fear from Germany, whilst it wasall in the interest of that country to see Rumania strong and firmlyestablished. At the same time, acting on the advice of Bismarck, he didnot fail to work toward a better understanding with Russia, 'who mightbecome as well a reliable friend as a dangerous enemy to the Rumanianstate'. The sympathy shown him by Napoleon III was not always shared bythe French statesmen, [1] and the unfriendly attitude of the Frenchambassador in Constantinople caused Prince Carol to remark that 'M. DeMoustier is considered a better Turk than the Grand Turk himself'. Underthe circumstances a possible alliance between France and Russia, givingthe latter a free hand in the Near East, would have proved a grave dangerto Rumania; 'it was, consequently, a skilful, if imperious act, to entervoluntarily, and without detriment to the existing friendly relations withFrance, within the Russian sphere of influence, and not to wait tillcompelled to do so. '

[Footnote 1: See _Revue des Deux Mondes_, June 15, 1866, article by EugèneForcade. ]

The campaigns of 1866 and 1870 having finally established Prussia'ssupremacy in the German world, Bismarck modified his attitude towardsAustria. In an interview with the Austrian Foreign Secretary, Count Beust(Gastein, October 1871), he broached for the first time the question of analliance and, touching upon the eventual dissolution of the OttomanEmpire, 'obligingly remarked that one could not conceive of a great powernot making of its faculty for expansion a vital question'. [2] Quite inkeeping with that change were the counsels henceforth tendered to PrinceCarol. Early that year Bismarck wrote of his sorrow at having been forcedto the conclusion that Rumania had nothing to expect from Russia, whilePrince Anthony, Prince Carol's father and faithful adviser, wrote soonafter the above interview (November 1871), that 'under certaincircumstances it would seem a sound policy for Rumania to rely upon thesupport of Austria'. Persevering in this crescendo of suggestion, Austria's new foreign secretary, Count Andrassy, drifted at length to thepoint by plainly declaring not long afterwards that 'Rumania is not sounimportant that one should deprecate an alliance with her'. 

[Footnote 2: Gabriel Hanotaux, _La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe_ (Beust, Mémoires), Paris, 1914, p. 297. ]

Prince Carol had accepted the throne with the firm intention of shakingoff the Turkish suzerainty at the first opportunity, and not unnaturallyhe counted upon Germany's support to that end. He and his country werebitterly disappointed, therefore, when Bismarck appealed directly to thePorte for the settlement of a difference between the Rumanian Governmentand a German company entrusted with the construction of the Rumanianrailways; the more so as the Paris Convention had expressly forbidden anyTurkish interference in Rumania's internal affairs. It thus becameincreasingly evident that Rumania could not break away from Russia, thecoming power in the East. The eyes of Russia were steadfastly fixed onConstantinople: by joining her, Rumania had the best chance of gaining herindependence; by not doing so, she ran the risk of being trodden upon byRussia on her way to Byzantium. But though resolved to co-operate withRussia in any eventual action in the Balkans, Prince Carol skilfullyavoided delivering himself blindfold into her hands by deliberatelycutting himself away from the other guaranteeing powers. To the conferencewhich met in Constantinople at the end of 1876 to settle Balkan affairs headdressed the demand that 'should war break out between one of theguaranteeing powers and Turkey, Rumania's line of conduct should bedictated, and her neutrality and rights guaranteed, by the other powers'. This _démarche_ failed. The powers had accepted the invitation to theconference as one accepts an invitation to visit a dying man. Nobody hadany illusions on the possibility of averting war, least of all the twopowers principally interested. In November 1876 Ali Bey and M. De Nelidovarrived simultaneously and secretly in Bucarest to sound Rumania as to anarrangement with their respective countries, Turkey and Russia. Inopposition to his father and Count Andrassy, who counselled neutrality andthe withdrawal of the Rumanian army into the mountains, and in sympathywith Bismarck's advice, Prince Carol concluded a Convention with Russia onApril 16, 1877. Rumania promised to the Russian army 'free passage throughRumanian territory and the treatment due to a friendly army'; whilstRussia undertook to respect Rumania's political rights, as well as 'tomaintain and defend her actual integrity'. 'It is pretty certain', wrotePrince Carol to his father, 'that this will not be to the liking of mostof the great powers; but as they neither can nor will offer us anything, we cannot do otherwise than pass them by. A successful Russian campaignwill free us from the nominal dependency upon Turkey, and Europe willnever allow Russia to take her place. '

On April 23 the Russian armies passed the Pruth. An offer of activeparticipation by the Rumanian forces in the forthcoming campaign wasrejected by the Tsar, who haughtily declared that 'Russia had no need forthe cooperation of the Rumanian army', and that 'it was only under theauspices of the Russian forces that the foundation of Rumania's futuredestinies could be laid'. Rumania was to keep quiet and accept in the endwhat Russia would deign to give her, or, to be more correct, take fromher. After a few successful encounters, however, the Tsar's soldiers metwith serious defeats before Plevna, and persistent appeals were now urgedfor the participation of the Rumanian army in the military operations. Themoment had come for Rumania to bargain for her interests. But Prince Carolrefused to make capital out of the serious position of the Russians; heled his army across the Danube and, at the express desire of the Tsar, took over the supreme command of the united forces before Plevna. After aglorious but terrible struggle Plevna, followed at short intervals byother strongholds, fell, the peace preliminaries were signed, and PrinceCarol returned to Bucarest at the head of his victorious army. 

Notwithstanding the flattering words in which the Tsar spoke of theRumanian share in the success of the campaign, Russia did not admitRumania to the Peace Conference. By the Treaty of San Stefano (March3, 1878) Rumania's independence was recognized; Russia obtained from Turkeythe Dobrudja and the delta of the Danube, reserving for herself the rightto exchange these territories against the three southern districts ofBessarabia, restored to Rumania by the Treaty of Paris, 1856. Thisstipulation was by no means a surprise to Rumania, Russia's intention torecover Bessarabia was well known to the Government, who hoped, however, that the demand would not be pressed after the effective assistancerendered by the Rumanian army. 'If this be not a ground for the extensionof our territory, it is surely none for its diminution, ' remarkedCogalniceanu at the Berlin Congress. Moreover, besides the promises of theTsar, there was the Convention of the previous year, which, in exchangefor nothing more than free passage for the Russian armies, guaranteedRumania's integrity. But upon this stipulation Gorchakov put thejesuitical construction that, the Convention being concluded in view of awar to be waged against Turkey, it was only against Turkey that Russiaundertook to guarantee Rumania's integrity; as to herself, she was not inthe least bound by that arrangement. And should Rumania dare to protestagainst, or oppose the action of the Russian Government, 'the Tsar willorder that Rumania be occupied and the Rumanian army disarmed'. 'The armywhich fought at Plevna', replied Prince Carol through his minister, 'maywell be destroyed, but never disarmed. '

There was one last hope left to Rumania: that the Congress which met inBerlin in June 1878 for the purpose of revising the Treaty of San Stefano, would prevent such an injustice. But Bismarck was anxious that no'sentiment de dignité blessée' should rankle in Russia's future policy;the French representative, Waddington, was 'above all a practical man';Corti, the Italian delegate, was 'nearly rude' to the Rumanian delegates;while Lord Beaconsfield, England's envoy, receiving the Rumanian delegatesprivately, had nothing to say but that 'in politics the best services areoften rewarded with ingratitude'. Russia strongly opposed even the ideathat the Rumanian delegates should be allowed to put their case before theCongress, and consent was obtained only with difficulty after LordSalisbury had ironically remarked that 'having heard the representativesof Greece, which was claiming foreign provinces, it would be but fair tolisten also to the representatives of a country which was only seeking toretain what was its own'. Shortly before, Lord Salisbury, speaking inLondon to the Rumanian special envoy, Callimaki Catargiu, had assured himof England's sympathy and of her effective assistance in case either ofwar or of a Congress. 'But to be quite candid he must add that there arequestions of more concern to England, and should she be able to come to anunderstanding with Russia with regard to them, she would not wage war forthe sake of Rumania. ' Indeed, an understanding came about, and anindiscretion enabled the _Globe_ to make its tenor public early in June1878. 'The Government of her Britannic Majesty', it said, 'considers thatit will feel itself bound to express its deep regret should Russia persistin demanding the retrocession of Bessarabia. . . . England's interest in thisquestion is not such, however, as to justify her taking upon herself alonethe responsibility of opposing the intended exchange. ' So Bessarabia waslost, Rumania receiving instead Dobrudja with the delta of the Danube. Butas the newly created state of Bulgaria was at the time little else than adetached Russian province, Russia, alone amongst the powers, opposed andsucceeded in preventing the demarcation to the new Rumanian province of astrategically sound frontier. Finally, to the exasperation of theRumanians, the Congress made the recognition of Rumania's independencecontingent upon the abolition of Article 7 of the Constitution--whichdenied to non-Christians the right of becoming Rumanian citizens--and theemancipation of the Rumanian Jews. [1]

[Footnote 1: Rumania only partially gave way to this intrusion of thepowers into her internal affairs. The prohibition was abolished; but onlyindividual naturalization was made possible, and that by special Act ofParliament. Only a very small proportion of the Jewish population hassince been naturalized. The Jewish question in Rumania is undoubtedly avery serious one; but the matter is too controversial to be dealt with ina few lines without risking misrepresentation or doing an injustice to oneor other of the parties. For which reason it has not been included in thisessay. ]

It was only after innumerable difficulties and hardships that, at thebeginning of 1880, Rumania secured recognition of an independence whichshe owed to nobody but herself. Whilst Russia was opposing Rumania atevery opportunity in the European conferences and commissions, she was atpains to show herself more amenable in _tête-à-tête_, and approachedRumania with favourable proposals. 'Rather Russia as foe than guardian, 'wrote Prince Carol to his father; and these words indicate an importantturning-point in Rumania's foreign policy. 

In wresting Bessarabia from Rumania merely as a sop to her own pride, andto make an end of all that was enacted by the Treaty of Paris, 1856, Russia made a serious political blunder. By insisting that Austria shouldshare in the partition of Poland, Frederick the Great had skilfullyprevented her from remaining the one country towards which the Poles wouldnaturally have turned for deliverance. Such an opportunity was lost byRussia through her short-sighted policy in Bessarabia--that of remainingthe natural ally of Rumania against Rumania's natural foe, Austria-Hungary. 

Rumania had neither historical, geographical, nor any importantethnographical points of contact with the region south of the Danube; theaims of a future policy could only have embraced neighbouring tracts offoreign territory inhabited by Rumanians. Whereas up to the date of theBerlin Congress such tracts were confined to Austria-Hungary, by thatCongress a similar sphere of attraction for Rumanian aspirations wascreated in Russia. [1] The interests of a peaceful development demandedthat Rumania should maintain friendly relations with both the powersstriving for domination in the Near East; it was a vital necessity forher, however, to be able to rely upon the effective support of at leastone of them in a case of emergency. Russia's conduct had aroused a deepfeeling of bitterness and mistrust in Rumania, and every lessening of herinfluence was a step in Austria's favour. Secondary considerations tendedto intensify this: on the one hand lay the fact that through Russia'sinterposition Rumania had no defendable frontier against Bulgaria; on theother hand was the greatly strengthened position created for Austria byher alliance with Germany, in whose future Prince Carol had the utmostconfidence. 

[Footnote 1: It is probable that this confederation had much to do withthe readiness with which Bismarck supported the demands of his goodfriend, Gorchakov. ]

Germany's attitude towards Rumania had been curiously hostile during theseevents; but when Prince Carol's father spoke of this to the GermanEmperor, the latter showed genuine astonishment: Bismarck had obviouslynot taken the emperor completely into his confidence. When, a few dayslater, Sturdza had an interview with Bismarck at the latter's invitation, the German Chancellor discovered once more that Rumania had nothing toexpect from Russia. Indeed, Rumania's position between Russia and the newSlav state south of the Danube might prove dangerous, were she not to seekprotection and assistance from her two 'natural friends', France andGermany. And, with his usual liberality when baiting his policy with falsehopes, Bismarck went on to say that 'Turkey is falling to pieces; nobodycan resuscitate her; Rumania has an important role to fulfil, but for thisshe must be wise, cautious, and strong'. This new attitude was the naturalcounterpart of the change which was at that time making itself felt inRusso-German relations. While a Franco-Russian alliance was propounded byGorchakov in an interview with a French journalist, Bismarck and Andrassysigned in Gastein the treaty which allied Austria to Germany (September1879). As Rumania's interests were identical with those of Austria--wroteCount Andrassy privately to Prince Carol a few months later--namely, toprevent the fusion of the northern and the southern Slavs, she had only toexpress her willingness to become at a given moment the third party in thecompact. In 1883 King Carol accepted a secret treaty of defensive alliancefrom Austria. In return for promises relating to future politicalpartitions in the Balkans, the monarch pledged himself to oppose alldevelopments likely to speed the democratic evolution, of Rumania. Thoughthe treaty was never submitted to parliament for ratification, andnotwithstanding a tariff war and a serious difference with Austria on thequestion of control of the Danube navigation, Rumania was, till the Balkanwars, a faithful 'sleeping partner' of the Triple Alliance. 

All through that externally quiet period a marked discrepancy existed anddeveloped between that line of policy and the trend of public opinion. Theinterest of the Rumanians within the kingdom centred increasingly on theirbrethren in Transylvania, the solution of whose hard case inspired most ofthe popular national movements. Not on account of the political despotismof the Magyars, for that of the Russians was in no way behind it. Butwhilst the Rumanians of Bessarabia were, with few exceptions, illiteratepeasants, in Transylvania there was a solidly established and spiritedmiddle class, whose protests kept pace with the oppressive measures. Manyof them--and of necessity the more turbulent--migrated to Rumania, andthere kept alive the 'Transylvanian Question'. That the country's foreignpolicy has nevertheless constantly supported the Central Powers is due, tosome extent, to the fact that the generation most deeply impressed by theevents of 1878 came gradually to the leadership of the country; to agreater extent to the increasing influence of German education, [1] and theeconomic and financial supremacy which the benevolent passivity of Englandand France enabled Germany to acquire; but above all to the personalinfluence of King Carol. Germany, he considered, was at the beginning ofher development and needed, above all, peace; as Rumania was in the sameposition the wisest policy was to follow Germany, neglecting impracticablenational ideals. King Carol outlined his views clearly in an interviewwhich he had in Vienna with the Emperor Franz Joseph in 1883: 'No nationconsents to be bereaved of its political aspirations, and those of theRumanians are constantly kept at fever heat by Magyar oppression. But thiswas no real obstacle to a friendly understanding between the twoneighbouring states. '

[Footnote 1: Many prominent statesmen like Sturdza, Maiorescu, Carp, &c. Were educated in Germany, whereas the school established by the Germancommunity (_Evangelische Knaben und Realschule_), and which it under thedirect control of the German Ministry of Education, is attended by morepupils than any other school in Bucarest. ]

Such was the position when the Balkan peoples rose in 1912 to sever thelast ties which bound them to the decadent Turkish Empire. King Carol, whohad, sword in hand, won the independence of his country, could have noobjection to such a desire for emancipation. Nor to the Balkan Leagueitself, unfortunately so ephemeral; for by the first year of his reign hehad already approached the Greek Government with proposals toward such aleague, and toward freeing the Balkans from the undesirable interferenceof the powers. [1] It is true that Rumania, like all the other states, hadnot foreseen the radical changes which were to take place, and whichconsiderably affected her position in the Near East. But she was safe aslong as the situation was one of stable equilibrium and the leagueremained in existence. 'Rumania will only be menaced by a real danger whena Great Bulgaria comes into existence, ' remarked Prince Carol to Bismarckin 1880, and Bulgaria had done nothing since to allay Rumanian suspicions. On the contrary, the proviso of the Berlin Convention that allfortifications along the Rumania frontier should be razed to the groundhad not been carried out by the Bulgarian Government. Bulgarian officialpublications regarded the Dobrudja as a 'Bulgaria Irredenta', and at theoutset of the first Balkan war a certain section of the Bulgarian pressspeculated upon the Bulgarian character of the Dobrudja. 

[Footnote 1: See Augenzeuge, op. Cit. , i. 178]

The Balkan League having proclaimed, however, that their action did notinvolve any territorial changes, and the maintenance of the _status quo_having been insisted upon by the European Concert, Rumania declared thatshe would remain neutral. All this jugglery of mutual assurances brokedown with the unexpected rout of the Turks; the formula 'the Balkans tothe Balkan peoples' made its appearance, upon which Bulgaria was at oncenotified that Rumania would insist upon the question of the Dobrudjafrontier being included in any fundamental alteration of the BerlinConvention. The Bulgarian Premier, M. Danev, concurred in this point ofview, but his conduct of the subsequent London negotiations was so'diplomatic' that their only result was to strain the patience of theRumanian Government and public opinion to breaking point. Nevertheless, the Rumanian Government agreed that the point in dispute should besubmitted to a conference of the representatives of the great powers inSt. Petersburg, and later accepted the decision of that conference, thoughthe country considered it highly unsatisfactory. 

The formation of the Balkan League, and especially the collapse of Turkey, had meant a serious blow to the Central Powers' policy of peacefulpenetration. Moreover, 'for a century men have been labouring to solve theEastern. Question. On the day when it shall be considered solved, Europewill inevitably witness the propounding of the Austrian Question. '[1] Toprevent this and to keep open a route to the East Austro-German diplomacyset to work, and having engineered the creation of Albania succeeded inbarring Serbia's way to the Adriatic; Serbia was thus forced to seek anoutlet in the south, where her interests were doomed to clash withBulgarian aspirations. The atmosphere grew threatening. In anticipation ofa conflict with Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia sought an alliance withRumania. The offer was declined; but, in accordance with the policy whichBucarest had already made quite clear to Sofia, the Rumanian army wasordered to enter Bulgaria immediately that country attacked her formerallies. The Rumanians advanced unopposed to within a few miles of Sofia, and in order to save the capital Bulgaria declared her willingness tocomply with their claims. Rumania having refused, however, to conclude aseparate peace, Bulgaria had to give way, and the Balkan premiers met inconference at Bucarest to discuss terms. The circumstances were notauspicious. The way in which Bulgaria had conducted previous negotiations, and especially the attack upon her former allies, had exasperated theRumanians and the Balkan peoples, and the pressure of public opinionhindered from the outset a fair consideration of the Bulgarian point ofview. Moreover, cholera was making great ravages in the ranks of thevarious armies, and, what threatened to be even more destructive, severalgreat powers were looking for a crack in the door to put their tailsthrough, as the Rumanian saying runs. So anxious were the Balkan statesmento avoid any such interference that they agreed between themselves to ashort time limit: on a certain day, and by a certain hour, peace was to beconcluded, or hostilities were to start afresh. The treaty was signed onAugust 10, 1913, Rumania obtaining the line Turtukai-Dobrich-Balchik, thisbeing the line already demanded by her at the time of the Londonnegotiations. The demand was put forth originally as a security againstthe avowed ambitions of Bulgaria; it was a strategical necessity, but atthe same time a political mistake from the point of view of futurerelations. The Treaty of Bucarest, imperfect arrangement as it was, hadnevertheless a great historical significance. 'Without complicating thediscussion of our interests, which we are best in a position tounderstand, by the consideration of other foreign, interests, ' remarkedthe President of the Conference, 'we shall have established for the firsttime by ourselves peace and harmony amongst our peoples. ' Dynasticinterests and impatient ambitions, however, completely subverted thismomentous step towards a satisfactory solution of the Eastern Question. 

[Footnote 1: Albert Sorel, op, cit. , p. 266. ]

The natural counter-effect of the diplomatic activity of the CentralPowers was a change in Rumanian policy. Rumania considered the maintenanceof the Balkan equilibrium a vital question, and as she had entered upon acloser union with Germany against a Bulgaria subjected to Russianinfluence, so she now turned to Russia as a guard against a Bulgaria underGerman influence. This breaking away from the 'traditional' policy ofadjutancy-in-waiting to the Central Powers was indicated by the visit ofPrince Ferdinand--now King of Rumania--to St. Petersburg, and the evenmore significant visit which Tsar Nicholas afterwards paid to the lateKing Carol at Constanza. Time has been too short, however, for those newrelations so to shape themselves as to exercise a notable influence uponRumania's present attitude. 

8

_Rumania and the Present War_

_(a) The Rumanians outside the Kingdom_

The axis on which Rumanian foreign policy ought naturally to revolve isthe circumstance that almost half the Rumanian nation lives outsideRumanian territory. As the available official statistics generally showpolitical bias it is not possible to give precise figures; but roughlyspeaking there are about one million Rumanians in Bessarabia, a quarter ofa million in Bucovina, three and a half millions in Hungary, whilesomething above half a million form scattered colonies in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Macedonia. All these live in more or less close proximity tothe Rumanian frontiers. 

That these Rumanian elements have maintained their nationality is due topurely intrinsic causes. We have seen that the independence of Rumania inher foreign relations had only recently been established, since when theking, the factor most influential in foreign politics, had discouragednationalist tendencies, lest the country's internal development might becompromised by friction with neighbouring states. The Government exertedits influence against any active expression of the national feeling, andthe few 'nationalists' and the 'League for the cultural unity of allRumanians' had been, as a consequence, driven to seek a justification fortheir existence in antisemitic agitation. 

The above circumstances had little influence upon the situation inBucovina. This province forms an integral part of the Habsburg monarchy, with which it was incorporated as early as 1775. The political situationof the Rumanian principalities at the time, and the absence of a nationalcultural movement, left the detached population exposed to Germanization, and later to the Slav influence of the rapidly expanding Ruthene element. That language and national characteristics have, nevertheless, not beenlost is due to the fact that the Rumanian population of Bucovina ispeasant almost to a man--a class little amenable to changes ofcivilization. 

This also applies largely to Bessarabia, which, first lost in 1812, wasincorporated with Rumania in 1856, and finally detached in 1878. The fewRumanians belonging to the landed class were won over by the new masters. But while the Rumanian population was denied any cultural and literaryactivities of its own, the reactionary attitude of the Russian Governmenttowards education has enabled the Rumanian peasants to preserve theircustoms and their language. At the same time their resultant ignorance haskept them outside the sphere of intellectual influence of the mothercountry. 

The Rumanians who live in scattered colonies south of the Danube are thedescendants of those who took refuge in these regions during the ninth andtenth centuries from the invasions of the Huns. Generally known asKutzo-Vlakhs, or, among themselves, as Aromuni, they are--as even Weigand, who undoubtedly has Bulgarophil leanings, recognizes--the most intelligentand best educated of the inhabitants of Macedonia. In 1905 the RumanianGovernment secured from the Porte official recognition of their separatecultural and religious organizations on a national basis. Exposed as theyare to Greek influence, it will be difficult to prevent their finalassimilation with that people. The interest taken in them of late by theRumanian Government arose out of the necessity to secure them againstpan-Hellenic propaganda, and to preserve one of the factors entitlingRumania to participate in the settlement of Balkan affairs. 

I have sketched elsewhere the early history of the Rumanians ofTransylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian nation. As already mentioned, part of the Rumanian nobility of Hungary went over to the Magyars, theremainder migrating over the mountains. Debarred from the support of thenoble class, the Rumanian peasantry lost its state of autonomy, whichchanged into one of serfdom to the soil upon which they toiled. Desperaterisings in 1324, 1437, 1514, 1600, and 1784 tended to case the Hungarianoppression, which up to the nineteenth century strove primarily after apolitical and religious hegemony. But the Magyars having failed in 1848 intheir attempt to free themselves from Austrian domination (defeated withthe assistance of a Russian army at Villagos, 1849), mainly on account ofthe fidelity of the other nationalities to the Austrian Crown, theyhenceforth directed their efforts towards strengthening their own positionby forcible assimilation of those nationalities. This they were able todo, however, only after Königgrätz, when a weakened Austria had to giveway to Hungarian demands. In 1867 the Dual Monarchy was established, andTransylvania, which up to then formed a separate duchy enjoying fullpolitical rights, was incorporated with the new Hungarian kingdom. TheMagyars were handicapped in their imperialist ambitions by their numericalinferiority. As the next best means to their end, therefore, they resortedto political and national oppression, class despotism, and a completedisregard of the principles of liberty and humanity. [1] Hungarian was madecompulsory in the administration, even in districts where the bulk of thepopulation did not understand that language. In villages completelyinhabited by Rumanians so-called 'State' schools were founded, in whichonly Hungarian was to be spoken, and all children upwards of three yearsof age had to attend them. The electoral regulations were drawn up in sucha manner that the Rumanians of Transylvania, though ten times morenumerous than the Magyars, sent a far smaller number than do the latter tothe National Assembly. To quash all protest a special press law wasintroduced for Transylvania. But the Rumanian journalists being usuallyacquitted by the juries a new regulation prescribed that press offencesshould be tried only at Kluj (Klausenburg)--the sole Transylvanian townwith a predominating Hungarian population--a measure which was infundamental contradiction to the principles of justice. [2] In 1892 theRumanian grievances were embodied in a memorandum which was to have beenpresented to the emperor by a deputation. An audience was, however, refused, and at the instance of the Hungarian Government the members ofthe deputation were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for havingplotted against the unity of the Magyar state. 

[Footnote 1: The Rumanians inhabit mainly the province of Transylvania, Banat, Crishiana, and Maramuresh. They represent 46. 2 per cent. Of thetotal population of these provinces, the Magyars 32. 5 per cent. , theGermans 11. 5 per cent. , and the Serbs 4. 5 per cent. These figured aretaken from official Hungarian statistics, and it may therefore be assumedthat the Rumanian percentage represents a minimum. ]

[Footnote 2: Over a period of 22 years (1886-1908) 850 journalists werecharged, 367 of whom were Rumanians; the sentences totalling 216 years ofimprisonment, the fines amounting to Fcs. 138, 000. ]

Notwithstanding these disabilities the Rumanians of Transylvania enjoyed along period of comparative social and economic liberty at a time whenTurkish and Phanariote domination was hampering all progress in Rumania. Office under the Government growing increasingly difficult to obtain, theRumanians in Transylvania turned largely to commercial and the openprofessions, and, as a result, a powerful middle class now exists. Intheir clergy, both of the Orthodox and the Uniate Church--which last, while conducting its ritual in the vernacular, recognizes papal supremacy--the Rumanians have always found strong moral support, while the nationalstruggle tends to unite the various classes. The Rumanians of Hungary formby far the sanest element in the Rumanian nation. From the Rumanianswithin the kingdom they have received little beside sympathy. Theimportant part played by the country at the Peace of Bucarest, and herdetachment from Austria-Hungary, must necessarily have stimulated thenational consciousness of the Transylvanians; while at the same time allhope for betterment from within must have ceased at the death of ArchdukeFrancis Ferdinand, an avowed friend of the long-suffering nationalities. It is, therefore, no mere matter of conjecture that the passive attitudeof the Rumanian Government at the beginning of the present conflict musthave been a bitter disappointment to them. 

_(b) Rumania's Attitude_

The tragic development of the crisis in the summer of 1914 threw Rumaniainto a vortex of unexpected hopes and fears. Aspirations till thenconsidered little else than Utopian became tangible possibilities, while, as suddenly, dangers deemed far off loomed large and near. Not only wassuch a situation quite unforeseen, nor had any plan of action beenpreconceived to meet it, but it was in Rumania's case a situation uniquefrom the number of conflicting considerations and influences at workwithin it. Still under the waning influence of the thirty yearsquasi-alliance with Austria, Rumania was not yet acclimatized to her newrelations with Russia. Notwithstanding the inborn sympathy with andadmiration for France, the Rumanians could not be blind to Germany'smilitary power. The enthusiasm that would have sided with France forFrance's sake was faced by the influence of German finance. Sympathy withSerbia existed side by side with suspicion of Bulgaria. Popular sentimentclashed with the views of the king; and the bright vision of the'principle of nationality' was darkened by the shadow of Russia as despotof the Near East. 

One fact in the situation stood out from the rest, namely, the unexpectedopportunity of redeeming that half of the Rumanian nation which was stillunder foreign rule; the more so as one of the parties in the conflict hadgiven the 'principle of nationality' a prominent place in its programme. But the fact that both Austria-Hungary and Russia had a large Rumanianpopulation among their subjects rendered a purely national policyimpossible, and Rumania could do nothing but weigh which issue offered herthe greater advantage. 

Three ways lay open: complete neutrality, active participation on the sideof the Central Powers, or common cause with the Triple Entente. Completeneutrality was advocated by a few who had the country's material securitymost at heart, and also, as a _pis aller_, by those who realized thattheir opinion that Rumania should make common cause with the CentralPowers had no prospect of being acted upon. 

That King Carol favoured the idea of a joint action with Germany is likelyenough, for such a policy was in keeping with his faith in the power ofthe German Empire. Moreover, he undoubtedly viewed with satisfaction thepossibility of regaining Bessarabia, the loss of which must have beenbitterly felt by the victor of Plevna. Such a policy would have met withthe approval of many Rumanian statesmen, notably of M. Sturdza, sometimeleader of the Liberal party and Prime Minister; of M. Carp, sometimeleader of the Conservative party and Prime Minister; of M. Maiorescu, ex-Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, who presided at the BucarestConference of 1913; of M. Marghiloman, till recently leader of theConservative party, to name only the more important. M. Sturdza, the oldstatesman who had been one of King Carol's chief coadjutors in the makingof modern Rumania, and who had severed for many years his connexion withactive politics, again took up his pen to raise a word of warning. M. Carp, the political aristocrat who had retired from public life a fewyears previously, and had professed a lifelong contempt for the 'Press andall its works', himself started a daily paper (_Moldova_) which, heintended should expound his views. Well-known writers like M. Radu Rosettiwrote[1] espousing the cause favoured by the king, though not for theking's reasons: Carol had faith in Germany, the Rumanians mistrustedRussia. They saw no advantage in the dismemberment of Austria, the mostpowerful check to Russia's plans in the Near East. They dreaded the ideaof seeing Russia on the Bosphorus, as rendering illusory Rumania'ssplendid position at the mouth of the Danube. For not only is a cheapwaterway absolutely necessary for the bulky products forming the chiefexports of Rumania; but these very products, corn, petroleum, and timber, also form the chief exports of Russia, who, by a stroke of the pen, mayrule Rumania out of competition, should she fail to appreciate thepolitical leadership of Petrograd. Paris and Rome were, no doubt, belovedsisters; but Sofia, Moscow, and Budapest were next-door neighbours to bereckoned with. 

[Footnote 1: See R. Rosetti, _Russian Politics at Work in the RumanianCountries_, facts compiled from French official documents, Bucarest, 1914. ]

Those who held views opposed to those, confident in the righteousness ofthe Allies' cause and in their final victory, advocated immediateintervention, and to that end made the most of the two sentiments whichanimated public opinion: interest in the fate of the Transylvanians, andsympathy with France. They contended that though a purely national policywas not possible, the difference between Transylvania and Bessarabia inarea and in number and quality of the population was such that nohesitation was admissible. The possession of Transylvania was assured ifthe Allies were successful; whereas Russia would soon recover if defeated, and would regain Bessarabia by force of arms, or have it once morepresented to her by a Congress anxious to soothe her 'sentiment de dignitéblessée'. A Rumania enlarged in size and population had a better chance ofsuccessfully withstanding any eventual pressure from the north, and it wasclear that any attempt against her independence would be bound to developinto a European question. Rumania could not forget what she owed to France;and if circumstances had made the Transylvanian question one 'à laquelleon pense toujours et dont on ne parle jamais', the greater was the duty, now that a favourable opportunity had arisen, to help the brethren acrossthe mountains. It was also a duty to fight for right and civilization, proclaimed M. Take Ionescu, the exponent of progressive ideas in Rumanianpolitics; and he, together with the prominent Conservative statesman, M. Filipescu, who loathes the idea of the Rumanians being dominated by theinferior Magyars, are the leaders of the interventionist movement. It wasdue to M. Filipescu's activity, especially, that M. Marghiloman was forcedby his own party to resign his position as leader on account of hisAustrophil sentiments--an event unparalleled in Rumanian politics. 

These were the two main currents of opinion which met in conflict at theCrown Council--a committee _ad hoc_ consisting of the Cabinet and theleaders of the Opposition--summoned by the king early in August 1914, whenRumania's neutrality was decided upon. The great influence which the Crowncan always wield under the Rumanian political system was rendered the morepotent in the present case by the fact that the Premier, M. Bratianu, isabove all a practical man, and the Liberal Cabinet over which he presidesone of the most colourless the country ever had: a Cabinet weak to thepoint of being incapable of realizing its own weakness and the imperativenecessity at this fateful moment of placing the helm in the hands of anational ministry. M. Bratianu considered that Rumania was too exposed, and had suffered too much in the past for the sake of other countries, toenter now upon such an adventure without ample guarantees. There wouldalways be time for her to come in. This policy of opportunism he was ableto justify by powerful argument. The supply of war material for theRumanian army had been completely in the hands of German and Austrianarsenals, and especially in those of Krupp. For obvious reasons Rumaniacould no longer rely upon that source; indeed, Germany was actuallydetaining contracts for war and sanitary material placed with her beforethe outbreak of the war. There was the further consideration that, owingto the nature of Rumania's foreign policy in the past, no due attentionhad been given to the defence of the Carpathians, nor to those branches ofthe service dealing with mountain warfare. On the other hand, a continuousline of fortifications running from Galatz to Focshani formed, togetherwith the lower reaches of the Danube, a strong barrier against attack fromthe north. Rumania's geographical position is such that a successfuloffensive from Hungary could soon penetrate to the capital, and by cuttingthe country in two could completely paralyse its organization. Sucharguments acquired a magnified importance in the light of the failure ofthe negotiations with Bulgaria, and found many a willing ear in a countrygoverned by a heavily involved landed class, and depending almostexclusively in its banking organization upon German and Austrian capital. 

From the point of view of practical politics only the issue of theconflict will determine the wisdom or otherwise of Rumania's attitude. But, though it is perhaps out of place to enlarge upon it here, it isimpossible not to speak of the moral aspect of the course adopted. Bygiving heed to the unspoken appeal from Transylvania the Rumanian nationalspirit would have been quickened, and the people braced to a wholesomesacrifice. Many were the wistful glances cast towards the Carpathians bythe subject Rumanians, as they were being led away to fight for theiroppressors; but, wilfully unmindful, the leaders of the Rumanian stateburied their noses in their ledgers, oblivious of the fact that in thesetimes of internationalism a will in common, with aspirations in common, isthe very life-blood of nationality. That sentiment ought not to enter intopolitics is an argument untenable in a country which has yet to see itsnational aspirations fulfilled, and which makes of these aspirationsdefinite claims. No Rumanian statesman can contend that possession ofTransylvania is necessary to the existence of the Rumanian state. Whatthey can maintain is that deliverance from Magyar oppression is vital tothe existence of the Transylvanians. The right to advance such a claimgrows out of their very duty of watching over the safety of the subjectRumanians. 'When there are squabbles in the household of mybrother-in-law, ' said the late Ioan Bratianu when speaking on theTransylvanian question, 'it is no affair of mine; but when he raises aknife against his wife, it is not merely my right to intervene, it is myduty. ' It is difficult to account for the obliquity of vision shown by somany Rumanian politicians. 'The whole policy of such a state [having alarge compatriot population living in close proximity under foreigndomination] must be primarily influenced by anxiety as to the fate oftheir brothers, and by the duty of emancipating them, ' affirms one of themost ardent of Rumanian nationalist orators; and he goes on to assure usthat 'if Rumania waits, it is not from hesitation as to her duty, butsimply in order that she may discharge it more completely'. [1] Meantime, while Rumania waits, regiments composed almost completely ofTransylvanians have been repeatedly and of set purpose placed in theforefront of the battle, and as often annihilated. Such could never be thesimple-hearted Rumanian peasant's conception of his duty, and here, as inso many other cases in the present conflict, the nation at large must notbe judged by the policy of the few who hold the reins. 

[Footnote 1: _Quarterly Review_, London, April, 1915, pp. 449-50. ]

Rumania's claims to Transylvania are not of an historical nature. They arefounded upon the numerical superiority of the subject Rumanians inTransylvania, that is upon the 'principle of nationality', and are morallystrengthened by the treatment the Transylvanians suffer at the hands ofthe Magyars. By its passivity, however, the Rumanian Government hassacrificed the prime factor of the 'principle of nationality' to theattainment of an object in itself subordinate to that factor; that is, ithas sacrificed the 'people' in order to make more sure of the 'land'. Inthis way the Rumanian Government has entered upon a policy of acquisition;a policy which Rumania is too weak to pursue save under the patronage ofone or a group of great powers; a policy unfortunate inasmuch as it willdeprive her of freedom of action in her external politics. Her policywill, in its consequences, certainly react to the detriment of theposition acquired by the country two years ago, when independent actionmade her arbiter not only among the smaller Balkan States, but also amongthose and her late suzerain, Turkey. 

Such, indeed, must inevitably be the fate of Balkan politics in general. Passing from Turkish domination to nominal Turkish suzerainty, and thenceto independence within the sphere of influence of a power or group ofpowers, this gradual emancipation of the states of south-eastern Europefound its highest expression in the Balkan League. The war against Turkeywas in effect a rebellion against the political tutelage of the powers. But this emancipation was short-lived. By their greed the Balkan Statesagain opened up a way to the intrusion of foreign diplomacy, and even, aswe now see, of foreign troops. The first Balkan war marked the zenith ofBalkan political emancipation; the second Balkan war was the first act inthe tragic _débâcle_ out of which the present situation developed. Theinterval between August 1913 (Peace of Bucarest) and August 1914 wasmerely an armistice during which Bulgaria and Turkey recovered theirbreath, and German and Austrian diplomacy had time to find a pretext forwar on its own account. 

'Exhausted but not vanquished we have had to furl our glorious standardsin order to await better days, ' said Ferdinand of Bulgaria to his soldiersafter the conclusion of the Peace of Bucarest; and Budapest, Vienna, andBerlin have no doubt done their best to keep this spirit of revenge aliveand to prevent a renascence of the Balkan Alliance. They have succeeded. They have done more: they have succeeded in causing the 'principle ofnationality'--that idea which involves the disruption of Austria--to bestifled by the very people whom it was meant to save. For whilst theGerman peoples are united in this conflict, the majority of the southernSlavs, in fighting the German battles, are fighting to perpetuate thepolitical servitude of the subject races of Austria-Hungary. 

However suspicious Rumania may be of Russia, however bitter the quarrelsbetween Bulgars, Greeks, and Serbs, it is not, nor can it ever be natural, that peoples who have groaned under Turkish despotism for centuriesshould, after only one year of complete liberation, join hands with an oldand dreaded enemy not only against their fellow sufferers, but evenagainst those who came 'to die that they may live'. These are the Dead Seafruits of dynastic policy. Called to the thrones of the small states ofthe Near East for the purpose of creating order and peace, the Germandynasties have overstepped their function and abused the power entrustedto them. As long as, in normal times, political activities were confinedto the diplomatic arena there was no peril of rousing the masses out oftheir ignorant indolence; but, when times are abnormal, it is a differentand a dangerous thing to march these peoples against their most intimatefeelings. When, as the outcome of the present false situation, sooner orlater the dynastic power breaks, it will then be for the powers who arenow fighting for better principles not to impose their own views upon thepeoples, or to place their own princes upon the vacant thrones. Rathermust they see that the small nations of the Near East are given a chanceto develop in peace and according to their proper ideals; that they be notagain subjected to the disintegrating influence of European diplomacy; andthat, above all, to the nations in common, irrespective of their presentattitude, there should be a just application of the 'principle ofnationality'. 

TURKEY

Turkey is no better name for the Osmanli dominion or any part of it thanNormandy would be for Great Britain. It is a mediaeval error ofnomenclature sanctioned by long usage in foreign mouths, but without anyequivalent in the vernacular of the Osmanlis themselves. The real 'Turkey'is Turkestan, and the real Turks are the Turcomans. The Osmanlis are theleast typical Turks surviving. Only a very small proportion of them haveany strain of Turkish blood, and this is diluted till it is rarelyperceptible in their physiognomy: and if environment rather than blood isto be held responsible for racial features, it can only be said that theterritory occupied by the Osmanlis is as unlike the homeland of the trueTurks as it can well be, and is quite unsuited to typically Turkish lifeand manners. 

While of course it would be absurd to propose at this time of day anychange in the terms by which the civilized world unanimously designatesthe Osmanlis and their dominion, it is well to insist on theirincorrectness, because, like most erroneous names, they have brederroneous beliefs. Thanks in the main to them, the Ottoman power issupposed to have originated in an overwhelming invasion of Asia Minor byimmense numbers of Central Asiatic migrants, who, intent, like the earlyArab armies, on offering to Asia first and Europe second the choice ofapostasy or death, absorbed or annihilated almost all the previouspopulations, and swept forward into the Balkans as single-minded apostlesof Islam. If the composition and the aims of the Osmanlis had been these, it would pass all understanding how they contrived, within a century oftheir appearance on the western scene, to establish in North-west Asia andSouth-east Europe the most civilized and best-ordered state of their time. Who, then, are the Osmanlis in reality? What have they to do with trueTurks? and in virtue of what innate qualities did they found andconsolidate their power?

1

_Origin of the Osmanlis_

We hear of Turks first from Chinese sources. They were then theinhabitants, strong and predatory, of the Altai plains and valleys: butlater on, about the sixth century A. D. , they are found firmly establishedin what is still called Turkestan, and pushing westwards towards theCaspian Sea. Somewhat more than another century passes, and, reached by amissionary faith of West Asia, they come out of the Far Eastern darknessinto a dim light of western history. One Boja, lord of Kashgar and Khan ofwhat the Chinese knew as the people of Thu-Kiu--probably the same name as'Turk'--embraced Islam and forced it on his Mazdeist subjects; but otherTurkish tribes, notably the powerful Uighurs, remained intolerant of thenew dispensation, and expelled the Thu-Kiu _en masse_ from their holdingin Turkestan into Persia. Here they distributed themselves in detachedhordes over the north and centre. At this day, in some parts of Persia, e. G. Azerbaijan, Turks make the bulk of the population besides supplyingthe reigning dynasty of the whole kingdom. For the Shahs of the Kajarhouse are not Iranian, but purely Turkish. 

This, it should be observed, was the western limit of Turkish expansion inthe mass. Azerbaijan is the nearest region to us in which Turki bloodpredominates, and the westernmost province of the true Turk homeland. AllTurks who have passed thence into Hither Asia have come in comparativelysmall detachments, as minorities to alien majorities. They have invaded asgroups of nomads seeking vacant pasturage, or as bands of militaryadventurers who, first offering their swords to princes of the elderpeoples, have subsequently, on several occasions and in severallocalities, imposed themselves on their former masters. To the firstcategory belong all those Turcoman, Avshar, Yuruk, and other Turki tribes, which filtered over the Euphrates into unoccupied or sparsely inhabitedparts of Syria and Asia Minor from the seventh century onwards, andsurvive to this day in isolated patches, distinguished from the mass ofthe local populations, partly by an ineradicable instinct for nomadiclife, partly by retention of the pre-Islamic beliefs and practices of thefirst immigrants. In the second category--military adventurers--fall, forexample, the Turkish praetorians who made and unmade not less than fourcaliphs at Bagdad in the ninth century, and that bold _condottiere_, Ahmedibn Tulun, who captured a throne at Cairo. Even Christian emperors availedthemselves of these stout fighters. Theophilus of Constantinopleanticipated the Ottoman invasion of Europe by some five hundred years whenhe established Vardariote Turks in Macedonia. 

The most important members of the second category, however, were theSeljuks. Like the earlier Thu-Kiu, they were pushed out of Turkestan latein the tenth century to found a power in Persia. Here, in Khorasan, themass of the horde settled and remained: and it was only a comparativelysmall section which went on westward as military adventurers to fall uponBagdad, Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor. This first conquest was littlebetter than a raid, so brief was the resultant tenure; but a century latertwo dispossessed nephews of Melek Shah of Persia set out on a militaryadventure which had more lasting consequences. Penetrating with, a smallfollowing into Asia Minor, they seized Konia, and instituted there akingdom nominally feudatory to the Grand Seljuk of Persia, but in realityindependent and destined to last about two centuries. Though numericallyweak, their forces, recruited from the professional soldier class whichhad bolstered up the Abbasid Empire and formed the Seljukian kingdoms ofPersia and Syria, were superior to any Byzantine troops that could bearrayed in southern or central Asia Minor. They constituted indeed theonly compact body of fighting men seen in these regions for somegenerations. It found reinforcement from the scattered Turki groupsintroduced already, as we have seen, into the country; and even fromnative Christians, who, descended from the Iconoclasts of two centuriesbefore, found the rule of Moslem image-haters more congenial, as it wascertainly more effective, than that of Byzantine emperors. The creed ofthe Seljuks was Islam of an Iranian type. Of Incarnationist colour, itrepudiated the dour illiberal spirit of the early Arabian apostles whichlatter-day Sunnite orthodoxy has revived. Accordingly its professors, backed by an effective force and offering security and privilege, quicklywon over the aborigines--Lycaonians, Phrygians, Cappadocians, andCilicians--and welded them into a nation, leaving only a few detachedcommunities here and there to cherish allegiance to ByzantineChristianity. In the event, the population of quite two-thirds of theAnatolian peninsula had already identified itself with a ruling Turkicaste before, early in the thirteenth century, fresh Turks appeared on thescene--those Turks who were to found the Ottoman Empire. 

They entered Asia Minor much as the earlier Turcomans had entered it--asmall body of nomadic adventurers, thrown off by the larger body of Turkssettled in Persia to seek new pastures west of the Euphrates. There aredivers legends about the first appearance and establishment of theseparticular Turks: but all agree that they were of inconsiderable number--not above four hundred families at most. Drifting in by way of Armenia, they pressed gradually westward from Erzerum in hope of finding someunoccupied country which would prove both element and fertile. Byzantineinfluence was then at a very low ebb. With Constantinople itself in Latinhands, the Greek writ ran only along the north Anatolian coast, ruled fromtwo separate centres, Isnik (Nicaea) and Trebizond: and the Seljuk kingdomwas run in reality much more vigorous. Though apparently without a rival, it was subsisting by consent, on the prestige of its past, rather than onactual power. The moment of its dissolution was approaching, and theAnatolian peninsula, two-thirds Islamized, but ill-organised and veryloosely knit, was becoming once more a fair field for any adventurer ableto command a small compact force. 

The newly come Turks were invited finally to settle on the extremenorth-western fringe of the Seljuk territory--in a region so near Nicaeathat their sword would be a better title to it than any which the feudalauthority of Konia could confer. In fact it was a debatable land, an anglepushed up between the lake plain of Nicaea on the one hand and the plainof Brusa on the other, and divided from each by not lofty heights, Yenishehr, its chief town, which became the Osmanli chief Ertogrul'sresidence, lies, as the crow flies, a good deal less than fifty miles fromthe Sea of Marmora, and not a hundred miles from Constantinople itself. Here Ertogrul was to be a Warden of the Marches, to hold his territory forthe Seljuk and extend it for himself at the expense of Nicaea if he could. If he won through, so much the better for Sultan Alaeddin; if he failed, _vile damnum!_

Hardly were his tribesmen settled, however, among the Bithynians andGreeks of Yenishehr, before the Seljuk collapse became a fact. The Tartarstorm, ridden by Jenghis Khan, which had overwhelmed Central Asia, spentits last force on the kingdom of Konia, and, withdrawing, left the Seljuksbankrupt of force and prestige and Anatolia without an overlord. Thefeudatories were free everywhere to make or mar themselves, and they spentthe last half of the thirteenth century in fighting for whatever might besaved from the Seljuk wreck before it foundered for ever about 1300 A. D. In the south, the centre, and the east of the peninsula, where Islam hadlong rooted itself as the popular social system, various Turki emiratesestablished themselves on a purely Moslem basis--certain of these, likethe Danishmand emirate of Cappadocia, being restorations of tribaljurisdictions which had existed before the imposition of Seljukoverlordship. 

In the extreme north-west, however, where the mass of society was stillChristian and held itself Greek, no Turkish, potentate could either revivea pre-Seljukian status or simply carry on a Seljukian system in miniature. If he was to preserve independence at all, he must rely on a society whichwas not yet Moslem and form a coalition with the 'Greeks', into whom therecent recovery of Constantinople from the Latins had put fresh heart. Osman, who had succeeded Ertogrul in 1288, recognized where his onlypossible chance of continued dominion and future aggrandizement lay. Heturned to the Greeks, as an element of vitality and numerical strength tobe absorbed into his nascent state, and applied himself unremittingly towinning over and identifying with himself the Greek feudal seigneurs inhis territory or about its frontiers. Some of these, like Michael, lord ofHarmankaya, readily enough stood in with the vigorous Turk and becameMoslems. Others, as the new state gained momentum, found themselvesobliged to accept it or be crushed. There are to this day Greekcommunities in the Brusa district jealously guarding privileges which datefrom compacts made with their seigneurs by Osman and his son Orkhan. 

It was not till the Seljuk kingdom was finally extinguished, in or about1300 A. D. That Osman assumed at Yenishehr the style and title of a sultan. Acknowledged from Afium Kara Hissar, in northern Phrygia, to the Bithyniancoast of the Marmora, beside whose waters his standards had already beendisplayed, he lived on to see Brusa fall to his son Orkhan, in 1326, andbecome the new capital. Though Nicaea still held out, Osman died virtuallord of the Asiatic Greeks; and marrying his son to a Christian girl, thefamous Nilufer, after whom the river of Brusa is still named, he laid onChristian foundations the strength of his dynasty and his state. The firstregiment of professional Ottoman soldiery was recruited by him andembodied later by Orkhan, his son, from Greek and other Christian-bornyouths, who, forced to apostatize, were educated as Imperial slaves inimitation of the Mamelukes, constituted more than a century earlier inEgypt, and now masters where they had been bondmen. It is not indeed fornothing that Osman's latest successor, and all who hold by him, distinguish themselves from other peoples by his name. They are Osmanlis(or by a European use of the more correct form Othman, 'Ottomans'), because they derived their being as a nation and derive their nationalstrength, not so much from central Asia as from the blend of Turk andGreek which Osman promoted among his people. This Greek strain has oftenbeen reinforced since his day and mingled with other Caucasian strains. 

It was left to Orkhan to round off this Turco-Grecian realm in ByzantineAsia by the capture first of Ismid (Nicomedia) and then of Isnik (Nicaea);and with this last acquisition the nucleus of a self-sufficient sovereignstate was complete. After the peaceful absorption of the emirate ofKarasi, which added west central Asia Minor almost as far south as theHermus, the Osmanli ruled in 1338 a dominion of greater area than that ofthe Greek emperor, whose capital and coasts now looked across to Ottomanshores all the way from the Bosphorus to the Hellespont. 

2

_Expansion of the Osmanli Kingdom_

If the new state was to expand by conquest, its line of advance wasalready foreshadowed. For the present, it could hardly break back intoAsia Minor, occupied as this was by Moslem principalities sanctioned bythe same tradition as itself, namely, the prestige of the Seljuks. Toattack these would be to sin against Islam. But in front lay a rich butweak Christian state, the centre of the civilization to which the popularelement in the Osmanli society belonged. As inevitably as the state ofNicaea had desired, won, and transferred itself to, Constantinople, so didthe Osmanli state of Brusa yearn towards the same goal; and it needed noinvitation from a Greek to dispose an Ottoman sultan to push over to theEuropean shore. 

Such an invitation, however, did in fact precede the first Osmanlicrossing in force. In 1345 John Cantacuzene solicited help of Orkhanagainst the menace of Dushan, the Serb. Twelve years later came a secondinvitation. Orkhan's son, Suleiman, this time ferried a large army overthe Hellespont, and, by taking and holding Gallipoli and Rodosto, secureda passage from continent to continent, which the Ottomans would neveragain let go. 

Such invitations, though they neither prompted the extension of theOsmanli realm into Europe nor sensibly precipitated it, did neverthelessdivert the course of the Ottoman arms and reprieve the Greek empire tillTimur and his Tartars could come on the scene and, all unconsciously, secure it a further respite. But for these diversions there is littledoubt Constantinople would have passed into Ottoman hands nearly a centuryearlier than the historic date of its fall. The Osmanli armies, thus ledaside to make the Serbs and not the Greeks of Europe their firstobjective, became involved at once in a tangle of Balkan affairs fromwhich they only extricated themselves after forty years of incessantfighting in almost every part of the peninsula except the domain of theGreek emperor. This warfare, which in no way advanced the proper aims ofthe lords of Brusa and Nicaea, not only profited the Greek emperor byrelieving him of concern about his land frontier but also used up strengthwhich might have made head against the Tartars. Constantinople then, asnow, was detached from the Balkans. The Osmanlis, had they possessedthemselves of it, might well have let the latter be for a long time tocome. Instead, they had to battle, with the help now of one section of theBalkan peoples, now of another, till forced to make an end of all theirfeuds and treacheries by annexations after the victories of Kosovo in 1389and Nikopolis in 1396. 

Nor was this all. They became involved also with certain peoples of themain continent of Europe, whose interests or sympathies had been affectedby those long and sanguinary Balkan wars. There was already bad blood andto spare between the Osmanlis on the one hand, and Hungarians, Poles, andItalian Venetians on the other, long before any second opportunity toattack Constantinople occurred: and the Osmanlis were in for that age-longstruggle to secure a 'scientific frontier' beyond the Danube, whence theAdriatic on the one flank and the Euxine on the other could be commanded, which was to make Ottoman history down to the eighteenth century and spellruin in the end. 

It is a vulgar error to suppose that the Osmanlis set out for Europe, inthe spirit of Arab apostles, to force their creed and dominion on all theworld. Both in Asia and Europe, from first to last, their expeditions andconquests have been inspired palpably by motives similar to those activeamong the Christian powers, namely, desire for political security and thecommand of commercial areas. Such wars as the Ottoman sultans, once theywere established at Constantinople, did wage again and again with knightlyorders or with Italian republics would have been undertaken, and foughtwith the same persistence, by any Greek emperor who felt himself strongenough. Even the Asiatic campaigns, which Selim I and some of hissuccessors, down to the end of the seventeenth century, would undertake, were planned and carried out from similar motives. Their object was tosecure the eastern basin of the Mediterranean by the establishment of somestrong frontier against Iran, out of which had come more than once forcesthreatening the destruction of Ottoman power. It does not, of course, inany respect disprove their purpose that, in the event, this object wasnever attained, and that an unsatisfactory Turco-Persian border stillillustrates at this day the failures of Selim I and Mohammed IV. 

By the opening of the fifteenth century, when, all unlooked for, a mostterrible Tartar storm was about to break upon western Asia, the Osmanlirealm had grown considerably, not only in Europe by conquest, but also inAsia by the peaceful effect of marriages and heritages. Indeed it nowcomprised scarcely less of the Anatolian peninsula than the last Seljukshad held, that is to say, the whole of the north as far as the Halys riverbeyond Angora, the central plateau to beyond Konia, and all the westerncoast-lands. The only emirs not tributary were those of Karamania, Cappadocia, and Pontus, that is of the southern and eastern fringes; andone detached fragment of Greek power survived in the last-named country, the kingdom of Trebizond. As for Europe, it had become the main scene ofOsmanli operations, and now contained the administrative capital, Adrianople, though Brusu kept a sentimental primacy. Sultan Murad, whosome years after his succession in 1359 had definitely transferred thecentre of political gravity to Thrace, was nevertheless carried to theBithynian capital for burial, Bulgaria, Serbia, and districts of bothBosnia and Macedonia were now integral parts of an empire which had cometo number at least as many Christian as Moslem subjects, and to depend asmuch on the first as on the last. Not only had the professional Osmanlisoldiery, the Janissaries, continued to be recruited from the children ofnative Christian races, but contingents of adult native warriors, whostill professed Christianity, had been invited or had offered themselvesto fight Osmanli battles--even those waged against men of the True Faithin Asia. A considerable body of Christian Serbs had stood up in Murad'sline at the battle of Konia in 1381, before the treachery of another bodyof the same race gave him the victory eight years later at Kosovo. Solittle did the Osmanli state model itself on the earlier caliphial empiresand so naturally did it lean towards the Roman or Byzantine imperial type. 

And just because it had come to be in Europe and of Europe, it was able tosurvive the terrible disaster of Angora in 1402. Though the Osmanli armywas annihilated by Timur, and an Osmanli sultan, for the first and lasttime in history, remained in the hands of the foe, the administrativemachinery of the Osmanli state was not paralysed. A new ruler wasproclaimed at Adrianople, and the European part of the realm held firm. The moment that the Tartars began to give ground, the Osmanlis began torecover it. In less than twenty years they stood again in Asia as theywere before Timur's attack, and secure for the time on the east, couldreturn to restore their prestige in the west, where the Tartar victory hadbred unrest and brought both the Hungarians and the Venetians on theBalkan scene. Their success was once more rapid and astonishing: Salonikapassed once and for all into Ottoman hands: the Frank seigneurs and thedespots of Greece were alike humbled; and although Murad II failed tocrush the Albanian, Skanderbey, he worsted his most dangerous foe, JohnHunyadi, with the help of Wallach treachery at the second battle ofKosovo. At his death, three years later, he left the Balkans quiet and thefield clear for his successor to proceed with the long deferred butinevitable enterprise of attacking all that was left of Greek empire, thedistrict and city of Constantinople. 

The doom of New Rome was fulfilled within two years. In the end it passedeasily enough into the hands of those who already had been in possessionof its proper empire for a century or more. Historians have made more ofthis fall of Constantinople in 1453 than contemporary opinion seems tohave made of it. No prince in Europe was moved to any action by its peril, except, very half-heartedly, the Doge. Venice could not feel quiteindifferent to the prospect of the main part of that empire, which, whilein Greek hands, had been her most serious commercial competitor, passinginto the stronger hands of the Osmanlis. Once in Constantinople, thelatter, long a land power only, would be bound to concern themselves withthe sea also. The Venetians made no effort worthy of their apprehensions, though these were indeed exceedingly well founded; for, as all the worldknows, to the sea the Osmanlis did at once betake themselves. In less thanthirty years they were ranging all the eastern Mediterranean and layingsiege to Rhodes, the stronghold of one of their most dangerouscompetitors, the Knights Hospitallers. 

In this consequence consists the chief historic importance of the Osmanlicapture of Constantinople. For no other reason can it he called anepoch-marking event. If it guaranteed the Empire of the East againstpassing into any western hands, for example, those of Venice or Genoa, itdid not affect the balance of power between Christendom and Islam; for thestrength of the former had long ceased to reside at all in Constantinople. The last Greek emperor died a martyr, but not a champion. 

3

_Heritage and Expansion of Byzantine Empire_

On the morrow of his victory, Mohammed the Conqueror took pains to make itclear that his introduction of a new heaven did not entail a new earth. Aslittle as might be would be changed. He had displaced a Palaeologus by anOsmanli only in order that an empire long in fact Osmanli shouldhenceforth be so also _de jure_. Therefore he confirmed the pre-existingOecumenical patriarch in his functions and the Byzantine Greeks in theirprivileges, renewed the rights secured to Christian foreigners by theGreek emperors, and proclaimed that, for his accession to the throne, there should not be made a Moslem the more or a Christian the less. Moreover, during the thirty years left to him of life, Mohammed devotedhimself to precisely those tasks which would have fallen to a Greekemperor desirous of restoring Byzantine power. He thrust back Latinswherever they were encroaching on the Greek sphere, as were the Venetiansof the Morea, the Hospitallers of Rhodes, and the Genoese of the Crimea:and he rounded off the proper Byzantine holding by annexing, in Europe, all the Balkan peninsula except the impracticable Black Mountain, theAlbanian highlands, and the Hungarian fortress of Belgrade; and, in Asia, what had remained independent in the Anatolian peninsula, the emirates ofKaramania and Cappadocia. 

Before Mohammed died in 1481 the Osmanli Turco-Grecian nation may be saidto have come into its own. It was lord _de facto et de jure belli_ of theeastern or Greek Empire, that is of all territories and seas groupedgeographically round Constantinople as a centre, with only a fewexceptions unredeemed, of which the most notable were the islands ofCyprus, Rhodes, and Krete, still in Latin hands. Needless to say, theOsmanlis themselves differed greatly from their imperial predecessors. Their official speech, their official creed, their family system were allforeign to Europe, and many of their ideas of government had been learnedin the past from Persia and China, or were derived from the originaltribal organization of the true Turks. But if they were neither more norless Asiatics than the contemporary Russians, they were quite as muchEuropeans as many of the Greek emperors had been--those of the Isauriandynasty, for instance. They had given no evidence as yet of a fanaticalMoslem spirit--this was to be bred in them by subsequent experiences--andtheir official creed had governed their policy hardly more than does oursin India or Egypt. Mohammed the Conqueror had not only shown marked favourto Christians, whether his _rayas_ or not, but encouraged letters and thearts in a very un-Arabian spirit. Did he not have himself portrayed byGentile Bellini? The higher offices of state, both civil and military, were confided (and would continue so to be for a century to come) almostexclusively to men of Christian origin. Commerce was encouraged, andwestern traders recognized that their facilities were greater now thanthey had been under Greek rule. The Venetians, for example, enjoyed inperfect liberty a virtual monopoly of the Aegean and Euxine trade. Thesocial condition of the peasantry seems to have been better than it hadbeen under Greek seigneurs, whether in Europe or in Asia, and better thanit was at the moment in feudal Christendom. The Osmanli militaryorganization was reputed the best in the world, and its fame attractedadventurous spirits from all over Europe to learn war in the first schoolof the age. Ottoman armies, it is worth while to remember, were the onlyones then attended by efficient medical and commissariat services, and maybe said to have introduced to Europe these alleviations of the horrors ofwar. 

Had the immediate successors of Mohammed been content--or, rather, hadthey been able--to remain within his boundaries, they would have robbedOttoman history of one century of sinister brilliance, but might havepostponed for many centuries the subsequent sordid decay; for the seeds ofthis were undoubtedly sown by the three great sultans who followed thetaker of Constantinople. Their ambitions or their necessities led to agreat increase of the professional army which would entail many evils intime to come. Among these were praetorianism in the capital and the greatprovincial towns; subjection of land and peasantry to military seigneurs, who gradually detached themselves from the central control; warsundertaken abroad for no better reason than the employment of soldieryfeared at home; consequent expansion of the territorial empire beyond theadministrative capacity of the central government; development of the'tribute-children' system of recruiting into a scourge of the _rayas_ anda continual offence to neighbouring states, and the supplementing of thatsystem by acceptance of any and every alien outlaw who might offer himselffor service: lastly, revival of the dormant crusading spirit of Europe, which reacted on the Osmanlis, begetting in them an Arabian fanaticism anddisposing them to revert to the obscurantist spirit of the earliestMoslems. To sum the matter up in other words: the omnipotence andindiscipline of the Janissaries; the contumacy of 'Dere Beys' ('Lords ofthe Valleys, ' who maintained a feudal independence) and of provincialgovernors; the concentration of the official mind on things military andreligious, to the exclusion of other interests; the degradation andembitterment of the Christian elements in the empire; the perpetualfinancial embarrassment of the government with its inevitable consequenceof oppression and neglect of the governed; and the constant provocation inChristendom of a hostility which was always latent and recurrently active--all these evils, which combined to push the empire nearer and nearer toruin from the seventeenth century onwards, can be traced to the brilliantepoch of Osmanli history associated with the names of Bayezid II, Selim I, and Suleiman the Magnificent. 

At the same time Fate, rather than any sultan, must be blamed. It wasimpossible to forgo some further extension of the empire, and verydifficult to arrest extension at any satisfactory static point. For onething, as has been pointed out already, there were important territoriesin the proper Byzantine sphere still unredeemed at the death of Mohammed. Rhodes, Krete, and Cyprus, whose possession carried with it something likesuperior control of the Levantine trade, were in Latin hands. Austrian aswell as Venetian occupation of the best harbours was virtually closing theAdriatic to the masters of the Balkans. Nor could the inner lands of thePeninsula be quite securely held while the great fortress of Belgrade, with the passage of the Danube, remained in Hungarian keeping, Furthermore, the Black Sea, which all masters of the Bosphorus havedesired to make a Byzantine lake, was in dispute with the Wallachs and thePoles; and, in the reign of Mohammed's successor, a cloud no bigger than aman's hand came up above its northern horizon--the harbinger of theMuscovite. 

As for the Asiatic part of the Byzantine sphere, there was only one littlecorner in the south-east to be rounded off to bring all the Anatolianpeninsula under the Osmanli. But that corner, the Cilician plain, promisedtrouble, since it was held by another Islamic power, that of the EgyptianMamelukes, which, claiming to be at least equal to the Osmanli, possessedvitality much below its pretensions. The temptation to poach on it wasstrong, and any lord of Constantinople who once gave way to this, wouldfind himself led on to assume control of all coasts of the easternmostLevant, and then to push into inland Asia in quest of a scientificfrontier at their back--perilous and costly enterprise which Rome hadessayed again and again and had to renounce in the end. Bayezid II tookthe first step by summoning the Mameluke to evacuate certain forts nearTarsus, and expelling his garrisons _vi et armis_. Cilicia passed to theOsmanli; but for the moment he pushed no farther. Bayezid, who was underthe obligation always to lead his army in person, could make but onecampaign at a time; and a need in Europe was the more pressing. Inquitting Cilicia, however, he left open a new question in Ottomanpolitics--the Asiatic continental question--and indicated to his successora line of least resistance on which to advance. Nor would this be his onlydangerous legacy. The prolonged and repeated raids into Adriatic lands, asfar north as Carniola and Carinthia, with which the rest of Bayezid'sreign was occupied, brought Ottoman militarism at last to a point, whoseeventual attainment might have been foreseen any time in the past century--the point at which, strong in the possession of a new arm, artillery, itwould assume control of the state. 

Bayezid's seed was harvested by Selim. First in a long series ofpraetorian creatures which would end only with the destroyer of thepraetorians themselves three centuries later, he owed his elevation to aJanissary revolt, and all the eight bloody years of his reign were to bepunctuated by Janissary tumults. To keep his creators in any sort of orderand contentment he had no choice but to make war from his first year tohis last. When he died, in 1520, the Ottoman Empire had been swelled toalmost as wide limits in Asia and Africa as it has ever attained since hisday. Syria, Armenia, great part of Kurdistan, northern Mesopotamia, partof Arabia, and last, but not least, Egypt, were forced to acknowledgeOsmanli suzerainty, and for the first time an Osmanli sultan hadproclaimed himself caliph. True that neither by his birth nor by themanner of his appointment did Selim satisfy the orthodox caliphialtradition; but, besides his acquisition of certain venerated relics of theProphet, such as the _Sanjak i-sherif_ or holy standard, and besides a yetmore important acquisition--the control of the holy cities of the faith--he could base a claim on the unquestioned fact that the office was vacant, and the equally certain fact that he was the most powerful Moslem princein the world. Purists might deny him if they dared: the vulgar Sunni mindwas impressed and disposed to accept. The main importance, however, ofSelim's assumption of the caliphate was that it consecrated Osmanlimilitarism to a religious end--to the original programme of Islam. Thiswas a new thing, fraught with dire possibilities from that day forward. Itmarked the supersession of the Byzantine or European ideal by the Asiaticin Osmanli policy, and introduced a phase of Ottoman history which hasendured to our own time. 

The inevitable process was continued in the next reign. Almost all themilitary glories of Suleiman--known to contemporary Europe as 'theMagnificent' and often held by historians the greatest of Osmanli sultans--made for weakening, not strengthening, the empire. His earliest operationsindeed, the captures of Rhodes from the Knights and of Belgrade and[)S]abac from the Hungarians, expressed a legitimate Byzantine policy; andthe siege of Malta, one of his latest ventures, might also be defended asa measure taken in the true interests of Byzantine commerce. But the mostbrilliant and momentous of his achievements bred evils for which militaryprestige and the material profits to be gained from the oppression of anirreconcilable population were inadequate compensation. This was theconquest of Hungary. It would result in Buda and its kingdom remainingOttoman territory for a century and a half, and in the principalities ofWallachia and Moldavia abiding under the Ottoman shadow even longer, andpassing for all time out of the central European into the Balkan sphere;but also it would result in the Osmanli power finding itself on a weakfrontier face to face at last with a really strong Christian race, theGermanic, before which, since it could not advance, it would haveultimately to withdraw; and in the rousing of Europe to a sense of itscommon danger from Moslem activity. Suleiman's failure to take Vienna morethan made good the panic which had followed on his victory at Mohacs. Itwas felt that the Moslem, now that he had failed against the bulwark ofcentral Europe, was to go no farther, and that the hour of revenge wasnear. 

[Illustration: The Ottoman Empire (Except the Arabian and Africanprovinces)]

It was nearer than perhaps was expected. Ottoman capacity to administerthe overgrown empire in Europe and Asia was strained already almost tobreaking-point, and it was in recognition of this fact that Suleiman madethe great effort to reorganize his imperial system, which has earned himhis honourable title of _El Kanun_, the Regulator. But if he could resetand cleanse the wheels of the administrative machine, he could notincrease its capacity. New blood was beginning to fail for the governingclass just as the demands on it became greater. No longer could it bemanned exclusively from the Christian born. Two centuries of recruiting inthe Balkans and West Asia had sapped their resources. Even the Janissarieswere not now all 'tribute-children'. Their own sons, free men Moslem born, began to be admitted to the ranks. This change was a vital infringement ofthe old principle of Osmanli rule, that all the higher administrative andmilitary functions should be vested in slaves of the imperial household, directly dependent on the sultan himself; and once breached, thisprinciple could not but give way more and more. The descendants ofimperial slaves, free-born Moslems, but barred from the glory and profitsof their fathers' function, had gradually become a very numerous class ofcountry gentlemen distributed over all parts of the empire, and a verymalcontent one. Though it was still subservient, its dissatisfaction atexclusion from the central administration was soon to show itself partlyin assaults on the time-honoured system, partly in assumption of localjurisdiction, which would develop into provincial independence. 

The overgrowth of his empire further compelled Suleiman to divide thestanding army, in order that more than one imperial force might take thefield at a time. Unable to lead all his armies in person, he elected, inthe latter part of his reign, to lead none, and for the first time leftthe Janissaries to march without a sultan to war. Remaining himself at thecentre, he initiated a fashion which would encourage Osmanli sultans tolapse into half-hidden beings, whom their subjects would gradually investwith religious character. Under these conditions the ruler, the governingclass (its power grew with this devolution), the dominant population ofthe state, and the state itself all grew more fanatically Moslem. 

In the early years of the seventeenth century, Ahmed I being on thethrone, the Ottoman Empire embraced the widest territorial area which itwas ever to cover at any one moment. In what may be called the properByzantine field, Cyprus had been recovered and Krete alone stood out. Outside that field, Hungary on the north and Yemen (since Selim's conquestin 1516) on the south were the frontier provinces, and the Ottoman flaghad been carried not only to the Persian Gulf but also far upon theIranian plateau, in the long wars of Murad III, which culminated in 1588with the occupation of Tabriz and half Azerbaijan. 

4

_Shrinkage and Retreat_

The fringes of this vast empire, however, none too surely held, werealready involving it in insoluble difficulties and imminent dangers. Onthe one hand, in Asia, it had been found impossible to establish militaryfiefs in Arabia, Kurdistan, or anywhere east of it, on the system whichhad secured the Osmanli tenure elsewhere. On the other hand, in Europe, aswe have seen, the empire had a very unsatisfactory frontier, beyond whicha strong people not only set limits to further progress but was preparedto dispute the ground already gained. In a treaty signed at Sitvatorok, in1606, the Osmanli sultan was forced to acknowledge definitely the absoluteand equal sovereignty of his northern neighbour, Austria; and although, less than a century later, Vienna would be attacked once more, there wasnever again to be serious prospect of an extension of the empire in thedirection of central Europe. 

Moreover, however appearances might be maintained on the frontiers, theheart of the empire had begun patently to fail. The history of the nexttwo centuries, the seventeenth and eighteenth, is one long record ofpraetorian tumults at home; and ever more rarely will these be compensatedby military successes abroad. The first of these centuries had not halfelapsed ere the Janissaries had taken the lives of two sultans, andbrought the Grand Vizierate to such a perilous pass that no ordinaryholder of it, unless backed by some very powerful Albanian or other tribalinfluence, could hope to save his credit or even his life. During thisperiod indeed no Osmanli of the older stocks ever exercised real controlof affairs. It was only among the more recently assimilated elements, suchas the Albanian, the Slavonic, or the Greek, that men of the requisitecharacter and vigour could be found. The rally which marked the latterhalf of the seventeenth century was entirely the work of Albanians or ofother generals and admirals, none of whom had had a Moslem grandfather. Marked by the last Osmanli conquest made at the expense of Europe--thatof Krete; by the definite subjugation of Wallachia; by the second siege ofVienna; by the recovery of the Morea from Venice; and finally by anhonourable arrangement with Austria about the Danube frontier--it is allto be credited to the Kuprili 'dynasty' of Albanian viziers, whichconspicuously outshone the contemporary sovereigns of the dynasty ofOsman, the best of them, Mohammed IV, not excepted. It was, however, nomore than a rally; for greater danger already threatened from anotherquarter. Agreement had not been reached with Austria at Carlowitz, in1699, before a new and baleful planet swam into the Osmanli sky. 

It was, this time, no central European power, to which, at the worst, allthat lay north of the proper Byzantine sphere might be abandoned; but aclaimant for part of that sphere itself, perhaps even for the very heartof it. Russia, seeking an economic outlet, had sapped her way south to theEuxine shore, and was on the point of challenging the Osmanli right tothat sea. The contest would involve a vital issue; and if the Porte didnot yet grasp this fact, others had grasped it. The famous 'Testament ofPeter the Great' may or may not be a genuine document; but, in eithercase, it proves that certain views about the necessary policy of Russia inthe Byzantine area, which became commonplaces of western politicalthinkers as the eighteenth century advanced, were already familiar to eastEuropean minds in the earlier part of that century. 

Battle was not long in being joined. In the event, it would cost Russiaabout sixty years of strenuous effort to reduce the Byzantine power of theOsmanlis to a condition little better than that in which Osman had foundthe Byzantine power of the Greeks four centuries before. During the firsttwo-thirds of this period the contest was waged not unequally. By theTreaty of Belgrade, in 1739, Sultan Mahmud I appeared for a moment even tohave gained the whole issue, Russia agreeing to her own exclusion from theBlack Sea, and from interference in the Danubian principalities. But thesuccess could not be sustained. Repeated effort was rapidly exhaustingOsmanli strength, sapped as it was by increasing internal disease: andwhen a crisis arrived with the accession of the Empress Catherine, itproved too weak to meet it. During the ten years following 1764 Osmanlihold on the Black Sea was lost irretrievably. After the destruction of thefleet at Chesme the Crimea became untenable and was abandoned to the briefmercies of Russia: and with a veiled Russian protectorate established inthe Danubian principalities, and an open Russian occupation in Moreanports, Constantinople had lost once more her own seas. When Selim III wasset on a tottering throne, in 1787, the wheel of Byzantine destiny seemedto have come again almost full circle: and the world was expecting aMuscovite succession to that empire which had acknowledged already theRoman, the Greek, and the Osmanli. 

Certainly history looked like repeating itself. As in the fourteenthcentury, so in the eighteenth, the imperial provinces, having shaken offalmost all control of the capital, were administering themselves, andhappier for doing so. Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and Trebizondacknowledged adventurers as virtually independent lords. Asia Minor, ingeneral, was being controlled, in like disregard of imperial majesty, by agroup of 'Dere Beys', descended, in different districts, from tribalchieftains or privileged tax-farmers, or, often, from both. The latterpart of the eighteenth century was the heyday of the Anatolian feudalfamilies--of such as the Chapanoghlus of Yuzgad, whose sway stretched fromPontus to Cilicia, right across the base of the peninsula, or theKaramanoghlus of Magnesia, Bergama, and Aidin, who ruled as much territoryas the former emirs of Karasi and Sarukhan, and were recognized by therepresentatives of the great trading companies as wielding the onlyeffective authority in Smyrna. The wide and rich regions controlled bysuch families usually contributed neither an _asper_ to the sultan'streasury nor a man to the imperial armies. 

On no mountain of either Europe or Asia--and mountains formed a large partof the Ottoman empire in both--did the imperial writ run. Macedonia andAlbania were obedient only to their local beys, and so far had gone thedevolution of Serbia and Bosnia to Janissary aghas, feudal beys, and theBeylerbey of Rumili, that these provinces hardly concerned themselves morewith the capital. The late sultan, Mustapha III, had lost almost the lastremnant of his subjects' respect, not so much by the ill success of hismutinous armies as by his depreciation of the imperial coinage. He haddied bankrupt of prestige, leaving no visible assets to his successor. What might become of the latter no one in the empire appeared to care. Asin 1453, it waited other lords. 

5

_Revival_

It has been waiting, nevertheless, ever since--waiting for much more thana century; and perhaps the end is not even yet. Why, then, haveexpectations not only within but without the empire been so greatly atfault? How came Montesquieu, Burke, and other confident prophets sincetheir time to be so signally mistaken? There were several co-operatingcauses, but one paramount. Constantinople was no longer, as in 1453, amatter of concern only to itself, its immediate neighbours, and certaintrading republics of Italy. It had become involved with the commercialinterests of a far wider circle, in particular of the great tradingpeoples of western Europe, the British, the French, and the Dutch, andwith the political interests of the Germanic and Russian nations. None ofthese could be indifferent to a revolution in its fortunes, and least ofall to its passing, not to a power out of Asia, but to a rival power amongthemselves. Europe was already in labour with the doctrine of the Balanceof Power. The bantling would not be born at Vienna till early in thecentury to come: but even before the end of the eighteenth century itcould be foreseen that its life would be bound up with the maintenance ofConstantinople in independence of any one of the parent powers--that is, with the prolongation of the Osmanli phase of its imperial fortunes. Thisdoctrine, consistently acted upon by Europe, has been the sheet anchor ofthe Ottoman empire for a century. Even to this day its Moslem dynasty hasnever been without one powerful Christian champion or another. 

There were, however, some thirty years still to elapse after Selim'saccession before that doctrine was fully born: and had her hands beenfree, Russia might well have been in secure possession of the Byzantinethrone long before 1815. For, internally, the Osmanli state went from badto worse. The tumultuous insubordination of the Janissaries became an evergreater scandal. Never in all the long history of their riots was theirrecord for the years 1807-9 equalled or even approached. Never before, also, had the provinces been so utterly out of hand. This was the era ofJezzar the Butcher at Acre, of the rise of Mehemet Ali in Egypt, of AliPasha in Epirus, and of Pasvanoghlu at Vidin. When Mahmud II was thrust onto the throne in 1809, he certainly began his reign with no more personalauthority and no more imperial prestige or jurisdiction than the lastGreek emperor had enjoyed on his accession in 1448. 

The great European war, however, which had been raging intermittently fornearly twenty years, had saved Mahmud an empire to which he could succeedin name and try to give substance. Whatever the Osmanlis suffered duringthat war, it undoubtedly kept them in Constantinople. Temporary loss ofEgypt and the small damage done by the British attack on Constantinople in1807 were a small price to pay for the diversion of Russia's main energiesto other than Byzantine fields, and for the assurance, made doubly surewhen the great enemy did again attack, that she would not be allowed tosettle the account alone. Whatever Napoleon may have planned and signed atTilsit, the aegis of France was consistently opposed to the enemies of theOsmanlis down to the close of the Napoleonic age. 

Thus it came about that those thirty perilous years passed without theexpected catastrophe. There was still a successor of Osman reigning inConstantinople when the great Christian powers, met in conclave at Vienna, half unconsciously guaranteed the continued existence of the OsmanliEmpire simply by leaving it out of account in striking a Balance of Powerin Europe. Its European territory, with the capital within it, was ofquite enough importance to disturb seriously the nice adjustment agreed atVienna; and, therefore, while any one's henceforth to take or leave, itwould become always some one's to guard. A few years had yet to passbefore the phrase, the Maintenance of the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would be a watchword of European diplomacy: but, whether formulated thusor not, that principle became a sure rock of defence for the OsmanliEmpire on the birthday of the doctrine of the Balance of Power. 

Secure from destruction by any foes but those of his own household, asnone knew better than he, the reigning Osmanli was scheming to regain theindependence and dignity of his forefathers. Himself a creature of theJanissaries, Mahmud had plotted the abolition of his creators from thefirst year of his reign, but making a too precipitate effort after theconclusion of peace with Russia, had ignominiously failed and fallen intoworse bondage than ever. Now, better assured of his imperial position andsupported by leading men of all classes among his subjects, he returnednot only to his original enterprise but to schemes for removing otherchecks on the power of the sovereign which had come into being in the lasttwo centuries--notably the feudal independence of the Dere Beys, and theirresponsibility of provincial governors. 

Probably Mahmud II--if he is to be credited with personal initiation ofthe reforms always associated with his name--was not conscious of anypurpose more revolutionary than that of becoming master in his own house, as his ancestors had been. What he ultimately accomplished, however, wassomething of much greater and more lasting moment to the Osmanli state. Itwas nothing less than the elimination of the most Byzantine features inits constitution and government. The substitution of national forces formercenary praetorians: the substitution of direct imperial government ofthe provinces for devolution to seigneurs, tribal chiefs, andirresponsible officers: the substitution of direct collection fortax-farming: and the substitution of administration by bureaucrats foradministration by household officers--these, the chief reforms carriedthrough under Mahmud, were all anti-Byzantine. They did not cause theOsmanli state to be born anew, but, at least, they went far to purge it oforiginal sin. 

That Mahmud and his advisers could carry through such reforms at all in soold a body politic is remarkable: that they carried them through amid theevents of his reign is almost miraculous. One affront after another wasput on the Sultan, one blow after another was struck at his empire. Inspired by echoes of the French Revolution and by Napoleon's recognitionof the rights of nationalities, first the Serbs and then the Greeks seizedmoments of Ottoman disorder to rise in revolt against their local lords. The first, who had risen under Selim III, achieved, under Mahmud, autonomy, but not independence, nothing remaining to the sultan as beforeexcept the fortress of Belgrade with five other strongholds. The second, who began with no higher hopes than the Serbs, were encouraged, by thebetter acquaintance and keener sympathy of Europe, to fight their way outto complete freedom. The Morea and central Greece passed out of theempire, the first provinces so to pass since the Osmanli loss of Hungary. Yet it was in the middle of that fatal struggle that Mahmud settled forever with the Janissaries, and during all its course he was settling oneafter another with the Dere Beys!

When he had thus sacrificed the flower of his professional troops and hadhardly had time to replace the local governments of the provinces byanything much better than general anarchy, he found himself faced by aRussian assault. His raw levies fought as no other raw levies than theTurkish can, and, helped by manifestations of jealousy by the otherpowers, staved off the capture of Constantinople, which, at one moment, seemed about to take place at last. But he had to accept humiliatingterms, amounting virtually, to a cession of the Black Sea. Mahmudrecognized that such a price he must pay for crossing the broad streambetween Byzantinism and Nationalism, and kept on his way. 

Finally came a blow at the hands of one of his own household and creed. Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who had faithfully fought his sovereign's battles inArabia and the Morea, held his services ill requited and his claim to beincreased beyond other pashas ignored, and proceeded to take what had notbeen granted. He went farther than he had intended--more than half-wayacross Asia Minor--after the imperial armies had suffered three signaldefeats, before he extorted what he had desired at first: and in the end, after very brief enjoyment, he had to resign all again to the mandate, notof his sovereign, but of certain European powers who commanded his seas. Mahmud, however, who lived neither to see himself saved by the _giaur_fleets, nor even to hear of his latest defeat, had gone forward with thereorganization of the central and provincial administration, undismayed byMehemet Ali's contumacy or the insistence of Russia at the gate of theBosphorus. 

As news arrived from time to time in the west of Mahmud's disasters, itwas customary to prophesy the imminent dissolution of his empire. We, however, looking backward now, can see that by its losses the Osmanlistate in reality grew stronger. Each of its humiliations pledged somepower or group of powers more deeply to support it: and before Mahmuddied, he had reason to believe that, so long as the European Concertshould ensue the Balance of Power, his dynasty would not be expelled fromConstantinople. His belief has been justified. At every fresh crisis ofOttoman fortunes, and especially after every fresh Russian attack, foreignprotection has unfailingly been extended to his successors. 

It was not, however, only in virtue of the increasing solicitude of thepowers on its behalf that during the nineteenth century the empire wasgrowing and would grow stronger, but also in virtue of certain assetswithin itself. First among these ranked the resources of its Asiaticterritories, which, as the European lands diminished, became more and morenearly identified with the empire. When, having got rid of the old army, Mahmud imposed service on all his Moslem subjects, in theory, but ineffect only on the Osmanlis (not the Arabs, Kurds, or other halfassimilated nomads and hillmen), it meant more than a similar measurewould have meant in a Christian empire. For, the life of Islam being war, military service binds Moslems together and to their chiefs as it bindsmen under no other dispensation; therefore Mahmud, so far as he was ableto enforce his decree, created not merely a national army but a nation. His success was most immediate and complete in Anatolia, the homeland ofthe Osmanlis. There, however, it was attained only by the previousreduction of those feudal families which, for many generations, hadarrogated to themselves the levying and control of local forces. Hence, asin Constantinople with the Janissaries, so in the provinces with the DereBeys, destruction of a drastic order had to precede construction, and moreof Mahmud's reign had to be devoted to the former than remained for thelatter. 

He did, however, live to see not only the germ of a nation emerge fromchaos, but also the framework of an organization for governing it well orill. The centralized bureaucracy which he succeeded in initiating was, ofcourse, wretchedly imperfect both in constitution and equipment. But itpromised to promote the end he had in view and no other, inasmuch as, being the only existent machine of government, it derived any effectivepower it had from himself alone. Dependent on Stambul, it served to turnthither the eyes and prayers of the provincials. The naturally submissiveand peaceful population of Asia Minor quickly accustomed itself to lookbeyond the dismantled strongholds of its fallen beys. As for the rest--contumacious and bellicose beys and sheikhs of Kurdish hills and Syriansteppes--their hour of surrender was yet to come. 

The eventual product of Mahmud's persistency was the 'Turkey' we have seenin our own time--that Turkey irretrievably Asiatic in spirit under asemi-European system of administration, which has governed despotically inthe interests of one creed and one class, with slipshod, makeshiftmethods, but has always governed, and little by little has extended itsrange. Knowing its imperfections and its weakness, we have watched withamazement its hand feeling forward none the less towards one remotefrontier district after another, painfully but surely getting its grip, and at last closing on Turcoman chiefs and Kurdish beys, first in theAnatolian and Cilician hills, then in the mountains of Armenia, finally inthe wildest Alps of the Persian borderland. We have marked its stealthymovement into the steppes and deserts of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia--now drawn back, now pushed farther till it has reached and held regionsover which Mahmud could claim nothing but a suzerainty in name. To judgehow far the shrinkage of the Osmanli European empire has been compensatedby expansion of its Asiatic, one has only to compare the political stateof Kurdistan, as it was at the end of the eighteenth century, and as ithas been in our own time. 

It is impossible to believe that the Greek Empire, however buttressed andprotected by foreign powers, could ever have reconstituted itself afterfalling so low as it fell in the fourteenth century and as the OsmanliEmpire fell in the eighteenth; and it is clear that the latter must stillhave possessed latent springs of vitality, deficient in the former. Whatcan these have been? It is worth while to try to answer this question atthe present juncture, since those springs, if they existed a hundred yearsago, can hardly now be dry. 

In the first place it had its predominant creed. This had acted as Islamacts everywhere, as a very strong social bond, uniting the vast majorityof subjects in all districts except certain parts of the European empire, in instinctive loyalty to the person of the padishah, whatever might befelt about his government. Thus had it acted with special efficacy in AsiaMinor, whose inhabitants the Osmanli emperors, unlike the Greek, hadalways been at some pains to attach to themselves. The sultan, therefore, could still count on general support from the population of his empire'sheart, and had at his disposal the resources of a country which noadministration, however improvident or malign, has ever been able toexhaust. 

In the second place the Osmanli 'Turks', however fallen away from thevirtues of their ancestors, had not lost either 'the will to power' ortheir capacity for governing under military law. If they had neversucceeded in learning to rule as civilians they had not forgotten how torule as soldiers. 

In the third place the sultanate of Stambul had retained a vague butvaluable prestige, based partly on past history, partly on its pretensionto religious influence throughout a much larger area than its properdominions; and the conservative population of the latter was in greatmeasure very imperfectly informed of its sovereign's actual position. 

In the fourth and last place, among the populations on whose loyalty theOsmanli sultan could make good his claim, were several strong unexhaustedelements, especially in Anatolia. There are few more vigorous and enduringpeoples than the peasants of the central plateau of Asia Minor, north, east, and south. With this rock of defence to stand upon, the sultan coulddraw also on the strength of other more distant races, less firmlyattached to himself, but not less vigorous, such, for example, as theAlbanians of his European mountains and the Kurds of his Asiatic. Howeverdecadent might be the Turco-Grecian Osmanli (he, unfortunately, had thelion's share of office), those other elements had suffered no decline inphysical or mental development. Indeed, one cannot be among them nowwithout feeling that their day is not only not gone, but is still, for themost part, yet to be. 

Such were latent assets of the Osmanli Empire, appreciated imperfectly bythe prophets of its dissolution. Thanks to them, that empire continued notonly to hold together throughout the nineteenth century but, in somemeasure, to consolidate itself. Even when the protective fence, set up byEuropean powers about it, was violated, as by Russia several times--in1829, in 1854, and in 1877--the nation, which Mahmud had made, alwaysproved capable of stout enough resistance to delay the enemy till Europeandiplomacy, however slow of movement, could come to its aid, and ultimatelyto dispose the victor to accept terms consistent with its continuedexistence. It was an existence, of course, of sufferance, but one whichgrew better assured the longer it lasted. By an irony of the Osmanliposition, the worse the empire was administered, the stronger became itsinternational guarantee. No better example can be cited than the effect ofits financial follies. When national bankruptcy, long contemplated by itsGovernment, supervened at last, the sultan had nothing more to fear fromEurope. He became, _ipso facto_, the cherished protégé of every powerwhose nationals had lent his country money. 

Considering the magnitude of the change which Mahmud instituted, the stageat which he left it, and the character of the society in which it had tobe carried out, it was unfortunate that he should have been followed onthe throne by two well-meaning weaklings, of whom the first was avoluptuary, the second a fantastic spendthrift of doubtful sanity. Mahmud, as has been said, being occupied for the greater part of his reign indestroying the old order, had been able to reconstruct little more than aframework. His operations had been almost entirely forcible--of a kindunderstood by and congenial to the Osmanli character--and partly bycircumstances but more by his natural sympathies, he had been identifiedfrom first to last with military enterprises. Though he was known tocontemplate the eventual supremacy of civil law, and the equality of allsorts and conditions of his subjects before it, he did nothing to openthis vista to public view. Consequently he encountered little or nofactious opposition. Very few held briefs for either the Janissaries orthe Dere Beys; and fewer regretted them when they were gone. Osmanlisociety identified itself with the new army and accepted the consequentreform of the central or provincial administration. Nothing in thesechanges seemed to affect Islam or the privileged position of Moslems inthe empire. 

It was quite another matter when Abdul Mejid, in the beginning of hisreign, promulgated an imperial decree--the famous Tanzimat or Hatti Sherifof Gulkhaneh--which, amid many excellent and popular provisions for thecontinued reform of the administration, proclaimed the equality ofChristian and Moslem subjects in service, in reward, and before the law. The new sultan, essentially a civilian and a man of easy-goingtemperament, had been induced to believe that the end of an evolution, which had only just begun, could be anticipated _per saltum_, and that heand all his subjects would live happily together ever after. Hiscounsellors had been partly politicians, who for various reasons, good andbad, wished to gain West European sympathy for their country, involved inpotential bondage to Russia since the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833), and recently afflicted by Ibrahim Pasha's victory at Nizib; and theylooked to Great Britain to get them out of the Syrian mess. Partly alsoAbdul Mejid had been influenced by enthusiasts, who set more store byideas or the phrases in which they were expressed, than by the evidence offacts. There were then, as since, 'young men in a hurry' among the moreEuropeanized Osmanlis. The net result of the sultan's precipitancy was toset against himself and his policy all who wished that such itconsummation of the reform process might never come and all who knew itwould never come, if snatched at thus--that is, both the 'Old Turks' andthe moderate Liberals; and, further, to change for the worse the spirit inwhich the new machine of government was being worked and in which freshdevelopments of it would be accepted. 

To his credit, however, Abdul Mejid went on with administrative reform. The organization of the army into corps--the foundation of the existingsystem--and the imposition of five years' service on all subjects of theempire (in theory which an Albanian rising caused to be imperfectlyrealized in fact), belong to the early part of his reign; as do also, onthe civil side, the institution of responsible councils of state andformation of ministries, and much provision for secondary education. Tohis latest years is to be credited the codification of the civil law. Hehad the advantage of some dozen initial years of comparative security fromexternal foes, after the Syrian question had been settled in his favour byGreat Britain and her allied powers at the cheap price of a guarantee ofhereditary succession to the house of Mehemet Ali. Thanks to the samesupport, war with Persia was avoided and war with Russia postponed. 

But the provinces, even if quiet (which some of them, e. G. The Lebanon inthe early 'forties', were not), proved far from content. If the form ofOsmanli government had changed greatly, its spirit had changed little, anddefective communications militated against the responsibility of officialsto the centre. Money was scarce, and the paper currency--an ill-omeneddevice of Mahmud's--was depreciated, distrusted, and regarded as animperial betrayal of confidence. Finally, the hostility of Russia, notoriously unabated, and the encouragement of aspiring _rayas_ creditedto her and other foreign powers made bad blood between creeds andencouraged opposition to the execution of the pro-Christian Tanzimat. WhenChristian turbulence at last brought on, in 1854, the Russian attack whichdeveloped into the Crimean War, and Christian allies, though theyfrustrated that attack, made a peace by which the Osmanlis gained nothing, the latter were in no mood to welcome the repetition of the Tanzimat, which Abdul Mejid consented to embody in the Treaty of Paris. The reignclosed amid turbulence and humiliations--massacre and bombardment atJidda, massacre and Franco-British coercion in Syria--from all of whichthe sultan took refuge with women and wine, to meet in 1861 a drunkard'send. 

His successor, Abdul Aziz, had much the same intentions, the same civiliansympathies, the same policy of Europeanization, and a different, but morefatal, weakness of character. He was, perhaps, never wholly sane; but hisaberration, at first attested only by an exalted conviction of his divinecharacter and inability to do wrong, excited little attention until itbegan to issue in fantastic expenditure. By an irony of history, he is theone Osmanli sultan upon the roll of our Order of the Garter, the right toplace a banner in St, George's Chapel having been offered to thisAllah-possessed caliph on the occasion of his visit to the West in 1867. 

Despite the good intentions of Abdul Aziz himself--as sincere as can becredited to a disordered brain---and despite more than one minister ofoutstanding ability, reform and almost everything else in the empire wentto the bad in this unhappy reign. The administration settled down tolifeless routine and lapsed into corruption: the national army was starved:the depreciation of the currency grew worse as the revenue declined andthe sultan's household and personal extravagance increased. Encouraged bythe inertia of the imperial Government, the Christians of the Europeanprovinces waxed bold. Though Montenegro was severely handled forcontumacy, the Serbs were able to cover their penultimate stage towardsfreedom by forcing in 1867 the withdrawal of the last Ottoman garrisonsfrom their fortresses. Krete stood at bay for three years and all but wonher liberty. Bosnia rose in arms, but divided against herself. Pregnantwith graver trouble than these, Bulgaria showed signs of waking from longsleep. In 1870 she obtained recognition as a nationality in the OttomanEmpire, her Church being detached from the control of the OecumenicalPatriarch of the Greeks and placed under an Exarch. Presently, herpeasantry growing ever more restive, passed from protest to revolt againstthe Circassian refugee-colonists with whom the Porte was flooding theland. The sultan, in an evil hour, for lack of trained troops, let looseirregulars on the villages, and the Bulgarian atrocities, which theycommitted in 1875, sowed a fatal harvest for his successor to reap. Hisown time was almost fulfilled. The following spring a dozen highofficials, with the assent of the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the active dissentof no one, took Abdul Aziz from his throne to a prison, wherein two dayslater he perished, probably by his own hand. A puppet reigned three monthsas Murad V, and then, at the bidding of the same king-makers whom hisuncle had obeyed, left the throne free for his brother Abdul Hamid, a manof affairs and ability, who was to be the most conspicuous, or rather, themost notorious Osmanli sultan since Suleiman. 

6

_Relapse_

The new sultan, who had not expected his throne, found his realm inperilous case. Nominally sovereign and a member of the Concert of Europe, he was in reality a semi-neutralized dependant, existing, as anundischarged bankrupt, on sufferance of the powers. Should the Concert bedissolved, or even divided, and any one of its members be left free toforeclose its Ottoman mortgages, the empire would be at an end. Internallyit was in many parts in open revolt, in all the rest stagnant and slowlyrotting. The thrice-foiled claimant to its succession, who six yearsbefore had denounced the Black Sea clause of the Treaty of Paris and sofreed its hands for offence, was manifestly preparing a fresh assault. Something drastic must be done; but what?

This danger of the empire's international situation, and also the disgraceof it, had been evident for some time past to those who had any justappreciation of affairs; and in the educated class, at any rate, somethinglike a public opinion, very apprehensive and very much ashamed, hadstruggled into being. The discovery of a leader in Midhat Pasha, formergovernor-general of Bagdad, and a king-maker of recent notoriety, inducedthe party of this opinion to take precipitate action. Murad had beendeposed in August. Before the year was out Midhat presented himself beforeAbdul Hamid with a formal demand for the promulgation of a Constitution, proposing not only to put into execution the pious hopes of the two HattiSherifs of Abdul Mejid but also to limit the sovereign and govern theempire by representative institutions. The new sultan, hardly settled onhis uneasy throne, could not deny those who had deposed his twopredecessors, and, shrewdly aware that ripe facts would not be long ingetting the better of immature ideas, accepted. A parliament was summoned;an electorate, with only the haziest notions of what it was about, wentthrough the form of sending representatives to Constantinople; and thesittings were inaugurated by a speech from the throne, framed on the mostapproved Britannic model, the deputies, it is said, jostling and crowdingthe while to sit, as many as possible, on the right, which they understoodwas always the side of powers that be. 

It is true this extemporized chamber never had a chance. The Russianscrossed the Pruth before it had done much more than verify its powers, andthe thoughts and energies of the Osmanlis were soon occupied with the mostsevere and disastrous struggle in which the empire had ever engaged. Butit is equally certain that it could not have turned to account any chanceit might have had. Once more the 'young men in a hurry' had snatched atthe end of an evolution hardly begun, without taking into account theimmaturity of Osmanli society in political education and politicalcapacity. After suspension during the war, the parliament was dissolvedunregretted, and its creator was tried for his life, and banished. Infailing, however, Midhat left bad to become so much worse that the nextreformers would inevitably have a more convinced public opinion behindthem, and he had virtually destroyed the power of Mahmud's bureaucracy. Ifthe only immediate effect was the substitution of an unlimited autocracy, the Osmanli peoples would be able thenceforward to ascribe theirmisfortunes to a single person, meditate attack, on a single position, anddream of realizing some day an ideal which had been definitely formulated. 

The Russian onslaught, which began in both Europe and Asia in the springof 1877, had been brought on, after a fashion become customary, bymovements in the Slavonic provinces of the Ottoman Empire and in Rumania;and the latter province, now independent in all but name and, in defianceof Ottoman protests, disposing of a regular army, joined the invader. Incampaigns lasting a little less than a year, the Osmanli Empire wasbrought nearer to passing than ever before, and it was in a suburb ofConstantinople itself that the final armistice was arranged. But action byrival powers, both before the peace and in the revision of it at Berlin, gave fresh assurance that the end would not be suffered to come yet; and, moreover, through the long series of disasters, much latent strength ofthe empire and its peoples had been revealed. 

When that empire had emerged, shorn of several provinces--in Europe, ofRumania, Serbia, and northern Greece, with Bulgaria also well on the roadthey had travelled to emancipation, and in Asia, of a broad slice ofCaucasia--Abdul Hamid cut his losses, and, under the new guarantee of theBerlin Treaty, took heart to try his hand at reviving Osmanli power. Heand his advisers had their idea, the contrary of the idea of Midhat andall the sultans since Mahmud. The empire must be made, not more European, but more Asiatic. In the development of Islamic spirit to pan-Islamicunity it would find new strength; and towards this end in the earlyeighties, while he was yet comparatively young, with intelligenceunclouded and courage sufficient, Abdul Hamid patiently set himself. InAsia, naturally sympathetic to autocracy, and the home of the faith of hisfathers, he set on foot a pan-Islamic propaganda. He exalted his caliphate;he wooed the Arabs, and he plotted with extraneous Moslems againstwhatever foreign government they might have to endure. 

It cannot be denied that this idea was based on the logic of facts, and, if it could be realized, promised better than Midhat's for escape fromshameful dependence. Indeed, Abdul Hamid, an autocrat bent on remainingone, could hardly have acted upon any other. By far the greater part ofthe territorial empire remaining to him lay in Asia. The little left inEurope would obviously soon be reduced to less. The Balkan lands werewaking, or already awake, to a sense of separate nationality, and whatchance did the Osmanli element, less progressive than any, stand in them?The acceptance of the Ottoman power into the Concert of Europe, thoughformally notified to Abdul Mejid, had proved an empty thing. In thatgalley there was no place for a sultan except as a dependent or a slave. As an Asiatic power, however, exerting temporal sway over some eighteenmillion bodies and religious influence over many times more souls, theOsmanli caliph might command a place in the sun. 

The result belied these hopes. Abdul Hamid's failure was owed in the mainto facts independent of his personality or statecraft. The expansion ofIslam over an immense geographical area and among peoples living inincompatible stages of sophistication, under most diverse political andsocial conditions, has probably made any universal caliphial authority forever impossible. The original idea of the caliphate, like that of the_jehad_ or holy war of the faithful, presupposed that all Moslems wereunder governments of their own creed, and, perhaps, under one government. Moreover, if such a caliph were ever to be again, an Osmanli sultan wouldnot be a strong candidate. Apart from the disqualification of his blood, he being not of the Prophet's tribe nor even an Arab, he is lord of astate irretrievably compromised in purist eyes (as Wahabis and Senussishave testified once and again) by its Byzantine heritage of necessaryrelations with infidels. Abdul Hamid's predecessors for two centuries ormore had been at no pains to infuse reality into their nominal leadershipof the faithful. To call a real caliphate out of so long abeyance couldhardly have been effected even by a bold soldier, who appealed to thegeneral imagination of Moslems; and certainly was beyond the power of atimid civilian. 

When Abdul Hamid had played this card and failed, he had no other; and hisnatural pusillanimity and shiftiness induced him to withdraw ever moreinto the depths of his palace, and there use his intelligence inexploiting this shameful dependence of his country on foreign powers. Unable or unwilling to encourage national resistance, he consoled himself, as a weak malcontent will, by setting one power against another, pin-pricking the stronger and blustering to the weaker. The history of hisreign is a long record of protests and surrenders to the great in bigmatters, as to Great Britain in the matter of Egypt in 1881, to Russia inthat of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, to France on the question of theConstantinople quays and other claims, and to all the powers in 1881 inthe matter of the financial control. Between times he put in suchpin-pricks as he could, removing his neighbours' landmarks in the Aden_hinterland_ or the Sinaitic peninsula. He succeeded, however, in keepinghis empire out of a foreign war with any power for about thirty years, with the single exception of a brief conflict with Greece in 1897. Whilein the first half of his reign he was at pains to make no European friend, in the latter he fell more and more under the influence of Germany, which, almost from the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II, began to prepare asouthward way for future use, and alone of the powers, never browbeat thesultan. 

Internally, the empire passed more and more under the government of theimperial household. Defeated by the sheer geographical difficulty ofcontrolling directly an area so vast and inadequately equipped with meansof communication, Abdul Hamid soon relaxed the spasmodic efforts of hisearly years to better the condition of his subjects; and, uncontrolled anddemoralized by the national disgrace, the administration went from bad tomuch worse. Ministers irresponsible; officials without sense of publicobligation; venality in all ranks; universal suspicion and delation;violent remedies, such as the Armenian massacres of 1894, for diseases dueto neglect; the peasantry, whether Moslem or Christian, but especiallyChristian, forced ultimately to liquidate all accounts; impoverishment ofthe whole empire by the improvidence and oppression of the central power--such phrasing of the conventional results of 'Palace' government expressesinadequately the fruits of Yildiz under Abdul Hamid II. 

_Pari passu_ with this disorder of central and provincial administrationincreased the foreign encroachments on the empire. The nation saw not onlyrapid multiplication of concessions and hypothecations to aliens, and ofalien persons themselves installed in its midst under extra-territorialimmunity from its laws, secured by the capitulations, but also wholeprovinces sequestered, administered independently of the sultan'sgovernment, and prepared for eventual alienation. Egypt, Tunisia, EasternRumelia, Krete--these had all been withdrawn from Ottoman control sincethe Berlin settlement, and now Macedonia seemed to be going the same way. Bitter to swallow as the other losses had been--pills thinly sugared witha guarantee of suzerainty--the loss of Macedonia would be more bitterstill; for, if it were withdrawn from Ottoman use and profit, Albaniawould follow and so would the command of the north Aegean and the Adriaticshores; while an ancient Moslem population would remain at Christianmercy. 

It was partly Ottoman fault, partly the fault of circumstances beyondOttoman control, that this district had become a scandal and a reproach. In the days of Osmanli greatness Macedonia had been neglected in favour ofprovinces to the north, which were richer and more nearly related to theways into central Europe. When more attention began to be paid to it bythe Government, it had already become a cockpit for the new-born Christiannationalities, which had been developed on the north, east, and south. These were using every weapon, material and spiritual, to securepreponderance in its society, and had created chronic disorder which theOttoman administration now weakly encouraged to save itself trouble, nowviolently dragooned. Already the powers had not only proposed autonomy forit, but begun to control its police and its finance. This was the laststraw. The public opinion which had slowly been forming for thirty yearsgained the army, and Midhat's seed came to fruit. 

By an irony of fate Macedonia not only supplied the spectacle whichexasperated the army to revolt, but by its very disorder made thepreparation of that revolt possible; for it was due to local limitationsof Ottoman sovereignty that the chief promoters of revolution were able toconspire in safety. By another irony, two of the few progressive measuresever encouraged by Abdul Hamid contributed to his undoing. If he had notsent young officers to be trained abroad, the army, the one Ottomaninstitution never allowed wholly to decay, would have remained outside theconspiracy. If he had never promoted the construction of railways, as hebegan to do after 1897, the Salonika army could have had no such influenceon affairs in Constantinople as it exerted in 1908 and again in 1909. Asit was, the sultan, at a mandate from Resna in Macedonia, re-enactedMidhat's Constitution, and, a year later, saw an army from Salonika arriveto uphold that Constitution against the reaction he had fostered, and tosend him, dethroned and captive, to the place whence itself had come. 

7

_Revolution_

Looking back on this revolution across seven years of its consequences, wesee plainly enough that it was inspired far less by desire for humaneprogress than by shame of Osmanli military decline. The 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' programme which its authors put forward (a civilianminority among them, sincerely enough), Europe accepted, and the populaceof the empire acted upon for a moment, did not express the motive of themovement or eventually guide its course. The essence of that movement wasmilitant nationalism. The empire was to be regenerated, not by humanizingit but by Ottomanizing it. The Osmanli, the man of the sword, was the typeto which all others, who wished to be of the nation, were to conform. Suchas did not so wish must be eliminated by the rest. 

The revolutionary Committee in Salonika, called 'of Union and Progress', held up its cards at first, but by 1910 events had forced its hand on thetable. The definite annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina byAustria-Hungary in 1908, and the declaration of independence andassumption of the title Tsar by the ruler of Bulgaria, since they were theprice to be paid by the revolutionaries for a success largely made inGermany, were opposed officially only _pro forma_; but when uninformedopinion in the empire was exasperated thereby against Christendom, theCommittee, to appease reactionaries, had to give premature proof ofpan-Osmanli and pro-Moslem intentions by taking drastic action against_rayas_. The Greeks of the empire, never without suspicions, had failed totestify the same enthusiasm for Ottoman fraternity which others, e. G. TheArmenians, had shown; now they resumed their separatist attitude, and madeit clear that they still aspired, not to Ottoman, but to Hellenicnationality. Nor were even the Moslems of the empire unanimous forfraternity among themselves. The Arab-speaking societies complained ofunder-representation in the councils and offices of the state, and made nosecret of their intention not to be assimilated by the Turk-speakingOsmanlis. To all suggestions, however, of local home-rule and conciliationof particularist societies in the empire, the Committee was deaf. Withoutunion, it believed in no progress, and by union it understood theassimilation of all societies in the empire to the Osmanli. 

Logic was on the side of the Committee in its choice of both end andmeans. In pan-Ottomanism, if it could be effected, lay certainly thesingle chance of restoring Osmanli independence and power to anything likethe position they had once held. In rule by a militarist oligarchy forsome generations to come, lay the one hope of realizing the pan-Ottomanidea and educating the resultant nation to self-government. That end, however, it was impossible to realize under the circumstances in whichpast history had involved the Ottoman Empire. There was too much bad bloodbetween different elements of its society which Osmanli rulers had beenlabouring for centuries rather to keep apart than to unite; and certainimportant elements, both Moslem and Christian, had already developed toomature ideas of separate nationality. With all its defects, however, thenew order did undoubtedly rest on a wider basis than the old, and itsorganization was better conceived and executed. It retained some of thesympathy of Europe which its beginnings had excited, and the westernpowers, regarding its representative institutions as earnests of goodgovernment, however ill they might work at the first, were disposed togive it every chance. 

Unfortunately the Young Turks were in a hurry to bring on theirmillennium, and careless of certain neighbouring powers, not formidableindividually but to be reckoned with if united, to whom the prospect ofregenerated Osmanlis assimilating their nationals could not be welcome. Had the Young Turks been content to put their policy of Ottomanization inthe background for awhile, had they made no more than a show of acceptinglocal distinctions of creed and politics, keeping in the meantime a tightrein on the Old Turks, they might long have avoided the union of thoseneighbours, and been in a better position to resist, should that unioneventually be arrayed against themselves. 

But a considerable and energetic element among them belonged to thenervous Levantine type of Osmanli, which is as little minded to compromiseas any Old Turk, though from a different motive. It elected to dealdrastically and at once with Macedonia, the peculiar object not only ofEuropean solicitude but also of the interest of Bulgaria, Serbia, andGreece. If ever a province required delicate handling it was this. It didnot get it. The interested neighbours, each beset by fugitives of itsoppressed nationals, protested only to be ignored or browbeaten. They drewtowards one another; old feuds and jealousies were put on one side; and atlast, in the summer of 1912, a Holy League of Balkan States, inspired byVenezelos, the new Kretan Prime Minister of Greece, and by Ferdinand ofBulgaria, was formed with a view to common action against the oppressor ofGreek, Serbian, and Bulgarian nationals in Macedonia. Montenegro, alwaysspoiling for a fight, was deputed to fire the train, and at the approachof autumn the first Balkan war blazed up. 

8

_Balkan War_

The course of the struggle is described elsewhere in this volume. Itsevent illustrates the danger of an alliance succeeding beyond theexpectations in which it was formed. The constituent powers had looked fora stiff struggle with the Ottoman armies, but for final success sufficientto enable them, at the best, to divide Macedonia among themselves, at theworst, to secure its autonomy under international guarantee. Neither theynor any one else expected such an Ottoman collapse as was in store. Theirmoment of attack was better chosen than they knew. The Osmanli War Officewas caught fairly in the middle of the stream. Fighting during therevolution, subsequently against Albanians and other recalcitrantprovincials, and latterly against the Italians, who had snatched atTripoli the year before, had reduced the _Nizam_, the first line oftroops, far below strength. The _Redif_, the second line, had receivedhardly more training, thanks to the disorganization of Abdul Hamid's lastyears and of the first years of the new order, than the _Mustafuz_, thethird and last line. Armament, auxiliary services, and the like had beendisorganized preparatory to a scheme for thorough reorganization, whichhad been carried, as yet, but a very little way. A foreign (German)element, introduced into the command, had had time to impair the oldspirit of Ottoman soldiers, but not to create a new one. The armies sentagainst the Bulgarians in Thrace were so many mobs of various arms; thosewhich met the Serbs, a little better; those which opposed the Greeks, alittle worse. 

It followed that the Bulgarians, who had proposed to do no more in Thracethan block Adrianople and immobilize the Constantinople forces, werecarried by their own momentum right down to Chataldja, and there and atAdrianople had to prosecute siege operations when they ought to have beenmarching to Kavala and Salonika. The Serbs, after hard fighting, brokethrough not only into Macedonia but into Albania, and reached theAdriatic, but warned off this by the powers, consoled themselves with theoccupation of much more Macedonian territory than the concerted plans ofthe allies had foreseen. The Greeks, instead of hard contests for theHaliacmon Valley and Epirus--their proper Irredenta--pushed such weakforces before them that they got through to Salonika just in time toforestall a Bulgarian column. Ottoman collapse was complete everywhere, except on the Chataldja front. It remained to divide the spoil. Serbiamight not have Adriatic Albania, and therefore wanted as much Macedonia asshe had actually overrun. Greece wanted the rest of Macedonia and hadvirtually got it. Remained Bulgaria who, with more of Thrace than shewanted, found herself almost entirely crowded out of Macedonia, the commonobjective of all. 

Faced with division _ex post facto_, the allies found their _a priori_agreement would not resolve the situation. Bulgaria, the predominantpartner and the most aggrieved, would neither recognize the others' rightsof possession nor honestly submit her claims to the only possible arbiter, the Tsar of Russia. Finding herself one against two, she tried a _coup demain_ on both fronts, failed, and brought on a second Balkan war, in whicha new determining factor, Rumania, intervened at a critical moment todecide the issue against her. The Ottoman armies recovered nearly all theyhad lost in eastern and central Thrace, including Adrianople, almostwithout firing a shot, and were not ill pleased to be quit of a desperatesituation at the price of Macedonia, Albania, and western Thrace. 

Defeated and impoverished, the Ottoman power came out of the war clingingto a mere remnant of its European empire--one single mutilated provincewhich did not pay its way. With the lost territories had gone aboutone-eighth of the whole population and one-tenth of the total imperialrevenue. But when these heavy losses had been cut, there was nothing moreof a serious nature to put to debit, but a little even to credit. Ottomanprestige had suffered but slightly in the eyes of the people. Theobstinate and successful defence of the Chataldja lines and the subsequentrecovery of eastern Thrace with Adrianople, the first European seat of theOsmanlis, had almost effaced the sense of Osmanli disgrace, and stood tothe general credit of the Committee and the individual credit of itsmilitary leader, Enver Bey. The loss of some thousands of soldiers andmuch material was compensated by an invaluable lesson in the faultiness ofthe military system, and especially the _Redif_ organization. The way wasnow clearer than before for re-making the army on the best European model, the German. The campaign had not been long, nor, as wars go, costly towage. In the peace Turkey gained a new lease of life from the powers, and, profligate that she was, the promise of more millions of foreign money. 

Over and above all this an advantage, which she rated above internationalguarantees, was secured to her--the prospective support of the strongestmilitary power in Europe. The success of Serbia so menacedGermano-Austrian plans for the penetration of the Balkans, that theCentral Powers were bound to woo Turkey even more lavishly than before, and to seek alliance where they had been content with influence. In astrong Turkey resided all their hope of saving from the Slavs the way tothe Mediterranean. They had kept this policy in view for more than twentyyears, and in a hundred ways, by introduction of Germans into the militaryorganization, promotion of German financial enterprise, pushing of Germancommerce, pressure on behalf of German concessions which would entailprovincial influence (for example, the construction of a transcontinentalrailway in Asia), those powers had been manifesting their interest inTurkey with ever-increasing solicitude. Now they must attach her tothemselves with hoops of steel and, with her help, as soon as might be, try to recast the Balkan situation. 

The experience of the recent war and the prospect in the future madecontinuance and accentuation of military government in the Ottoman Empireinevitable. The Committee, which had made its way back to power by violentmethods, now suppressed its own Constitution almost as completely as AbdulHamid had suppressed Midhat's parliament. Re-organization of the militarypersonnel, accumulation of war material, strengthening of defences, provision of arsenals, dockyards, and ships, together with devices forobtaining money to pay for all these things, make Ottoman history for theyears 1912-14. The bond with Germany was drawn lighter. More Germaninstructors were invited, more German engineers commissioned, moremunitions of war paid for in French gold. By 1914 it had become so evidentthat the Osmanlis must array themselves with Austro-Germany in anyEuropean war, that one wonders why a moment's credit was ever given totheir protestations of neutrality when that war came at last in August1914. Turkey then needed other three months to complete her first line ofdefences and mobilize. These were allowed to her, and in the late autumnshe entered the field against Great Britain, France, and Russia, armedwith German guns, led by German officers, and fed with German gold. 

9

_The Future_

Turkey's situation, therefore, in general terms has become this. With thedissolution of the Concert of Europe the Ottoman Empire has lost what hadbeen for a century its chief security for continued existence. Its fatenow depends on that of two European powers which are at war with the restof the former Concert. Among the last named are Turkey's two principalcreditors, holding together about seventy-five per cent. Of her publicdebt. In the event of the defeat of her friends, these creditors will befree to foreclose, the debtor being certainly in no position to meet herobligations. Allied with Christian powers, the Osmanli caliph has provedno more able than his predecessors to unite Islam in his defence; but, forwhat his title is worth, Mohammed V is still caliph, no rival claim havingbeen put forward. The loyalty of the empire remains where it was, pendingvictory or defeat, the provinces being slow to realize, and still slowerto resent, the disastrous economic state to which the war is reducingthem. 

The present struggle may leave the Osmanli Empire in one of threesituations: (1) member of a victorious alliance, reinforced, enlarged, andlightened of financial burdens, as the wages of its sin; (2) member of adefeated alliance, bound to pay the price of blood in loss of territory, or independence, or even existence; (3) party to a compromise under whichits territorial empire might conceivably remain Ottoman, but under evenstricter European tutelage than of old. 

The first alternative it would be idle to discuss, for the result ofconditions so novel are impossible to foresee. Nor, indeed, when immediateevents are so doubtful an at the present moment, is it profitable toattempt to forecast the ultimate result of any of the alternatives. Should, however, either the second or the third become fact, certaingeneral truths about the Osmanlis will govern the consequences; and thesemust be borne in mind by any in whose hands the disposal of the empire maylie. 

The influence of the Osmanlis in their empire to-day resides in threethings: first, in their possession of Constantinople; second, in thesultan's caliphate and his guardianship of the holy cities of Islam;third, in certain qualities of Osmanli character, notably 'will to power'and courage in the field. 

What Constantinople means for the Osmanlis is implied in that name _Roum_by which the western dominions of the Turks have been known ever since theSeljuks won Asia Minor. Apart from the prestige of their own earlyconquests, the Osmanlis inherited, and in a measure retain in the NearEast, the traditional prestige of the greatest empire which ever held it. They stand not only for their own past but also for whatever still livesof the prestige of Rome. Theirs is still the repute of the imperial people_par excellence_, chosen and called to rule. 

That this repute should continue, after the sweeping victories of Semitesand subsequent centuries of Ottoman retreat before other heirs of Rome, isa paradox to be explained only by the fact that a large part of thepopulation of the Near East remains at this day in about the same stage ofcivilization and knowledge as in the time of, say, Heraclius. TheOsmanlis, be it remembered, were and are foreigners in a great part oftheir Asiatic empire equally with the Greeks of Byzantium or the Romans ofItaly; and their establishment in Constantinople nearly five centuries agodid not mean to the indigenous peoples of the Near East what it meant toEurope--a victory of the East over the West--so much as a continuation ofimmemorial 'Roman' dominion still exercised from the same imperial centre. Since Rome first spread its shadow over the Near East, many men of manyraces, whose variety was imperfectly realised, if realised at all, by thepeasants of Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, have ruled in itsname; the Osmanlis, whose governmental system was in part the Byzantine, made but one more change which meant the same old thing. The peasantsknow, of course, about those Semitic victories; but they know also that ifthe Semite has had his day of triumph and imposed, as was right andproper, his God and his Prophet on Roum--even on all mankind as manybelieved, and some may be found in remoter regions who still believe--hehas returned to his own place south of Taurus; and still Roum is Roum, natural indefeasible Lord of the World. 

Such a belief is dying now, of course; but it dies slowly and hard. Itstill constitutes a real asset of the Osmanlis, and will not cease to havevalue until they lose Constantinople. On the possession of the oldimperial city it depends for whatever vitality it has. You maydemonstrate, as you will, and as many publicists have done since theBalkan War and before, what and how great economic, political, and socialadvantages would accrue to the Osmanlis, if they could bring themselves totransfer their capital to Asia. Here they would be rid of Rumelia, whichcosts, and will always cost them, more than it yields. Here they couldconcentrate Moslems where their co-religionists are already the greatmajority, and so have done with the everlasting friction and weaknessentailed in jurisdiction over preponderant Christian elements. Here theymight throw off the remnants of their Byzantinism as a garment and, nolonger forced to face two ways, live and govern with single minds as theAsiatics they are. 

Vain illusion, as Osmanli imperialists know! It is their empire that wouldfall away as a garment so soon as the Near East realized that they nolonger ruled in the Imperial City. Enver Pasha and the Committee wereamply justified in straining the resources of the Ottoman Empire tocracking-point, not merely to retain Constantinople but also to recoverAdrianople and a territory in Europe large enough to bulk as Roum. Nothingthat happened in that war made so greatly for the continuation of the oldorder in Asiatic Turkey as the reoccupation of Adrianople. The oneoccasion on which Europeans in Syria had reason to expect a generalexplosion was when premature rumours of the entry of the Bulgarian armyinto Stambul gained currency for a few hours. That explosion, had the newsproved true or not been contradicted in time, would have been apanic-stricken, ungovernable impulse of anarchy--of men conscious that anold world had passed away and ignorant what conceivable new world couldcome to be. 

But the perilous moment passed, to be succeeded by general diffusion of abelief that the inevitable catastrophe was only postponed. In thebreathing-time allowed, Arabs, Kurds, and Armenians discussed and plannedtogether revolt from the moribund Osmanli, and, separately, the mutualmassacre and plundering of one another. Arab national organizations andnationalist journals sprang to life at Beirut and elsewhere. The revivalof Arab empire was talked of, and names of possible capitals and kingswere bandied about. One Arab province, the Hasa, actually broke away. Thenmen began to say that the Bulgarians would not advance beyond Chataldja:the Balkan States were at war among themselves: finally, Adrianople hadbeen re-occupied. And all was as in the beginning. Budding life witheredin the Arab movement, and the Near East settled down once more in thepersistent shadow of Roum. 

Such is the first element in Osmanli prestige, doomed to disappear themoment that the Ottoman state relinquishes Europe. Meanwhile there it isfor what it is worth; and it is actually worth a tradition of submission, natural and honourable, to a race of superior destiny, which isinstinctive in some millions of savage simple hearts. 

 * * * * *

What of the second element? The religious prestige of the Ottoman power asthe repository of caliphial authority and trustee for Islam in the HolyLand of Arabia, is an asset almost impossible to estimate. Would a deathstruggle of the Osmanlis in Europe rouse the Sunni world? Would theMoslems of India, Afghanistan, Turkestan, China, and Malaya take up armsfor the Ottoman sultan as caliph? Nothing but the event will prove thatthey would. Jehad, or Holy War, is an obsolescent weapon difficult anddangerous for Young Turks to wield: difficult because their own Islamicsincerity is suspect and they are taking the field now as clients of_giaur_ peoples; dangerous because the Ottoman nation itself includesnumerous Christian elements, indispensable to its economy. 

Undoubtedly, however, the Ottoman sultanate can count on its religiousprestige appealing widely, overriding counteracting sentiments, and, if itrouses to action, rousing the most dangerous temper of all. It is futileto ignore the caliph because he is not of the Koreish, and owes hisdignity to a sixteenth-century transfer. These facts are either unknown ornot borne in mind by half the Sunnites on whom he might call, and weighfar less with the other half than his hereditary dominion over the HolyCities, sanctioned by the prescription of nearly four centuries. 

One thing can be foretold with certainty. The religious prestige of anOttoman sultan, who had definitely lost control of the Holy Places, wouldcease as quickly and utterly as the secular prestige of one who hadevacuated Constantinople: and since the loss of the latter would probablyprecipitate an Arab revolt, and cut off the Hejaz, the religious elementin Ottoman prestige may be said to depend on Constantinople as much as thesecular. All the more reason why the Committee of Union and Progressshould not have accepted that well-meant advice of European publicists! Asuccessful revolt of the Arab-speaking provinces would indeed sound thedeath-knell of the Ottoman Empire. No other event would be so immediatelyand surely catastrophic. 

 * * * * *

The third element in Osmanli prestige, inherent qualities of the Osmanli'Turk' himself, will be admitted by every one who knows him and hishistory. To say that he has the 'will to power' is not, however, to saythat he has an aptitude for government. He wishes to govern others; hiswill to do so imposes itself on peoples who have not the same will; theygive way to him and he governs them indifferently, though often betterthan they can govern themselves. For example, bad as, according to ourstandards, Turkish government is, native Arab government, when not intutelage to Europeans, has generally proved itself worse, when tried inthe Ottoman area in modern times. Where it is of a purely Bedawi barbarictype, as in the emirates of central Arabia, it does well enough; but ifthe population be contaminated ever so little with non-Arab elements, practices, or ideas, Arab administration seems incapable of producingeffective government. It has had chances in the Holy Cities at intervals, and for longer periods in the Yemen. But a European, long resident in thelatter country, who has groaned under Turkish administration, where it hasalways been most oppressive, bore witness that the rule of the native Imamonly served to replace oppressive government by oppressive anarchy. 

As for the Osmanli's courage as a fighting man, that has often beenexemplified, and never better than in the Gallipoli peninsula. It isadmitted. The European and Anatolian Osmanlis yield little one to theother in this virtue; but the palm, if awarded at all, must be given tothe levies from northern and central Asia Minor. 

 * * * * *

If Constantinople should be lost, the Arab-speaking parts of the empirewould in all likelihood break away, carrying the Holy Cities with them. When the constant risk of this consummation, with the cataclysmic natureof its consequences is considered, one marvels why the Committee, whichhas shown no mean understanding of some conditions essential to Osmanliempire, should have done so little hitherto to conciliate Arabsusceptibilities. Neither in the constitution of the parliament nor in thehigher commands of the army have the Arab-speaking peoples been givenanything like their fair share; and loudly and insistently have theyprotested. Perhaps the Committee, whose leading members are of a markedlyEuropeanized type, understands Asia less well than Europe. Certainly itsprogramme of Ottomanization, elaborated by military ex-attachés, by Jewbankers and officials from Salonika, and by doctors, lawyers, and other_intellectuels_ fresh from Paris, was conceived on lines which offeredthe pure Asiatic very little scope. The free and equal Osmanlis were allto take their cue from men of the Byzantine sort which the Europeanprovinces, and especially the city of Constantinople, breed. After therevolution, nothing in Turkey struck one so much as the apparition on thetop of things everywhere of a type of Osmanli who has the characteristicqualities of the Levantine Greek. Young officers, controlling theirelders, only needed a change of uniform to pass in an Athenian crowd. Spare and dapper officials, presiding in seats of authority over Kurds andArabs, reminded one of Greek journalists. Osmanli journalists themselvestreated one to rhodomontades punctuated with restless gesticulation, whichrevived memories of Athenian cafés in war-time. It was the Byzantinetriumphing over the Asiatic; and the most Asiatic elements in the empirewere the least likely to meet with the appreciation or sympathy of theByzantines. 

Are the Arab-speaking peoples, therefore, likely to revolt, or besuccessful in splitting the Ottoman Empire, if they do? The present writerwould like to say, in parenthesis, that, in his opinion, this consummationof the empire is not devoutly to be wished. The substitution of Arabadministration for Osmanli would necessarily entail European tutelage ofthe parts of the Arab-speaking area in which powers, like ourselves, havevital interests--Syria, for example, southern Mesopotamia, and, probably, Hejaz. The last named, in particular, would involve us in so ticklish andthankless a task, that one can only be thankful for the Turkish caretakerthere to-day, and loth to see him dismissed. 

An Arab revolt, however, might break out whether the Triple Ententedesired its success or not. What chance of success would it have? Thepeoples of the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire are a congeries ofdiffering races, creeds, sects, and social systems, with no common bondexcept language. The physical character of their land compels a good thirdof them to be nomadic, predatory barbarians, feared by the othertwo-thirds. The settled folk are divided into Moslem and Christian (not tomention a large Jewish element), the cleavage being more abrupt than inwestern Turkey and the tradition and actual spirit of mutual enmity moreseparative. Further, each of those main creed-divisions is subdivided. Even Islam in this region includes a number of incompatible sects, such asthe Ansariye, the Metawali, and the Druses in the Syrian mountains, ShiiteArabs on the Gulf coast and the Persian border, with pagan Kurds andYezidis in the latter region and north Mesopotamia. As for the Christians, their divisions are notorious, most of these being subdivided again intotwo or more hostile communions apiece. It is almost impossible to imaginethe inhabitants of Syria concerting a common plan or taking common action. The only elements among them which have shown any political sense orcapacity for political organization are Christian. The Maronites of theLebanon are most conspicuous among these; but neither their numbers northeir traditional relations with their neighbours qualify them to form thenucleus of a free united Syria. The 'Arab Movement' up to the present hasconsisted in little more than talk and journalese. It has not developedany considerable organization to meet that stable efficient organizationwhich the Committee of Union and Progress has directed throughout theOttoman dominions. 

As for the rest of the empire, Asia Minor will stand by the Osmanli cause, even if Europe and Constantinople, and even if the Holy Places and all theArab-speaking provinces be lost. Its allegiance does not depend on eitherthe tradition of Roum or the caliphate, but on essential unity with theOsmanli nation. Asia Minor is the nation. There, prepared equally byByzantine domination and by Seljukian influence, the great mass of thepeople long ago identified itself insensibly and completely with thetradition and hope of the Osmanlis. The subsequent occupation of theByzantine capital by the heirs of the Byzantine system, and their stilllater assumption of caliphial responsibility, were not needed to cementthe union. Even a military occupation by Russia or by another strong powerwould not detach Anatolia from the Osmanli unity; for a thing cannot bedetached from itself. But, of course, that occupation might after longyears cause the unity itself to cease to be. 

Such an occupation, however, would probably not be seriously resisted orsubsequently rebelled against by the Moslem majority in Asia Minor, supposing Osmanli armaments to have been crushed. The Anatolian populationis a sober, labouring peasantry, essentially agricultural and wedded tothe soil. The levies for Yemen and Europe, which have gone far to depleteand exhaust it of recent years, were composed of men who fought to orderand without imagination, steadily and faithfully, as their fathers hadfought. They have no lust for war, no Arabian tradition of fighting forits own sake, and little, if any, fanaticism. Attempts to inspireAnatolian troops with religious rage in the Balkan War were failures. Theywere asked to fight in too modern a way under too many Teutonic officers. The result illustrated a prophecy ascribed to Ghasri Mukhtar Pasha. WhenGerman instructors were first introduced into Turkey, he foretold thatthey would be the end of the Ottoman army. No, these Anatolians desirenothing better than to follow their plough-oxen, and live their commonvillage life, under any master who will let them be. 

Elements of the Christian minority, however, Armenian and Greek, wouldgive trouble with their developed ideas of nationality and irrepressibletendency to 'Europize'. They would present, indeed, problems of which atpresent one cannot foresee the solution. It seems inevitable that anautonomous Armenia, like an autonomous Poland, must be constituted erelong; but where? There is no geographical unit of the Ottoman area inwhich Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in thevilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput, and Van, i. E. In easternmostAsia Minor, than elsewhere, and form a village people of the soil, theyare consistently a minority in any large administrative district. Numerous, too, in the trans-Tauric vilayets of Adana and Aleppo, the seatof their most recent independence, they are townsmen in the main, and notan essential element of the agricultural population. Even if aconsiderable proportion of the Armenians, now dispersed through towns ofwestern Asia Minor and in Constantinople, could be induced to concentratein a reconstituted Armenia (which is doubtful, seeing how addicted theyare to general commerce and what may be called parasitic life), they couldnot fill out both the Greater and the Lesser Armenias of history, insufficient strength to overbear the Osmanli and Kurdish elements. Thewidest area which might he constituted an autonomous Armenia with goodprospect of self-sufficiency would be the present Russian province, wherethe head-quarters of the national religion lie, with the addition of theprovinces of Erzerum, Van, and Kharput. 

But, if Russia had brought herself to make a self-denying ordinance, shewould have to police her new Armenia very strongly for some years; for anacute Kurdish problem would confront it, and no concentration of nationalscould be looked for from the Armenia Irredenta of Diarbekr, Urfa, Aleppo, Aintab, Marash, Adana, Kaisariyeh, Sivas, Angora, and Trebizond (not tomention farther and more foreign towns), until public security was assuredin what for generations has been a cockpit. The Kurd is, of course, anIndo-European as much as the Armenian, and rarely a true Moslem; but itwould be a very long time indeed before these facts reconciled him to thedomination of the race which he has plundered for three centuries. Most ofthe Osmanlis of eastern Asia Minor are descendants of converted Armenians;but their assimilation would be slow and doubtful. Islam, more rapidly andcompletely than any other creed, extinguishes racial sympathies and groupsits adherents anew. 

The Anatolian Greeks are less numerous but not less difficult to providefor. The scattered groups of them on the plateau--in Cappadocia, Pontus, the Konia district--and on the eastward coast-lands would offer no seriousdifficulty to a lord of the interior. But those in the westernriver-basins from Isbarta to the Marmora, and those on the western andnorth-western littorals, are of a more advanced and cohesive politicalcharacter, imbued with nationalism, intimate with their independentnationals, and actively interested in Hellenic national politics. Whathappens at Athens has long concerned them more than what happens atConstantinople; and with Greece occupying the islands in the daily view ofmany of them, they are coming to regard themselves more and more every dayas citizens of Graecia Irredenta. What is to be done with these? What, inparticular, with Smyrna, the second city of the Ottoman Empire and thefirst of 'Magna Graecia'? Its three and a half hundred thousand soulsinclude the largest Greek urban population resident in any one city. Shallit be united to Greece? Greece herself might well hesitate. It would provea very irksome possession, involving her in all sorts of continentaldifficulties and risks. There is no good frontier inland for such an_enclave_. It could hardly be held without the rest of westernmost Asia, from Caria to the Dardanelles, and in this region the great majority ofthe population is Moslem of old stocks, devotedly attached both to theirfaith and to the Osmanli tradition. 

The present writer, however, is not among the prophets. He has but triedto set forth what may delay and what may precipitate the collapse of anempire, whose doom has been long foreseen, often planned, invariablypostponed; and, further, to indicate some difficulties which, being boundto confront heirs of the Osmanlis, will be better met the better they areunderstood before the final agony--If this is, indeed, to be!

INDEX

Abbasid Empire, Abdul Aziz, Sultan, Abdul Hamid, Sultan, Abdul Mejid, Sultan, Achaia, Achmet III: _see_ Ahmed III. Adalia, Adana, Aden, Adhamandios Koráis, Adrianople, captured by the Turks (1361), captured by Serbians and Bulgarians (1913), first European seat of the Osmanlis, foundation of, Peace and Treaty of (1829), restored to Turkey (1913), Russians before (1878), siege of (1912-13), Adriatic, the, Aegean, the, islands of, trade of, Aehrenthal, Baron and Count, Afium Kara Hissar, Agram (Zagreb), capital of Croatia, Agram high treason trial, the, Agrapha, clansmen of, Ahiolu (Anchialo), Ahmed I, Sultan, Ahmed III, Sultan, Ahmed ibn Tulun, Aidin, Aintab, Aigina, Ainos, _See also_ Enos. Aivali, _See also_ Kydhonies. Akarnania, Akerman, Convention of (1826), Alaeddin, Sultan, Ala Shehr (Philadelphia), Albania, and the Macedonian question, conquest of, by the Turks, during the Slav immigration, in classical times, made independent, revolts against Young Turks, under the Turks, Albanian language, the, Albanians, the, migrations of, Aleppo, Alexander the Great, Alexander I, King of Serbia (1889-1903), Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, Alexander II, Emperor of Russia, Alexander III, Emperor of Russia, Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria (1879-85), Alexander Karagjorgjevi['c], Prince of Serbia (1843-58), Alexandria, Alexis Comnenus, the Emperor, Ali Pasha, Ambelakia, America, effect of emigration from south-eastern Europe to, Anatolia, the Turks and, character of the population, feudal families, Anatolikón, captured by the Turks (1825), Andrassy, Count, Angora, battle of (1402), Arabia, Turkish prestige in, and the Turks, movement of, in the direction of revolt, Arabs and Anatolia, and Bulgars, and Islam, Arcadiopolis: _see_ Lule-Burgas. Argos, Arian controversy, the, Armatoli, or Christian militia, Armenians, the, character of the, massacres of (1894), Arnauts: _see_ Albanians. Arta, Gulf of, plain of, Asen dynasty, the, Asia Minor, Turks in, Asparukh (Bulgar prince), Aspropotamo, the, Astypalià, Athens, Duchy of, University of, siege of (1821-2), (1827), Athos, Mount, Attila, Austerlitz, battle of (1805), Austria-Hungary and the Adriatic, and the Macedonian question, and Serbia, relations between, and the Serbs, and the Treaty of Berlin, and Turkey, relations between, wars between, annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by, occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by, relations with the Balkan League, relations with Rumania, Ruman and South Slavonic populations in, Austrian politics in Rumania, Austrians and Serbs, relations between, and Turks, Avars, the: their invasion of the Balkan peninsula with the Slavs, their war with the Bulgars, Avlona, bay of, Avshar tribe, 'Ayon Oros', Azerbaijan, Ba[)c]ka, Bagdad, 'Balance of Power', the, Balkan League, the, formation of the, dissolution of the, Balkan peninsula, the, annexation of, by Mohammed II, control of, economic unity of, German policy in, nationalism in, Slav inhabitants of, Turkish power in, under Roman rule, Balkan States, relations between the, zollverein, Balkan war, the first (1912-13), the second (June 1913), Banat, the, Baranya, Basil I, the Emperor, Basil II, the Emperor, 'Slayer of the Bulgars', Bassarab, dynasty of, Bayezid I, Sultan, Bayezid II, Sultan, Beaconsfield, Earl of, Beirut, Belgrade, capital of Serbia, captured by the Serbs (1807), captured by the Turks (1521), (1813), its Celtic name, Treaty of (1739), Belisarius, Berchtold, Count, Bergama, Berlin, Congress of (1878), Treaty of (1878), Bessarabia, Bulgars in, 25, lost(1812), regained (1856), lost again (1878), importance with regard to present situation, Bieberstein, Duron Marschall von, Bismarck, Bitolj: _see_ Monastir. Black Castle of Afiun, Black Sea, Russian exclusion from, Bogomil heresy, the, Boja, lord of Kashgar, Boris, Bulgar prince (852-88), Boris, Crown Prince of Bulgaria, Bosnia, annexation of, independence of, and conquest of, by the Turks, in relation to the other Serb territories, its Slavonic population, relations of, with Hungary, revolts in, against Turkey, under Austro-Hungarian rule, under Turkish rule, Bosphorus, the, Botzaris, Marko, Brankovi['c], George, Brankovi['c], Vuk, Bratianu, Ioan (father), (son), Bregalnica, battle of the (1913), Brusa, Bucarest, Committee of, Peace Conference (1913), Treaty of (1812), (1913), Bucovina, acquisition by Austria, Rumanians in, Buda, Budapest, in relation to the Serbo-Croats, Budua, Bulgaria, declaration of independence by, and assumption of title Tsar by its ruler, conflicting interests with Greece, early wars between, and the Greeks, geographical position of, growth of, intervention on the side of the Central Powers in the European War, its division into eastern and western, extent of western, in the two Balkan wars (1912-13), its early relations with Rome, its relations with Russia, obtains recognition as a nationality in the Ottoman Empire, of Slav speech and culture, place of, in the Balkan peninsula, Turkish atrocities in, Bulgaria and Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, contrasted, the agreement between, wars between (1885, 1913), Bulgaria and Turkey, relations between, Bulgarian bishoprics in Macedonia, Church, early vicissitudes of the, claims and propaganda in Macedonia, Exarchist Church, the, literature, monarchy, origins of the, Bulgarians, general distribution of, their attitude to the Slavs and the Germans, Bulgarians and Serbians, contrast between, Bulgars, the, their origin, their advance westwards and then southwards into the Balkan peninsula, their absorption by the Slavs, north of the Danube, adherents of the Orthodox Church, Burke, Edmund, Byron, Lord, Byzantine Christianity, commerce, diplomacy, its attitude towards the Slav and other invaders, Empire, heritage and expansion of, by the Turks, Byzantium, ascendancy of, over Bulgaria, decline of, Greek colony of, Roman administrative centre, Cairo, Caliphate, the, Campo Formio, Treaty of (1797), Candia, siege of, Canea, Cantucuzene, John, Cape Malea, Cappadocia, Caria, Carinthia, Carlowitz, Treaty of (1699), Carniola, Carol, Prince of Rumania, his accession, joins Russia against Turkey, intention to abdicate, proclaimed king, King, and the Balkans, personal points, Carp, P. P. , Carpathian mountains, the, Catargiu, Lascar, Catherine, Empress, Cattaro, Bocche di, Caucasia, Cefalonia, Celts, the, in the Balkan peninsula, Cerigo, Cetina river (Dalmatia), Cetinje, Chaeronea, Charlemagne, crushes the Avars, Charles VI, Emperor of Austria, Charles, Prince and King of Rumania: _see_ Carol. [)C]aslav, revolts against Bulgars, Chataldja, lines of, Chesme, destruction of Turkish fleet in, Chios: _see_ Khios. Christianity, in the Balkan peninsula in classical times, introduced into Bulgaria, introduced amongst the Serbs, Christians, their treatment by the Turks, Church, division of the, affects the Serbs and Croats, Church, Generalissimo Sir Richard, Churches, rivalry of the eastern and western, Cilicia, Claudius, the Emperor, Coalition, Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serb, the, Cochrane, Grand Admiral, Cogalniceanu, M. , Comnenus: _see_ Alexis _and_ Manuel. Concert of Europe, Constantine the Great, Constantine, King of Greece, Constantine, ruler of Bulgaria, Constantinople, and the Serbian Church, ascendancy of, over Bulgaria, cathedral of Aya Sophia, commercial interests of, decline of, defences of, ecclesiastical influence of, fall of (1204), (1453), its position at the beginning of the barbarian invasions, made an imperial city, Patriarchate at, 'Phanari', the, spiritual rivalry of, with Rome, Constitution, Rumanian, Corfù, Corinth: _see_ Korinth. Crete: _see_ Krete. Crimea, abandoned to Russia, Crimean War, the, Croatia, absorbed by Hungary, position of, in relation to the Serb territories, Croato-Serb unity, movement in favour of, Croats, Crotians, general distribution of, their origin, Croats and Serbs, difference between, Crusaders, the, in the Balkan peninsula, Crusades; the first; the fourth, Cuza, Prince of Rumania, Cyclades, the, Cyprus, in Latin hands, in Ottoman hands, under the British, Cyrenaica, Cyril, St. , Cyrillic alphabet, the, Dacia, subjection to, and abandonment by, the Romans, Dacians, settlement in Carpathian regions, wars with Rome, Dalmatia, acquired by Austria-Hungary, and Venice, in classical times, in relation to other Serb territories, its Slavonic population, relations of, with Hungary, Daniel, Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Danilo, Prince of Montenegro, Danube, the, as frontier of Roman Empire, Danube _(continued)_: Bulgars cross the, Slavs cross the, Danubian principalities, Russian protectorate in, Dardanelles, the, Decius, the Emperor, Dedeagach, Deliyannis, Demotika, Dhimitzána, Diocletian, the Emperor, his redistribution of the imperial provinces, Dnieper, the, Dniester, the, Dobrudja, acquisition by Rumania, Bulgarian aspirations in regard to, Draga, Queen-Consort of Serbia, Dramali, Drave, the, Drina, the, Dubrovnik: _see_ Ragusa. Dulcigno (Ulcinj), Durazzo, Durostorum: _see_ Silistria. Dushan: _see_ Stephen Du[)s]an. 

Eastern Church, the, Eastern Slavs; _see_ Russians. Edremid, Egypt, Egyptian expedition (1823-4), Enos-Midia line, the, Enver Bey, Epirus, power of Hellenism in, Ertogrul, Osmanli chief, Erzerum, Eugen, Prince, of Savoy, Euphrates, the, Euxine trade, Evyénios Voulgáris, Exarchist Church, the, Fabvier, Ferdinand, Prince and King of Bulgaria (1886-), his relations with foreign powers, Ferdinand, King of Rumania, Filipescu, Nicholas, Fiume (Rjeka), France, and the Macedonian question, and the struggle for Greek independence, and the struggle for the Mediterranean, and the Turks, relations with Rumania, French, the, in the Balkan peninsula, in Dalmatia, in Morocco, influence in Rumania, French Revolution and the rights of nationalities, Friedjung, Dr. , and the accusation against Serbia, Galaxidhi, Galicia, Gallipoli, Genoese, George, Crown Prince of Serbia, George, King of Greece, assassination of, George, Prince of Greece, German diplomacy at Constantinople, influence in the Near East, influence in Rumania, influence in Turkey, German Empire, restlessness of, German hierarchy, early struggles of, against Slavonic liturgy, Germanic peoples, southward movement of, Germanòs, metropolitan bishop of Patrae, Germany and the Turkish frontier, efforts to reach the Adriatic, its expansion eastward, and the Macedonian question, and Russia, relations between, and the Treaty of Berlin, relations with Rumania, revolutions promoted by, Gjorgjevi['c], Dr. V. , Golden Horn, Goluchowski, Count, Gorazd, Gorchakov, Prince, Goths, invasion of the, Great Britain and the Balkan States, relations between, and Egypt, and Rumania, and Syria, and the Ionian Islands, and the Macedonian question, and the struggle for Greek independence, and the struggle for the Mediterranean, and the Treaty of Berlin, loan to Greece, occupation of Cyprus, Greece, anarchy in, ancient, and Macedonia, and Russia, and Serbia, and the adjacent islands, and the Christian religion, and the first Balkan war, and the Ionian Islands, and the Orthodox Church, and the Slav migration, brigandage in, conflict of interests with Bulgaria, conquest of, by the Turks, delimitation of the frontier (1829), dispute with Italy as to possession of Epirus, effect of the French Revolution on, invasion of, by Goths, land-tax, loans to, local liberties, 'Military League' of 1909, minerals of, monarchy established, and its results, 'National Assembly', oppressive relations with Turkey, and efforts for liberation, revolutions in 1843 and 1862. Territorial contact with Turkey. 'tribute-children' for Turkish army from. War with Turkey (1828); (1897); (1912). Greek agriculture. Anti-Greek movement in Rumania. Army. Art and architecture. Ascendancy in Bulgaria. _bourgeoisie_. Claims and propaganda in Macedonia. Coalition with the Seljuks. Commerce and economic progress. Dialects of Ancient Greece. Education. Influence in the Balkan peninsula. Influence in Bulgaria. Influence in Rumania. Language in Rumanian Church. Literature. Monastic culture. Nationalism. National religion. Navy. Officials tinder the Turks. Patriarch. Public finance. Public spirit. Public works. Railways. Renaissance. Shipping. Unity. Greek Empire, decline of. Greek hierarchy, in Bulgaria, the. Greeks, Anatolian. Byzantine. General distribution of. Ottoman. Their attitude with regard to the barbarian invasions. Gregorios, Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. Gulkhaneh. 

Hadrian, the Emperor. Haliacmon Valley. Halys river. Hasa. Hatti Sherif. Hejaz. Hellenic culture and civilization. Hellenic Republic. Hellespont, the. Hercegovina. Annexation of, by Austria-Hungary. Its Slavonic population. Origin and independence of, and conquest of, by the Turks. Revolts in, against Turkey. Under Austro-Hungarian rule. Under Turkish rule. Hilmi Pasha. Hungarians. And the Turks. Invade the Balkan peninsula. Hungary, and the Balkan peninsula, and the Serbo-Croats, and the Serbs, and Turkey, wars between, conquest of, by Suleiman I, growth of, loss of, by the Turks, Slavs in, Huns, arrival of the, in Europe, their origin, settled in Hungary, Hunyadi, John, Hydhra and the Hydhriots, Hypsilantis, Prince Alexander, Prince Demetrius, Ibar, the, Ibrahim Pasha, Ida, Mount, Ignatiyev, Count, Illyria, Celtic invasion of, prefecture of, Roman conquest of, Illyrians, the, Imbros, Ionescu, Take, Ionian islands, presented to Greece by Great Britain, Ipek: _see_ Pe['c]Iran, Iskanderoun, Gulf of, Italian influence in the Balkan peninsula, trading cities, Italy, and the Macedonian question, and the possession of Epirus, diocese of, prefecture of, war with Turkey (1911-12), Ivan III, Tsar of Russia, Ivan IV, Tsar of Russia, Jehad, or Holy War, Jenghis Khan, Jerusalem, Jews, at Constantinople, in Rumania, in Turkey, Jezzar the Butcher, Jidda, John Alexander, ruler of Bulgaria, John Asen I, Bulgar Tsar (1186-96), John Asen II, Bulgar Tsar (1218-41), John Tzimisces, the Emperor, John the Terrible, Prince of Moldavia, Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, Judah, Jugo-Slav(ia), Justin I, the Emperor, Justinian I, the Emperor, Kaisariyeh, Kalamata, Kaloian, Bulgar Tsar (1196-1207), Kama, Bulgars on the, Kanaris, Constantine, Kapodistrias, John, Kara-George (Petrovi['c]), Karagjorgjevi['c] (sc. Family of Kara-George) dynasty, the, Karaiskakis, Karamania, Karasi, Karlovci (Carlowitz, Karlowitz), Karpathos, Kasos; destruction of (1824), Kavala, Kazan, Khalkidhiki, Kharput, siege of (1822), Khorasan, Khurshid Pasha, Kiev, Kilkish, Greek victory at, Kirk-Kilissé, battle of, Kisseleff, Count, Kladovo, Knights Hospitallers of St. John, Kochana, Kolettis, Kolokotrónis, Theodore, Kondouriottis, Konia, battle of, Kopais basin, draining of, Korinth, surrender of (1822), Korinthian Gulf, Kos, Kosovo, vilayet of, Kosovo Polje, battle of, Kraljevi['c], Marko: _see_ Marko K. Krete, conquest of, by Turks, intervention of the powers and constituted an autonomous state, speech of, Krum (Bulgar prince), Kru[)s]evac, Kubrat (Bulgar prince), Kumanovo, battle of (1912), Kumans, the Tartar, Kurdistan, Kurds, the, Kutchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, Kydhonies, destruction of, Laibach (Ljubljana), Lansdowne, Marquess of, Lárissa, Latin Empire at Constantinople, the, influence in the Balkan peninsula, Lausanne, Treaty of (1912), Lazar (Serbian Prince), 'League of Friends', Leipsic, battle of (1813), Lemnos, Leo, the Emperor, Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, Lepanto, battle of (1571), Lerna, Leskovac, Levant, the, commerce of, Libyan war (1911-12), Lombards, the, London, Conference of (1912-13), Treaty of (1913), Louis, conquers the Serbs, Lule-Burgas, battle of (1912), Macedonia, anarchy in, defeat of the Turks by the Serbians in, establishment of Turks in, general characteristics of, in classical times, inhabitants of, revolt in, place-names in, Macedonian question, the, Slavs, the, Magnesia, Magyars, the, their irruption into Europe, growing power and ambitions of the, influence upon the Rumanians, Mahmud I, Sultan, Mahmud II, Sultan, Maina, Maiorescu, TituMalasgerd, battle of, Malta, siege of, Mamelukes, Egyptian, Manichaean heresy, the, Manuel Comnenus, the Emperor, Marash, Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor, Marghiloman, Alexander, Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, Maritsa, the, battle of, Marko Kraljevi['c], Marmora, Sea of, Mavrokordatos, Alexander, Mavromichalis clan, Mavromichalis, Petros, Mediterranean, the, Megaspélaion, Mehemet Ali: _see_ Mohammed Ali. Melek Shah, of Persia, Mendere (Maiandros), Mesolonghi, Mesopotamia, Messenia, Mesta, Metéora, Methodius, St. , Michael Obrenovi['c] III, Prince of Serbia (1840-2, 1860-8), Michael III, the Emperor, Michael the Brave, Prince of Wallachia, Midhat Pasha and representative institutions in Turkey, Media, Milan Obrenovi['c] II, Prince of Serbia (1839), Milan Obrenovi['c] IV, Prince and King of Serbia (1868-89), Mile[)s]evo, monastery of, Milica, Princess, Military colonies, Austro-Hungarian, of Serbs against Turkey, Milo[)s] Obrenovi['c] I, Prince of Serbia (1817-39, 1858-60), Milovanovi['c], Dr. , Mircea the Old, Prince of Wallachia, Misivria (Mesembria), Mitylini, Modhon, Mohacs, battle of, Mohammed II, Sultan, Mohammed IV, Sultan, Mohammed V, Sultan, Mohammed Ali Pasha, of Egypt, Mohammedan influence in the Balkan peninsula, Mohammedan Serbs, of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the, Moldavia, foundation of, Monastir (Bitolj, in Serbian), battle of (1912), Montenegro, achieves its independence, and the Balkan League, autonomous, becomes a kingdom, conquered by the Turks, during the Napoleonic wars, in the Balkan war (1912-13), position of, amongst the other Serb territories, relations with Russia, revolt in, under Turkish rule, war with Turkey, Montesquieu, Morava, the, Moravia, its conversion to Christianity, Morea: _see_ Peloponnesos. Morocco crisis, the, Moslems, Mukhtar Pasha, Muntenia (Wallachia), foundation of, Murad I, Sultan, murder of, Murad II, Sultan, Murad III, Sultan, Murad V, Sultan, Murzsteg programme of reforms, the, Mustapha II, Sultan, Mustapha III, Sultan, Naissus: _see_ Nish. Napoleon I, Napoleon III, and Rumania, Natalie, Queen-Consort of Serbia, Nationalism, Nauplia, fall of (1822), Nauplia Bay, Navarino, battle of (1827), Negrepont, Nemanja dynasty, the, Nicaea, Nicholas I, Prince and King of Montenegro (1860-), Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, Nicomedia, Nikarià, 230. Nikiphóros Phokas, the Emperor, Nikopolis, battle of, Nik[)s]i['c], Nilufer, Nish (Naissus, Ni[)s]), Celtic origin, Goths defeated at, Bulgarians march on, geographical position of, Nish-Salonika railway, Nizib, Normans, the, Novae: _see_ Svishtov. Novi Pazar, Sandjak of, occupied by Austria-Hungary, evacuated by Austria-Hungary, occupied by Serbia and Montenegro, Obili['c], Milo[)s], Obrenovi['c] dynasty, the, Odessa, Committee of, Odhyssèus, Oecumenical Patriarch, the, Okhrida, Archbishopric and Patriarchate of, Lake of, Old Serbia (northern Macedonia), Orient, prefecture of the, Orkhan, Orthodox Church: _see_ Eastern Church. Osman (Othman), Sultan, Osmanli: _see_ Turkey _and_ Turks. Ostrogoths, the, Otranto, straits of, Otto, Prince, of Bavaria, King of Greece, driven into exile, Ottoman Empire: _see_ Turkey. Ouchy, Treaty of: _see_ Lausanne, Treaty of. Oxus, Palaiologos, Romaic dynasty of, Pannonia, Bulgars in, Pan-Serb movement, thePan-Slavism, Paris, Congress of (1856), Convention (1858), Treaty of (1856), Pa[)s]a, M, Passarowitz, Treaty of, Pasvanoghlu, Patmos, Patras, Gulf of, Paul, Emperor of Russia, Paulicians, the, Pe['c] (Ipek, in Turkish), patriarchate of, Pechenegs, the Tartar, Petraeus, 'Peloponnesian Senate', Peloponnesos (Morea), Pera, Persia and the Turks, at war with Constantinople, Grand Seljuk of, Persian Gulf, Peter the Great, 'Testament' of, Peter, Bulgar Tsar (927-69)Peter I, King of Serbia (1903), Peter I, Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Petrovi['c]-Njego[)s], dynasty of, Petta, battle of, Phanariote Greeks, the, _See_ Greek officials under the Turks, _and_ Turkey, Phanariot régime. 'Philhellenes', 'Philikì Hetairia', Philip, Count of Flanders, Philip of Macedonia, Philippopolis, Bogomil centre, foundation of, revolts against Turks, Pindus, Pirot, Place-names, the distribution of classical, indigenous, and Slavonic, in the Balkan peninsula, Plevna, siege of, Podgorica, Poland, Pontus, Popes, attitude of the, towards the Slavonic liturgy, Poros, Porto Lagos, Po[)z]arevac, Preslav, Bulgarian capital, Prespa, Pressburg, Treaty of (1805), Prilep, battle of (1912), 'Primates', the, Prizren, Prussia and Austria, war between (1866), Psarà, Radowitz, Baron von, Ragusa (Dubrovnik, in Serbian), its relations with the Serbianstate, prosperity of, under Turkish rule, decline of, Railways in the Balkan peninsula, Rashid Pasha, Ra[)s]ka, centre of Serb state, Règlement Organique, Religious divisions in the Balkan peninsula, Resna, in Macedonia, Rhodes, siege of, Risti['c], M. , Rodosto, Romaic architecture, government, language, 'Romaioi', Roman Catholicism in the Balkan peninsula, Roman Empire, Roman law, Rome, its conquest of the Balkan peninsula, relations of, with Bulgaria, relations of, with Serbia, spiritual rivalry of, with Constantinople, Rosetti, C. A. , Rovine, battle of, Rumania and the Balkan peninsula, and the second Balkan war(1913), and Bulgaria, and the Russo-Turkish war (1877), anti-Greek movement in, anti-Russian revolution in, commerce of, convention with Russia (1877), dynastic question in, education in, influences at work in, military situation, nationalist activity in, neutrality of, origins of, Patriarch's authority in, peasantry of, Phanariotes in, political parties in, politics of, internal, relations with Russia, religion and Church in, Roman civilization, influence in, rural question in, Russian influence in; politics in, struggle for independence, territorial gains, territorial losses, Turkish rule in, Upper class in (cneazi, boyards), origins of, social evolution of, economic and political supremacy, Rumanian army, claims in Macedonia, principalities, foundation of, union of, revolt (1822), Rumanians, early evidences of, in Bessarabia, in Bucovina, in Hungary, in Macedonia, Rumelia, Eastern, Russia and Bulgaria, and Greece, and Montenegro, and Rumania, and Serbia, and Turkey, and the Macedonian question, and the struggle for Greek independence, Bulgars in, commercial treaty with Turkey (1783), convention with Rumania (1877), conversion to Christianity, occupation of Kars, re-organization under Peter the Great, wars with Turkey (1769-84), (1787), (1807), (1828), (1877-8), (1914-15), Russian diplomacy at Constantinople, influence in Bulgaria, invasion of Balkan peninsula, relations with the Balkan Christians, relations with the Balkan League, Russians, the, comparison of, with the Southern Slavs, _see_ Slavs, the Eastern, [)S]abac (Shabatz), Salisbury, Lord, Salonika, Salonika-Nish railway, the, Samos, Samothraki, Samuel, Tsar of western Bulgaria (977-1014), San Stefano, Treaty of (1878), Saracens, the, Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, Sava, St. , Save, the, Scutari (di Albania), Skodra, Selim I, Sultan, Selim III, Sultan, Seljuks, the, Semendria: _see_ Smederevo. Semites, the, Serb migrations, national life, centres of, political centres, race, home of the, territories, divisions of the, Serbia and Austria-Hungary, relations between, and Bulgaria, contrasted, the agreement between, and Macedonia, and Russia, relations between, and the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the Balkan League, and Turkey, dissensions in, geography of, Patriarch's authority in, the barrier to German expansion eastwards, Turkish conquest of, wars with Turkey (1875-7), Serbian Church, the, claims and propaganda in Macedonia, Empire, its extent under Stephen Du[)s]an, literature, nation, centre of gravity of, principality, its extent in 1830, Serbo-Bulgarian war (1885), (1913), Serbo-Croat nationality, formation of the, Serbo-Croat unity, movement in favour of, Serbo-Croats, general distribution of, Serbs, defeat Bulgars and Greeks, distribution of the, in the Balkan peninsula, general distribution of the, north of the Danube, outside the boundaries of the Serb state, religious persecution of, revolt against Bulgaria, revolt against the Magyars, revolts against Turkey, their attitude towards the Germans, Serbs and Croats, difference between, Shabatz: _see_ [)S]abac. Shipka Pass, Shishman, revolts against Bulgaria, Sicily, Silistria, Simeon the Great, Bulgar Tsar (893-927), Singidunum: _see_ Belgrade. Sitvatorok, Treaty of, Sivas, Skanderbey, Skodra: _see_ Scutari. Skoplje (Üsküb, in Turkish), Slav influence in Rumania, Slavonia, absorbed by Hungary, Slavonic immigration, the streams of, in the Balkan peninsula, languages, the, use of, in Rumanian Church, liturgy, the, southern, nationalities, Slavs, maritime, method of their migration southwards into the Balkan peninsula migration, in the seventh century, their lack of cohesion, their attacks on Salonika and Constantinople with the Avars, their original home, their settlement south of the Danube, the Balkan, their attitude towards the Church, under Turkish rule, the Eastern (Russians), the Southern, general distribution of, the Western, Slivnitsa, battle of (1885), Slovenes, the, Smederevo (Semendria), Smyrna, Sofia, captured by the Bulgars from the Greeks, captured by the Turks, Soudha Bay, Southern Slav nationalities, the, Spain, Jews expelled from, Spalajkovi['c], Dr. , Spetza, Sporades, the, Srem: _see_ Syrmia. Stambul, Sultanate of, Stambulov, Stephen Dragutin, Stephen Du[)s]an, King of Serbia(1331-45), Tsar of Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks (1345-55), Stephen (Lazarevi['c]), Serbian Prince, Stephen Nemanja, _veliki [)z]upan_, Stephen Nemanji['c], King of Serbia (1196-1223), the First-Crowned, Stephen Radoslav, King of Serbia (1223-33), Stephen Uro[)s] I, King of Serbia (1242-76), Stephen Uro[)s] II (Milutin), King of Serbia (1282-1321), Stephen Uro[)s] III (De['c]anski), King of Serbia (1321-31), Stephen Vladislav, King of Serbia (1233-42), Stephen the Great, Prince of Moldavia, Struma, the, Suleiman I, Sultan (the Magnificent), Suli, clansmen of, [)S]umadija, Svetoslav, ruler of Bulgaria, Svishtov, Svyatoslav, Prince of Kiev, Syria, Syrian question, the, Syrmia, Tabriz, Tanzimat, the, Tarabo[)s], Mount, Tarsus, Tartar invasion, the, Tartars of the Golden Horde, Tenedos, Teutons, the, Thasos, Theodore Lascaris, the Emperor, Theodoric, Theodosius, the Emperor, Theophilus of Constantinople, Thessaly, Thrace, Thu-Kiu, people of, Tilsit, peace of (1807), Timok, the, Timur, Tirnovo, centre and capital of second Bulgarian empire, Trajan, the Emperor, in the Balkan peninsula, his conquest of Dacia, Transylvania, Trebizond, Trieste, Trikéri, destruction of, Trikoupis, Greek statesman, Tripoli, Tripolitza, Tunisia, Turcomans, the, Turkestan, Turkey: administrative systems, and the Armenian massacres (1894), and the Balkans, and Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian atrocities, and Greece, and the islands of southeastern Europe, and Rumania, and Russia, and Serbia, and the struggle for Greek independence, and the suzerainty of Krete, Christians in, position of, codification of the civil law, commercial treaties, Committee of Union and Progress, conquests in Europe, in Asia, of the Balkan peninsula, decline and losses of territory in Europe and Asia, 'Dere Beys', Dragoman, office of, 184, 185, expansion: of the Osmanli kingdom, of the Byzantine Empire, extent of the empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, territorial expansion in Asia, feudal aristocracy of, financial embarrassments and public debt, frontier beyond the Danube, German influence in, Grand Vizierate, military organization, soldiery recruited from Christian races, 'tribute-children' system of recruiting, name of, pan-Islamic propaganda under Abdul Hamul, pan-Ottomanism, Phanariot régime, praetorians, railway construction, effect of, reforms in, representative institutions inaugurated, revival and relapse in the nineteenth century, revolution of 1910, war in the Balkans (1912), war with Great Britain, France, and Russia (1914-15), wars with Greece (1821), (1897), (1912), war with Italy (1911-12), wars with Russia (1769-74), (1787), (1807), (1828), (1877-8), (1914-15), wars with Serbia (1875-7), Young Turks, the, Turkish conquests in Europe, fleet, janissaries, Turks (Osmanlis), entry into Europe, general distribution of, nomadic tribes of, origin of, vitality and inherent qualities of the, Tzakonia, Uighurs, Turkish tribe, Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), Uro[)s], King of Serbia: _see_ Stephen Uro[)s]. Uro[)s], Serbian Tsar (1355-71), Üskub: _see_ Skoplje, Valens, the Emperor, Valtetzi, battle of, Van, Vardar, the, Varna, battle of (1444), captured by the Bulgars, Venezelos, E. , Kretan and Greek statesman, his part in the Kretan revolution, becomes premier of Greece, work as a constructive statesman, the formation of the Balkan League, his proposals to Bulgaria for settlement of claims, his handling of the problem of Epirus, results of his statesmanship, Venice and the Venetian Republic, Victoria, Queen of England, Vienna, besieged by the Turks (1526), (1683), Congress of (1814), in relation to the Serbo-Croats: _see_ Budapest. Visigoths, the, Vlad the Impaler, Prince of Wallachia, Vlakhs, the, Volga, Bulgars of the, Volo, Gulf of, Vranja, Vrioni, Omer, Wallachia, advent of the Turks in, subjugation of, by the Turks, Wied, Prince of, William II, German Emperor, Yannina, Yantra, the, Yemen, Yenishehr, Yuruk tribe, Yuzgad, Zabergan, Zaimis, high commissioner of Krete, Zante, Zeta, the, river and district,