THE

ART OF WAR

BY

BARON DE JOMINI, GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA. 

A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps. 

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

Capt. G. H. MENDELL, CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY, AND

Lieut. W. P. CRAIGHILL, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY. 

Originally published in 1862

PREFACE. 

In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either handwhich are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner inmaking a translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of toorigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, andon the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In either case thesense of the author may not be truly given. It is not always easy topreserve a proper mean between these extremes. The translators ofJomini's Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored torender their author into plain English, without mutilating or adding tohis ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms. 

To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it isnot necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. Tothose not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming moreinterested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great massof the American public, ) it is sufficient to say, and it may be saidwith entire truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competentjudges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of thisor any other day. 

The translation now presented to the people has been made with theearnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. As theexistence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemedincompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important thatmilitary information be as extensively diffused as possible among thepeople. If by the present work the translators shall find they havecontributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object, they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it. 

To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it isrecommended to begin at the article "Strategy, " Chapter III. , from thatpoint to read to the end of the Second Appendix, and then to return toChapters I. And II. It should be borne in mind that this subject, to beappreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especiallytrue of strategy. An acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. Isquite important, as they are constantly referred to by Jomini and by allother recent writers on the military art. 

U. S. Military Academy, West Point, N. Y. January, 1862. 

CONTENTS. 

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE. 

DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR. 

CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR. 

 ART. I. --Offensive Wars to Recover Rights. 

 ART. II. --Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a Military View. 

 ART. III. --Wars of Expediency. 

 ART. IV. --Wars with or without Allies. 

 ART. V. --Wars of Intervention. 

 ART. VI. --Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other Causes. 

 ART. VII. --Wars of Opinion. 

 ART. VIII. --National Wars. 

 ART. IX. --Civil and Religious Wars. 

 ART. X. --Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time. 

CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY. 

 ART. XI. --Military Statistics and Geography. 

 ART. XII. --Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a War. 

 ART. XIII. --The Military Institutions of States. 

 ART. XIV. --The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations. 

 ART. XV. --The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies. 

CHAPTER III. STRATEGY. Definition of Strategy and Tactics. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR. 

 ART. XVI. --The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations. 

 ART. XVII. --The Theater of Operations. 

 ART. XVIII. --Bases of Operations. 

 ART. XIX. --Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and Objective Points of Operation. 

 ART. XX. --Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic Positions. 

 ART. XXI. --Zones and Lines of Operations. 

 ART. XXII. --Strategic Lines of Maneuver. 

 ART. XXIII. --Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves. 

 ART. XXIV. --The Old and New Systems of War. 

 ART. XXV. --Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations. 

 ART. XXVI. --Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched Lines. --Wars of Sieges. 

 ART. XXVII. --Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts in their Relation to Strategy. 

 ART. XXVIII. --Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries. 

 ART. XXIX. --Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions. 

 Epitome of Strategy. 

CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES. 

 ART. XXX. --Positions and Defensive Battles. 

 ART. XXXI. --Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle. 

 ART. XXXII. --Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle. 

 ART. XXXIII. --Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March. 

 ART. XXXIV. --Surprises of Armies. 

 ART. XXXV. --Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de Main generally. 

CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY INTHE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS. 

 ART. XXXVI. --Diversions and Great Detachments. 

 ART. XXXVII. --Passage of Rivers and other Streams. 

 ART. XXXVIII. --Retreats and Pursuits. 

 ART. XXXIX. --Cantonments and Winter Quarters. 

 ART. XL. --Descents, or Maritime Expeditions. 

CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES. 

 ART. XLI. --A few Remarks on Logistics in general. 

 ART. XLII. --Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate Information of the Enemy's Movements. 

CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE. 

 ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle. 

 ART. XLIV. --Formation and Employment of Infantry. 

 ART. XLV. ---Formation and Employment of Cavalry. 

 ART. XLVI. ---Formation and Employment of Artillery. 

 ART. XLVII. --Employment of the Three Arms together. 

CONCLUSION. 

SUPPLEMENT. 

APPENDIX. 

SECOND APPENDIX. 

SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS. 

SUMMARY OF

THE ART OF WAR. 

DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR. 

The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purelymilitary branches, --viz. : Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hithertounrecognized, might be termed _Diplomacy in its relation to War_. Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with theprofession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot bedenied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it isindispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into allthe combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with thevarious operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, itshould have a place in a work like this. 

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:--

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war. 

2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater ofwar, either for defense or for invasion. 

3. Grand Tactics. 

4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies. 

5. Engineering, --the attack and defense of fortifications. 

6. Minor Tactics. 

It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first fourbranches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art ofengineering. 

Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a goodinfantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for astaff officer, this knowledge is indispensable. 

CHAPTER I. 

STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR. 

Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesmanconcludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, anddetermines the various operations necessary to attain the object of thewar. 

A government goes to war, --

To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;

To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;

To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for thesafety of the government or the balance of power;

To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;

To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or todefend them;

To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions ofterritory;

To defend the threatened independence of the state;

To avenge insulted honor; or, From a mania for conquest. 

It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in somedegree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary forthe proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced tothe defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; andthere may be other circumstances which will affect the nature andconduct of a war, as, --

1. A state may simply make war against another state. 

2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with eachother. 

3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy. 

4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary. 

5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginningor after it has commenced. 

6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of anally, or upon its own. 

7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distantterritory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold andadventurous. 

8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against theenemy. 

9. The war may be a civil or a religious war. 

War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of theart; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of theoperations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstancesof the case. 

For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate theSpanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as thesame number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, tocompel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina asthey fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture tomarch upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temperof the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, orbetween the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight innearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided bycircumstances and events. 

To these different combinations, which belong more or less tostatesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the managementof armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belongexclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of thehighest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general. 

ARTICLE I. 

Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights. 

When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best toenforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted beforeaction. 

The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, andwhich, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate withthe sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in ourtimes there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are inreality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to theSpanish crown under Louis XIV. Was very clear, since it was plainlysettled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by thegeneral consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested byall Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimatelegatee. 

Frederick II. , while Austria and France were at war, brought forward anold claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thusdoubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even ifhe had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeurand importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far assuch attempts can be justified. 

In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profitby every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movementsshould be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural stepwould be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations maybe carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strengthof the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territoryby the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of hisown country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may beable to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. Inan offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arousethe jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of theenemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving properguarantees to other states. 

ARTICLE II. 

Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point ofView. 

A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields itwithout a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always morehonorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead ofawaiting the attack on the frontiers. 

There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are alsoadvantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with nointernal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a thirdparty, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostilesoil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry onthe war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purelymilitary sense, it is certain that an army operating in its ownterritory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificialfeatures are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge ofthe country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of theconstituted authorities, possesses great advantages. 

These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war;but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is differentwith the political part of war, which is modified by the tone ofcommunities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head ofstates and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used toprove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principleswhich can never be safely violated in the presence of an active andskillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents thesevariations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: toexecute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed. 

For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia woulddiffer widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands ofTurks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, andpossess no steadiness under misfortunes. 

ARTICLE III. 

Wars of Expediency. 

The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II. , and the war of the SpanishSuccession, were wars of expediency. 

There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful stateundertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and politicalreasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or toprevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for astate will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor toform a coalition for that purpose. 

These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war. 

ARTICLE IV. 

Of Wars with or without Allies. 

Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things beingequal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weakerstates in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger thaneither separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threateningportions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. Allhistory teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised andneglected by any power, however formidable. 

ARTICLE V. 

Wars of Intervention. 

To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to astate than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain. The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its wholeweight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, whenit can make decisive use of its resources. 

There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internalaffairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations. 

Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of thefirst class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by theseinterferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assuredin a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful. While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland, Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interferein the internal affairs of France during the Revolution. 

Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, andperhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has theright to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but itcertainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which mayreach the adjoining states. 

There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreignwars, --viz. : 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintainthe political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of thewar already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war notto be obtained otherwise. 

History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglectof these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits theimmoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may becomethe arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at theproper time. "

In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a newand large army as a third party in a well-contested war must bedecisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in referenceto the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Königsberg, leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria hadlaunched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder, it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; thereis every reason to think that his army could not have regained theRhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundredthousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field, and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at theproper time would have decided the fate of Europe. 

There are several kinds of war resulting from these two differentinterventions:--

1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a forcespecified by former treaties. 

2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defendinghis territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil. 

3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater ofwar, --which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers againstone. 

4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, orinterferes before the declaration of war. 

When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience totreaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voicein the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, andwith an imposing force, the case is quite different. 

The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in theSeven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation ofPrussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army asfar as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fateof these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or badmaneuvering of their allies. 

Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicateoperations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations ofthis, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX. , in discussing themilitary character of these expeditions. 

It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by thesedistant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its ownterritory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilitiesis so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be, in a measure, an advantage to the state. 

In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who isboth a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with theallies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony withthe common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greaternumber of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficultstruggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies. 

The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with thewhole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promisingthan the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807, but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813. Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, takinghis front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle withtwo hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. Sheregained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany, which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this interventionAustria had not only the political but also the military chances in herfavor, --a double result, combining the highest advantages. 

Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theaterwas sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possibledisplay of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest alreadyin progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources andat the time most opportune for her. 

This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerfulmonarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influencewhen they know how to profit by it. 

Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxonyboldly declared war against Charles V. , who was master of Spain, Italy, and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. And heldFrance in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, andarrested the great conqueror in his career. 

In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostileto Louis XIV. , changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused therecall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls ofTurin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalizedPrince Eugene. 

Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of theseopportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but theycould not add to the conviction of the reader. 

ARTICLE VI. 

Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons. 

There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoiningstate; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory ofgreat extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile. 

Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous, --as Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However, there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed withoutincurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassusand the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia, furnish bloody proofs of these truths. --The love of conquest, however, was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and hiscontest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was tomake him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but hewas also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or ofyielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this worldto teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victoriesteach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; hisdisasters, what might have been avoided by prudence. 

A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is acrime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, wheninduced by great interests or when conducted with good motives. 

The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in objectand in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, whichthreatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to itsauthor; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered thegeneral interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to asuccessful termination because its object met with the approval of themajority of the people whose territory was invaded. 

These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of thesame character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which oughtnever to have been changed. 

Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attackthan to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check thespirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at theproper time. 

An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to theend to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome. 

An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices andlikely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, aswas well proved by the war in Spain, (1808, ) and by the wars of theRevolution in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France wasbetter prepared than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she wasattacked by all Europe upon both land and sea. 

Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion ofTurkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of nationalresistance. The religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited himto arms; but the same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who weretwice as numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks andTurks been harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the unitedpeople would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the elementof religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey wasformidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found, while in the interior all was weakness. 

When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from theinhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popularfeeling rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt. (These military points are treated of in Article XXIX. ) But when theinvasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its successwill depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step toinsure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of astate adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops, and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations, depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally musthave the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all thispossible. 

Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is notpowerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention mayarrest the most brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805and 1809 might have ended differently if Prussia had interfered. Theinvasion of the North of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted byAustria. That of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not awise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention. 

ARTICLE VII. 

Wars of Opinion. 

Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimesconfounded, they differ enough to require separate notice. 

Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and, lastly, (which, however, is rare, ) they may be foreign or exteriorwithout being intestine or civil. 

Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars ofintervention; for they result either from doctrines which one partydesires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which itdesires to crush, --in both cases leading to intervention. Althoughoriginating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are mostdeplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, andbecome vindictive, cruel, and terrible. 

The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars ofthe League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion isthe pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one ofdogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empirethan to preach the Koran, and Philip II. , bigot as he was, did notsustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the RomanChurch. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX. , when he went on acrusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than ofgaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher. 

The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; forit excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. Forinstance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. In France, had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may, however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that thedogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitterenemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful. 

The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions areabout equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanaticsthought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famousdeclaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justlyalarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcingthe lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishingit. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression areinappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in thehuman passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as itis the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions andfor all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of afactious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but thesestorms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt torestrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain theexplosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is farbetter to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than totry to prevent it and to perish in the attempt. 

After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if theGirondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreignarmaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious handsupon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists wouldnever have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses ofDumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted toclash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it isprobable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, theAssembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good, temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities andthe immemorial traditions of the French. 

In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force notonly is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks ofan exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one partywill necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation ofanother and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses allthe public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it issupported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be thesupport of the faction which possesses no such means? What service didone hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists dofor the Coalition in 1793?

History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of theRevolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger ofattacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of themilitary operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and beforededucing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain whatwould have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead ofdestroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed thecommanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong toFrance, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris withtwo hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and, again, they might never have returned, at least without the protectionof an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult todecide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would havedepended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problemthus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gaveone; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say. Experiment alone could have determined it. 

The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for nationalwars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the countryshould be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged andreduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is ofless importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should bemade to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care beingconstantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for itsindependence or the integrity of its territory. 

The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor ofthis course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that theconditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 wasmade up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla deLeon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a nationalwar, and a civil war, --while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 wasthoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle ofopinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormousdifference in the results. 

Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoulême was well carried out. Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to theabove-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he theredivided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements ofstrength of their enemies, --which they could safely do, since they weresustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed theinstructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest ofthe country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees andthe Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhapshave failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloodyone, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the countrysimilar to that of 1807. 

Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that itwas a political operation rather than a military one, and that itbehooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different fromthat of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all chargedwith similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls ofCadiz. 

If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanshipwas not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solidorder of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in itscommanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to thecounsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height ofits mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinandblindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deepveneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authorityfor the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. Thenation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not havebeen impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anewinto collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823, --a striking lesson, bywhich no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land, although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violentreactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which toconstruct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightfulconflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separatedfrom all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon thegeneral interests of the country, --a monarchy capable of rallying to itssupport this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits notless extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those whowere in the best position to know it. 

ARTICLE VIII. 

National Wars. 

National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those ofinvasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be appliedto such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority ofthem, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain theirindependence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only itscamp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of thesword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured. 

The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands ouradmiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake ofhumanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not beconfounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutionsof the state and directed by the government. 

This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs mayrise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters, affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set themthe example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanaticalpeople may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiasticin its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of itsinstitutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds mostdear. 

The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of anational invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, andare masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it, their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of thefacility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on allthe points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which willbe thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea. 

The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facilityof a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are alwaysmost formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensiveforests. 

The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, thatof the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by theRussians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally, the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that theinhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longertime than those of the plains, --which is due as much to the differencein character and customs as to the difference in the natural features ofthe countries. 

Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind ofdefense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so justly celebrated, proves thatany country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches orcanals, admits of a formidable defense. 

The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well asin national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the generalconducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contestof the Netherlands with Philip II. And that of the Americans with theEnglish, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinarystruggle of La Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain, Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of theMorea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the armies of QueenChristina, are still more striking illustrations. 

The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported bya considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only anarmy: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost whollyin arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, eachindividual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even thenon-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by everymeans in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon whichhe encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile andmultiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step. 

These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country isdifficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and theirconnections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; thecommanders also know the country, and, learning immediately theslightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the bestmeasures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without informationof their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments togain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety onlyin the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: hiscombinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concertedmovements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he isabout to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signsof the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he isattacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, hisdepots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he mustinevitably yield after a time. 

In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. WhenNey's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies ofthe artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of fourbrigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanishforces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiagode Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo, Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night thecompanies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were neverable to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporalescaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, hadthus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a singledivision marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of theNavia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A partof the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behindthe very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but aleague from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: whenhe was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of theregiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guardGalicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of themarshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking asthis. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliableinformation for the French; what was given was but a lure to make themfall more readily into snares. 

No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such asystem applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold allthe essential points of the country, cover its communications, and atthe same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemywherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army ofrespectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, whatforce will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure thesafety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?

The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all theobstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in theoccupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. Whatefforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troopsof Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves forsix years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards andPortuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!

If success be possible in such a war, the following general course willbe most likely to insure it, --viz. : make a display of a mass of troopsproportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by timeand patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. In the wars of theLeague, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon andValencia, of Hoche in La Vendée, are models of their kind, which may beemployed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirableorder and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in thelate war were also models, and were not a little conducive to thesuccess of their enterprises. 

The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these warshave led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be anyother kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest beingalso more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders. This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all itsconsequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce thepeople to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to beconvinced that there would be in the future no wars but those ofconquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are onlyto maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and howto excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundredthousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally withthe intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, andwithout any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the wholepopulation--men, women, and children--of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walledtown, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, andincendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and theGermans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces, who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part ofthem, even though at first they had never contemplated it? Thedifficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favorof national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasionwithout bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war ofextermination? Is there no mean between these contests between thepeople and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Willit not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, toorganize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by theirgovernments into service, would regulate the part the people should takein the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?

I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to thecases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular Frenchtroops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get thebetter of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced tofifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse orarriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that goodnational reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensivein peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This systemwas used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by thewhole of Germany in 1813. 

I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopianphilanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars ofextermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that thedefenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of goodpolitical alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence. 

As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organizedassassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge thatmy prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French andEnglish Guards courteously invited each other to fire first, --as atFontenoy, --preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. 

ARTICLE IX. 

Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion. 

Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generallythe result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religioussectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently thecollisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the mostdeplorable. 

We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use forceagainst its own subjects in order to crush out factions which wouldweaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but thatit should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers inFrench or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, isdifficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than LouisXIV. , who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had putupon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism arehorrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightfulwhen they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of theLeague should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It isdifficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the timeof Francis I. Should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable astate of brutality. 

To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule uponwhich all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the twoparties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward toreconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, theintervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be withambitious views. 

Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of apolitical disease whose principles threaten social order; and, althoughthese fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it ispossible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But inreligious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. Could have hadno other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than tosubject France to his influence, or to dismember it. 

ARTICLE X. 

Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at Once. 

The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars atthe same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare thenecessity of demonstrating its wisdom. 

A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboringstates; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an allyto come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance ofthe political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nationsallied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enterinto it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, itwill be an ordinary war. 

Louis XIV. , Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon, sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contestsarise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error onthe part of the state which invites them; but if they arise fromimperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seekingalliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establishsomething like equality between the strength of the parties. 

The great coalition against Louis XIV. , nominally arising from hisdesigns on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which hadalarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could onlyoppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the moreequivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in addingto the number of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of thesubsidies of England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six differentstates, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies ofEurope: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends. 

Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it wasalmost impossible to avoid. 

France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence ofthe extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas ofthe Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleetsthey would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurdcalculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which Francemiraculously escaped. 

Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who hasvoluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidablewars, --with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last casehe expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that ofTurkey and Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; sothat the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has beengenerally supposed. 

It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war madeagainst a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary, and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations inopposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. Forinstance, the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria andSpain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest withAustria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These lattercontests belong to ordinary wars. 

It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided ifpossible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is moreprudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule, however, is not without exception: the respective forces, thelocalities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure, equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which willinfluence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, innoting both the danger and the means of remedying it. 

CHAPTER II. 

MILITARY POLICY. 

We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embracesthe moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If thepolitical considerations which we have just discussed be also moral, there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of awar, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. Weinclude these under the head of _Military Policy_. 

Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of anyprojected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot beassigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, andwithout deviating from my intention, --which is, not to give a treatiseon theses subjects, but to point out their relations to militaryoperations. 

Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to befought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves, their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their governmentor their institutions, the character of the executive, the charactersand military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influenceof cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon theiroperations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the establishedforce of the state and its armament, the military geography andstatistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, theresources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all ofwhich are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy. 

There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the governmentshould neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, andthat it is indispensable to take them into consideration in thearrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal pointswhich ought to guide in this sort of combinations. 

ARTICLE XI. 

Military Statistics and Geography. 

By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledgepossible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemywith whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in thetopographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with allthe obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and theexamination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented inthe whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of thecountry. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and hischief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty ofcruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day, despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical, diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite twoexamples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau's army, entering theBlack Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles andforests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing thedeclivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, withtheir spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from thesources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain. 

The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed theinterior of Bohemia to be very mountainous, --whereas there is nodistrict in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surroundingit has been crossed, which may be done in a single march. 

All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference tothe Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it wasgiven out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnablebarrier and the palladium of the empire, --an error which I, having livedin the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeplyrooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals ofwhich are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia andwould defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has provedthat the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries inthe frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those citiesmore warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projectsof reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the oldsystem, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that theempire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a meremultitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor anational defense. 

Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geographyand statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth intreatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay uponthem, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was notfortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; herepresents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between theTyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphedwith armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and1809. 

But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of theEuropean staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable forinstruction in them, --at least for the special staff school. Awaitingthe time when some studious officer, profiting by those published andunpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military andstrategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress oftopography of late years, partially supply the want of it by theexcellent charts published in all European countries within the lasttwenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topography wasin its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, theworks of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussianstaff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. Thecharts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, andParis, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promiseto future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors. 

Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have butvague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies andnavies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed bya state, --which is far from being the knowledge necessary to planoperations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these importantsubjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in militaryenterprises. 

ARTICLE XII. 

Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War. 

As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerfulenemy, both the general and his government should use their best effortsto allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on thispoint under the head of national wars. 

On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify hisown soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which heendeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alikesusceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, varywith the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and hasbeen the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon andof Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, andthose of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models oftheir different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and themiracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by verydifferent means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general whoinspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means ofelectrifying an army and conducing to victory. Some dispute theadvantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness inbattle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasmimpels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is inmaintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it, disorder easily results. 

The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of thearmies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted torules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic valueof their troops, and that resulting from their organization as comparedwith that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidlyorganized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing againstundisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however bravemay be its individuals. [1] Concert in action makes strength; orderproduces this concert, and discipline insures order; and withoutdiscipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general wouldnot be so bold before European troops having the same instruction andnearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attemptwith a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with aNapoleon. 

The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influencesthe boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands aretied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a matchfor one who has liberty of action, other things being equal. 

As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges ofvictory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generalshave often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not makea rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into thehands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful generalhad prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks whichcannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account todeny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? Thisrisk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that theyare applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended toapply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting thistruth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; thisobjection is not well founded, for a general's science consists inproviding for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and ofcourse cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number ofbattles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due toaccident, it would not invalidate my assertion. 

If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, itwill readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one ofthe most delicate points in the science of government and one of themost essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately, this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank, age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it asthe public interest and justice. This subject is so important that wewill devote to it a separate article. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be ofthe greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication, &c. , and may--as in the case of the French in 1812--make a retreat verydisastrous. ]

ARTICLE XIII. 

Military Institutions. 

One of the most important points of the military policy of a state isthe nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by ageneral of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army witha good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do agreat deal more if its own superiority and that of the general becombined. 

Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:--

1. To have a good recruiting-system;

2. A good organization;

8. A well-organized system of national reserves;

4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties aswell as those of a campaign;

5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit ofsubordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on theformalities of the service;

6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;

7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;

8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as todefensive and offensive arms;

9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having anorganization calculated to advance the theoretical and practicaleducation of its officers;

10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of generaladministration;

11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing theprincipal operations of war;

12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people. 

To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing andequipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field ofbattle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of thetroops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives andhealth of veterans. 

None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without graveinconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but withoutnational reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall infifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it hasoften been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a goodarmy. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming andinstructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capableof the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugateIndia and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessivelove of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Greatan army capable of executing his great enterprises. 

A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thusculpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for itsstandards and its country, instead of by a different course preparingfor it success. We are far from saying that a government shouldsacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but itought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if theprince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him tofulfill his duty in this respect. In this case--which is, unfortunately, of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wiseinstitutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of thegeneral staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system ofnational reserves. 

There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow theexecutive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of theRoman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. And Frederick ofPrussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction ofoperations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle, it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the formof government exercises a great influence in the development of themilitary strength of a nation and the value of its troops. 

When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affectedby local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous andpenurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive, whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as achief devoted to all the national interests. 

The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute tothis deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the mostfar-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war, whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country atsome future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resistsudden aggressions. 

In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the membersof an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus, Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow theinstitutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined armyto fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of anexaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves andtheir constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable tothe more statesmanlike preparations for war?

I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon thesword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition ofthings would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible, except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply meanthat civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war ina short time, --that they should never be found unprepared. And thewisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparationas foresight in their administration and the perfection of their systemof military policy. 

If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms, governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature areless suitable than others for the creation or preparation of aformidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises thesedeliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, andhave concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength. Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a listof exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placedunder the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by theextraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country andthemselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measuresand by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, whichoverthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Hereit is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation ofpower, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is thetrue cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Conventionafter the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of PublicSafety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if thedictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plankof safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion thatcountries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically andmilitarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects theypresent decided advantages. 

It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies inthe interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely todegenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies, and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintlyresembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage inpreparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them frombecoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in laborsuseful for the defense of the country. 

The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worstpossible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions andpermanent corps d'armée seems to be much preferable. In general terms, the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; andif in many points its customs would be useless and impracticableelsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well becopied from it. 

As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service, and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of thepromotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and theremaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. Onthe contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should besuspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving theother two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services. 

The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war:it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element ofsuccess. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylauand Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also referto the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of thecuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows thegreat advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers wouldnot be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is avery different affair. How many brave cavalry soldiers have been thevictims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was alittle more trouble to carry than a saber!

The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; thestate which shall take the lead in making them will secure greatadvantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but theoffensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve theattention of a provident government. 

The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a greatrevolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alonewill remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipiosand Cæsars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of thenature of the arms and the organization of the troops. 

The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightfulrapidity. [2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which itis said the Austrians can now regulate, --the shrapnel howitzers, whichthrow a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet, --the Perkinssteam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion, --willmultiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate theEuropean races. 

If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe theseinventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make thehalf of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capturewith great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will beobliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which abattalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy. 

We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor, and horses also will require the same protection. 

While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is, however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances whichshould lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abusedby Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics. 

We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of themilitary policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government. 

1. The prince should receive an education both political and military. He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councilsthan good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of thelatter himself. 

2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be hisfirst duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. Hemust confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to thegeneral most capable of directing his armies. 

3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectablefooting, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, byreserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction anddiscipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization;its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, andsuperior if possible. 

4. The matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, andabundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals. National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of allimprovements in this matériel made in other countries. 

5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should beencouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientificmilitary corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way ofsecuring for the army men of merit and genius. 

6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in laborspreparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives shouldbe furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with allstatistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises andpapers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chiefof this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanentlystationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should besimply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secretdepartment for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns ofthe corps. 

7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geographyand the military statistics of other states, so as to know theirmaterial and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as thestrategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers shouldbe employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when theyacquit themselves with marked ability. 

8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not anentire plan of operations, --which is always impossible, --but a system ofoperations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as wellas all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of theenterprise. 

9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of thewar, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of thecountry, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether ofthe army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral andmaterial means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bringinto action; and it ought to take into consideration the probablealliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the partiesduring the war. 

10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among thechances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attributeto this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Greatin the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, whenarmies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the lastcrown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are wellorganised money will no longer exercise the same influence, --at leastfor one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procuresoldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country andhonor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be madeto support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and theenthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power whichcannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of itsefforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports ofthe cabinet of London, and particularly of M. D'Yvernois, announced thatFrance was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had200, 000, 000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the whilemeeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies. 

A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself verybadly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither thestrongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in thescales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happycombination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, ofwell-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, impartsto a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable ofsustaining a long war. 

A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under whicha nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron, and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. Thisresult can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory ofthe enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishingresources to an assailant. 

We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which arenot directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for ourpurpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will befor the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances andlocalities may make in these relations. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: It will be recollected that the author wrote this manyyears ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has beenattentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, whichhe regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone importantimprovements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no lessmarked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet nocivilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests fordepriving these destructive machines of their efficiency. --TRANSLATORS. ]

[Footnote 3: There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fallof Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendousefforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811. ]

ARTICLE XIV. 

The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations. 

Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person bythe monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certainthat if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, orNapoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor ofperforming great actions which he might do himself; for in this he wouldbe untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country. 

As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is morefortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject, ) we willonly state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in otherrespects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general whois himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that heis responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do muchby the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the publicresources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerfulaccessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will bedevoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for hisenterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with theexecution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare andin secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives toinduce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity andthe contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess nomilitary ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easilyinfluenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing goodresults, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one willpresent his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experiencenecessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit hisjudgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with andopposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, evenif he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign mightaccompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on thecontrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case hispresence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead togreat embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from itscommunications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sadresults might not follow from the presence of the sovereign athead-quarters!

When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of hisarmies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supremedirection of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by thePrussian government with Blücher, --viz. ; he should be accompanied by twogenerals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability, the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity beharmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the armyof Silesia in 1813. 

The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges itproper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as hasfrequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurredthat the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case withthe Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterwardwith the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, Ithink, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system isdeplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is knownthat at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacitythan Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secretauthority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment andallow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skilland courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor. 

If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles, he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed fullselection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the sametitles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general ofthe staff, and another general distinguished for his talent inexecution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of thesecounselors with more authority than a voice in consultation. 

We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies inperson, his most important duty will be to have the position ofcommander well filled, --which, unfortunately, is not always done. Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall themore modern examples under Louis XIV. And Louis XV. The merit of PrinceEugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (theablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. AfterLouvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places ofTurenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermontsucceeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in theSaloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference formere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enoughto afford the least intelligent government means of making rationalnominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise aninfluence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off theprize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services. But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will beprofitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander willbe difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it ajudicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful generalrequires either that the person who makes the selection shall be amilitary man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should beguided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improperinfluence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there isat hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside ofthe fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gaineda battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others, ) it is notalways the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of thegovernment. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, theremay not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. Inthis case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is betterthan another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head oftheir arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for thisposition; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with theirsubordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is notastonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to theirappropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled byappearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well bedeceived in his selections. 

One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be inrealizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, by finding afaithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between theprince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of hismore direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch inreference to selections of individuals best recommended by theircharacter and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield topersonal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff wasrejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required allthe art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shedso much luster upon the Russian arms. 

It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothingcould be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Cæsar, when he wasignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparteat the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by twodirectors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, publicsentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crisesand the experience of events. 

The most essential qualities for a general will always be asfollow:--First, _A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_;Secondly, _A physical courage which takes no account of danger_. Hisscientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentionedcharacteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. Itis not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. Hisknowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should beperfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Nextin importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who isgallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in othersinstead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this meritconduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may evenpass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice tomerit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds arealways jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons oflittle ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizingthat the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all theglory of its success, even when least entitled to it. 

The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable toassign to the command a general of long experience in service withtroops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but littleexperience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that waris a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to beable to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regimentagainst an enemy. Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon areinstances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from thestaff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it willnot be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster thathe will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a naturalgenius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, ageneral from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable ofconducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this questiondoes not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative ornegative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities ofthe individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading toa rational conclusion:--

1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equalchances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but onearm or special corps. 

2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will be equally fitted for the command. 

3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in acommander-in-chief. 

Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united therequisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of theprinciples of the art of war. 

The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to theformation of a good general staff, which being near the general mayadvise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over theoperations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful oforganizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introductioninto it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal. 

Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, neverthought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of GeneralRuchel, [4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infalliblerule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a stepfrom the sublime to the ridiculous!

Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general andhis chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a manof recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choiceof the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon ageneral would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permithim to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous;for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor orfortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. Thebest means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option ofseveral designated officers, all of undoubted ability. 

It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequentcouncils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give moreweight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, ifthe commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well findin a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority ofthe opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could beexpected from operations conducted by others than those who haveoriginated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operationwhich is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not hisown conception?

I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, andno one has a better appreciation of the value of such services thanmyself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part isabsurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the militaryofficers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be toaccomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amountof dissent. 

What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleonproposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, themaneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regardedthem as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousanddifficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejectingthem; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had beenexecuted by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have provedfailures?

In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can beuseful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which casethey may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will useevery means to insure the success of the movement. This is the onlyadvantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simplyconsultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of thisharmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produceunfortunate results. 

Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means oforganizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved byexperience, is--

1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger. 

2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open andfaithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfectharmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some tothe friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher, aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he wouldnot have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double commandis more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon, a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no greatgeneral to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system. 

Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means ofinfluencing military operations--viz. : that of a council of war at theseat of government--deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directedfrom Paris the armies of Louis XIV. , and with success. Carnot, also, from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, andsaved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but herepaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely atfault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnotindividually controlled the armies, and that there was no council ofwar. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with theduty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never beenbut one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether thisopinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able todecide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in thisconnection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan ofoperations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out thecampaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to givebattle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which shoulddetermine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied tothese first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for thelevies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points, it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals andministers, and to these points should the control of the council belimited; for if it should not only order the general in command to marchto Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicatethe manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, theunfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the wholeresponsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of thosewho, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty ofdirecting the army, --a duty so difficult for any one, even upon thescene of operations. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he couldsave the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder inorder to form an oblique line. ]

ARTICLE XV. 

The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies. 

The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an armywould be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate amilitary spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London, situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets, that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a militarydecoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments andhabits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooneror later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civicvirtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that theRomans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost thesevirtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honoras well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls, the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true thatwhatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neitherneglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches ofindustry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but theyshould always be secondary to the great institutions which make up thestrength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly andheroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for, whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confrontdeath in the footsteps of the Cæsars than to fatten upon the publicmiseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit. Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of thetax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in publicestimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune to the defense of his country. 

The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the armywith all possible social and public consideration. The second means isto give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state, in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of thegovernment, or even to require a certain length of military service as aqualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient militaryinstitutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subjectworthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting tocontrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declareagainst the employment of officers of the army in other publicfunctions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the importantoffices of administration. [5] It is true that many public employmentsdemand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in theabundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he wouldprefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the professionof arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officersretired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, wouldit not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it notlead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere thanin the theaters and public clubs?

It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military tothe civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a highmilitary spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedientto place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was theearly practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers werebought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the ideathat they were to die by their standards. Even the English--so jealousof their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation forthe whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting fortwenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, andin those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not beadvisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; butwhere the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people, the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previousmilitary service of ten years in any aspirant for the publicemployments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the militaryspirit, --particularly in this age, when the attainment of materialcomfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people. 

However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms ofgovernment, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, inorder to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, underthe penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and sufferinginsult and dependency. 

It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people, but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Ofwhat avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it beregarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues arewanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor. 

The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quitedifferent things, and should not be confounded, although they producethe same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of atemporary character, --of a political or religious nature, for instance, or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon theskill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, ismore permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be theobject of the attention of every far-seeing government. [6] Courageshould be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rankrespected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictionsrather than in external forms only. 

The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, andfaithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory ispossible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses ismore honorable than enthusiasm in success, --since courage alone isnecessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make adifficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, alwaysopposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meetwith a reward equal to that given for a great victory. 

By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnationin garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority overtheir enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring alove for great exploits, --in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm byevery means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage, punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice, --we may expect to maintaina high military spirit. 

Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: thoseformidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass inthe times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them tooheavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire waslost. 

I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt forthe enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if heencounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes'troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they wouldcontend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians. 

The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panicswhich often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlledby discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is thesurest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundredthousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and atKagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderlycharges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because theyfought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized withpanic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorderis once introduced all concerted action on the part of individualsbecomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, nomaneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is noresource but in ignominious flight. 

Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedyit. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have neverbeen questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kindwhich were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic whichpervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battleof Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry afterthe victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A stillmore extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteenhundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Twodays afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the mostvigorous assaults mentioned in modern history. 

Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comesmore quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to thosewho remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rallypromptly when their lines have been for the instant broken. 

In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others. The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equaldegrees to the national character, the natural instincts of thesoldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacityof imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack ofprecautions on the part of the generals to maintain this ordercontributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference ofmost generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take theslightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachmentsor scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate therallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in amomentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they wereoffended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still, the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often bepowerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degreeobviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions. There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficientfor the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of thesoldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, andwhen their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organizethem, --which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out theseexceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions forrallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if notin preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it. 

It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired totrace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects whichare purely military. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officersfrom the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to allcolonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. Themost venal deputies will not be those from military life. ]

[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit shouldpervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable, and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men. ]

CHAPTER III. 

STRATEGY. 

DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR. 

The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz. : Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a generalwhen war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highestimportance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to thenecessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, andascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formationand handling of a great army. 

We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of itscommander should be to agree with the head of the state upon thecharacter of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations, taking intoconsideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. 

The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zoneof operations. The general will take a first objective point: he willselect the line of operations leading to this point, either as atemporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorableopportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line ofoperations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. Thetemporary positions which the corps d'armée will occupy upon this frontof operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions. 

When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meetresistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compelhim to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategiclines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certaindegree from the general line of operations, with which they must not beconfounded. 

To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made, lines of supply, depots, &c. Will be established. 

If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops inannoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked anddispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy maybe carried on without reference to them. If the second of these coursesbe pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be theresult. 

The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if theenemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight willbe resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objectivepoint or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objectivepoint be the possession of an important fort, the siege will becommenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, afterdetaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take astrategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having fortythousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul. 

If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or ifit have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and moreimportant objective point. 

If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish anintermediate point of support. One or more secure cities alreadyoccupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a smallstrategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear andalso the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses largestreams, it will construct _têtes de pont_; and, if the bridges arewithin walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase themeans of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or thestrategic reserve which may occupy these posts. 

Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, inorder to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what isequivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified postsand camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces. 

When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or thefield will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success andis desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These wintercampaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do notdiffer from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increasedactivity and energy to attain prompt success. 

Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, while discussing combinations which result from these operations. 

Strategy embraces the following points, viz. :--

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of thedifferent combinations of which it admits. 

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, andthe most favorable direction for operations. 

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone ofoperations. 

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive. 

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations. 

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point orstrategic front. 

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the differentmaneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases. 

8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves. 

9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers. 

10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of thearmy. 

11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered. 

12. Points for intrenched camps, _tétes de pont, _ &c. 

13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary. 

These points are principally of importance in the determination of thefirst steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixednature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of whichbelongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy. 

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the differentformations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics isthe art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marchesand camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is theexecution of strategical and tactical enterprises. 

To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, andcomprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art ofposting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of theground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon theground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations mayextend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logisticscomprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans ofstrategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics bringsthe troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of executionand the employment of the troops. 

It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements, and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs inthe exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case ofpitched battles the above definition holds good. 

Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to thefollowing objects:--

1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle. 

2. The offensive in a defensive battle. 

3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for theattack of the enemy's line. 

4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles. 

5. Surprises of armies in the open field. 

6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle. 

7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps. 

8. _Coups de main_. 

All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties, skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, andany thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may beregarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR. 

It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying allthe operations of war, --a principle which must be followed in all goodcombinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:--

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon thecommunications of the enemy as much as possible without compromisingone's own. 

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk ofone's forces. 

3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon thedecisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is ofthe first importance to overthrow. 

4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon thedecisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and withenergy. 

This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: oneobjection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of theforces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies inrecognizing those points. 

This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous toenunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with allnecessary explanations for its application upon the field. In ArticleXIX. These decisive points will be described, and in Articles fromXVIII. To XXII. Will be discussed their relations to the differentcombinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what isthere stated, still regard the determination of these points as aproblem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehendingstrategy. 

The general theater of operations seldom contains more than threezones, --the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front ofoperations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as eachline of battle, has the same subdivisions, --two extremities and thecenter. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable forthe attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the tworemaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will bewholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connectionwith the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, itwill appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver thequestion for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right, to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these threesimple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art ofgiving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis ofstrategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executivetalent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessaryto carry out any combinations previously arranged. 

We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategyand tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebratedcampaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes andthe greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle inthe one case, and from a neglect of it in the other. 

OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS. 

ARTICLE XVI. 

Of the System of Operations. 

War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether itshall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meantby these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against agreat state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory isattacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defenseof moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally, if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and isconfined to a single operation, it is called the taking the_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearlyalways advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves theassailant's country from devastation, increases his resources anddiminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, andgenerally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasionexcites the ardor and energy of the adversary, --particularly when hefeels that the independence of his country is threatened. 

In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its badside. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles inthe enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, arefavorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of thecountry, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, aregenerally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struckin a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seeka speedy termination of the contest. 

For a single operation, which we have called the taking the_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularlyin strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the massesupon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take theinitiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what hedesires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires tostrike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemyfall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knowswhere his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repelhim. 

Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are lesspositive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the partytaking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detecthis designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail. 

The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from theobstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on whichaccount the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive areabout equally balanced. 

Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategicallyfrom the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusivelythroughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may becomedefensive before it ends. 

A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. Itmay be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passivedefense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes. The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, thecountry threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed toretard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplyingobstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's ownarmy. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will thenseek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on thecontrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending offdetachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident tohis progress. 

An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positiveinferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural orartificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplyingobstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to anextreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general hasthe good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain inhis positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly uponthe alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points ofthe enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, andmay have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines theadvantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon aprepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by allthe advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success takethe initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike. 

During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick wasthe assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model ofthe defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this byhis adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and manyopportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's coursewas mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the mostsuitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatesttalents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) thesetwo systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative duringthe progress of a defensive war. 

ARTICLE XVII. 

Of the Theater of Operations. 

The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the partiesmay assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, orto weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest. When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace bothhemispheres, --as has happened in contests between France and Englandsince the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined, and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or theother army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austriamay be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if theGerman States take part therein. 

Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the wholetheater of operations may be considered as a single field upon whichstrategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In thesecond case each army will have its own independent theater ofoperations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all theterritory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary todefend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt anymaneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be indanger of being surrounded, ) since the supposition is that no concert ofaction has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields. If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater ofoperations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of thegeneral field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a commonobject. 

Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which oneor more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:--

1. Of a fixed base of operations. 

2. Of a principal objective point. 

3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense. 

4. Of zones and lines of operations. 

5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications. 

6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to theenemy. 

7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important, either for the offensive or defensive. 

8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objectivepoint and the primary base. 

9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse. 

For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austriawith two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, andstarting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the MaritimeAlps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armiestraverses may be considered as a zone of the general field ofoperations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige withoutconcerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but azone becomes for that army a theater of operations. 

In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objectivepoint, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective pointwith the base, either in the offensive or the defensive. 

It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations_par excellence. _ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads tomove the army within the range of its operations, and at least one lineof retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines ofmaneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers areexcellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishmentof a good line of operations, but never the line itself. 

It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expresslyto be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, becausethey facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich citiesfor manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, thesepoints must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made adesert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of anindividual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, andthe roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover, was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the useof converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable fordefense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radiallines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which arepursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing massesseparately. 

Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound instrategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary, these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but alsothat if more rare they are more important and more decisive. 

Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war, inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of theRhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put hisfoot. "

Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare haveunited with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty ofcarrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages ofpartisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard theheights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at thedecisive points, --the junctions of the large valleys. 

These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the readerthat, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are manypoints that admit of discussion. 

The most important topographical or artificial features which make upthe theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, beexamined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper toremark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of thegeneral. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered thepassage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability ofthese chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet anda walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo. 

ARTICLE XVIII. 

Bases of Operations. 

A base of operations is the portion of country from which the armyobtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when ittakes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by whichit is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively. 

The base of operations is most generally that of supply, --though notnecessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance, a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia orFranconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine. 

When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may bealternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a lineof defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will alwaysbe prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in itsown country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still avast difference between those parts of the country without militarypositions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and thoseother portions where these military resources are found; and theselatter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army mayhave in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army inGermany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have othersbeyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; butif it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either theMeuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourthupon the Loire. 

These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to thefirst. On the contrary, a total change of direction may becomenecessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a goodbase on Béfort or Besançon, on Mézières or Sedan, as the Russian armyafter the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east andestablished itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces. These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are oftendecisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of thecountry, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintainhimself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks beingheld by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired. 

The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be incovering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off fromit. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have sofavorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is moreretired. 

A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points ofsufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. Thereshould be a _tête de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams. 

All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinionshave varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel tothat of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those ofthe enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sidesalmost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thusaffording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control oftwo sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widelyapart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which anunforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate. 

The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great MilitaryOperations:--

 "The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and, consequently, upon the direction of the bases. 

 [Illustration: Fig. 1. ]

 "If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign, may hold one of these faces, --perhaps two, --while the enemy occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1, p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces, the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine. 

 "The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented by the side A B. The result is well known. 

 "The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. 

 "When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it. The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided, since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the shortened side, --as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806, with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of Franconia. "

[Illustration: Fig. 2. ]

The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of myopinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of theFrench army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immenseadvantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have affordedNapoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor. Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon theOka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank marchupon Wiazma and Krasnoi. 

If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will onlybe necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that ofthe enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line ofoperations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communicationsand line of retreat. 

It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorablein the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics mayobject to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said infavor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and againstdouble lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI. ) Theobjection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of aperpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient, which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On theother hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both shouldbe occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will besufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies, while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face, --as wasdone in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninetydegrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, andthence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and anotherperpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by hisleft toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of theenemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon theextremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carriedhim in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisionshaving already rejoined him. 

In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the firstand parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained theextremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussiansat Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat. 

If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of thembeing almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it iswell to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may bepartially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen inArticle XX. 

Another very important point in reference to the proper direction ofbases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may befavorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must alwaysexist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease ofthe establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only befavorable to naval powers, ) that it is astonishing to hear in our daypraises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief ofSpain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that ofLisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers allthe avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus notonly protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possibleline of retreat, which was upon the fleet. 

Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedrassecured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes, many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are goodexcept such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities ofsupply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similarnotions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought tohave posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fiftythousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting thatthe first precept for a continental army is to establish its base uponthe front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of allits elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if thebase were established upon the coast. 

An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue adiametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle, viz. : _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustainedby all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a saferetreat. _

A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the seaadjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of fortyor fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and itssupplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army ofone hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by adisciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness. 

However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which itmay be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, whenyour adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being masterof the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during theTurkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians wasgiven to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a planwhich they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin. 

Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide uponthe fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The armycovered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, andSilistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon asits base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previouslywould have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would haveterminated with the first campaign. 

Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our ownfrontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual ortemporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy'scountry; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, theywill, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII. 

ARTICLE XIX. 

Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, andObjective Points of Operations. 

Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive thistitle simply from their position, which gives them all their importance:these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a valuefrom the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of thehostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed againstthem: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, there are points which have only a secondary importance, and otherswhose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVEstrategic points. 

Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication, or from thepresence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographicalstrategic point. 

A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarilybe a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplatedoperation. I think differently; for a strategic point is suchessentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be fromthe scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field bysome unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. Itwould, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are notnecessarily decisive points. 

Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or fromtheir relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdividedas follows, --viz. : geographic lines which by their permanent importancebelong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those whichhave value merely because they connect two strategic points. 

To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines intheir relations to maneuvers, --confining ourselves here to what relatesto the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations uponwhich enterprises occur. 

Although these are most intimately connected, since every objectivepoint ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theaterof war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for alldecisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations. We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided inour selection of the second. 

I think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to allthose which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon theresult of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whosegeographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favorthe attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defenseare included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupyin importance the first rank among them. 

The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The firstare the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and aconsequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take thecase of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of theMeuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of thecountry; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between theMeuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin ifhe give battle parallel to that sea. [8] Similarly, the valley of theDanube presents a series of important points which have caused it to belooked upon as the key of Southern Germany. 

Those points the possession of which would give the control of thejunction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines ofcommunication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. Forinstance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls thevalleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communicationsbetween France and Italy and between the South and East; but it wouldnot be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing anextended camp with _têtes de pont_. Leipsic is most certainly astrategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all thecommunications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupyboth banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country, --ifa country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisivepoint. 

All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they arenot only centers of communications, but also the seats of power andgovernment. 

In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes ofexit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference toany enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was theimportance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in1800. 

The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both sides. 

When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian armythrough Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerthor the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he wascut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended tosupport him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the sameposition, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol andfrom the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack uponhim was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, sincethis would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line ofretreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objectivepoint of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by theSaint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: henceSaint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reasonof the march of Mélas upon Nice. 

It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points ofmaneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponentoperates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supportingforces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite tothe sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity offorcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in thecase of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, althoughdangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet. 

If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, thedecisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will bemore divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushedseparately. 

The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by, --

1. The features of the ground. 

2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim. 

3. The positions occupied by the respective forces. 

These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles. 

OBJECTIVE POINTS. 

There are two classes of objective points, --objective _points ofmaneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. A geographical objectivepoint may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front ofoperations which affords good lines of defense or good points of supportfor ulterior enterprises. _Objective points of maneuver_, incontradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importancefrom, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostilemasses. 

In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of thehostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemyto make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, theobjective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, thepolitical relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and theirrespective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to theart of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans ofoperations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not tooccupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or lineof defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of whichwould render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. Forinstance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, thefirst objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; thesecond, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, theobjective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gainpossession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, beingconsidered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point ofthe defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a firstline and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French armyreduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would beto prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve theforts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of theriver and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover thefirst base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle, --which might beattained by a lateral defense as well as one in front. 

As to the objective points of _maneuvers_, --that is, those which relateparticularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostileforces, --their importance may be seen by what has already been said. Thegreatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie insome degree in the good choice of these points. This was the mostconspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which weresatisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation ofan adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means ofaccomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostilearmy, --since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is noorganized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relativeadvantages presented by the different zones of operations, toconcentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the bestpromise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximateposition of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon hiscenter if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by whichhe could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cuthis line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy hisforces, --such was the system followed by Napoleon in his firstcampaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the verybest. 

When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distancesand the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful asin Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war isnot suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chancesof success are still very great, and it is based upon principle. Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its realadvantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and theyare made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and ofthe adjoining states. 

The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations arealmost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, andin what will be stated in Article XXI. In discussing the choice of linesof operations. 

As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally dependupon the aim of the war and the character which political or othercircumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities ofthe two parties. 

In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it maybe prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages, --suchas the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great successby incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of thehostile army, as did Napoleon. 

The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whoseonly object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, theycould not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, fivehundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more tobe lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain bysuccess. 

There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which aredetermined more from political than from strategic considerations: theyplay a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations andplans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_. 

Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war inits preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises areundertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, butoften very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of greaterrors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of theDuke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to theoperations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused theirfailure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. Theexpedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799--likewise due to theviews of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria onBelgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the ArchdukeCharles from Zurich upon Manheim, --a step quite contrary to theinterests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. Theseillustrations prove that political objective points should besubordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has beenattained. 

This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurdto attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be givenhas just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objectivepoints should be selected according to the principles of strategy, ortheir consideration should be postponed till after the decisive eventsof the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it willbe seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirkshould have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; inother words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for greatattempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of thiskind are generally included in grand diversions, --to be treated of in aseparate article. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 7: I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression, --since aline cannot be a _point_, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisiveor objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that _objective_points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form ofexpression used to designate the object which an army desires toattain. ]

[Footnote 8: This only applies to continental armies, and not to theEnglish, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothingto fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse. ]

ARTICLE XX. 

Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and StrategicPositions. 

There are some parts of the military science that so closely resembleeach other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequentlyconfounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are _fronts ofoperations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategicpositions_. It is proposed in this article to show the distinctionbetween them and to expose their relations to each other. 

FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS. 

When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, theygenerally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupiedtoward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. The portion of thetheater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in twoor three marches is called the _front of operations_. 

The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men toconfound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other. 

Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formedby the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while theother embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one ortwo marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includesthe ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision. 

When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one ofthe armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and willundertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of thestrategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and lineof defense may coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon theRhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French, and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. Thisoccasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons toconfound them, while they are really very different. An army has notnecessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: whenits masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategicfront, but it is never without a front of operations. 

The two following examples will illustrate the difference between thedifferent terms. 

At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operationsextended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along theline of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being atLöwenberg, ) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. Hisforces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whosestrategic positions were interior and central and presented threedifferent faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real lineof defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend tothe rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond thestrategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extendedhis operations to these points. 

The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front ofoperations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to theAdriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, betweenLake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, betweenPeschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to hispositions. 

The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies, and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base ofoperations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and oughtto be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extendfar enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, thisdirection may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or onaccount of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happensthat it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base andparallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategicfront is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by thismeans the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained, thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed abase with two faces. (See Art. XVIII. )

The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates thesepoints. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which madethe Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew, from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka, to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and theBaltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can beobtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. Itought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should alwaysbe sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words, that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, andshould be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allensteinupon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of thearmy the _tête de pont_ of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communicationswere safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his lineparallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrownback upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another veryremarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jenaand Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right uponAugsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and therebyforcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm. 

The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to thebase may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days'duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit byimportant advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisiveblows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and goodpivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base. 

It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategicfront, either by the features of the theater of war, or because everyline of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As anexample of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. Inorder to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged topresent a double front, --in the first case, to face the valley of theDanube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon. 

All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, thesame precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will requirea double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troopsinto the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countrieswhich present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemycould themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of doublestrategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of anoffensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are alwaysdangerous. (See Article XXXVI. )

Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a nationalor intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim wouldhave its own strategic front determined by the features of the countryand the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus, Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined. 

LINES OF DEFENSE. 

Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategicallines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines ofdefense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such asthe line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, whichrelate only to the temporary position of an army. 

The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents awell-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such asranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range ofthe Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since thepracticable passes are guarded by forts which would prove greatobstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges inthe valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines ofdefense, on account of the important forts found upon them. 

Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, andevery defile, having their weak points covered by temporaryfortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, bothstrategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progressof the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left insearch of a weaker point, --in which case the advantage is evidentlystrategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evidenttactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an armyfrom its position behind a river, or from a point naturally andartificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the otherhand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we shouldfall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so manyarmies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive andreceiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield. [9] Inaddition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] isdifficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may beable with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all theoutlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and toWurmser in Mantua. 

STRATEGIC POSITIONS. 

There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic positionmay be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions forbattle. 

Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intendedto cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would becovered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a lineof defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerabledistances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 inSaxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. Thepositions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium beforethe battle of Ligny, (1814, ) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aarin 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and inface of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategicpositions, --for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The dailypositions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which aresometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class. 

This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover severalpoints and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes ofobservation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, thepositions of detachments on a double front of operations, the positionof a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhileoperating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all largedetachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupyingstrategic positions. 

The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon amultitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety. 

In every case, the first general rule is that the communications withthe different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured. 

In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines ofdefense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable naturalor artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points ofsupport on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, andare practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots ofmaneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot ofoperations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months. In 1813 Dresden was his pivot. 

Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points whichit is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to thefulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished thepivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot ofNapoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his lineof retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material pointof both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point ofsupport and endures throughout a campaign. 

The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be asshort as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army ifit is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that theextent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent theprompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageouspoint. 

The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if itbe too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive tomake strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since ashort front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neithershould the front of operations be too extended. Such a front isunsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if nota good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the resultsof a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautifuloperations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the sameresults upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, couldhave found another by adopting a new zone of operations. 

The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it shouldbe more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the armyshould have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from theintervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central orinterior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the frontin the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead toa dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the partof the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element ofsecurity or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possiblerapid concentration at different and successive points of the front. 

An army should never long occupy any strategic point without makingselection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of thereconcentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemywhen he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleonprepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that ofWaterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram. 

When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should becareful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might becalled the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equalfaces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal forall the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive anattack. 

Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical pointupon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategicfront. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being ableto occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position inrear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, soas to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effectinga passage. 

For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugationor of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, howeverbrilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line ofdefense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to completethe subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected withtemporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII. )

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a greatdifference. They are treated of in Article XXVII. ]

[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not ofpositions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapterdevoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX. )]

ARTICLE XXI. 

Zones and Lines of Operations. 

A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. Forexample, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of theright, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army. 

A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line ofoperations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, orof the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein. Generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_, depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the numberof great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations. 

It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a_line of operations_, --though doubtless it may happen that any good roadin a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line;but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond thesphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the realline of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading tothe same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, wouldnot constitute so many lines of operations, but, being thecommunications of the different divisions of the same army, the wholespace bounded by them would constitute but a single line. 

The term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of thegeneral theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designatethe part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategiclines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisivepoints of the theater of operations either with each other or with thefront of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name tothose lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisivepoints, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires atemporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _Lines ofcommunications_ designate the practicable routes between the differentportions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zoneof operations. 

For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the GrandCoalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, andanother Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden, Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of theforces. This zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to Leipsic asan objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leadingfrom the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic;the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau byDresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadottefrom Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armiesmarched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not besaid that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principalline of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and uponwhich depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat. 

If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensivecombinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones oneach theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities, it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are dividedinto different classes, according to their relations to the differentpositions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, and to the enterprises projected by the commander. 

_Simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from afrontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies. 

_Double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armiesproceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armieswhich are commanded by the same general but are widely separated indistance and for long intervals of time. [11]

_Interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies tooppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that thegeneral can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force ina shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to opposeto them a greater force. [12] _Exterior lines_ lead to the oppositeresult, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same timeon both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses. 

_Concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart fromwidely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advanceof or behind the base. 

_Divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given pointto move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army. 

There are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_. 

The term _maneuver-lines_ I apply to momentary strategic lines, oftenadopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to beconfounded with the real _lines of operations_. 

_Secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford eachother mutual support, --as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse wassecondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagrationwas secondary to that of Barclay. 

_Accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change theoriginal plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of thehighest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fullyrecognized only by a great and active mind. 

There may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines ofoperations_. The first designate the line adopted by an army in apreliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to selecta more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to theclass of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of linesof operations. 

These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have precededme. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance thanthat arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latterhas even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it hasno lines of operations. 

The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose twoarmies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance ofDusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their largedepots are immediately behind the river, --certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted. These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence theywill certainly have lines of operations, arising from the differentproposed enterprises. 

1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, willextend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would bothbe cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself inthe interval which separates them from it. Even if Mélas[13] hadpossessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less havebeen cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemyoccupied the line of the Po. 

2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentratedhis forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a doubleexterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter dividedhis forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable himto concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred tocould unite. 

Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army onits own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations thanwhen on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points ofsupport and some of the advantages which are sought for in theestablishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line ofoperations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why ithas no line of operations. 

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCHREVOLUTION. 

At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia andAustria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was includedin the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, itbeing too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed. The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised threezones of operations, --the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningueto Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of theinterval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was thefrontier from Givet to Dunkirk. 

When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent aunion of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in thezones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand inBelgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did notconquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made. Four months intervened between the declaration of war and theconcentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasionof Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given theKing of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced himnot to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing uponFrance another form of government?

When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, theFrench were no longer able to invade. This _rôle_ was reserved for theallies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves. 

The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteenthousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and fortyleagues and divided into five corps d'armée, and could not make a gooddefense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it wasonly necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also infavor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and couldonly be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between theMoselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than therest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of theexcellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted thisplan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception. 

The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for familyreasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse mightsubject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand, Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-fivethousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on theRhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterwarddisplayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of themthan to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conducton the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for theresolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field, as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. Duringthe campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary forsuccess. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they hadanticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a moreserious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all theadvantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions, and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately. Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez atGrandpré, --that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Châlons. 

The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued withthe false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order toguard every point. 

The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle andSarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, andhow their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruinof armies. 

Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting thestrongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length ofa frontier to prevent invasion, --which was exactly the means ofrendering invasion upon every point feasible. 

I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishlyabandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theaterfrom the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, hewas unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by thismovement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front, while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back uponthe North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirelyin a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes. 

The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faultydirection of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recoveredBelgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operationsto the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deservespraise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified thisenterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against theextreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French hadbeen driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganizedand unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of afew towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize newarmies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution ofthe wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades ofthe allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?

Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital areparticularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince, and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters ofthe army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in warsof opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power. [14]If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris wasFrance, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation hadrisen against the government which oppressed them. If, after havingbeaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch andHanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and theAustrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and theMoselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless armyof the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, withits flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. Itis even probable that, without changing the direction of the war orrunning great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed theduty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the armypursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining severalvictories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying ona few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While theythreatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodiesof troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennesand Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces uponthe camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on oneside and Landau on the other. 

It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts inthe beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, theyshould have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that whilethe allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded oraided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, thisarmy took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon theSambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise andBroglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?

In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from apainful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations ofthis campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong torepresent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this, it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of thearmies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, andthe direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had fourcorps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had fourdivisions, which composed two armies. 

These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels, as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The onlydifference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanderswere not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but thisdifference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The positionof the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflankthe Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass ofthe enemy, --a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given togreat operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen onthe Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fateof the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced uponthe Baltic, is another proof of this truth. 

If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily havemade Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed amonth before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up. 

The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensivewas before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and sixbattalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flankFlanders was covered by the corps d'armée of Clairfayt, and upon theleft Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain ofa battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuiswas found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French wereknown to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched toClairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the armybefore Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delayinvasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of hiscentral position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium andto beat all his large detachments in detail. 

Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part havingbeen sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividingthis grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would havebeen concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred andforty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famousdiversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut upbetween the sea and two fortresses?

The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radicalerror of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion onCourtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroitill the 3d of June, --more than a month afterward. Here was a splendidopportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. Ifthe Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army byits left, --that is, both upon the Meuse, --the state of affairs wouldhave been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a lineof scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of thedifferent fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack thecenter of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustainedby the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line ofthree hundred miles in extent. 

In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principaltheater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy, --which opened a newfield of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in thiscampaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim. Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forcesalternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and inthe lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambreand Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and broughtPichegru back to Landau. 

In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. Thearmies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from theextremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794, they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than thePrince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating hisforces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He thenseized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, tosteal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: thebattle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army ofMoreau to retreat. 

Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan isto separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by thebattle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategiclines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidablearmy is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commitsthe error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. Thelightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandonsevery thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon thefirst column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it backupon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, andis there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol tokeep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom theselessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo andVicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first backupon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorgesof the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army totake refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender. 

In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formedtwo exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine andthe Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of thecenter marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia, being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _The threearmies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn_, eightyleagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: heunites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and thearmy of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and EasternSwitzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead offollowing up their success on this central line, which cost them sodearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on theLower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while theother trifles at Manheim. 

In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leavesthirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon theAdige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their forceis too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naplesreturns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategicdirection opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his centralposition, from which he derives full profit, marches against this armyand beats it, while some leagues from the other. 

In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is againchanged, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines ofoperations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanksof Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon thePo. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords nosimilar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines, affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adoptan exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cutsoff the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preservingits own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, whichforms its secondary line. 

Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations ofthe two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of thearmies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray andMélas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of theSaint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines ofoperations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat ofMélas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. Itmay thus be seen that Mélas is cut off from his base, and that, on thecontrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all hiscommunications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines. 

[Illustration: Fig. 3. THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806. ]

The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly theimportance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in militaryoperations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters ofdefeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render hisinvasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province. 

By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most notedcampaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have ledto success have been established in conformity to the fundamentalprinciple already alluded to, --viz. : that _simple and interior linesenable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon theimportant point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may alsosatisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed tothis principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permitsfractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy. 

MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS. 

From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as fromthat of many others, the following maxims result:--

1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisivepoint of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, thechoice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attainingthis end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of acampaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera, --maneuvers that cannot be toomuch studied by military men. 

Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. Theobjective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan tobe followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken forthis end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this firstoperation and the new phases it may develop. 

2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographicalsituation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the positionof the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _In every case, however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of theextremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderatingwould it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and thetwo extremities at the same time_. [15]

It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy dividehis forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-linewill be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon therear of his line of defense or front of operations. 

The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity itaffords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact thatby using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy'sforce. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left ofthe line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almostwithout an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of theDanube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious directionof the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia andBavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by theSaint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Mélas were still morebrilliant. 

3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained, it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing theassailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid thisdanger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategicdirection, such that the army will always find either to its rear or tothe right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to takeadvantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require achange of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12. )

The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most importantqualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated bythese examples. 

If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched uponAsti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previouslyprotected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of thePo, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreatthan Mélas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary pointsof Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona andTenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means ofregaining the Var or the Valais. 

In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and hadthere awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would havebeen cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from theElbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar heplaced his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof, which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussianshad endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Geraand Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line, --theexcellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort, --as well as the two roadswhich lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel. 

4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of largecoalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act uponthe same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better tohave all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies theprincipal army. 

5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forceson the same frontier, a single line of operations will be moreadvantageous than a double one. 

6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, eitherfrom the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line hasbeen adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part ofthe army to each of his masses. 

7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable toexterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army canbe concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fateof the campaign. [16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategicplan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of theadversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a bodyof observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, withinstructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy asmuch as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually fallingback upon the principal army. 

8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority offorce, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bringagainst it. In this case this course will be advantageous, --since asingle line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all fromacting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support wellthe army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and therespective positions of the parties, has the most important duty toperform. 

9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two othermaxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines andsustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior innumbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contractedspace, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened toNapoleon at Leipsic. [17] The second is, that interior lines should notbe abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy theopportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however, may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive asto conclude the war, --when the fate of these secondary bodies would beviewed with comparative indifference. 

10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous thantwo divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy, and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication andsupply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that thearmies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to thecombined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect theirjunction. 

11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of theenemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or bya strategic movement, --in which case divergent operations would add tothe dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior, since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than thepursued. 

12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line ofoperations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate andimportant step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally greatdisasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate anarmy from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of thesechanges; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans tomeet unforeseen events. 

At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt aline of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which wouldhave opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning byVienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which theArchduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed oneof these changes of the line of operations after the raising of thesiege of Olmutz. 

In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but onewhich was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon thefortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open tothe allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had hepossessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced themost decisive results and have put the seal on his military career. 

13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographicalcharacter of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence onthe direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantagesto be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, likeBohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because theynaturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate theproject of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient anglebecome so important that every means should be taken to render themimpregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages maybe gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the followingfigure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of thearmy A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interiorlines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G, which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was theresult of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809. 

[Illustration: Fig. 4. 

 K /\ / \ / \ / \ F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G / \ A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D]

14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence thedirection to be given to the lines of operations, these latter beingnaturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that thegreatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when thefrontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations ofthe enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line andcutting him from his base. 

But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, theline of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of theperpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to thefigure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if itmarched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all thestrategic advantages of its base C D. 

The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so toestablish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the armyas to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one'sown, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy. 

15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over thedirection to be given to the line of operations; it is when theprincipal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in thepresence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, thechoice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor theadvantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for thefirst consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be mostcertainly effected, and where are to be found the means for thispurpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was nearDusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed byMarshal Paskevitch near Ossiek, --viz. , that in neither case was therethe bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged toprocure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French inHolland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality ofPrussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemywas not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage ledthe French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failedbecause the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armiesseparately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with onlya small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived atLowicz. 

When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chancesof failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary toselect the point which may, either on account of its topography or theposition of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion betweenNapoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of themost curious examples of the different combinations presented by thisquestion, which is both strategic and tactical. 

Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victoryis gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon thedirections of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. Thepoint selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon thecenter or one of the flanks of the enemy. 

A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extendedline might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete thedispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would notthink of disturbing the bridges. 

If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is moreconcentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after thepassage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to passit upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from thebridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage ofrivers. 

16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to benoticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at homeand one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country willalso influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps orthe Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states ofthe second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are alwaysrivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of thatunity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the otherhand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much moredangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first couldbe thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling andinterest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on itsown soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants, authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and evenprivate stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad. 

Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to theassailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desertregions, particularly when the people are not united against theinvader. In provinces like those first named the army would find athousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are aboutthe only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but everything else must be carried by the army, --thus infinitely increasing theembarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare anddangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts ofSwabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, andactually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania. 

17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is muchinsisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It isthat on each side of the line of operations the country should becleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line:otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule iseverywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, therivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of thepeople, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated bydiagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemycould be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but acompliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means oftaking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign inrecent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does notcontradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Viennawhen Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of theAustrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and theCol-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Mélas? Did not Eugene march byway of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French uponthe Mincio but a few leagues from his base?

OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES--WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM. 

Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upondefinitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it uponthemselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whetherthe conditions of the case which might modify the application of theseprinciples were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, evenadmitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannotdisprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon naturalprinciples. 

In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted thefamous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkableevent, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believein principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptionalcases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands ofopposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far fromoverthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go toestablish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that incase of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double linesof operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric andarranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Blücher, Bernadotte, andBenningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferiorarmy, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directedits efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and notupon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me aredoubly in my favor. 

Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and theOder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm, Katzbach, and Dennewitz, --in a word, to faults of execution, entirelyforeign to the principles in question. 

What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point withthe greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remainon the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until thedecisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat ofan essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the wholearmy may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armiesare exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of thearmy, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813. 

If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued theallies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, havethreatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To thiserror may be added a fault quite as great, --that of fighting decisivebattles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbachhis instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait forBlücher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by holdmovements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments overtorrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meetBlücher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followedup his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, basedupon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric lineof operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The studyof his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that heknew how to apply this system. 

There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows theinjustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon inSaxony, --viz. : _that his front of operations was outflanked on theright, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of thefrontiers of Bohemia_. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A centralposition with such faults is not to be compared to one without them. When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland, Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostileenemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807;but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system ofoperations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be asmuch in favor of as against it, --which was by no means the case in 1813, either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respectiveforces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses atKatzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable ofdestroying a principle the simplest application of which required theseofficers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement. Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage canbe expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the armywhich have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere, shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contentedwith being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy whoapplies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover, in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, fromthe battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth ofthese maxims. 

The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategicquestion which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertionsfounded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines losesits advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing withMontesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude ofthe arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answerin the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundredthousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies ofthirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating themsuccessively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strongagainst three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; andfor several good reasons:--

1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary tobring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army ofone hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easilyresist a much larger force. 

2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousandmen to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction withone of the other armies. 

3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such aquantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _matériel_ of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its effortsfrom one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of theimpossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted tosupport such numbers. 

4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold incheck two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must bevery strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of suchmagnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they willprobably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh theadvantages gained by the principal army. 

I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentricsystem. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, andto demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications ofprinciples. 

Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad:all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentriclines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from agiven point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separatelydestroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was themaneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all theoperations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, byclosely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, havingpierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentricdirections to disperse the defeated army. [19]

On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. Whenthey tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will besure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end theefforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separatelyby a stronger enemy. 

Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may bemost pernicious, --which should teach us the necessity of detecting theprinciples upon which systems are based, and not to confound principlesand systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant baseto march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior linesand more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a unionbefore the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the casewith Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles. 

In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separatedthan Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger. What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser andQuasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of LakeGarda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brusselsbe forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on thiscity, --one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Blücher and Wellington, taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, andthe terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutableprinciples of war cannot be violated with impunity. 

Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is notin accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claimto the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, andwere applied by Cæsar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as byMarlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point themout, and to lay down the principal chances in their variousapplications. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has givenrise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it. 

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations, ) and not of greatroutes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or threeroutes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of thedifferent masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or threelines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with twoarmies of 70, 000 men each, being independent of each other, there was adouble line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachmentstarts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or sixother corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not havea double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term todesignate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and setthem in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a singlecorps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principalenterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with anaccessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms orradii, but the operation was not double. ]

[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound centralpositions with the line of operations, --in which assertion they aremistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of twomasses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: theseare two very different things. Others have thought that I would havedone better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea ofdouble lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive thetheater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, afterall, a line, it is simply a dispute about words. ]

[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;for Mélas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, wasunable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communicationby couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged tocut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced. ]

[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate ofNapoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and theFrench people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If hehad possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown thatthe capital was at his head-quarters. ]

[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusivelyupon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_, and the ability of their commander are also very important elements. ]

[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the mainbody by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intendedto act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategicpositions, and not lines of operations. ]

[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle ofLeipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line ofoperations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions;but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative oflines of operations. ]

[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid acombat without running greater risks than would result from a check; butMacdonald might have fought Blücher to advantage if he had betterunderstood Napoleon's instructions. ]

[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve ofconcentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflectthat among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which heemployed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; forexample, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809. ]

ARTICLE XXII. 

Strategic Lines. 

Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, whichdiffer essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well todefine them, for many confound them. We will not consider thosestrategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason oftheir position and their relation to the features of the country, likethe lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and theBalkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minuteexamination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for thiskind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of SouthernGermany. 

The term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead bythe most direct or advantageous route from one important point toanother, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of itsobjective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war iscrossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time thoseonly which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any realimportance. This renders plain the distinction between the general lineof operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, whichare temporary and change with the operations of the army. 

Besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines ofmaneuvers_. 

An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone ofoperations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that betweenthe Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia andthe sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, atmost, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior, directions, --while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategiclines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one foreach wing which would join the general line of operations. If itoperated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt, according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerthand Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulmwith Nuremberg or Mayence. 

It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines ofoperations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarilyapplicable to strategic lines. These may be _concentric_, to inflict adecisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. They are rarely _simple_, since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when theyare double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ ifthe forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numericalsuperiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimesbe remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when theforces are equal, to attain an important result without running muchrisk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to theimportant masses. 

Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed againstone of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations. 

The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding goodfor strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to applythem to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deservesmention, --viz. : that it is important generally, in the selection ofthese temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operationsexposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done, to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success;but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have beentaken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the lineof operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to. 

We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian armywas based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologneand Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp, and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attackby Napoleon on Flanders decided Blücher to receive battle parallel tothe English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have nouneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a goodchance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge inAntwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerfulmaritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, andseeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Blücher had but threestrategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht, that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English armynear Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by theapplication of interior strategic lines, --which Napoleon here, perhapsfor the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen thatthe line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither aline of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a_strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. It was bold, because heexposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that hesought a junction with the English made his movement accord with theprinciples of war. 

A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. LeavingWittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the rightto gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left hisprimitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior inforce. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whoseintention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from thebeginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishingthis change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He didnothing of this kind, --either from forgetfulness, or on account of thefeeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat, --and the severelosses at Dennewitz were the result. 

Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these differentcombinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extendedfrom the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredoand determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valleyof the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser hadmoved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse. There were but three courses open to him, --to remain in the narrowvalley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser, or the last, --which was sublime, but rash, --to follow him into thevalley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose twopassages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man tohesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavisto cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano. The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route fromTrent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a_strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre. However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, atthe end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten atBassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication withVerona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain ingreat haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall backeither upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, whichmade this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; foreven if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not haveinterfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable himto anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vauboisfrom Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austriangeneral, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the Frencharmy was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, wouldscarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beatenat Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch hadadvanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would therehave been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted uponhim the fate of Vandamme at Culm. 

I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of timeand distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of manyadventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that itmay be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes itsline of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent theenemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and bydemonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of whatis taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to beadopted under an urgent necessity. 

ARTICLE XXIII. 

Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases orStrategic Reserves. 

When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual ortemporary bases, --which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong ashis own frontiers. A river with _têtes de ponts_, and one or two largetowns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army andto serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be anexcellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be atemporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operationsleading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had agood real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, andbecame but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution ofa single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation, particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beatenin an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from itsown frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distanttemporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannotexpect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for atemporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategicreserve, --which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demeritsdeserve notice. 

STRATEGIC RESERVES. 

Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive, who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon ofskirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise governmentalways provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses themwhen they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the armyhas its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail toprovide one. 

The reserves of an army are of two kinds, --those on the battle-field, and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: thelatter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater ofwar, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will dependnot only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers andthe distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an armytakes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility ofbeing compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reservebetween the base and front of operations the advantage of an activereserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support ofmenaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that toform a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from activeservice; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to beinstructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing centraldepots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making themthe rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, andadding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may beformed capable of important service. 

Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Evenin 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert onthe Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in theneighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the partalternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont nearVienna. 

In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier usedthem to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming atMayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, betweenthe Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleondecided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, withmuch ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixtythousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the Englishand to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as herinterests. 

The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it wasbadly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg orDessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by givingPrince Hohenlohe and Blücher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin. 

These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of thecountry leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill thedouble object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity, of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens itsflanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve. 

Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, andwhenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or thetroops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distantinvasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if thescene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from thefrontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally bedispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when newlevies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, underthe protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will beindispensable. 

The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of thesereserves according to the state of the country, the length of the lineof operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity ofa hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors touse for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so muchas the withdrawal of his good troops. 

These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the baseand front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have beenreduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and ifthere be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw upintrenched camps or _têtes de ponts_ to protect the depots and toincrease the strength of their positions. 

All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable totemporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuableif they possess such well-located pivots. 

ARTICLE XXIV. 

The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches. 

_By the system of positions_ is understood the old manner ofconducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their suppliesat hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the othercovering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, theother counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was warfrom the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During thisrevolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or lessvalue sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: theFrench encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them. It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that thissystem was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men infourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents, provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or werequartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means ofsuccess. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns, which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account ofthe broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, theythrew out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover thecolumns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, atfirst met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted themethodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack, to whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increasedhis reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to opposean open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to thepoor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carriedthe positions. 

The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more. The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of theCommittee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad. Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of thewar. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid ofDunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidlyfrom point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at thesedifferent points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France. 

The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances, and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movementof the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led tothe success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium. 

In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputedto treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded byClairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and thePrince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle ofinterior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a singlemarch. 

Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large, --eitherto procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought itbetter to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commandersto arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments, incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded inoverwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs whenNapoleon made his _début_ in Italy. His activity from the beginningworsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances, his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered theItalian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. Hismarch on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity ofovercoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcementsfrom the Rhine. 

The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a newera in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. Headopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than thecapture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were lessextended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodiesof two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy washere fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merelycorollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the systemof columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italynot to meet with his approval. 

It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted toall capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, therecan be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to theold system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches andcamps of the Seven Years' War with those of the _seven weeks'_ war, --asNapoleon called the campaign of 1806, --or with those of the three monthswhich elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 tillits arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as tothe relative merits of the two systems. 

The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method ofconducting a war than this. 

It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, hispersonal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred inurging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon athrone, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dareto adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of verydistant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he hasmarked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions willfor a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be muchmodified and improved. 

If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches, humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions andbivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun, are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarianhordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is notlikely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth hasbeen demonstrated by Napoleon's wars, --viz. : that remoteness is not acertain safeguard against invasion, --that a state to be secure must havea good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves andmilitary institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Thenthe people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve asreserves to the active armies, which will render the latter moreformidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the morenecessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results. 

If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state, --if nations, insteadof fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, toacquire a natural frontier or to maintain the politicalequilibrium, --then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, andperhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale. Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand menreturn to a mixed system of war, --a mean between the rapid incursions ofNapoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Untilthen we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has producedso great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of anactive and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion. 

The science of marches now includes more than details, like thefollowing, viz. : the order of the different arms in column, the time ofdeparture and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, andthe means of communication between the columns, all of which is a partof the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these veryimportant details, there is a science of marches in the great operationsof strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernardto fall upon the communications of Mélas, those made in 1805 byDonauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians, the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, thatof the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisiveoperations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on accountof their strategic relations. 

Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the greatprinciple of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point;and this point is to be determined from the considerations given inArticle XIX. What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line ofoperations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of theenemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jenawere the same maneuvers; and what was Blücher's march at Waterloo but anapplication of interior strategic lines?

From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend tothrow the mass of the army successively upon the different points of thefront of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply theprinciple of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. Theoperations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those ofNapoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind. 

One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is toso combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greateststrategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the tripleobject of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with easeand rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, itis necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means ofconcentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow. 

This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is thetrue test of a great general. 

There is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, whichdeserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; butnothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term_flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field ofbattle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicateoperations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made toordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous inthem, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In astrategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated byabout two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advancedguards from the enemy and from their own columns. ) In such a case therecould be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another. 

There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogetherinadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations, of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen asto present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was thefamous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden onthe flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies. It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of theauthor. 

The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as wasthe case with Napoleon at Borodino, ) and particularly if this lineaffords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flankmovement exposing this line would be a great fault. 

In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements arestill less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in achange of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition ofthe troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanderswill, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements. 

The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; sowas that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that ofMarshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successfulissue is well known. 

A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite adifferent affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz, and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin. 

Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was atrue flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealedby the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in itscamp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shockDaun was taken in flank, and not Frederick. 

In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where lineof battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by aright or left into line, ) movements parallel to the enemy's line werenot _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real frontof the line of battle. 

The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn thelines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, andno less successful. 

In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and notstrategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of thegreatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred towas a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before thebattle. 

ARTICLE XXV. 

Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches. 

The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is thecommissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must besupplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy'scountry is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relationbetween the commissariat and strategy. 

It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsistedtheir immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task tosupply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks, barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerablebodies of men in that country. Cæsar said that war should support war, and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of thecountries he overran. 

The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds, and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals, Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they livedduring their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaderswould also be an interesting subject of research. 

In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armiesof Francis I. , in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with themlarge stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty orfifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys ofthe Ticino and Po. 

Under Louis XIV. And Frederick II. The armies were larger; they foughton their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which wereestablished as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations, restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent uponthe means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and thenumber of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return tocamp. 

During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity. The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes inthe houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon thecountry, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on thegranaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine andDanube, is easy, --particularly if it marches in a number of columns anddoes not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; butthis would be very difficult in some other countries, and quiteimpossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily beconceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army whereevery thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. Thissystem gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying iton too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable. 

A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invadedcountry contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use thelocal authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as tomake them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to theirfulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should createprovisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinarypowers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the pointsmost convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husbandthem, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking careto reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them. The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey thesupplies to the points occupied by the troops. 

It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent toundertake without having previously established these depots, as muchdepends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit ofthe people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:--

1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of onehundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant fromthe enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent ofcountry, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by anysingle operation. 

As the first operation never requires more than a month, during whichtime the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will besufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wantsof the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remainat a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it wasbesieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and ifthere had been a scarcity the operation might have failed. 

2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the suppliesobtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve thewants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take aposition to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise. 

3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should beecheloned as much as possible upon three different lines ofcommunication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of thearmy, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successivesupplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots shouldbe as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to havethe depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations, which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has tworeal advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts ofthe enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, itfacilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a singlepoint of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking theinitiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed theoffensive and gained some advantage. 

4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack itsmost necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not toadvance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficientprovisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon itslines of depots. 

5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing intheir path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, itis impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions andwithout having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Underthese circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if notimpossible. 

6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, butit is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or afterthe army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapidexpeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations shouldconsist of the most portable articles, --as biscuit, rice, &c. : thewagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds ofroads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and thesevehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not totake the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband thesuccessive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carrywith him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour. 

7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation ofsupplies; and the party which is master on this element can supplyhimself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case ofa large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communicationswith its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thusexposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with themass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the armyadvance too far from the coast, there will be danger of itscommunications being intercepted; and this danger increases with theprogress of the army. 

8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should baseitself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of itsships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategicfront opposed to the sea. 

9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operationsof the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and alsofree the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwisenecessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are themost favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this casethe lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it isessential that the troops should be able to move at some distance fromthe river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exteriorflank upon the river, --which might be as dangerous as if it were thesea. 

In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used fortransportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since asmall body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render itsure, it is necessary to occupy both banks, --which is hazardous, asMortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantagesof rivers are more substantial. 

10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may befed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populouscountries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source ofsupply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this planleads to plunder. The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchasedelsewhere. 

I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which mayappear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that inhis first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troopswere in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemyto procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which itwould be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains thesuccess of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual wardiffers from narrow theory. 

ARTICLE XXVI. 

The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines. --Wars ofSieges. 

Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers;secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign. 

The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate. It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with greatnatural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, andthese admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem hereis simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and thePyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, ofErzgebirge, of the Böhmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, andof the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by agood system of fortresses. 

Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was bestcovered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, ofMont-Genèvre, and of Mont-Cenis, --the only ones consideredpracticable, --were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works ofconsiderable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plainsof Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount thesedifficulties. 

These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passageof an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may becarried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some otherroute hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by FrancisI. , --which is so well described by Gaillard, --Napoleon's passage of theSaint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth inthe remark of Napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can sethis foot_, --a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man, and applied by him with great success. 

Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line oras a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently sowell calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade andcommunication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot besaid that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as longas the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the realfrontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods heldpoints upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession ofMayence, Luxembourg, and the _têtes de ponts_ of Manheim and Wesel onthe left bank. 

If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, andAdige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why theyshould not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever theypermit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations. 

An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria fromAustria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north byBohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the threefortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with somepoetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whosecurtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the mostrapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of"impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800, 1805, and 1809. 

The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means soformidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, orconsisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable numberof points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equallyapplicable to all cases. 

When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt tomake a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses, requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might notprevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to buildfewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectationof absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply theimpediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support themovements of the army which is to repel him. 

If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents theprogress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compelsthe army to detach a part of its force or to make _détours_ in itsmarch; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages tothe army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and, finally, is a place of refuge in case of need. 

Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations;and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy. 

The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies inthe distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass theforts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege;the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siegewhich it proposes to cover. 

As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the samedegree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. Theyare an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and thestate whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europein this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortressesvery close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban, who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the greatnumber of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this pointare as follow:--

1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, andshould extend from the frontiers toward the capital. [20] There should bethree in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in thethird, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this wouldrequire, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places. 

It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria hasnot so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upononly a third of its frontiers, (from Besançon to Dunkirk, ) and still hasnot enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Boardconvened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses hasdecided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove thatthere were not already too many, but that certain points in additionshould be fortified, while those on the first line, although too muchcrowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence. Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one fromBasel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totallydistinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts, requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that thisis enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than thenortheast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an importantelement of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she isbordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile, place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above givenis what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts ofnearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extendingfrom Königsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortifiedupon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographicalposition and extent of states may either diminish or increase the numberof fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included. 

2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic pointsalready designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, theirsites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, inorder to increase the difficulty of blockading them. 

3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their owndefense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly thosesituated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz, and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models ofthis kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers commandthree different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, forinstance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main thefort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidableplace in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men:so that works of this extent must be few in number. 

4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, arepreferable to small ones, --particularly when the assistance of thecitizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the wholepower of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene andMarlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of Frencharmies. During the last wars these places were passed without beingbesieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms againstFrance; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their frontone hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine withimpunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points. 

5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps, and positions; recently they have been directed only against organizedarmies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificialobstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: thetrue course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will alwaysbe of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies ofthe enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable topass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will beunwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends uponthe situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit ofthe nations. 

If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow inthe footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fiftythousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, inthe very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797. [21] Such events onlyoccur under exceptional circumstances. 

6. It may be concluded from what precedes, --1st, that, while fortifiedplaces are essential supports, abuse in their application may, bydividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d, that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the lineof these forts, --always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d, that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine, without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in orderto secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the armymay advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege otherplaces; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as thearmy advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siegeare correspondingly diminished. 

7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendlypeople, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest anenemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid theoperations of an army in the field. The fort of Königstein in 1813 wasas useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procureda _tête de pont_ on the Elbe. 

In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in valueto fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, andnot to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valleyof Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800. 

8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortressesas places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts tofacilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch maybe very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots, hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of anysmall bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularlyserviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weakenthe active army. 

9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positionsare a positive misfortune for both the army and state. 

10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war, except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continentalarmy, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsenalmost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 onKönigsberg, --which he did because it was convenient for supply. If theRussian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, hadsupported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger ofbeing forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases. 

The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are oftwo kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places withoutattacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least towatch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each otherit will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armée, under a singlecommander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. Whenthe invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carryon the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may eithercontinue its march or take a position to cover the siege. 

Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a wholearmy, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation andcontravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and expense as thesiege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteenmiles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French, were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enoughto condemn this ridiculous system. 

Much as the recital of the immense labors of Cæsar in the investment ofAlise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general inour times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessaryfor the investing force to strengthen its position by detached workscommanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which thesiege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon atMantua, and by the Russians at Varna. 

Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat andpursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. Ifthe besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up astrategic position covering all the avenues by which succor mightarrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can bespared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approachingarmy and decide whether the siege shall continue or not. 

Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for theoperations of an army of observation. 

INTRENCHED LINES. 

Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred toabove, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, andis in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it isintended to protect a part of the frontiers. 

As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for anarmy, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system ofintrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extentclosing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may beregarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in lengthand intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance, those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front, supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemedto fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced onevery occasion when they were assailed. 

The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the samepart as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; andthose of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate. 

The lines of Turin, (1706, ) and those of Mayence, (1795, ) althoughintended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines inquestion in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However wellthey may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzestheir defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned. To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked andsurrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, ismanifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see anotherinstance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat oftheir attack and defense. 

It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extendedlines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to bederived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besiegingforce, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 20: The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value ofsuch a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defilesof the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would nothave reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple. ]

[Footnote 21: Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in theFrioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from theRhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important tobeat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of thecircumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with theprinciples of war. ]

ARTICLE XXVII. 

The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts with Strategy. 

It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites ofordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards, or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts. Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, andeven of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they affordan army. 

It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which savedFrederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, thatsuch a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau onthe Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp ofTorres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the countrybetween the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla. 

The principal rule in this connection is that camps should beestablished on strategic points which should also possess tacticaladvantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812, it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to theirdefensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow. Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days. 

The maxims which have been given for the determination of the greatdecisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, becausethey ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of thesecamps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departurefor an offensive operation, as _têtes de ponts_ to assure the crossingof a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge fora defeated army. 

However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficultto locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp ofTorres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it canbe passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled toabandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresdenwas an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as itwas outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of anordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corpswithin a few days for want of provisions. 

Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporarysupport to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, evenwhen the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken inreverse, --that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a_coup de main_. It is also important that they be established close to afortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front ofthe camp nearest to the line of retreat. 

In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tête de pont_on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified citylike Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will neverbe more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and ofcollecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy, it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in theopen country. 

The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularlyadvantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If aFrench army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lostwhen the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but ifit were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with alittle assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while theenemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and theintrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine. 

We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; butseveral German generals have maintained that they are suitable to coverplaces or to prevent sieges, --which appears to me to be a littlesophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a placewhen an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the fortsand camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real andprincipal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, atemporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensivelyupon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such acamp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simplyto retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolongedthe defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did nothis army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not thinkso; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and thesiege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege wasnecessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken byreason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence oughtrather to have hastened than retarded its surrender. 

The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would, indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French hadpossessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had notbeen crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau inthe Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave theplace to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of afortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an armyto pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the objectof preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place inEurope is upon such a site?

So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, itseems to me that a very important question in the establishment of thesecamps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on thesame bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to makea choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located tocover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter. 

To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on thebank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principaldanger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse bypassing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon thesame bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon theother bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to takethe latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not holdfor twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemyfor a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank ofthe Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, atKehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while ifStrasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp wouldeasily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine. 

Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortifiedplace upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks wouldfulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recentlyconstructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. This system of thePrussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanentworks, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be itsdefects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immenseadvantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, theinconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are onlyvery useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed tothe dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleonat Essling, )--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisionsand munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works mightnot avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has theadvantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on thesame bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom fromattack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city wereupon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched campof field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of securityeither for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinaryfortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily makeit a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouchingfrom it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficultof access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress ofa force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed. 

Much has been recently said of a new system used by the ArchdukeMaximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz, --by masonry towers. As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard inthe _Spectateur Militaire_, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only knowthat the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreisappeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible ofimprovements, --which the archduke seems to have added. We are told thatthe towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, havethe advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of beingsheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if wellflanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageouscamp, --always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines. If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered byfield-works, (to be thrown up when required, ) they will make a camppreferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageousas afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers numberthirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fortcommanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank, some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this lineis about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and sixhundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by apalisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, witha barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleventwenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Thosetowers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _déblais_ of which formsa high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I shouldthink it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire. 

Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a completebastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank, would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than aquarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, anentirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege, they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched campto give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a largearmy, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a warlike that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved thecapital. 

To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better toencircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have builtseven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of theTraun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as tohave included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, theTraun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of thefirst rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, evenif not quite so large, would have answered for a large army, particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort ofPerlingsberg had been preserved. 

TÊTES DE PONTS. 

_Têtes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. Thedifficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the faceof the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works, which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since ifthe bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events whichmay attend a rapid retreat across a large river. 

_Têtes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were_keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they alsocover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then theywill mutually support each other. It is needless to state that theseworks are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon allfronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that theprincipal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of_têtes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed ofdetached and closed works, while _têtes de ponts_ usually consist ofcontiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense mustbe occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generallyrequire a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments aredetached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them. 

The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequentpart of this volume. 

ARTICLE XXVIII. 

Strategic Operations in Mountains. 

A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, underfour different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or itmay be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, orthere may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army maydebouch into large and rich plains. 

If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey andHungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countriesthe mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but adifficult defile to cross, --a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome, is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range oncecrossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains maybe regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back andfind a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observedis, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line ofretreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and thePyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad, ) are of thisnature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and theVosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the wholecountry as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province, the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line ofmountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy andCastile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are asmarked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporaryobstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin ofthe Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields ofMongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theissfor a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads, which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungarythere are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, thoughnot so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class offields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as itsevacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of theWaag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. Theattack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic studyof the most interesting character. 

When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland, is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains issecondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armiesdeciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, beotherwise if this be the whole field. 

It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gavecontrol of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gavecontrol of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent andcompetent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated thatthe valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, inthis kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and theirarrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing onBavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the lattershould throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replacethem by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficultfor the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a forceon its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, andLofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousandmen, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority overthe army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment tomask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz, --asMoreau did in 1800. 

Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as onlyaccessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields ofoperations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. Thecampaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on thisbranch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring outtheir teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannotdo better than refer my readers to it. 

When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland bythe French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent ofthe theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples, we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in thetransactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality ofSwitzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studyingthe interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, andMassena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first isa model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second isa model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decidedon the plains. 

I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from thisstudy. 

When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principaltheater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirelybased upon maxims applicable in an open country. 

Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operationsof the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. Insuch a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a smallnumber of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advancedguards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to providemeans for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separatethese valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable forthe passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by smallbodies of light troops. 

The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of thelarger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few innumber; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of itsforces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to directattacks to dislodge it. 

However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare anddifficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On thecontrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of thesecenters of communication between the large valleys upon the line ofretreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than itwould be in an open country; since the occupation of one or twodifficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of thewhole army. 

If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must beadmitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessityof covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be madeupon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversalmarches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points. In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and thedifficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by thehundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would havebeen impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversalroutes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg toMemmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roadshave effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had beenentrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, fromwhich there was but a single outlet. 

On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level countryconcentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter tooccupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will beeasy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a verymountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principalroutes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of theenemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since seriousinconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be notobserved. 

Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense inmountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when weattempt simply to give advice in such cases, --to say nothing of layingdown maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of asingle definite front of small extent, consisting of four or fiveconverging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of twoor three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would beeasier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend theconstruction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turnedpoint of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigadesof infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half thearmy should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be inposition either to sustain the advanced guards most seriouslythreatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when hedebouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders ofthe advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point forrendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them tocontinue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, thegeneral on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to themany difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, ifthere be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of whichare to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of thedefense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of acordon of forts becomes dangerous, --while it is not easy to adopt abetter one. 

We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the considerationof the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan'sdefeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen andRheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He hadenemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch, and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italianarmy menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defendsuch a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these greatvalleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, towardSoleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of thetrap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot ofthe defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? howabandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and theapproach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to theCoalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where wouldbe his army when he would need it to give battle to an approachingforce? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate themasses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrenderthe keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where aninferior army could be concentrated without compromising it. 

After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, itseemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the lineof the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis, --a line shorterthan that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distanceto the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going intoLombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction withthe archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to provethat if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defensein a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense, because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only beremedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to theoffensive. 

General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, onthe contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kindof war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course hemight lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends bydemonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an activeattack, --which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable inmountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, itought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where hesustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, evenwhen he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard. Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposedto Wurmser and Alvinzi. 

As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by readingthe events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon theMuttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring tocapture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire thepresence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved thatgeneral and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and theMuttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe hadbeen, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinarywas the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousandmen was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousandallies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth afterfour admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory_in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic willis worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons, need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, notto risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall Isay also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operationsshould be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally, that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of thegreat valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with greatmobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means ofdefending the country?

I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainouscountries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is anational one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homeswith the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: everyadvance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is alwaysnecessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more orless numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes ofStanz and of the Tyrol. 

The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case:it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which areextensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous. 

In the first case there is little more to be done than this, --viz. : makedemonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead theenemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point whichpromises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to breakthrough a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of thedefenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the wholeline is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture ofLeutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand menon Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizingthis central point compelled them to retreat in all directions, ) showthat with brave infantry and bold commanders these famousmountain-ranges can generally be forced. 

The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. Turned the armywhich was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains betweenMont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those_insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose himit would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we havealready seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss andItalians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because itinclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateralissues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops intothese valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the armytoward Turin or Carignano. 

When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, andthe immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined toregard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by asingle valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it oughtto be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. Inmy opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and toconfirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of thecolumns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or sixroads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and theroutes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, theenemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of theSaint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on thecenter, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, todivide the attention of the enemy and flank his march. 

The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a muchgreater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may beaccomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields ofbattle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainousregion, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here itwould be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrowand deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus theinvading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two orthree lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated, the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at thejunction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should bedriven from all the ridges which separate these valleys. 

Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland wouldbe the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and withtheir assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triplenumber. 

To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely withlocalities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies, would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the bestschool for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 bythe Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in myHistory of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign ofthe Grisons by Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyrand Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and thepassage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I. , ) are good guides in thisstudy. 

ARTICLE XXIX. 

Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions. 

There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are thosewhich are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. Thesecond are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts ofcountry, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by seaby means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond theseas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includesthe great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful state is attacked. 

As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on theRhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainlybe stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either ofthese points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for itsbase, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be thesame as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines ofdefense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in theirarsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon theVistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sadfate of many of these great invasions. 

In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state ismerely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its owninterest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers inthe way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander ofall the armies, --particularly if he belong to the state which is not aprincipal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. GeneralKoutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirtythousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in themean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousandmen brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thusfound himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activityof Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete hismisfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance ofabout seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have beenhopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. Thebattle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered theRussian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost becamethe victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it theopportunity of regaining its own country. 

The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in theexpedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen inHolland, are examples which should be well studied by every commanderunder such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was lessdisadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, hiscommunications with his base were preserved and his operations were inno respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate ofthe French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Greatabandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties wereallies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the politicalties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissensionwhich may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind havebeen cited in Article XIX. , on political objective points. 

History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasionsacross extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered withforests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron werenecessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent tothe other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overranempires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artilleryand the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularlysince civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closertogether and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustainingeach other, no such events have taken place. 

Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in theMiddle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those ofCharlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have beenscarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. To Naples, and ofCharles XII. Into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes inGermany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and theSwedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and, besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times noone but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europefrom the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will beimitated. 

Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, allinvasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present thesame operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises fromthese great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines ofoperations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only onesapplicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable, although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812, although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. Hiscare in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, whileMacdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor coveredSmolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that hehad neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himselfsafely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simplyon account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success. 

If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomaticprecautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies oftroops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long atWilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who wasunequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty whichthat general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I donot speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after theconflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken placeimmediately. He has also been accused of having too much despiseddistances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin. Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought toknow the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead ofwintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have beenpossible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without havingpreviously defeated the Russian army. 

It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment ofAustria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the braveryof the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of thepeople. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty andsincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would havegiven him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia, he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave andenthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to thegreatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm. 

The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital pointfor their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "neverto attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant allianceof a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford aproper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and whichmay also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means ofresuming the offensive. " As to the precautions to be observed in theseoperations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. And XXII. , on thesafety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventualbases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; tothese should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries, --in short, accuracy in calculation andmoderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carriedtoo far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims caninsure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only fiveor six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearlyruined nations and armies. 

Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have beenrare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last indate of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of thesea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers, has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions. 

It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things nowis very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquestof Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or whenAlexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while hisfleet coasted the shore. 

Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true thatthe assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be ofimmense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progressdepends upon the winds, --which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kindof fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rareoccurrence. 

The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line ofoperations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, arethe only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operationsof war. 

Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attackingCadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based uponthe Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and theTagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart ofHungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without goingas far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposabletroops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will allbe elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to beundertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, inview of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general. Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasionsas in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated inArticle VI. , there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would notbe useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change ofpolicy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of thatday, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing thestrict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when theirco-operation cannot be obtained. 

EPITOME OF STRATEGY

 * * * * *

The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilledby what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations whichenter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from thedefinition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most importantoperations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and thatwe depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treatingof these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinationsof grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid ofwhich the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made. 

By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, willbe better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will givea synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter. 

From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that themanner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theatersof operations is found in what follows:--

1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which thereciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, inaccordance with Article XVIII. 

2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategicfield, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemywith the least risk to one's self. 

3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines ofoperations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the ArchdukeCharles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, forretreats parallel to the frontiers. 

On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the successof Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon theextremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which wassuccessful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operationsupon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determinedby the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maximspresented in Article XXI. 

4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving themsuch directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of theforces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or fromaffording each other mutual support. 

5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategicpositions, and all large detachments made to cover the most importantstrategic points of the theater of war. 

6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility andactivity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it maybe important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions ofthe hostile army. 

The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of anarmy, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of theenemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect willbe quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisivestrategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows tothe enemy can be given. 

However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisivecourse to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content withattaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid andsuccessive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy, thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly andcontinually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both ofgaining victories and of securing great results therefrom. 

The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths mostsatisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, alreadymentioned in Article XXIV. , and the details of which may be found inVolume IV. Of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Fortybattalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, andLandau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained fourvictories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have beenfound in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisivestrategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of theCoalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was uponthe Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted themost severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the mostpressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategicprinciple; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the mostdecisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon. The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples. 

It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to beable to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater ofwar most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its owncountry, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, andof _têtes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the greatdecisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part ofthe science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these linesand these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon hasafforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon andMont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads fromthe Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as bydifferent fortified places projected or completed. 

CHAPTER IV. 

GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES. 

Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about greatquestions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies tothe decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius andfortune, gains victories. 

Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary tobattles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle intactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass ofthe force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon thatpoint the possession of which promises the most important results. 

Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and decidingfeatures of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies havebeen destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitchedbattles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true thata complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the samecharacter when there may have been no grand strategic combinations. 

The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes whichare not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of theorder of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in theplan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details, the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officerssubordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, theproportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm, superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, andthe manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, aswell as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories andtheir results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in assertingthat a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannotresult in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a fewbrief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanishbefore his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning hisposition. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was themaneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As is evident from Article XXXII. , I by no means intend to discouragethe use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate ofit; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully andopportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general'sdesign to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at thesame time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic thantactical combinations to accomplish it. 

There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or thosefought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy'sattack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another inposition; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from thecollision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine insuccession the different combinations they present. 

ARTICLE XXX. 

Positions and Defensive Battles. 

When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its lineof battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of thiswork, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_and _orders of battle_, --things which have been constantly confounded. Iwill designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied bybattalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army willtake up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it willawait attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it isthe right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tacticalintervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fullyexplained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention toexecute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, theoblique order, the perpendicular order. 

This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a properdistinction between two things which should by no means beconfounded. [22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident thatthe _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements;because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it willbe must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line ofbattle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement oftroops formed with an intention of fighting while executing somemaneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly tooffensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that theline of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body oftroops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of aposition, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order orany other. I refer above only to ordinary cases. 

Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war ofpositions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at afavorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for thepurpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may betaken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, suchas a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controlsthe surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege. 

There are two kinds of positions, --the _strategic_, which has beendiscussed in Article XX. , and the _tactical_. The latter, again, aresubdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupiedto await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected, --in aword, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations havebeen treated in Article XXVII. , and their attack and defense arediscussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we have positions naturally strong, where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Thirdand last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on thedefensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions varyaccording to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importancenot to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails tooextensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steepand difficult of access, --quite suitable places, probably, for temporarycamps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of thiskind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult ofaccess, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troopsforming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstaclespresented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemythan for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, intaking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great errorif his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it wasexactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason, Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made agood choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approachwere well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover, rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply abattle-ground. 

The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions arethe following:--

 1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to approach the line of battle. 

 2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense. 

 3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point deemed the proper one. 

 4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements. 

 5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat. 

 6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or at least some point of the front. 

 This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed to afford perfect protection. This danger--about which there can be no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable obstacles. [23]

 7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full details on this point are given in the description of the battle of Prague, (Chapter II. Of the Seven Years' War. )

 8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defense, --as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo. Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered. 

 When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining idle spectators of it. 

The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are butpalliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive isto _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_. Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has beenmentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings usto an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo. Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good roadbehind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, asNapoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is thatsuch a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirelyopen field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposureto very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, aportion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would, in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a greatpart of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than aforest, --this statement being made upon the supposition that there areat least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures forretreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to presstoo closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flankmovement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if, as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; forthis re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops andgive them time to pass off in succession on the main roads. 

When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varyingchances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, giverise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking theinitiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops andstriking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts uponthe defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, isoften taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements bythose of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantagesare not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smallerextent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal hismovements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at oncecounteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the partyadvancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arisingfrom accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostileline; and, however flat a country it may be, there are alwaysinequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges, farm-houses, villages, &c. , which must either be taken possession of orbe passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy'sbatteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to agreater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fireeither of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light ofthese facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantagesresulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages. 

However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still moremanifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history. Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, ifattacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting byall the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready totake the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatestsuccess. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keepingstrictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must giveway when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general whoindeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fallupon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him andtransfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onwardmovement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strengthinto the action at the most important point, --a thing altogetherimpossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a generalwho occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, hasthe advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previouslyarranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteriesplaced so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay verydearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; andwhen the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself stronglyassailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, theadvantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moraleffect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposedto be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops. 

A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal successeither the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable, --1st, that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should knowhow to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his_coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be ableto rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, heshould by no means neglect to apply the general principle which wouldhave regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th, that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths aredemonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well asby Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I havemodified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it iswrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, ifwe continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition oftroops in line, it must be improper to designate certain importantmaneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order ofbattle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _obliquesystem of battle_, &c. 

I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The _order of battle_on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinaryformation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line ofbattle_. ]

[Footnote 23: The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, andthe rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than thefamous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube, in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said thatthe courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but, throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that thedifficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need notbe insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingenthe great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almostineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense. ]

ARTICLE XXXI. 

Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle. 

We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights whenassaulting another in position. [24] An army reduced to the strategicdefensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an armyreceiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take theoffensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishesnumerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensivebattles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantagesof the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to theconsideration of offensive movements. 

It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantageover the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than thelatter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty. 

As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attackmust be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called_order of battle_. 

It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced withouta detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirelyknown. In either case it should be well understood that there is inevery battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more thanof any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder tomake a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements shouldtherefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point. 

The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been alreadystated, by the character of the position, the bearing of differentlocalities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by thearrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy'sflank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might beattained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tacticallyconsidered; but it may happen that the height in question is verydifficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the leastimportance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the leftof the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which provincewas at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tacticallyconsidered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to beheld, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one lineof retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing theright, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat andthrow the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost alltheir _matériel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. Thiscourse was also easier for them on account of the difference in thefeatures of the ground, led to more important results, and would havediminished the obstacles in the future. 

The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated:1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tacticalkey; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that whichcombines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When thedifficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategicpoint of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point;4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point dependsvery much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in linesof battle too much extended and divided the center will always be theproper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center isthe strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in thiscase is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numericalsuperiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously uponboth extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferiornumerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all thecombinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as toobtain the most effective action upon that one of the three pointsmentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success, --apoint very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned. 

The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy orto cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruinhis army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him atsome point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flankand rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking himin front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his lineturned. 

To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to makechoice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used. 

At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz. : 1. The simpleparallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensivecrotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The orderreinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the obliquereinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order onone or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. Theorder by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on thecenter; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon thecenter and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16. )

[Illustration: Fig. 5. [25]

A TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

____________________________|____________________________ B ]

Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has beenstated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended toturn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the meritsof each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of thegeneral principles which have been laid down. For example, it ismanifest that the parallel order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for itrequires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion againstbattalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tacticalskill is needed in such a battle. 

There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order, which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in greatstrategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy'scommunications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering itsown; when the battle takes place between them, that army which hasreached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, havingeffected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its effortsshould now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor toopen a way through for himself. Except for this single case, theparallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battlecannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other mustgain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage willthen be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when toengage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored byfortune. 

[Illustration: Fig. 6. 

 | | | | A | |BTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT | |______________________|________________________| B]

The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is mostusually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of anoffensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst inthe case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a veryremarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed ifproperly attacked. 

[Illustration: Fig. 7. ATTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

 ____|___ ___________________|____________________ B ____|___]

The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7, ) or upon thecenter, (Fig. 8, page 190, ) to pierce that of the enemy, is much morefavorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more inaccordance with the general principles which have been laid down;although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of theline which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its ownsafety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy. 

[Illustration: Fig. 8. ATTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

 ________|________ _________________ B _________________]

[Illustration: Fig. 9. ]

The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking asuperior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the mainstrength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, ithas two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not onlykept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the doubleduty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and ofbeing at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engagedwing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battlesof Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in moderntimes was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (SeeChapter VII. Of Treatise on Grand Operations. )

[Illustration: Fig. 10. C | \ | \ | \|TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT/| / | / | / | C | B-| | | | | | | |

]

[Illustration: Fig. 11. 

| || || ___________A______________ || || || || || || ||-B B-|| || || || || |]

The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the directionalong which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle. Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positionsindicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its firstposition on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the armyA, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line;and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond theextremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the rightor the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so takehim in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown inFig. 10. The inference is that one division of the assailing army wouldtake a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainderof the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; andthis would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown inFigures 9 and 16. 

The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may bevery advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is verydecidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is tobring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weakerarmy would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superiorforce. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on. 

[Illustration: Fig. 12. ]

The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since theday when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannæ. This order mayindeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise toit; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him, and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this orderis adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling onthe center, has only to attack the wings, which present theirextremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if theyhad been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcelyever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order tofight a battle, as will be seen farther on. 

[Illustration: Fig. 12, _bis_. ]

An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken linewith the center retired, (Fig. 12, _bis_. ) If several writers may bebelieved, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on thefamous days of Crécy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better thana semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack, whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all theadvantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if theenemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, iscontent to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort uponone wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of aconcave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed anerror in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danubebehind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges ofcommunication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver atpleasure. 

[Illustration: Fig. 13. ]

The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for anengagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings mustbe retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when adefensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to bepassed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it maybecome a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. Ifan enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a singlewing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army. [26]

The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, becausethe Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the centeror upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or sixdiverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly thesame convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second andthird days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it hadjust the result that might have been expected. 

[Illustration: Fig. 14 ATTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ B _____ _______]The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature asthe perpendicular order, (Fig. 11, ) being, however, better than that, because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction wherethe reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both asregards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the centerand make at that point a threatening counter-attack. 

[Illustration: Fig. 15 ATTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

 ___|___ ___|__ __|___ _____ _____ _____B B__________ _____

]

The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with specialsuccess against an army occupying a position too much cut up and tooextended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from thewings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would beprobably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamentalprinciple, this order of attack would appear to be less certain ofsuccess against an army having a connected and closed line; for thereserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to acteither by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremostechelons, might readily repulse them. 

If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedgeor _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it alsodiffers from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solidmass, --an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use ofartillery, --it would have a large open space in the middle, which wouldrender movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has beensaid, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and mightbe equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if thewings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against theflanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result. A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps bea much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line inthis case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as tothe point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelonsof the center by the flank. 

This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of theintrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapterxxviii. ) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certainthat the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments, there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, thisformation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the pointof his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be madeupon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack. 

[Illustration Fig 16. ]

The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at thesame time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in anattack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It mayeven be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. Theattack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, preventsthe assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank, as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which ishemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, havingto contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated andprobably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon hisvictories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt atBorodino, --where he obtained only a partial success, on account of theheroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in thefamous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout'scorps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also atBautzen, --where an unprecedented success would have been the result, butfor an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wingintended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, everyarrangement having been made with that view. 

It should be observed that these different orders are not to beunderstood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A generalwho would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as uponpaper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would belikely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are nowfought. In the time of Louis XIV. Or of Frederick, it was possible toform lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures, because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collectedtogether, and were in presence of each other several days, thus givingample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columnsto be at regular distances from each other. But in our day, --when armiesbivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility, when they take position near each other in obedience to orders giventhem while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there hasbeen no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position, --finally, when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line ofbattle, --under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must belaid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figureshave never been of any other use than to indicate approximatearrangements. 

If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under theinfluence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art ofwinning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order ofbattle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success ofmaneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be torender certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerousfractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will givegood ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty isto cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisivemaneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, isto result in victory. 

Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will beunderstood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief, excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective_coup-d'oeil militaire_, --every thing of this kind may interfere withthe simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, withoutspeaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent thearrival of a corps at the appointed place. 

Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisivemaneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuversseasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed thanthose determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating toprevious strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are todecide the day upon those points where their presence will secure theexpected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From themoment when Blücher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont, nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, andthey could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In likemanner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of theallies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them, for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better whathe was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one. 

As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon theco-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army, with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank, it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it dependsupon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarelyseen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII. 

Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of anorder of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles beginwithout even the assailant having a well-defined object, although thecollision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either fromcircumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy'sposition and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may bestill expected to arrive on the field. 

From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible toreduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or thatthe adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of anengagement, --an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the casescited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan itis probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupylines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; theparty acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the stormwill burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, tobe used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar effortsto have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attackshall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directedagainst the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once. Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear aresemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even inunexpected engagements the same thing would happen, --which will, it ishoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of thedifferent systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless. 

There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves myassertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of beingrepresented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, atRivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces towardthe center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy. At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. AtLeipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very likeFig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether like Fig. 16, bringing uptwo masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing;and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before thePrussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirelyunforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensivemovement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almostperpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to breakthrough the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on thecenter being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attackvigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by thetwo wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his centerwas covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition, the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon theenemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself, the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, savedhim from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won bystrategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do withthem. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle. 

I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to markout upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would beused in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may neverthelessbear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may socombine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall besimilar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations, whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, toform a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field;and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy'sline of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategyrequires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts tothis point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check orwatch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the pointthe possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, hewill have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics canimpose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in themost perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of abattle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX. )

Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to methat this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made inthe Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon. 

The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a moderninvention, a theorist's fancy, --an opinion I can by no means share; forthe oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen itused with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon's seems the moreremarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo, the very order of which he thus denies the existence. 

If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigidand precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school. Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but Irepeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, andwhen such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics itcan only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea bythe use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line ofbattle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's mustbe oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of anotherarmy, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon itwhile the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction ofthe line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of itwill be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so farfrom being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that byechelons on one wing, (Fig. 14. )

As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be deniedthat at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians wasa concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these ordersparallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and theywould be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part ofthe line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy thananother. 

Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometricalfigures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battlesin a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attendedto:--

 1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force the enemy from his position by all reasonable means. 

 2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and turning his position. 

 3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault. 

 4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points. 

 5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing, while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique line. 

 6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point. 

 7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position, and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least expect to meet it. 

 8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset. A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. In the practical use of this system many variations must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c. 

 9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force. 

 History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers, especially when used against generals of weak character; and, although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these turning movements with attacks by main force. 

 10. The combination of these two methods--that is to say, the attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but, in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in presence of a contemptible enemy. 

 11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force is the following:--Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry. 

 But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that, the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to replace them by those of the second line, because they generally follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in repelling the attack. 

 These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable, and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first. 

 12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth: "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of battles. "

 In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. 

 The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be always held in hand, [27] will, therefore, at the critical moment of the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention. This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put forth, --on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous. 

 13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a strong probability of his repulse. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and theother assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party anddefensive for the other. ]

[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelveorders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies arerepresented each in a single line, in order not to complicate thefigures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battleought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns ofattack, in squares, or checkerwise. ]

[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also insome cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or theenemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, afalse attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against oneextremity, would be the best method to use against such a line. ]

[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged whenit is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a finalreserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreaudecided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and whatKellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader ofhistory. ]

ARTICLE XXXII. 

Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles. 

We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turnan enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which maybe expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the widedétours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure ofso many plans seemingly well arranged. 

It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous whichis so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is takingplace, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to whichhe is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so manymaneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeededagainst others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardousin presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entiresuccess against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact totake the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himselfhave been in the habit of moving in this manner. 

It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of theforce well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for anything that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill andseems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may bemore daring. 

A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader ofthe truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of theseextended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and thearmies concerned in them. 

In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague becausethe Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yardsbetween their right and the remainder of their army, --the latter partremaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction wasthe more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorterdistance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick hadto attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederickwas obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it. 

On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended anddisconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right ofMarshal Daun. [28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentricmovement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whoseline was thus reformed. 

The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiarwith that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrotherwished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on theplateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten, --while their left was piledup in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was makinga wide _détour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he wasspeedily surrounded and captured. 

No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived theunfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army ofsixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eightthousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilstSaint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men, ) was topass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army ofsixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over thesedivided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in theirrear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle. 

We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired tosurround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing ofthe allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him offfrom Vienna, (where he did not desire to return, ) by a circular movementof nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in theirline. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, andsurrounded their left, which was completely shut up between LakesTellnitz and Melnitz. 

Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar toNapoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat toPortugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line, --seeingwhich, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had nosupport. 

If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, hemight have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each casea total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixtythousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to beunable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take properadvantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way, Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chiefmerit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. With the Duke ofYork or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have beensuccessful. 

Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterlooand Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first wasalmost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rareconcurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we willsearch in vain in military history for another example of a singlebrigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected inthe defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in allprobability, to lay down his arms. 

At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to thesuccessful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the centerunder Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportuneassistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would havebeen the result. 

So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion thatno rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; forit seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule anorder of battle well closed and well connected, a general will findhimself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of hisenemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him toregulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbersor discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent werethe forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver tooutflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, andopportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on theenemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communicationsbefore giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing armypreserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to besuccessful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnectedmaneuver during the battle. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. AndXXV. Of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations. ]

ARTICLE XXXIII. 

Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March. 

The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march givesrise to one of the most imposing scenes in war. 

In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in aposition chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance asclose and accurate as possible. It often happens, however, --especiallyas war is now carried on, --that two armies approach each other, eachintending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collisionensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where itdoes not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by anotherwhich has prepared a surprise for it, --as happened to the French atRossbach. 

A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of askillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is alwayspossible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commandermay not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen, Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant geniusendowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations. 

There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by nomeans easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are thevery cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind thefundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applyingthem, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decidedupon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms. 

Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage, and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than causetheir advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads theyare traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time beconcentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper directionconsidering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed indeploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if thedeployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than abadly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advancedguard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of thetroops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach, Treatise on Grand Operations. )

In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching uponseveral roads, and divided into masses which may act independently, these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles areunchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and thenthe mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is bestsuited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers theenemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him. 

ARTICLE XXXIV. 

Of Surprises of Armies. 

I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments, --the chieffeatures in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the lightRussian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myselfto an examination of the surprise of whole armies. 

Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effectedthan at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing areheard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next toan impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgottenand the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is knownbecause there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' Warpresents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows thata surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that aresleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from thecombination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremityof the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take itso entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged fromtheir tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the pointintended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack. 

As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march, prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to planone it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy'scamp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like asurprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpectedattack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse hisimprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; butthere was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through hisown negligence. 

It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is tofall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing ofthe sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place;and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and cangive a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of hisforces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen eventsoccur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, althoughit is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination whichrenders the victory certain even before the battle is fought. 

For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunitiesfor surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used toprevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of anywell-organized army should point out the means for doing the last. 

ARTICLE XXXV. 

Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps orLines. --Of Coups de Main in General. 

There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses, are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless becarried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogetherpracticable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some othermeans of getting to the parapet. 

The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinationsas that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups demain_. 

This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strengthof the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they arebuilt; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, withthe morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of allof these varieties. 

For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw, the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch, Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each withvarying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments werebetter connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, infact, a _tête de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; forthe archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it wouldhave been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. AtWarsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they hadas a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defendedby a number of desperate men. 

Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front ofwhich, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as wassuited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simpleredoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keepgiving it its sole strength. [29]

At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so atTurin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificantparapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep. In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they wereattacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugeneassailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front, only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the rightflank. 

The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are fewin number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attackeda little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but ifthis operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is byno means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched campwill permit itself to be surprised, --especially as the regulations ofall services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attackby main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, thefollowing simple and reasonable directions are laid down:--

 1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire, which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the defenders. 

 2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and mount the parapet. 

 3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken, skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their support. 

 4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible. 

 5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most daring rashness. 

Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers forescalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with greatadvantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating thepassage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets. 

Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read, none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenchedcamp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositionsfor attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, isan excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be citedas one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to MarshalPaskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to befollowed, no better can be given than the arrangements made forattacking Dresden in 1813. 

Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults orescalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747, --bothpreceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since inneither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault. 

Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a betterinterconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried, because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almostimpossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point. The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are describedin the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. And XXII. , )and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellentlessons for study. 

This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is sofamiliar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details ofit; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory wasbought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic planwas certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenzato Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio, was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. Whenwe examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victorsowed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required nogreat effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare theorder he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contemptfor his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand alliedtroops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on theone side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp forforty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was everattempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid ofinstruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write abetter. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigadein two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to makeopenings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, makeup the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order tocarry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point ofthe intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half thebodies of its defenders. 

But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanationof the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. Ifthey have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them byassault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned bystrategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course lastindicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is anyreason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon oneof the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored. There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by thedefenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at thatpoint, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeededsimply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and thecharacter of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course tobe pursued. 

The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps. It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the reliefand proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would bequite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn awayfrom the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry ofmoderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of thischaracter; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch sogloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his standat the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet withan inclination of scarcely thirty degrees. 

If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to thinkof penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces, the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columnsadvancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them. This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because theenemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensivereturn upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. Ageneral and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already halfconquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to themwhen their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, Icannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a riskand meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause ofcomplaint. 

Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps andlines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed betweenthe center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right ofthe left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangementsuccor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, whichcould not be done were there but one central reserve. It has beensuggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchmentis very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two arequite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of greatimportance, --that the troops be made to understand they must by no meansdespair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point;because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attackthe assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may havesupposed in his power. 

COUPS DE MAIN. 

These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for thecapture of posts of different strength or importance. [30] They partakeof the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for boththese methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to asuccessful issue. Although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tacticaloperations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of thecaptured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will becomenecessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de mainin Article XXXVI. , when speaking of detachments. However tiresome theserepetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executingsuch operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attackof intrenchments. 

I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to theseoperations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rulesare not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, andrefer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic, where they are mentioned. 

I have previously stated that important results may often follow fromthese enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessfulattack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprisesof Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814, as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of thedifferent kinds of _coup de main_. Some are effected by surprise, othersby open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of theassailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the thingswhich have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_. 

As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longerof the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence uponthe results of a great strategic operation. 

The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, thatof a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like thetwo attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in theGrisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally, the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot ofprovisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are theenterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engagingin them may be exposed. 

Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes withfascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for thesame purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always beprepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes ofsoldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded theintrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona byPrince Eugene. 

In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; forwhat has been done once may be done again. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 29: The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and thethird day, more than one hundred thousand. ]

[Footnote 30: The distinction between the importance and the strength ofa post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very littleimportance, and vice aversá. ]

CHAPTER V. 

OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICALAND PARTLY TACTICAL. 

ARTICLE XXXVI. 

Of Diversions and Great Detachments. 

The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so importanta bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determiningtheir strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatestand most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothingis more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out andhaving a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equallycertain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsideratelyadopted. Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essentialqualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out manydetachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or ofattacking the main body during their absence. 

The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes beencarried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that manypersons now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedlymuch safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass;but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining acomplete or even considerable success. The essential point in thismatter is to send out as few detachments as possible. 

There are several kinds of detachments. 

 1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater or less importance. 

 2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if threatened. 

 3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations, in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some combined operation. 

 4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign. 

I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at adistance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of atheater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishlysupposed the whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in buttwo cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employedcannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from thereal theater of operations, and the second is that where such adetachment would receive strong support from the population among whichit was sent, --the latter case belonging rather to political thanmilitary combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out ofplace here. 

The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russianexpedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward theend of the last century, (which have been referred to in Article XIX. , )are well known. 

In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intendedan Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combinedforces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover, nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separatedpoints. But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremitiesof Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover, Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction with Massena in the Frioul, andBernadotte, leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations ofUlm and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had nodifficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of thefailure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an operationwould have been proper. 

In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men toLa Vendée, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing thenumbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon theRhine, and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have beennot only very useful, but decisive. 

It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and ofsmall bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operationsof the main army. 

If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondaryobjects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it isno less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be, indispensable. 

These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first arepermanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a directionopposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout acampaign. The second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose ofassisting in carrying out some special enterprise. 

Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of anarmy that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of whichmention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat whenthe configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. Forexample, a Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged toleave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and thevalley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line ofoperations. However successful it may be, a respectable force mustalways be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank ofthe river toward Routchouk. 

This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have adouble strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corpsmust be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of themain army. Other localities and other circumstances might be mentionedwhere this measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is thedouble strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French armypassing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its maincolumn, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strongto hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line ofcommunications. The third example is the frontier of Spain, whichenables the Spaniards to establish a double front, --one covering theroad to Madrid, the other having Saragossa or Galicia as a base. Towhichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on theother proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction. 

All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlargeas much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and togive them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable themby opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkableillustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in thevalley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating towardthe Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the riskof losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the partsof his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded thathe could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended noparticular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments uponhis communications. 

Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the followingreasons:--

 1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations, or else to cover your own. 

 2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own reinforcements. 

 3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing army, while a blow is struck at the remainder. 

 4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions, on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a convoy of your own. 

 5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an enterprise in another direction. 

 6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison shut up within the ramparts. 

 7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications of an enemy already retreating. 

However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations asthose enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they arealways secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to besuccessful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must, therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reasonthan that they were not kept together. 

We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that theirsuccess depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skillof their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution. 

Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of CharlesXII. By causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famousconvoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denainthe large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale. 

The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick duringthe siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate ofthe two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxenin 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid makingdetachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our owntimes, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teachingthat a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we mustadmit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the faultwas not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting itproperly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed atMaxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason. 

Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army aredecidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging theenemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces iscollected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck. In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corpsmaking the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the mainbody. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts. 

In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of hismarch, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he wasreally filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simplyshown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau. 

In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps ofBernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the ArchdukeFerdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in anotherdirection he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but hewithdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decidethe issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was theresult of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from beingin opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary tofacilitate their application. 

It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot belaid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success ofwhich depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk ofmaking detachments only after careful consideration and observation ofall the surrounding circumstances. The only reasonable rules on thesubject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recallthorn immediately when their duty is performed. The inconveniencesnecessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by givingjudicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders:herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff. 

One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachmentssometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed bytactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in goodpositions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflictwith too large a body of troops. In such cases ease and rapidity ofmotion will be most likely to insure safety. It seldom happens that itis right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the positionit has taken, whether voluntarily or by order. 

It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and offield-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by thearmy itself. 

Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachmentsthose intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a fewexamples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We maycall to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the endof 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf ofBourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russiansrapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential_point d'appui_ beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established inadvance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case offailure, no one was compromised, --not even the small corps which hadbeen debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping. 

In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the _coup de main_ attempted bythe Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl anddestroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, wouldhave had very important consequences if it had not failed. 

In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and, as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they maybe freely recommended. 

Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy'soperations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A fewhundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and theymay be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The smalldetachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were agreat hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused hisplans to fail by intercepting his couriers. 

For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and fullof stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury theycan without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking atelling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of anydangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address andpresence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, arequalities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness. For further information on this subject I refer my readers to ChapterXXXV. Of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. Of thiswork, on light cavalry. 

ARTICLE XXXVII. 

Passage of Rivers and Other Streams. 

The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in placeor might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinationsbelonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a largeriver, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, theVistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closeststudy. 

The art of building military bridges is a special branch of militaryscience, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It is not fromthis point of view that I propose to consider the passage of a stream, but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver. 

The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of thepoint of passage may have an important connection with all theoperations taking place within the entire theater of the war. Thepassage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800 is an excellentillustration of the truth of this remark. Napoleon, a more skillfulstrategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order totake Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut himoff from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who hadalready a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater convenienceto his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. Thetactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than thestrategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the riskattending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the samecampaign Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the highstrategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army ofthe reserve, after the engagement of the Chiusella, could either marchby the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentinoand march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino, enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching withtwenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross the Po atPiacenza, expecting to get before Mélas more certainly in that directionthan if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage ofthe Danube at Donauwerth and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similaroperation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause ofthe destruction of Mack's army. 

The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined byrecollecting the principles laid down in Article XIX. ; and it is hereonly necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as inevery other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisivepoints, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on thedistribution of the hostile forces. 

If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical, no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstaclesexceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making thenew selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movementas nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction. Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a greatinfluence in fixing the point of passage, there is still anotherconsideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position isthat where the army after crossing can take its front of operations andline of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the firstmarches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upondifferent lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fightinga battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling. 

Enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerationsinfluencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. We will nowproceed to speak of the passage itself. History is the best school inwhich to study the measures likely to insure the success of suchoperations. The ancients deemed the passage of the Granicus--which is asmall stream--a wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned, the people of modern days can cite much greater. 

The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. Has been greatlylauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time, General Dedon hasmade famous the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl and of the Danube atHochstadt in 1800. His work is a model as far as concerns the details;and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. Morerecently, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-famouspassage of the Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kindpreviously seen. The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling andat Wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand menprovided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where thebed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting account ofthem should be carefully read. The third was executed by the Russianarmy at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to be compared with thetwo just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great localdifficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. Thepassage of the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to givehistorical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the specialnarratives of these events. I will give several general rules to beobserved. 

 1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. In addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the real attempt is to be made. 

 2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods, or other obstacles in the vicinity. 

 3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other. 

 4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge. 

 5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the passage. 

 6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks, that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on both banks of the river. For this reason, those points where the banks are high and steep should be usually avoided. 

The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course fromthose for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteractthe efforts of the assailants. The important thing is to have thecourse of the river watched by bodies of light troops, withoutattempting to make a defense at every point. Concentrate rapidly at thethreatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only ofhis army shall have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vendôme at Cassano, andthe Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809, --the last example beingparticularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not sodecidedly successful as might have been expected. 

In Article XXI. Attention was called to the influence that the passageof a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving directionto the lines of operations. We will now see what connection it may havewith subsequent strategic movements. 

One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is tocover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, withoutinterfering too much with the free movement of the army. When the armyis numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passedjust after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling;but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies areabout equal, the case is very different. 

If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg or atManheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the first thingto be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions, --first, before them as far as the Black Forest, secondly, by the right in orderto cover the bridges on the Upper Rhine, and thirdly, by the left tocover the bridges of Mayence and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is thecause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make theinconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must beinsisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to beseparated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remainabsent longer than the few days required for taking possession of thenatural point of concentration of the enemy's forces. 

The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one inwhich the general finds his position a most trying one; for if hedivides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contendwith one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, andhave it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, theenemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point, the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may findhimself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain avictory. 

The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city whichwill afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse allpossible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage, to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and tobeat them in such a way that they will have no further desire oftouching the bridges. In some cases eccentric lines of operations may beused. If the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into severalcorps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected withone hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the lineof posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may beoverwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then beformed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainlydrive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent themfrom reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges. But if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of theenemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemymay be beaten throughout its whole extent, --in the same manner thatFrederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout itslength, --the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remainprotected during all the forward movements. It was in this manner thatJourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extremeright of the Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward theMain. He was driven away because the French, having a double andexterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand meninactive between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdanupon the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the advantagesgained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategicfront. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or thatpreviously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, andthe use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances ofthe case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, aswell as the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations, of which something has already been said in the article on lines ofoperations, does not appear out of place here, since their connectionwith the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion. 

It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage isattempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case withJourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is gained of having in caseof need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thusoperating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him, in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in acondition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed atdifferent points. Such an operation will always lead to disastrousresults when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how totake advantage of this violation of principles. 

In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may bediminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points, which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the twoportions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemyfrom destroying them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed thisrule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction ofDonauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably haveachieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of being driven back uponthe Rhine. 

ARTICLE XXXVIII. 

Retreats and Pursuits. 

Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. This remarkis so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said, in his usualpiquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded inretreating. When we think of the physical and moral condition of an armyin full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preservingorder, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hardto understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated toattempt such an operation. 

What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight becontinued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed undercover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance, but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strongopposition still made to the pursuing army? Should a forced march bemade in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy aspossible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show offighting again? Each of these methods, although entirely proper incertain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If thetheory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats iscertainly one of them. 

If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may exposeyourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forcedretreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing indarkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of yourarmy, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thingproperly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned inbroad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to holdit, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy isabout to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of thetroops, you may lose their confidence, --as they are always inclined toblame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doingmay be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreatcommenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may notbecome a rout?

When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decidewhether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of theenemy as possible, --since this hurried movement might sometimes causethe destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be itssalvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that, in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best toretreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard ofsufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in checkfor several hours. 

Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from whichthey result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, inorder to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to hispresent one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It wasthus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw theallies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus thatWellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposedto do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon wasknown. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde tochoose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that Iwas proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrogrademovement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoidingthe catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813. )

A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a pointthreatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line ofretreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in anexhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearerits supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lostbattle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise. 

These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. Theircharacter will vary with that of the country, with the distances to bepassed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. They are speciallydangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which theretreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base ofoperations, they become painful and difficult. 

From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so justlycelebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the French armyin 1812, history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. Thatof Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That ofthe Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. Inmore recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. To Naples, when he passedby a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. Theretreat of M. De Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises ithas received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising thesiege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very wellarranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796, which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, butnot at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin toAltorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of theTrebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, wereglorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration. The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow--a space oftwo hundred and forty leagues, --in presence of such an enemy as Napoleonand such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainlyadmirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances, but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed bythe generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirablefortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Althoughthe retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it wasalso glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and theBeresina, --because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a singleman should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both partiescovered themselves with glory. 

The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to betraversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, theattacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority orinferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstanceswhich have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving outof consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may makefor their execution. 

A general falling back toward his native land along his line ofmagazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order, and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsisthis army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extendedposition. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring fromMoscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalryand draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order andwith the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with everything necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immensenumber of light cavalry. 

There are five methods of arranging a retreat:--

 The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road. 

 The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps, marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order to avoid confusion, especially in the _matériel_. 

 The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival. 

 The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads. 

 The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging roads. 

I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it istaken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and wellsustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement iscommon to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with thestrategic relations of these operations. 

An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting assoon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as itshall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the firstmethod, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army andenables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since itis simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainderof the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. Anarmy employing this method must not, however, confine itself to thesingle main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to beoccupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure. 

When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, havingthe portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein agreat mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, butmoving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendiculardirection into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fataldays of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method beingchiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between thedeparture of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillerymay readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march, the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, ahalf-march from each other. These masses, moving off in succession withan interval of two hours between the departure of their severalarmy-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least inordinary countries. In crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, othercalculations would doubtless be necessary. 

I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or onehundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousandor twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. The armymay be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each, encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. Each ofthese masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which mayeither move successively along the road or form in two lines across theroad. In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at fiveA. M. And the other at seven, there will be no danger of interferencewith each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the secondmass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind thefirst, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the sametime. 

When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at leastfor infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. It isscarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be usedwhen provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best, because the army is then marching in battle-order. In long days and inhot countries the best times for marching are the night and the earlypart of the day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logisticsto make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts forarmies; and this is particularly the case in retreats. 

Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, andgreat disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade ordivision takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are alittle tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army andthe more compactly it marches, the more important does it become toarrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the armyis to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause asmuch mischief as a rout. 

If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order torelieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will haltwith this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men inbattle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns;and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the spacewhich has been lost. 

The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, isexcellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if theyare quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the otherwing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels itto stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburgtoward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind. 

The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, isundoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when theretreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unitethe forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effectingthis. 

The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system ofeccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and have opposed sowarmly in the earlier editions of my works, because I thought I couldnot be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject oras to the object of his system. I gathered from his definition that herecommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, toseparate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double objectof withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arrestinghis march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. Ifound great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beatenarmy is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing itsforces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy. 

Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his meaning, andthat by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreatmade on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of beingdirected toward the center of the base of operations or the center ofthe country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and alongthe line of the frontier of the country. 

I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, andin this case my criticism falls to the ground; for I have stronglyrecommended that kind of a retreat to which I have given the name of theparallel retreat. It is my opinion that an army, leaving the line whichleads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view ofmoving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearlyparallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations andits base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallelretreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentricretreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from thestrategic front. 

However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which wasthe obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only with those retreatsmade along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greaterextent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks. 

By using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may begiven to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. Anarmy in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally;because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numericalinferiority. Shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? Ifind no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase theease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I amspeaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. Suppose anarmy of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand. If the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men, the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. Canhe not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in successionall his divisions? How can they escape such a fate? _By concentration_. This being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter fallsof itself. 

I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When the leadingdivisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Bonapartecollected them all together at Roverbella; and, although he had onlyforty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he hadonly to contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergentretreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? Wurmser, after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his twowings toward the extremities of the line of defense. What was theresult? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, wasbeaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, anddestroyed that at Bassano and Mantua. 

When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of theFrench armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentricmovement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentricretreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line ofisolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for hisown destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted thealternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and allthe efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which itwas necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of twohundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion. [31]

There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and thenonly as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a greatdefeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protectionwithin the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where thesympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of thearmy thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried onaccording to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simplyabsurd. 

There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction ofa retreat, --to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to thefrontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should beparallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up theline of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions forhis retreat, --either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France, or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees. In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched towardBohemia instead of returning to Silesia. 

These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason thatthey divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and thecenter of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to aretreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, thepositions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army mayhave for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its directcommunications with the central portions of the state. 

Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French armypenetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves uponPampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in eithercase the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line ofoperations would be at the mercy of their adversary. 

The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the sameadvantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them. 

In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when thenation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which isstriving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile armypenetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and theSaône, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, oras far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by wayof Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. Theoccupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least veryhazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and basedupon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for allcountries having double fronts of operations. [32]

Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of thedirections of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube. Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastionsconnected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards thisfrontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. Thisassertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trialon that ground, the question is still an open one. 

It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel methoddepends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances ofeach case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way ofBavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, itwould be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army intothe Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in thisway the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is leftupon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunatedivision of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw thewhole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there wouldbe great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy, beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult applicationon the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemyapproaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operationswould be too contracted. 

In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage againstan army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst itsemployment would be impossible against a French army moving from theRhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austriawere allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of thecountry, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in thedirection of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such amovement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin. 

When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, apursuit always follows. 

A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an armyin good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; andthis is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source ofsupplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat thenbecomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and itsdifficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemyin conducting the pursuit. 

The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, uponthe character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ ofthe two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all casesof pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:--

 1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must, however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely. 

 2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained; because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously followed up. 

 3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say; for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers. 

Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on thesubject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grandcombinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tacticalmeasures which may render them more easy of execution. 

One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is tofamiliarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may beresisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and thatthe preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troopsharassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline isat all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of specialimportance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must befurnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for thepurpose of getting supplies by marauding. 

It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officerof great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, inadvance of its movements, examine and select points suitable foroccupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally sorapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to haveconsiderable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate theexecution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means ofthoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as toprevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of theretreating columns. 

It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at thedistance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard wouldrun great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When, however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it mayincrease the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march tothe rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the samedegree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, itmay remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon itsstrength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength ofthe pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importancenot to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat ismade in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from timeto time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as theArchduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, andKleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account ofthe surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body oftroops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies andspoils. 

Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid ofinterest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges overit, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but whenthe river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge, it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to betaken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so thatthey may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well forthe army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guardshould also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body, --asfar, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed willpermit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too muchhurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shallhave reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of themain body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving therear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will passthrough the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross theriver; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to givehim battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The newrear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross theriver, breaking the bridges after it. 

It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they formon the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corpsleft to hold the enemy in check. 

The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of theprecautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always betaken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to beconstructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for theconstruction of a regular _tête de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts willbe found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops. 

If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is onlypressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army isthreatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemyin force. 

The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the mostremarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a moredesperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously andskillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelvehundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy infront and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surroundedby vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for thehonor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helpedits escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praiseshould be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan ofoperations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities ofMoldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to arendezvous arranged in peace, --a plan which came near effecting thecapture of their formidable adversary, --or the wonderful firmness of thelion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies. 

The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to beclosely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the onewhich is following the rear of your column can come up. Never placeyourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in sucha case is rare. 

If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either byregular _têtes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover therear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should useevery effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down thebank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, alsofire-ships and mills, --a means the Austrians used in 1796 againstJourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromisedthe army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the samething at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, andbrought Napoleon to the brink of ruin. 

It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this characterunless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may beanchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floatingbodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 31: Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, theconcentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army. Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in theend, the cause of his ruin. ]

[Footnote 32: In all these calculations I suppose the contending forcesnearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive, it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directlyupon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along thefrontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible. ]

ARTICLE XXXIX. 

Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in WinterQuarters. 

So much has been written on this point, and its connection with mysubject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly. 

To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, isgenerally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and thereis almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A countrywhere large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia, or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment ofquarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troopshave not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit thedivisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia, portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it ismore difficult to put an army into winter quarters. 

Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at theend of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisancharacter and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts. 

The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, byTurenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method ofconducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on theother side to prevent its success. 

The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be thefollowing. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly andoccupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a tooextended line of troops, which is always easily broken through andcannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outerline of troops in huts and with their position strengthened byfield-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all thetroops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues bywhich an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry;finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at anypoint. 

In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonmentsbehind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone beinghutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. The army numbered morethan one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisitein feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this positionuntil June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot beexpected to be the case everywhere. 

An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult tohave a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countrieswhere large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the sizeof the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of countryoccupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the meansof opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion. The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixtythousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and withthe certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held incheck, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army isassembled. 

It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in goinginto winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seemsinclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawnfrom this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to anarmy in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it inquarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice. 

In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of acampaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, orwaiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it willprobably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of suchpositions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in orderthat he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemyto do. An army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsistreadily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to beready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions areby no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than toplace the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that incase of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy maypresent himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's marchfrom each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The samerules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winterquarters. 

ARTICLE XL. 

Descents. 

These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among themost difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-preparedenemy. 

Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it innavies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrousthree-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundredcannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of anumerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least untilthe debarkation of the army takes place. 

Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships ofwar; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, andcould skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to thenumber of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests, the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as muchcertainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for thesereasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than moderntimes. 

Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by thePersians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago, --theinnumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius, --the greatexpeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that ofAlexander into Asia Minor, those of Cæsar to England and Africa, thatof Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe, --the Crusades, --the expeditionsof the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy?

Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II. Was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set onfoot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditionswere of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. And ofSebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descentsof the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St. Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp, Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; forthat was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of thedifficulties to be apprehended in such attempts. 

The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of theworld prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except againstsecond-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportationfor one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immensetrains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c. 

We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vastproblem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is truethat Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundredand sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles:unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has leftus entirely in the dark as to this grave question. 

It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in theChannel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point ofbeing done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, topass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what wouldbecome of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of warand the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat thefleet or oblige it to regain its ports?

Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all futuregenerations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, orat least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met theirdeaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plainsof Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal andthe forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bringto a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seenbetween two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in thepreparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons thepresent century has furnished for the study of soldiers and ofstatesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of Francefrom 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of theactivity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to thecareful attention of young officers. But, while admitting thepossibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as theEnglish to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada hadhad a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be keptmoving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would notso many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover, the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh waterthat must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor inpreparation and vast means of transportation. 

Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such anexpedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it isevident that a descent can be made with this number of men in fourcases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, againstsecond-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture aposition which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make adiversion, at once political and military, against a state alreadyengaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from thepoint of the descent. 

It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character. About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceivethe enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vesselsmay anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as muchactivity as possible into the operation, and take possession of somestrong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put onshore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protectionto the troops that have landed. 

A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that thetransports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landedin boats and rafts, --which takes time and gives the enemy greatadvantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed togreat risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats, tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sicknessfor the proper use of their arms?

I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forcestoo much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility toline the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; butthe approaches to those places where large establishments are to beprotected must be closed. Signals should be arranged for giving promptnotice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposableforce should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining afirm foothold. 

The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents andtheir prosecution. There are countries where the coasts are steep andpresent few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to belanded: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descentbecomes more difficult. 

Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descentswhich may be usefully pointed out. The same principle which forbids acontinental army from interposing the mass of its forces between theenemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon acoast should always keep its principal mass in communication with theshore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies. For the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of thepossession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of landwhich is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthenedby fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may bere-embarked without hurry and loss. 

CHAPTER VI. 

LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES. 

ARTICLE XLI. 

A few Remarks on Logistics in General. 

Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it ageneral science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art ofwar? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designatecollectively the different branches of staff duty, --that is to say, thedifferent means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinationsof the art?

These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmlyconvinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, andbelieve it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seemsalready accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that gooddefinitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment inanswering these questions which seem so simple. 

In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of othermilitary writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details ofstaff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service andof special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. Thiswas the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word _logistics_is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major général des logìs_, (translated in German by _Quartiermeister_, ) an officer whose duty itformerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to themarches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics wasthen quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps, movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had moreextended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty oftransmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant pointsof the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documentsfor arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to theassistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information ofthem to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and tosupervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minutedetails: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all theoperations of a campaign. 

To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a manshould be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. Ifthe term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the ArchdukeCharles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard, and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incompletesketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less thanthe science of applying all possible military knowledge. 

It appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ isinsufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that thereal duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made toinstruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should beaccurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with thegeneral principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution topublish well-considered regulations, which should define all the dutiesof staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as tothe best methods of performing these duties. 

The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for theirgovernment; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adaptedto the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the onlywork of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both publicand secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Severalgenerals--as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut--have preparedmanuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issuedseveral partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found acomplete manual on the subject. 

If it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to detailsof marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staffofficers at the present day are intimately connected with the mostimportant strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logisticsincludes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if weretain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended anddeveloped in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties ofordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief. 

To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal pointsthat must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty anddetail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakingsresulting from such movements:--

 1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign. Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of operations. 

 2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected battles. 

 3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to facilitate the operations of the army. 

 4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as possible of the positions and movements of the enemy. 

 5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner. Ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of halts. 

 6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards, flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the performance of their duties. 

 7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the character of the enemy. [33]

 8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of need. 

 9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage, munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking precautions for order and security, both on the march and when trains are halted and parked. 

 10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies. Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of the army, and regulating their use. 

 11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations for their safety, good order, and police. 

 12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies, as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its base. 

 13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men, movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their safety. 

 14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some center of action, and forming strategic reserves. 

 15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction between the army and its base of operations. 

 16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults. 

 17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard; causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper precautions to insure safety. 

 18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps; indicating to each principal division of the army a place of assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders, instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed. 

An examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longerby entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark thatthese are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staffofficers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the verypurpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attentionto the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be providedwith staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution. Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; andwoe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! Thiswant of harmony is often seen, --first, because generals are men and havefaults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individualinterests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff andhindering them in performing their duties. [34]

It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for theguidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifariousduties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staffofficers with different names and rounds of duties, --so that I should beobliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, thesedetails are fully entered into in special books pertaining to thesesubjects. 

I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some ofthe first articles enumerated above:--

1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the armyto enter upon active operations in the field include all those which arelikely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. Theyshould, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, thatthe _matériel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses, carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. Should be carefullyexamined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tooltrains, _matériel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move, ambulances, --in a word, every thing which conies under the head of_matériel_, --should be carefully examined and placed in good order. 

If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers, gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craftshould be collected at the points and at the bank where they willprobably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorablepoints both for embarkations and for landings, --preferring thoselocalities which present the greatest chances of success for a primaryestablishment on the opposite bank. 

The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will benecessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to theproper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such directionto the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them anything relative to the projected enterprise. 

If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chiefengineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base ofoperations, when _têtes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to beconstructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be builtbetween the first line of defense and the second base. 

2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates tomaking arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by thegeneral and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs ofstaff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that ofknowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitatingthe execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may bethe real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of acommander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if thegeneral lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as hecan, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief. 

I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of theservice. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists inissuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, generalinstructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so muchthe more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps, who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the samesort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out ofschool. 

The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon tohis marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself, and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either onthe right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of theoperations of the whole army. [35] I have good reasons for knowing thathe did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air ofmystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the handsof the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans. 

It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his planssecret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if hisnight-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire. That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's time, when his wholearmy was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness ofNapoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert ofaction can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what isgoing on around them?

Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious meanmay be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and theminute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay, Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companiesand reforming again in line of battle, --a piece of nonsense all the moreridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of theenemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases, to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and toadd a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan ofthe operations and the part they are to take individually in executingit. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmittedverbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating itaccurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, andconcert of action would be secured. 

3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake someenterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert andprecision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usualprecaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursueand to cover its movements thoroughly. 

There are two kinds of marches, --those which are made out of sight ofthe enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing orretiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes inlate years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they hadbeen several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party hadroads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to eachother. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existingroads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, whenan army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advancedguard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to removeobstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c. , if necessary, andsecure the means of easy communication between the different corps ofthe army. 

In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times anddistances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a differentdistance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure andgiving them instructions the following particulars must beconsidered:--1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of_matériel_ in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstaclesplaced in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it isimportant for the march to be concealed or open. 

Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arrangingthe movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of allthose corps not marching with the column attached to the generalhead-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of thegenerals commanding those corps, --being careful, however, to let themunderstand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It willthen be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and theobject to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at whichthey will be expected to be in position. They should be informed whatcorps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roadsto the right or left in order that they may govern themselvesaccordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of theenemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them. [36]

All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for thechiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them inposition are mere pedantry, --more hurtful than useful. To see that theymarch habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; butthey should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at theappointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from theircommand if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats, however, which are made along a single road by an army separated intodivisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated. 

Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that itsmarch may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenientalso, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of eachcolumn to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with toolsfor removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few ofthese workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a lighttrestle-bridge train will be found very useful. 

4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard, or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wingmay have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reservesand the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advancedguard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so thathalf the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under thesecircumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing theroad. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to bemade in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, thegeneral head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be movedin that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating themarch of the center must be applied to that wing. 

Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable offorming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving anaccurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make hisplans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assistthe general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composedof light troops of all arms, containing some of the _élite_ troops ofthe army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, somehorse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c. , with light trestles andpontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be outof place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketchof the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body ofirregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regularcavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to suchservice. 

5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomesthe more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots whichmay keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officerswill divide the depots into departments, the principal depot beingestablished in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest numberof men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selectedas the site of the principal depot. 

The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen tothirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distanceapart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteendepots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided intothree or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commanderand a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate thearrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to theauthorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilitiesfor transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander seesthat the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, thereshould be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at theprincipal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embracedwithin certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent andable general officers; for the security of the communications of thearmy often depends on their operations. [37] These commands may sometimesbecome strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII. ; a few goodbattalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passingcontinually between the army and the base, will generally be able tokeep open the communications. 

6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, tobe taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order ofmarch to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requiresgoing into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly insilence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerousworks specially devoted to this branch of the art of war. 

Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples shouldbe given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system oflogistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of theFrench army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance ofthe army upon the campaign of 1815. 

In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make sucharrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated, were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point ofthe zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issueof the campaign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of askillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangementsfor moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originatedin his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed thoseinstructions which were conceived with so much precision and usuallytransmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequentopportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor washis own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened toa distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straightline, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking intoaccount the windings of the roads, ) bending over and sometimes stretchedat full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and thesupposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors, he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty andprecision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from pointto point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marchesnecessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by acertain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing inmind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and thehour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are aloneenough to make any man famous. 

Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia, Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte andAugereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were allthus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneouslybetween Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or inGermany having any conception of the object of these movements whichseemed so very complicated. 

In the same manner, in 1815, when Blücher had his army quietly incantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington wasattending _fêtes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion ofFrance, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossedwith diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had beenbut recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt uponCharleroi and Blücher's quarters, his columns arriving from all pointsof the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in theplains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did notleave Paris until the 12th. )

The combinations described above were the results of wise strategiccalculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece oflogistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures, I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logisticscame very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having beenrecalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, andbeing certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier intoBavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which wasextended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust wasreturning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who hadbeen on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourgroute; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from theirrespective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances, and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily breakthrough this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justlyuneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the warhad not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate itin a more retired position toward Ulm. 

The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun, Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, asthe corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundredthousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous thearmy would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would havefive or six marches more to make before reaching-it, --which was ahighly-important consideration as the parties were then situated. 

No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities havingcommenced, however, but a few days after Berthier's arrival at Munich, this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to aliteral obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving itsobvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon, but even obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshalhad had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward Ingolstadt. 

Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of thepassage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with thespeed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust was on the point ofbeing surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of onehundred and eighty thousand enemies. We know how wonderfully Napoleonsucceeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on theglorious days of Abensberg, Siegberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon, that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with hiscontemptible logistics. 

We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events whichpreceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the Danube before thebattle of Wagram. The measures taken to bring to a specified point ofthe island of Lobau the corps of the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, thatof Marmont from Styria, that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderfulthan the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulatedthe details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plainsof Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand Austriansand five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fête_. These masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the4th of July; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of theDanube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidsttorrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over thebridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up beforemid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which theycovered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less timethan might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuverfor instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had, it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage;but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositionsis not at all diminished by it. 

Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made tencopies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridgeof the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing, whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in thecenter. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it notbeen for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful sceneof confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of theenemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a fewdetachments following corps to which they did not belong. The mostremarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact thatafter such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Princeof Wagram. 

The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree;but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made tencopies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation ofthe troops?

Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of goodlogistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting thisbattle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in themidst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, itwas highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare thebanks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. Theseprecautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; butthey would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as wellas the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorderand of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up ofthe bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessnessupon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name, owing to the manner of Berthier's management of it. We must also agreethat Napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measuresof an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what wouldbe proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor waspresent himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the futureunless by his direction. 

To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it becomesnecessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances. They are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical andstatistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, itsaccidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c. , and to learn itsresources and means of every kind. At the present day, when the sciencesof geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state, these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they arestill very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of anycountry will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensedwith. There are many excellent books of instruction as to the art ofmaking these reconnoissances, and I must direct the attention of myreaders to them. 

Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary togain information of the movements of the enemy. They are made bydetachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy is drawn up inbattle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make thereconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may bethrown out to break through his screen of posts. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 33: I refer here to general instructions and forms, which arenot to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable. ]

[Footnote 34: The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of theadministrative departments all claim to have direct connection with thegeneral-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, ofcourse, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these highofficers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence ofthe chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise, confusion is inevitable. ]

[Footnote 35: I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviatedfrom his usual custom by issuing a general order. ]

[Footnote 36: Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that nogeneral should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten. In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is oftenindispensable. ]

[Footnote 37: It may be objected that in some wars, as where thepopulation is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, toorganize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposedto great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are mostnecessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madridwas such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of theguerrillas, --although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time theline extended as far as Cadiz. ]

ARTICLE XLII. 

Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct Information ofthe Movements of the Enemy. 

One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be toorder movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy'sproceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, ifhe is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably ofthe highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of theutmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of thechief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practiceof war. 

From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simplylearned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquiredthat practical _coup-d'oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in thedirection of military operations. It is a very easy matter for aschool-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a lineof communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions ofboth parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful, active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfectriddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of theincapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius. 

I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if I hadto put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for theman who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemythan for him who could make a grand display of theories, --things sodifficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when onceexemplified. 

There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations. The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists inreconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third, in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses ofprobabilities. This last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There isalso a fifth method, --that of signals. Although this is used rather forindicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as tohis designs, it may be classed with the others. 

Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any otheragency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; forreconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thingbeyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean to say that theyshould not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaininginformation; but I do say that their results are small and not to bedepended upon. Reports of prisoners are often useful, but it isgenerally dangerous to credit them. A skillful chief of staff willalways be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame theirquestions as to elicit important information from prisoners anddeserters. 

The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines ofoperations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it isalmost impossible to communicate with them and receive the informationthey possess. An extensive system of espionage will generally besuccessful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to thegeneral's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best forhim, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with hisown eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the general receivesfrom his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of thosewhich may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finallyto attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passedthrough Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed through Geratoward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, Where are theygoing, and what enterprise are they engaged in? These things the mostskillful spy cannot learn. 

When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of theenemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could bethrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could reportaccurately their movements; but with the existing organization intocorps d'armée which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult tolearn any thing about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when thehostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign whoalways moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. Such, forexample, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If it was known whenthey moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult toconclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements ofsmaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly. 

A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by makingreasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with great satisfactionsay that this means hardly ever failed me. Though fortune never placedme at the head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly ahundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councilsof the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question underconsideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies ofEurope; and I was never more than two or three times mistaken in myhypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. AsI have said before, I have constantly noticed that, as an army canoperate only upon the center or one extremity of its front ofoperations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions thatcan possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths andconversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a planwhich will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of thefuture. I will cite a few examples which have come under my ownobservation. 

In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the war withPrussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and theoperations which would take place. 

I made the three following hypotheses:--1st. The Prussians will awaitNapoleon's attack behind the Elbe, and will fight on the defensive asfar as the Oder, in expectation of aid from Russia and Austria; 2d. Orthey will advance upon the Saale, resting their left upon the frontierof Bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d. Or else, expecting the French by the great Mayence road, they willadvance imprudently to Erfurt. 

I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless thePrussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces, already inferior to the French, upon the two directions of Wesel andMayence, --a useless mistake, since there had not been a French soldieron the first of these roads since the Seven Years' War. 

These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should askwhat course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply "that themass of the French army being already assembled in Bavaria, it should bethrown upon the left of the Prussians by way of Grera and Hof, for thegordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what planthey should adopt. "

If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their line ofretreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the North Sea. Ifthey rested upon the Saale, he could attack their left by way of Hof andGera, defeat them partially, and reach Berlin before them by way ofLeipsic. If they stood fast behind the Elbe, he must still attack themby way of Gera and Hof. 

Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, whatmattered it to him to know the details of their movements? Being certainof the correctness of these principles, I did not hesitate to announce, _a month before the war_, that Napoleon would attempt just what he did, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place atJena and Naumburg!

I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if thatwere my motive I might mention many more of a similar character. I haveonly been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be oftenarranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, withoutmuch attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy'smovements. 

Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has beenneglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. In 1813 thestaff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure forsuch services, and the Emperor Alexander was obliged to furnish thestaff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them tosend agents into Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon'swhereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806, were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often sufferedseverely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to getinformation as to what was going on around them. 

The Russian army is better provided than any other for gatheringinformation, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks; and historyconfirms my assertion. 

The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent after the battle ofDresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimmingand marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, asWittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The informationfurnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf, Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it wasthrough a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa, intercepted near Châlons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informedof the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with hiswhole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified townsof Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of informationdecided Blücher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies, which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously broughtto act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne. 

We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroffsaved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just leftMoscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first creditthis news, --which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture ofa French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the Frenchbivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, whichdecided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleonfrom taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greaterfacilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrousdays of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him wouldthus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented. 

Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what goodpartisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers. 

I will conclude this article with the following summary:--

1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of theenemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use ofreconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capableofficers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners. 

2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matterhow imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often besifted from them. 

3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means. 

4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methodsmentioned, a general should never move without arranging several coursesof action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relativesituation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight ofthe principles of the art. 

I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing veryunexpected can befall him and cause his ruin, --as has so often happenedto others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he shouldat least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy isgoing to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit eachof these hypotheses. [38] It cannot be too much insisted upon that thereal secret of military genius consists in the ability to make thesereasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number isalways small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means ofregulating one's conduct is neglected. 

In order to make this article complete, I must state what is to begained by using a system of signals. Of these there are several kinds. Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all. Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Ratisbon, in 1809, to the factof his having established a telegraphic communication between thehead-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris when theAustrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invadingBavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, intwenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundredmiles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later hehad gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without thetelegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact issufficient to impress us with an idea of its value. 

It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a telegraphicarrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, couldcommunicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line ofbattle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters. Repeated trials of it were made in Russia; but the project was givenup, --for what reason, however, I have not been able to learn. Thesecommunications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the methodcould not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could bereduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented bysigns. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it should benecessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable oftransmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly be a gain ofrapidity. [39] attempt of another kind was made in 1794, at the battle ofFleurus, where General Jourdan made use of the services of a balloonistto observe and give notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am notaware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not againused; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him thevictory: of this, however, I have great doubts. 

It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readinessto make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making carefulobservations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercyof the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaininginformation. By giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up withit an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy'smovements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connectionwith the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from itsuse. Sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty ofdistinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know towhich party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists veryunreliable. For example, a balloonist would have been greatlyembarrassed in deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it wasGrouchy or Blücher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; butthis uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed. I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observationswhen I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic;and Prince Schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the samepoint, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince wasprevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the Pleisse and theElster. An observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower thanin a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always athand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported atpleasure. 

There is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fireskindled upon elevated points of the country. Before the invention of thetelegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of aninvasion from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss have madeuse of them to call the militia to arms. They have been also used togive the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops morerapidly. The signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged soas to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy'sthreatening movements and the point where they should concentrate tomeet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice ofdescents. 

Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, bymeans of military instruments. This method of signals has been broughtto greater perfection in the Russian army than in any other I know of. While I am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method ofsetting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will ofthe commander, I am convinced that it must be a long time before theproblem is solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except forskirmishers. A movement of a long line of troops may be made nearlysimultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidlyfrom man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort ofinspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. I have seen but twocases of it in thirteen campaigns. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 38: I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event inwar can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To provethe falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite thesurprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of theopinion, however, that such events even as these might always have beenanticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits ofprobability or possibility. ]

[Footnote 39: When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was notknown. --Translators. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USEOF THE THREE ARMS. 

ARTICLE XLIII. 

Posting Troops in Line of Battle. 

Having explained in Article XXX. What is to be understood by the term_line of battle_, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed, and how the different troops are to be distributed in it. 

Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments andbrigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines, each of which had a right and a left wing. The cavalry was usuallyplaced upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was veryunwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. The army campedtogether, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalrywings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columnswere thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was speciallyapplicable to flank movements, ) two columns were formed, unless, onaccount of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantryhad camped in a third line, --which was rare. 

This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessaryto give such orders as the following:--"The army will move in suchdirection, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left. " Thismonotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no bettercould have been devised as war was carried on in those days. 

The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columnsas brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line, --asimple impossibility. 

If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of campingand marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system wereapplied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fiftythousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result wouldbe the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach. 

The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke upthe excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon thefield fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground. This change was a real improvement, --although they went from one extremeto the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of theRomans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, andcavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended, either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with anabsurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that ofthe enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seenmarching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant fromeach other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other supportthan five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or fourhundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of hisforces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced, and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, coulddo nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns. 

Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partlyby the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, andpartly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point wherethe decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of thegovernment, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantlyincreasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a strongerorganization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old systemand the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisionalsystem. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of twoor three divisions, which he placed under the command oflieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and thereserve of his army. [40]

This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, wherehe organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who hadunder their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Eachcorps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as anarmy. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve, composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one oflight cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantryreserve. At a later period--1812--the cavalry was also organized intocorps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to theconstantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as nearperfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about suchgreat results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soonimitated. 

Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, haverecommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to actindependently, should contain three instead of two brigades, becausethis number will allow one for the center and each wing. This wouldcertainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but twobrigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigadeson the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannotwith safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with threebrigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held inreserve, --a manifest advantage. But, if thirty brigades formed in tendivisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteendivisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain thisperfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantryby one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three totwo, --which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corpsis much more frequently called upon to act independently than adivision, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best forthat[41]. 

What is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upona campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics;because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organizationin the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent outcontinually. 

The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization seemed toleave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. Thecenter under Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, and thereserve under Lannes, formed together a regular and formidablebattle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting thoseof the guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotteand Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left, were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the Danubeat Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to fivedivisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly tothe right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement wasdestroyed. 

It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. Eventsare, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and Moreau'scampaign of 1800 proves that the original organization may sometimes bemaintained, at least for the mass of the army. With this view, it wouldseem prudent to organize an army in four parts, --two wings, a center, and a reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the strengthof the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomesnecessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general linein order to furnish the necessary detachments. While these divisions arewith the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive orgive the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of themain body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. Bach of the fourgreat parts of the army may be a single corps of three or fourdivisions, or two corps of two divisions each. In this last case therewould be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corpsshould contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and tothe center. 

With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general linein order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corpsmay be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, andfrom these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the marchof the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a weakorder of battle. 

These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line ofbattle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of lightcavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be morestable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions. 

But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of theunits of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of theoperations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatlyvaried. I cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit theprincipal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in twoor three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I haveindicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either onebehind the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28inclusive. )

_Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry. _

[Illustration: Fig. 17. Two Corps deployed, One behind the Other. ]

 First Corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- -----2d Division. | 1st Division. 

 Second Corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- -----2d Division. | 1st Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 18. Two Corps formed Side by Side. ]

Second Corps. ^ First Corps. |----- ----- | ----- -----1st Division. | 1st Division. |----- ----- | ----- -----2d Division. | 2d Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 19. Two Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each. ]

 First Corps. 

----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- 2d Division. | 1st Division. 

 Second Corps. 

----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- 2d Division. | 1st Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 20. Two Corps Side by Side. ]

 Second Corps. ^ First Corps. |----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- 1st Division. | 1st Division. |----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- 2d Division. | 2d Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 21. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each. ]

 First Corps. 

2d Division. 1st Division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

 Second Corps. 

2d Division. 1st Division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

[Illustration: Fig. 22. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each, placed Side by Side. ]

Second Corps. ^ First Corps. |1st Division. | 1st Division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | ----- | 2d Division. | 2d Division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | -----

_Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades each. _

[Illustration: Fig. 23. ]

 First Corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ----3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division. 

 Second Corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ----3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 24. ]

 Second Corps. ^ First Corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- | ---- ---- ^ ---- ----2d Division. | 1st Division | 2d Division. | 1st Division | ---- ---- | ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 25. ]

 2d Corps. ^ 1st Corps. | ---- ---- | ---- ----1st Division. | 1st Division. | ---- ---- | ---- ----2d Division. | 2d Division. | ---- ---- | ---- ----3d Division. | 3d Division. 

 * * * * *

_Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades each. _

[Illustration: Fig. 26. Two Divisions in the 1st Line, and one in the2d Line. ]

 First Corps. 

 ^---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 2d Division. | 1st Division. 

 ---- ---- ---- 3d Division. 

 Second Corps. 

 ^---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 2d Division. | 1st Division. 

 ---- ---- ---- 3d Division. 

[Illustration: Fig. 27. Same Order with 3d Brigade as Reserve, and the2 Corps Side by Side. ]

 Second Corps. ^ First Corps. |2d Division. ^ 1st Division. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division. 

[Illustration: _Shallower Formation: Twelve Brigades in the First Line, and Six in the Second Line. _

Fig. 28. ]

 Second Corps. ^ First Corps. |2d Division. ^ 1st Division. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division. 

 * * * * *

Note. --In all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; butthese lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions incolumns of attack by divisions of two companies. The cavalry attached tothe corps will be placed on the flanks. The brigades might be so drawnup as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. 

The question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to placetwo corps one behind the other, as Napoleon often did, particularly atWagram. I think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may beused only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle;for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and itsreserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, underdifferent commanders. However much one general may be disposed tosupport a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops forthat purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not acolleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probablehe will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatlyneeded. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long linecannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his frontwas only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his owntroops drawn up in rear. 

The table below[42] will show that the number of men in an army willhave great influence in determining the best formation for it, and thatthe subject is a complicated one. 

In making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for thecase of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from 1812 to1815, when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strengthfrom two to five divisions. With such large numbers nothing better canbe proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Ofthese corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain sixfor detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line thatmight require support. If this system be applied to an army of onehundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employdivisions of two brigades each where Napoleon and the allies used corps. 

If nine divisions form the main body, --that is, the wings and thecenter, --and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteendivisions would be required, or thirty brigades, --which would make onehundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains threebattalions. This supposition brings our army up to one hundred andforty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. Withregiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred andtwenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regimentcontains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand menstrong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twentythousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men. These calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions mustbe carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. If anarmy does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formationby divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this wasNapoleon's army of 1800. 

Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhatpermanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be outof place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and ifit is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing thecomposition of corps and their positions. 

I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gainedwhile still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. Ifthe divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and thecenter, --that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead ofthree, --and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wingwhich is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be acorps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduceit to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced bya portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemywould thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of theline. 

But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable that, whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, theorganization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers ofEurope, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle mustbe made upon that basis. 

The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed inrecent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. Formerly itwas usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or morereserves. In recent[43] conflicts in Europe, when the masses broughtinto collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in twolines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines;and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines ofinfantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. Such a formationmay answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the bestfor battle, as it is entirely too deep. 

The classical formation--if I may employ that term--is still two linesfor the infantry. The greater or less extent of the battle-field and thestrength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; butthese cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines andthe reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number ofmen to be simultaneously engaged. 

When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed infront of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen thereserve;[44] but, as has been previously stated, this will not oftenhappen with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each winghas usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the mainor central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leadingcorps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies returnto their proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserveis almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not preventits taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battleby the character of the position or by the wishes of the commandinggeneral. 

From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very greatchanges of army organization took place from the time of the revival ofthe art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the French Revolution, and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV. , ofPeter the Great, and of Frederick II. , they should consider them fromthe stand-point of those days. 

One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way ofexample, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post thecavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for anarmy of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in thecenter is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near theextremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalryto each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preferenceto the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. Ifthe reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit theorganization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to thecenter and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. Ifthat is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one onthe right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing. These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may bethreatened. [45]

The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, asformerly, be distributed along the front, that of each divisionremaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that, the organizationof the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageousdistribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistaketo scatter it too much. Few precise rules can be laid down for theproper distribution of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to adviseas a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with onehundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support, as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here intomuch detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give thefollowing rules:--

1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can movefreely in every direction. 

2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavycaliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges fromsudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for me to add--whatevery young officer should know already--that too elevated positions arenot those to give artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-slopingground is better. 

3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it iswell for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readilythrown into any desired position. It is, moreover, proper to havehorse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possibleto any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause forself-congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve;for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himselfwhen his line had been broken through between the center and the left. 

4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries infront, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable toattack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view ofchecking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns. 

5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery notin reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the wholeline, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This mustnot, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character ofthe position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of theartillery to move to a wing or to the center. 

6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a verypowerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to makea decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such adegree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fateof the battle is to turn. I shall at another place have more to say asto the employment of artillery in battles. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 40: Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wingof three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions underSaint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne, thegeneral-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his ownimmediate orders. ]

[Footnote 41: Thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of twobrigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, whilethe same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades eachmay have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. But itthen becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to havebut two in a corps, --which would be a faulty arrangement, because thecorps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action thanthe division. ]

[Footnote 42: Every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve, --inall, four principal subdivisions, --besides accidental detachments. 

Below are some of the different formations that may be given toinfantry. 

1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:--

 Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, and three divisions for detachments.................. 11 = 22 = 88 = 72, 000

 Four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for detachments................... 15 = 30 = 120 = 96, 000

 Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for detachments....................... 16 = 32 = 128 = 103, 000

2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:--

 Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, besides detachments, ............................... 11 = 22 = 132 105, 000

 Four corps of three divisions each, besides detachments................................ 15 = 30 = 180 = 144, 000

 Eight corps of two divisions each............ 16 = 32 = 192 = 154, 000

If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, andengineers, the total force for the above formations may be known. 

It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundredmen each would become very weak at the end of two or three months'campaigning. If they do not consist of three battalions, then eachbattalion should contain one thousand men. ]

[Footnote 43: The term _recent_ here refers to the later wars ofNapoleon I. --Translators. ]

[Footnote 44: As the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy everyday, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hourof battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of theline of battle. ]

[Footnote 45: This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made uponthe supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. This isthe essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle. ]

ARTICLE XLIV. 

Formation and Employment of Infantry. 

Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since itforms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defenseof positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry andartillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at timesbe very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partialsuccess. 

We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow andthe deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided, is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle ofWaterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantagesof fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deeporder. I will give my own opinion farther on. 

There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The questionnow is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank, armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation ofproducing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greaterresistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows thedifficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions inthree ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase thedisorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, whohad seen service, should have insisted so much upon the materialadvantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; forit very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troopstakes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turntheir backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increasein the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firingupon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so muchmobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficultto move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three:although in the former case the extent of front is less, the rankscannot be kept properly closed. 

Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurdthat it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. Hewishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundredand fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well askwhat would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry maypenetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind. 

But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist ofdeployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns ofattack, each battalion being formed in column on the central divisionand depending on its force and impetuosity?

I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision ofthe question in hand. 

There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack anenemy:--l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous orcheckerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the centraldivisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares. 

The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishersare, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantageof the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill upintervals, and to defend the skirts of a position. 

These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four:the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; thehalf-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled onthe center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments arepartly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composedof heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other. 

[Illustration: Fig. 29. [46]

 Deployed order in two lines. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---------- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

]

The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly usedto a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. Thesedeployed lines may either be continuous, (Fig. 29, ) or checkerwise, orin echelons. 

[Illustration: Fig. 30. 

Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers inthe intervals. 

 -----... -----... -----... -----... -----... ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----------... -----... -----... -----... -----... ---------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---------- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

]

A more compact order is shown in Fig. 30, where each battalion is formedinto a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division. It is really a line of small columns

In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[47] willhave twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this waytoo many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for theartillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed, whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in tworanks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind theother, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals ofthe battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, theseskirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31. )Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besidesthose thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be, also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while havingreally a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundredmen, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for eachbattalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained. [48] A battalion ofeight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of fourdivisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the firstalone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. Bachbattalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at avolley, whilst formed in the manner shown in Fig. 31 it would deliverfour hundred. 

[Illustration: Fig. 31. ]

While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, wemust not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, andthat its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins tofire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movementis lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageousagainst infantry, as the column of four divisions in threeranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry. The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularlyat Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in mychapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The bravecavalry of Bessières could make no impression upon these small masses. 

To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, itis true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this wouldbe a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to acharge than the three-rank formation, --particularly on the flanks. If toremedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many militarymen believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well ascolumns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in tworanks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry, only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, ifthe two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will bedifficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it isscarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, toemploy them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable thatany European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployedlines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columnsof attack. 

I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, offorming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may beemployed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicablethan any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, wouldbe suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation. 

[Illustration: Fig. 32. ]

There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamentoand by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions, one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear incolumns. (See Fig. 32. ) This arrangement--which belongs also to thehalf-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because thefirst line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw himinto more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns maydebouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while indisorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing theleading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same linewith the central deployed battalion. There would thus be ahalf-battalion more to each regiment in the first line, --a by no meansunimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fearthat, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, theirbattalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against theenemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may beuseful in many cases. I have therefore indicated it. 

[Illustration: Fig 33. ]

[Illustration: Fig 34. ]

The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is certainly themost injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions weresometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-sixranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to thedestructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion arediminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of suchmasses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated. Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a greatsacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would havebeen victorious had it not been for the successes of Davoust andOudinot on the left of the archduke's line. 

When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainlybe taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so thatif the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested inits progress. (See Fig. 33. ) Under the protection of these battalions, which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march tothe point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposedto a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, willbe thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken as wasthe Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius. 

Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiorityin cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square is best for thedefensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (See Figs. 35, 36, 37. )

[Illustration: Fig. 35. 

Division in battalion squares. ]

[Illustration: Fig. 36. 

The same division in long battalion squares. ]

[Illustration: Fig. 37. 

Squared of regiments of three battalions. ]

The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large frontand pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. Aregiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheelingthe center battalion half to the right and half to the left. 

In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, becausehostilities were carried on in the vast plains of Bessarabia, Moldavia, or Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense force of cavalry. But if theseat of war be the Balkan Mountains or beyond them, and their irregularcavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportionsusual in Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and theRussian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia. 

However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalionsseems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not thesuperiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous forthe enemy's charges. The elongated square, especially when applied to abattalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front andone on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployedbattalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above; butthere would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if thebattalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the advantage, also, of being prepared to resist cavalry. 

Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask eachother. All the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as withdeployed lines. 

It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations describedis always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctnessof which every one will assent, --that a formation suitable for theoffensive must possess the characteristics of _solidity, mobility_, and_momentum_, whilst for the defensive _solidity_ is requisite, and alsothe power of delivering _as much fire as possible_. 

This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether thebravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long inpresence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in oneround, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousandin five minutes. In the later wars in Europe, positions have often beencarried by Russian, French, and Prussian columns with their arms at ashoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of _momentum_ andthe moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of theEnglish infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore, Albuera, and Waterloo. 

We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that theadvantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; forwhen the French formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is notat all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which theywere composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have beenrepulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if they had usedcolumns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on thecenter? I think not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority ofthe shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deeporder and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how adeployed line would stand an assault from a formation like Fig. 31, (page 293. ) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I haveseen them tried. 

Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching toattack a position? Can an immense deployed line be moved up into actionwhile firing? I think no one will answer affirmatively. Suppose theattempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, whilefiring either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defendedposition: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desiredpoint, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock ofsheep. 

What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? 1. If thedeep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive. 2. The column of attack of single battalions is the best formation forcarrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished asmuch as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavya column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy'sfire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported bycavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the secondin columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either of them may besuccessful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to usehis troops properly in the manner indicated in Articles XVI. And XXX. 

Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have beenmade in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much moredestructive. The effect of this is to incline men to prefer theshallower formations, even in the attack. We cannot, however, forget thelessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries, shrapnel-shot, and the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better methodof forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Somepersons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets andbreastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attackin deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to the deployedsystem, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to theattack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used withproper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position, or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks ofcompanies, --all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemywho is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. A skillfulcommander will use either, or a combination of all, of thesearrangements, according to circumstances. 

Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tacticalproblems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle;but I have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of asingle method is an impossibility. 

In the first place, the topography of different countries is veryvarious. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men might bemaneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy, Switzerland, thevalley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is barely possible to deploy adivision of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops, andtheir national characteristics, may also have an influence upon thesystem of formation. 

Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its instructionin maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long linesso much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system whichwould be entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armiesof the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe thatnothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men who thinkthat there can be but one type and one system for all armies and allcountries. 

To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, itseems to me, we ought to find out:--1. The best method of moving when insight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; 2. The best method of comingto close quarters with him; 3. The best defensive order. 

In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in allcases to exercise the troops--1. In marching in columns of battalionsdoubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, whencoming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; 2. In marching incontinuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching indeployed battalions arranged checkerwise, --as these broken lines aremore easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving to the front bythe flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the front in small squares, either in line or checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using thesedifferent methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed bycolumns of companies at full distance, without deployment, --a moreexpeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one bestsuited to all kinds of ground. 

Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks ofcompanies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. In a plainit succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. Itbreaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privatesto it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, allconfusion can be avoided. The only objection to it is the danger towhich the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down bycavalry. This danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, andnot using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting overthe first part of the large interval separating the two armies. At theleast sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformedinstantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. Whateverprecautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced withwell-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. I have neverseen it tried in presence of an enemy, --but frequently at drills, whereit has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front. 

I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions incheckerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the samebattalions in continuous lines did not. The French, particularly, havenever been able to march steadily in deployed lines. This checkeredorder would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. Itmay be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make itmore easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with theleading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to formline at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance onlybetween the leading and following battalions; for we must not forgetthat in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one, which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in themarches of continuous lines. 

It is very difficult to determine positively the best formation formaking a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of all the methods Ihave seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. Form twenty-fourbattalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the centerready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pacetoward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will thendeploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spreadout in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line andpouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns followsthe first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step throughthe intervals of the first line. This maneuver was executed when noenemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of theadvantages of firing and of the column. 

Besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods ofattacking in the half-deep order. 

The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with othersin column on the wings of those deployed, (Fig. 32, page 295. ) Thedeployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column wouldopen fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. Thesecond is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reachinghalf musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second linethrough the intervals of the first. The third is the order in echelons, mentioned on page 193, and shown in Fig. 15 on that page. 

Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployedlines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or theother party takes to its heels, --a case not likely to happen. 

I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for Ihave not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real combats ofinfantry I have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencingto fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmlyagainst the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, orrepulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves movedout to meet the advance. I have seen _mêlées_ of infantry in defiles andin villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collisionand thrust each other with the bayonet; but I never saw such a thing ona regular field of battle. 

In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, andshould be continued. It would be absurd to discard as useless the fireof infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation;and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style oftactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against everydifferent nation. It is not so much the mode of formation as the propercombined use of the different arms which will insure victory. I must, however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned. 

I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to beattended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troopsas much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not bywithdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of allinequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view ofthe enemy. When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault isthen to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishersand troops on the defensive. 

It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of aposition, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who isassailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we mustnever forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene, seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, brokethrough the center and captured twenty-four battalions which weresacrificed in defending these posts. 

For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood, which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter thetroops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent theenemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. The case of the park ofHougoumont at the battle of Waterloo is a fine example of the influencethe possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin thepossession of the woods was very important. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 46: In this and subsequent figures we suppose a division oftwelve battalions. ]

[Footnote 47: The word _division_ being used to designate four or fiveregiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger ofconfusion in its use. ]

[Footnote 48: In the Russian army the skirmishers are taken from thethird rank of each division, --which makes the column eight men in depth, instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate rallying theskirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take thewhole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or threedivisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry therewould be twelve ranks. ]

ARTICLE XLV. 

Cavalry. 

The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the wholearmy, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may beso handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at propermoments. 

The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has variedgreatly. It depends on the natural tastes of nations making theirpeople more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality ofhorses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of theRevolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatlyinferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what waspompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine, --a weakbrigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the samereserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses, --somuch had ideas and means changed. 

As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open countryshould contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; inmountainous countries one-tenth will suffice. 

The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease ofmotion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but wemust be careful lest a false application be made of this last. 

Whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations ofwar, cavalry can never defend a position without the support ofinfantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or torender it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing theenemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disorderedinfantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficientin cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreatsextremely difficult. 

The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend uponthe ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy'smovements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentionedhere. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in itsuse. 

All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in goodorder cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it besupported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearlyfor having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Greatfared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obligedto push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time forcharging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposinginfantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several othersprove this. 

There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority overinfantry, --when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and theycannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau, and so did the Austrian left at Dresden. 

Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other waymay be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind wasmade by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge againstsquares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed. 

A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery andenable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantrymust then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of thischaracter has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage ofbefore the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. Thebeautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic, October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloowith the same object in view were admirable, but failed becauseunsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon PrinceHohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done undersuch circumstances. 

General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive itfrom the field of battle and return more free to act against hisinfantry. 

Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of anenemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by theinfantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, ifsuccessful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation israrely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good;for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets inrear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry isparticularly fitted. 

In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results byopportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposingline and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. Itmay regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and causethe destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and atWaterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'arméemay charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combinedattack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or tofinish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat. 

It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as itdepends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are butfour methods of charging, --in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at agallop, and in open order, --all of which may be successfully used. Incharges in line, the lance is very useful; in _mêlées_, the saber ismuch better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, whichfinishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing isof very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, orwhen light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previousto a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body ofcavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy, and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack. There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while onhorseback and in rapid motion. 

I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good. It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives theadvantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on thecontrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because everything depends, in such a case, upon the _ensemble_ and good order of themovement, --things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop. Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get overthe ground as rapidly as possible. In like manner, if the cavalry isarmed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from theenemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if thecavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, sincethe advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation ofgood order: in a _mêlée_ the lance is almost useless. 

If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallopto meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while thetrotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is itsapparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this isestimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect hisfirm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen gallopingin confusion. 

In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed thesmall advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate wherelancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry ismuch disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is anyadvantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break goodsquares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiersarmed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better modelsfor imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks. 

Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of usingcavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of anenemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may becompletely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry, it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come incollision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. Itis highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have aquick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head. 

Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming andorganizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposeswhen a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike anenemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have asecond rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easilyhandled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks becomebroken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge oflancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory. 

The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass ofstrong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military menof experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms offormer days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance wouldcertainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why theyshould not have lances like those of the light cavalry. 

Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals calleddragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions ofmounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it inretreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or asoldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. Thismight have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons whenfighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry foughtquite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatestinconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact ofbeing obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannotresist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed withhis musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument hasmore plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to makemen believe such contradictory statements, it would be much morereasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, bravefoot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not alwaysdepend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand otherthings; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of thecommanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery andmusketry fire, rain, --mud, even, --have been the causes of repulses or ofvictories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted, will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing thesetruths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to theiradversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the casewith the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount tofight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, likefoot-soldiers. 

It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bringsoldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties. 

The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot ormounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the largenumber of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, whilehe did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with Frenchdragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regimentof these troops at some particular point. It is probable that thisconcentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to theinstruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, andthat in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisionsof the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages mightresult to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men onhorseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. Itthus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution havetheir respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean betweenthe extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of thearmy and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat, ) andthen to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps. 

Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry isapplicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:--

1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalrythan full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are toomuch disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeedin penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwiseformation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movementsbefore reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defendthemselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or fulllines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one ischecked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It iswell to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be lessthan for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full. It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should beleft the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in columnupon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through ofthe troops which have been brought up. 

2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used, cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions. The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doublingon the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are onlyfour squadrons, there can be but two lines. 

3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed _en masse_ likethat of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadrondistance, that each may have room to disengage itself and chargeseparately. This distance will be so great only for those troopsengaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may beclosed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to bepassed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, bekept beyond cannon-range. 

4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in acombat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed inechelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may formto the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction. 

5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadronsagainst the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front. Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, andit may be better. 

6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that thecommander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of theformation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it wouldnot be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind theother, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line andone in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own properreserve behind it, --an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for ina charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible fora general to control the deployed regiments. 

By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able todispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have ageneral reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me tothink that five regiments would make a good division. The charge maythen be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving asa general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form theline, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may bepreferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping theothers in column. This is a good arrangement, because the threeregiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanksof the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it isbeaten back. (See Fig. 38. )

[Illustration: Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments. 

Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in fulllines. ]

7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for allencounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line mustsooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the firstcharge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemywill bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must atlength be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that, with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory willremain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readinessto be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is alsoengaged. 

Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to theproper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle. 

Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying largecavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is veryunmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its careerthe second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike ablow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example theattack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussiancavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry. 

In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I neverintended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons, or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry, expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other, the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first linebreaks and turns. [49]

With cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is veryimportant. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, andthe intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _mêlée_ orin the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than theadoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation isadopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, thevictory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a viciousformation. 

The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the olddisputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end getthe better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all seriousencounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return tothe combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemyby continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and severalexploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalryseem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry, I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it doesnot compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship, organization, or in care of the animals. ) We must by no means concludeit possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers toaccomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. Theyacquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilstthey are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a commonobject. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as theCossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively. 

Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of thebest cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated thatthey are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fateof a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attackin line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results. 

From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalrya regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting, however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c. , an irregular cavalry armedwith pistols, lances, and sabers. 

Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that anumerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a greatinfluence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite afeeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it cancarry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make hiscommunications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of hisoperations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising_en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, andrear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertaintyin his calculations. 

Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which providesfor great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporationof militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly notpossess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live onhorseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measuresupply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better offthan any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality ofher horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia shecan bring into the field at very short notice. 

Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. Of theTreatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:--

"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not tobe estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shockof a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks, ) are terrible inpursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle tothe execution of a general's designs, --because he can never be sure ofthe arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always indanger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a fewregiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value hasnot been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand ortwenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized, --especially in acountry where the population is not hostile to them. 

"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with astrong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Muchunusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent'sregular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue. 

"Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out, may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officeredand move freely about from point to point. "

In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resourcespossessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militiahave proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, iffor no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of thoseoccasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such asforming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving onoutposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often bemore really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of theline, --because the fear of compromising a body of these last oftenrestrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations wherehe would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus loseexcellent opportunities of accomplishing great results. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 49: To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of thebattle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of cavalryin fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up checkerwise. Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formedcheckered in two lines; but the real cause of Marlborough's success washis seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind Anderkirchand Gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eightsquadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way hadtwice as many cavalry as the French, and outflanked them. But Icheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which Ihave not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalrytactics, --a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself. ]

ARTICLE XLVI. 

Employment of Artillery. 

Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive anddefensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may breakan enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for thetroops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles thestrength of a position, not only on account of the material injury itinflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moraleffect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril ofapproaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no lessimportant in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenchedcamps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems offortification. 

I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions asto the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it isdifficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in thebattle itself. It will not be right to say that artillery can actindependently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. AtWagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into thegap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in checkthe Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance. This was a special case, and should not be often imitated. 

I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules, observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service, (1838. ) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall saylittle with reference to them. 

1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery shouldconcentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to bestruck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then itassists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry. 

2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensivemovements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intendedfor the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with anoffensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the columnwithout accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it mayhave greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front. 

3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should beheld in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point. [50]For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whenceit can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated thebest positions for the heavy calibers. 

4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along thedefensive line, should give their attention particularly to those pointswhere the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account ofthe facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artilleryshould therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of thebattle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. Thedistribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these. 

5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to thefront is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochetfiring: a converging fire is the best. 

6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery inbattles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to theirbatteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries, in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery maybe assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directedagainst the infantry and cavalry of the enemy. 

7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavorto cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns canbe so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect isproduced. 

8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. Itis advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flankand reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops isinconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a fewpieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checkedthem, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction hewas pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazardsupon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, faroverbalancing the risks run. 

9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, andespecially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may bedeviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this. 

10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry, preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells, and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, insuch a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and, when necessary, the cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behindthe pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever theyshould cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smallersquares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient infrightening the horses. 

11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue itsfire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon. The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if thebattery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation ofthe three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion bythe artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry willcause its destruction. 

12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleonconquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces, --whilst in 1812 heinvaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed. These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible. Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but thisallowance will depend on circumstances. 

The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also betweenwide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery, whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. Aremarkable proof of the great importance of having a strongartillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. Thegreat havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of theRussians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. Withwonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those alongthe Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, andto cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previouslycaptured. In three months he doubled the _matériel_ and _personnel_ ofhis artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his ownfrontiers, --a feat without a parallel in the annals of war. 

13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantageis to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategistand tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only ofthe reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to thedifferent corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult withthe commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration ofthe mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successfulissue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thusmassing his artillery without previous orders from the commandinggeneral. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 50: Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery bymounting the men on the boxes. ]

ARTICLE XLVII. 

Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms. 

To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of thecombined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing byconsidering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon ifI should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailedoperations that would arise in the application of the general rules laiddown for each of the arms. 

Several authors--chiefly German--have treated this subject veryextensively, and their labors are valuable principally because theyconsist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actualminor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take theplace of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on thesubject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that thecommander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employthem so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, afterall, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for theattempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct inevery case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied, would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As theobject and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon theconsideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the bestworks which do treat of them. 

I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different armsbe posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according tothe object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that theybe used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care beingtaken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of theevents of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations ofwar, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the abilityto use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties ofthe three arms, either single or combined. 

CONCLUSION. 

I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may beregarded as fundamental in war. War in its _ensemble_ is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixedlaws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true ofwar viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned asoften being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they maybecome essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and athousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. Thepassions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, thewarlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of theircommanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations andepochs, [51]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry andmetaphysics of war, --will have a permanent influence on its results. 

Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things astactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? Whatmilitary man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Arewe to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply byinspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of theirbattalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, andRamillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena, or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? Whenthe application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procuredvictory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in theirfavor the great probability of leading to success, shall theiroccasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying theirvalue and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall atheory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of thewhole number of chances of success in its favor?

The _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon thefate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effectproduced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon ahostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughlyenlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect thanthe attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the samepoint. 

Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing thegreatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of thetheater of war or of the zone of operations. 

Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which theyshall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, theart of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive pointof the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than offight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in whichI use the term. 

A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessedof military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellentstrategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics inpresence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will beable to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose hiswits he will lose his army. 

The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician andstrategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victorythat his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderatelyseconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain adecided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline norcourage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him, [52] he willundoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinationscan only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almostunavoidable defeat. 

No system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army isbad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon someoccurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling. Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherenceto or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle. 

These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no soundrules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, willlead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men withmathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; butit is also certain that they will always point out the errors whichshould be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, forthese rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commandingbrave troops, means of almost certain success. 

The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remainsto be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this abilityconsists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however, leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maximrelating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of thegreatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment andplace. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinationswhich lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing tobe attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle forthe object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on thefield, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, astrong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, acolumn of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed divisioncoolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consistof tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of theadversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the causeof victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred issimply impossible. 

If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that hemay see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presentsfor himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandinglyproceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the mostsuitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keepconstantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative tolines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularlyendeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objectivepoints of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of itssubsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance, depending upon its first successes. 

The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, toneutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protractingoperations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of thewar, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion ofthe enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for thepurpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c. 

Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; butno plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertainalways, --the character and the issue of the first conflict. If yourlines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements wellconcealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movementswhich permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successfulin your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use ofyour strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equallymatched at the time of conflict, there will result one of thosestupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, andDresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in thechapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence. 

If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefullystudying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the greatmasters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principlesnor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words ofFrederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under PrinceEugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning. "

Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actualevents of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a trueschool of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce greatmen, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to takerank next after the natural masters of the art of war. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 51: The well-known Spanish proverb, _He was brave on such aday_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French atRossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians atPrentzlow as at Dennewitz. ]

[Footnote 52: The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapableof understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and whowill commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same resultof causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander. ]

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR. 

My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in themilitary instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained aconcluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to giveit now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon themeans of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_. 

It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly thatin the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easyfor the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features towhich all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development ofthese elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehendthem clearly and to apply them properly. 

I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations ofwar is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinaryintelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity, many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly. Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixingthemselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what isjust within their reach if they only would think so. 

Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _hemust know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry itto a successful termination_. The first of these talents may be anatural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. Thesecond depends more on individual character, is rather a personalattribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved. 

It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a governmentto possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although hemay not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operationsand decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submittedto him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacityof his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, andhaving firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with thecommand of an army. 

If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executiveability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise militarycombinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that havecharacterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were onlybrave soldiers without being at all improved by study. 

From the principles which I have laid down, and their application toseveral famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory ofthe great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths. 

The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how tochoose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of theenemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to theimportance of decisive points, --which is not a difficult matter when heis aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly inArticles from XVIII. To XXII. 

The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon thetheater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (See ArticleXVII. ) This employment of the forces should be regulated by twofundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapidmovements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops againstfractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisivedirection_, --that is to say, in that direction where the consequences ofhis defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same timehis success would yield him no great advantages. 

The whole science of great military combination is comprised in thesetwo fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnectedor more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so alsowould the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sendingout a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, everywell-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also withcentral strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended thanthe enemy's. 

The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. Ifyou have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's, you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty ofthem to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty toobserve and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eightybattalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is totake place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interiorlines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostileline. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of thesemeans is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and following. )

In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that astrategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has acenter and two extremities. "_ A theater has usually three zones, --aright, a left, and a central. 

In choosing a zone of operations, select one, --1, that will furnish asafe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run byyourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing inmind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, thedispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are nearthe theater of war. 

One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while theother two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances. 

The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attemptsmust be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There aretwo very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial orgeographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defensewhich it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenchedcamp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely inthe destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without givingattention to geographical points of any kind_. This was the favoriteobjective of Napoleon. [53]

I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on thispoint, (page 86;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far themost important thing in a plan of operations_, I recommend the whole ofArticle XIX. , (pages 84 and following. )

The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by oneor two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to thefundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless thecharacter of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or theenemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of histroops. Article XXI. Treats this subject fully. If two geographicallines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forcesalong the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line bydetachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the mainbody. 

The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving inpresence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporarystrategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemymay attack, is its front of operations. There is an importantconsideration with reference to the direction of the front of operationsand to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article XX. , (page 93. )

The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, thatthe front be less extensive than the enemy's, --especially if the frontremains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are moreclosely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly andmore easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle willbe applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannotconcentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by movingin a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to beable to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obviousmeasure. 

But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from eachother, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War;or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of itssides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent theenemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numericalinferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of theextremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if hismasses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you. 

It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisivepoints of a theater of war, requires two things:--1st, that theprincipal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement beadopted, --that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive pointsalready known, and afterward upon secondary points. 

To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give asketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (See PlateIII. )

It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on thefrontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea. 

The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1. )

Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2. )

The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin. (No. 3. )

The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, andwas guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strongdetachments. (No. 4. )

Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5. )

Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin andCharleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6. )

Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7. )

The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8. )

The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9. )

General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No. 10. )

The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostilecorps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise, Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e. ) A strong reserve, (g, )composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northernfrontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy'sline in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood, (i, k, l, m. )

This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel nearDunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under theDuke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3, ) at Menin; next that ofClairfayt, (5, ) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of theMoselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges, and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f, ) drove Wurmserfrom the lines of Wissembourg. 

The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similaroperation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half theallied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5, and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collectedthree of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski atThuin, (No. 6, ) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by theCharleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the NorthSea, and would have obtained immense results. 

The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importancethat Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of theEnglish. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might becut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses forthis object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were goodreasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. Theprincipal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate thestrategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line ofretreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way ofpunishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off theEnglish as he might have done. 

It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along thewhole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which haddecisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through, and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession, none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If theFrench had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse, had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, hadfallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski, assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued himvigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do atLigny in 1815, the result would have been very different. 

I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the twoimportant points to be attended to in the strategic management of massesof troops; that is, their employment at different points in successionand at decisive points. [54]

Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, andwill be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upontheir conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say, the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or thecenter, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is ofimportance in battles to calculate distances with still greateraccuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field followingthem more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, everyprecaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to adangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up. Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choosepositions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with_offensive returns_, (Art. XXX. ;) the simultaneous employment of theforces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to 204;) thefaculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportunemoments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far asthe general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing whichwill constitute him a skillful tactician. 

It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field ofbattle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely herethat genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of littlevalue. 

It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII. , whichexplains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as towhat the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shallhimself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to beprepared for any eventuality. 

I must also call attention to Article XXVIII. , upon great detachments. These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, mayprove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are, to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_, to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to givethem good instructions for avoiding disasters. 

I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on militarypolicy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary ofthis part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, butshould be thoroughly understood by military men. I will, however, invite special attention to Article XIV. , relating to the command ofarmies or to the choice of generals-in-chief, --a subject worthy the mostanxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it oftendepends the safety of the nation. 

We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief ofstaff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man oftried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united actionof two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a greatcaptain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliantresults. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 53: The objective may be in some degree_political_, --especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairsof another country; but it then really becomes geographical. ]

[Footnote 54: The operations mentioned show the advantage of employingmasses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793, butbecause it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's place, hewould have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi, whence be wouldhave attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg and cut his line ofretreat. Let any one compare the results of Carnot's half-skillfuloperations with the wise maneuvers of Saint-Bernard and Jena, and beconvinced. ]

NOTE

UPON

THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL. 

The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuablepractical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, orto the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may beprocured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_, --the most valuablecharacteristic of a good general, without which he can never put inpractice the finest theories in the world. 

When a military man who is a student of his art has become fullyimpressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass againstsuccessive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when herecognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upondecisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desireto be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. Ihave already, in Chapter III. , page 70, of the preceding Summary, indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained. There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains inall the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:--_in everyposition a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operateby the right, by the left, or by the front_. 

To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first takethis general in his private office at the opening of the war. His firstcare will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him thegreatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for himin case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than threezones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left, )and as I have in Articles from XVII. To XXII. Pointed out the manner ofperceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of azone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty. 

When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate withthe principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall beestablished in that zone, the army will have a front of operationstoward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts ofoperations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains, then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he caninjure the enemy most, --for this will always be the best, especially ifhe can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I havedwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary. 

Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon thefield of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are uponthe point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, andcenter; and it remains for the general to decide still between thesethree directions of striking. 

Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, thetheater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and theNorth Sea. (See Fig. 39. )

Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographicalsections, --viz. : the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, thatbetween the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and theScheldt, and that between the last river and the sea, --it isnevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B thefront of operations will have only three general directions to choosefrom; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone, as it will always have one on the right and another on the left. 

[Illustration: Fig. 39. ]

The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whosebase was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. Ifit maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D, )it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward theRhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg, might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front andfight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin ifseriously defeated. 

If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort uponthe left, (toward E, ) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortifiedtowns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniencesstill more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in forcetoward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking thiswing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country towardAntwerp between the Scheldt and the sea, --where there would remain buttwo things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut itsway through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers. 

It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the mostdisadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient, although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zoneremains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirableadvantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force towardCharleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operationsof the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back uponAntwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its owncommunications. 

When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone, they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward theenemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object inview. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against theenemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion ofhis army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue tooperate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatesteffort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was togain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as youanticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on thecontrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention ofcrowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuverby your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuveredby the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown backupon the sea in case of a reverse. 

Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that inthose campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, thedirection of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on theline of retreat of Mélas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which ledby the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreatof Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line ofretreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera. 

In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on theright, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of thecenter, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left, leading to the line of communications of Mélas, by way of Saint-Bernardor the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, andthe right might have been very dangerous, --as, in fact, it proved toMassena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisivedirection was evidently that by the left. 

I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point. 

The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in thearrangements for these there are both strategical and tacticalconsiderations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position forbattle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and thebase of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; butthis direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of theground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement:these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such aposition for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it, sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. Insuch a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force uponthe wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off ordestroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcinghis way through your line. 

I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthenin 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick'swars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in1812. 

[Illustration: Fig. 40. ]

The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line AA is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B tocover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff'sarmy D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of theFrench, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had beenanticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thusfifteen hundred miles from its true base. 

There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, byoutflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, wouldhave entirely cut them off from the Rhine. 

At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, whichwas in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason theright wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated afew days later. 

In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point isthat wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and thisline you must seize while protecting your own. 

When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to andbehind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack thecenter, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be theleast favorable for the defense; for in such a case the firstconsideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the totaldestruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numericalstrength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, withreference to which no fixed rules can be laid down. 

Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing theenemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did atMarengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case beensecured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to preventthe enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothingbetter than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason formaneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy whois thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strikemost heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope mostspeedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the massof his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. Allthat he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall betoward the right or the left. 

It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in thepresence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which thegeneral rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of anexceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep thebridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throwthe mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view oftaking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy backupon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces inanother direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in avery critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle ofWagram is an excellent example in point, --as good, indeed, as could bedesired. I have treated this subject in Article XXXVII. , (pages 224 andfollowing. )

A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths thathave been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate_coup-d'oeil_. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general whoestimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use, either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps, will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; andeven when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he willalways be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, byconstantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles whichshould regulate all the operations of war. 

Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublimeart of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciatethoroughly the difference between the directing principles ofcombinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that specialtalent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst thenoise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand menco-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know wellwhat should be the character and talents of the general who has to makesuch masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper pointsimultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied witharms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this specialtalent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be grantedthat the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the beststrategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublimecharacteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under thecommand of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability, have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were movedimprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other!Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny, Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen. 

I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said. To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to mefor attaching too much importance to the application of the few maximslaid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first toannounce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full ofpassion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresightand ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and theimpulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influenceupon it. " I may be permitted also, after having written the detailedhistory of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the mostcelebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case wherethese principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success. 

As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetratingmind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows onlywhat others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those thingsinto a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I haveseen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree ofreputation by talking largely of principles which they conceivedincorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these menintrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the mostextravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgmentand were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intendedfor such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been tofacilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, bypointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit forhaving rendered valuable service to those officers who are reallydesirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms. 

Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:--

"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is, that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a trulymartial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commitfaults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels. "

[Blank Page]

SECOND APPENDIX

TO THE

SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR. 

ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE. 

Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished persondid me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements infire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of makingwar. 

I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details oftactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grandcombinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from theapplication of the principles which had led to the success of greatgenerals in all ages, --of Alexander and Cæsar as well as of Frederickand Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of myopinion. 

The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have notproduced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contestbetween two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies andmounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event withoutprecedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstanceswhich produced it cannot occur again. 

Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblanceto regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannotinfluence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even thetactics of battles. 

The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of themurderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigatethe changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in thetactics for infantry. 

I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order tocomplete what was published on this point twenty years ago in theSummary of the Art of War. 

The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles isnot new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, andparticularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said)because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers inloading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute morethan their enemies. [55] The discussion which arose at this epoch betweenthe partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops isknown to all military students. 

The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for theinfantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle, was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve. 

The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed asthe only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use ofbattalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats, --suchas an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or smallintrenchments. [56]

The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republicforced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle thesystem of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, thenature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--theVosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vendée--renderedthis the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible toattack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployedregiments?

In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, asthey were nearly always the assailants. 

In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with thetitle of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War, " in whichI proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columnsof battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march tothe attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance, preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated byintervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of abattalion and the minimum of the front of one column. 

What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, andEylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, ofmarching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, toattack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me topublish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted someattention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also onaccount of what was said on tactics. 

The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troopsdeployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to themurderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some mindsas to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not tillafter 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle worerenewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray. 

In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearestminds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast inthe same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange, without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances, national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I hadproposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: Inever intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for thedefense. 

I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation wasapproved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at theCongress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charlesobserved "that he was under great obligations for the summary I hadpublished in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808from Silesia. " At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had notthought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but atthe battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him toform a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehrparticularly, ) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of thecuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, they could not have done if they had been deployed. 

At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line wasformed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terriblefighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because hisarmy was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrownback so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince wassatisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to thismixture of small columns with deployed battalions. 

The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress ofVerona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of thecontroversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system towhich a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the Frenchupon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against asolid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and wellsupported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that thesedeep columns were very different from the small columns which Iproposed, --a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and forcethan a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages ofartillery. 

I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed theHanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. Heanswered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon theEnglish. " I replied that this admission proved that he thought a lineformed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines. He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always dependsupon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot actin the same manner under all circumstances. "

To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in thecampaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of theinfantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as themost suitable, --which was identically what I had proposed in 1807. 

The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns atWaterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columnsof battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper. 

If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, itwould seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, atleast in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the lineextending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; butseveral officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formedin columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions beingdeployed behind each other at six paces' interval. 

This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military termsof the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of fourregiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each, --whichis absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed onthe 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns bydivisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood itvery differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the following formations:--

1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed infour large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according tothe strength of the regiments, ) as is indicated in this figure for eightbattalions. [57]

2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns ofbattalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to thesystem I have proposed, as in this figure, viz. :--

I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led tothe deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it isimportant that in every language there should be two different terms toexpress two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalionsand a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion. 

Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summaryalready referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it Idevoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantagesof the different formations for battle. I also added some considerationsrelative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, whichconsisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying thecentral one, the other two being in column on the wings. 

 * * * * *

After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:--

1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive. 

2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, beas good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it wassuccessfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento. 

3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty inmarching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks overan interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficientorder to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, thefront all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry. 

I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it asimpossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to theattack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary forsuccess. 

Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in theseterms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assaultupon the enemy. " I ask, what means is there of carrying up to theassault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole ingood order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected fromeach other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the massas a whole. 

I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden, Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland, Katzbach, or Dennewitz. 

I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched indeployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generallyawaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory bymaneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing wasbeaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, whatfate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau ofMont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon inposition on the heights of La Belle Alliance?

I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to benecessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since mySummary of the Art of War was written. 

Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to itsvalue by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as tomake them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With thisview, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies onebehind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but insmall columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies oftwo hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into foursections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed asskirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a smallcolumn; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will formfour, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve smallcolumns instead of three--

[Illustration:

3d Battalion. 2d Battalion. 1st Battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- ---]

It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against theenemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixtyskirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would neverpresent the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion. Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria. 

The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eightcompanies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies, but by divisions of two companies, --that is, in three or four columns, according to the number of companies. 

Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of theseformations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisionswould be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, ifdriven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than inthe columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed, according to circumstances, localities, and the _morale_ of the troops. Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not awarewhether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza andNovara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in theircamps of instruction. 

Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to beconsidered:--

"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bringabout any important changes in the formation for battle and the nowrecognized principles of tactics?"

If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was becausethe Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgottenthat in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, sothat in future the advantage will not be confined to one side. 

What change will it make in tactics?

Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still benecessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two orthree ranks, or lines of battalions in columns?

Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties willfire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shallretreat or be destroyed?

What military man will reply in the affirmative?

It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary, and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; andhe cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns ofbattalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or twocompanies. To attempt to prescribe by regulation under whatcircumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd. 

If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon theenemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let theshallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined tothe attack of isolated posts; but I freely confess that I would neveraccept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for aregulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of verydeep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keepin order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that theirdestruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase inany respect their chances of success. 

If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt forinfantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organizationaccording with the formation for battle. I would then make each regimentof infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. Each battalionshould consist of six companies, so that when in column by division thedepth would be three divisions or six ranks. 

This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form thebattalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of eachbattalion, or on any other division. 

The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not beso much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have themobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch themupon the enemy with great force. The deployment of these small columnscould be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the formingof a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable inseveral respects to one of four or six divisions. 

In the Russian service each battalion consists of four companies of twohundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a divisionin the French organization. The maneuver of double column on the centeris not practicable, since the center is here merely an intervalseparating the second and third companies. Hence the column must besimple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. Somethinganalogous to the double column on the center would be attained byforming the first and fourth companies behind the second and thirdrespectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather thanin column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the organization ofthe battalion in six companies or three divisions. 

By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eightin all, the formation of _double column on the center_ might be made onthe fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then eachdivision would be composed of two platoons belonging to differentcompanies, so that each captain would have half of the men of hiscompany under the command of another officer, and half of his owndivision would be made up of another company. 

Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, asthe captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of hisown company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty thanany stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with adecided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, itwould be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged torun from one side to the other to find their companies. In the Frenchsystem, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming asmany platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since eachcompany is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will betwo captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather anadvantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulationbetween the two captains and their men, which will lead to greaterdisplay of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there, to command the division as a whole. 

It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the importantquestion at issue. 

Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is properto explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the lightof historical events. 

In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command amass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidencein regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want ofinstruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatredof the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing theenemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury andimpetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena andNey, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosityand afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficultto approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish andPortuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of theinequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on thetactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddledthe advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire, while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, wereposted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival ofthese columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, outof breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a generaldischarge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by theinfantry with the bayonet. 

This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable toSpain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind oftroops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they couldbe useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicableto Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with agentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent fieldof fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of thisplateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau, could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his ownwere hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented hislosing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to hisaid. 

Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terriblebattle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstratedthat its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use ofdeployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes, viz. :--

1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attackpainful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective, and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery. 

2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of theFrench, principally on the right wing. 

3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: theinfantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with eachother, but they were in no case simultaneous. 

4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussianarmy at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of theFrench. 

Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud andthe firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantryhad been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediatelyafter the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have beenbroken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if thePrussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled toretreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proofof the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks incolumns. 

From all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions, viz. :--

1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any importantchange in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would beuseful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation ofcolumns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen orskirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Thosearmies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute themthrough the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detailsharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, whichwould be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by thisplan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with theothers; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companiesbe at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion oflight infantry to each division. 

2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire beexcellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in anattack upon an enemy in position. 

3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in abattle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: itwill always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of theother. 

4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly, upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grandtactics, which consist in this, viz. : in knowing how to direct the greatmass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of thebattle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous actionof the three arms. 

5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on thissubject in Chapters IV. And V. ; and that it would be unreasonable todefine by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle. 

6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the party takingthe offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of takinghis troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy, adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to thespirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character. 

Finally, I will terminate this article with the following remark: Thatwar, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioneddrama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, butalso dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physicalcomplications. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 55: It is probable that Baron Jomini here refers to iron, instead of cylindrical, ramrods. Before 1730, all European troops usedwooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones isattributed by some to the Prince of Anhalt, and by others to PrinceLeopold of Dessau. The Prussians were the first to adopt the ironramrod, and at the date of the battle of Mollwitz (1741) it had not beenintroduced into the Austrian service. 

Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777, thirty-sixyears after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of the cylindricalramrod consisted in this, --that the soldier in loading saved the timenecessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of timecould never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loadedonce, --all other things being equal. --Translators. ]

[Footnote 56: Columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to beintended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, inorder to facilitate their deployment. ]

[Footnote 57: We suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: ifthere should be three in each regiment, the deep column would thenconsist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, whilein the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line insteadof eight, the depth not being increased. ]

SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS. 

I have thought it proper to give here an account of the principalmaritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents. 

The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the earliestmentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. The Persiansconquered these nations, as well as Asia Minor, and became the mostformidable power on both land and sea. 

About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the coast ofMauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz, passed thestraits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the Balearic Isles andSardinia, and finally made a descent on Sicily. 

The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that could nothave been expected, --although no country was ever more favorablysituated for a naval power than Greece, with her fifty islands and hergreat extent of coast. 

The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and gave her thenaval power to which Greece was indebted for her independence. Herfleets, united with those of the islands, were, under Themistocles, theterror of the Persians and the rulers of the East. They never made granddescents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to theirnaval strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of aconfederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse, Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other, it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered the world before theRomans. 

If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greekhistorians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four thousandvessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the accountof them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to believe that at the sametime, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landedthree hundred thousand Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totallydefeated by Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleetof Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal, Imilcon, and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to one hundred andfifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were taken, Lilybæum wasfounded, and Syracuse besieged twice. The third time Androcles, withfifteen thousand men, landed in Africa, and made Carthage tremble. Thiscontest lasted one year and a half. 

Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty thousand men:his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the Persianshad four hundred; and to save his fleet Alexander sent it back toGreece. 

After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the divisionof the empire, made no important naval expedition. 

Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by theirfleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousandhorses, and the first elephants which had been seen in Italy. This wastwo hundred and eighty years before the Christian era. 

Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is difficult tounderstand why he should have gone to Sicily at the solicitation of theSyracusans to expel the Carthaginians. Recalled, after some success, bythe Tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the Carthaginianfleet: then, reinforced by the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little toolate, concluded to march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed onBeneventum, when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which wasall that remained of his force. 

Carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by theruin of Tyre and the Persian empire. 

The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the preponderating powerin Italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity. The Romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which theyimproved and increased their marine. In the year 264 B. C. Their boats orvessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years afterfound Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and forty largevessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twentycombatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. TheCarthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousandmen and fifty vessels. 

The victory of Ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that ofActium--was the first important step of the Romans toward universalempire. The subsequent descent in Africa consisted of forty thousandmen; but the greater part of this force being recalled to Sicily, theremainder was overthrown, and Regulus, being made prisoner, became ascelebrated by his death as by his famous victory. 

The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at Clypea, butwas destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the samefate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249 B. C. The Romans were defeated atDrepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundredvessels. Another fleet, on its way to besiege Lilybæum, in the sameyear, was lost off Cape Pactyrus. 

Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at firstresolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of Sicilyand Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to armits fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius Catullus set out withthree hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for Drepanum, andgained the battle in the Ægates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lostone hundred and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close thefirst Punic war. 

The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy, was lessmaritime in its character. Scipio, however, bore the Roman eagles toCartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of theCarthaginians in Spain. Finally, he carried the war into Africa with aforce inferior to that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining thebattle of Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning fivehundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed theHellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained thecelebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the Romans thekingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was aided by avictory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome andRhodes, over the navy of Antiochus. 

From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her powerby using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. PaulusEmilius in the year 168 B. C. Landed at Samothrace at the head oftwenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia tosubmission. 

Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of Carthage. The important port of Utica having been given up to the Romans, animmense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousandfoot-soldiers and four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and theson of Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the gloryof completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had begun, bydestroying the bitter rival of his country. 

After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in Europe, was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment shaken byMithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in succession the smalladjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fiftythousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which threehundred were decked. He defeated the three Roman generals who commandedin Cappadocia, invaded Asia Minor and massacred there at least eightythousand Roman subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece. 

Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousandRomans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent in succession two largearmies by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles: the first, one hundredthousand strong, was destroyed at Chæronea, and the second, of eightythousand men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time, Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities ofAsia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes, was prepared totransport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and Mithridates, from fear, made peace. 

In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena andLucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates, driven step bystep into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived theproject of turning the Black Sea by the Caucasus, in order to passthrough Thrace to assume the offensive, --a policy which it is difficultto understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend hiskingdom against fifty thousand Romans. 

Cæsar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred vessels, transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars he transportedthirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came from Brundusium to joinhim with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet ofPompey, --in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of Cæsaras by the arrangements of his lieutenants. 

Afterward Cæsar carried an army of sixty thousand men to Africa; theydid not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments. 

The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic was thatof Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousandhorses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides the numeroustransports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixtyvessels of war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land, but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had onehundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of Cleopatra'sgalleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besidesthe necessary rowers. 

Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels, carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouthsof the Ems. Half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm;and it is difficult to understand why Germanicus, controlling both banksof the Rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea, when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days. 

When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the Euphrates, maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races ofthe North of Europe, which began after the division of the empire, gaveemployment to the Roman armies on the sides of Germany and Thrace. Theeastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, whichthe possession of the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, whileat the same time it afforded the means. 

The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few events ofinterest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having acquired Spain, landedin Africa, eighty thousand strong, under Genseric. They were defeated byBelisarius; but, holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlledthe Mediterranean for a time. 

At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe, theScandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their operationsare little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden inthe mysteries of Odin. 

The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels toSweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to theDanes and three hundred to Norway: these frequently acted in concert. 

The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the Baltic, and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more favorably situatedwith respect to the North Sea, directed their course toward the coastsof France and England. 

If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part of thesevessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score ofrowers. There were also _snekars_, with twenty banks or forty rowers. The largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. The incursions of theDanes, who had long before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us toinfer that the greater part of these vessels were very small. 

However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported fivethousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels, --which would go to showthat there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the Elbewas superior to that of the Scandinavians. 

Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under Ida andCridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it into sevenkingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed (833) thatthey were again united under the authority of Egbert. 

The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe. In 712, the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the lead of Tarik. They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of Count Julian; and, far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerousenemies of the Visigoths. This was the happy era of the Caliphs, and theArabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants ofthe North. Tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeatedRodrigo at Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, severalmillions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and settled inSpain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents, still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes inhistory, occurring between the incursions of the Vandals in Africa andthe Crusades in the East. 

A revolution not less important, and one which has left more durabletraces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast empire nowknown as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the Novgorodians, ofwhom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by greatexpeditions. 

In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in twothousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the river anddebouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. Theyproceeded to Constantinople, and forced Leo the Philosopher to paytribute. 

Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a fleet said tohave consisted of ten thousand boats. Near Constantinople his fleet, terrified by the effects of the Greek fire, was driven on the coast ofAsia, where the force was disembarked. It was defeated, and theexpedition returned home. 

Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and descended tothe mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus I. Sent to renew thetribute and ask for peace, (943. )

In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with the King ofBulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the Black Sea, ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled by the Petchenegs, who were menacing Kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returnedinto Bulgaria, broke his alliance with the Greeks, and, being reinforcedby the Hungarians, crossed the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople. The throne of Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of hisposition. Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as hispredecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed arespectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged him toretreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of the Bulgarians. The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far fromSilistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained oneof the most memorable sieges recorded in history. 

In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians performedprodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers. Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty. 

About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the hope ofpillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king, Ogier, toFrance to be avenged of his brothers. The first success of these piratesincreased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or sixyears their bands swarmed on the coasts of France and Britain anddevastated the country. Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conductedthem sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the mouths ofthe Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted thatHastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to Avignon;but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of their fleets isnot known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail. 

In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed in England, but, finding little chance of success against Alfred, he entered intoalliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and advanced from Rouen onParis: other bodies marched from Nantes on Chartres. Repulsed here, Rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. Charles the Simplesaw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasingscourge than to offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on conditionthat he would marry his daughter and turn Christian, --an offer which waseagerly accepted. 

Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors ofCharles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The latter landed inconsiderable force, defeated the French, took the king prisoner, andassured Rollo's son in the possession of Normandy. 

During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even greaterhostility toward England than to France, although they were much moreassimilated to the Saxons than to the French in language and customs. Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family inNorthumberland. Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar's successors, succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission ofthe Danes. 

The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more fortunate thanIvar, after conquering and devastating England, granted peace oncondition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to Denmark, leaving a part of his army behind him. 

Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of the Saxonpower, thought he could not do better to free himself from hisimportunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all theDanes in the kingdom, (1002. ) But Sweyn reappeared in the followingyear at the head of an imposing force, and between 1003 and 1007 threesuccessive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunateEngland was ravaged anew. 

In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again swept overthe land like a torrent, and the English, tired of obedience to kingswho could not defend them, recognized him as king of the North. His son, Canute the Great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him, (Edmund Ironside. ) Returning from Denmark at the head of a considerableforce, and aided by the perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southernpart of England and threatened London. A new division of the kingdomresulted; but, Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute wasfinally recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed toconquer Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. Whenhe died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according tothe usage of the times. 

Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the crown to theirAnglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted tobe a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. He died in1066, leaving to Harold a crown which the chief of the Normans settledin France contested with him, and to whom, it is said, Edward had made acession of the kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a greatand ambitious man. 

The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. While Williamthe Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a formidable armament againstHarold, the brother of the latter, having been driven fromNorthumberland for his crimes, sought support in Norway, and, with theKing of Norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundredvessels, and landed at the mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirelydestroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near York; but a moreformidable storm was about to burst upon his head. William tookadvantage of the time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting theNorwegians, to sail from St. Valery with a very large armament. Humeasserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authoritiesreduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventythousand men. Harold hastened from York, and fought a decisive battlenear Hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunaterival soon reduced the country to submission. 

At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer, RobertGuiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and Sicily with ahandful of troops, (1058 to 1070. )

Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiasticpriest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated largeforces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land. 

At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundredthousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under theattacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, Peter the Hermitsucceeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived before Nice with fromfifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by theSaracens. 

An expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign ofreligious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men, composed of French, Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of Lorraine, under Godfrey ofBouillon, marched through Austria on Constantinople; an equal number, under the Count of Toulouse, marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, andMacedonia; and Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force ofNormans, Sicilians, and Italians, and took the route by Greece onGallipolis. 

This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions ofXerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets were chartered totransport these swarms of Crusaders by the Bosporus or Dardanelles toAsia. More than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on theplains of Nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors. Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem, where he founded a kingdom. 

All the maritime resources of Greece and the flourishing republics ofItaly were required to transport these masses across the Bosporus and inprovisioning them during the siege of Nice; and the great impulse thusgiven to the coast states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageousresult of the Crusades. 

This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of greatdisasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, unitedto resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the Christiancamps. A new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the braveNoureddin was threatening. Louis VII. And the Emperor Conrad, each atthe head of one hundred thousand Crusaders, marched, as theirpredecessors had done, by the route of Constantinople, (1142. ) But theGreeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests, plotted their destruction. 

Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid forhim by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles bythe Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate, defeated the Turks on thebanks of the Mender; but, being deprived of the support of Conrad, andhis army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passageof defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia, on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. Themeans furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more thanfifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the king: theremainder either perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens. 

This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of theclimate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they werecontinually aided by small bodies brought over from Europe by theItalian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks ofSaladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in effecting an alliancebetween the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France andEngland to save the Holy Land. 

The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one hundredthousand Germans, he opened a passage through Thrace in spite of theformal resistance of the Greeks, now governed by Isaac Angelus. Hemarched to Gallipolis, crossed the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. Hedied in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has beenpretended, was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by theMussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely sixthousand men. 

At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion[58] and Philip Augustus morejudiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from Marseilles andGenoa with two immense fleets, (1190. ) The first seized Cyprus, and bothlanded in Syria, --where they would probably have triumphed but for therivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which Philipreturned to France. 

Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203. ) Part ofthe Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others, led by the Countof Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with theintention of embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded bythe skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, uponthe pretext of upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of IsaacAngelus, who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor ofthose Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies ofConrad and Louis VII. 

Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital ofthe world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. Theyassailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The usurper fled, andAlexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat:the Greeks made an insurrection in favor of Murzupha, but the Latinstook possession of Constantinople after a more bloody assault than thefirst, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin ofFlanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the Greekstook refuge at Nice and Trebizond. 

A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of Brienne, who, notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of Damietta, was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of theMussulman population. The remains of his splendid army, after a narrowescape from drowning in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate inbeing able to purchase permission to re-embark for Europe. 

The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal ofChristendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits, encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering realm atJerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of Hesse embarked atBrundusium in 1227, at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. Thelandgrave, and afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet putin at Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by thepresumption of Gregory IX. , who excommunicated him because he was tooslow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded withten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontificalthunders. 

Louis IX. , animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we maycredit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out fromAigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty large vessels, andfifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the Genoese, the Venetians andthe Catalans; for France was at that time without a navy, althoughwashed by two seas. This king proceeded to Cyprus, and, having therecollected a still larger force, set out, according to Joinville'sstatement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descentinto Egypt. His army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for, although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast ofSyria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty thousandfighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should be stated thatthe Count of Poictiers had arrived also with troops from France. 

The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent thesame king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty years later, (1270. ) Hedisembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of Carthage, and besiegedTunis. The plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himselfwas one of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with powerfulreinforcements at the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry backthe remains of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempestwhich caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. Thisprince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest ofthe Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of greatervalue and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and successor of SaintLouis, being anxious to return to France, would have nothing to do withthat project. This was the last effort. The Christians who wereabandoned in Syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli andPtolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge atCyprus and established themselves at Rhodes. 

The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipolis in1355, and took possession, one after the other, of the Europeanprovinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins had themselvesgiven the fatal blow. 

Mohammed II. , while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said to havehad his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canaland closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to bemanned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. After the capture ofthis capital, Mohammed found his means increased by all those of theGreek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank ofmaritime powers. He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and uponOtranto on the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search ofa more worthy opponent (Hunniades. ) Repulsed and wounded at Belgrade, the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that cityto sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sailto make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he carried byassault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at thehead of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was afailure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to go tothat point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores ofIonia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but deathclosed his career, and the project was not carried into effect. 

About the same period England began to be formidable to her neighbors onland as well as on the sea; the Dutch also, reclaiming their countryfrom the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power moreextraordinary even than that of Venice. 

Edward III. Landed in France and besieged Calais with eight hundredships and forty thousand men. 

Henry V. Made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is stated, fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom sixthousand were cavalry. 

All the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, andincluding the capture of Constantinople, were before the invention ofgunpowder; for if Henry V. Had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimed bysome writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. From thattime all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; andthis revolution took place--if I may use that expression--at the timewhen the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of Americaand of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the maritime commerce ofthe world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system ofcolonial dependencies. 

I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards toAmerica, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to India bydoubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their great influenceupon the commerce of the world, --notwithstanding the genius of Gama, Albuquerque, and Cortez, --these expeditions, undertaken by small bodiesof two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing offire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view. 

The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by thisdiscovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reignof Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition to Tunis, which wasconquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldierstransported in five hundred Genoese or Spanish vessels, was balanced bythe disaster which befell a similar expedition against Algiers, (1541, )undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to thewise counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under waywhen the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eightthousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by theskill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where Charles V. Himselfarrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril. 

While these events were transpiring, the successors of Mohammed were notneglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many finemaritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of thecontrol of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. At this periodthe Turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery andthe military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the apex oftheir greatness under Solyman I. , who besieged and captured Rhodes(1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred andforty thousand men, --which was still formidable even upon thesupposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half. 

In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent upon Malta, where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new establishment; they carriedover thirty-two thousand Janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships. John of Valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsingthem. 

A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels andfifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle of Cyprus, whereNicosia was taken and Famagosta besieged. The horrible crueltiespracticed by Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress. Spain, Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succorCyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding theheroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive byMustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand Turks that hadperished in the space of two years spent on the island. 

The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of Austria, brother of Philip II. , and Andrea Doria, attacked the Turkish fleet atthe entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the promontory of Actium, where Antony and Augustus once fought for the empire of the world. TheTurkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundredvessels and thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571. )This victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was agreat check in their career of greatness. However, they made suchvigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to seaduring the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which suchenormous losses were sustained. 

The bad fortune of Charles V. In his expedition against Algiers did notdeter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest ofMorocco, where he was invited by a Moorish prince who had been deprivedof his estates. Having disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at thehead of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his armycut to pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578. 

Philip II. , whose pride had increased since the naval battle of Lepantoon account of the success he had gained in France by his diplomacy andby the folly of the adherents of the League, deemed his armsirresistible. He thought to bring England to his feet. The invincibleArmada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, wascomposed of an expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including, according to Hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels, armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, andcarrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousandsailors. To these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousandmen which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by wayof Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the failureof this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for theperiod when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-soundingname it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vesselsbefore it even came near the English coast. 

After this expedition comes in chronological order that of GustavusAdolphus to Germany, (1630. ) The army contained only from fifteen toeighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by ninethousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating thatit carried eight thousand cannon. The debarkation in Pomerania receivedlittle opposition from the Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had astrong party among the German people. His successor was the leader of avery extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one otherexample mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X. OfSweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from Sleswickupon Copenhagen by way of the island of Funen, (1658. ) He had twenty-fivethousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery inproportion. This undertaking was so much the more rash because the icewas unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriagehaving broken through and been lost. 

After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and the Turksrecommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of fifty-fivethousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to Candia, and gainedpossession of the important post of Canea before the republic thought ofsending succor. Although the people of Venice began to lose the spiritwhich made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noblesouls: Morosini, Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years againstthe Turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiorityand the possession of Canea. The Venetian fleet had, nevertheless, gained a marked ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third ofit was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himselfperished. 

In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city furiouslyat the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in twoassaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach beingmade. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo rushed to meet them, expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant victory was the reward ofhis heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled withtheir dead bodies. 

Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty thousand men toCandia; but Europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had alreadycalled into active service all the men fit for war she could produce. 

The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of Troy, andeach campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the Turks tocarry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by theVenetians. The latter people had kept up with the advance of navaltactics in Europe, and thus were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, whoadhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for everyattempt to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name ofMorosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous in thisprotracted struggle. 

Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the head ofthe Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of thiswar which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island, where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head heconducted the attack in a vigorous manner. (1667. )

In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than previously:their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for thefirst time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of anItalian engineer. 

The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense bymines. Never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutualdestruction by combats, mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistanceenabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venicesent reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds ofFrench volunteers. 

The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled theirefforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand Frenchmencame to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the Dukeof Beaufort and Navailles, (1669. ) A badly-conducted sortie discouragedthese presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with thesufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the endof two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to France. Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a placewhich was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and atruce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. Candia hadcost the Turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundredthousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. Itis estimated that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nationsperished in the glorious defense of the place. 

The struggle between Louis XIV. , Holland, and England gives examples ofgreat maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. That of James II. In Ireland (1690) was composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, althoughDe Tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carryingfive thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. Agrave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand meninto Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later, DeTourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and theremains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return throughthe instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of theisland. 

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and Russiansundertook two expeditions very different in character. 

Charles XII. , wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein, made a descent uponDenmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundredvessels and protected by a strong squadron. He was really assisted bythe English and Dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reasonthe less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. The sameprince effected a descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed histroops at a Swedish port. 

Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the Persians, and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in 1722)upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea with two hundred and seventyvessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended toAgrakhan, at the mouths of the Koisou, where he expected to meet hiscavalry. This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousandCossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czarthen seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty with oneof the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord theempire of the Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key ofthe Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian empire. 

The time of Louis XV. Furnished examples of none but secondaryexpeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca, whichwas very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent. 

[In 1762, an English fleet sailed from Portsmouth: this was joined by aportion of the squadron from Martinico. The whole amounted to nineteenships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred andfifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. The expedition besieged andcaptured Havana. --TRS. ]

The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen or sixteenthousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of thesea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmoniousaction between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, onaccount of the murderous fire which the troops received from theTurkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surroundingthe city. The troops returned to their vessels after having two thousandmen placed _hors de combat_. 

The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime effortsupon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see this powersend Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships of the line, while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet ofsixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected withthree hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at Havre andSt. Malo. 

This new armada moved back and forth for several months, butaccomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port. 

D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiorityin the Antilles and in landing in the United States six thousandFrenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, byanother division, and assisted in investing the English army underCornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the independence of America was thussecured. France would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacablerival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the displaymade in the English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousandmen more to India with Admiral Suffren. 

During the French Revolution, there were few examples of descents: thefire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of Ushant had greatly injuredthe French navy. 

Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand men wasscattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter weremade. (1796. )

At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting oftwenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and fourhundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which werefollowed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of expelling him, landedfifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were all captured or driven intothe sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them ofintrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is anexcellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive undersimilar circumstances. 

The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in 1802 toSt. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of theravages of yellow fever. 

Since their success against Louis XIV. , the English have given theirattention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation ofcolonies than to great descents. The attempts made in the eighteenthcentury against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelvethousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state likeFrance. The remarkable conquests which procured them their Indian empireoccurred in succession. Having obtained possession of Calcutta, and thenof Bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival oftroops in small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined tothe number of one hundred and fifty thousand. 

The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed of fortythousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of thedetails of the operations is, however, quite interesting. 

In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz, effected adescent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen. The results of thisexpedition are well known. 

General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806, ) after some successes atMaida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of Sicily. Thatagainst Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and wasterminated by a capitulation. 

In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five thousandmen, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of theDanish fleet, which was his object. 

In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand men. After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the general risingof the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom. The samearmy, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed underMoore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into Spain with aview of relieving Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and therere-embark, after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effectedanother landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an army ofthirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with which he avengedMoore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at Oporto, (May, 1809, ) and thenbeating Joseph at Talavera, under the very gates of his capital. 

The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the largestEngland has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was composed of notless than seventy thousand men in all, --forty thousand land-forces andthirty thousand sailors. It did not succeed, on account of theincapacity of the leader. 

A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X. Of Swedenwas effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the Gulf of Bothnia onthe ice in five columns, with their artillery. Their object was to takepossession of the islands of Aland and spread a feeling of apprehensionto the very gates of Stockholm. Another division passed the gulf toUmeå, (March, 1809. )

General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in theneighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of cutting Suchetoff from Valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thoughtbest to re-embark. 

The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after his returnfrom Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the great mass of_matériel_ landed at Ostend and Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian armycontained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others weredisembarked at a friendly port. 

The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may beregarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on the capital ofthe United States. The world was astonished to see a handful of seven oreight thousand Englishmen making their appearance in the midst of astate embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of itscapital, and destroying all the public buildings, --results unparalleledin history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitaryspirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had notrisen, like those of Greece, Rome, and Switzerland, to defend theirhomes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, anEnglish expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirelydefeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states under the ordersof General Jackson. 

If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of Xerxes andthe Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has beenactually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed withpowerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project andproportionate preparations made by Napoleon for throwing one hundred andfifty thousand veterans upon the shores of England by the use of threethousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of theline[59]. 

From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a differencethere is in point of difficulty and probability of success betweendescents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only inwidth, and those in which the troops and _matériel_ are to betransported long distances over the open sea. This fact gives the reasonwhy so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of theBosporus. 

 * * * * *

[The following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:--

In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers, composedof an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred andeighty pieces of artillery. More than five hundred vessels of war andtransports were employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon. 

In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera Cruz. Thecastle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after a shortbombardment. A small force of about one thousand men, in three columns, took the city of Vera Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight. 

In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon the coast ofMexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under thecommand of General Scott. One hundred and fifty vessels were employed, including men-of-war and transports. The city of Vera Cruz and thecastle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily fell into the possession of theforces of the United States. This important post became the secondarybase of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with thecapture of the city of Mexico. 

In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between Russia onthe one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey on the other. Several descents were made by the allied forces at different points ofthe Russian coast: of these the first was in the Baltic Sea. An Englishfleet sailed from Spithead, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, onthe 12th of March, and a French fleet from Brest, under the command ofVice-Admiral Parseval Deschênes, on the 19th of April. They effected ajunction in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleetnumbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels. The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of Bomarsund, on oneof the Aland Isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to theconclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. A French corps often thousand men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under GeneralBaraguay-d'Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced. 

Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed;and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order togive an idea of its magnitude:--

September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men andtwo hundred pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, composed ofthirty thousand French, twenty-one thousand five hundred English, andseven thousand Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place oflanding by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, andtransports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma, (September 20, ) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English tookpossession of the harbor of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch: thesewere the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for thearmy in the Crimea were sent. 

November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army numberedseventy-one thousand men. 

At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five thousandmen and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the English had sentfifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only fifteen thousand werealive, present, and fit for duty. 

February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the English, twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks, twenty-five thousand. 

May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with fifteenthousand Sardinians. 

In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand men wassent to Kertch. 

In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one hundred andtwenty thousand men. 

September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in theevacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then in batterymore than eight hundred pieces of artillery. 

The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attackof October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five ships. There were presentand prepared to attack in September, 1855, thirty-four ships. 

October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent toKinburn, which place was captured. 

Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the Frenchemperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria three hundred andten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred andtwenty-seven thousand men returned to France and Algeria. 

The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers onlyto French operations:-)

The artillery _matériel_ at the disposal of the Army of the Eastcomprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages, two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and ninemillion pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousandtons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred andseventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousandwar-rockets. 

On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteenbatteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds ofpowder. They required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions. 

Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The engineersexecuted fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixtythousand fascines, and one million sand-bags. 

Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent. 

Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons. 

Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons. 

Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons. 

In all, about six hundred thousand tons. 

It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the English, Sardinian, and Turkish armies. 

In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a force of fortythousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces ofartillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred andtwenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numeroustransports. 

In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast of China, whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. Thisexpedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers whichventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply andsuccor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of themost populous empire in the world. 

The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small in numbers, andpresented no remarkable features. 

Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the United Statessent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port Royal, on the coastof South Carolina, one of the seceding States. The fleet of war-vesselsand transports sailed from Hampton Roads, under command of CaptainDupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and_matériel_ were small, however, and the fleet finally reached therendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the navalforces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, GeneralSherman being in command. 

England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged in anexpedition directed against Mexico. The first operations were thecapture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its defenses: theMexicans offered no resistance at that point. The future will developthe plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if, indeed, one be attempted by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when threeof the most powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble andtottering republic of Mexico. ]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 58: Richard sailed from England with twenty thousand foot andfive thousand horsemen, and landed in Normandy, whence he proceeded byland to Marseilles. We do not know what fleet he employed to transporthis troops to Asia. Philip embarked at Genoa on Italian ships, and witha force at least as large as that of Richard. ]

[Footnote 59: See the account of the expedition to theCrimea. --TRANSLATORS. ]

INDEX

A. 

Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, 384. 

Accidental lines, 103. 

Action, concert of, how secured, 259. 

Active armies and sieges, relation between, 152. 

Advanced guard, 261, 262. Attack of the enemy's, in retreats, 243. In armies meeting unexpectedly, 208. In battle, 288, 289. 

Advance, line of, how determined, 71. 

Advantages of awaiting invasion, 17. Of elevated points for observation, 276. 

Aggressive wars for conquest, 22. 

Agincourt, order of battle at, 192. 

Albis, position of, 181. 

Alcazar, battle of, 378. 

Alexander the Great, 173, 362. 

Alfred the Great, 369. 

Algiers, French descent on, in 1830, 386. Spanish descent on, 382. 

Alise, investment of, by Cæsar, 153. 

Allies, at Bautzen, 187. Defeat of, at Zurich, 112. Error of, in 1793, 107, 108. Failure of diversion of, in 1805, 219. In war, 18. March of, upon Leipsic, 123. 

Alps, passage of, by Francis I. , 168. 

American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, 383. 

Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, 384. 

Angoulême, Duke of, expedition of, 28. 

Antony, retreat of, from Media, 233. 

Antwerp, English expedition to, 385. 

Archduke Charles, 294. Concentric retreat of, in 1796, 238. Interior lines of, 136. Opinion of, as to small-column formation, 350. Opinion of, as to the valley of the Danube, 162. Success of, 110, 111. 

Archduke Ferdinand, 53. 

Armada, Spanish, 249, 378, 379. 

Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, 47. Superior, importance of, 47, 48. 

Armies, auxiliary, 170. Central, observations on, 126. Command of, 52. French, in the Revolution, 135. How to act, 75. In intrenchments, 154. In peace, how preserved, 47. Large, fitness of central lines for, 125. Large, organization of, 286. Meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, 208. Morale of, 60, 178, 322. Movements of, points to be attended to in, 254-256. Of French Revolution, how subsisted, 142. Of Louis XIV. And Frederick II. , how subsisted, 142. Of Napoleon, operations of, 136. Promotions in, 47. Standing, effect of, on distant invasions, 171. Surprises of, 209. Two, on interior lines, 117. Two, on the same frontier, 116. Unexpected meeting of two, 207. 

Armor, defensive, for cavalry, 308. 

Arms and organization of cavalry, 307, 308. 

Arms for irregular cavalry, 313. 

Army, best means of organizing the command of, 59. 

Army corps, system of, 279. 

Army, defensive, proper course for, 324. Defensive, when it has the advantage, 202. Head-quarters of, when the most important point, 107. How perfected, 43. Importance of a good, 44. Number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, 285. 

Army of Boulogne, 280. Of four corps, 281. Of seven corps, 281. Offensive, proper course for, 324. Of invasion, line of defense important to, 99. Of the Rhine in 1800, 115. Permanent, necessary condition of, 49. Proportion of cavalry in, 304. Pursuing, has the advantage, 241. 

Artillerists, directions for, in battle, 317. 

Artillery, concentration of fire of, in offensive line of battle, 290. Employment of, 315-318. Heavy, in defensive line of battle, 290. Importance of, to infantry, 290. Matériel of the French army in the Crimea, 388. Napoleon's, at Wagrani, 289, 316. Post of, in line of battle, 289. Proportion of, 318. Protection of infantry from the enemy's, 303. Rules for use of, in battle, 316-318. Use of, in the offensive, 316. Who should command, 318. 

Art of war, definition of, 13. Principal parts of, 66. 

Assailant, advantages of, 186. 

Assailant's best means of victory, 202. 

Assault, beat formation of infantry for, 298. Of field-works, instances of well-arranged, 212. 

Athens, naval power of, 361. 

Attack, cavalry column of, 310. Close, formation for, 301. Column of, in two lines, 292. Columns of, 293, 356. Columns of, of single battalions, 298. Five methods of forming troops for, 292. Formation for, at Turin, 213. In columns, order of, 194. In front, 201. In rear, 207. Of field-works, directions for, 211, 212. Of fortified places, 210. Of intrenched lines, 214. On flank, 203. On Sank, cavalry, 310. When order in squares suitable for, 297. 

Attacks and marches, arrangements of, 258. In half-deep order, 302. 

Audenarde, battle of, 53. 

Augustus, armament of, 365. 

Aulic Council, 59. 

Austerlitz, 170, 179, 206. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, 106. Force of, in the French Revolution, 106. Fortresses of, 149. Interest of, in the French Revolution, 105. Intervention of, in 1813, 21. 

Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, 112. Camp before Mayence, 157. Order at Essling and Fleurus, 200. 

Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, 246. Why victorious in 1753, 107. 

Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, 240. 

Authority of counselors, 53. 

B. 

Balloons, difficulties in use of, 275, 276. How they might be useful, 275. Used at Fleurus, 275. 

Barbarossa, 373. 

Bard, fort of, 152, 167. Importance of defile of, 87. 

Base of operations, where to be established, 84. 

Bases of operations, definition of, 77 of operations, how to be chosen, 79, 80. Of operations, plurality of, 78. On the sea, 83, 84. Temporary or eventual, 84. Temporary, when necessary, 132. With two faces, 83. 

Bassano, Napoleon's march on, 131. 

Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, 301. 

Battalion squares, 296. 

Batteries, 317. 

Battle, advanced guard in, 288, 289. Calculation of distances in, 334. Classification of orders of, useful, 197. Combinations of, 187. Concave order of, 191. Convex order of, 192. Critical moment of, 203. Decisive moment of, 334. Defensive arrangements for, 201. 

Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, 186. Decisive point of, 187. Strategic point of, when important, 187. 

Battle-formation in small columns, 350. Influence of topography upon, 299. 

Battle, formation of troops for, 347-360. Influence of orders of, on result of engagements, 197. Line of, arrangement of cavalry in, 288. Line of, before the French Revolution, 277. Line of, definition of, 179. Line of, distribution of troops in, 287. Line of, post of artillery in, 289. Lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284. Oblique order of, 190. Of Agincourt, 192. Of Alcazar, 378. Of Audenarde, 53. Of Austerlitz, 170, 179, 198, 206. Of Bautzen, 187, 196, 317. Of Blenheim, 303. Of Cannæ, 191. Of Crécy, 192. Of Ecnomos, 363. Of Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350. Of Fossano, 168. Of Jena, 90, 198, 305. Of Leipsic, 158, 192, 193, 198, 267, 305. Of Lepanto, 378. Of Leuthen, 140, 190, 229, 342. Of Millesimo, 111. Of Mollwitz, 348. Of Prague, 189, 205. Of Ramillies, 312. Of Rivoli, 179, 198, 205. Of Torgau, 205. Of Turin, 53. Of Ulm, 53, 90. Of Ulm, won by strategy, 198. Of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130, 181, 182, 183, 196, 198, 206, 294, 295, 303-306, 354, 358, 359. Offensive, object of, 188. Offensive order of, 200. Order of, 186. Order of, at Leipsic, 193. Order of, definition of, 180. Orders of, 188. Parallel order of, 188. Reinforced, 189. When suitable, 189. With crotchet, 189. Perpendicular order of, 190. Position for, 341. Posting troops in line of, 277. Results of, depend on what, 178. Rules for use of artillery in, 316-318. 

Battle-order for cavalry, 312. 

Battle-orders, various, 349. 

Battles, 178. Defensive, 179. Elements of uncertainty regarding, 197. Great difficulty of tactics of, 196. Influence of musketry-fire in, 348. Offensive, 186. Of Napoleon, orders of, 198. Rules for scientific, 200. Success in, depends on maneuvering, 360. Three kinds of, 179. What may interfere with success of, 196. 

Bautzen, battle of, 187, 317. French at, 196. 

Bellegarde, 166. 

Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, 109. 

Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, 289. Base on Königsberg in 1807, 152. Position in 1807, 171. Mixed system at Eylau, 352. 

Beresina, passage of, 226, 245. 

Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, 212. 

Berthier at Leipsic, 267. 

Berthier's error at Wagram, 267. Error in campaign of 1809, 265. 

Blenheim, battle of, 303. 

Blücher, 53, 130. 

"Boar's head" of the ancients, 194. 

Bonaparte's career in Italy, 111. Expedition to Egypt, 383. 

Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Boulogne, army of, 280. Camp of, 279. 

Bravery, first requisite for a leader, 345. 

Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c. , 245. In retreats, 244. Means of destroying, 245. Protection of, after passage, 229. 

Bridge-trains, importance of, 121. 

Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Buntzelwitz, camp of, 154. 

Burgundy, Duke of, 53. 

C. 

Cæsar's investment of Alise, 153. Maritime expeditions, 365. 

Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, 137. Of 1793, 107. Of 1799, 111. Of 1800, 112. Of 1812, Napoleon's error in, 172. Of the Spaniards in Flanders, 171. Of the Swedes in Germany, 171. 

Campaigns in mountains, instances of, 169. In winter, 68. Of 1799 and 1800, 162. 

Camp at Kehl, 167. Intrenched, influence of, 155. Intrenched, on which side of a river, 157. Intrenched, on river, 156. Of Boulogne, 279. Of Drissa, 157. 

Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, 215. Fortified, 154. Intrenched, connection of, with strategy, 154. Intrenched, instances of, 210, 211. Intrenched, maxims on, 155, 156. Intrenched, Prussian system of, 158. Intrenched, use of, 156. Intrenched, where to be established, 155. Strategic square for, 99. 

Candia, siege of, 380, 381. Turkish descent on, 379. 

Cannæ, order of battle at, 191. 

Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, 247. 

Cantonments, 246. Duty of staff officers in, 256. Rules for establishing, 246. Selection of positions for, 247. 

Canute, 370. 

Capitals as strategic points, 87. 

Capital, when the center of power, 107. 

Capture of posts, means for, 216. When important, 216. 

Carbine, in cavalry-charges, 306. 

Carnot, 59. Operations of, 136. 

Carthage, destruction of, 364. 

Carthaginians, expeditions of, 361, 362. 

Cavalry, 303. Advantages of large corps of, 309. Arms and organization of, 307, 308. Arrangement of, in line of battle, 288. At Ramillies, 312. Battle-order for, 312. Best formation of infantry against, 294. Charge at Hohenfriedberg, 305. Charge, general, 305. Charges, four kinds of, 306. Charges of the Turks, 307. Defensive armor for, 308. Divisions of five regiments, 311. Duties of, 304. Encounters of, against cavalry, 311. Flank charges of, 307. Formations of, 309-311. Importance of, in retreats, 243. Importance of, to infantry, 290. Influence of, in a war, 313, 314. In the defensive, 306. Irregular, 313. Light, advantages of, 314. Militia as, 314, 315. Morale of, 312. Must be supported by infantry, 304. Proportion of, in an army, 304. Reserves, 288, 311. When it should charge a line of infantry, 305. 

Center, when proper point of attack, 187. 

Central armies, 126. Line of Napoleon in Saxony, 124. Lines, application of, to large masses, 125. Position, when untenable, 331. 

Chæronea, 365. 

Charges, irregular cavalry, 313. 

Charles V. Of Spain, expedition of, 377. VIII. , retreat of, to Naples, 233. X. Of Sweden, expedition of, 379. XII. Of Sweden, descent of, on Denmark, 382. 

Checkerwise formation of cavalry, 310. Order, infantry, 301. 

Chief of staff, 57, 253. 

China, English and French expedition to, 389. 

Choice of objective points, 90. 

Circumvallation, lines of, 152. 

Civil wars, 35. 

Clairfayt, victories of, 110. 

Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, 178. Opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, 166. 

Coalition against France in 1793, 37. Frederick the Great, 36, 37. Louis XIV. , 36. 

Coasts, influence of, on descents, 251. 

Coblentz, fortification of, 157, 158. Towers of, 159. 

Coburg, Prince of, 109, 193. 

Column of attack, cavalry, 310. Of attack in two lines, 292. 

Columns of attack, 293, 294, 356. Of attack of single battalions, 298. Of four divisions in three ranks, 294. 

Combinations of battle, 187. Strategic, 72. 

Combined use of the three arms, 203, 319, 320. 

Commander, difficulty of selecting, 55. Essential qualities for a, 55. Importance of, 54. 

Commander, first care of, on taking the field, 66. Of artillery, duties of, 319. 

Command of an army, best means of organizing, 59. Of armies, 52. 

Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, 141. Of Louis XIV. And Frederick II. , 142. The, and strategy, 141. 

Committee of Public Safety, 136. 

Concave order of battle, 191. 

Concentration of artillery-fire, 290. In retreat, advantages of, 238. 

Concentric lines, 102. Retreats, instances of, 238, 239. System, 126. 

Concert of action, how secured, 259. In action, importance of, 42. 

Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, 31-34. Wars for, instances of, 22. 

Conrad III. , Crusade of, 372. 

Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, 368. Siege of, by the Crusaders, 373. Siege of, by Mohammed II. , 375. 

Contempt for the enemy, 63. 

Contravallation, lines of, 152. 

Control of operations, 52. 

Convergent operations, 126. 

Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, 118. 

Continuous intrenched lines, 213. 

Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, 30. 

Convex order of battle, 192. 

Copenhagen, siege of, 384. 

Cordon system, 165. 

Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, 287. Organization of an army in four, 281. Organization of an army in seven, 281. System of, 279. Two, one behind the other, 285. 

Cossacks, 272, 273, 313, 314. 

Council of war at seat of government, 59. 

Councils of war, value of, 58. 

Counselors, authority of, 53. 

Coup-d'oeil, strategic, 337-345. 

Coups de main, 215. Instances of, 216, 223. 

Crécy, order of battle at, 192. 

Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, 387-389. 

Crimean War, 387. 

Critical moment of battles, 203. 

Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, 120. 

Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, 189. 

Crotchets, danger of, 182. 

Crusade of 1203, 373. 

Crusades, 25, 371-375. 

Cuirass, 47, 308. 

Cuirassiers, 308. 

Culm, 221. 

Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, 377. 

D. 

Danes, incursions of, 368, 369. 

Danger of two wars at once, 36. 

Dangers of auxiliary armies, 170. 

Danube, Napoleon's passage of, 226. Valley of, key of Southern Germany, 162. 

Decisive direction, 328. Moment of battle, 334. Point at Bautzen, 187. Point, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187. Point of battle-field, 187. Point of battle-field, how determined, 88, 186. Points, 337. Points, defiles as, 87. Points of the theater of war, 85. 

Deep columns, 356. At Waterloo, 359. Masses, 298, 302. Order, disadvantages of, 298. 

Defeat, 68. Of the French at Waterloo, causes of, 359. 

Defense, in mountainous countries, 163. Line of, important to an army of invasion, 99. Line of, should be short, 98. Of frontiers, 146. Of intrenched camps and lines, 215. Rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, 96. Second lines of, 147. Should not be passive, 185. Tactical, of Switzerland, 169. Maxims for frontier, 148, 149. 

Defensive armor for cavalry, 308. Army has the advantage, when, 202. Army, proper course for, 324. Arrangements for battle, 201. Battles, 179. Best formation of infantry for, 298. Cavalry in, 306. Characteristics of infantry formation for, 297. In descents, duty of, 251. Line of battle, heavy artillery in, 290. 

Defensive movements, when advised, 124. -offensive war, 74. Or offensive system, either may be employed, 185. The, in a level country, 164. War, 72, 73. 

Defiles as decisive points, 87. As eventual lines of defense, 96. In retreats, 243. 

Definitive lines, 103. 

Dennewitz, Ney's error at, 130. 

Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, 301. Lines in two ranks, 294. Lines, two, formation of infantry in, 292. 

Depots, establishment of, on march, 262. Command of, 263. Lines of, 263. Of supplies, 141. Of supplies, general maxims, 143. Secondary, 262, 263. 

Descents, 248. Cases where made, 250. Difficulties of, 250. Duty of defensive in, 251. Effect of modern inventions on, 248. More extensive in ancient times, 248. Precautions after landing, 252. Rules for conducting, 251. 

D'Estaing's fleet, 383. 

Detached orders of Napoleon, 259. Works, importance of, 154. 

Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, 220. Four kinds of, 217. Great, 217, 219, 334. Great, instances of, 221, 222. Great, why made, 220, 221. Multiplication of, must be avoided, 221. Necessary when there is a double strategic front, 220. Of Napoleon in 1805, 222. Precise rules for, cannot be laid down, 222. Requisites in officers of, 224. Small, how useful, 224. 

Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, 219. 

Détours, 197, 204. 

Difficulty of applying theories in war, 269. 

Diplomacy in invasions, 24. 

Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, 116. Of lines of operations, 115. 

Discipline, importance of, 42. Importance of, in retreats, 242. 

Distances in battle, calculation of, 334. 

Distant expeditions, 169. Invasions across extensive territories, 171. Invasions, maxim for, 173. Invasions to aid an ally, 170. 

Distribution of troops in line of battle, 287. 

Divergent lines, 103. 

Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, 91. To Holland in 1799, 91. 

Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, 106, 107. 

Dunkirk, expedition to, 91. 

Duties of cavalry, 304. Of staff officers, 254-256. 

Duty of a general, 324. Of statesmen in offensive wars, 17. 

Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, 222. 

Division, improper use of the term, 351. 

Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, 311. Defects of system of, 278. Remedied by Napoleon, 278. Formation by, when preferable, 286. Organization of, 279, 280. System of, 278. 

Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, 273. 

Double line of operations, when applicable, 117. When necessary, 116. Lines of operations, 102, 110. When advantageous, 123. Lines to be avoided, 330. Passages of rivers, 230. Strategic front, 95. Wars, 36. Wars of Napoleon, 37. 

Dragoons, 308. Concentration of, by Emperor Nicholas, 309. 

Drepanum, 363. 

Dresden, 305. Intrenched camp at, 155, 211. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Victory at, 124. 

Drissa, camp of, 155, 157. 

Divergent lines, when advantageous, 118. Operations, 126. Retreats, when admissible, 239. 

Diversions, 218. Instances of, 218. When useful, 218. 

E. 

Eccentric lines, 237. Retreat. Bulow's use of the term, 237. 

Eccentric system, 126. 

Echelon, order of battle by, 193. 

Echelons, order in, 193. Squares in, 297. 

Ecnomos, victory of, 363. 

Edward III. Of England, 376. 

Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, 374. 

Ehrenbreitstein, 158. 

Elchingen, Ney at, 182. 

Elective governments, weakness of, 46. 

Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, 276. 

Elongated squares, 296, 297. 

Employment of artillery, 315-318. 

Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, 311. 

Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, 67. Contempt for, 63. How dislodged, 188. How to drive from his position, 201, 202. Should not be paid to leave a country, 242. 

Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, 268. 

England controls the sea, 173. Invasion of, by Sweyn, 370. Projected invasion of, by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386. 

England's attack on Washington in 1814, 385. 

English and French expedition to China, 389. 

English, descents of, on France, 376. Expedition against Napoleon in 1815, 385. Expedition in 1762 against Havana, 382. Maritime expeditions, 384-390. Squares at Waterloo, 294. 

Enthusiasm, importance of, 41. Not military spirit, 62. 

Epaminondas, 190. 

Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, 172. 

Error of the allies in 1793, 107, 108. 

Errors in strategy, 91. 

Essential bases of military policy, 49. 

Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350. Napoleon at, 158. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Order of battle at, 192, 193. 

Eugene at Turin, 153. March of, 141. 

Eventual bases, 84. Lines of defense, 96. 

Expediency, wars of, 18. 

Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, 273. To the Crimea, details of, 387-389. 

Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, 174. Distant, 169. Marine, in modern times, 249. Maritime, 361-390. Of the ancients, 248. Of the Middle Ages, 171. Partly on land, partly by sea, 173. 

Extended movements, when dangerous, 204. 

Exterior lines of operations, 102. 

Extermination, wars of, 34. 

Eylau, 305, 306, 318, 352. French armament at, 47. Napoleon's march on, 94. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Russian artillery reserve at, 289. Russian order at, 295. 

F. 

Famous retreats, instances of, 233. 

Field, strategic, of 1806, 113. 

Field-works, directions for attack of, 211, 212. Instances of well-arranged assaults on, 212. 

Final reserves, 203. 

Financial considerations, 50. 

Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, 347, 355, 359. 

Fire-signals, how used, 276. 

Flank attack, 203. Attack, cavalry, 310. Charges of cavalry, 307. Marches, 139, 140. Marches, where inadmissible, 140. Tactical maneuver by, 140. 

Flanks of companies, movement by, 300, 301. Protection of, in tactical positions, 182. 

Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, 174. 

Fleurus, 136, 193, 200. Balloons used at, 275. Order of battle at, 192. 

Foot-artillery in line of battle, 289. In the offensive, 316. 

Forests, advantages of, in retreats, 183. 

Formation by divisions, when preferable, 286. For attack at Turin, 213. For battle in small columns, 350. For battle, Napoleon's system, 278, 279. For battle often determined by size of army, 285. For battle, Prussian and Austrian system, 354. For close attack, 301. Of infantry for attack, five methods of, 292. In two ranks, 356. Of troops for battle, 347-350. 

Formations of cavalry, 309-311. Of lines of battle for two infantry corps, 282-284. Various, for infantry, 285. 

Fortification of Coblentz, 157, 158. 

Fortifications, remark upon, 151. 

Fortified camps, 154. Places, attack of, 210. Places on the sea-coast, importance of, 152. Places, when a misfortune, 152. 

Fortresses at Mayence, 150. Greatest advantages of, 150. Large, when preferable, 150. Number and position of, 149. Of France and Austria, 149. On frontiers, 148. Relation of, to strategy, 148, 150. 

Forts in a mountainous country, 151. Purposes of, 146. 

Fossano, battle of, 168. 

Four-rank formation of infantry, 291. 

France adapted to parallel retreats, 240. Coalition against, in 1793, 37. Course and error of, in 1792, 105. Fortresses of, 149. Intention of, when declaring war in 1792, 105. Invasions of, by the English, 376. 

Francis I. , passage of the Alps by, 168. 

Frederick the Great, 36, 37. At Leuthen, 229. At Prague, 205. At Torgau, 206. Commissariat of, 142. Defensive-offensive operations of, 74. Maneuver of, at Leuthen, 141. Military genius of, 16. 

Frederick II. , Crusade of, 374. 

French and English expedition to China, 389. 

French armies in the Revolution, 135. Armies, situation of, in 1800, 112. At Bautzen, 196. At Fleurus, why successful, 193. At Waterloo, 196. Capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838, 386. Causes of defeat of, at Waterloo, 359. Cavalry, 313. Columns at Waterloo, 351. Defeat of, at Stockach, 111. Descent on Algiers in 1830, 386. Errors in 1795, 136. Expedition to Syria, 390. In Bohemia in 1742, 171. Invasions of 1766 and 1795, 120. 

French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, 383. Operations in Italy, 112. Operations of, at close of 1793, 331-333. Operations of, in 1794, 108. Order at Essling and Fleurus, 200. Order at Minden, 278. Plan in 1799, error of, 110. Revolution, 26-28. Revolution, armies of, how subsisted, 142. Revolution, course of Austria in, 106. Revolution, course of Prussia in, 105, 106. Revolution, interest of Austria in, 105. Revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, 104. Revolution, relation of Italy to, 104. Revolution, relation of Prussia and Austria to, 104. Revolution, theater of operations in, 104. Revolution, zones of operations in, 105. 

Frontier defenses, maxims for, 148, 149. When a permanent line of defense, 96. 

Frontiers, defense of, 146. Disadvantage of fortresses on, 148. How to be fortified, 152. Mountains as, 146. Rivers as, 147. 

Front of operations, 330, 338. Of operations, extent of, 98. Of operations, how varied, 93. Strategic, change of, 94. Strategic, not to be too extended, 98. 

Fronts of operations, 92. 

Fronts, strategic, 92. 

Fundamental principle of war, 66. Maxims of, 70. Principles for employment of troops, 328. 

G. 

Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307. 

General advanced guard, how composed, 262. Cavalry charge, 305. 

General, essential qualities of a, 55. Importance of a skillful, 43. One of the greatest talents of, 74. Qualities of a skillful, 334. What constitutes a, 327. 

General principle of war, manner of applying, 175. Staff, employment of, in time of peace, 49. Staff, usefulness of, 57. 

Genoa, panic at siege of, 64. 

Geography, military, 39. 

Geographical objective points, 88. 

Germanicus, expedition of, 366. 

Girondists, 26, 37. 

Gosa, French charge on, 305. 

Governments, elective, weakness of, 46. Should not be unprepared for war, 46. 

Grand tactics, 69, 70, 178. Principles of, 360. 

Great detachments, 217, 219, 334. Instances of, 221, 222. Why made, 220, 221. 

Grouchy, 127. 

Guard, advanced, 261, 262. In battle, 288, 289. In unexpected battles, 208. 

Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, 171. 

Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, 375. 

H. 

Half-deep order, infantry-formation, 295. Attacks in, 302. 

Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, 236. 

Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, 236. 

Hannibal at Cannæ, 191. At Zama, 179. 

Harold, 370, 371. 

Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, 107. 

Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, 167. 

Hengist, 367. 

Henry V. Of England, descents of, on France, 376. 

Hoche's expedition to Ireland, 383. 

Hochkirch, 303. Surprise of, 209. 

Hohenfriedberg, 305. 

Hohenlinden, 183, 206. 

Holland, expedition to, 91. 

Horse-artillery in line of battle, 289. In the offensive, 316. 

Houchard, 333. 

Hougoumont, 303. 

Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, 161. 

Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, 270. 

Hypotheses of the author in 1806, 271. How events justified them, 272. 

I. 

Igor, expeditions of, 368. 

Illustrations of importance of logistics, 263-268. 

Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, 299. Effects of, on war, 347, 355, 359. 

Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, 60, 61. 

Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, 287. Best formation of, for assault, 298. Best formation of, for the defensive, 298. Cavalry must be supported by, 304. Checkerwise formation, 310. Formation of, in two deployed lines, 292. Formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, 299. Importance of, 290. In three-rank formation, 293. In what movements should be exercised, 300. Lines of battle for, 282-284. Mixed order, 295. Mounted, 308. Needs support of cavalry and artillery, 290. Protection of, from enemy's artillery, 303. Squares, 294, 296. Supports of artillery, 316, 317. Three-rank formation of, 291. Various formations for, 285. When a line of, should be charged by cavalry, 305. 

Information from partisans, 270. Of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, 273, 274. Of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, 269. 

Initiative, advantages of, 184. 

Institutions, military, 43. 

Interior and simple lines, advantage of, 114. 

Interior lines, observations on, 123. Of Archduke Charles, 136. Of operations, 102. Of operations, why preferable, 127. Should not be too much extended, 117. Two armies on, 117. 

Intervention, instances of, 20-22. Kinds of, 19. Reasons for, 19. Wars of, 19. Wars of, essentials in, 21. 

Intestine wars, 35. 

Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, 157. 

Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, 215. Connection of, with strategy, 154. How differ from têtes deponts, 160. Influence of, 155. Instances of, 210, 211. Maxims on, 155, 156. On river, 156. Prussian system of. 158. Use of, 156. Where to be established, 155. 

Intrenched lines, 146, 153. Attack of, 214. Continuous, 213. 

Intrenched positions, 181. 

Intrenchments, armies in, 154

Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, 142. 

Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, 72. Advantages of awaiting, 17. Army of, line of defense important to, 99. Control of the sea important in, 30. Difficult in national wars, 144. How rendered feasible, 106. Of a mountainous country, 169. Of England contemplated by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386. Of Turkey by Russia, 23. Two kinds of, 22. Wars of, when advantageous, 17. 

Invasions, diplomacy in, 24. Distant, across extensive territories, 171. Distant, effect of standing armies on, 171. Distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, 171. Distant, maxim for, 173. Distant, to aid an ally, 170. How to be carried on, 24. Neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, 174. Of neighboring states, 174. Of Spain, 23. When excusable, 23. 

Investing a city, false system of, 152. Force, how strengthened, 153. 

Irregular cavalry, 313. Arms for, 313. 

Islamism, wars of, 25. 

Italy, operations of the French in, 111, 112. Parallel retreats in, 241. Relation of, in the French Revolution, 104. 

Ivar, expedition of, 369. 

J. 

James II. , expedition of, in Ireland, 381. 

Jemmapes, 342. 

Jena, battle of, won by strategy, 198. Maneuvers at, 90. Napoleon's march on, 94. Ney's charge at, 305. 

Jourdan, 229. At Stockach, 205. Balloons used by, at Fleurus, 275. 

Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, 120. 

Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, 233. 

K. 

Kagoul, panic at, 64. 

Katzbach, 124. 

Kehl, intrenchments at, 157, 210, 211. 

Kolin, 303. 

Koudacheff's expedition, 273. 

Koutousoff, 170. 

Krasnoi, combination at, 342. 

Kray, 87. 

Kunnersdorf, 304. 

L. 

Lance, importance of, 47. When best for cavalry, 307. When useful, 306. 

Lender, bravery the first requisite for, 345. 

League, wars of the, 25. 

Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, 87. Battle of, 192, 193, 267, 305. March of the allies upon, 123. March on, modified, 140. / Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Order of battle at, 193. 

Lepanto, battle of, 378. 

Leuthen, battle of, 190, 229, 342. Maneuver of Frederick at, 140. 

Level country, defensive in, 164

Light cavalry, advantages of, 314. 

Ligny, 195. 

Line of advance, how determined, 71. Of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, 288. Of battle before the French Revolution, 277. Of battle, definition of, 179. Of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, 290. Of battle, distribution of troops in, 287. Of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, 290. Of battle, posting troops in, 277. 

Line of battle, post of artillery in, 289. Of defense important to an army of invasion, 99. Of defense should be short, 98. Of operations, double, when necessary, 116. Of operations, how protected, 132. Of operations, single, when advantageous, 116. Of retreat, 261, 341-343. 

Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, 215. And points, strategic, 85. Central, application of, to large masses, 125. Deployed, in two ranks, 294. Double, to be avoided, 330. Eccentric, 237. Interior, observations on, 123. Interior, two armies on, 117. Intrenched, 146, 153. Intrenched, attack of, 214. Of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284. Of circumvallation, 152. Of contravallation, 152. Of defense, second, 147. Of defense, eventual, 96. Of defense, permanent, 95. Of defense, strategical and tactical, 95. Of depots, 263. Of direction, importance of, illustrated, 116. Of maneuver, importance of, 114. Of operations, 100-103. Of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, 121. Of operations, best direction of, 115. Of operations, change of, 118. Of operations, converging and divergent, 118. Of operations, double, 110. Of operations, double, when advantageous, 123. Of operations, great art of directing, 120. Of operations, how established, 114. Of operations, how influenced, 119. Of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of 1806, 113. Of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, 122. Of operations in the wars of the French Revolution, 104. Of operations, maxims on, 114. Of operations, rivers as, 76. Of operations, selecting of, 80. 

Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, 115. Of Stollhofen, 154. Of Turin, 153. Of Turin, capture of, 213. Parallel, 200. Strategic, 128, 129. Strategic, of Napoleon in 1796, 131. 

Linz, towers of, 158. 

Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, 291. 

Logistics, 69, 252-268. Derivation of the term, 253. Faulty, instances of, 265-267. Illustration of importance of, 263-268. Of battle of Leipsic, 267. Principal points of, 254-256. 

Louis VII. , Crusade of, 372. IX. , Crusade of, 374. IX. , expedition of, to Tunis, 375. XIV. , coalition against, 36. XIV. , commissariat of, 142. 

Louvois, 59. 

Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, 87. 

M. 

Macdonald's column at Wagram, 295, 296. Error at Katzbach, 124. 

Mack, 164, 170. At Ulm, 53. 

Magnesia, victory of, 364. 

Malplaquet, 183. 

Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, 377. 

Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, 360. 

Maneuver line, 114, 115. Lines, 103. Lines of, their importance, 114. Objective points of, 88. Pivots of, 98. Tactical, by flank, 140. Turning, 179, 206. 

Maneuvers, 200, 201, 207. At Ulm and Jena, 90. For breaking through a line, 197. Must conform to strategic principles, 333. Objective points of, 89. Of Napoleon in 1814, 118. Simplest, most likely to be successful, 196. Strategic lines of, 128. Sudden, generally better than predetermined, 196. Transversal, 163. 

Maneuvers, turning, rules for, 204. 

Mantua, siege of, 111. Wurmser at, 156. 

March, establishment of depots on, 262. 

Marches and attacks, arrangements of, 258. Effects of systems of, 138. Flank, 139. Instructions to generals commanding corps in, 260, 261. Particulars to be considered in, 260. System of, 135, 138. Rapid, 176. Rules for, 257-263. Transversal, in mountainous countries, 163. Two kinds of, 260. 

Marengo, French armament at, 47. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Maritime expeditions, 361-390. 

Marmont at Salamanca, 206. 

Marsin, 53. 

Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by, 158. 

Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799, 165, 166. 

Massena's position of the Albis, 181. 

Matériel of war, 49. Should be inspected by staff officers, 257. 

Maurice of Saxony, 22. 

Maxim for distant invasions, 173. 

Maxims for frontier defenses, 148, 152. Of fundamental principle of war, 70. On intrenched camps, 155, 156. On lines of operations, 114-122. On operations in mountainous countries, 163. On strategic fronts, 98, 99. On strategic operations, 90. Relative to supplies, 143-146. 

Mayence, Austrian camp before, 157. Fortresses at, 150. Intrenched camp at, 211. 

Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, 390. 

Middle Ages, expeditions of the, 171. 

Military education important to a ruler, 49. Geography and statistics, importance of a knowledge of, 40. Geography, Lloyd's essay on, 40. Institutions, 43. Institutions of Rome, 61. Instruments, signals by, 276. Operations influenced by a cabinet, 42. Policy, 38. Policy, essential bases of, 49. Sciences, study of. 49. Spirit, how encouraged, 61. Spirit, how maintained, 63. Spirit of nations, 60. Statistics and geography, 39. 

Militia as cavalry, 314, 315. 

Millesimo, effect of the battle of, 111. 

Minden, French order at, 278. 

Mithridates, 364, 365. 

Mixed order, infantry formation, 295. System of Benningsen at Eylau, 352. 

Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, 376. Marine expeditions, 249. 

Mohammed II. , 375. 

Molitor, General, 167. 

Mollwitz, battle of, 348. 

Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, 125. 

Moors, invasion of Europe by, 367. 

Morale of armies, 60, 178, 322. Of cavalry, 312. 

Moreau at Engen, 203. Base of operations of, in 1800, 82. Retreat of, in 1796, 233. 

Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, 222. Passage of the Rhine in 1800, 224, 225. 

Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, 389. 

Moscow, retreat of the French from, 233. 

Mountain-campaigns, instances of, 169. 

Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, 162. Countries, cavalry in, 304. Countries, defense in, 163. Countries, heights to be secured in, 167. Countries, strategic defense in, 164. Countries, strategic positions of, 76. Countries, the offensive in, 167. Countries, transversal marches in, 163. Country, character of a war in, 169. Country, forts in a, 151. Country, invasion of a, 169. 

Mountains as eventual lines of defense, 96. As frontiers, 146. Campaigns in, 169. Importance of, when secondary, 161, 162. Of European countries, relation of, to warlike operations, 161. Strategic operations in, 160. 

Mounted infantry, 308. Militia, 315. 

Movement by flanks of companies, 300, 301. 

Movements, extended, when dangerous, 204. In which infantry should be exercised, 300. Of armies, points to be attended to, 254-256. Of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, 273, 274. 

Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, 209. 

Murray's descent in 1813, 385. 

Musketry-fire better for defensive, 203. Influence of, in battles, 348. 

N. 

Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, 212. 

Naples, French army at, 112. 

Napoleon, 111, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177, 185, 198, 218. And Grouchy at Waterloo, 127, 130. At Austerlitz, 206. At Essling, 158. At Ligny, 195. At Ratisbon, 274. At Wagram, 195. Double wars of, 37. English expedition against, in 1815, 385. His own chief staff officer, 264. Operations of the armies of, 136. 

Napoleon's artillery, 318. Artillery at Wagram, 316. Base of operations in 1806, 80-82. Battles, orders of, 198. Bold maneuvers in 1814, 118. Campaign of 1800, 137. Cantonment on the Passarge, 247. Central lines in Saxony, 124. Central position in 1813, why disastrous, 123. Changes of line of operations, 118. Choice of objective points, 89. Concentric retreat in 1796, 238. Defense in Champagne in 1814, 125. Detachments in 1805, 222. Error after his victory at Dresden, 124. Error in the campaign of 1812, 172. Favorite objective, 330. Front of operations in 1796, 93. Front of operations in 1813, 93. Infantry, panic of, at Wagram, 64. Line of defense in 1813, 93. Logistics in 1806 and 1815, 264, 265. March on Bassano, 131. 

Napoleon's march on Eylau, 94. March on Jena in 1806, 94. March on Naumburg in 1806, 94. March to Königsberg, 20. Mode of issuing orders, 259. Motives and necessities, 22. Operations, comments on, 116. Order at the Tagliamento, 295. Passages of the Danube, 226, 266. Passage of the Saint-Bernard, 168. Passage of the Po in 1800, 225. Projected invasion of England, 249, 250, 386. Reserves, 133. Retreat from Smolensk, 235. Return from Egypt in 1800, 112. Rule for the passage of an army, 147. Strategic lines in 1796, 130, 131. Strategic positions, 97. System of formation for battle, 278, 279. System of marches, 137. Victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, 23. 

National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, 167. Wars, definition of, 29. Wars, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34. Wars, effect of the nature of the country in, 30. Wars, how prevented, 33, 34. Wars, how success attained in, 33. Wars, invasion difficult in, 144. Wars, military precepts for, 27. 

Nations, military spirit of, 60. 

Nature and extent of war, how influenced, 14. 

Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, 94. 

Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, 376. 

Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, 174. 

Ney, 31, 168, 196. At Bautzen, 317. At Dennewitz, 130. At Elchingen, 182. At Jena, 305. 

Nicholas I. , concentration of dragoons by, 309. 

O. 

Objective point, how held, 67. Point, manner of approach to, 67. Point of Napoleon in 1800, 87. Point, selection of, 66. Points, geographical, 88. Points, how chosen, 90. 

Objective points in strategy, how determined, 88. Points of maneuver, 88, 89. Points of operations, 85. Points, political, 91. 

Objectives of operations, 329, 330. 

Objects of war, 14. 

Oblique order, 199, 200. Order, antiquity of, 199. Order assumed by Napoleon at Marengo, 198. Order of battle, 190. 

Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, 184. Army, proper course for, 324. Battle, object of, 188. Battles, 186. Characteristics of infantry formation for, 297. Line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, 290. Movements, when advised, 124. Or defensive system, either may be employed, 185. Order of battle, 200. System to be followed in, 176. The, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, 184. The, in mountainous countries, 167. Use of artillery in, 316. War, 72, 73. War, duty of staff officers in, 258. War, reserves, how posted in, 133, 135. Wars, duty of statesmen in, 17. Wars, how conducted, 16. Wars to reclaim rights, 16. 

Oleg, expedition of, 867. 

Open positions, 181. 

Operations, base of, where to be established, 84. Bases of, definition of, 77. How to be chosen, 79, 80. Plurality of, 78. Change of lines of, 118. Control of, 52. Divergent and convergent, 126, 127. Double lines of, 102, 110, 123. Exterior lines of, 102. Fronts of, 92, 330, 338. In mountainous countries, maxims on, 163. Interior lines of, 102. Line of, how protected, 132. Lines of, 100, 120. Lines of, converging and divergent, 118. Lines of, how established, 114. Lines of, how influenced, 119. Lines of, maxims on, 114. Military, influenced by a cabinet, 42. Objective points of, 85. Objectives of, 329, 330. Of 1809 and 1814, 176, 177. Of the French at the close of 1793, 331-333. Pivots of, 98. Simple lines of, 101. System of, 72. System of, how to be judged, 125. System of, necessary in war, 50. Theater of, 74, 75. Theater of, between the Rhine and the North Sea, 338-340. Theater of, how divided, 71. Zone of, 66. Zone of, how to select, 329. Zones of, 100, 338. 

Opinion, public, danger of, 55. Wars of, 25. 

Orchomenus, 365. 

Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, 301. Half-deep, attacks in, 302. Half-deep, infantry formation, 295. Importance of, 42. In deep masses, infantry formation, 295, 296. In echelons, 193. In squares, when suitable for attack, 297. Mixed, infantry formation, 295, oblique, 199, 200. Of attack in columns, 194. Of battle, 186. Of battle at Agincourt, 192. At Cannæ, 189. At Crécy, 192. At Essling, 192, 193. At Fleurus, 192. At Leipsic, 193. At Mollwitz, 348. At passage of a river, 192. By echelon, 193. Convex, 192. Definition of, 180. Oblique, 190. Offensive, 200. Of the generals of the Republic, 349. Of infantry as skirmishers, 292. Shallow, infantry, 292. 

Orders, best mode of issuing, 259. How issued by Napoleon, 259. Inaccurate transmission of, 196. Of battle, 188. Of battle, classification of, useful, 197. 

Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, 197. Of Napoleon's battles, 198. Should be clear, 258. Two methods of issuing, 258, 259. 

Organization and arms of cavalry, 307, 308. By corps, likely to be permanent, 287. Of an army in four corps, 281. In seven corps, 281. Of divisions, 279, 280. Of very large armies, 286. 

P. 

Panics, cause and remedy of, 65. Instances of, 64. Officers and troops to be warned against, 63. 

Parallel lines, 200. Order of battle, 188. Order of battle reinforced, 189. Order of battle, when suitable, 189. Order of battle with crotchet, 189. Retreat, 237. Retreats, countries adapted to, 240, 241. Retreats, when preferable, 239. 

Partisans, information from, 270. 

Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, 273. 

Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, 120. 

Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, 147. Of a river, best position for, 226. Of the Beresina, 226, 245. Of the Danube by Napoleon, 266. Of the Rhine in 1795, 120. Of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon, 168. Of rivers, 224, 343. Of rivers, double, 230. Of rivers, famous modern, 226. Of rivers in retreats, 243, 244. Of rivers in retreats, rules for, 245. Of rivers, rules for, 227. Of rivers, rules for preventing, 228. 

Peninsular War, 32. 

Perfect army, essential conditions of, 43. 

Permanent lines of defense, 95. 

Perpendicular order of battle, 190. 

Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, 382. 

Peter the Hermit, 371. 

Peterwardein, panic at, 64. 

Philip II. Of Spain, 378. 

Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, 109. 

Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, 306. 

Pivots of maneuver, 98. 

Pivots of operations, 98. 

Points, decisive, 337. Decisive and objective, 86. Decisive geographic, 87. Decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187. Decisive, of battle-field, now determined, 186. Decisive strategic, 86. Of operations, objective, 85. 

Political objective points, 91. Objective points subordinate to strategy, 91. Wars, 26. 

Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, 225. 

Portable telegraphs, 275. 

Port Mahon, assault of, 212. 

Port Royal, expedition of U. S. Government to, 390. 

Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, 183. For battle, 341. How to drive an enemy from, 201, 202. Strong, essentials for, 181. System of wars of, 135. Tactical, protection of flanks in, 182. 

Positions, 179. For cantonments, selection of, 247. Intrenched, 181. Open, 181. Strategic, 66, 97, 330, 331. Tactical, 181. Tactical, rules for selecting, 181. Two kinds of, 180, 181. 

Post, capture of, when important, 216. 

Posting troops in line of battle, 277. 

Posts, means for capture of, 216. 

Prague, battle of, 189, 205. 

Preservation of armies in time of peace, 47. 

Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, 54. 

Prince Eugene, 54, 141, 153, 213. Of Coburg, error of, in 1794, 109. 

Principle of decisive points of maneuver, 88. 

Principles of strategy, 331. Of strategy always the same, 17. 

Promotions in armies, 47. 

Protection by trees and brushwood, 303. 

Provisional lines, 103. 

Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, 105, 106. Parallel retreat in, 241. Relation of, in the French Revolution, 104. 

Prussian army at Waterloo, 129. Reserves in 1806, 134. System of forming columns, 294. System of intrenched camps, 158. 

Public opinion, danger of, 55. 

Punic wars, 363, 364. 

Pursuit, rules for, 242. 

Pursuits, 241. 

Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, 362. 

Q. 

Qualities of a skillful general, 334. 

R. 

Ramillies, 312. 

Ramrods, 348. 

Rapid marches, 176. 

Ratisbon, Napoleon at, 274. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Rear, attack in, 207. 

Rear-guard in retreat, 243. 

Rear-guards in retreat, 234. 

Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, 244. 

Reconnoissances, 268. Give but limited information, 269. To gain information of the enemy's movements, 268. 

Religion, wars of, 35. 

Reports of prisoners, 269. 

Reserve, cavalry, 311. Final, 203. Horse-artillery, advantages of, 289. 

Reserves, cavalry, 288. Importance of, 133, 134. In offensive war, how posted, 133, 135. Nature of, 133. Of Napoleon, 133. Prussian, in 1806, 134. Strategic, 67, 133. 

Retreat along converging roads, 236 along diverging roads, 237. Along parallel roads, 236. By several corps, 235. Difficulty of deciding method of, 231. Five methods of arranging, 234. In single mass, when preferable, 234. Line of, 261, 341-343. Means of, to be considered in a defensive position, 183. Parallel, 237. Well effected, should be rewarded, 63. 

Retreats, 230. At night, 231. Attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, 243. Bridges in, 244. By diverging roads, danger of, 238. Cavalry in, 243. Circumstances influencing, 232, 233. Concentration in, 238. Concentric, instances of, 238, 239. Defiles in, 243. Divergent, when admissible, 239. Duty of staff officers in, 256. Firmness of Russians in, 64. Halts in, to relieve rear-guard, 236. Hours of departures and halts in, 236. In daylight, 231. Instances of famous, 233. Measures to insure success of, 242, 243. Parallel, countries adapted to, 240, 241. Parallel, when preferable, 239. Passage of rivers in, 243, 244. Prince de Ligne's remark on, 230. Rear-guard in, 234, 243. Should be slow, 232. Various kinds of, 231. 

Reverse fire, 317. 

Rhine, passages of, 120, 224, 226. 

Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, 377. 

Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 373. 

Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, 382. 

River, best position for passage of, 226. Crossing of, in presence of an enemy, 120. Order of battle at passage of, 192. 

Rivers as eventual lines of defense, 96. As frontiers, 147. As lines of operations, 76. Double passage of, 230. Famous modern passages of, 226. Passage of, 224, 343. Passage of, in retreats, 243, 244. Rules for, 245. Points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, 121. Rules for passage of, 227. Rules for preventing passage of, 228. 

Rivoli 179, 205. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. 

Rocket-batteries, use of, 318. 

Rollo, 369. 

Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, 63. Nation, cause of the decline of, 60. 

Romans, naval expeditions of, 363. 

Rome, military institutions of, 61. 

Rossbach, 207. 

Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, 328. 

Rules for conducting descents, 251. For fighting battles scientifically, 203. For gaining information of enemy's movements, 273, 274. For offensive or defensive operations, 185. For passage of rivers, 227. For passage of a river in retreat, 245. For pursuit, 242. For preventing passage of rivers, 228. For use of artillery in battle, 316-318. To be observed in selecting tactical positions, 181. 

Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, 64. Army, skirmishers in, 293. Base in 1828 and 1829, 84. Cavalry, 314. Expeditions in 1809, 385. Order at Eylau, 295. Retreat in 1812, 233. System of forming columns, 294. 

Russians, early maritime expeditions of, 368, 369. 

S. 

Saber, when best for cavalry, 308. When useful, 306. 

Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, 168. 

Saint-Cyr at Stockach, 205. 

Saxons, expedition of, 367. 

Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, 124. 

Savoy, Duke of, 22. 

Scandinavians, 366. 

Science of marches, essential point in, 139. Of marches, includes what, 138. 

Sciences, military, study of, 49. 

Scipio, 364. 

Sea-coast as a base of operations, 83, 84. 

Sea, control of, held by England, 173. Control of, important in an invasion, 30. 

Secondary lines, 103. 

Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, 378. 

Sebastopol, 347. 

Secondary depots, 262, 263. 

Shallow order, 298. Order, infantry, 292. 

Shumla, camp of, 155. 

Siege, how covered, 153. Of Candia, 380, 381. Of Copenhagen, 384. Of Mantua, 111. 

Sieges and active armies, relations between, 112. Duty of staff officers in, 256. Wars of, 146. 

Signaling by fires, 276. 

Signals by military instruments, 276. Simultaneous shouts as, 277. System of, 274. 

Simple and interior lines, advantage of, 114. Lines of operations, 101. 

Simultaneous shouts as signals, 277. 

Single line of operations, when preferable, 116. 

Sizeboli, capture of, 223. 

Skill, superiority in, 42. 

Skirmishers, 359, 360. 

Skirmishing-order, 292. 

Small detachments, how useful, 224. 

Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, 235. 

Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of, 162. 

Sovereign as commander, 52. 

Spain adapted to parallel retreats, 240. And Portugal, Wellington's tactics in, 358. Invasions of, 23. War in, in 1823, 27. 

Spanish Armada, 249, 378, 379. Capture of Vera Cruz by, 390. Descent on Algiers, 382. Descent on Morocco in 1859, 389. 

Spies, 269. Best course for, 270. Difficulties in their way, 270. Use of, neglected in many modern armies, 270. When especially useful, 270. 

Squares in echelons, 297. Infantry, 294, 296, 297. In two ranks, 294. 

Staff, chief of, 253, chief of, how selected, 57. General, usefulness of, 57. Officers and general must act in concert, 257. Officers, duties of, should be defined, 253. Officers, duty of, in offensive war, 258. Officers should inspect matériel, 257. Officers, summary of duties of, 254-256. 

Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, 171. 

State, how rendered secure, 138. 

Statesmanship, relation of, to war, 14. 

Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, 17. 

Statistics, military, 39. 

St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, 384. 

Stockach, 179, 205. Defeat of the French at, 111. 

Strategic defense in mountainous countries, 164. 

Stollhofen, lines of, 152. 

Strategical and tactical lines of defense, 95. 

Strategic combinations, 72. Combinations, when better than tactical, 179. Coup-d'oeil, 337-345. Field of 1806, 113. Front and line of defense may coincide, 92. Front, change of, 94. Front, double, 95. Front not to be too extended, 98. Front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau, 94. Fronts, 92. Fronts, maxims on, 98. Lines, 128, 129. Lines and points, 85. Lines at Waterloo, 130. Lines of maneuvers, 128. Lines of Napoleon in 1796, 130, 131. Operations in mountains, 160. Operations, maxims on, 90. Point, Leipsic as a, 87. Lyons as a, 87. Point of a battle-field, when important, 187. Points, capitals as, 87. Position, essential conditions for, 99. Positions, 66, 97, 330, 331. Positions of mountainous countries, 76. Positions of Napoleon, 97. Reserves, 67, 133. Square for camps, 99. 

Strategy, 322, 337. Advantage of the offensive in, 184. And the commissariat, 141. Battles of Ulm and Jena won by, 198. Connection of intrenched camps with, 154. Connection of têtes de ponts with, 154. Definition of, 66. Directs movements, tactics executes them, 175. Errors in, 91. How it should be studied, 337. Illustration of, by operations of 1793, 331-333. Illustrations of, 339-341. In what it consists, 328. Objective points in, how determined, 88. One great end of, 177. Points embraced by, 68. Political objective points subordinate to, 91. Principles of, 331. Principles of, always the same, 17. Province of, 178. Relation of fortresses to, 148, 150. Science of marches in, 138. System of, developed in 1800, 137. The art of, 69. 

Strong position, essentials for a, 181. 

Study of strategy, how made profitable, 337. 

Successful retreat, how to insure, 242, 243. 

Surprises of armies, 209. Difficulty of, 209. 

Suwaroff, 55, 170. 

Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, 166. 

Supplies, depots of, 141, 143. 

Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, 168. 

Svatoslav, expedition of, 308. 

Sweyn, 369, 370. 

Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, 162. Massena in, in 1799, 165. Suwaroff in, 166. Tactical defense of, 169. 

Syria, French expedition to, 390. 

System, concentric or eccentric, 126. Of corps, 279. Of divisions, 278. Of marches, 135. Of marches, effects of, 138. Of marches, includes what, 138. Of marches, relation of, to commissariat, 141. Of marches the result of circumstances, 135. Of operations, 72. Of operations, how to be judged, 125. Of signals, 274. Of strategy developed in 1800, 137. Of wars, change of, 135. Of wars of position, 135. 

Systems modified by forms of government, 45. 

T. 

Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, 178. Defense of Switzerland, 169. Operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, 184. Position, protection of flanks in, 182. 

Tactical positions, 181. Positions, rules for selecting, 181. 

Tactics, 322. Executes movements, strategy directs them, 175. Grand, 69, 70. Of battles, great difficulty of, 196. Of Wellington in Spain and Portugal, 358. 

Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, 295. 

Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, 209. 

Telegraphs, portable, 275. 

Temporary bases, 84. Bases, when necessary, 132. 

Têtes de ponts, 160. Connection of, with strategy, 154. How differ from intrenched camps, 160. 

Theater of operations, 74, 75. Of operations between the Rhine and North Sea, 338-340. Of operations, how composed, 75. Of operations, how divided, 71. Of operations in the French Revolution, 104. Of war, border of the, 80, 81. Of war, decisive points of the, 85. Of war, definition of, 74. 

Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, 269. Use of, in war, 323. 

Thirty Years' War, 25. 

Three-rank formation of infantry, 291, 293. 

Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, 268. 

Torgau, battle of, 205. 

Torres-Vedras, camp of, 155. Intrenched camp at, 83. 

Towers, masonry, 158. Of Coblentz, 159. Of Linz, 158. 

Transversal maneuvers, 163. Marches in mountainous countries, 163. 

Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, 303. 

Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, 287. Employment of, 328. 

Trot, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307. 

Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, 246. 

Turin, battle of, 53. Intrenched camp at, 211. Lines of, 153, 213. 

Turkey, invasion of, 23. 

Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, 84. Wars, squares in, 296, 297. 

Turks, cavalry charge of, 307. Naval expeditions of, 377, 378, 380. 

Turning maneuvers, 179, 201, 206. Maneuver, rules for, 204. 

Two corps, one behind the other, 285. 

Two-rank formation, 346. 

Two wars at once, danger of, 36. 

U. 

Ulm, battle of, 53. Battle of, won by strategy, 198. Camp of, 154. Maneuvers at, 90. 

Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, 197. 

Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, 208. Meeting of two armies, 207. 

United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, 387. English expeditions against, in 1814 and 1815, 385, 386. Expedition to Port Royal, 390. 

Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, 272. Of the three arms combined, 203. 

V. 

Vandals, 366. 

Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, 221. 

Venice, 379, 380. 

Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, 390. Taken by the French, 386. Taken by the United States, 387. 

Vessels, Roman, 363. Scandinavian, 366. 

Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, 333. 

Victory, assailant's best means of, 202. On what it depends, 309, 310. When it may be expected, 360. 

Villages, importance of, on front of a position, 303. 

Villars's infantry, panic among, 64. 

Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, 120. 

W. 

Wagram, 195, 206, 266, 317, 343, 350. Macdonald's column at, 295, 296. Napoleon's artillery at, 289, 316. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Panic at, 64. 

War an art, 321. Border of the theater of, 80, 81. Character of, from Middle Ages to French Revolution, 135. Circumstances which influence result of, 321. Council of, at seat of government, 59. Councils of, 58. Decisive points of the theater of, 85. Defensive-offensive, 74. Definition of the art of, 13. Fundamental principle of, 66, 70. Governments should not be unprepared for, 46. How to be conducted, 15. Influence of cavalry in a, 313, 314. Influence of improvements in fire-arms on, 347, 355, 359. Manner of applying general principle of, 175. Matériel of, 49. Maxims of fundamental principles of, 70. Nature and extent of, how influenced, 14. Not an exact science, 344, 350. Objects of, 14. Of the Crimea, 387. Offensive and defensive, definition of, 72. Offensive, duty of staff officers in, 258. Operations of, how directed, 150. Principal parts of the art of, 66. Relation of statesmanship to, 14. Theater of, definition, 74. Use of theories in, 323. 

Warsaw, intrenchments at, 211. 

Wars, aggressive, for conquest, 22. Change of system of, 135. Civil, 35. Defensive politically, offensive militarily, 17. Double, 36. For conquest, instances of, 22. Intestine, 35. Natural character of, in mountainous countries, 167. National, definition of, 29. National, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34. National, effect of nature of the country on, 30. National, how prevented, 33, 34. National, invasion difficult in, 144. Offensive, how conducted, 16. Offensive, to reclaim rights, 16. Of expediency, 18. Kinds of, 18. Of extermination, 34. Of intervention, 19. Of intervention, essentials in wars of, 21. Of intervention, military chances in, 20. Of invasion, when advantageous, 17. Of opinion, 25. Of opinion, character of, 26. Of opinion, instances of, 25. Of opinion, military precepts for, 27. Of position, system of, 135. Of religion, 35. Of sieges, 146. Political, 26. Political part of, how modified, 17. Punic, 363, 364. Turkish, squares in, 296, 297. When most just, 16. With or without allies, 18. 

Waterloo, 127, 183, 206, 295, 303-306, 354. Blücher at, 130. Campaign of, 129, 130. English squares at, 294 formations at, 351. French at, 196. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Ney at, 182, 183. Strategic lines at, 130. Wellington's position at, 181, 388. 

Wellington, 181, 185, 353, 357, 358, 381, 382, 384, 385. And Blücher at Waterloo, 127, 130. At Salamanca, 206. At Torres-Vedras, 83. Defensive-offensive operations of, 74. 

Wellington's position at Waterloo, 181. 

Weyrother, 205, 206. 

William the Conqueror, 370, 371. 

Winkelried, column of, 194. 

Winter campaigns, 68. Quarters, countries adapted to, 246. Quarters, when dangerous, 247. Quarters, when strategic, 97. 

Woods, importance of possession of, 303. 

Wurmser at Mantua, 156. Eccentric retreat of, in 1796, 238. Error of, 111. 

X. 

Xerxes, 173. Army of, 362. 

Z. 

Zama, battle of, 364. 

Zimisces, 368. 

Zone of operations, 66, 100, 338. Of operations, how to select, 329. Of operations in 1813, 101. 

Zones of operations in the French Revolution, 105. 

Zurich, defeat of the allies at, 112.