STORIES FROM THUCYDIDES RETOLD BY H. L. HAVELL B. A. FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OXFORD _O my poor Kingdom, sick with civil blows!_ SHAKESPEARE, _Henry IV_. CONTENTS PROLOGUECORINTH AND CORCYRATHE SURPRISE OF PLATAEATHE PLAGUE AT ATHENSINVESTMENT OF PLATAEANAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIOTHE REVOLT OF LESBOSESCAPE OF TWO HUNDRED PLATAEANS. FALL OF PLATAEACAPTURE OF A HUNDRED AND TWENTY SPARTANS AT SPHACTERIACAMPAIGNS OF BRASIDAS IN THRACETHE HOLLOW PEACETHE ATHENIANS IN SICILYEPILOGUE PROLOGUE In a former volume we have traced the course of events which ended inthe complete overthrow of Xerxes and his great army. Our present taskis to describe the chief incidents in the cruel and devastating war, commonly known as the Peloponnesian War, which lasted for twenty-sevenyears, and finally broke up the Athenian Empire. The cause of that warwas the envy and hatred excited in the other states of Greece by thepower and greatness of Athens; and in order to make our storyintelligible we must indicate briefly the steps by which she rose tothat dangerous eminence, and drew upon herself the armed hostility ofhalf the Greek world. We take up our narrative at the point of time when the Atheniansreturned to their ruined homes after the defeat of the Persians atPlataea. Of their ancient city nothing remained but a few houses whichhad served as lodgings for the Persian grandees, and some scatteredfragments of the surrounding wall. Their first task was to restore theouter line of defence, and by the advice of Themistocles the new walltook in a much wider circuit than the old rampart which had beendestroyed by the Persians. The whole population toiled night and dayto raise the bulwark which was to guard their temples and their homes, using as materials the walls of the houses which had been sacked andburnt by the Persians, with whatever remained of public buildings, sacred or profane, and sparing not even the monumental pillars ofgraves in the urgency of their need. But jealous eyes were watching them, and busy tongues were waggingagainst that gallant race of Attica which had been foremost in thecommon cause against the barbarian invader. "These Athenians aredangerous neighbours, " was the cry. "Let us stop them from buildingtheir wall, or Athens will become a standing menace to ourselves. "Before long these murmurs reached the ears of the Spartans, and theysent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from fortifying their city. Their real purpose was disguised under the mask of anxiety for thegeneral safety of Greece. "It is not expedient, " they urged, "that thePersians, when next they come against us, should find fencéd citieswhich they may make their strongholds, as they have lately done inAthens and in Thebes. Cease, therefore, from building this wall, andhelp us to destroy all such defences, outside of Peloponnesus. If weare attacked again, we will unite our forces within the isthmus, andmeet the invader from there. " But Themistocles was not the man to be hoodwinked by the simplecunning of the Spartans. By his advice the Athenians dismissed theenvoys, promising to send an embassy to discuss the matter at Sparta. As soon as they were gone, Themistocles caused himself to be appointedas head of the embassy, and set out at once for Sparta, instructingthe Athenians to keep his colleagues back until the wall had beenraised to a sufficient height for purposes of defence. Arrived atSparta, he kept himself close in his lodging, and declined allconference with the authorities, alleging that he could do nothingwithout his colleagues. Meanwhile the Athenians were making incredible efforts to carry on thework which was essential to their liberty and prosperity. Men, women, and children toiled without intermission, and the wall was rapidlyapproaching a defensible height. The clamour of their enemies grewlouder and louder, and angry messages reached the Spartans everyday, reproaching them with their supineness and procrastination. Beingasked the meaning of these reports, Themistocles professed totalignorance, and bade the Spartans send men to Athens to see forthemselves. The Spartans did so, and when the men arrived at Athensthe Athenians, who had been privately warned by Themistocles, keptthem in custody, as hostages for their own representatives at Sparta. Themistocles had meanwhile been joined by his partners in the embassy, and learning from them that the wall was now of sufficient height, hespoke out plainly, and let the Spartans understand what his truepurpose was. "Athens, " he said, "is once more a fortified city, and weare able to discuss questions of public or private interest on afooting of equality. When we forsook all, and took to our ships tofight for the common weal, it was done without prompting of yours; andthat peril being past, we shall take such measures as concern oursafety, without leave asked of you. And in serving ourselves, we areserving you also; for if Athens is not free, how can she give anunbiased vote in questions which concern the general welfare ofGreece?" It was impossible for the Spartans to express open resentment at aplea so moderate and so reasonable. But they were secretly annoyed tofind that their malice had been detected and exposed; and by thisincident was sown the first seed of ill-will which was afterwards tobear such bitter fruit for Athens and for Greece. For the present, however, the affair was ended, and the first step secured for theAthenians in their career of glory and power. Themistocles was the first who clearly saw that the future of Athenslay on the sea. But if Athens was to hold and extend her position asthe first naval power in Greece, it was above all things necessarythat she should have a strong and fortified station for her fleets, her arsenals, and her dockyards. Nature had provided her with what sheneeded, in the peninsula of Peiraeus, which juts out into the SaronicGulf, about five miles south-west of the inland town. As soon as thecity-wall was completed, fortifications of immense strength werecarried round the whole of Peiraeus; and within this vast rampart rosea second city, equal in size to the old one, with streets laid out instraight lines, and filled with the stir and bustle of a maritimepopulation. Three land-locked harbours gave ample room for the fleetsof Athens to lie in shelter and safety; and this great sea-port townwas afterwards united to the original city by two long walls, whichmet the sea, one at the north-western corner of Peiraeus, and theother at the south-eastern point of the Bay of Phalerum. Betweenthese, at a later period, a third wall was built, running parallel tothe northern wall at a distance of about two hundred feet, and knownas the Southern or Middle Wall. Many years elapsed before these important works were completed; and inthe meantime great events had been happening in other parts of theGreek world, tending more and more to realise the dream ofThemistocles, and make his beloved city the undisputed mistress of thesea. After the defeat of the Persian armies and fleets at Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale, much hard work remained to be done, in reducingthe outlying cities on the coasts of Thrace and in the eastern cornersof the Aegaean, which held out for the Great King. The Spartans werestill nominal leaders of the allied Greek navy; but after a year ofservice they resigned this position, which they owed to theiracknowledged supremacy in land warfare, to the Athenians. They wereinduced to take this step, partly by their own aversion to foreignenterprises, and partly by the misconduct of their general Pausanias, who had disgusted the allies serving under him in the fleet by hisintolerable arrogance and tyranny. The field was thus left open to theAthenians, who willingly assumed the command offered them by themaritime cities of Greece, with the object of prosecuting the warvigorously against Persia. Each city was assessed to furnish a fixedcontribution of ships or money, and the sacred island of Delos wasappointed as the common treasury and meeting-place of the league. Thuswas formed the famous Delian Confederacy, with the avowed purpose ofmaking reprisals on the Great King's territory for the havoc which hehad wrought in Greece. For a time all went smoothly, and the variousmembers of the league fought under Athens as her independent allies. But by degrees the Greeks from the islands and coast-lands of Asiabegan to weary of their arduous duties, and murmured against theAthenians, who proved hard task-masters, and compelled them by forceto perform their part in the bargain. One by one the cities revoltedfrom the leadership of Athens, were attacked by her navies, andreduced to the position of subjects and tributaries. Othersvoluntarily withdrew from all active co-operation in the war, agreeingto pay a fixed annual sum as a substitute for service in the fleet. And before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the two powerfulislands of Lesbos and Chios were the only members of the originalleague who still retained their independence. Such were the circumstances which led to the foundation of theAthenian Empire, which grew up, by the force of necessity, out of thedecay of a confederacy born of a common need, and organised for thespecial benefit of the Asiatic Greeks. For the names of the Greekcities on the coasts of Asia Minor still figured in the Persiantribute-lists; and the moment that the grasp of Athens relaxed on theconfines of the King's dominions, after the ruinous defeat in Sicily, Persian tax-gatherers came knocking at the gates of Ephesus andMiletus, demanding the arrears of tribute. So urgent was the needsupplied by the energy of Athens, and so blind were these Greeks ofAsia Minor to their own interests. The visible sign of this momentous change, by which the DelianConfederacy became merged in the Athenian Empire, was the removal ofthe treasury from Delos to Athens. The Athenians now undertook thewhole administration of the common fund, using the surplus for theadornment of Athens by magnificent public buildings. Thisappropriation seems reasonable enough, when we consider that the wholeburden of defending the eastern Greeks against Persia, and keeping thebarbarian out of Greek waters, now lay upon Athens. This great publicduty, which had been thrown upon her by the indifference of Sparta, and the unmanly sloth of her own allies, was faithfully performed; andshe might well ask why she should be called upon to lavish the bloodof her own citizens for nothing. That Athens should be great, splendid, and powerful, was not only a reward due to her public spiritand devotion to the common cause, but also a guarantee for the generaldignity and liberty of Greeks. And we, who have still before us theremnants of her temples and statues, and learn from them what man canaccomplish under the inspiration of great ideals, need not scan tooclosely her claim to appropriate the funds which she employed for sonoble a purpose. For this was the great age of Grecian art, the age ofPhidias, Polycletus, Myron, and Polygnotus. The greatest of these wasPhidias; and in the Parthenon, or Temple of the Virgin Goddess, [Footnote: Athene, the patron goddess of Athens. ] built under hisdirection on the Acropolis at Athens, he has left the most enduringmonument of his fame. He also designed the Propylaea, a magnificentcolumned vestibule, fronting the broad flight of steps which led up tothe western entrance of the Acropolis. But the most renowned of hisworks was the gigantic statue of the Olympian Zeus, wrought in goldand ivory, which was the chief glory of the temple at Olympia. Of thissublime creation, the highest expression of divinity achieved by theancients, only the fame survives. These triumphs of art were notbrought to completion until nearly the close of the period of forty-eight years which separates the Persian from the Peloponnesian War;and it is now necessary to glance backward, and touch briefly on theprincipal events which occurred after the formation of the DelianConfederacy. The war was carried on with energy against Persia, andhostilities continued at intervals for thirty years after the battleof Plataea. [Footnote: B. C. 479-449. ] The chief leader in these enterprises was the heroic Cimon, leader ofthe conservative party at Athens, and the great rival of Pericles; andhis most brilliant exploit was a crushing defeat inflicted on thePersian army and fleet at the mouth of the river Eurymedon inPamphylia. But the victorious career of the Athenians received asevere check twelve years later in Egypt, where a large force of shipsand men was totally destroyed by the Persian general Megabyzus. Thewar dragged on for five years longer, and peace was then concluded onterms highly advantageous to the Greeks. Shortly before this, Cimon, who had been the chief promoter of the war, died at Cyprus. The same years which brought to a successful issue the long strugglewith Persia witnessed a renewal of those internal conflicts by whichthe energies of Greece were finally exhausted, leaving her an easyprey to the arms of Macedon. The guilt of renewing these suicidalquarrels lies with the Spartans, who had long been nursing theirgrudge against Athens, and were waiting for the opportunity to inflicton her a fatal blow. Fifteen years [Footnote: B. C. 464. ] after thebattle of Plataea they seized the occasion when the Athenians wereengaged with a large part of their forces in carrying on operationsagainst the revolted island of Thasos to prepare an invasion ofAttica. But at the very moment when they were meditating this act ofperfidy a double disaster fell upon them at home, demanding all theirexertions to save them from ruin. Sparta was levelled to the ground bya terrible earthquake, in which twenty thousand of her citizensperished; and in the midst of the panic caused by this awful calamitythe Helots rose in arms against their oppressors, and forming analliance with the Messenian subjects of Sparta, entrenched themselvesin a strong position on Mount Ithome. Here they maintained themselvesfor two years, defying all the efforts of the Spartans to drive themfrom their stronghold. In spite of their recent treachery, theSpartans were not ashamed to apply to Athens for help: and chieflythrough the influence of Cimon, whose laurels from the Eurymedon werestill fresh, four thousand Athenian hoplites [Footnote: Heavy-armedfoot-soldiers. ] were sent under his command to aid in dislodging theHelots. The Athenians were famous for their skill in attackingfortified places; but on this occasion they were unsuccessful, and theSpartans, whose evil conscience made them prone to suspicion, at oncebegan to doubt the honesty of their intentions, and dismissed themwith scant ceremony. This unfriendly act helped to embitter therelations between the two leading cities of Greece; and two yearslater, when the Messenians were expelled from Ithome, and driven intoexile, the Athenians settled them with their families at Naupactus, animportant strategic position on the north of the Corinthian Gulf, which has recently fallen into the hands of Athens. Deeply offended by the affront received at Ithome, the Athenians nowformed an alliance with Argos, the ancient rival and bitter enemy ofSparta. Thessaly, connected with Athens by old ties of friendship, joined the league; and Megara, now suffering from the oppressions ofCorinth, made a fourth. Within sight of the shores of Attica lies the island of Aegina, famousin legend as the home of Aeacus, grandfather of Achilles, anddistinguished for its school of sculpture, and for its mighty breed ofathletes, whose feats are celebrated in the laureate strains ofPindar. The Aeginetans had obtained the first prize for valourdisplayed in the battle of Salamis, and for many years they hadpressed the Athenians hard in the race for maritime supremacy. Theywere now attacked by an overwhelming Athenian force, and after astubborn resistance were totally defeated, and compelled to enrollthemselves among the subjects of Athens. A still harder fate wasreserved for the hapless Dorian islanders in the next generation. In the following nine years [Footnote: B. C. 456-447. ] the power ofAthens reached its greatest height, and for a moment it seemed as ifshe were destined to extend her empire over the whole mainland ofGreece. By the victory of Oenophyta, gained over the Boeotians justbefore the reduction of Aegina, Athens became mistress of all thecentral provinces of the Greek peninsula, from the pass of Thermopylaeto the gulf of Corinth. The alliance of Megara, lately united by longwalls to its harbour of Nisaea, secured her from invasion on the sideof Peloponnesus. The great island of Euboea, with its rich pasturesand fruitful corn lands, had, since the Persian War, become anAthenian estate, and was jealously guarded as one of her most valuablepossessions; and on the sea, from the eastern corner of the Euxine tothe strait of Gibraltar, there was none to dispute her sway. But this rapid ascent was followed by no less speedy a fall, and oneact of indiscretion stripped the Athenians of all the advantages whichthey had acquired on the mainland of Greece. In every city of Greecethere were always two parties, the wealthy and noble, calledoligarchs, and the demos, or commons; and according as Spartan orAthenian influence was in the ascendant the balance of power in eachcity wavered between the nobles and the people, the Atheniansfavouring the Many, the Spartans the Few. Accordingly there was alwaysa party living in exile, and waiting for a turn of affairs which mightenable them to return to their city, and wrest the power from thatfaction which had been the last to triumph. In the cities of Boeotiathe leaders of the oligarchs had been driven into banishment after thebattle of Oenophyta, and democracies were established under thecontrol of Athens. After nine years of banishment these exilesreturned, and the result was an oligarchical reaction in the chiefcities of Boeotia. A hastily equipped and ill-organised force was sentout from Athens to put down the authors of the revolution, and in thebattle which followed, at Coronea, [Footnote: B. C. 447. ] the Athenianssustained a severe defeat, and a large number of their citizens weretaken prisoners by the Boeotians. To recover these prisoners theAthenians consented to evacuate Boeotia, and by this surrender theylost their hold on central Greece, as far as Thermopylae. This heavy blow was followed two years later by the revolt of Megaraand Euboea; and in the midst of the alarm thus occasioned, theAthenians heard that a powerful Spartan army was threatening theirborders. It was a terrible moment for Athens; but she was saved by theprudence and energy of Pericles, whose influence in her councils wasnow supreme. By some means or other--as the Spartans asserted, by aheavy bribe--he induced the Spartan king Pleistoanax to draw off hisforces; and then crossing over into Euboea, he quickly reduced thewhole island to submission, and took severe measures to prevent anyoutbreak in the future. The exertions of the Athenians during the last thirty years had beenprodigious, and their efforts to found an empire in continental Greecehad ended in total failure. Discouraged by their reverses, theyconcluded a thirty years' truce with the Spartans and their allies, resigning the last remnant of their recent conquests, and leavingMegara in her old position as a member of the Peloponnesian leagueunder Sparta. The loss of Megara was severely felt, and her conduct inthe late troubles was neither forgotten nor forgiven. The Megarianshad by their own free choice been admitted into the Athenian alliance, and in an hour of great peril to Athens, without shadow of pretextthey had risen in arms against her. It was not long before they had topay a heavy penalty for their treachery and inconstancy. The last event which we have to record, before entering into the maincurrent of our narrative, is the secession of Samos, the mostimportant member of the maritime allies of Athens. This wealthy andpowerful island had hitherto, with Chios and Lesbos, enjoyed thedistinction of serving under Athens as an independent ally. TheAthenians, with a view to their own interests, had recently set up ademocracy in Samos, which had hitherto been governed by an oligarchy. Incensed by this interference, the Samian nobles, who had been driveninto exile, hired a mercenary force, and making a sudden attack fromthe mainland, overthrew the democracy and raised the standard ofrevolt. The crisis called for prompt and vigorous action on the partof Athens; for if Samos had been successful in defying her authority, the other members of the league would speedily have followed theexample, and the whole fabric of her empire might have been shatteredto pieces. Pericles was again equal to the emergency, and by employingthe whole naval power of Athens he was able, after a siege of ninemonths, to reduce the refractory islanders to submission. The Samianswere compelled to surrender their fleet, to pull down their walls, topay a heavy war indemnity, and to give hostages as a security fortheir good conduct in the future. And henceforward they becamesubjects and tributaries of Athens. We have now completed our review of the chief events which occurredbetween the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was a period of rapiddevelopment for Athens, of ceaseless activity at home and abroad, ofimmense progress in all the arts of war and peace. The imperial cityhad now risen to her full stature, and stood forth, supreme inintellect and in action, the wonder and envy of mankind. Her mightywalls bade defiance to her enemies at home, and she held in her handthe islands and coast-districts of the Aegaean, where the last murmurof resistance had been quelled. Her recent reverses on the mainland ofGreece had left the real sources of her power untouched; and taughther, if she would but take the lesson to heart, the proper limits ofher empire. And she had risen to this height, not by the prevailingforce of any single mind, but by the united efforts of all hercitizens, working together for a whole generation, shunning nosacrifice, and shrinking from no exertion, in their devotion to thecommon mother of them all. Every Athenian, from the wealthiest nobleto the poorest rower in the fleet, felt that he had a stake in thecountry, which to a Greek meant the city, where he was born. He gavehis vote in the Parliament [Footnote: Called the Ecclesia. ] of Athens, and served on the juries chosen by lot from the whole body of thecitizens, before whose judgment-seat, unassailable by bribery orintimidation, the mightiest offenders trembled. He was a statesman, ajudge, a lawgiver, and a warrior, and he might even hope to climb tothe highest place in the State, and rule, like Pericles, as a princeof democracy. Around him rose the temples and statues of the gods, fresh from the chisel of the artist, the visible symbols of Atheniangreatness, and of the grand ideals which he served. The masterpiecesof Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides opened to him the boundlessrealms of the imagination, taught him grave lessons of moral wisdom, and connected the strenuous present with the heroic past; and the OldComedy, the most complete embodiment of the very genius of democracy, afforded a feast of wit and fancy for his lighter hours. If he had ataste for higher speculation, he might hear Anaxagoras discoursing onthe mysteries of the spiritual world, or Zeno applying his sharp testsfor the conviction of human error. And when the assembly was summonedto discuss matters of high imperial policy, he felt all the greatnessand majesty of the Athenian state, as he hung entranced on the lips ofPericles. Such was Athens in her prime, and such were the men who raised her tothe lofty eminence which she held among the cities of Greece. But theyears which had lifted her to that unparalleled height had raised up ahost of enemies against her, and it behoved her to temper ambitionwith prudence if she would maintain the proud position which the held. The scattered units which composed the Athenian empire were heldtogether by no tie of loyalty or affection to their common mistress, but solely by the dread of her overwhelming naval power. Even in thenoblest spirits of ancient Greece, the feeling of patriotism, as weunderstand it, was feeble and uncertain; when we speak of our_country_, the Greek spoke of his _city_, and his love, hishopes, his highest aspirations, were bounded by the narrow circuit ofthe walls which contained the tombs of his ancestors and the templesof his gods. This feeling, the most deeply-rooted instinct of Greekpolitical life, had been grievously offended by Athens, when shecompelled the islanders of the Aegaean, and the Greek cities of Asia, to serve in her navies, and pay tribute to her exchequer. Turning now to the mainland of Greece we find, in most of the leadingstates, a sentiment of mingled fear and hatred against Athens, whichhad been steadily increasing in volume in the course of the lastthirty years. The haughty Thebans had not forgotten their defeat atOenophyta, and their nine years of servitude to Athens. Aegina wasgroaning under her yoke, and threatened with total politicalextinction. Megara complained that her commerce was ruined by a decreewhich excluded her merchants from the ports in the Athenian Empire. Inthe heart of Peloponnesus the Spartans were hatching mischief againsttheir hated rival, who had robbed them of half their dignity as theacknowledged leaders of the Greeks. Corinth, whose commerce waschiefly in the western sea, outside the sphere of Athenian influence, was disposed to be friendly, and had done the Athenians good serviceduring the revolt of Samos. [Footnote: See below, p. 31. ] But fiveyears later [Footnote: B. C. 435. ] an event occurred which changed thisfeeling into bitter hatred against Athens, and drove the Corinthiansinto the ranks of her most inveterate foes. And it is at this pointthat we take up the main thread of our story. STORIES FROM THUCYDIDES CORINTH AND CORCYRA I It was in a remote corner of the Greek world that the trouble beganwhich was destined to breed such mischief and havoc for the whole ofGreece. At the beginning of the seventh century before our era theisland of Corcyra had been colonised by the Corinthians. The colonygrew and flourished, and in its turn founded other settlements on theopposite coasts of Epirus and Illyria. Among these was Epidamnus, called by the Romans Dyrrachium, and in Roman times the ordinarylanding-place for travellers from Italy to Greece. After many years ofprosperity the resources of Epidamnus were much crippled by internalfaction, and by wars with the neighbouring barbarians. Four yearsbefore the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the nobles of Epidamnus, who had been expelled in the last revolution, made an alliance withthe native tribes of Illyria, and by constant plundering raids reducedthe Epidamnians to such straits that they were compelled to apply toCorcyra for help. But the Corcyraeans, whose sympathies were on theside of the banished nobles, refused to interfere. Epidamnus, as we have seen, was a colony founded by a colony, andaccording to Greek custom the original settlers had been led by acitizen of Corinth, the mother-city of Corcyra. Seeing, therefore, that they had nothing to hope from the Corcyraeans, the distressedpeople of Epidamnus began to turn their thoughts towards their ancientmetropolis, and considered whether they should appeal to her to savethem from ruin. But as this was a step of doubtful propriety, theyfirst consulted the oracle of Delphi, the great authority on questionsof international law. Receiving a favourable answer, they sent envoysto Corinth, and offered to surrender their city to the Corinthians, inreturn for their countenance and protection. The Corcyraeans had long been in evil odour at Corinth, for they hadgrown insolent in prosperity, and neglected all the observances whichwere due from a colony to the mother-city. They were, in fact, superior to the Corinthians in wealth and power, and their fleet, numbering a hundred and twenty triremes, was second only to that ofAthens. Corcyra was famous in legend as the seat of the Phaeacians, aheroic sailor race, whose deeds are sung by Homer in the_Odyssey_; and the Corcyraeans regarded themselves as the lawfulinheritors of their fame. For all these reasons they despised theCorinthians, and made no secret of their contempt. Remembering themany occasions on which they had been publicly insulted by Corcyra, the Corinthians lent a favourable ear to the petition of Epidamnus, and determined to appropriate the colony to themselves. Accordinglythey invited all who chose to go and settle at Epidamnus, and sent thenew colonists under a military escort, with instructions to proceed byland to Apollonia, for fear lest they should be obstructed by theCorcyraean fleet, if they went by sea. Great was the indignation at Corcyra when the news arrived that hercolony had been surrendered to Corinth, and a force of forty ships wassent off in haste, bearing a peremptory demand to the Epidamnians thatthey should receive back their exiles and send away the new colonists. As the citizens refused to obey their mandate, they prepared to laysiege to the town, which is situated on an isthmus. When the Corinthians heard of the danger of Epidamnus, they began tomake preparations on a much larger scale, collecting a host of newcolonists, and a fleet of seventy-five ships to convoy them on theirpassage to Epidamnus. Apprised of these proceedings, the Corcyraeanssent envoys to Corinth, with a civil remonstrance against thearbitrary interference with their own colony. They were willing, theysaid, to submit the matter to arbitration, and in the meantime tosuspend all hostilities against the revolted city. But the Corinthianspaid no attention to their overtures, and all being now ready, thegreat multitude, drawn from all parts of Greece, set sail forEpidamnus. When they reached Actium, at the mouth of the AmbracianGulf, they were met by a herald, sent out from Corcyra in a skiff, toforbid their approach. This was a mere manoeuvre, to throw the guiltof commencing hostilities on the Corinthians; and meanwhile theCorcyraeans manned their ships, to the number of eighty, and put outto meet the enemy's fleet. In the sea-fight which followed theCorcyraeans gained a complete victory, and on the same day Epidamnuswas compelled to capitulate to the besieging force. By this victory the Corcyraeans gained complete command of the westernor Ionian sea, and for the rest of the summer they sailed from placeto place, plundering the allies of Corinth. The Corinthians, however, were not at all disposed to acquiesce in their defeat, and during thewhole of the following year they were busy organising a freshexpedition on a vast scale, being resolved at all costs to put downthe insolence of Corcyra. These preparations caused no small anxietyto the Corcyraeans. Hitherto they had stood apart, and refused to takeany share in the complicated game of Greek politics. The course ofaffairs during the last forty years had tended more and more to dividethe Greek world into two opposite camps, arrayed under the banners ofAthens and Sparta. As Dorians, the Corcyraeans would naturally haveenrolled themselves among the allies of Sparta, --as islanders andseamen, they might have leaned to the side of Athens: but confident intheir remote situation, and in the power of their fleet, they hadchosen to remain neutral. But finding themselves threatened withdestruction, they now resolved to abandon their policy of selfishisolation, and sue for admission into the Athenian alliance. Ambassadors were sent to Athens to urge their plea; and theCorinthians, hearing of their intention, sent representatives of theirown to oppose the application. The Athenians were fully alive to the gravity of the question whichthey were called upon to decide, and after listening to the argumentsof the Corcyraean and Corinthian orators, they adjourned the debateuntil the next day. To Corinth they were bound by old ties ofobligation; for on three distinct occasions the Corinthians had donethem signal service. More than seventy years before the date which wehave reached, the Spartans summoned their allies to consider whetherit was expedient to compel the Athenians to receive back the banishedtyrant Hippias; and it was chiefly by the eloquence of the Corinthianspeaker Sosicles, who drew a vivid picture of the miseries ofdespotical government, that they were shamed out of their purpose. Afew years later, when the Athenians were at war with Aegina, they wereaided by twenty Corinthian ships. And quite recently, in the greatperil which menaced Athens at the revolt of Samos, Corinth had oncemore shown herself a friend. At a congress of the Peloponnesianallies, summoned to consider an appeal from the Samians for help, theCorinthians had spoken strongly against interference with the revoltedallies of another city. Corinth was a place of old renown, the queenof the Isthmus, a centre of civilisation; whereas Corcyra was a remoteisland, and her people, though Greeks by descent, were in manners andcharacter more than half barbarians. But there were two arguments put forward by the Corcyraean orator, which outweighed all other considerations of policy or friendship. Thefirst was addressed to the fears of the Athenians, the second to theirambition. War, he argued, was inevitable, and it was of the utmostimportance for Athens to secure the alliance of the Corcyraean fleet, and prevent it from being added to the naval forces of her enemies. And his concluding words struck a note which found a response amongthe more daring spirits among his hearers, whose thoughts, as it wouldseem, were already turning to the western colonies of Greece, as a newfield of enterprise and conquest. "It will not do, " he said, "to betoo nice. While you are hesitating, and weighing nice points ofinternational right, you will be outdistanced in the race for power, if you tamely give up a great naval station which holds the key toItaly and Sicily. " Such reasoning, hollow and false as it was, turned the scale in favourof Corcyra, and a defensive alliance was concluded, pledging theAthenians and Corcyraeans to aid each other against any attack on theterritory or allies of either state. For the Athenians wished to avoidbreaking the Thirty Years' Truce, and therefore refrained fromentering into any agreement which might oblige them to acts of openaggression against Corinth. There can be little doubt that Pericles, who was mainly responsiblefor this decision, committed a fatal error in advising the Atheniansto take up the cause of Corcyra. By this act Athens incurred theimplacable hostility of Corinth, and revived the old grudge which thatcity had conceived against her when Megara joined the Athenianalliance. In the constantly shifting currents of Greek politics, Athens might well, under wise guidance, have steered her way safelythrough the perils which surrounded her. The Corinthians had halfforgotten their grievance, as is proved by their conduct at the revoltof Samos; and the tone of their representative at the Corcyraeandebate is decidedly friendly. The Spartans were sluggish andprocrastinating by nature, and required some powerful impulse toinduce them to act with vigour; and this impulse was now supplied byCorinth. By accepting, therefore, the alliance of Corcyra, Athensbarred the way to all compromise, and gathered into one head all thescattered causes of jealousy and hatred which had been accumulatingagainst her in the last fifty years. Early in the following year the Corinthian fleet, numbering a hundredand fifty sail, put to sea from Corinth, to renew the war withCorcyra, and a battle was fought off the coast of Epirus. Theengagement was long and fierce, and the event was finally decided by asmall squadron of Athenian ships, which had been sent withinstructions to hinder any attempt of the enemy to land on the islandSeeing that the Corcyraeans were being forced back upon their owncoast, the Athenian captains, who had hitherto looked on, and taken nopart in the battle, now assumed the offensive, and lent such effectualaid that the Corinthians were held in check until the suddenappearance of twenty additional ships from Athens, which had been sentoff immediately after the others, put an end to the action. Thistimely interference saved Corcyra from ruin; for next day theCorinthians, after a formal remonstrance, set sail for home, takingwith them two hundred and fifty prisoners, belonging to the noblestfamilies in Corcyra, whom they kept in safe custody, but treated withgreat consideration, hoping by means of them at some future time torecover their influence in the island. II It was not long before the effects of this impolitic breach withCorinth were sensibly felt by Athens. In the course of the followingsummer, Potidaea, a Corinthian colony, situated on the borders ofMacedon, and included in the Athenian alliance, openly raised thestandard of revolt, encouraged by promises from Sparta, and by thepresence of a strong body of hoplites, sent for its support fromCorinth. Potidaea was presently closely invested by an Athenian armyand fleet, and the Corinthians pretended to make this a fresh groundof complaint, though they had themselves incited the city to throw offits allegiance to Athens. Feeling that matters were now approaching a crisis, the Spartanssummoned a congress of their allies, and invited all who had anygrievance against Athens to state their case. Then some spoke of thewrongs of Aegina, formerly not the least among Greek cities, but nowso crushed under the yoke of Athens that she had not dared to raiseher voice openly against the tyrant-city. The Megarians complained ofthe restrictions on their commerce, which threatened them with anempty exchequer and a starving population; and others followed in thesame strain. When all the rest had spoken, the Corinthian orator, whohad reserved his eloquence till the end, came forward and delivered avehement harangue, containing hardly any specific charge againstAthens, but well calculated to inflame the passions and provoke thepride of the Spartans. Though the acknowledged leader of Greece, andchampion of her liberties, Sparta, he said, had always been the lastto see the dangers which menaced the common country, and the last totake measures for her defence. Spartan apathy and indolence hadbrought the Greeks to the brink of ruin in the Persian War; and whenthat danger was passed, the same fatal indifference had enabled Athensto advance step by step on the path of aggrandisement; until now shehad grown so strong that the united force of the whole Peloponnesianleague would be required to put her down. Why had not the Spartanslistened to the warnings which they had heard, when the Athenians wererebuilding their walls? Then they might have stopped the evil at itssource, and saved a multitude of cities from slavery and oppression. "Consider, " cried the orator, warming to his subject, "what manner ofmen these Athenians are, and how vast is the difference between themand you. While you are shut up in this inland valley, treading thedull round of mechanical routine, they are continually pushing forwardthe boundaries of their empire, toiling night and day to make theircity great, never satisfied with what they have, always thirsting formore. Cautious, timid, and conservative as you are, hardly to beroused from your sloth by the most imminent perils, how can you hopeto curb the flight of Athenian ambition, which knows no limit, and ischecked by no reverse? "Men of Sparta, I speak as a friend, and you will not take my candouramiss. New times require new manners, and if you would maintain yourgreat position you must move with the march of events, and abandonyour old-fashioned ways. Do not mistake stagnation for stability, butlearn a lesson even from these hated Athenians, who have risen totheir present pitch of greatness by adapting themselves to every newneed as it arose. "You know what you have to do, if you would wipe out the reproachwhich rests upon you, and keep the respect of your faithful allies. Send an army into Attica, and compel the Athenians to withdraw theirforces from Potidaea. And let it be done speedily, for while we aretalking our kinsmen are perishing. " It happened that an Athenian embassy was present in Sparta, havingbeen sent there on some other business, and not for the purpose ofrepresenting Athens at the debate. But when they heard of the outcrywhich had been raised against their city, the envoys asked permissionfor one of their number to address the Spartan assembly, wishing toexplain the true character and origin of the Athenian Empire, and towarn the Spartans against plunging the whole country into the horrorsof civil war. Leave being granted, the Athenian orator entered on hissubject by sketching the course of events for the last sixty years. Athens, he said, had twice saved Greece, first at Marathon, andafterwards at Salamis. On the first of these occasions she had stoodalmost alone against an overwhelming force of Persians; and ten yearslater, though betrayed by her allies, she had borne the brunt againstthe navy of Xerxes. Who, then, was worthier than she to hold empireover Greeks? That empire had been forced upon her by the inertness ofSparta, and by the cowardice and sloth of her own allies in the Delianleague. The power thus gained had been used with moderation, in markedcontrast to the previous tyranny of Persia exercised over the samecities, and the arrogance of Spartan officers when engaged on foreignservice. But a light yoke, it would seem, was harder to bear than aheavy one; if Athens had openly oppressed her subjects, she wouldnever have heard a murmur. Having thus tried to combat the prejudice against Athens, the oratoraddressed himself directly to the Spartans, and said: "Consider theawful responsibility which you will incur, if you suffer yourselves tobe carried away by the invectives of your allies, and drive us againstour will to tempt with you the dark uncertainties and perilous issuesof war. There is still time for an amicable settlement of ourdifferences: Athens is prepared to make all reasonable concessions, and to submit to arbitration, as the terms of the treaty direct. Andif you decline to accept this offer, the guilt of the aggressor willlie with you. " It is remarkable that the speaker, in tracing the later course ofAthenian policy, lays no claim to those high motives of patriotismwhich had inspired his people with sublime self-devotion twogenerations back. He boldly asserts the principle that it is lawfulfor the stronger to rule the weaker, and claims merit for Athens inabstaining from excessive abuse of her power. The Athenians, we maybelieve, had been tainted by the baseness of their confederates. Inthe early days of the Delian league they had not attempted to educatethe Greeks whom they led up to the standard of their own splendidzeal, --or, if the attempt had been made, it was unsuccessful. They hadtaken upon themselves the whole burden of a great public duty, andstanding alone, without moral support from their countrymen, they hadgradually fallen away from the pure and lofty virtues of theirancestors. This decay of public morality proceeds with rapid stridesin the years which follow, and we shall presently hear the doctrinethat might is right proclaimed with cynical frankness by the lips ofan Athenian. Having heard the complaints of their allies against Athens, and thereply of the Athenian orator, the Spartans ordered all but those oftheir own race to withdraw, and continued the debate with closeddoors. A great majority of the speakers were in favour of declaringimmediate war on Athens. But there was one important exception: theaged Archidamus, who for the last fourteen years had been reigning assole king at Sparta, spoke strongly against the imprudence of assumingthe aggressive, before they had made adequate preparations to copewith the offending city. It was an opinion generally held by the war-party that the Athenians would be ready to make any concessions, inorder to save the land of Attica from ravage. This, said Archidamus, was a great error; and the event proved that he was right. TheAthenians, with their great colonial empire, and complete command ofthe sea, were quite independent of the products of their own estatesin Attica. And many years must elapse before the states ofPeloponnesus could train a fleet, and attack them on the sea, wherealone they were assailable. It was folly to suppose that such acontest could be decided by a single summer campaign, as was commonlybelieved by the enemies of Athens. "I fear rather, " said the king, with prophetic foresight, "that we shall leave this war as aninheritance to our children; such is the power, and such the pride, ofthe state with which we have to contend. " On the other hand, theSpartans, as champions of the liberties of Greece, must not allow thecommon oppressors of their countrymen to continue their career oftyranny unchecked. Let them first, however, try what could be effectedby negotiation, and in the meantime prepare for war, by buildingships, and above all by collecting money, without which all theirvalour would be useless. Then, if Athens still refused to listen toreason, they might declare war with better hope of success. The speech of Archidamus shows a true insight into the nature of thecrisis which the Spartans were called upon to face, and his views wereamply justified by subsequent events. His wise words were no doubtapplauded by the older and more sober-minded among his hearers. Butthere was another and a much more numerous party at that time inSparta, filled with bitter envy and hatred against Athens. Theirpassions had been inflamed by the invectives of the Corinthian orator, and without counting the cost they were resolved to try the issues ofimmediate battle. Their blind rancour found expression in the curt andpithy harangue of Sthenelaidas, one of the five Ephors, a college ofmagistrates which in recent years had greatly encroached on theauthority of the kings. Sthenelaidas spoke with true laconic brevity. "I don't understand, " he said, "all the fine talk of these Athenians. They have told us a great deal about their own merits, but have notsaid a word in answer to the charges brought against them. Even if weaccept their own account of themselves, their good conduct in the pastonly lends a darker colour to their present crimes. We have one plainduty to perform, and that is to save our faithful allies from ill-treatment. The time for words is past--leave them to the transgressor. Our part is to act, at once, and with all our might, and put down theoverwhelming insolence of Athens. " Then, in his capacity as Ephor, Sthenelaidas, without staying forfurther argument, forthwith put the question to the Spartan assembly. According to their ordinary procedure, the Spartans gave their votesby cries of "Ay" and "No. " But on this occasion Sthenelaidas pretendedto be unable to distinguish whether the "Ays" or "Nos" had it, andwishing to encourage the war-party by showing how much they were inthe majority, he ordered the house to divide on the question whetherthe treaty was broken, and whether the Athenians were in the wrong ornot. The division was made, and a great majority were in favour of themotion, recording their votes against Athens. The allies were thencalled in, and informed to the result of the private debate, and a daywas named for a general synod of the whole Peloponnesian league, toreconsider the situation and decide whether war was to be declared. In the interval, before the final assembly of the allies, the Spartanssent to ask the oracle at Delphi whether it was expedient for them tomake war; and the answer, according to common report, was that if theyfought with all their might they would conquer, and that the god[Footnote: Apollo. ] would be on their side. The Corinthians were atthe same time carrying on an active canvass against Athens, sendingtheir agents from city to city to blow up the flames of war. In the autumn of the same year the allies met in full synod at Sparta, and once more the Corinthian speaker led the cry against Athens, andcalled for a unanimous war-vote, flattering his hearers with hopes ofa speedy victory. The Spartans, he said, had at last set a goodexample to their allies, and shown themselves convinced that imperialcities had imperial obligations, by pronouncing in favour of war. Every member of the league must join heartily in the struggle, whetherhe belonged to an inland or to a maritime city; for if the seaportswere closed by the Athenian fleets, the inland towns would beprevented from exporting their products, and importing what theywanted from abroad. War, then, was in the interest of the whole bodyof allies. And on the moral side their position was equally sound, forthey were only acting on desperate provocation, and the common god ofGreece had promised success to their arms. But to deserve thatsuccess, all must co-operate heartily, contributing freely from theirprivate purses to raise a fleet which would make them a match forAthens on her own element. And they must watch the course of eventswith a vigilant eye, and be ready to seize any opportunity which mightarise to aim a decisive blow at their common enemy. Let them be warnedby the experience of the Ionians, and put out all their strength tosave themselves from being swallowed up by the devouring ambition ofAthens. Justice, heaven's favour, the good-will of all Greece, were ontheir side. Others spoke to the same effect, and then the representatives of eachcity were called up in turn to give their vote; and by far the greaternumber voted for war. But many months elapsed before any overt act ofhostility occurred, and the time was occupied in preparations for aninvasion of Attica, and in a series of demands sent by Sparta to trythe temper of the Athenians, and put them in the wrong, if theyrefused to comply. The first of these messages was conveyed inmysterious terms, bidding the Athenians "to drive out the curse of thegoddess. " The meaning of this was as follows: nearly two hundred yearsbefore a certain Cylon tried to make himself tyrant of Athens: theattempt was frustrated, and some of his adherents, who had takenrefuge in the sacred precinct of Athene, were put to death by themagistrates, after they had surrendered under a solemn promise thattheir lives should be spared. The illustrious family of theAlcmaeonidae was especially concerned in this act of murder andsacrilege, and the Spartans, in reviving the memory of an ancientcrime, were aiming a blow at Pericles, who was descended on hismother's side from the Alcmaeonidae. For the Athenians were highlysensitive in all matters of religion, and it was possible that theymight even banish Pericles, if their consciences were suddenlyalarmed. And though this was not likely, the Spartans hoped at anyrate to lessen his influence, which was adverse to themselves, andfasten on him the odium of being, in some sense, the cause of the war. But their manoeuvre was unsuccessful, and the Athenians retorted bybidding the Spartans drive out the curse of Taenarus, in allusion tothe murder of certain Helots who had taken sanctuary in the temple ofPoseidon at Taenarus. And they further charged the Spartans to ridthemselves of the curse of Athene of the Brazen House. This was a holyplace in Sparta, where Pausanias, when convicted of treasonablecorrespondence with Persia, had sought refuge from the vengeance ofthe Spartans. He was kept a close prisoner in the temple by theEphors, who set a watch on him, to prevent him from being suppliedwith food, and when he was reduced to the last extremity, brought himout to die. But though his death occurred outside the temple, this didnot save them from the sin of sacrilege, and a public reprimand by theDelphic God. The game of diplomatic fencing went on for some time, and envoys werecontinually passing to and fro between Athens and Sparta. TheAthenians were required to raise the siege of Potidaea--to allow theAeginetans to govern themselves--to rescind the decree against Megara;and when all these demands were met by a firm refusal, the Spartanssent two ambassadors, bearing their ultimatum, which was worded asfollows: "The Lacedaemonians wish that there should be peace, and warmay be averted if ye will let the Greeks go free. " Knowing that thedecisive moment had now arrived, the Athenians met together in fullassembly, to decide on their final answer. There were many speakers oneither side, some arguing for peace, others for war: and then washeard that majestic voice, which, for more than thirty years, hadguided the counsels of Athens--the voice of the Olympian Pericles. Hehad chosen his line of policy a year before, in the fatal affair ofCorcyra, and it was now too late to draw back: peace with honour wasno longer possible for Athens. The furious zeal of Corinth had unitedher enemies against her, and they were bent on her ruin. The demandsput forward by Sparta were a mere pretext, and if the Athenians hadyielded the smallest point, new concessions would have been requiredof them, until they were stripped of all that had been won by thestrenuous toil and devotion of two generations. "We must listen, " saidPericles, in the course of a long speech, "to no proposal from Spartawhich is not made as from an equal to an equal. Dictation is notarbitration. If we are to fight at all, the occasion matters little, be it small or great. What right has Sparta to require of us that weshould rescind the decree against Megara, when her own laws jealouslyexclude all strangers from entering her streets? Or why should werelax our hold upon our allies, or break off the relations with themwhich were sanctioned by the Thirty Years' Truce? No, all this is amere pretence, and if we are deceived by it, we shall be led on stepby step to deeper and still deeper humiliation. It may seem a hardthing to give up the fair land of Attica to pillage and devastation. But think how far greater was the sacrifice made by our grandsires, who refused the fairest offers from Persia, and gave up all they had, rather than betray the common cause. Athens and Attica were then allthe country they had, and these lost they had nothing left but theirships, their strong arms, and their stout hearts. In our case, on theother hand, all the essential elements of our power--our city, ourfleet, our colonial empire--remain untouched. Shall we, then, sell ourhonour to save a few vineyards and olive-grounds from temporarydamage? That would be a short-sighted policy indeed, and in the endwould involve not only dishonour, but the loss of our whole empire. Let us act, then, in the spirit of our fathers, and send away theSpartan ambassadors with the only answer which is consistent with ourdignity and our interest. " The reply to the Spartan ultimatum was framed as Pericles haddirected, and from this moment all negotiations ceased. And here weclose our account of the events which led to the Peloponnesian War. THE SURPRISE OF PLATAEA I On the northern slope of Cithaeron, the mountain range which dividesAttica from Boeotia, lies the little town of Plataea. By race and bygeographical position the Plataeans were naturally included in theBoeotian confederacy, under the leadership of Thebes. But nearly acentury before the time of which we are now speaking they had desertedthe Thebans, whose rule was harsh and overbearing, and enrolledthemselves among the allies of Athens. On the eve of the battle ofMarathon, they had joined the Athenians with their whole force, athousand strong, and shared the peril and the honour of that gloriousday. Ten years later their city was laid in ruins by the army ofXerxes, at the instigation of the Thebans; and in the following yearthe great battle which ended the long struggle between Greece andPersia was fought within sight of their shattered walls. In gratitudefor this great victory, the confederate Greeks under Pausaniasdeclared that the Plataean territory should be hallowed ground, andswore a solemn oath to maintain the independence of the city. But theThebans had never forgotten or forgiven the secession of Plataea fromthe confederacy of which they were the leaders; and seizing theopportunity while the Athenians were occupied with measures for theirown safety, they made a treacherous attempt to gain possession of thetown. On a dark and moonless night in the early spring three hundred armedThebans appeared before the gates of Plataea, which were opened tothem by a party of the citizens who favoured their design. Marching ina body to the market-place, they made proclamation by a herald, inviting all who chose to return to their allegiance, and take sideswith their lawful leaders, the Thebans. For they wished, if possible, to gain over the place without bloodshed, and before the war hadactually broken out; otherwise, they might have to give it up again onthe conclusion of peace. The Plataeans, being wakened out of their first sleep, and thinkingthat the Thebans were in much greater force than was really the case, at first attempted no resistance, but were disposed to accept theterms offered them. But perceiving by degrees that their enemies werefar weaker in numbers than themselves, they changed their minds, andresolved to attack them. For the party which had betrayed the town wasbut small, and the general body of the citizens detested the thoughtof falling once more under the supremacy of Thebes. Their measureswere taken with great secrecy and despatch: to avoid exciting thesuspicions of the Thebans, they broke down the dividing walls of theirhouses, and passed to and fro unobserved, until they had completedtheir preparations. To embarrass the movements of the Thebans, theybarricaded the streets with waggons, and then, just before daybreak, they poured out of their houses, and fell upon the enemy, who werestill stationed in the market-place. Though taken by surprise, theThebans defended themselves stoutly, and standing shoulder to shoulderrepulsed the assault of the Plataeans two or three times. But theywere greatly inferior in numbers, wearied by their long vigil, andsoaked with the heavy rain which had fallen in the night; thePlataeans returned again and again to the attack, assailing them withfurious cries; and the women and slaves who crowded the roofs added totheir discomfiture, pelting them with tiles and stones, and stunningtheir ears with a frightful uproar of yells and shrieks; so that atlast their hearts failed them, and breaking their ranks they fledwildly through the streets. Some succeeded in reaching the gate bywhich they had entered, but only to find that their escape was cut offin this direction; for one of the Plataeans had closed the gate, usingthe spike of his javelin to secure the bolt. Others lost their way inthe narrow and muddy streets, and wandered up and down until they wereslain by the Plataeans. A few contrived to escape by an unguardedpostern-gate, having cut through the bolt with an axe given them by awoman. Others, in despair, flung themselves from the walls, and forthe most part perished. But a good number, who had kept together, werecaught in a trap; for coming to a large building which abutted on thewall, and finding the doors open, they thought that they had reachedthe town-gate, and rushed headlong in. The pursuers, who were close attheir heels, made fast the doors, and then the question arose whatthey should do with their captives. Some proposed to set fire to thebuilding, and to burn it down, with the Thebans in it; but at lastthose who were thus taken, and the few who were still straggling inthe town, were allowed to surrender at discretion. Meanwhile a strong reinforcement of Thebans, who had started after thethree hundred, were on the way to Plataea; but being delayed by thestate of the roads, and the swollen condition of the Asopus, whichthey had to cross, they arrived too late. Being informed of what hadhappened, they prepared to plunder the property of the Plataeansoutside the walls, and seize any of the citizens who crossed theirpath, to serve as hostages for their own men in the town. ThePlataeans, perceiving their intention, sent a herald to remonstrate, threatening that unless they desisted, all the Theban prisoners shouldat once be put to death. And they promised further, under an oath, that if the Thebans would withdraw their forces, the captives shouldbe restored--at least this was the account which was afterwardscurrent at Thebes, though the Plataeans denied that they had made anysuch promise unconditionally, and declared that they had sworn nooath. It seems probable that the Thebans had received some suchexplicit assurance as they asserted; for, on receiving the answer fromPlataea, they marched away without doing any harm. No sooner were theygone than the Plataeans made all haste to get their property withinthe walls, and then put all their prisoners to death. The day was notfar distant when they were bitterly to rue this act of passion, whichwas not only cruel, but grossly impolitic; for the Thebans thus slainin cold blood, a hundred and eighty in number, would have beeninvaluable as hostages, whereas the Plataeans had now cut themselvesoff from all hope of reconciliation with Thebes, and virtually sealedtheir own fate. Two messengers had been despatched from Plataea to Athens, one afterthe first entrance of the Thebans, and the second after their defeatand capture; and the Athenians, on receiving the second message, sentoff a herald bidding the Plataeans to wait for further instructions, before taking any steps against the prisoners. When the heraldarrived, he found the men already slain, and the Athenians thenproceeded to place the town in a state of defence, removing the womenand children and all those who were unfit for military service, toAthens, and leaving a small body of their own citizens to directoperations. II The surprise of Plataea was the first open violation of the ThirtyYears' Truce, and from this time forward all Greece was involved formany years in civil war. Public opinion was strongly on the side ofthe Spartans, who stood forward as champions of the liberties ofGreece; but there was great enthusiasm on both sides, and the popularimagination was much excited by the approaching struggle between thetwo imperial cities. Both in Sparta and in Athens there was a youngergeneration, who had grown up during a long period of peace, and nowentered gaily into the contest with all the light-hearted ignorance ofyouth. Old prophecies current among the people, foretelling a greatwar of Greeks against Greeks, passed from mouth to mouth, and theprofessional soothsayers, whose business it was to collect and expoundsuch sayings, found eager hearers. The gods themselves could not beindifferent on the eve of such mighty events, so deeply affecting thedestiny of the nation which worshipped them in a thousand temples; andan earthquake, which had recently occurred at Delos, the sacred islandof Apollo, where such a visitation had never been known before, wasinterpreted as a portent of great things to come. While the Peloponnesians were mustering their forces at the Isthmus, the rural population of Attica were breaking up their homes, andflocking by thousands into the city. A constant stream of waggonspassed along the roads, loaded with furniture, household utensils, andeven the woodwork of the farm-buildings; and many a little group ofwomen, children, and servants set out on that sorrowful journey, leaving their fields, their gardens, and their vineyards, to betrampled down and laid waste by the ruthless invader. Athens, indeed, was the common mother of them all, their glory, their strength, andtheir pride; for since the days of Theseus the scattered ruralcommunities of Attica had been united under the Aegis of Athene, andacknowledged Athens as the head and centre of their civic life. But alarge proportion of the Athenian citizens still continued to reside inthe country, and all their dearest associations were connected withthe little spot of earth where they and their fathers were born. Herewere the graves of their ancestors, and the temples of the heroes whowere the guardian spirits of each little aggregate of families. It wastherefore with bitter and resentful feelings that they left thesehappy scenes behind them, and turned their steps towards the gates ofthe city, through which many of them were never to pass again. For allof them it was a grievous change from the free and careless life ofthe country-side to the confined space, polluted air, and jostlingmultitudes of the town, now crowded to overflowing. Some few foundshelter in the houses of friends or relations; but by far the greaternumber were obliged to encamp in the open spaces of the city, in theprecincts of temples, or in the narrow room between the Long Walls. Even a place beneath the Acropolis, called the Pelasgic Field, was nowcovered with the huts of the immigrants, though an ancient oracle hadforbidden its occupation under a curse. From day to day new crowdskept flocking in, and the later comers were obliged to take up theirdwelling in Peiraeus, which was soon almost as much overcrowded as theupper city. And now the younger generation of Athenians, who had entered socheerfully into the conflict, were to have their first taste of thegrim realities of war. The Peloponnesian army advanced leisurely, andproceeded at first to Oenoe, an outlying fort near the borders ofBoeotia; for Archidamus, who held the chief command, still hoped thatthe Athenians, when they saw the enemy on the confines of Attica, would make some concessions, to save their farms from destruction. Forthis reason he had long delayed his march from the Isthmus, and nowwasted more time in fruitless operations at Oenoe, until the alliesbegan to murmur against him, and suspected him of receiving bribesfrom the Athenians to spare their lands. At last, being unable to putoff the fatal moment any longer, he turned southwards, and afterravaging the plain of Eleusis, advanced to Acharnae, one of the mostfertile and prosperous districts of Attica, about seven miles north ofAthens. Here the Peloponnesians encamped, and applied themselvessystematically to the work of pillage and havoc. Great was the rage of the Acharnians, a hardy race of farmers andcharcoal-burners, when they saw the smoke rising from their ruinedhomesteads; and their feelings were shared by the general body of thecitizens, who had watched the advance of Archidamus from Eleusis, andhad now no hope of saving their estates. Little knots of angrydisputants were seen in the streets and public places, for the mostpart clamouring against Pericles, and demanding to be led against theinvader, while some few argued for the more prudent course. ButPericles, who knew the fickle temper of the multitude, turned a deafear to all this uproar, and steadily refused to summon an assembly, lest some hasty resolution should be passed, which would lead touseless loss of life. In order, however, to relieve the publicexcitement, he sent out a body of horsemen to skirmish with the enemy, and despatched a fleet of a hundred triremes to ravage the coasts ofPeloponnesus. When the first invasion of Attica was over, two cities, which had beenforemost in stirring up war against Athens, were made to feel the fullweight of her resentment. The unhappy Aeginetans were expelled fromtheir island, and the land of Aegina was distributed among Atheniancitizens. And later in the same summer the Athenians marched in fullforce into the territory of Megara, which was laid waste from end toend. This proceeding, which afforded a pleasant summer excursion tothe Athenians, was repeated annually for the next seven years. Thebanished Aeginetans found an asylum at Thyrea, a coast district ofeastern Peloponnesus, which was assigned to them by Sparta. And so thefirst year of the war came to an end; for, except on extraordinaryoccasions, no military operations were undertaken during the winter. THE PLAGUE AT ATHENS I At the beginning of the next summer the Peloponnesians again enteredAttica, and resumed their work of devastation, destroying the youngcrops, and wrecking whatever had been spared in the previous year. Before they had been many days in Attica, a new and far more terriblevisitation came upon the Athenians, threatening them with totalextinction as a people. We have seen how the whole upper city, withthe space between the Long Walls, and the harbour-town of Peiraeus, was packed with a vast multitude of human beings, penned together, like sheep in a fold. Into these huddled masses now crept a subtle andunseen foe, striking down his victims by hundreds and by thousands. That foe was the Plague, which beginning in Southern Africa, anddescending thence to Egypt, reached the southern shores of theMediterranean, and passed on to Peiraeus, having been carried thitherby seamen who trafficked between northern Africa and Greece. FromPeiraeus it spread upwards with rapid strides, and before long thewhole space within the walls presented the appearance of a vast lazar-house. From the description of the symptoms we may conclude that thisepidemic was similar to that dreadful scourge of mankind which hasbeen almost conquered by modern science, the small-pox. The patientwho had taken the infection was first attacked in the head, withinflammation of the eyes, and violent headache. By degrees the poisonworked its way into the whole system, affecting every organ in thebody, and appearing on the surface in the shape of small ulcers andboils. One of the most distressing features of the disease was araging thirst, which could not be appeased by the most copiousdraughts of water; and the internal heat, which produced this effect, caused also a frightful irritability of the skin, so that the sufferercould not bear the touch of the lightest and most airy fabrics, butlay naked on his bed, in all the deformity of his dire affliction. Ofthose who recovered, many bore the marks of the sickness to theirgraves, by the loss of a hand, a foot, or an eye; while others wereaffected in their minds, remaining in blank oblivion, without power torecognise themselves or their friends. The healing art had made greatprogress in Greece in the course of the last generation; and in this, as in all else, the Greeks remained the sole teachers of Europe forages after. But against such a malady as this, the most skilfulphysicians could do nothing, and those who attempted to exercise theirskill caught the plague themselves, and for the most part perished. Still less, as we may well suppose, was the benefit derived fromamulets, incantations, inquiries of oracles, or supplications attemples; and at last, finding no help in god or man, the Atheniansgave up the struggle, and resigned themselves to despair. It is recorded as a curious fact, showing the strange and outlandishcharacter of the pestilence, that the birds and animals which feed onhuman flesh generally shunned the bodies of those who died of theplague, though they might have eaten their fill, for hundreds wereleft unburied. The very vultures fled from the infected city, andhardly one was seen as long as the pestilence continued. The fearful rapidity with which the infection spread caused a panicthroughout the city, and even the boldest were not proof against thegeneral terror. If any man felt himself sickening of the plague, he atonce gave up all hope, and made no effort to fight against thedisease. Few were found brave enough to undertake the duty of nursingthe sick, and those who did generally paid for their devotion withtheir lives. In most cases the patient was left to languish alone, andperished by neglect, while his nearest and dearest avoided hispresence, and had grown so callous that they had not a sigh or a tearleft for the death of husband, or child, or friend. The few whorecovered, now free from risk of mortal infection, did what they couldto help their suffering fellow-citizens. The mischief was aggravated by the overcrowded state of the city, especially among those who had come in from the country, and wereliving in stifling huts through the intense heat of a southern summer. Here the harvest of death fell thickest, and the corpses lay heapedtogether, while dying wretches crawled about the public streets, andencumbered the fountain-sides, to which they had dragged themselves intheir longing for drink. All sense of public decency, all regard forlaws, human or divine, was lost. The temples in which they had madetheir dwellings were choked with dead, and the sacred duty of burial, to which the conscience of antiquity attached so high an importance, was performed in wild haste and disorder. Sometimes those who werecarrying out a corpse found a vacant pile prepared by the relatives ofanother victim, flung their dead upon it, set fire to the pile, anddeparted; and sometimes, when a body was already burning, others whowere seeking to dispose of a corpse forced their way to the fire, andthrew their burden upon it. In the general relaxation of public morality all the dark passions ofhuman nature, which at ordinary times lurk in secret places, cameforth to the light of day, and raged without restraint. Some, who hadgrown rich in a day by the death of wealthy relatives, resolved toenjoy their possessions, and indulge every appetite, before they wereovertaken by the same fate. Others, who had hitherto led good lives, seeing the base and the noble swept away indifferently by the sameruthless power, began to doubt the justice of heaven itself, andrushed into debauch, convinced that conscience and honour were butempty names. For human laws they cared still less, for in theuniversal panic there was none to enforce them, and before the voiceof public authority could be heard again, both judge and transgressor, as they believed, would be involved in a common doom. All shame andfear were accordingly thrown aside, and those whom the plague had notyet touched seemed possessed by one sole desire--to drown thought andcare in an orgy of fierce excess, and then to die. II The second invasion of the Peloponnesians was prolonged for fortydays, and the whole Attic territory was laid waste. Pericles againrefused to venture a pitched battle against them, knowing well thatthe Athenian army was no match for them in the open field. But apowerful fleet was sent to cruise round Peloponnesus, which inflictedmuch damage on the coast districts. It was a welcome relief to theAthenians selected for this service to escape for a time from theplague-stricken city; but unhappily they carried the infection withthem, and the crews were decimated by the same disease. Nor did theevil stop here: for the same armament being afterwards despatched toPotidaea, to reinforce the blockading army and fleet, caused avirulent outbreak of the plague among the forces stationed there, which up till then had been healthy. After some fruitless operationsagainst the town this second armament was withdrawn, and returned toAthens with the loss of more than a thousand men. After all these disasters the reaction against Pericles, which hadbegun with the first invasion of Attica, reached a climax, and on allsides he was loudly decried by the Athenians, as the author of alltheir miseries. Envoys were sent with overtures of peace to Sparta, and when these returned with no favourable answer, the storm ofpopular fury grew more violent than ever. Pericles, who knew thetemper of his people, and had foreseen that some such outbreak wouldoccur, remained calm and unmoved. But wishing to allay the generalexcitement, and bring back the citizens to a more reasonable view oftheir prospects, he summoned an assembly, and addressed the multitudein terms of grave and dignified rebuke. He reminded them that theythemselves had voted for war, and remonstrated against the unfairnessof making him responsible for their own decision. If war could havebeen avoided without imperilling the very existence of their city, then that decision was wrong; but if, as was the fact, peace couldonly have been preserved by ruinous concessions, then his advice hadbeen good, and they had been right in following it. The welfare of theindividual citizen depended on the welfare of the community to whichhe belonged; as long as that was secured, private losses could alwaysbe made good, but public disaster meant private ruin. On thisprinciple they had acted two years before, when they determined toreject the demands of Sparta. Why, then, were they now indulging inweak regrets, and turning against him whom they had appointed as theirchosen guide and adviser? Was there anything in his character, anyfact in his whole life, which justified them in suspecting him ofunworthy motives? Was he the man to lead them astray, in order to savesome selfish end--he, the great Pericles, whose loyalty, eloquence, clear-sightedness, and incorruptibility, had been proved in a publiccareer of more than thirty years? If any other course had been open tothem, he would have been to blame in counselling war; but thealternative was between that and degradation. The immediate pressureof private calamity was blinding them to the magnitude of theinterests at stake--Athens, with all her fond traditions, and all thelustre of her name. That they were sure of victory he had alreadydeclared to them on many infallible grounds. But seeing them so sunkin despair, he would speak in a tone of loud assurance, and boldlyassert a fact which they seemed to have overlooked. They were lords ofthe sea, absolute masters, that was to say, of half the world! Letthem keep a firm grasp on this empire, and they would soon recoverthose pretty ornaments of empire--their gardens and their vineyards--which they held so dear: but, that once relinquished, they would loseall. Surely this knowledge should inspire them with a lofty contemptof their foes, a contempt grounded, not on ignorance or shallowenthusiasm, but on rational calculation. They could not now descendfrom the eminence on which they stood. Athens, who had blazed so longin unrivalled splendour before the eyes of the world, dared not sufferher lustre to be abated: for her, obscurity meant extinction. Let themkeep this in mind, and not listen to counsels of seeming prudence andmoderation, which were suicidal in a ruling state. All theircalamities, except the plague, were the foreseen results of their owndecision. Now was the time to display their known courage andpatience. Let them think of the glory of Athens, and her imperialfame. This memorable speech, the last recorded utterance of Pericles, hadthe desired effect. It was resolved to continue the war, and nofurther embassies were sent to Sparta. But resentment still smoulderedin the hearts of the Athenians against their great statesman. Howfearful was the contrast between the high hopes with which they hadembarked in this struggle, and the scenes of horror and desolationwhich lay around them! From the walls they could see their trampledfields, their ravaged plantations, and the blackened ruins of theirhomes. Within, the pestilence still raged undiminished, and the citywas filled with sounds and sights of woe. Under the pressure of thesecalamities the ascendency of Pericles went through a brief period ofeclipse, and he was condemned to pay a fine. Soon, however, herecovered all his influence, and remained at the head of affairs untilhis death, which occurred in the autumn of the following year. Pericles is the representative figure in the golden age of Atheniangreatness, the most perfect example of that equable and harmoniousdevelopment in every faculty of body and mind which was the aim ofGreek civic life at its best. As an orator, he was probably neverequalled, and the effect of his eloquence has found immortalexpression in the lines of his contemporary Eupolis. Persuasion, weare told, sat enthroned on his lips; like a strong athlete, heovertook and outran all other orators; his words struck home like thelightning, while he held his audience enchained, as by a powerfulspell; and among all the masters of eloquence, he was the only one wholeft his sting behind him. As a statesman, it was his object to admitevery freeborn Athenian to a share of public duties and privileges;and for this purpose he introduced the system of payment, whichenabled the poorer citizens to perform their part in the service ofthe state. His military talents, though never employed for conquest oraggression, were of no mean order; and on two occasions of supremeperil to Athens, the revolt of Euboea, and the revolt of Samos, it washis energy and promptitude which saved his city from ruin. But it is as the head of the great intellectual movement whichculminated in this epoch, as the friend of poets, philosophers, andartists, that Pericles has won his most enduring fame. By his liberaland enlightened policy the surplus of the Athenian revenues wasdevoted to the creation of those wonders of architecture andsculpture, whose fragments still serve as unapproachable models to themind of modern Europe. And under his rule Athens became the school ofGreece, the great centre for every form of intellectual activity, aposition which she maintained until the later period of the RomanEmpire. If, however, we would understand the character of Pericles, and thespirit of the age which he represents, we must never forget that thisaspect of Athenian greatness, to us by far the most important, was notthe aspect which awoke the highest enthusiasm in him and hiscontemporaries. Those things which have made the name of Athensimmortal, her art and her literature, were matters of but secondaryimportance to the Athenian of that age. He worshipped his city as abeloved mistress, and, like a lover, he delighted to adorn her withoutward dignity and splendour. But to lavish all his thought and careon these external embellishments would have been, in his estimation, asenseless waste of his highest faculties, as if a lover should makethe robes and jewels of his mistress the objects of his highestadoration. To make Athens the mightiest state in Greece, to build upthe fabric of her material greatness--these were the objects for whichhe was ready to devote the best energies of heart and brain, and ifneed were, to lay down his life. He might be skilled in every elegantaccomplishment, an acute reasoner, an orator, a musician, a poet; andto some extent he was all of these. But before all else he was in thehighest sense a practical man, finding in strenuous action his chiefglory and pride. And such a man was the last to melt into ecstasiesover the high notes of a singer, or dream away his life in thefairyland of poetry. We have dwelt at some length on the work and character of Pericles, ashis death marks a turning point in Athenian history. From that dayonward the policy of Athens takes a downward direction, denoting acorresponding decline in Athenian character and aspiration. Pericleshad been able, by his commanding talents and proved integrity, toexercise a salutary check on the restless energies and soaringambition of his countrymen. He had been a true father and ruler of hispeople, in evil times and in good, curbing them in the insolence ofprosperity, comforting and exalting them in the dark hour of disaster. But the government now passed into the hands of weaker men, who, sincethey were incapable of leading the people, were compelled to followit, and to maintain their position by pandering to the worst vices ofthe Athenian character. Rash where they should have been cautious, yielding where they should have been resolute, they squandered theimmense resources of Athens, and led her on, step by step, tohumiliation and defeat. The course of our narrative will show howeasily the Athenians might have emerged triumphant from the strugglewith their enemies, if they had followed the line of conduct markedout by Pericles. They might, indeed, have avoided the occasion ofoffence which led immediately to the war, and thus have escaped thenecessity of fighting altogether; and this, as we have seen, was theone fatal mistake made by Pericles. But, once launched in theconflict, they were sure of an easy victory, if they had only shown avery moderate degree of prudence and self-restraint. And we need notblame the great statesmen too harshly for not foreseeing the wildexcesses of folly and extravagance which we shall have to record inthe following pages. INVESTMENT OF PLATAEA In the third year of the war the usual invasion of Attica was omitted, and the Peloponnesian army under Archidamus marched against Plataea. Having pitched their camp before the walls they prepared to lay wastethe territory; but before the work of havoc began, the Plataeans sentenvoys to remonstrate. "Unrighteous are your deeds, " said thespokesman of the embassy, "ye men of Sparta, and unworthy of the menwhose sons ye are. After the victory of Plataea, which ended thestruggle against Persia, Pausanias, the chief captain of theconfederate Greeks, offered sacrifice and thanksgiving at Plataea toZeus the Liberator, and swore a solemn oath, both he, and all theGreeks whom he led, to maintain the independence of our city againstall who should assail it. This they did as a recompense for our valourand devotion in our country's service. But ye, in direct violation ofthat oath, have made common cause with our worst enemies, the Thebans, and have come hither to enslave us. In the name of the gods whowitnessed that covenant, in the name of every power worshipped alikeat Plataea and at Sparta, we adjure you not to commit this sacrilege, but to leave us in peaceful possession of the privileges vouchsafed tous on that memorable day. " Such were the words of the Plataeans, to which Archidamus replied asfollows: "Ye say well, men of Plataea, if ye act in the spirit of thecompact to which ye have appealed. The oath which Pausanias swore wastaken in defence of the common liberties of Greece. Against thoseliberties a new enemy has arisen, Athens, who holds half our nation inbondage, and threatens to lay her yoke upon us all. To put down thattyranny has this great coalition been called together, and if ye aretrue men, ye will enlist in the same cause, and take up arms for therelief of your distressed countrymen. Or at least, if ye cannot dothis, then stand apart from this conflict, helping neither one sidenor the other; and with this we shall be satisfied. " Having heard the answer of Archidamus, the Plataean envoys went back, and reported his words to their fellow-townsmen. But the Plataeansreplied that, without the consent of the Athenians, they dare notaccept his proposal, as their wives and children had been removed toAthens. Moreover, they feared that if they remained neutral theThebans would seize the opportunity to make another attempt on theirtown. "Well, then, " answered Archidamus, "we make you this secondoffer: Hand over your town and your dwellings to us, the Spartans;keep a strict account of all your trees, [Footnote: Vines and olive-trees] and of all else that can be numbered, and retire yourselves tosome safe retreat, as long as the war continues. When it is over, wewill restore all your property, and meanwhile keep the land incultivation, and pay you a fixed rent, such as may suffice you. " The offer was fair, and even generous; but the Plataeans werepowerless to act, without the consent of the Athenians, who held theirfamilies as hostages. Accordingly they asked for a truce, to enablethem to lay the proposal before the authorities at Athens, and thisbeing granted, they sent envoys to Athens, who speedily returned withthis answer: "We have never left you at the mercy of your enemies inthe past, since ye became our allies, nor will we do so now, but willhelp you to the best of our power; and we charge you by the oath whichyour fathers swore not to depart from your allegiance to Athens. " It was a cruel alternative which was offered to the hapless Plataeans:either they must leave their wives and children to the vengeance ofAthens, or face the whole power of the confederates, led by Sparta. True to their character, they chose the nobler part, and determined tostand by the Athenian alliance. Henceforth no one was allowed to leavethe town, and their final answer was delivered from the walls. Theywere unable, they said, to accept the terms offered by Archidamus. On hearing their decision, the Spartan king made a last solemn appealto the powers who presided over the territory of Plataea, a hallowedprecinct, now about to be given up to plunder and ravage: "Ye gods andheroes, who keep the land of Plataea, bear witness that we had justcause from the first for marching hither, since the Plataeans hadforsaken the alliance, and that if we do aught against them, we shallstill be justified. For we have made them the fairest offers, but theywould not be persuaded. Therefore let those with whom the guilt liesbe punished, and prosper ye the cause of righteous vengeance. " The siege of Plataea now began in earnest. First the town wassurrounded with a palisade, to prevent anyone from escaping, thematerials being taken from the plantations in the neighbourhood of thetown. Then they raised a mound against the wall, expecting that withso large a force as theirs they would easily carry the place by storm. Timber was brought from Cithaeron, and with this they set up two stoutbuttresses of cross-beams, at right angles to the town-wall, to serveas a support on either side of the mound. Within this framework theypiled up fascines, stones, earth, and whatever else was at hand. Thewhole army was employed in this task, which was continued for seventydays and nights without intermission, the men working in regularspells. Meanwhile the Plataeans had not been idle. First they built a wall ofbricks and timber opposite to the point where the mound was rising, and resting on the ramparts, in order to raise the height of theirdefences. The new wall was covered with hides, raw and dressed, toprotect the timber and the workmen from being injured by burningarrows. And while this structure was in progress, they made a breachin the old wall, and carted away the earth from the bottom of themound. To prevent this, the Peloponnesians filled up the space thuscaused with heavy masses of clay, rammed tightly into baskets ofosier, which made a solid structure, much harder to remove than theloose earth. Then the Plataeans had recourse to another device:marking carefully the position of the mound, they ran a mine from thecity under it, and as fast as the earth fell in, they carried it away. This continued for a long time, for the Peloponnesians, who saw theirmound rising no higher, for all their labour, but rather growing less, did not guess the cause, but went on heaping up materials, which wereswallowed up as fast as they were brought. Still the Plataeans feared that in spite of these counterworks theywould at length be overpowered by numbers, unless they contrived somebetter means of defence. So they left off building the wall of bricksand timber, and beginning at either end of it, they built a crescent-shaped wall, curving inwards towards the city. Thus thePeloponnesians, if they succeeded in carrying the first wall, wouldfind themselves confronted by a second line of defence, and would haveall their work to do over again, besides being exposed to a cross-fire. While the Plataeans were thus vigorously defending themselves, andbefore the mound was completed, the Peloponnesians brought siege-engines to bear on the wall, one of which greatly alarmed the besiegedgarrison, by severely shaking their wall of timber and bricks. Butthis new mode of attack was frustrated, like the rest, by theingenuity of the Plataeans, who dropped nooses over the ends of thebattering-rams, and drew them up just before the moment of impact. Moreover they suspended heavy beams of wood at intervals along thewall, each beam hanging by long chains from two cranes which rested onthe wall and projected outwards from it; and whenever a ram was beingbrought up, they drew up the beam at right angles to it, and then, letting go the chains, dropped the ponderous timber, which camecrashing down on the ram, and broke off its head. Thus baffled at every point, the Peloponnesians began to despair oftaking the town by assault, and thought that they would be compelledto form a blockade. But before being driven to this costly and tediousoperation, they determined to try and set fire to the place, whichseemed possible, as it was but small in extent. So they waited tillthe wind was in the right direction, and then brought vast quantitiesof faggots, and threw them into the space between the mound and thewall; and this being soon filled up, they piled up more faggots as faras they could reach within the city itself, and then throwing inlighted torches, with brimstone and pitch, they set fire to the wholemass. Then arose a great sheet of flame, such as had never been raisedby human hands, though not, of course, to be compared to the vastforest-fires, produced by natural means; yet it was sufficient tocause a panic among the Plataeans, and bring their town to the vergeof destruction. The heat was so intense that a whole quarter of theplace was cleared of its defenders, and if a wind had arisen to drivethe flame inwards, nothing could have saved the whole town fromdestruction. [Footnote: Thucydides seems to imply that there was awind, though a slight one. ] But fortunately the breeze was but slight, and it is said also that a heavy fall of rain came on, and quenchedthe conflagration. Having failed in their last attempt, the Peloponnesians sent away partof their army, and employed those who remained in building ablockading wall round Plataea. The work was completed towards the endof September, and they then disbanded their army, leaving a forcesufficient to guard half the wall; for the Thebans, relentless intheir zeal against Plataea, took charge of the other half. The numberof the besieged was four hundred and eighty, of whom eighty wereAthenians, and a hundred and ten women to make bread for the garrison. NAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIO I During the last half-century the art of naval warfare had made greatprogress in Greece. The Greek war-galley, or trireme, a vesselpropelled by three banks of oars, had always been furnished with asharp-pointed prow, for the purpose of ramming an opponent's ship; butmany years elapsed before the Greeks attained genuine skill in the useof this formidable weapon. According to the ordinary method offighting, after the first shock of collision the affair was decided bythe hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry, stationed on the decks of thetwo contending ships; and in this manner was fought the engagementbetween the Corcyraean and Corinthian. Fleets which occurred in theyear before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. There the ship wassimply a vehicle, which served to bring the antagonists together, andthe rest was left to the prowess of the hoplites. The Athenians were the first to abandon this crude and clumsy style offighting, and in the course of two generations their seamen had becomerenowned throughout Greece for the unrivalled skill which they showedin working and manoeuvring the trireme. A few hoplites were stillcarried, to serve in cases of emergency; but by far the most importantpart in the encounter was played by the trireme itself, with its long, tapering, sharp-pointed prow. To use this deadly but delicateinstrument with effect required great coolness, dexterity, andjudgment, on the part of the steersman, and a crew under perfectcommand. The tactics usually employed were as follows: watching hisopportunity, the captain gave the order "full speed ahead!" anddarting rapidly through the enemy's line, wheeled suddenly round, anddrove the beak of his galley with terrible force against the stern orside of the vessel selected for attack. One blow from the long lance-like point, propelled by the whole weight and impetus of the trireme, was sufficient to sink or disable an enemy's ship, and the attackinggalley was then backed away from the wreck, and directed againstanother victim. The incessant practice of nearly half a century had enabled theAthenians to attain consummate mastery in this new method of navalwarfare; and they were now to give signal proof of their immensesuperiority over the other maritime powers of Greece. In the same summer which witnessed the investment of Plataea, theSpartans planned an expedition against Acarnania, the westernmostprovince of Greece, which they wished to detach from the Athenianalliance. A Spartan officer, named Cnemus, was sent off in advance, with a thousand hoplites, to raise the wild mountain tribes, and ledan attack against Stratus, the capital of Acarnania; and in themeantime orders were sent round to equip a numerous fleet, which wasto support the operations of Stratus by harassing the coast districts. The attack on Stratus failed altogether, chiefly in consequence of theimpetuosity of the rude mountaineers serving under Cnemus, whoadvanced unsupported against the town, and meeting with a severerepulse embarrassed the movements of their Greek allies. About thesame time the Peloponnesian fleet, consisting of forty-seven ships, was sailing down the Corinthian Gulf to co-operate with Cnemus. It wasknown that Phormio, the Athenian admiral, was stationed at Naupactuswith a squadron of twenty vessels; but the Peloponnesian captainsnever dreamed that he would venture to attack them with so small aforce, and they pursued their voyage along the southern shore of thegulf, without making any preparations for a battle. Phormio, however, had other intentions: keeping close to the opposite shore, he followedtheir movements, and allowed them to pass through the narrow straitwhich divides the inner from the outer gulf, wishing to avoid anengagement until they reached the open water. The Peloponnesiansdropped anchor for the night at Patrae in Achaia, and Phormio took uphis station at Chalcis, a harbour-town of Aetolia, at the mouth of theEvenus. Being now convinced that Phormio meditated an encounter, forwhich they had little inclination, the Peloponnesian admirals made anattempt [Footnote: I have adopted the reading of Bloomfield, approvedby Classen (4th Edition). ] to steal across under cover of darkness. But this manoeuvre was detected, and they found their way barred bythe Athenian squadron in the middle of the channel. Being thus drivento bay the Peloponnesians drew up their ships in a circle, with theirprows turned outwards, like a flock of sheep assailed by a dog. Withinthe circle were placed the smaller vessels accompanying the fleet, andfive of the swiftest galleys, which were intended to lend assistanceagainst any attack of the enemy. To keep a large flotilla in such a position, even in a calm sea, whereno hostile movement was made against them, would have been a task totry the skill of the most accomplished mariners. But the Peloponnesiancrews were untrained, the decks of their ships were crowded withsoldiers, and they were hampered by the crowd of smaller craft. Worstof all, they were threatened in every direction by the agile Atheniangalleys, which, moving in single file, swept round and round them, approaching closer and closer at every circuit, so that they werepenned together in an ever-narrowing space, and in danger of foulingone another. To complete their confusion, the morning breeze began toblow from the gulf; and Phormio, who had been waiting for this, nowgave the signal for attack. The Peloponnesians hardly attempted anydefence; for the unskilful crews of the galleys could not manage theiroars in the rising sea, and the steersmen had consequently no controlof their vessels. All their efforts were employed in keeping clear ofone another, warding off a collision with long poles, amid a hubbub ofcurses and abuse. Into this huddled, swaying mass of war-galleys andmerchant-craft mingled together now dashed the Athenian triremes, wrecking every vessel which they met. A wild panic ensued among thePeloponnesian crews, and as fast as they could extricate themselvesthey rowed off and sought shelter in the harbour of Patrae. From herethey afterwards sailed to Cyllene, the dockyard of Elis, where theywere joined by Cnemus with the troops from Acarnania. Twelve shipsfell into the hands of the Athenians, and taking these with them theysailed first to Rhium, a level headland on the Locrian Coast, on whichstood a temple of Poseidon. Having left one of the captured ships as athank-offering to the god of the sea, they made their way back to theoriginal station at Naupactus. II The authorities at Sparta were highly indignant at the failure oftheir expedition in Acarnania, and the defeat of the Peloponnesianfleet by so inferior a force. For this was their first experience of asea-fight since the outbreak of the war, and they made no allowancefor the want of skill in their own crews, attributing the disaster tomere cowardice. They did not reflect how vast was the differencebetween raw sailors, lately transferred from the plough to the oar, and the veteran seamen of Athens, trained under a system which hadbeen slowly perfected in the course of half a century. So they sentthree commissioners to Cnemus, with peremptory orders to prepare foranother sea-fight, and not allow himself to be shut up in harbour bythe feeble squadron of Phormio. One of these commissioners wasBrasidas, a brilliant young officer, who had gained distinction twoyears before by saving the harbour-town of Methone, on the coast ofMessenia, from being captured by the Athenians. We shall hear muchmore of him in the sequel. On the arrival of Brasidas and his colleagues, the ships lying atCyllene were made ready for immediate service, and orders were sentround to the allied cities for other ships. Phormio also sent anurgent despatch to Athens announcing his victory, and asking forreinforcements; and the Athenians sent twenty triremes to his aid. These vessels, however, arrived too late, for the admiral, acting oninstructions from Athens, sailed first to Crete, where he was delayeda long time by contrary winds. Phormio, with his twenty triremes, wastherefore compelled to engage the whole Peloponnesian fleet, numberingseventy-seven ships, which had now sailed round from Cyllene, andtaken up its station just within the strait, close to the Achaean townof Panormus. A strong force of Peloponnesian soldiers was encamped onthe shore, to co-operate with the fleet. Phormio anchored his shipsjust outside the strait, being resolved, if it were in any waypossible, not to fight the Peloponnesians in the narrow waters. As thePeloponnesians, on their side, were equally determined not to be luredout into the open sea, the two fleets remained confronting each otherfor a whole week, without attempting any aggressive movement. At lastthe Peloponnesian leaders decided to give battle with Phormio at once, fearing that if they delayed any longer he would be reinforced fromAthens. It was the universal custom of Greek commanders to wind up the courageof their men on the eve of a battle by a short and pithy address, calculated to inspire them with confidence, by giving them areasonable hope of victory. Such a practice, strange as it may seem tous, was natural among a people whose armies and fleets were recruitedfrom the general body of the citizens, accustomed to free speech intheir public assemblies. They were not men of war by profession, trained in habits of blind obedience, but sensitive Greeks, whocarried into the camp the noble freedom of civic life, and were notprepared to shed their blood without sufficient cause, and a fairprospect of success. Seldom was there greater need of this sort of military eloquence thanon the present occasion. On both sides there was much discouragement, and a general reluctance to begin the fight. The Peloponnesians werecowed by their recent defeat, and dreaded the naval skill of theAthenians, which seemed to them almost supernatural; and Phormio's menshrank from an encounter with such enormous odds. Accordingly thePeloponnesian captains on one side, and Phormio on the other, did whatthey could to argue their crews into a more hopeful frame of mind. ThePeloponnesian seamen who had taken part in the first battle werereminded that they had been caught unprepared, and assured that thistime every precaution would be taken to prevent a second reverse. Theywere flattered by the confident assertion that the superior skill ofthe Athenians was far outweighed by their own superior courage. "Look, " said one of the admirals, speaking to his own division, "atthis powerful armament, outnumbering the enemy by four to one--look atthe army drawn up on the shore, ready to lend aid to any who are hardpressed--and you will see that with such advantages defeat isimpossible. Do your duty like men, and expect to be rewarded orpunished according to your deserts. " Similar addresses, combiningencouragement with threats, were heard in the other parts of thefleet. Among the Athenian sailors there had been much jesting about the land-lubbers of Peloponnesus, and in the first flush of their victory theyhad been ready to face any odds on the sea. But now, seeing themselvesconfronted by such overwhelming numbers, they had lost heart for themoment, and were seen standing about in little groups, shaking theirheads and whispering fearfully together. It was an anxious moment forPhormio; he knew the immense importance of maintaining, at any cost, the naval reputation of Athens, and if his men went into battle intheir present temper, they were certain to suffer a crushing defeat. Determining, therefore, if possible, to allay the panic which was fastspreading throughout the fleet, he summoned the crews into hispresence, and harangued them as follows:-- "Comrades, I have called you hither to assure you that you have nocause for alarm. The numbers of the enemy, which seem to you soformidable, should, if properly considered, be a ground of confidence;for this unwieldy armament is a sign that they are thoroughlyterrified, and seek safety in a huge crowd of ships. The firmness anddiscipline which they have acquired by long experience of land warfarewill avail them little on the sea For courage is largely a matter ofhabit, and the bravest landsman is a mere coward when he is taken awayfrom his own element, and set down on the heaving deck of a war-galleywhere he can hardly keep his feet. The disorganized multitude withwhich we shall have to deal is a mere mob, held together by theauthority of Sparta, demoralized by their late defeat, and forced tofight against their will. Face them boldly, and our very audacity inassailing such numbers will sink them still deeper into helplessterror, for they will think that we must be invincible, or we shouldnever run such risks. It shall be my business to bring on theengagement in blue water, where we shall have them at our mercy. Nowevery man to his station; be prompt, and be silent, and attend to theword of command. Remember your old spirit, and reflect that the honourof Athens is in your hands to-day. " The great object of the Peloponnesian leaders was to compel Phormio togive battle in the confined space of the strait. With this intentionthey determined to make a sudden movement towards the northern coastof the gulf, threatening an attack on Naupactus. At daybreak they drewup their ships in four lines, with the coast of Peloponnesus behindthem, and with twenty fast-sailing triremes stationed on the rightwing, to cut off Phormio's fleet, if, as they anticipated, he advancedto the defence of Naupactus. Wheeling then to the right, the shipssailed some distance, four abreast, towards the inner gulf; and whenthey came opposite to Naupactus, they changed their course, and movedin column, with the right wing leading towards the northern shore. The manoeuvre, so far as concerned its immediate purpose, wascompletely successful. Phormio, much against his will, was obliged toleave his station outside the strait, and go to the aid of Naupactus, which had been left undefended. Great was the delight of thePeloponnesian captains when they saw the little Athenian squadroncreeping close, in single file, along the northern side of the gulf, for they thought that not one of the twenty would escape them. At agiven signal, the whole fleet formed into line, resuming its originalorder, four deep, and bore down upon the Athenians. Eleven ofPhormio's triremes succeeded in clearing the strait, and getting intothe open waters in the direction of Naupactus; but the remaining ninewere overtaken and driven aground, and their crews, except those whoescaped by swimming, were put to the sword. Some of these vessels weretowed off as prizes by the Peloponnesians, and one they captured withall her crew. The rest were saved by the valour of the Messeniansoldiers, who had followed the movements of Phormio's vessels alongthe shore, and now did good service by boarding the stranded triremes, and hauling them to land, after a sharp tussle with the enemy. Meanwhile the eleven ships which had eluded the attack were hotlypursued by the twenty fast-sailing vessels on the Peloponnesian rightwing. All but one got through in safety, and took refuge in theharbour of Naupactus, and drawing up in line, with their prowsoutwards, prepared to defend themselves if the enemy advanced furtheragainst them. But the rearmost vessel was hard pressed by a Leucadianship, and the rest of the pursuers followed at a considerabledistance, singing the paean [Footnote: A song of victory. ] as theyrowed, and expecting an easy victory. Now, however, occurred one ofthose sudden turns of fortune so frequent in the course of a sea-fight. The Athenian trireme which had been left far behind in thechase, made a sudden sweep round a merchant-vessel anchored at themouth of the harbour, struck her pursuer amidships, and sank her. This splendid feat of seamanship filled the Peloponnesians, who wereadvancing in disorder, with amazement and terror. On every trireme thecry of "Hold her!" [Footnote: This was done by thrusting the oars, withthe blades held flat, deep into the water] was heard, and some of thevessels, losing way suddenly, ran aground on the shallows. The othershung back, waiting until the main body of the fleet should come totheir support. Seeing them drifting thus, stupefied and helpless, theAthenians took heart again, and raising a shout rowed swiftly fromtheir station within the harbour, and charged down upon them. ThePeloponnesians, after a feeble attempt at resistance, took to flight, heading for their original station on the opposite coast. Six of theirvessels were captured, and the Athenians, not content with this, fellupon the main body of the fleet, and recovered their own ships whichhad been taken in the strait. The victorious crews of Phormio thenreturned to Naupactus, and set up a trophy at the place where they hadbeen moored when this splendid rally was made, opposite to the templeof Apollo. The Peloponnesians also raised a trophy, to commemoratetheir first success, and then, fearing the arrival of the fresh shipsfrom Athens, they sailed off to Lechaeum, the northern harbour ofCorinth. III In strange contrast with the disgraceful exhibition of cowardice andincompetence which we have just witnessed, we have now to record adaring attempt, undertaken shortly afterwards, to strike at the veryheart of the Athenian power. While the beaten crews of thePeloponnesian fleet were waiting to be paid off at Lechaeum, theysuddenly received orders to take their oars and rowing-cushions, andproceed to Nisaea, the port of Megara. The plan was to embark them onforty vessels, which were lying in the dockyards, and make a night-attack on Peiraeus. The suggestion came from the Megarians, but incarrying it out the Peloponnesians were probably influenced by thebold and enterprising spirit of Brasidas. And in fact, the meditateddescent on Peiraeus was neither so wild nor so rash as it may at firstsight appear. For the Athenians, never dreaming that they might betaken by surprise, had not taken the precaution to close the entranceof their harbour, or to station guard-ships for its defence. Without delay, the officers in charge of the expedition mustered theircrews at Nisaea, and embarking by night, got their ships under way. But at the last moment their hearts failed them, and instead ofsailing to Peiraeus, they landed on the island of Salamis, and afterattacking a sea-side fort, and capturing three triremes which wereriding at anchor near it, they spread themselves out, and beganravaging and plundering the country. Meanwhile fire-signals had been raised, conveying the alarm toPeiraeus and Athens. A wild panic ensued, and a rumour ran through theupper city that the enemy had sailed into Peiraeus, while in theharbour-town it was generally supposed that Salamis was lost, andPeiraeus on the point of being invaded. The Peloponnesians employed inthis adventure afterwards pretended that they had been hindered bycontrary winds from carrying out their original design. But this was amere excuse, and if they had chosen they might have sailed unopposedto Peiraeus, and inflicted terrible injury on Athens. But it was nowtoo late, for the Athenians, as soon as the news was brought, hadmarched down with their whole military force to Peiraeus, and occupiedevery assailable point in the harbour, while at the same time everyship in the docks was launched and manned, and sent off in headlonghaste to Salamis. By this time it was broad daylight, and the Peloponnesians, beingwarned that a rescue was on the way from Peiraeus, made off with theirbooty, and getting, on board their ships, sailed back to Nisaea. Theyhad the more reason for hastening their departure, as the Megarianships which had carried them to Salamis, having lain a long while indry-dock, were leaky and unseaworthy; for the harbour of Megara hadfor some time past been kept in close blockade by the Athenians. This memorable incident, following close on the brilliant victories ofPhormio, taught the Athenians to take better precautions for thefuture. Hitherto they would have scoffed at the suggestion that theirown arsenals and dockyards were exposed to attack. But now theyprovided for the safety of Peiraeus by closing the harbours andkeeping a vigilant watch. And that terrible night left an impressionon their minds which was not soon forgotten. THE REVOLT OF LESBOS I We have already traced the steps by which the various citiescomposing the Confederacy of Delos gradually became subjects andtributaries of Athens. After this great change was effected, the onlymembers of the original league who retained their independence werethe wealthy and powerful communities of Chios and Lesbos. These twoislands were allowed to retain undisturbed control of their ownaffairs, with the sole obligation of sending a fixed quota of ships toserve in the Athenian Navy. It does not appear that the performance ofthis duty was felt as a grievance, and no act of oppression had beencommitted by Athens, such as might have provoked her allies in Lesbosor Chios to turn against her. In both islands the general body of thecitizens were on the whole friendly to the Athenians, who affordedthem an effectual means of protection against the tyranny of thenobles, by summoning high-born offenders to be tried before theAthenian tribunals. [Footnote: The evidence for this statement will befound in Thucydides, viii. 48. ] It was therefore not among the peopleat large, but among the privileged few, that any movement of revoltagainst Athens was to be expected. Some years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Lesbianmalcontents had solicited the Spartans to help them in throwing offthe yoke of Athens. This application, which was probably made at thetime of the revolt of Samos, found no favour with Sparta, and nothingfurther was attempted on that occasion. But in the fourth year of thewar alarming rumours were brought to Athens from Tenedos, a smallisland included in the Athenian alliance, whose inhabitants werejealous of the threatened ascendancy of Lesbos in the easterndistricts of the Aegaean. There was a design, it was said, among theleading citizens of Mytilene, the principal city of Lesbos, to unitethe inhabitants of the island by force under their rule, and renouncetheir allegiance to Athens. Help was expected from Sparta, and theBoeotians, who were of the same race as the Lesbians, were also in theplot. This statement was confirmed by envoys from Methymna, the secondcity of Lesbos, which stood apart from the conspiracy, and by certaincitizens of Mytilene, who had turned informers from motives of privaterevenge. Among the Athenians at this time there was a general feeling ofdespondency and exhaustion. The full hardship of the war pressedheavily upon them, and their population was thinned by the ravages ofthe plague. In such a mood the thought of undertaking a campaignagainst a great island like Lesbos, then at the height of her power, filled them with dismay. Was it possible that a favoured andprivileged ally had taken up arms against them in the hour of theirdistress? It was a slander, they could not, they would not believe it. At any rate, before proceeding to extremities, they would try theeffect of a friendly remonstrance. So they sent envoys with a pacificmessage to the Mytilenaeans, hoping by fair words to deter them fromtheir purpose. In this, however, they were disappointed, and being atlast convinced that the Lesbians were on the brink of revolt, theysent off forty triremes without delay, in order, if possible, to catchthem unawares. For they had been informed that the Mytilenaeans wereabout to celebrate the festival of Apollo, in which the wholepopulation took part, outside the city walls; and if the triremesarrived in time, there would be a fine opportunity for a surprise. Atthe same time they took possession of ten Mytilenaean triremes, whichhad been sent to serve in the Athenian fleet, and imprisoned thecrews. But now was seen one of the weaknesses inherent in the nature of theAthenian constitution. These measures could not be taken withoutpublic debate in the popular assembly, and such a method of procedurerendered secrecy impossible. The Mytilenaeans received timely warningof their danger, and keeping close within their walls, repaired theweak places in their defences, and set a careful watch. Shortlyafterwards the Athenian fleet hove in sight. As the Mytilenaeansrefused to obey the summons delivered to them in the name of theimperial people, --that they should raze their walls, and surrendertheir ships, --hostilities commenced. But on neither side was muchvigour displayed, for the Athenian officers thought themselves tooweak to undertake any decisive operations with their present force, and the Mytilenaeans desired to obtain a respite, to enable them toobtain aid from Sparta. Accordingly they asked for an armistice, pretending that they wished to plead their cause by their ownrepresentatives before the Athenian assembly; and their request beinggranted, they sent envoys to Athens, who made a show of carrying onnegotiations. And in the meantime a trireme was despatched in allhaste to carry their petition to Sparta. On the return of the Mytilenaean envoys from Athens, where of coursethey had accomplished nothing, the siege of Mytilene began in earnest. The city was situated on a promontory facing the Asiatic coast on thesouth-eastern side of the island, and had two harbours, on itsnorthern and southern side. Both of these harbours were now held inclose blockade by the Athenians, who established two camps, one oneither side of the town, and patrolled the harbour-mouths with theirships. But on the land side the investment was not yet completed, sothat supplies could still be brought into the town from the island. Reinforcements, however, came pouring into the Athenian quarters inanswer to a summons sent to the cities of the Athenian alliance, whowere the more willing to lend help, as the Lesbians made no vigorouseffort in their own defence. While the prospects of Athens were thus brightening, the Mytilenaeanenvoys, after a stormy voyage, arrived at Sparta, and laid theirpetition before the authorities. It happened that the Olympic festivalwas close at hand, where representatives would be present from all thecities of the Peloponnesian league; so the envoys received orders togo to Olympia, and state their case in the presence of the Spartanallies. They went, therefore, to Olympia, and when the festival wasover, the Mytilenaean orator addressed the confederates as follows:-- "Before we urge our claim for assistance we wish to combat a prejudicewhich we know to be general in Greece against those who desert theirallies in time of war. For we wish not only to obtain your countenanceand support, but also to preserve your respect. To abandon an allywithout just cause in a time of peril is justly regarded as an act oftreason. But then the alliance must be a fair and equal relationvoluntarily assumed on both sides, based on mutual esteem and parityof power. Can anyone assert that our connexion with Athens answers tothis description? Have we not seen how the confederacy of maritimecities formed against Persia was gradually converted into an Athenianempire? And though we and the Chians enjoyed nominal independence, wehad good reason to fear that this was only a temporary concession, which would be withdrawn as soon as the Athenians felt themselvesstrong enough to attack us. We were allowed to retain our liberty, partly because they feared our navy, and partly because they wished tomake us accomplices in their own aggressions, and lend an appearanceof equity to the acts of violence in which we were compelled to takepart. Having swallowed up the smaller states, they were ready topounce upon us, and were only prevented by the outbreak of the presentwar. Who, then, can blame us, if we seized the opportunity when theywere weakened to repudiate this false alliance, and anticipate theblow which they were preparing for us? Athens, we repeat, has no justtitle to our allegiance; the bond which held us together was fear onour side and interest on theirs. We are natural enemies; and when yourfoe is disabled, then is the time to strike. "Having thus cleared ourselves from the imputation of disloyalty, wewill now make plain to you the advantages which you will gain byespousing our cause. If you wish to inflict irreparable injury onAthens, you must promote every hostile movement against her in thoseregions which contain the sources of her power, that is to say, theislands and coast-lands of the Aegaean. For if our revolt issuccessful, others will follow our example, and the Athenians will bestripped of their revenues, the mainstay of their empire. You can lendus aid most effectually by summoning your allies for a second[Footnote: Attica had already been invaded earlier in the summer. ]invasion of Attica, and thus preventing the Athenians from sendingreinforcements to Lesbos. You have a rare opportunity, for their cityis wasted by the plague, and their navies are dispersed on foreignservice. Remember, then, your proud position as champions of Greekliberty, and put away the reproach which you have sometimes incurredby leaving the revolted subjects of Athens to fight their battlesalone. [Footnote: As in the case of Samos. ] For the cause of Lesbos isthe cause of all Greece. " It will be observed that the greater part of this remarkable speechconsists of an elaborate endeavour on the part of the Mytilenaeans tojustify themselves. The arguments employed were entirely sophistical, for the Lesbians had no real grievance--and the statement that theywere in danger of losing their independence was a pure invention. Butthey spoke to a partial audience, and the Spartans had alreadyprejudged the case in their favour. It was therefore decided toreceive them into the Peloponnesian alliance, and orders were issuedto the allies to assemble at the Isthmus with two-thirds of theirforces for an immediate invasion of Attica. The Spartans, acting withunusual vigour, were the first to appear at the Isthmus, where theymade preparations for hauling ships overland from the northern harbourof Corinth, intending to attack Athens by sea and land. But the restof the confederates came in but slowly, as they were engaged ingetting in their harvest, and had little inclination for a secondcampaign. The Spartans soon found out that they were mistaken in supposing theenergies of Athens to be exhausted. Without moving their fleet fromLesbos, the Athenians manned a hundred triremes, raising the crewsfrom the whole body of the citizens, with the exception of the knightsand the wealthiest class of the Solonian census, and pressing evenresident foreigners into the service; and with this imposing forcethey made an armed demonstration before the eyes of their enemies atthe Isthmus, and then, coasting along Peloponnesus, made descentswherever they pleased. This spirited conduct produced the desiredeffect. For the Spartans, who were still waiting for their allies atthe Isthmus, saw themselves baffled in all their calculations, andconcluded that they had been misinformed by the Lesbians as to thestate of affairs at Athens; and hearing that their own coast-landswere being ravaged by the Athenian fleet, they hastily decamped, andthe plan of a second invasion came to nothing. The summer was now drawing to a close, and as yet no progress had beenmade with the siege of Mytilene. The town was still blockaded by sea, but the Mytilenaeans had free egress on the land-side, and marched upand down the island, confirming the other towns which had joined inthe revolt, and threatening Methymna, which still remained loyal tothe Athenian alliance. When the Athenians were informed of this stateof things, they sent a thousand hoplites under Paches to reinforce thebesieging army; and on their arrival the investment of Mytilene wascompleted by a wall drawn from sea to sea, and cutting off the townfrom the rest of the island. The Mytilenaeans now began to despair, for their supplies were failing, and there seemed no hope of relief. But during the winter a ray of hope reached them from outside, andencouraged them to persevere in their resistance. There was a weakpoint in the Athenian wall, where it closed a ravine; and through thisinterval a Spartan named Salaethus, who had sailed to Lesbos in atrireme, and crossed the island on foot, succeeded in making his wayinto the town. Salaethus announced himself as an agent sent fromSparta, to inform the distressed garrison that, as soon as the seasonpermitted, forty triremes would be sent to their assistance, and thatAttica would be invaded at the same time, to keep the enemy occupiedat home. At this welcome news the hopes of the Mytilenaeans revived, and all thoughts of surrender were laid aside. II As soon as spring arrived, the Spartans, true to their promise, sentoff forty triremes, commanded by Alcidas, to raise the siege ofMytilene, and marched in full force into Attica, thinking thus todivert the attention of the Athenians, and prevent them frominterfering with the voyage of Alcidas. They remained a long time inAttica, waiting for news from their fleet, and employing the time in asystematic ravage of the whole territory. But time passed, and nomessage arrived from Alcidas, who seemed to have disappeared with allhis ships; so that at last, as their expectations were disappointed, and their supplies exhausted, they broke up their army and returnedhome. The position of Mytilene was now growing desperate. Nothing more washeard of the relieving squadron, and the scanty store of provisionswas rapidly failing; for, owing to the betrayal of their design, theMytilenaeans had been hurried into revolt before their preparationswere completed, and had had no time to lay up a sufficient stock offood. Salaethus, therefore, determined to make a sudden sally, andbreak out of the town; and the better to effect this purpose, hefurnished the common people, who had hitherto served as light-armedsoldiers, with the full equipment of heavy infantry. But thisproceeding brought on a catastrophe, for the commons no sooner foundthemselves in possession of better weapons than they turned upon theirmasters, and accused them of secreting supplies of corn for their ownuse. "Bring out your corn, " they cried, "and divide it equally, or wewill go out and make terms with the Athenians for ourselves. " Alarmedat this threat, which if carried out would leave them exposed as thesole objects of Athenian vengeance, the nobles sent a message toPaches, on behalf of the whole city, offering to surrender, oncondition that their case should be tried by the tribunals at Athens, and stipulating that, while the decision was pending, no violenceshould be offered to any of the inhabitants. The proposal wasaccepted, and Paches marched his forces into the town. In spite of theconvention, the leaders of the revolt took sanctuary in the temples, being in dread of summary execution. Paches reassured them, and sentthem in safe custody to Tenedos. We must now turn back a little, and follow the movements of Alcidas. The Spartan admiral, it would seem, had small stomach for the boldadventure on which he was bound--no less than to rob the Athenians ofone of their most important possessions, and defy the redoubtablecaptains of Athens on their own element. After loitering for some timeoff the coast of Peloponnesus, he sailed on slowly as far as Delos, and then, touching at Icarus, he heard that Mytilene was alreadytaken. Wishing, however, to inform himself with certainty, he pushedon as far as Erythrae, on the mainland of Asia, which he reached sevendays after the fall of Mytilene. Being now assured that the report wastrue, he called a council of war to decide what was to be done. Then acertain Greek of Elis, named Teutiaplus, made a bold suggestion: "Letus, " he said, "sail straight to Mytilene, and make an attempt torecapture the town by surprise. Most likely the Athenians, flushedwith success, will be taken unawares, and we shall find the harbouropen, and the land forces dispersed, and if we make a sudden onfall, under cover of darkness, we shall probably succeed. " The prudent Alcidas found this proposal little to his taste; nor washe better pleased by another plan, put forward by the Lesbian envoyswho were returning on board the Peloponnesian fleet, and seconded by aparty of exiles from the cities of Ionia. These men tried to persuadeAlcidas to establish himself in some city of Asia Minor, and raise arevolt among the allies of Athens in these parts. He had, they said, every prospect of success, for his arrival was welcomed on all sides. Let him seize the opportunity of attacking the Athenians in their mostmortal part, first by withdrawing the tribute of Ionia, and secondlyby putting them to the expense of a blockade. This daring scheme might have led to something important, if the fleethad been commanded by Brasidas. But Alcidas was a man of verydifferent temper, and having arrived too late to save Mytilene, he hadnow but one thought, --to return to Peloponnesus as fast as he could, and get out of the reach of the terrible Athenian triremes. So he sethis fleet in motion, and sailing along the coast in a southerlydirection put in at Ephesus. On the voyage he showed himself to be ascruel as he was cowardly, by capturing and putting to death the crewsof the vessels which came in his way. These were not a few, for theships which crossed his path approached fearlessly, under theimpression that his fleet was from Athens; for no one dreamed that aPeloponnesian squadron would dare to enter these waters. For thissenseless barbarity he was severely rebuked by a deputation of Samianexiles, now living on the mainland, who met him at Ephesus. His was astrange method, they remarked with bitter irony, of helping theIonians to recover their liberty--to butcher defenceless men, who haddone him no harm, but looked to him for rescue from their bondage toAthens! If he continued to behave thus, he would make the name ofSparta detested throughout Ionia. Dull as he was, Alcidas could notbut feel the justice of this reprimand, and he let the rest of hisprisoners go. The presence of a Peloponnesian fleet had caused great alarm amongthe inhabitants of Ionia, and urgent messages came in daily to Pachesat Mytilene, summoning him to their aid. For even though Alcidashad declined to take up a permanent station on the coast, as theexiles had suggested, it was apprehended that he would pillage thesea-side towns, which were unfortified, on his homeward voyage. Atlast two state triremes, the _Paralus_ and _Salaminia, _ which hadbeen sent on public business from Athens, came into Mytilene with thenews that they had sighted the fleet of Alcidas lying at anchor offClarus. [Footnote: A little town, north-west of Ephesus. ] ThereuponPaches put to sea at once, and gave chase. But Alcidas had got wind ofhis danger, and was already on the high seas, making all speed forPeloponnesus. Paches pursued him as far as Patmos, and then turnedback. He would gladly have caught the Peloponnesians in blue water, where he could have sent all their ships to the bottom; but as it washe thought himself fortunate to have escaped the necessity of forminga blockade, as he must have done if he had come up with them nearland, and driven them ashore. As for Alcidas, he fled in wild haste, keeping the open sea, being resolved not to touch land, if he couldhelp it, until he reached the shelter of a Peloponnesian harbour. III On his return to Lesbos, Paches despatched to Athens the prisoners whohad been sent to Tenedos, among whom was the Spartan Salaethus. Whenthey arrived the Athenians immediately put Salaethus to death, andthen met in full assembly to decide on the fate of the rest. They hadjust been delivered from a fearful danger, and in the natural reactionof vindictive rage which had now set in they came to the horribleresolution of putting all the adult male population of Mytilene to thesword, and selling the women and children as slaves. The Mytilenaeans, they argued, were without excuse: they were not subjects of Athens, who might wish to escape from their burdens, but free and privilegedallies. They had treacherously plotted against Athens, when she wassunk deep in calamity, and brought a Peloponnesian fleet within thesacred circle of her empire. For a long time past they had evidentlybeen hatching a vile conspiracy against the very existence of Athens. Having once come to this decision, the Athenians lost no time, butsent off a trireme on the same day, with orders to Paches to carry thedecree into effect. But after a night of cool reflection they began to repent of theirhaste. It was a cruel and monstrous thing, they now thought, tobutcher the population of a whole city, innocent and guilty alike. TheMytilenaean envoys, who had been sent to Athens on the surrender ofthe city, perceived that there was a change in the public temper, andacting in concert with influential Athenians who were in theirinterest, they induced the magistrates to summon a second assembly, and re-open the debate. It is on this occasion that we first catch sight [Footnote: That is, in the narrative of Thucydides. ] of the notorious demagogue Cleon, whofor the next six years will be the most prominent figure in Athenianpublic life. This man belongs to a class of politicians who had begunto exercise great influence on the affairs of Athens after the deathof Pericles. That great statesman had really led the people, checkingtheir excesses, setting bounds to their ambition, and guiding all themoods of the stormy democracy. But the demagogues were lowbornupstarts, who, while seeming to lead the people, really followed it, and kept their position by pandering to the worst passions of themultitude. It must, however, be mentioned that the two contemporarywriters from whom we draw our materials for the portrait of Cleon, thehistorian Thucydides and the comic poet Aristophanes, were bothviolently prejudiced against him. Aristophanes hated him as therepresentative of the new democracy, which was an object of abhorrenceto the great comic genius; and Thucydides, a born aristocrat, ofstrong oligarchical sympathies, looked with cold scorn and aversion onthe coarse mechanic, [Footnote: Cleon was a tanner by trade. ] whopresumed to usurp the place, and ape the style, of a true leader likePericles. In the previous debate Cleon had been the chief promoter of themurderous sentence passed against Mytilene; and when the question wasbrought forward again, he made a vehement harangue, the substance ofwhich has been preserved by Thucydides. In this speech he appears as apractised rhetorical bravo, whose one object is to vilify hisopponents, and throw contempt on their arguments, by an unscrupuloususe of the weapons of ridicule, calumny, and invective. He reproachesthe magistrates for convening a second assembly, in a matter which hadalready been decided; and this was, in fact, strictly speaking, abreach of the constitution. He laughs at the Athenians as weaksentimentalists, always inclined to mercy, even when mercy wassuicidal. Of the subject communities he speaks as if they were mereslaves and chattels, outside the pale of humanity, to be kept downwith the scourge and the sword. "Let the law prevail, " cries thissecond Draco. "The law is sacred, and must not be moved. You are soclever that you will not live, by fixed rule and order, and you deridethe approved principles of political wisdom. Every one of you wants tobe a lawgiver, a statesman, and a reformer, and to manage the publicaffairs in his own way. We, who understand your true interests, arebound to resist this mood of lawless extravagance, and keep you in theright path, whether you will or no. " Then preserving the same tone, as of one who is exposing an outrageousparadox, Cleon proceeds to deal with the actual subject of debate. Tomassacre a whole population, was, in his view, a commonplace andordinary proceeding; and, in the present instance, the only courseconsistent with prudence and common sense. Those who maintained thecontrary were either flighty enthusiasts, whose opinion was not worthconsidering, or venal orators, who had sold their country for a bribe. "Will you suffer yourselves, " asked the indignant moralist, "to beblinded by these corrupt advocates, who amuse you with theireloquence, and then pocket the price? But it is your own fault: youhave no sense of public responsibility--you are like clever children, playing at a game of politics. While you sit here, listening to yourfavourite speakers, and sharpening your wits against theirs, yourempire is going to ruin. Plain fact is too simple a diet for yourpampered appetites; you must have it hashed and served up with a fineflavouring of fancy and wit. In short, you have lost all hold uponreality, you live in an intellectual Utopia, and treat grave mattersof public interest as though they were mere themes in a school ofdeclamation. " In drawing this remarkable picture of Athenian character, which, though strangely out of place, really contained a large element oftruth, Cleon overreached himself, and was caught in his own snare. Itwas he, and not his opponents, who was diverting attention from facts, and involving a plain issue in a cloud of wordy rhetoric. He has noarguments, worthy of the name, but tries to carry his case by playingon the passions of the people, and blowing up the flames of theiranger, which was beginning to cool. But though the more discerningamong his audience must have seen through his sophistries, to a largeproportion of his hearers his speech no doubt seemed a masterpiece ofeloquence. The Athenians, who, like all people of lively talent, werefond of laughing at themselves, would be especially amused by hishumorous description of their own besetting weakness, their restlessvanity, and inordinate love of change. The chief advocate for mitigating the sentence against Mytilene was acertain Diodotus, who had taken a leading part in the previous debate, and now stood up again to oppose the blood-thirsty counsels of Cleon. The speech of Diodotus is calm, sober, and business-like. After adignified remonstrance against the vile insinuations of Cleon, by whomall who differed from him were decried as fools or knaves, Diodotusproceeded to argue the question from the point of view of expediency. He was not there, he said, to plead the cause of the Mytilenaeans, orto discuss abstract questions of law and justice. What they had toconsider was what course would be most conducive to the interests ofAthens. According to Cleon, those interests would be best served by awholesale massacre of the inhabitants of Mytilene, which would striketerror into the other subjects of Athens, and prevent them fromyielding to the same temptation. But, reasoned Diodotus, experiencehad shown that intending criminals were not deterred from wrongdoingby the increased severity of penal statutes. For a long time lawgivershad framed their codes in this belief, thinking to drive mankind intothe path of rectitude by appealing to their terrors. Yet crime had notdiminished, but rather increased. And what was true of individuals, was still more true of cities, where each man hoped to be concealedamong the crowd of transgressors. Criminals, whether they actedsingly, or in large numbers, were only rendered desperate, if alldegrees of crime were confounded in one common penalty of death. Such were the enlightened principles of jurisprudence set forth by anAthenian of the fifth century before Christ--principles which werefirst recognised in modern Europe within the memory of men stillliving. Then, bringing his theories to a practical test, he pointedout the gross impolicy of driving a revolted city to desperation, byexcluding all rebels from the hope of pardon. This, he said, would bethe effect on the subjects of Athens, if they passed the same sentenceon the Mytilenaeans, without distinction between the innocent and theguilty. At present the commons in every city were loyal to Athens; andthough they might be beguiled or coerced into rebellion, they would, if assured of fair treatment, take the first opportunity of returningto their allegiance, as the commoners of Mytilene had done. "Do not, therefore, " concluded Diodotus, "destroy this, the strongest guaranteeof your security, but punish the ringleaders of the revolt, after duedeliberation, and leave the rest in peace. " The arguments of Diodotus were unanswerable, and it might have beensupposed that the Athenians, in their relenting mood, would havecarried the amendment by a large majority. But this was not the case. The debate was keenly contested, and when the president called for ashow of hands, the more merciful decree was only passed by a fewvotes. There was no time to be lost, for the first trireme was alreadya day and a night on her voyage, and the fate of Mytilene hung by ahair. A second trireme was launched with all speed, and theMytilenaeans present in Athens promised large rewards to the crew ifthey arrived in time. With such inducements the rowers toiled day andnight, taking their meals, which consisted of barley-meal kneaded withwine and oil, at the oar, and sleeping and rowing by turns. Happilythere was no contrary wind to retard their progress, and the crew ofthe first vessel, bearing that savage mandate, made no efforts toshorten their passage. As it was, they were not an hour too soon: forwhen they arrived, Paches had already received the decree, and waspreparing to carry it out. Thus Mytilene escaped destruction by ahair's-breadth, and Athens was saved from committing a great crime. But even the modified sentence, which was passed directly afterwardson the motion of Cleon, condemning more than a thousand Mytilenaeancitizens to death, was sufficiently ferocious, and was rememberedagainst the tyrant city in the days of her humiliation. ESCAPE OF TWO HUNDRED PLATAEANS FALL OF PLATAEA I The siege of Plataea had now lasted for more than a year, and thebrave garrison began to be in sore straits, for their supplies weregiving out, and they had no hope of rescue from outside. In thisdesperate situation they resolved to make an attempt to break throughthe besieging lines, and make their escape to Athens. All were to takepart in the adventure, leaving the Peloponnesians in possession of anempty town. But when the time came for carrying out this bold design, half of the garrison drew back, thinking the risk too great. The otherhalf, numbering about two hundred and twenty, persisted in theirpurpose, and forthwith fell to work on their preparations. They beganby making ladders for scaling the enemy's wall; and in order toascertain the proper length of the ladders, they counted the coursesof bricks in a part of the wall facing the town, which happened tohave been left unplastered. Many counted the courses together, and byrepeating the process over and over again, and comparing the result, they at last hit upon the right number. When once this was known, theycould easily calculate the length of their ladders, for the brickswere all of the same dimensions, and they knew the thickness of asingle brick. The Peloponnesians had built a double line of wall round Plataea, thetwo lines being separated by a distance of sixteen feet. The whole ofthe space within this double wall was covered by a flat roof, so as topresent the appearance of a single thick wall, with battlements oneither side; and this covered space, which was divided into rooms bypartition-walls, served as barracks for the besiegers. Along the topwere high towers, with intervals of ten battlements between them, andbuilt flush with the wall on both sides, so as to leave no passage, except through the middle of the tower. These served as guard-rooms, where the soldiers on duty took shelter on wet and stormy nights. Forthe distance between the towers was very small, and they could rushout and man the walls at a moment's notice. The Plataeans omitted no precaution which might secure success fortheir hazardous enterprise. Every man understood exactly the partwhich he had to play, and knew that his own life, and the lives of hiscomrades, depended on his courage and coolness. They had chosen theirtime well, for it was now mid-winter. So they waited for a night ofstorm and rain, when there was no moon, and sallying forth from thetown crossed the inner ditch, and came up to the inner wall, unperceived by the enemy; for the noise of their footsteps was drownedby the roaring of the wind, and they were careful to advance in openorder, so as not to be discovered by the clashing of their arms. Thewhole troop was lightly equipped, and they walked with their rightfoot unsandalled, to give them a firmer hold on the muddy ground. Choosing one of the spaces between two towers, they adjusted theirladders, and began to ascend the wall. The first to mount were twelvepicked men, armed with breastplates and daggers, who as soon as theyreached the top, rushed to the towers, six men to each, and havingoverpowered the guard, stood ready to defend the passage. These werefollowed by others, armed with javelins, whose shields were handed upto them from below as they ascended, to enable them to climb the moreeasily. Several of this party had got up in safety, when one of thosewho were following dislodged a tile as he grasped the battlements. Thesound of the falling tile alarmed the guards in the towers, and soonthe whole besieging force was in a commotion. But being bewildered bythe darkness, and deafened by the tempest which was blowing, they knewnot which way to turn, and remained at their quarters, waiting fororders. And at the same time the Plataeans left in the town made afeigned attack on the Peloponnesian wall at the opposite side todivert the attention of the enemy. In the general confusion thuscreated the besiegers were at a loss what to do, and three hundred oftheir men, who were kept together for prompt service on any pressingoccasion, took up their station before the outer wall, thinking thatthe Athenians had come to relieve the town. Fire-signals were nowkindled by the Peloponnesians, to summon help from Thebes; but thePlataeans were prepared for this also, and they kindled other beaconswhich had been raised for the purpose on their wall, so as to obscurethe meaning of the enemy's signals, and delay the march of theThebans, until their own comrades had had time to escape. The way was thus left clear for the gallant two hundred. Those who ledthe party had secured possession of the passages through the towers, and stood ready to bar the way against all assailants. Others whofollowed brought ladders, and planting them at the foot of the towers, mounted to the top, and kept off the Peloponnesians, when theyattempted to force an entrance, with a shower of javelins. Over theintervening space now swarmed the main body of the Plataeans; and eachman, as he got over, halted at the edge of the outer ditch, and keptup a hot fire of javelins and arrows, to cover the retreat of hiscomrades, and repel any attack from below. When all the rest hadcrossed the wall, those who held the towers began to descend; and thiswas the most perilous part of the adventure, especially for those whocame last. All, however, succeeded in joining their comrades by theditch, and just at this moment the picked troop of three hundred, whocarried torches, came upon them. But fortune still favoured thePlataeans; crouching in the deep shadow thrown by the high banks ofthe ditch, they plied the enemy, who with their blazing torchesafforded an easy mark, with darts and arrows. And thus, fighting andretreating at the same time, they made their way gradually across theditch, but not without a severe struggle, for the water was swollen bythe snow which had fallen in the night, and covered with rotten ice. Their best friend was the tempest, which raged with extraordinaryviolence throughout the night. When their last man had crossed, the Plataeans went off at a run inthe direction of Thebes, being assured that no one would expect themto take the road which led to their worst enemy. And the prudence ofthis course soon appeared, for looking back they saw thePeloponnesians hurrying with lighted torches along the road to Athens. Then after marching towards Thebes for about a mile, they doubledback, and taking to the mountains soon reached the friendly territoryof Attica. They received a kind welcome at Athens, where it was foundthat out of the original two hundred and twenty, only eight weremissing. Seven of these had lost heart at the last moment, andreturned to Plataea, where they announced that all the rest of theparty had been slain. One only, an archer, was taken prisoner at theouter ditch. On hearing the report of those who had turned back, the Plataeansapplied for a truce to bury their dead; and when their herald cameback from his useless errand, they learned to their delight that thisgallant enterprise, so ably planned, and so boldly executed, had beencrowned with complete success. II Well would it have been for the Plataeans who remained in the town ifthey had stood by their first purpose, and shared the fortunes oftheir brave comrades. Better far to have died, sword in hand, than tomeet the ignoble fate which was now reserved for them. It was in thefollowing summer, two years after the beginning of the siege, that thecrisis arrived. The Plataeans had come to the end of their provisions, and were suffering severely from want of food. In this state ofweakness they were suddenly attacked by the besiegers, who mighteasily have carried the town by storm. But the Spartan general wished, if possible, to avoid this, as all places taken by assault would haveto be given back to their original owners on the conclusion of peace, whereas those which had voluntarily surrendered might be retained. Accordingly he sent a herald, and summoned the Plataeans to surrender, promising that they should have a fair trial by Spartan judges; andthey, being actually on the point of starvation, accepted the termsoffered, and laid down their arms. They were kept in custody andsupplied with food until the judges, five in number, arrived fromSparta. On the arrival of the judges no express charge was madeagainst them, but they were called up one by one, and asked thissimple question: "Have you done any service to the Spartans or theirallies in the course of the present war?" The Plataeans saw the snare which was set for them, and seeking toevade it they asked permission to plead their cause at length. Leavebeing given, the Plataean advocate rose to address the court, and madea most moving and eloquent appeal, which well deserves to bereproduced in its main outlines. "Men of Sparta, " began the orator, "we surrendered our city on thefaith of your promise that the innocent should be spared, and only theguilty condemned. But we fear that our confidence has been misplaced. That our doom is already pronounced we have but too plain evidence, inyour sinister question, in your cold, condemning looks, in the gloomyfaces of our enemies, who have poisoned your ears against us. We havebut little hope of turning you from your purpose by anything that wecan say. Nevertheless we have resolved to speak, lest in the hour ofdeath we should be tormented by the thought that a word might havesaved us, and that word remained unspoken. "In the history of the last fifty years no city in Greece has a fairerrecord than ours. Though not trained to the sea, we served in thefleet at Artemisium; we fought under Pausanias in the great battlewhich decided the fate of Greece, and took part beyond our strength inall the trials and perils of our common country. On the gratitude ofSparta we have a special claim, for in the day of her direstextremity, after the earthquake, when the Helots were in arms againsther, we sent a third part of our citizens to her aid. Since then wehave been found in the ranks of your enemies; but this was your fault, not ours. Who drove us into the arms of Athens, when we were hardpressed by the tyranny of Thebes? We joined the Athenian alliance atyour bidding; they defended us against our enemies, and admitted us tothe rights of Athenian citizenship. We were bound, therefore, by everytie of honour and duty to stand by them, whether their cause was justor unjust. "What, then, is the meaning of your question, whether we have done youor your allies any service during this war? If you ask as foes, howcan you claim any service? And if you ask as friends, you have done usbitter wrong, by attacking us unprovoked. "The Thebans seized our city in time of peace, and at a holy season, and we were justified by the laws of nature and of nations in wreakingvengeance upon them. It may seem to your interest to pay court to themnow; but think how different was our conduct from theirs when thePersian was at our doors, threatening slavery to us all. We were amongthe few who obeyed the call of honour, while Thebes and all the othertowns of Boeotia took sides with the Barbarian. "Hitherto Sparta has been called the glass of honour in Greece. What, then, will men say, if Spartan judges are guilty of blotting Plataeaout of the map of Greece, and of the judicial murder of her citizens?Strange, indeed, and terrible has been the fate of our city, both nowand in the past. Our fathers were brought to the brink of ruin bytheir valour and devotion; we, their sons, have just passed throughall the horrors of a siege, and now we are forced to plead for ourlives. Outcasts from our fatherland, spurned and rejected of all, weare thrown upon your mercy; and much we fear that your hearts arehardened against us. "We adjure you, then, by the memory of those times, and of the partwhich we took in the salvation of Greece, not to betray us to ourworst enemies, the Thebans. Do not win their gratitude by murder, butours by mercy. Forget the cold calculations of policy; think of theeverlasting infamy of such a deed. Your fathers are buried in ourland, and we have been constant in paying all honour and service totheir tombs. Will ye give up the land in which they rest to the men[Footnote: The Thebans, who fought on the side of the Persians atPlataea. ] who are guilty of their blood? Will ye enslave those fieldswhich saw the triumph of Greek liberty, and dishonour the gods bywhose favour the victory was won? By your own renown, by theconscience of Greece, by the memory of your sires, we adjure you, menof Lacedaemon, not to do this deed. "But it is time to make an end. If we have spoken in vain, and you areresolved on our death, we have still one request. Send us back intoour city, and keep us there immured until we have perished of hunger. Any fate is better than falling into the hands of the Thebans, theenemies of Plataea, and of all Greece. " The orator had indeed spoken in vain, or if his words had made anyimpression on the minds of the judges, it was speedily obliterated bya fierce and bitter tirade which was delivered by a Theban speaker inreply. As soon as he had finished his harangue, the prisoners werecalled up again in turn, and questioned as before. When each of themhad answered, in the only manner possible, he was led away and put todeath; and not one of them was spared. The number of those slain wastwo hundred and twenty-five, and of these twenty-five were Athenians. The city was then levelled to the ground, and the territory left atthe disposal of the Thebans. Thus was this brave little communitysacrificed to the rancour of Thebes, and the selfish policy of Sparta. CAPTURE OF A HUNDRED AND TWENTY SPARTANS AT SPHACTERIA I The result of six years of desultory fighting had fully justified theforebodings of Archidamus, and the sanguine anticipations of Pericles. In spite of the terrible ravages of the plague, Athens had easily heldher own against the whole power of the Peloponnesian league. As yet, however, no decisive advantage had been gained on either side. But inthe seventh year of the war an event occurred which would have enabledthe Athenians, but for their own folly, to conclude an honourablepeace. The ablest of the Athenian generals at this time was Demosthenes, [Footnote: To be carefully distinguished from the great orator, bornabout forty years after the date reached in this chapter (425 B. C. ). ]who in the previous year had greatly distinguished himself by abrilliant campaign in Aetolia. In the following summer he obtainedpermission to take passage on board a fleet which was bound on avoyage to Corcyra and Sicily. He sailed in a private capacity, but hewas authorized to use the ships against the coasts of Peloponnesus, ifhe saw any opening which might be utilized in the interests of Athens. On a rocky promontory, at the northern end of the spacious bay ofNavarino, lies the little town of Pylos, generally believed to havebeen the home of the Homeric Nestor. Since the conquest of Messenia bythe Spartans, the town had remained in ruins, and the country for somedistance round was a desert. The natural advantages of the adjacentcoast had already caught the keen eye of Demosthenes, and he hadformed the plan of raising a fortified outpost on the spot, to be heldby a picked troop of the banished Messenians, and thus planting athorn in the side of Sparta. Fortune favoured his design. For on rounding the western headland ofPeloponnesus, the fleet encountered a storm, and was compelled to seekshelter at Pylos. Demosthenes now urged the admirals to employ theirenforced leisure in fortifying the place. But they repulsed himrudely, and treated his suggestion with contempt. He next tried tointerest the inferior officers in his project, but meeting with nobetter success, he began to fear that this grand opportunity would bethrown away. The discussion, however, had reached the ears of thesoldiers, and having nothing else to do, they agreed among themselvesto pass the time by building a fort. Choosing a place of great naturalstrength, where the rocky coast descends abruptly to the open sea, they went to work with a will. As they had no tools for stone-cutting, they picked out the stones, and fitted them together according totheir shape; and for want of hods they carried the mortar, wherever itwas required, on their backs, stooping forward and clasping theirhands together behind them, to prevent it from slipping off. Theycarried out their self-imposed task with great energy, and after sixdays of vigorous labour the fort was completed, for the naturaldefences of the site were so strong that in most places there was noneed of a wall. As the weather was now favourable, the fleet proceededon its voyage, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison thefort. The news of the occupation of Pylos soon reached the Spartans, but atfirst they paid little heed, thinking that they could expel theaudacious intruders whenever they chose to exert themselves. Moreover, they were just then engaged in keeping one of those religiousfestivals of which the Spartan calendar was so full, and a good partof their army was absent in Attica. Agis, however, the Spartan king, and those under him who were commanding in Attica, took a wiser viewof the situation, and cutting short their operations they led theirforces with all speed back to Sparta. They were the more inclined todo this as the season was yet early, the weather inclement, and, thecorn being still green, they wanted means to nourish their troops. Thus the inventive genius of Demosthenes had already proved of signalservice to his country; for this was the shortest of all thePeloponnesian invasions, lasting only fifteen days. On the return of their troops from Attica the Spartans sent a smallforce to commence the attack on Pylos, and ordered the main body oftheir army to follow. There was some discontent among those who hadalready been serving abroad at this second levy, and the full musterof the troops was consequently delayed. In the meantime a message wasdespatched to a Peloponnesian fleet then sailing to Corcyra, which atthis time was in a state of revolution, with orders to return at once, and assist in the campaign against Pylos. Demosthenes was now inimminent danger, being threatened with an immediate assault by sea andland, which he had no adequate means of repelling. Having sent off twoof his ships to recall the Athenian squadron from its voyage toCorcyra, he prepared to defend himself, until the arrival of succour, as best he could. The Peloponnesian fleet was the first to arrive, and the Spartans, whowere now present in full force with their allies, determined to makethe most of their time. They hoped, by a simultaneous onslaught oftheir army and fleet, to carry the fort before the Athenian ships hadtime to return. But in case they should fail in this, they intended tocripple the movements of the relieving squadron, by blocking theentrances to the bay. For the long, narrow island of Sphacteria formsa natural break water, converting the harbour of Navarino into a land-locked basin, with two narrow passages at the northern and southernend. [Footnote: The description of Thucydides does not correspond tothe picture of the harbour given in our modern maps. But in the courseof twenty centuries great changes may well have occurred. ] Theseinlets the Spartans proposed to close, by anchoring triremes closetogether, with their prows turned seawards, which they could easilyhave done, for at the southern entrance there was only room for eightor nine vessels to sail abreast, and at the northern entrance onlyroom for two. This precaution, however, was never carried out; and theSpartans, as if blinded by fate, adopted another measure, which led tofatal consequences for themselves. Wishing to keep command of everyspot of land in the neighbourhood of Pylos, they landed a body oftheir own men, numbering four hundred and twenty, with the usualproportion of Helots, on the island, and the same time posted troopsat every assailable point on the opposite coast. Thinking now that the little garrison at Pylos, surrounded on allsides by enemies, would fall an easy prey, they sent orders to thefleet to get under way, and prepared to attack the fort on the landside. Meanwhile Demosthenes had not been idle: having drawn his threeremaining ships under the shelter of the fort, and protected them infront by a stockade, he armed the crews with such weapons as he had, including a number of wicker-shields, taken from a thirty-oaredMessenian galley which had recently come to his assistance with aforce of forty hoplites. Then, having posted the greater part of histroops for the defence of his position against the Peloponnesian army, he himself descended with a picked body of sixty hoplites, and took uphis station on the rocky shore. For on this side the defences wereweakest, as the Athenians, in building the fort, had never anticipatedan attack from the sea. Demosthenes had just time to address a few words of caution andencouragement to his men, assuring them of victory, if they would onlystand fast, when the Peloponnesian fleet was seen bearing down uponthem; and at the same moment a loud shout from the fort announced thatthe garrison was already engaged behind them. The assault was fiercestat the point where Demosthenes and his men were stationed, and thePeloponnesians made desperate efforts to effect a landing. But theywere embarrassed by the difficult and rocky coast, which only alloweda few ships to approach at a time. As fast as one division was beatenback, another came on, with the white foam spouting round the prows, and the waters roaring and eddying to the strokes of the giganticoars, while the cliffs resounded with the shouts of their comrades inthe ships behind, cheering them on to the attack. Conspicuous among those who fought on the ships was seen the gallantfigure of Brasidas, who exerted himself, by voice and by example, toinfuse his own heroic spirit into the rest of the crews and theirofficers. His ringing tones were heard above the tumult, urging on thecaptains and steersmen, when they hung back in fear lest their shipsshould be shattered on the rocks. "Spare not these timbers, " he cried, "but let every hull among them go to wreck, rather than suffer theenemy to violate the soil of Lacedaemon. Where is your loyalty toSparta? Have you forgotten the debt which you owe to her? Have atthem, I say, and hurl this fort with its defenders into the sea. "Saying this he ordered the master of his own trireme to beach thevessel, and stood ready on the gangway, that he might be the first toleap on shore. But as he attempted to land he was hurled back by theAthenians, and fell fainting, covered with wounds, on the deck. Hisshield slipped off his arm, and dropped into the sea, and having beenwashed ashore, was picked up by the Athenians, who used it to adornthe trophy which they afterwards erected. After the fall of Brasidas the Peloponnesians still continued theirefforts to effect a landing, but they were baffled by the obstinatedefence of the Athenians, and the rugged and inhospitable coast. Itwas a strange reversal of affairs which had been brought about by thefortune of war. On one side were the Spartans, trained to militaryservice on land, but now compelled to serve on board a fleet, in orderto obtain a footing on their own territory, and on the other side theAthenians, whose natural element was the sea, drawn up on land torepel a naval attack. Next day the assault was repeated, but again without success. TheSpartans sent for a supply of timber, to construct siege engines, intending to try and batter down the Athenian wall where it overlookedthe harbour, as at this point there was a better landing-place for theships. In this task, however, they were interrupted by the suddenappearance of the Athenian fleet, now numbering fifty vessels, havingbeen reinforced by four Chian ships, and six from Naupactus. Findingthe harbour occupied by the Peloponnesians, and the whole coast linedwith troops, they retired for the night to the little island of Prote. Next day they weighed anchor early, and dividing their fleet, sailedinto the harbour of Navarino by both entrances at once. Though takenby surprise, the Peloponnesians manned their ships, and as fast asthey were ready put out to meet them; but before their array wascomplete they were attacked by the Athenians, who disabled many oftheir vessels, captured five, and drove the rest ashore. So completewas the rout that the Athenians pursued the flying ships into the veryinterior of the harbour, and rammed some of them after they had beenbrought to land. Others they charged while the crews were stillgetting on board, and began to tow off the disabled hulls. But in theheat of victory the Athenians had pushed their advantage somewhat toofar, and they paid for their audacity by the loss of a considerablenumber of their men. For the Lacedaemonians, in wild dismay at thedefeat of their ships, by which their comrades on the island would becut off from all help, made desperate exertions to save their fleet, wading into the water in their heavy armour, and hauling back thevessels as they were being towed off. In the confined spacemanoeuvring was impossible, and the sea-fight had now become a furioushand to hand encounter, as between two armies on land. After aprolonged struggle, in which both sides suffered severely, theSpartans succeeded in saving their ships, except those which had beentaken at first, and the Athenians then retired to their station. The result of this battle was to give the Athenians complete commandof the sea, for the Peloponnesian fleet was in no condition to renewthe engagement. From their camp on the mainland the Spartans could seethe Athenian triremes rowing round and round the island, and keepingvigilant watch, to prevent those who were confined there fromescaping. News of the disaster was sent without delay to Sparta, andthe magistrates, recognising the gravity of the crisis, proceeded atonce to Pylos, wishing to inform themselves on the spot, and thendecide what was best to be done. Finding on their arrival that therewas no prospect of rescuing their men on the island, they applied tothe Athenian commanders for a truce, to enable them to send envoys toAthens, and arrange some terms for the recovery of the imprisonedSpartans. The Athenians consented, and a truce was made on thefollowing conditions: The Spartans were to surrender all their fleet, including any ships of war on the coast of Laconia, to the Athenians, and to refrain from any attack on the fort, until the return of theenvoys. The Athenians, on their part, agreed to allow provisions to besent to the Spartans on the island, all such provision being conveyedthither under their own inspection, and none by stealth. They furtheragreed to carry the envoys to Athens in one of their own triremes, andto suspend all hostilities until the expiration of the truce. When theenvoys returned, the Peloponnesian ships were to be given back. It was a proud moment for Athens when the Spartan envoys appearedbefore the assembly, bearing the humble petition from her great enemy. The terms offered by the spokesman of the embassy in the name ofSparta were simple and concise, peace and friendship with Sparta, inreturn for the men shut up on the island. The rest of his speech wasmade up of grave moral reflections, such as are generally paraded bythose on the losing side. Let the Athenians beware of abusing theiradvantage; though they had the upper hand to-day, they might bebrought to their knees to-morrow. War was a game of hazard, in whichthe luck was always changing. Now they had an opportunity ofconcluding an honourable peace, and establishing a lasting claim tothe gratitude of Sparta. And if the two leading states of Greece wereonce united, they could dictate what terms they pleased to the rest. The notorious selfishness of Spartan policy is glaringly manifested inthis speech. In their anxiety to recover their own citizens, theSpartans completely ignored the interests of their allies, and heldout the right hand of fellowship to the people whom they had latelybranded as the oppressors and spoilers of Greece. The Athenians mightwell distrust the professions of these perfidious statesmen, whorepudiated their sworn obligations with such cynical levity. TheSpartans in Sphacteria were already, they thought, prisoners ofAthens, to be dealt with as they pleased; and were they to resign thiscostly prize, in return for a vague promise of friendship from Sparta?Their answer was framed on the advice of Cleon: they could not, theysaid, enter into any discussion, until the men on the island hadsurrendered themselves, and been brought to Athens. Then, if theSpartans agreed to restore to the Athenians Nisaea and Pegae, [Footnote: The harbour-towns of Megara. ] and some other places whichthey had held before the Thirty Years' Truce, peace might be made, andthe prisoners restored. The Spartan envoys were somewhat startled bythese demands, which involved a gross breach of faith to their ownallies; so they affected to ignore the proposal, and suggested aprivate conference between themselves and select Atheniancommissioners. It is not impossible that the terms offered, infamousas they were to Sparta, might have been accepted; but the wholenegotiation was frustrated by the violence of Cleon, who, on hearingthe suggestion of the envoys, overwhelmed them with abuse, accusingthem of double-dealing and bad faith. The envoys were confounded bythis specimen of Athenian manners, and seeing that they were wastingtheir time to no purpose, they turned their backs on the city of freespeech. On their return to Pylos the truce expired, and the Spartans demandedback their ships, but the Athenians refused to restore them, on theground of some alleged violation of the conditions laid down. Thereupon hostilities were resumed with vigour on both sides. TheSpartans made repeated attacks on the fort, and watched for anopportunity of bringing off their men from the island: and theAthenians kept a vigilant guard to prevent their escape. During theday two triremes sailed continually round Sphacteria in oppositedirections, and at night their whole fleet, now raised to the numberof seventy by the arrival of twenty fresh ships, was moored about theisland, except on the exposed side in windy weather. Before long the Athenians began to feel the difficulties of theirposition. They were but scantily supplied with food, and had muchtrouble in obtaining water. The only spring to which they had access, and even that by no means abundant, was in the citadel of Pylos, andmost of them were reduced to scraping the shingle, and thus obtaininga meagre supply of brackish water. On land their quarters werestraitened and uncomfortable, and they had no proper anchorage fortheir ships, so that the crews had to go ashore in turns to get theirmeals. They were greatly disappointed to find their task thusprolonged, for they had supposed that a few days' siege would sufficeto starve the imprisoned Spartans into a surrender, as the island wasbarren and ill-furnished with water. But day followed day, and stillthey waited in vain for any sign of yielding. For the Spartanmagistrates had offered large rewards to anyone who succeeded inconveying wine, meal, or other portable provisions, to the island, andmany were tempted to run the risk, especially among the Helots, whowere offered their liberty in return for this service. They put outfrom various points of the mainland, and landed under cover of nighton the seaward side of the island, choosing their time when the windwas blowing strong from the sea, which made it impossible for theAthenian triremes to keep their exposed anchorage. The Spartanhoplites stood ready on the rocks to help them; and so long as theycould get ashore with their freight, they cared nothing what happenedto their boats, for if they were wrecked, the Spartans had pledgedthemselves for the full value. Others, still bolder, swam, across theharbour, dragging after them leather bags filled with a mixture ofpoppy-seed or linseed and honey, [Footnote: Poppy-seed was valued inancient medicine as an antidote against hunger, and linseed againstthirst. ] and attached to a cord. These were soon detected; but theother source of supply remained open, and it seemed likely that thesiege would be protracted till winter, when it would have to be givenup. The Athenians at home were much concerned when they were informed ofthis state of affairs, and they began to regret that they had notaccepted the terms offered by Sparta. They were suspicious and uneasy, and Cleon, on whose advice they had acted, saw himself in danger offalling a victim to their resentment. But his boundless self-confidence served him well in this crisis. At first he affected todisbelieve the report sent from Pylos, and proposed to sendcommissioners to inquire into the true state of the case. His motionwas carried, and he himself was nominated as one of the commissioners. Cleon was now placed in an awkward position: either he would have toconfirm the statement of the messengers from Pylos, and thus makehimself ridiculous, or, if he contradicted them, he would be convictedof falsehood. So he turned round again, and advised the Athenians, ifthey believed the report, to waste no more time, but to order animmediate attack on the island. "If I were general, " [Footnote: Thechief civil and military magistrate at Athens, corresponding to theRoman consul. ] he said, with a meaning glance at Nicias, who was thenholding that office, "it would not be long before these Spartans werebrought in chains to Athens. The Athenians want a _man_ to leadthem. " This Nicias, on whom the demagogue had so scornfully reflected, was agreat noble, and the chief political opponent of Cleon. When he heardthe boastful words of his rival, it struck Nicias that there was afine opportunity of bringing him to ruin, by thrusting upon him acommand for which he was totally unqualified. Encouraged by the shoutsof the multitude, who were crying to Cleon, "Why don't you go and doit?" he rose from his place, and proposed that the tanner should besent in charge of an expedition to take the men at Sphacteria. Atfirst Cleon agreed to go, thinking that Nicias was jesting; but whenhe saw that the proposal was made seriously, he began to draw back. "It is your business, not mine, " he said to Nicias. "I am not general--you are; why should I do your work for you?" "Never mind the title, "answered Nicias; "I resign my office on this occasion to you. " Thedispute grew hotter and hotter, much to the amusement of theAthenians, who fell readily into the humour of the situation, andloudly applauded the proposal of Nicias. The more Cleon objected, themore they shouted that he should go. Finding that he must make goodhis words, Cleon at last plucked up a spirit, and accepted the honourthus contemptuously forced upon him. "I am not afraid of theSpartans, " he declared valiantly. "Give me the contingent of soldiersfrom Lemnos and Imbros, the Thracian peltasts, [Footnote: Light-armedsoldiers. ] and four hundred archers, and without taking a singleAthenian from the city, within three weeks I will either bring thoseSpartans as prisoners to Athens, or kill them where they are. " There was some laughter among the Athenians at Cleon's vain-gloriouspromise; but the more sober-minded were not displeased at hisappointment, expecting that, if he failed, they would be rid of anuisance; while, if he succeeded, they would gain an immense advantageover their enemies. Such, at least, is the comment of the historian;but he makes no remark on the incredible levity of the Athenians, towhom the gravest interests of state were matter for mirth and pastime;and he has not a word of censure for Nicias and his "sober-minded"partisans, who, in their eagerness to ruin a political opponent, showed a criminal disregard for the welfare of Athens. II When Cleon arrived at Pylos with his forces, he found Demosthenesengaged in active preparations for an attack on the island. For histroops were growing impatient, and clamouring to be led into action, and a happy accident had recently occurred, which greatly increasedthe prospect of success. Till quite lately Sphacteria had been coveredwith a dense growth of underwood, and Demosthenes knew by hisexperience in Aetolia that an attacking force would be at a greatdisadvantage in marching against an enemy who fought under cover, andknew every inch of the ground. But a party of Athenian soldiers, whohad landed on the island to cook their breakfast, accidentally setfire to the brushwood, and a wind springing up, the flames werecarried over the greater part of the island, leaving it a blackenedwaste. Demosthenes now discovered that the besieged Spartans were morenumerous than he had supposed, having hitherto believed that theirnumber had been purposely exaggerated, to give an excuse for sendingmore food; and the main obstacle being now removed, he issued thewelcome order to make ready for an immediate assault. When he received his commission, Cleon had prudently stipulated thatDemosthenes should be associated with him in the command. The two ill-assorted colleagues--the turbulent demagogue, and the veteran general--now took counsel together, and after a last fruitless attempt atnegotiation, they set sail at night with a force of eight hundredhoplites, and disembarking just before dawn on both sides of theisland at once, led their men at a run against the first guard-stationof the Spartans. They found the enemy posted in three divisions: thefirst, consisting of thirty hoplites, formed an advanced guard; somedistance behind these, where the ground forms a shallow basin, containing the only spring in the island, was stationed the main body, commanded by Epitadas; and at the extreme north, opposite Pylos, therewas a small reserve force, left to guard a sort of natural citadel, which would serve as a last retreat, if Epitadas and his men wereoverpowered. The thirty Spartans in the outpost were taken by surprise, and cutdown to a man; for though they had seen the Athenian ships puttingout, they had no suspicion of what was intended, supposing that theywere merely proceeding to their anchorage for the night. At daybreakthe rest of the fleet put in at the island, bringing the whole of theforces which Demosthenes had at his disposal, except a few, who wereleft to garrison the fort at Pylos. They were a motley host, armed forthe most part with slings, javelins, and bows, but admirably suitedfor the work which was to be done. Swarming over the island byhundreds and by thousands they took up their stations on every pieceof rising ground, threatening the enemy in front, in the rear, on theright flank, and on the left. The Spartans, in their heavy armour, were helpless against these agile foes, who eluded every attempt tocome to close quarters, and kept up a continual shower of arrows, javelins, and stones. Such had been the orders of Demosthenes, whichwere now carried into effect. When the Spartans under Epitadas saw their advanced guard cut up, andthe Athenians marching against them, they drew up in order, and triedto come within spear-thrust of the enemy; but they were unable toeffect their purpose, for the Athenian hoplites kept their ground, andat the same moment they themselves were assailed on both flanks and inthe rear by a cloud of light infantry. It was a kind of warfare towhich the Spartans were totally unaccustomed: if they attempted toadvance, their nimble assailants drew back, and pursuit was impossibleon the rocky and broken ground. For a time the light-armed troopsapproached them with caution, being somewhat cowed in spirit whenbrought face to face with the renowned warriors of Sparta, hithertosupposed to be invincible. But seeing how the Spartans wereembarrassed, they took courage, and came on in a roaring multitude, surrounding them on all sides, and leaving them not a moment to takebreath. The air was darkened by a tempest of missiles; and a finedust, caused by the ashes of the late fire, rose in choking cloudsfrom the trampling of many feet. Exhausted by their violent exertions, stunned by the uproar, and blinded by the dust, the Spartans began togive ground, and closing their ranks fell back on the stronghold wheretheir reserve was stationed. They were hotly pursued, and some fewwere cut off in the retreat, but the greater part succeeded inreaching the fort, where they turned at bay, and prepared to defendthemselves to the last. Until a late hour in the day the Atheniansmade vain attempts to dislodge them from their position, which wasonly assailable in front. At last, when both sides were sorelydistressed by the long conflict under a burning sun, an officer whowas in command of the Messenian troops came to the generals, andoffered, if they would place a few light-armed soldiers at hisdisposal, to lead them up the precipitous cliffs at the northern endof Sphacteria, and take the Spartans in the rear. Permission beingreadily granted, he chose his men, and taking care that his movementswere not perceived by the enemy, made his way with them along theperilous and slippery face of the cliffs to the rear of thebeleaguered garrison, scaled the steep ascent, and suddenly appearingon the heights, struck terror into the Spartans, and gave freshcourage to their assailants. The situation of the Spartans was now similar to that of theirancestors when they made their last stand at Thermopylae. They wereattacked in front and rear, and hemmed in on both sides by the naturaldifficulties of the place. In their weak and exhausted condition itwould have been an easy task to make an end of them. But the greatobject of Cleon and Demosthenes was to take them alive. They thereforesuspended the attack, and sent a herald, and summoned them to lay downtheir arms. When they heard the proclamation, most of them loweredtheir shields, and waved their hands in the air, to show that they haddropped their weapons. The Athenian generals then entered into aparley with Styphon the third in command of the Spartans; forEpitadas, the chief officer, was slain, and Hippagretus, the second, had been left for dead on the field. Styphon requested permission tocommunicate with the Spartan authorities on the mainland, and ask whathe and his comrades were to do; and the Athenian commanders sent oneof their own men to carry the message. Having heard his report, theSpartan magistrates sent a herald to see how matters stood; and aftermore than one messenger had passed to and fro between their camp andthe island, they sent their final instructions, conveyed in thesewords "The Spartans bid you to decide for yourselves, but to donothing dishonourable. " Fifty years before, these wounded and weary men would have needed noinstructions to tell them their duty. According to the ancienttradition of Sparta they had but one course open to them--to die attheir posts. But the lapse of time had softened the stern fibre of theSpartan character; and the broken remnant now brought to bay inSphacteria interpreted the ambiguous mandate in their own favour, andsurrendered themselves and their arms. The number of the prisoners was two hundred and ninety-two, of whomabout a hundred and twenty were Spartans of pure descent, several ofthem belonging to the highest families in Sparta. They weredistributed among the captains of the fleet for transportation toAthens. Dating from the first sea-fight, the siege had lastedaltogether seventy-two days; and during seven weeks of this periodthey had subsisted on the casual supplies smuggled over by theblockade-runners from the mainland. Great was the joy at Athens whenthat costly freight was brought safely into the harbour of Peiraeus;and Cleon, whose bustling energy had really helped to precipitate acrisis, was the hero of the hour. He had promised to settle thebusiness, one way or the other, within twenty days, and this promise, which had been laughed at as a piece of crazy vanity, was fulfilled tothe letter. The whole merit of the performance, however, belonged toDemosthenes, who had planned the attack on Sphacteria with admirablesagacity, and led the operations from first to last. The surrender of a picked troop of Spartan warriors caused arevolution of feeling throughout Greece. Hitherto it had been assumedas a matter of course that no Spartan soldier, in any circumstances, would yield to an enemy; but now more than a hundred Spartans hadpreferred life to honour. It was generally believed that the survivorswere inferior in valour to those who had fallen; and some timeafterwards one of the captives was asked this insulting question byone of the Athenian allies: "Your _brave_ comrades were buried onthe field, I suppose?" The Spartan's answer was couched in a riddle:"It would be a mighty clever spindle, [Footnote: Arrow. ] which singledout the brave. " His meaning was that the stones and arrows had dealtout death among his comrades without distinction. CAMPAIGNS OF BRASIDAS IN THRACE I One advantage which accrued to the Athenians from the possession ofthe Spartan captives was the immunity from invasion. For if theSpartans prepared to make any movement against Attica, they couldbring out their prisoners, and threaten to put them to death. And inother directions the future looked brighter than it had done for manyyears. They held Pylos, which was garrisoned by Messenian troops, andserved as an open door, through which they could carry havoc over thewhole western district of Laconia; and the occupation of Cythera, which was effected in the following year, gave them increased facilityfor harassing the commerce of Sparta, and making descents on hereastern coast. Elated by these successes, the Athenians determined on a bolderflight, and forgetting the lessons of Pericles, thought of recoveringthe possessions which they had held on the mainland thirty yearsbefore. With this intention they planned an attack, which was to becarried out from three different points at once, on Boeotia. But thewhole scheme proved a failure, and led to a severe defeat at Delium;and about the same time news arrived from Thrace which showed that thetide was turning, and should have warned them, if they were wise, toset bounds to their restless ambition. Brasidas had long since recovered from the wounds received at Pylos. The deep humiliation of Sparta, now reduced to become a suppliant forpeace, filled him with shame and sorrow, and in the eighth year of thewar he formed the bold design of organizing a campaign against thecoast-towns of Thrace, which were among the most important of theAthenian tributaries. Having obtained the necessary commission fromSparta, he collected a force of seventeen hundred heavy-armedinfantry, and in the summer following the disaster at Sphacteria, turned his steps northward, and arrived without mishap at the bordersof Thessaly. The Thessalians generally were then on friendly termswith Athens, and, apart from this, the passage of so large a forcethrough their territory caused suspicion and alarm among theinhabitants. But Brasidas was a man of rare gifts: endowed with morethan a full share of the typical Spartan virtues, he combined withthese a graciousness of manner, and a winning eloquence, which madehim an equal of the most accomplished Athenian. He had, moreover, friends among the powerful nobles of Thessaly, who undertook to guidehim in safety to the Macedonian frontier. On reaching the riverEnipeus, he found his passage barred by a Thessalian force, who seemedresolved to dispute his progress. His courteous demeanour, and fairwords, disarmed their hostility, and he was allowed to pass. Fearing, however, a general rising of the natives against him, and urged todespatch by his guides, he pushed on by forced marches, and enteringthe passes of Olympus, descended into the southern plain of Macedonia, whose king Perdiccas, a shifty and treacherous barbarian, thoughnominally in alliance with Athens, favoured the enterprise ofBrasidas. Perdiccas had undertaken to provide pay for half the Spartan force, inreturn for help to be rendered against a rebel chieftain with whom hewas at war. But Brasidas, whose main object was to raise a revoltamong the Athenian allies, insisted on entering into negotiations withthe rebel, and having patched up a truce, conducted his troops to theneighbourhood of Acanthus, a town on the eastern side of theChalcidian peninsula, where there was a party discontented with theAthenian rule. In all the cities subject to Athens the general mass ofthe people were found loyal towards her, or, at the worst, disinclinedfor any change; and Acanthus was no exception. When Brasidas with hislittle army appeared before the walls the people at first refused himadmission. But it was just before the vintage, and their grapes werehanging in ripe clusters, exposed to the hand of the spoiler; and so, to save their vineyards from ravage, they were at last induced to givehim a hearing. It was very important for Brasidas to secure the voluntary adherenceof the Acanthians, whose action would have a powerful effect indetermining the attitude of the other Chalcidians towards them. Accordingly he exerted all his skill as an orator, which wasconsiderable, to allay their suspicions, and rouse their enthusiasmfor the cause which he represented. That cause, he said, was theliberation of Greece from the tyranny of Athens. Let none of themsuppose that he had come in the interests of a faction, to enslave themany to the few, or the few to the many. He had bound the authoritiesof Sparta by the most solemn oaths to respect the constitution of anystate which enlisted under their banner. Freedom for Greeks!--that wasthe watchword which should find a response in every patriotic heart. After this fine burst of sentiment, Brasidas descended to a much lowerlevel, and plainly intimated that if the Acanthians would not join himfrom these high motives, he would employ coercion, and proceed toravage their estates, This last argument was decisive, and in order tosave their valuable harvest from destruction, they agreed to admitBrasidas and his army into the town. Shortly afterwards their examplewas followed by Stagirus, one day to become famous as the birthplaceof Aristotle. It is melancholy to find a man of really pure and generous characterlike Brasidas lending himself to be the mouthpiece of Spartanhypocrisy. To him the sounding phrases and lofty professions which heuttered may have meant something: but in their essence they were merehollow cant, intended to divert attention from the true issue, anddrag a peaceful and prosperous community into the private quarrels ofSparta. So degraded was now the tone of politics in Greece, even amongher best and ablest men. II On the banks of the Strymon, just where the river sweeps round in asharp curve, west and east, the Athenians had founded, six yearsbefore the outbreak of the war, the colony of Amphipolis. It was asite which had long been coveted by the leaders of Greek colonialenterprise, being the key to the richest district in Thrace, withunrivalled facilities for commerce, and close to the gold-mines ofMount Pangeus. A previous attempt which was made by the Athenians tooccupy the position had ended in ruinous disaster; but nearly thirtyyears later a second body of emigrants, led by Hagnon from Athens, metwith much better success; Amphipolis now grew and prospered, and atthe time which we have reached was the most important city in theAthenian empire. The Amphipolitans had a bitter and jealous enemy in the neighbouringtown of Argilus, situated a few miles to the west, on the road toAmphipolis; and ever since the appearance of Brasidas in Thrace theArgilians had been plotting against the tranquillity of their hatedrival. Accordingly, when Brasidas, who had planned a surprise onAmphipolis, appeared before their gates, they welcomed him eagerly, and conducted him and his army to the bridge over the Strymon, whichcrossed the river just outside the southern end of the city wall. Thedefenders of the bridge, few in number, and taken unawares, wereinstantly cut to pieces; for Brasidas came upon them before daybreak, and the weather, which was wintry and inclement, favoured his design. The farms and country-houses of the Amphipolitans, which occupied anextensive district on the eastern side of the city, now lay at themercy of Brasidas, and after choosing a position for his camp, hebegan to overrun the country. For those who were responsible for thesafety of Amphipolis had taken no precautions, though they knew thatthis daring and active enemy had been carrying on a campaign for manyweeks in the adjacent parts of Thrace. Consequently, a good number ofthe citizens, who were attending to the business of their estates, fell into his hands, and it is not improbable that, if he had made asudden assault on the city, he would have captured it on the same day. There was a disaffected party in Amphipolis, who had planned thebetrayal of the place, acting in concert with Argilus, through theagency of certain Argilian citizens residing in the town. The traitorsnow proposed that Brasidas and his army should be admitted, but theywere overruled by the general voice of the people, and it was agreedthat the Athenian Eucles, governor of Amphipolis, should send amessage for help to another Athenian officer, who was commissioned towatch the interests of Athens in Thrace. That officer was Thucydides, the historian, from whose work the materials for the present narrativeare taken. Thucydides was descended on his mother's side from theroyal family of Thrace, [Footnote: Such, at least, is the highlyprobable conjecture of Classen. ] and through this connexion he was theowner of valuable working rights in the gold-mines of Mount Pangaeus, and a man of great power and, influence in these districts. When themessage arrived from Amphipolis, he was engaged in some business atThasos, and postponing all other concerns he collected a smallsquadron of seven ships and hastened to the rescue with all speed. But Brasidas, who had received intelligence of his movements, was tooquick for him. He had valuable hostages in the persons of thoseAmphipolitans who had been taken outside the walls. The population ofAmphipolis consisted almost entirely of men of mixed or foreigndescent, who were anxious about their properties, and in fear fortheir friends, while the few Athenian residents were alarmed for theirown safety, having little hope of prompt succour. Taking advantage ofthis state of public feeling, the politic Spartan issued aproclamation, pledging him to respect the rights and property of allwho chose to remain; while those who preferred to withdraw wereallowed five days to take away their goods. This tempting offerproduced the desired effect. It was in vain that the Athenian governorinterposed his authority, and strove to uphold the imperial claims ofAthens. The people threatened to rise in mutiny against him, and whenthe partisans of Brasidas, now grown bold, openly moved a resolutionto accept his conditions, the proposal was carried, and the Spartangeneral marched unopposed into the town. Late on the same day Thucydides sailed into the harbour of Eion, theport of Amphipolis, and learning that Brasidas was already inpossession of the inland city, took all necessary precautions toprovide against an immediate attack. He was only just in time; for onthe very next day Brasidas carried his troops down the river on aflotilla of boats, and tried to establish himself in a strongposition, commanding the mouth of the river, and at the same time senta storming party to make an assault on the land side. But the attemptwas frustrated, and Eion at least was saved to Athens. The fall of Amphipolis, which occurred shortly after the crushingdefeat at Delium, caused great consternation among the Athenians. Apart from the wound to their pride, they were deprived by this lossof a large portion of their revenue, and cut off from the principalsource of their timber supply. And there were still further groundsfor alarm. For Amphipolis was now an open door, through which theSpartans could send troops into eastern Thrace, and carry the war tothe entrance of the Euxine. For a moment it seemed as if all theirfears would be realized. The gentle manners of Brasidas--his fairness, modesty, and strict regard for the rights of all men--had won thehearts of the Athenian allies in Thrace, and secret agents wereconstantly arriving at his head-quarters on the Strymon, inviting himto come and help them to recover their liberty. He had skilfullyappealed to the most deeply-rooted instinct of the Greek, the desirefor unfettered action in his own city, free from all interference fromoutside. This instinct, long held in abeyance, first by the necessityfor protection from Persia, and when that danger was removed, by thehabits acquired under the mild rule of Athens, was now awakened intonew life by the influence of the great warrior and accomplishedstatesman, whose watchword was "Liberty for Greeks!" The recentreverses of Athens had excited a feeling of contempt among hersubjects, and led them greatly to under-estimate her real power; andBrasidas himself, by a not over-scrupulous perversion of facts, hadbeen careful to encourage this belief. All these causes produced aburst of enthusiasm throughout Thrace, and if the Spartans hadsupported Brasidas with vigour, a general insurrection would havefollowed among the Athenian allies. But the authorities of Sparta werejealous of their brilliant officer, and their chief anxiety was torecover the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. In the same winter the indefatigable Spartan effected the capture ofTorone, a town situated on the second of the three headlands whichproject, like the prongs of a fork, from the peninsula of Chalcidice. As in the case of Amphipolis, Torone fell into his hands by treachery;but he had now made good his title as the champion of Greekindependence, and early in the following spring the citizens ofScione, on the first or westernmost headland, invited him to come overand take command of their town. On receiving this welcome summonsBrasidas lost no time, and crossed over by night in a skiff, which wasconvoyed by a trireme, so that if any hostile vessel appeared insight, it might be engaged by the trireme, and leave him free toescape. He reached Scione in safety, and having convened a generalassembly of the citizens, addressed them in flattering terms, praisingtheir high courage and patriotic spirit. "You, " he said, "have set anoble example to your oppressed brethren: isolated as you are, and cutoff from all succour from the mainland, you have defied all perils, and thrown in your lot, for better or for worse, with the friends ofliberty. Your gallantry and self-devotion has given you a just claimto the gratitude of Sparta and of all Greece. " The revolt of Scionewas indeed a daring defiance of the Athenian power, for since thecapitulation of Potidaea, which occurred seven years before, theinhabitants had been in the position of islanders, exposed to thewhole maritime power of Athens. For the moment, however, the peoplewere carried away by a transport of enthusiasm, and little dreaming ofthe terrible vengeance which was to overtake them two years later, they greeted Brasidas as a deliverer, and vied with one another whoshould honour him most. He was publicly presented with a crown ofgold, as the liberator of Greece; and in private houses he waswreathed with garlands, and surrounded with worship, like a victoriousathlete. But a few days before the defection of Scione all the ambitiousschemes of Brasidas had been checkmated by the action of his owncountrymen at home. For some time past negotiations had been inprogress between Athens and Sparta; and since the battle of Delium, and the rapid successes of their great enemy in Thrace, the Athenianshad been more disposed to come to terms. In this altered mood theyagreed to make a truce for one year with Sparta, which would give timeto arrange the conditions of a lasting peace, and leave them atleisure to repair the shattered fabric of their empire. Twocommissioners, an Athenian and a Spartan, were at once despatched toannounce the conclusion of the truce to Brasidas. They found him atTorone, preparing to set out a second time for the western peninsula, and continue his intrigues against the subjects of Athens. In theinterview which followed a dispute arose between Brasidas and thecommissioners, as to whether Scione should be admitted into the truce. Brasidas asserted that the city had joined the Spartan alliance beforethe truce was signed; but the Athenian commissioner loudly protestedthat the revolt occurred after the conclusion of the truce, --and such, indeed, was the fact. Brasidas, however, was bound in honour to defendthe hapless community which had been drawn by his fatal influence intoso fearful a peril; and in the existing confusion of the Greekcalendar it was not easy to establish a date with perfect exactitude. Accordingly Brasidas refused to surrender Scione to the vengeance ofAthens, and placed the town in a state of defence. Not content withthis, he extended the same measures of protection to Mende, whichrevolted after the arrival of the commissioners. This was an openviolation of the truce, and the Athenians, in great fury, immediatelyprepared to send a fleet against these audacious rebels, and passed asavage decree, condemning the whole adult male population of Scione todeath. III During the following summer Mende was recovered by Nicias for theAthenians, Scione was closely invested, and Perdiccas, who hadquarrelled with Brasidas, once more became an ally of Athens, and gaveproof of his sincerity by preventing the passage of Spartanreinforcements to Thrace. The Athenians were thus left free to turntheir attention to Amphipolis, and at the beginning of the tenth yearof the war, the truce having now expired, Cleon was sent with a fleetof thirty ships to conduct the siege of this important place. That soweighty a charge should have been entrusted to hands so incompetentargues a degree of infatuation in the Athenians which is very hard tounderstand. On his voyage Cleon succeeded in retaking Torone by asudden assault, and then proceeding northwards dropped anchor at Eion, where he remained inactive, after despatching messengers to Perdiccas, and to a friendly Thracian prince, to ask for reinforcements. Meanwhile Brasidas, who some time before had returned to Amphipolis, was waiting to strike a blow at his unwarlike enemy. His own troops, though about equal in numbers to the force under Cleon, were farinferior in equipment and discipline; but he counted on someincautious movement on the part of the Athenian general, which wouldthrow the picked infantry of Athens into disorder, and place them at adisadvantage. So he left Clearidas, a young Spartan, whom he hadappointed governor of Amphipolis, in charge of the garrison, andtaking with him fifteen hundred men occupied a position on the rightbank of the river, where the ground rises abruptly to a considerableheight, affording a wide view over the city to the country beyond, asfar as Eion. From this point, which is called Cerdylium, he couldwatch the proceedings of the enemy, and still have ample time torejoin Clearidas in Amphipolis, if, as he expected, Cleon should leavehis defences and advance upon the town. He had not long to wait. The Athenian soldiers stationed at Eion werechafing at their inaction, and mutinous speeches were heard on allsides. What a man was this Cleon, this cowardly braggart, under whomthey were to take the field against the most daring and skilful leaderin Greece! They had known what to expect from such a general, sincethe day when they sailed for Thrace. These murmurs reached the ears ofCleon, and he saw that something must be attempted, or his men wouldbe totally demoralized. So he gave the order to march, and led histroops up the ridge of hills which slope down towards Amphipolis onthe eastern side, where the town was defended by a single line ofwall, reaching from the northern to the southern bend of the river. Hewas far from supposing that anyone would come out to attack him; heonly wanted, he said, to take a good view of the place, and when hisreinforcements arrived, he would surround the city on all sides, andcarry it by assault. For his wonderful good fortune at Pylos had givenhim unbounded confidence in his powers as a strategist, and he thoughtthat Amphipolis would prove a second Pylos, forgetting that here hehad a Brasidas to deal with, and no Demosthenes to do the work forhim. When he reached the top of the ascent, he called a halt, and tooka leisurely survey of the wide sweep of country spread below him, --tothe north, the broad, marshy waters of Lake Cercynitis, from which theriver issues just above the town, --eastwards, the towering summit ofMount Pangaeus, --and on the other side, just beneath his feet, thedevoted city, which now seemed cowering, silent and deserted, as ifconscious of Cleon's eagle glance. The gates were closed, and not aman was to be seen on the battlements. "What a pity, " remarked Cleon, "that we brought no siege-engines with us! We might have battered downthe wall, and marched in at once, --there is none to oppose us. " So readily did this holiday general fall into the trap which Brasidas, with a just estimate of his capacity, had set for him. As soon as hesaw that Cleon had started from Eion, the Spartan general left hispost in Cerdylium, and led his men back into Amphipolis. Here he madesuch a disposition of his forces as to give the place that peacefuland innocent appearance which deceived Cleon's unpractised eye. Thenhe took up his station with a picked troop of a hundred and fiftyhoplites at the southern gate of Amphipolis, leaving Clearidas incharge of the main body, and awaited a favourable moment to attack. But these preparations could not be made without exciting someattention among the more experienced of the Athenian officers. Theyhad seen Brasidas entering the city, and observed him offeringsacrifice, as for battle, before the temple of Athene; and Cleon, whowas standing, lost in his contemplations, some distance in advance ofhis forces, suddenly received the alarming intelligence that the enemywere on the point of making a sally. "The whole garrison is inmotion, " said the messenger, "and we have caught sight of the feet ofmany horses and men under the gates: evidently they mean to attackus. " Thus rudely startled from his meditations, Cleon went to look forhimself, and seeing that the messenger had spoken the truth he gavethe order for a retreat in the direction of Eion. This movement shouldhave begun from the left wing, but there was some delay in executingthe order, and Cleon, who was in a great hurry to reach a place ofsafety, led the way with his own division, which, being on the right, ought to have closed the retreat. The consequence was that the wholeAthenian army was thrown into confusion, and Brasidas, who waswatching from his station at the gate, saw by the irregular motion oftheir spears and helmets that all discipline was at an end. "Now isour time, " he cried to his men: "Open the gates! The day is ours. "With these words he rushed out with his troops, and fell upon theAthenian centre; and at the same moment the main body under Clearidaspoured out from the northern gate, and attacked them in the rear. The effect of this sudden assault was to cut the Athenian army inhalf: the left wing, which was nearest to Eion, fled without strikinga blow, but the right made a vigorous resistance, though abandoned bytheir cowardly general, who was cut down by a Thracian spearman as hetried to make good his escape. A far nobler name was also added to thedeath-roll of that fatal day: Brasidas, fighting at the head of histroop, received a mortal wound, and was carried, unobserved by theAthenians, into the city. He lived long enough to hear that his menhad gained a decisive victory, and then passed away, the purest andthe most heroic spirit among all those who played their part in thisunhappy war. After his death he received divine honours at Amphipolis, and was worshipped as the second founder of the city. THE HOLLOW PEACE I The negotiations for peace, begun in the previous year; had beeninterrupted by the brilliant successes of Brasidas, and the factiousopposition of Cleon, and after their death the main obstacle to apacific understanding was removed. The high hopes conceived by theAthenians after the capture of the Spartans at Pylos had been dampedby their disastrous defeat at Delium, and by the revolt of theirallies in Thrace; and, above all, they were anxious to recoverAmphipolis. Still more depressed was the temper of the Spartans. Theyhad entered on the war in a spirit of sanguine confidence, expectingto make an end of the conflict by a single invasion of Attica; andnow, after ten years of fighting, their great rival remained almostuntouched in the chief sources of her power. Their coasts were exposedto continual ravage by the Athenian fleets, and Pylos was stilloccupied by their bitter enemies, the Messenians, attracting all thediscontented elements in Sparta, and keeping the Helots in a continualferment. And finally a hundred and twenty of their noblest citizenswere immured in the dungeons of Athens, and they were ready to makegreat sacrifices to procure their release. Accordingly, in the winter after the battle of Amphipolis, negotiations were resumed, and early in the following spring a treatyof peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta, on the understandingthat all places taken by force of arms should be restored, and allprisoners set at liberty. Such was the Peace of Nicias, named afterits chief promoter, the former rival of Cleon, and now the leadingpolitician at Athens. It was really a private agreement between Athensand Sparta, for the most important of the Spartan allies, who thoughtthat their interests were neglected, refused to sign the treaty. Alarmed by this, the Spartans immediately concluded a second treatywith Athens, binding both sides to mutual aid and defence, in casetheir territories were attacked. The prisoners taken at Sphacteriawere now restored, but owing to the bungling of Nicias, the Atheniansfailed to regain Amphipolis. II Six years elapsed after the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias, beforewar was again openly declared; but it was a peace only in name, andwas broken by many acts of hostility on both sides. During this periodthe principal states of Greece were involved in a network of politicalintrigue, treaty following treaty, and alliance succeeding toalliance, for the most part with no result. To this statement, thereis, however, one important exception. A year after the signing of thesecond treaty between Athens and Sparta, a coalition was formed, including Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, under the leadership of Argos;and in mentioning this event we have to usher on to the stage one ofthe most extraordinary characters in history. This was Alcibiades, ayoung Athenian noble, endowed with every advantage of mind, person, and fortune, whose fatal gifts, and lawless ambition, made him theevil genius of his country. His high birth, his wealth, his wit, andhis wonderful beauty, attracted to him a host of flatterers, who fedhis vanity with soft adulation, and led him to believe that nothingwas too great for such powers as his. Like most of the brilliant youngmen of his day, he attached himself for a time to the philosopherSocrates, for whom he seems to have felt a warm admiration. But hisconnexion with that great teacher and thinker, though it served tosharpen his understanding, could not eradicate the effects of evilhabit and example. His wilful, selfish, and despotic temper soon brokeloose from that salutary restraint, and henceforth we find himpursuing a course of action which brought ruin on his people, and onhimself a traitor's death and a dishonoured name. Much irritation had been caused among the Athenians by the shiftingand treacherous conduct of the Spartans, who had failed to redeemtheir sworn pledges, and had excited great suspicion at Athens byrepeated intrigues with Argos, and with their own offended allies ofthe Peloponnesian League. Alcibiades had a private grudge against theSpartans, to whom he had made overtures of friendship and service atthe time when the treaty was under discussion, only to be set aside asa profligate and frivolous youth, unfit to meddle with serious mattersof state. He now placed himself at the head of the party hostile toSparta, and it was not long before he had an opportunity of revengingthe insult to his pride. He used all his influence to promote analliance with Argos, the ancient enemy and rival of Sparta inPeloponnesus; and when envoys arrived from Sparta to remonstrateagainst this proceeding, and reassure the Athenians as to theirintentions, he contrived by a masterpiece of low cunning to cover themwith shame and contempt. When the envoys were introduced to the senatethey declared that they had come with full powers to settle alldifferences, and Alcibiades feared that if they made the samestatement to the general assembly of the citizens, they might inducethe Athenians to renounce their alliance with Argos. So, after thesenate had risen, he took the envoys aside, and with an air of greatcandour and friendliness warned them that they must conceal the extentof their powers when they appeared before the popular assembly. "Youdo not understand, " he said, "how to deal with the mob of Athens; ifyou show your hand, they will force you into extravagant concessions. Leave the matter to me, and everything will turn out as you wish. " The simple Spartans fell into the snare. They were not at all startledby the proposal that they should eat their own words, for indishonesty they were not behind Alcibiades himself, though they wereno match for him in cunning. Being brought before the people, andasked whether they had come with full powers, they answered bluntly"No!" Great was the amazement at this flat contradiction of the avowalwhich they had made before the senate, and Alcibiades, giving voice tothe general indignation, overwhelmed the astonished envoys with atorrent of invective and abuse. The Spartans were dumb-foundered byhis perfidy, and looked helplessly at Nicias, the staunch friend andsupporter of Sparta, whom they had forsaken for this shameless youngreprobate. Nicias, who of course knew nothing of the trick, wasutterly confounded by the double-dealing of the envoys, and could donothing to relieve their embarrassment. The result was that the envoyswere abruptly dismissed, and after a fruitless mission of Nicias toSparta, which only served to lower his own reputation, the Atheniansentered heart and soul into the Argive alliance. III We have seen how much the credit of Sparta had been injured in theeyes of Greece by the capture of her chosen warriors at Pylos, and byher subsequent behaviour during the negotiations which led to thepeace of Nicias. Spartan valour was seen to be not above reproach, andthe Peloponnesian allies had still better reason to complain of thehollowness of Spartan faith. The high reverence which had long beenattached to the name of Sparta had given place to something likecontempt, and the Eleans, who had an old grudge against her, tookadvantage of this feeling to exclude her citizens from taking publicpart in the Olympic festival, which was celebrated with great pomp andsplendour in the second year of the peace. And the degradation of theproud Dorian city seemed to be complete, when a Spartan named Lichas, who had entered for the chariot-race under another name, was drivenwith blows from the racecourse. So deep was the abasement to which thegreat name of Sparta had now sunk. The Spartans saw that a vigorous effort must be made, if they wouldrecover their lost ascendancy; and two years later the opportunityoccurred for which they were waiting. On the northern side of theArgolic peninsula lies the ancient city of Epidaurus, famous for itsrich vineyards, and its great temple of Asclepius, [Footnote:Aesculapius. ] the god of healing. For some time past, the Epidaurians, who were in alliance with Sparta, had been involved in a dispute, arising out of some obscure question of ritual, with Argos; and theywere now in sore straits, being hard pressed by the whole weight ofthe Argive power, backed by the new confederacy. This was the pretextneeded by the Spartans, and mustering their whole forces they marched, under the command of their king Agis, against Argos. The Argives had received notice of the advance of Agis, and theyimmediately marched out to meet him, wishing to engage the Spartansbefore they had united with their allies from Corinth, Boeotia, andelsewhere, who were assembling in great force at Phlius. The twoarmies confronted each other for a moment at Methydrium, in Arcadia;but Agis succeeded in avoiding an engagement, and breaking up his campunder cover of darkness pushed on to Phlius. Thereupon the Argives, who were accompanied by their allies from Mantinea and Elis, returnedin haste to Argos, and then, marching northwards, took up theirposition at Nemea, which commanded the ordinary route from Phlius tothe Argive territory. But they were again outmanoeuvred by the skilfuldispositions of Agis. Avoiding the road by Nemea, which led through anarrow and dangerous pass, he led his Spartans over the mountains anddescended into the plain which surrounds the city of Argos. Onecontingent of his allies had orders to proceed in the same directionby another mountain-path, while the Boeotians, who numbered no lessthan ten thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry, were directed totake the high road by Nemea; for Agis expected that by threatening thecultivated lands around Argos he would draw the Argives from theirposition, and bring them down in haste to the defence of theirestates. The plan was completely successful. As soon as the Argives learnt thatAgis was ravaging their fields they set out with all speed towardsArgos, and finding Agis engaged in the work of pillage, they drew uptheir forces, and offered battle. Their situation was in the highestdegree perilous. In front of them, cutting them off from the city ofArgos, was the flower of the Spartan army, reinforced by the troops ofTegea and Arcadia; on their right flank the mountain slopes swarmedwith the infantry of Corinth and Phlius; and in the rear their retreatwas cut off by the thronging masses of Boeotians, who were now pouringalong the road from Nemea. They were fairly cut off, and seemeddelivered over to destruction; nevertheless, such was the presumptuousconfidence which possessed them, that they awaited eagerly the signalfor battle, crying out that they had caught the Spartans in a trap. Fortunately for them there were two men among their leaders who took awiser view of the position; one of these was Alciphron, an officialwho represented the interests of Sparta at Argos, [Footnote: The Greekword is _Proxenos_, --a sort of consul. ] and the other wasThrasyllus, one of the five generals. These two men entered into aparley with Agis, and by promising to satisfy the demands of Spartainduced him to grant a truce. Agis then drew off his forces, andreturned by way of Nemea to Sparta; and the allies, much against theirwill, were compelled to follow his example. Loud were the murmursamong the confederates, and even among the Spartan soldiers, againstAgis, who had thrown away this golden opportunity of humbling thepride of Argos, and brought dishonour on one of the finest armies thathad ever been led into the field by a Grecian general. Strange to say, the Argives were not less indignant against the two men who had savedthem from overwhelming disaster; and Thrasyllus, the general, narrowlyescaped being stoned to death. IV The Argives thought themselves bound to abide by the conditions of thetruce, though made without their consent; but shortly after theretreat of Agis, an Athenian force of a thousand hoplites and threehundred cavalry arrived at Argos, and Alcibiades, who was present inthe character of ambassador, strongly urged the renewal of thecampaign. His proposal was warmly supported by the Mantineans andEleans, and they and the Athenians marched forthwith againstOrchomenus in Arcadia, which was in alliance with Sparta; and theArgives, who had wavered at first, soon afterwards joined them. Orchomenus was gained over with little trouble, and then the Eleanswere eager to proceed against Lepreum, a town in their alliance whichhad gone over to Sparta. But the Argives, Athenians, and Mantineans, insisted on attacking Tegea, where there was a party opposed toSparta, by whose means they hoped to bring this powerful city, theancient rival of Mantinea, to their side. Thereupon the Eleansabandoned the expedition, and went home in a rage, but the rest of theallies took up their quarters at Mantinea, and prepared to make anattack on Tegea. The Spartans were in high anger against Agis for his unsoldier-likeconduct in the recent campaign, and when they heard of thecapitulation of Orchomenus their resentment rose to such a pitch thatit was proposed to inflict on him a heavy fine, and raze his house tothe ground. At his earnest entreaty they consented to reserve thesentence, and give him an opportunity of wiping out the stain on hishonour; but as a mark of diminished confidence they appointed tencommissioners, without whose consent he was not allowed to lead anarmy out of the city. They had just come to this decision when an urgent message arrivedfrom Tegea, bidding them to bring help with all speed, or the townwould be lost. The imminent peril startled the Spartans from theirwonted apathy, and they set out at once in full force to the relief ofTegea. On reaching the borders of Arcadia they sent back the elder andyounger men, amounting to a sixth part of the army, to serve as agarrison in Sparta; and at the same time couriers were despatched tosummon their allies in Arcadia and central Greece. The Arcadiansarrived in time to take part in the battle, but the Boeotians, Corinthians, and others, though they hastened to obey the order, weredelayed by a long and difficult march, through the hostile territoryof Argos. Passing by Tegea, Agis entered the district of Mantinea, and havingpitched his camp began to lay waste the country. Informed of hisapproach, the Argives and their allies marched out to meet him, andchoosing a position on the slope of a hill, defended in front byrugged and broken ground, they drew up in order of battle. TheSpartans, incited, doubtless, by the example of their king, who waseager to redeem his reputation, rushed impetuously to the assault; andthey were already within a stone's-throw of the enemy when a Spartanveteran cried out to Agis: "Heal not ill with ill!" His meaning wasthat in Argos Agis had been too cold, and now he was too hot. Agisheard the warning voice, and his own good sense must have shown himhow rashly he was acting; accordingly, at the very moment ofencounter, he gave the word to retreat, and fell back to theneighbourhood of Tegea. At this place there was a copious head ofwater, which, when properly regulated, served to irrigate the fieldsof Tegea and Mantinea. The disposal of the water-supply was a constantsource of dispute between the two rival cities; and Agis now preparedto turn the whole volume of the fountain towards Mantinea, expectingthat the Mantineans, when they saw their fields threatened withinundation, would come down into the plain to hinder the mischief. The Argives and their allies were dumb-foundered by the suddendisappearance of the Spartans; and when they had recovered from theirastonishment, they waited impatiently for the order to pursue therunaways. As no such order was given, cries of "Treason!" arose in theranks, and the generals were openly accused of having sold themselvesto the enemy. The Spartans, it was asserted, had been allowed toescape, when they were fairly caught under the walls of Argos; and nowthe confederates had been betrayed a second time by their officers. Amid the general clamour the Argive commanders stood for a momentconfounded and amazed; then recovering themselves they gave the wordto advance, and led their forces down into the plain. Here they passedthe night in the open field, and early next morning they stood totheir arms, and prepared for an immediate attack. Agis was not aware that the Argive generals had taken up a newposition, and thinking that the confederates were still stationed onthe hill, he gave up his scheme of diverting the water, and directedhis march towards the place where he had first encamped. As theyproceeded thus in marching order, and quite unprepared for any hostilemovement, the Spartans suddenly found themselves face to face with thewhole Argive army, drawn up in order of battle. For one instant itseemed as if a panic were about to spread through the Spartan ranks;then their wonderful discipline prevailed, and with all promptitude, but without flurry or confusion, the necessary orders were passed fromthe King to the commanders of divisions, from these again to thecolonels, from the colonels to the captains, and from the captainsdown to the sergeants, [Footnote: I have thought it best to give theEnglish titles, which of course have only a general correspondencewith the Greek Polemarch, Lochagus, etc. ] who in their turn had to seethat the required movement was executed by the men under theircommand: for such was the regular gradation of authority andresponsibility in the Spartan army. Thanks to this perfectorganization, in a very few minutes every man was in his place andready for battle. On the left wing of the Spartan army were posted the Sciritae, hardymountaineers from southern Arcadia; next to them stood theenfranchised Helots, who had served under Brasidas in Thrace, andothers of the same race who had received the Spartan citizenship inreward for public service; then came the main body of the Spartansthemselves, and after them the rest of the Arcadian allies; while theright wing was assigned by immemorial privilege to the Tegeans, withwhom were a few picked Spartans. The cavalry, never a very strong partof the Spartan army, were posted on either flank. On the other side the Mantineans held the place of honour on the rightwing, because the engagement was fought in their territory; next inorder were the Arcadian allies of Argos, and after them, more towardsthe centre, stood a picked troop of a thousand Argives, trained andequipped at the public expense; then followed the main body of theArgive troops, with the rest of their allies, the Athenians occupyingthe extreme left. As to the numbers engaged, nothing certain is known. Some time was lost by the Argive army in delivering the customaryharangues addressed by the generals of the several contingents totheir men, and this enabled the Spartans to steady their ranks beforethe fighting began. They, on their side, men of war from their youth, had no need of set speeches to remind them of their duty; but pithywords of exhortation passed from man to man, and high and clear rosetheir national war-songs, thrilling them with the memories of theirheroic past. Then the signal was given on both sides to charge, andthe Argives and their allies rushed impetuously to the onset, whilethe Spartans advanced to meet them with even and deliberate pace, timed to the music of numerous pipers, who were stationed at regularintervals in their ranks. The regular equipment of the Greek infantry soldier consisted, besideshis helmet and body-armour, of shield and lance, and in advancing tobattle he had always a tendency to diverge towards the right, from anatural wish to keep his shielded side towards the enemy. Thisdivergence from the forward direction was begun by the man posted onthe extreme right; his comrade on the left followed his example, andthe deflection was continued along the whole line. The consequence wasthat when two armies came into action, the left wing on either sidewas greatly outflanked by the opponents' right; and the battle ofMantinea affords no exception to this rule, for not even Spartandiscipline was able to counteract the overpowering instinct of self-preservation. Seeing that his left wing was on the point of beingoutflanked by the Mantineans, Agis signalled to the Sciritae andBrasideans to draw off in a lateral direction towards the left, inorder to present an equal line to the right wing of the enemy. Theorder was executed, and to fill up the gap thus produced on the leftof his own centre, Agis ordered the Spartan officers commanding on hisright wing to bring up their men and occupy the vacant space. They, however, flatly refused to obey the order, and consequently theSciritae and Brasideans were assailed in front and on both flanks byoverwhelming numbers, and driven back with great loss to their camp. So completely were the Spartans out-manoeuvred and worsted in tactics, through the blunders of their general, and the cowardice of hissubordinates. But in this terrible crisis they showed what nativevalour, aided by life-long discipline, can do. Leaving a victoriousenemy in their rear, they advanced without flinching against theopposing centre, where the main body of the Argives were posted, withthe troops of Orneae and Cleonaea supporting them on the left. Then itwas seen that neither the courage of the Spartans, nor the terror oftheir name, had diminished with the lapse of time; for when theconfederate troops found themselves face to face with the renownedwarrior of the Eurotas, they turned and fled, almost without strikinga blow, and trampling their comrades under foot, in their haste toavoid the thrust of the Spartan lances. The Athenians on the left wingwere now in great danger; for the charge of the troops of Agis had cutthem off from the centre, and they were attacked on the other flank bythe Tegeans and Spartans. They were saved from immediate destructionby the exertions of their own cavalry, and presently found themselvesat liberty to retire from the field; for Agis, having completed therout of the main body, called off his men, and went to the relief ofhis own left. The Mantineans and the Argive Thousand made no effort toretrieve the fortunes of the day, but gave way before the first onsetof the Spartans, and joined the flight of their comrades. TheMantineans suffered severely in their retreat, but of the Argives onlya few were slain. Such was the battle of Mantinea, which completely restored themilitary fame of the Spartans, and blotted out the reproach ofcowardice and sloth which for some years past had rested on theirname. VI One incident remains to be recorded, before we proceed to the crowningcatastrophe of our great historical drama. The Athenians, it should beobserved, were still nominally at peace with Sparta, and if they hadbeen wise they would have taken the opportunity of this respite fromhostilities to recover Amphipolis, and consolidate their empire inThrace. Instead of this, they looked around for fresh conquests, andfixed their eyes on the little island of Melos, belonging to theCyclad group, which had been colonized in very early times fromSparta. The Melians had not joined the Confederacy of Delos, and they mighttherefore be reproached for sharing the protection of Athens withoutmaking any return. Beyond this the Athenians had no ground ofcomplaint against them, for they had taken no part in thePeloponnesian War, but had remained quietly at home, occupied withtheir own affairs. But Athens claimed the haughty title of mistress ofthe sea, and pretended to regard the neutrality of one insignificantisland as an open defiance of her power. Ten years before an Athenianfleet had been sent under Nicias to reduce the refractory Melians tosubjection; but the attempt was unsuccessful, and Nicias withdrew, after having ravaged the outlying districts. Being now more atleisure, the Athenians resolved, in the mere wantonness of power, thatMelos should only be suffered to exist as a dependency of Athens, andthirty triremes sailed from the harbour of Peiraeus to carry out thearbitrary decree. On their arrival at Melos the Athenian admirals sent envoys into thetown, to summon the inhabitants to surrender. The envoys were invitedto a private conference with the chief men of the island; and betweenthe representatives of Athens and the Melian nobles there ensued anextraordinary dialogue, which is given at great length by thehistorian, and is commonly known as the Melian Debate. We cannotsuppose that the arguments here placed by Thucydides in the mouth ofthe Athenian speaker were really uttered as set down by that writer. Such a paradox of iniquity, such a shameless insult to the generalconscience of humanity, might have been employed by Plato, in exposingthe vicious teaching of the Sophists, or by Aristophanes in the fullriot of his satire: but the total abnegation of principle here impliedcould never have been openly avowed by a responsible agent, speakingfor the most polished community in Greece. Even the worst criminalsseek to give some specious colour to their villainy; and the condemnedfelon, who will face death without a tremor, shudders at the cry ofexecration which greets his appearance at the scaffold. So hard it is, even for the most depraved, to stifle the last embers of the moralsense. We cannot suppose, then, that an educated Athenian of the fifthcentury would publicly have claimed for his state the right of rapineand murder. For this is the line of argument pursued by therepresentative of Athens in the Melian Debate. The substance of whathe says may briefly be stated as follows "You are weak--we are strong;Melos is a paltry island, Athens is queen of the Aegaean, and theexistence of an independent city in these waters is an insult to herempire. Let us waste no time in discussions about abstract law andright. For the mighty there is but one law--to get what they can, andto keep it; and the weak have no rights, except by the sufferance ofthe strong. This rule of conduct we know to be universal among men, and we believe that the gods themselves are governed by it. [1]To sum up the whole case in one word: you must yield or perish. " [1] Desire of power, on earth a vicious weed, Yet sprung from high, is of celestial seed; In God 'tis glory; and when men aspire, 'Tis but a spark too much of heavenly fire. --DRYDEN. It was in vain that the unhappy Melians tried to argue the questionfrom a higher standpoint; in vain they warned the Athenians that theythemselves might one day stand before the bar of justice, and pleadfor their existence. They were brought back relentlessly to the grimalternative-submission, or extermination. At length this strangecontroversy came to an end, and after one final hint, of fearfulsignificance, the Athenian envoys withdrew, leaving the Melians toconsider their answer. The brave islanders were not long in comingto their decision: they would not, they said, consent to enslave a citywhich had maintained its liberty for seven hundred years; they puttheir trust in divine justice, and in their kinsmen the Spartans, andwere resolved to resist to the last. On receiving this answer the Athenian commanders at once laid siege toMelos, and the doomed city was soon closely blockaded by sea and land. The Melians made a gallant defence, and twice succeeded in breakingthrough the lines of the besiegers, and conveying supplies into thetown. But presently reinforcements arrived from Athens, and theMelians were confined within their walls. All hope of succour fromSparta had vanished, food began to fail, and treason was at work amongthe garrison. Thus driven to extremity, the Melians surrendered atdiscretion. Then the Athenians showed that their threats had not beenidly uttered. All the men of military age in Melos were put to death, the women and children were sold into slavery, and the land wasdistributed among Athenian settlers. In the fifth year of the war, after the capitulation of Mytilene, athousand of the inhabitants had been butchered in cold blood; and thissentence, which seems so cruel to us, was regarded by the Athenians asan act of mercy. Six years later, the decree which had originally beenpassed against Mytilene, was actually executed on Scione, which hadrevolted at the instigation of Brasidas. In this act of savageretribution, Athens still remained within the limits of Greekinternational law, which placed the inhabitants of a revolted city atthe mercy of their conquerors. But the case of Melos was different, for that island had never been included in the Athenian alliance, andthe Melians had done nothing to provoke an attack. Thus the threenames, Mytilene, Scione, and Melos, mark an ascending scale ofbarbarity, culminating in a massacre which, even in the eyes ofGreeks, was an atrocious crime. Athens had now offended beyondforgiveness, giving colour to the accusations of her worst enemies, and heaping up vengeance for the days to come. THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY I The Peloponnesian War may be conveniently divided into four chiefperiods. The first of these periods lasted for ten years, down to thepeace of Nicias. The second extends from the peace of Nicias to themassacre of Melos. In the third, the scene of war was shifted fromGreece to Sicily, and it was there that the Athenian power reallyreceived its death-blow. The fourth and final period begins after theoverthrow of the Athenians at Syracuse, and ends, nine yearsafterwards, with their final defeat at Aegospotami, and the downfallof the Athenian empire. It is the third of these periods which will occupy our attention forthe remainder of the present volume, and as the momentous events whichwe have to relate occurred entirely in Sicily, it is necessary to saysomething of the previous history of that great island. The connexionof the Greeks with Sicily begins in the latter half of the eighthcentury before Christ, when settlers from Chalcis in Euboea foundedthe city of Naxos on the north-eastern coast, under the shadow ofAetna. Naxos in its turn sent out colonists, who built the cities ofLeontini and Catana, the former on an inland site, commanding thegreat plain which extends southwards from Aetna, the latter on thecoast, in a line with the centre of the same plain. These were Ioniccolonies, and we may close the list with the name of Messene[Footnote: Originally called Zancle. ] founded twenty years later onthe Sicilian side of the strait which bears its name. We have now to enumerate the principal Dorian cities. First amongthese in time, and by far the first in importance, was Syracuse, founded from Corinth a year after the settlement of Naxos. BetweenSyracuse and the mother-city there was a close and intimate tie offriendship, which remained unbroken throughout the course of Greekhistory. The original city was built on the island of Ortygia, but anew town afterwards arose on the low-lying coast of the mainland, andspread northwards till it covered the eastern part of the neighbouringheights. Ortygia was then converted into a peninsula by theconstruction of a causeway, connecting the new city with the old. Under the despotism of Gelo, who made himself master of the city inthe early part of the fifth century, [Footnote: 485 B. C. ] Syracuserose to great power and splendour, and her territory extended over agreat part of eastern Sicily. Gelo gained immortal renown by defeatinga mighty host of Carthaginians, who invaded Sicily at the time whenthe confederate cities of old Greece were fighting for their existenceagainst Xerxes and his great armada. After his death the power passedto his brother Hiero, whose victories in the Olympian and PythianGames are commemorated in the Odes of Pindar. Hiero reigned for twelveyears, and was succeeded by his brother Thrasybulus; but a year laterthe despotism was overthrown, and the government returned to ademocracy. A bare mention must suffice for Gela, founded from Rhodes and Cretenearly half a century after Syracuse, and the more famous Agrigentum, a colony from Gela, and next to Syracuse the greatest city in Sicily. These played no part in the struggle with Athens; but Selinus andCamarina, the two remaining Dorian cities of southern Sicily, willoccupy an important place in the following narrative. Thus the whole coast districts on southern and eastern Sicily wereheld by opulent and flourishing Greek cities. On the north was Himera, an Ionic colony, and the scene of Gelo's great victory over Carthage;while the western and north-western district was divided between thePhoenicians and the Elymi, a people of unknown origin, whose chiefseats were at Eryx and Egesta. The inland parts were held, in thewest, by the Sicans, who are believed to have come from Spain, and inthe east by the Sicels, a people of Latin race, who gave their name tothe island. II Since the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War, Athens had beenmeddling in the affairs of Sicily, under pretence of aiding the Ioniancities, who dreaded the encroaching ambition of Syracuse. That thesefears were not unfounded was proved when, a few years afterwards, theSyracusans expelled the commons of Leontini, and took possession oftheir territory. The Leontine exiles sought refuge at Athens, buttheir appeal for help remained for a time unanswered, as the Athenianswere then fully occupied in Greece. But six years after the conclusionof the Peace of Nicias, an appeal came to Athens from a remote cornerof Sicily, which stimulated the Leontine exiles to fresh efforts, andled to most important results. Between the Greeks of Selinus and the Elymians of Egesta there was along-standing quarrel, and in a war which had recently broken out theEgestaeans were reduced to severe straits by the combined forces ofSelinus and Syracuse. In their distress they turned to Athens forhelp, and envoys were sent to plead their cause before the Athenianassembly. In aiding Egesta, argued the envoys, Athens would be servingher own interests; for if the Syracusans were not speedily checked intheir aggressions, they would soon make themselves masters of thewhole of Sicily, and in that case they could bring such an accessionof strength to the enemies of Athens in Greece as to make themirresistible. They had good reason, therefore, to take sides againstthe enemies of Egesta, and the more so as the Egestaeans promised todefray all the expenses of the war. The Athenians generally were inclined to take up the quarrel ofEgesta, but as a measure of precaution it was decided to send agentsof their own to make an inspection on the spot, and see whether theEgestaeans were as wealthy as they pretended. On their return toAthens these men reported that Egesta was possessed of fabulousriches. At every house where they had been entertained, the tables andthe sideboards had been one blaze of gold and silver plate. The factwas that the Egestaeans had collected all the gold and silver vesselsin the town, and others borrowed from the neighbouring cities, and bypassing them on from house to house, wherever these important guestswere invited, had contrived to make a great display. As an earnest ofall this wealth, the Athenian commissioners brought back with themsixty talents of silver. The smallness of this sum ought to have been sufficient to arouse thesuspicions of the Athenians; but they were willing to be deceived, andthey gave ready credence to reports of their commissioners. Voting infull assembly, they passed a decree that sixty ships should be sent toSicily, under the command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. Thefleet was first to be employed in helping Egesta, and when thatcontest had been brought to a successful issue the Leontines were tobe restored to their homes; finally, the generals were empowered toact as might seem best in the interests of Athens. The real purpose ofthe enterprise is indicated in the last clause. Vague plans ofconquest were floating before the minds of the Athenians, and at atime when their whole energies should have been employed to repair thebreaches in their empire, they dreamed of founding a new dominion inthe west. Five days later the assembly met again to vote supplies and discussany further details which remained to be settled. But Niciasdetermined to take the opportunity of reopening the whole question, wishing, if possible, to divert his countrymen from their purpose, andput an end to the expedition altogether. It was folly, he argued, totake up the cause of needy foreigners, and drain the resources ofAthens for a distant and hazardous enterprise, when their subjects inThrace were still in open revolt, and their enemies in Greece were onthe watch to take them at a disadvantage. If they trusted in thetreaty with Sparta, they would soon find how infirm was the ground oftheir confidence. That treaty had been forced upon the Spartans bytheir misfortunes, and they would be only too glad to repudiate it, which they could easily do, as many of the conditions were still underdispute. Moreover, the most powerful cities of the PeloponnesianLeague had refused to sign the treaty, and were ready, at the firsthint from Sparta, to renew the war. Athens was beset with perils, which were enough to tax her strength to the utmost: and yet theytalked of sailing to Sicily, and raising up a new host of enemiesagainst her! Even if the expedition succeeded, they could never keeptheir hold on that vast and populous island, while, if it failed, theywould be utterly ruined. As to the supposed danger from the ambitionof Syracuse, that was mere idle talk. The schemes of conquest, withwhich the Egestaeans had tried to alarm the Athenians, would keep theSyracusans busy at home, and prevent them from meddling in the affairsof Greece. "Leave the Greeks of Sicily alone, " said Nicias with trueprophetic insight; "and they will not trouble you. Do not disturb theprestige which belongs to a distant and unfamiliar power. If they oncelearn to know you, they may learn to despise you. " Then fixing his eyes on Alcibiades, who was sitting surrounded by hisown partisans, young profligates like himself, Nicias concluded thus:"There is another danger against which I would warn you, men ofAthens--the danger of being led astray by the wild eloquence ofunscrupulous politicians, who seek to dazzle you with visions of newempire, that they may rise to high command, and restore their ownshattered fortunes. Yes, Athens is to pour out her blood and treasure, to provide young spendthrifts with the means of filling their racing-stables! Against the mad counsels of these desperate men I invoke themature prudence of the elder members of this assembly, and call uponthem to show by a unanimous vote that neither flattery nor taunts caninduce them to sacrifice the true interests of Athens. " It must have been a severe ordeal for the young Alcibiades to sit andlisten to this keen and bitter invective, which set in a glaring lightthe worst features in his character--his selfish ambition, hisshameless life, his total want of principle, his vulgar ostentation. The last quality, so alien from the best traditions of Atheniancharacter, had been conspicuously displayed only a few weeks before atthe Olympic festival, where he had entered seven four-horsed cars forthe chariot-race, and won the first, second, and fourth prizes. Everyword of Nicias went home, galling him in his sorest point--hisoutrageous vanity; and hardly had the elder statesman concluded hisspeech, when he sprang to his feet, and burst without preface into awild harangue, which is a remarkable piece of self-revelation, disclosing with perfect candour the inner motives of the man on whom, more than on any other, the future of Athens depended. He began bydefending his barbaric extravagance, recently displayed at Olympia, which, as he pretended to believe, had covered his native city withglory, and spread the fame of Athenian wealth and power from one endof Greece to another. The lavish outlay, and haughty demeanour, whichwould be justly blamed in a common man, were right and proper in him, one of the elect spirits of the time, inspired with great aims, andtreading the summits of public life. He had already shown what hecould do in the highest regions of diplomacy, by raising a greatcoalition in Peloponnesus, which had faced the whole might of Spartain the field, and struck terror into the enemies of Athens. After this impudent defence of his own pernicious policy, which hadled to the crushing defeat at Mantinea, and thus enabled the Spartansto restore their damaged reputation, Alcibiades proceeded to deal withthe question of the day, and exerted all his sophistry to confirm theAthenians in their design of invading Sicily. That island, heasserted, was inhabited by a mixed population with no settled homes, and no common patriotic sentiment; and among these motley elementsthey would find plenty of adherents. The Siceliots [Footnote: Greeksof Sicily. ] were poorly armed, ill-furnished with heavy infantry, andin constant danger from the hostile Sicels. The risk of attack fromthe Peloponnesians would not be increased by sending part of theAthenian fleet to Sicily: for Attica was in any case always exposed toinvasion, and a sufficient force of ships would be left at home tokeep command of the sea. "We have no excuse, then, " said Alcibiades in conclusion, "forbreaking our word to the Egestaeans, and drawing back from thisenterprise. Both honour and policy are pointing the way to Sicily. Anempire like ours is an ever-expanding circle, which lives by growing, and cannot stand still. It is only by getting more, and always more, that we can keep what we have. And let not Nicias succeed in hisattempt to set the old against the young, neither let us believe, likehim, that the stability of a state consists in stagnation. It is onlyby a hearty co-operation of all ages and classes that any state canprosper, and a community which finds no outlet for its energies abroadis soon worn out by discord and faction at home. Above all is thistrue of us Athenians, to whom ceaseless toil and endeavour is the veryelement in which we live. " The advice of Alcibiades, thus tendered in the garb of politicalwisdom, was of fatal and ruinous tendency, and in direct opposition tothe oft-repeated warnings of Pericles. But his speech was exactlysuited to the temper of his audience, and most of those who followedhim spoke to the same effect, and when the Egestaeans and Leontinesrenewed their entreaties it became evident that the original motionwould be confirmed by a large majority. Nicias, however, resolved tomake one more effort, and he came forward to speak again, hoping by anew device to check the torrent of popular enthusiasm. Affecting toregard the matter as settled, he entered into an estimate of the forcerequired for the proposed expedition, prefaced by an alarming pictureof the wealth and power of the Sicilian Greeks. To act with effectagainst such an enemy, they must send, not only an overwhelming navalforce, but a numerous body of troops, both cavalry and infantry, and afleet laden with supplies for many months. They must proceed, in fact, as if they were founding a great city on a hostile soil. On no othercondition, added Nicias, would he undertake the command. Nicias hadintended, by exaggerating the difficulties of the undertaking, to dampthe ardour of the Athenians; but to his utter dismay, these timidcounsels were greeted with a great shout of applause. It was supposedthat he had changed his opinion, and even the elder men began to thinkthat so prudent a leader, backed by such an armament, could not failof success. A great wave of excitement swept over the assembly, andthe few who still doubted were cowed into silence. When the tumult hadsubsided, a certain Demostratus, [Footnote: The name is given byPlutarch. ] who had spoken strongly in favour of the expedition, addressing Nicias in the name of the assembly, asked him to stateplainly what force he required. Thus driven into a corner, Niciasanswered, with great reluctance, that the number of triremes must benot less than one hundred, with five thousand heavy-armed infantry, and slingers and bow-men in proportion. This enormous estimate wascarried without demur, and by the same vote full powers were conferredon the generals to fix the scale of the armament as they might thinkbest for the interests of Athens. Thus, by a strange freak of fortune, the Athenians, at the mostmomentous crisis of their history, were urged along the road to ruinby the most opposite qualities in their leaders, the cold caution ofNicias, and the wild energy of Alcibiades. III During the whole of the following spring [Footnote: B. C. 415. ]preparations for the invasion of Sicily were actively pushed on, andthe whole city was in a bustle and stir of excitement. Athens hadrecently recovered from the ravages of the plague, and six years ofpeace had recruited her resources, both in men and money. Since thefirst outbreak of the war a new generation had grown up, and theseyoung and untried spirits joined, with all the fire of youth, in anenterprise which promised them a boundless field of adventure. Otherswere attracted by the baser motive of gain, or by mere curiosity, andthe love of travel. No thought of danger or hardship, no hint ofpossible failure, clouded the brilliant prospect; it was a gay holidayexcursion, and at the same time a grand scheme of conquest, offeringfame to the ambitious, wealth to the needy, and pleasant recreation toall. Thousands flocked eagerly to enter their names for the service, and the only trouble of the recruiting officers was in choosing thestoutest and the best. The great armament was on the eve of departure, and all hearts werefull of joyful anticipation, when an event occurred which suddenlychilled this happy mood, and cast a shadow of evil augury on the wholeundertaking. The Athenians of that age, like their descendants nearlyfive centuries later, [Footnote: See Acts xvii. 22. ] were "more god-fearing than other men. " They worshipped a multitude of divinities, and their city was thronged with the temples and statues of heroes andgods. Conspicuous among the objects of popular adoration was the godHermes, who is exhibited by ancient poets and artists as a graciousand lovely youth, the special patron of eloquence and wit, theguardian spirit of travellers and merchants, and the giver of goodluck. A familiar feature in the streets and public places of Athenswas the bust of Hermes, surmounting a quadrangular stone pillar. Manyhundreds of these pillars, which were called Hermae, were scatteredabout over the whole city, standing before the doors of houses andtemples, at cross-ways and places of public resort. Wherever he went, whatever he did, the Athenian felt himself to be in the presence ofthis genial and friendly power, who attended him, with more than humansympathy, in all his ways. If such were the feelings of the Athenians towards their favouritedeity, what must have been their horror when they awoke one morning tofind that all the busts of Hermes, with one or two exceptions, wereshattered and mutilated beyond all recognition. The whole populationwas thunderstruck, and wild rumours ran from mouth to mouth concerningthe perpetrators and the motive of this shocking outrage. It wasevident that many hands must have been employed on the work ofdestruction, and those who had so foully insulted the most hallowedaffections of their fellow-citizens were believed to be capable of anyenormity. It was loudly asserted that a black conspiracy was hatchingagainst the liberties of the people, and that the worst days of thetyranny were about to be revived. For in those days religion andpolitics were associated with a closeness of intimacy unknown inmodern Europe, and sacrilege might well be regarded as a prelude totreason. Active measures were at once taken to bring the offenders tojustice, and great rewards were offered to anyone, whether citizen, slave, or resident foreigner, who gave information concerning this orany similar crime. At first nothing was disclosed as to the mutilationof the Hermae, but other recent acts of profanation were brought tolight, and among these was mentioned a derisive parody of the greatEleusinian Mysteries, alleged to have been performed in the house ofAlcibiades, and elsewhere. The enemies of Alcibiades, who were bothnumerous and powerful, eagerly seized this handle against him; butwhen the matter was debated in the public assembly, it became evidentthat, if he were brought to trial at once, his present popularity, aschief promoter of the Sicilian expedition, would ensure his acquittal. Seeing, therefore, that their attack had been premature, those who hadled the outcry against him now drew back, reserving themselves for amore favourable occasion. Being known as the bitter opponents ofAlcibiades, they could not, without exciting grave suspicions, proposethe adjournment of his trial; but other speakers, prompted by them, urged on grounds of public expediency that the charges against himshould be held in suspense, so as not to delay the departure of thefleet. Alcibiades saw plainly that this manoeuvre was contrived to gethim out of the way, to remove his adherents from Athens, and leave hisenemies free to pursue their machinations during his absence. But itwas in vain that he exposed the malicious motives of the lastspeakers, and pleaded earnestly for an immediate trial. The Athenianswere still possessed by their daring scheme of conquest, and theydecreed that Alcibiades should keep his command, and sail at once toSicily. IV At last the great day arrived, and in the first light of a mid-summerdawn, a vast multitude was seen pouring along the broad highway whichled, between the Long Walls, from Athens to Peiraeus. The Upper Citywas almost deserted by its inhabitants, for there was hardly oneAthenian who had not some cherished comrade, or some near relation, enrolled for service in Sicily, and the crowd was swelled by thousandsof strangers, who came as spectators of that memorable scene. Littlenow appeared of that sanguine and joyous temper which had prevailedamong the Athenians when they first voted for the expedition. Theirfeelings had lately been fearfully harrowed by the mutilation of theHermae, and now that the moment of parting was at hand, all the perilsand uncertainties of their grand enterprise rose up vividly beforethem. They were restored, however, to some degree of cheerfulness, when they reached the harbour of Peiraeus, and saw the magnificentfleet riding at anchor. Nearly all the vessels lying in the bay wereAthenian; for the main body of the allies, and the commissariat ships, had been ordered to muster at Corcyra. The triremes furnished byAthens numbered a hundred, of which sixty were fully equipped as war-galleys, while forty were employed as transports. These numbers hadbeen equalled more than once before during the war; but in efficiency, in splendour of appearance, and in the quality of the crews, this wasby far the finest fleet that ever sailed from Peiraeus. Only the barehulls of the ships were provided by the state, and each vessel wasassigned to some wealthy citizen, who defrayed all the expense offitting her for active service. Sometimes the cost of equipping a shipwas divided between two or more citizens, and at ordinary times thisform of taxation must have been felt by the rich as a heavy burden. But such was the popularity of the Sicilian expedition that thewealthy Athenians who were charged with this duty went far beyond whatwas required of them, each striving to surpass the others by thesuperior beauty and speed of his own ship. The crews were all composedof picked men, attracted by the double rate of pay which was furnishedfrom the state exchequer; and in addition to this, the trierarchs[Footnote: Citizens charged with the duty of equipping a trireme. ]paid special premiums to the petty officers and to the highest classof rowers. The same spirit of emulation extended to the whole body ofAthenians enrolled in the army and fleet; every man felt that whateverhe spent on his own personal equipment was spent for the honour andglory of Athens. And the effect produced on the public mind in Greecewas, in fact, prodigious: after all the ravages of the plague, and tenyears of exhausting warfare, Athens, it seemed, was stronger thanever, and in the mere exuberance of energy was making this imposingdisplay of wealth and power. As to the ostensible object of theexpedition--the conquest of Sicily--few doubted that it must follow asa matter of course. The last farewell had been spoken, the troops were all embarked, andthe rowers sat ready at their oars. The trumpet sounded, commandingsilence, and the voice of the herald was heard, repeating a solemnprayer, which was taken up by the whole multitude on sea and on shore, while the captains and soldiers poured libations of wine from gobletsof silver and gold. When this act of worship was ended, the crewsraised the paean, and at a given signal the whole fleet was set inmotion, and passed, in single file, out of the harbour. On reachingthe open water, they quitted this order, and engaged in a friendlycontest of speed as far as Aegina. Then the crews settled down totheir work, and the great armament swept on, high in heart and hope, to join the allied contingents, and commissariat fleet, now assembledat Corcyra. As yet only general rumours of the intended invasion had reachedSyracuse, and few of the citizens were aware of the imminent peril inwhich they stood. Among those who were better informed wasHermocrates, a Syracusan of high rank, who for many years had been theguiding spirit in Sicilian politics. Speaking at a public assembly, about the time when the Athenian fleet sailed from Peiraeus, he urgedthe necessity of taking prompt measures for placing the city in athorough state of defence. He had no fear, he said, of the ultimatetriumph of Syracuse in the approaching struggle: only let them be ontheir guard, and not underrate the power of the enemy whom they wouldhave to face. The words of Hermocrates, who enjoyed a high reputationfor valour, patriotism, and sagacity, were not without their effect, and it was resolved that the generals should at once set aboutorganizing the military resources of Syracuse, and providing allthings necessary for the public safety. Some steps in this directionthey had already taken; and tidings soon arrived at Syracuse whichcaused them to redouble their exertions. For in the meantime the Athenians had reached Corcyra, where they helda final review of all their forces. The total number of the triremeswas a hundred and thirty-four, and with these sailed a vast fleet ofmerchant ships, and smaller craft, laden with stores of all kinds, andcarrying a whole army of bakers, masons, and carpenters, with thetools of their crafts, and all the engines required for a siege. Besides these, there was a great number of other vessels, small andgreat, fitted out by private speculators for purposes of trade. Themilitary force was on a corresponding scale, comprising five thousand, one hundred hoplites, of whom fifteen hundred were full Atheniancitizens, four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred slingers fromRhodes, and a hundred and twenty exiles from Megara, equipped aslight-armed troops. The force of cavalry was but small, being conveyedin a single transport. The whole armament now weighed anchor from Corcyra and sailed in threedivisions, each commanded by one of the generals, to the oppositecoast of Italy. On arriving at Rhegium, an Ionic city on the Italianside of the strait, they received permission to beach their ships, andform a camp outside the walls; and here they waited for the return ofthree fast-sailing triremes, which had been sent forward fromCorcyrato carry the news of their approach to Egesta, and claim thepromised subsidy, and at the same time to sound the temper of theGreek cities in Sicily. Before long the ships came back with theirreport, and the Athenians now learned to their great chagrin that allthe fabled wealth of Egesta had dwindled to the paltry sum of thirtytalents. The three generals now held a council of war, to decide on a plan ofcampaign. It was evident that no help was to be obtained from Egesta, and the attitude of the Rhegini, who declined to enter their alliance, boded ill for the success of the expedition. As their prospects wereso discouraging, Nicias proposed to confine their operations withinthe narrowest limits, to patch up a peace between Selinus and Egesta, to aid the Leontines, if it could be done without risk or expense, andafter making a display of the Athenian power, to sail home to Athens. Alcibiades protested strongly against such a course, as disgraceful toAthens, and unworthy of the splendid armament entrusted to theircommand. Let them try first what could be effected by negotiation withthe Greek cities and native tribes of Sicily, and after gaining asmany allies as possible in the island, let them proceed to the attackof Selinus and Syracuse. Lamachus, on the other hand, a plain, downright soldier, was for sailing straight to Syracuse, and strikingimmediately at the heart of Sicily. The city, he argued, would befound unprepared, and if they acted at once, in the first terror oftheir presence, they were certain of victory; but if they waited, their men would lose heart, the efficiency of the fleet would beimpaired, and the Syracusans would gather strength and courage fromthe delay. How true was the forecast of Lamachus was proved by the event; but hisbold plan was distasteful alike to the timid temper of Nicias, and tothe tortuous, intriguing spirit of Alcibiades. Finding, therefore, that he had no hope of convincing his colleagues, he voted for themiddle course, and accordingly the plan of Alcibiades, unquestionablythe worst of the three, was adopted. In pursuance of this fatal policy Alcibiades crossed over to Messene, and tried to win over that city to the side of Athens. Meeting with nosuccess, he returned to Rhegium, and immediately afterwards he and oneof his colleagues sailed with a force of sixty triremes to Naxos. Herethe Athenians found a hearty welcome, but at Catana, which was thenunder the influence of Syracuse, their overtures were rejected, sothey continued their voyage southwards, and made their camp for thenight at the mouth of the river Terias. Starting early next day, theyproceeded along the coast, and, crossing the bay of Thapsus, came insight, for the first time, of their great enemy, Syracuse. The mainbody of the fleet remained in the offing, but ten triremes were sentforward to reconnoitre the Great Harbour, and get a nearer view of thefortifications. When the little squadron came within hearing of thewalls, a herald proclaimed in a loud voice that any of the Leontinesnow present in Syracuse should leave the city without fear, and comeover to their faithful kinsmen and allies, the Athenians. After thisfutile demonstration, better calculated; to excite laughter thanterror, the reconnoitring triremes withdrew, and the whole fleetsailed back in the direction of Rhegium. On their return voyage theAthenians succeeded, by a lucky accident, in gaining the adherence ofCatana, which henceforth became the head-quarters of the wholearmament. Soon after they had effected this important change ofstation the Salaminian state trireme arrived with momentous news fromAthens. We have seen what a panic of superstitious fear had beencaused among the Athenians by the mutilation of the Hermae. Arrestedfor the moment by the all-absorbing interest of the Sicilianexpedition, the excitement broke out with renewed violence after thedeparture of the fleet. The enemies of Alcibiades saw that the timewas now ripe for bringing up against him the charge of violating themysteries, and pressing for a judgment. A formal indictment was laidbefore the senate, and it was decided that he should come home andstand his trial. But it was necessary to proceed with caution, forAlcibiades was popular with the troops serving in Sicily; and it waspossible that, if any violence were attempted against his person, theymight break out into mutiny. Accordingly the captain of the Salaminiantrireme was instructed to treat him with all respect, and allow him toreturn to Athens in his own vessel. On receiving the summonsAlcibiades affected to obey, and set sail from Catana, with the statetrireme in attendance. The two ships remained in company as far asThurii, a Greek town of southern Italy, but there the great criminaldisappeared, and after searching for him in vain the officers of theSalaminia were obliged to return to Athens without him. When the newsof his flight was brought to Athens, he was arraigned in his absence, and condemned to death. But if his enemies supposed that they hadheard the last of Alcibiades, they soon learnt how deeply they weremistaken. V The conduct of the campaign in Sicily was thus left in the feeblehands of Nicias; for though Lamachus nominally held an equal command, his poverty and political insignificance prevented him from holdingthe position to which his military talents entitled him. The fewremaining weeks of summer were frittered away in trivial operations onthe western coasts of the island, and then the Athenians withdrew intowinter quarters at Catana. The predictions of Lamachus now began to befulfilled: seeing that Nicias, with the vast force at his disposal, attempted nothing against them, the Syracusans began to despise theirenemy, and thought of taking the offensive. Horsemen from Syracuserode repeatedly up to the Athenian outposts at Catana, and tauntinglyinquired if the Athenians had come to found a colony in Sicily. Atlast even Nicias felt that some display of activity was necessary tosave himself from contempt. He had learnt from certain Syracusanexiles that there was a convenient place for landing troops, on thelow-lying shore where the river Anapus flows into the Great Harbour. Here he determined to make a sudden descent, and in order to avoiddisembarking in the face of an enemy, he contrived a stratagem toremove the whole Syracusan force out of reach. A citizen of Catana, who was attached to the Athenian interest, was sent with a message tothe Syracusan generals, which held out a tempting prospect of gainingan easy and decisive advantage over the Athenian army. Professing tocome from the partisans of Syracuse still remaining in Catana, hepromised on their behalf that if the Syracusans made a sudden assaulton the Athenian camp, their friends in Catana would simultaneouslyfall upon the Athenian troops, who were in the habit of desertingtheir quarters and straggling about the town, and set fire to theirships. This plausible story found ready credence with the Syracusan generals, and they named a day on which they promised to appear in full forcebefore the walls of Catana. When the time appointed drew near, theymarched out with the whole Syracusan army, leaving the city to begarrisoned by their allies, and took up a position within easy reachof Catana. Thereupon Nicias, who was fully informed of theirmovements, embarked his troops by night, sailed down the coast pastSyracuse, and entering the Great Harbour, came to land near theoutlying suburb of Polichne, where stood the great temple of theOlympian Zeus. Here he planted a breastwork of palisades to defend hisships, and drew up his army on ground which offered many obstacles tothe advance of the Syracusan cavalry. Then, having broken down thebridge over the Anapus, he waited for the enemy to appear. Meanwhile the Syracusan generals had marched upon Catana, and findingthat they had been duped, returned with all speed to the defence oftheir own city. After a long and fatiguing march, they came in view ofthe Athenian position, and drew up their forces for battle. But Niciasdeclined the challenge, and the day being now far advanced, they fellback and encamped for the night in the open field. Next morning Nicias, acting with unusual vigour, drew up his army intwo equal divisions, and leaving one half to defend the camp, and actas a reserve, with the other he advanced rapidly upon the enemy. TheSyracusans, who had perhaps reckoned too much on the known indolenceof Nicias, were taken by surprise. Their discipline was lax, and manyof them had left their posts, and gone off into the town. Nevertheless, they met the attack with firmness: those who were on thespot hastened to assume their weapons, which they had laid aside, while the stragglers came running back, and took their stand whereverthey saw a gap in the ranks. After some preliminary skirmishingbetween the light-armed troops, the heavy masses of the hoplites cameto close quarters, and a fierce hand to hand struggle ensued. Whilethe issue was still uncertain, a violent thunderstorm broke over thecontending armies, and struck terror into the Syracusans, who regardedit as an omen of defeat. But the seasoned soldiers of Nicias sawnothing unusual in an autumn tempest, and perceiving the enemy towaver, they pressed their attack, and broke through the opposinglines. The whole Syracusan army now fell back upon Syracuse, but theyretired without haste or disorder, and their retreat was covered by anumerous and efficient body of cavalry, so that their total lossamounted only to two hundred and sixty. The victory thus remained with the Athenians; but the moral advantagewas entirely on the side of the Syracusans. With an army composed ofraw recruits, they had met the flower of the Athenian forces, trainedby years of warfare, and led by experienced generals, in fair fight, and though attacked at a disadvantage, they had fought with spirit, and retreated with coolness and deliberation. They had good reason tobe satisfied with the result of their first encounter with theinvader, and they might well share the high and confident hopesexpressed by their most eminent citizen, Hermocrates. Speaking at ageneral assembly, immediately after the battle, the great patriotcongratulated his countrymen on the courage which they had displayed, and at the same time pointed out the necessity of improving theirdiscipline and military organization. One important reform should bemade at once; the number of the generals, which had hitherto beenfifteen, should be greatly reduced, and those appointed to the supremecommand should be given absolute power, so that they might act withsecrecy and despatch. Further, let the whole adult male population beplaced under arms, and kept in constant drill all through the winter. If these measures were vigorously carried out, they might successfullydefy the Athenians to do their worst. Acting on this advice, the Syracusans deposed the existing generals, and chose Hermocrates, with three others, to fill their place. Thereform of the army was at once taken in hand, and ambassadors weresent to Corinth and Sparta to ask for aid. Corinth, as the mother-cityof Syracuse, might well respond to the call, and it was hoped that theSpartans would be induced to declare open war on Athens, so as tocompel the Athenians to withdraw their forces from Sicily, or at leastprevent them from sending reinforcements. Various defensive works were undertaken by the Syracusans during thewinter. The most important of these was a new wall, extending from thenorthern sea to the Great Harbour, and taking in a wide space ofground, outside the old line of wall, to the west of the city. By thusincreasing the area of Syracuse, they made it much more difficult forNicias to draw his line of blockade, when the siege began in thefollowing spring. They also constructed a fort, with a permanentgarrison, to guard the temple of Zeus in the suburb of Polichne, anddrove piles into the sea at all the landing-places of the GreatHarbour. Soon after the battle Nicias shifted his winter quarters to Naxos, andlearning this the Syracusans marched in full force to Catana, laidwaste the territory, and burnt the deserted huts of the Athenians. Theinsult was tamely endured, and shortly afterwards the ever-activeHermocrates had an opportunity of thwarting the Athenian intriguesamong the Greek cities of Sicily. The scene of this diplomaticencounter was Camarina, a Dorian city which had hitherto waveredbetween its hatred of Syracuse and its fear of Athens. Early in thewinter Athenian envoys appeared at Camarina with overtures ofalliance, and Hermocrates was sent to represent the interests ofSyracuse. Speaking first in the debate, Hermocrates set himself tounmask the designs of the Athenians, who, under the thin pretence ofhelping the Ionic cities of Sicily, had come (he said) to make aconquest of the whole island. The Ionians of Greece had long groanedunder their yoke, and the same fate was in store for the Ionians ofSicily, if they allowed themselves to be beguiled by specious lies. The plea of friendship and goodwill might pass with the degenerateGreeks of Asia and the Aegaean, born to be cajoled and enslaved; butthe Camariaeans were of the stout Dorian race, the hereditary foes oftyranny, too wise and too brave to lend themselves as tools to a bare-faced scheme of aggression. If not, let them beware: Syracuse wasfighting in a righteous cause, and must prevail in the end; help wascoming from Peloponnesus, and if the Camariaeans stood aloof, the daywould come when they would regret their disloyalty. There can be no doubt that Hermocrates was right in his view of themotive which brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the arguments ofEuphemus, the advocate for Athens, who strove to confute him, will notbear examination. But the people of Camarina were in a difficultposition; their city had suffered many things in the past at the handsof Syracuse, and they had reason to fear that her oppressions might berenewed, if she emerged triumphant from the present struggle. On theother hand, if the Athenians were victorious, they might forfeit theirindependence altogether. In this dilemma they determined to play awaiting game, and when the time came for action, to throw their weighton the winning side. For the present they answered that they chose toremain neutral. The debate at Camarina, though interesting and instructive from thelight which it throws on the passions and motives of the combatants, had little influence on the final issue of the war. But about the sametime a scene was being enacted in another part of the Greek world, which led to most momentous consequences. Early in the winter theSyracusan envoys arrived at Corinth, and made an earnest appeal forhelp. The Corinthians were warmly attached to their famous colony, which had never wavered in its allegiance to the mother-city, andmoreover they were the implacable enemies of Athens. They thereforetook up the cause of Syracuse with enthusiasm, and they sent theenvoys on to Sparta, accompanied by delegates of their own, to urgethe immediate resumption of hostilities against Athens, and thesending of prompt aid to Sicily. At Sparta they found an able and unscrupulous ally, the very last whomthey had expected to meet there. This was the outlaw Alcibiades, who, after eluding the vigilance of the Athenian officers at Thurii, hadcrossed over in a merchant ship to Cyllene, the port of Elis. Whilestaying there, he received an invitation from the Lacedaemonians toproceed to Sparta, and made his way thither, having first stipulatedfor a safe-conduct; for he dreaded the vengeance of the Spartans, towhom he had done much mischief by raising the coalition which led tothe battle of Mantinea. So there he was, the guest of his old enemies, burning with all an exile's hatred, and ready to strike some deadlyblow against the city which had cast him out. At first the Spartans gave but a cool and qualified response to theapplication of the envoys from Corinth. They were prepared to lendmoral support to the Syracusans, by sending an embassy to encouragethem in their resistance, but of more substantial aid they said littleor nothing. Now was the time for Alcibiades to play his part. He knew, far better than any of his hearers, all the vulnerable points ofAthens, and had no scruple in using his knowledge for her ruin. Havingobtained permission from the magistrates, he rose to address theSpartan assembly; and his speech is given at full length by thehistorian, who was himself an exile at the time, and may possibly havebeen present [Footnote: The suggestion is made by Grote. ] on thisimportant occasion. The Spartans might smile when they heard this accomplished traitorprofessing friendship towards themselves, and zeal for their service;they might be disgusted at the flippant sophistries by which he stroveto defend his unexampled villainy. But far different feelings musthave been awakened, when he went on to unfold the gigantic scheme ofconquest, to which, as he pretended, the invasion of Sicily was nomore than a prelude. According to this statement, the Atheniansintended, after subjugating the Greeks of Sicily, to turn their armsagainst the Italian Greeks, and finally to attack Carthage. If allthese designs were successful, they would build a great number of newships, taking their materials from the forests of Italy, raise a vastmilitary force, both of Greeks and barbarians, and then return, backedby the whole power of the West, and draw a ring of war roundPeloponnesus. With such resources they would be irresistible, and allGreece must inevitably fall under their sway. "Such, " continued Alcibiades, "is the secret history of the Sicilianexpedition, which you have heard from the mouth of him who knows itbest. Remember, then, that the issue before you concerns not Syracuseonly, but Sparta also: for if Syracuse falls--and fall she must, ifleft without support--all Sicily will be under the heel of Athens;then will come the turn of Italy, and after that you will soon havethe enemy at your own doors. Now learn what you must do, if you wouldavert all the evils which I have foretold. You must send a fleet toSicily at once, with hoplites who can row the ships themselves, andserve in the army as soon as they land, and with them a Spartancommander, to organize the fighting men of Sicily, and compel thosewho are hanging back to do their duty. Such a man will be a host inhimself, and will infuse new life and energy into the defence. Further, you must establish a fortified camp at Decelea, a positionwhich commands the whole territory of Attica; for by so doing you willreduce Athens to a state of siege, and compel the whole malepopulation to serve on garrison duty; you will deprive the Atheniansof their revenues from the silver-mines at Laurium, and you will putnew heart into the cities subject to Athens, and encourage them towithhold their tribute. Let these measures be carried out withpromptitude and vigour, and you will soon reap your reward, in thehumiliation of Athens, and the honour and gratitude of all Greece. " At these words of Alcibiades the sluggish Spartans took fire, andrecognizing the importance of his advice they determined to follow thecourse which he had indicated. Gylippus, a Spartan of high rank, received orders to proceed at once to Syracuse, and assume the controlof the war, and the Corinthians were directed to provide ships for theconveyance of troops. But after this brief display of energy theSpartans relapsed into their wonted torpor. Many months elapsed beforeGylippus was able to embark for Sicily, and meanwhile important eventshad been occurring at the seat of war. We return, therefore, to thehead-quarters of Nicias, which had once more been removed from Naxosto Catana. VI For the next year and a half [Footnote: Spring 414--autumn 413 B. C. ]the scene of our narrative lies almost entirely in the immediateneighbourhood of Syracuse, so that it now becomes necessary todescribe in some detail the site of that city, and the character ofthe adjacent country. Mention has already been made of the island ofOrtygia, the site of the original colony, connected with the mainlandof Sicily by a bridge or causeway. At the southern extremity ofOrtygia there is a narrow strip of land, pointing like a fingertowards the rocky peninsula of Plemmyrium; and between these twopoints lies the entrance to a spacious bay, already alluded to underthe name of the Great Harbour. At the western end of the bay there isa long stretch of low, marshy ground, intersected by the little riversCyana and Anapus, and infested with fever during the heats of summer. On a rising ground, south of the Anapus, stood the suburb of Polichne, with its great temple, sacred to the Olympian Zeus. A little to thenorth of Ortygia the coast rises abruptly in a bold line of cliffs, facing eastwards, and forming the base of a triangular plateau, whichslopes upwards from the sea, and gradually grows narrower until itends in a point, called the hill of Euryelus. This plateau, which borethe name of Epipolae, is guarded on all its three sides by rockyprecipices, only to be ascended at two or three places. Its easternend, called Acheadina, from the wild pear-trees which once flourishedthere, was occupied by a new city, now included with Ortygia in thesame wall of defence. Here were situated the famous stone-quarries, which afterwards acquired so tragic an interest from the sufferings ofthe captive Athenians; and southwards from this district the groundshelves gently to the shores of the Little Harbour, a sheltered inletat the northern end of Ortygia. At the opening of spring the operations against Syracuse began in goodearnest. The first object of Nicias was to obtain possession of theheights of Epipolae, for since the construction of the new Syracusanwall it had become impossible for him to draw his line of blockadefrom the side of the Great Harbour. His preparations were already faradvanced, when the Syracusan generals resolved to anticipate him, byoccupying all the approaches to Epipolae. With this intention theyissued an order for a full muster of troops in a meadow by the Anapus, and after a general review and inspection of arms they appointed apicked body of six hundred hoplites to guard the heights of Epipolae, and hold themselves ready for any other pressing service. But theprecaution was taken too late. On the night before the review Niciasset sail with his whole army from Catana, and landed at a place calledLeon, not more than six or seven furlongs from the northern side ofEpipolae. The fleet then took up its station in the sheltered waterbehind the peninsula of Thapsus, while the land forces, advancing at arun, crossed the level ground, and then, breasting the ascent, gainedthe summit of Euryelus. News of their approach presently reached the Syracusans, who werestill mustered by the Anapus, and breaking off the review, theymarched in haste towards Epipolae, hoping still to dislodge theAthenians from their position. But in their rapid advance over adistance of nearly three miles their ranks became disordered, andtheir attack was so straggling and ineffectual that they were easilyrepulsed, and driven back with considerable loss into the town. On thefollowing day Nicias led his troops down the slope, and offered battlebefore the walls of Syracuse; but the challenge was declined, and theSyracusans remained within their defences, leaving the Athenians in. Undisputed possession of Epipolae. After this important success the Athenian generals prepared at once toform the siege of Syracuse. They first constructed a fort at a placecalled Labdalum, on the northern verge of Epipolae, and near itswestern extremity, to serve as a safe depositary for their baggage andmoney. Then, taking up a position near the centre of Epipolae, theybuilt a circular wall, covering a considerable space of ground, anddefended on the side towards the city by an outer breastwork, athousand feet long. This enclosure, which was called the Circle, wasintended as a shelter for the men employed on construction of theblockading wall, which started from either side of the Circle, and wasto be carried north and south until it reached the sea. The work maderapid progress, and greatly alarmed the Syracusans, who saw themselvesin danger of being cut off from all hope of succour on the land side. Dismayed by this prospect, they resolved to make one more effort todrive the Athenians from their position, and marching out in fullforce, offered battle. Advancing in haste and disorder, they wouldcertainly have suffered a crushing defeat, but for the prudent cautionof their generals, who were so much impressed by the superiordiscipline of the Athenians, that they gave the order to retire, andled their troops back into the city, leaving only a detachment ofhorse to skirmish with the besiegers. But the Athenians had now anefficient force of cavalry, which had been raised by successivereinforcements to the number of six hundred and fifty men; and these, backed by a small force of infantry, soon drove the horsemen ofSyracuse from the field. The Athenians then completed the building of their Circle, and beganto lay the materials for the northern line of wall. By the advice ofHermocrates the Syracusans made no further attempt to attack them infull force, but began to build a counterwall, running out from thecity in a direction south of the Athenian Circle, so as to cross theline to be followed by the wall of blockade, and prevent it fromreaching the Great Harbour. The work proceeded without interruption, for the Athenians were engaged in their building operations north ofthe Circle, and did not choose to divide their forces. When it wascompleted, this counterwork consisted of a solid stone wall, crownedwith wooden towers, and defended in front by a palisade. The blockadeof Syracuse was thus rendered impossible, as long as the defenderscould keep possession of their counterwall. But unfortunately theguards left in charge of the new wail soon began to neglect theirduty, and erected tents in the shade, where they passed the hot hoursof the afternoon, while some even left their posts, and went off torefresh themselves in the city. The Athenian generals did not fail totake advantage of this negligence. Watching their opportunity, whenmost of the Syracusan guards were reposing under the shelter of thetents, they sent a chosen troop of some three hundred men to make asudden assault on the counterwall. Then, having divided the main bodyof the Athenian army between them, they disposed their forces so as toprevent any rescue from the town. One division was drawn up before theprincipal gate in the new Syracusan wall, while the other proceeded toa postern-gate, at the point where the counterwall started from thecity. The combined movement was completely successful; the threehundred carried the stockade and cross-wall by storm, and compelledthe defenders to take refuge within the ramparts of Syracuse. Thewhole Athenian army then marched up to the counterwall and stockade, which they speedily demolished, carrying off the materials for theirown use. Wishing to prevent any second attempt on the part of the Syracusans tocut them off from the southern slope of Epipolae, the Atheniangenerals now fortified that part of the cliff which looks towards theGreat Harbour. By occupying this point they obtained a new centre, commanding the space between the Circle and the southern edge of thecliff, and placing them in communication with the level valley of theAnapus, across which they had to carry their line of blockade. For thepresent building operations were suspended on the northern side of theCircle, as they wished first of all to complete the investment ofSyracuse towards the south. Perceiving their intention, the Syracusans began a second counterwork, consisting of a stockade and ditch, which started at the point ofjunction between the old city-wall and the new, and ran across the lowswampy ground as far as the Anapus. Thus the Athenians were confrontedby a new obstacle, which had to be removed, before they could make anyfurther progress. Acting with energy and decision, they sent orders tothe fleet, which was still lying at Thapsus, to sail round into theGreat Harbour; and without waiting for its arrival, before daybreakLamachus led his troops down the cliff, and advanced against thestockade. His men carried hurdles and planks, to secure their footingin the most treacherous parts of the swamp, and, proceeding thus, inthe first light of dawn they came up to the stockade. They found theSyracusans assembled in force to resist them, and an engagementensued, which speedily ended in favour of the Athenians. The rightwing of the Syracusan army fled back into the city, while the leftwing retreated towards the suburb of Polichne, hotly pursued by thepicked troop [Footnote: P. 203. ] of Athenian hoplites, who wished tocut them off before they reached the river. By this rash movement theAthenians came near to forfeiting the advantage which they had gained, and brought upon themselves an irreparable loss. For the Syracusancavalry turned on their pursuers, and drove them back in disorder uponthe Athenian right. The sudden reverse created something like a panicin that part of the line, and Lamachus, who was in command of the leftwing, hastened to their relief, and threw himself, with a handful ofmen, between the Syracusan cavalry and the fugitives. This gallantaction turned the tide of battle once more, and gave the Athenians onthe right wing time to rally; but Lamachus and his followers, pushingforward too hotly, were attacked by the enemy in a place where theirretreat was cut off by a ditch, and slain to a man. Meanwhile the Syracusans who had fled into the city, observing thetemporary defeat of the Athenians, had taken courage again, and theyreturned to the field, having first sent a detachment to attack theAthenian Circle, where Nicias, who was disabled by sickness, had beenleft in charge with a small garrison. Thinking to make an easycapture, the party sent on this service ran up the slope of Epipolae, and reached the breastwork of the Circle, which they took anddemolished. With the scanty force at his disposal, Nicias had littlehope of repelling the attack, so he had recourse to a desperateexpedient. He ordered the camp-servants to set fire to a great pile oftimber, which was lying, together with a number of siege engines, infront of the wall. They did as he directed, and a great flame arose, which drove back the assailants, and gave warning of his danger to theAthenians in the plain below, where the whole Syracusan army was nowin full retreat. Almost at the same moment the Athenian fleet was seensailing into the Great Harbour, and a strong contingent from thevictorious army came swarming up the hill to the rescue. Thereupon thestorming party from Syracuse turned and fled back to the city, wherethey found the streets thronged by their beaten and dispiritedcomrades. The result of this battle was to leave the Athenian in undisputedpossession of the whole country round Syracuse. Lamachus, indeed, hadfallen, and the loss of that daring and active spirit soon made itselfseverely felt. But for the present the fortunes of Athens were in theascendant, and everything seemed to promise a speedy triumph. TheSyracusans were thoroughly cowed by their defeat, and looked passivelyon, while a double wall of blockade crept steadily forwards from thesouthern edge of Epipolae towards the Great Harbour, where theAthenian fleet had now taken up its permanent station. The nativeSicels, who had hitherto held back through fear of Syracuse, nowjoined the Athenians in great numbers. Even the distant Etruscans, theancient enemies of Syracuse, sent three war-galleys to take part inthe sack of the great Dorian city. Day by day the spirits of the Syracusans sank lower and lower. Theynow began to feel the actual pressure of a siege. Months had passedsince their envoys had sailed for Greece, and there was still no signof help from Corinth or Sparta. They had lost all hope of savingthemselves by their own unaided efforts, and no course seemed left tothem but to make the best terms they could with Nicias. Negotiationswere accordingly opened with the Athenian general, but after muchdiscussion no definite result was attained. In this hour of weaknessand distress, the Syracusans became divided against themselves, andevery man suspected his neighbour of treason. Then they turned upontheir generals, who, after holding out such high promises, had broughtthem to this pass, either by mismanagement, or by deliberatetreachery. Hermocrates and his colleagues were deposed from theircommand, and three other generals succeeded to their place. In the eyes of all those who were watching the struggle, the fate ofSyracuse was sealed; she was destined to fall a prey to the devouringambition of Athens. But at this very moment a little cloud wasapproaching from the east, which was fraught with disaster and ruin tothe besieging army. VII Just at the time when the Syracusans were brought to the brink ofdespair, Gylippus, after so many months' delay, was on his voyage toSicily. While lying at Leucas, a Corinthian settlement in the Ioniansea, he received the alarming intelligence that Syracuse was alreadycompletely blockaded, and the report was confirmed by every vesselthat came in from the west. Deceived by these false rumours, he gaveup all hope of saving Sicily, but hoping still to forestall theAthenians in Italy, he put out from Leucas with four ships, andsteered a straight course for Tarentum. From this city, which wasfriendly to Sparta and Syracuse, he started on his mission among theItalian Greeks, and putting in at Locri he heard for the first timethat the Athenian wall was still unfinished on the northern side ofEpipolae, leaving a wide gap, through which a relieving force mightenter the town. Two courses now lay open to Gylippus. He might sail southwards, andmake an attempt to run the blockade of Syracuse--or he might land onthe northern coast of Sicily, march across the island, and fight hisway into the city through the unwalled interval. In either case, theenterprise seemed desperate enough. By a very moderate exertion on thepart of Nicias, employing only a fraction of the immense force at hisdisposal, Gylippus might have been destroyed, before he had time tobecome dangerous. But Nicias was lulled into a fatal confidence. Hehad heard of the mission of Gylippus, but made no attempt to opposehis voyage to Italy, regarding him as a mere free-booter, unworthy ofserious notice. At last, learning that Gylippus was at Locri, he wasinduced to send out four triremes against him. They were instructed totake station at Rhegium, and cut off the daring intruder as he passedthrough the strait. But when they reached Rhegium, the wary Spartanwas already beyond their reach. He had decided to approach Syracuse byland, and was now far advanced on his voyage to Himera, the only Greeksettlement on the north coast of Sicily. Himera, though an Ioniccolony, was attached to the Dorian interest, and her citizens gave ahearty welcome to the Spartan deliverer. Before long, a little army ofabout three thousand men was assembled at Himera, and ready to followthe fortunes of Gylippus. Seven hundred of these were the sailors andmarines from his own vessels, armed as hoplites, and the Himeraeansfurnished a thousand infantry, light and heavy-armed, and a hundredcavalry. Owing to the recent death of a powerful chieftain, who hadbeen a strong partisan of Athens, the northern Sicels had now changedsides, and they sent a thousand men to serve under the Spartan leader. Small contingents also arrived, in answer to the call of Gylippus, from Gela and Selinus. With this little force, composed of such motleyelements, Gylippus started from Himera, and entered on his march forthe relief of Syracuse. The fate of Syracuse was already wavering inthe balance. As yet no news of approaching succour had reached thebeleaguered city, and the Syracusans had abandoned all hope. To savethemselves from a worse calamity, they resolved to surrender, and anassembly was summoned to settle the terms of capitulation. But at thisvery moment a message came to them by sea, which kindled their courageafresh, and banished these counsels of despair. When Gylippus leftLeucas, a Corinthian fleet of some fifteen vessels was preparing tosail from that port for Syracuse. One of the ships, commanded by acertain Gongylus, was delayed in the harbour, and started after therest. But Gongylus, instead of steering the ordinary course, whichwould have taken him first to Italy, made a bold dash, straight acrossthe sea, and just when the momentous decision was pending, his shipcame to anchor in the Little Harbour. Forthwith the joyful tidingsspread like wildfire through the city: Gylippus was coming, armed withfull authority from Sparta--Corinth had taken up their cause--Syracusewas saved! All thought of surrender was instantly flung away, and newsarriving shortly afterwards that Gylippus was near at hand, the wholeSyracusan force marched out to meet him, and escorted him triumphantlyinto the town. Thus, without a blow being struck, an immense access of strength hadbeen brought to the besieged, and the grand condition of successfulresistance, on which Alcibiades had laid such weight, was fulfilled. ASpartan officer of consummate ability was now in Syracuse, and he hadmade his way into the city, not alone, not by stealth, but at the headof an army, and before the very eyes of the enemy. Weeks must haveelapsed between the departure of Gylippus from Leucas, and his arrivalat Syracuse; and during all this time, with one trifling exception, Nicias made no effort to oppose his progress. Prudent men might wellhave regarded the enterprise of Gylippus as a wild and desperateadventure; and such it must have proved, but for the astoundingblindness and apathy of Nicias. At the time when Gylippus reached Syracuse the Athenian lines ofcircumvallation were all but completed on the side of the GreatHarbour; but a wide interval was still left between the Circle and thenorthern sea, and it was here that Gylippus had effected an entrance. To keep this space open was a matter of supreme importance, and thescene of action is now shifted again to the northern slope ofEpipolae. On the day after his arrival Gylippus succeeded in capturingthe Athenian fort at Labdalum, and the command of this position gaveincreased facilities for the construction of a third counterwall, which was forthwith taken in hand, and carried in the direction ofLabdalum, until it crossed the blockading line at its northern end. If the Syracusans succeeded in completing and holding thiscounterwork, the blockade of Syracuse would be rendered impossible. Yet for some time Nicias made no attempt to interrupt its progress. Asif already convinced of his inferiority in the field, he took steps tokeep his communications open by sea, and with this object he employeda part of his forces in fortifying the headland of Plemmyrium, whichcommanded the entrance to the Great Harbour. Here he built three fortswhich served as an arsenal for the Athenian stores; and henceforthPlemmyrium became the chief station for his fleet. This removal had adisastrous effect on the Athenian crews; for the place being almost adesert, and the springs distant and scanty, they were compelled to gofar from their quarters in search of forage and water, and while thusengaged they were cut off in great numbers by the Syracusan horse, whohad been posted at Polichne for this purpose. A rapid demoralizationof the crews was the consequence, and desertions became more frequentevery day. Meanwhile the counterwall was advancing steadily up the hill, andevery day Gylippus drew up his army, to cover the operations of theworkmen. At last he determined to force on an engagement, and in thefirst encounter the Syracusans, fighting in a confined space, whichprevented their cavalry from coming into action, suffered a defeat. Inno wise discouraged by this reverse, on the next day they took up aposition in the more open ground, and offered battle again. By thistime the Syracusan counterwork had almost passed the end of theAthenian wall, and if it were carried a few yards further, the siegeof Syracuse would be brought to a standstill. Roused by the imminenceof the crisis, Nicias determined to make one more effort to regain hismastery in the field, and led his troops to the attack. The main bodyof the hoplites were soon hotly engaged on both sides, and in themidst of the action Gylippus directed his cavalry and light-armedinfantry to make a sudden charge on the Athenian left. This movementwas executed with so much skill and resolution that the Athenians inthat part of the line gave way, and drew after them the rest of theircomrades, who broke their ranks, and fled for shelter behind the siegeworks. The Syracusans lost no time in turning their victory to account. Onthe very same night their wall was extended some distance beyond theblockading line, and until this new barrier was overthrown, theinvestment of Syracuse had now become impossible. Whichever way he looked, Nicias saw himself menaced with failure anddefeat. He had sent twenty ships to intercept the Corinthian squadronon its voyage from Leucas; but the little fleet of rescue succeeded inavoiding the snare, and made its way into the port of Syracuse, thusadding twelve fresh vessels to the defending force. Gylippus himselfwas marching unhindered up and down the island, passing from city tocity, and raising reinforcements of ships and men; and a secondembassy had been despatched by the Syracusans, to carry the news oftheir victory to Corinth and Sparta, and ask for further help. Anotherominous sign of coming events was the bustle and activity now visiblein the dockyards of Syracuse and the waters of the Little Harbour; forthe Syracusans had turned their attention seriously to their fleet, and thought of nothing less than attacking the Athenians on their ownelement. These symptoms of renewed confidence and energy were observed byNicias with growing disquiet. And if he turned his eyes to his owncamp, he saw little to relieve his anxiety. For the predictions ofLamachus had been fulfilled to the letter. By his fatal policy ofprocrastination Nicias had frittered away the resources of the mostsplendid armament that ever set sail from Peiraeus. His soldiers wereinfected by the despondency of their leader, and many of them werestricken by the marsh-fever which haunts the unwholesome district ofthe Anapus. Above all the condition of the fleet showed the lamentableeffect of long inaction and delay. All the supplies of the Athenianscame to them by sea, and in order to keep their communications open, it was necessary to keep the whole of the fleet on constant duty. Inconsequence of this, the hulls of the triremes had become sodden withwater, which made them leaky, and difficult to row. Moreover thecrews, which were largely composed of foreign seamen, had grownrestive and mutinous under the severe strain of hardships andprivation, so different from the easy and lucrative service in thehope of which they had enlisted. Some took the first opportunity ofdeserting to the enemy, while others ran away to remote parts ofSicily; and there was no means of filling the places thus left vacant. Such was the burden of care and apprehension which lay heavy on thefeeble shoulders of the Athenian general. He was naturally a weak man, haunted by superstitious terrors, irresolute, easily cast down; andthis infirmity of character was aggravated by a painful and incurabledisease. There was no longer any question of laying siege to Syracuse:he himself was now besieged, and it was all he could do to maintainhis position within his defences, and keep the sea open for theconveyance of supplies. In this desperate situation he determined tosend a written despatch to Athens. We are led to suppose that this wasan unusual proceeding, and that news from the seat of war wasgenerally sent by word of mouth. The document is given at full length, with all its grievous confessions of incompetence and failure. Aftersetting forth the facts of the case as stated above, Nicias insiststhat one of two things must be done: either the army now lying beforeSyracuse must be recalled to Athens, or the Athenians must send out asecond army, equal in strength to the first, and a general to relievehim of his command. At the conclusion of his despatch Nicias peevishly complains of theexacting temper of the Athenians, and their readiness to blame anyonebut themselves if anything untoward occurred. Whatever may be thetruth of the general charge, it was most ill-timed and ungrateful inhis own case. Towards him, at least, the conduct of his fellow-citizens was marked by an excess of generosity, amounting to actualinfatuation. Nothing is more remarkable than the unshaken confidenceof the Athenians in their feeble general, after hearing this terribleindictment, drawn up by his own hand. They refused to accept hisresignation, and passed a decree that large reinforcements should besent to Sicily, with Demosthenes and Eurymedon as generals; and in themeantime they appointed Menander and Euthydemus, two officers alreadyserving before Syracuse, to share with Nicias the burden of command. Before the winter was ended Eurymedon started with ten ships forSicily, to announce that effectual help was coming; while Demostheneswas charged with the duty of enlisting troops and organizing a fleet. Meanwhile new perils were gathering round the Athenians at home, whichshould have warned them to abandon their wild plans of conquest, andconcentrate all their strength for their own defence. The Spartans hadlong been restrained by a scruple of conscience from an opendeclaration of war, wishing to avoid the guilt which is associatedwith the first act of aggression. Eighteen years before they hadrefused all offers of arbitration, and deliberately provoked anencounter with Athens, in direct violation of the Thirty Years' Truce, which provided for an amicable settlement of differences; and by soacting they had, as they believed, incurred the anger of heaven, andbrought on themselves a long train of disasters. But now the positionwas reversed: for in the previous year the Athenians had made descentson the coasts of Laconia, and other districts of Peloponnesus; andthey had repeatedly turned a deaf ear to the friendly overtures of theSpartans, who proposed to submit all disputed matters to a peacefultribunal. Thus relieved of their scruples, the Spartans prepared to renew thewar in good earnest, and early in the following spring [Footnote: B. C. 4I3. ] they summoned their allies to the Isthmus, and marched underAgis their king into Attica. After ravaging the plain, they encampedat Decelea, fourteen miles north of Athens, and here they establisheda fortified post, which was garrisoned by contingents of thePeloponnesian army, serving in regular order. Once more Alcibiades hadcause to exult in the success of his malignant counsels, which hadsent Gylippus to Syracuse, and had now planted this root of bittermischief on the very soil of Attica. While the allies were thus engaged at Decelea, a considerable body oftroops had embarked at Taenarum and at Corinth, and sailed to takepart in the defence of Syracuse. In Greece, all the old enemies ofAthens were arming against her, and beyond the sea her prospects grewdarker and darker every day. Yet nothing, it seemed, could break thespell of fatal delusion which rested on the doomed city. While Atticalay in the grip of the enemy, a fleet of sixty-five triremes, carryinga great military force, weighed anchor from Peiraeus, and steered itscourse, under the command of Demosthenes, for Sicily. VIII We must now return to Syracuse, where fortune was preparing a new blowfor the ill-fated Athenian army. Gylippus came back from his missionat the beginning of spring, bringing with him the reinforcements whichhe had gathered from various parts of Sicily. At once resuming theoffensive, he planned an attack on the forts recently erected byNicias at Plemmyrium, and in order to divide the attention of theAthenians, he determined to make a simultaneous movement against themby sea and land. He himself took command of the army, and setting outat night, made his way round to the rear of the Athenian position atPlemmyrium. Meanwhile the Syracusan fleet lay ready in two divisions, one of which, consisting of thirty-five vessels, was moored in thedocks, within the Great Harbour, while the other, to the number offorty-five, had its station in the Lesser Harbour. At the hourappointed by Gylippus, just as day was breaking, both squadrons gotunder weigh, and bore down upon Plemmyrium, from the opposite sides ofOrtygia. Though taken by surprise, the Athenians put out in haste withsixty triremes, and a sea-fight ensued, in which the Syracusans forsome time had the advantage. By this time Gylippus was at hand withhis army, and by a sudden assault on the Athenian forts he made aneasy capture of all three; for the greater part of the garrison hadflocked down to the sea, to watch the progress of the action in theGreat Harbour. Fortunately for these men, who had so grossly neglectedtheir duty, the Athenian fleet had now gained a decisive victory, andthey were thus enabled to make their escape by water, and cross overto the camp of Nicias, on the other side of the bay. By the capture of Plemmyrium a great treasure fell into the hands ofthe Syracusans. The loss to the Athenians, in money, stores, and men, was serious enough; but further consequences ensued, which werenothing less than disastrous. The enemy now commanded both sides ofthe entrance to the Great Harbour, and not a ship-load of provisionscould reach the Athenian camp without an encounter with the Syracusantriremes. Well might despondency and dismay take possession of thebeleaguered army, cramped in their narrow quarters on the swampy flatsof the Anapus. All Sicily, with one or two exceptions, had now declared for Syracuse, and reinforcements came pouring in from every side. Gylippus wasresolved, if possible, to destroy the armament of Nicias, before thefresh succours from Athens had time to arrive; and, as before, theattack was to be made simultaneously by sea and land. Since the lossof Plemmyrium, the Athenian fleet had been penned up in the confinedspace at the head of the Great Harbour. Outside of these narrowlimits, the whole coast was in the hands of the enemy, and anyAthenian trireme which ventured out into open water ran the risk ofbeing driven on a hostile shore. Unless they chose to incur this greatperil, the Athenians would have to fight in close order, with thelong, tapering prows of their vessels exposed to collision. The Syracusans skilfully availed themselves of the advantage thusoffered. The impact of prow with prow, which had hitherto beenregarded as a disgraceful evidence of bad seamanship, had now becomethe most effective method of attack; and in order to execute thissimple manoeuvre without damage to their own ships, the Syracusansshortened the prows of their triremes, and strengthened them withheavy beams of timber, thus converting them into a broad and solidmass, which could be driven with crushing force against the slenderbeaks of the Athenian galleys. When all was ready, Gylippus led out his troops, and assailed theAthenian wall which faced towards Syracuse, and at the same time thegarrison stationed at Polichne left their quarters, and made anotherattack on the opposite side. The assault had already commenced, whenthe Syracusan fleet, which numbered eighty triremes, was seenadvancing towards the inner shore of the bay, where the ships ofNicias lay moored; and the Athenian seamen, who had not expected to becalled into action, hastened in some confusion to man their ships, seventy-five of which were presently engaged with the enemy. After aday passed in irregular and desultory fighting, the battle endedslightly in favour of the Syracusans. During the next day theSyracusans remained inactive, and Nicias employed the interval inrepairing the ships which had suffered damage, and providing for thedefence of his fleet. The Athenian naval station was protected by arow of piles, rammed into the bottom of the sea, forming a semi-circular breastwork, with an opening about two hundred feet wide, where the ships passed in and out. On either side of this entranceNicias caused a merchant vessel to be moored, and each vessel wasprovided with an engine called a dolphin, a heavy mass of lead, suspended from the yard-arm, which could be dropped on the deck of anyhostile trireme attempting to pass. Early on the following morning the Syracusans resumed hostilities bothby sea and land, and after several hours of desultory fighting, theydrew off their fleet, and sailed back to their station under the wallsof the city. The Athenians were well pleased by this sudden relief, and concluding that their work was done for the day, they disembarkedat leisure, and began to prepare their midday meal. But before theyhad time to snatch a mouthful, the whole Syracusan fleet was seenadvancing again from the opposite shore, and the hungry and wearyAthenian crews were summoned on board to repel a second attack. Thiscrafty manoeuvre was due to a suggestion of Ariston, the most skilfulof the Corinthian seamen, by whose advice provisions had been broughtdown to the beach, so that the Syracusan crews were kept together, andready to renew the action, after a brief interval for repose andrefreshment. For a little while the two fleets faced each other, without venturingto attack; then the Athenians, who were feverish with hunger andfatigue, could restrain themselves no longer, but with one consentthey dashed their oars into the water, and with shouts of mutualencouragement charged down upon the enemy. The Syracusans kept a firmfront, and opposing their massive prows to the rash assault, inflictedgreat damage on the Athenian triremes, many of which were completelywrecked by the shock of the collision. On every side the Athenianswere hard beset; the light-armed troops posted on the decks of theSyracusan vessels, plied them with a shower of javelins, while thewaters swarmed with a multitude of boats, manned by daringadventurers, who rowed boldly up to the sides of the Atheniantriremes, broke the oars, and hurled darts through the port-holes atthe rowers. After fighting for some time at a great disadvantage, withexhausted crews, and in a narrow space, where they had no room tomanoeuvre, the Athenians were compelled to fall back, and soughtrefuge behind their palisade. This important success raised the spirits of the Syracusans higherthan ever. They had gained a decisive victory over the greatest navalpower in Greece, sunk seven triremes, disabled many more, and slain ortaken prisoners a large number of men. Flushed with pride and hope, they immediately began to prepare for a final attack, which was to endin the complete destruction of their enemies both by sea and land. Butthese high expectations received a sudden check; for on the day afterthe battle, [Footnote: Or possibly two days. ] the watchers on thewalls of Syracuse descried a great fleet on the northern horizon. Presently the regular beat of ten thousand oars could be distinctlyheard; it grew louder and louder, and as the vanguard came into fullview, the alarmed Syracusans recognized the truth. There was nomistaking the peculiar build and familiar ensigns of the renownedAthenian galleys. This could be no other than the fleet ofDemosthenes, arrived just in time to save the shattered armament ofNicias, and once more turn the tide of war against Syracuse. A greatmultitude rushed to the battlements, and gazed with keen pangs ofanxiety as the long line of triremes, seventy-three in number, sweptpast the walls of Ortygia, rounded the southern point, and crossingthe Great Harbour, dropped anchor at the naval station of Nicias. Ifanyone not concerned in the struggle had been present, he might haveadmired the grand exhibition of military pomp and power, the perfecttrim and condition of the triremes, the precision of the rowing, andthe glittering ranks of the hoplites, javelin-men, archers, andslingers, who thronged the decks. But no such feeling could find roomin the minds of the Syracusans. After their long trials andsufferings, on the very eve of their crowning triumph, a new host ofenemies had sprung up against them, and all their toils were beginninganew. IX When Demosthenes arrived at Syracuse, the position of affairs was asfollows: the blockading wall of the Athenians still extended in anunbroken line from the circular fort on Epipolae to the camp and navalstation of Nicias at the head of the Great Harbour; but the Athenianswere cut off from access to the northern slope of Epipolae by theSyracusan counterwall, which had been carried up the whole length ofthe plateau as far as the hill of Euryelus. Along the northern edge ofthe cliff the Syracusans had established three fortified camps, wherethe defenders of the counterwall had their quarters, and on the summitof Euryelus a fort had been erected, which held the key to the wholesystem of defence. Demosthenes saw at once that, before any progress could be made withthe siege of Syracuse, it was necessary to gain possession of thecounterwall, and confine the Syracusans within the limits of theircity. The sooner he made the attempt, the greater was his chance ofsuccess; for every day wasted would give new confidence to the enemy, and the condition in which he found the troops of Nicias was a visiblewarning against the fatal consequences of delay. An attack made on thecross-wall from its southern side ended in total failure; his siege-engines were burnt, and the storming-parties repulsed at every point. The only course which remained was to march round to the north-westernextremity of the plateau, carry the fort of Euryelus, and assail theSyracusans within their own lines. After consulting with hiscolleagues, Demosthenes determined to try the hazardous method of anight-attack, hoping thus to take the garrison on Euryelus bysurprise. He himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the command, and the whole Athenian army was engaged in the adventure, except thosewho remained behind with Nicias to guard the camp. On a moonlightnight in August, at the hour of the first watch, the march began. Moving cautiously up the valley of the Anapus, they turned thenorthern end of the hill, and reached the path by which Lamachus hadascended in the spring of the previous year. At first all seemed topromise success to the Athenians unobserved by the enemy, Demosthenesascended the hill, stormed the fort, and, drove the garrison back onthe three fortified camps which flanked the Syracusan counterwall onits northern side. The fugitives raised the alarm, and the call waspromptly answered by a picked troop of six hundred hoplites, who werestationed nearest to the point of danger. These men made a gallantstand, but they were overpowered by superior numbers, and thrust backon the main body of the Syracusans, who were now advancing underGylippus to the rescue. They in their turn were forced to give groundbefore the impetuous charge of Demosthenes, and a general panic seemedabout to spread through the whole Syracusan army. Already theAthenians had begun to throw down the battlements of the counterwall, and if they were allowed to proceed, Syracuse would once more beexposed to imminent danger. But now occurred one of those sudden turns of fortune which were socommon in Greek warfare. As the soldiers of the Athenian van rushedforward too hotly, wishing to complete the rout of the enemy they fellinto disorder, and in this condition they were confronted by a stoutlittle troop of Boeotian hoplites, who had found their way to Syracuseearlier in the summer. This unexpected resistance checked the furiousonset of the Athenians, and the Boeotians, pursuing their advantage, charged in solid phalanx and put them to flight. Once more the tide ofbattle had turned against Athens. Restored to confidence by the steadyvalour of their allies, the Syracusans closed their ranks, andadvanced in dense masses up the hill. A scene of indescribable horrorand confusion ensued, so that no one was afterwards able to give aclear account of what had happened. On the narrow neck of land whichforms the western end of Epipolae two great armies were rushing to theencounter. On one side was the main body of the Athenians, stillignorant of the defeat of their comrades, and hurrying forward toshare in the victory. On the other side was the whole host ofSyracuse, advancing with deafening shouts to meet them; and in themiddle were the men of Demosthenes, flying in headlong rout before theconquering Boeotians. In the uncertain light, the fugitives were atfirst mistaken for enemies, and many of them perished miserably by thespears of their own countrymen. On came the Syracusans, bearing downall before them; but the Athenians, as they strove to escape, wereflung back upon the enemy by fresh bodies of their own men, who werestill thronging by thousands up the northern path of Euryelus. Allsemblance of order was now lost in the Athenian army, which was brokenup into detached parties, some flying, some advancing, and shoutingtheir watchword to all whom they met, so as to learn whether they hadto do with friend or foe. But the Syracusans soon learnt thewatchword, which thus became a means of betraying the Athenians totheir own destruction. To add to the confusion, the Dorian allies ofAthens raised a paean, or war-song, so similar to that of theSyracusans, that the Athenians fled at their approach supposing themto be enemies. The grand army of Demosthenes, which had set out withsuch high hopes, was now no better than a mob of wild and desperatemen, friend fighting against friend, and citizen against citizen. Atlength the whole multitude turned and fled, each man seeking to savehimself as best he could. Some, hard pressed by the enemy, flungthemselves from the cliffs, and were dashed to pieces on the rocksbelow; others succeeded in reaching the plain, and found their wayback to the camp of Nicias; while not a few lost their way, andwandered about the country until the following day, when they werehunted down and slain by the Syracusan horseman. Demosthenes had done all that a man could to recover the ground lostby Nicias, and resume the aggressive against Syracuse. His well-laidscheme had ended disastrously, and only one course remained, consistent with public duty and common sense. To waste the blood andtreasure of Athens in Sicily any longer would be suicidal folly. TheAthenians at home were in a state of siege, and needed every man andevery ship for the defence of their own territory, and the maintenanceof their empire in Greece. Sickness and despondency had alreadywrought dire havoc among the troops encamped before Syracuse. Toremain was utter ruin, both to themselves and their fellow-citizens. The sea was still open, and the new armament, with what remained ofthe old, would be strong enough to secure their retreat. Let themembark without delay, turn their backs on the fatal shores of Sicily, and hoist sail for home. These arguments were urged by Demosthenes with unanswerable force at aprivate meeting of the generals which was held immediately after thedefeat on Epipolae But unhappily for all those most nearly concernedin the debate, the influence of Nicias was still supreme in theAthenian camp; and to spur that gloomy trifler into decisive actionwas beyond the power even of Demosthenes. Nicias knew that, if he gavethe word to retreat, in a few weeks he would have to stand before thebar of his countrymen, and give an account of the great trust which hehad betrayed. It would be better, he thought, to perish under thewalls of Syracuse, than to brave that stern tribunal, and read hisdoom on those angry, accusing faces. And apart from these selfishterrors, he was still in communication with his partisans in Syracuse, who encouraged him to wait for a favourable turn of affairs. Thusfettered to the spot both by his hopes and his fears, he obstinatelyrefused to move. While Demosthenes argued, and Nicias demurred, Gylippus had not beenidle. A day or two after the battle, he once more left Syracuse, andtraversed the whole length of the island, collecting troops on hisway. At Selinus he was joined by the Peloponnesian and Boeotiansoldiers who had sailed from Taenarum early in the spring, and hadjust reached that port, after a long and adventurous voyage. With thiswelcome addition to his forces, and thousands more who had answeredhis call from all parts of Sicily, he returned to Syracuse, andprepared to put out all his strength in a general assault on the armyand fleet of Athens. The Athenians had not yet abandoned their lines on the southern sideof Epipolae, and from this position they watched the arrival of thenew army raised by Gylippus, as it defiled down the slope, and pouredthrough the gates of Syracuse to swell the ranks of their enemies. Intheir own camp the state of things was growing worse every day, andeven Nicias now became convinced that to remain any longer would besheer madness. With the hearty concurrence of his colleagues, he gavehis vote for immediate departure, and the order was secretly passedround the camp that every man should hold himself in readiness to goon board, as soon as the signal was given. It was necessary to proceedwith caution, for if the enemy were informed of their purpose, theywould have to fight their way through the Syracusan fleet. Thepreparations were accordingly made with as little noise as possibleand in a short time all was ready for the voyage. Night sank down onthe Athenian camp, but among all that vast multitude no one thought ofsleep, for the whole host was waiting in breathless eagerness for thesignal to embark. Over the eastern waters the full moon was shining, making a long path of silver and pointing the way to home. Butsuddenly a dark shadow touched the outer rim of that gleaming disk, and crept stealthily on, until the whole face of the moon was veiledin darkness. A whisper, a murmur, a shudder went round among thoseanxious watchers, and before the shadow had passed away, ten thousandtongues were eagerly discussing the meaning of that mysteriousportent. Most were agreed that it was a warning from heaven, forbidding their departure until the angry powers had been appeased bysacrifice and prayer. In the mind of Nicias, enslaved by the grossestsuperstition, there was no room for doubt. He was surrounded byprophets, whose advice he sought on every occasion, and guided by themhe proclaimed that for thrice nine days, the time required for acomplete circuit of the moon, there could be no talk of departing. But the Athenians were soon engaged in a sterner task than the vainrites of propitiation and penitential observance. The news of theirintended retreat, and its untoward interruption, so raised the spiritsof the Syracusans, that they resolved to risk another sea-fight, andafter some days spent in training their crews, they sailed out withseventy-six ships, and offered battle, and Gylippus at the same timeattacked the Athenian lines by land. The Athenians succeeded inrepulsing the assault on their walls, but in the encounter between thefleets, though they out-numbered the enemy by ten ships, they suffereda decisive defeat. Eurymedon was slain, and eighteen vessels fell intothe hands of the Syracusans, who put all the crews to the sword. The pride and ambition of the Syracusans now knew no bounds. Relievedfrom all fear for the safety of their city they began to take aloftier view of the struggle, and to grasp the full compass andgrandeur of the issues involved. It was no mere feud between two rivalstates, but a great national conflict, which was to end in thedownfall of a wide-spread usurpation, and the deliverance of a hundredcities from bondage. The whole naval and military forces of Athens laycrippled and helpless within their grasp; they would shatter to piecesthe instrument of tyranny, and win an immortal name as the liberatorsof all Greece. Their first care was to prevent the escape of theAthenians, and for this purpose they began to close the mouth of theGreat Harbour by a line of triremes and vessels of burden, anchoredbroadside across the channel. X The Athenians were thus caught in a trap, and their only hope ofsaving themselves was to force the barrier of the Great Harbour, andescape by sea, or, failing that, to make their way by land to somefriendly city. As a last sad confession of defeat, they withdrew thegarrison from their walls on Epipolae, and reduced the dimensions oftheir camp, confining it to a narrow space of the coast, where thefleet lay moored. Every vessel which could be kept afloat was preparedfor action, and when the whole force was mustered, out of two greatarmaments only a hundred and ten were found fit for service. A smallbody of troops was left to guard the camp, and all the rest, exceptsuch as were totally disabled by sickness, were distributed asfighting-men among the ships. For the countrymen of Phormio had nowreverted to the primitive conditions of naval warfare, in which thetrireme was a mere vehicle for carrying troops, and not, as in thedays of that great captain, the chief weapon of offence. Every foot ofstanding-room on the decks was occupied by a crowd of hoplites, javelin-men, archers, and slingers, and on their prowess the issue ofthe battle depended. To lay their vessels aboard the enemy with aslittle delay as possible, and leave the rest to the soldiers, was nowthe chief object of the Athenian captains; and the better to effect. This, men were stationed on the prows, armed with grappling-irons, tohold the attacking trireme fast, and prevent her from backing awayafter the first shock of collision. With hearts full of sad foreboding, the great multitude mustered onthe beach, and waited for the word to embark. On a rising ground, fronting the camp, the generals; stood grouped in earnestconsultation; then every voice was hushed, as Nicias came forward, andbeckoned with his hand, commanding silence. The form of the generalwas bowed with years, and his face lined with pain and sickness, butin his eye there was an unwonted fire, and his tones rang clear andfull, as he reminded his hearers of the great cause for which theywere to fight, and the mighty interests which hung in the balance thatday. "Men of Athens, " he said, "and you, our faithful allies, yourlives, your liberty, and the future of all who are dear to you, are inyour own hands. If you would ever see home again, you must resolve toconquer fortune, even against her will, like seasoned veterans, inuredto the perils and vicissitudes of war. Hitherto we have generally gotthe better of the enemy on land and we are now going to fight a landbattle on the sea. As soon as you come within reach of a Syracusanvessel, fling your grappling-irons, and hold her fast, until not a manis left alive to defend her deck. This will be the task of thesoldiers, whom I need not tell to do their duty. And you, seamen ofthe Athenian fleet, be not dismayed because we have forsaken ourformer tactics, but trust to the strong arms of the fighting men. Remember, those of you who are not of Attic descent, how long you haveenjoyed the high privileges of Athenian citizens, and the honourreflected on you by your connection with Athens. "My last word shall be spoken to you, fellow-citizens, Athenians bornand bred. You know what you have to expect from the Syracusans, ifthis last struggle should end in defeat. But consider further whatwill be the fate of your friends at home. Their docks are empty, theirwalls are stripped of defenders, and if you fail them, Syracuse willunite with their old enemies, and bear them down. Here, where westand, are the army, the fleet, the city, and the great name ofAthens; go, then, and fight as you never fought before, for never yethad soldier such a prize to win, and such a cause to defend. " When Nicias had concluded his stirring appeal, the embarkation of thetroops began. As the fatal moment drew nearer and nearer, the anxietyand distress of the Athenian general became unbearable. Feeling thathe had not said enough, he hurried to and fro, addressing each captainwith an agony of supplication, and imploring him by every sacredname, --his wife, his children, his country, and his country's gods, --to play a man's part, forgetting all thoughts of self. Havingexhausted every topic of entreaty, and seen the last man on board, heturned away, still unsatisfied, and addressed himself to the task ofdrawing up the troops left under his command for the defence of thecamp. These were disposed along the shore in as long a line aspossible, that they might encourage those fighting on the sea by theirpresence, and lend prompt help in case of need. Behind them, everypoint of outlook was held by a throng of anxious spectators, --thesick, the maimed, and the wounded, --every man who had strength tocrawl from his bed, and watch that last desperate struggle for libertyand home. And now the Athenian admirals, Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, raised the signal, and the great fight began. The foremost shipssucceeded in reaching the mouth of the Great Harbour, and began tobreak through the barrier, when the whole Syracusan fleet closed inupon them on all sides, and forced them back Then the battle becamegeneral, and soon the two fleets were scattered over the whole surfaceof the bay in little groups, and each group engaged in a wild andfurious melee. There was no attempt to manoeuvre, but ship encounteredship; as accident brought them together, and advanced to the attack, under a shower of javelins and arrows. Then followed the dull crash ofcollision, and the fierce rush of the fighting-men, as theyendeavoured to board. Here and there could be seen knots of three orfour triremes, locked together with shattered hulls and broken oars, while the soldiers on the decks strove for the mastery. Nearly twohundred triremes, and some forty thousand men, were engaged in thattumultuous fight; and the thunder of the oars, the crash of collidingtriremes, and the yells of the assailants, raised an uproar sotremendous that it was impossible to hear the voice of command. Allorder and method was lost, yet still they fought on, the Syracusanswith a savage thirst for vengeance, the Athenians with the fury ofdespair; and for a long time the issue remained doubtful. All this scene of havoc and carnage was witnessed by the wholepopulation of Syracuse, who thronged the walls, or stood in arms alongthe shore, and followed every incident with breathless interest. Butabove all among the Athenians left behind in the camp excitement wasstrained to the point of anguish. Here the view was more restricted, and each group of spectators had its attention fixed on some one ofthe many encounters which were raging in different parts of the bay. Some who saw their friends conquering, shouted with joy and triumph;some shrieked in terror, as an Athenian ship went down; and others, when the combat long wavered, rocked their bodies to and fro in anagony of suspense. Thus at the same moment every shifting turn ofbattle, victory and defeat, panic and rally, flight and pursuit, wasmirrored on those pale faces, and echoed in a thousand mingled cries. But at length these discordant voices were united in one general noteof horror, as the whole Athenian fleet, or all that was left of it, was seen making in headlong rout for the upper end of the bay, withthe victorious Syracusans pressing hard behind. Then most of those whowere watching from the shore were seized with uncontrollable terror, and sought to hide themselves in holes and corners of the camp; whilea few, who were more stout-hearted, waded into the water, to save theships, or rushed to defend the walls on the land side. But for thepresent the Syracusans were contented with their victory, and afterchasing the fugitive triremes as far as their defences, they wheeledand rowed back across the Great Harbour, through floating corpses, andthe wrecks of more than seventy vessels. On their arrival at Syracusethey were hailed with such a burst of enthusiasm as had rarely beenwitnessed in any Greek city. The victory, indeed, had been dearlybought, but it was well worth the cost, and the power of Athens hadsustained a blow from which it could never recover. But among all thethronging hosts of Syracuse, who now gave themselves up to revel andrejoicing, there was one man at least who knew that even now thedanger was not yet past. Forty thousand Athenian soldiers were stillencamped within sight of the walls, and if they were allowed toescape, they might establish themselves in some friendly city, andbegin the war again. All this was strongly felt by Hermocrates, and helost no time in imparting his cares and anxieties to the responsibleleaders. The Athenians, he urged, would be almost certain to decampduring the night: let a strong force be sent out at once fromSyracuse, to occupy all the roads, and cut off their retreat. Theadvice was good, but in the present temper of the army it was felt tobe impracticable. The whole city had become a scene of riot andwassail, and if the order were given to march, it was but too evidentthat not a man would obey. Baffled in this direction, the keen-wittedSyracusan hit upon another plan, which he at once proceeded to carryinto effect. Hermocrates was not mistaken in his conjecture. The beaten anddispirited Athenians had now but one thought, --to break up their campwith all despatch, and make their escape by land. They had still sixtytriremes left, and Demosthenes proposed to make one more attempt toforce the entrance of the Great Harbour; but when his suggestion wasmade known to the crews, they broke into open mutiny, and flatlyrefused to go on board. The generals were therefore compelled to adoptthe only alternative, and it was resolved to set out on that verynight. But Fortune had not yet exhausted her malice against thehapless Athenians. The order to strike camp had been issued, and thesoldiers were busy preparing for the march, when a party of horsemenrode up to the Athenian outposts, and hailing the sentinels, said thatthey had a message to Nicias from his friends in Syracuse. "Tell him, "said the spokesman of the party, "That he must not attempt to stir to-night, for all the roads are held by strong detachments of theSyracusans. Let him wait until he has organised his forces, for ahasty and disordered flight is sure to end in disaster. " The message, of course, came from Hermocrates, who had contrived thistrick to delay the departure of the Athenians, until time had beengained to occupy the passes on their route. That Nicias should havefallen into the snare is not surprising, but it is less easy toexplain how Demosthenes and the other generals came to be deceived byso transparent a fraud. Yet such was in fact the case; the insidioushint was accepted as a piece of friendly advice, and the march waspostponed. For a whole day and night the Athenians still lingered onthe spot, and thus gave ample time for their enemies to draw the netround them, and block every avenue to safety. On the third day after the battle, the order was given to march. Asthe great army formed into column, the full horror of their situationcame home to every heart. This, then, was the end of those granddreams of conquest with which they had sailed to Sicily two yearsbefore! On the heights of Epipolae their walls and their fort wasstill standing, a monument of failure and defeat. Each familiarlandmark reminded them of some fallen comrade, or some disastrousincident in the siege. If they glanced towards the Great Harbour, theycould see the victorious Syracusans towing off the shattered hull ofan Athenian trireme, the last sad remnant of two great armaments. Ifthey turned their thoughts towards Athens and home, they found nocomfort there; for their beloved city was beset with enemies, and inthemselves, beaten and broken as they were, lay her chief hope ofsalvation. The past was all black with calamity, and the future loomedterrible before them, threatening captivity and death; and thepresent, in that last hour of parting, was full of such sights andsounds of woe as might have stirred pity even in the breasts of theirenemies. Around them, the camp was strewn with the unburied corpses ofbrothers, comrades and sons, and thousands more were tossing on thewaves, or flung up on the shores of the bay. And while the neglect ofthat sacred duty pressed heavily on their conscience, still moreharrowing were the cries of the sick and wounded, who clung roundtheir knees, imploring to be taken with them, and when the army beganto move followed with tottering steps, until they sank down exhausted, calling down the curse of heaven on the retreating host. Such was theanguish of that moment, that it seemed as if the whole population ofsome great city had been driven into exile, and was seeking a new homein a distant soil. In this dire extremity, when the strongest spirits were crushed withmisery, one voice was heard, which still spoke of hope. It was thevoice of Nicias, who, when all others faltered, rose to a pitch ofheroism which he had never shown before. Bowed as he was with care, and wasted by disease, he braced himself with more than human energy, and moved with light step from rank to rank, exhorting that strickenmultitude in words of power. "Comrades, " he said, "even now there isno need to despair. Others have been saved before now from calamitiesyet deeper than ours. You see in what state I am, cast down from thesummit of human prosperity, and condemned, in my age and weakness, toshare the hardships of the humblest soldier among you, --I, who wasever constant in the service of the gods, and punctual in theperformance of every social duty. Yet have I not lost faith in therighteousness of heaven, nor should you give up all for lost, if byany act of yours you have fallen under the scourge of divinevengeance. There is mercy, as well as justice, among the gods, and we, in sinking thus low, have become the proper objects of theircompassion. Think too what firm ground of confidence we have, in theshields and spears of so many thousand warriors. There is no power inSicily which can resist us, either to prevent our coming or to shortenour stay. A few days march will bring us to the country of thefriendly Sicels, who have already received notice of our approach. Once there, we can defy all attack, and look forward to the time whenwe shall see our homes again, and raise up the fallen power ofAthens. " These and similar exhortations were repeated by Nicias again andagain, as the army moved slowly forwards up the valley of the Anapus, keeping a westerly direction, towards the interior of the island. Thetroops were formed in a hollow oblong, with the baggage animals andcamp-followers in the middle, and advanced in two divisions, Niciasleading the van, and Demosthenes bringing up the rear. The vigilanceand activity of Nicias never relaxed for a moment. Careless of hismany infirmities and exalted rank, he passed incessantly up and downthe column, chiding the stragglers, and attending to the even trim ofhis lines. On reaching the ford of the Anapus, they put to flight adetachment of the enemy which was stationed there to oppose theirpassage, and crossing the river, continued their march. But now thereal difficulties of the retreat began to appear. The Syracusans hadno intention of hazarding a pitched battle, but their horsemen andlight infantry hung upon the flanks of the Athenian army, makingsudden charges, and keeping up a constant discharge of javelins. At nightfall the Athenians encamped under the shelter of a hill, somefive miles from their starting-point, and setting out at daybreak onthe following day, they pushed on with pain and difficulty, harassedat every step by the galling attacks of the Syracusan troops. [Footnote: Thucydides, with characteristic brevity, leaves this to beinferred from the slowness of their progress. ] A march of two milesand a half brought them to a village, situated on a level plain, andhere they halted, wishing to supply themselves with food, andreplenish their water-vessels; for the country which they had now totraverse was a desert, many miles in extent. Directly in their line ofroute there is a narrow pass, when the road, on entering the hillcountry, drops sheer down on either side into a deep ravine, and ifthey could once cross this dangerous point they would be within reachof their allies, the Sicels. But it was too late to proceed furtherthat day, and while they lay encamped in the village, the Syracusanshurried on in advance, and blocked the pass by building a wall acrossthe road. When the Athenians resumed their march next morning, theywere fiercely assailed by the enemy's light horse and foot, whodisputed every inch of ground, and at last compelled them to fall backon the village where they had encamped the night before. Provisionswere now growing scanty, and every attempt to leave their lines insearch of plunder and forage was baffled by the Syracusan horse. On the fourth day they broke up their camp early, and by incessantfighting succeeded in forcing their way as far as the pass. But allfurther advance was prevented by the wall, and the dense masses ofinfantry posted behind it. In vain the Athenians flung themselvesagain and again upon the barrier. The troops stationed on the cliffsabove assailed them with a shower of missiles, and the solid phalanxof hoplites repulsed every assault. Convinced at last that they werewasting their strength to no purpose, they desisted, and retiring fromthe wall halted at some distance for a brief interval of repose. During this pause a storm of rain and thunder broke over their heads;and to the weary and disheartened Athenians it seemed that the veryelements were in league with the enemy against them. But they hadlittle time to indulge in these melancholy reflections; for while theywere resting, Gylippus stole round to their rear, and prepared to cutoff their retreat by building a second wall across the pass. The newsof this imminent peril roused the Athenians from their stupor, andthey marched back with all speed along the road by which they hadcome. A picked body of troops, sent on in advance, scattered thesoldiers of Gylippus, and the whole army then emerged from that death-trap, and encamped for the night in the open plain. The next day was spent in a last desperate effort to reach the hillcountry. But being now on level ground, they were exposed on all sidesto the attacks of the Syracusan horse, who charged them incessantly, and slew their men by hundreds, with hardly any loss to themselves. The hopeless struggle continued until evening, and when the enemy drewoff, they left the Athenians not a mile from the place where they hadpassed the previous night. The original plan of the Athenian generals had been to penetrate thehighlands of Sicily to the west of Syracuse, and then strike acrosscountry, until they reached the southern coast, in the direction ofGela or Camarina. [Footnote: I have followed Holm, as cited inClassen's Appendix (Third Edition, 1908). ] But after two days'fighting they had utterly failed to force an entrance into themountains. Many of their soldiers were wounded, the whole army wasweakened by famine, and a third attempt, made in such conditions, mustinevitably end in utter disaster. They resolved therefore to changetheir route, and march southwards along the level coast country, untilthey could reach the interior by following one of the numerous glenswhich pierce the hills on this side of Sicily. Having come to thisdecision, they caused a great number of fires to be lighted, and thengave the order for an immediate start, hoping by this means to steal amarch on the enemy. This sudden flight through the darkness, in ahostile country, with unknown terrors around them, caused somethinglike a panic in the Athenian army. Nicias, however, who was still leading the van, contrived to keep hismen together, and made good progress; but the division underDemosthenes fell into great disorder, and was left far behind. Bydaybreak, both divisions [Footnote: See note, p. 242. ] were withinsight of the sea, and entering the road which runs north and southbetween Syracuse and Helorus, they continued their march towards theriver Cacyparis. Here they intended to turn off into the interior, with the assistance of the Sicels, whom they expected to meet at theriver. But when they reached the ford of the Cacyparis, they found, instead of the Sicels, a contingent of Syracusan troops, who wereraising a wall and palisade to block the passage. This obstruction wasovercome without much difficulty, and the whole Athenian army crossedthe river in safety. But the presence of the enemy on this side ofSyracuse was sufficient to deter them from taking the inland route bythe valley of the Cacyparis, and following the advice of their guides, they kept the main road, and pressed on towards the south. We must now return for a moment to the Syracusans under Gylippus, whoremained in their camp all night, not far from the pass which they hadso successfully defended. When they found in the morning that theAthenians had departed, they were loud in their anger againstGylippus, thinking that he had purposely suffered them to escape. Thetracks of so many thousands left no room for doubt as to the directionwhich the fugitives had taken, and full of rage at the supposedtreachery of their leader, the Syracusans set out at once in hotpursuit. About noon, on the sixth day of the retreat, they overtookthe division of Demosthenes, which had again lagged behind, and wasmarching slowly and in disorder separated from the other half of thearmy by a distance of six miles. Deprived of all hope of succour fromhis colleague, and hemmed in on all sides by implacable enemies, Demosthenes called a halt, and prepared to make his last stand. Buthis men, who from the first had held the post of honour and danger, were fearfully reduced in numbers, faint with famine, and exhausted bytheir long march. Driven to and fro by the incessant charges of theSyracusan cavalry, they could make no effective resistance, and atlast they huddled pell-mell into a walled enclosure, planted witholive-trees, and skirted on either side by a road. They were now atthe mercy of the Syracusans. Who surrounded the enclosure, and pliedthem with javelins, stones, and arrows. After this butchery hadcontinued for many hours, and the survivors were brought to extremityby wounds, hunger, and thirst, Gylippus sent a herald, who was thebearer of a remarkable message. "Let those of you, " he said, "who arenatives of the islands subject to Athens, come over to us, and youshall be free men. " The offer was addressed to the Greeks from themaritime cities of the Aegaean, who might be supposed to be servingunder compulsion, and it speaks volumes for the loyalty and attachmentof these men to Athens that most of them refused to accept theirfreedom from the hands of her enemies. At length, however, the wholearmy of Demosthenes, which had now dwindled to six thousand men, wasinduced to surrender, on condition that none of them should sufferdeath by violence, by bonds, or by starvation. At the command of theircaptors they gave up the money which they had with them, and theamount collected was so considerable that it filled the hollows offour shields. When the capitulation was concluded, Demosthenes, whohad refused to make any terms for himself, drew his sword, andattempted to take his own life; [Footnote: This interesting fact isrecorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, who copied it from thecontemporary Syracusan historian, Philistus. ] but he was preventedfrom effecting his purpose, and compelled to take his place in themournful procession which was now conducted by a strong guard alongthe road to Syracuse. Meanwhile the vanguard under Nicias, in total ignorance of the fatewhich had befallen their comrades, marched steadily forwards, andcrossing the river Erineus, encamped for the night on a neighbouringhill. Here they were found next morning by Gylippus and theSyracusans, who informed them that Demosthenes and his men hadsurrendered, and called upon them to do the same. Doubting their goodfaith, Nicias obtained a truce, while he sent a horseman to ascertainthe facts; and even when he had learnt the truth from his messenger, he still tried to parley, offering, in the name of the Athenian state, to defray the whole cost of the war, and to give hostages for payment, at the rate of an Athenian citizen for each talent, on condition thathe and his men were allowed to go. But the Syracusans were in no moodto listen to such proposals, even if Nicias had spoken with fullauthority from Athens. Bare life they would grant, but no more, and asthe Athenians refused to yield on these terms, they closed in uponthem, and the cruel, hopeless struggle began again, and continueduntil evening. The wretched Athenians lay down supperless to snatch afew hours of rest, intending, when all was quiet, to steal away undercover of darkness. But when they rose at dead of night, and preparedto march, a shout from the Syracusan camp warned them that the enemywere on the alert, and they were compelled to return to theircomfortless bivouac. Three hundred, however, persisted in theirintention, and forcing their way through the Syracusan lines, gainedfor themselves a brief respite from capture. A whole week had now elapsed since the ill-fated army left itsquarters on the shores of the Great Harbour, and a few thousandstarving and weary men were all that remained of that great host. Atdawn on the eighth day Nicias gave the word to march, and they pressedon eagerly towards the Assinarus, a stream of some size, with high andprecipitous banks, not more than two miles distant from their lasthalting-place. They had still some faint hope of making good theirescape, if they could but cross the river. So they fought their wayonwards, through the swarming ranks of the Syracusans, who closed themin on all sides, and thrust them together into one solid mass. Therewas life, there was freedom a little way beyond, --or, if that hopeproved futile, at any rate there was water; and every fibre in theirbodies ached and burned with intolerable thirst. They reached theriver; both banks were already lined by the Syracusan horse, who hadridden on before, and stood guarding the ford: but there was nostopping the wild rush of that maddened, desperate multitude. Down thesteep bank they plunged, trampling on one another, and flungthemselves open-mouthed upon the stream, with one thought, one wish, overpowering every other impulse, --to drink, and then to die. Somefell upon the spears of their comrades, and perished, others slippedon the floating baggage, lost their foothold, and were swept away bythe flood. Yet still they poured on, by hundreds and by thousands, drawn by the same longing, and thrust downwards by the weight of thosebehind, until the whole riverbed was filled with a huddled, surgingmob of furious men, who drank, and still drank, or fought with oneanother to reach the water. All this time an iron storm of missilesrained down upon them from the thronging hosts of their enemies on thebanks above, while some, in the midst of their draught, were piercedby the spears of the Peloponnesians, who followed them into the river, and slew them at close quarters. The water grew red with blood, andfoul from the trampling of so many feet, but the thirsty multitudestill came crowding in, and drank with avidity of the polluted stream. For a long time the slaughter raged unchecked, and the river-bed waschoked with heaps of slain. A few, who escaped from the river, werepursued and cut down by the Syracusan horse. Nicias had held out untilthe last moment; but when he perceived that all was lost, his menbeing powerless either to fight or fly, he made his way to Gylippus, and implored him to stop the useless carnage. "I surrender myself, " hesaid, "to you and the Spartans. Do with me as you please, but put anend to this butchery of defenceless men. " Gylippus gave the necessaryorder, and the word was passed round to kill no more, but take captivethose who survived. The order was obeyed, though slowly and withreluctance, and the work of capture began. But few of those taken inthe river ever found their way into the public gaol, where Demostheneswas now lying, with the six thousand who had surrendered on the daybefore. For, as there had been no regular capitulation, large numbersof the prisoners were secretly conveyed away by the Syracusans, whoafterwards sold them into slavery for their own profit. As for thethree hundred who had broken out of camp on the previous night, theywere presently brought in by a party of cavalry despatched in pursuit. When the first transports of joy and triumph were over, an assemblywas called to decide on the fate of the two Athenian generals, and ofthose state prisoners, some seven thousand in number, who were thesole visible remnant of two great armies. Then arose a strangeconflict of motives. The first who put forward his claims wasGylippus, to whose genius and energy the victorious issue of thestruggle was mainly due. As a reward for his services, he asked thatNicias and Demosthenes should be left to his disposal, for he wishedto have the honour of carrying home with him these famous captains, one the greatest friend, the other the greatest enemy of Sparta. Butthe general voice of the assembly was strongly against him. Nothingbut the blood of the two principal offenders could satisfy thevengeance of the Syracusans, and those who had intrigued with Niciaswere anxious to put him out of the way, in fear lest he should betraythem. Moreover the Corinthian allies of Syracuse, who for some reasonhad a special grudge against Nicias, demanded his immediate execution. In vain Hermocrates pleaded the cause of mercy, [Footnote: Plutarch, _Nicias_, c. 28. ] and urged his fellow-citizens to make agenerous use of their victory. Sentence of death was passed, and thesetwo eminent Athenians, so different in character and achievement, wereunited in their end. Far worse was the doom pronounced on the six thousand men ofDemosthenes, and the thousand more who were brought to Syracuse afterthe massacre at the Assinarus. They were condemned to confinement inthe stone quarries, deep pits surrounded by high walls of cliff, underthe south-eastern edge of Epipolae. Penned together in these rooflessdungeons, they were exposed to the fierce heat of the sun by day, andto the bitter cold of the autumn nights, and having scarcely room tomove, they were unable to preserve common decency, or commoncleanliness. Many died of their wounds, or of the diseases engenderedby exposure, and their bodies were left unburied, a sight of horrorand a source of infection to the survivors. To these frightfulmiseries were added a perpetual burning thirst, and the lingeringtorture of slow starvation, for each man received as his dailyallowance a poor half pint of water, and a mere pittance of food, justenough to avoid breaking the letter of the conditions whichDemosthenes had made for his troops. In this state they were leftwithout relief for ten long weeks; then all except the Atheniansthemselves, and their allies from the Greek cities of Sicily andItaly, were taken out and sold as slaves. EPILOGUE Such was the end of the Sicilian Expedition, which ultimately decidedthe issue of the Peloponnesian War. Forsaking the wise counsels oftheir greatest statesman, and carried away by the mad sophistry ofAlcibiades, the Athenians had committed themselves, heart and soul, toa wild game of hazard, in which they had little to win, and everythingto lose. By this act of desperate folly they brought on themselves anoverwhelming disaster, from which it was impossible for them wholly torecover. With wonderful vitality they rallied from the blow, andstruggled on for nine years more, against the whole power ofPeloponnesus, and their own revolted allies, backed by the influenceand the gold of Persia. They gained great victories, and under prudentleaders they might still have been saved from the worst consequencesof their defeat in Sicily. But at every favourable crisis theywantonly flung away the advantage they had gained, and abandonedthemselves to blind guides, who led them further and further on theroad to ruin. The history of Thucydides ends abruptly in the twenty-first year ofthe war, and for an account of the closing scenes we have to go to thepages of Xenophon. It will be convenient, therefore, to bring ournarrative to a close at the point which we have reached, for anyattempt even to sketch the events of this confused and troubled periodwould carry us far beyond the limits of the present volume. And so forthe present we take leave of the Athenians, in the hour of theirdecline. Their light is burning dim, and yet darker days are awaitingthem in the future. But they are still great and illustrious, as thechief guardians of those spiritual treasures which are our choicestheritage from the past.