John C. Calhoun, "On Nullification and the Force Bill. " U. S. Senate, 15 February 1833

Mr. President:

At the last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that thepublic debt, as to all practical purposes, was in fact paid, the smallsurplus remaining being nearly covered by the money in the Treasury andthe bonds for duties which had already accrued; but with the arrival ofthis event our last hope was doomed to be disappointed. After a longsession of many months, and the most earnest effort on the part ofSouth Carolina and the other Southern States to obtain relief, all thatcould be effected was a small reduction of such a character that, whileit diminished the amount of burden, it distributed that burden moreunequally than even the obnoxious Act of 1828; reversing the principleadopted by the Bill of 1816, of laying higher duties on the unprotectedthan the protected articles, by repealing almost entirely the dutieslaid upon the former, and imposing the burden almost entirely on thelatter. It was thus that, instead of relief--instead of an equaldistribution of burdens and benefits of the government, on the paymentof the debt, as had been fondly anticipated--the duties were soarranged as to be, in fact, bounties on one side and taxation on theother; thus placing the two great sections of the country in directconflict in reference to its fiscal action, and thereby letting in thatflood of political corruption which threatens to sweep away ourConstitution and our liberty. 

This unequal and unjust arrangement was pronounced, both by theadministration, through its proper organ, the Secretary of theTreasury, and by the opposition, to be a *permanent* adjustment; and itwas thus that all hope of relief through the action of the generalgovernment terminated; and the crisis so long apprehended at lengtharrived, at which the State was compelled to choose between absoluteacquiescence in a ruinous system of oppression, or a resort to herreserved powers--powers of which she alone was the rightful judge, andwhich only, in this momentous juncture, could save her. She determinedon the latter. 

The consent of two-thirds of her Legislature was necessary for the callof a convention, which was considered the only legitimate organ throughwhich the people, in their sovereignty, could speak. After an arduousstruggle the States-rights party succeeded; more than two-thirds ofboth branches of the Legislature favorable to a convention wereelected; a convention was called--the ordinance adopted. Theconvention was succeeded by a meeting of the Legislature, when the lawsto carry the ordinance into execution were enacted--all of which havebeen communicated by the President, have been referred to the Committeeon the Judiciary, and this bill is the result of their labor. 

Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepresentations as to thenature of this controversy, and given a rapid sketch of the movement ofthe State in reference to it, I will next proceed to notice someobjections connected with the ordinance and the proceedings under it. 

The first and most prominent of these is directed against what iscalled the test oath, which an effort has been made to render odious. So far from deserving the denunciation that has been levelled againstit, I view this provision of the ordinance as but the natural result ofthe doctrines entertained by the State, and the position which sheoccupies. The people of Carolina believe that the Union is a union ofStates, and not of individuals; that it was formed by the States, andthat the citizens of the several States were bound to it through theacts of their several States; that each State ratified the Constitutionfor itself, and that it was only by such ratification of a State thatany obligation was imposed upon its citizens. Thus believing, it isthe opinion of the people of Carolina that it belongs to the Statewhich has imposed the obligation to declare, in the last resort, theextent of this obligation, as far as her citizens are concerned; andthis upon the plain principles which exist in all analogous cases ofcompact between sovereign bodies. On this principle the people of theState, acting in their sovereign capacity in convention, precisely asthey did in the adoption of their own and the Federal Constitution, have declared, by the ordinance, that the acts of Congress whichimposed duties under the authority to lay imposts, were acts not forrevenue, as intended by the Constitution, but for protection, andtherefore null and void. The ordinance thus enacted by the people ofthe State themselves, acting as a sovereign community, is as obligatoryon the citizens of the State as any portion of the Constitution. Inprescribing, then, the oath to obey the ordinance, no more was donethan to prescribe an oath to obey the Constitution. It is, in fact, but a particular oath of allegiance, and in every respect similar tothat which is prescribed, under the Constitution of the United States, to be administered to all the officers of the State and Federalgovernments; and is no more deserving the harsh and bitter epithetswhich have been heaped upon it than that or any similar oath. It oughtto be borne in mind that, according to the opinion which prevails inCarolina, the right of resistance to the unconstitutional acts ofCongress belongs to the State, and not to her individual citizens; andthat, though the latter may, in a mere question of *meum* and *tuum, *resist through the courts an unconstitutional encroachment upon theirrights, yet the final stand against usurpation rests not with them, butwith the State of which they are members; and such act of resistance bya State binds the conscience and allegiance of the citizen. But thereappears to be a general misapprehension as to the extent to which theState has acted under this part of the ordinance. Instead of sweepingevery officer by a general proscription of the minority, as has beenrepresented in debate, as far as my knowledge extends, not a singleindividual has been removed. The State has, in fact, acted with thegreatest tenderness, all circumstances considered, toward citizens whodiffered from the majority; and, in that spirit, has directed the oathto be administered only in the case of some official act directed to beperformed in which obedience to the ordinance is involved. . . . 

It is next objected that the enforcing acts have legislated the UnitedStates out of South Carolina. I have already replied to this objectionon another occasion, and will now but repeat what I then said: thatthey have been legislated out only to the extent that they had no rightto enter. The Constitution has admitted the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates within the limits of the several States only so far as thedelegated powers authorize; beyond that they are intruders, and mayrightfully be expelled; and that they have been efficiently expelled bythe legislation of the State through her civil process, as has beenacknowledged on all sides in the debate, is only a confirmation of thetruth of the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina have contended. 

The very point at issue between the two parties there is, whethernullification is a peaceful and an efficient remedy against anunconstitutional act of the general government, and may be asserted, assuch, through the State tribunals. Both parties agree that the actsagainst which it is directed are unconstitutional and oppressive. Thecontroversy is only as to the means by which our citizens may beprotected against the acknowledged encroachments on their rights. Thisbeing the point at issue between the parties, and the very object ofthe majority being an efficient protection of the citizens through theState tribunals, the measures adopted to enforce the ordinance, ofcourse, received the most decisive character. We were not children, to act by halves. Yet for acting thus efficiently the State isdenounced, and this bill reported, to overrule, by military force, thecivil tribunal and civil process of the State! Sir, I consider thisbill, and the arguments which have been urged on this floor in itssupport, as the most triumphant acknowledgment that nullification ispeaceful and efficient, and so deeply intrenched in the principles ofour system, that it cannot be assailed but by prostrating theConstitution, and substituting the supremacy of military force in lieuof the supremacy of the laws. In fact, the advocates of this billrefute their own argument. They tell us that the ordinance isunconstitutional; that it infracts the Constitution of South Carolina, although, to me, the objection appears absurd, as it was adopted by thevery authority which adopted the Constitution itself. They also tellus that the Supreme Court is the appointed arbiter of all controversiesbetween a State and the general government. Why, then, do they notleave this controversy to that tribunal? Why do they not confide tothem the abrogation of the ordinance, and the laws made in pursuance ofit, and the assertion of that supremacy which they claim for the lawsof Congress? The State stands pledged to resist no process of thecourt. Why, then, confer on the President the extensive and unlimitedpowers provided in this bill? Why authorize him to use military forceto arrest the civil process of the State? But one answer can be given:That, in a contest between the State and the general government, if theresistance be limited on both sides to the civil process, the State, byits inherent sovereignty, standing upon its reserved powers, will provetoo powerful in such a controversy, and must triumph over the Federalgovernment, sustained by its delegated and limited authority; and inthis answer we have an acknowledgment of the truth of those greatprinciples for which the State has so firmly and nobly contended. . . . 

Notwithstanding all that has been said, I may say that neither theSenator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), nor any other who has spoken onthe same side, has directly and fairly met the great question at issue:Is this a Federal Union? a union of States, as distinct from that ofindividuals? Is the sovereignty in the several States, or in theAmerican people in the aggregate? The very language which we arecompelled to use when speaking of our political institutions affordsproof conclusive as to its real character. The terms union, federal, united, all imply a combination of sovereignties, a confederation ofStates. They never apply to an association of individuals. Who everheard of the United State of New York, of Massachusetts, or ofVirginia? Who ever heard the term federal or union applied to theaggregation of individuals into one community? Nor is the other pointless clear--that the sovereignty is in the several States, and that oursystem is a union of twenty-four sovereign powers, under aconstitutional compact, and not of a divided sovereignty between theStates severally and the United States? In spite of all that has beensaid, I maintain that sovereignty is in its nature indivisible. It isthe supreme power in a State, and we might just as well speak of half asquare, or half of a triangle, as of half a sovereignty. It is a grosserror to confound the *exercise* of sovereign powers with *sovereignty*itself, or the *delegation* of such powers with the *surrender* ofthem. A sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised by as manyagents as he may think proper, under such conditions and with suchlimitations as he may impose; but to surrender any portion of hissovereignty to another is to annihilate the whole. The Senator fromDelaware (Mr. Clayton) calls this metaphysical reasoning, which he sayshe cannot comprehend. If by metaphysics he means that scholasticrefinement which makes distinctions without difference, no one can holdit in more utter contempt than I do; but if, on the contrary, he meansthe power of analysis and combination--that power which reduces themost complex idea into its elements, which traces causes to their firstprinciple, and, by the power of generalization and combination, unitesthe whole in one harmonious system--then, so far from deservingcontempt, it is the highest attribute of the human mind. It is thepower which raises man above the brute--which distinguishes hisfaculties from mere sagacity, which he holds in common with inferioranimals. It is this power which has raised the astronomer from being amere gazer at the stars to the high intellectual eminence of a Newtonor a Laplace, and astronomy itself from a mere observation of isolatedfacts into that noble science which displays to our admiration thesystem of the universe. And shall this high power of the mind, whichhas effected such wonders when directed to the laws which control thematerial world, be forever prohibited, under a senseless cry ofmetaphysics, from being applied to the high purposes of politicalscience and legislation? I hold them to be subject to laws as fixed asmatter itself, and to be as fit a subject for the application of thehighest intellectual power. Denunciation may, indeed, fall upon thephilosophical inquirer into these first principles, as it did uponGalileo and Bacon, when they first unfolded the great discoveries whichhave immortalized their names; but the time will come when truth willprevail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and when politics andlegislation will be considered as much a science as astronomy andchemistry. 

In connection with this part of the subject, I understood the Senatorfrom Virginia (Mr. Rives) to say that sovereignty was divided, and thata portion remained with the States severally, and that the residue wasvested in the Union. By Union, I suppose, the Senator meant the UnitedStates. If such be his meaning--if he intended to affirm that thesovereignty was in the twenty-four States, in whatever light he mayview them, our opinions will not disagree; but according to myconception, the whole sovereignty is in the several States, while theexercise of sovereign power is divided--a part being exercised undercompact, through this general government, and the residue through theseparate State governments. But if the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) means to assert that the twenty-four States form but onecommunity, with a single sovereign power as to the objects of theUnion, it will be but the revival of the old question, of whether theUnion is a union between States, as distinct communities, or a mereaggregate of the American people, as a mass of individuals; and in thislight his opinions would lead directly to consolidation. . . . 

Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between power andliberty; and I tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me, that, asstrong as may be the love of power on their side, the love of libertyis still stronger on ours. History furnishes many instances of similarstruggles, where the love of liberty has prevailed against power underevery disadvantage, and among them few more striking than that of ourown Revolution; where, as strong as was the parent country, and feebleas were the Colonies, yet, under the impulse of liberty, and theblessing of God, they gloriously triumphed in the contest. There are, indeed, many striking analogies between that and the presentcontroversy. They both originated substantially in the samecause--with this difference--in the present case, the power of taxationis converted into that of regulating industry; in the other the powerof regulating industry, by the regulation of commerce, was attempted tobe converted into the power of taxation. Were I to trace the analogyfurther, we should find that the perversion of the taxing power, in theone case, has given precisely the same control to the northern sectionover the industry of the southern section of the Union, which the powerto regulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the industry of theColonies in the other; and that the very articles in which the Colonieswere permitted to have a free trade, and those in which themother-country had a monopoly, are almost identically the same as thosein which the Southern States are permitted to have a free trade by theAct of 1832, and in which the Northern States have, by the same act, secured a monopoly. The only difference is in the means. In theformer, the Colonies were permitted to have a free trade with allcountries south of Cape Finisterre, a cape in the northern part ofSpain; while north of that, the trade of the Colonies was prohibited, except through the mother-country, by means of her commercialregulations. If we compare the products of the country north and southof Cape Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with the listof last year. Nor does the analogy terminate here. The very argumentsresorted to at the commencement of the American Revolution, and themeasures adopted, and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (toenforce the law), are almost identically the same. 

But to return from this digression to the consideration of the bill. Whatever difference of opinion may exist upon other points, there isone on which I should suppose there can be none; that this bill restsupon principles which, if carried out, will ride over Statesovereignties, and that it will be idle for any advocates hereafter totalk of State rights. The Senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) says thathe is the advocate of State rights; but he must permit me to tell himthat, although he may differ in premises from the other gentlemen withwhom he acts on this occasion, yet, in supporting this bill, heobliterates every vestige of distinction between him and them, savingonly that, professing the principles of '98, his example will be morepernicious than that of the most open and bitter opponent of the rightsof the States. I will also add, what I am compelled to say, that Imust consider him (Mr. Rives) as less consistent than our oldopponents, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from their premises, while his premises ought to have led him to opposite conclusions. Thegentleman has told us that the new-fangled doctrines, as he chooses tocall them, have brought State rights into disrepute. I must tell him, in reply, that what he calls new-fangled are but the doctrines of '98;and that it is he (Mr. Rives), and others with him, who, professingthese doctrines, have degraded them by explaining away their meaningand efficacy. 

He (Mr. R. ) has disclaimed, in behalf of Virginia, the authorship ofnullification. I will not dispute that point. If Virginia chooses tothrow away one of her brightest ornaments, she must not hereaftercomplain that it has become the property of another. But while I have, as a representatives of Carolina, no right to complain of the disavowalof the Senator from Virginia, I must believe that he (Mr. R. ) has donehis native State great injustice by declaring on this floor, that whenshe gravely resolved, in '98, that "in cases of deliberate anddangerous infractions of the Constitution, the States, as parties tothe compact, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose toarrest the progress of the evil, and to maintain within theirrespective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertainingto them, " she meant no more than to proclaim the right to protest andto remonstrate. To suppose that, in putting forth so solemn adeclaration, which she afterward sustained by so able and elaborate anargument, she meant no more than to assert what no one had ever denied, would be to suppose that the State had been guilty of the mostegregious trifling that ever was exhibited on so solemn an occasion.