PEACELESS EUROPE

By

FRANCESCO S. NITTI

1922

PREFACE

In this book are embodied the ideas which, as a parliamentarian, ashead of the Italian Government, and as a writer, I have upheld withfirm conviction during the last few years. 

I believe that Europe is threatened with decadence more owing to thePeace Treaties than as a result of the War. She is in a state of dailyincreasing decline, and the causes of dissatisfaction are growingapace. 

Europe is still waiting for that peace which has not yet beendefinitely concluded, and it is necessary that the public should bemade aware that the courses now being followed by the policy of thegreat victorious States are perilous to the achievement of serious, lasting and useful results. I believe that it is to the interest ofFrance herself if I speak the language of truth, as a sincere friendof France and a confirmed enemy of German Imperialism. Not only didthat Imperialism plunge Germany into a sea of misery and suffering, covering her with the opprobrium of having provoked the terrible War, or at least of having been mainly responsible for it, but it hasruined for many years the productive effort of the most cultured andindustrious country in Europe. 

Some time ago the ex-President of the French Republic, R. Poincaré, after the San Remo Conference, _à propos_ of certain differences ofopinion which had arisen between Lloyd George and myself on the onehand and Millerand on the other, wrote as follows:

 "Italy and England know what they owe to France, just as France knows what she owes to them. They do not wish to part company with us, nor do we with them. They recognize that they need us, as we have need of them. Lloyd George and Nitti are statesmen too shrewd and experienced not to understand that their greatest strength will always lie in this fundamental axiom. On leaving San Remo for Rome or London let them ask the opinion of the 'man in the street. ' His reply will be: '_Avant tout, restez unis avec la France_. '"

I believe that Lloyd George and I share the same cordial sentimentstoward France. We have gone through so much suffering and anxietytogether that it would be impossible to tear asunder links firmlywelded by common danger and pain. France will always remember with asympathetic glow that Italy was the first country which proclaimed herneutrality, on August 2, 1914; without that proclamation the destiniesof the War might have taken a very different turn. 

But the work of reconstruction in Europe is in the interest of Franceherself. She has hated too deeply to render a sudden cessation of herhate-storm possible, and the treaties have been begotten in rancourand applied with violence. Even as the life of men, the life ofpeoples has days of joy and days of grief: sunshine follows the storm. The whole history of European peoples is one of alternate victoriesand defeats. It is the business of civilization to create suchconditions as will render victory less brutal and defeat morebearable. 

The recent treaties which regulate, or are supposed to regulate, the relations among peoples are, as a matter of fact, nothing but aterrible regress, the denial of all those principles which had beenregarded as an unalienable conquest of public right. President Wilson, by his League of Nations, has been the most responsible factor insetting up barriers between nations. 

Christopher Columbus sailed from Europe hoping to land in India, whereas he discovered America. President Wilson sailed from Americathinking that he was going to bring peace to Europe, but onlysucceeded in bringing confusion and war. 

However, we should judge him with the greatest indulgence, for hisintentions were undoubtedly sincere and honest. 

France has more to gain than any other country in Europe by revertingto those sound principles of democracy which formed her erstwhileglory. We do not forget what we owe her, nor the noble spirit whichpervades some of her historic deeds. But _noblesse oblige_, and allthe more binding is her duty to respect tradition. 

When France shall have witnessed the gradual unfolding of approachingevents, she will be convinced that he who has spoken to her thelanguage of truth and has sought out a formula permitting the peoplesof Europe to rediscover their path in life, towards life, is not onlya friend, but a friend who has opportunely brought back to France'smind and heart the deeds of her great ancestors at the time when freshdeeds of greatness and glory await accomplishment. The task which wemust undertake with our inmost feeling, with all the ardour of ourfaith, is to find once more the road to peace, to utter the word ofbrotherly love toward oppressed peoples, and to reconstruct Europe, which is gradually sinking to the condition of Quattrocento Italy, without its effulgence of art and beauty: thirty States mutuallydiffident of each other, in a sea of programmes and Balkan ideas. 

Towards the achievement of this work of civilization the greatdemocracies must march shoulder to shoulder. At the present moment Ihear nothing but hostile voices; but the time is not far distant whenmy friends of France will be marching with us along the same road. They already admit in private many things which they will presently beobliged to recognize openly. Many truths are the fruit of persuasion;others, again, are the result of former delusions. 

I place my greatest trust in the action of American democracy. 

By refusing to sanction the Treaty of Versailles and all the otherpeace treaties, the American Senate has given proof of the soundestpolitical wisdom: the United States of America has negotiated its ownseparate treaties, and resumes its pre-war relations with victors andvanquished alike. 

It follows that all that has been done hitherto in the way oftreaties is rendered worthless, as the most important participanthas withdrawn. This is a further motive for reflecting that it isimpossible to continue living much longer in a Europe divided by twocontending fields and by a medley of rancour and hatred which tends towiden the chasm. 

It is of the greatest interest to America that Europe should once morebe the wealthy, prosperous, civilized Europe which, before 1914, ruledover the destinies of the world. Only by so great an effort can thefinest conquests of civilization come back to their own. 

We should only remember our dead in so far as their memory may preventfuture generations from being saddened by other war victims. Thevoices of those whom we have lost should reach us as voices prayingfor the return of that civilization which shall render massacresimpossible, or shall at least diminish the violence and ferocity ofwar. 

Just as the growing dissolution of Europe is a common danger, so isthe renewal of the bonds of solidarity a common need. 

Let us all work toward this end, even if at first we may bemisunderstood and may find obstacles in our way. Truth is on the marchand will assert herself: we shall strike the main road after much ofdreary wandering in the dark lanes of prejudice and violence. 

Many of the leading men of Europe and America, who in the intoxicationof victory proclaimed ideas of violence and revenge, would now be veryglad to reverse their attitude, of which they see the unhappy results. The truth is that what they privately recognize they will not yetopenly admit. But no matter. 

The confessions which many of them have made to me, both verbally andin writing, induce me to believe that my ideas are also their ideas, and that they only seek to express them in the form and on theoccasions less antagonistic to the currents of opinion which theythemselves set up in the days when the chief object to be achievedseemed to be the vivisection of the enemy. 

Recent events, however, have entirely changed the situation. 

As I said before, the American Senate has not sanctioned the Treatyof Versailles, nor is it likely to give it its approval. The UnitedStates of America concludes separate treaties on its own account. 

Agreements of a military character had been arrived at in Paris: theUnited States of America and Great Britain guaranteed France againstany future unjust attack by Germany. The American Senate did notsanction the agreement; in fact, it did not even discuss it. The Houseof Commons had approved it subordinate to the consent of the UnitedStates. Italy has kept aloof from all alliances. As a result of thissituation, the four Entente Powers, "allied and associated" (asformerly was the official term), have ceased to be either "allied" or"associated" after the end of the War. 

On the other hand, Europe, after emerging from the War, is darkenedand overcast by intrigues, secret agreements and dissimulated plots:fresh menaces of war and fresh explosions of dissatisfaction. 

Nothing can help the cause of peace more than giving a full knowledgeof the real situation to the various peoples. Errors thrive indarkness while truth walks abroad in the full light of day. It hasbeen my intention to lay before the public those great controversieswhich cannot merely form the object of diplomatic notes or ofposthumous books presented to Parliament in a more or less incompletecondition after events have become irreparable. 

The sense of a common danger, threatening all alike, will prove themost persuasive factor in swerving us from the perilous route which weare now following. 

As a result of the War the bonds of economic solidarity have beentorn asunder: the losers in the War must not only make good their ownlosses, but, according to the treaties, are expected to pay for allthe damage which the War has caused. Meanwhile all the countries ofEurope have only one prevailing fear: German competition. In orderto pay the indemnities imposed upon her (and she can only do it byexporting goods), Germany is obliged to produce at the lowest possiblecost, which necessitates the maximum of technical progress. Butexports at low cost must in the long run prove detrimental, if notdestructive, to the commerce of neutral countries, and even to that ofthe victors. Thus in all tariffs which have already been published orwhich are in course of preparation there is one prevailing object inview: that of reducing German competition, which practically amountsto rendering it impossible for her to pay the War indemnity. 

If winners and losers were to abandon war-time ideas for a while, and, rather, were to persuade themselves that the oppression of thevanquished cannot be lasting, and that there is no other logical wayout of the difficulty but that of small indemnities payable in afew years, debiting to the losers in tolerable proportion all debtscontracted towards Great Britain and the United States, the Europeansituation would immediately improve. 

Why is Europe still in such a state of economic disorder? Because theconfusion of moral ideas persists. In many countries nerves are stillas tense as a bowstring, and the language of hatred still prevails. For some countries, as for some social groups, war has not yetceased to be. One hears now in the countries of the victors the samearguments used as were current coin in Germany before the War andduring the first phases of the War; only now and then, more as aquestion of habit than because they are truly felt, we hear the wordsjustice, peace, and democracy. 

Why is the present state of discomfort and dissatisfaction on theincrease? Because almost everywhere in Continental Europe, in thecountries which have emerged from the War, the rate of production isbelow the rate of consumption, and many social groups, instead ofproducing more, plan to possess themselves with violence of the wealthproduced by others. At home, the social classes, unable to resist, are threatened; abroad, the vanquished, equally unable to resist, aremenaced, but in the very menace it is easy to discern the anxietyof the winners. Confusion, discomfort and dissatisfaction thus growapace. 

The problem of Europe is above all a moral problem. A great steptoward its solution will have been accomplished when winners andlosers persuade themselves that only by a common effort can they besaved, and that the best enemy indemnity consists in peace and jointlabour. Now that the enemy has lost all he possessed and threatensto make us lose the fruits of victory, one thing is above all othersnecessary: the resumption, not only of the language, but of the ideasof peace;

During one of the last international conferences at which I waspresent, and over which I presided, at San Remo, after a long exchangeof views with the British and French Premiers, Lloyd George andMillerand, the American journalists asked me to give them my ideason peace: "What is the most necessary thing for the maintenance ofpeace?" they inquired. 

"One thing only, " I replied, "is necessary. Europe must smile oncemore. " Smiles have vanished from every lip; nothing has remained buthatred, menaces and nervous excitement. 

When Europe shall smile again she will "rediscover" her politicalpeace ideas and will drink once more at the spring of life. Classstruggles at home, in their acutest form, are like the competition ofnationalism abroad: explosions of cupidity, masked by the pretext ofthe country's greatness. 

The deeply rooted economic crisis, which threatens and prepares newwars, the deeply rooted social crisis, which threatens and preparesfresh conflicts abroad, are nothing but the expression of a _statusanimae_ or soul condition. Statesmen are the most directly responsiblefor the continuation of a language of violence; they should be thefirst to speak the language of peace. 

F. S. NITTI. 

ACQUAFREDDA IN BASILICATA. 

_September_ 30, 1921. 

P. S. --"Peaceless Europe" is an entirely new book, which I have writtenin my hermitage of Acquafredda, facing the blue Adriatic; it contains, however, some remarks and notices which have already appeared inarticles written by me for the great American agency, the _UnitedPress_, and which have been reproduced by the American papers. 

I have repeatedly stated that I have not published any document whichwas not meant for publication; I have availed myself of my knowledgeof the most important international Acts and of all diplomaticdocuments merely as a guide, but it is on facts that I have solidlybased my considerations. 

J. Keynes and Robert Lansing have already published some veryimportant things, but no secret documents; recently, however, Tardieuand Poincaré, in the interest of the French nationalist thesis whichthey sustain, have published also documents of a very reserved nature. Tardieu's book is a documentary proof of the French Government'sextremist attitude during the conference, amply showing that thepresent form of peace has been desired almost exclusively by France, and that the others have been unwilling parties to it. Besides hisarticles in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Poincaré has recentlypublished in the _Temps_ (September 12, 1921) a whole secretcorrespondence between Poincaré, President of the Republic, Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers, the AmericanDelegation, and, above all, Lloyd George. 

CONTENTS

1. EUROPE WITHOUT PEACE

2. THE PEACE TREATIES AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR

3. THE PEACE TREATIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND AIMS

4. THE CONQUERORS AND THE CONQUERED

5. THE INDEMNITY FROM THE DEFEATED ENEMY AND THE ANXIETIES OF THEVICTORS

6. EUROPE'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE POLICY

INDEX

_The author includes in the book numerous secret official documentsthat emanated from the Peace Conference and which came into his handsin his position, at that time, as Italian Prime Minister. Among theseis a long and hitherto unpublished secret letter sent by Lloyd Georgeto Nitti, Wilson, Clemenceau, and the other members of the PeaceConference_. 

I

EUROPE WITHOUT PEACE

Is there anyone who still remembers Europe in the first months of 1914or calls to mind the period which preceded the first year of the War?It all seems terribly remote, something like a prehistoric era, notonly because the conditions of life have changed, but because ourviewpoint on life has swerved to a different angle. 

Something like thirty million dead have dug a chasm between two ages. War killed many millions, disease accounted for many more, but thehardiest reaper has been famine. The dead have built up a great coldbarrier between the Europe of yesterday and the Europe of to-day. 

We have lived through two historic epochs, not through two differentperiods. Europe was happy and prosperous, while now, after theterrible World War, she is threatened with a decline and a reversionto brutality which suggest the fall of the Roman Empire. We ourselvesdo not quite understand what is happening around us. More thantwo-thirds of Europe is in a state of ferment, and everywhere thereprevails a vague sense of uneasiness, ill-calculated to encourageimportant collective works. We live, as the saying is, "from hand tomouth. "

Before 1914 Europe had enjoyed a prolonged period of peace, attaininga degree of wealth and civilization unrivalled in the past. 

In Central Europe Germany had sprung up. After the Napoleonicinvasions, in the course of a century, Germany, which a hundred yearsago seemed of all European countries the least disposed to militarism, had developed into a great military monarchy. From being the mostparticularist country Germany had in reality become the most unifiedstate. But what constituted her strength was not so much her army andnavy as the prestige of her intellectual development. She had achievedit laboriously, almost painfully, on a soil which was not fertile andwithin a limited territory, but, thanks to the tenacity of her effort, she succeeded in winning a prominent place in the world-race forsupremacy. Her universities, her institutes for technical instruction, her schools, were a model to the whole world. In the course of a fewyears she had built up a merchant fleet which seriously threatenedthose of other countries. Having arrived too late to create a realcolonial empire of her own, such as those of France and England, shenevertheless succeeded in exploiting her colonies most intelligently. 

In the field of industry she appeared to beat all competitors from atechnical point of view; and even in those industries which were nothers by habit and tradition she developed so powerful an organizationas to appear almost uncanny. Germany held first place not only in theproduction of iron, but in that of dyes and chemicals. Men wentthere from all parts of the world not only to trade but to acquireknowledge. An ominous threat weighed on the Empire, namely theconstitution of the State itself, essentially militaristic andbureaucratic. Not even in Russia, perhaps, were the reins of powerheld in the hands of so few men as in Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

A few years before the World War started one of the leading Europeanstatesmen told me that there was everything to be feared for thefuture of Europe where some three hundred millions, the inhabitantsof Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, about two-thirds of the wholecontinent, were governed in an almost irresponsible manner by a manwithout will or intelligence, the Tsar of Russia; a madman without aspark of genius, the German Kaiser, and an obstinate old man hedged inby his ambition, the Emperor of Austria-Hungary. Not more thanthirty persons, he added, act as a controlling force on these threeirresponsible sovereigns, who might assume, on their own initiative, the most terrible responsibilities. 

The magnificent spiritual gifts of the Germans gave them an EmanuelKant, the greatest thinker of modern times, Beethoven, their greatestexponent of music, and Goethe, their greatest poet. But the imperialGermany which came after the victory of 1870 had limited the spirit ofindependence even in the manifestations of literature and art. Therestill existed in Germany the most widely known men of science, thebest universities, the most up-to-date schools; but the clumsymechanism tended to crush rather than to encourage all personalinitiative. Great manifestations of art or thought are not possiblewithout the most ample spiritual liberty. Germany was the most highlyorganized country from a scientific point of view, but at the sametime the country in which there was the least liberty for individualinitiative. It went on like a huge machine: that explains why italmost stopped after being damaged by the war, and the whole life ofthe nation was paralysed while there were very few individual impulsesof reaction. Imperial Germany has always been lacking in politicalability, perhaps not only through a temperamental failing, but chieflyowing to her militaristic education. 

Before the War Germany beat her neighbours in all the branches ofhuman labour: in science, industry, banking, commerce, etc. But in onething she did not succeed, and succeeded still less after the War, namely, in politics. When the German people was blessed with apolitical genius, such as Frederick the Great or Bismarck, it achievedthe height of greatness and glory. But when the same people, afterobtaining the maximum of power, found on its path William II with hismediocre collaborators, it ruined, by war, a colossal work, not onlyto the great detriment of the country, but also to that of the victorsthemselves, of whom it cannot be said with any amount of certainty, so far as those of the Continent are concerned, whether they are thewinners or the losers, so great is the ruin threatening them, and sovast the material and moral losses sustained. 

I have always felt the deepest aversion for William II. So few as tenyears ago he was still treated with the greatest sympathy both inEurope and America. Even democracies regarded with ill-dissimulatedadmiration the work of the Kaiser, who brought everywhere his voice, his enthusiasm, his activity, to the service of Germany. As a matterof fact, his speeches were poor in phraseology, a mere conglomerateof violence, prejudice and ignorance. As no one believed in thepossibility of a war, no one troubled about it. But after the Warnothing has been more harmful to Germany than the memory of those uglyspeeches, unrelieved by any noble idea, and full of a clumsy vulgaritydraped in a would-be solemn and majestic garb. Some of his threateningutterances, such as the address to the troops sailing for China inorder to quell the Boxer rebellion, the constant association inall his speeches of the great idea of God, with the ravings of amegalomaniac, the frenzied oratory in which he indulged at thebeginning of the War, have harmed Germany more than anything else. Itis possible to lose nobly; but to have lost a great war after havingwon so many battles would not have harmed the German people if ithad not been represented abroad by the presumptuous vulgarity of theKaiser and of all the members of his entourage, who were more or lessguilty of the same attitude. 

Before the War Germany had everywhere attained first place in allforms of activity, excepting, perhaps, in certain spiritual andartistic manifestations. She admired herself too much and too openly, but succeeded in affirming her magnificent expansion in a greatnessand prosperity without rival. 

By common accord Germany held first place. Probably this consciousnessof power, together with the somewhat brutal forms of the struggle forindustrial supremacy, as in the case of the iron industry, threw amysterious and threatening shadow over the granitic edifice of theEmpire. 

When I was Minister of Commerce in 1913 I received a deputation ofGerman business men who wished to confer with me on the Italiancustoms regime. They spoke openly of the necessity of possessingthemselves of the iron mines of French Lorraine; they looked upon waras an industrial fact. Germany had enough coal but not enough iron, and the Press of the iron industry trumpeted forth loud notes of war. After the conclusion of peace, when France, through a series of whollyunexpected events, saw Germany prostrate at her feet and without anarmy, the same phenomenon took place. The iron industry tends toaffirm itself in France; she has the iron and now she wants coal. Should she succeed in getting it, German production would be doomed. To deprive Germany of Upper Silesia would mean killing productionafter having disorganized it at the very roots of its development. 

Seven years ago, or thereabouts, Germany was flourishing in anunprecedented manner and presented the most favourable conditions fordeveloping. Her powerful demographic structure was almost unique. Placed in the centre of Europe after having withstood the push of somany peoples, she had attained an unrivalled economic position. 

Close to Germany the Austro-Hungarian Empire united together elevendifferent peoples, not without difficulty, and this union tended tothe common elevation of all. The vast monarchy, the result of a slowaggregation of violence and of administrative wisdom, represented, perhaps, the most interesting historic attempt on the part ofdifferent peoples to achieve a common rule and discipline on the sameterritory. Having successfully weathered the most terrible financialcrises, and having healed in half a century the wounds of two greatwars which she had lost, Austria-Hungary lived in the effort ofholding together Germans, Magyars, Slavs and Italians without theirflying at each others' throats. Time will show how the effort ofAustria-Hungary has not been lost for civilization. 

Russia represented the largest empire which has ever been inexistence, and in spite of its defective political regime was dailyprogressing. Perhaps for the first time in history an immense empireof twenty-one millions and a half of square kilometres, eighty-fourtimes the size of Italy, almost three times as large as the UnitedStates of America, was ruled by a single man. From the Baltic tothe Yellow Sea, from Finland to the Caucasus, one law and one rulegoverned the most different peoples scattered over an immenseterritory. The methods by which, after Peter the Great, the old Duchyof Muscovy had been transformed into an empire, still lived in theadministration; they survive to-day in the Bolshevist organization, which represents less a revolution than a hieratic and brutal form ofviolence placed at the service of a political organization. 

The war between Russia and Japan had revealed all the perils ofa political organization exclusively based on central authorityrepresented by a few irresponsible men under the apparent rule of asovereign not gifted with the slightest trace of will power. 

Those who exalt nationalist sentiments and pin their faith onimperialistic systems fail to realize that while the greatest pushtowards the War came from countries living under a less liberalregime, those very countries gave proof of the least power ofresistance. Modern war means the full exploitation of all the humanand economic resources of each belligerent country. The greater anation's wealth the greater is the possibility to hold out, and theperfection of arms and weapons is in direct ratio with the degreeof technical progress attained. Moreover, the combatants and thepossibility of using them are in relation with the number of personswho possess sufficient skill and instruction to direct the war. Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States of America, were able without any appreciable effort to improvise an enormousnumber of officers for the War, transforming professional men, engineers and technicians into officers. Russia, who did not have areal industrial bourgeoisie nor a sufficient development of the middleclasses, was only able to furnish an enormous number of combatants, but an insufficient organization from a technical and military pointof view, and a very limited number of officers. While on a peacefooting her army was the most numerous in the world, over one millionthree hundred thousand men; when her officers began to fail Russia wasunable to replace them so rapidly as the proportion of nine or tentimes more than normal required by the War. 

Russia has always had a latent force of development; there is withinher a _vis inertiae_ equivalent to a mysterious energy of expansion. Her birth-rate is higher than that of any other European country;she does not progress, she increases. Her weight acts as a menaceto neighbouring countries, and as, by a mysterious historic law theprimitive migrations of peoples and the ancient invasions mostlyoriginated from the territories now occupied by Russia, the latter hassucceeded in amalgamating widely different peoples and in creatingunity where no affinity appeared possible. 

At any rate, although suffering from an excessively centralizedgovernment and a form of constitution which did not allow thedevelopment of popular energies nor a sufficient education of thepeople, Russia was perhaps, half a century before the War, theEuropean country which, considering the difficulties in her path, hadaccomplished most progress. 

European Russia, with her yearly excess of from one million and ahalf to two million births over deaths, with the development ofher industries and the formation of important commercial centres, progressed very rapidly and was about to become the pivot of Europeanpolitics. 

When it will be possible to examine carefully the diplomatic documentsof the War, and time will allow us to judge them calmly, it will beseen that Russia's attitude was the real and underlying cause of theworld-conflict. She alone promoted and kept alive the agitationsin Serbia and of the Slavs in Austria; she alone in Germany's eyesrepresented the peril of the future. Germany has never believed in aFrench danger. She knew very well that France, single handed, couldnever have withstood Germany, numerically so much her superior. Russiawas the only danger that Germany saw, and the continual increase ofthe Russian army was her gravest preoccupation. Before the War, whenItaly was Germany's ally, the leading German statesmen with whom Ihad occasion to discuss the situation did nothing but allude to theRussian peril. It was known (and subsequent facts have amply provedit) that the Tsar was absolutely devoid of will power, that he was ledand carried away by conflicting currents, and that his advisers werefor the most part favourable to the War. After the Japanese defeat themilitarist party felt keenly the need for just such a great militaryrevival and a brilliant _revanche_ in Europe. 

Possessing an enormous wealth of raw materials and an immenseterritory, Russia represented Europe's great resource, her support forthe future. 

If the three great empires had attained enviable prosperity anddevelopment in 1914, when the War burst, the three great westerndemocracies, Great Britain, France and Italy, had likewise progressedimmensely. 

Great Britain, proud of her "splendid isolation, " and ruler of theseas, traded in every country of the world. Having the vastest empire, she was also financially the greatest creditor country: creditor ofAmerica and Asia, of the new African states and of Australia. Perhapsall this wealth had somewhat diminished the spirit of enterprisebefore the War, and popular culture also suffered from thisunprecedented prosperity. There was not the spasmodic effortnoticeable in Germany, but a continuous and secure expansion, anundisputed supremacy. Although somewhat preoccupied at Germany'sprogress and regarding it as a peril for the future, Great Britainattached more importance to the problems of her Empire, namely to herinternal constitution: like ancient Rome, she was a truly imperialcountry in the security of her supremacy, in her calm, in herforbearance. 

France continued patiently to accumulate wealth. She did not increaseher population, but ably added to her territory and her savings. Threatened with the phenomenon known to political economists under thename of "oliganthropy, " or lack of men, she had founded a colonialempire which may be regarded as the largest on earth. It is true thatthe British colonies, even before the War, covered an area of thirtymillion square kilometres, while France's colonial empire was slightlyover twelve millions. But it must be remembered that the Britishcolonies are not colonies in the real sense of the word, but consistchiefly in Dominions which enjoy an almost complete autonomy. Canadaalone represents about one-third of the territories of the BritishDominions; Australia and New Zealand more than one-fourth, andAustralasia, the South African Union and Canada put together representmore than two-thirds of the Empire, while India accounts for aboutfifty per cent. Of the missing third. After England, France was themost important creditor country. Her astonishing capacity for savingincreased in proportion with her wealth. Without having Germany'sforce of development and Great Britain's power of expansion, Franceenjoyed a wonderful prosperity and her wealth was scattered all overthe world. 

Italy had arisen under the greatest difficulties, but in less thanfifty years of unity she progressed steadily. Having a territorytoo small and mountainous for a population already overflowing andconstantly on the increase, Italy had been unable to exploit thelimited resources of her subsoil and had been forced to build up herindustries in conditions far less favourable than those of othercountries. Italy is perhaps the only nation which has succeeded informing her industries without having any coal of her own and verylittle iron. But the acquisition of wealth, extremely difficult atfirst, had gradually been rendered more easy by the improvement intechnical instruction and methods, for the most part borrowed fromGermany. On the eve of the War, after a period of thirty-three years, the Triple Alliance had rendered the greatest services to Italy, fullyconfirming Crispi's political intuition. France, with whom we had hadserious differences of opinion, especially after the Tunis affair, didnot dare to threaten Italy because the latter belonged to the TripleAlliance, and for the same reason all ideas of a conflict withAustria-Hungary had been set aside because of her forming part of the"Triplice. "

During the Triple Alliance Italy built up all her industries, she consolidated her national unity and prepared her economictransformation, which was fraught with considerable difficulties. Suddenly her sons spread all over the world, stimulated by thefecundity of their race and by the narrowness of their fields. 

The greater States were surrounded by minor nations which had achievedconsiderable wealth and great prosperity. 

Europe throughout her history had never been so rich, so far advancedon the road to progress, above all so united and living in her unity;as regards production and exchanges she was really a living unity. Thevital lymph was not limited to this or that country, but flowed withan even current through the veins and arteries of the various nationsthrough the great organizations of capital and labour, promoting acontinuous and increasing solidarity among all the parties concerned. 

In fact, the idea of solidarity had greatly progressed: economic, moral and spiritual solidarity. 

Moreover, the idea of peace, although threatened by militaryoligarchies and by industrial corners, was firmly based on thesentiments of the great majority. The strain of barbaric blood whichstill ferments in many populations of Central Europe constituted--itis true--a standing menace; but no one dreamt that the threat wasabout to be followed, lightning like, by facts, and that we were onthe eve of a catastrophe. 

Europe had forgotten what hunger meant. Never had Europe had at herdisposal such abundant economic resources or a greater increase inwealth. 

Wealth is not our final object in life. But a minimum of means is anindispensable condition of life and happiness. Excessive wealth maylead both to moral elevation and to depression and ruin. 

Europe had not only increased her wealth but developed the solidarityof her interests. Europe is a small continent, about as large asCanada or the United States of America. But her economic ties andinterests had been steadily on the increase. 

Now the development of her wealth meant for Europe the development ofher moral ideas and of her social life and aspirations. We admire acountry not so much for its wealth as for the works of civilizationwhich that wealth enables it to accomplish. 

Although peace be the aspiration of all peoples, even as physicalhealth is the aspiration of all living beings, there are wars whichcannot be avoided, as there are diseases which help us to overcomean organic crisis to which we might otherwise succumb. War and peacecannot be regarded as absolutely bad or absolutely good and desirable;war is often waged in order to secure peace. In certain cases war isnot only a necessary condition of life but may be an indispensablecondition towards progress. 

We must consider and analyse the sentiments and psychological causeswhich bring about a war. A war waged to redeem its independence by anation downtrodden by another nation is perfectly legitimate, evenfrom the point of view of abstract morality. A war which has forits object the conquest of political or religious liberty cannot becondemned even by the most confirmed pacificist. 

Taken as a whole, the wars fought in the nineteenth century, wars ofnationality, of independence, of unity, even colonial wars, were of acharacter far less odious than that of the great conflict which hasdevastated Europe and upset the economic conditions of the world. Ithas not only been the greatest war in history, but in its consequencesit threatens to prove the worst war which has ravaged Europe in moderntimes. 

After nearly every nineteenth-century war there has been a markedrevival of human activity. But this unprecedented clash of peopleshas reduced the energy of all; it has darkened the minds of men, andspread the spirit of violence. 

Europe will be able to make up for her losses in lives and wealth. Time heals even the most painful wounds. But one thing she has lostwhich, if she does not succeed in recovering it, must necessarily leadto her decline and fall: the spirit of solidarity. 

After the victory of the Entente the microbes of hate have developedand flourished in special cultures, consisting of national egotism, imperialism, and a mania for conquest and expansion. 

The peace treaties imposed on the vanquished are nothing but arms ofoppression. What more could Germany herself have done had she won theWar? Perhaps her terms would have been more lenient, certainly notharder, as she would have understood that conditions such as we haveimposed on the losers are simply inapplicable. 

Three years have elapsed since the end of the War, two since theconclusion of peace, nevertheless Europe has still more men underarms than in pre-war times. The sentiment of nationality, twisted andtransformed into nationalism, aims at the subjugation and depressionof other peoples. No civilized co-existence is possible where eachnation proposes to harm instead of helping its neighbour. 

The spread of hatred among peoples has everywhere rendered moredifficult the internal relations between social classes and theeconomic life of each country. Fearing a repetition of armedconflicts, and owing to that spirit of unrest and intoleranceengendered everywhere by the War, workers are becoming every day moreexacting. They, too, claim their share of the spoils; they, too, clamour for enemy indemnities. The same manifestations of hate, thesame violence of language, spread from people to people and from classto class. 

This tremendous War, which the peoples of Europe have fought andsuffered, has not only bled the losers almost to death, but it hasdeeply perturbed the very life and existence of the victors. Ithas not produced a single manifestation of art or a single moralaffirmation. For the last seven years the universities of Europeappear to be stricken with paralysis: not one outstanding personalityhas been revealed. 

In almost every country the War has brought a sense of internaldissolution: everywhere this disquieting phenomenon is more or lessnoticeable. With the exception, perhaps, of Great Britain, whoseprivileged insular situation, enormous mercantile navy and flourishingtrade in coal have enabled her to resume her pre-war economicexistence almost entirely, no country has emerged scatheless fromthe War. The rates of exchange soar daily to fantastic heights, andinsuperable barriers to the commerce of European nations are beingcreated. People work less than they did in pre-war times, buteverywhere a tendency is noticeable to consume more. Austria, Germany, Italy, France are not different phenomena, but differentmanifestations and phases of the same phenomenon. 

Before the War Europe, in spite of her great sub-divisions, represented a living economic whole. To-day there are not onlyvictors and vanquished, but currents of hate, ferments of violence, ahungering after conquests, an unscrupulous cornering of raw materialscarried out brutally and almost ostentatiously in the name of therights of victory: a situation which renders production, let alone itsdevelopment and increase, utterly impossible. 

The treaty system as applied after the War has divided Europe intotwo distinct parts: the losers, held under the military and economiccontrol of the victors, are expected to produce not only enoughfor their own needs, but to provide a super-production in order toindemnify the winners for all the losses and damages sustained onaccount of the War. The victors, bound together in what is supposed tobe a permanent alliance for the protection of their common interests, are supposed to exercise a military action of oppression and controlover the losers until the full payment of the indemnity. Another partof Europe is in a state of revolutionary ferment, and the EntentePowers have, by their attitude, rather tended to aggravate than toimprove the situation. 

Europe can only recover her peace of mind by remembering that theWar is over and done with. Unfortunately, the treaty system not onlyprevents us from remembering that the War is finished, but determinesa state of permanent war. 

Clemenceau bluntly declared to the French Chamber that treaties were ameans of continuing the War. He was perfectly right, for war is beingwaged more bitterly than ever and peace is as remote as it ever was. 

The problem with which modern statesmen are confronted is very simple:can Europe continue in her decline without involving the ruin ofcivilization? And is it possible to stop this process of decay withoutfinding some form of civil symbiosis which will ensure for all men amore human mode of living? In the affirmative case what course shouldwe take, and is it presumable that there should be an immediate changefor the better in the situation, given the national and economicinterests now openly and bitterly in conflict?

We have before us a problem, or rather a series of problems, whichcall for impartiality and calm if a satisfactory solution is to bearrived at. Perhaps if some fundamental truths were brought home tothe people, or, to be more exact, to the peoples now at loggerheadswith each other, a notion of the peril equally impending upon allconcerned and the conviction that an indefinite prolongation of thepresent state of things is impossible, would prove decisive factors inrestoring a spirit of peace and in reviving that spirit of solidaritywhich now appears spent or slumbering. 

But in the first place it is necessary to review the situation, suchas it is at the present moment:

Firstly, Europe, which was the creditor of all other continents, hasnow become their debtor. 

Secondly, her working capacity has greatly decreased, chiefly owing tothe negative change in her demographic structure. In pre-war times theancient continent supplied new continents and new territories with ahardy race of pioneers, and held the record as regards population, both adult and infantile, the prevalence of women over men beingespecially noted by statisticians. All this has changed considerablyfor the worse!

Thirdly, on the losing nations, including Germany, which is generallyunderstood to be the most cultured nation in the world, the victorshave forced a peace which practically amounts to a continuation ofthe War. The vanquished have had to give up their colonies, theirshipping, their credits abroad, and their transferable resources, besides agreeing to the military and economic control of the Allies;moreover, despite their desperate conditions, they are expected topay an indemnity, the amount of which, although hitherto only vaguelymentioned, surpasses by its very absurdity all possibility of an evenremote settlement. 

Fourthly, considerable groups of ex-enemy peoples, chiefly Germansand Magyars, have been assigned to populations of an inferiorcivilization. 

Fifthly, as a result of this state of things, while Germany, Austriaand Bulgaria have practically no army at all and have submittedwithout the slightest resistance to the most stringent forms ofmilitary control, the victorious States have increased their armiesand fleets to proportions, which they did not possess before the War. 

Sixthly, Europe, cut up into thirty States, daily sees her buyingcapacity decreasing and the rate of exchange rising menacingly againsther. 

Seventhly, the peace treaties are the most barefaced denial of all theprinciples which the Entente Powers declared and proclaimed during theWar; not only so, but they are a fundamental negation of PresidentWilson's famous fourteen points which were supposed to constitute asolemn pledge and covenant, not only with the enemy, but with thedemocracies of the whole world. 

Eighthly, the moral unrest deriving from these conditions has dividedamong themselves the various Entente Powers: United States of America, Great Britain, Italy and France, not only in their aims and policy, but in their sentiments. The United States is anxious to get rid, as far as possible, of European complications and responsibilities;France follows methods with which Great Britain and Italy are notwholly in sympathy, and it cannot be said that the three Great Powersof Western Europe are in perfect harmony. There is still a great dealof talk about common ends and ideals, and the necessity of applyingthe treaties in perfect accord and harmony, but everybody is convincedthat to enforce the treaties, without attenuating or modifying theirterms, would mean the ruin of Europe and the collapse of the victorsafter that of the vanquished. 

Ninthly, a keen contest of nationalisms, land-grabbing and corneringof raw materials renders friendly relations between the thirty Statesof Europe extremely difficult. The most characteristic examples ofnationalist violence have arisen out of the War, as in the case ofPoland and other newborn States, which pursue vain dreams of empirewhile on the verge of dissolution through sheer lack of vital strengthand energy, and becoming every day more deeply engulfed in misery andruin. 

Finally, Continental Europe is on the eve of a series of fresh andmore violent wars among peoples, threatening to submerge civilizationunless some means be found to replace the present treaties, which arebased on the principle that it is necessary to continue the War, by asystem of friendly agreements whereby winners and losers are placedon a footing of liberty and equality, and which, while laying on thevanquished a weight they are able to bear, will liberate Europe fromthe present spectacle of a continent divided into two camps, where oneis armed to the teeth and threatening, while the other, unarmed andinoffensive, is forced to labour in slavish conditions under themenace of a servitude even more severe. 

II

THE PEACE TREATIES AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR

The various peace treaties regulating the present territorialsituation bear the names of the localities near Paris in which theywere signed: Versailles, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Trianon and Sèvres. The first deals with Germany, the second with Austria, the thirdwith Hungary, and the fourth with Turkey. The Treaty of Neuilly, comparatively far less important, concerns Bulgaria alone. But the onefundamental and decisive treaty is the Treaty of Versailles, inasmuchas it not only establishes as a recognized fact the partition ofEurope, but lays down the rules according to which all future treatiesare to be concluded. 

History has not on record a more colossal diplomatic feat than thistreaty, by which Europe has been neatly divided into two sections:victors and vanquished; the former being authorized to exercise on thelatter complete control until the fulfilment of terms which, even atan optimistic point valuation, would require at least thirty years tomaterialize. 

Although it is a matter of recent history, we may as well call to mindthat the Entente Powers have always maintained that the War waswanted and was imposed by Germany; that she alone, with her Allies, repeatedly violated the rights of peoples; that the World War couldwell be regarded as the last war, inasmuch as the triumph of theEntente meant the triumph of democracy and a more human regime oflife, a society of nations rich in effects conducive to a lastingpeace. It was imperative to restore the principles of internationaljustice. In France, in England, in Italy, and later, even moresolemnly, in the United States, the same principles have beenproclaimed by Heads of States, by Parliaments and Governments. 

There are two documents laying down and fixing the principles whichthe Entente Powers, on the eve of that event of decisive importance, the entry of the United States into the War, bound themselves tosustain and to carry on to triumph. The first is a statement by Briandto the United States Ambassador, in the name of all the other Allies, dated December 30, 1916. Briand speaks in the name of all "_lesgouvernements alliés unis pour la défense et la liberté des peuples_. "

Briand's second declaration, dated January 10, 1917, is even morefundamentally important. It is a collective note of reply to PresidentWilson, delivered in the name of all the Allies to the United StatesAmbassador. The principles therein established are very clearlyenunciated. According to that document the Entente has no idea ofconquest and proposes mainly to achieve the following objects:

1st. Restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, with theindemnities due to them. 

2nd. Evacuation of invaded territories in France, Russia and Rumaniaand payment of just reparations. 

3rd. Reorganization of Europe with a permanent regime based on therespect of nationalities and on the right of all countries, both greatand small, to complete security and freedom of economic development, besides territorial conventions and international regulations capableof guaranteeing land and sea frontiers from unjustified attacks. 

4th. Restitution of the provinces and territories taken in the pastfrom the Allies by force and against the wish of the inhabitants. 

5th. Liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and Czeko-Slovaks fromforeign rule. 

6th. Liberation of the peoples subjected to the tyranny of the Turksand expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, as being decidedlyextraneous to western civilization. 

7th. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia in regardto Poland are clearly indicated in the proclamation addressed to hisarmies. 

8th. The Allies have never harboured the design of exterminatingGerman peoples nor of bringing about their political disappearance. 

At that time the autocratic form of government still prevailed inRussia, and the Allies still considered themselves bound to Russia'saspirations; moreover there existed, in regard to Italy, theobligations established by the Pact of London. That is why in thestatements of the Entente Powers of Europe the restoration ofMontenegro is regarded as an obligation; mention is made of thenecessity of driving the Turks out of Europe in order to enable Russiato seize Constantinople; and as to Poland, there are only vagueallusions, namely, the reference made to the Tsar's intentions asoutlined in his proclamation. 

The Entente has won the War, but Russia has collapsed under thestrain. Had victory been achieved without the fall of Russia, thelatter would have installed herself as the predominating Power in theMediterranean. On the other hand, to unite Dalmatia to Italy, whileseparating her from Italy, according to the pact of London, byassigning the territory of Fiume to Croatia, would have meant settingall the forces of Slav irredentism against Italy. 

These considerations are of no practical value inasmuch as events havetaken another course. Nobody can say what would have happened if theCarthagenians had conquered the Romans or if victory had remained withMithridates. Hypotheses are of but slight interest when truth followsanother direction. Nevertheless we cannot but repeat that it was agreat fortune for Europe that victory was not decided by Russia, andthat the decisive factor proved the United States. 

It is beyond all possible doubt that without the intervention ofthe United States of America the War could not have been won by theEntente. Although the admission may prove humiliating to the Europeanpoint of view, it is a fact which cannot be attenuated or disguised. The United States threw into the balance the weight of its enormouseconomic and technical resources, besides its enormous resources inmen. Although its dead only amount to fifty thousand, the UnitedStates built up such a formidable human reserve as to deprive Germanyof all hopes of victory. The announcement of America's entry in theWar immediately crushed all Germany's power of resistance. Germanyfelt that the struggle was no longer limited to Europe, and that everyeffort was vain. 

The United States, besides giving to the War enormous quantities ofarms and money, had practically inexhaustible reserves of men to placein the field against an enemy already exhausted and famine-stricken. 

War and battles are two very different things. Battles constitute anessentially military fact, while war is an essentially political fact. That explains why great leaders in war have always been first andforemost great political leaders, namely, men accustomed to manageother men and able to utilize them for their purposes. Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, the three greatest military leaders producedby Aryan civilization, were essentially political men. War is not onlya clash of arms, it is above all the most convenient exploitation ofmen, of economic resources and of political situations. A battle is afact of a purely military nature. The Romans almost constantly placedat the head of their armies personages of consular rank, who regardedand conducted the war as a political enterprise. The rules of tacticsand strategy are perfectly useless if those who conduct the war failto utilize to the utmost all the means at their disposal. 

It cannot be denied that in the War Germany and Austria-Hungary scoredthe greatest number of victories. For a long period they succeeded ininvading large tracts of enemy territory and in recovering thoseparts of their own territory which had been invaded, besides alwaysmaintaining the offensive. They won great battles at the cost ofenormous sacrifices in men and lives, and for a long time victoryappeared to shine on their arms. But they failed to understand thatfrom the day in which the violation of Belgium's neutrality determinedGreat Britain's entry in the field the War, from a general point ofview, could be regarded as lost. As I have said, Germany is especiallylacking in political sense: after Bismarck, her statesmen have neverrisen to the height of the situation. Even von Bülow, who appearedto be one of the cleverest, never had a single manifestation of realintelligence. 

The "banal" statements made about Belgium and the United States ofAmerica by the men who directed Germany's war policy were preciselythe sort of thing most calculated to harm the people from whom theycame. What is decidedly lacking in Germany, while it abounds inFrance, is a political class. Now a political class, consisting ofmen of ability and culture, cannot but be the result of a democraticeducation in all modern States, especially in those which haveachieved a high standard of civilization and development. It seemsalmost incredible that Germany, despite all her culture, shouldhave tolerated the political dictatorship of the Kaiser and of hisaccomplices. 

At the Conferences of Paris and London, in 1919 and 1920, I did allthat was in my power to prevent the trial of the Kaiser, and I amconvinced that my firm attitude in the matter succeeded in avoidingit. Sound common sense saved us from floundering in one of the mostformidable blunders of the Treaty of Versailles. To hold one manresponsible for the whole War and to bring him to trial, his enemiesacting as judge and jury, would have been such a monstrous travestyof justice as to provoke a moral revolt throughout the world. On theother hand it was also a moral monstrosity, which would have deprivedthe Treaty of Versailles of every shred of dignity. If the oneresponsible for the War is the Kaiser, why does the Entente demand ofthe German people such enormous indemnities, unprecedented in history?

One of the men who has exercised the greatest influence on Europeanevents during the last ten years, one of the most intelligent ofliving statesmen, once told me that it was his opinion that the Kaiserdid not want the War, but neither did he wish to prevent it. 

Germany, although under protest, has been forced to accept thestatement of the Versailles Treaty to the effect that she isresponsible for the War and that she provoked it. The same charge hasbeen levelled at her in all the Entente States throughout the War. 

When our countries were engaged in the struggle, and we were at gripswith a dangerous enemy, it was our duty to keep up the _morale_ of ourpeople and to paint our adversaries in the darkest colours, laying ontheir shoulders all the blame and responsibility of the War. But afterthe great world conflict, now that Imperial Germany has fallen, itwould be absurd to maintain that the responsibility of the War issolely and wholly attributable to Germany and that earlier than 1914in Europe there had not developed a state of things fatally destinedto culminate in a war. If Germany has the greatest responsibility, that responsibility is shared more or less by all the countries of theEntente. But while the Entente countries, in spite of their mistakes, had the political sense always to invoke principles of right andjustice, the statesmen of Germany gave utterance to nothing but brutaland vulgar statements, culminating in the deplorable mental and moralexpressions contained in the speeches, messages and telegrams ofWilliam II. He was a perfect type of the _miles gloriosus_, not aharmless but an irritating and dangerous boaster, who succeeded inpiling up more loathing and hatred against his country than the mostactive and intelligently managed enemy propaganda could possibly havedone. 

If the issue of the War could be regarded as seriously jeopardizedby England's intervention, it was practically lost for the CentralEmpires when the United States stepped in. 

America's decision definitely crippled Germany's resistance--andnot only for military, but for moral reasons. In all his messagesPresident Wilson had repeatedly declared that he wanted a peacebased on justice and equity, of which he outlined the fundamentalconditions; moreover, he stated that he had no quarrel with theGermans themselves, but with the men who were at their head, and thathe did not wish to impose on the vanquished peace terms such as mightsavour of oppression. 

President Wilson's ideas on the subject have been embodied in abulky volume. [1] Turning over the pages of this book now we have theimpression that it is a collection of literary essays by a man who hadhis eye on posterity and assumed a pose most likely to attract theadmiration of generations as yet unborn. But when these same wordswere uttered in the intervals of mighty battles, they fell onexpectant and anxious ears: they were regarded as a ray of light inthe fearsome darkness of uncertainty, and everybody listened to them, not only because the President was the authorized exponent of agreat nation, of a powerful people, but because he represented aninexhaustible source of vitality in the midst of the ravages ofviolence and death. President Wilson's messages have done as much asfamine and cruel losses in the field to break the stubborn resistanceof the German people. If it was possible to obtain a just peace, whygo to the bitter end when defeat was manifestly inevitable? Obstinacyis the backbone of war, and nothing undermines a nation's power ofresistance so much as doubt and faint-heartedness on the part of thegoverning classes. 

[Footnote 1: "President Wilson's State Speeches and Addresses, " NewYork, 1918. ]

President Wilson, who said on January 2, 1917, that a peace withoutvictory was to be preferred ("It must be a peace without victory"), and that "Right is more precious than peace, " had also repeatedlyaffirmed that "We have no quarrel with the German people. "

He only desired, as the exponent of a great democracy, a peace whichshould be the expression of right and justice, evolving from the War aLeague of Nations, the first milestone in a new era of civilization, aleague destined to bind together ex-belligerents and neutrals in one. 

In Germany, where the inhabitants had to bear the most cruelprivations, President Wilson's words, pronounced as a solemn pledgebefore the whole world, had a most powerful effect on all classesand greatly contributed towards the final breakdown of collectiveresistance. Democratic minds saw a promise for the future, whilereactionaries welcomed any way out of their disastrous adventure. 

After America's entry in the War, President Wilson, on January 8, 1918, formulated the fourteen points of his programme regarding thefinalities of the War and the peace to be realized. 

It is here necessary to reproduce the original text of PresidentWilson's message containing the fourteen points which constitute aformal pledge undertaken by the democracy of America, not only towardsenemy peoples but towards all peoples of the world. 

These important statements from President Wilson's message have, strangely enough, been reproduced either incompletely or in an utterlymistaken form even in official documents and in books published bystatesmen who took a leading part in the Paris Conference. 

It is therefore advisable to reproduce the original text in full:

 1st. Honest peace treaties, following loyal and honest negotiations, after which secret international agreements will be abolished and diplomacy will always proceed frankly and openly. 

 2nd. Full liberty of navigation on the high seas outside territorial waters, both in peace and war, except when the seas be closed wholly or in part by an international decision sanctioned by international treaties. 

 3rd. Removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and establishment of terms of equality in commerce among all nations adhering to peace and associated to maintain it. 

 4th. Appropriate guarantees to be given and received for the reduction of national armaments to a minimum compatible with internal safety. 

 5th. A clear, open and absolutely impartial settlement of all colonial rights, based on a rigorous observance of the principle that, in the determination of all questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations shall bear equal weight with those of the Government whose claims are to be determined. 

 6th. The evacuation of all Russian territories and a settlement of all Russian questions such as to ensure the best and most untrammelled co-operation of other nations of the world in order to afford Russia a clear and precise opportunity for the independent settlement of her autonomous political development and of her national policy, promising her a cordial welcome in the League of Nations under institutions of her own choice, and besides a cordial welcome, help and assistance in all that she may need and require. The treatment meted out to Russia by the sister nations in the months to come must be a decisive proof of their goodwill, of their understanding of her needs as apart from their own interests, and of their intelligent and disinterested sympathy. 

 7th. Belgium, as the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and reconstructed without the slightest attempt at curtailing the sovereign rights which she enjoys in common with other free nations. Nothing will be more conducive to the re-establishment of confidence and respect among nations for those laws which they themselves have made for the regulation and observance of their reciprocal relations. Without this salutary measure the whole structure and validity of international law would be permanently undermined. 

 8th. All French territories will be liberated, the invaded regions reconstructed, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871, in the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and which has jeopardized the peace of the world for nearly half a century, must be made good, so as to ensure a lasting peace in the general interest. 

 9th. The Italian frontier must be rectified on the basis of the clearly recognized lines of nationality. 

 10th. The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and maintained, should come to an agreement as to the best way of attaining their autonomous development. 

 11th. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro are to be evacuated and occupied territories restored: a free and secure access to the sea for Serbia; mutual relations between the Balkan States to be determined on a friendly basis by a Council, following the lines of friendship and nationality traced by tradition and history; the political and economic integrity of the various Balkan States to be guaranteed. 

 12th. A certain degree of sovereignty must be assigned to that part of the Ottoman Empire which is Turkish; but the other nationalities now under the Turkish regime should have the assurance of an independent existence and of an absolute and undisturbed opportunity to develop their autonomy; moreover the Dardanelles should be permanently open to the shipping and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 

 13th. An independent Polish State should be founded, comprising all territories inhabited by peoples of undoubtedly Polish nationality, with a free and secure access to the sea and its political and economic independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by international agreements. 

 14th. A League of Nations must be formed with special pacts and for the sole scope of ensuring the reciprocal guarantees of political independence and of territorial integrity, in equal measure both for large and small States. 

The Peace Treaty as outlined by Wilson would really have brought abouta just peace; but we shall see how the actual result proved quite thereverse of what constituted a solemn pledge of the American people andof the Entente Powers. 

On February 11, 1918, President Wilson confirmed before Congress thatall territorial readjustments were to be made in the interest and forthe advantage of the populations concerned, not merely as a bargainbetween rival States, and that there were not to be indemnities, annexations or punitive exactions of any kind. 

On September 27, 1918, just on the eve of the armistice, when Germanresistance was already shaken almost to breaking point, PresidentWilson gave it the _coup de grâce_ by his message on the _post-bellum_economic settlement. No special or separate interest of any singlenation or group of nations was to be taken as the basis of anysettlement which did not concern the common interest of all; therewere not to be any leagues or alliances, or special pacts or ententeswithin the great family of the society of nations; economic deals andcorners of an egotistical nature were to be forbidden, as also allforms of boycotting, with the exception of those applied in punishmentto the countries transgressing the rules of good fellowship; allinternational treaties and agreements of every kind were to bepublished in their entirety to the whole world. 

It was a magnificent programme of world policy. Not only would it havemeant peace after war, but a peace calculated to heal the deep woundsof Europe and to renovate the economic status of nations. 

On the basis of these principles, which constituted a solemn pledge, Germany, worn out by famine and even more by increasing internalunrest, demanded peace. 

According to President Wilson's clear statements, made not only inthe name of the United States but in that of the whole Entente, peaceshould therefore have been based on justice, the relations betweenwinners and losers in a society of nations being exclusively inspiredby mutual trust. 

There were no longer to be huge standing armies, neither on thepart of the ex-Central Empires or on that of the victorious States;adequate guarantees were to be _given and received_ for the reductionof armies to the minimum necessary for internal defence; removal ofall economic barriers; absolute freedom of the seas; reorganizationof the colonies based on the development of the peoples directlyconcerned; abolition of secret diplomacy, etc. 

As to the duties of the vanquished, besides evacuating the occupiedterritories, they were to reconstruct Belgium, to restore to Francethe territories taken in 1871; to restore all the territoriesbelonging to Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, giving Serbia a free andsecure access to the sea; to constitute a free Poland with territories_undoubtedly Polish_ to which _there might_ be granted a free andsecure access to the sea. Poland, founded on secure ethnical bases, far from being a military State, was to be an element of peace, andher political and economic independence and territorial integrity wereto have been guaranteed by an international agreement. 

After the rectification of the Italian frontier according to theprinciples of nationality, the peoples of Austria-Hungary were toagree on the free opportunity of their autonomous development. Inother terms, each people could freely choose autonomy or throw in itslot with some other State. After giving a certain sovereignty to theTurkish populations of the Ottoman Empire the other nationalities wereto be allowed to develop autonomously, and the free navigation of theDardanelles was to be internationally guaranteed. 

These principles announced by President Wilson, and already proclaimedin part by the Entente Powers when they stoutly affirmed that theywere fighting for right, for democracy and for peace, did notconstitute a concession but a duty towards the enemy. In each of thelosing countries, in Germany as in Austria-Hungary, the democraticgroups contrary to the War, and those even more numerous which hadaccepted the War as in a momentary intoxication, when they exertedthemselves for the triumph of peace, had counted on the statements, orrather on the solemn promises which American democracy had made notonly in the name of the United States but in that of all the EntentePowers. 

Let us now try to sum up the terms imposed on Germany and the otherlosing countries by the treaty of June 28, 1919. The treaty, it istrue, was concluded between the allied and associated countries andGermany, but it also concerns the very existence of other countriessuch as Austria-Hungary, Russia, etc. :

I. --TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL CLAUSES

Until the payment of an indemnity the amount of which is as yet notdefinitely stated, Germany loses the fundamental characters of asovereign state. Not only part of her territory remains under theoccupation of the ex-enemy troops for a period of fifteen years but awhole series of controls is established, military, administrative, ontransports, etc. The Commission for Reparations is empowered to effectall the changes it thinks fit in the laws and regulations of theGerman State, besides applying sanctions of a military and economicnature in the event of violations of the clauses placed under itscontrol (Art. 240, 241). 

The allied and associated governments declare and Germany recognizesthat Germany and her allies are solely responsible, being the directcause thereof, for all the losses and damages suffered by the alliedand associated governments and their subjects as a result of the War, which was thrust upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies(Art. 231). Consequently the resources of Germany (and by theother treaties those of her allies as well) are destined, even ifinsufficient, to ensure full reparation for all losses and damages(Art. 232). 

The allied and associated Powers place in a state of public accusationWilliam II of Hohenzollern, ex-German Emperor, charging him withthe gravest offences against international morality and the sacredauthority of treaties. A special tribunal composed of representativesof the five great Entente Powers shall try him and will have theright of determining his punishment (Art. 227). The German Governmentlikewise recognizes the right of the allied and associated Powers totry in their courts of justice the persons (and more especially theofficers) accused of having committed acts contrary to the rules andcustoms of war. 

Restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France without any obligationon the latter's part, not even the corresponding quota of public debt(Art. 51 _et seq_. ). 

The treaties of April 19, 1839, are abolished, so that Belgium, beingno longer neutral, may become allied to France (Art. 31); attributionto Belgium of the territories of Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet. 

Abolition of all the treaties which established political and economicbonds between Germany and Luxemburg (Art. 40). 

Annulment of all the treaties concluded by Germany during the War. 

German-Austria, reduced to a little State of hardly more than6, 000, 000 inhabitants, about one-third of whom live in the capital(Art. 80), cannot become united to Germany without the consent of theSociety of Nations, and is not allowed to participate in the affairsof another nation, namely of Germany, before being admitted to theLeague of Nations (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Art. 88). As theconsent of the League of Nations must be unanimous, a contrary vote onthe part of France would be sufficient to prevent German-Austria frombecoming united to Germany. 

Attribution of North Schleswig to Denmark (Art. 109). 

Creation of the Czeko-Slovak State (Art. 87), which comprises theautonomous territory of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, Germany abandoning in favour of the new State all her rights andclaims on that part of Silesia mentioned in Art. 83. 

Creation of the State of Poland (Art. 87), to whom Posnania and partof Western Prussia are made over. Upper Silesia is to decide by aplebiscite (Art. 88) whether it desires to be united to Germany or toPoland. The latter, even without Upper Silesia, becomes a State of31, 000, 000 inhabitants, with about fifty per cent. Of the populationnon-Polish, including very numerous groups of Germans. 

Creation of the Free State of Danzig within the limits of Art. 100, under the protection of the League of Nations. The city is a FreeCity, but enclosed within the Polish Customs House frontiers, andPoland has full control of the river and of the railway system. Poland, moreover, has charge of the foreign affairs of the Free Cityof Danzig and undertakes to protect its subjects abroad. 

Surrender to the victors, or, to be more precise, almost exclusivelyto Great Britain and France, of all the German colonies (Art. 119 and127). The formula (Art. 119) is that Germany renounces in favour ofthe leading allied and associated Powers all her territories beyondthe seas. Great Britain has secured an important share, but so hasFrance, receiving that part of Congo ceded in 1911, four-fifths of theCameroons and of Togoland. 

Abandonment of all rights and claims in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Bulgaria and Shantung (Art. 128 and 158). 

Creation of a League of Nations to the exclusion, practically, ofGermany and of the other losing countries, with the result that theLeague is nothing but a juridical completion of the Commission ofReparations. In all of the various treaties, the pact of the League ofNations, the Covenant, left standing among the collapse of PresidentWilson's other ideas and proposals, is given precedence over all otherclauses. 

II. --MILITARY CLAUSES AND GUARANTEES

Germany is obliged, and with her, by the subsequent treaties, all theother losing countries, to surrender her arms and to reduce her troopsto the minimum necessary for internal defence (Art. 159 and 213). TheGerman army has no General Staff; its soldiers are mercenaries whoenlist for a period of ten years; it cannot be composed of more thanseven infantry and three cavalry divisions, not exceeding 100, 000men including officers: no staff, no military aviation, no heavyartillery. The number of gendarmes and of local police can only beincreased proportionately with the increase of the population. Themaximum of artillery allowed is limited to the requirements ofinternal defence. Germany is strictly forbidden to import arms, ammunition and war material of any kind or description. Conscriptionis abolished, and officers must remain with the colours at least tillthey have attained the age of forty-five. No institute of science orculture is allowed to take an interest in military questions. Allfortifications included in a line traced fifty kilometres to the eastof the Rhine are to be destroyed, and on no account may German troopscross the said line. 

Destruction of Heligoland and of the fortresses of the Kiel Canal. 

Destruction under the supervision of the allied commissions of controlof all tanks, flying apparatus, heavy and field artillery, namely35, 000 guns, 160, 000 machine guns, 2, 700, 000 rifles, besides the toolsand machinery necessary for their manufacture. Destruction of allarsenals. Destruction of the German fleet, which must be limited tothe proportions mentioned in Art. 181. 

Creation of inter-allied military commissions of control to superviseand enforce the carrying out of the military and naval clauses, at theexpense of Germany and with the right to install themselves in theseat of the central government. 

Occupation as a guarantee, for a period of fifteen years after theapplication of the treaty, of the bridgeheads and of the territoriesnow occupied west of the Rhine (Art. 428 and 432). If, however, theCommission of Reparations finds that Germany refuses wholly or in partto fulfil her treaty obligations, the zones specified in Article421 will be immediately occupied by the troops of the allied andassociated Powers. 

III. --FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

The principle being recognized that Germany alone is responsible forthe War which she willed and which she imposed on the rest of theworld, Germany is bound to give complete and full reparation withinthe limits specified by Art. 232. The amount of the damages for whichreparation is due will be fixed by the Commission of Reparations, consisting of the representatives of the winning countries. 

The coal fields of the Saar are to be handed over, in entire andabsolute ownership, free of all liens and obligations, to France, incompensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north ofFrance. Before the War, in 1913, the output of the Saar basin amountedto 17, 000, 000 tons. The Saar is incorporated in the French douanesystem and after fifteen years will be submitted to a plebiscite. 

Germany may not charge heavier duties on imports from allied countriesthan on those from any other country. This treatment of the mostfavoured nation to be extended to all allied and associated Statesdoes not imply the obligation of reciprocity (Art. 264). A similarlimitation is placed on exports, on which no special duty may belevied. 

Exports from Alsace and Lorraine into Germany to be exempt from duty, without right of reciprocity (Art. 268). 

Germany delivers to the Allies all the steamers of her mercantilefleet of over I, 600 tons, half of those between 1, 000 and I, 600 tons, and one-fourth of her fishing vessels. Moreover, she binds herself tobuild at the request of the Allies every year, and for a period offive years, 200, 000 tons of shipping, as directed by the Allies, andthe value of the new constructions will be credited to her by theCommission of Reparations (Part viii, 3). 

Besides giving up all her colonies, Germany surrenders all her rightsand claims on her possessions beyond the seas (Art. 119), and allthe contracts and conventions in favour of German subjects for theconstruction and exploiting of public works, which will be consideredas part payment of the reparations due. The private property ofGermans in the colonies, as also the right of Germans to live andwork there, come under the free jurisdiction of the victorious Statesoccupying the colonies, and which reserve unto themselves the right toconfiscate and liquidate all property and claims belonging to Germans(Art. 121 and 297). 

The private property of German citizens residing in Alsace-Lorraine issubject to the same treatment as that of residents in the ex-Germancolonies. The French Government may confiscate without granting anycompensation the private property of Germans and of German concerns inAlsace-Lorraine, and the sums thus derived will be credited towardsthe partial settlement of eventual French claims (Art. 53 and 74). The property of the State and of local bodies is likewise surrenderedwithout any compensation whatever. The allies and associates reservethe right to seize and liquidate all property, claims and interestsbelonging, at the date of the ratification of the treaty, toGerman citizens or to firms controlled by them, situated in theirterritories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including theterritories surrendered in accordance with the clauses of the treaty(Art. 217). 

Germany loses everything with the exception of her territory:colonies, possessions, rights, commercial investments, etc. 

After giving the Saar coal fields in perpetual ownership to France inreparation of the temporary damages suffered by the French coal mines, the treaty goes on to establish the best ways and means to depriveGermany, in the largest measure possible, of her coal and her iron. The Saar coal fields have been handed over to France absolutely, whilethe war damages of the French mines have been repaired or can berepaired in a few years. Upper Silesia being subject to the plebiscitewith the occupation of the allied troops, Germany must have lostseveral of her most important coal fields had the plebiscite goneagainst her. 

Germany is forced to deliver in part reparation to France 7, 000, 000tons of coal a year for ten years, besides a quantity of coal equalto the yearly _ante-bellum_ output of the coal mines of the North ofFrance and of the Pas-de-Calais, which were entirely destroyed duringthe War; the said quantity not to exceed 20, 000, 000 tons in the firstfive years and 8, 000, 000 tons during the five succeeding years (Partviii, 5). Moreover, Germany must give 8, 000, 000 tons to Belgium for aperiod of ten years, and to Italy a quantity of coal which, commencingat 4, 500, 000 tons for the year 1919-1920, reaches the figure of8, 500, 000 tons in the five years after 1923-1924. To Luxemburg Germanymust provide coal in the same average quantity as in pre-war times. Altogether Germany is compelled to hand over to the winners as partreparation about 25, 000, 000 tons of coal a year. 

For three years Polish exports to Germany, and for five years exportsfrom Luxemburg into Germany, will be free of all duty, without rightof reciprocity (Art. 268). 

The Allies have the right to adopt, on the territories left of theRhine and occupied by their troops, a special customs regime both asregards imports and exports (Art. 270). 

After having surrendered, as per Par. 7 of the armistice terms, 5, 000 locomotives and 150, 000 trucks and carriages with all theiraccessories and fittings (Art. 250), Germany must hand over therailway systems of the territories she has lost, with all the rollingstock in a good state of preservation, and this measure applies evento Prussian Poland occupied by Germany during the War (Art. 371). 

The German transport system is placed under control, and theadministration of the Elbe, the Rhine, the Oder, the Danube, owing tothe fact that they pass through more than one state and give accessto the sea, is entrusted to inter-allied commissions. In all thesecommissions Germany is represented by a small minority. Franceand Great Britain, who are not directly interested, have numerousrepresentatives on all the important river commissions, while on theRhine commission Germany has only four votes out of nineteen (Art. 382to 337). A privilege of first degree is established on all productionand resources of the German States to ensure the payment ofreparations and other charges specified by the treaty (Art. 248). 

The total cost of the allied and associated armies will be borne byGermany, including the upkeep of men and beasts, pay and lodging, heating, clothing, etc. , and even veterinary services, motor lorriesand automobiles. All these expenses must be reimbursed in gold marks(Art. 249). 

The privilege, as per Art. 248 of the treaty, is to be applied in thefollowing order:

(a) Reimbursement of expenses for the armies of occupation duringthe armistice and after the peace treaty. 

(b) Payment of the reparations as established by the treaty ortreaties or supplementary conventions. 

(c) Other expenses deriving from the armistice terms, from the peacetreaty and from other supplementary terms and conventions (Art. 251). Restitution, on the basis of an estimate presented sixty days afterthe application of the treaty by the Commission of Reparations, of thelive stock stolen or destroyed by the Germans and necessary for thereconstruction of the invaded countries, with the right to exact fromGermany, as part reparations, the delivery of machinery, heatingapparatus, furniture, etc. 

Reimbursement to Belgium of all the sums loaned to her by the alliedand associated Powers during the War. 

Compensation for the losses and damages sustained by the civilianpopulation of the allied and associated Powers during the period inwhich they were at war with Germany (Art. 232 and Part viii, I). 

Payment, during the first two years, of twenty milliard marks ingold or by the delivery of goods, shipping, etc. , on account ofcompensation (Art. 235). 

The reparations owed by Germany concern chiefly:

1st. Damages and loss of life and property sustained by the civilianpopulation. 

2nd. Damages sustained by civilian victims of cruelty, violence orill-treatment. 

3rd. Damages caused on occupied or invaded territories. 

4th. Damages through cruelty to and ill-treatment of prisoners of war. 

5th. Pensions and compensations of all kinds paid by the allied andassociated Powers to the military victims of the War and to theirfamilies. 

6th. Subsidies paid by the allied and associated Powers to thefamilies and other dependents of men having served in the army, etc. , etc. (Part viii, I). These expenses, which have been calculatedat varying figures, commencing from 350 billions, have undergoneconsiderable fluctuations. 

I have given the general lines of the Treaty of Versailles. 

The other treaties, far less important, inasmuch as the situationof all the losing countries was already well defined, especially asregards territorial questions, by the Treaty of Versailles, are castin the same mould and contain no essential variation. 

Now these treaties constitute an absolutely new fact, and no one canaffirm that the Treaty of Versailles derives even remotely from thedeclarations of the Entente and from Wilson's solemn pledges utteredin the name of those who took part in the War. 

If the terms of the armistice were deeply in contrast with the pledgesto which the Entente Powers had bound themselves before the wholeworld, the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties derivingtherefrom are a deliberate negation of all that had been promised, amounting to a debt of honour, and which had contributed much morepowerfully towards the defeat of the enemy than the entry in the fieldof many fresh divisions. 

In the state of extreme exhaustion in which both conquerors and losersfound themselves in 1918, in the terrible suffering of the Germanicgroup of belligerents, deprived for four years of sufficientnourishment and of the most elementary necessaries of life, in themoral collapse which had taken the place of boasting and temerity, thewords of Wilson, who pledged himself to a just peace and establishedits terms, proclaiming them to the world, had completely broken downwhatever force of resistance there still remained. They were the mostpowerful instruments of victory, and if not the essential cause, certainly not the least important among the causes which brought aboutthe collapse of the Central Empires. 

Germany had been deeply hit by the armistice. Obliged to hand overimmediately 5, 000 locomotives and 150, 000 railway trucks and carriagesat the very time when she had to demobilize, during the first monthsshe found her traffic almost completely paralysed. 

Every war brings virulent germs of revolution in the vanquishedcountries. The war of 1870 gave France the impulsive manifestations of_La Commune_ in exactly the same manner as war gave rise in Germanyduring the first months after the armistice to a violent revolutionarycrisis, overcome not without difficulty and still representing a gravemenace. 

Forced to surrender immediately a large quantity of live stock, todemobilize when the best part of her railway material had gone, stillhampered by the blockade, Germany, against the interest of the Alliesthemselves, has been obliged to sacrifice her exchange because, in theabsence of sufficient help, she has had to buy the most indispensablefoodstuffs in neutral countries. Her paper currency, which at theend of 1918 amounted to twenty-two milliard marks, not excessive ascompared with that of other countries, immediately increased with agrowing crescendo till it reached, in a very short time, the figure ofeighty-eight milliards, thus rendering from the very first the paymentof indemnities in gold extremely difficult. 

The most skilled men have been thrust into an absolute impossibilityof producing. To have deprived Germany of her merchant fleet, built upwith so much care, means to have deprived the freight market of sixtythousand of the most skilled, intelligent and hard-working seamen. 

But what Germany has lost as a result of the treaty surpasses allimagination and can only be regarded as a sentence of ruin and decayvoluntarily passed over a whole people. 

Germany, without taking into account the countries subject toplebiscite, has lost 7. 5 per cent. Of her population. Should theplebiscites prove unfavourable to her, or, as the tendency seems tobe, should these plebiscites be disregarded, Germany would lose 13. 5per cent. Of her population. Purely German territories have beenforcibly wrenched from her. What has been done in the case of theSaar has no precedents in modern history. It is a country of 650, 000inhabitants of whom not even one hundred are French, a country whichhas been German for a thousand years, and which was temporarilyoccupied by France for purely military reasons. In spite of thesefacts, however, not only have the coal fields of the Saar beenassigned in perpetuity to France as compensation for the damagescaused to the French mines in the North, but the territory of the Saarforms part of the French customs regime and will be subjected afterfifteen years to a plebiscite, when such a necessity is absolutelyincomprehensible, as the population is purely German and has neverin any form or manner expressed the intention of changing itsnationality. 

The ebb and flow of peoples in Europe during the long war ofnationalities has often changed the situation of frontier countries. Sometimes it may still be regarded as a necessity to include smallgroups of alien race and language in different states in order toensure strategically safe frontiers. But, with the exception of thenecessity for self-defence, there is nothing to justify what has beendone to the detriment of Germany. 

Wilson had only said that France should receive compensation forthe wrong suffered in 1871 and that Belgium should be evacuated andreconstructed. What had been destroyed was to have been built upagain; but no one had ever thought during the War of handing over toBelgium a part, however small, of German territory or of surrenderingpredominantly and purely German territories to Poland. 

The German colonies covered an area of nearly 3, 000, 000 squarekilometres; they had reached an admirable degree of development andwere managed with the greatest skill and ability. They represented anenormous value; nevertheless they have been assigned to France, GreatBritain and in minor proportion to Japan, without figuring at all inthe reparations account. 

It is calculated that as a result of the treaty, owing to the lossof a considerable percentage of her agricultural area, Germany istwenty-five per cent. The poorer in regard to the production ofcereals and potatoes and ten to twelve per cent. In regard to thebreeding of live stock. 

The restitution of Alsace-Lorraine (the only formal claim advanced bythe Entente in its war programme) has deprived Germany of the bulk ofher iron-ore production. In 1913 Germany could count on 21, 000, 000tons of iron from Lorraine, 7, 000, 000 from Luxemburg, 138, 000 fromUpper Silesia and 7, 344 from the rest of her territory. This meansthat Germany is reduced to only 20. 41 per cent. Of her pre-war wealthin iron ore. 

In 1913 the Saar district represented 8. 95 per cent. Of the totalproduction of coal, and Upper Silesia 22. 85 per cent. 

Having lost about eighty per cent. Of her iron ore and large stocksof coal, while her production is severely handicapped, Germany, completely disorganized abroad after the suppression of all economicequilibrium, is condemned to look on helplessly while the very sourcesof her national wealth dry up and cease to flow. In order to form acorrect estimate of the facts we must hold in mind that one-fifth ofGermany's total exports before the War consisted of iron and of toolsand machinery mostly manufactured with German iron. 

If we now consider the fourteen points of President Wilson, acceptedby the Entente as a peace programme, comparing the actual resultsobtained by the Treaty of Versailles, we are faced with the followingsituation:

1. "_After loyal peace negotiations and the conclusion and signingof peace treaties, secret diplomatic agreements must be regarded asabolished_, " says Wilson. On the contrary, secret peace negotiationshave been protracted for more than six months, and no hearing was evengranted to the German delegates who wished to expose their views. By asystem of treaties France has created a military alliance with Belgiumand Poland, thus completely cornering Germany. 

2. _Absolute freedom of the sea beyond territorial waters_. Nothing, as a matter of fact, has been changed from the pre-war state ofthings; with the difference that the losers have had to surrendertheir mercantile fleets and are therefore no longer directlyinterested in the question. 

3. _Removal of all economic barriers and equality of tradeconditions_. The treaty imposes on Germany terms without reciprocity, and almost all Entente countries have already adopted protectionistand prohibitive tariffs. 

4. _Adequate guarantees to be given and received for the reduction ofarmaments to a minimum compatible with home defence_. The treatieshave compelled the vanquished countries to destroy or to surrendertheir navies, and have reduced the standing armies of Germany to100, 000 men, including officers, of Bulgaria to 23, 000, of Austria to30, 000 (in reality only 21, 000), of Hungary to 35, 000. The conqueringstates, on the other hand, maintain enormous armies numericallysuperior to those which they had before the War. France, Belgiumand Poland have between them about 1, 400, 000 men with the colours. Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria altogether have only 179, 000men under arms, while Rumania alone has 206, 000 and Poland more than450, 000 men. 

5. _Loyal and straightforward settlement of colonial rights andclaims, based chiefly on the advantage of the peoples directlyconcerned_. All her colonies have been taken from Germany, who neededthem more than any other country of continental Europe, having adensity of population of 123 inhabitants per square kilometre (Italyhas a density of 133 per square kilometre) while France has 74, Spain40, and European Russia before the War had only 24. 

6. _Evacuation of all Russian territories and cordial co-operation forthe reconstruction and development of Russia_. For a long time theEntente has given its support to the military ventures of Koltchak, Judenic, Denikin and Wrangel, all men of the old regime. 

7. _Evacuation and reconstruction of Belgium_. This has been done, butto Belgium have been assigned territories which she never dreamt ofclaiming before the War. 

8. _Liberation of French territories, reconstruction of invadedregions and restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France in respect ofthe territories taken from her in 1871_. France occupies a dominatingposition in the Saar which constitutes an absolute denial of theprinciple of nationality. 

9. _Rectification of the Italian frontier, according to clearlydefined lines of nationality_. As these lines have never been clearlydefined or recognized, the solution arrived at has been distastefulboth to the Italians and to their neighbours. 

10. _The peoples of Austria-Hungary to be left free to unite togetheror to form autonomous states in the manner best suited to theirdevelopment_. As a matter of fact the treaties have taken the greatestpossible number of Germans from Austria and of Magyars from Hungary inorder to hand them over to Poland, to Czeko-Slovakia, to Rumania andto Jugo-Slavia, namely to populations for the most part inferior tothe Germans. 

11. _Evacuation of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro_. This has beeneffected, but whereas the Entente Powers have always proclaimed theirfundamental duty for the reconstruction of Montenegro, they allcontributed to its disappearance, chiefly at the instigation ofFrance. 

12. _A limited sovereignty to the Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire, liberation of other nationalities and freedom of navigation in theDardanelles placed under international guarantees_. What reallyhappened was that the Entente Powers immediately tried to possessthemselves of Asia Minor; but events rendered it necessary to adopta regime of mandates because direct sovereignty would have been tooperilous an experiment. A sense of deep perturbation and unrestpervades the whole of Islam. 

13. _An independent Polish state with populations undoubtedly Polishto be founded as a neutral State with a free and secure outlet to thesea and whose integrity is to be guaranteed by international accords_. In reality a Polish state has been formed with populations undoubtedlynon-Polish, having a markedly military character and aiming at furtherexpansion in Ukranian and German territory. It has a population of31, 000, 000 inhabitants while it should not exceed 18, 000, 000, andproposes to isolate Russia from Germany. Moreover the Free State ofDanzig, practically dependent from Poland, constitutes a standingmenace to Germany. 

14. _Foundation of the League of Nations for the sole purposeof re-establishing order among nations, and laying the basis ofreciprocal guarantees of territorial integrity and politicalindependence for all states, both great and small_. After more thantwo years have elapsed since the conclusion of peace and three sincethe armistice the League of Nations is still nothing but a holyalliance the object of which is to guarantee the privileges of theconquerors. After the vote of the Senate, deserving of all praisefrom every point of view, the United States does not form part of theLeague nor do the losing countries, including Germany. 

It is therefore obvious that the most solemn pledges on which peacewas based have not been maintained; the noble declarations made by theEntente during the War have been forgotten; forgotten all the solemncollective pledges; forgotten and disregarded Wilson's proclamationswhich, without being real contracts or treaties, were something farmore solemn and binding, a pledge taken before the whole world at itsmost tragic hour to give the enemy a guarantee of justice. 

Without expressing any opinion on the treaties it cannot be deniedthat the manner in which they have been applied has been even worse. For the first time in civilized Europe, not during the War, wheneverything was permissible in the supreme interests of defence, butnow that the War is over, the Entente Powers, though maintainingarmies more numerous than ever, for which the vanquished must pay, have occupied German territories, inhabited by the most cultured, progressive and technically advanced populations in the world, as aninsult and a slight, with coloured troops, men from darkest and mostbarbarous Africa, to act as defenders of the rights of civilizationand to maintain the law and order of democracy. 

III

THE PEACE TREATIES--THEIR ORIGIN AND AIMS

How, after the solemn pledges undertaken during the War, a peace couldhave been concluded which practically negatives all the principlesprofessed during the War and all the obligations entered into, iseasily explained when the progress of events is noted from the autumnof 1918 to the end of the spring of 1919. I took no direct part inthose events, as I had no share in the government of Italy fromJanuary to the end of June, 1919, the period during which the Treatiesof Versailles and Saint-Germain-en-Laye were being prepared. TheOrlando Ministry was resigning when the Treaty of Versailles was drawnup for signature, and the situation which confronted the Ministryof which I was head was clearly defined. Nevertheless I asked theMinister of Foreign Affairs and the delegates of the preceding Cabinetto put their signatures to it. Signing was a necessity, and it fell tome later on to put my signature to the ratification. 

The Treaty of Versailles and those which have followed with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have been validly signed, and they pledgethe good faith of the countries which have signed them. But in theapplication of them there is need of great breadth of view; there isneed of dispassionate study to see if they can be maintained, if thefulfilment of the impossible or unjust conditions demanded of theconquered countries will not do more harm to the conquerors, will not, in point of actual fact, pave the way to their ruin. 

If there is one thing, Lloyd George has said, which will never beforgotten or forgiven, it is arrogance and injustice in the hourof triumph. We have never tired of saying that Germany is the mostbarbarous among civilized countries, that under her civilizationis hidden all the barbarism of mediaeval times, that she puts intopractice the doctrine of might over right. At the present moment it isour duty to ask ourselves if something of the principles which we havefor so long been attributing to Germany has not passed over to theother side, if in our own hearts there is not a bitterness of hatredclouding our judgment and robbing our programme of all action that cando real good. 

Prussia won the war against Austria-Hungary in 1866, and did not askfor or impose any really onerous terms. It was contented with havingregained hegemony among the German people. Prussia conquered Francein 1870. It was an unjust war, and Prussia laid down two unjustconditions: Alsace-Lorraine and the indemnity of five milliards. Assoon as the indemnity was paid--and it was an indemnity that could bepaid in one lump sum--Prussia evacuated the occupied territory. It didnot claim of France its colonies or its fleet, it did not impose thereduction of its armaments or control of its transport after thepeace. The Treaty of Frankfort is a humanitarian act compared with theTreaty of Versailles. 

If Germany had won the War--Germany to whom we have always attributedthe worst possible intentions--what could it have done that theEntente has not done? It is possible that, as it is gifted with morepractical common sense, it might have laid down less impossibleconditions in order to gain a secure advantage without ruining theconquered countries. 

There are about ninety millions of Germans in Europe, and perhapsfifteen millions in different countries outside Europe. But in theheart of Europe they represent a great ethnic unity; they are thelargest and most compact national group in that continent. With allthe good and bad points of their race, too methodical and at the sametime easily depressed by a severe setback, they are still the mostcultivated people on earth. It is impossible to imagine that they candisappear, much less that they can reconcile themselves to live in acondition of slavery. On the other hand, the Entente has built on afoundation of shifting sand a Europe full of small States poisonedwith imperialism and in ruinous conditions of economy and finance, anda too great Poland without a national basis and necessarily the enemyof Russia and of Germany. 

No people has always been victorious; the peoples who have fought mostwars in modern Europe, English, French and Germans, have hadalternate victories and defeats. A defeat often carries in its trainreconsideration which is followed by renewed energy: the greatness ofEngland is largely due to its steadfast determination to destroy theNapoleonic Empire. What elevates men is this steadfast and perseveringeffort, and a series of such collective efforts carries a nation to ahigh place. 

There is nothing lasting in the existing groupings. At the moment ofcommon danger eternal union and unbreakable solidarity are proclaimed;but both are mere literary expressions. 

Great Britain, the country which has the least need to make war, hasbeen at war for centuries with nearly all the European countries. There is one country only against which it has never made war, noteven when a commercial challenge from the mercantile Republics ofItaly seemed possible. That country is Italy. That shows that betweenthe action of Italy there is not, nor can there be, contrast, andindeed that between the two nations there is complete agreement inEuropean continental policy. It is the common desire of the twonations, though perhaps for different reasons, that no one State shallhave hegemony on the continent. But between the years 1688 and 1815Great Britain and France were at war for seventy years: for seventyyears, that is, out of a hundred and twenty-seven there was a state ofdeadly hostility between the two countries. 

General progress, evinced in various ways, above all in respect forand in the autonomy of other peoples, is a guarantee for all. Nopeoples are always victorious, none always conquered. In the time ofNapoleon the First the French derided the lack of righting spiritin the German peoples, producers of any number of philosophersand writers. They would have laughed at anyone who suggested thepossibility of any early German military triumph. After 1815 thecountries of the Holy Alliance would never have believed in thepossibility of the revolutionary spirit recovering; they were sure oflasting peace in Europe. In 1871 the Germans had no doubt at all thatthey had surely smothered France; now the Entente thinks that it hassurely smothered Germany. 

But civilization has gained something: it has gained that collectionof rules, moral conditions, sentiments, international regulations, which tend both to mitigate violence and to regulate in a form whichis tolerable, if not always just, relations between conquerors andconquered, above all, a respect for the liberty and autonomy of thelatter. 

Now, the treaties which have been made are, from the moral point ofview, immeasurably worse than any consummated in former days, in thatthey carry Europe back to a phase of civilization which was thoughtto be over and done with centuries ago. They are a danger too. Foras everyone who takes vengeance does so in a degree greater than thedamage suffered, if one supposes for a moment that the conqueredof to-day may be the conquerors of to-morrow, to what lengths ofviolence, degradation and barbarism may not Europe be dragged?

Every effort, then, should now be made to follow the opposite road tothat traversed up to now, the more so in that the treaties cannot becarried out; and if it is desired that the conquered countries shallpay compensation to the conquerors, at least in part, for the mostserious damage, then the line to be followed must be based onrealities instead of on violence. 

But before trying to see how and why the treaties cannot be carriedout, it may be well to consider how the actual system of treatieshas been reached, in complete opposition to all that was said by theEntente during the War and to President Wilson's fourteen points. Atthe same time ought to be examined the causes which led in six monthsfrom the declarations of the Entente and of President Wilson to theTreaty of Versailles. 

The most important cause for what has happened was the choice of Parisas the meeting-place of the Conference. After the War Paris was theleast fitted of any place for the holding of a Peace Conference, andin the two French leaders, the President of the Republic, Poincaré, and the President of the Council of Ministers, Clemenceau, even if thelatter was more adaptable in mind and more open to consideration ofarguments on the other side, were two temperaments driving inevitablyto extremes. Victory had come in a way that surpassed all expectation;a people that, living through every day the War had lasted, had passedthrough every sorrow, privation, agony, had now but one thought, todestroy the enemy. The atmosphere of Paris was fiery. The decision ofthe peace terms to be imposed on the enemy was to be taken in a citywhich a few months before, one might really say a few weeks before, had been under the fire of the long-range guns invented by theGermans, in hourly dread of enemy aeroplanes. Even now it isinexplicable that President Wilson did not realize the situationwhich must inevitably come about. It is possible that the delirium ofenthusiasm with which he was received at Paris may have given him theidea that it was in him alone that the people trusted, may have madehim take the welcome given to the representative of the decidingfactor of the War as the welcome to the principles which he hadproclaimed to the world. Months later, when he left France amidgeneral indifference if not distrust, President Wilson must haverealized that he had lost, not popularity, but prestige, the one sureelement of success for the head of a Government, much more so for thehead of a State. It was inevitable that a Peace Conference heldin Paris, only a few months after the War, with the direction andpreparation of the work almost entirely in French hands and withClemenceau at the head of everything, should conclude as it didconclude; all the more so when Italy held apart right from thebeginning, and England, though convinced of the mistakes being made, could not act freely and effectively. 

The first duty of the Peace Conference was to restore a state ofequilibrium and re-establish conditions of life. Taking Europe as aneconomic unity, broken by the War, it was necessary first of all andin the interests of all to re-establish conditions of life which wouldmake it possible for the crisis to be overcome with the least possibledamage. 

I do not propose to tell the story of the Conference, and it is aswell to say at once that I do not intend to make use of any documentplaced in my hands for official purposes. But the story of the ParisConference can now be told with practical completeness after whathas been published by J. M. Keynes in his noble book on the EconomicConsequences of the War and by the American Secretary of State, RobertLansing, and after the statements made in the British and FrenchParliaments by Lloyd George and Clemenceau. But from the politicalpoint of view the most interesting document is still André Tardieu'sbook _La Paix_, to which Clemenceau wrote a preface and whichexpresses, from the point of view of the French Delegation at theConference, the programme which France laid before itself and what itobtained. This book explains how the principal decisions were taken, and indeed can be fairly considered to show in a more reliable waythan any other publication extant how the work of the Conferenceproceeded. For not only was M. Tardieu one of the French Delegates tothe Conference, one of those who signed the Versailles Treaty, butalso he prepared the plan of work as well as the solutions of the mostimportant questions in his capacity of trusted agent of the PrimeMinister. 

The determination in the mind of President Wilson when he came toParis was to carry through his programme of the League of Nations. Hewas fickle in his infallibility, but he had the firmest faith that hewas working for the peace of the world and above all for the glory ofthe United States. Of European things he was supremely ignorant. Weare bound to recognize his good faith, but we are not in the leastbound on that account to admit his capacity to tackle the problemswhich with his academic simplicity he set himself to solve. When hearrived in Europe he had not even prepared in outline a scheme of whatthe League of Nations was to be; the principal problems found himunprepared, and the duty of the crowd of experts (sometimes not tooexpert) who followed him seemed rather to be to demonstrate thetruth of his idea than to prepare material for seriously thought outdecisions. 

He could have made no greater mistake than he did in coming to Europeto take part in the meetings of the Conference. His figure lost reliefat once, in a way it seemed to lose dignity. The head of a State wastaking part in meetings of heads of Governments, one of the latterpresiding. It was a giant compelled to live in a cellar and therebysacrificing his height. He was surrounded by formal respect and insome decisions he exercised almost despotic authority, but his workwas none the less disordered; there was a semblance of giving in tohim while he was giving away his entire programme without being awareof it. 

In his ignorance of European things he was brought, withoutrecognizing it, to accept a series of decisions not superficially inopposition to his fourteen points but which did actually nullify them. 

Great Britain is part of Europe but is not on the Continent of Europe. While Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Hungary, Holland, Belgium, etc. , live the same life, are one in thought, Great Britainlives in her superb insularity. If she had any moment of supremeanxiety during the War, it was in the spring and summer of 1917 duringthe terrible threat of the destruction of her shipping by submarinesand the inability of construction to keep pace with it. But afterthe defeat of Germany Great Britain found herself with a fleet farsuperior to those of all the rest of Europe put together; once moreshe broke away from Continental Europe. 

Lloyd George, with swiftly acting brain and clear insight, undoubtedlythe most remarkable man at the Paris Conference, found himself in adifficult situation between President Wilson's pronouncements, someof them, like that regarding the freedom of the seas, undefined anddangerous, and the claims of France tending, after the brutal attackit had had to meet, not towards a true peace and the reconstruction ofEurope, but towards the vivisection of Germany. In one of the firstmoments, just before the General Elections, Lloyd George, too, promised measures of the greatest severity, the trial of the Kaiser, the punishment of all guilty of atrocities, compensation for all whohad suffered from the War, the widest and most complete indemnity. Butsuch pronouncements gave way before his clear realization of facts, and later on he tried in vain to put the Conference on the plane ofsuch realization. 

Italy, as M. Tardieu says very plainly, carried no weight in theConference. In the meetings of the Prime Ministers and PresidentWilson _le ton était celui de la conversation; nul apparat, nullepose. M. Orlando parlait peu; l'activité de l'Italie à la conferencea été, jusqu'à l'excès, absorbée par la question de Fiume, et sa partdans les débats a été de ce fait trop réduite. Restait un dialogue àtrois: Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George_. The Italian Government cameinto the War in May, 1915, on the basis of the London Agreement of thepreceding April, and it had never thought of claiming Fiume eitherbefore the War when it was free to lay down conditions or during theprogress of the War. 

The Italian people had always been kept in ignorance of the principlesestablished in the London Agreement. One of the men chieflyresponsible for the American policy openly complained to me that whenthe United States came into the War no notification was given them ofthe London Agreement in which were defined the future conditionsof part of Europe. A far worse mistake was made in the failure tocommunicate the London Agreement to Serbia, which would certainly haveaccepted it without hesitation in the terrible position in which itthen was. 

But the most serious thing of all was that Italian Ministers wereunaware of its provisions till after its publication in London by theorgan of the Jugo-Slavs, which had evidently received the text fromPetrograd, where the Bolsheviks had published it. In Italy the LondonAgreement was a mystery to everyone; its text was known only to thePresidents of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of theWar Cabinets. Thus only four or five people knew about it, secrecy wasstrictly kept, and, moreover, it cannot possibly be said that it wasin accordance either with national ideals or the currents of publicopinion, much less with any intelligent conception of Italy's needsand Italy's future. 

The framers of the London Agreement never thought of Fiume. Indeedthey specifically expressed their willingness that it should go toCroatia, whether in the case of Austria-Hungary remaining united or ofthe detachment of Croatia from it. It is not true that it was throughthe opposition of Russia or of France that the Italian framers of theLondon Agreement gave up all claim to Fiume. There was no oppositionbecause there was no claim. The representatives of Russia and Francehave told me officially that no renunciation took place through anyaction on the part of their Governments, because no claim was evermade to them. On the other hand, after the armistice, and when itbecame known through the newspapers that the London Agreement gaveFiume to Croatia, a very strong movement for Fiume arose, fanned bythe Government itself, and an equally strong movement in Fiume also. 

If, in the London Agreement, instead of claiming large areas ofDalmatia which are entirely or almost entirely Slav, provision hadbeen made for the constitution of a State of Fiume placed in acondition to guarantee not only the people of Italian nationality butthe economic interests of all the peoples in it and surrounding it, there is no doubt that such a claim on the part of Italy would havegone through without opposition. 

During the Paris Conference the representatives of Italy showed hardlyany interest at all in the problems concerning the peace of Europe, the situation of the conquered peoples, the distribution of rawmaterials, the regulation of the new states and their relations withthe victor countries. They concentrated all their efforts on thequestion of Fiume, that is to say on the one point in which Italianaction was fundamentally weak in that, when it was free to enter intothe War and lay down conditions of peace, at the moment when theEntente was without America's invaluable assistance and was beginningto doubt the capacity of Russia to carry on, it had never even askedfor Fiume in its War Treaty, that it had made the inexplicable mistakeof neglecting to communicate that treaty to the United States whenthat country came into the War and to Serbia at the moment whenItaly's effort was most valuable for its help. At the conference Italyhad no directing policy. It had been a part of the system ofthe German Alliance, but it had left its Allies, Germany andAustria-Hungary, because it recognized that the War was unjust, andhad remained neutral for ten months. Then, entering into the Warfreely and without obligation, there was one road for it to follow, that of proclaiming solemnly and defending the principles of democracyand justice. Indeed, that was a moral duty in that the break with thetwo countries with which Italy had been in alliance for thirty-threeyears became a matter not only of honesty but of duty solely throughthe injustice of the cause for which they had proclaimed an offensivewar. It was not possible for Italy to go to war to realize the dreamof uniting the Italian lands to the nation, for she had entered thesystem of Alliance of the Central Empires and had stayed there longyears while having all the time Italian territories unjustly subjectedto Austria-Hungary. The annexation of the Italian lands to theKingdom of Italy had to be the consequence of the affirmation of theprinciples of nationality, not the reason for going to war. In anycase, for Italy, which had laid on itself in the London Agreementthe most absurd limitations, which had confined its war aims withinexceedingly modest limits, which had no share in the distributionof the wealth of the conquered countries, which came out of the Warwithout raw materials and without any share in Germany's colonialempire, it was a matter not only of high duty but of the greatestutility to proclaim and uphold all those principles which the Ententehad so often and so publicly proclaimed as its war policy and its waraims. But in the Paris Conference Italy hardly counted. Without anydefinite idea of its own policy, it followed France and the UnitedStates, sometimes it followed Great Britain. There was no affirmationof principles at all. The country which, among all the Europeanwarring Powers, had suffered most severely in proportion to itsresources and should have made the greatest effort to free itselffrom the burdens imposed on it, took no part in the most importantdecisions. It has to be added that these were arrived at between March24 and May 7, while the Italian representatives were absent from Parisor had returned there humbled without having been recalled. 

After interminable discussions which decided very little, especiallywith regard to the League of Nations which arose before the nationswere constituted and could live, real vital questions were tackled, asis seen from the report of the Conference, on March 24, and it is afact that between that date and May 7 the whole treaty was put inshape: territorial questions, financial questions, economic questions, colonial questions. Now, at that very moment, on account of thequestion of Fiume and Fiume alone, for some inscrutable reason theItalian delegates thought good to retire from the Conference, to whichthey returned later without being invited, and during that time allthe demonstrations against President Wilson took place in Italy, notwithout some grave responsibility on the part of the government. Italyreceived least consideration in the peace treaties among all theconquering countries. It was practically put on one side. 

It has to be noted that both in the armistice and in the peace treatythe most serious decisions were arrived at almost incidentally;moreover they were always vitiated by slight concessions apparentlyof importance. On November 2, 1917, when the representatives of thedifferent nations met at Paris to fix the terms of armistice, M. Tardieu relates, the question of reparation for damages was decidedquite incidentally. It is worth while reproducing what he says in hisbook, taken from the official report:

M. CLEMENCEAU: _Je voudrais venir maintenant sur la question desréparations et des tonnages. On ne comprenderait pas chez nous, enFrance, que nous n'inscrivions pas dans l'armistice une clause àcet effet. Ce que je vous demande c'est l'addition de trois mots:"Réparations des dommages" sans autre commentaire. 

Le dialogue suivant s'établit_:

M. HYMANS: _Cela serait-il une condition d'armistice_?

M. SONNINO: _C'est plutôt une condition de paix_. 

M. BONAR LAW: _Il est inutile d'insérer dans les conditionsd'armistice une clause qui ne pourrait être exécutée dans un brefdélai_. 

M. CLEMENCEAU: _Je ne veux que mentionner le principe. Vous ne devezpas oublier que la population française est une de celles qui ontle plus souffert. Elle ne comprendrait pas que nous ne fissions pasallusion à cette clause_. 

M. LLOYD GEORGE: _Si vous envisages le principe des réparations surterre, il faut mentionner aussi celui des réparations pour les navirescoulés_. 

M. CLEMENCEAU: _Je comprends tout cela dans mes trois mots, "Réparations des dommages. " Je supplie le Conseil de se mettre dansl'esprit de la population française. .. . _

M. VESSITCH: _Et serbe_. .. . 

M. HYMANS: _Et belge_. .. . 

M. SONNINO: _Et italienne aussi_. .. . 

M. HOUSE: _Puisqu'est une question importante pour tous, je proposel'addition de M. Clemenceau_. 

M. BONAR LAW: _C'est deja dit dans notre lettre au Président Wilson, qui la comuniquera à l'Allemagne. Il est inutile de la dire deuxfois_. 

M. ORLANDO: _J'accepte en principe, quoiqu'il n'en ait pas été faitmention dans les conditions de l'armistice avec l'Autriche_. 

_L'addition "Réparations des dommages" est alors adoptée. M. Klotzpropose de mettre en tête de cette addition les mots: "Sous réservede toutes revendications et restaurations ultérieures de la part desAlliés et des Etats-Unis. " Il est ainsi décidé_. 

If I were at liberty to publish the official report of the doings ofthe Conference while the various peace treaties were being prepared, as MM. Poincaré and Tardieu have published secret acts, it would beseen that the proceedings were very much the same in every case. Meanwhile we may confine ourselves to an examination of the report asgiven by M. Tardieu. 

The question of reparation of damages was not a condition of thearmistice. It had not been accepted. Clemenceau brings the question upagain solely in homage to French public opinion. The suggestion is towrite in simply the three words: _Reparation of damages_. It is truethat these three words determine a policy, and that there is nomention of it in the claims of the Entente, in the fourteen pointsof President Wilson, or in the armistice between Italy andAustria-Hungary. In his fourteen points Wilson confined himself, inthe matter of damages, to the following claims: (1) Reconstructionof Belgium, (2) Reconstruction of French territory invaded, (3)Reparation for territory invaded in Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania. There is no other claim or statement in the fourteen points. On theother hand the pronouncement, "_Réparation des dommages_, " included, as in fact was afterwards included, any claim for damage by land orsea. 

The representatives of Belgium, Italy and Great Britain remark that itis a condition of peace, not of armistice. But Clemenceau makes ita question of regard and consideration for France. France would notunderstand there being no mention of it; there was no desire to defineanything, only just to mention it, and in three simple words. "I askyou, " says Clemenceau, "to put yourselves into the spirit of thepeople of France. " At once the British representative notes thenecessity of a clear statement regarding reparations for losses at seathrough submarines and mines; and all, the Serbian, the Belgian and, last of all, the Italian, at once call attention to their own damages. Mr. House, not realizing the wide and serious nature of the claim, says that it is an important question for all, while America hadalready stated, in the words of the President of the Republic, that itrenounced all indemnity of any nature whatsoever. 

So was established, quite incidentally, the principle of indemnity fordamages which gave the treaty a complete turn away from the spiritof the pronouncements by the Entente and the United States. Equallyincidentally were established all the declarations in the treaty, thepurpose of which is not easy to understand except in so far as it isseen in the economic results which may accrue. 

Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles states that the allied andassociated governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibilityof Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to whichthe allied and associated governments and their peoples have beensubjected as a consequence of the War imposed on them by theaggression of Germany and her allies. 

Article 177 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye states in thesame way that the allied and associated governments affirm, andAustria-Hungary accepts, the responsibility of Austria and her allies, etc. 

This article is common to all the treaties, and it would have no morethan historic and philosophic interest if it were not followed byanother article in which the allied and associated governmentsrecognize that the resources of Germany (and of Austria-Hungary, etc. )are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions ofsuch resources which will result from other provisions of the presenttreaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The allied and associated governments, however, require, and Germanyundertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to thecivilian population of the allied and associated powers and to theirproperty during the period of the belligerency of each as an allied orassociated power against Germany by such aggression by land, by seaand from the air, and in general all damage as defined in the treaty, comprising many of the burdens of war (war pensions and compensationsto soldiers and their families, cost of assistance to families ofthose mobilized during the War, etc. ). 

There is nothing more useless, indeed more stupid, than to take yourenemy by the throat after you have beaten him and force him to declarethat all the wrong was on his side. The declaration is of no usewhatever, either to the conqueror, because no importance can beattributed to an admission extorted by force; or to the conquered, because he knows that there is no moral significance in being forcedto state what one does not believe; or for third parties, because theyare well aware of the circumstances under which the declaration wasmade. It is possible that President Wilson wanted to establish a moralreason--I do not like to say a moral alibi--for accepting, as he wasconstrained by necessity to accept, all those conditions which werethe negation of what he had solemnly laid down, the moral pledge ofhis people, of the American democracy. 

Germany and the conquered countries have accepted the conditionsimposed on them with the reserve that they feel that they are notbound by them, even morally, in the future. The future will pourridicule on this new form of treaty which endeavours to justifyexcessive and absurd demands, which will have the effect of destroyingthe enemy rather than of obtaining any sure benefit, by using a forceddeclaration which has no value at all. 

I have always detested German imperialism, and also the phases ofexaggerated nationalism which have grown up in every country after theWar and have been eliminated one after the other through the simplefact of their being common to all countries, but only after havingbrought the greatest possible harm to all the peoples, and I cannotsay that Germany and her allies were solely responsible for the Warwhich devastated Europe and threw a dark shadow over the life of thewhole world. That statement, which we all made during the War, was aweapon to be used at the time; now that the War is over, it cannot belooked on as a serious argument. 

An honest and thorough examination of all the diplomatic documents, all the agreements and relations of pre-war days, compels me todeclare solemnly that the responsibility for the War does not liesolely on the defeated countries; that Germany may have desiredwar and prepared for it under the influence of powerful industrialinterests, metallurgic, for instance, responsible for the extremeviews of newspapers and other publications, but still all the warringcountries have their share of responsibility in differing degree. Itcannot be said that there existed in Europe two groups with a moralconception differing to the point of complete contrast; on one side, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, responsible for theWar, which they imposed by their aggression; on the other, all thefree and independent nations. By the side of England, France, Italyand the United States there was Russia, which must bear, if not thegreatest, a very great responsibility for what happened. Nor is ittrue that armament expenses in the ten years preceding the War weregreater in the Central Empires, or, to put it better, in the Statesforming the Triple Alliance, than in the countries which later formedthe European Entente. 

It is not true that only in the case of Germany were the war aimsimperialist, and that the Entente countries came in without desire ofconquest. Putting aside for the moment what one sees in the treatieswhich have followed the War, it is worth while considering what wouldhave happened if Russia had won the War instead of being torn topieces before victory came. Russia would have had all the Poland ofthe eighteenth century (with the apparent autonomy promised by theTsar), nearly all Turkey in Europe, Constantinople, and a great partof Asia Minor. Russia, with already the greatest existing land empireand at least half the population not Russian, would have gainedfresh territories with fresh non-Russian populations, putting theMediterranean peoples, and above all Italy, in a very difficultsituation indeed. 

It cannot be said that in the ten years preceding the War Russia didnot do as much as Germany to bring unrest into Europe. It was onaccount of Russia that the Serbian Government was a perpetual causeof disturbance, a perpetual threat to Austria-Hungary. The unendingstrife in the Balkans was caused by Russia in no less degree thanby Austria-Hungary, and all the great European nations shared, withopposing views, in the policy of Eastern expansion. 

The judgment of peoples and of events, given the uncertainty of policyas expressed in parliament and newspapers, is variable to the lastdegree. It will be enough to recall the varying judgment upon Serbiaduring the last ten years in the Press of Great Britain, France andItaly: the people of Serbia have been described as criminals andheroes, assassins and martyrs. No one would have anything to do withSerbia; later Serbia was raised to the skies. 

The documents published by Kautsky in Germany and those revealed fromtime to time by the Moscow Government prove that the preparation forand conviction of war was not only on the part of the Central Empires, but also, and in no less degree, on the part of the other States. Onepoint will always remain inexplicable: why Russia should have takenthe superlatively serious step of general mobilization, which couldnot be and was not a simple measure of precaution. It is beyond doubtthat the Russian mobilization preceded even that of Austria. Aftera close examination of events, after the bitter feeling of war hadpassed, in his speech of December 23, 1920, Lloyd George said justlythat the War broke out without any Government having really desiredit; all, in one way or another, slithered into it, stumbling andtripping. 

There were three Monarchies in Europe, the Russian, German, andAustro-Hungarian Empires, and the fact that they were divided intotwo groups necessarily led to war. It was inevitable sooner or later. Russia was the greatest danger, the greatest threat to Europe; whathappened had to happen under one form or another. The crazy giant wasunder the charge of one man without intelligence and a band of men, the men of the old regime, largely without scruples. 

Each country of Europe has its share of responsibility, Italy notexcluded. It is difficult to explain why Italy went to Tripoli in theway in which she did in 1911, bringing about the Italo-Turkish war, which brought about the two Balkan wars and the policy of adventure ofSerbia, which was the incident though not the cause of the EuropeanWar. 

The Libyan adventure, considered now in the serene light of reason, cannot be looked on as anything but an aberration. Libya is an immensebox of sand which never had any value, nor has it now. Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan cover more than one million one hundredthousand square kilometres and have less than nine hundred thousandinhabitants, of whom even now, after ten years, less than a third areunder the effective control of Italy. With the war and expenses ofoccupation, Libya has cost Italy about seven milliard lire, and for along time yet it will be on the debit side in the life of the nation. With the same number of milliards, most of which were spent before theEuropean War, Italy could have put in order and utilized her immensepatrimony of water-power and to-day would be free from anxiety aboutthe coal problem by which it is actually enslaved. The true policyof the nation was to gain economic independence, not a barren waste. Ignorant people spoke of Libya in Italy as a promised land; in oneofficial speech the King was even made to say that Libya could absorbpart of Italian emigration. That was just a phenomenon of madness, for Libya has no value at all from the agricultural, commercial ormilitary point of view. It may pay its way one day, but only if allexpenses are cut down and the administrative system is completelychanged. It may be that, if only from a feeling of duty towards theinhabitants, Italy cannot abandon Libya now that she has taken it, butthe question will always be asked why she did take it, why she tookit by violence when a series of concessions could have been obtainedwithout difficulty from the Turkish Government. 

The Libyan enterprise, undertaken on an impulse, against the opinionof Italy's allies, Austria and Germany, against the wish of Englandand France, is a very serious political responsibility for Italy. 

The European War was the consequence of a long series of movements, aspirations, agitations. It cannot be denied, and it is recognized byclear-thinking men like Lloyd George, that France and England toohave by their actions taken on themselves their part in the seriousresponsibility. To say that in the past they had never thought ofwar is to say a thing not true. And there is no doubt that all thediplomatic documents published before and during the War show inRussia, above all, a situation which inevitably would soon lead towar. In the Balkans, especially in Serbia, Russia was pursuing acynical and shameless policy of corruption, nourishing and excitingevery ferment of revolt against Austria-Hungary. Russian policy inSerbia was really criminal. Everyone in Germany was convinced thatRussia was preparing for war. The Tsar's pacificist ideas were of noimportance whatever. In absolute monarchies it is an illusion to thinkthat the sovereign, though apparently an autocrat, acts in accordancewith his own views. His views are almost invariably those of thepeople round him; he does not even receive news in its true form, butin the form given it by officials. Russia was an unwieldy giant whohad shown signs of madness long before the actual revolution. Itis impossible that a collective madness such as that which has hadpossession of Russia for three years could be produced on the spur ofthe moment; the regime of autocracy contained in itself the germsof Bolshevism and violence. Bolshevism cannot properly be judged byWestern notions; it is not a revolutionary movement of the people; itis, as I have said before, the religious fanaticism of the EasternOrthodox rising from the dead body of Tsarist despotism. Bolshevism, centralizing and bureaucratic, follows the same lines as the imperialpolicy of almost every Tsar. 

Undoubtedly the greatest responsibility for the War lies on Germany. If it has not to bear all the responsibility, as the treaties claim, it has to bear the largest share; and the responsibility lies, ratherthan on the shoulders of the Emperor and the quite ordinary menwho surrounded him, on those of the military caste and some greatindustrial groups. The crazy writings of General von Bernhardi andother scandalous publications of the same sort expressed, more thanjust theoretical views, the real hopes and tendencies of the wholemilitary caste. It is true enough that there existed in Germany a realdemocratic society under the control of the civil government, butthere was the military caste too, with privileges in social life and aspecial position in the life of the State. This caste was educated inthe conception of violence as the means of power and grandeur. When acountry has allowed the military and social theories of General vonBernhardi and the senselessly criminal pronouncements of the EmperorWilliam II to prevail for so many years, it has put the mostformidable weapons possible into the hands of its enemies. The peoplewho governed Germany for so long have no right to complain now of theconditions in which their country is placed. But the great Germanpeople, hardworking and persevering, has full right to look on suchconditions as the negation of justice. The head of a European State, aman of the clearest view and calmest judgment, speaking to me of theEmperor William, of whose character and intellect he thought verylittle, expressed the view that the Emperor did not want war, but thathe would not avoid it when he had the chance. 

The truth is that Germany troubled itself very little about France. Kinderlen Wächter, the most intelligent of the German ForeignMinisters, and perhaps the one most opposed to the War, when heoutlined to me the situation as it was ten years ago, showed noanxiety at all except in regard to Russia. Russia might make war, andit was necessary to be ready or to see that it came about at a momentwhen victory was certain if conditions did not change. Germany had noreason at all for making war on France from the time that it had gotwell ahead of that country in industry, commerce and navigation. Itis true that there were a certain number of unbalanced people in themetal industry who talked complacently of French iron and stirred upthe yellow press, just as in France to-day there are many industrialswith their eyes fixed on German coal which they want to seize as faras possible. But the intellectuals, the politicians, even militarycircles, had no anxiety at all except with regard to Russia. 

There were mistaken views in German policy, no doubt, but at the sametime there was real anxiety about her national existence. With a hugepopulation and limited resources, with few colonies, owing to herlate arrival in the competition for them, Germany looked on thenever-ceasing desire of Russia for Constantinople as the ruin of herpolicy of expansion in the East. 

And in actual fact there was but one way by which the three greatEmpires, which in population and extension of territory dominatedthe greater part of Europe, could avoid war, and that was to join inalliance among themselves or at least not to enter other alliances. The three great Empires divided themselves into two allied groups. From that moment, given the fact that in each of them the militarycaste held power, that the principal decisions lay in the hands of afew men not responsible to parliament; given the fact that Russia, faithful to her traditional policy, aimed to draw into her politicalorbit all the Slav peoples right down to the Adriatic and the Aegeanand Austria, was leaning toward the creation of a third Slav monarchyin the dual kingdom, it was inevitable that sooner or later theviolence, intrigue and corruption with which we are familiar shouldculminate in open conflict. Bismarck always saw that putting Russiaand Germany up against each other meant war. 

Peoples, like individuals, are far from representing with anythingapproaching completeness such social conceptions as we call violenceand right, honesty and bad faith, justice and injustice; each peoplehas its different characteristics, but no one people represents good, or another bad, no one represents brutality, or another civilization. All these meaningless phrases were brought out during the War, according to which, as was said by one of the Prime Ministers of theEntente, the War was the decisive struggle between the forces ofautocracy and liberty, between the dark powers of evil and violenceand the radiant powers of good and right. To-day all this causesnothing but a smile. Such things are just speechifying, and banal atthat. Perhaps they were a necessity of War-time which might well bemade use of; when you are fighting for your very life you use everymeans you have; when you are in imminent danger you do not choose yourweapons, you use everything to hand. All the War propaganda againstthe German Empires, recounting, sometimes exaggerating, all the crimesof the enemy, claiming that all the guilt was on the side of Germany, describing German atrocities as a habit, almost a characteristic ofthe German people, deriding German culture as a species of liquidin which were bred the microbes of moral madness--all this waslegitimate, perhaps necessary, during the War. The reply to theasphyxiating gas of the enemy was not only the same gas, but apropaganda calculated to do more damage, and which, in fact, did do asmuch damage as tanks and blockade. 

But, when war is over, nothing should be put into a peace treatyexcept such things as will lead to a lasting peace, or the mostlasting peace compatible with our degree of civilization. 

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson explained the reasons why hemade the proposal to put an end to the War; he said in the AmericanSenate that the greatest danger lay in a peace imposed by conquerorsafter victory. At that time it was said that there must be neitherconquerors nor conquered. A peace imposed after victory would be thecause of so much humiliation and such intolerable sacrifices for theconquered side, it would be so severe, it would give rise to so muchbitter feeling that it would not be a lasting peace, but one foundedon shifting sand. 

In the spring of 1919, just before the most serious decisions were tobe taken, Lloyd George put before the conference a memorandum entitled"_Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finallydraft their terms_. "

With his marvellously quick insight, after having listened to thespeeches of which force was the leading motive (the tendency round himwas not to establish a lasting peace but to vivisect Germany), LloydGeorge saw that it was not a true peace that was being prepared. 

On March 25, 1919, Lloyd George presented the following memorandum tothe conference:

I

When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth alltheir strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it isnot difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generationwhich experienced the horrors of the war has passed away. Picturesof heroism and triumph only tempt those who know nothing of thesufferings and terrors of war. It is therefore comparatively easy topatch up a peace which will last for thirty years. 

What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will notprovoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experienceof what war means have passed away. History has proved that apeace which has been hailed by a victorious nation as a triumph ofdiplomatic skill and statesmanship, even of moderation, in the longrun has proved itself to be short-sighted and charged with danger tothe victor. The peace of 1871 was believed by Germany to ensure notonly her security but her permanent supremacy. The facts have shownexactly the contrary. France itself has demonstrated that those whosay you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hitback are utterly wrong. Year by year France became numerically weakerin comparison with her victorious neighbour, but in reality she becameever more powerful. She kept watch on Europe; she made alliance withthose whom Germany had wronged or menaced; she never ceased to warnthe world of its danger, and ultimately she was able to secure theoverthrow of the far mightier power which had trampled so brutallyupon her. You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armamentsto a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; allthe same, in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treatedin the peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution fromher conquerors. The impression, the deep impression, made upon thehuman heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear withthe hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of theGreat War. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon therebeing no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit ofpatriotism, of justice or of fair play to achieve redress. Our termsmay be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the sametime they can be so just that the country on which they are imposedwill feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. Butinjustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph, will never beforgotten nor forgiven. 

For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferringmore Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation thancan possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of futurewar than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselvesone of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should besurrounded by a number of small states, many of them consisting ofpeople who have never previously set up a stable government forthemselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germansclamouring for reunion with their native land. The proposal of thePolish Commission that we should place 2, 100, 000 Germans under thecontrol of a people of a different religion and which has never provedits capacity for stable self-government throughout its history, must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East ofEurope. What I have said about the Germans is equally true about theMagyars. There will never be peace in South-Eastern Europe if everylittle state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar Irredentawithin its borders. 

I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that asfar as is humanly possible the different races should be allocatedto their motherlands, and that this human criterion should haveprecedence over considerations of strategy or economics orcommunications, which can usually be adjusted by other means. 

Secondly, I would say that the duration for the payments of reparationought to disappear if possible with the generation which made the war. 

But there is a consideration in favour of a long-sighted peace whichinfluences me even more than the desire to leave no causes justifyinga fresh outbreak thirty years hence. There is one element in thepresent condition of nations which differentiates it from thesituation as it was in 1815. In the Napoleonic Wars the countries wereequally exhausted, but the revolutionary spirit had spent its forcein the country of its birth, and Germany had satisfied the legitimatepopular demands for the time being by a series of economic changeswhich were inspired by courage, foresight and high statesmanship. Evenin Russia the Tsar had effected great reforms which were probablyat that time even too advanced for the half-savage population. Thesituation is very different now. The revolution is still in itsinfancy. The extreme figures of the Terror are still in command inRussia. The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep sense not only of discontent, but of anger and revoltamong the workmen against pre-war conditions. The whole existingorder, in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned bythe masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other. Insome countries, like Germany and Russia, the unrest takes the form ofopen rebellion, in others, like France, Great Britain and Italy, ittakes the shape of strikes and of general disinclination to settledown to work, symptoms which are just as much concerned with thedesire for political and social change as with wage demands. 

Much of this unrest is healthy. We shall never make a lasting peace byattempting to restore the conditions of 1914. But there is a dangerthat we may throw the masses of the population throughout Europe intothe arms of the extremists, whose only idea for regenerating mankindis to destroy utterly the whole existing fabric of society. Thesemen have triumphed in Russia. They have done so at a terrible price. Hundreds and thousands of the population have perished. The railways, the roads, the towns, the whole structural organization of Russia hasbeen almost destroyed, but somehow or other they seem to have managedto keep their hold upon the masses of the Russian people, and what ismuch more significant, they have succeeded in creating a large armywhich is apparently well directed and well disciplined, and is, as toa great part of it, prepared to die for its ideals. In another yearRussia, inspired by a new enthusiasm, may have recovered from herpassion for peace and have at her command the only army eager tofight, because it is the only army that believes that it has any causeto fight for. 

The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is thatGermany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of therevolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world forBolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera. Thepresent government in Germany is weak; its authority is challenged; itlingers merely because there is no alternative but the Spartacists, and Germany is not ready for Spartacism, as yet. But the argumentwhich the Spartacists are using with great effect at this very time isthat they alone can save Germany from the intolerable conditions whichhave been bequeathed her by the War. They offer to free the Germanpeople from indebtedness to the Allies and indebtedness to their ownricher classes. They offer them complete control of their own affairsand the prospect of a new heaven and earth. It is true that the pricewill be heavy. There will be two or three years of anarchy, perhapsof bloodshed, but at the end the land will remain, the people willremain, the greater part of the houses and the factories will remain, and the railways and the roads will remain, and Germany, having thrownoff her burdens, will be able to make a fresh start. 

If Germany goes over to the Spartacists it is inevitable that sheshould throw in her lot with the Russian Bolshevists. Once thathappens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of theBolshevik revolution, and within a year we may witness the spectacleof nearly three hundred million people organized into a vast red armyunder German instructors and German generals, equipped with Germancannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of theattack on Western Europe. This is a prospect which no one can facewith equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary yesterday showsonly too clearly that this danger is no fantasy. And what are thereasons alleged for this decision? They are mainly the belief thatlarge numbers of Magyars are to be handed over to the control ofothers. If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternativeof Bolshevism. I would therefore put it in the forefront of the peacethat once she accepts our terms, especially reparation, we will opento her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms withourselves, and will do everything possible to enable the German peopleto get upon their legs again. We cannot both cripple her and expecther to pay. 

Finally, we must offer terms which a responsible government in Germanycan expect to be able to carry out. If we present terms to Germanywhich are unjust, or excessively onerous, no responsible governmentwill sign them; certainly the present weak administration will not. If it did, I am told that it would be swept away within twenty-fourhours. Yet if we can find nobody in Germany who will put his hand toa peace treaty, what will be the position? A large army of occupationfor an indefinite period is out of the question. Germany would notmind it. A very large number of people in that country would welcomeit, as it would be the only hope of preserving the existing order ofthings. The objection would not come from Germany, but from our owncountries. Neither the British Empire nor America would agree tooccupy Germany. France by itself could not bear the burden ofoccupation. We should therefore be driven back on the policy ofblockading the country. That would inevitably mean Spartacism from theUrals to the Rhine, with its inevitable consequence of a huge red armyattempting to cross the Rhine. As a matter of fact, I am doubtfulwhether public opinion would allow us deliberately to starve Germany. If the only difference between Germany and ourselves were betweenonerous terms and moderate terms, I very much doubt if public opinionwould tolerate the deliberate condemnation of millions of women andchildren to death by starvation. If so, the Allies would have incurredthe moral defeat of having attempted to impose terms on Germany whichGermany had successfully resisted. 

From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we oughtto endeavour to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartialarbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war. This settlement oughtto have three ends in view. 

First of all it must do justice to the Allies, by taking into accountGermany's responsibility for the origin of the War, and for the way inwhich it was fought. 

Secondly, it must be a settlement which a responsible Germangovernment can sign in the belief that it can fulfil the obligationsit incurs. 

Thirdly, it must be a settlement which will contain in itself noprovocations for future wars, and which will constitute an alternativeto Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all reasonableopinion as a fair settlement of the European problem. 

II

It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and far-sighted peacewith Germany. If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevismwe must make the League of Nations into something which will be botha safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair dealing withtheir neighbours and a menace to those who would trespass on therights of their neighbours, whether they are imperialist empires orimperialist Bolshevists. An essential element, therefore, in thepeace settlement is the constitution of the League of Nations as theeffective guardian of international right and international libertythroughout the world. If this is to happen the first thing to do isthat the leading members of the League of Nations should arrive at anunderstanding between themselves in regard to armaments. To my mindit is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation of armamentsupon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose a limitationupon ourselves. I recognize that until Germany has settled downand given practical proof that she has abandoned her imperialistambitions, and until Russia has also given proof that she does notintend to embark upon a military crusade against her neighbours, itis essential that the leading members of the League of Nations shouldmaintain considerable forces both by land and sea in order to preserveliberty in the world. But if they are to present a united front to theforces both of reaction and revolution, they must arrive at such anagreement in regard to armaments among themselves as would make itimpossible for suspicion to arise between the members of the Leagueof Nations in regard to their intentions towards one another. If theLeague is to do its work for the world it will only be because themembers of the League trust it themselves and because there are norivalries and jealousies in the matter of armaments between them. Thefirst condition of success for the League of Nations is, therefore, afirm understanding between the British Empire and the United Statesof America and France and Italy, that there will be no competitivebuilding up of fleets or armies between them. Unless this is arrivedat before the Covenant is signed the League of Nations will be a shamand a mockery. It will be regarded, and rightly regarded, as a proofthat its principal promoters and patrons repose no confidence in itsefficacy. But once the leading members of the League have made itclear that they have reached an understanding which will both secureto the League of Nations the strength which is necessary to enableit to protect its members and which at the same time will makemisunderstanding and suspicion with regard to competitive armamentsimpossible between them its future and its authority will be assured. It will then be able to ensure as an essential condition of peace thatnot only Germany, but all the smaller States of Europe, undertake tolimit their armaments and abolish conscription. If the small nationsare permitted to organize and maintain conscript armies running eachto hundreds of thousands, boundary wars will be inevitable, and allEurope will be drawn in. Unless we secure this universal limitation weshall achieve neither lasting peace nor the permanent observance ofthe limitation of German armaments which we now seek to impose. 

I should like to ask why Germany, if she accepts the terms we considerjust and fair, should not be admitted to the League of Nations, atany rate as soon as she has established a stable and democraticgovernment? Would it not be an inducement to her both to sign theterms and to resist Bolshevism? Might it not be safer that she shouldbe inside the League than that she should be outside it?

Finally, I believe that until the authority and effectiveness of theLeague of Nations has been demonstrated, the British Empire and theUnited States ought to give France a guarantee against the possibilityof a new German aggression. France has special reason for asking forsuch a guarantee. She has twice been attacked and twice invaded byGermany in half a century. She has been so attacked because she hasbeen the principal guardian of liberal and democratic civilizationagainst Central European autocracy on the continent of Europe. It isright that the other great Western democracies should enter into anundertaking which will ensure that they stand by her side in time toprotect her against invasion should Germany ever threaten her again, or until the League of Nations has proved its capacity to preserve thepeace and liberty of the world. 

III

If, however, the Peace Conference is really to secure peace and proveto the world a complete plan of settlement which all reasonable menwill recognize as an alternative preferable to anarchy, it must dealwith the Russian situation. Bolshevik imperialism does not merelymenace the States on Russia's borders. It threatens the whole of Asia, and is as near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think thatthe Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may havearranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is to-day. I do notpropose, however, to complicate the question of the peace with Germanyby introducing a discussion of the Russian problem. I mention itsimply in order to remind ourselves of the importance of dealing withit as soon as possible. 

The memorandum is followed by some proposals entitled "General Linesof the Peace Conditions, " which would tend to make the peace lesssevere. It is hardly worth while reproducing them. As in many pointsthe decisions taken were in the opposite sense it is better not to gobeyond the general considerations. 

Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum is a secret document. But as the Englishand American Press have already printed long passages from it, itis practically possible to give it in its entirety without addinganything to what has already been printed. 

M. Tardieu has published M. Clemenceau's reply, drawn up by M. Tardieuhimself and representing the French point of view:

I

The French Government is in complete agreement with the generalpurpose of Mr. Lloyd George's Note: to make a lasting peace, and forthat reason a just peace. 

But, on the other hand, it does not think that this principle, whichis its own, really leads to the conclusions arrived at in the Note inquestion. 

II

The Note suggests that the territorial conditions laid down forGermany in Europe shall be moderate in order that she may not feeldeeply embittered after peace. 

The method would be sound if the recent War had been nothing but aEuropean war for Germany; but that is not the case. 

Previous to the War Germany was a great world Power whose _futurewas on the sea_. This was the power of which she was so inordinatelyproud. For the loss of this world power she will never be consoled. 

The Allies have taken from her--or are going to take from her--withoutbeing deterred by fear of her resentment, all her colonies, all herships of war, a great part of her commercial fleet (as reparations), the foreign markets which she controlled. 

That is the worst blow that could be inflicted on her, and it issuggested that she can be pacified by some improvements in territorialconditions. That is a pure illusion. The remedy is not big enough forthe thing it is to cure. 

If there is any desire, for general reasons, to give Germany somesatisfaction, it must not be sought in Europe. Such help will be vainas long as Germany has lost her world policy. 

To pacify her (if there is any interest in so doing) she must havesatisfaction given her in colonies, in ships, in commercial expansion. The Note of March 26 thinks of nothing but satisfaction in Europeanterritory. 

III

Mr. Lloyd George fears that unduly severe territorial conditionsimposed on Germany will play into the hands of Bolshevism. Is therenot cause for fear, on the other hand, that the method he suggestswill have that very result?

The Conference has decided to call into being a certain number of newStates. Is it possible without being unjust to them to impose on theminacceptable frontiers towards Germany? If these people--Poland andBohemia above all--have resisted Bolshevism up to now it is throughnational sentiment. If this sentiment is violated Bolshevism will findan easy prey in them, and the only existing barrier between Russianand German Bolshevism will be broken. 

The result will be either a Confederation of Eastern and CentralEurope under the direction of a Bolshevik Germany or the enslavery ofthose countries to a Germany become reactionary again, thanks to thegeneral anarchy. In either case the Allies will have lost the War. 

The policy of the French Government, on the other hand, is to givethe fullest aid to those young peoples with the support of everythingliberal in Europe, and not to try to introduce at their expenseabatements--which in any case would be useless--of the colonial, navaland commercial disaster which the peace imposes on Germany. 

If it is necessary, in giving these young peoples frontiers withoutwhich they cannot live, to transfer under their sovereignty someGermans, sons of the men who enslaved them, we may regret thenecessity, and we should do it with moderation, but it cannot beavoided. 

Further, when all the German colonies are taken from her entirely anddefinitely, because she ill-treated the natives, what right is thereto refuse normal frontiers to Poland and Bohemia because Germansinstalled themselves in those countries as precursors of the tyrantPan-Germanism?

IV

The Note of March 26 insists on the necessity of a peace which willappear to Germany as a just peace, and the French Government agrees. 

It may be observed, however, that, given the German mentality, theirconception of justice may not be the same as that of the Allies. 

And, also, surely the Allies as well as Germany, even before Germany, should feel this impression of justice. The Allies who fought togethershould conclude the War with a peace equal for all. 

Now, following the method suggested in the Note of March 26, what willbe the result?

A certain number of total and definite guarantees will be given tomaritime nations whose countries were not invaded. 

Total and definite, the surrender of the German colonies. 

Total and definite, the surrender of the German war fleet. 

Total and definite, the surrender of a large part of the Germancommercial fleet. 

Total and lasting, if not definite, the exclusion of Germany fromforeign markets. 

For the Continental countries, on the other hand--that is to say, forthe countries which have suffered most from the War--would be reservedpartial and transitory solutions:

Partial solution, the modified frontiers suggested for Poland andBohemia. 

Transitory solution, the defensive pledge offered France for theprotection of her territory. 

Transitory solution, the regime proposed for the Saar coal. 

There is an evident inequality which might have a bad influence onthe after-war relations among the Allies, more important than theafter-war relations of Germany with them. 

It has been shown in Paragraph I that it would be an illusion to hopethat territorial satisfaction offered to Germany would compensateher sufficiently for the world disaster she has suffered. And it maysurely be added that it would be an injustice to lay the burden ofsuch compensation on the shoulders of those countries among the Allieswhich have had to bear the heaviest burden of the War. 

After the burdens of the War, these countries cannot bear the burdensof the peace. It is essential that they should feel that the peace isjust and equal for all. 

And unless that be assured it is not only in Central Europe that therewill be fear of Bolshevism, for nowhere does it propagate so easily, as has been seen, as amid national disillusionment. 

V

The French Government desires to limit itself for the moment to theseobservations of a general character. It pays full homage to theintentions which inspired Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum. But itconsiders that the inductions that can be drawn from the present Noteare in consonance with justice and the general interests. 

And those are the considerations by which the French Government willbe inspired in the coming exchange of ideas for the discussion ofconditions suggested by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. 

These two documents are of more than usual interest. 

The British Prime Minister, with his remarkable insight, at once notesthe seriousness of the situation. He sees the danger to the peaceof the world in German depression. Germany oppressed does not meanGermany subjected. Every year France becomes numerically weaker, Germany stronger. The horrors of war will be forgotten and themaintenance of peace will depend on the creation of a situation whichmakes life possible, does not cause exasperation to come into publicfeeling or into the just claims of Germans desirous of independence. Injustice in the hour of triumph will never be pardoned, can never beatoned. 

So the idea of handing over to other States numbers of Germans is notonly an injustice, but a cause of future wars, and what can be saidof Germans is also true of Magyars. No cause of future wars must beallowed to remain. Putting millions of Germans under Polish rule--thatis, under an inferior people which has never shown any capacity forstable self-government--must lead to a new war sooner or later. IfGermany in exasperation became a country of revolution, what wouldhappen to Europe? You can impose severe conditions, but that does notmean that you can enforce them; the conditions to be imposed must besuch that a responsible German Government can in good faith assume theobligation of carrying them out. 

Neither Great Britain nor the United States of America can assumethe obligation of occupying Germany if it does not carry out theexcessively severe conditions which it is desired to impose. CanFrance occupy Germany alone?

From that moment Lloyd George saw the necessity of admitting Germanyinto the League of Nations _at once_, and proposed a scheme of treatycontaining conditions which, while very severe, were in part tolerablefor the German people. 

Clemenceau's reply, issued a few days later, contains the French pointof view, and has an ironical note when it touches on the weak pointsin Lloyd George's argument. The War, says the French note, was not aEuropean war; Germany's eyes were fixed on world power, and shesaw that her future was on the sea. There is no necessity to showconsideration regarding territorial conditions in Europe. By takingaway her commercial fleet, her colonies and her foreign markets moreharm is done to Germany than by taking European territory. To pacifyher (if there is any occasion for doing so) she must be offeredcommercial satisfaction. At this point the note, in consideringquestions of justice and of mere utility, becomes distinctly ironical. 

Having decided to bring to life new States, especially Poland andCzeko-Slovakia, why not give them safe frontiers even if some Germansor Magyars have to be sacrificed?

One of Clemenceau's fixed ideas is that criterions of justice must notbe applied to Germans. The note says explicitly that, given the Germanmentality, it is by no means sure that the conception of justice ofGermany will be the same as that of the Allies. 

On another occasion, after the signing of the treaty, when LloydGeorge pointed out the wisdom of not claiming from Germany theabsurdity of handing over thousands of officers accused of crueltyfor judgment by their late enemies, and recognized frankly theimpossibility of carrying out such a stipulation in England, Clemenceau replied simply that the Germans are not like the English. 

The delicate point in Clemenceau's note is the contradiction in whichhe tries to involve the British Prime Minister between the clauses ofthe treaty concerning Germany outside Europe, in which no moderationhad been shown, and those regarding Germany in Europe, in which hehimself did not consider moderation either necessary or opportune. 

There was an evident divergence of views, clearing the way for a calmreview of the conditions to be imposed, and here two countries couldhave exercised decisive action: the United States and Italy. 

But the United States was represented by Wilson, who was already in adifficult situation. By successive concessions, the gravity of whichhe had not realized, he found himself confronted by drafts of treatieswhich in the end were contradictions of all his proposals, theabsolute antithesis of the pledges he had given. It is quite possiblethat he had not seen where he was going, but his frequent irritationwas the sign of his distress. Still, in the ship-wreck of his wholeprogramme, he had succeeded in saving one thing, the Statute of theLeague of Nations which was to be prefaced to all the treaties. He wanted to go back to America and meet the Senate with at leastsomething to show as a record of the great undertaking, and he hopedand believed in good faith that the Covenant of the League of Nationswould sooner or later have brought about agreement and modified theworst of the mistakes made. His conception of things was academic, and he had not realized that there was need to constitute the nationsbefore laying down rules for the League; he trusted that bringing themtogether with mutual pledges would further most efficiently the causeof peace among the peoples. On the other hand, there was diffidence, shared by both, between Wilson and Lloyd George, and there was littlelikelihood of the British Prime Minister's move checking the coursethe Conference had taken. 

Italy might have done a great work if its representatives had hada clear policy. But, as M. Tardieu says, they had no share in theeffective doings of the Conference, and their activity was almostentirely absorbed in the question of Fiume. The Conference was athree-sided conversation between Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, and the latter had hostility and diffidence on each side of him, withItaly--as earlier stated--for the most part absent. Also, it wasjust then that the divergence between Wilson and the Italianrepresentatives reached its acute stage. The essential parts of thetreaty were decided in April and the beginning of May, on April 22the question of the right bank of the Rhine, on the 23rd or 24th theagreement about reparations. Italy was absent, and when the Italiandelegates returned to Paris without being asked on May 6, the text ofthe treaty was complete, in print. In actual fact, only one person didreally effective work and directed the trend of the Conference, andthat person was Clemenceau. 

The fact that the Conference met in Paris, that everything that wasdone by the various delegations was known, even foreseen so thatit could be opposed, discredited, even destroyed by the Pressbeforehand--a thing which annoyed Lloyd George so much that at onetime he thought seriously of leaving the Conference--all this gavean enormous advantage to the French delegation and especially toClemenceau who directed the Conference's work. 

All his life Clemenceau has been a tremendous destroyer. For years andyears he has done nothing but overthrow Governments with a sort ofobstinate ferocity. He was an old man when he was called to lead thecountry, but he brought with him all his fighting spirit. No onedetests the Church and detests Socialism more than he; both of thesemoral forces are equally repulsive to his individualistic spirit. I donot think there is any man among the politicians I have known who ismore individualistic than Clemenceau, who remains to-day the man ofthe old democracy. In time of war no one was better fitted than he tolead a fighting Ministry, fighting at home, fighting abroad, withthe same feeling, the same passion. When there was one thing onlynecessary in order to beat the enemy, never to falter in hatred, neverto doubt the sureness of victory, no one came near him, no one couldbe more determined, no one more bitter. But when War was over, when itwas peace that had to be ensured, no one could be less fitted for thework. He saw nothing beyond his hatred for Germany, the necessityfor destroying the enemy, sweeping away every bit of his activity, bringing him into subjection. On account of his age he could notvisualize the problems of the future; he could only see one thingnecessary, and that was immediate, to destroy the enemy and eitherdestroy or confiscate all his means of development. He was notnationalist or imperialist like his collaborators, but before alland above all one idea lived in him, hatred for Germany; she must berendered barren, disembowelled, annihilated. 

He had said in the French Parliament that treaties of peace werenothing more than a way of going on with war, and in September, 1920, in his preface to M. Tardieu's book, he said that France must getreparation for Waterloo and Sedan. Even Waterloo: _Waterloo et Sedan, pour ne pas remonter plus haut, nous imposaient d'abord les douloureuxsoucis d'une politique de réparation_. 

Tardieu noted, as we have seen, that there were only three peoplein the Conference: Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Orlando, heremarks, spoke little, and Italy had no importance. With subtle ironyhe notes that Wilson talked like a University don criticizing an essaywith the didactic logic of the professor. The truth is that afterhaving made the mistake of staying in the Conference he did notsee that his whole edifice was tumbling down, and he let mistakesaccumulate one after the other, with the result that treaties wereframed which, as already pointed out, actually destroyed all theprinciples he had declared to the world. 

Things being as they were in Paris, Clemenceau's temperament, thepressure of French industry and of the newspapers, the real anxiety tomake the future safe, and the desire on that account to exterminatethe enemy, France naturally demanded, through its representatives, the severest sanctions. England, given the realistic nature of itsrepresentatives and the calm clear vision of Lloyd George, alwaysfavoured in general the more moderate solutions as those which weremore likely to be carried out and would least disturb the equilibriumof Europe. So it came about that the decisions seemed to be acompromise, but were, on the other hand, actually so hard and so sternthat they were impossible of execution. 

Without committing any indiscretion it is possible to see now fromthe publications of the French representatives at the Conferencethemselves what France's claims were. 

Let us try to sum them up. 

As regards disarmament and control there could have been and thereought to have been no difficulty about agreement. I am in favourof the reduction of all armaments, but I regard it as a perfectlylegitimate claim that the country principally responsible for the War, and in general the conquered countries, should be obliged to disarm. 

No one would regard it as unfair that Germany and the conqueredcountries should be compelled to reduce their armaments to the measurenecessary to guarantee internal order only. 

But a distinction must be drawn between military sanctions meant toguarantee peace and those which have the end of ruining the enemy. In actual truth, in his solemn pronouncements after the entry of theUnited States into the War, President Wilson had never spoken of aseparate disarmament of the conquered countries, but of adequateguarantees _given and received_ that national armaments shouldbe reduced to the smallest point compatible with internal order. Assurances given and received: that is to say an identical situationas between conquerors and conquered. 

No one can deny the right of the conqueror to compel the conqueredenemy to give up his arms and reduce his military armaments, at anyrate for some time. But on this point too there was useless excess. 

I should never have thought of publishing France's claims. Bitternesscomes that way, responsibility is incurred, in future it may be anargument in your adversary's hands. But M. Tardieu has taken thisoffice on himself and has told us all France did, recounting herclaims from the acts of the Conference itself. Reference is easy tothe story written by one of the representatives of France, possiblythe most efficient through having been in America a long timeand having fuller and more intimate knowledge of the Americanrepresentatives, particularly Colonel House. 

Generally speaking, in every claim the French representatives startedfrom an extreme position, and that was not only a state of mind, itwas a tactical measure. Later on, if they gave up any part of theirclaim, they had the air of yielding, of accepting a compromise. Whentheir claims were of such an extreme nature that the anxiety theycaused, the opposition they raised, was evident, Clemenceau put onan air of moderation and gave way at once. Sometimes, too, he showedmoderation himself, when it suited his purpose, but in reality he onlygave way when he saw that it was impossible to get what he wanted. 

In points where English and American interests were not involved, given the difficult position in which Lloyd George was placed andWilson's utter ignorance of all European questions, with Italy keepingalmost entirely apart, the French point of view always came out ontop, if slightly modified. But the original claim was always soextreme that the modification left standing the most radically severemeasure against the conquered countries. 

Many decisions affecting France were not sufficiently criticized onaccount of the relations in which the English and Americans stoodto France; objections would have looked like ill-will, pleading theenemy's cause. 

Previously, in nearly every case when peace was being made, therepresentatives of the conquered countries had been called to statetheir case, opportunity was given for discussion. The Russo-Japanesepeace is an example. Undoubtedly the aggression of Russia had beenunscrupulous and premeditated, but both parties participated indrawing up the peace treaty. At Paris, possibly for the first timein history, the destiny of the most cultured people in Europe wasdecided--or rather it was thought that it was being decided--withouteven listening to what they had to say and without hearing from theirrepresentatives if the conditions imposed could or could not possiblybe carried out. Later on an exception, if only a purely formal one, was made in the case of Hungary, whose delegates were heard; but itwill remain for ever a terrible precedent in modern history that, against all pledges, all precedents and all traditions, therepresentatives of Germany were never even heard; nothing was left tothem but to sign a treaty at a moment when famine and exhaustion andthreat of revolution made it impossible not to sign it. 

If Germany had not signed she would have suffered less loss. But atthat time conditions at home with latent revolution threatening thewhole Empire, made it imperative to accept any solution, and all themore as the Germans considered that they were not bound by theirsignature, the decisions having been imposed by violence without anyhearing being given to the conquered party, and the most seriousdecisions being taken without any real examination of the facts. Inthe old law of the Church it was laid down that everyone must have ahearing, even the devil: _Etiam diabulus audiatur_ (Even the devilhas the right to be heard). But the new democracy, which proposed toinstall the society of the nations, did not even obey the preceptswhich the dark Middle Ages held sacred on behalf of the accused. 

Conditions in Germany were terribly difficult, and an army of twohundred thousand men was considered by the military experts theminimum necessary. The military commission presided over by MarshalFoch left Germany an army of two hundred thousand men, recruited byconscription, a Staff in proportion, service of one year, fifteendivisions, 180 heavy guns, 600 field-guns. That is less than whatlittle States without any resources have now, three years after theclose of the War. But France at once imposed the reduction of theGerman army to 100, 000 men, no conscription but a twelve years'service of paid soldiers, artillery reduced practically to nothing, noheavy guns at all, very few field-guns. No opportunity was given fordiscussion, nor was there any. Clemenceau put the problem in such away that discussion was out of the question: _C'est la France qui, demain comme hier, sera face à l'Allemagne_. Lloyd George and ColonelHouse confined themselves to saying that on this point France formallyexpressed their views, Great Britain and the United States had noright to oppose. Lloyd George was convinced that the measures weretoo extreme and had tried on May 23, 1919, to modify them; butFrance insisted on imposing on Germany this situation of tremendousdifficulty. 

I have referred to the military conditions imposed on Germany:destruction of all war material, fortresses and armament factories;prohibition of any trade in arms; destruction of the fleet; occupationof the west bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads for fifteen years;allied control, with wide powers, over the execution of the militaryand naval clauses of the treaty, with consequent subjection ofall public administrations and private companies to the will of aforeigner, or rather of an enemy kept at the expense of Germany itselfand at no small expense, etc. In some of the inter-allied conferencesI have had to take note of what these commissions of control reallyare, and their absurd extravagance, based on the argument that theenemy must pay for everything. 

The purport of France's action in the Conference was not to ensuresafe military guarantees against Germany but to destroy her, at anyrate to cut her up. And indeed, when she had got all she wanted andGermany was helpless, she continued the same policy, even intensifyingit. Every bit of territory possible must be taken, German unity mustbe broken, and not only military but industrial Germany must belaid low under a series of controls and an impossible number ofobligations. 

All know how, in Article 428 of the treaty, it is laid down, as aguarantee of the execution of the treaty terms on the part of Germany, or rather as a more extended military guarantee for France, thatGerman territory on the west bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheadsare to be occupied by allied and associated troops for fifteen years, methods and regulations for such occupation following in Articles 429and 432. 

This occupation not only gives deep offence to Germany (France hasalways looked back with implacable bitterness on the few months'military occupation by her Prussian conquerors in the war of 1870), but it paralyses all her activity and is generally judged to becompletely useless. 

All the Allies were ready to give France every military guaranteeagainst any unjust aggression by Germany, but France wanted inaddition the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. It was a verydelicate matter, and the notes presented to the Conference by GreatBritain on March 26 and April 2, by the United States on March 28 andApril 12, show how embarrassed the two Governments were in consideringa question which France regarded as essential for her future. It hasto be added that the action of Marshal Foch in this matter wasnot entirely constitutional. He claimed that, independently ofnationality, France and Belgium have the right to look on the Rhine asthe indispensable frontier for the nations of the west of Europe, _etpar là, de la civilisation_. Neither Lloyd George nor Wilson couldswallow the argument of the Rhine a frontier between the civilizationof France and Belgium, all civilization indeed, and Germany. 

In the treaty the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and thebridgeheads by the allied and associated powers for fifteen yearswas introduced as a compromise. Such districts will be evacuated bydegrees every five years if Germany shall have faithfully carried outthe terms of the treaty. Now the conditions of the treaty are in largemeasure impossible of execution, and in consequence no execution ofthem can ever be described as faithful. Further, the occupying troopsare paid by Germany. It follows that the conception of the occupationof the left bank of the Rhine was of a fact of unlimited duration. The harm that would result from the occupation was pointed out at theConference by the American representatives and even more strongly bythe English. What was the use of it, they asked, if the German armywere reduced to 100, 000 men? M. Tardieu himself tells the story of allthe efforts made, especially by Lloyd George and Bonar Law, to preventthe blunder which later on was endorsed in the treaty as Article 428. Lloyd George went so far as to complain of political intrigues forcreating disorder on the Rhine. But Clemenceau took care to put thequestion in such a form that no discussion was possible. In the matterof the occupation, he said to the English, you do not understand theFrench point of view. You live in an island with the sea as defence, we on the continent with a bad frontier. We do not look for an attackby Germany but for systematic refusal to carry out the terms ofthe treaty. Never was there a treaty with so many clauses, with, consequently, so many opportunities for evasion. Against that risk thematerial guarantee of occupation is necessary. There are two methodsin direct contrast: _En Angleterre on croit que le moyen d'y réussirest de faire des concessions. En France nous croyons que c'est debrusquer_. 

On March 14 Lloyd George and Wilson had offered France the fullestmilitary guarantee in place of the occupation of the left bank of theRhine. France wanted, and in fact got, the occupation as well as thealliances. "_Notre but_?" says Tardieu. "_Sceller la garantie offerte, mais y ajouter l'occupation_. " Outside the Versailles Treaty theUnited States and Great Britain had made several treaties of alliancewith France for the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany. Lateron the French-English Treaty was approved by the House of Commons, theFrench-American underwent the same fate as the Versailles Treaty. Butthe treaty with Great Britain fell through also on account of theprovision that it should come into force simultaneously with theAmerican Treaty. 

In a Paris newspaper Poincaré published in September, 1921, somestrictly reserved documents on the questions of the militaryguarantees and the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. Hewished to get the credit of having stood firm when Clemenceau himselfhesitated at the demand for an occupation of the left bank of theRhine for even a longer period than fifteen years. He has publishedthe letter he sent to Clemenceau to be shown to Wilson and LloydGeorge and the latter's reply. 

He said that there must be no thought of giving up the occupation andrenouncing a guarantee until every obligation in the treaty shouldhave been carried out; he went so far as to claim that in occupationregarded as a guarantee of a credit representing an indemnity fordamages, there is nothing contrary to the principles proclaimed byPresident Wilson and recognized by the Allies. Nor would it sufficeeven to have the faculty of reoccupation, because "this faculty" couldnever be a valid substitute for occupation. As regards the suggestionthat a long occupation or one for an indeterminate period would causebad feeling, M. Poincaré was convinced that this was an exaggeration. A short occupation causes more irritation on account of its arbitrarylimit; everyone understands an occupation without other limit than thecomplete carrying out of the treaty. The longer the time that passesthe better would become the relations between the German populationsand the armies of occupation. 

Clemenceau communicated Poincaré's letter to Lloyd George. The BritishPrime Minister replied on May 6 in the clearest terms. In his eyes, forcing Germany to submit to the occupation of the Rhine and the RhineProvinces for an unlimited period, was a provocation to renew the warin Europe. 

During the Conference France put forward some proposals the aim ofwhich was nothing less than to split up Germany. A typical exampleis the memorandum presented by the French delegation claiming theannexation of the Saar territory. This is completely German; in thesix hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants before the War there werenot a hundred French. Not a word had ever been said about annexationof the Saar either in Government pronouncements or in any vote in theFrench Parliament, nor had it been discussed by any political party. No one had ever suggested such annexation, which certainly was a farmore serious thing than the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, as there was considerable German population in Alsace-Lorraine. Therewas no French population at all in the Saar, and the territory inquestion could not even be claimed for military reasons but only forits economic resources. Reasons of history could not count, for theywere all in Germany's favour. Nevertheless the request was put forwardas a matter of sentiment. Had not the Saar belonged in other daysentirely or in part to France? Politics and economics are noteverything, said Clemenceau; history also has great value. For theUnited States a hundred and twenty years are a long time; for Francethey count little. Material reparations are not enough, there must bemoral reparations too, and the conception of France cannot be the sameas that of her Allies. The desire for the Saar responded, accordingto Clemenceau, to a need of moral reparation. On this point, too, the extreme French claim was modified. The Saar mines were given toFrance, not provisionally as a matter of reparations, but permanentlywith full right of possession and full guarantees for their working. For fifteen years from the date of the treaty the government of theterritory was put in the hands of the League of Nations as trustee;after fifteen years the population, entirely German, should be calledto decide under what government they desired to live. In other words, in a purely German country, which no one in France had ever claimed, of which no one in France had ever spoken during the War, the mostimportant property was handed to a conquering State, the country wasput under the administration of the conquerors (which is what theLeague of Nations actually is at present), and after fifteen years oftorment the population is to be put through a plebiscite. Meanwhilethe French douane rules in the Saar. 

It was open to the treaty to adopt or not to adopt the system ofplebiscites. When it was a case of handing over great masses of Germanpopulations, a plebiscite was imperative--at any rate, where any doubtexisted, and the more so in concessions which formed no part of theWar aims and were not found in any pronouncement of the Allies. On theother hand, in all cessions of German territory to Poland and Bohemia, no mention is made of a plebiscite because it was a question ofmilitary necessity or of lands which had been historically victimsof Germany. But only for Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Marienwerder, Allenstein, Klagenfurth and the Saar were plebiscites laid down--andwith the exception that the plebiscite itself, when, as in the case ofUpper Silesia, it resulted in favour of Germany, was not regarded asconclusive. 

But where the most extreme views clashed was in the matter ofreparations and the indemnity to be claimed from the enemy. 

We have already seen that the theory of reparation for damage foundits way incidentally, even before the treaty was considered, into thearmistice terms. No word had been said previously of claiming from theconquered enemy anything beyond restoration of devastated territories, but after the War another theory was produced. If Germany and herallies are solely responsible for the War, they must pay the wholecost of the War: damage to property, persons and war works. Whendamage has been done, he who has done the wrong must make reparationfor it to the utmost limit of his resources. 

The American delegation struck a note of moderation: no claimshould be made beyond what was established in the peace conditions, reparation for actions which were an evident violation ofinternational law, restoration of invaded country, and reparation fordamage caused to the civil population and to its property. 

During the War there were a number of exaggerated pronouncements onthe immense resources of Germany and her capacity for payment. 

Besides all the burdens with which Germany was loaded, there was adiscussion on the sum which the Allies should claim. The War had cost700 milliard francs, and the claims for damage to persons and propertyamounted to at least 350 milliards for all the Allies together. 

Whatever the sum might be, when it had been laid down in the treatywhat damage was to be indemnified, the French negotiators claimedsixty-five per cent. , leaving thirty-five per cent. For all theothers. 

What was necessary was to lay down proportions, not the actual amountof the sum. It was impossible to say at once what amount the damageswould reach: that was the business of the Reparations Commission. 

Instead of inserting in the treaty the enormous figures spoken of, thequality, not the quantity, of the damages to be indemnified was laiddown. But the standard of reckoning led to fantastic figures. 

An impossible amount had to be paid, and the delegations werediscussing then the very same things that are being discussed now. TheAmerican experts saw the gross mistake of the other delegations, andput down as the maximum payment 325 milliard marks up to 1951, thefirst payment to be 25 milliard marks in 1921. So was invented theReparations Commission machine, a thing which has no precedent in anytreaty, being a commission with sovereign powers to control the lifeof the whole of Germany. 

In actual truth no serious person has ever thought that Germany canpay more than a certain number of milliards a year, no one believesthat a country can be subjected to a regime of control for thirtyyears. 

But the directing line of work of the treaties has been to break downGermany, to cut her up, to suffocate her. 

France had but one idea, and later on did not hesitate to admit it:to dismember Germany, to destroy her unity. By creating intolerableconditions of life, taking away territory on the frontier, puttinglarge districts under military occupation, delaying or not making anydiplomatic appointments and carrying on communications solely throughmilitary commissions, a state of things was brought about which mustinevitably tend to weaken the constitutional unity of the GermanEmpire. Taking away from Germany 84 thousand kilometres of territory, nearly eight million inhabitants and all the most important mineralresources, preventing the unity of the German people and the sixmillion and five hundred thousand of German Austrians to whichAustria was then reduced, putting the whole German country under aninterminable series of controls--all this did more harm to Germanunity than would have been done by taking the responsibility of aforcible and immediate division to which the Germans could not haveconsented and which the Allies could not have claimed to impose. 

What has been said about Germany and the Versailles Treaty can be saidabout all the other conquered countries and all the other treaties, with merely varying proportions in each case. 

The verdict that has to be passed on them will very soon be shown byfacts--if indeed facts have not shown already that, in great measure, what had been laid down cannot be carried out. One thing is certain, that the actual treaties threaten to ruin conquerors and conquered, that they have not brought peace to Europe, but conditions of war andviolence. In Clemenceau's words, the treaties are a way of going onwith war. 

But, even if it were possible to dispute that, as men's minds cannotyet frame an impartial judgment and the danger is not seen by all, there is one thing that cannot be denied or disputed, and that is thatthe treaties are the negation of the principles for which the UnitedStates and Italy, without any obligation on them, entered the War;they are a perversion of all the Entente had repeatedly proclaimed;they break into pieces President Wilson's fourteen points which were asolemn pledge for the American people, and to-morrow they will be thegreatest moral weapon with which the conquered of to-day will face theconquerors of to-day. 

IV

THE CONQUERORS AND THE CONQUERED

How many are the States of Europe? Before the War the politicalgeography of Europe was almost tradition. To-day every part ofEurope is in a state of flux. The only absolute certainty is that inContinental Europe conquerors and conquered are in a condition ofspiritual, as well as economic, unrest. It is difficult indeed to sayhow many political unities there are and how many are lasting, andwhat new wars are being prepared, if a way of salvation is not foundby some common endeavour to install peace, which the peace of Parishas not done. How many thinking men can, without perplexity, rememberhow many States there are and what they are: arbitrary creations ofthe treaties, creations of the moment, territorial limitations imposedby the necessities of international agreements. The situation ofRussia is so uncertain that no one knows whether new States willarise as a result of her continuous disintegration, or if she will bereconstructed in a solid, unified form, and other States amongst thosewhich have arisen will fall. 

Without taking into account those traditional little States which aremerely historical curiosities, as Monaco, San Marino, Andorra, MonteSanto, not counting Iceland as a State apart, not including theSaar, which as a result of one of the absurdities of the Treatyof Versailles is an actual State outside Germany, but consideringMontenegro as an existing State, Europe probably comprises thirtyStates. Some of them are, however, in such a condition that they donot give promise of the slightest guarantee of life or security. 

Europe has rather Balkanized herself: not only the War came from theBalkans, but also many ideas, which have been largely exploited inparliamentary and newspaper circles. Listening to many speeches andbeing present at many events to-day leaves the sensation of being inBelgrade or at Sarajevo. 

Europe, including Russia and including also the Polar archipelagos, covers an area of a little more than ten million square kilometres. Canada is of almost the same size; the United States of America hasabout the same territory. 

The historical procedure before the War was towards the formation oflarge territorial unities; the _post-bellum_ procedure is entirelytowards a process of dissolution, and the fractionizing, resulting alittle from necessity and a little also from the desire to dismemberthe old Empires and to weaken Germany, has assumed proportions almostimpossible to foresee. 

In the relations between the various States good and evil are notabstract ideas: political actions can only be judged by their results. If the treaties of peace which have been imposed on the conqueredwould be capable of application, we could, from an ethnical point ofview, regret some or many of the decisions; but we should only have towait for the results of time for a definite judgment. 

The evil is that the treaties which have been signed are notapplicable or cannot be applied without the rapid dissolution ofEurope. 

So the balance-sheet of the peace, after three years from thearmistice--that is, three years from the War--shows on the whole aworsening of the situation. The spirit of violence has not died out, and perhaps in some countries not even diminished; on the other handthe causes of material disagreement have increased, the inequalityhas augmented, the division between the two groups has grown, and thecauses of hatred have been consolidated. An analysis of the foreignexchanges indicated a process of undoing and not a tendency toreconstruction. 

We have referred in a general manner to the conditions of Germany as aresult of the Treaty of Versailles; even worse is the situation of theother conquered countries in so far that either they have not beentreated with due regard, or they have lost so much territory that theyhave no possibility of reconstructing their national existence. Suchis the case with Austria, with Turkey and with Hungary. Bulgaria, which has a tenacious and compact population composed of smallagriculturists, has less difficult conditions of reconstruction. 

Germany has fulfilled loyally all the conditions of the disarmament. After she had handed over her fleet she destroyed her fortifications, she destroyed all the material up to the extreme limit imposed by thetreaties, she disbanded her enormous armies. If in any one of theworks of destruction she had proceeded with a bad will, if she hadtried to delay them, it would be perfectly understandable. A differentstep carries one to a dance or to a funeral. At the actual momentGermany has no fleet, no army, no artillery, and is in a condition inwhich she could not reply to any act of violence. This is why all theviolence of the Poles against Germany has found hardly any opposition. 

All this is so evident that no one can raise doubts on the question. 

Everyone remembers, said Hindenburg, the difficult task that theUnited States had to put in the field an army of a million men. Nevertheless they had the protection of the ocean during the periodwhen they were preparing their artillery and their aerial material. 

Germany for her aviation, for her heavy artillery, for her armaments, is not even separated by the ocean from her Allies, and, on thecontrary, they are firmly established in German territory; it wouldrequire many months to prepare a new war, during which France and herAllies would not be resting quietly. 

General Ludendorff recently made certain declarations which have acapital importance, since they fit the facts exactly. He declaredthat a war of reconquest by Germany against the Allies and especiallyagainst France is for an indefinite time completely impossible fromthe technical and military point of view. France has an army largelysupplied with all the means of battle, ready to march at any time, which could smash any German military organization hostile to France. The more so since by the destruction of the German war industriesGermany has lost every possibility of arming herself afresh. It isabsurd to believe that a German army ready for modern warfare can beorganized and put on a war footing secretly. A German army which couldfight with the least possible hope of success against an enemy armyarmed and equipped in the most modern manner would first of all haveto be based on a huge German war industry, which naturally could notbe improvised or built up in secret. Even if a third power wishedto arm Germany, it would not be possible to arm her so quickly andmobilize her in sufficient time to prevent the enemy army fromobtaining an immediate and decisive victory. 

It would be necessary, as everyone realizes even in France, thatGermany should wish to commit suicide. In consequence of the treatythere is the "maximum of obstacles which mind can conceive" toguard against any German peril; and against Germany there have beenaccumulated "_such guarantees that never before has history recordedthe like_" (Tardieu), and Germany cannot do anything for many years. Mobilization requires years and years for preparation and the greatestpublicity for its execution. 

Wilson spoke of guarantees _given and received_ for the reduction ofarmaments. Instead, after the treaties had been concluded, if theconquered were completely disarmed, the conquering nations havecontinued to arm. Almost all the conquering nations have not only highexpenses but more numerous armies. If the conditions of peace imposedby the treaties were considered supportable, remembering the fact thatthe late enemies were harmless, against whom are these continuousincrease of armaments?

We have already seen the military conditions imposed on Germany--asmall mercenary army, no obligatory conscription, no militaryinstruction, no aviation, no artillery except a minimum andinsignificant quantity required by the necessities of interior order. Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary can only have insignificant armies. Austria may maintain under arms 30, 000 men, but her ruined financesonly permit her, according to the latest reports, to keep 21, 700;Bulgaria has 20, 000 men plus 3, 082 gendarmes; Hungary, according tothe Treaty of Trianon, has 35, 000. Turkey in Europe, which hardlyexists any more as a territorial State, except for the city ofConstantinople, where the sovereignty of the Sultan is more apparentthan real, has not an actual army. 

Taken all together the States which formed the powerful nucleus of warof Germany as they are now reduced territorially have under arms fewerthan 180, 000 men, not including, naturally, those new States risen onthe ruins of the old Central Empires, and which arm themselves by therequest and sometimes in the interest of some State of the Entente. 

The old enemies, therefore, are not in a condition to make war, andare placed under all manner of controls. Sometimes the controls areeven of a very singular nature. All have been occupied in giving thesea to the victors. Poland has obtained the absurd paradox of theState of Danzig because it has the sea. The constant aim of theAllies, even in opposition to Italy, has been to give free and safeoutlets on the sea coast to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. 

At the Conference of London and San Remo I repeatedly referred tothe expenses of these military missions of control and often theiroutrageous imposition on the conquered who are suffering from hunger. There are generals who are assigned as indemnity and expenses of allsorts, salaries which are much superior to that of the President ofthe United States of America. It is necessary to look at Vienna andBudapest, where the people are dying of hunger, to see the carnival ofthe Danube Commission. For the rest it is only necessary to look atthe expense accounts of the Reparations Commissions to be convincedthat this sad spectacle of greed and luxury humiliates the victorsmore than the conquered. 

German-Austria has lost every access to the sea. She cannot live onher resources with her enormous capital in ruins. She cannot unitewith Germany, though she is a purely German country, because thetreaty requires the unanimous consent of the League of Nations, andFrance having refused, it is therefore impossible. She cannot unitewith Czeko-Slovakia, with Hungary and other countries which havebeen formed from the Austrian Empire, because that is against theaspirations of the German populations, and it would be the formationanew of that Danube State which, with its numerous contrasts, was oneof the essential causes of the War. Austria has lost every accessto the sea, has consigned her fleet and her merchant marine, but inreturn has had the advantage of numerous inter-allied commissions ofcontrol to safeguard the military, naval and aeronautic clauses. Butthere are clauses which can no longer be justified, as, for instance, when Austria no longer has a sea coast. (Art. 140 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which forbids the construction or acquisition of: any sort ofsubmersible vessel, even commercial. ) It is impossible to understandwhy (Art. 143) the wireless high-power station of Vienna is notallowed to transmit other than commercial telegrams under thesurveillance of the Allied and Associated Powers, who take the troubleto determine even the length of the wave to be used. 

Before the War, in 1914, France desired to bring her army to themaximum of efficiency; opposite a great German army was to be found agreat French army. 

Germany had in 1913, according to the Budget presented to theReichstag, a standing army of 647, 000 soldiers of all arms, of which105, 000 were non-commissioned officers and 30, 000 officers. It was thegreatest army of Europe and of the world, taking into account its realefficiency. 

Whilst Germany has no longer an army, France on July 1, 1921, hadunder arms 810, 000 men, of which 38, 473 were officers, therefore manymore than Germany had before the War. Given its demographic character, it is the greatest military force which has been seen in modern times, and can only have two reasons--either military domination or ruin. Themilitary budget proposed for the present year in the ordinary sectionis for 2, 782 millions of francs, besides that portion paid by Germanyfor the army of occupation; the extraordinary section of the samebudget is for 1, 712 millions of francs, besides 635 millions forexpenses repayable for the maintenance of troops of occupation inforeign countries. 

Austria-Hungary had in 1913 a total of 34, 000 officers and 390, 249men; the States which have arisen from her ruins have a good manymore. Whilst German-Austria has, as a matter of fact, only 21, 700 menand Hungary has only 35, 000, Czeko-Slovakia has 150, 000 men, of which10, 000 are officers; Jugo-Slavia has about 120, 000, of which 8, 000 to10, 000 are officers. 

But the two allies of France--Belgium and Poland, Belgium no longerneutral, Poland always in disorder and in a state of continualprovocation abroad and of increasing anarchy at home--have in theirturn armies which previous to the War could have been maintained onlyby a first-class power. Belgium has doubled her peace effectives, which now amount to 113, 500 men, an enormous army for a populationwhich is about equal to that of the city of New York or London. 

Poland, whose economic conditions are completely disastrous, and maybe described as having neither money nor credit any more, but whichmaintains more employees than any other country on earth, has underarms not fewer than 430, 000 men, and often many more, and possibly hasto-day many more--about 600, 000. Her treaty with France imposes on hermilitary obligations the extension of which cannot be compatible withthe policy of a country desiring peace. Poland has, besides, vastdreams of greatness abroad, and growing ruin in the interior. Sheenslaves herself in order to enslave others, and pretends in herdisorder to control and dominate much more intelligent and culturedpeoples. 

Rumania has under arms 160, 000 men besides 80, 000 carabineers and16, 000 frontier guards. Greece has, particularly on account of herundertakings in Asia Minor, which only the lesser intelligence of hernational exaltations can explain, more than 400, 000 men under arms. She is suffocating under the weight of heavy armaments and can moveonly with difficulty. 

The two pupils of the Entente, Greece and Poland, exactly like naughtychildren, have a policy of greed and capriciousness. Poland was notthe outcome of her own strength, but of the strength of the Entente. Greece never found the way to contribute heavily to the War with astrong army, and after the War has the most numerous army which shehas ever had in her history. 

Great Britain and Italy are the only two countries which have largelydemobilized; Great Britain in the much greater measure. It iscalculated that Great Britain has under arms 201, 000 men, of which15, 030 are officers. In this number, however, are not included 75, 896men in India and the personnel of the Air Force. 

In Italy, on July 31, 1921, there were under arms 351, 076 soldiersand 18, 138 officers, in all 369, 214, of which, however, 56, 529 werecarabineers carrying out duties almost exclusively of public order. 

Under the pressure and as a result of the example of the States whichhave come through the War, those States which did not take part havealso largely augmented their armies. 

So, whilst the conquered have ceased every preoccupation, the neutralsof the War have developed their armaments, and the conquerors havedeveloped theirs beyond measure. 

No one can say what may be the position of Bolshevik Russia; probablyshe has not much less than a million of men under arms, also becausein a communist regime the vagabonds and the violent find the easiestoccupation in the army. 

The conquerors, having disarmed the conquered, have imposed theireconomic conditions, their absurd moralities and territorialhumiliations, as those imposed on Bulgaria, Turkey and Hungary, conditions which are sufficiently difficult to be maintained. And asthe ferment of hate develops, the conquerors do not disarm. Aboveall, the little States do not disarm, who have wanted too much, haveobtained too much, and now do not know how to maintain what theyhave. In many countries for certain social reasons war has become anindustry; they live by the state of war. What would they do without astate of war?

In general, then, Europe has considerably more men under arms than in1913. Not only has it not disarmed, as the Entente always declaredwould be the consequence of the victory of the principles ofdemocracy, but the victors are always leaning toward further armament. The more difficult it becomes to maintain the conditions of the peace, because of their severity and their absurdity, the more necessary itis to maintain armies. The conquered have not armies; the conquerorsare, or, perhaps, up to a short time ago, were sure that the bigarmies would serve to enforce the payment of the indemnities. Now, infact, they would not serve for anything else. 

At the Conference of London, after a long discussion in February, 1920, the economic manifesto was drawn up which warned Europe of theperils of the economic situation. Lloyd George and myself were easilyagreed in denouncing it as the gravest danger, as the principal causeof high prices and of economic disorder, both as to the maintenance oflarge armies and in the continuation of the state of war. 

A Europe divided distinctly into two parts cannot be pacific evenafter the conquered have yielded up their arms. The conquerors arebound to arm themselves because of their own inquietude, from theconviction that the only salvation is in force, which allows, if nota true peace, at least an armed peace; if not the development ofproduction and exchange, at least the possibility of cutting off fromthe markets the very fountains of riches. 

Violence begets new violence. If the conditions of the peace cannotbe fulfilled, other heavier conditions can be imposed. In Franceirresponsible people are supporting already the necessity of occupyingpermanently the Ruhr, that is to say, the greatest German centre forthe production of coal, and of not respecting the plebiscite of UpperSilesia. 

What has been said about the armies is true also about the fleets. There is a race towards the increase of naval armaments. If first thatwas the preoccupation of the conquered, now it is the preoccupation ofthe conquerors in the exchange of doubts into which they have fallenafter the War. 

The state of mind which has been created between Great Britain, theUnited States of America and Japan deserves to be seriously examined. The race for naval armaments into which these three countries enterednot many months ago, and the competition between the two greatAnglo-Saxon people, cannot be other than very damaging forcivilization. 

The Great War which has been fought was at bottom the fight betweenthe Germanic race and the Slav race; it was the doubts in regard tothe last and not in regard to France which pushed Germany to war andprecipitated events. The results of the Continental War, however, arethe suppression of Germany, which lost, as well as of Russia, whichhad not resisted, and France alone has gathered the fruits of thesituation, if they can be called that, from amongst the thorns whicheverywhere surround the victory. 

But the War was decided, above all, by the intervention of theAnglo-Saxon people, Great Britain, her Dominions, and the UnitedStates of America. Nothing but the small political intelligence of theGerman statesmen could have united in the same group the peopleswho have the greatest contrast of interests among themselves--GreatBritain, Russia, the United States of America, Japan, France andItaly. 

But now the situation of Europe and especially that of Asia iscreating fresh competitions, the expenses for the navies, according tothe figures of the various Budgets from 1914 to 1921, have risen inthe United States of America from 702 millions of lire to 2, 166, inGreat Britain from 1, 218 millions to 2, 109, in Japan from 249 millionsto 1, 250, in France from 495 millions to 1, 083, in Italy from 250millions to 402. The sums proposed for new constructions in the year1921-22 are 450 millions in the United States of America, 475 millionsfor Great Britain, 281 millions for Japan, 185 millions for France, and 61 millions for Italy. 

The United States of America and Great Britain are countries of greatresources: they can stand the effort. But can Japan, which has butlimited resources, support these for any length of time? or has shesome immediate intentions?

A comparative table of the navies in 1914 and 1921 shows that thefleets of the conquering countries are very much more powerful thanthey were before the War. Nevertheless, Russia and Austria-Hungary andthe people arisen in their territories are not naval powers; Germanyhas lost all her fleet. The race for naval armaments regardsespecially the two Anglo-Saxon powers and Japan; the race for landarmaments regards all the conquerors of Europe and especially thesmall States. 

This situation cannot but be the cause of great preoccupation; butthe greater preoccupation arises from the fact that the minor States, especially those which took no part in the War, become every day moreexigent and display fresh aspirations. 

The whole system of the Treaty of Versailles has been erected on theerror of Poland. Poland was not created as the noble manifestationof the rights of nationality, ethnical Poland was not created, but agreat State which, as she is, cannot live long, because there are notgreat foreign minorities, but a whole mass of populations which cannotco-exist, Poland, which has already the experience of a too numerousIsraelitic population, has not the capacity to assimilate the Germans, the Russians and the Ukranians which the Treaty of Versailles hasunjustly given to her against the very declarations of Wilson. 

So that after, with the aid of the Entente, having had the strengthto resist the Bolshevik troops, Poland is now in a state of permanentanarchy; consumes and does not produce; pays debts with a fantasticbigness and does not know how to regulate the incomings. No countryin the world has ever more abused paper currency; her paper money isprobably the most greatly depreciated of any country on earth. Shehas not succeeded in organizing her own production, and now tends todissolve the production of her neighbours. 

The whole Treaty of Versailles is based on a vigorous and vitalPoland. A harmless Germany, unable to unite with an equally harmlessGerman-Austria, should be under the military control of France andBelgium on the west, and of Poland on the east. Poland, separatingGermany from Russia, besides imposing on Germany the territorialoutrage of the Danzig corridor, cuts her off from any possibility ofexpansion and development in the east. Poland has been conceived as agreat State. A Polish nation was not constituted; a Polish militaryState was constituted, whose principal duty is that of disorganizingGermany. 

Poland, the result of a miracle of the War (no one could foretell thesimultaneous fall of the Central Empires and of the Russian Empire), was formed not from a tenacious endeavour, but from an unforeseencircumstance, which was the just reward for the long martyrdom of apeople. The borders of Poland will reach in time to the Baltic Sea inthe north, the Carpathians and the Dniester in the south, in the eastthe country almost as far as Smolensk, in the west to the parts ofGermany, Brandenburg and Pomerania. The new patriots dream of animmense Poland, the old Poland of tradition, and then to descend intothe countries of the Ukraine and dominate new territories. 

It is easy to see that, sooner or later, the Bolshevik degenerationover, Russia will be recomposed; Germany, in spite of all the attemptsto break her up and crush her unity, within thirty or forty years willbe the most formidable ethnical nucleus of Continental Europe. Whatwill then happen to a Poland which pretends to divide two people whorepresent numerically and will represent in other fields also thegreatest forces of Continental Europe of to-morrow?

Amongst many in France there is the old conception of Napoleon I, whoconsidered the whole of European politics from an erroneous point ofview, that of a lasting French hegemony in Europe, when the lastinghegemony of peoples is no longer possible. In the sad solitude of hisexile at Saint Helena, Napoleon I said that not to have created apowerful Poland keystone of the roof of the European edifice, not tohave destroyed Prussia, and to have been mistaken in regard to Russia, were the three great errors of his life. But all his work had as anend to put the life of Europe under the control of France, and wasnecessarily wrecked by reality, which does not permit the lastingmistake of a single nation which places herself above all the othersin a free and progressive Europe. 

If the policy of the Entente towards Germany and towards the conqueredcountries does not correspond either to collective declarations madeduring the War, or to the promises solemnly made by Wilson, the policytowards Russia has been a whole series of error. In fact, one cannottalk of a policy of the Entente, in so far that with the exception ofa few errors committed in common, Great Britain, France and Italy haveeach followed their own policy. 

In his sixth point, among the fourteen points, no longer pure, butviolated and outraged worse than the women of a conquered race by atribe of Kurds, Wilson said on January 8, 1918, that the treatmentmeted out to Russia by the sister nations, and therefore their loyaltyin assisting her to settle herself, should be the stern proof oftheir goodwill. They should show that they did not confound theirown interests, or rather their egoism, with what should be done forRussia. The proof was most unfortunate. 

The attitude of the Entente towards Russia has had different phases. 

In the first phase, the prevailing idea, especially on the part ofone of the Allies, was to send military expeditions in conjunctionespecially with Rumania and Poland. This idea was immediatelyabandoned on account of its very absurdity. 

In the second phase, the greatest hopes were placed in the blockade;of isolating Russia completely, cutting off from her (and for the restshe no longer had it) every facility of trade exchange. At the sametime war on the part of Poland and Rumania was encouraged, to help theattempt which the men of the old regime were making in the interior. France alone reached the point of officially recognizing the Tsaristundertaking of General Wrangel. 

Lloyd George, with the exception of some initial doubts, always hadthe clearest ideas in regard to Russia, and I never found myself indisagreement with him in valuing the men and the Russian situation. Itis easy for a broad and serene mind to judge the position of the rest. 

For my part I always tried to follow that policy which would bestbring about the most useful result with the least damage. After theWar the working masses in Europe had the greatest illusions aboutRussian communism and the Bolshevik organization. Every militaryexpedition against Russia signified giving the people the convictionthat it was desired not to fight an enemy but to suffocate in blood anattempt at a communist organization. I have always thought that thedictatorship of the proletariat, that is the dictatorship of ignoranceand incapacity, would necessarily lead to disaster, and that hungerand death would follow violence. There are for the peoples greaterrors which must be carried out in the very effort to benefitcivilization. Our propaganda would have served nothing without thereality of ruin. Only the death by hunger of millions of men incommunist Russia will convince the working masses in Europe andAmerica that the experiment of Russia is not to be followed; rather isit to be avoided at any cost. To exterminate the communist attempt byan unjust war, even if it were possible, would have meant ruin forWestern civilization. 

On repeated occasions I have counselled Rumania and Poland not to makeany attempt against Russia and to limit themselves to defence. Everyunjust aggression on the part of Bolshevik Russia would have found theEntente disposed to further sacrifice to save two free nations, butany provocation on their part could not create secure solidarity. 

When I assumed the direction of the Government in June, 1919, anItalian military expedition was under orders for Georgia. The Englishtroops, who were in small numbers, were withdrawing; Italy had, withthe consent of the Allies, and partly by her own desire, prepareda big military expedition. A considerable number of divisions wereready, as also were the ships to commence the transport. Georgia is acountry of extraordinary natural resources, and it was thoughtthat she would be able to furnish Italy with a great number of rawmaterials which she lacked. What surprised me was that not only men ofthe Government, but intelligent financiers and men of very advancedideas, were convinced supporters of this expedition. 

However, confronted by much opposition, I immediately renounced thisundertaking, and renounced it in a definite form, limiting myself toencouraging every commercial enterprise. 

Certainly the Allies could not suggest anything unfriendly to Italy;but the effect of the expedition was to put Italy directly at variancewith the government of Moscow, to launch her upon an adventure ofwhich it was impossible to tell the consequences. 

In fact, not long afterwards Georgia fell into the hands of theBolsheviks, who sent there an army of 125, 000 men, and since thenshe has not been able to liberate herself. If Italy had made thatexpedition she would have been engaged in a frightful militaryadventure, with most difficult and costly transport in a theatre ofwar of insuperable difficulty. To what end?

Georgia before the War formed part of the Russian Empire, and nocountry of the Entente had considered that unjust. Further, as thoughthe vast empire and the dominion of the Caucasus were not enough forRussia, the Entente with monstrous condescension had given to RussiaConstantinople and the Straits and a huge zone in Asia Minor. Howcould you take away from Russia a territory which was legitimatelyhers? And _vice versa_, if Georgia and the other States of theCaucasus had sufficient strength to live autonomously, how canyou dominate Aryan people who have risen to a notable state ofdevelopment?

To go to Georgia inevitably meant war with Russia for Italy, and one, moreover, fraught with extraordinary difficulties. In fact, later, thegovernment of Moscow, as we have said, succeeded in invading as wellas Georgia almost all the republics of the Caucasus. And at San Remo, discussing the possibility of an expedition on the part of GreatBritain, France and Italy to defend at least the oil production, afterthe report of a military committee presided over by Marshal Foch, theconclusion was quickly and easily arrived at that it was better toleave the matter alone. 

Italy had already made an expedition into Albania, the reason forwhich beyond the military necessities for the period of the War hasnever been understood, except that of spending a huge sum withoutreceiving the gratitude of the Albanians; an expedition in Georgiawould have done harm, the consequence of which cannot be readilymeasured, it could, indeed, have meant ruin. 

Even those minds that are most blinded by prejudice and hate recognizethe complete failure of the Russian communist system. The so-calleddictatorship of the proletariat is reduced in practice to a militarydictatorship of a communist group which represents only a fraction ofthe working classes and that not the best. The Bolshevik governmentis in the hands of a small minority in which fanaticism has taken theplace of character. Everything which represented the work of the pasthas been destroyed and they have not known how to construct anything. The great industries have fallen and production is paralysed. Russiahas lived for a long time on the residues of her capitalisticproduction rather than on new productions. The productivity of heragricultural and industrial work has been killed by communism, and theforce of work has been reduced to a minimum. The Russian people are instraits which have no comparison, and entire territories are dying ofhunger. The communist regime in a short time has precipitated suchdamage and such misery as no system of oppression could achieve incenturies. It is the proof, if any were necessary, that the form ofcommunist production is not only harmful but not even lasting. Theeconomists say that it is absurd, but, given the collective madnesswhich has attacked some people, nothing is absurd beyond hoping in therapid recovery of the most excited nations. 

If any country could be the scene of a communist experiment it wasRussia. Imperial Russia represented the most vast continuativeterritory which a State ever occupied in all history's records of vastempires. Under the Tsars a territory which was almost three times thesize of the United States of America was occupied by a peoplewho, with the exception of a few cases of individual revolt, wereaccustomed to the most servile obedience. Under Nicholas II a few menexercised rule in a most despotic form over more than 180, 000, 000individuals spread over an immense territory. All obeyed blindly. Centralization was so great, and the obedience to the central power soabsolute, that no hostile demonstration was tolerated for long. Thecommunist regime therefore was able to count not only on the apathyof the Russian people but also upon the blindest obedience. To thisfundamental condition of success, to a Government which must regulateproduction despotically, was joined another even greater conditionof success. Russia is one of those countries which, like the UnitedStates of America, China and Brazil (the four greatest countriesof the earth, not counting the English dominions with much thinnerpopulations), possess within their own territories everythingnecessary for life. Imagine a country of self-contained economy, thatlives entirely upon her own resources and trades with no one (and thatis what happened in Russia as a result of the blockade), Russia hasthe possibility of realizing within herself the most prosperousconditions of existence. She has in her territories everything: grain, textile fibres, combustibles of every sort; Russia is one of thegreatest reserves, if not the greatest reserve, in the world. Well, the communist organization was sufficient, the bureaucraticcentralization, which communism must necessarily carry with it, toarrest every form of production. Russia, which before could give grainto all, is dying of hunger; Russia, which had sufficient quantities ofcoal for herself and could give petroleum to all Europe, can no longermove her railways; Russia, which had wool, flax, linen, and could haveeasily increased her cotton cultivation in the Caucasus, cannot evenclothe the soldiers and functionaries of the Bolshevik State. Ceasedis the stimulus of individual interest; few work; the peasants workonly to produce what their families need; the workers in the city arechiefly engaged in meetings and political reunions. All wish tolive upon the State, and production, organized autocratically andbureaucratically, every day dries up and withers a bit more. 

To those who read the collection of laws issued by the Bolshevikgovernment many institutions appear not only reasonable, but also fullof interest and justice. Also many laws of the absolute governmentsof past regimes appear intelligent and noble. But the law has not initself any power of creation; it regulates relations, does not createthem. It can even take away wealth from some and give it to others, but cannot create the wealth. When the individual interest begins tolack, work, which is sorrow and pain, lags and does not produce. Tobegin with, it weakens in the short days when energy is avoided, andthen it stops through incapacity for energy. The old fundamental truthis that in all the Aryan tongues the words which indicate work havethe same root as the words which denote pain. Among the great mass ofman work is only done by necessity or under the stimulus of individualinterest which excites the production of wealth. They work for wealth;and therefore in the Aryan tongues wealth means dominion and power. 

Two years ago I wanted, in spite of the opinion of others, to consentto the Italian Socialists visiting Russia. I was convinced thatnothing would have served better to break in Italy the sympathyfor Russia, or rather the illusions of the revolutionaries, as thespectacle of famine and disorder would. Never did the Press of mycountry, or the greater part of it, criticize with more violence aproposal which I considered to be both wise and prudent. I am glad tostate that I was right, and that, maybe through the uncertaintiesand the lessons of those who had spread the illusions, the ItalianSocialists returned from Russia were bound to recognize that thecommunist experiment was the complete ruin of the Russian people. Noconservative propaganda could have been more efficacious than thevision of the truth. 

I am convinced that the hostile attitude, and almost persecution, onthe part of the Entente rather helped the Bolshevik government, whoseclaims to discredit were already so numerous that it was not necessaryto nullify it by an unjust and evident persecution. 

The Bolshevik government could not be recognized: it gave noguarantees of loyalty, and too often its representatives had violatedthe rights of hospitality and intrigued through fanatics and excitedpeople to extend the revolution. Revolution and government are twoterms which cannot co-exist. But not to recognize the government ofthe Soviet does not mean that the conditions of such recognition mustinclude that the War debt shall be guaranteed, and, worse still, thepre-War debt, or that the gold resources and the metals of Russiashall be given as a guarantee of that debt. This morality, exclusivelyfinancial and plutocratic, cannot be the base of internationalrelations in a period in which humanity, after the sorrows of the War, has the annoyance of a peace which no one foresaw and of which veryfew in the early days understood the dangers. 

Even when there was a tendency favourable to the recognition of therepublic of the Soviet, I was always decidedly against it. It isimpossible to recognize a State which bases all its relations onviolence, and which in its relations with foreign States seeks, orhas almost always sought, to carry out revolutionary propaganda. Evenwhen, yielding to an impulse which it was not possible to avoid--inthe new Italian Chamber, after the elections of 1919 not only theSocialists, but above all the Catholic popular party and the party ofRinnovamento, of which the ex-soldiers especially formed part, votedunanimously an order of the day for the recognition of the actualgovernment of Russia--I did not think it right to give, and did notgive, effect to that vote, impulsively generous, which would haveinvested Italy with the responsibility of recognizing, even if it were_de facto_, the government of the Soviet. 

I have always, however, rebelled and would never give my consent toany military undertakings against Russia, not even to a participationin the undertakings of men of the old regime. It was easy to foreseethat the population would not have followed them and that theundertakings were doomed to failure. However, all the attempts atmilitary revolts and counter-revolutions were encouraged with suppliesof arms and material. But in 1920 all the military undertakings, inspite of the help given, failed one after another. In February theattempt of Admiral Koltchak failed miserably, and in March that ofGeneral Judenic. Failed has the attempt of Denikin. All the hopes ofthe restoration were centred in General Wrangel. The only Grand Dukewith any claim to military authority also sent to tell me that thiswas a serious attempt with probability of success. General Wrangel, infact, reunited the scattered forces of the old regime and occupied alarge territory in power. France not only recognized in the governmentof Wrangel the legitimate representative of Russia, but nominated herofficial representatives with him. In November, 1920, even the armyof Wrangel, which appeared to be of granite, was scattered. Poland, through alternating vicissitudes, claimed the power of resistance, buthas shown that she has no offensive power against Russia. So all theattempts at restoration have broken, one after another. 

One of the greatest errors of the Entente has been to treat Russiaon many occasions, not as a fallen friend, but as a conquered enemy. Nothing has been more deplorable than to have considered as Russia themen of the old regime, who have been treated for a long time as therepresentatives of an existing State when the State no longer existed. 

Let us suppose that the Bolshevik government transforms itself andgives guarantees to the civilized nations not to make revolutionaryagitations in foreign countries, to maintain the pledges she assumes, and to respect the liberty of citizens; the United States of America, Great Britain and Italy would recognize her at once. But France has anentirely different point of view. She will not give any recognitionunless the creditors of the old regime are guaranteed. 

In June, 1920, the government of Moscow sent some gold to Sweden topurchase indispensable goods. Millerand, President of the Council ofMinisters and Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to the Minister ofSweden at Paris that if his Government consented to receive Russiangold _ferait acte de receleur_. He then telegraphed to the Minister ofFinance at Stockholm regretting that the Government and public opinionin Sweden were tending to consider the _revendications juridiques_ ofthe French creditors of the ancient Russian regime to be such thatthey did not stop the consignment of Swedish goods against Russiangold. He added at the end that the syndicates of creditors couldutilize the news in telegram No. 355, in which the Swedish Governmentgave notice of the trade and put a sequestration on Russian gold sentto Sweden. 

This telegram, better than any speech, shows the diversity ofconception. 

The Bolshevik government may be so immoral that we cannot recognizeit until it gives serious guarantees. But if the government of Moscowsends a little of the gold that remains, or has remained, to buygoods, what right have we to sequestrate the gold in the interests ofthe creditors of the old regime?

The new regime, born after the revolution, can also not recognize thedebts of the old regime and annul them. It is not for that that wehave no relations with it. 

We have pushed Germany by absurd demands to ruin her circulation. Itis already at about 100 milliard of marks; if to-morrow it goes to 150or to 200, it will be necessary to annul it, nearly the same as isdone for bills of exchange. And for this should we not treat withGermany?

The new plutocratic conception, which marks the policy of a sectionof the Entente, is not lasting, and the people have a justifiablediffidence towards it. 

Bolshevism, as I have repeatedly stated, cannot be judged by ourwestern eyes: it is not a popular and revolutionary movement; it is areligious fanaticism of the orthodox of the East hoisted on the throneof Tsarist despotism. 

Italy is the country which suffers most from the lack of continuousrelations with Russia in so far that almost all Italian commerce, andin consequence the prices of freight and goods, have been for almosthalf a century regulated by the traffic with the Black Sea. 

Ships which leave England fully laden with goods for Italy generallycontinue to the Black Sea, where they fill up with grain, petroleum, etc. , and then return to England, after having taken fresh cargoes inItaly and especially iron in Spain. It was possible in Italy for longperiods of time to obtain most favourable freights and have coal atalmost the same price as in England. The voyages of the ships weremade, both coming and going, fully laden. 

The situation of Russia, therefore, hurts especially Italy. GreatBritain has Mediterranean interests; France is partly a Mediterraneannation; Italy alone is a Mediterranean nation. 

Although Italy has a particular interest in reopening relations withRussia, the Italian Government has understood that the best andshortest way is not to recognize the government of Moscow. But Italywill never subordinate her recognition to plutocratic considerations. Whatever government there may be in Italy, it will never associateitself with actions directed to compelling Russia, in order to berecognized, to guarantee the payment of obligations assumed previousto the War and the revolution. Civilization has already suppressedcorporal punishment for insolvent debtors, and slavery, from whichindividuals are released, should not be imposed on nations bydemocracies which say they are civilized. 

The fall of the communistic organization in Russia is inevitable. Veryprobably from the immense revolutionary catastrophe which has hitRussia there will spring up the diffusion of a regime of small landedproprietors. Whatever is contrary to human nature is not lasting, andcommunism can only accumulate misery, and on its ruins will arise newforms of life which we cannot yet define. But Bolshevik Russia cancount still on two elements which we do not habitually take intoaccount: the apathy and indolence of the people on the one hand, andthe strength of the military organization on the other. No otherpeople would have resigned itself to the intense misery and to theinfinite sufferings which tens of millions of Russians endure withoutcomplaint. But still in the midst of so much misery no other peoplewould have known how to maintain a powerful and disciplined army suchas is the army of revolutionary Russia. 

The Russian people have never had any sympathy for the militaryundertakings which the Entente has aided. During some of the meetingsof Premiers at Paris and London I had occasion, in the sittings ofthe conferences, to speak with the representatives of the newStates, especially those from the Caucasus. They were all agreedin considering that the action of the men of the old regime, andespecially Denikin, was directed at the suppression of the independentStates and to the return of the old forms, and they attributed to thisthe aversion of the Russian people to them. 

Certainly it is difficult to speak of Russia where there exists nolonger a free Press and the people have hardly any other preoccupationthan that of not dying of hunger. Although it is a disastrousorganization, the organization of the Soviet remains still the onlyone, which it is not possible to substitute immediately with another. Although the Russian people can re-enter slowly into internationallife and take up again its thread, a long time is necessary, but alsoit is necessary to change tactics. 

The peasants, who form the enormous mass of the Russian people, lookwith terror on the old regime. They have occupied the land and willmaintain that occupation; they do not want the return of the greatRussian princes who possessed lands covering provinces and were evenignorant of their possessions. One of the causes which has permittedBolshevism to last is, as I have said, the attitude of the Entente, which on many occasions has shown the greatest sympathy for the men ofthe old regime. The Tsar of Russia was an insignificant man, all theGrand Dukes were persons without dignity and without credit, and theCourt and Government abounded with men without scruples--violent, thieves, and drunkards. If Bolshevik government had been ruin, no onecan deny but that a great part of the blame belongs to the old regime, the return of which no honest man desires. 

An error not less serious was to allow Poland to occupy large tractsof purely Russian territory. 

There remain in Europe, therefore, so many states of unrest which donot only concern the conditions of the conquered countries, but alsothose of the conquering countries. We have already seen how Germanyand the States which form part of her group cannot now any longerrepresent a danger of war for many years to come, and that none theless the victorious countries and the new States continue to armthemselves in a most formidable manner. We have seen what an elementof disorder Poland has become and how the policy of the Ententetowards Russia has constituted a permanent danger. 

But all Europe is still uncertain and the ground is so movable thatany new construction threatens ruin. Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, cannot live under the conditions imposed on them by thetreaties. But the new States for the most part are themselves in asufficiently serious position. 

With the exception of Finland all the other States which have arisenon the ruins of the Russian Empire are in serious difficulty. IfEsthonia and Lithuania are in a fairly tolerable situation Lettonia isin real ruin, and hunger and tuberculosis rule almost everywhere, asin many districts of Poland and Russia. At Riga hunger and sicknesshave caused enormous losses amongst the population. Recently 15, 000children were in an extremely serious physical and mental condition. In a single dispensary, of 663 children who were brought for treatment151 were under-nourished, 229 were scrofulous, 66 anaemic, and 217suffering from rickets. The data published in England and the UnitedStates and those of the Red Cross of Geneva are terrible. 

Even with the greatest imagination it is difficult to think howHungary and Austria can live and carry out, even in the smallestdegree, the obligations imposed by the treaties. By a moral paradox, besides living they must indemnify the victors, according to theTreaties of St. Germain and the Trianon, for all the damages which theWar has brought on themselves and which the victors have suffered. 

Hungary has undergone the greatest occupation of her territories andher wealth. This poor great country, which saved both civilization andChristianity, has been treated with a bitterness which nothing canexplain except the desire of greed of those surrounding her, and thefact that the weaker people, seeing the stronger overcome, wish andinsist that she shall be reduced to impotence. Nothing, in fact, canjustify the measures of violence and the depredations committed inMagyar territory. What was the Rumanian occupation of Hungary: asystematic rapine and the systematic destruction for a long timehidden, and the stern reproach which Lloyd George addressed in Londonto the Premier of Rumania was perfectly justified. After the Wareveryone wanted some sacrifice from Hungary, and no one dared to say aword of peace or goodwill for her. When I tried it was too late. The victors hated Hungary for her proud defence. The adherents ofSocialism do not love her because she had to resist, under morethan difficult conditions, internal and external Bolshevism. Theinternational financiers hate her because of the violences committedagainst the Jews. So Hungary suffers all the injustices withoutdefence, all the miseries without help, and all the intrigues withoutresistance. 

Before the War Hungary had an area almost equal to that of Italy, 282, 870 square kilometres, with a population of 18, 264, 533inhabitants. The Treaty of Trianon reduced her territory to 91, 114kilometres--that is, 32. 3 per cent. --and the population to 7, 481, 954, or 41 per cent. It was not sufficient to cut off from Hungary thepopulations which were not ethnically Magyar. Without any reason1, 084, 447 Magyars have been handed over to Czeko-Slovakia, 457, 597 toJugo-Slavia, 1, 704, 851 to Rumania. Also other nuclei of populationhave been detached without reason. 

Amongst all the belligerents Hungary perhaps is the country which incomparison with the population has had the greatest number of dead;the monarchy of the Habsburgs knew that they could count on thebravery of the Magyars, and they sent them to massacre in all the mostbloody battles. So the little people gave over 500, 000 dead and anenormous number of injured and sick. 

The territories taken from Hungary represent two-thirds of her mineralwealth; the production of three million quintali (300, 000 tons) ofgold and silver is entirely lost; the great production of salt isalso lost to her (about 250, 000 tons). The production of iron ore isreduced by 19 per cent. , of anthracite by 14 per cent. , of lignite by70 per cent. ; of the 2, 029 factories, hardly 1, 241 have remained toHungary; more than three-quarters of the magnificent railway wealthhas been given away. 

Hungary at the same time has lost her greater resources in agricultureand cattle breeding. 

The capital, henceforth, too large for a too small state, carrieson amidst the greatest difficulties, and there congregate the mostpitiable of the Transylvanian refugees and those from other lostregions. 

The demographic structure of Hungary, which up to a few years ago wasexcellent, is now threatening. The mortality among the children andthe mortality from tuberculosis have become alarming. At Budapest, even after the War, the number of deaths surpasses the number ofbirths. The statistics published by Dr. Ferenczi prove that thenumber of children afflicted with rickets and tuberculosis reaches inBudapest the terrific figure of 250, 000 in a population of about twomillions. It is said that practically all the new-born in recentyears, partly through the privations of the mothers and partly fromthe lack of milk, are tuberculous. 

The conditions of life are so serious that there is no comparison;some prices have only risen five to tenfold, but very many from thirtyto fifty and even higher. Grain, which before the War cost 31 crowns, costs now 500 crowns; corn has passed from 17 to 220 and 250 crowns. A kilogram of rice, which used to cost 70 centimes, can be found nowonly at 80 crowns. Sugar, coffee and milk are at prices which areabsolutely prohibitive. 

Of the financial situation it is almost useless to speak. Thedocuments presented to the Conference of Brussels are sad evidence, and a sure index is the course of the crown, now so reduced as to havehardly any value in international relations. The effective income ismore than a fourth part of the effective expenses, and the rest iscovered especially by the circulation. 

Such is the situation of Hungary, which has lost everything, and whichsuffers the most atrocious privations and the most cruel pangs ofhunger. In this condition she should, according to the Treaty ofTrianon, not only have sufficient for herself, but pay indemnities tothe enemy. 

The Hungarian deputies, at the sitting which approved the Treaty ofTrianon, were clad in mourning, and many were weeping. At the closethey all rose and sang the national hymn. 

A people which is in the condition of mind of the Magyar people canaccept the actual state of affairs as a temporary necessity, but havewe any faith that it will not seek all occasions to retake what it hasunjustly lost, and that in a certain number of years there will not benew and more terrible wars?

I cannot hide the profound emotion which I felt when Count Apponyi, on January 16, 1920, before the Supreme Council at Paris, gave thereasons of Hungary. 

You, gentlemen [he said], whom victory has permitted to placeyourselves in the position of judges, you have pronounced theculpability of your late enemies and the point of view which directsyou in your resolutions is that of making the consequences of the Warfall on those who were responsible for it. 

Let us examine now with great serenity the conditions imposed onHungary, conditions which are inacceptable without the most seriousconsequences. Taking away from Hungary the larger part of herterritory, the greater part of her population, the greater portion ofher economic resources, can this particular severity be justified bythe general principles which inspire the Entente? Hungary not havingbeen heard (and was not heard except to take note of the declarationof the head of the delegation), cannot accept a verdict which destroysher without explaining the reasons. 

The figures furnished by the Hungarian delegation left no doubtbehind: they treated of the dismemberment of Hungary and the sacrificeof three millions and a half of Magyars and of the German populationof Hungary to people certainly more ignorant and less advanced. At theend Apponyi and the Hungarian delegation did not ask for anything morethan a plebiscite for the territories in dispute. 

After he had explained in a marvellous manner the great function ofhistoric Hungary, that of having saved on various occasions Europefrom barbaric invasion, and of having known how to maintain its unityfor ten centuries in spite of the many differences amongst nations, Count Apponyi showed how important it was for Europe to have a solidHungary against the spread of Bolshevism and violence. 

You can say [added Apponyi] that against all these reasons there isonly one--victory, the right of victory. We know it, gentlemen; we aresufficient realists in politics to count on this factor. We know whatwe owe to victory and we are ready to pay the price of our defeat. Butshould this be the sole principle of construction: that force aloneshould be the basis of what you would build, that force alone shouldbe the base of the new building, that material force alone should bethe power to hold up those constructions which fall whilst you aretrying to build them? The future of Europe would then be sad, and wecannot believe it. We do not find all that in the mentality of thevictorious nations; we do not find it in the declarations in which youhave defined the principles for which you have fought, and the objectsof the War which you have proposed to yourselves. 

And after having referred to the traditions of the past, Count Apponyiadded:

We have faith in the sincerity of the principles which you haveproclaimed: it would be doing you injustice to think otherwise. Wehave faith in the moral forces with which you have wished to identifyyour cause. And all that I wish to hope, gentlemen, is that the gloryof your arms may be surpassed by the glory of the peace which you willgive to the world. 

The Hungarian delegation was simply heard; but the treaty, which hadbeen previously prepared and was the natural consequence of the Treatyof Versailles, was in no way modified. 

An examination of the Treaty of Trianon is superfluous. By a strokeof irony the financial and economic clauses inflict the most seriousburdens on a country which had lost almost everything: which has lostthe greatest number of men proportionately in the War, which sincethe War has had two revolutions, which for four months suffered thesackings of Bolshevism--led by Bela Kun and the worst elements ofrevolutionary political crime--and, finally, has suffered a Rumanianoccupation, which was worse almost than the revolutions or Bolshevism. 

It is impossible to say which of the peace treaties imposed on theconquered is lasting and which is the least supportable: after theTreaty of Versailles, all the treaties have had the same tendency andthe same conformation. 

The situation of German-Austria is now such that she can say withAndromache: "Let it please God that I have still something more tofear!" Austria has lost everything, and her great capital, which wasthe most joyous in Europe, shelters now a population whose resourcesare reduced to the minimum. The slump in her production, which iscarried on amidst all the difficulties, the fall in her credit, theabsolute lack of foreign exchanges, the difficulty of trading with thehostile populations which surround her, put Austria in an extremelydifficult position and in progressive and continuous decadence. Thepopulation, especially in the cities, is compelled to the hardestprivations; the increase of tuberculosis is continuous andthreatening. 

Bulgaria has had rather less loss, and although large tracts ofBulgarian territory have been given without any justifiable motive toGreece and Jugo-Slavia, and although all outlet on the Aegean has beentaken from her by assigning to Greece lands which she cannot maintain, on the whole Bulgaria, after the Treaty of Neuilly, has less sharpsufferings than the other conquered countries. Bulgaria had aterritorial extension of 113, 809 square kilometres; she has now lostabout 9, 000 square kilometres. She had a population of 4, 800, 000, andhas lost about 400, 000. 

As for Turkey, if the treaties should continue to exist, she can beconsidered as disappearing from Europe and on the road to disappearfrom Asia. The Turkish population has been distributed haphazard, especially to Greece, or divided up under the form of mandates tocountries of the Entente. According to the Treaty of Sèvres of August10, 1920, Turkey abandons all her territory in Europe, withdrawing herfrontier to the Ciatalgia lines. 

Turkey in Europe is limited, therefore, to the surroundings ofConstantinople, with little more than 2, 000 square kilometres, and apopulation which is rather hard to estimate, but which is that only ofthe city and the surroundings--perhaps a million and a half men. InAsia Minor Turkey loses the territory of the Sanjak of Smyrna, over which, however, she retains a purely nominal sovereignty; theterritory still undefined of the Armenian Republic: Syria, Cilicia, Palestine and Mesopotamia, which become independent under mandatorypowers; in Arabia the territory of the Hedjaz, whilst the remainderof the peninsula will enjoy almost complete independence. Besides, Constantinople and the Straits are subject to international control, and the three States now the most closely interested--Great Britain, France and Italy--assume the control of the finances and other aspectsof the Ottoman administration. 

Every programme has ignored Turkey except when the Entente has hadopportunity to favour Greece. The Greece of Venezelos was the ward ofthe Entente almost more than Poland itself. Having participated in theWar to a very small extent and with almost insignificant losses, shehas, after the War, almost trebled her territory and almost doubledher population. Turkey was put entirely, or almost so, outside Europe;Greece has taken almost everything. Rejected was the idea of fixingthe frontier on the Enos Medea line, and the frontier fixed atCiatalgia; Constantinople was under the fire of the Greek artillery, and Constantinople was nominally the only city which remained toTurkey. The Sanjak of Smyrna, in Asia Minor, was the true wealth ofTurkey; it represented forty-five per cent. Of the imports of theTurkish Empire. Although the population of the whole vilayet of Audinand the majority of the Sanjak of Smyrna was Mussulman, Greece had thepossession. The whole of Thrace was assigned to Greece; Adrianople, a city sacred to Islam, which contains the tombs of the Caliphs, haspassed to the Greeks. 

The Entente, despite the resistance of some of the heads ofgovernments, always yielded to the requests of Greece. There was asentiment of antipathy for the Turks and there was a sympathy forthe Greeks: there was the idea to put outside Europe all Mussulmandominion, and the remembrance of the old propaganda of Gladstone, andthere were the threats of Wilson, who in one of his proposals desiredexactly to put Turkey outside Europe. But above all there was thepersonal work of Venezelos. Every request, without being even examinedthoroughly, was immediately justified by history, statistics, ethnography. In any discussion he took care to _solliciter doucementles textes_ as often the learned with few scruples do. I have met fewmen in my career who united to an exalted patriotism such a profoundability as Venezelos. Every time that, in a friendly way, I gave himcounsels of moderation and showed him the necessity of limiting therequests of Greece, I never found a hard or intemperate spirit. Heknew how to ask and obtain, to profit by all the circumstances, toutilize all the resources better even than the professional diplomats. In asking he always had the air of offering, and, obtaining, heappeared to be conceding something. He had at the same time a supremeability to obtain the maximum force with the minimum of means and amobility of spirit almost surprising. 

He saw no difficulty, convinced as he was, of erecting a Greek Empireon the remnants of Turkey. Every time that doubts were expressed tohim, or he was shown data which should have moderated the positions, he denied the most evident things, he recognized no danger, and sawno difficulty. He affirmed always with absolute calm the certainty ofsuccess. It was his opinion that the Balkan peninsula should be, inthe north, under the action of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and ofRumania, and in the south of Greece. But Greece, having almost all theislands of the Aegean, a part of the territory of Turkey and all theports in the Aegean, and having the Sanjak of Smyrna, should forma littoral Empire of the East and chase the Turks into the poorerdistricts of Anatolia. 

In the facility with which the demands of Greece were accepted (andin spite of everything they were accepted even after the fall ofVenezelos) there was not only a sympathy for Greece, but, aboveall, the certainty that a large Greek army at Smyrna would serveprincipally towards the security of those countries which have andwished to consolidate great interests in Asia Minor, as long as theTurks of Anatolia were thinking specially about Smyrna and could notuse her forces elsewhere. For the same motive, in the last few years, all the blame is attributed to the Turks. If they have erred much, theerrors, even the minor ones, have been transformed into crimes. Theatrocities of the Turks have been described, illustrated, exaggerated;all the other atrocities, often no less serious, have been forgottenor ignored. 

The idea of a Hellenic Empire which dominates all the coast of theAegean in Europe and Asia encounters one fundamental difficulty. Todominate the coast it is necessary to have the certainty of a largehinterland. The Romans in order to dominate Dalmatia were obliged togo as far as the Danube. Alexander the Great, to have a Greek Empire, had, above all, to provide for land dominion. Commercial colonies orpenetration in isolation are certainly possible, but vast politicalorganizations are not possible. It is not sufficient to haveterritory; it is necessary to organize it and regulate the life. Mankind does not nourish itself on what it eats, and even less on whatit digests, but on what it assimilates. 

Historians of the future will be profoundly surprised to learn that inthe name of the principle of nationality the vilayet of Adrianople, which contains the city dearest to the heart of Islam after Mecca, wasgiven to the Greeks. According to the very data supplied by Venezelosthere were 500, 000 Turks, 365, 000 Greeks, and 107, 000 Bulgarians; intruth the Turks are in much greater superiority. 

The Grand Vizier of Turkey, in April, 1920, presented a note to theambassadors of the Entente to revindicate the rights on certainvilayets of the Turkish Empire. According to this note, in WesternThrace there were 522, 574 inhabitants, of which 362, 445 wereMussulmans. In the vilayet of Adrianople, out of 631, 000 inhabitants, 360, 417 were Mussulmans. The population of the vilayet of Smyrna is1, 819, 616 inhabitants, of which 1, 437, 983 are Mussulmans. Perhapsthese statistics are biased, but the statistics presented by theopposing party were even more fantastic. 

After having had so many territorial concessions, Greece--who duringthe War had enriched herself by commerce--is obliged, even after thereturn of Constantine, who did not know how to resist the pressure, to undertake most risky undertakings in Asia Minor, and has no way ofsaving herself except by an agreement with Turkey. In the illusion ofconquering the Turkish resistance, she is now obliged to maintainan army twice as big as that of the British Empire! The dreams ofgreatness increase: some little military success has given Greece theidea also that the Treaty of Sèvres is only a foundation regulatingthe relationship with the Allies and with the enemy, and constitutingfor Greece a title of rights, the full possession of which cannot bemodified. The War determines new rights which cannot invalidate theconcessions already given, which, on the contrary, are reinforced andbecome intangible, but renders necessary new concessions. 

What will happen? Whilst Greece dreams of Constantinople, and we havedisposed of Constantinople and the Straits, Turkey seems resigned toConstantinople itself, to-day a very poor international city ratherthan a Turkish city. The Treaty of Sèvres says that it is true thatthe contracting States are in agreement in not offending any of therights of the Ottoman government on Constantinople, which remainsthe capital of the Turkish Empire, always under the reserve ofthe dispositions of the treaty. That is equivalent to saying of apolitical regime that it is a controlled "liberty, " just as inthe time of the Tsars it was said that there existed a _Monarchieconstitutionnelle sous un autocrate_. Constantinople under the Treatyof Sèvres is the free capital of the Turkish Empire under the reserveof the conditions which are contained in the treaty and limit exactlythat liberty. 

The force of Turkey has always been in her immense power ofresistance. Win by resisting, wear out with the aid of time, which theTurks have considered not as an economic value, but as their friend. To conquer the resistance of Turkey, both in the new territories ofEurope and in Asia Minor, Greece will have to exhaust the greaterpart of her limited resources. The Turks have always brought to astandstill those who would dominate her, by a stubborn resistancewhich is fanaticism and national dignity. On the other hand, theTreaty of Sèvres, which has systematized in part Eastern Europe, wasconcluded in the absence of two personages not to be unconsidered, Russia and Germany, the two States which have the greatest interestthere. Germany, the War won, as she could not give her explanations onthe conclusions of peace, was not able to intervene in the solutionsof the question of the Orient. Russia was absent. Worn out with theforce of a war superior to her energies, she fell into convulsions, and is now struggling between the two misfortunes of communism andmisery, of which it is hard to say whether one, or which of the two, is the consequence of the other. 

One of the most characteristic facts concerns Armenia. The Ententenever spoke of Armenia. In his fourteen points Wilson neitherconsidered nor mentioned it. It was an argument difficult for theEntente in so far that Russia was straining in reality (under thenecessity of protecting the Christians) to take Turkish Armeniawithout leaving Russian Armenia. 

But suddenly some religious societies and some philanthropic peopleinstituted a vast movement for the liberation of Armenia. Nothingcould be more just than to create a small Armenian State which wouldhave allowed the Armenians to group themselves around Lake Van andto affirm their national unity in one free State. But here alsothe hatred of the Turks, the agitation of the Greeks, the dimlyilluminated philanthropy, determined a large movement to form a greatState of Armenia which should have outlets on the sea and greatterritories. 

So that no longer did people talk of a small State, a refuge and safeasylum for the Armenians, but of a large State. President Wilsonhimself, during the Conference of San Remo, sent a message in the formof a recalling to mind, if not a reproof, to the European States ofthe Entente because they did not proceed to the constitution of aState of Armenia. It was suggested to bring it down to Trebizond, toinclude Erzeroum in the new Armenia, a vast State of Armenia in whichthe Armenians would have been in the minority. And all that in homageto historical tradition and for dislike of the Turks! A great Armeniacreates also a series of difficulties amongst which is that of therelations between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbajan, supposing that inthe future these States cut themselves off definitely from Russia. Thegreat Armenia would include the vilayet of Erzeroum, which is nowthe centre of Turkish nationalism, and contains more Mussulmans thanArmenians. As a matter of fact the vilayet of Erzeroum has 673, 000Mussulmans, 1, 800 Greeks and 135, 000 Armenians. 

When it was a question of giving Greece territories in which theGreeks were in a minority it was said that the populations were sobadly governed by the Turks that they had the right to pass undera better regime, whatever it might be. But for a large part of theterritory of the so-called Great Armenia it is possible to commit theerror of putting large majorities of Mussulman people under a hostileArmenian minority. 

The Armenians would have to fight at the same time against the Kurdsand against Azerbajan; they are surrounded by enemies on all sides. 

But the whole of the discussion of giving the vilayet of Erzeroum toArmenia or leaving it to Turkey is entirely superfluous, for it isnot a question of attributing territory but of determining actualsituations. If it is desired to give to the Armenians the city ofErzeroum, it is first of all necessary that they shall be able toenter and be able to remain there. Now since the Armenians have notshown, with a few exceptions, a great power of resistance, and arerather a race of merchants than warriors, it would be necessary forothers to undertake the charge of defending them. None of the EuropeanStates desired a mandate for Armenia, and no one wished to assumethe serious military burden of protecting the Armenians; the UnitedStates, after having in the message of Wilson backed a great Armenia, wished even less than the other States to interest themselves in it. 

Probably proposals of a more reasonable character and marked by lessaversion for the Turks would have permitted the Turks not only torecognize, which is not difficult for them, but in fact to respect, the new State of Armenia, without the dreams of a sea coast and themadness of Erzeroum. 

If the condition of the conquered is sufficiently seriousthe situation of the peoples most favoured by the Entente inEurope--Poland and Greece, who have obtained the greatest and mostunjust increases in territory, having given for a diversity of reasonsextremely little during the War--is certainly not less so. Each ofthese countries are suffocating under the weight of the concessions, and seek in vain a way of salvation from the burdens which they arenot able to support, and from the mania of conquest which are thefruits of exaltation and error. 

Having obtained much, having obtained far more than they thought orhoped, they believe that their advantage lies in new expansion. Polandviolates treaties, offends the laws of international usage, andis protected in everything she undertakes. But every one of herundertakings can only throw her into greater discomfort and augmentthe total of ruin. 

All the violences in Upper Silesia to prevent the plebiscite going infavour of Germany were not only tolerated but prepared far ahead. 

When I was head of the Italian Government the representative of theGerman Government in Rome, von Herf, gave documentary evidence on whatwas being prepared, and on April 30, 1920, in an audience which I gavehim as head of the Council he furnished me with proofs of what wasthe Polish organization, what were its objects and the source of itsfunds. 

As everyone knows, the plebiscite of March 20, 1921, in spite of theviolence and notwithstanding the officially protected brigandage, resulted favourably to Germany. Out of 1, 200, 636 voters 717, 122 werefor Germany and 483, 514 for Poland. The 664 richest, most prosperousand most populous communes gave a majority for the Germans, 597communes gave a majority for Poland. The territory of Upper Silesia, according to the treaty, according to the plebiscite, according to themost elementary international honesty, should be immediately handedover to Germany. But as they do not wish to give the coal ofUpper Silesia to Germany, and the big interests of the new greatmetallurgical group press and trick, the Treaty of Versailles has herealso become a _chiffon de papier_. 

Instead of accepting, as was the first duty, the result of theplebiscite, people have resorted to sophism of incomparable weakness:Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles says only that the inhabitantsof Upper Silesia shall be called to designate by means of a plebisciteif they desire to be united to Germany or to Poland. 

It was necessary to find a sophism!

The Addendum of Section 8 establishes how the work of scrutiny shallbe carried out and all the procedure of the elections. There are sixarticles of procedure. Paragraph 4 says that each one shall vote inthe commune where he is domiciled or in that where he was born if hehas not a domicile in the territory. The result of the vote shall bedetermined commune by commune, according to the majority of votes ineach commune. 

This means then that the results of the voting, as is done inpolitical questions in all countries, should, be controlled commune bycommune: it is the form of the scrutiny which the appendix defines. Instead, in order to take the coal away from Germany, it wasattempted, and is being still attempted, not to apply the treaty, butto violate the principle of the indivisibility of the territory and togive the mining districts to Poland. 

The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not an offence to atreaty more serious than this attempt; the Treaty of 1839 cannot beconsidered a _chiffon de papier_ more than the Treaty of Versailles. Only the parties are inverted. 

It is not France, noble and democratic, which inspires thesemovements, but a plutocratic situation which has taken the samepositions, but on worse grounds, as the German metallurgists beforethe War. It is the same current against which Lloyd George has severaltimes bitterly protested and for which he has had very bitter wordswhich it is not necessary to recall. It is the same movement which hascreated agitations in Italy by means of its organs, and which attemptone thing only: to ruin the German industry and, having the control ofthe coal, to monopolize in Europe the iron industries and those whichare derived from it. 

First of all, in order to indemnify France for the _temporary_ damagesdone to the mines in the North, there was the cession _in perpetuo_ ofthe mines of the Saar; then there were the repeated attempts to occupythe territory of the Ruhr to control the coal; last of all there isthe wish not to apply the plebiscite and to violate the Treaty ofVersailles by not giving Upper Silesia to Germany, but giving itabusively to Poland. 

Germany produced before the War about 190, 000, 000 tons of coal; in1913 191, 500, 000. The consumption of these mines themselves was abouta tenth, 19, 000, 000 tons, whilst for exportation were 83, 500, 000 tons, and for internal consumption were 139, 000, 000. 

Now Germany has lost, and justly, Alsace-Lorraine, 3, 800, 000 tons. Shehas lost, and it was not just, the Saar, 13, 200, 000 tons. She is boundby the obligations of the treaty to furnish France with 20, 000, 000tons, and to Belgium and Italy and France again another 25, 000, 000tons. If she loses the excellent coal of Upper Silesia, about43, 800, 000 tons per year, she will be completely paralysed. 

It is needless to lose time in demonstrating for what geographic, ethnographic and economist reason Upper Silesia should be united withGermany. It is a useless procedure, and also, after the plebiscites, an insult to the reasoning powers. If the violation of treaties is nota right of the victor, after the plebiscite, in which, notwithstandingall the violences, three-quarters of the population voted for Germany, then there is no reason for discussion. 

The words used by Lloyd George on May 18, 1921, in the House ofCommons, are a courteous abbreviation of the truth. From thehistorical point of view, he said, Poland has no rights over Silesia. The only reason for which Poland could claim Upper Silesia is that itpossesses a numerous Polish population, arrived there in comparativelyrecent times with the intention of finding work, and especially in themines. That is true and is more serious than would be an agitation ofthe Italians in the State of San Paulo of Brazil, claiming that theyhad a majority of the population. 

"The Polish insurrection, " said Lloyd George justly, "is a challengeto the Treaty of Versailles, which, at the same time, constitutes thecharter of Polish Liberty. " Poland is the last country in Europe whichhas the right to deplore the treaty, because Poland did not conquerthe treaty. Poland did not gain her liberty, and more than any othercountry should respect every comma of the treaty. She owes her libertyto Italy, Great Britain and France. 

In the future [said the English Prime Minister] force will lose itsefficiency in regard to the Treaty of Versailles, and the maintenanceof the undertakings on the part of Germany on the basis of hersignature placed to the treaty will count increasingly. We have theright to everything which she gives us: but we have the right also toleave everything which is left to her. It is our duty of impartialityto act with rigorous justice, without taking into account theadvantages or the disadvantages which may accrue therefrom. Either theAllies must demand that the treaty shall be respected, or they shouldpermit the Germans to make the Poles respect it. It is all very wellto disarm Germany, but to desire that even the troops which she doespossess should not participate in the re-establishment of order is apure injustice. 

Russia [added Lloyd George] to-day is a fallen Power, tired, a preyto a despotism which leaves no hope, but is also a country of greatnatural resources, inhabited by a people of courage, who at thebeginning of the War gave proof of its courage. Russia will not alwaysfind herself in the position in which she is to-day. Who can say whatshe will become? In a short time she may become a powerful country, which can say its word about the future of Europe and the world. Towhich part will she turn? With whom will she unite?

There is nothing more just or more true than this. 

But Poland wants to take away Upper Silesia from Germanynotwithstanding the plebiscite and against the treaty, and which hasin this action the aid of the metallurgical interests and the greatinterests of a large portion of the Press of all Europe. Poland, whichhas large nuclei of German populations, after having been enslaved, claims the right to enslave populations, which are more cultured, richer and more advanced. And besides the Germans it claims the rightto enslave even Russian peoples and further to occupy entire Russianterritories, and wishes to extend into Ukraine. There is then thepolitical paradox of Wilna. This city, which belongs according to theregular treaty to Lithuania, has been occupied in an arbitrary mannerby the Poles, who also claim Kowno. 

In short, Poland, which obtained her unity by a miracle, is working inthe most feverish manner to create her own ruin. She has no finance, she has no administration, she has no credit. She does not work, andyet consumes; she occupies new territories, and ruins the old ones. Ofthe 31, 000, 000 inhabitants, as we have seen, 7 millions are Ukranians, 2. 2 Russians, 2. 1 Germans, and nearly half a million of othernationalities. But among the eighteen or nineteen million Poles thereare at least four million Jews--Polish Jews, without doubt, butthe greater portion do not love Poland, which has not known how toassimilate them. The Treaty of Versailles has created the absurdposition that to go from one part to the other of Germany it isnecessary to traverse the Danzig corridor. In other terms, Germany iscut in two parts, and to move in Prussia herself from Berlin to one ofthe oldest German cities, the home of Emanuel Kant, Konigsberg, it isnecessary to traverse Polish territory. 

So Poland separates the two most numerous people of Europe: Russia andGermany. The Biblical legend lets us suppose that the waters ofthe Red Sea opened to let the Chosen People pass: but immediatelyafterwards the waters closed up again. Is it possible to suppose thatsuch an arbitrary arrangement as this will last for long?

If it has lasted as long as it has, it is because it was, at leastfrom the part of one section of the Entente, not the road to peace, but because it was a method of crushing down Germany. 

If a people had conditions for developing rapidly it wasCzeko-Slovakia. But also with the intention of hurting Germany and theGerman peoples, a Czeko-Slovak State was created which has alsoits own tremendous crisis of nationality. A Czeko-Slovakia with apopulation of eight to nine million people represented a compactethnical unity. Instead, they have added five and a half millionpeople of different nationalities, amongst whom about 4, 000, 000Germans, with cities which are the most German in the world, asPilsen, Karlsbad, Reichenberg, etc. What is even more serious is thatthe 4, 000, 000 Germans are attached to Germany, and, having a superiorculture and civilization, will never resign themselves to being placedunder the Czeks. 

Czeko-Slovakia had mineral riches, industrial concerns and solidagriculture, and a culture spread among the people--all the conditionsfor rising rapidly. All these advantages risk being annulled by thegrave and useless insult to the Germans and Magyars. 

Not only is the situation of Europe in every way uncertain, but thereis a tendency in the groups of the victors on the Continent of Europeto increase the military budgets. The relationships of trade are beingrestored only slowly; commerce is spoken of as an aim. In Italy thedangers and perils of reopening trade with Germany have been seriouslydiscussed; customs duties are raised every day; the industrial groupsfind easy propaganda for protection. Any limitation of competition isa duty, whether it be the enemy of yesterday or the enemy of to-day, and so the greatest evils of protection are camouflaged underpatriotism. 

None of the countries which have come out of the War on the Continenthave a financial position which helps toward a solid situation. All the financial documents of the various countries, which I havecollected and studied with great care, contain enormous massesof expenses which are the consequences of the War; those of theconquering countries also contain enormous aggregations of expenseswhich are or can become the cause of new wars. 

The conquered countries have not actually any finance. Germany has anincrease of expenses which the fall of the mark renders more serious. In 1920 she spent not less than ninety-two milliards, ruining hercirculation. How much has she spent in 1921?

Austria and Hungary have budgets which are simply hypotheses. The lastAustrian budget, for 1921, assigned a sum of seventy-one milliardsof crowns for expenses, and this for a poor country with 7, 000, 000inhabitants. 

A detailed examination of the financial situation of Czeko-Slovakia, of Rumania, and of the Serbo-Croat States gives results which are atthe least alarming. Even Greece, which until yesterday had a solidstructure, gallops now in a madness of expenditure which exceeds allher resources, and if she does not find a means to make peace withTurkey she will find her credit exhausted. The most ruinous of allis the situation of Poland, whose finance is certainly not betterregulated than that of the Bolsheviks of Moscow, to judge from thecourse of the Polish mark and the Russian rouble if anyone gets theidea of buying them on an international market. 

The situation of the exchange since the War has not sensibly betteredeven for the great countries, and it is extraordinarily worse for theother countries. 

In June, 1921, France had a circulation of about thirty-eight milliardof francs, Belgium six milliard of francs, Italy of about eighteenmilliards; Great Britain, between State notes and Bank of Englandnotes, had hardly £434, 000, 000 sterling. Actually, among thecontinental countries surviving the War, Italy is the country whichhas made the greatest efforts not to augment the circulation but toincrease the duties; also because she had no illusions of rebuildingher finance and her national economy on an enemy indemnity. 

But the conquered countries have so abused their circulation thatthey almost live on the thought of it--as, in fact, not a few of theconquering countries and those come out from the War do. Germany haspassed eighty-eight milliards, and is rapidly approaching one hundredmilliards. Now, when one thinks that the United States, after so manyloans and after all the expenses of the War, has only a circulation of4, 557, 000, 000 dollars, one understands what difficulty Germany has toproduce, to live, and to refurnish herself with raw materials. 

Only Great Britain of all the countries in Europe which have issuedfrom the War has had a courageous financial policy. Public opinion, instead of pushing Parliament to financial dissipation, has insistedon economy. If the situation created by the War has transformed alsothe English circulation into unconvertible paper money, this is merelya passing fact. If the sterling loses on the dollar--that is, ongold--given the fact that the United States of America alone now havea money at par, almost a quarter of its value, this is also merely atransitory fact. 

Great Britain has the good sense to curtail expenses, and the sterlingtends always to improve. 

France and Italy are in an intermediate position. Their money can besaved, but it will require energetic care and great economies, stern finance, a greater development of production, limitation ofconsumption, above all, of what is purchased from abroad. At the dateof which I am writing, expressed on a percentual basis, the Frenchfranc is worth 47 centimes of the sterling and 36 of the dollar--thatis to say, of gold. The Italian lira is worth 28 centimes of thesterling and 21 of the dollar. 

Here are still two countries in which tenacious energy can save andwith many sacrifices they can arrive at good money. France has a goodmany more resources than Italy; she has a smaller need of importationsand a greater facility for exportations. But her public debt hasreached 265 milliards, the circulation has well passed thirty-eightmilliards, and they still fear to calculate amongst the extraordinaryincome of the budget the fifteen milliards a year which should comefrom Germany. 

Italy, with great difficulty of production and less concord inside thecountry, has a more true vision, and does not reckon any income whichis not derived from her own resources. Her circulation does not passeighteen milliards, and her debt exceeds by a little one hundredmilliards. 

With prudence and firmness France and Italy will be able to balancetheir accounts. 

But the financial situation and the exchanges of the conqueredcountries, even that of Germany, may be called desperate. 

If expressed in percentages, the German mark is worth 5. 11 per cent. In comparison with the pound sterling and 3. 98 per cent. Of thedollar. What possibility is there of systematizing the exchange?

Germany was compelled this year to carry her expenses to 130 milliardsof marks. As her circulation has exceeded eighty-eight milliards, howcan she straighten out her money?

As for the Austrian and Hungarian crowns, the Jugo-Slav crowns, theRumanian lei, and all the other depreciated moneys, their fate is notdoubtful. As their value is always descending, and the gold equivalentbecomes almost indeterminable, they will have a common fate. As forthe Polish mark, it can be said that before long it will not be worththe paper on which it is printed. 

There is, then, the fantastic position of the public debts! They havereached now such figures that no imagination could have forecasted. France alone has a debt which of itself exceeds by a great dealall the debts of all the European States previous to the War: 265milliards of francs. And Germany, the conquered country, has in herturn a debt which exceeds 320 milliards of marks, and which is rapidlyapproaching 400 milliards. The debts of many countries are onlyrecorded by feats of memory, because there is no practical interest inknowing whether Austria, Hungary, and especially Poland, has one debtor another, since the situation of the creditors is not a situation ofreality. 

The whole debt of the United States of America is, after so much war, only 23, 982, 000, 000 dollars; but the United States are creditors ofthe Entente for 9, 500, 000, 000 dollars. Also England, against a debt of£9, 240, 000, 000 sterling, has a credit of £1, 778, 000, 000. 

These serious figures, whilst they increase the condition ofdiscomfort rendered even more serious by the scarcity of commercialexchanges, indicate also what necessity may be superior to all inevery country to preserve internal peace: produce more, consume less, put the finances in order, and reconquer the credits. 

Instead, the conquered countries are going downwards every day and theconquering countries are maintaining very big armies, exhausting theirresources, whilst they are spreading the conviction that the indemnityfrom the enemy will compensate sufficiently, or at least partially, for the work of restoration. 

In fact, the causes of discontent and diffidence are augmenting. Nothing is more significant than the lack of conscience with whichprogrammes of violence and of ruin are lightly accepted; nothing ismore deplorable than the thoughtlessness with which the germs of newwars are cultivated. Germany has disarmed with a swiftness which haseven astonished the military circles of the Entente; but the bitterresults of the struggle are not only not finished against Germany, not even to-day does she form part of the League of Nations (which israther a sign of a state of mind than an advantage), but the attitudetowards her is even more hostile. 

Two years after the end of the war R. Poincaré wrote that the Leagueof Nations would lose its best possibility of lasting if, _un jour_, it did not reunite all the nations of Europe. But he added that ofall the conquered nations--Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey andGermany--the last-mentioned, by her conduct during the War andafter the peace, justified least a near right of entry. It would be_incontestablement plus naturel_ (of how many things does natureoccupy herself!) to let Austria enter first if she will disavow thepolicy of reattachment--that is, being purely German, renounceagainst the principle of nationality, in spite of the principleof auto-decision, when she cannot live alone, to unite herself toGermany; Bulgaria and Turkey as long as they had a loyal and courteousattitude towards Greece, Rumania and Serbia. The turn of Germanywill come, but only after Turkey, when she will have given proof ofexecuting the treaty, which no reasonable and honest person considersany more executable in its integrity. 

The most characteristic facts of this peace which continues the Warcan be recapitulated as follows:

1. Europe on the whole has more men under arms than before the War. The conquered States are forced to disarm, but the conquering Stateshave increased the armaments; the new States and the countries whichhave come through the War have increased their armaments. 

2. Production is very tardily being taken up again because there iseverywhere, if in a different degree, a lesser desire for work onthe part of the working classes joined with a need for higherremuneration. 

3. The difficulties of trade, instead of decreasing in many countriesof Europe are increasing, and international commerce is very slowlyrecovering. Between the States of Europe there is not a real commercewhich can compare with that under normal conditions. Consideringactual values with values before the War, the products which now formthe substance of trade between European countries do not representeven the half of that before the War. 

As the desire for consumption, if not the capacity for consumption, has greatly increased, and the production is greatly decreased, allthe States have increased their functions. So the discredit of thepaper money and the Treasury bills which permit these heavy expensesis in all the countries of Europe, even if in different degrees, verygreat. 

The conquering countries, from the moment that they had obtained inthe treaties of peace the acknowledgment of the conquered that the Warwas caused by them, held it to be legitimate that they should lose alltheir disposable goods, their colonies, their ships, their credits andtheir commercial organization abroad, but that the conquered shouldalso pay all the damages of the War. The War, therefore, should bepaid for by the conquered, who recognized (even if against their will)that they were alone responsible. That forms henceforth a certaincanon of foreign politics, the less a thing appears true the more itis repeated. 

Although the treaties oblige Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey topay the damages of the War, it is, however, certain that they are notable to pay anything and not even the expenses of the victors on theirterritory. "_Cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator_, " said Juvenal("Who has nothing can give nothing"), and Austria, for her part, instead of giving is imploring food succour. 

So the problem remains limited to Germany. Can she pay the indemnityindicated in the treaty? Can she pay for the damages and indemnify thevictors? After having given up her colonies, her ships, her railwaymaterial, all her disposable credits abroad, in what form can she pay?

The fundamental controversy reduces itself henceforth only to thispoint, which we shall try if possible to make clear, since we desirethat this matter shall be presented in the clearest and most evidentform. 

From now on it is not the chancelleries which must impose thesolutions of great problems; but it is the mass of the public inEurope and America. 

V

THE ANXIETIES OF THE VICTORS

We have seen the process by which the idea of the indemnity fordamages, which was not contained either in the peace declaration ofthe Entente, nor in the manifestations of the various parliaments, norin the first armistice proposals, nor in the armistice between Italyand Austria, was introduced in the armistice with Germany, out of pureregard for France, without taking heed of the consequences. Threewords, said Clemenceau, only three words need be added, words whichcompromise nothing and are an act of deference to France. The entireconstruction of the treaties, after all, is based on those threewords. 

And how fantastic the demands for compensation have become!

An old Italian proverb says, "In time of war there are more lies thanearth. " Ancient and modern pottery reproduce the motto, which iswidespread, and whose truth was not understood until some yearsago. So many foolish things were said about the almost mysteriousmanoeuvres of Germany, about her vast expansion, her great resourcesand accumulated capital, that the reality tended to become lost tosight. 

These absurd legends, formed during the War, were not forgotten, andthere are even now many who believe in good faith that Germany canpay, if not twenty or twenty-five milliards a year, at least eight ornine without any difficulty. 

France's shrewdest politicians, however, well knew that the demandfor an enormous and unlimited indemnity was only a means of puttingGermany under control and depressing her to the point of exhaustion. But the others maintained this proposal more out of rancour and hatredthan from any actual political concept. It may be said that theproblem of the indemnity has never been seriously studied and that thecalculations, the valuations, the procedures, have all formed a seriesof impulsive acts co-ordinated by a single error, the error of theFrench politicians who had the one aim of holding Germany down. 

The procedure was simple. 

In the first phase the indemnities came into being from three wordsinserted almost by chance into the armistice treaty on November 2, 1918, _réparation des dommages_. It was merely a matter of a simpleexpression to content public feeling: _Je supplie le conseil de semettre dans l'esprit de la population française_. .. . It was a moralconcession, a moral satisfaction. 

But afterwards, as things went on, all was altered when it came topreparing the treaties. 

For a while the idea, not only of a reparation of damages, but of thepayment of the cost of the War was entertained. It was maintained thatthe practice of making the vanquished reimburse the cost of the Warwas permitted by international law. Since Germany had provoked the Warand lost it, she must not only furnish an indemnity for the losses, but also pay the cost. 

The cost was calculated roughly at seven hundred milliards of francsat par. Further, there was the damage to assess. In the aggregate, warcosts, damage to property, damage to persons, came to at least onethousand milliards. But since it was impossible to demand immediatepayment and was necessary to spread the sum over fifty years, takinginto consideration sinking funds and interest the total came to threethousand milliards. The amount was published by the illustrated paperswith the usual diagrams, drawings of golden globes, length of papermoney if stretched out, height of metal if all piled up together, etc. Etc. 

These figures were discussed for the first few months by a publicaccustomed to be surprised at nothing. They merely helped todemonstrate that an indemnity of 350 milliards was a real sacrificefor the Allies. 

Thus a whole series of principles came to be established which were acontradiction of reality. 

A great share in the responsibility in this matter lies with GreatBritain, who not only followed France's error, but in certain waysmade it worse by a number of intemperate requests. Italy had noinfluence on the proceedings owing to her indecisive policy. Only theUnited States, notwithstanding the banality of some of her experts(_lucus a non lucendo_), spoke an occasional word of reason. 

When Lloyd George understood the mistake committed in the matter ofthe indemnity it was too late. 

The English public found itself face to face with the elections almostthe day after the conclusion of the War. In the existing state ofexaltation and hatred the candidates found a convenient "plank" inpromising the extermination of Germany, the trial of the Kaiser, aswell as of thousands of German officers accused of cruelty, and last, but not least, the end of German competition. 

The Prime Minister of Australia, William Morris Hughes, asmall-minded, insensitive, violent man, directed a furious campaignin favour of a huge indemnity. Lord Northcliffe lent the aid of hisnumerous papers to this campaign, which stirred up the electors. 

Lloyd George, with his admirable intelligence, perceived the situationclearly. He did not believe in the usefulness or even in thepossibility of trying the Kaiser and the German officers. He did notbelieve in the possibility of an enormous indemnity or even a verylarge one. 

His first statements, like those of Bonar Law, a serious, honest, well-balanced man, an idealist with the appearance of a practicalperson, revealed nothing. On the eve of the dissolution of Parliament, Lloyd George, speaking at Wolverhampton, November 24, 1918, did noteven hint at the question of the reparations or indemnity. He wasimpelled along that track by the movement coming from France, by thebehaviour of the candidates, by Hughes's attitude, and by the Pressgenerally, especially that of Northcliffe. 

A most vulgar spectacle was offered by many of the English candidates, among whom were several members of the War Cabinet, who used languageworthy of raving dervishes before crowds hypnotized by promises of themost impossible things. 

To promise the electors that Germany should pay the cost of the War, to announce to those who had lost their senses that the Kaiser was tobe hanged, to promise the arrest and punishment of the most guiltyGerman officers, to prophesy the reduction to slavery of a Germanycompeting on sea and land, was certainly the easiest kind ofelectoral programme. The numerous war-mutilated accepted it with muchenthusiasm, and the people listened, open-mouthed, to the endlessseries of promises. 

Hughes, who was at bottom in good faith, developed the thesis which heafterwards upheld at Paris with logical precision. It was Germany'sduty to reimburse, without any limitation, the entire cost of theWar: damage to property, damage to persons, and war-cost. He who hascommitted the wrong must make reparation for it to the extreme limitsof his resources, and this principle, recognized by the jurists, requires that the total of the whole cost of the War fall upon theenemy nations. Later on, Hughes, who was a sincere man, recognizedthat it was not possible to go beyond asking for reparation of thedamages. 

Lloyd George was dragged along by the necessity of not drawing awaythe mass of the electors from the candidates of his party. Thus he wasobliged on December 11, in his final manifesto, to announce not onlythe Kaiser's trial and that of all those responsible for atrocities, but to promise the most extensive kind of indemnity from Germany andthe compensation of all who had suffered by the War. Speaking thesame evening at Bristol, he promised to uphold the principle of theindemnity, and asserted the absolute right to demand from Germanypayment for the costs of the War. 

In England, where the illusion soon passed away, in France, where ithas not yet been dissipated, the public has been allowed to believethat Germany can pay the greater part, if not the entire cost, of theWar, or at least make compensation for the damage. 

For many years I have studied the figures in relation to privatewealth and the wealth of nations, and I have written at length onthe subject. I know how difficult it is to obtain by means of evenapproximate statistics results more or less near to the reality. Nothing pained me more than to hear the facility with whichpoliticians of repute spoke of obtaining an indemnity of hundreds ofmilliards. When Germany expressed her desire to pay an indemnity inone agreed lump sum (_à forfait_) of one hundred milliards of goldmarks (an indemnity she could never pay, so enormous is it), I sawstatesmen, whom I imagined not deprived of intelligence, smile atthe paltriness of the offer. An indemnity of fifty milliards ofgold marks, such as that proposed by Keynes, appeared absurd in itssmallness. 

When the Peace Conference reassembled in Paris the situationconcerning the indemnity was as follows. The Entente had never duringthe War spoken of indemnity as a condition of peace. Wilson, in hisproposals, had spoken only of reconstruction of invaded territories. The request for _réparation des dommages_ had been included in theterms of the armistice merely to afford a moral satisfaction toFrance. But the campaign waged in France and during the electionsin England had exaggerated the demands so as to include not onlyreparation for damage but reimbursement of the cost of the War. 

Only the United States maintained that the indemnity should be limitedto the reparation of the damages: a reparation which in later phasesincluded not only reconstruction of destroyed territories and damagedone to private property, but even pensions to the families of thosedead in the War and the sums in grant paid during it. 

When Prussia beat France in 1870 she asked for an indemnity of fivemilliards. The Entente could have demanded from the vanquished anindemnity and then have reassumed relations with them provided it werean indemnity which they could pay in a brief period of time. 

Instead, it being impossible to demand an enormous sum of 300 or 400milliards, a difficult figure to fix definitely, recourse was had toanother expedient. 

From the moment that the phrase _réparation des dommages_ was includedin the armistice treaty as a claim that could be urged, it becameimpossible to ask for a fixed sum. What was to be asked for wasneither more nor less than the amount of the damages. Hence a specialcommission was required, and the Reparations Commission appears onthe scene to decide the sum to demand from Germany and to controlits payment. Also even after Germany was disarmed a portion of herterritory must remain in the Allies' hands as a guarantee for theexecution of the treaty. 

The reason why France has always been opposed to a rapid conclusion ofthe indemnity question is that she may continue to have the right, inview of the question remaining still open, to occupy the left bank ofthe Rhine and to keep the bridgeheads indicated in the treaty. 

The thesis supported by Clemenceau at the Conference was a simple one:Germany must recognize the total amount of her debt; it is not enoughto say that we recognize it. 

I demand in the name of the French Government, and after havingconsulted my colleagues, that the Peace Treaty fixes Germany's debtto us and indicates the nature of the damages for which reparation isdue. We will fix a period of thirty years if you so wish it, and wewill give to the Commission, after it has reduced the debt to figures, the mandate to make Germany pay within these thirty years all she owesus. If the whole debt cannot be paid in thirty years the Commissionwill have the right to extend the time for payment. 

This scheme was agreed. And the thesis of the compensation of damages, instead of that for the payment of the cost of the War, prevailed fora very simple reason. If they proposed to demand for all integralreparations, and therefore the reimbursement of the cost of the War, the figures would have been enormous. It became necessary to reduceall the credits proportionally, as in the case of a bankruptcy. Now, since in the matter of the indemnities France occupied the first place(to begin with, she asked sixty-five per cent. Of all sums paid byGermany), she took the greater part of the indemnities, while on thesums paid for reimbursement of cost of war, she would only have gotless than twenty per cent. 

Germany has therefore been put under control for all the time she willbe paying the indemnities--that is, for an indefinite time. 

The valuation of the expenses for the reconstruction of the ruinedterritories had to be carried out according to the regulations ofthe treaty, and, the prices having increased, the French Governmentpresented in July, 1920, a first approximate valuation: damages, 152milliards; pensions, 58 milliards; in all, 210 milliards. In November, 1920, the damages had increased to 218 milliards. 

Even these figures represent something less absurd than the firstdemands and figures. 

On September 5, 1919, the French Minister of Finance, speaking in theFrench Chamber, calculated the total of the German indemnities arisingfrom the treaty at 375 milliards, whose interest would accumulateuntil 1921, after which date Germany would begin to pay her debtin thirty-four annual rates of about 25 milliards each, and 13, 750milliards a year would go to France. 

Again, in November, 1920, Ogier, Minister of the liberated regions, put before the Reparations Commission in the name of France a detailedmemorial which made the value of the territories to be reconstructedonly for the cases of private individuals come to 140 milliards, notincluding the pensions, damage to railways and mercantile marine, which totalled 218 milliards, of which 77 milliards were for pensionsand 141 milliards for damages. 

Of late the sense of reality has begun to diffuse itself. The MinisterLoucheur himself has laughed at the earlier figures, and has statedthat the damages do not exceed eighty milliards. 

But the French public has been accustomed for some time to take thefigures of Klotz seriously, and to discuss indemnities of 150, 200and 250 milliards. The public, however, is not yet aware of the realposition, and will not be able to arrive at a just realization of itwithout passing through a serious moral crisis which will be the firstsecure element of the real peace. 

Setting aside all questions of indemnities from Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria (they have nothing to give, can give nothing; onthe contrary, they ask and merit assistance), it is clear that all theindemnities must be paid by Germany. 

The French totals of the material damage claims in the invadeddistricts have been absolutely fantastic and more exaggerated than inthe case of Belgium, whose indemnity claims would lead one to supposethe total destruction of at least the third part of her territory, almost as if she had undergone the submersion of, say, ten thousandsquare metres of her small territory. 

This problem of the indemnities, limited to the reparation of damages, and in accordance with the costs contemplated in the Treaty ofVersailles, has never been seriously tackled. One may even say it hasnot been seriously examined. And it is deplorable that there has beencreated among the public, or among a large part of it, the convictionthat Germany will repair the damage of the War by her own effort. Thisidea, however, finds no acceptance in England among serious persons, and in Italy no one believes in it. But in France and Belgium the ideais widely diffused, and the wish to spread the belief is lively inseveral sections of opinion, not because intelligent people believein the possibility of effective payment, but with the idea of puttingGermany in the light of not maintaining the clauses of the peace, thusextending the right to prolong the military occupation and even toaggravate it. Germany, thereby, is kept out of the League of Nationsand her dissolution facilitated. 

John Maynard Keynes, ever since the end of 1919, has shown in hisadmirable book the absurdity of asking for vast indemnities, Germany'simpossibility of paying them, and the risk for all Europe of followinga road leading to ruin, thus at the same time accentuating the workof disintegration started by the treaty. That book had awakened awide-sounding echo, but it ought to have had a still wider one, andwould have done but for the fact that, unfortunately, the Press infree countries is anything but free. 

The great industrial syndicates, especially in the steel-makingindustry, which control so large a part of the Press among themajority of the States of Europe, and even beyond Europe, findeasy allies in the inadequate preparation of the major part ofthe journalists to discuss the most important problems, and theindisposition on the part of the public to examine those questionswhich present difficulties, and are so rendered less convenient fordiscussion. 

I knew Keynes during the War, when he was attached to the BritishTreasury and chief of the department charged to look after the foreignexchanges and the financial relations between Great Britain and herallies. A serious writer, a teacher of economics of considerablevalue, he brought to his difficult task a scrupulousness and anexactness that bordered on mistrust. Being at that time Chancellor ofthe Exchequer in Italy, in the bitterest and most decisive period ofthe War, I had frequent contact with Mr. Keynes, and I always admiredhis exactness and his precision. I could not always find it in myselfto praise his friendly spirit. But he had an almost mystic force ofseverity, and those enormous squanderings of wealth, that facileassumption of liabilities that characterized this period of the War, must have doubtless produced in him a sense of infinite disgust. Thisstate of mind often made him very exigent, and sometimes unjustifiablysuspicious. His word had a decisive effect on the actions of theEnglish Treasury. 

When the War was finished, he took part as first delegate of theEnglish Treasury at the Peace Conference of Paris, and was substitutedby the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Supreme Economic Council. He quitted his office when he had come to the conclusion that it washopeless to look for any fundamental change of the peace treaties. 

His book is not only a document of political uprightness but the firstappeal to a sense of reality which, after an orgy of mistakes, menacesa succession of catastrophes. In my opinion it merits a seriousreconsideration as the expression of a new conscience, as well as anexpression of the truth, which is only disguised by the existing stateof exasperation and violence. 

After two years we must recognize that all the forecasts of Keyneshave been borne out by the facts: that the exchange question has grownworse in all the countries who have been in the War, that the absurdindemnities imposed on the enemies cannot be paid, that the depressedcondition of the vanquished is harmful to the victors almost in equalmeasure with the vanquished themselves, that it menaces their veryexistence, that, in fine, the sense of dissolution is more widespreadthan ever. 

The moment has come to make an objective examination of the indemnityquestion, and to discuss it without any hesitation. 

Let us lay aside all sentiment and forget the undertakings of thepeace treaties. Let us suppose that the Entente's declarationsand Wilson's proposals never happened. Let us imagine that we areexamining a simple commercial proposition stripped of all sentimentand moral ideas. 

After a great war it is useless to invoke moral sentiments: men, whilethey are blinded by hatred, recognize nothing save their passion. Itis the nature of war not only to kill or ruin a great number of men, not only to cause considerable material damage, but also, necessarily, to bring about states of mind full of hate which cannot be ended atonce and which are even refractory to the language of reason. 

For a long time I myself have looked upon the Germans with theprofoundest hatred. When I think of all the persons of my race dead inthe War, when I look back upon the fifteen months of anguish when myfirst-born son was a prisoner of war in Germany, I am quite able tounderstand the state of mind of those who made the peace and themental condition in which it was made. What determined the atmosphereof the peace treaties was the fact that there was a conferencepresided over by Clemenceau, who remembered the Prussians in thestreets of Paris after the war of 1870, who desired but one thing: theextermination of the Germans. What created this atmosphere, or helpedto create it, was the action of Marshal Foch, who had lost in the Warthe two persons dearest to him in life, the persons who attached himto existence. 

But now we must examine the question not in the light of oursentiments or even of our hatreds. We must see quite calmly if thetreaties are possible of application without causing the ruin of thevanquished. Then we must ask ourselves if the ruin of the vanquisheddoes not bring in its train the ruin of the victors. Putting aside, then, all moral considerations, let us examine and value the economicfacts. 

There is no question that the reparation problem exists solely inthe case of Germany, who has still a powerful statal framework whichallows her to maintain great efforts, capable not only of providingher with the means of subsistence, but also of paying a largeindemnity to the victors. The other vanquished States are more in needof succour than anything else. 

What are the reparations?

Let us follow the _précis_ of them which a representative of Francemade at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. They are as follows:

1. Germany is responsible for the total of the losses and damagessustained by her victors inasmuch as she caused them. 

2. Germany, in consideration of the permanent diminution of herresources, resulting from the Peace Treaty, is only obliged (but isobliged without restitutions or reserves) to reimburse the directdamages and the pensions as precised in Schedule I of Clause viii ofthe treaty. 

3. Germany must pay before May 1, 1921, not less than twenty milliardsof gold marks or make equivalent payment in kind. 

4. On May 1 the Reparations Commission will fix the total amount ofthe German debt. 

5. This debt must be liquidated by annual payments whose totals are tobe fixed by the Commission. 

6. The payments will continue for a period of thirty years, or longerif by that time the debt is not extinguished. 

7. Germany will issue one hundred milliards of gold marks of bearerbonds, and afterwards all such issues as the Reparations Commissionshall demand, until the amount of the debt be reached in order topermit the stabilization of credit. 

8. The payments will be made in money and in kind. The payments inkind will be made in coal, live stock, chemical products, ships, machines, furniture, etc. The payments _in specie_ consist of metalmoney, of Germany's credits, public and private, abroad, and of afirst charge on all the effects and resources of the Empire and theGerman States. 

9. The Reparations Commission, charged with seeing to the execution ofthis clause, shall have powers of control and decision. It will bea commission for Germany's debt with wider powers. Called upon todecide, according to equity, justice and good faith, without beingbound by any codex or special legislation, it has obtained fromGermany an irrevocable recognition of its authority. Its duty is tosupervise until the extinction of the debt Germany's situation, herfinancial operations, her effects, her capacity for production, herprovisioning, her production. This commission must decide what Germanycan pay each year, and must see that her payments, added to thebudget, fall upon her taxpayers at least to the extent of the alliedcountry most heavily taxed. Its decisions shall be carried outimmediately and receive immediate application, without any otherformality. The commission can effect all the changes deemed necessaryin the German laws and regulations, as well as all the sanctions, whether of a financial, economic or military nature arising fromestablished violations of the clauses put under its control. AndGermany is obliged not to consider these "sanctions" as hostile acts. 

In order to guarantee the payments an inter-allied army--in realitya Franco-Belgian army--occupies the left bank of the Rhine, and isstationed at the bridgeheads. Germany is completely helpless, and haslost all the features of a sovereign State inasmuch as she is subjectto "controls" in a way that Turkey never was. In modern history we canfind no parallel for this state of things. These are conditionswhich alter the very bases of civilization and the relations betweenpeoples. Such procedure has been unknown in Europe for centuries. The public has become accustomed in certain countries to considerresponsible for the War not the government that wished it or theGerman people, but the future generations. Thus the indemnities areto be paid--were such conditions possible--in thirty years and for atleast twenty years afterwards by people still unborn at the time ofthe War. This cursing of the guilty people has no parallel in modernhistory. We must go back to the early ages of humanity to findanything of the kind. 

But even the most inhuman policies, such as Germany has never adoptedin her victories, although she has been accused of every cruelty, canfind at least some justification if they had a useful effect on thecountry which has wished and accepts responsibility for them. Theconqueror has his rights. Julius Caesar killed millions of Germansand retarded perhaps for some centuries the invasion of Rome. Butthe practices established by the Treaty of Versailles are in effectequally harmful to victors and vanquished, though maybe in unequalmeasure, and in any case prepare the dissolution of Europe. 

I had my share in arranging at San Remo the Spa Conference, in thehope and with the desire of discussing frankly with the Germans whatsum they could pay by way of indemnity without upsetting their economyand damaging severely that of the Allies. But the ministerial crisiswhich took place in June, 1920, prevented me from participating atthe Spa Conference; and the profitable action which Great Britain hadagreed to initiate in the common interest, ours as well as France's, could not be proceeded with. The old mistakes continued to berepeated, though many attenuations have come about and the truthbegins to appear even for those most responsible for past errors. 

We shall have to examine with all fair-mindedness if Germany is ina position to pay in whole or in part the indemnity established orrather resulting from the treaty. France especially believes, or hassaid on several occasions she believes, that Germany can pay withoutdifficulty 350 milliards. 

After many stupidities and many exaggerations which have helpedconsiderably to confuse the public, in face of the new difficultieswhich have arisen, new arrangements for the payment of the indemnityhave been established. On May 11, in face of the situation which hadarisen, the Allies proposed and Germany accepted a fresh scheme forthe payment of the reparations. Germany is constrained to pay everyyear in cash and in kind the equivalent of 500 million dollars, plus26 per cent. Of the total of her exports. 

The rest of the accord refers to the procedure for the issue ofbonds guaranteed on the indicated payments, to the constitution of aguarantee committee, and to the date of payment. Probably Germany willhave been able to get through the year 1921 without insurmountabledifficulties. 

At Spa, on April 27, 1921, the proportionate sums assessed for each ofthe conquering powers were established on a total indemnity notablyreduced in comparison with the earlier absurd demands. 

But leaving alone the idea of an indemnity of 250, 150, or even 100milliards of gold marks, it will be well to see in a concrete formwhat Germany can be made to pay, and whether the useless and elaboratestructure of the Reparations Commission which, with its powers ofregulating the internal life of Germany for thirty years or more, ought not to be substituted by a simpler formula more in sympathy withcivilized notions. 

Shortly before the War, according to successive statistics, theprivate wealth of France did not amount to more than 250 milliards. 

The wealth of France, according to successive valuations, wascalculated at 208 milliards of francs in 1905 (de Foville), at 214milliards in 1908 (Turquan), at about 250 milliards according to otherauthors. The wealth of Belgium, according to official statisticspublished by the Belgian Ministry of Finance in 1913, amounted torather less than 30 milliards of francs. The estimate is perhaps atrifle low. But this official figure must not be considered as beinga long way from the truth. At certain moments Belgium's demands havesurpassed even the total of her national wealth, while the damageshave not been more than some milliards. 

The value of the land in France was calculated before the War atbetween 62 and 78 milliards; the value of the buildings, accordingto _l'Annuaire Statistique de la France_, at 59-1/2 milliards. Theterritory occupied by the Germans is not more than a tenth of thenational territory. Even taking into consideration the loss ofindustrial buildings it is very difficult to arrive at the figure of15 milliards. At the same time it is true that the Minister Loucheurdeclared on February 17, 1919, in the French Chamber that thereconstruction of the devastated regions in France required 75milliards--that is, very much more than double the private wealth ofall the inhabitants of all the occupied regions. 

In all the demands for compensation of the various States we have seennot so much a real and precise estimate of the damages as a kind offixing of credit in the largest measure possible in order that in thesuccessive reductions each State should still have proportionally anadvantageous position. 

Making his calculation with a generosity which I assert to beexcessive (and I assert this as a result of an accurate study ofthe question, which perhaps I may have occasion to publish), Keynesmaintains that the damages for which Germany should be made to paycome to 53 milliards for all losses on land and sea and for theeffects of aerial bombardments--53 milliards of francs all told, including the damages of France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, etc. ! I do not believe that the damages reach 40 milliards ofgold marks, unless, of course, we calculate in them the pensions andallowances. 

But these figures have but small interest, since the demands have beenalmost entirely purely arbitrary. 

What we must see is if Germany can pay, and if, with a regime ofrestrictions and violence, she can hand over, not the many milliardswhich have been announced and which have been a deplorable speculationon the ignorance of the public, but a considerable sum, such as isthat which many folk still delude themselves it is possible to have. 

Germany has already consigned all her transferable wealth; the gold inher banks, her colonies, her commercial fleet, a large and even thebest part of her railway material, her submarine cables, her foreigncredits, the property of her private citizens in the victoriouscountries, etc. Everything that could be handed over, even inopposition to the rights of nations as such are known in moderncivilized States, Germany has given. She has also hypothecated all hernational goods. What can she give now?

Germany can pay in three ways only:

1. Merchandise and food products on account of the indemnity: coal, machines, chemical products, etc. 

2. Credits abroad coming from the sale of merchandise. If Germanyexports, that is sells eight milliard marks' worth of goods abroad, she pays two milliards to the Reparations Commission. 

3. Property of private citizens. Germany can enslave herself, cedingthe property of her private citizens to foreign States or citizens tobe disposed of as they wish. 

Excluding this last form, which would constitute slavery pure andsimple, as useless, as impossible, and calculated to parallel themethods in use among barbarous peoples, there only remain the firsttwo methods of payment which we will examine briefly. 

It must be remembered that Germany, even before the War, was indifficulties for insufficient avenues of development, given therestricted nature of her territory and the exuberance of herpopulation. Her territory, smaller than that of France and much lessfertile, must now nourish a population which stands to that of Franceas three to two. 

If we have had gigantic war losses, Germany, who fought on all thefronts, has had losses certainly not inferior to ours. She too hashad, in larger or smaller proportion, her dead and her mutilated. She has known the most atrocious sufferings from hunger. Thus herproductive power is much diminished, not only on account of the gravedifficulties in which her people find themselves (and the developmentof tuberculosis is a terrible index), but also for the loweredproductive capacity of her working classes. 

The statistics published by the Office of Public Health of the Empire(_Reichsgesundheitsamt_) and those given in England by ProfessorStarling and laid before the British Parliament, leave no doubt in thematter. 

Germany has had more than 1, 800, 000 dead and many more than 4, 000, 000of wounded. She has her mass of orphans, widows and invalids. Takenaltogether the structure of her people has become much worse. 

What constituted the great productive force of the German people wasnot only its capacity to work, but the industrial organization whichshe had created with fifty years of effort at home and abroad withmany sacrifices. Now Germany has not only lost 8 per cent. Of herpopulation, but _25_ per cent. Of her territory, from which cerealsand potatoes were produced, and 10 to 12 per cent. Of her live stock, etc. We have already seen the enormous losses sustained by Germany incoal, iron and potash. 

The most intelligent and able working classes, created by themost patient efforts, have been reduced to the state of becomingrevolutionary elements. By taking away from Germany at a stroke hermercantile marine, about 60, 000 sailors have been thrown on thestreets and their skill made useless. 

Germany, therefore, impoverished in her agricultural territory, deprived of a good part of her raw materials, with a populationweakened in its productive qualities, has lost a good part of herproductive capacity because all her organization abroad has beenbroken, and everything which served as a means of exchange ofproducts, such as her mercantile fleet, has been destroyed. Moreover, Germany encounters everywhere obstacles and diffidence. Impeded fromdeveloping herself on the seas, held up to ridicule by the absurdcorridor of Danzig, whereby there is a Polish State in Germanterritory, she cannot help seeking life and raw materials in Russia. 

In these conditions she must not only nourish her vast population, notonly produce sufficient to prevent her from falling into misery, but must also pay an indemnity which fertile fantasies have made adeceived Europe believe should amount even to 350 milliards of goldmarks, and which even now is supposed by seemingly reasonable peopleto be able to surpass easily the sum of a hundred milliards. 

Could France or Italy, by any kind of sacrifice, have paid anyindemnities after ending the War? Germany has not only to live andmake reparation, but to maintain an inter-allied army of occupationand the heavy machinery of the Reparations Commission, and mustprepare to pay an indemnity for thirty years. France and Italy havepreserved their colonies (Italy's do not amount to much), theirmercantile fleets (which have much increased), their foreignorganization. Germany, without any of these things, is to find herselfable to pay an indemnity which a brazen-faced and ignorant Pressdeceived the public into believing could amount to twenty ortwenty-five milliards a year. 

Taking by chance Helferich's book, which valued the annualcapitalization at ten milliards, the difference between an annualproduction of forty-three milliards and a consumption of thirty-threemilliards, inexpert persons have said that Germany can pay withoutdifficulty ten milliards, plus a premium on her exports, plus asufficient quantity of goods and products. 

One becomes humiliated when one sees newspapers of serious reputationand politicians deemed not to be unimportant reasoning in language sofalse. 

The estimates of private wealth, about which the economists makeexperiments, and on which I myself have written much in the past, havea relative value. It may be argued that before the War the total ofall private patrimony in Germany surpassed but by little three hundredmilliards of marks; and this is a valuation made upon generouscriteria. 

But when it is said that the annual capitalization of Germany wasten milliards, that is not to say that ten milliards of capital isdeposited in the banks ready to be transferred at will. Capitalizationmeans the creation of instruments of production. The national capitalincreases in proportion as these are increased. Therefore the best wayof examining the annual capitalization of a country is to see how manynew industries have arisen, to what extent the old ones have beenimproved, what improvements have been introduced into agriculture, what new investments have been made, etc. 

If the capitalization of Germany before the War was scarcely tenmilliards of marks, it was too small for an Empire of some 67, 000, 000persons. I believe that in reality it was larger. But even if it cameto fifteen milliards, it represented a very small figure. 

The population in the progressive countries augments every year. InGermany, before the War, in the period 1908-1913, the populationincreased on an average by 843, 000 persons a year, the differencebetween the people born alive and the dead. In other words, the annualincrease of the population per annum was at the rate of 13. 0 perthousand. 

As in certain districts of Italy the peasants plant a row of trees onthe birth of every son, so among nations it is necessary to increasethe national wealth at least in proportion to the newly arrived. Supposing that the private wealth of the German citizens was from 300to 350 milliards of marks (an exaggeration, doubtless), it would meanthat the wealth increased each year by a thirteenth part or rathermore. The difference between the increase in population and theincrease in wealth constituted the effective increase in wealth, butalways in a form not capable of being immediately handled. To planttrees, build workshops, utilize water-power: all this stands for theoutput of so much force. One may undertake such works or not, but inany case the result cannot immediately be given to the enemy. 

This is so obvious as to be banal. 

To seek to propagate the idea that Germany can give that whichconstitutes her annual capitalization either wholly or in great partis an example of extreme ignorance of economic facts. 

It is positively painful to listen to certain types of argument. 

A French Minister has said that the success of the war loans for 151milliards in Germany, and the increase of bank deposits for a sum of28 milliards, coinciding with an increase of capital of 45 milliardsin limited companies, demonstrate that Germany has saved at least 180milliards in four years. Leaving aside the exactness of these figures, it is really sad to observe reasoning of this type. How can the publichave an idea of the reality?

Let us apply the same reasoning to France. We must say that inasmuchas France before the War had a public debt of 32 milliards, and nowhas a debt of 265 milliards, without calculating what she owes toGreat Britain and the United States, France, by reason of the War, hasimmensely enriched herself, since, leaving aside the debt contractedabroad and the previous debt, she has saved during the War 200milliards, quite apart from the increase in bank deposits and theincrease in capital of limited companies. The War has thereforeimmensely enriched her. In reality we are face to face with one of thephenomena of the intoxication brought about by paper money, by meansof which it has been possible at certain times for the public tobelieve that the War had increased wealth. Other features of thisphenomenon we have in the wretched example of the capitalist classes, after which it was not unnatural that the people should give way toa great increase in consumption, should demand high wages and offerlittle work in return at the very time when it was most necessaryto work more and consume less. There is small cause for wonder thatcertain erroneous ideas are diffused among the public when they havetheir being in those very sophisms according to which the indemnity tobe paid by the beaten enemy will pay all the debts and losses of theconquering nations. 

We are told that Germany, being responsible for the War, must imposeon herself a regime of restrictions and organize herself as anexporting nation for the payment of the reparation debts. 

Here again the question can be considered in two ways, according asit is proposed to allow Germany a free commerce or to impose on her aseries of forced cessions of goods in payment of the reparations. Bothhypotheses can be entertained, but both, as we shall see, lead toeconomic disorder in the conquering States, if these relations are tobe regulated by violence. 

It is useless to dilate on the other aphorisms, or rather sophisms, which were seriously discussed at the Paris Conference, and which hadeven the honour of being sustained by the technical experts:

1. That it is not important to know what Germany can pay, but it issufficient to know what she ought to pay. 

2. That no one can foresee what immense resources Germany will developwithin thirty or forty years, and what Germany will not be able to paywill be paid by the Allies. 

3. That Germany, under the stimulus of a military occupation, willincrease her production in an unheard-of manner. 

4. The obligation arising from the treaty is an absolute one; thecapacity to pay can only be taken into consideration to establish thenumber and amount of the annual payments; the total must in any casebe paid within thirty years or more. 

5. _Elle ou nous_. Germany must pay; if she doesn't the Allies mustpay. It is not necessary that Germany free herself by a certain date;it is only necessary that she pay all. 

6. Germany has not to discuss, only to pay. Let time illustrate whatis at present unforeseeable, etc. Etc. 

If we exclude the third means of payment Germany has two ways open toher. First of all she can give goods. What goods? When we speak ofgoods we really mean coal. Now, as we have seen, according to thetreaty Germany must furnish for ten years to Belgium, Italy, andFrance especially quantities of coal, which in the first five yearsrun from 39-1/2 to 42 millions of tons, and in the following fiveyears come to a maximum of about 32 millions. And all this whenshe has lost the Saar coalfields and is faced with the threateningsituation in Upper Silesia. 

Germany's exports reached their maximum in 1913, when the figurestouched 10, 097 millions of marks, excluding precious metals. Groupingexports and imports in categories, the millions of marks weredistributed as follows:

 Imports. Exports. 

 Foodstuffs 2, 759 1, 035 Live animals 289 7. 4 Raw materials 5, 003 1, 518 Semi-manufactured goods 5, 003 1, 139 Manufactured goods 1, 478 6, 395

About one-fifth of the entire exports was in iron and machine products(1, 337 [mil. ] articles in iron, 680 machines); 722 millions fromcoal (as against imports of other qualities of 289), 658 millionsof chemical products and drugs, 446 from cotton, 298 paint, 290techno-electrical productions, etc. 

What goods can Germany give in payment of the indemnity? We have seenhow she has lost a very large part of her iron and a considerablequantity of her coal. 

All the economic force of Germany was based upon:

(a) The proper use of her reserves of coal and iron, which allowedher to develop enormously those industries which are based on thesetwo elements. 

(b) On her transport and tariff system, which enabled her to fight anycompetition. 

(c) On her potent overseas commercial organization. 

Now, by effect of the treaty, these three great forces have beenentirely or in part destroyed. 

What goods can Germany give in payment of the indemnity, and whatgoods can she offer without ruining the internal production of theEntente countries? Let us suppose that Germany gives machines, colours, wagons, locomotives, etc. Then for this very fact thecountries of the Entente, already suffering by unemployment, wouldsoon see their factories obliged to shut down. Germany must therefore, above all, give raw materials; but since she is herself a country thatimports raw materials, and has an enormous and dense population, sheis herself obliged to import raw materials for the fundamental needsof her existence. 

If we examine Germany's commerce in the five years prior to theWar--that is, in the five years of her greatest boom--we shall findthat the imports always exceeded the exports. In the two years beforethe War, 1912 and 1913, the imports were respectively 10, 691 and10, 770 millions, and the exports 8, 956 and 10, 097 millions. In someyears the difference even exceeded two milliards, and was compensatedby credits abroad, with the payment of freights and with theremittances (always considerable) of the German emigrants. All this islost. 

Exported goods can yield to the exporter a profit of, let us suppose, ten, twelve, or twenty per cent. For the Allies to take an income fromthe Custom returns means in practice reducing the exports. In fact, in Germany production must be carried on at such low prices as tocompensate for the difference, or the exports must be reduced. 

In the first case (which is not likely, since Germany succeeds onlywith difficulty, owing to her exchange, in obtaining raw materials, and must encounter worse difficulties in this respect than othercountries), Germany would be preparing the ruin of the other countriesin organizing forms of production which are superior to those ofall her rivals. Germany would therefore damage all her creditors, especially in the foreign markets. 

In the second case--the reduction of exports, one would havethe exactly opposite effect to that imagined in the programmeproposed--that is, the indemnities would become unpayable. 

In terms of francs or lire at par with the dollar, Germany'sexportations in 1920 have amounted to 7, 250 millions. In 1921 anincrease may be foreseen. 

If Germany has to pay in cash and kind 2, 500 millions of marks atpar, plus 26 per cent. Of the total of her exports, then supposing anexport trade of eight milliards, she will have to give 1, 840 millions, or in all 4, 540 millions of marks. Thus we arrive by stages at lesshyperbolical figures, coming down from the twenty-five milliardsa year to something less than a fifth. But to come to grips withreality, Germany in all ways, it must be admitted, cannot give morethan two milliards a year, if, indeed, it is desired that an indemnitybe paid. 

Notwithstanding her great resources, France would not be in acondition to pay abroad two milliards a year without ruining herexchange, which would drop at once to the level of Germany's. Italywith difficulty could pay one milliard. 

France and Italy are honest countries, yet they cannot pay their warcreditors, and have not been able, and are not able, to pay any shareof their debt either to the United States of America or to GreatBritain. As a matter of fact, up till now they have paid nothing, andthe interest continues to accumulate with the capital. 

Why have neither France nor Italy yet started to pay some of theirdebt? Having won the War, France has had all she could have--fertileterritories, new colonies, an abundance of raw material, and above alliron and potash. The simple explanation is that which I have givenabove. 

Can, then, Germany, who is in a terrible condition, whose circulationpromises ruin, who has no longer credits nor organization abroad, whohas a great shortage in raw materials; can Germany pay four or fivemilliards a year?

We must also remember that Germany, in addition to the indemnity, mustpay the cost of the Army of Occupation, which up to now has amountedto twenty-five milliards of paper marks a year, or more than 1, 600millions of francs at par. That is, Germany has to bear for thesupport of the Allied troops a charge equal to the cost of maintainingthe armies of France, Italy and Belgium before the War. 

No financier seriously believes that the issue of bonds authorized bythe treaty for the credit of the Reparations Commission has now anyprobability of success. Germany's monetary circulation system isfalling to the stage of _assignats_, and the time is not distantwhen, if intelligent provision is not made, Germany will not be in aposition to pay any indemnity. 

Obliged to pay only one milliard of gold marks, Germany has not beenable to find this modest sum (modest, that is, in comparison with allthe dreams about the indemnity) without contracting new foreign debtsand increasing her already enormous paper circulation. Each newindemnity payment, each new debt incurred, will only place Germany inthe position of being unable to make payments abroad. 

Many capitalists, even in Italy, inspire their Press to state thatGermany derives an advantage from the depreciation of her mark, or, in other words, is content with its low level. But the high exchanges(and in the case of Germany it amounts to ruin) render almostimpossible the purchase of raw materials, of which Germany has need. With what means must she carry out her payments if she is obliged tocede a large part of her customs receipts, that is of her best form ofmonetary value, and if she has no longer either credits or freightsabroad?

If what is happening injured Germany only, it would be more possibleto explain it, if not to justify it. But, on the contrary, Germany'sfall, which is also the decadence of Europe, profoundly disturbs notonly the European continent, but many other producing countries. Though the United States and Great Britain partially escape theeffect, they too feel the influence of it, not only in their politicalserenity, but in the market of goods and values. Germany's positionis bound up with that of Europe; her conquerors cannot escape direconsequences if the erstwhile enemy collapses. 

We must not forget that before the War, in the years 1912 and 1913, the larger part of Germany's commerce was with the United States, with Great Britain, with Russia and with Austria-Hungary. In 1913 hercommerce with the United States represented alone little less thantwo milliards and a half of marks according to the statistics of theGerman Empire, and 520 millions of dollars according to the figuresof America. If we except Canada, which we may consider a territorialcontinuation, the two best customers of the United States were GreatBritain and Germany. They were, moreover, the two customers whoseimports largely exceeded the exports. The downfall of Germany willbring about inevitably a formidable crisis in the Anglo-Saxoncountries and consequent ruin in other countries. 

Up to now Germany has given all she could; any further payment willcause a downfall without changing the actual monetary position. Germany, after a certain point, will not pay, but will drag down inher fall the economic edifices of the victorious countries of theContinent. 

All attempts at force are useless, all impositions are sterile. 

All this is true and cannot be denied, but at the same time it mustbe recognized that in the first move for the indemnity there was areasonable cause for anxiety on the part of the Allies. 

If Germany had had to pay no indemnity this absurd situation wouldhave come about, that although exhausted, Germany would have issuedfrom the War without debts abroad and could easily have got into herstride again, while France, Italy, and in much less degree GreatBritain, would have come out of the War with heavy debts. 

This anxiety was not only just and well founded, but it is easy to seewhy it gave ground for a feeling of grave disquiet. 

France and Italy, the two big victor States of the Continent, wereonly able to carry on the War through the assistance of Great Britainand the United States. The War would not have lasted long without theaid of the Anglo-Saxons, which had a decisive effect. 

France has obtained all she asked for, and, indeed, more than all herprevisions warranted. Italy has found herself in a difficult position. She too has realized her territorial aspirations, though notcompletely, and the assistance of her Allies has not always beencordial. 

I have had, as head of the Government, to oppose all the agitations, and especially the Adriatic adventures, which have caused an acuteparty division in Italy. From a sense of duty I have also assumed allresponsibility. But the rigidness of Wilson in the Fiume and Adriaticquestions and the behaviour of some of the European Allies have beenperfectly unjustifiable. In certain messages to Wilson during my termof government I did not fail to bring this fact forward. Certainly, Jugo-Slavia's demands must be considered with a sense of justice, andit would have been an error and an injustice to attribute to Italylarge tracts of territory in Dalmatia; but it would have been possibleto find a more reasonable settlement for a country which has had suchsufferings and known such losses during the War. In any case, whenby the absurd system followed in the treaties so many millions ofGermans, Magyars, Turks and Bulgarians have been handed over to Stateslike Serbia, whose intemperate behaviour precipitated the War, or toStates like Greece, which took only a small and obligatory part in it, when States like Poland have won their unity and independence withoutmaking war, when Germany has been dismembered in order to give Polandan access to the sea and the ridiculous situation of Danzig has beencreated, when the moral paradox of the Saar, which now becomes aGerman Alsace-Lorraine, has been set up, when so many millions of menhave been parcelled out without any criteria, it was particularlyinvidious to contest so bitterly Italy's claims. I can freely affirmthis inasmuch as, risking all popularity, I have always done my dutyas a statesman, pointing out that solution which time has proved to beinevitable. 

No one can deny that Italy is passing through a period of crisis andpolitical ill-health. Such states of public psychology are for peopleswhat neurasthenia is for individuals. On what does it depend? Oftenenough on reasons which cannot be isolated or defined. It is a stateof mind which may come to an end at any minute, and is consequent uponthe after-effects of the War. Rather than coming from the economicdisorder, it derives from a malady of the temperament. 

I have never believed, in spite of the agitations which have been seenat certain periods, in the possibility of a revolutionary movement inItaly. Italy is the only country which has never had religious wars, the only country which in twenty centuries has never had a realrevolution. Land of an ancient civilization, prone to sudden bursts ofenthusiasm, susceptible to rapid moods of discouragement, Italy, withall the infinite resources of the Latin spirit, has always overcomethe most difficult crises by her wonderful adaptive power. Inhuman history she is, perhaps, the only country where three greatcivilizations have risen up one after another in her limited soil. If Italy can have the minimum of coal, cereals and raw materialsnecessary to her existence and her economic revival, the traditionalgood sense of the Italian people will easily overcome a crisis whichis grave, but which affects in various measure all the victors, and isespecially temperamental. 

It cannot be denied that if all Europe is sick, Italy has its ownspecial state of mind. Those who wished the War and those who wereagainst it are both dissatisfied: the former because, after theWar, Italy has not had the compensations she expected, and has hadsufferings far greater than could have been imagined; the latterbecause they attribute to the War and the conduct of the War the greattrials which the nation has now to face. This sickness of the spiritis the greatest cause of disorder, since malcontent is always theworst kind of leaven. 

Four great countries decided the War: Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States of America. Russia fell to pieces soon, andfell rather on account of her own internal conditions than from enemypressure. The action of the United States arrived late, but wasdecisive. Each country, however, acted from a different state of mind. France had of necessity to make war. Her territory was invaded, andall hope of salvation lay in moral resistance alone. Great Britainhad to wage the War out of sense of duty. She had guaranteed theneutrality of Belgium, and could not fail to keep her word of honour. Two countries alone chose freely the sorrowful way of the War: Italyand the United States. But their sacrifices, sufferings and losseshave been very different. During the War the United States have beenable to develop their immense resources, and, notwithstanding somecrises, they have come out of it much richer than before. From beingdebtors to Europe they have become creditors. They had few lossesin men, and a great development in wealth. Italy, who after manydifficulties had developed in her famous but too narrow territory thegerms of a greater fortune, has had, together with very heavy lossesin men, heavy losses in her wealth. 

Italy saved the destinies of France for the first time by declaringher neutrality on August 2, 1914, and letting the certainty of it beknown from July 30, as the diplomatic documents have shown. 

It was that sudden and unexpected declaration of neutrality whichrendered it possible for France to concentrate all her forces in thenorth and to win the battle of the Marne. Italy for a second timesaved the destinies of the Entente by entering into the War (tooprecipitately and unprepared), in May, 1915, thus preventing theAustrian army, which was formidable for its technical organization andfor its valour, from obtaining the advantages it expected. 

Why did Italy go to war?

The diplomatic documents, which are not all documents of politicalwisdom, demonstrate the anxiety of the Italian Government torealize its Adriatic programme and to gain secure frontiers againstAustria-Hungary and its successors. But this was not the _cause_of the War; it was rather a means of explaining to the people thenecessity for the War. Italy had been for nearly thirty-four yearsally of Austria-Hungary, and the aspirations of Italy's Adriaticpolicy had never disturbed the relations between the two countries. The real cause of Italy's war was a sentimental movement, a form ofextraordinary agitation of the spirits, brought about by the invasionof Belgium and the danger of France. The intellectual movementespecially, the world of culture, partook largely in fomenting thestate of exaltation which determined the War. 

During the progress of the War, which was long and bitter, Italypassed through some terrible hours. Her privations during the War, andimmediately after, surpassed all expectations. Italy found herselfface to face with an enemy who enjoyed a superior geographicalsituation, a numerical superiority, as well as a superiority inartillery. After the downfall of Russia she had to support a terriblecampaign. Even in 1917, after the military disaster, when alliedtroops came to Italy, she sent abroad more men than there came alliedtroops to her aid. According to some statistics which I had compiled, and which I communicated to the Allies, Italy was shown, in relationto her demographic structure, to have more men in the front line thanany other country. The economic sufferings were, and are, greaterthan those endured by others. France is only in part a Mediterraneancountry, while Italy is entirely so. During the War the action of thesubmarines rendered the victualling of Italy a very difficult matter. Many provinces, for months on end, had to content themselves withthe most wretched kind of food. Taking population and wealth intoproportion, if the United States had made the effort of Italy theywould have had to arm sixteen millions of men, to have lost a millionand a half to two million soldiers, and to have spent at least fourhundred milliards. In order to work up popular enthusiasm (and it wasperhaps necessary), the importance of the country's Adriatic claimswas exaggerated. Thus many Italians believe even to-day in good faiththat the War may be considered as lost if some of these aspirationshave not been realized or will not be realized. 

But, after the War, Italy's situation suddenly changed. The War hadaroused in the minds of all Europeans a certain sentiment of violence, a longing for expansion and conquest. The proclamations of theEntente, the declarations of Wilson's principles, or points, became socontorted that no trace of them could be found in the treaties, savefor that ironic _covenant_ of the League of Nations, which is alwaysrepeated on the front page, as Dante said of the rule of St. Benedict, _at the expense of the paper_. 

For Italy a very curious situation came about. France had but oneenemy: Germany. She united all her forces against this enemy ina coherent and single action which culminated in the Treaty ofVersailles. France had but one idea: to make the Entente abandon theprinciples it had proclaimed, and try to suffocate Germany, dismemberher, humiliate her by means of a military occupation, by controllingher transports, confiscating all her available wealth, by raisingto the dignity of elevated and highly civilized States inferiorpopulations without national dignity. 

Austria-Hungary was composed of eleven peoples. It was split up intoa series of States. Austria and Hungary were reduced to smallterritories and shut up in narrow confines. All the other countrieswere given to Rumania, to Serbia, or more exactly to the S. H. S. State, to Poland, or else were formed into new States, such asCzeko-Slovakia. These countries were considered by the Entente asallies, and, to further good relations, the most important of theEntente nations protected their aspirations even against the wishes ofItaly. The Italians had found themselves in their difficult theatre ofwar against Galatians, Bosnians, Croats, Transylvanians, etc. Butby the simple fact of their having changed names, and having calledthemselves Poles, Jugo-Slavs, Rumanians, they became friends. In orderto favour some of these new friends, it has happened that not onlyhave Italy's sentiments been offended, but even justice itself. Montenegro was always mentioned in the declarations of the Entente. On January 10, 1917, Briand, speaking in the name of all the Allies, united at that time _pour la défense et la liberté des peuples_, putforward as a fundamental programme the restoration of Belgium, Serbiaand Montenegro: Montenegro was in this on an equality with Belgium. Just a year afterwards, January 8, 1918, Wilson, when formulating hisfourteen points, had included in the eleventh proposition the dutyof evacuating the territories of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, andrestoring them. The exact reason for which it was established thatMontenegro should be absorbed (even without plebiscite) by the S. H. S. State, thus offending also Italy's sentiments, will remain one of themost melancholy pages of the New Holy Alliance that the Entente hasbecome, along with that poor prestigeless organism, the League ofNations. But let us hope this latter will find a means of renovatingitself. 

While France was ruining the German people's sources of life, thepeoples who had fought most ferociously against Italy became, throughthe War, friendly nations, and every aspiration of Italy appeareddirected to lessen the prestige of the new friends and allies. 

The territories annexed to Italy have a small economic value. 

For more than thirty years Italy had sold a large part of her richestagricultural produce to Germany and had imported a considerable shareof her raw materials from Russia. Since the War she has found herselfin a state of regular isolation. A large part of the Italian Press, which repeats at haphazard the commonest themes of the French Pressinstead of wishing for a more intense revival of commercial relationswith Germany, frightens the ignorant public with stories of Germanpenetration; and the very plutocracy in France and Italy--though notto the same extent in Italy--abandons itself to the identical error. So to-day we find spread throughout the peninsula a sense oflively discontent which is conducive to a wider acceptance of theexaggerations of the Socialists and the Fascists. But the phenomenonis a transitory one. 

Italy had no feeling of rancour against the German people. Sheentered the War against German Imperialism, and cannot now followany imperialistic policy. Indeed, in the face of the imperialisticcompetitions which have followed the War, Italy finds herself in astate of profound psychological uneasiness. 

France worries herself about one people only, since as a matter offact she has only one warlike race at her frontiers: Germany. Italy'sfrontiers touch France, the German peoples, the Slav races. It is, therefore, her interest to approve a democratic policy which allows noone of the group of combatants to take up a position of superiority. The true Italian nationalist policy consists in being against allexcessive nationalisms, and nothing is more harmful to Italy's policythan the abandonment of those democratic principles in the name ofwhich she arose and by which she lives. If the policy of justice isa moral duty for the other nations, for Italy it is a necessity ofexistence. The Italian people has a clear vision of these facts, notwithstanding a certain section of her Press and notwithstanding theexaggerations of certain excited parties arisen from the ashes of theWar. And therefore her uneasiness is great. While other countries havean economic crisis, Italy experiences, in addition, a mental crisis, but one with which she will be able to cope. 

France, however, is in a much more difficult situation, and her policyis still a result of her anxieties. All the violences against Germanywere, until the day before yesterday, an effect of hatred; to-day theyderive from dread. Moral ideas have for nations a still greater valuethan wealth. France had until the other day the prestige of herdemocratic institutions. All of us who detested the Hohenzollerndynasty and the insolent fatuity of William II loved France, heir ofthe bourgeois revolution and champion of democracy. So, when the Warcame, all the democracies felt a lively pang: the crushing of Francemeant the crushing of democracy and liberty. All the old bonds arebroken, all the organization which Germany had abroad is smashed up, and France has been saved, not by arms alone, but by the potent lifeof free peoples. 

Yet victory has taken away from France her greatest prestige, herfascination as a democratic country. Now all the democratic races ofthe world look at France with an eye of diffidence--some, indeed, withrancour; others with hate. France has comported herself much morecrudely toward Germany than a victorious Germany would have comportedherself toward France. In the case of Russia, she has followed purelyplutocratic tendencies. She has on foot the largest army in the worldin front of a helpless Germany. She sends coloured troops to occupythe most cultured and progressive cities of Germany, abusing thefruits of victory. She shows no respect for the principle ofnationality or for the right of self-determination. 

Germany is in a helpless and broken condition to-day; she will notmake war; she cannot. But if to-morrow she should make war, how manypeoples would come to France's aid?

The policy which has set the people of Italy against one another, thediffusion of nationalist violence, the crude persecutions of enemies, excluded even from the League of Nations, have created an atmosphereof distrust of France. Admirable in her political perceptiveness, France, by reason of an error of exaltation, has lost almost all thebenefit of her victorious action. 

A situation hedged with difficulties has been brought about. TheUnited States and Great Britain have no longer any treaty of allianceof guarantee with France. The Anglo-Saxons, conquerors of the War andthe peace, have drawn themselves aside. Italy has no alliance andcannot have any. No Italian politician could pledge his country, andParliament only desires that Italy follow a democratic, peacefulpolicy, maintaining herself in Europe as a force for equilibrium andlife. 

France, apart from her military alliance with Belgium, has a wholesystem of alliances based largely on the newly formed States: shiftingsands like Poland, Russia's and Germany's enemy, whose fate no one canprophesy when Germany is reconstructed and Russia risen again, unlessshe finds a way of remedying her present mistakes, which are much morenumerous than her past misfortunes. Thus the more France increases herarmy, the more she corners raw materials and increases her measuresagainst Germany, the more unquiet she becomes. 

She has seen that Germany, mistress on land, and to a large extent onthe seas, after having carried everywhere her victorious flag, afterhaving organized her commerce and, by means of her bankers, merchantsand capitalists, made vast expansions and placed a regular network ofrelations and intrigue round the earth, fell when she attempted heract of imperialistic violence. France, when in difficulties, appealedto the sentiment of the nations and found arms everywhere to help her. What then is able organization worth to-day?

The fluctuations of fortune in Europe show for all her peoples asuccession of victories and defeats. There are no peoples alwaysvictorious. After having, under Napoleon I, humiliated Germany, Francesaw the end of her imperialistic dream, and later witnessed the ruinof Napoleon III. She has suffered two great defeats, and then, whenshe stood diminished in stature before a Germany at the top of herfortune, she, together with the Allies, has had a victory over anenemy who seemed invincible. 

But no one can foresee the future. To have conveyed great nuclei ofGerman populations to the Slav States, and especially to Poland; tohave divided the Magyars, without any consideration for their finerace, among the Rumanians, Czeko-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs; to haveused every kind of violence with the Bulgars; to have offended Turkeyon any and every pretext; to have done this is not to have guaranteedthe victory and the peace. 

Russia sooner or later will recover. It is an illusion to suppose thatGreat Britain, France and Italy can form an agreement to regulate thenew State or new States that will arise in Russia. There are too manytendencies and diverse interests. Germany, too, will reconstructherself after a series of sorrows and privations, and no one can sayhow the Germans will behave. Unless a policy of peace and socialrenovation be shaped and followed, our sons will witness scenes muchmore terrible than those which have horrified our generation and upsetour minds even more than our interests. 

Meanwhile, in spite of the frightful increase of scrofula, ricketsand tuberculosis, from which the conquered peoples are principallysuffering, the march of the nations will proceed according to the lawswhich have hitherto ruled them and on which our limited action canonly for brief periods cause small modifications or alterations. 

Demographic forecasts, like all forecasts of social events, have buta comparative value. It is true that demographic movements areespecially biological manifestations, but it is also true thateconomic and social factors exercise a profound influence in limitingtheir regularity and can disturb them very considerably. It is bettertherefore not to make long prophecies. 

What is certain is that the French population has increased almostimperceptibly while the population of Germany augmented very rapidly. The annual average of births in the five years before the War, 1908-13, was 762, 000 in France and 176, 000 in Belgium. In Germany itwas 1, 916, 000. The average of deaths was 729, 000 in France, 117, 000 inBelgium, and 1, 073, 000 in Germany. Thus, per thousand, the excess ofbirths in France was 0. 9, in Belgium 7. 7, in Germany 13. The Warhas terribly aggravated the situation in France, whose demographicstructure is far from being a healthy one. From statistics publishedgiving the first results of the French census of 1921--without the newterritory of Alsace-Lorraine--France, in the interval between thetwo census periods, has decreased by 2, 102, 864; from 39, 602, 258 to37, 499, 394 (1921). The deaths in the War do not represent a half ofthis decrease, when is deducted the losses among the coloured troopsand those from French colonies who fought for France. The newterritories annexed to France do not compensate for the War-mortalityand the decrease in births. 

We may presume that if normal conditions of life return, thepopulation of Germany and German-Austria will be more than one hundredmillions, that the population of Belgium altogether little less thanfifty millions, that Italy will have a population much greater thanthat of France, of at least forty-five million inhabitants, and thatGreat Britain will have about sixty million inhabitants. In the caseof the Germans we have mentioned one hundred million persons, takinginto consideration Germany and German-Austria. But the Germans ofPoland, of Czeko-Slovakia and the Baltic States will amount to atleast twenty millions of inhabitants. No one can make forecasts, evenof an approximate nature, on Russia, whose fecundity is always thehighest in Europe, and whose losses are rapidly replaced by a highbirth-rate even after the greatest catastrophes. And then there arethe Germans spread about the world, great aggregations of populationsas in the United States of America and in a lesser degree in Brazil. Up to now these people have been silent, not only because they weresurrounded by hostile populations, but because the accusation of beingsons of the Huns weighed down upon them more than any danger of theWar. But the Treaty of Versailles, and more still the manner inwhich it has been applied, is to dissipate, and soon will entirelydissipate, the atmosphere of antipathy that existed against theGermans. In Great Britain the situation has changed profoundly inthree years. The United States have made their separate peace and wantno responsibility. In Italy there scarcely exists any hatred for theGermans, and apart from certain capitalists who paint in lurid coloursthe danger of German penetration in their papers because they wanthigher tariff protection and to be able to speculate on governmentorders, there is no one who does not desire peace with all peoples. The great majority of the Italian people only desire to reconstructthe economic and social life of the nation. 

Certain tendencies in France's policy depend perhaps on her greatanxiety for the future, an anxiety, in fact, not unjustified by thelessons of the past. Germany, notwithstanding her fallen state, heranguish and the torment she has to go through, is so strong and vitalthat everybody is certain of seeing her once again potent, indeed morepotent and formidable than ever. 

Everyone in France is convinced that the Treaty of Versailles has lostall foundation since the United States of America abandoned it, andsince Great Britain and Italy, persuaded of the impossibility ofputting certain clauses into effect, have shown by their attitude thatthey are not disposed to entertain coercive measures which are asuseless as they are damaging. 

In France the very authors of the Treaty of Versailles recognize thatit is weakened by a series of successive attenuations. Tardieu hasasserted that the Treaty of Versailles tends to be abandoned on allsides: "_Cette faillite a des causes allemandes, des causes alliés, des causes françaises_" (p. 489). The United States has asked itself, after the trouble that has followed the treaty, if wisdom did not liein the old time isolation, in Washington's testament, in the Monroedoctrine: _Keep off_. But in America they have not understood, saysTardieu, that to assist Europe the same solidarity was necessary thatexisted during the War (p. 493). 

Great Britain, according to Tardieu, tends now also to stand aside. The English are inclined to say, "_N'en parlons plus_" (p. 493). NoFrenchman will accept with calm the manner in which Lloyd George hasconceived the execution of the peace treaty. The campaign for therevision of the treaties sprang up in lower spheres and from popularassociations and workmen's groups, has surprised and saddened theFrench spirit (p. 495). In the new developments "_était-ce une autreAngleterre, était-ce un autre Lloyd George_?" (p. 496). Even in Franceherself Tardieu recognizes sadly the language has altered: "_lesgouvernements français, qui se sont succédé au pouvoir depuis le_ 10_janvier_, 1920, " that is, after the fall of Clemenceau, accused inturn by Poincaré of being weak and feeble in asserting his demands, "_ont compromis les droits que leur prédecesseur avait faitreconnaître à la France_" (p. 503). 

Taking into consideration Germany's financial downfall, whichthreatens to upset not only all the indemnity schemes but the entireeconomy of continental Europe, the state of mind which is prevalent isnot much different from that which Tardieu indicates. 

It is already more than a year ago since I left the direction of theItalian Government, and the French Press no longer accused me of beingin perfect agreement with Lloyd George, yet Poincaré wrote on August1, 1920:

_L'autre jour M. Asquith déclarait au parlement britannique: "Quelqueforme de langage qu'on emploie, la conférence de Spa a bien été, enfait, une conférence pour la révision des conditions du traité. ""Chut!" a répondu M. Lloyd George: "c'est là une déclaration trèsgrave par l'effet qu'elle peut produire en France. Je ne puis lalaisser passer sans la contredire. " Contradiction de pure forme, faitepour courtoisie vis-à-vis de nous, mais qui malheureusement ne changerien au fond des choses. Chaque fois que le Conseil Suprême s'estréuni, il a laissé sur la table des delibérations quelques morceauxépars du traité_. 

No kind of high-handedness, no combined effort, will ever be able tokeep afloat absurdities like the dream of the vast indemnity, thePolish programme, the hope of annexing the Saar, etc. As things gothere is almost more danger for the victors than for the vanquished. He who has lost all has nothing to lose. It is rather the victoriousnations who risk all in this disorganized Europe of ours. Theconquerors arm themselves in the ratio by which the vanquished disarm, and the worse the situation of our old enemies becomes, so muchthe worse become the exchanges and the credits of the victoriouscontinental countries. 

Yet, in some of the exaggerated ideas of France and other countries ofthe Entente, there is not only the rancour and anxiety for the future, but a sentiment of well-founded diffidence. After the War the EuropeanStates belonging to the Entente have been embarrassed not only onaccount of the enormous internal debts, but also for the huge debtscontracted abroad. 

If Germany had not had to pay any indemnity and had not lost hercolonies and mercantile marine we should have been confronted with theabsurd paradox that the victorious nations would have issued fromthe War worn out, with their territories destroyed, and with a hugeforeign debt; Germany would have had her territory quite intact, herindustries ready to begin work again, herself anxious to startagain her productive force, and in addition with no foreign debt, consequently ample credit abroad. In the mad struggle to breakup Germany there has had part not only hatred, but also a quitereasonable anxiety which, after all, must be taken into consideration. 

Even to-day, three years after the War, Great Britain has not paid herdebt to America, and France and Italy have not paid their debts toAmerica and Great Britain. Great Britain could pay with a greateffort; France and Italy cannot pay anyhow. 

According to the accounts of the American Treasury the Allies' Wardebt is 9, 587 millions of dollars: 4, 277 millions owing from GreatBritain, 2, 977 millions from France, 1, 648 millions from Italy, 349millions from Belgium, 187 millions from Russia, 61 millions fromCzeko-Slovakia, 26 millions from Serbia, 25 millions from Rumania, and15 millions from Greece. Up to last July Great Britain had paid back110 millions of dollars. Since the spring of 1919 the payment ofthe interest on the amounts due to the American Treasury has beensuspended by some European States. Between October and November, 1919, the amount of the capitalizing and unpaid interests of the EuropeanStates came to 236 million dollars. The figure has considerablyincreased since then. 

According to the _Statist_ (August 6, 1921) the Allies' debt to theUnited States on March 31, 1921, amounted to ten milliards and 959million dollars, including the interests, in which sum Great Britainwas interested to the sum of 4, 775 million dollars and France for3, 351 million dollars. But the _Statist's_ figures, in variance to theofficial figures, include other debts than strictly war debts. 

The debts of the various allied countries' to Great Britain on March31, 1921, according to a schedule annexed to the financialstatement for 1921-22, published by the British Treasury, came to£1, 777, 900, 000, distributed as follows: France 557 millions, Italy476 millions, Russia 561 millions, Belgium 94 millions, Serbia 22millions, Portugal, Rumania, Greece and other Allies 66 millions. Thissum represents War debts. But to it must be added the £9, 900, 000 givenby Great Britain for the reconstruction of Belgium and the loansgranted by her for relief to an amount of £16, 000, 000. So, altogether, Great Britain's credit to the Allies on March 31, 1921, was£1, 803, 600, 000, and has since been increased by the interests. GreatBritain had also at the same date a credit of £144, 000, 000 to herdominions. 

France has credit of little less than nine milliard francs, of which875 millions is from Italy, four milliards from Russia, 2, 250 millionsfrom Belgium, 500 millions from the Jugo-Slavs, and 1, 250 millionsfrom other Allies. Italy has only small credits of no account. 

Now this situation, by reason of which the victorious countries ofEurope are heavy debtors (France has a foreign debt of nearly 30milliards, and Italy a debt of more than 20 milliards) in comparisonwith Germany, which came out of the War without any debt, has createda certain amount of bad feeling. Germany would have got on her feetagain quicker than the victors if she had no indemnity to pay and hadno foreign debts to settle. 

France's anxieties in this matter are perfectly legitimate and must bemost seriously considered without, however, producing the enormitiesof the Treaty of Versailles. 

Assuming this, the situation may be stated in the following terms:

1. All the illusions as to the capacity of Germany being able to payhave fallen to pieces, and the indemnities, after the absurd demandswhich tended to consider as inadequate the figure of 350 milliardsand an annual payment of from ten to fifteen milliards have becomean anxious unknown quantity, as troublesome to the victors as to thevanquished. The German circulation has lost all control under theforce of internal needs, and Germany is threatened with failure. The other debtors--Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria--have needof succour, and can pay nothing. Austria has need of the mostindispensable objects of existence, and everything is lacking. 

2. The indemnity which Germany can pay annually in her presentcondition cannot, calculating goods and cash payments altogether, represent more than two or three milliards at the most. 

3. The victorious countries, such as France, have won immenseterritories and great benefits, yet they have not been able to pay theWar debts contracted abroad, and not even the interests. France andItaly, being countries of good faith, have demonstrated that, if theycannot pay, it is absurd to demand the payment of much higher sumsfrom countries like Germany, which has lost almost all her bestresources: mercantile fleet, colonies and foreign organization, etc. 

4. The danger exists that with the aggravation of the situation in thevanquished countries and the weakening of the economic structure ofEurope, the vanquished countries will drag the victors down withthem to ruin, while the Anglo-Saxon peoples, standing apart fromContinental Europe, will detach themselves more and more from itspolicy. 

5. The situation which has come about is a reason for everyone to beanxious, and threatens both the downfall of the vanquished and thealmost inevitable ruin of the victors, unless a way is found ofreconstructing the moral unity of Europe and the solidarity ofeconomic life. 

VI

EUROPE'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE POLICY

No right-thinking person has nowadays any doubt as to the profoundinjustice of the Treaty of Versailles and of all the treaties whichderive from it. But this fact is of small importance, inasmuch as itis not justice or injustice which regulates the relations betweennations, but their interests and sentiments. In the past we have seenChristian peoples, transplanted in America, maintain the necessity ofslavery, and we have seen, and continue to see every day, methods ofreasoning which, when used by the defeated enemy were declared to befallacious and wrong, become in turn, when varied only in form, theideas and the customary life of the conquerors in the War--ideas whichthen assume the quality of liberal expressions of democracy. 

If appeals to the noblest human sentiments are not made in vain (andno effort of goodness or generosity is ever sterile), the convictionwhich is gradually forming itself, even in the least receptive minds, that the treaties of peace are inapplicable, as harmful to theconquerors as to the conquered, gains in force. For the treaties areat one and the same time a menace for the conquerors and a paralysisof all activity on the part of the conquered, since once the economicunity of Continental Europe is broken the resultant depression becomesinevitable. 

If many errors have been committed, many errors were inevitable. Whatwe must try to do now is to limit the consequences of these mistakesin a changed spirit. To reconstruct where we see only ruins is themost evident necessity. We must also try to diffuse among the nationswhich have won the War together and suffered together the least amountof diffidence possible. As it is, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, all go their own way. France has obtained hermaximum of concessions, including those of least use to her, but neverbefore has the world seen her so alone in her attitude as after thetreaties of Paris. 

What is most urgently required at the moment is to change theprevalent war-mentality which still infects us and overcomes allgenerous sentiments, all hopes of unity. The statement that war makesmen better or worse is, perhaps, an exaggerated one. War, whichcreates a state of exaltation, hypertrophies all the qualities, allthe tendencies, be they for good or for evil. Ascetic souls, spiritsnaturally noble, being disposed toward sacrifice, develop a stateof exaltation and true fervour. How many examples of nobility, ofabnegation, of voluntary martyrdom has not the War given us? But inpersons disposed to evil actions, in rude and violent spirits (andthese are always in the majority), the spirit of violence increases. This spirit, which among the intellectuals takes the form of arroganceand concupiscence, and in politics expresses itself in a policy ofconquest, assumes in the crowd the most violent forms of class war, continuous assaults upon the power of the State, and an unbalanceddesire to gain as much as possible with the least possible work. 

Before the War the number of men ready to take the law into their ownhands was relatively small; now there are many such individuals. The various nations, even those most advanced, cannot boast a moralprogress comparable with their intellectual development. The explosionof sentiments of violence has created in the period after the War inmost countries an atmosphere which one may call unbreathable. Peoplesaccustomed to be dominated and to serve have come to believe that, having become dominators in their turn, they have the right to useevery kind of violence against their overlords of yesterday. Are notthe injustices of the Poles against the Germans, and those of theRumanians against the Magyars, a proof of this state of mind? Even inthe most civilized countries many rules of order and discipline havegone by the board. 

After all the great wars a condition of torpor, of unwillingness towork, together with a certain rudeness in social relations, has alwaysbeen noticed. 

The war of 1870 was a little war in comparison with the cataclysm letloose by the European War. Yet then the conquered country had itsattempt at Bolshevism, which in those days was called the Commune, and the fall of its political regime. In the conquering country wewitnessed, together with the rapid development of industrial groups, aquick growth in Socialism and the constitution of great parties likethe Catholic Centre. _Mutatis mutandis_, the same situation has shownitself after the European War. 

What is most urgently necessary, therefore, is to effect a return topeace sentiments, and in the manifestations of government to abandonthose attitudes which in the peaces of Paris had their roots in hate. 

I have tried, as Premier of Italy, as writer, and as politician, toregulate my actions by this principle. In the first months of 1920 Igave instructions to Italy's ambassador in Vienna, the Marquis dellaTorretta, to arrange a meeting between himself and Chancellor Renner, head of the Government of Vienna. So the chief of the conqueredcountry came, together with his Ministers, to greet the head of theconquering country, and there was no word that could record in any waythe past hatred and the ancient rancour. All the conversation was ofthe necessity for reconstruction and for the development of freshcurrents of life and commercial activity. The Government of Italyhelped the Government of Austria in so far as was possible. And in soacting, I felt I was working better for the greatness of my countrythan I could possibly have done by any kind of stolid persecution. I felt that over and beyond our competition there existed the humansorrow of nations for whom we must avoid fresh shedding of blood andfresh wars. Had I not left the Government, it was my intention notonly to continue in this path, but also to intensify my efforts inthis direction. 

The banal idea that there exist in Europe two groups of nations, oneof which stands for violence and barbarism--the Germans, the Magyarsand the Bulgarians--while the other group of Anglo-Saxons and Latinsrepresents civilization, must not continue to be repeated, because notonly is it an outrage on truth but an outrage on honesty. 

Always to repeat that the Germans are not adapted for a democraticregime is neither just nor true. Nor is it true that Germany is anessentially warlike country, and therefore different from all otherlands. In the last three centuries France and England have fought manymore wars than Germany. One must read the books of the Napoleonicperiod to see with what disdain pacificist Germany is referredto--that country of peasants, waiters and philosophers. It issufficient to read the works of German writers, including Treitschkehimself, to perceive for what a long period of time the German lands, anxious for peace, have considered France as the country always eagerfor war and conquest. 

Not only am I of the opinion that Germany is a land suited fordemocratic institutions, but I believe that after the fall of theEmpire democratic principles have a wider prevalence there than inany other country of Europe. The resistance offered to the peace ofVersailles--that is, to disorganization--may be claimed as a merit forthe democratic parties, which, if they are loyally assisted by theStates of the Entente, can not only develop themselves but establish agreat and noble democracy. 

Germany has accustomed us in history to the most remarkable surprises. A century and a half ago she was considered as a pacificist nationwithout national spirit. She has since then become a warlike countrywith the most pronounced national spirit. Early in the seventeenthcentury there were in Germany more than one hundred territories andindependent States. There was no true national conscience, and noteven the violence of the Napoleonic wars, a century after, sufficedto awaken it. What was required was a regular effort of thought, asustained programme of action on the part of men like Wolff, Fichteand Hegel to mould a national conscience. Fifty years earlier no onewould have believed in the possibility of a Germany united andcompact in her national sentiment. Germany passed from the widestdecentralization to the greatest concentration and the intensestnational life. Germany will also be a democratic country if theviolence of her ancient enemies does not drive her into a state ofexaltation which will tend to render minds and spirits favourable to areturn to the old regime. 

To arrive at peace we must first of all desire peace. We must nolonger carry on conversations by means of military missions, but bymeans of ambassadors and diplomatic representatives. 

1. --THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE VANQUISHED

A great step towards peace may be made by admitting at once allex-enemy States into the League of Nations. Among the States ofEuropean civilization millions of persons are unrepresented in theLeague of Nations: the United States, who has not wished to adhere toit after the Treaty of Versailles sanctioned violence; Russia, whohas not been able to join owing to her difficult position; Germany, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria, who have not been permitted to join;the Turks, etc. The League of Nations was a magnificent conception inwhich I have had faith, and which I have regarded with sympathy. But aformidable mistake has deprived it of all prestige. Clauses 5 and 10of its originating constitution and the exclusion of the defeatedhave given it at once the character of a kind of Holy Alliance of theconquerors established to regulate the incredible relations which thetreaties have created between conquerors and conquered. Wilson hadalready committed the mistake of founding the League of Nationswithout first defining the nations and leaving to chance the resourcesof the beaten peoples and their populations. The day, however, onwhich all the peoples are represented in the League, the UnitedStates, without approving the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain orTrianon, etc. , will feel the need of abandoning their isolation, whichis harmful for them and places them in a position of inferiority. Andthe day when all the peoples of the world are represented, and acceptreciprocal pledges of international solidarity, a great step will havebeen taken. 

As things stand, the organism of the Reparations Commission, established by Schedule 2 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, is an absurd union of the conquerors (no longer allies, but reunitedsolely in a kind of bankruptcy procedure), who interpret the treaty intheir own fashion, and can even modify the laws and regulations inthe conquered countries. The existence of such an institution amongcivilized peoples ought to be an impossibility. Its powers must betransferred to the League of Nations in such a manner as to provideguarantees for the victors, but guarantees also for the conquered. The suppression of the Reparations Commission becomes, therefore, afundamental necessity. 

2. --THE REVISION OF THE TREATIES

When the public, and especially in the United States and GreatBritain, become convinced that the spirit of peace can only prevail bymeans of an honest revision of the treaties the difficulties will beeasily eliminated. But one cannot merely speak of a simple revision;it would be a cure worse than the evil. During the tempest one cannotabandon the storm-beaten ship and cross over to a safer vessel. It isnecessary to return into harbour and make the transhipment where calm, or relative calm at any rate, reigns. 

Inasmuch as Europe is out of equilibrium, a settlement, even of abad kind, cannot be arrived at off-hand. To cast down the presentpolitical scaffolding without having built anything would be an error. Perhaps here the method that will prove most efficacious is to entrustthe League of Nations with the task of arriving at a revision. When the League of Nations is charged with this work the variousgovernments will send their best politicians, and the discussion willbe able to assume a realizable character. 

According to its constitution, the League of Nations may, in case ofwar or the menace of war (Clause 11), convoke its members, and takeall the measures required to safeguard the peace of the nations. Allthe adhering States have recognized their obligation to submit allcontroversies to arbitration, and that in any case they have no rightto resort to war before the expiration of a term of three months afterthe verdict of the arbiters or the report of the Council (Clause 12). Any member of the League of Nations resorting to war contrary to theundertakings of the treaty which constitutes the League is, _ipsofacto_, considered as if he had committed an act of war against allthe other members of the League (Clause 19). 

But more important still is the fact that the Assembly of the Leagueof Nations may invite its members to proceed to a fresh examinationof treaties that become inapplicable as well as of internationalsituations whose prolongation might imperil the peace of the world(Clause 19). 

We may therefore revise the present treaties without violence andwithout destroying them. 

What requires to be modified there is no necessity to say, inasmuch asall the matter of this book supplies the evidence and the proof. Whatis certain is that in Europe and America, except for an intransigentmovement running strong in France, everyone is convinced of thenecessity of revision. 

It will be well that this revision should take place through theoperations of the League of Nations after the representatives of allthe States, conquerors, conquered and neutrals, have come to form partof it. 

But in the constitution of the League of Nations there are two clauseswhich form its fundamental weakness, sections desired by France, whosegravity escaped Wilson. 

Clause 5 declares that, save and excepting contrary dispositions, thedecisions of the Assembly or of the Council are to be by the unanimousconsent of the members represented at the meetings. It is difficultto imagine anything more absurd. If the modification of a territorialsituation is being discussed, all the nations must agree as to thesolution, including the interested nation. The League of Nations isconvinced that the Danzig corridor is an absurdity, but if France isnot of the same opinion no modification can be made. Without a changeof this clause, every honest attempt at revision must necessarilybreak down. 

Clause 10, by which the members of the League of Nations pledgethemselves to respect and preserve from external attacks theterritorial integrity and the existing political independence of allthe members of the League, must also be altered. This clause, whichis profoundly immoral, consecrates and perpetuates the mistakesand faults of the treaties. No honest country can guarantee theterritorial integrity of the States now existing after the monstrousparcelling out of entire groups of Germans and Magyars to othernations, arranged without scruples and without intelligence. No onecan honestly guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland as itstands at present. If a new-risen Russia, a renewed Germany, and anunextinguished Austria desire in the future a revision of the treatiesthey will be making a most reasonable demand to which no civilizedcountry may make objection. It is indeed Clauses 5 and 10 which havedeprived the constitution of the League of Nations of all moralcredit, which have transformed it into an instrument of oppression forthe victors, which have caused the just and profound disapproval ofthe most enlightened men of the American Senate. A League of Nationswith Clauses 5 and 10 and the prolonged exclusion of the vanquishedcannot but accentuate the diffidence of all the democracies and theaversion of the masses. 

But the League of Nations can be altered and can become indeed a greatforce for renovation if the problem of its functioning be clearlyconfronted and promptly resolved. 

The League of Nations can become a great guarantee for peace on threeconditions:

(a) That it include really and in the shortest space of time possibleall the peoples, conquerors, conquered and neutrals. 

(b) That clauses 5 and 10 be modified, and that after theirmodification a revision of the treaties be undertaken. 

(c) That the Reparations Commission be abolished and its powers beconferred upon the League of Nations itself. 

As it exists at present the League of Nations has neither prestige nordignity; it is an expression of the violence of the conquering groupof nations. But reconstituted and renovated it may become the greatestof peace factors in the relations between the peoples. 

3. --THE SAFETY OF FRANCE AND THE MILITARY GUARANTEES

In the state of mind in which France exists at present there is areasonable cause of worry for the future. Since the conclusion ofthe War the United States of America have withdrawn. They concernthemselves with Europe no more, or only in a very limited form andwith diffidence. The Monroe doctrine has come into its own again. Great Britain watches the decadence of the European continent, but, girt by the sea, has nothing to fear. She is a country of Europe, butshe does not live the life of Europe; she stands apart from it. Italy, when she has overcome the difficulties of her economic situation, canbe certain of her future. The very fact that she stands in directopposition to no State, that she may have competition with variouspeoples but not long-nurtured hatreds, gives Italy a relativesecurity. But France, who has been in less than forty-four years twiceat war with Germany, has little security for her future. Germanyand the Germanic races increase rapidly in number. France does notincrease. France, notwithstanding the new territories, after her warlosses, has probably no more inhabitants than in 1914. In her almosttormented anxiety to destroy Germany we see her dread for thefuture--more indeed than mere hatred. To occupy with numerous troopsthe left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads is an act of vengeance;but in the vengeance there is also anxiety. There are many in Francewho think that neither now nor after fifteen years must the territoryof the vanquished be abandoned. And so France maintains in effectiveforce too large an army and nourishes too great a rancour. And forthis reason she helps the Poles in their unjustifiable attempt inUpper Silesia, will not allow the Germans of Austria to live, andseeks to provoke and facilitate all movements and political actionswhich can tend towards the dismemberment of Germany. The British andthe Italian viewpoints are essentially different. France, which knowsit can no longer count on the co-operation of Great Britain, of theUnited States, or of Italy, keeps on foot her numerous army, hasallied herself with Belgium and Poland, and tries to suffocate Germanyin a ring of iron. The attempt is a vain one and destined to failwithin a few years, inasmuch as France's allies have no capacity forresistance. Yet, all the same, her attempt derives from a feeling thatis not only justifiable but just. 

France had obtained at Paris, apart from the occupation of the leftbank of the Rhine and all the military controls, two guaranteeingtreaties from the United States and from Great Britain: in case ofunprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, Great Britain andthe United States pledged themselves to defend France. The BritishParliament, as we have seen, approved the treaty provisionally on thesimilar approbation of the United States. But as the latter has notapproved the Treaty of Versailles, and has not even discussed theguarantee treaty, France has now no guarantee treaty. 

If we are anxious to realize a peace politic two things are necessary:

1. That France has security, and that for twenty years at leastGreat Britain and Italy pledge themselves to defend her in case ofaggression. 

2. That the measures for the disarmament of the conquered States bemaintained, maybe with some tempering of their conditions, and thattheir execution and control be entrusted with the amplest powers tothe League of Nations. 

No one can think it unjust that the parties who provoked the War orthose who have, if not the entire, at least the greatest share ofresponsibility, should be rendered for a certain time incapable. The fall of the military caste in Germany and the formation of ademocratic society will derive much help from the abolition, for a nottoo brief period of time, of the permanent army, and this will renderpossible, at no distant date, an effective reduction of the armamentsin the victorious countries. 

Great Britain has the moral duty to proffer a guarantee alreadyspontaneously given. Italy also must give such a guarantee if shewishes truly to contribute towards the peace of Europe. 

As long as Germany has no fleet, and cannot put together an artilleryand an aviation corps, she cannot present a menace. 

Great Britain and Italy can, however, only give their guarantees onthe condition that they guarantee a proper state of things and not acontinued condition of violence. The withdrawal of all the troops fromthe Rhine ought to coincide with a clear definition concerning thefate of the Germans of Austria and the Germans detached from Germanywithout motive. Such a retirement must coincide with the definitionof the territory of the Saar, and the assigning, pure and simple, ofUpper Silesia to Germany and the end of all the insupportable controlsand the indemnity regulations. 

Being myself contrary to any pledge binding Italy for too long aperiod, I am of opinion that it is perfectly right that Great Britainand Italy should make this sacrifice for the peace of Europe. 

But no guarantee is possible, either for Great Britain or Italy, untilthe most essential problems be resolved in the justest manner by meansof straightforward and explicit understandings. 

Italy's tendency towards British policy on the continent of Europedepends on the fact that Great Britain has never wished or toleratedthat any continental State should have a hegemony over others. And, therefore, she has found herself at different epochs ranged againstFrance, Germany and Russia. 

England is in the Mediterranean solely to secure her passage throughit, not to dominate it. She continues to follow the grand policy bywhich she has transformed her colonies into dominions, and, in spiteof errors, she has always shown the greatest respect for the libertyof other peoples. 

But Europe will not have peace until the three progressive countriesof the Continent, Germany, France and Italy, find a way of agreementwhich can reunite all their energies in one common force. 

Russia has conceived the idea of having the hegemony of Europe;Germany has indeed had the illusion of such a hegemony. Now thisillusion penetrates certain French elements. Can a people of fortymillion inhabitants, who are not increasing, who already finddifficulties in dominating and controlling their immense colonies, aspire to hegemonic action, even taking count of their great politicalprestige? Can France lastingly dominate and menace a country likeGermany, which at no distant date will have a population double thatof France?

The future of European civilization requires that Germany, France andItaly, after so much disaster, find a common road to travel. 

The first step to be taken is to give security of existence and ofreconstruction to Germany; the second is to guarantee France from theperils of a not distant future; the third is to find at all costs ameans of accord between Germany, France and Italy. 

But only vast popular movements and great currents of thought andof life can work effectively in those cases where the labours ofpoliticians have revealed themselves as characterized by uncertaintyand as being too traditional. Europe is still under the dominion ofold souls which often enough dwell in young bodies and, therefore, unite old errors with violence. A great movement can only come fromthe intellectuals of the countries most menaced and from fresh popularenergies. 

4. --REGULATING INTER-ALLIED DEBTS, GERMANY'S INDEMNITY AND THAT OF THEDEFEATED COUNTRIES

These two problems are closely connected. 

The victorious countries demand an indemnity from the conqueredcountries which, except Germany, who has a great productive force evenin her hour of difficulties, are in extreme depression and misery. 

Great Britain is in debt to the United States, and France, Italy andminor nations are in their turn heavy debtors to the Americans and toGreat Britain. 

The experience of the last three years has shown that, even with thebest will, none of the countries owing money to the Entente has beenable to pay its debts or even the interest. With an effort GreatBritain could pay; France and Italy will never be able to, and have, moreover, exchanges which constitute a real menace for the future ofeach. 

The fact that France and Italy, although they came out of the warvictoriously, have not been able to pay their debts or even theinterest on them is the proof that Germany, whose best resources havebeen taken away from her, can only pay an indemnity very differentfrom the fantastic figures put forward at the time of the Conferenceof Paris, when even important political men spoke of monstrous andridiculous indemnities. 

The problem of the inter-allied debts, as well as that of theindemnity, will be solved by a certain sacrifice on the part of allwho participated in the War. 

The credits of the United States amount to almost 48 milliards of lireor francs at par, and the credits of Great Britain to 44 milliards. Great Britain owes about 21 milliards to the United States and is inturn creditor for some 44 milliards. She has a bad debt owing fromRussia for more than 14 milliards, but 13 milliards are owing fromFrance, about 12 milliards from Italy, and almost 2-1/2 milliards fromBelgium. That is to say, that Great Britain could well pay her debtto the United States, ceding the greater part of her credits towardsFrance and Italy. 

But the truth is that, while on the subject of the German indemnities, stolid illusions continue to be propagated (perhaps now with greaterdiscretion), neither France nor Italy is in a position to pay itsdebts. 

The most honest solution, which, intelligently enough, J. M. Keynes hasseen from the first, is that each of the inter-allied countries shouldrenounce its state credits towards countries that were allies orassociates during the War. The United States of America are creditorsonly; Great Britain has lent the double of what she has borrowed. France has received on loan the triple of what she has lent to others. 

The credits of France are for almost two-thirds undemandable creditsof Great Britain; more than 14 milliards being with Russia, they arefor considerably more than one-third bad debts. 

France and Italy would be benefited chiefly by this provision. GreatBritain would scarcely either benefit or lose, or, rather, the benefitaccruing to her would be less in so much as her chief credits are toRussia. 

The United States would doubtless have to bear the largest burden. Butwhen one thinks of the small sacrifice which the United States hasmade in comparison with the efforts of France and Italy (and Italy wasnot obliged to enter the War), the new sacrifice demanded does notseem excessive. 

During the War the United States of America, who for three yearsfurnished food, provisions and arms to the countries of the Entente, have absorbed the greater part of their available resources. Not onlyare the States of Europe debtors, but so are especially the privatecitizens who have contracted debts during or after the War. GreatBritain during the War had to sell at least 25 milliards of herforeign values. The United States of America, on the contrary, haveimmensely increased their reserves. 

But this very increase is harmful to them, inasmuch as the capacityfor exchange of the States of Europe has been much reduced. The UnitedStates now risk seeing still further reduced, if not destroyed, this purchasing capacity of their best clients; and this finallyconstitutes for the U. S. A. Infinitely greater damage than therenouncing of all their credits. 

To reconstruct Germany, to intensify exchange of goods with the oldcountries of Austria-Hungary and Russia, to settle the situation ofthe exchange of goods with Italy and the Balkan countries is much moreimportant for the United States and the prosperity of its people thanto demand payment or not demand payment of those debts made for thecommon cause. 

I will speak of the absurd situation which has come about. Czeko-Slovakia and Poland unwillingly indeed fought against theEntente, which has raised them to free and autonomous States; andnot only have they no debts to pay, being now in the position ofconquerors, or at least allies of the conquerors, but they have, infact, scarcely any foreign debts. 

The existence of enormous War debts is, then, everywhere a menace tofinancial stability. No one is anxious to repudiate his debts in ordernot to suffer in loss of dignity, but almost all know that they cannotpay. The end of the War, as Keynes has justly written, has broughtabout that all owe immense sums of money to one another. The holdersof loan stock in every country are creditors for vast sums towardsthe State, and the State, in its turn, is creditor for enormous sumstowards the taxpayers. The whole situation is highly artificial andirritating. We shall be unable to move unless we succeed in freeingourselves from this chain of paper. 

The work of reconstruction can begin by annulling the inter-allieddebts. 

If it is not thought desirable to proceed at once to annulment, thereremains only the solution of including them in the indemnity whichGermany must pay in the measure of 20 per cent. , allocating a certainproportion to each country which has made loans to allied andassociated governments on account of the War. In round figures theinter-allied loans come to 100 milliards. They can be reduced to 20, and then each creditor can renounce his respective credit towardsallies or associates and participate proportionately in the new credittowards Germany. Such a credit, bearing no interest, could only bedemanded after the payment of all the other indemnities, and would beconsidered in the complete total of the indemnities. 

All the illusions concerning the indemnities are now fated todisappear. They have already vanished for the other countries; theyare about to vanish in the case of Germany. 

Nevertheless it is right that Germany should pay an indemnity. Yet, ifthe conquerors cannot meet their foreign debts, how can the vanquishedclear the vast indemnity asked? Each passing day demonstrates moreclearly the misunderstanding of the indemnity. The non-experts havenot learned financial technics, but common sense tells them that thegolden nimbus which has been trailed before their eyes is only a thickcloud of smoke that is slowly dissipating. 

I have already said that the real damages to repair do not exceed40 milliards of gold marks and that all the other figures are pureexaggerations. 

If it be agreed that Germany accept 20 per cent. Of the inter-allieddebt, the indemnity may be raised to 60 milliards of francs at par, tobe paid in gold marks. 

But we must calculate for Germany's benefit all that she has alreadygiven in immediate marketable wealth. Apart from her colonies, Germanyhas given up all her mercantile marine fleet, her submarine cables, much railway material and war material, government property in cededterritory without any diminution of the amount of public debts, etc. Without taking account, then, of the colonies and her magnificentcommercial organization abroad, Germany has parted with at least 20milliards. If we were to calculate what Germany has ceded with thesame criteria with which the conquering countries have calculatedtheir losses, we should arrive at figures much surpassing these. Wemay agree in taxing Germany with an indemnity equivalent in gold marksto 60 milliards of francs at par--an indemnity to be paid in thefollowing manner:

(a) Twenty milliards of francs to be considered as already paid inconsideration of all that Germany has ceded in consequence of thetreaties. 

(b) Twenty milliards from the indemnity which Germany must pay to herconquerors, especially in coal and other materials, according to theproportions already established. 

(c) Twenty milliards--after the payment of the debts in the secondcategory to be taken over by Germany--as part of the reimbursement forcountries which have made credits to the belligerents of the Entente:that is, the United States, Great Britain and France, in proportion tothe sums lent. 

In what material can Germany pay 20 milliards in a few years?Especially in coal and in material for repairing the devastatedterritories of France. Germany must pledge herself for ten years toconsign to France a quantity of coal at least equal in bulk to thedifference between the annual production before the War in the minesof the north and in the Pas de Calais and the production of the minesin the same area during the next ten years. She must also furnishItaly--who, after the heavy losses sustained, has not the possibilityof effecting exchanges--a quantity of coal that will representthree-quarters of the figures settled upon in the Treaty ofVersailles. We can compel Germany to give to the Allies for ten years, in extinction of their credits, at least 500 millions a year in gold, with privileges on the customs receipts. 

This systematization, which can only be imposed by the free agreementof the United States and Great Britain, would have the effect ofcreating excellent relations. The United States, cancelling their, ingreat part, impossible debt, would derive the advantage of developingtheir trade and industry, and thus be able to guarantee credits forprivate individuals in Europe. It would also be of advantage to GreatBritain, who would lose nothing. Great Britain has about an equalnumber of debits and credits, with this difference, that the debitsare secured, while the credits are, in part, unsecured. France'scredits are proportionately the worst and her debits largest, almost27 milliards. France, liberated from her debt, and in a position tocalculate on a coal situation comparable with that of before the Warand with her new territories, would be in a position to re-establishherself. The cancellation of 27 milliards of debt, a proportionateshare in 20 milliards, together with all that she has had, representon the whole a sum that perhaps exceeds 50 milliards. Italy wouldhave the advantage of possessing for ten years the minimum of coalnecessary to her existence, and would be liberated from her foreigndebt, which amounts to much more than she can possibly hope for fromthe indemnity. 

Such an arrangement, or one like it, is the only way calculated toallow Europe to set out again on the path of civilization and tore-establish slowly that economic equilibrium which the War hasdestroyed with enormous damage for the conquerors and the certain ruinof the vanquished. 

But, before speaking of any indemnity, the Reparations Commission mustbe abolished and its functions handed over to the League of Nations, while all the useless controls and other hateful vexations must be putan end to. 

While the Allied troops' occupation of the Rhine costs Germany25 milliards of paper marks a year, it is foolish to speak ofreconstruction or indemnity. Either all occupation must cease or theexpenses ought not to exceed, according to the foregoing agreements, amaximum of 80 millions at par, or even less. 

We shall, however, never arrive at such an arrangement until theContinental countries become convinced of two things: first, that theUnited States will grant no credits under any formula; secondly, thatGermany, under the present system, will be unable to pay anything andwill collapse, dragging down to ruin her conquerors. 

Among many uncertainties these two convictions become ever clearer. 

If in all countries the spirit of insubordination among the workingclasses is increasing, the state of mind of the German operativesis quite remarkable. The workmen almost everywhere, in face of theenormous fortunes which the War has created and by reason of thespirit of violence working in them, have worked with bad spirit afterthe War because they have thought that a portion of their labour hasgone to form the profits of the industrials. It is useless to say thatwe are dealing here with an absurd and dangerous conception, becausethe profit of the capitalist is a necessary element of production, and because production along communist lines, wherever it has beenattempted, has brought ruin and misery. But it is useless to deny thatsuch a situation exists, together with the state of mind which itimplies. We can well imagine, then, the conditions in which Germanyand the vanquished countries find themselves. The workmen, who inFrance, England and Italy exhibit in various degree and measure astate of intractability, in Germany have to face a situation stillgraver. When they work they know that a portion of their labour isdestined to go to the victors, another part to the capitalist, andfinally there will remain something for them. Add to this that inall the beaten countries hunger is widespread, with a consequentdiminution of energy and work. 

No reasonable person can explain how humanity can continue to believein the perpetuation of a similar state of things for another fortyyears. 

In speaking of the indemnity which Germany can pay, it is necessaryto consider this special state of mind of the operatives and othercategories of producers. 

But the mere announcement of the settling of the indemnity, of theimmediate admission of the vanquished nations into the League ofNations, of the settling the question of the occupation of the Rhine, and of the firm intention to modify the constitution of the Leagueof Nations, according it the powers now held by the ReparationsCommission, will improve at once the market and signalize a definiteand assured revival. 

The United States made a great financial effort to assist theirassociates, and in their own interests, as well as for those ofEurope, they would have done badly to have continued with suchassistance. When the means provided by America come to be employed tokeep going the anarchy of central Europe, Rumania's disorder, Greece'sadventures and Poland's violences, together with Denikin's andWrangel's restoration attempts, it is better that all help shouldcease. In fact, Europe has begun to reason a little better than hergovernments since the financial difficulties have increased. 

The fall of the mark and Germany's profound economic depression havealready destroyed a great part of the illusions on the subject of theindemnity, and the figures with which for three years the public hasbeen humbugged no longer convince anyone. 

5. --FORMING NEW CONNEXIONS WITH RUSSIA

Among the States of the Entente there is always a fundamental discordon the subject of Russia. Great Britain recognized at once that if itwere impossible to acknowledge the Soviet Government it was a mistaketo encourage attempts at restoration. After the first moments ofuncertainty Great Britain has insisted on temperate measures, andnotwithstanding that during the War she made the largest loans to theRussian Government (more than 14 milliards of francs at par, whileFrance only lent about 4 milliards), she has never put forward theidea that, as a condition precedent to the recognition of the SovietGovernment, a guarantee of the repayment of the debt was necessary. Only France has had this mistaken idea, which she has forced to thepoint of asking for the sequestration of all gold sent abroad by theSoviet Government for the purchase of goods. 

Wilson had already stated in his fourteen points what the attitude ofthe Entente towards Russia ought to be, but the attitudes actuallyassumed have been of quite a different order. 

The barrier which Poland wants to construct between Germany and Russiais an absurdity which must be swept away at once. Having taken awayGermany's colonies and her capacities for expansion abroad, we mustnow direct her towards Russia where alone she can find the outletnecessary for her enormous population and the debt she has to carry. The blockade of Russia, the barbed wire placed round Russia, havedamaged Europe severely. This blockade has resolved itself into ablockade against the Allies. Before the present state of economicruin Russia was the great reservoir of raw materials; she was theunexplored treasure towards which one went with the confidence offinding everything. Now, owing to her effort, she has fallen; buthow large a part of her fall is as much due to the Entente as to heraction during the War and since. For some time now even the mosthidebound intelligences have recognized the fact that it is uselessto talk of entering into trade relations with Russia without theco-operation of Germany, the obvious ally in the vast task ofrenovation. Similarly, it is useless to talk of reattempting militarymanoeuvres. While Germany remains disassociated from the workof reconstruction and feels herself menaced by a Poland that isanarchical and disorderly and acts as an agent of the Entente, whileGermany has no security for her future and must work with doubt andwith rancour, all attempts to reconstruct Russia will be vain. Thesimple and fundamental truth is just this: One can only get to Moscowby passing through Berlin. 

If we do not wish conquerors and conquered to fall one after theother, and a common fate to reunite those who for too long have hatedeach other and continue to hate each other, a solemn word of peacemust be pronounced. 

Austria, Germany, Italy, France are not diverse phenomena; they aredifferent phases of the same phenomenon. All Europe will go to piecesif new conditions of life are not found, and the economic equilibriumprofoundly shaken by the War re-established. 

I have sought in this book to point out in all sincerity the thingsthat are in store for Europe; what perils menace her and in whatway her regeneration lies. In my political career I have found manybitternesses; but the campaign waged against me has not disturbed meat all. I know that wisdom and life are indivisible, and I have noneed to modify anything of what I have done, neither in my propagandanor in my attempt at human regeneration, convinced as I am that I amserving both the cause of my country and the cause of civilization. Blame and praise do not disturb me, and the agitations promoted in theheart of my country will not modify in any way my conviction. On thecontrary, they will only reinforce my will to follow in my own way. 

Truth, be it only slowly, makes its way. Though now the clouds areblackest, they will shortly disappear. The crisis which menaces anddisturbs Europe so profoundly has inoculated with alarm the mostexcited spirits; Europe is still in the phase of doubt, but after thecries of hate and fury, doubt signifies a great advance. From doubtthe truth may come forth. 

INDEX

 ADRAIANOPLE, passes to the Greeks, Adriatic programme, Italy's Albania, an Italian expedition into Alexander the Great as politician Allenstein, a plebiscite for Allies, the, war debts of Alsace-Lorraine, annexation of restitution of America, and question of army of occupation her attitude on reparations result of her entry into the war (_see also_ United States) Apponyi, Count, on the Treaty of Trianon Arabia, Turkey's losses in Armaments, reduction of the peace treaties and Armenia, movement for liberation of Armenian Republic, the Armistice terms, summary of three words change tenor of Army of Occupation, the Asia Minor, the Entente Powers and, Turkey's losses in Australasia, British possessions in Australia as part of British dominions Austria, financial position of, loses access to the sea Austria-Hungary, and the Versailles Treaty civilizing influence of pre-war army of result of Treaty of St. Germain Germain-en-Laye States of, before the war victories of Austrian army, the Azerbajan

 BALKANS, the, Russia's policy in Battles, a military fact difference between war and Beethoven Belgium, acquires German territory army of financial position of population of violation of, and the consequences Bernhardi, General von Bismarck, foresight of political genius of Bolshevik Government, the fiasco of result of Bolshevism, and what it is Boxer rebellion, the Kaiser's address to his troops Briand, M. , on the objects of the Entente Bridgeheads, German, occupation of, British colonies, before the war, Brussels, Conference of, Budapest, conditions in, mortality in, Bulgaria, army of, the Treaty of Neuilly and, Bülow, von

 CANADA as part of British dominions, Cilicia, Civilization, evolution of, Clemenceau, M. , and the military guarantees question, and the Paris Conference, and the reparations clause, as destroyer, communicates Poincaré's letter to Lloyd George, fall of, his hatred of the Germans, on peace treaties, replies to Lloyd George's note, Coal fields, Germany's pre-war, Colonial rights, and the Versailles Treaty, Colonies, British, German pre-war, Germany loses her, Commune, the French, Communist system, Russian, failure of, Constantine, King of Greece, return of, Constantinople, retained by the Turks, Russia's desire for, subject to international control, the Treaty of Sèvres and, Croatia and Fiume, Cyrenaica, Czeko-Slovakia, State of, added population of, army of, financial position of, Magyars in

 DALMATIA, the London Agreement and, Dante, a celebrated dictum of, Danube Commission, the, Danzig, allotted to Poland, Dardanelles, the, freedom of: Versailles Treaty and, De Foville's estimate of wealth of France, Denikin, Denmark acquires North Schleswig, Disarmament conditions fulfilled by Germany, Disease, and the aftermath of war

 ECONOMIC barriers, removal of, and the peace treaty, England, and the Mediterranean, war record of, Entente, the, and Germany's responsibility for war, and the Bolshevik Government, author's opinion of peace terms of, division among, as result of peace treaties, Erzeroum, Mussulman population of, Esthonia, Eupen ceded to Belgium, Europe, area of, financial difficulties of, increased armaments in

 Europe, monarchies in, before the war pre-war conditions of reconstruction of, and peace policy results of world-war in States of European civilization, future of European States, war debts of (_cf of_ War Debts)

 FERENCZI, Dr. , his statistics of sickness in Budapest Fezzan Fichte, and Germany Financial and economic clauses of peace treaty Finland Fiume, Italy's position regarding question of the London Agreement and Wilson and Foch, Marshal, and the military commission and the peace treaties unconstitutional action of France, acquires Saar mines alliances with and the indemnity and the old regime in Russia claims of, at Paris Conference, expenses of her navy financial position of iron industry of Italy and population of post-war army of post-war condition of presses for occupation of the Ruhr pre-war status of private wealth of, before the war purport of her action in the Conference recognizes government of Wrangel safety of, and military guarantees the political class in treaties with U. S. And Great Britain war record of Franco-Prussian War, the indemnity demanded by victors unjust terms of Prussia Frankfort, Treaty of, compared with Versailles Treaty Frederick the Great, political genius of Freedom of the seas, the peace treaties and French-American Treaty, the French-English Treaty, the French territories, liberation Frontiers, changed condition of

 GEORGE, Lloyd, a memorandum for Peace Conference a truism of and question of military guarantees and reparations question and Russia and the Paris Conference and the proposed trial of the Kaiser denounces economic manifesto difficult position of, at Paris Conference on Poland's claim to Upper Silesia proposes Germany's admission to League of Nations Georgia, in Bolshevik hands Italy prepares a military expedition to German army reduced by peace terms delegates and the Paris Conference German-Austria, army of loses access to the sea plight of Germany, a country of surprises a war of reconquest by, impossible accepts armistice terms Allies' demands for indemnities and America's entry into the war and her indemnity and reconstruction of Russia and the political sense annual capitalization of commerce of, before the war cost of army of occupation to effect of peace treaty on effect of President Wilson's messages on financial position of her indemnity increased her pre-war colonies her responsibility for the war how she can pay indemnity imports and exports of is she able to pay indemnity asked? loses her colonies losses of, in Great War militarist party in military conditions imposed on population of, in and outside Europe pre-war army of pre-war coal supply of pre-war conditions of result of Versailles Treaty to revolutionary crisis in Sèvres Treaty and suited for democratic principles territories and States in, before the war victories of war record of Goethe Great Britain, and the indemnity and the Treaty of Versailles army of enters the war expenses of her navy financial position of general election in insularity of population of pre-war conditions of war record of why she entered the war Great War, the, author's opinion of peace terms estimated number of dead in how it was decided post-war results of question of responsibility for Greece, acquires Bulgarian territory army of financial position of her gains by Sèvres Treaty her illusion of conquering Turkish resistance her policy of greed the Entente and

 HEGEL, and Germany, Helferich, and the capitalization of Germany, Herf, von, and Polish organization, Hindenburg, and the U. S. Army, House, Colonel, and the reduction of the German army, and the reparations proposal, Hughes, W. M. , Premier of Australia, and the German indemnity, Hungary, alarming mortality in, army of, conditions of life in, delegates of, at Paris Conference, harsh treatment of, losses of, by peace treaty, pre-war, revolutions in, 166 Hunger and disease, a legacy of war, Hymans, M. , at Paris Conference, INDEMNITIES, question of, what Germany can pay, (_see also_ Reparations) Indemnity clause, how inserted, _et seq_. , India, British, Inter-Allied debts, problem of, _et seq_. (_see also_ Allies, war debts of) Iron, Germany's lack of, Iron-ore, Germany's pre-war wealth in, Italian frontier, rectification of, Italian Socialists visit Russia, Italians, their difficult theatre of war, Italo-Turkish war, the, Italy, a period of crisis in, an expedition into Albania, and Georgia, and Montenegro, and the Balkans, and the League of Nations, and the London Agreement, and the Paris Conference, army of, breaks with the Alliance, custom of tree-planting in, declares her neutrality, economic sufferings of, enters the war, expenses of her navy, financial position of, Great Britain and, her costly Libyan adventure, her freedom from revolutions, in the Triple Alliance, ministerial crisis in, population of, pre-war status of, stands apart from Conference, suffers from situation in Russia territories annexed to, the Adriatic problem, the question of Fiume, votes for recognition of the Soviet, why she entered the war, JAPAN, expenses of her navy, Jews, Polish, Judenic, General, Jugo-Slavia, acquires Bulgarian territory, army of, financial position of, Magyars in, Julius Caesar as politician, KANT, Emanuel Kautsky, published documents of Keynes, John Maynard, and inter-Allied debts and the Paris Conference author's admiration for represents English Treasury at Paris Conference the indemnity question and true forecasts of Klagenfurth, a plebiscite for Klotz, and the indemnity Koltchak, Admiral Konigsberg, the home of Emanuel Kant Kowno claimed by Poles

 LABOUR and the war Lansing, Robert, and the Paris Conference Law, Bonar, and question of military guarantees and reparations and the indemnity League of Nations, the, a suggested revision of treaties by and Danzig and the participation of the vanquished as trustee of Saar mines covenant of foundation of, and its objects Germany debarred from its capabilities and mistakes modification of two clauses of its constitution needed powers of Wilson in a difficult situation Lettonia Libyan adventure, the Lithuania, Wilna ceded to, but occupied by Poles London Agreement, the secrecy of London, Conference of discusses economic manifesto Lorraine, Germany's pre-war iron production from iron mines of: German ambitions for Loucheur, M. , and the indemnity Ludendorff, General, important declaration by Luxemburg, iron industry of

 MAGYARS, in Rumania Treaty of Trianon and, Malmédy given to Belgium Marienwerder, a plebiscite for Marne, battle of the Mesopotamia lost by Turkey Military clauses and guarantees of peace treaty Millerand, M. , and Sweden Monroe doctrine, the Montenegro, absorbed by the S. H. S. State restoration of the Entente and Moresnet becomes Belgian territory Moscow Government sends gold to Sweden: French action Mussulman population of pre-war Turkey

 NAPOLEON I as politician his three great errors Napoleon III Nationalism, and what it implies Naval armaments, the race for Neuilly, the Treaty of New Zealand, Britain's share of Nicholas II, his proclamation regarding Poland weakness of Nineteenth century, the, wars of Nitti, Francesco S. , and admission of ex-enemies into League of Nations and Germany's responsibility for the war and Italian Socialists and Russia and the Italian military expedition to Georgia and the proposed trial of the Kaiser at Conferences of London and San Remo denounces economic manifesto his son a prisoner of war ideals of opposes Adriatic adventure receives deputation of German business men signs ratification of Treaty of Versailles the indemnity question and Northcliffe Press, the, and the indemnity

 OGIER, M. , territorial reconstruction scheme of Oliganthropy, Orlando, M. , and the reparations question Orlando Ministry, the, resignation of Ottoman Empire, the, a limited sovereignty to Turkish parts of

 PALESTINE, Treaty of Sèvres and Paper currency, Germany's pre-and post-war Paris, an unsuitable meeting place for Conference Peace Conference in Supreme Council at welcomes President Wilson Paris Conference, and the indemnity Peace, necessary conditions for Peace Conference, Lloyd George's memorandum for Peace treaties, a negation of justice and continuation of the war and their application effect on Germany of origin and aims of question of reparation and indemnity revision of, a necessity their opposition to Wilson's fourteen points Peace treaty of June, 1919, summary of terms of Peasants, Russian, and the old regime Petrograd, text of London Agreement published in Plebiscite, result of, in Upper Silesia Plebiscites, system of Poincaré, M. , and Clemenceau and Germany's right of entry into League of Nations and the peace treaties Lloyd George replies to on military guarantees and occupation Poland, aims at further expansion anarchic condition of and the plebiscite and the Treaty of Versailles Poland, army of financial position of gains by Treaty her policy of greed obtains State of Danzig of to-day the Tsar's proclamation regarding treaty with France working for ruin Polish state, foundation of an independent Politics, German, pre-war Portugal, war debt of Progress, war as condition towards Public debts of warring nations (_cf_. Allies, war debts of)

 RECONSTRUCTION of Europe, the, and annullment of inter-Allied debts and the revision of peace treaties Germany's indemnity and that of defeated countries necessity of forming new connexions with Russia the League of Nations and the safety of France and the military guarantees Renner, Chancellor of Vienna, confers with Marquis della Torretta Reparations clause, origin of Reparations Commission, the, expense accounts of formation of suppression of, a necessity Reparations, the problem of (_cf_. Indemnities) Rhine, the, as frontier occupation of an act of vengeance cost of, to Germany Riga, hunger and sickness in, the aftermath of war Ruhr, the, question of occupation of Rumania, army of evacuation of financial position of her gains by Treaty Magyars in Rumanian occupation of Hungary Russia, and the League of Nations as cause of world-conflict birth-rate of blockade of Entente aids military undertakings in financial position of Germany's fear of her policy of expansion Lloyd George on military revolts in peace army of policy of Entente towards power of the Tsar in present-day plight of pre-war empire of probable number of men under arms in Sèvres Treaty and the Versailles Treaty and under the Tsars Russian peasants and the old regime Russians, remarkable fecundity of Russo-Japanese peace, the and how drafted Russo-Japanese War, the

 SAAR, the, a plebiscite for annexation of: French proposals regarding coalfields of, assigned to France pre-war production of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of San Remo, Conference of Schleswig, a plebiscite for, Secret diplomacy, peace treaties and Serbia, evacuation of her gains by Treaty ignorant of London Agreement responsibility for the war Russian policy in the Allied Press and war debt of Serbo-Croat States, financial position of sea-coast outlets for S. H. S. State absorbs Montenegro Silesia (_see_ Upper Selesia) Slav States, cosmopolitan population of Smyrna, the Sanjak of Sonnino, M. , at Paris Conference South Africa, British Soviet, the, recognition of, refused Spa Conference, the Starling, Professor States, European, pre- and post-war, _et seq_. Submarine menace, the Sweden, Russian gold sent to Syria

 TARDIEU, André, and the guarantees against Germany and the Paris Conference and the question of military guarantees draws up reply to Lloyd George his report on Paris Conference on President Wilson on the Treaty of Versailles Territorial and political clauses of peace treaty Thrace assigned to Greece Torretta, Marquis della, confers with Chancellor Renner Trade conditions, equality of, and the peace treaty Treaties, peace (_see Neuilly, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Sèvres Trianon, Versailles) Treaties with France against German aggression Treaty system, the, division of Europe by Trianon, Treaty of Triple Alliance, the Italy and "Triplice, " the (_see_ Triple Alliance) Tripoli, Italy Tripolitania Turkey, and the result of Treaty of Sèvres army of Grand Vizier of, and his note Turks, their power of resistance Turquan's estimate of wealth of France

 United States, the, a deciding factor of the war abandons Treaty of Versailles and Armenian question and the indemnity United States, the, and the League of Nations, and the naval question, expenses of her navy, financial position of, losses in the Great War, (see also America) Upper Silesia, a plebiscite for, iron industry of, result of plebiscite in, VENEZELOS, M. , author's tribute to, fall of, Versailles, Treaty of, abandoned by America, and the future of Germany, characteristic facts of, conditions of Germany as result of, injustice of, Lloyd George on, on what based, ratification of, summary of, violation of, why it has been weakened, Vessitch, M. , at Paris Conference, Vienna, conditions in, the wireless high-power station at, WÄCHTER, Kinderlen-, and Russia, War, a political fact, as a necessary condition of life, difference between battles and, legitimacy of, the aftermath of, the nature of, War debts, a menace to financial stability, War debts of the Allies, (_cf_. Inter-Allied debts) Warfare, modern, what it means, Wars of the last three centuries, the, Wealth, influence of, on life and happiness, William II, and his responsibility for the war, as _miles gioriosus_, author's aversion to, frenzied oratory of, proposed trial of, Wilna ceded to Lithuania, but occupied by Poles, Wilson, President, and Armenia and Fiume, and military guarantees, and the League of Nations, demonstrations against, in Italy, his fourteen points, compared with Treaty of Versailles, his ignorance of European affairs, and the result, how he was received in Paris, memorable speech in American Senate, peace ideals of, 34, _post-bellum_ economic settlement proposals of (_see_ League of Nations) Wolff, and Germany, Wrangel, General,