OCEAN STEAM NAVIGATION AND THE OCEAN POST. BY THOMAS RAINEY. NEW-YORK:D. APPLETON & CO. , 346 & 348 BROADWAY. TRÜBNER & CO. , PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON. 1858. Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, byJOHN GLENN RAINEY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States forthe Southern District of New-York. DEDICATED, IN TOKEN OF RESPECT AND ESTEEM, TO THE HON. AARON VENABLE BROWN POST MASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. Reprinted 1977by Eastern Press, Inc. New Haven, Conn. Published byEdward N. Lipson Distributed bya Gatherin'Post Office Box 175Wynantskill, N. Y. 12198 PREFACE. In offering to the Government and the public this little volume onOcean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post, I am conscious of myinability to present any new views on a subject that has engaged theattention of many of the most gifted statesmen and economists of thiscountry and Europe. There is, however, no work, so far as I aminformed, in any country, which treats of Marine Steam Navigation inits commercial, political, economic, social, and diplomatic bearings, or discusses so far the theory and practice of navigation as todevelop the cost and difficulties attending high speed on the ocean, or the large expense incurred in a rapid, regular, and reliabletransport of the foreign mails. It has been repeatedly suggested to the undersigned by members ofCongress, and particularly by some of the members of the committees onthe Post Office and Post Roads in the Senate and House ofRepresentatives, that there was no reliable statement, such as thatwhich I have endeavored to furnish, on the general topics connectedwith trans-marine steam navigation, to which those not speciallyinformed on the subject, could refer for the settlement of the manydisputed points brought before Congress and the Departments. It isrepresented that there are many conflicting statements regarding thecapabilities of ocean steam; the cost of running vessels; theconsumption of fuel; the extent and costliness of repairs; thedepreciation of vessels; the cost of navigating them; the attendantincidental expenses; the influence of ocean mails in promoting trade;the wants of commercial communities; the adaptation of the mailvessels to the war service; the rights of private enterprise; and theability of ocean steamers generally to support themselves on their ownreceipts. While this is true, there is no work on this general subject to whichpersons can refer for the authoritative settlement of any of thesepoints, either absolutely or proximately; and while a simple statementof facts, acknowledged by all steamship-men, may tend to dispel muchmisapprehension on this interesting subject, it will also be notunprofitable, I trust, to review some of the prominent arguments onwhich the mail steamship system is based. That system should stand orfall on its own merits or demerits alone; and to be permanent, it mustbe based on the necessities of the community, and find its support inthe common confidence of all classes. I have long considered a wise, liberal, and extended steam mail system vitally essential to thecommerce of the country, and to the continued prosperity and power ofthe American Union. Yet, I am thoroughly satisfied that this verydesirable object can never be attained by private enterprise, orotherwise than through the direct pecuniary agency and support of theGeneral Government. The abandonment of our ocean steam mail system isimpossible so long as we are an active, enterprising, and commercialpeople. And so far from the service becoming self-supporting, it isprobable that it will never be materially less expensive than at thepresent time. It has been my constant endeavor to give the best class of authoritieson all the points of engineering which I have introduced, as thatregarding the cost of steam and high mail speed; and to this end Ihave recently visited England and France, and endeavored to ascertainthe practice in those countries, especially in Great Britain. I desire to return my sincere acknowledgments for many courtesiesreceived from Mr. Charles Atherton, of London, England; Robert Murray, Esq. , Southampton; and Hon. Horatio King, of Washington, D. C. THOMAS RAINEY. New-York, _December 9, 1857_. THE ARGUMENT. 1. _Assumed_ (Section I. ) _that steam mails upon the ocean control thecommerce and diplomacy of the world; that they are essential to ourcommercial and producing country; that we have not established theocean mail facilities commensurate with our national ability and thedemands of our commerce; and that we to-day are largely dependent on, and tributary to our greatest commercial rival, Great Britain, for thepostal facilities, which should be purely national, American, andunder our own exclusive control:_ 2. _Assumed_ (Section II. ) _that fast ocean mails are exceedinglydesirable for our commerce, our defenses, our diplomacy, themanagement of our squadrons, our national standing, and that they aredemanded by our people at large:_ 3. _Assumed_ (Section III. ) _that fast steamers alone can furnishrapid transport to the mails; that these steamers can not rely onfreights; that sailing vessels will ever carry staple freights at amuch lower figure, and sufficiently quickly; that while steam iseminently successful in the coasting trade, it can not possibly be soin the transatlantic freighting business; and that the rapid transitof the mails, and the slower and more deliberate transport of freightis the law of nature:_ 4. _Assumed_ (Section IV. ) _that high, adequate mail speed isextremely costly, in the prime construction of vessels, their repairs, and their more numerous employées; that the quantity of fuel consumedis enormous, and ruinous to unaided private enterprise; and that thisis clearly proven both by theory and indisputable facts as well as bythe concurrent testimony of the ablest writers on ocean steamnavigation:_ 5. _Assumed_ (Section V. ) _that ocean mail steamers can not live ontheir own receipts; that neither the latest nor the anticipatedimprovements in steam shipping promise any change in this fact; thatself-support is not likely to be attained by increasing the size ofsteamers; that the propelling power in fast steamers occupies all ofthe available space not devoted to passengers and express freight; andthat steamers must be fast to do successful mail and profitablepassenger service:_ 6. _Assumed_ (Section VI. ) _that sailing vessels can not successfullytransport the mails; that the propeller can not transport them asrapidly or more cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with anyconsiderable economy of fuel and other running expenses, it is butlittle faster than the sailing vessel; that to patronize these slowvessels with the mails, the Government would unjustly discriminateagainst sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that we can notin any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the transport ofthe mails; that individual enterprise can not support fast steamers;and that not even American private enterprise can under any conditionsfurnish a sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine: then, _ 7. _Conceded_ (Section VII. ) _that it is the duty of the Government toits people to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, andrapid steam mail marine, for the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses, the public character, and the general interestsof all classes; that our people appreciate the importance of commerce, and are willing to pay for liberal postal facilities; that our tradehas greatly suffered for the want of ocean mails; that we have beenforced to neglect many profitable branches of industry, and many largefields of effort; and that there is positively no means of gaining andmaintaining commercial ascendency except through an ocean steam mailsystem:_ 8. _Conceded_ (Section VIII. ) _that the Government can discharge theclear and unquestionable duty of establishing foreign mail facilities, only by paying liberal prices for the transport of the mails for along term of years, by creating and sustaining an ocean postal system, by legislating upon it systematically, and by abandoning our slavishdependence upon Great Britain:_ 9. _Conceded_ (Section IX. ) _that the British ocean mail systemattains greater perfection and extent every year; that instead ofbecoming self-supporting, it costs the treasury more and more everyyear; that English statesmen regard its benefits as far outweighingthe losses to the treasury; that so far from abandoning, they areregularly and systematically increasing it; that it was never regardedby the whole British public with more favor, than at the present time;that it is evidently one of the most enduring institutions of thecountry; that it necessitates a similar American system; that withoutit our people are denied the right and privilege of competition; andthat we are thus far by no means adequately prepared for thatcompetition, or for our own development. _ Section X. _notices each of the American lines, and presents manyfacts corroborating the views advanced in the preceding sections. _ PAPER A. Paper A _(page 192) enumerates all the Steamers of the United States_. PAPER B. Paper B _(page 193) gives a list of all the British Ocean Mail Lines_. PAPER C. Paper C _(page 198) presents Projét of Franco-American Navigation_. PAPER D. Paper D _(page 199) gives the Steam Lines between Europe and America_. PAPER E. Paper E _(page 200) gives many extracts from eminent statesmen, corroborating views herein advanced_. PAPER F. Paper F _(page 219) gives the Steam Lines of the whole world_. PAPER G. Paper G _(page 220) American Mail Lines: Letter of Hon. Horatio King_. PAPER H. Paper H _(page 221) List of British, French, and American Navies_. HEADS OF ARGUMENT. SECTION I. PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION. THE SPLENDID TRIUMPHS OF STEAM: IT IS THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS OF NATIONAL PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE FORERUNNER OF CIVILIZATION: IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES AS AN AGRICULTURAL, MANUFACTURING, AND COMMERCIAL COUNTRY: NATURE OF OUR PEOPLE: MARITIME SPIRIT: VARIOUS COMMERCIAL COUNTRIES: OURS MOST ADVANTAGEOUSLY SITUATED: THE DESTINY OF AMERICAN COMMERCE: OUR COMMERCIAL RIVALS: GREAT BRITAIN: SHE RESISTS US BY STEAM AND DIPLOMACY: OUR POSITION: MOST APPROVED INSTRUMENTS OF COMMERCIAL SUCCESS: PORTUGAL AND HOLLAND: ENGLAND'S WISE STEAM POLICY: LIBERAL VIEWS OF HER STATESMEN: EXTENT OF HER MAIL SERVICE: HER IMMENSE STEAM MARINE, OF 2, 161 STEAMERS: OUR CONTRAST: OUR DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN: THE UNITED STATES MAIL AND COMMERCIAL STEAM MARINE IN FULL: A MOST UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON. SECTION II. NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS. ARE OCEAN STEAM MAILS DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY FOR A COMMERCIAL PEOPLE? THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE DEMANDS THEM: MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF NATIONS: FAST MAILS NECESSARY TO CONTROL SLOW FREIGHTS: THE FOREIGN POST OF EVERY NATION IS MORE OR LESS SELFISH: IF WE NEGLECT APPROVED METHODS, WE ARE THEREBY SUBORDINATED TO THE SKILL OF OTHERS: THE WANT OF A FOREIGN POST IS A NATIONAL CALAMITY: OTHER NATIONS CAN NOT AFFORD US DUE FACILITIES: WARS AND ACCIDENTS FORBID: THE CRIMEA AND THE INDIES AN EXAMPLE: MANY OF OUR FIELDS OF COMMERCE NEED A POST: BRAZIL, THE WEST-INDIES, AND PACIFIC SOUTH-AMERICA: MAILS TO THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE BY THE NUMEROUS CUNARD VESSELS: CORRESPONDENCE WITH AFRICA, CHINA, THE EAST-INDIES, THE MAURITIUS, AND AUSTRALIA: SLAVISH DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN: DESIRABLE FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE: FOR THE CONTROL OF OUR SQUADRONS: CASES OF SUFFERING: NECESSARY FOR DEFENSE: FOR CULTIVATING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND OPENING TRADE: THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH WILL REQUIRE FASTER AND HEAVIER MAILS: OUR COMMERCE REQUIRES FAST STEAMERS FOR THE RAPID AND EASY TRANSIT OF PASSENGERS: MODES OF BENEFITING COMMERCE. SECTION III. THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM. THE COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM: STEAM MAILS ARRIVE AND DEPART AT ABSOLUTELY FIXED PERIODS: UNCERTAINTY IS HAZARDOUS AND COSTLY: SUBSIDIZED STEAMERS GIVE A NECESSARILY HIGH SPEED TO THE MAILS: MONEY CAN NOT AFFORD TO LIE UPON THE OCEAN FOR WEEKS: COMPARED WITH SAIL: STEAMERS TRANSPORT CERTAIN CLASSES OF FREIGHT: THE HAVRE AND THE CUNARD LINES: THE CUNARD PROPELLERS: STEAMERS CAN AFFORD TO TRANSPORT EXPRESS PACKAGES AND GOODS: GOODS TAKEN ONLY TO FILL UP: WHY PROPELLERS ARE CHEAPER IN SOME CASES: STEAM IN SOME CASES CHEAPER THAN THE WIND: AN ESTIMATE: THE PROPELLER FOR COASTING: STEAM ON ITS OWN RECEIPTS HAS NOT SUCCEEDED ON THE OCEAN: MARINE AND FLUVIAL NAVIGATION COMPARED: MOST FREIGHTS NOT TRANSPORTABLE BY STEAM ON ANY CONDITIONS: AUXILIARY FREIGHTING AND EMIGRANT PROPELLERS: LAWS OF TRANSPORT: RAPID MAILS AND LEISURE TRANSPORT OF FREIGHT THE LAW OF NATURE: THE PRICE OF COALS RAPIDLY INCREASING: ANTICIPATED IMPROVEMENTS AND CHEAPENING IN MARINE PROPULSION NOT REALIZED. SECTION IV. COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED. MISAPPREHENSION OF THE HIGH COST OF STEAM MARINE PROPULSION: VIEWS OF THE NON-PROFESSIONAL: HIGH SPEED NECESSARY FOR THE DISTANCES IN OUR COUNTRY: WHAT IS THE COST OF HIGH ADEQUATE MAIL SPEED: FAST STEAMERS REQUIRE STRONGER PARTS IN EVERY THING: GREATER OUTLAY IN PRIME COST: MORE FREQUENT AND COSTLY REPAIRS: MORE WATCHFULNESS AND MEN: MORE COSTLY FUEL, ENGINEERS, FIREMEN, AND COAL-PASSERS: GREAT STRENGTH OF HULL REQUIRED: ALSO IN ENGINES, BOILERS, AND PARTS: WHY THE PRIME COST INCREASES: THEORY OF REPAIRS: FRICTION AND BREAKAGES: BOILERS AND FURNACES BURNING OUT: REPAIRS TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN PER CENT: DEPRECIATION: SEVERAL LINES CITED: USES FOR MORE MEN: EXTRA FUEL, AND LESS FREIGHT-ROOM: BRITISH TRADE AND COAL CONSUMPTION. THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED, WITH TABLE: THE RESISTANCE VARIES AS IS THE SQUARE OF THE VELOCITY: THE POWER, OR FUEL, VARIES AS THE CUBE OF THE VELOCITY: THE RATIONALE: AUTHORITIES CITED IN PROOF OF THE LAW: EXAMPLES, AND THE FORMULÆ: COAL-TABLE; NO. I. : QUANTITY OF FUEL FOR DIFFERENT SPEEDS AND DISPLACEMENTS: DEDUCTIONS FROM THE TABLE: RATES AT WHICH INCREASED SPEED INCREASES THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL: CONSUMPTION FOR VESSELS OF 2, 500, 3, 000, AND 6, 000 TONS DISPLACEMENT: COAL-TABLE; NO. II. : FREIGHT-TABLE; NO. III. : AS SPEED AND POWER INCREASE, FREIGHT AND PASSENGER ROOM DECREASE: FREIGHT AND FARE REDUCED: SPEED OF VARIOUS LINES: FREIGHT-COST: COAL AND CARGO; NO. IV. : MR. ATHERTON'S VIEWS OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT. SECTION V. OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. INCREASE OF BRITISH MAIL SERVICE: LAST NEW LINE AT $925, 000 PER YEAR: THE SYSTEM NOT BECOMING SELF-SUPPORTING: CONTRACT RENEWALS AT SAME OR HIGHER PRICES: PRICE OF FUEL AND WAGES INCREASED FASTER THAN ENGINE IMPROVEMENTS: LARGE SHIPS RUN PROPORTIONALLY CHEAPER THAN SMALL: AN EXAMPLE, WITH THE FIGURES: THE STEAMER "LEVIATHAN, " 27, 000 TONS: STEAMERS OF THIS CLASS WILL NOT PAY: SHE CAN NOT TRANSPORT FREIGHT TO AUSTRALIA: REASONS FOR THE SAME: MOTION HER NORMAL CONDITION: MUST NOT BE MADE A DOCK: DELIVERY OF FREIGHTS: MAMMOTH STEAMERS TO BRAZIL: LARGE CLIPPERS LIE IDLE: NOT EVEN THIS LARGE CLASS OF STEAMERS CAN LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS: EFFICIENT MAIL STEAMERS CARRY BUT LITTLE EXCEPT PASSENGERS: SOME HEAVY EXTRA EXPENSES IN REGULAR MAIL LINES: PACIFIC MAIL COMPANY'S LARGE EXTRA FLEET, AND ITS EFFECTS: THE IMMENSE ACCOUNT OF ITEMS AND EXTRAS: A PARTIAL LIST: THE HAVRE AND COLLINS DOCKS: GREAT EXPENSE OF FEEDING PASSENGERS: VIEWS OF MURRAY AND ATHERTON ON THE COST OF RUNNING STEAMERS, AND THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESENT MAIL SERVICE. SECTION VI. HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED? THE TRANSMARINE COMPARED WITH THE INLAND POST: OUR PAST SPASMODIC EFFORTS: NEED SOME SYSTEM: FRANCE AROUSED TO STEAM: THE SAILING-SHIP MAIL: THE NAVAL STEAM MAIL: THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE MAIL: ALL INADEQUATE AND ABANDONED: GREAT BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE IN ALL THESE METHODS: NAVAL VESSELS CAN NOT BE ADAPTED TO THE MAIL SERVICE: WILL PROPELLERS MEET THE WANTS OF MAIL TRANSPORT, WITH OR WITHOUT SUBSIDY? POPULAR ERRORS REGARDING THE PROPELLER: ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES: BOURNE'S OPINION: ROBERT MURRAY: PROPELLERS TOO OFTEN ON THE DOCKS: THEY ARE VERY DISAGREEABLE PASSENGER VESSELS: IF PROPELLERS RUN MORE CHEAPLY IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE SLOWER: COMPARED WITH SAIL: UNPROFITABLE STOCK: CROSKEY'S LINE: PROPELLERS LIVE ON CHANCES AND CHARTERS: IRON IS A MATERIAL: SENDING THE MAILS BY SLOW PROPELLERS WOULD BE AN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SAILING VESSELS: INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE CAN NOT SUPPLY MAIL FACILITIES: THEREFORE IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT. SECTION VII. WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE? RESUMÉ OF THE PREVIOUS SECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS: IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH RAPID STEAM MAILS: OUR PEOPLE APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE, AND OF LIBERAL POSTAL FACILITIES: THE GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE: IT MUST FOSTER THEIR INTERESTS AND DEVELOP THEIR INDUSTRY: THE WANT OF SUCH MAILS HAS CAUSED THE NEGLECT OF MANY PROFITABLE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY: AS A CONSEQUENCE WE HAVE LOST IMMENSE TRAFFIC: THE EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING SYSTEM AND OURS: FIELDS OF TRADE NATURALLY PERTAINING TO US: OUR ALMOST SYSTEMATIC NEGLECT OF THEM: WHY IS GREAT BRITAIN'S COMMERCE SO LARGE: CAUSES AND THEIR EFFECTS: HER WEST-INDIA LINE RECEIVES A LARGER SUBSIDY THAN ALL THE FOREIGN LINES OF THE UNITED STATES COMBINED: INDIFFERENCE SHOWN BY CONGRESS TO MANY IMPORTANT FIELDS OF COMMERCE: INSTANCES OF MAIL FACILITIES CREATING LARGE TRADE: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S TESTIMONY: THE BRITISH AND BRAZILIAN TRADE: SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM THE FIGURES: CALIFORNIA SHORN OF HALF HER GLORY: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT MISERS: THEY WISH THEIR OWN PUBLIC TREASURE EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR INDUSTRY: OUR COMMERCIAL CLASSES COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF THE PRIVILEGE OF COMPETING WITH OTHER NATIONS. SECTION VIII. HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? WE NEED A STEAM MAIL SYSTEM: HOW OUR LINES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONTRASTED: SPASMODIC AND ENDURING LEGISLATION: MR. POLK'S ADMINISTRATION ENDEAVORED TO INAUGURATE A POLICY: GEN. RUSK ENDEAVORED TO EXTEND IT: THE TERM OF SERVICE TOO SHORT: COMPANIES SHOULD HAVE LONGER PERIODS: A LEGISLATION OF EXPEDIENTS: MUST SUBSIDIZE PRIVATE COMPANIES FOR A LONG TERM OF YEARS: SHOULD WE GIVE TO OUR POSTAL VESSELS THE NAVAL FEATURE: OUR MAIL LINES GAVE AN IMPULSE TO SHIP-BUILDING: LET US HAVE STEAM MAILS ON THEIR MERITS: NO NAVAL FEATURE SUBTERFUGES: THESE VESSELS HIGHLY USEFUL IN WAR: THEY LIBERALLY SUPPLY THE NAVY WITH EXPERIENCED ENGINEERS WHEN NECESSARY: THE BRITISH MAIL PACKETS GENERALLY FIT FOR WAR SERVICE: LORD CANNING'S REPORT: EXPEDIENTS PROPOSED FOR CARRYING THE MAILS: BY FOREIGN INSTEAD OF AMERICAN VESSELS: DEGRADING EXPEDIENCY AND SUBSERVIENCY: WE CAN NOT SECURE MAIL SERVICE BY GIVING THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE GENERAL TREASURY SHOULD PAY FOR THE TRANSMARINE POST: REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONTRACTS: METHOD OF MAKING CONTRACTS: THE LOWEST BIDDER AND THE LAND SERVICE: THE OCEAN SERVICE VERY DIFFERENT: BUT LITTLE UNDERSTOOD: LOWEST-BIDDER SYSTEM FAILURES: SENATOR RUSK'S OPINION: INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF LOWEST BIDDER: INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS AND RIGHTS. SECTION IX. THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS. STEAM MAIL SYSTEM INAUGURATED AS THE PROMOTER OF WEALTH, POWER, AND CIVILIZATION: THE EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM ON COMMERCE: THE LONG PERIOD DESIGNATED FOR THE EXPERIMENT: NEW LINES, WHEN, HOW, AND WHY ESTABLISHED: THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM: FIRST CONTRACT MADE IN 1833, LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN: WITH ROTTERDAM IN 1834: FALMOUTH AND GIBRALTAR, 1837: ABERDEEN, SHETLAND, AND ORKNEYS, 1840: THE "SAVANNAH, " THE FIRST OCEAN STEAMER: THE SIRIUS AND GREAT WESTERN: CUNARD CONTRACT MADE IN 1839: EXTRA PAY "WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS:" MALTA, ALEXANDRIA, SUEZ, EAST-INDIES, AND CHINA IN 1840: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY: WEST-INDIA SERVICE ESTABLISHED IN 1840: POINTS TOUCHED AT: PROVISIONAL EXTRA PAY: PANAMA AND VALPARAISO LINE ESTABLISHED IN 1845: HOLYHEAD AND KINGSTON IN 1848: ALSO THE CHANNEL ISLANDS: WEST COAST OF AFRICA AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE IN 1852: CALCUTTA VIA THE CAPE IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: PLYMOUTH, SYDNEY, AND NEW SOUTH WALES ALSO IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: INVESTIGATION OF 1851 AND 1853, AND NEW AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT IN 1856: HALIFAX, NEWFOUNDLAND, BERMUDA, AND ST. THOMAS IN 1850: NEW-YORK AND BERMUDA SOON DISCONTINUED: COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIES, RATES PER MILE, TOTAL DISTANCES, AND POSTAL INCOME: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAYS HIGHER SUBSIDIES THAN THE AMERICAN: WORKINGS AND INCREASE OF THE BRITISH SERVICE: GEN. RUSK'S VIEWS: SPEECH OF HON T. B. KING: COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, 1849: NEW INVESTIGATION ORDERED IN 1853, AND INSTRUCTIONS: LORD CANNING'S REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT ABANDON HER MAIL SYSTEM: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN LINE: TESTIMONY OF ATHERTON AND MURRAY: MANY EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT: STEAM INDISPENSABLE: NOT SELF-SUPPORTING: THE MAIL RECEIPTS WILL NOT PAY FOR IT: RESULT OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM: ANOTHER NEW SERVICE TO INDIA AND CHINA: SHALL WE RUN THE POSTAL AND COMMERCIAL RACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN? CANADA AND THE INDIES. SECTION X. THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES. THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES: THE HAVRE AND BREMEN, THE PIONEERS: THE BREMEN SERVICE RECENTLY GIVEN TO MR. VANDERBILT: BOTH LINES RUN ON THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE CALIFORNIA LINES: WONDROUS DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PACIFIC POSSESSIONS: THE PACIFIC MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS HISTORY, SERVICES, LARGE MATERIEL, AND USEFULNESS: THE UNITED STATES MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS RAMIFIED AND LARGE EXTRA SERVICE: EFFECT UPON THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF: ITS HEAVY LOSSES, AND NEW SHIPS: STEAMSHIP STOCKS GENERALLY AVOIDED: CONSTANTLY FAR BELOW PAR: THE COLLINS LINE: A COMPARISON WITH THE CUNARD: ITS SOURCES OF HEAVY OUTLAY, AND ITS ENTERPRISE: THE AMERICAN MARINE DISASTERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY HUMAN FORESIGHT; THE VANDERBILT BREMEN LINE: THE CHARLESTON AND HAVANA LINE. SECTION I. PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION. THE SPLENDID TRIUMPHS OF STEAM: IT IS THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS OF NATIONAL PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE FORERUNNER OF CIVILIZATION: IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES AS AN AGRICULTURAL, MANUFACTURING, AND COMMERCIAL COUNTRY: NATURE OF OUR PEOPLE: MARITIME SPIRIT: VARIOUS COMMERCIAL COUNTRIES: OURS MOST ADVANTAGEOUSLY SITUATED: THE DESTINY OF AMERICAN COMMERCE: OUR COMMERCIAL RIVALS: GREAT BRITAIN: SHE RESISTS US BY STEAM AND DIPLOMACY: OUR POSITION: MOST APPROVED INSTRUMENTS OF COMMERCIAL SUCCESS: PORTUGAL AND HOLLAND: ENGLAND'S WISE STEAM POLICY: LIBERAL VIEWS OF HER STATESMEN: EXTENT OF HER MAIL SERVICE: HER IMMENSE STEAM MARINE, OF 2, 161 STEAMERS: OUR CONTRAST: OUR DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN: THE UNITED STATES MAIL AND COMMERCIAL STEAM MARINE IN FULL: A MOST UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON. The agreeable and responsible duty of developing and regulating themost important discovery of modern times, and the greatest materialforce known to men, has been committed to the present generation. Theprogress of Steam, from the days of its first application to liftingpurposes, through all of its gradations of application to railwaylocomotion and steamboat and steamship propulsion down to the presenttime, has been a series of splendid and highly useful triumphs, alikecreditable to the genius of its promoters, and profitable to thenations which have adopted it. However great the progress of theworld, or the prosperity of commercial nations prior to itsintroduction, it can not be doubted that it now constitutes thelargest, surest, and most easily available means of progress, prosperity, and power known to civilized nations; or that thedevelopment, wealth, and independence of any country will be in theratio of the application of steam to all of the ordinary purposes oflife. It has been canonized among the sacred elements of nationalpower, and commissioned as the great laborer of the age. Everycivilized nation has adopted it as the best means of interiordevelopment, and as almost the only forerunner of commerce andcommunication with the outer world. It has thus become anindispensable necessity of every day life, whether by land or by sea, to the producer, the consumer, the merchant, the manufacturer, theartisan, the pleasure-seeker, the statesman, and the state itself, topublic liberty, and to the peace of the world. The existence of an agent of so great power and influence, isnecessarily a fact of unusual significance to a nation like the UnitedStates, which combines within itself in a high degree, the three mostimportant interests, of large Agricultural and Mineral Productions, extensive and increasing Manufactures, and an immense Foreign Commerceand Domestic Trade. Our country is essentially commercial in itstastes and tendencies; our people are, as a result of our commonschools, bold, inquiring, and enterprising; and our constitution andlaws are well calculated to produce a nation of restless and vigorousmerchants, traders, and travellers. Foreign commerce is a necessityof our large and redundant agricultural production. Our extendedsea-coast, and necessarily large coasting-trade between the States, have begotten an unbounded spirit of maritime adventure. The amplematerial, and other facilities for building vessels, have alsocontributed to this end. As capable as any people on earth of runningvessels and conducting mercantile enterprise, we have found foreigncommerce a profitable field for the investment of labor, intelligence, and capital. There is scarcely any field of trade in the world which we are notnaturally better calculated to occupy than any other country. Most ofthe great commercial nations employ their ships as common carriers forother nations, and limit their exports to manufactures alone. GreatBritain is an example of this. She exports no products of the soil, for very obvious reasons. The exports of France partake of the samegeneral character, domestic manufactures, with a small portion of theproducts of the soil. So, also, with the German States and Holland. The United States, to the contrary, have an immense export trade inthe products of the soil. These exports have the advantage ofembracing every production of the temperate zone, and some few of themore profitable of those of the torrid. These constitute a largesource of wealth, and are daily increasing in quantity, value, andimportance. Combined with the manufactured productions of the country, and the yield of the mines, they require a large amount of shipping, which, extending to nearly all nations, opens a diversified and richfield of trade. The exchanges of production between our own and othercountries, are, consequently, very large and general, and mustcontinue to increase to an indefinite extent, as the States andTerritories of the Union fill up, and as the various new and openingbranches of domestic industry develop and mature. The extent which this trade will reach in a few generations, itsaggregate value, and the influence which it will wield over the worldif judiciously and energetically promoted, and if wisely protectedagainst encroachment from abroad, and embarrassment at home, no humanforesight can predict or adequately imagine. With a larger field ofoperations, at home and abroad, than any nation ever possessed before, with the pacific commercial policy of the age, and with the aids ofscience, the telegraph, and steam to urge it on, American Commerce hasopened before it a glorious career and an imposing responsibility. But the conquests of this commerce are not to be the bloodlessvictories of power unopposed; not the result of bold adventure withoutcheck, or of simply American enterprise without the Government's aid. Our foe is a wary, well-scarred, and well-tried old warrior, who hasthe unequalled wisdom of experience, and the patient courage that hastriumphed over many defeats. The field has been in his hands for tengenerations, and he knows every byway, every marsh, every foot ofdefense, and the few inassailable points to be preserved and guarded. Great Britain, particularly, knows how essential is a large generalcommerce for opening a market for her manufactures. She is dependenton those manufactures, and upon the carrying trade of the world for aliving; and she fosters and protects them not alone by the reputed andwell-known individual enterprise and energy of her people, but by awise and forecasting policy of state, a mighty and irresistible navaland military array, a wisely concerted, liberal, well-arranged, andlong-pursued steam system, and prompt, unflinching protection ofBritish subjects in their rights throughout the world. Great Britain is prepared to resist our commercial progress, as shehas already done, step by step, by all the means within her power. Shehas wisely brought steam to her aid, and now has a system of longstanding at last well matured. Her diplomacy has ever been conspicuousthroughout the world, for ability and zeal, whether in the ministerialor consular service, and for its persistent advocacy of British rightsin trade as well as for its machinations against the extension of thecommerce or the power of this country. Such action on the part of anywise rival nation is naturally to be expected; and all that we canobject to is that, seeing this policy and its inevitable tendency, ourcountry should stand still and suffer her trade to be paralyzed andwrested from her, without an effort to relieve it, or the employmentof any of those commercial agencies and facilities which experienceshows to be all-efficient in such cases. It is utter folly for us tomaintain a simply passive competition; we must either progress orretrograde. It is wrong to be willing to occupy a secondary place, when nature and the common wants of the world so clearly indicate thatwe should occupy the first; for if, as before assumed, foreigncommerce is our destiny, and if we can not accomplish our highestcapabilities except by commerce, then if we ever attain our truedignity and station as a nation, it must be by enlarging, liberalizing, strengthening, and encouraging our foreign trade, by allof the proper, efficient, and honorable means within our power. It isthe duty of the Government, both to itself and to its citizens. (_SeeSection VII. _) The history of commercial nations admonishes us that no trading peoplecan long maintain their ascendency without using all of the mostapproved means of the age for prosecuting trade. Portugal was at onetime the most powerful commercial nation of the globe; and at anotherHolland was the mistress of the seas. But while the latter is now onlya fourth-rate commercial power, the former has sunk into obscurity, and is nearly forgotten of men. At that time England and France hadbut a limited foreign trade and scarcely any commercial reputation. France could more easily maintain her existence without a foreigntrade, than could England; and yet her matured manufactures and herproducts of the soil became so valuable that she sought a foreignmarket. England, to the contrary, had not territory enough to remainat home, and yet be a great power. She matured an immensemanufacturing system, and needed a market, as well as the rawmaterial, and food for her operatives. She began to stretch her armsto the outer world, and had made very considerable strides in foreigncommerce side by side with France and the German States, and in theface of the steady young opposition of the American States. It now became a contest for supremacy. Her large navy had enabled herto conquer important foreign territories, which with the supremacy ofthe seas would make her the mistress of the world. France was stillher equal rival, and the United States were becoming formidable commoncarriers, although they had but little legitimate commerce of theirown, and none that was under their positive control. The commercialmen of England finding their statesmen ready to aid them in theirefforts for national progress, wealth, and glory, directed theirattention to steam as an agent of supremacy and power, both in theNavy and the Commercial Marine. They indicated and proved thenecessity of drawing the bonds between them and foreign countries moreclosely; of shortening the distances between them; of providing themeans of rapid, safe, and comfortable transit of English merchantsbetween their homes and foreign lands; of regular, rapid, reliableBritish steam mails to every point with which Englishmen had business, or could create it; and of government agency as the only means bywhich this desirable, this essential service could be rendered tocommerce and to the country. They readily saw that rapid and reliablepassenger facilities, and the rapid and regular transmission ofcommercial and diplomatic intelligence would give to British merchantsand to British statesmen the certain control of commerce, and theconformation of the political destinies of many of the smaller nationsof the Eastern and Western hemispheres. It was not a difficult task to convince the British statesman that itwas his duty to encourage the commerce, on which the wealth, power, and glory of his country depended, by all the aids known to theconstitution; and to uphold the hands of the merchant by the use ofthe money which his traffic had brought into the public coffers. Therewas no contest between North and South, East and West. It was thewhole of England which was to be benefited directly or indirectly; andthey were willing that it should be any part rather than none. Theevident advantages which the United States possessed in her morenumerous articles of export, (_see page 16_, ) as well as the rapidstrides which her first clippers were making across the ocean, werereasons urgent enough for the forecasting statesmen of Britain; andthey determined to continue or to obtain the profitable dominion ofthe seas, although it might cost a sum of money far beyond the postalincome. They knew that these postal and passenger facilities wereneeded by every class of community, and that there was no one in thekingdom who would not be in some way benefited by them; and that thesums of money paid for them, although not apparently returned, wereyet returned in a thousand indirect channels and by a variety ofreflex benefits not calculable as a transaction of exchange. We, therefore, see to-day, as the fruit of that determination, theproudest and the most profitable postal and mercantile steam marinethat floats the seas. Several large companies, authorized to transportthe mails to all parts of the world, were immediately organized, andpaid liberal allowances for their peculiar duties. Where thepracticability of the service was considered doubtful, larger sumswere paid, and a greater length of time granted for making theexperiment. The contracts were generally made for twelve years; andwhen their terms expired they were renewed for another term of twelveyears, which will expire in 1862. Thus many of the lines have been inoperation for the last nineteen years, and have demonstrated thepracticability, the cheapness, the utility, and the necessity of suchservice. The entire foreign mail service is conducted by fifteencompanies, having one hundred and twenty-one steamers, with a grosstonnage of 235, 488 tons; the net tonnage being 141, 293, assuming theengines, boilers, fuel, etc. , to be forty per cent of the wholetonnage, which is altogether too low an estimate. The whole number ofBritish sea-going steamers is sixteen hundred and sixty-nine, with anaggregate tonnage of 383, 598 tons, exclusive of engines and boilers, and of 639, 330 tons gross, including engines and boilers. (_See paperA, page 192. _) We must add to this list the new steamer "GreatEastern, " whose tonnage is twenty-seven thousand tons, and which willmake the entire present mercantile steam tonnage of Great Britain660, 330 tons. The greater portion of these steamers, exclusive ofthose engaged in the foreign mail service, are employed in thecoasting and foreign continental trade; while some few of them run inthe American merchant service, and many others in the subsidized mailservice of foreign countries, such as the lines from Hamburgh andAntwerp to Brazil, and from those cities to the United States. Some ofthem are also engaged in the mail service between Canada and England, under the patronage of the Canadian government. (_See paper D, page199. _) If we add to this list the 271 war steamers, the 220 gunboats, and the Great Eastern, we shall find that the British Mail, Mercantile, and War Marine consists of the enormous number of twothousand one hundred and sixty-one steamers, exclusive of the largenumber now building. Nearly all of these are adapted to the ocean, orto the coasting service, and may be classed as sea-going vessels. It is interesting to trace this rapid progress of steam since itsfirst application to purposes of mail transport in 1833. Anintelligent writer says, "The rise and progress of the ocean steammail service of Great Britain is second in interest to no chapter inthe maritime history of the world;" and while we acknowledge agrateful pride in the triumphs of our transatlantic brethren, we mustblush with shame at our dereliction in this great, and civilizing, andenriching service of modern times. The steam marine of the UnitedStates, postal, mercantile, and naval, is to-day so insignificant inextent that we do not feel entirely certain that it is a sufficientnucleus for the growth of a respectable maritime power. The few shipsthat we possess are among the fleetest and the most comfortable thattraverse the ocean, and have excited the admiration of the worldwherever they have been seen. But their number is so small, theirservice so limited, their field of operation so contracted, that ourlarge commerce and travel are dependent, in most parts of the world, on British steam mail lines for correspondence and transport, or onthe slow, irregular, and uncertain communications of sailing vessels. The question here naturally suggests itself: Have we progressed inocean steam navigation in a ratio commensurate with the improvementsof the age, or of our own improvement in every thing else? And has theGovernment of the country afforded to the people the facilities ofenterprise and commercial competition which are clearly necessary toenable them to enter the contest on equal terms with other commercialcountries? (_See Section VII. _) The Ocean Mail Service of the United States, consists of eight lines, and twenty one steamers in commission, with an aggregate tonnage of48, 027 tons. Three of these lines are transatlantic; the Collins, theHavre, and the Bremen. Two connect us with our Pacific possessions, and incidentally with Cuba and New-Granada. They are howeverindispensable lines of coast navigation. One connects the ports ofCharleston, in the United States, and Havana, in Cuba, anotherconnects New-Orleans with Vera Cruz, and another connects Havana andNew-Orleans. Beyond these, we have a line of two steamers runningbetween New-York and New-Orleans, touching at Havana, and one steamertouching at the same point between New-York and Mobile. Also foursteamers between New-York and Savannah, four between New-York andCharleston, two between New-York and Norfolk, two between Philadelphiaand Savannah, two between Boston and Baltimore, four betweenNew-Orleans and Texas, and two between New-Orleans and Key West. Allof these are coast steamers of the best quality; and some few of themhave a nominal mail pay. We have also several transient steamers whichhave no routes or mail contracts, and which are consequently employedin irregular and accidental service, or laid up. They are theEricsson, the Washington and the Hermann, the Star of the West, thePrometheus, the Northern Light, the Daniel Webster, the Southerner, the St. Louis, laid up in New-York; the Uncle Sam, the Orizaba, andthe Brother Jonathan, belonging to the Nicaragua Transit Company, andthe California, Panamá, Oregon, Northerner, Fremont, and the tow-boatTobago, belonging to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, all lying inthe Pacific. Also the Queen of the West, Mr. Morgan's new steamer, inNew-York. These, like all other American steamers when unemployed onmail lines, generally lie in port for want of a remunerative trade. (_See Paper A. _) The aggregate tonnage of these fifty-seven steamers is 94, 795 tons. Eighteen of them, with an aggregate tonnage of 24, 845 tons, areengaged in no service. Twenty-three of them, with 24, 071 tons, areengaged in our coasting trade. Fourteen of them, with 19, 813 tons, (Gov. Register, ) are engaged in the California, Oregon, CentralAmerican, Mexican, and Cuban mail service; while eight of them, with25, 178 tons aggregate tonnage, are engaged in the transatlantic mailservice proper, between this country and Europe. It is thus seen thatwe have in all but 57 ocean steamers, of 94, 795 aggregate tons; whileGreat Britain has sixteen hundred and seventy, with 666, 330 aggregatetons; that we have twenty-two of these, of 45, 001 tons, engaged in theforeign and domestic mail service, while she has one hundred andtwenty-one, of 235, 488 aggregate tonnage, engaged in the foreign mailservice almost exclusively; and that we have thirty-seven steamersengaged in the coasting trade and lying still, while she has fifteenhundred and forty-eight steamers engaged in her coasting trade andmerchant service. (_See page 167_, for length of British and Americanmail lines, and the miles run per year. ) Comparisons are said to beodious, but it is more odious for such comparisons as these to bepossible in these days of enlightened commercial enterprise andthrift; and especially when so greatly to the disadvantage of acountry which boldly claims an aggregate civilization, enterprise, andprosperity equalled by those of no other country on the globe. Asregards our steam navy, it is too small to afford adequate protectionto our commerce and citizens; much less to defend the country in timeof war. We have not steamers enough in the navy to place one at eachof our important seaports; much less to send them to foreign stations. SECTION II. NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS. ARE OCEAN STEAM MAILS DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY FOR A COMMERCIAL PEOPLE? THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE DEMANDS THEM: MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF NATIONS: FAST MAILS NECESSARY TO CONTROL SLOW FREIGHTS: THE FOREIGN POST OF EVERY NATION IS MORE OR LESS SELFISH: IF WE NEGLECT APPROVED METHODS, WE ARE THEREBY SUBORDINATED TO THE SKILL OF OTHERS: THE WANT OF A FOREIGN POST IS A NATIONAL CALAMITY: OTHER NATIONS CAN NOT AFFORD US DUE FACILITIES: WARS AND ACCIDENTS FORBID: THE CRIMEA AND THE INDIES AN EXAMPLE: MANY OF OUR FIELDS OF COMMERCE NEED A POST: BRAZIL, THE WEST-INDIES, AND PACIFIC SOUTH-AMERICA: MAILS TO THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE BY THE NUMEROUS CUNARD VESSELS: CORRESPONDENCE WITH AFRICA, CHINA, THE EAST-INDIES, THE MAURITIUS, AND AUSTRALIA: SLAVISH DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN: DESIRABLE FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE: FOR THE CONTROL OF OUR SQUADRONS: CASES OF SUFFERING: NECESSARY FOR DEFENSE: FOR CULTIVATING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND OPENING TRADE: THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH WILL REQUIRE FASTER AND HEAVIER MAILS: OUR COMMERCE REQUIRES FAST STEAMERS FOR THE RAPID AND EASY TRANSIT OF PASSENGERS: MODES OF BENEFITING COMMERCE. Having seen that the ocean steam mail service is largely developed insome countries, especially in Great Britain, and that the second andthird commercial powers of the world, the United States and France, have not largely employed this important agent in their commerce, theinquiry naturally arises, whether fast ocean steam mails are desirableand necessary to the commercial prosperity of a people. Whether thisquestion be considered in its relative or its natural bearings, thereply is the same. Relatively considered, a large ocean steam mailservice is indispensable to a people who are largely commercial, because the most noted commercial rivals of the world employ it, andthus either force them to its use, or the loss of their commerce, andthe gradual transference of their shipping and trade into the hands oftheir rivals. Considered in its natural bearings, in its directinfluences and effects _per se_, it becomes even more evidentlynecessary, as the means of a ready and reliable knowledge of thecondition, wants, and movements of all those with whom a commercialnation necessarily has business, or could or should create it. The spirit of the age demands a more intimate acquaintance andcommunication than we have hitherto had with the outer world. Ourknowledge of foreign lands has pointed out innumerable wants hithertounknown, and suggested innumerable channels of their supply. Nationshave learned to depend on each other as formerly neighbor depended onhis neighbor for any little necessary or luxury of life. The luxuriousspirit of the times requires the importation and exportation of animmense list of articles with which foreign countries were formerlyunacquainted, but which have now become as indispensable as air, andlight, and water. And if it is not necessary that these many articlesshall be transported from land to land with the speed of the telegraphor the fleetness of the ocean steamer, it is at any rate necessarythat the facts concerning them, their ample or scarce supply, theirhigh or low price, their sale or purchase, their shipment or arrival, their loss, or seizure, or detention, should be made known with all ofthe combined speed of the telegraph, the lightning train, and therapid ocean mail steamer. If we possess ourselves these facilities ofrapid, regular, and reliable information to an extent that no othernation does, we will be the first to reach the foreign market with oursupplies, the first to bring the foreign article into the markets ofthe world, and the proper recipients of the first and largest profitsof the cream of the trade of every land. If we neglect these precautions, and refuse to establish thesefacilities, because their cost is apparent in one small sum ofexpenditure, while their large returns in profits diffused among thewhole people are not so palpably apparent to the common eye; if weleave to the genius and enterprise of the people that which privateenterprise and human skill unaided can never accomplish; in a word, ifwe fail to keep up with the world around us, and to progress _paripassu_ with our wise, acute, and experienced commercial rivals, then, as a matter of course, the information which we receive from theforeign world must come through others, and those our rivals, and mustbe deprived of its value by the advantage which they have alreadytaken of it. It is idle to suppose that any commercial nation on earthwill not so arrange her foreign post as to exclude others than her owncitizens as much as possible from its benefits. This is a paramountduty of the government to the citizen. It is therefore apparent thatour commerce must of necessity greatly suffer when its conduct is atall dependent on foreigners and competitors, and that it isexceedingly desirable, for the avoidance of such a calamity, that weshould have independent and ample foreign mail facilities of our own, wherever it is possible for our people to trade and obtain wealth. It is clearly impossible that other nations should afford thesefacilities, or that our people should have confidence in them ifattempted, or that they could be in any sense reliable in those manycases of exigency, national disputes, war, and accident, which usuallyafford us our best chances of speculation and profit. A dependence onforeigners for this supply of information, which never reaches usuntil it is emasculated of its virtues, is extremely hazardous. Itfails just at the point where it is most desirable. Foreign nations, especially the commercial European nations, are constantly at war, andare constantly interrupting their packet service. The late Crimean andthe present Indian wars are a good illustration. Our country, isolatedfrom the contending nations, and fortified against continual rupturesby a policy of non-intervention, is peculiarly blessed with theprivilege and ability to regularly and unintermittingly conduct hercommerce and reap her profits, even more securely, while her rivalsare temporarily devoting their attention to war. Such being the fact, it is wholly desirable and necessary to the end proposed that oursteam post should on all such occasions regularly come and go, evenamid the din of battle, and the conflict of our rivals, who for thetime are powerless to oppose our peaceful and legitimate commerce, andare generally but too glad to avail its offerings. There are many instances of the desirableness and the necessity of thetransmarine steam post on important lines of foreign communicationwhere we have a large trade, and yet no postal means of conducting it. Our immense trade with Brazil and other portions of South-America, which if properly fostered would increase with magic rapidity, sendsits news and its freight by the same vessel, or is compelled to usethe necessarily selfishly arranged, and circuitous, and non-connectinglines of Great Britain. A letter destined for Brazil, four thousandmiles distant, must needs go by England, Portugal, the Coast ofAfrica, Madeira, and the Cape de Verdes, a distance of eight thousandmiles, in a British packet. One destined for the Pacific Coast ofSouth-America must go to Panama and await the arrival of the Englishpacket, with London letters more recently dated, before it can proceedon to Callao, Lima, or Valparaiso. Letters destined to the West-Indiescan go to Havana only, by American steamers; but they must there awaitthe British line which takes them to St. Thomas, and there bedistributed and forwarded to the various islands, the Spanish Main, the Guianas, Venezuela, and New-Granada by some one of the tendifferent British steam packet lines running semi-monthly from thatstation. So with half of our letters which go to the Continent of Europe: theymust go by the Cunard line to England, and thence by English steamersto the British Channel, the Baltic, the White Sea, the Mediterranean, Egypt, Constantinople, or the Black Sea. Those to places along thecoast of Africa and to the Cape of Good Hope are dependent on the sameEnglish packet transit. For our communication with China, India, Australia, the East-Indies generally, and the Islands of the Pacific, we are entirely and slavishly dependent, as usual, on Great Britain. Instead of sending our letters and passengers direct from Panamá orSan Francisco to Honolulu, Hong Kong, Shanghae, Macáo, Calcutta, Ceylón, Bombáy, Madrás, Sydney, Melbourne, Batavia, the Mauritius, andthe Gulf of Mozambique, by a short trunk line of our own steamers, andfrom its terminus only, by the British lines, they now go first toEngland, as a slavish matter of course, then across the Continent orthrough the Mediterranean to Egypt, thence by land to the Red Sea, andthence to China and the East-Indies; or from England by her steamlines around the Cape of Good Hope to Australia and the East-Indies;or by slow and uncertain sailing packets direct from our own country, either around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope. It is evident toevery reflecting man who has given the subject any attention, that allof these lines of communication would be very desirable, and veryhighly profitable to our people at large; and that the latter and thatalong the West Coast of South-America could be easily established bytwo new contracts for that purpose, or in some other way, to the greatand lasting advantage of our countrymen. The transmarine post is very desirable for the better conduct of ourforeign diplomacy and the consular service. It is now almostimpossible for our ministers and agents abroad to hold any thing likea regular correspondence with the State Department, unless it be thosein Southern and Western Europe. I was told last year by our Ministerin Rio de Janeiro that his dispatches from the Government at homeseldom reached him under four months; and Mr. Gilmer, the Consul ofthe United States at Bahia, reports, in the "Consular Returns" nowabout to be published, that his dispatches never come to hand underfour months, that they are frequently out six months, and that manyare lost altogether. This is the experience and the reïteratedcomplaint of nearly every foreign _employée_ of the Government, whohas any zeal in prosecuting his country's business, and may find itnecessary to get instructions or advice from home. Many knowing thedelays, uncertainty, and irregularity of correspondence, make noattempt whatever to communicate regularly with the Department. Wefrequently express great surprise that we have no intelligence fromour ministers, special ambassadors, and agents; but do not reflectthat in the majority of cases dispatches have to be sent byirresponsible and slow-sailing vessels, or by the steamers of GreatBritain, which it may be safely asserted are in no particular hurry todeliver them to us. Three several letters sent by me at separate timesthrough the British mail from Rio de Janeiro for New-York neverreached their destination. Nor is it better with our squadrons on foreign stations. They receivetheir orders in the same slow and irregular way, and find it almost aseasy to send a vessel when they wish to communicate with the NavyDepartment, or await the movements of their dull old storeships, as toattempt any other means of intercourse. It may be safely said thatthey are not actually under the control of the Department, in manyimportant cases, one time in ten. Whatever the dispute, it is leftentirely at the will of the Commodore, or it remains unsettledaltogether. Our recent accumulated Paraguayan difficulties is a casein point. American citizens were driven from the country, and theirvaluable property confiscated. They applied to the Commodore forrelief, but could not obtain it. Our surveying vessel, engaged in apermitted scientific exploration, was fired into and had some of hermen killed; and redress being demanded by the Captain from theCommodore, it was refused. The Commodore feared transcending hisinstructions: he could not communicate with the home authorities muchunder a year; and so the case rested, and yet rests. These wants, papable as they are in times of peace, become doubly pressing in timeof war. Let a conflict commence with England, or France, on whom wedepend for mails, or with their allies, and they could easily surpriseand destroy every squadron which we have upon the high seas monthsbefore they would necessarily hear of a declaration of war, or knowwhy they were captured. The very contemplation of such possibilitiesis intolerable, and should be sufficient of itself, setting aside allconsiderations of commerce and diplomacy, to arouse our nation to theadoption of the proper means for its safety and defense. An effective steam postal marine is unquestionably most desirable andnecessary for the defense of our country, and for the prosecution ofany foreign war. Lord Canning, the British Post-Master General, recently said in a report to the House of Lords, that although all ofthe steam mail packets might not be able to carry an armament, or berequired in the transport service in time of war, yet the mailfacilities which they would then afford would be more important andnecessary than at any other time. He had no idea that because engagedin a foreign war the postal service would be useless, but to thecontrary, more than ever indispensable. Such proved to be the fact inthe late contest in the Crimea, and such is to-day the case withregard to the troubles in India and China. Their postal vessels haveproven a first necessity in both of these wars, not only for transportof the troops, but for speedy intelligence also. Without them, Englandcould not have entered the Crimean contest, and the French forceswould have been compelled to remain at home. Turkey would have beenoverawed, and Constantinople would have fallen before the Russianfleet. We are to-day, and always must be, liable to a foreign war. Wehave a great boiling cauldron running over with excitement all alongour southern and south-western borders. Central America, Cuba, theWest-Indies, and South-America are far more foreign countries to usthan Europe or the Mediterranean to England. Cuba will no doubt be atsome day our most important naval station and possession. Even thedefense of our own coast would require an immense transport service;for Texas is nearly four thousand miles from Maine, and California isseven thousand from the Atlantic seaboard. No better proof can begiven of the necessity of a large and extra naval transport servicethan the late Mexican war. But for our steamers it would have taken usyears to concentrate an army on the shores of Mexico. It was a tediousprocess at the time; for our ocean mail packets were not then in use. We could now land a larger number of men there in one month than wethen did in a whole year. But our transport facilities are not yet byany means adequate. A large postal steam marine is desirable as a means of cultivating thesympathies and respect of foreign nations, by bringing them intocloser friendly and commercial connection with us; and for creatingamong them that respect and consideration which the British statesmenso well know to be an easy means of conducting diplomacy, and anunfailing source of commercial advantages. It is not necessary that weshall impose upon foreign countries in these respects by falsepretenses; but it is truly desirable, and it would be profitable to anextent little imagined, to let them know our real importance as anation, and understand our pacific policy and _bona fide_ intentions. These are important considerations when we wish to carry any point, establish any line of policy, remove any prejudice; and nothing willmore readily produce them, and arouse attention to our articles ofexport, and induce a people to establish a regular business with us, than these ever-present, convenient, and imposing mail steamers. Nations as well as individuals estimate us by our appearances; andwhile it is not desirable that we shall appear more than we are, it isyet very important that foreign nations with which we have businessshall know our real merits, and respect us for what we areintrinsically worth. There is evidently no means of our commercialtriumph over other nations without a liberal and widely extended steammail service; and as this triumph is of paramount importance to us, who have so many resources, so is the ocean steam mail as the onlymeans of securing it. (_See views of Gen. Rusk, in papers appended. _) It has recently been suggested by parties who certainly have notthought very deeply on the subject, that the completion of theAtlantic Telegraph, which every body reasonably expects soon to becompleted, will so inaugurate a new era in the transmission ofintelligence, that one of its effects will be the supersession of fastocean mails, and consequently of subsidized steamers. It is a firstand palpable view of this question that much of the importantintelligence between the two countries requiring speedy transmissionwill be sent through the telegraph, notwithstanding the necessarilyhigh prices which will be charged for dispatches. These communicationswill be sententious, summary, and of great variety. The markets, prices, important political and other events, private personal andunelaborated intelligence will come over the wires just as they nowcome over existing land lines. The line will create extra facilitiesfor operations on both sides, and cause more mutual business to bedone. It will thus create the necessity for more correspondence thanbefore, for particulars, elaboration, items, bills of lading, exchanges, duplicates, minute instructions, etc. , to which there willbe no end. The main transaction of any business being made morequickly, it will be essential for the papers to pass with greaterdispatch. If there were twenty telegraphic wires working day andnight, which never can be the case from their expensiveness, theycould not do in a month the correspondence and business done by onesteamer's mail. Beside this, those who got their dispatches firstwould have a decided advantage over those who would be compelled fromthe mass of business to wait several days. It is an advantage of thesteam mails that all get their letters and papers at the same time;and that no one has thus the advantage of the other. It is hardlypossible for one unacquainted with the postal business to conceive howlarge a mass of mail matter is deposited by each steamer; and it isonly necessary to see this to realize that the Atlantic Telegraph willnever materially interfere with the steamers except to require of themgreater speed and heavier mails. It is the experience on all of our land routes that the thousands ofmiles of telegraph, so far from superseding the mails, have made moremails necessary, have caused and required them to be much faster, havenecessitated more correspondence, and induced people to live in moremutual dependence, to have more communication with one another, and tomake the home or the business of a man less than formerly his closedcastle, which none entered, and which no one had any occasion toenter. The American telegraph has now arrived at great perfection, andsends its electric throb to every corner of the Union, save Californiaonly. At the same time, the railroads of the country are taxed totheir highest capacity. No period ever witnessed so many, so rapid, and so well-filled mails. It is evident that no telegraphic system canproperly do detailed business. First, it is and must ever remain toocostly. Second, it would require about as many lines as business men, to give them all equal chances, and no one the profitable precedence. Next, there is nothing positively accurate and fully reliable. Nosignatures can pass over the line. No transaction can be made final byit. No bank will pay, or ought to pay, money on public telegraphicdrafts. And, as in the land service, so in the ocean. The telegraphacross the ocean will simply create far more business for the mails, and make it desirable and indispensable that they shall be sent andreceived by the most rapid conveyance known to the times. Thus, it isevident that this new and as yet not fully established agent ofinternational communication, so far from obviating our rapidtransmarine service, will but the more effectually necessitate it. Nor must it be forgotten that our commercial prosperity largelydepends on the ready and comfortable transit of passengers. Thepassenger traffic has increased with astonishing rapidity during thelast eighteen years. Our smaller merchants can go abroad when mailsteamers are plenty, and make their own purchases and sales, withoutpaying heavy commissions and high prices to middlemen; do theirbusiness on less capital; and thus benefit themselves and reduce theprices to our consumers. Compared with sailing vessels, these few mailsteamers become the forerunners of trade and commerce, and create animmense service for the sail. They enable us to save large sums ofinterest or advances on merchandise consigned, and give to us quickreturns from the products which we ship abroad. This has long beenevident to Great Britain, and she has acted liberally on thesuggestion. So desirable is the service for the general prosperity ofher people, that she expends annually for her foreign steam mailsnearly six millions of dollars, while they do not return to thetreasury much above three. She regards the expenditure as she doesthat for the navy and the army, a necessity for the publicpreservation and prosperity. As regards the lines that we now have, they are among the noblest inthe world. For aggregate comfort, convenience, safety, speed, andcheapness, they are not equalled by the most famous British lines. More luxurious tables, more neatness, cleanliness, and roominess, moregeneral comforts than have always been characteristic of our Havre, Liverpool, and California lines, can not be found in the world. Theonly objection to them is, that the service is not sufficient; thatthe trips are not frequent enough; and that the companies are notenabled to sustain a larger steam marine which would proportionallycheapen the service, and accommodate more persons and a much largerclass of interests. Our experiences of the benefits of existing lines, limited as those lines are, present an unanswerable argument for thedesirableness and necessity of a liberal steam postal system, and alarge and judicious extension of the present service. (_See views ofSenate Committee, 1852, Paper E. _) SECTION III. THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM. THE COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM: STEAM MAILS ARRIVE AND DEPART AT ABSOLUTELY FIXED PERIODS: UNCERTAINTY IS HAZARDOUS AND COSTLY: SUBSIDIZED STEAMERS GIVE A NECESSARILY HIGH SPEED TO THE MAILS: MONEY CAN NOT AFFORD TO LIE UPON THE OCEAN FOR WEEKS: COMPARED WITH SAIL: STEAMERS TRANSPORT CERTAIN CLASSES OF FREIGHT: THE HAVRE AND THE CUNARD LINES: THE CUNARD PROPELLERS: STEAMERS CAN AFFORD TO TRANSPORT EXPRESS PACKAGES AND GOODS: GOODS TAKEN ONLY TO FILL UP: WHY PROPELLERS ARE CHEAPER IN SOME CASES: STEAM IN SOME CASES CHEAPER THAN THE WIND: AN ESTIMATE: THE PROPELLER FOR COASTING: STEAM ON ITS OWN RECEIPTS HAS NOT SUCCEEDED ON THE OCEAN: MARINE AND FLUVIAL NAVIGATION COMPARED: MOST FREIGHTS NOT TRANSPORTABLE BY STEAM ON ANY CONDITIONS: AUXILIARY FREIGHTING AND EMIGRANT PROPELLERS: LAWS OF TRANSPORT: RAPID MAILS AND LEISURE TRANSPORT OF FREIGHT THE LAW OF NATURE: THE PRICE OF COALS RAPIDLY INCREASING: ANTICIPATED IMPROVEMENTS AND CHEAPENING IN MARINE PROPULSION NOT REALIZED. Believing that no further arguments or facts are necessary to showthat a rapid steam mail marine is desirable and essential to thesuccessful government of the country, to our foreign commerce, and tothe growth of individual interests and a general prosperity of thepeople, I shall now make some few inquiries concerning the CommercialCapabilities of steam, as the most effective agent for the rapidtransit of the ocean, and the most expensive agent for the transportof goods. After this, it will be necessary to examine into the Costof Steam, as a subject closely allied to its general capabilities. Whatever may be said of the wind as a cheap agent of locomotion, thismuch may be safely predicated of steam vessels for the mails; thattheir time of departure and arrival has an absolute fixity which isattainable by no other means, and which is highly conducive to thebest interests of all those for whom commerce is conducted. Noreasoning is necessary to show to the man of business, or even to thepleasure-seeker, the importance of approximate certainty as to thetime when the mail leaves and when he can receive an answer to hisdispatches. He may not be able to give clearly philosophic reasons forit; yet he feels the necessity in his business; and it certainlyrelieves him of many painful doubts, if nothing more. Uncertainty incommercial operations is always hazardous and costly to the great massof the people, who as a general thing pay more for whatever they get, on the principle that we seldom take a venture in an uncertain thingunless it holds out inducements of large profit, or unless we get ahigh price for guarantying it. So in commercial correspondence, whichconstitutes the great bulk of the ocean mails. Let uncertainty prevailfor but three or four days beyond the time when we should have newsfrom abroad, and every body is in doubt, every body speculates, and inthe end every body is injured. Nor is this certainty in the time of arrival and departure of themails more desirable than their speed. The common sense of the worldhas settled down upon the necessity of rapid mails; and all of theingenuity of the age is now taxed to its very highest to secure morespeed in the transmission of intelligence. Many interests demand it. Money, which represents labor, is continually lent and borrowed inbills of exchange, acceptances, deposits, and in actual cash sentacross the seas. The length of time for passing the bills andcorrespondence, or the specie itself, thus becomes an exceedinglyimportant item to those who are to use them, and consequently to theultimate consumer for whom they are conducting the commercialtransaction. What community would to-day tolerate the idea of sendingthree millions of dollars per week, and five millions of creditsbetween England and the United States on a sailing ship of whateverquality, with the probability of keeping it lying unproductive on theocean for thirty days? Extend this to weekly shipments of the sameamounts, and have at one time on the waters between the two countriestwelve million dollars in specie and twenty in credits, tossing aboutthe ocean, unproductive and unsafe, and entailing all of the evilsincident to the uncertainty as to the time when it will arrive. But ifthis is not sufficient, extend the inquiry to South-America, andChina, and India, and see how enormous and useless a waste of moneyand interest is incurred in the many millions which by sailing vesselsand slow steamers is fruitlessly gilding the ocean for months. Moneyis too valuable and interest too high to keep so many millions of itlocked up from the world. At two and three per cent a month, thenation, or, what is the same thing, its commercial and mercantileclasses, as representing the producing, would soon become bankrupt. The only avoidance of these evident evils is in a rapid transmissionof the mails, specie, and passengers. And herein consists the chiefvalue of the rapid ocean steamer. It is an important case which theTelegraph, with all of its benefits, can never reach. It can nevertransmit specie; neither the evidences of debt nor of property. Thevoluminous mails, with all of their tedious details, upon which suchtransactions depend, must go and come on steamers, and on steamersonly. They have the certainty, which will satisfy men and preventspeculation, gambling, and imposition; they have the speed, whichshortens credit, keeps specie alway in active use, and enablescommercial men to know, meet, and supply the wants of the world beforethey become costly or crushing; and they give a rapid and comfortabletransit to passengers, who can thus look after their business, andsave much to themselves and to the producer and consumer. Comparedwith sailing vessels their efficiency is really wondrous. Foreigncorrespondence was formerly very limited, and the interchange ofinterests, feelings, and opinions was slow and tedious. Each nationdepended solely on itself; and instead of the brotherhood nowprevailing, communicated through the costly channels of war, bymessages of the cannon, and in powerful, hostile fleets. But theforeign correspondence of the world is really enormous, and rapidlyincreasing, since the introduction of ocean steamers; and no one willsay that they have had a small share in producing that fraternalinternational spirit which is now so widely manifested in PeaceCongresses, Congresses of the Five Powers, explanations, concessions, and amicable adjustments of difficulties. The peaceful influences andthe civilization of the times are but another comment on thecapabilities of steam. There are also certain classes of freights which steam is bettercalculated than sailing vessels to transport; certain rich and costlygoods which would either damage or depreciate if not brought speedilyinto the market. There are many articles also, as gold and silverware, jewelry, diamonds, bullion, etc. , and some articles of _vertu_as well as use, which are costly, and have to be insured at highvalues unless sent on steamers; and which consequently can pay arather better price. As in the case of specie, they are too valuableto be kept long on the ocean; but in the general traffic of the worldthere is so little of this class of freight that steamers can place noreliance on it as a source of income. These freights have aboundedmost between France and England and the United States. This is theprincipal reason why the New-York and Havre line of mail steamers hasrun on so unprecedentedly small a subsidy; a sum not more than halfadequate to the support of a mail line but for that class of freights. The Cunard line has also derived a large sum of its support from thesame source. All such articles passing by that line come from England, Ireland, and Scotland, where they are manufactured; and being shippedby British merchants, are given, as a matter of duty, to their ownsteamers. Another reason for the Cunard line getting most of thosemore profitable freights is that a steamer leaves every week; everySaturday; and shippers sending packages weekly are not compelled everyother week to hunt up a new line, and open a new set of accounts, aswould be the case if they attempted to ship by the Collinssemi-monthly line. These freights have hitherto proven a profitable source of income tothat line. As there is no manufacturing done in this country forEurope, the Cunarders and the Havre as well as the Collins andVanderbilt lines, have no freights that pay the handling from theUnited States to Europe. And not only has the Cunard line, by startingfrom home, taken all of these profitable freights from the Collins, but it has run a weekly line of propellers from Havre and taken thefreight over to Liverpool free of charge for its New-York and Bostonsteamers, and thereby shared the freights and greatly reduced theincome of the Havre line. There being a great superabundance ofpropeller stock in Great Britain, which can be purchased frequently atless than half its cost, and these vessels running the short distancebetween Havre and Liverpool very cheaply, (_See pages 108-13_, ) theCunarders have cut the Havre freights down from forty to fifteendollars per ton, and sometimes for months together to ten dollars perton. As a matter of course, this price would not pay the handling andcare of these costly articles; but at fifteen dollars it enabled theCunard line to fill their ships and derive some profit; as most ofthem, with the exception of the _Persia_, run slowly, use less coal, and have more freight room. All of these freights are, however, smallin quantity, and not much to be relied on from year to year, as willbe seen below, in consequence of the action of propellers. There is another class of business which mail steamers can do atremunerating prices; but which is exceedingly limited anywhere, andnot at all known on some lines. This is in Express packages. They paya high price; but seldom reach more than three or four tons under themost favorable circumstances. In the early stages of the Californialines, when there was a rush of travel to the gold regions, and ahurried transit required for a thousand little necessaries of life, the New-York and Aspinwall and the Pacific Mail Steamship Company'slines transported a large express freight outward at every voyage, amounting sometimes to two hundred tons; but the golden days of suchcargo have long gone by, and California is now supplied like the restof the world by the cheaper and more deliberate transport of sailingvessels; and the steamers are left to their legitimate business ofmails and passengers. Taking together all of the classes of freightswhich steamers having mail payment are capable of transporting, theyamount at present to but an insignificant part of the income by whichthese steamers can be run. During the last six years these freightshave reduced more than one hundred per cent; and goods which were thenprofitable to the steamer, are now taken only "to fill up. " And thechief reason for this reduction arises not so much from competitionbetween the steam-lines, which well knew that they could not transportthese freights when reduced to the present low prices, but from theintroduction of a large number of propellers, some of which wereoriginally designed for this species of trade, and many others whichwere built during the war in the Crimea for the transport of troops. These ships were never prosperous anywhere, and are in nearly allcases at the present found in second hands; the original proprietorshaving lost a large share of their investment. Thus, purchasedcheaply, and running with simply an auxiliary steam power, and makingthe passages but little shorter than the sailing vessels, and not evenso short as their best passages, they have but little more dailyexpense than the sailing vessels, with all of the deceptive advantagesof being called steamers. They thus get these better freights and alarge number of immigrants, which with small interest on prime costenables them to live. Paradoxical as it may seem, there are yet some cases, even upon theocean, in which steam can transport freight cheaper than the winds ofheaven. And this species of trade constitutes one of the bestcapabilities of steam power applied to navigation. It is not in thelong voyage between Europe and America, or between the East andCalifornia, or yet in the far-off trade among the calms and pacificseas of the East-Indies and the Pacific Islands; it is not in thesmooth, lake-like seas of the West-Indies, where there is no freightwhose transport price will pay for putting it on and taking it off thesteamer; nor in the trade of Brazil whence a bag of coffee can betransported five thousand miles to New-York nearly as cheaply as itcan from New-York to Baltimore or to Charleston; but it is in thecoasting trade of almost every country, where the voyage is short. Inthe trade between New-York and Baltimore, between Charleston andSavannah, between Boston and Portland, or between New-Orleans and KeyWest, or New-Orleans and Galveston, the small sailing vessels spendone half of their time in working in and out of the harbors. Sometimesthey are two days awaiting winds, to get out of a harbor, two days insailing, and two days again in making and entering their port ofdestination; whereas a steamer would make the whole passage in one dayto a day and a half. Now, the distance actually to be run, and forwhich the steamer will be compelled to burn coal is not very great;but the trouble of working the vessel in and out, against adversewinds and currents, and amid storms and calms, is sometimes excessive, while the delay and cost are disheartening. They have also the troubleof warping into and out of the docks, which is not the case withsteamers. Thus, it frequently takes a week for a sailing vessel to do the workthat a steamer will readily do in twenty-four to thirty-six hours. Saythat it takes the sail four times as long as the steamer to accomplisha given voyage. To do as much business as the steamer would do in thesame time, would require four sailing vessels; four times as many menas one sail requires, or probably twice as many hands in the aggregateas the steamer would have; and would incur at least twice the expenseof the steamer in feeding them. Now, there is also a much largeraggregate sum invested in these four sail, and the owners pay a muchlarger sum of interest on their prime investment. Or, in other words, the steamer with but a few more men, but little greater expense inliving, a small coal-bill, an engineer and firemen, and a prime outlayof not more than double the capital, will carry four times the freightand passengers, without incurring probably so much as three times theexpense of one of the sail. After the prime cost the most importantitem of expenditure in one of these small steamers is the coal; butthe distance run being so short, and getting into and out of theharbor and docks being so easy, the vessel does large execution atlittle expense. The two most essential benefits, however, of her shortvoyage are, that she is not compelled to carry much fuel, andconsequently occupies nearly all of her space with freight; and thatthe prices of freight on these short voyages are much larger inproportion than they are on long voyages. Sailing vessels charge verylittle more for a thousand miles than they do for five hundred; but asteamer may have to charge nearly three times as much; especially ifshe run fast, consume much fuel, and occupy her cargo-room with coal. There are distances at which steamers, however large, can not carry apound of freight; but occupy all their available space with the powerthat drives them. In these long voyages sail becomes much cheaper. It is by no means essential that these small coasting vessels shall bepropellers; for to acquire the same speed they expend the same powerand have the disadvantage of being deeper in the water, and not beingable to go into all harbors with much freight. They have also theadvantage of carrying more sail, and being generally better able tostand coast storms than a side-wheel of light draught of water. Theyare not quite so expensive in prime construction, but generallyrequire more repairs, and must be on the docks much oftener. They are, however, much better suited than side-wheel vessels to voyages where amedium speed is required, and where the steam can be used at pleasuresimply as an auxiliary power. In such cases there is a profitableeconomy of fuel. But speed has generally been deemed essential in thiscountry, and the side-wheel is everywhere used. But entirely thecontrary is the case in Great Britain and France. There the coastingbusiness is conducted by screws almost altogether; and the speed doesnot transcend the limit of economy and commercial capability. Theydistinguish between the extremely fast carriage of mails andpassengers on the one hand, and freights on the other; and althoughthey wish the speed and certainty of steam, yet it is not the costlyspeed. When they know that a given quantity of fuel will carry freighteight knots per hour, they would consider it wasteful and foolish toconsume twice that quantity of fuel just to carry it ten knots; andmore especially so, when, in addition to the extra quantity of fuel, they would lose just its bulk in paying freight room. England is thusemploying most of her vast fleet of coasting ocean steamers in her owntrade, or in the foreign trade lying within a few hundred miles of herports. And the voyages being short, her coals being cheap andconvenient, frequently not above three dollars per ton to thecoasters, and in addition to this, the prime cost of these vesselsbeing smaller than in this country, as both iron and labor arecheaper, she has found them very profitable at home, and isinsinuating them into all the short routes wherever she can get afoothold. It was not until she attempted the same species ofself-supporting steam navigation with distant countries, that herpropeller system failed her and involved her citizens in loss. Meanwhile it is more than probable that within the next fifteen yearswe shall find five hundred propellers scattered along the coasts ofthe United States. Notwithstanding the eminent capabilities of steam when applied tocoast navigation, or to the fluvial navigation of the interior, it hasfailed to make the same triumphs in the carriage of freights andpassengers upon the ocean. And it is not alone because the voyage islong and the freights low in price. Steamers carry freights up theMississippi river two thousand miles from New-Orleans, and find itprofitable. Some run even as high as three thousand miles up thatriver and the Missouri; a voyage nearly as long as to Europe, and makemoney by it. But the circumstances are very different. They do notleave the dock at New-Orleans with even more than enough fuel on boardfor the whole trip, as the ocean steamers do. If they did they couldcarry no freight. But they stop every twelve to eighteen hours andtake on wood just as they need it, fifty to a hundred cords at a time;and instead of occupying all of their available room with wood, theyhave the steamer full of cargo, and have on board only fifty or sixtytons of fuel at a time, and only half that weight on an average. Noneof the best steamers on those rivers could take enough wood on boardfor the whole three thousand miles, even though they should not have aton of freight. And compared with ocean steamers of the same enginepower, they do not cost half of the money, I might say generally, notone third of the money. There is no reason, then, why these steamersshould not carry large quantities of freight and make large sums ofmoney by it. They have the great elements, fuel, freight capacity, andprime cost in their favor. There is a large class of freights which are not transportable bysteam on long ocean voyages under any conditions. We will grant thatunder the most favorable circumstances, where rich and costly articlesare transported in small bulk, that propellers running at a low rateof speed, or just fast enough to anticipate sailing vessels, will makea living. But change the class of these freights into the greataverage class of those filling the thousands of sailing vessels, anddeprive these screw vessels of an immense emigrant passenger traffic, and they would not pay their running expenses by fifty per cent. Thisstyle of freights, sailing vessels in their great competition havereduced to the lowest paying figure. The margin left for profit is sosmall that our ship-owners constantly complain that unless there arechanges they must go into other business; and many of them say thishonestly, as is shown by the hundreds of ships which of late years wecan always find lying up, awaiting improvement in business. Now, leteven the slowest and cheapest running screw vessel attempt to carrythe same freights, to say nothing of fast side-wheel mail vessels, andwe shall see against what odds the screw or other steamer has tocontend. In the first place, her engines, boilers, coal, etc. , occupyat least forty per cent of her total registered tonnage. Grant thatthe additional expense of a steamer over a sail, that is, wages forengineers, firemen, coal passers, etc. , and finding the same in foodand rooms, costs even no more than the loss of an additional ten percent of her freight room. In other words, considering her steammachinery, fuel, extra expenses, etc. , to be equal to half of herfreight room, it is evident that she would carry only half as muchfreight as a sailing vessel of the same size, and that she would getbut half as much money for it. It is thus clear, I think, that there is a certain class of oceanfreights which steam can not transport under any conditions so long asthere are sailing vessels on the ocean; and in that class arecomprehended all the great standard and staple articles of the world, constituting in sum seventeen twentieths of all the freight passingupon the ocean. This being so, it is utterly idle to suppose thatsteam in any form can take the place of sail upon the ocean, eventhough the present prices for the carriage of standard articles shouldincrease three hundred per cent. There are many considerations which affect this question. The ordinaryaverage passages of the ocean on long voyages are now very rapid; andsome of the clippers have attained a speed which no freighting steamermay ever be expected to do on the high seas. They do not maintain thishigh speed as an average, but it is sufficiently high for all of theordinary purposes of transport in the standard articles of commerce, and where the business of the clipper is done by a fast mail steamer. There is no positive necessity for the speedy transport that some haveattempted to give to articles, whose presence in the markets, as theordinary supplies of life, to-day, next month, or a month later, is amatter of total indifference to every one except the ship-ownerhimself. It but little concerns the public whether a cargo of cotton, or beef or pork, or corn is one month or forty-five days between theUnited States and England, so that it is safe in the end. It is anannual production that must have an annual transit, and howeverunnecessarily fast we may become, we can not send more than one cropin the year. The world frequently becomes too fast in every thing; andcrises, panics, and bankruptcies follow as legitimate consequences. When a fictitious value is given to every thing, and every globule ofair which one has breathed comes puffing out, a splendid bubble, amagnificent speculation, and when men have to go so fast that theyneed a telegraph to ride them through the world lest they get behindthe heated times, no wonder that the shipper can not sit quietly downin his office and wait thirty days for a load of corn to reachEngland, or a load of iron to appear in the harbor in return. And itdoes not matter to him that it may not be used there in six months. Hewishes to finish the "operation, " to close up the "transaction" beforehe goes up town in the evening. There is a rational distinction between the necessary and theunnecessary which we must learn to make, and a limit which safetyassigns to every operation. There are some things which must be donerapidly, and others which may be done at leisure. Between the freightcargo, and the correspondence which controls it there is a greatdifference. Rapid transport of letters, intelligence, and passengers, and leisure transport of freight, is the law of nature, and to attemptto reverse it is but to attempt that which will never be successfullydone, simply because wholly unnecessary in any permanent economicsense. And not only is higher speed than that of clippers unnecessaryin ordinary freight transport, but it is clearly impossible in anynormal condition of trade. Circumstances may, and doubtless often willexist, which will require some sluggish article to be transported along distance in a short time, as in the case of the famine inIreland, and which may insure rates at which steam vessels can takesmall quantities of such freights; but such occasions will ever beaccidental, and the support of vessels depending on them thequestionable support of expedients, and capricious in the extreme. Itwill ever be just as impossible to hurry gross freights across theocean in a healthy state of commerce as it will to prevent rapidmails, or forego the comforts of quick passenger transit. To say nothing of a vessel which is half filled with its own power, attempting to compete, in the ordinary freights of the world, with onewhich fills every square foot with paying cargo, it is equallyimportant that we should look at the question of fuel. The coals ofthe world are not so plentiful or so cheap that we should consumewhole pits in a year in unnecessary and unproductive service. They arealready beginning to fail in many parts of the world, or to the sameeffect, are mined and brought to market at such increasing cost, andapplied to so many new purposes day by day, that in a few years theprice will place them entirely beyond the reach of commercial purposesupon the ocean. It is contended, however, that the science ofengineering is also rapidly advancing, and that we shall soon havesome discovery by which we can have heat without fuel, and powerwithout heat. But I have heard of those imaginary engineering hopes solong that I begin to believe them vague, and that we shall yet for afew generations measure the power applied by the number of pounds ofcoal consumed. From past experiences and present indications we canpredicate nothing with more certainty of fuel than that it willindefinitely increase in price. I am satisfied, therefore, that withall of the capabilities of steam it can never be applied to generalocean transportation; first, because undesirable; and second, becauseimpossible even if desirable. But to show more clearly that it isimpossible, I will now make some inquiries concerning the cost ofocean steam, which is the cardinal point of interest in marinepropulsion. SECTION IV. COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED. MISAPPREHENSION OF THE HIGH COST OF STEAM MARINE PROPULSION: VIEWS OF THE NON-PROFESSIONAL: HIGH SPEED NECESSARY FOR THE DISTANCES IN OUR COUNTRY: WHAT IS THE COST OF HIGH ADEQUATE MAIL SPEED: FAST STEAMERS REQUIRE STRONGER PARTS IN EVERY THING: GREATER OUTLAY IN PRIME COST: MORE FREQUENT AND COSTLY REPAIRS: MORE WATCHFULNESS AND MEN: MORE COSTLY FUEL, ENGINEERS, FIREMEN, AND COAL-PASSERS: GREAT STRENGTH OF HULL REQUIRED: ALSO IN ENGINES, BOILERS, AND PARTS: WHY THE PRIME COST INCREASES: THEORY OF REPAIRS: FRICTION AND BREAKAGES: BOILERS AND FURNACES BURNING OUT: REPAIRS TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN PER CENT: DEPRECIATION: SEVERAL LINES CITED; USES FOR MORE MEN: EXTRA FUEL, AND LESS FREIGHT-ROOM: BRITISH TRADE AND COAL CONSUMPTION: THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED, WITH TABLE: THE RESISTANCE VARIES AS IS THE SQUARE OF THE VELOCITY: THE POWER, OR FUEL, VARIES AS THE CUBE OF THE VELOCITY: THE RATIONALE: AUTHORITIES CITED IN PROOF OF THE LAW: EXAMPLES, AND THE FORMULÆ: COAL-TABLE; NO. I. : QUANTITY OF FUEL FOR DIFFERENT SPEEDS AND DISPLACEMENTS: DEDUCTIONS FROM THE TABLE: RATES AT WHICH INCREASED SPEED INCREASES THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL: CONSUMPTION FOR VESSELS OF 2, 500, 3, 000, AND 6, 000 TONS DISPLACEMENT: COAL-TABLE; NO. II. : FREIGHT-TABLE; NO. III. : AS SPEED AND POWER INCREASE FREIGHT AND PASSENGER ROOM DECREASE: FREIGHT AND FARE REDUCED: SPEED OF VARIOUS LINES: FREIGHT-COST: COAL AND CARGO; NO. IV. : MR. ATHERTON'S VIEWS OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT. The foregoing arguments bring us to the conclusion that steam, however desirable, can not be profitably employed in commercegenerally as an agent of transport; and that it is best applicable tothe rapid conveyance of the mails, passengers, specie, and costlyfreights only. That this fact may be presented in a clearer light, andthat we may see the almost incredibly high cost of rapid steaming, orthe attainment of a speed sufficiently high for the carriage ofimportant mails, it will be necessary to make some critical inquiriesconcerning the working cost of steam power, under any conditions, asapplied to marine propulsion. Much misapprehension prevails on thispoint among nearly all classes of the people, and even among therulers of the country whose action controls the destiny and uses ofthis valuable power. It is hardly to be expected, however, thatgentlemen engaged actively in the all-engrossing pursuits of businessor of public life, with a thousand different sets of ideas to bematured on a thousand different subjects, such as demand the attentionof Congress, and the Departments of the Executive Government, shouldbe practically or even theoretically acquainted with a professionwhich requires years of close application and study, and a wide fieldof practical, daily observation and experience. It would be as absurdfor unprofessional gentlemen of any class, as well from the walks ofstatesmanship and the Government as from those of quiet private life, to assume an acquaintance with the theory and practice of navigation, and the cost, embarrassments, and difficulties attending steamshipenterprise, as it would for any two or three of them to enter an oceansteamer for the first time of their lives, and essay to work theengines and navigate the ship across the seas. The skill and knowledgerequisite for such a task would require years of application; and itcan not be reasonably supposed that those entirely unacquainted withthe theory and parts of an engine, should know much about itscapabilities, or the cost attending its use. But there are approximate conclusions, readily applicable topractice, at which even the unprofessional can arrive with certaintyand security on a proper presentation of the prominent facts andtheories concerned; and that these may be given to the public in areliable and intelligible form, for the removal of the doubts andobscurities which have hung around the subject, is the chief object ofthis publication. This inquiry becomes the more important as the speedof American steamers is proverbially beyond that of any other steamvessels in the world. From the first conception of fluvial and marinesteam propulsion by Fitch and Fulton, the public and the inventorsthemselves regarded the new application of this power with the morefavor as it promised to be a means of shortening the long distancesbetween the different parts of our own large country. And the sameobject has acted as a stimulus ever since to that increase of speedwhich has placed localities all over this country, hitherto daysapart, now, probably, but as many hours. The slow trip through marshesand rivers, over hills and mountains, and by the meandering roads ofthe country, between New-York and Albany, once required from four tosix days; but the attainment of twenty-five miles per hour in our fastriver steamers has at length placed that capital within six hours ofthe Metropolis. And, as in this instance, so has the effort beenthroughout our whole country, and upon the ocean, until we haveattained, both upon the rivers and the high seas, the highest speedyet known, notwithstanding the important fact that steamship buildingis a new and not fully developed species of enterprise in thiscountry. We have already seen how imperatively the spirit of the ageand the genius of our people demand rapid steam mails by both land andsea, and a rapid conveyance of passengers; and it would beunreasonable to suppose that if we required these for the developmentof our youth, they would be less necessary for the fruitful uses ofmanhood and maturity. It is abundantly evident that the Americanpeople are by nature and habit a progressive and unusually hurryingpeople; and it is not to be supposed that they will reverse thisconstitutional law of their nature in their attempts at oceannavigation. To answer the question, "What is the cost of high, adequate mailspeed?" requires something more than an inquiry into the quantity offuel consumed; although this is the principal element of its cost. Wemust consider that the attainment and maintenance of high speed dependupon the exertion of a high power; and that, I. High speed and power require stronger parts in every thing: in theship's build, the machinery, the boilers, and all of the workingarrangements: II. High speed and power require a larger outlay in prime cost, inmaterial and building, for the adequate resistance required by suchpower: III. High speed and power require more frequent and costly repairs: IV. High speed and power require more watchfulness, a more promptaction, and consequently more persons: V. High speed and power require more fuel, more engineers, morefiremen, and more coal-stokers. 1. These propositions are nearly all self-evident to every class ofmind. That a high speed attained through the exertion of a high powerwill require stronger parts in every thing that exerts a force orresists one, is as manifest as that a force necessary to remove oneton of weight will have to be doubled to remove two tons. In the primeconstruction of the hull this is as requisite as in any other part. The resistance to a vessel, or the concussion against the water, at alow rate of speed, will not be very sensibly felt; but if that speedis considerably increased and the concussion made quicker without acorresponding increase in the strength of the frame and hull of theship generally, we shall find the ship creaking, straining, andyielding to the pressure, until finally it works itself to pieces, andalso disconcerts the engines, whose stability, bracing, and keepingproper place and working order depend first and essentially on thepermanence and stability of the hull. If the resistance to a vessel inpassing through the water increases as the square of the velocity, andif in addition to this outward thrust against the vessel it has tosupport the greater engine power within it, which has increased as thecube of the velocity, then the strength of the vessel must be adequateto resist without injury these two combined forces against which ithas to contend. The same increased strength is necessary also in the engines andboilers. It is admitted by the ablest engineers, and verified bypractice, as will be shown in another part of this Section, that toincrease the speed of a steamer from eight to ten knots per hour, itis necessary to double the power, and so on in the ratio of the cubesof the velocity. Suppose that we wish to gain these two knots advanceon eight. It is evident that, if the boilers have to generate, and theengines to use twice the power, and exert twice the force, they musthave also twice the strength. The boiler must be twice as strong andheavy; the various working parts of the engine must be twice asstrong: the shafts, the cranks, the piston and other rods, the beams, the cylinders, the frame work, whether of wood or iron, and even theiron wheels themselves, with every thing in any way employed to usethe power, overcome the resistance, and gain the speed. There is noworking arrangement in any way connected with the propulsion of theship that does not partake of this increase; every pump, every valve, every bolt connected directly or indirectly with the engine economy ofthe ship. 2. In the second place, seeing that much greater strength of parts isrequired to overcome the increased resistance, it is equally evidentthat this high speed and power thus require a larger outlay in everypoint of the prime construction of the vessel and engines by which thespeed is to be attained. The hull's heavier timbers cost a higherprice according to size than the direct proportion of size indicates. Large and choice timbers are difficult to get, and costly. The hullmust also be strengthened to a large extra extent by heavy ironstrapping and bracing, which, unlike the rest, cost in the ratio ofthe material used. So with the engines. The shaft, which weighs twiceas much, does not cost only twice as much, but frequently three orfour or five times as much. This arises not from the weight of themetal, as is evident; but from the difficulty of forging pieces thatare so large. The persons engaged in the forging and finishing of theimmense shafts, cranks, pistons, etc. , used in our first classsteamers, frequently consider that the last and largest piece is the_chef d'oeuvre_ of the art, and that it will never be transcended, even if equalled again. They have expended all of their skill andingenuity in the task, and have not succeeded sometimes until theyhave forged two or three new pieces. When a great work of this kind isdone, it may be discovered in the turning, polishing, and fitting up, that it has at last a flaw, and that it will not do for the serviceintended. As a matter of course, it must be thrown aside and a newpiece forged. This was but recently the case with one of the shafts ofthe "Leviathan, " in England. So with the shafts of the new Collins'steamer "Adriatic. " They were forged in Reading, Pennsylvania, and inaddition to their enormous prime cost had to incur that of shipmentfrom the interior of Pennsylvania to the city of New-York. In all suchcases the prime cost increases immensely, and to an extent that wouldhardly be credited by those not practically familiar with the subject. 3. Again, high or increased power and speed require more frequent andmore costly repairs. Friction arises from the pressure of two bodiesmoving in opposite directions, and pressure results from the exertionof power, and in the ratio of the power applied. The amount offriction, therefore, is in the ratio of the power expended and of theextra weight of parts required for that power. But the effects offriction require a higher ratio when the power is greatly multiplied, as in the case of high speed. An immensely heavy shaft exerting anunusual force is certain to greatly heat the journals and boxes, andthus wear them away far more rapidly. Also a rapid motion of heavyparts of machinery, and the necessarily severe concussions andjarrings can not fail destroying costly working parts in the engine, and necessitating heavy and expensive repairs and substitutions. Anordinary engine working at a slow and easy rate, will not require onetenth the repairs necessary if it were working up to a high power andaccomplishing a high speed. With any little derangement the enginescan stop and the injury can be repaired before it reaches anymagnitude. But with rapid mail packets the engines must run on, andthe derangement which at first is small, will amount in the end, whenthe voyage is completed and the mails are delivered, to a sum probablyten or twenty times as great as in the case of the vessel that stopsand makes her repairs as she requires them. The exertion of a highmail power causes many costly parts to burn out from unrelievedpressure and friction, which would not be the case under otherconditions. It is also nearly impossible for the best built engines inthe world to make fast time without breaking some important part atevery trip or two, or so cracking and injuring it from the continuedstrain, that a wise precaution requires its removal to make thesteamer perfectly sea-worthy. Every practical man knows thesedifficulties, and every steamship owner estimates their importanceaccording to the immense bills they occasion month by month, or thedelays and losses which they cause unless he has expended largeamounts of capital in providing other ships to take their place onsuch occasions of derangement. Nor is the burning out of heavy brass, and composition, and steelpieces, or the breaking of large and troublesome parts in the enginethe only source of repairs on a steamship. The boiler department isparticularly fruitful in large bills of repairs, especially if it benecessary to attain a good mail speed. It stands to reason that if thewhole ship can not be filled with boiler power, which with reasonablyhigh fires, would give enough steam, then the boilers which are usedmust be exerted to their highest capacity, or the rapid speed can notbe attained. Many suppose that the boilers may generate twice thequantity of steam without any appreciable difference in the wear andtear; but this is a decided error. For high speed, and what I mean byhigh speed is simply that which gives a sufficiently rapid transit tothe mails, the fires must be nurtured up to their highest intensityand every pound of coal must be burned in every corner of the furnaceswhich will generate even an ounce of steam. This continued heatbecomes too powerful for the furnaces and the boilers, and they beginto oxidize, and burn, and melt away, as would never be the case underordinary heat. When the ship comes into port it is found that herfurnaces must be "overhauled, " her grate bars renewed, her bracesrestored, her boilers patched, sometimes all over, several of theirplates taken out, thousands of rivets removed and supplied, andprobably dozens of tubes also removed and replaced with new ones. Butthis is not all. The best boilers can not long run in this way. Aftersix to seven years at the utmost, they must be removed from the shipaltogether, and new ones must be put into their place. This is also amost expensive operation. The boilers constitute a large share of thecost of the engine power. To put a new set of boilers in one of theCollins steamers will cost about one hundred and ten thousand dollars, and this must be done every six years. The boilers of the West-IndiaRoyal Mail Steamers, which run very slowly, last on an average, sixyears. [A] [A] Statement by Mr. Pitcher, builder, before the Committee of theHouse of Commons. Murray on the _Steam Engine_, p. 170, SecondEdition. But this is not all. To restore the boilers, a ship has to be tornliterally almost to pieces. All of the decks in that part must beremoved and lost; the frame of the ship cut to pieces; large andcostly timbers removed, and altogether an expense incurred that isfrightful even to the largest companies. To insure perfect safety andto gratify the wish of the public, this is generally done long beforeit is strictly necessary, and when the boilers are in a perfectly goodcondition for the working purposes of ordinary speed. But precautionand safety are among the prerequisites of the public service, and mustbe attained at whatever cost. On slow auxiliary freighting steamersthis would be by no means necessary. But the extent and cost of theserepairs on steamers far exceed any thing that would be imagined. Theyare supposed to be twelve per cent. Per annum of the prime cost of avessel of ordinary speed, taking the whole ship's life together attwelve years at the utmost. Atherton in his "Marine EngineConstruction and Classification, " page 32, says of the repairs ofsteam vessels doing ordinary service in Great Britain, where all suchwork is done much cheaper than in this country: "By the Parliamentaryevidence of the highest authorities on this point, it appears to havebeen conclusively established, that the cost of upholding steamshipmachinery has of late years amounted, on the average, to about £6 perhorse power per annum, being about 12 per cent. Per annum, on theprime cost of the machinery, which annual outlay is but one of thegrand points of current expense in which steamship proprietors areconcerned. " Now, if these were the repairs of the slow West-IndiaRoyal mail steamers, which ran but 200 days in the year, and that at avery moderate speed, and in the machine shops of England, where atthat time (previous to 1852) wages were very low, they can not be lessin this country, on rapid mail steamers, where wages and materials arevery high, and where marine engineering was then in its infancy. There are some facts on this subject which prove the positions heretaken. The Collins steamers have been running but six years, and yettheir repairs have amounted in all to more than the prime cost of theships, or to about eighteen per cent. Per annum. They were as well andas strongly built originally as any ships in the world, as appearsfrom the report which Commodore M. C. Perry made to the Departmentregarding them, and from the fine condition of their hulls at thepresent time. Their depreciation with all of these repairs has notbeen probably above six per cent. Per annum. They will, however, probably depreciate ten per cent. During the next six years, and atthe age of twelve or fourteen years be unfit for service. The steamersWashington and Hermann, which had strong hulls, have been run eightyears, and are now nearly worthless. Their depreciation has been atleast ten per cent. The steamers Georgia and Ohio, which CommodorePerry and other superintending navy agents pronounced to be well-builtand powerful steamers, (_See Report Sec. Navy_, 1852, ) ran only fiveyears, and were laid aside, and said to be worthless. With all of therepairs put upon these ships, which were admitted to be capable ofdoing first class war service, as intended, they depreciated probablyseventeen per cent. ; as it is hardly possible that their old ironwould sell for more than fifteen per cent. Of their prime cost. Thesesteamers paid much smaller repair bills than the Collins, and were notso well constructed, or at so high a cost. American steamers do not, upon the average, last above ten years; but if they reach twelve orfourteen, they will pay a sum nearly equal to twice their cost, forrepairs and substitutions. Nor is this all. The life of a steamer endswhen her adaptation to profitable service ceases. She may not berotten, but may be so slow, or of so antiquated construction, or mayburn so much more fuel than more modern competitors, that she can notstand the test of competition. 4. We thus see that not only are the requisite repairs most extensiveand costly, but of such magnitude as to greatly reduce the earnings ofany class of steam vessels. But this is not the last costlyconsequence of mail speed. It requires more cautious watchfulness ofthe engines, the boilers, the deck, and of every possible departmentof the navigation, even including pilotage. It requires also morepromptness and dispatch in every movement, and hence a much largeraggregate number of men. More men are necessary to keep up high fires;twice as many men are necessary to pass twice as much coal; twice asmany engineers as under other circumstances are necessary for thefaithful working of the engines, and any accidents and repairs whichare indispensable on the ocean; and a larger number of sailors andofficers is necessary to all of the prompt movements required of themail steamer. The Havre mail steamers, the "Arago" and "Fulton, " nevercarry less than six engineers each, although they could be run acrossthe ocean with three under a hard working system. But this numberinsures the greater safety of the ship under ordinary circumstances, and is absolutely necessary in any case of accident and danger. It isthe same case with the firemen. When, in a heavy storm, the firedepartment may be imperfectly manned, the ship has taken one of thefirst chances for rendering the engines inefficient, and being finallylost. And all of these extra and indispensable _employées_ make anextra drain on the income of the ship, and add to the extremecostliness of a high adequate mail speed. 5. It is clear, then, that an adequate mail speed requires more fuel, more engineers, more firemen, more coal-stokers, and more generalexpense. The question of fuel is, however, alone the most important ofall those affecting the attainment of high speed, and the item whoseeconomy has been most desired and sought, both by those attempting tocarry freight, and those who carry the mails and passengers. Theprincipal points of interests concerning it are, the enormous quantitywhich both theory and practice show to be necessary to fast vessels;the large sum to be paid for it, and the steadily increasing price;and the paying freight room which its necessary carriage occupies. Infast steaming, the supply of coal to the furnaces frequently arrivesat a point where many additional tons may be burned and yet produce nouseful effect or increase of power. The draft through the furnaces andsmoke stacks is so rapid and strong as to take off a vast volume ofheat; and this, coupled with a large quantity of heat radiated fromthe various highly heated parts and surfaces, requires a consumptionof fuel truly astonishing. If we reflect that at the twelve principalports of Great Britain in the year of 1855, the tonnage entered was6, 372, 301, and departed 6, 426, 566, equal to 12, 798, 867 total, and thisduring the war, that a large part of this was steam tonnage, and thatthe total imports and exports of Great Britain for 1856 were1, 600, 000, 000 dollars, we can somewhat appreciate the present andfuture uses of coal, and its inevitably large increase in price. Thetwo hundred and seventy steamers in the British Navy, with about50, 000 aggregate horse power, consumed in 1856, according to a reportmade to a Committee of the "British Association for the Advancement ofScience, " this year, by Rear-Admiral Moorsom, 750, 000 tons of coal. The difficulty and cost of mining coal, its distance from thesea-shore, and the multifarious new applications in its use among ourrapidly increasing population, as well as its almost universal andincreasing demand for marine purposes, all conspire to make it morecostly from year to year; while, as a propelling agent, it is alreadybeyond the reach of commercial ocean steam navigation. Coal has goneup by a steady march during the last seven years from two and a halfto eight dollars per ton, which may now be regarded as a fair averageprice along our Atlantic seaboard. And that we may see more clearlyhow essentially the speed and cost of steam marine navigation dependupon the simple question of fuel alone, to say nothing further of theimpeding causes heretofore mentioned, I will now present a fewinquiries concerning THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED, WITH TABLES OF THE SAME. The resistance to bodies moving through the water increases as thesquare of the velocity; and the power, or coal, necessary to producespeed varies or increases as the cube of the velocity. This is a lawfounded in nature, and verified by facts and universal experience. Itsenunciation is at first startling to those who have not reflected onthe subject, and who as a general thing suppose that, if a vessel willrun 8 miles per hour on a given quantity of coal, she ought to run 16miles per hour on double that quantity. I think that it may be safelyasserted that in all cases of high speed, and ordinary dynamic orworking efficiency in the ship, the resistance increases more rapidlythan as the squares. The _rationale_ of the law is this: the powernecessary to overcome the resistance of the water at the vessel's bowand the friction increases as the square; again, the power necessaryto overcome the natural inertia of the vessel and set it in motion, increases this again as the square of the velocity, and the twotogether constitute the aggregate resistance which makes it necessarythat the power for increasing a vessel's speed shall increase as thecube of the velocity. But whatever the _rationale_, the law itself isan admitted fact by all theoretical engineers, and is proven inpractice by all steamships. In evidence of this, I will give thefollowing opinions. In his treatise on "The Marine Engine, " Mr. Robert Murray, who is amember of the Board of Trade in Southampton, England, says in speakingof the "Natural law regulating the speed of a steamer, " page 104:"These results chiefly depend upon the natural law that _the powerexpended in propelling a steamship through the water varies as thecube of the velocity_. This law is modified by the retarding effect ofthe _increased resisting surface_, consequent upon the weight of theengines and fuel, so that the horse power increases in a somewhathigher ratio than that named. " It must be understood that when hespeaks of power, horse power, etc. , it is simply another form ofrepresenting the quantity of coal burned; as the power is in thedirect ratio of the quantity of fuel. Bourne, the great Scotch writer upon the Screw Propeller, in his largevolume published by Longmans, London, page 145, says, in concluding asentence on the expensiveness of vessels: "Since it is known that theresistance of vessels increases more rapidly than the square of thevelocity in the case of considerable speeds. " Again, at page 236, on "the resistance of bodies moving through thewater, " he says: "In the case of very sharp vessels, the resistanceappears to increase nearly as the square of the velocity, but in caseof vessels of the ordinary amount of sharpness the resistanceincreases more rapidly than the square of the velocity. " Again, on page 231, in speaking of the folly of a company attemptingto run steamers sufficiently rapidly for the mails at the price paidfor them, he says: "At the same time an increased rate of speed has tobe maintained, which is, of course, tantamount to a further reductionof the payment. In fact, their position upon the Red Sea line is nowthis, that they would be better without the mails than with them, asthe mere expense of the increased quantity of fuel necessary torealize the increased speed which they have undertaken to maintain, will swallow up the whole of the Government subvention. _To increasethe speed of a vessel from 8 to 10 knots it is necessary that theengine power should be doubled. _" This work of Mr. Bourne is now thestandard of authority on the subject of which he treats, the worldover. Again, Mr. James R. Napier, of London, known as one of the largest andmost skilled engine-builders in Great Britain, in the discussion ofthe dynamic efficiency of steamships in the proceedings of the"British Association" in 1856, page 436, says: "_The power in similarvessels, I here take for granted, at present varies as the cube of thevelocity. _" The power simply represents the coal; in fact, it is thecoal. Mr. Charles Atherton, the able and distinguished Chief Engineer of HerMajesty's Royal Dock Yard, at Woolwich, has published a volume, called"Steamship Capability, " a smaller volume on "Marine EngineClassification, " and several elaborate papers for the BritishAssociation, the Society of Arts, London, the Association of CivilEngineers, and the Artisans' Journal, for the purpose of properlyexposing the high cost of steam freight transport as based on the lawabove noticed, and the ruinous expense of running certain classes ofvessels of an inferior dynamic efficiency. When but a few weeks sincein London, I asked the Editor of the "Artisan, " if any engineer inEngland disputed the laws relative to power, on which Mr. Athertonbased his arguments. He replied that he had never heard of one whodid. I asked Mr. Atherton myself, if in the case of the newest andmost improved steamers, with the best possible models for speed, hehad ever found any defect in the law of, the resistance as thesquares, and the power as the cubes of the velocity. He replied thathe had not; and that he regarded the law as founded in nature, and hadeverywhere seen it verified in practice in the many experiments whichit was his duty to conduct with steam vessels in and out of the RoyalNavy. I think, therefore, that with all of these high authorities, thedoctrine will be admitted as a law of power and speed, andconsequently of the consumption of coal and the high cost of runningsteamers at mail speeds. It is not my purpose here to discuss this law, or treat generally orspecially of the theory of steam navigation. It will suffice that Ipoint out clearly its existence and the prominent methods of itsapplication only, as these are necessary to the general deductionwhich I propose making, that rapid steamships can not supportthemselves on their own receipts. The general reader can pass overthese formulæ to p. 69, and look at their results. I. TO FIND THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE SPEED OFA STEAMER. Suppose that a steamer running eight miles per hour consumes fortytons of coal per day: how much coal will she consume per day at ninemiles per hour? The calculation is as follows: 8^3 : 9^3 :: 40 : required consumption, which is, 56. 95 tons. Here thespeed has increased 12-1/2 per cent. , while the quantity of fuelconsumed increased 42-1/2 per cent. Suppose, again, that we wish to increase the speed from 8 to 10, andfrom 8 to 16 miles per hour. The formula stands the same, thus: Miles. Miles. Tons Coal. Tons Coal. 8^3 : 10^3 :: 40 : _x_, = 78. 1 8^3 : 16^3 :: 40 : _x_, = 320. II. TO FIND THE SPEED CORRESPONDING TO A DIMINISHED CONSUMPTION OFFUEL. Murray has given some convenient formulæ, which I will here adopt. Suppose a vessel of 500 horse power run 12 knots per hour on 40 tonscoal per day: what will be the speed if she burn only 30 tons per day?Thus: 40 : 30 :: 12^3 : V^3 (or cube of the required velocity, ) Or, reduced, 4 : 3 :: 1728 : V^3, Equation, 3 × 1728 = 5184 = 4V^3, Or, 5184/4 = Cube root of 1296 = 10. 902 knots = V, required velocity. Thus, we reduce the quantity of coal one fourth, but the speed isreduced but little above one twelfth. III. RELATION BETWEEN THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL, AND THE LENGTH ANDVELOCITY OF VOYAGE. The consumption of fuel on two or more given voyages will vary as thesquare of the velocity multiplied into the distance travelled. Thus, during a voyage of 1200 miles, average speed 10 knots, the consumptionof coal is 150 tons: we wish to know the consumption for 1800 miles at8 knots. Thus: 150 tons : C required Consumption :: 10^2 knots × 1200 miles : 8^2, Knots × 1800 miles. Then, C × 100 × 1200 = 150 × 64 × 1800, * Or, C × 120, 000 = 17, 280, 000 Reduced to C = 1728/12 = 144 tons consumption. Suppose, again, that we wish to know the rate of speed for 1800 miles, if the coals used be the same as on another voyage of 1200 miles, with150 tons coal, and ten knots speed: We substitute former consumption, 150 tons for C, as in the equationabove, marked *, and V^2 (square of the required velocity) for 64, andhave, 150 × 100 × 1200 = 150 × V^2 × 1800, Or, 120, 000 = 1800V^2, Reduced, 1200/18 = V^2, And V = square root of 66. 66 = 8. 15 knots. From the foregoing easily intelligible formulæ we can ascertain withapproximate certainty the large quantity of coal necessary to increasespeed, the large saving of coal in reducing speed, as well as themeans of accommodating the fuel to the voyage, or the voyage to thefuel. It is not necessary here to study very closely the economy offuel, as this is a question affecting the transport of freight alone. When the mails are to be transported, economy of fuel is not theobject desired, but speed; and, consequently, we must submit toextravagance of fuel. This large expenditure of coal is not necessaryin the case of freights, as they may be transported slowly, and, consequently, cheaply. But one of the principal reasons for rapidtransport of the mails is that they may largely anticipate freights intheir time of arrival, and consequently control their movements. I recently had an excellent opportunity of testing the large quantityof fuel saved on a slight reduction of the speed, and give it asillustrative of the law advanced. We were on the United States Mailsteamer "Fulton, " Captain Wotton, and running at 13 miles per hour. Some of the tubes became unfit for use in one of the boilers, and thefires were extinguished and the steam and water drawn off from thisboiler, leaving the other one, of the same size, to propel the ship. An intelligent gentleman who happened to know that we were using onlyone boiler, and consequently, but half the power, remarked to me thatit was very strange that the ship was still going about eleven milesper hour, without any sail. He said: "It is strange, sir; two boilersof equal size drove us thirteen miles per hour; and here now but oneboiler drives us nearly eleven miles, or nearly as fast; whencommon-sense teaches that the one boiler would drive us only six and ahalf miles per hour. How is that?" I then explained to him veryclearly the natural law relative to power and speed, (_See Rule II. , page 68_, ) which he at once comprehended and admitted, but with theremark: "Indeed, sir, I would have testified that she ought with oneboiler to have gone at only half the speed; or that going at six mileswith one boiler, she would go twelve with two. " As it will be interesting to the general reader to examine the detailsof the increased consumption of fuel at increased rates of speed, Ipresent the following elaborate table recently prepared by Mr. Atherton for his new edition of "Steamship Capability, " according tothe formula above noticed, and the performance of the best type ofvessel in the Royal Navy, the steamer "Rattler. " Mr. A. Found a higherefficiency in this vessel per horse power than any other in the Navy, and consequently based the consumption of coal in the table on theassumption that the mail and passenger vessels generally should be ofas good contractive type as "Rattler. " I shall present also anothertable showing a much larger consumption of fuel by an inferior type ofvessel. I use these tables because they are thoroughly correct, andquite as perfect as any that I could construct on the same formula;and because they carry with them the weight of probably the highestauthority in Great Britain. COAL TABLE: No. I. _Displacement, [B] Speed, and Fuel consumed per Day, for Mail, Passenger, and Freight Steamers, whose locomotive performance is equalto that of the best class of ocean steam vessels; assuming theconsumption of fuel to be 4-1/2 lbs. Per indicated horse power perhour, equal to 33, 000 lbs. Raised one foot in one minute. The quantityconsumed is expressed in tons per day of 24 hours. _ [B] Displacement refers to the number of cubic feet of water displacedby the hull; allowing thirty-five cubic feet to the ton. KEY: A: SHIP'S DISPLACEMENT. -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- | SPEED PER HOUR. --NAUTICAL MILES. A +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- TONS. |TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- 100|1. 04|1. 65|2. 47|3. 51|4. 82|6. 41|8. 32|10. 6|13. 2|16. 3|19. 7|23. 7|28. 1|33. 0|38. 5 125|1. 20|1. 92|2. 86|4. 07|5. 59|7. 44|9. 66|12. 3|15. 3|18. 9|22. 9|27. 5|32. 6|38. 3|44. 7 150|1. 36|2. 16|3. 23|4. 60|6. 31|8. 40|10. 9|13. 9|17. 3|21. 3|25. 9|31. 0|36. 8|43. 3|50. 5 175|1. 51|2. 40|3. 58|5. 10|7. 00|9. 31|12. 1|15. 4|19. 2|23. 6|28. 7|34. 4|40. 8|48. 0|56. 0 200|1. 65|2. 62|3. 91|5. 57|7. 65|10. 2|13. 2|16. 8|21. 0|25. 8|31. 3|37. 6|44. 6|52. 4|61. 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 250|1. 92|3. 04|4. 54|6. 47|8. 87|11. 8|15. 3|19. 5|24. 3|29. 9|36. 3|43. 6|51. 7|60. 9|71. 0 300|2. 25|3. 44|5. 13|7. 30|10. 0|13. 3|17. 3|22. 0|27. 5|33. 8|41. 0|49. 2|58. 4|68. 7|80. 1 350|2. 40|3. 81|5. 68|8. 09|11. 1|14. 8|19. 2|24. 4|30. 5|37. 5|45. 5|54. 5|64. 7|76. 2|88. 8 400|2. 62|4. 16|6. 21|8. 85|12. 1|16. 2|21. 0|26. 7|33. 3|41. 0|49. 7|59. 6|70. 8|83. 3|97. 1 450|2. 84|4. 50|6. 72|9. 57|13. 1|17. 5|22. 7|28. 8|36. 0|44. 3|53. 8|64. 5|76. 6|90. 1|105 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 500|3. 04|4. 83|7. 21|10. 3|14. 1|18. 7|24. 3|30. 9|38. 6|47. 5|57. 7|69. 2|82. 1|96. 6|113 600|3. 43|5. 46|8. 14|11. 6|15. 9|21. 2|27. 5|34. 9|43. 6|53. 7|65. 1|78. 1|92. 8|109 |127 700|3. 81|6. 05|9. 02|12. 8|17. 6|23. 5|30. 4|38. 7|48. 4|59. 5|72. 2|86. 6|103 |121 |141 800|4. 16|6. 61|9. 87|14. 0|19. 3|25. 6|33. 3|42. 3|52. 9|65. 0|78. 9|94. 6|112 |132 |154 900|4. 50|7. 15|10. 7|15. 2|20. 8|27. 7|36. 0|45. 8|57. 2|70. 4|85. 4|102 |122 |143 |167 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1000|4. 83|7. 67|11. 4|16. 3|22. 4|29. 8|38. 6|49. 1|61. 3|75. 5|91. 6|110 |130 |153 |179 1250|5. 60|8. 90|13. 3|18. 9|26. 0|34. 5|44. 8|57. 0|71. 2|87. 6|106 |127 |151 |178 |208 1500|6. 33|10. 0|15. 0|21. 4|29. 3|39. 0|50. 6|64. 4|80. 4|98. 9|120 |144 |171 |201 |234 1750|7. 01|11. 1|16. 6|23. 7|32. 5|43. 2|56. 1|71. 3|89. 1|110 |133 |159 |189 |223 |260 2000|7. 66|12. 2|18. 2|25. 9|35. 5|47. 3|61. 3|77. 9|97. 4|120 |145 |174 |207 |243 |284 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2500|8. 89|14. 1|21. 1|30. 0|41. 2|54. 8|71. 2|90. 5|113 |139 |169 |202 |240 |283 |329 3000|10. 0|16. 0|23. 8|33. 9|46. 5|61. 9|80. 4|102 |128 |157 |191 |228 |271 |319 |372 3500|11. 1|17. 7|26. 1|37. 6|51. 5|68. 6|89. 0|113 |141 |174 |211 |253 |301 |354 |412 4000|12. 2|19. 3|28. 8|41. 1|56. 3|75. 0|97. 3|124 |155 |190 |231 |277 |329 |386 |451 5000|14. 1|22. 4|33. 5|47. 7|65. 4|87. 0|113 |144 |179 |221 |268 |321 |381 |448 |523 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6000|15. 9|25. 3|37. 8|53. 8|73. 8|98. 3|128 |162 |203 |249 |302 |363 |431 |506 |591 7000|17. 7|28. 1|41. 9|59. 6|81. 8|109 |141 |180 |224 |276 |335 |402 |477 |501 |654 8000|19. 3|30. 7|45. 8|65. 2|89. 4|119 |155 |196 |245 |302 |366 |439 |522 |613 |715 9000|20. 9|33. 2|49. 5|70. 5|96. 7|129 |167 |215 |265 |327 |396 |475 |564 |663 |774 10000|22. 4|35. 6|53. 1|75. 6|104 |138 |179 |228 |285 |350 |425 |510 |605 |712 |830 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12500|26. 0|41. 3|61. 7|87. 8|120 |160 |208 |265 |330 |406 |493 |592 |702 |826 |963 15000|29. 4|46. 6|69. 6|99. 1|136 |181 |235 |299 |373 |459 |557 |668 |793 |933 |1088 20000|35. 6|56. 5|84. 4|120 |165 |219 |285 |362 |452 |556 |675 |809 |961 |1130|1318 25000|41. 3|65. 6|97. 9|139 |191 |254 |330 |420 |525 |645 |783 |939 |1115|1311|1529 30000|46. 6|74. 0|111 |157 |216 |287 |373 |474 |592 |728 |884 |1060|1258|1480|1727 -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- By the inspection of this table we can see in condensed form thecoal-cost of any speed as high as twenty miles per hour, and for anysize of vessel from one hundred tons to thirty thousand tons. Let usfind in the left hand column a vessel of 2, 500 tons displacement. Pursuing the line along to the right we find in the second column 8. 89tons of coal, which a steamer of this displacement would burn in 24hours, if running, as indicated at the head of the column, 6 Nauticalmiles per hour. In the next column, under the head of 7 Nautical miles per hour, wefind that she would burn in one day 14. 1 tons; or one and a half timesas much coal to gain one sixth more speed: Again, at 8 miles per hour she burns 21. 1 tons; nearly three times asmuch as at six miles: At 9 miles she burns 30 tons: above twice as much as at 7, and nearlyfour times as much as at 6, although the speed is but half doubled: At 10 miles per hour she burns 41. 2 tons; about twice as much as at 8miles, although the speed is increased only one fourth. At 10 sheburns 34 per cent. More than at 9, although the increase of speed isonly eleven per cent. (_See pages 67 and 68_): At 11 miles per hour she will burn 54. 8 or 55 tons; nearly three timesas much as at 8 miles per hour, and six times as much as at 6 milesper hour: At 12 miles per hour she will burn 71. 2; about thirty per cent. Morethan at eleven miles per hour, although gaining but 9 per cent. Inspeed; nearly twice as much as at ten miles per hour, three and a halftimes as much as at 8, five times as much as at 7, and above eighttimes as much as at 6 miles per hour. It is here seen that to doublethe speed the consumption of fuel has increased eight-fold, whichverifies my statements hitherto made on this subject. We have alreadyseen that to gain two miles of speed on any stated speed, it wasnecessary to double the quantity of fuel used. At 13 miles per hour she burns 90. 5 tons. This is burning two and afourth times as much coal as if she ran only 10 miles per hour. Now, at this speed, the steamer will reach Southampton or Liverpool in 10days and 6 hours, which is equivalent to 10 days and 12 hours burningfuel, allowing six hours for heating and starting, and which wouldmake an aggregate consumption of 950 tons of coal for the passage ofthis steamer of 2, 500 displacement or probably 3, 000 tons register. At 14 miles per hour she burns 113 tons. This is nearly three times asmuch as 10 miles per hour. At this speed the steamer would reachSouthampton or Liverpool in 9 days, 12 hours, and 30 minutes, supposing the distance to be 3, 200 miles from New-York, or say 9 days18-1/2 hours coal-burning time, and would consume an aggregate of1, 104-1/2 tons. As this is but little above the distance from New-Yorkto Southampton, and under that from Panamá to California, and aboutthe tonnage of the steamers running, the time being within eleven daysgenerally, it will be seen how large is the cost of running thesteamers of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, those on the Europeanroutes, and also those between New-York and Aspinwall. As the route ofthe Havre and Bremen steamers is much longer, they are compelled torun slightly slower, or they would be filled up with their own fueland power. Taking a Collins steamer of 3, 000 tons, which we find inthe line below, and we see that in running 14 miles per hour as theyhave frequently done, the consumption would be 128 tons per day, or1, 252 tons for the passage. And yet, one of those steamers could make12 miles per hour on 80. 4 tons per day, or at 11 miles per hour on61. 9, or less than half that used at 14. But pursuing this table wesee that, At 15 miles per hour she would burn 139 tons, or three and a halftimes as much as at 10 miles. At 16 miles per hour she would burn 169 tons, or precisely eighttimes as much as at 8 miles per hour. Here again doubling the speed isfound to be an enormous expense. At 17 miles per hour she burns 202 tons per day. At 18 miles per hour the consumption is 240 tons per day. At 19 miles per hour she burns 283 tons coal per day; and At 20 miles per hour she burns 329 tons per day. At 20 miles per hourshe would run 480 miles per day, a thing as yet wholly unheard of, andwould consume on the voyage of 6 days and 16 hours, say 6 days and 22hours, 2, 276 tons of coal. It would be clearly impossible for her tocarry her own fuel; as the immense boiler and engine power necessaryto secure this speed would of itself fill a ship of this size, to saynothing of the fuel which also would nearly fill it. Then, we maynever expect any such ship to attain any such speed as seventeen, eighteen, or twenty miles per hour on so long a voyage withoutrecoaling. Seeing thus the enormous increase in the consumption of fuel for amoderate increase in the speed, we are enabled the better toappreciate the large expense incurred in running ocean steamerssufficiently rapidly for successful mail and passenger purposes. Wewill further pursue these inquiries by examining in this table theconsumption for vessels of 6, 000 tons, which would make thedisplacement of the ship nearly 5, 000 tons, such as the "Adriatic, "the "Vanderbilt, " and the "Niagara. " It appears that at 8 miles perhour they would consume 33 tons per day; at 10 miles, 65 tons; at 12miles, 113 tons; at 13 miles, 144 tons; at 14 miles, 179 tons; at 15miles, 221 tons; and at 16 miles, 268 tons per day. This is supposingthis speed to be maintained on an average across the ocean, in allkinds of weather, which this size of steamer could not do withoutmore engine and boiler power than any of them have. With suchadditional power the ships noticed would have scarcely any availableroom for freight or any thing else. One thing is very clear from thistable, that when steamers run at very moderately slow rates of speed, their consumption of fuel is very small; and that when they leave thislow freighting speed, for that of the necessarily rapid mails andpassengers, the consumption increases to an extent and with a rapiditythat would seem almost incredible at first view. COAL TABLE: No. II. _The following coal table is constructed in all respects as thepreceding, but for a lower type of vessels, or those whose coëfficientof Dynamic performance is inferior to that upon which the previoustable is estimated. As a consequence, this style of vessel requiresmore fuel. _ KEY: A: SHIP'S DISPLACEMENT. -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- | SPEED PER HOUR. --NAUTICAL MILES. A +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- TONS. |TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS|TONS -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- 500|3. 95|6. 28|9. 37|13. 4|18. 3|24. 3|31. 6|40. 1|50. 2|61. 7|75. 0|89. 9|106 |125 |147 600|4. 46|7. 10|10. 6|15. 1|20. 6|27. 5|35. 7|45. 3|56. 6|69. 8|84. 6|101 |120 |141 |165 700|4. 95|7. 86|11. 7|16. 6|22. 8|30. 5|39. 5|50. 3|62. 9|77. 3|93. 8|112 |134 |157 |183 800|5. 41|8. 59|12. 8|18. 2|25. 1|33. 3|43. 3|55. 0|68. 7|84. 5|102 |123 |145 |171 |200 900|5. 85|9. 29|13. 9|19. 7|27. 0|36. 0|46. 8|59. 5|74. 3|91. 5|111 |132 |158 |186 |217 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1000|6. 28|9. 97|14. 8|21. 2|29. 1|38. 7|50. 1|63. 8|79. 7|98. 1|119 |143 |169 |199 |232 1250|7. 28|11. 5|17. 3|24. 5|33. 8|44. 8|58. 2|74. 1|92. 5|114 |137 |165 |196 |231 |270 1500|8. 23|13. 0|19. 5|27. 8|38. 1|50. 7|65. 7|83. 7|104 |128 |156 |187 |222 |261 |304 1750|9. 11|14. 4|21. 5|30. 8|42. 2|56. 1|72. 9|92. 7|115 |143 |173 |206 |245 |290 |338 2000|9. 95|15. 8|23. 6|33. 6|46. 1|61. 5|79. 7|101 |126 |159 |188 |226 |269 |316 |369 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2500|11. 5|18. 3|27. 4|39. 0|53. 5|71. 2|92. 5|117 |147 |180 |219 |262 |312 |368 |427 3000|13. 0|20. 8|30. 9|44. 0|60. 4|80. 4|104 |132 |166 |204 |248 |296 |352 |414 |483 3500|14. 4|23. 0|34. 3|48. 8|66. 9|89. 1|115 |147 |183 |226 |274 |329 |391 |460 |535 4000|15. 8|25. 1|37. 4|53. 4|73. 2|97. 5|126 |161 |201 |247 |300 |360 |427 |501 |586 5000|18. 3|29. 1|43. 5|62. 0|85. 0|113 |147 |187 |232 |287 |348 |417 |495 |582 |679 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6000|20. 6|32. 9|49. 1|69. 9|95. 9|127 |166 |210 |264 |323 |392 |472 |560 |657 |768 10000|29. 1|46. 2|69. 0|98. 2|135 |179 |232 |296 |370 |455 |552 |663 |786 |925 |1079 -----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- FREIGHT TABLE: No. III. _Showing the mutual relation of Displacement, Power, Speed, Consumption of Coal, and capacity for Cargo of vessels ofprogressively increasing magnitude up to nearly 30, 000 tons ofDeep-draught Displacement, employed on a passage of 3, 250 nauticalmiles, without recoaling: showing also the prime cost Expenses per tonof Cargo conveyed. _ KEY: A: Mean or Mid-passage Displacement. B: Speed. C: POWER. Nominal H. P. D: POWER. Indicated h. P. E: Assumed weight of Hull and Engines. F: PASSAGE 3, 250 N. M. DIRECT. Time. G: PASSAGE 3, 250 N. M. DIRECT. Coal. H: PASSAGE 3, 250 N. M. DIRECT. Cargo. I: PASSAGE 3, 250 N. M. DIRECT. Deep Displacement. J: PASSAGE 3, 250 N. M. DIRECT. Expenses per Ton of Cargo. --------+-----+-----+-----+------+------+-----+------+------+---------- A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J Tons. |N. M. |H. P. |h. P. | TONS. | D. H. |TONS. | TONS. | TONS. | £ S. D. --------+-----+-----+-----+------+------+-----+------+------+---------- {| 8| 109| 436| 1109| 16. 22| 369| 1209| 2684| 2 1 10 {| 9| 155| 620| 1155| 15. 1| 466| 1112| 2733| 2 7 8 2, 500 {| 10| 213| 852| 1213| 13. 13| 577| 999| 2788| 2 16 11 {| 11| 284| 1136| 1284| 12. 7| 699| 867| 2849| 3 11 3 {| 12| 368| 1472| 1368| 11. 7| 830| 717| 2915| 4 14 5 | | | | | | | | | {| 8| 172| 688| 2172| 16. 22| 582| 2537| 5291| 1 16 1 {| 9| 245| 980| 2245| 15. 1| 737| 2386| 5368| 1 19 7 5, 000 {| 10| 336| 1344| 2336| 13. 13| 882| 2223| 5441| 2 4 1 {| 11| 448| 1792| 2448| 12. 7| 1103| 2000| 5551| 2 13 1 {| 12| 581| 2324| 2581| 11. 7| 1311| 1763| 5655| 3 5 1 | | | | | | | | | {| 8| 276| 1104| 4276| 16. 22| 934| 5257| 10467| 1 12 3 {| 9| 388| 1552| 4388| 15. 1| 1168| 5028| 10584| 1 13 10 {| 10| 536| 2144| 4536| 13. 13| 1407| 4760| 10703| 1 16 9 10, 000 {| 11| 712| 2848| 4712| 12. 7| 1753| 4411| 10876| 2 2 1 {| 12| 928| 3712| 4928| 11. 7| 2094| 4025| 11047| 2 9 4 {| 13| 1180| 4720| 5180| 10. 10| 2458| 3591| 11229| 2 19 5 {| 14| 1472| 5888| 5472| 9. 16| 2848| 3104| 11424| 3 14 3 | | | | | | | | | {| 8| 436| 1744| 8436| 16. 22| 1476| 10826| 20738| 1 9 0 {| 9| 620| 2480| 8620| 15. 1| 1866| 10447| 20933| 1 9 11 {| 10| 852| 3408| 8852| 13. 13| 2236| 10030| 21118| 1 11 4 20, 000 {| 11| 1136| 4544| 9136| 12. 7| 2797| 9466| 21398| 1 14 9 {| 12| 1472| 5888| 9472| 11. 7| 3322| 8867| 21661| 1 19 1 {| 13| 1872| 7488| 9872| 10. 10| 3900| 8178| 21950| 2 4 11 {| 14| 2340| 9360| 10340| 9. 16| 4528| 7396| 22264| 2 13 1 --------+-----+-----+-----+------+------+-----+------+------+---------- Mr. Atherton gives this table, which shows the following facts: That, as the various sized vessels named, increase in speed from 8 to12, or from 8 to 14 miles per hour, their horse power, as wellconsequently as their coal, increases: That, as the speed increases, so does the weight of the hull andengines: That, as the speed increases, with the consequent increased coal andengine weight, the cargo decreases: and That, as the speed increases, with the other necessary conditionsnoticed, the expense per ton of cargo also increases in a rapid ratio. In the four cross columns ships of different sizes are considered; of2, 500, 5, 000, 10, 000, and 20, 000 tons. There is also given the workingor indicated horse power, and the nominal horse-power, or that of33, 000 lbs. Raised a foot in a minute, which is the general basis ofmaking contracts. It is a fact, however, that engines generally workup to three or four times their nominal horse power; so that the wordhorse power has no positive or useful meaning. Vessels called onehundred nominal horse-power have been known to work up to six hundred. Let us take a ship of 5, 000 tons. We find that at 8 miles per hour thehorse power is 436; but at 12 miles it is 1, 472, nearly four times asgreat. At 13 miles, it would be nearly 1800 horse, and at 14 it wouldbe above 2100. So, also, with the weight of engines, boilers, etc. At8 miles per hour they would weigh 1, 109 tons; but at 12 they wouldhave to weigh, to be large and strong enough, 1, 368 tons. At 14 miles, they would weigh nearly 1, 600 tons. Now, see the columns "cargo" and "coal, " and observe how rapidly thatof coal increases, while that of cargo decreases in the inverse ratioof the coal, the engine, the boiler, and the hull weight combined. Thecargo has come from 1, 209 down to 717 tons; and if the speed wereincreased to 13 or 14 miles per hour, the cargo would be so reduced asto be unworthy of notice. The next column shows how much greater the quantity of water displacedas the speed increases. This extra displacement requires extra power. In the last column it is observable how rapidly the speed enhancesthe cost price of transporting cargo. At 13 miles per hour the costwould be about six pounds sterling per ton, and at 14 knots speed itwould be higher than was ever paid a steamer in the most flush periodsof even the best qualities of freights. Freights were about £8 per tonon the Cunard line before the establishment of the Collins; but theysoon came down, and are not now £3, or $15, on an average. So withpassage. The "Great Western" charged £45, the "British Queen" £50; theCunarders, until the Collins competition, £40, 19_s. _ The Collinssteamers put the price down to £35, and have since reduced it to £30homeward, and £24 outward. This is but little above half the fare ofthe Great Western, and something over two thirds of that formerlycharged by the Cunard line. The Report to the House of Commons "onSteam Communications with India, " No. 372 of 1851, second volume, page395, says, that the average speed of the Cunard line was 10. 443 knots, of the Collins line 11 knots, and of the Havre and Bremen lines 9. 875knots per hour. The Collins line had then just started, and has sincemade the average passages one and a half days quicker than those ofthe Cunard line. This being the case, it is easy to estimate the gainsof a steamer at such rates, when this column shows us that at 12 milesspeed per hour and an average trip of 11 days, the actual prime costof moving the freight is much above that which is received for it. Itis therefore taken in small quantities only to assist in paying therunning expenses of the steamer. This table shows another thing very conclusively, that large shipsrunning the same number of miles per hour, run cheaper and transportfreight more cheaply than smaller vessels. It presupposes, however, that they go full both ways. The engine power and general outlay donot increase as rapidly as the tonnage of the vessel and her capacityfor carrying. While a ship 2, 500 tons at 12 miles per hour on apassage of 3, 250 miles would make the cost per ton for thetransportation of freight $22. 75, one of 20, 000 tons, under the sameconditions would reduce it to $9 per ton. Yet it is hardly probablethat we shall ever profitably employ steamers of over 10, 000 tonstonnage in the passenger, mail, and freight business. Again, a ship of 2, 500 at 12 miles, running 6, 500 miles could nottransport cargo at less than $115; one of 5, 000 tons would transportit at $52; one of 10, 000 tons would transport it at $33 per ton; andone of 20, 000 tons burthen, as for instance the "Leviathan, " wouldtransport it at $24 per ton. And while none of the three first namedsizes of vessels would transport it 12, 500 miles, the one of 20, 000tons, running 12 miles per hour, would transport it at $80 per ton;and running 14 miles per hours, at $430 per ton. Two things must, however, not be forgotten in this; that the ship to do this mustalways run entirely full and have no waste room; and that these pricesare comparisons between different steamers, and not with sailingvessels, which, running much more slowly and with but little expense, transport the freight far more cheaply. The following table will set forth very clearly in a summary view, theTime, Horse-power, Coal, and Cargo for a steamer of good averagequality running on passages of 1, 000 miles, 2, 000 miles, and 3, 000miles, and at a speed varying from 6 to 18 miles per hour. It will beobserved that a steamer of 3, 000 tons can not take power and coalenough to run on a 2, 000 miles passage above 17 knots per hour, andthat one of 3, 000 tons also can not run on a 3, 000 miles passage at aspeed above 16 knots per hour. Observe the small quantity of cargo andthe large quantity of coal for a steamer of 3, 000 tons on a 3, 000miles passage at 16 miles per hour. COAL AND CARGO TABLE: No. IV. _Calculated for the mean Displacement of 3, 000 Tons. _ KEY: A: SPEED--PER HOUR. B: HORSE-POWER. C: WEIGHT OF HULL AND ENGINES. D: PASSAGE 1, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Time. E: PASSAGE 1, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Coal. F: PASSAGE 1, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Cargo. G: PASSAGE 2, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Time. H: PASSAGE 2, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Coal. I: PASSAGE 2, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Cargo. J: PASSAGE 3, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Time. K: PASSAGE 3, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Coal. L: PASSAGE 3, 000 NAUTICAL MILES. Cargo. -----+-----+-----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+---- A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L N. M. |H. P. |TONS. |D. H. |TONS|TONS|D. H. |TONS|TONS|D. H. |TONS|TONS -----+-----+-----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+---- 6| 52| 1252| 6. 23| 72|1711|13. 21| 144|1675|20. 20| 216|1639 7| 83| 1283| 5. 23| 98|1667|11. 22| 197|1617|17. 21| 296|1568 8| 123| 1323| 5. 5| 128|1612|10. 10| 256|1548|15. 15| 384|1484 | | | | | | | | | | | 9| 175| 1375| 4. 15| 162|1543| 9. 6| 324|1462|13. 21| 486|1381 10| 241| 1441| 4. 4| 200|1458| 8. 8| 401|1358|12. 12| 602|1257 11| 320| 1520| 3. 19| 242|1358| 7. 14| 484|1237|11. 9| 727|1116 | | | | | | | | | | | 12| 416| 1616| 3. 11| 288|1239| 6. 23| 577|1095|10. 10| 866| 950 13| 529| 1729| 3. 5| 339|1100| 6. 10| 678| 931| 9. 15|1017| 761 14| 661| 1861| 2. 23| 393| 942| 5. 23| 786| 745| 8. 22|1180| 548 | | | | | | | | | | | 15| 813| 2013| 2. 19| 451| 761| 5. 13| 903| 535| 8. 8|1355| 309 16| 987| 2187| 2. 14| 514| 555| 5. 5|1028| 298| 7. 19|1542| 41 17| 1183| 2383| 2. 11| 580| 327| 4. 22|1160| 37| | | | | | | | | | | | | | 18| 1405| 2605| 2. 8| 650| 69| | | | | | 19| 1652| 2852| | | | | | | | | 20| 1927| 3127| | | | | | | | | -----+-----+-----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+---- I will close this long chapter, in which I have endeavored to give aclear, comprehensible, and faithful idea of the cost of running oceanmail, freight, and passenger steamers, by an extract from that veryable and faithful work, "Steamship Capability. " As a summing up of thevarious laws and facts concerning the consumption of fuel, weight andpower of engines, speed of ships, and their capacity to do business, Mr. Atherton says, page 55: "Now suppose, for example, that thepassage be 1, 000 miles, and that, for brevity, we confine our remarksto the engine department only; which, indeed, will be the departmentof expense, chiefly affected by variations in the rate of speed. Itappears that the vessel of 5, 000 tons' mean displacement, if fittedto run at the speed of EIGHT NAUTICAL MILES per hour, will require 172H. P. , and a cargo of 2, 738 tons will be conveyed 1, 000 miles in fivedays five hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 33/100H. P. _per ton_ of goods. "If fitted to run at TEN NAUTICAL MILES an hour, the vessel willrequire 336 H. P. , the cargo will be reduced to 2, 524 tons, and thetime to four days four hours; being equivalent to one day's employmentof 55/100 H. P. _per ton_ of goods nearly. "If fitted to run at TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES an hour, the vessel willrequire 581 H. P. , the cargo will be reduced to 2, 217 tons, and thetime to three days eleven hours; being equivalent to one day'semployment of 91/100 H. P. _per ton_ of goods. "If fitted to run at FOURTEEN MILES an hour, the vessel will require923 H. P. , the cargo will be reduced to 1, 802 tons, and the time to twodays twenty-three hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of1-52/100 H. P. _per ton_ of goods. "If fitted to run at SIXTEEN MILES per hour, the vessel will require1, 377 H. P. , the cargo will be reduced to 1, 264 tons, and the time totwo days fourteen hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of2-86/100 H. P. _per ton_ of goods. "If fitted to run at EIGHTEEN MILES per hour, the vessel will require1, 961 H. P. , the cargo will be reduced to 585 tons, and the time to twodays eight hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 7-75/100H. P. , _per ton_ of goods. "And if fitted to run at TWENTY MILES per hour, there will be nodisplacement available for mercantile cargo. "Assuming, now, that the COST per ton of goods will be in proportionto the amount of power and tonnage employed to do the work, it appearsthat the cost _per ton of goods_ of performing this passage of 1, 000miles, at the respective speeds of 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 miles, will be proportional to the numbers--33/100, 55/100, 91/100, 1-52/100, 2-86/100, and 7-75/100, which are proportional to the numbers 33, 55, 91, 152, 286, and 775, or nearly as 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 23. "Hence it appears, that in the case of the ONE THOUSAND MILES passageabove referred to, the cost of freight _per ton of goods_ at TEN MILESper hour, will require to be nearly the _double_ of the rate at EIGHTMILES per hour. "The cost per ton at TWELVE MILES per hour will require to be _threetimes_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at FOURTEEN MILES per hour will require to be _fivetimes_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at SIXTEEN MILES per hour will require to be _ninetimes_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at EIGHTEEN MILES per hour will require to be_twenty-three times_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "And at TWENTY MILES per hour there will be _no displacement_available for mercantile cargo. "By applying the same process of calculation to a ship of 5, 000 tons'mean displacement, making a passage of THREE THOUSAND MILES, we shallfind that, at TEN MILES an hour, the cost of freight per ton willrequire to be double the rate of freight at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at TWELVE MILES will require to be three times therate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at FOURTEEN MILES will require to be six times therate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at SIXTEEN MILES will require to be twenty times therate at EIGHT MILES. "And at EIGHTEEN MILES per hour there will be _no displacement_available for mercantile cargo. "Finally, by applying the same process of calculation to a ship of5, 000 tons' mean displacement on a passage of 6, 000 miles, it will befound that the cost of freight per ton at TEN MILES per hour willrequire to be _double_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at TWELVE MILES per hour will require to be about_five times_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "The cost per ton at FOURTEEN MILES per hour will be about _sixteentimes_ the rate at EIGHT MILES. "And at SIXTEEN MILES per hour there will be _no displacement_available for mercantile cargo. "Hence, it appears, that for voyages of 1, 000 miles and upwards, without re-coaling, the speed of ten nautical miles per hour wouldinvolve about _double_ the cost _per ton_ of eight miles, and may, therefore, be regarded as the extreme limit that can be generallyentertained for the mercantile purpose of goods' conveyance; and thatthe attainment on long passages of a higher rate of speed than tenmiles (though admissibly practicable) would involve obligationsaltogether of an exceptional character, such as the special service ofdispatches, mails, passengers, specie, and the most valuabledescription of goods can only meet. " SECTION V. OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. INCREASE OF BRITISH MAIL SERVICE: LAST NEW LINE AT $925, 000 PER YEAR: THE SYSTEM NOT BECOMING SELF-SUPPORTING: CONTRACT RENEWALS AT SAME OR HIGHER PRICES: PRICE OF FUEL AND WAGES INCREASED FASTER THAN ENGINE IMPROVEMENTS: LARGE SHIPS RUN PROPORTIONALLY CHEAPER THAN SMALL: AN EXAMPLE, WITH THE FIGURES: THE STEAMER "LEVIATHAN, " 27, 000 TONS: STEAMERS OF THIS CLASS WILL NOT PAY: SHE CAN NOT TRANSPORT FREIGHT TO AUSTRALIA: REASONS FOR THE SAME: MOTION HER NORMAL CONDITION: MUST NOT BE MADE A DOCK: DELIVERY OF FREIGHTS: MAMMOTH STEAMERS TO BRAZIL: LARGE CLIPPERS LIE IDLE: NOT EVEN THIS LARGE CLASS OF STEAMERS CAN LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS: EFFICIENT MAIL STEAMERS CARRY BUT LITTLE EXCEPT PASSENGERS: SOME HEAVY EXTRA EXPENSES IN REGULAR MAIL LINES: PACIFIC MAIL COMPANY'S LARGE EXTRA FLEET, AND ITS EFFECTS: THE IMMENSE ACCOUNT OF ITEMS AND EXTRAS: A PARTIAL LIST: THE HAVRE AND COLLINS DOCKS: GREAT EXPENSE OF FEEDING PASSENGERS: VIEWS OF MURRAY AND ATHERTON ON THE COST OF RUNNING STEAMERS, AND THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESENT MAIL SERVICE. From the foregoing Section it is evident that the cost of runningocean steamers is enormous, and that in the chief element ofexpenditure it increases as the cube of the velocity. This, althoughtrue, is certainly a startling ratio of increase, and calculated toarouse attention to the difficulties of postal marine navigation. Seeing that ocean speed is attainable at so high a cost, we naturallyconclude that fast mail steamers can not live on their own receiptsupon the ocean. Since Great Britain established her first ocean steam mail in 1833, she has gone on rapidly increasing the same facilities, until hernoble lines of communication now extend to every land and compassevery sea. The last great contract which she conceded was last year, to the "European and Australian Company, " for carrying the mails on asecond line from Southampton _via_ Suez to Sydney, in Australia, at£185, 000, or $925, 000 per year. And although her expenditures for thisservice have gradually gone up to above five millions of dollars perannum, she continues the service as a necessity to her commerce, and abranch of facilities and accommodations with which the people of theKingdom will not dispense. The British Government set out with thedetermination to have the advantages of the system, whether it wouldpay or not. They believed that the system would eventually becomeself-supporting, by reason of the many important improvements thenproposed in the steam-engine, and they have ever since professed tobelieve the same thing. But their experience points quite the otherway; and while the service is daily becoming more important to them inevery sense, it is also becoming year by year more expensive. Contracts which the Admiralty made with several large and prominentcompanies in 1838 they renewed at the same or increased subsidies, after twelve years' operations, in 1850, for another term of twelveyears. And so far from those companies with their many ships on handbeing able to undertake the service for less, they demanded more inalmost every case, and received it from the government. Theimprovements which they anticipated in the marine engine were morethan counterbalanced by the rise in the price of fuel and wages allover the kingdom and the world. In fact, those improvements have beenvery few and very small. It still takes nearly as much coal toevaporate a pound of water as it then did; and the improvements whichhave been made were generally patents, and costly in the prime cost ofconstruction to a degree almost preclusive of increased benefits tothe general service. At any rate, the latest steam adaptations andimprovements have proven unequal to the end proposed, and the cost ofthe ocean service is now far heavier than it ever has been before, simply because of the greater speed required by the public for themails and passage. It had long been hoped that this difficulty of increasing cost inrunning ocean steamers might finally be overcome by another means; andthe whole available engineering and ship-building talent of GreatBritain and the United States has been directed not entirely to theengine department, but to the hulls and to the production of a largeclass of ships, which are admissibly cheaper in proportion to size andexpense of running when compared with smaller vessels, if they arealways employed and have full freights and passage. It is wellestablished that large steamers run proportionally cheaper than smallones. (_See Table III. , page 76. _) This arises from the important factthat the length increases far more rapidly than the breadth and depth. Consequently the tonnage of the vessel increases much faster than theresistance. In passing through the water the vessel cuts out a canalas large as the largest part of its body, which is at the middle ofthe ship. If the vessel be here cut in two, the width and depth, orthe beam and hold being multiplied together will give the squarecontents of the midship section. Now, when a vessel is doubled in allof its dimensions, this midship section and consequently the size ofthe canal which it cuts in the water, does not increase as rapidly asthe solid contents of the whole ship, and consequently, as thetonnage. Hence, the resistance to the vessel in passing through thewater does not increase so rapidly as the tonnage which the vesselwill carry. To make this clearer, let us suppose a vessel of good proportion, whose length is seven times the beam, or 280 ft. Long, 40 ft. Wide, and 30 feet deep. The midship section will be 40 × 30 = 1, 200 squarefeet: the solid contents will be 40 × 30 × 280 = 336, 000 solid feet. Again, let us double these dimensions, and the ship will be 80 ft. Wide, 60 ft. Deep, and 560 feet long. The midship section will be 80 ×60 = 4, 800 square feet: the solid contents will be 80 × 60 × 560 =2, 688, 000 solid feet. Now, comparing the midship sections, and alsothe said contents in each case we have, Midship Section, 4, 800 ----- = 4 to 1. Increase as the squares: Midship Section, 1, 200 Solid Contents, 2, 688, 000 --------- = 8 to 1. Increase as the cubes. Solid Contents, 336, 000 Thus, the midship resistance has increased as four to one, or as thesquare, while the solid contents, representing the tonnage, haveincreased as eight to one, or as the cube. It is evident that the shiphas but four times the mid-section resistance, while she has eighttimes the carrying capacity. Therefore the engine power, and the coaland weight necessary to propel a ship of twice the lineal dimensions, or eight times the capacity, would have to be only four times that ofthe smaller vessel, speaking in general terms; and as a consequence, the price of freight, considering the vessels to run at equal speed, would be but half as much in the larger as in the smaller vessel. The attempt has been made to seize the evident advantages thus offeredby increasing the size of the hull, until our clippers now reach anenormous size, and our steamers are stopping but little short of30, 000 tons. The splendid steamer "Leviathan" was built on this idea, and must prove a splendid triumph in comparative cheapness if she canonly get business so as to run full, and keep herself constantlyemployed in her legitimate business, running. But it is hardlypossible that she should be always filled with either freight orpassengers. Some of our large clipper ships have experienced thisdifficulty. The time necessary to load and unload is too great forshort routes, although they are well calculated for long passages. Ifone of these large steamers fail to get plenty of business the lossesbecome exceedingly severe. The prime cost is immense; the interest onthe capital and the insurance are very large; and the current expensesare even beyond those necessary for the government of some cities. These hazards all taken together more than neutralize the benefitswhich arise from extra size and extra proportional cheapness; so thatnotwithstanding all of the hopes which some have entertained for thecheapening of transport in this way, they are probably doomed todisappointment in the end; and ocean steaming continues as expensiveas ever, and is growing even more expensive than it has ever beenknown since its first introduction. (_See Coal Tables, pp. 71 and75. _) It is clear that, notwithstanding all of the advantages to be gainedfrom increased size, steamers can not support themselves upon theocean. Let us examine further the case of such a ship as the"Leviathan. " I can not see that there is any normal trade in which shecan run successfully. She may transport 6, 000 tons of measurementgoods to Australia; but it will be at the expense of fourteen tosixteen thousand tons of coals if the passage is made in fair time. Ifnot, sailing vessels will subserve all purposes except travel quite aswell. And certainly there is no class of freight for Australia or anyother portion of the world, which will pay such an enormous coal-bill, and so many other expenses, and the interest and insurance on threeand a half to four millions of dollars, just to save a few days in solong a voyage. And if the steamer is to do a freighting as well aspassenger business, then a long voyage is essential to her. Running is the legitimate business of a steamer. Her costly enginesare put in her for locomotion. Her large corps of engineers, firemen, and coal-passers, are employed for running her, and are of no use whenshe is lying still, although necessarily on full pay. Her condition isabnormal and unnatural every day that she is lying at the docks, andtaking or discharging freight; and hence, every day that she is thusemployed she is not performing her proper functions. A sailing shipcan better afford to lie still for weeks and await a freight, orslowly receive or discharge cargo; as she must pay only the intereston her investment, her dockage, the captain, and watchmen, and perhapsher depreciation. The prime investment is much less. She has no costlyengines and boilers. So are her current expenses. She has none of thecostly _employées_ that I have named, and who can never leave asteamer for a day. But eternal motion, flush freights, flush business, good prices, and constant employment, are everywhere essential to thesteamer. Suppose the "Leviathan" steamer running between Liverpool andNew-York. She would be occupied ten days at least in receiving herfreight, ten days in running and making port or docks, and ten days indischarging. Then, she would be employed only one third of her time inthe business for which she was constructed, running; while during twothirds of it she would be acting simply as a pier or dock, over whichfreight would be handled. Now, with her costly engines, and costly andnecessarily idle _employées_, she can not afford to be a dock; neithercan she afford to lie still so long. Nor can she on such conditionsget the freight necessary to her support. The community on neitherside of the water would wish fifteen thousand tons of any class offreights which she could transport dumped down upon the docks at onetime. They wish it to arrive a little and a little every day, as it iswanted, just enough to supply the market; and will not lie out of themoney which they pay for it, and have it nearly a month in marketbefore they need it, just to have it come on the "Leviathan. " It mustcome along in small lots, just as they need it, and it must be shippedthe day that it is bought, and delivered as soon as the ship is in, without being the last lot of fifteen thousand tons, and withoutkeeping the owners so long out of their money. Suppose that A. Putsthe first lot of freight in at London: he will be the last to receive, it in New-York. A smaller steamer taking another lot two days after, will deliver it before the large ship gets half way over. Or, again, the small steamer may leave London with it when the large steamer hasnearly arrived at New-York, and deliver the lot here to the owner inadvance. Beside not wishing so large a lot at once, they do not wishit all in one place. The double advantage of a great number of smallvessels is, that they bring cargo along as it is wanted, and at thesame time distribute it at all of the hundreds of large and smallports, without first delivering it at some great mammoth terminus, andthen reshipping and distributing it to its final destination. A gentleman, who is a prominent statesman, recently seriously advisedme not to think of establishing a line of mail steamers between theUnited States and Brazil, for the accommodation of the hundreds ofsailing vessels engaged in that trade, but to get up a mammoth companyand run five or six thirty thousand ton steamers, like the Leviathan, between Norfolk and Rio de Janeiro. He said that the increased size ofthe steamer would enable me to carry freight cheaper than sailingvessels. The reasoning was neither very clear nor convincing to me onbehalf of the mysterious capacities which he attributed to largesteamers. I suggested that, in the first place, there was no cargopassing either way between the United States and Brazil which couldafford to pay steam transportation under any circumstances; that solarge a cargo could never be obtained at once in Rio de Janeiro orelsewhere; that the merchants of this country did not wish it alllanded at one place; that it would cost as much to remove it fromNorfolk to the place of consumption, as it would from Rio de Janeiroto its final destination; that they did not wish it delivered all atonce, but in small lots at a time, and distributed where it wasneeded; and that, even if it were at all practicable, which nobusiness man could for a moment believe, the people would not bewilling to have a fruitful field of industry in shipping occupied bysome great overgrown company, with a great coffee monopoly, whichwould surely follow. Too much has been expected of large ships. Theclipper "Great Republic" is not freighted half of her time. The"Leviathan" can not pay in freighting unless she runs to Australia andthe East-Indies, and runs slowly, on very little coal. She may do verywell with a voluntary cargo, which will load and unload itself in ahurry, such as a cargo of emigrants, and not steaming at too a high aspeed. But it would require a dozen steamers as tenders to bring theseemigrants from Ireland, Bremen, Havre, Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and otherEuropean cities, to her central dépôt in England. She would, however, become a most useful if not indispensable transport vessel for theBritish Government. If the large class of steamers can not live on their own receipts, much less can the small. An adequate speed for the mails leaves noavailable space for cargo. The ship may carry two or three hundredtons of freight; but it pays perhaps but little more than the handlingand the extra coal necessary to transport its extra weight. As ageneral thing, it may be safely said that when a vessel is welladapted to the mails and passengers she is filled with her own power, that is, with heavy engines, large boilers, and a large quantity offuel, as also with her provisions and baggage. We have already seenhow the size and weight of engines and boilers must increase, as wellas the bulk and cost of the fuel, to gain a little speed. But it isnot generally known how large a quantity of consumable stores andbaggage go in a well-supported mail packet. The greater the postalefficiency of a steamer the less is it able to carry freight; and thetime will doubtless soon come when the fast mail packets will takenothing except a few express packages. The Persia now takes scarcelyany freight, and the Vanderbilt can not think of doing it when shemakes fast trips. It is very probable that the whole system of theocean will be materially changed; and that while clippers and slowpropellers carry the fine freights, fast vessels filled with their ownpower will carry the mails and passengers. And in doing this, they cannot, of course, support themselves; neither will they conflict withprivate enterprise in freight transport. It is now the case to a largeextent on most of our American lines. While the ocean mail steamer must be fast and costly, for the betteracceleration of correspondence and the accommodation of passengers, she must also go at the appointed hour, whether she is repaired ornot, and wholly irrespective of her freight and passenger list. Theremust be no delays for a lot of freight, or for a company of fiftypassengers who have been delayed by the train. She has the mails, andmust go at the hour appointed, whatever it may cost the company, andhowever large a lot of costly stores may have to be thrown away. Thispunctuality, while it is the means of securing small lots of freight, prevents also the accommodation of the ship's day of sailing toarrangements which might otherwise be profitable. This punctuality insailing always necessitates large extra expense in repairs. Itfrequently happens that companies of men work through the nights andon Sundays; getting much increased prices for such untimely labor, andbeing far less efficient in the night than in the day. If the steamerhas had a long passage from whatever causes, she discharges whatevershe has and takes in her coal in a hurried and costly way, frequentlyat fifty per cent. Advance on the cost necessary for it if she hadample time. The only means of avoiding these exigencies is by havingspare ships, which cost as much as any others, but which add nothingwhatsoever to the company's income. It may be safe to say that inevery mail company it is necessary to have one spare, and consequentlyunproductive, ship for every three engaged in active service. Thisthirty-three per cent. Additional outlay would not be necessary excepton a mail line, where punctuality was positively demanded. Yet, it isone of the heavy items of expense to be incurred by every companycarrying the mails, and with which they can not in any wise dispense, however well their ships may be built. The "Pacific Mail SteamshipCompany" in running their semi-monthly line from Panama to Californiaand Oregon, keep constantly at their docks eight unemployed steamersand one tow-boat, ready for all exigencies and accidents, and couldkeep their mails going if nearly their whole moving fleet should besunk at once. No wonder that they have never missed a single trip, orlost a single passenger by marine accident since they first started in1850. But there is another class of costs in running ocean steamers, which amount to large sums in the aggregate, and of which the peopleare generally wholly ignorant. I allude to the items, and what may becalled "odds and ends. " It is easily imaginable that a company has topay only the bills for wages, for fuel, and for provisions, and thatthen the cash-drawer may be locked for the voyage. Indeed, it isdifficult for those accustomed to the marine steam service to sit downand enumerate by memory in one day the thousand little treasury leaks, the many wastages, the formidable bill of extras, and the items whichare necessary to keep every thing in its place, and to pay every bodyfor what he does. The oil-bill of a large steamer would be astonishingto a novice, until he saw the urns and oil-cans which cling to everyjournal, and jet a constant lubricating stream. The tools employedabout a steamer are legion in number, and cost cash. We hear a coupleof cannon fired two or three times as we enter and leave port, or passa steamer upon the ocean, and consider it all very fine and inspiring;but we do not reflect that the guns cost money, and that pound afterpound of powder is not given to the company by the Government or thepublic. The steamer carries many fine flags and signals, which costcash. An anchor with the chain is lost; another costs cash. Heavyweather may be on, and it takes some hours to get into the dock. Theextra coal and the tow-boat cost cash. The wheel-house is torn topieces against the corner of the pier, and the bulwarks are carriedaway by heavy seas; but no one will repair the damage for any thingshort of cash. A large number of lights are by law required to be keptburning on the wheel-houses and in the rigging all night; but no onereflects that it took money first to purchase them, and a constantoutlay to keep them trimmed and burning. People suppose that thecaptain, or steward, or some body else can take a match and set thelamp off, and have it burn very nicely; but there are only a few whoknow that it takes one man all of his time to clean, fill, adjust, light, and keep these lamps going, as well as have them extinguishedat the proper time. I saw to-day a case in point as regards accidental expenses. Thesplendid steamship Adriatic sailed at 12. The wind was very high fromthe south, and almost blowing a gale. She was lying on the southernside of the dock, while the Atlantic was lying with her stern at theend of the dock, near where the Adriatic had to pass in going out. Atthe moment of starting, three strong tow-boats were attached to herbow, and endeavored as she went out to draw her head against the wind, down stream. But they proved insufficient to the task. The vesselcrushed down the corner of the dock, ran into the Atlantic, andcarried away her stern bulwarks, crushed one of her own large andcostly iron life-boats, and damaged one of her wheel-houses. Now, whoof the two hundred thousand spectators that lined the docks, would paythe two thousand dollars for the life-boat, a thousand for repairingthe dock and vessels, and the bill for the three tug-boats for twohours each? Moreover, we see a pilot get on the steamer at New-York, another atSouthampton, and a third at Havre; but we seldom reflect that thesteamer has to pay a large price to each one of them, both going andcoming. Take the coasting steamers, running between New-York andSavannah, or Charleston. It appears singular that the New-York pilotgoes all the way to Savannah, that the Savannah pilot comes all theway to New-York, and that the steamer pays for both of these men allthe time, and feeds them on board all of the time. Yet it is so. Suchis the law; and it amounts to a good many thousands during the year. And all this, the company must pay, as a part of those items whichtake cash, but for which the company never gets any credit from thepublic or the Government. Whenever a little accident occurs to thesteamer, it must be towed a few miles at a high price by a tug-boat. Whenever the Government or friends and visitors come on board, theyexpect to be liberally entertained; yet the company must pay for it, or be considered mean and unworthy of the Government's patronage. Eachship must have an experienced surgeon, whose wages must be paid likethose of other persons employed, and an apothecary's room and outfit. The ship must be painted and varnished, and overhauled at every trip;the upholstering and furnishing must be often renewed; stolen articlesmust be replaced; and the breakages of table-wares constantly renewed. All of this costs cash. The steamer also has to pay light dues and port charges wherever shegoes. Many of these are exorbitant and unreasonable. In Havre the"Fulton" and "Arago" must pay nearly twenty-four hundred dollars eachon every departure, or they will not be permitted to leave the docks. This is no small item for each steamer on every passage that shemakes. At New-York she pays wharfage again. It is not so high, but itis a large item, and requires the cash. Again, there is the greatshore establishment which every steam company must maintain. Largedocks, and warehouses, and coaling arrangements, staging, watchmen, porters, and messengers, and a shore-captain equal to those on board, must all be maintained. The Havre Company pays to the city $4, 000 peryear for its dock, $1, 200 for its annual repairs, and also for sheds, fixtures, etc. , extra. They keep also two watchmen at $40 each permonth, and other persons in the dock service. The Collins Company havea necessarily very costly dock both in New-York and Liverpool. That inNew-York would rent for $15, 000 per annum. The one in Liverpool is farmore costly. On each they keep a large number of men, with watchmen, gatekeepers, runners, porters, and clerks, and always keep an officeopen. Beside this, is the whole paraphernalia of the office of thecompany. There must be offices, clerks, bookkeepers, porters, runners, etc. ; a president, treasurer, and secretary; an attorney, agents, andagencies; and newspaper advertising, and a hundred little things whichno man can mention. I do not pretend to be able to give an adequateconception of the innumerable items which so swell the large actualworking expenses of regularly running steamers. Even the charities ofa decently managed company are large. Firemen and engineers becomedisabled and must be supported; or they are killed in the service ofthe ship, leaving families which no decent company can disregard. Theamount which the West-India Royal Mail Company pays in this way, andwhich our noble American lines advance to the deserving, are beyondall conception of the mere theorist. There is another source of loss which prevents, mail packetsespecially, from paying their expenses on their freight and passengerearnings. The table on all of our steamships has become exceedinglyexpensive, as it has in our hotels. Perhaps there is more necessityfor it on steamers than in the hotels, as passengers are generallysea-sick, and need every delicacy of life to keep them up. Thesupplies which our fine mail packets carry for this purpose are ofalmost incredible extent and costliness. No vegetable, fruit, game, orother rarity that can be kept fifteen days in large masses of ice, isneglected; so that the table of every steamer is necessarily bothluxurious and expensive. Indeed, it has become so much so, and theprice of passage fare has been reduced so low on all of the prominentlines, that as a general rule the steamers are not now making muchclear money on their passengers. The expense of keeping passengers wasnot half so great six years ago, as it is now; and there appears to beno safe means of permanent retrenchment. Nothing has been said ofInsurance. This is a most costly item. The Havre Company pay on theirtwo ships, which are worth about $900, 000, nine and a half per cent. Per annum; and Mr. Collins pays on his three ships, which are worthabout $2, 200, 000, nine per cent. Per annum. On the Havre steamers thisamounts to $85, 500 per year, which is nearly as much as the mail pay;and on the Collins, to $198, 000 per annum. And these are among what wecall the items of mail steamship expenditure. I do not know the sumspaid by the United States Mail, or by the Pacific Mail Companies. I will here give the views of Messrs. Murray and Atherton on the costof steam, as they replied to letters of inquiry, which I addressedthem Sept. 14, 1857. Mr. Murray says in answer to _Query 2_. "It is certainly my impression that ocean steamers ofsufficient speed to carry the mails with any thing like regularity, will not pay upon any route with which I am acquainted, withoutassistance from Government. " _Query 5_: Can Parliament do better in economy than in her presentmail contracts, all things considered? Mr. Murray replies: "I do not see how Parliament can avoid paying the large subsidies shedoes for the mail contracts under present circumstances. " _Query 4_: Is the steamship stock of Great Britain, subsidized orunsubsidized, paying stock, and is there much disposition amongcapitalists to invest, even in the stock of subsidized companies? Hereplies: "I do not think the steamship stock of Great Britain to be in a verynourishing condition: in fact, I know of only one company (thePeninsular and Oriental) in which I should like to invest money. " Mr. Atherton replies to a query regarding the cost of running steamersas follows: "As to whether the effective performance of high speed mail service iscompatible with ordinary mercantile service without governmentsubsidy, I am of opinion that the mutual relation of Speed and Cost inconnection with long sea-voyages has never yet been duly appreciatedby owners, managers, or agents in charge of steam shipping affairs. An acceleration of steaming speed involves an increase of costexpenses, and a decrease of mercantile earnings, as dependent on_freight per ton weight_ far beyond what is generally supposed. " He further says in reply to Query 9, which is as follows: Do you know of any disposition in the Government to cut down the oceanmail service, as an unproductive expenditure? He says: "It is impossible to estimate the national value of an effective mailservice throughout the whole globe; the breaking of one link, thoughapparently of trivial consequence, impairs the whole system. I can notimagine that there is any disposition to impair the completeness ofthe mail system. " From the foregoing considerations it is palpable that fast oceansteamers can not live on their own receipts. And the same will in mostcases hold true of freighting and other steamers of all classes, whichdepend entirely on steam as their agent of locomotion. Propellers willhardly form an exception to this rule. If the power and the passengersfill the hull, if the coal bill and other expenses increase as rapidlyas indicated for mail packets, if engineering improvements do notadvance as rapidly as the price of coals, if larger and more cheaplyrunning ships can not get an adequate support in business, if thereare the many leakages and expenses indicated, and if all of theexpenses of running steamers are continually increasing from year toyear rather than diminishing, then we may never expect to see the mailand passenger steamers of the ocean become self-supporting, or lessdependent than now, on the fostering care of the Government and thenational treasury. [C] [C] Since this was written, Mr. Drayton has shown me the receipt forthis year's _taxes_ on the Havre Company, which are $7, 782, the twoships being valued at $500, 000 only. SECTION VI. HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED? THE TRANSMARINE COMPARED WITH THE INLAND POST: OUR PAST SPASMODIC EFFORTS: NEED SOME SYSTEM: FRANCE AROUSED TO STEAM: THE SAILING-SHIP MAIL: THE NAVAL STEAM MAIL: THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE MAIL: ALL INADEQUATE AND ABANDONED: GREAT BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE IN ALL THESE METHODS: NAVAL VESSELS CAN NOT BE ADAPTED TO THE MAIL SERVICE: WILL PROPELLERS MEET THE WANTS OF MAIL TRANSPORT, WITH OR WITHOUT SUBSIDY: POPULAR ERRORS REGARDING THE PROPELLER: ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES: BOURNE'S OPINION: ROBERT MURRAY: PROPELLERS TOO OFTEN ON THE DOCKS: THEY ARE VERY DISAGREEABLE PASSENGER VESSELS: IF PROPELLERS RUN MORE CHEAPLY IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE SLOWER: COMPARED WITH SAIL: UNPROFITABLE STOCK: CROSKEY'S LINE: PROPELLERS LIVE ON CHANCES AND CHARTERS: IRON AS A MATERIAL: SENDING THE MAILS BY SLOW PROPELLERS WOULD BE AN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SAILING VESSELS: INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE CAN NOT SUPPLY MAIL FACILITIES: THEREFORE IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT. I have endeavored to prove in the foregoing Section that ocean mailsteamers can not live on their own receipts. The question now arises, how can we secure speed for the mails and passengers upon the ocean?With so many expenses and so small an income the fast ocean steamercan not become profitable to even the most thoroughly organized andbest administered companies. Much less can it be successfully run byindividuals and individual enterprise, which has never so manyreliable resources at command as a strong, chartered company. It istrue that there are a few prominent transatlantic routes wheresteamers can run as auxiliary propellers; but the number of them issmall, and the speed attained will by no means prove sufficient forpostal purposes. The transmarine postal service has been a source ofconstant annoyance to almost every commercial nation. The overlandmails have generally been self-supporting, and it has been a favoriteidea that those on the sea should be so also; although there is nojust reason why either should be necessarily so any more than in thecases of the Navy and the Army; branches of the service which entaillarge expenses on the Government, and yet without a moiety of thebenefits which directly flow from the postal service to all classes ofcommunity. No nation except Great Britain has come up to the issue andfaced this question boldly. Almost every other country, not exceptingour own, has been hanging back on the subject of the transmarine post, "waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up, " in theimprovements of ocean steam navigation, which might obviate thenecessity of paying for the ocean transit. But every hope has beendisappointed; and instead of realizing these wishes the case has beengrowing worse year by year, until we are at last compelled to move inthe matter, or lose our commerce, our ocean _prestige_, and sink downcontented with a second or third-rate position among commercialnations, and acknowledge ourselves tributary to the far-seeing andfar-reaching, and superior policy of our competitors. The United States have indeed become galvanically aroused now andthen, as in 1847 and '8, to a self-protecting and a self-developingsystem; but as soon as one faint effort has been made, we have, instead of pursuing that effort and developing it fully, relapsed backinto our old indifference, and given the whole available talent of theGovernment either to the administration, or to the everlastingdiscussion of petty politics. During the time that President Buchananwas Secretary of State, some of our noblest efforts for theestablishment of ocean mails were made, with his fullest countenanceand aid; but the policy then inaugurated with prospects so hopeful forour commercial future, and which has operated so healthfully eversince, is now half abandoned, or left without notice to take care ofitself; until it may be to-day said that we have no steam policy, andrun our ocean mails only by expedients. This ever has been and everwill be unfortunate for us, and costly. Individuals and companiesbuild steamers for the accidents of trade, let them lie still a yearor two, then pounce upon some disorganized trade, suck the life-bloodfrom it like vampires, and at last leave it, the very corpse ofcommerce, lying at the public door. All such irregular traffic isinjurious to the best interests of the country, destroys all generousand manly competition, and proves most clearly the want of aGovernment steam mail system. France has been awaiting the issues oftime, and under a too high expectation for the improvements of theage, until she finds that unless she inaugurates and sustains aliberal steam policy, and becomes less dependent on foreigners for hermails, she will have the commerce of the world swept from her shoresas by a whirlwind of enterprise. She has now become aroused, and hasdetermined to establish three great lines of communication, one withthe United States, one with the West-Indies, Central America, theSpanish Main, and Mexico, and one with Brazil and La Plata. She hasfound, that it will no longer do to abandon her mails to fate, andthat in the end it will be far more profitable to pay even largely forgood mails than to do without them. Hence, her offer to give to theAmerican, West-Indian, and Brazilian service named an annualsubvention of fourteen million _Francs_, or nearly three milliondollars, to be continued for twenty years, which the Government deemsa sufficient period for the establishment and test of a system. (_See_projêt_ of Franco-American Navigation, page 198. _) Among the many expedients adopted for the transmission of the foreignpost are those of employing ordinary sailing vessels on the one hand, or the vessels of the war marine on the other. Both systems have beeneffectually and forever exploded and abandoned. The objections tosailing vessels are very numerous. They are, in the first place, tooslow. They are too uncertain in their days of sailing and arrival. They can never be placed under the direction of the Department becausethey are private property, devoted to private uses, and generallyaccomplish their ends by private means; one of the most prominent ofwhich is, to keep back all letters except those going to their ownconsignees. If a merchant runs his ship for personal gain it is not tobe supposed that he will carry the letters of his commercialcompetitors, and thus forestall his own speculations. Sailing vesselshave no proper accommodations for the mails, and can not fairly beforced either to transport or to deliver them. The uncertainties ofcargo are such that they can not sail on fixed days with punctuality. But the great difficulty is their want of speed and the uncertainty oftheir progress or arrival. Whenever they have been employed by theBritish Government for postal service they have always proventhemselves inefficient and unreliable. Whenever they have beensuperceded by steamers, the postal income, before small, has gone uprapidly to five, ten, or twenty times the former income. This was wellillustrated in the British and Brazilian lines. The Parliamentaryreturns for 1842, when postal service with Brazil and La Plata wasperformed by a line of fine sailing packets, give the total incomefrom postages at £5, 034, 13_d_, 6_s_ Lord Canning, the British PostMaster General, stated that, in 1852, two years after the Royal MailSteam Packets commenced running to Brazil and La Plata, the incomefrom postages was £44, 091, 17_s_, or nearly nine times as much as whenthe mails went by sailing vessels. [D] Ship owners have a strongaversion to receiving letters for the places to which their ships arebound. As a barque was about sailing from New-York for Demerara in1855, I called on the owner, who was on the dock, just before thevessel got under way, and asked that some letters which I held in myhand, might be taken to Georgetown. He said that he could not takethem; that he sailed his vessel to make money; and that he could notdo other people's business. As I walked away from him rather abruptly, he called to me and wished to know to whom the letters were addressed. I told him, to Sir Edmund Wodehouse, the Governor of the Province; andthat they related to the establishment of steam mail facilitiesbetween this country and that Province. He at once begged my pardonand explained; asked that I would let him send the letters; and said, moreover, that he would at any time be glad to give me a passage thereand back on that business. [D] See Parliamentary Papers for 1852-3, postal affairs, Report ofLord Canning, July 8, 1853. The experiment of employing the steamers of the Navy in the postalservice has been very fully made by Great Britain. After attempts on aconsiderable number of lines, and extending over a period of tenyears, this service has been found inefficient, cumbrous, and morecostly, and has been entirely abandoned. Murray, page 172, says thatMr. Anderson, Managing Director of the Peninsular and OrientalCompany, said before the Parliamentary Committee as follows: "Thepostal communication can be done much cheaper by private contractsteamers than by Government boats, because of the merchandise andpassengers carried. The steam communication between Southampton andAlexandria, with vessels of 300 to 400 horse power, was done for 4_s_6_d_, per mile. From Suez to Ceylon, Calcutta, and Hong Kong, withvessels of 400 to 500 horse power, for 17_s_, 1_d_ per mile. TheEast-India Company's line (of naval vessels) between Suez and Bombaywith vessels of only 250 to 300 horse power, cost 30_s_ per mile. HerMajesty's vessels in the Mediterranean cost about 21_s_ per mile. "France also tried the experiment, but soon abandoned the system, asfruitless and exceedingly annoying. It is quite a plausible idea thatour mails should go under the flag of the country, with power toprotect them, and that vessels generally supposed to be idle should beengaged in some useful service. But this presupposes a fact which doesnot exist. No vessels in the world are more actively employed thanthose of the American navy, and there are many stations on which wecould employ twice as many as we have with excellent effect on ourcommerce and foreign relations generally. We constantly hear thecomplaint that the Secretary of the Navy has no steamer for someimmediately necessary or indispensable service. But if he had, and iftwo dozen steamers were lying all the time idle in our navy yards, they would probably not be installed six months in the postal serviceuntil they would be positively demanded in some way in that of thenation, and this diversion would at once frustrate all of the postaland commercial plans of the country. But the difficulties in the way of this service are so numerous as tobe readily palpable to all who examine it. No vessel that is wellfitted for naval service is well adapted to that of the post. The postrequires great speed, and hence, full-powered vessels. The navy doesnot require so great speed, and hence, the steamers are seldom morethan auxiliaries. They are built heavier and fuller, and are not soadapted to speed. Filling them with the power necessary to drive themwith sufficient rapidity for mail packets would unfit them for theefficient service of war. Naval vessels are, moreover, filled andweighted down with guns, stores, men, and a thousand things whichwould be in the way if they were employed for the mails. They have nostate-rooms, cabins, saloons, etc. ; and if they had them so as toaccommodate passengers, they would be unfit for the war service. Unless so fitted they could not accommodate passengers, as they willnot lash themselves up in hammocks under the deck, as thick as grass, as man-of-war's men will. If they are to be strictly naval vesselswhile running, they will be filled with their own men, and could nottake passengers even if they had state-room accommodations for them. They would thus be deprived entirely of this source of income. Again, they could take no freight; and if a passenger mail steamer has todepend upon both freight and passengers for an income to meet thelarge expenses, which are generally three, five, and often even tentimes the sum of subsidy received from the Government, then the navalvessel running in the postal service will be deprived of both thesesources of income, and must fall back on the department for all of itsexpenses, which would be three, five, and even ten times as much asthe sum paid private companies for carrying the mail. The average round trips of the Pacific mail steamers from Panamá toSan Francisco and Olympia, and back, are, beyond doubt, enormouslyexpensive; while they receive from the Government only $14, 500. Thisis, consequently, but a small fractional part of their income. Thetrip of the "Arago, " or "Fulton, " to Havre and back, costs about$45, 000, while the mail pay was only $12, 500, under the old contract, and is now probably not above $7, 500 per round trip. [E] Theseestimates are made exclusive of insurance, which is 9-1/2 per cent. ;repairs, 10 per cent. ; and depreciation, at least five per cent. Here, again, the Government gives but a meagre part of the large sumnecessary to keep those packets running. Now, if naval vessels werecarrying the same mails, and were deprived of the income which theyreceive for freight and passengers, it would evidently cost theGovernment six to eight times as much to carry the mails as it nowdoes, saying nothing about the income from the mails, which istrifling. But this class of vessels never could subserve the purposesof rapid correspondence. If they could carry freight and passengers, the difficulties would still be insuperable. It would cost twice asmuch for the department to accomplish the same object through itsofficers and its routine as it would for private companies orindividuals, who have but the one business and the one purpose inrunning their vessels. No man, company, or even department of theGovernment, can accomplish two important and difficult ends by thesame agency at the same time. Either the one or the other must sufferand be neglected, or both will be but imperfectly and ineffectivelyperformed. Many structures of this kind fall of their ownsuperincumbent weight and clumsiness. If naval vessels thus runningeven had passengers they would never be satisfied or well treated. Acaptain and crew, to be agreeable and satisfactory to passengers, mustfeel themselves under obligation to them for their patronage, andwould be compelled to exert themselves to merit the best feelings oftheir patrons. This could never be the case with naval gentlemen, whowould be dependent for their living on the department only. It isprobable that no one seriously entertains such a plan as this for thepostal service, as this must be a distinct, partly self-supporting, unbroken, and continuous service, while that of the Navy must also bedistinct, independent, and efficiently directed to one great cardinalobject. Therefore, we can not secure postal service by this means. [E] This line receives the total postages, ocean and inland, which in1856 were, according to the Post Master General's report, $88, 483. 99, or $7, 373. 33 per round voyage. (_See Letter of the Hon. Horatio King, 1st Asst. Post Master General. _) As much has been said of Propellers during the few years past, Ipropose examining the question with the view of ascertaining whetherthey are adapted to the mail service, and whether we can secure fromthem sufficient speed without a subsidy from the Government. It iswell known that the British are a far more steady-going people thanourselves, and not being so rushing do not require so much speed. Theyhave had an easy control of the European and foreign commercegenerally around them; and when competition aroused them to additionalefforts they did not endeavor to outstride themselves, but took merelyan additional step of progress and speed, and adopted the propellerfor their coasting business, because it was a little faster than wind, and yet cheaper than full steam. And because so many propellers havebeen built for the peculiar short-route trade of Great Britain, manypeople in this country can not see why we do not adopt the propellerfor our foreign trade. I have already shown (_See page 44_) that thereare some short routes on which steam is cheaper than the wind, andthat on others of greater length steamers can not transport freightunder any conditions. (_See latter part of Section IV. , on the Cost ofSteam. _) I do not propose making the Screw Propeller in any way anexception to the position stated; and shall consequently maintain thatit will never be the means of attaining a rapid and yet cheap mailspeed. There are no greater errors entertained by the public on any subjectconnected with steam navigation than concerning the Screw Propeller. It is generally supposed that it is a more economical and effectiveapplication of power than the side-wheel, which is a mistake: it isgenerally supposed that, with the same amount of power and all otherconditions equal, the propeller will not run as rapidly as theside-wheel, which is true of steaming in a sea-way or against ahead-wind, but a mistake as regards smooth water: it is generallysupposed that the engines weigh less, take up less room, and costless, which is all a mistake. The best authors on this subject and themost eminent builders generally agree, that in England and Scotland, where the propeller has attained its greatest perfection, thedifference between the side-wheel and the propeller as an applicationof power is very slight and hardly appreciable; or that the samenumber of tons of coal will drive two ships of the same size at thesame speed in smooth water; but that the side-wheel has greatly theadvantage in a head-sea or during rough weather generally. Manypersons who do not understand the subject, have theorized in just thecontrary direction. They say that in rough weather the screw has theadvantage, because it is alway in the water, etc. Experience showsjust the reverse; and theory will bear the practice out. If, in theside-wheel one wheel is part of the time out, the other has, at anyrate, the whole force of the engines, and the floats sink to and takehold on a denser, heavier, and less easily yielding stratum of water;so that the progress is nearly the same. The back current or opposingwave can not materially affect it, because the float is at the extremeend of the arm where the travel is greatest, and is always more rapidthan the wave. It is not so with the screw. The blade which meets thewave is not placed at the end of a long arm where the travel is veryrapid and the motion more sudden than that of the wave. This bladeextends all the way along from its extreme end, where the motion israpid, to the centre, or the shaft, where there is no motion; and allintermediate parts of this blade move so slowly, that the wave ofgreater rapidity counteracts it, and checks its progress. Theside-wheel applies its power at the extreme periphery, where thetravel is greatest, while the screw applies it all along between thepoint of extreme rapidity, and the stationary point in the shaft. There is, moreover, much power lost as the oblique blades of the screwrise and fall in a vertical line while the vessel is heaving. In the new edition (1855) of "Bourne on the Propeller, " he says in thepreface: "Large vessels, we know, are both physically and commercially moreadvantageous than small vessels, provided only they can be filled withcargo; but in some cases in which small paddle vessels have beensuperseded by large screw vessels, the superior result due to anincreased size of hull has been imputed to a superior efficiency ofthe propeller. No fact, however, is more conclusively established thanthis, that the efficiency of paddles and of the screw as propellinginstruments is very nearly the same; and in cases in which gearedengines are employed to drive a screw vessel, the machinery will takeup about the same amount of room as if paddles had been used, and theresult will be much the same as if paddles had been adopted. Whendirect acting engines, however, are employed, the machinery willoccupy a much less space in screw vessels than is possible in paddlevessels, and the use of direct acting engines in screw propellers isnecessary, therefore, for the realization of the full measure ofadvantage, which screw propulsion is able to afford. " Atherton says of the propeller in his "Marine Engine Construction andClassification, " page 45: "Its operation has been critically compared with that of thepaddle-wheel, under various conditions of engine power, and experiencehas shown that, under circumstances which admit of the screw propellerbeing favorably applied, it is equal to the paddle-wheel as aneffective means of applying engine power to the propulsion of thevessel. " Again: I recently addressed to Mr. Atherton the following question: "Takingtwo ships of the same _size, displacement, and power, or coal_, theone a side-wheel, the other screw: What will be their relative _speedand carrying capacity_ in smooth water? What in a sea-way, or inregular transatlantic navigation?" He replied under address, "WoolwichRoyal Dock Yard, 14 Sept. , 1857: "It is my opinion, based on experiment, that a well-applied screw isquite equal to the paddle-wheel for giving out the power by which itis itself driven, that is, in smooth water. I can not say fromobservation or experience what is the comparative operation at sea. " I addressed the same inquiry to Mr. Robert Murray, of Southampton, whohas written an able work, entitled, "The Marine Engine, " and who isconsidered excellent authority, and have from him the following reply, dated Southampton, 19 Sept. , 1857: "With regard to the relative efficiency of the paddle-wheel and screwfor full-powered mail steamers, I am disposed to prefer thepaddle-wheel for _transatlantic_ steaming, in which the vessel has tocontend with so much rough weather and heavy sea, and the screw forthe Mediterranean and the Pacific routes. "For auxiliary steamers of any kind the screw has manifestly theadvantage. "With regard to the actual speed obtained from each mode of propulsionin vessels of the same power and form, and with the propeller in itsbest trim, I am disposed to prefer the paddle-wheel, either in smoothwater, or when steaming head to wind, but in other conditions thescrew. " What he means by "other conditions, " is evidently when thescrew is running with a fair wind, which is seldom, so as to use hersails. Bourne also states very clearly in two places that thepropeller is by no means so efficient in a sea-way, as a side-wheelsteamer, and admits that when a vessel is steaming at eleven or twelveknots per hour, the sails not only do not aid her, but frequentlymaterially retard her motion. (_See Bourne, page 237. _) All of these authorities agree that the application of a given powerproduces about the same effect, whether through the side-wheel or thescrew; and if so, it is evident that the screw can not attain the samespeed as the side-wheel, without burning as much fuel, and having ascostly and as heavy engines and boilers. Indeed, taking the wholeevidence together, it appears well settled by these authorities, thatthe screw is equal to the side-wheel only in smooth water, and that, as a consequence of this distinction, it is not equal to it in generalocean navigation. It has been seen that much of its power is lost whenit contends with head-winds and seas, and that when it has attained afair average mail speed, the wind will help it very little, if any, under the most favorable circumstances. It is, therefore, reasonableto infer that it would cost more to attain a high average mail speedwith the propeller than with the side-wheel. If in attaining thisaverage mail speed the advantages are clearly in favor of theside-wheel, there is no hope that we shall accomplish the mail serviceat cheaper rates than heretofore, as this agency can not be introducedtoward that end; for not only is the prime cost of the steamer thesame, as also the consumption of fuel per mile, but there are otherand numerous disadvantages connected with the propeller, which arewholly unknown to the side-wheel. It is a well-known fact that propellers are compelled to be placedupon the docks three or four times as often as side-wheels. The screweither breaks, and must be replaced by another, or it cuts the boxesout, or works the stern of the vessel to pieces. Any one of theserequires that the steamer shall be docked, however great the expense;and as these accidents are constantly occurring in even the bestconstructed and best regulated propellers, it follows that they mustbe constantly on the docks. This species of vessel being builtnecessarily narrower than the side-wheel, it rolls more, and is foundto be an exceedingly disagreeable passenger vessel. Propellers havebecome deservedly unpopular the world over; and if it were possiblefor them to be faster than the side-wheel, it is hardly probable thatfirst-class passengers would even then go by them, as they are knownto be so exceedingly uncomfortable. The propeller, I have before said, is erroneously supposed to run morecheaply than the side-wheel. I think that I have shown that as a mailpacket it will cost more to run it at a given speed. But there arecertain cases in which it does run more cheaply; these are, however, only where the speed is low, and the machinery not geared, and where, as a consequence, sail can be used to more advantage than on aside-wheel. The economy is not the result of the application of thepower by the screw, as compared with the side-wheel, but of the sailalone; and this economy is more or less, just as canvas is employedmore or less in the propulsion. The screw is the better form ofsteamer for using sail; and the low speed at which propellersgenerally run, is a means of making that sail more effective. We havealready seen, in the section on the cost of steam, that it generallyrequires twice the original quantity of fuel to increase the speedfrom eight to ten knots per hour in either style of steamer. Now, itis a well-known fact that the transatlantic propeller lines are on theaverage more than two knots per hour short of the speed of theside-wheels, which makes their passages across the Atlantic from twoto six days longer than by the mail packets. They thus save from onehalf to two thirds of the fuel, and deducting its prime cost from thebill of expenses, they add to that of receipts the freight on thecargo, which occupies the space of the coal saved. They consequentlyrun on much smaller expenses; but only when their speed is less thanthat of the side-wheels, and far too low for effective postalservice. Economy thus purchased at the expense of speed may do forfreight, and enable propellers to derive some profits from certaincargoes; but it can never subserve the purposes of mails andpassengers. It must alway be recollected that the effective speed ofthe propeller is reduced just in the ratio of the greater economy ascompared with the side-wheel. It thus appears that with any appreciable economy the propeller mustbe slower than the side-wheel; and that with any considerable economyit can be but little faster than sail. It has, however, the advantageover sail of being rather more reliable and punctual, and can makearrivals and departures rather more matters of certainty. This at thesame time secures to it a better class of freights as well as vastnumbers of emigrants which together, enable it to incur the extraexpense over a sailing vessel. The cargo is less in the propeller thanin the sail, as much of the room is occupied by the engines, boilers, and fuel. Hence, the prices must be proportionally higher to meet thedeficit arising from the smaller quantity. But there are very fewtrades in which propellers can run as noticed on so long a voyage as3, 000 to 4, 000 miles; and these lie between a few countries in Europeand the ports of the United States. Their support arises chiefly fromthe emigrant trade; as without this their freights would not on anyknown lines enable them to run one month. And this is not simply anassumption of theory, but the experience of all the European lines. Iwas recently told in England and France by many persons who had nointerest or desire to deceive me, that propeller stock was invariablya burthen to every body having any thing to do with it, and couldgenerally be bought at sixty to seventy cents on the dollar, whilemuch of it would not bring half of its cost price. They cited as anevidence the fact that no line of propellers is permanent, unless insome way connected with a subsidized company, as in the case of theCunard screws running between Liverpool and New-York. The Glasgow lineis also an exception, and is said to pay dividends. The screw linesare always hunting a home and a new trade. (_See views of Mr. Murray, page 111. _) The only way in which some lines can run is by getting their stock athalf its value and thus having to pay the interest on a smaller sum. The "General Screw Steam shipping Company" is an example. The Companyhad from the first lost money, although they had nine fine steamers, and were compelled finally to close up and sell out. Mr. Croskey, theUnited States Consul at Southampton, supposed that they might be putinto a new trade and make a living on a smaller capital stock; thatis, if the new company should get them at half their value. Thetransfer was made and the "European and American Steamship Company"was established. Some of the vessels were put into the trade betweenBremen and London, Southampton, and New-York; some between Antwerp andBrazil; and some between Hamburg and Brazil. None of these lines havepaid, except, perhaps, the New-York, which has had large cargoes ofemigrants; and Mr. Croskey freely acknowledges that the new Companywould have been ruined but for the Indian Revolt, which enabled him tocharter five of the vessels to the Government at good prices, for theconveyance of troops by way of the Cape of Good Hope to India. Had thelines on which they were running been profitable they would never havebeen chartered to the Government. But like the whole propeller serviceof the world, this Company took the chances; and it may be safelyasserted that but for the opportunities which vessels of this classfind for chartering to the Government they could not live on their ownenterprise three years. The number of these vessels is now veryunnecessarily large; and many of them have been built to supply laborto the establishments, and for taking the chances of Governmentemployment at high prices. Their largest employment results fromcasualties rather than from the pursuit of legitimate trade. But thebusiness is overdone, even for the English market, when foreign war israther the rule, and peace the exception. But few propellers are nowbuilding; these few being small and intended for the coasting, or theshort-line Continental trade, where they will readily pay. (_See page42 for propeller stock; also pages 44 and 45 for the propellercoasting service. _) It does not materially alter the complexion of this question to saythat propellers are generally constructed of iron. There is not such adifference in their prime cost or their stowage capacity as to enablethem to take the large receipts necessary to their support; whilecertainly there is no advantage to be gained in speed from iron as amaterial of construction. The iron propeller can be constructedcheaper than the wooden in Great Britain, because of the greatscarcity of timber and the large and redundant quantity of iron; andan iron vessel has some advantage in being able to stow a largercargo, from the fact that her sides and bottom are not so thick asthose of wooden vessels; but these considerations do not verymaterially affect the consumption of fuel, and the quantity necessaryto carry a ton of freight. Iron is probably a better material thanwood for the construction of propellers, as the part about the stern, where the screw works, can be made stronger, and as all iron vesselscan be rather more readily divided into water-tight compartments bybulkheads. Yet as a material of construction it offers no transcendentadvantages over the side-wheel for transatlantic navigation, while itis not probably so safe, or so comfortable for passengers. Yet, itwill be well for us to adopt the propeller largely in our coastingtrade, and iron as the material of its construction. We have thus seen that to save fuel and carry freight, the speed ofthe propeller must be low; indeed very low, if it is to live on itsown receipts. It is therefore clearly impossible that with suchcomparatively low speed it should carry the mail. Neither can itsupport itself except by this low speed. By running thus but afraction faster than the sailing vessel, it can command on a fewprominent lines a large freight; but to give vessels of such speed asubsidy for carrying the mails would be both to render the mailservice inefficient, and to enable the propeller to compete with thesailing lines of the country at very undue advantage, which would bean unfair discrimination against all sailing interests. Should thepropeller, like the side-wheel, run fast enough on the average tripsof the year to carry the mails, which would certainly be at theexpense and abandonment of any considerable freighting business, thenthe Government might with propriety pay for the mails, as thesesteamers would not injure the freighting business of sailing vessels. The outcry by sail owners against steamers as competitors can not beagainst the mail packets; for these carry but little freight; butagainst these slow screws which should be treated like all otherfreighting vessels, notwithstanding the fact that some of their ownershave had the impudence to propose them for the paid mail service andto ask a subsidy from the Government, but the better to cripple theinterests of sailing vessels. As well might Government subsidize fastclippers, because they are a little faster than regular, ordinarysailers. When the steamer runs with sufficient rapidity for the mails, the sailing ship has nothing to fear from competition, and has all thebenefits of the more rapid correspondence. Thus, Government must payonly where there is a fast mail, whether it be in a side-wheel orpropeller; otherwise it destroys individual competition and cripplesprivate enterprise. If, as we have seen from all the facts regarding the expense ofrunning steamers, individual enterprise can not supply adequatelyrapid ocean postal facilities, and if such facilities are yet whollyindispensable to the commerce, the people, and the Government, theonly alternative presented is for the Government to pay for them, andto require, as it has of all the American lines, such a speed as toprevent injurious competition to sailing vessels and privateenterprise. Much capital is made by certain ship owners out of whatthey call the undue discrimination of subsidies against their vessels;but they can never lay this charge at the door of the fast and veryexpensive mail packets, or elsewhere than upon the slow auxiliarypropellers which any of them have a right to attempt to run, and whichthe Government never did and never will subsidize. This is the sourceand the only source of all the vaunted injurious effects of steam onthe sailing stock of the country. It is a question with which theGovernment has nothing to do, and which must be settled betweenpropeller owners and sail owners themselves, and with reference, perhaps, to the wishes of their customers. Mail steamers have enoughto do to get money to pay their coal, provision, repair, andinnumerable extras bills, without wrangling over the freightingbusiness. And, from all this we conclude that the only means of theGovernment securing an adequate mail speed is by paying for it. (_Seeremarks of Committee on this subject, Paper E. _) SECTION VII. WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE? RESUMÉ OF THE PREVIOUS SECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS: IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH RAPID STEAM MAILS: OUR PEOPLE APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE, AND OF LIBERAL POSTAL FACILITIES: THE GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE: IT MUST FOSTER THEIR INTERESTS AND DEVELOP THEIR INDUSTRY: THE WANT OF SUCH MAILS HAS CAUSED THE NEGLECT OF MANY PROFITABLE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY: AS A CONSEQUENCE WE HAVE LOST IMMENSE TRAFFIC: THE EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING SYSTEM AND OURS: FIELDS OF TRADE NATURALLY PERTAINING TO US: OUR ALMOST SYSTEMATIC NEGLECT OF THEM: WHY IS GREAT BRITAIN'S COMMERCE SO LARGE: CAUSES AND THEIR EFFECTS: HER WEST-INDIA LINE RECEIVES A LARGER SUBSIDY THAN ALL THE FOREIGN LINES OF THE UNITED STATES COMBINED: INDIFFERENCE SHOWN BY CONGRESS TO MANY IMPORTANT FIELDS OF COMMERCE: INSTANCES OF MAIL FACILITIES CREATING LARGE TRADE: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S TESTIMONY: THE BRITISH AND BRAZILIAN TRADE: SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM THE FIGURES: CALIFORNIA SHORN OF HALF HER GLORY: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT MISERS: THEY WISH THEIR OWN PUBLIC TREASURE EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR INDUSTRY: OUR COMMERCIAL CLASSES COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF THE PRIVILEGE OF COMPETING WITH OTHER NATIONS. 1. _Conceded_ (Section I. ) _that steam mails upon the ocean controlthe commerce and diplomacy of the world; that they are essential toour commercial and producing country; that we have not established theocean mail facilities commensurate with our national ability and thedemands of our commerce; and that we to-day are largely dependent on, and tributary to our greatest commercial rival, Great Britain, for thepostal facilities, which should be purely national, American, andunder our own exclusive control:_ 2. _Conceded_ (Section II. ) _that fast ocean mails are exceedinglydesirable for our commerce, our defenses, our diplomacy, themanagement of our squadrons, our national standing, and that they aredemanded by our people at large:_ 3. _Conceded_ (Section III. ) _that fast steamers alone can furnishrapid transport to the mails; that these steamers can not rely onfreights; that sailing vessels will ever carry staple freights at amuch lower figure, and sufficiently quickly; that while steam iseminently successful in the coasting trade, it can not possibly be soin the transatlantic freighting business; and that the rapid transitof the mails and the slower and more deliberate transport of freightis the law of nature:_ 4. _Conceded_ (Section IV. ) _that high, adequate mail speed isextremely costly, in the prime construction of vessels, their repairs, and their more numerous employées; that the quantity of fuel consumedis enormous, and ruinous to unaided private enterprise; and that thisis clearly proven both by theory and indisputable facts as well as bythe concurrent testimony of the ablest writers on ocean steamnavigation:_ 5. _Conceded_ (Section V. ) _that ocean mail steamers can not live ontheir own receipts; that neither the latest nor the anticipatedimprovements in steam shipping promise any change in this fact; thatself-support is not likely to be attained by increasing the size ofsteamers; that the propelling power in fast steamers occupies all ofthe available space not devoted to passengers and express freight; andthat steamers must be fast to do successful mail and profitablepassenger service:_ 6. _Conceded_ (Section VI. ) _that sailing vessels can notsuccessfully transport the mails; that the propeller can not transportthem as rapidly or more cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with anyconsiderable economy of fuel and other running expenses, it is butlittle faster than the sailing vessel; that to patronize these slowvessels with the mails the Government would unjustly discriminateagainst sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that we can notin any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the transport ofthe mails; that individual enterprise can not support fast steamers;and that not even American private enterprise can under any conditionsfurnish a sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine: then, _ The inference is clear and unavoidable, and we come irresistibly tothe conclusion, that it is the duty of the Government to its people toestablish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, and rapid steammail marine, for the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses, the character of the nation, and the public at large; and asthere is positively no other source of adequate and effective support, to pay liberally for the same out of any funds in the nationaltreasury, belonging to the enterprising, liberal, and enlightenedpeople of the Republic. There is no clearer duty of the Legislativeand Executive Government to the industrious people of the country thanthe establishment of liberal, large, and ready postal facilities, forthe better and more successful conduct of that industry, whether thosefacilities be upon land or upon the sea. It is sometimes difficult toextend our vision to any other sphere than that in which we move andhave our experiences; and thus there are many persons who, while theywould revolt at the idea that the Government should refuse to runfour-horse coaches to some little unimportant country town, would bewholly unable to grasp the great commercial world and the wide oceansover which their own products are to float, and from whose trade theGovernment derives the large duties which prevent these same personshaving to pay direct taxes. They do not understand the necessity ofcommerce, to even their own prosperity, or of the innumerable steammail lines which must convey the correspondence essential to the safeand proper conduct of that commerce. But the great mass of theAmerican people understand these questions, understand the reflexinfluences of all such facilities, and knowing how essential they areto the proper development of enterprise and industry in whateverchannel or field, boldly claim it as a right that easy postalcommunication shall be afforded them as well upon the high seas asupon the interior land routes. It is generally admitted that the government of a country isestablished for the benefit of the people; and constitutionsconflicting with this purpose are simply subversive of justice andliberty. If labor is a thing so desirable and so noble in a peoplethat the protection of its rewards in the form of property becomes oneof the highest attributes of good government, then it is equally anindisputable attribute of that protecting and fostering government toafford those facilities to labor, which experience shows that itneeds, and which the people can not attain in their individualcapacity, or without the intervention of the government. It is idlefor a government to say to the people that they are free, when itdenies to them the ordinarily approved means of making and conservingwealth. The common experience of mankind points to commerce as thenext great means to production in creating national and individualwealth. It equally shows us that foreign commerce can not flourishwithout liberal foreign mail facilities, and the means of readytransit of persons, papers, and specie. It also clearly indicatesthat the most successful means of accomplishing this, is theemployment of subsidized national mail steamships. It thereforebecomes obviously the duty of a paternal government to an industrious, enterprising, producing, and trading people, to give them the rapidocean steam mails necessary to the profitable prosecution of theirindustry. We have for many years neglected many important fields of foreigntrade, and many profitable branches of industry and art, which wecould easily have nurtured into sources of income and wealth, byadopting the foreign mail system, so wisely introduced and extended byGreat Britain. And in the absence of such efforts on our part, a largeand remunerative traffic has been swept from us, and this suicidalneglect has been the means of our subordination to so many controllingforeign influences. We are at this very hour commercially enslaved byEngland, France, Brazil, and the East. How is it that the trade of theworld is in the hands of Great Britain; that she absorbs most of everynation's raw material; and that she and France supply the world withten thousand articles of industry, that should furnish work to ourmanufacturers, and freight to our ships? There are some who will saythat it is because of her manufacturing system. Grant it. But how didshe establish that imperious, and overshadowing, and powerful system, and how does she keep it up? Her energetic people have ever had thefostering care of her government. Their steam mail system has beenestablished for twenty-four years. It has furnished the people withthe means of easy transport, rapid correspondence, the remittance ofspecie, and the shipment of light manufactured goods to every cornerof the world; it has invited foreigners from every land to her shoresand her markets; and it has been the means of throwing the rawmaterial of the whole world into the lap of the British manufacturerand artisan, and enabling them thus to control the markets in everyland. But we can get along, it is said, without such a manufacturing systemand such an ubiquity of trade. This is a mistake. The productions ofour soil are not sufficiently indispensable to the outer world tobring us all of the money we need for importing the millions offoreign follies, to which our people have become attached. It is notright or best for us that while our "Lowell Drillings" standpreëminent over the world, we should so far neglect the Brazilian, LaPlatan, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and East-Indian trade, thatManchester shall continue, as she now does, to manufacture an inferiorfabric, post it off by her steamers, forestall the market, and cheatus out of our profits; and that, by means of the reputation which ourskill has produced. And a few more crises like the one through whichwe have just begun to pass, will open our eyes to the necessity ofdoing something ourselves to make money, and show that foreign tradein every form, and the sale of every species of product known to theindustry of a skillful people, must be watched with jealous nationaland individual care, and nurtured as we would nurture a young andtender child. There are many fields of trade which may be said topertain naturally to this country, and which we have as whollyneglected and yielded to Great Britain, as if she had a divine rightto the monopoly of the entire commerce of the world. No one canbelieve that the trade of the islands which gem the Carribbean Sea andthe Gulf of Mexico, or the great Spanish Main, or the Guianas, or theOrinoco and Amazon, or the extended coast of Brazil, the PlatanRepublics, or Mexico, and the Central American States lying just atour door, belongs naturally to Europe, or that their productionsshould be transported in European ships, or that their supplies comenaturally five thousand miles across the ocean, rather than go a fewhundred miles from our own shores, in our own ships, and for thebenefit of our own merchants and producers. Yet, such is theimpression which our apathy of effort in those regions would produce. We have acted as if our people had no right of information concerningthe West-Indies and South-America, until it had gone to Europe andbeen emasculated of all its virtues. The same thing is true of the Pacific South-American, the Chinese, andthe East-Indian trade. That of the Pacific coast is not half so farfrom us, as it is from Europe; that of China, and the East-Indies, andAustralia, is by many thousand miles nearer to us; and yet the greaterportion of the commerce of all three of those great fields istriumphantly borne off by Great Britain alone. And why is all this?Why is her foreign trade sixteen hundred millions of dollars per year, while ours is only seven hundred millions? Causes can not fail toproduce their effects; and prime causes, however little understood intheir half obscure workings, are yet made manifest as the sun atnoon-day by effects so brilliant and important as these. Here, asever, the tree is known by its fruits. The tree of knowledge, ofBritish wisdom, "whose mortal taste brought death into our world, " ourWestern world of commerce, "with loss of Eden, " and many a fairparadise of enterprise and effort, has filled the bleak little islandsof Britain with the golden fruits of every clime, and scatteredbroadcast among its people the rich ambrosia of foreign commerce. Whenit was necessary to command the trade of the West-Indies, CentralAmerica, and Mexico, lying at our southern door, she established theRoyal Steam Packet service with thirteen lines and twenty steamers, and paid it for the first ten years £240, 000, and for the presenttwelve years £270, 000 per annum. In addition to this she pays £25, 000per annum for continuing the same lines down the west coast ofSouth-America to Valparaiso, and contracts to pay the Royal MailCompany an annual addition of £75, 000 in the event of coal, freight, insurance, etc. , being at anytime higher than they were at the date ofthe contract in 1850. This aggregate sum of £295, 000, or $1, 475, 000, to say nothing of the increased allowance of £75, 000 probably now paidto this one branch alone of the British service, is considerablygreater than that paid for the entire foreign mail service of theUnited States. Now, it is a very extraordinary fact that, with such a field ofcommerce lying along the sunny side of our republic, and with such anarray of facilities for converting it into European channels, ourGovernment has done literally nothing to protect the rights of itscitizens and give them the means, which they do not now possess, of afair competition with other countries for this rich and remunerativetrade. Yet such is the fact; all of the petitions and memorials of theseaboard cities to the contrary notwithstanding. The same is the casewith the Pacific and East-India trade before noticed. While we have anoble chain of communication between the Eastern States and Californiaand Oregon, which is manifestly essential to the integrity of theUnion and the continued possession of our rich Western territory;while California is admirably situated to command the trade of thosevast regions and concentrate it in the United States; while theBritish have several lines to China, the Indies, Australia, andSouthern as well as Western Africa; and while our citizens havepetitioned Congress year after year for even the most limited steammail facilities to those regions, which could be afforded at thesmallest price, it is truly astonishing that these facts and petitionshave hitherto been treated with contempt, and almost ruled out ofCongress as soon as presented. Such has been the course of actionthat, instead of fostering foreign commerce and encouraging theenterprise and industry of the people, the Government has reallyrepressed that enterprise, and practically commanded the intelligentcommercial classes of this country to look upon foreign trade asforbidden fruit which it was never intended should be grown upon oursoil. It is not to be disputed that foreign mail steamers, by creatingalmost unlimited facilities for the conduct of trade, greatly increasethe commerce of the nation with the countries to which they run. Theevidences of this position are patent all around us, and too evidentto need recital. The growth of our trade with Germany, France, Switzerland, and Great Britain since the establishment of the Bremen, Havre, and Liverpool lines of steamers has been unprecedented in thehistory of our commerce. That with California has sprung up as bymagic at the touch of steam, and has assumed a magnitude andpermanence in eight years which but for the steam mail and passengeraccommodations created, could not have been developed under thirtyyears. The mail accommodations have wholly transformed our commercewith Havana and Cuba, until they are wrested from foreign commercialdominion, as reason suggests that they must ere long be from foreignpolitical thraldom. As well might Europe attempt to attach the littleisland of Nantucket to some of her own dynasties as to deprive theUnited States of the control of the trade of Cuba so long as her steamlines are continued to that island. Mr. Anderson, the Managing Director of the Peninsular and OrientalCompany, recently testified before a Committee of the House ofCommons, that, "the advantages of the communication (between Englandand Australia) should not be estimated merely by the postage. Aftersteam communication to Constantinople and the Levant was opened, ourexports to those quarters increased by £1, 200, 000 a year. The actualvalue of goods exported from Southampton alone, last year, (1848-9, )by those steamers is nearly £1, 000, 000 sterling. Greek merchantsstate that the certainty and rapidity of communication enable them toturn their capital over so much quicker. Forty new Greekestablishments have been formed in this country since steamcommunication was established. The imports in that trade, fine rawmaterials, silk, goats' hair, etc. , came here to be manufactured. Supposing the trade to increase one million, and wages amount to£600, 000, calculating taxes at 20 per cent. , an income of revenue of£120, 000 would result from steam communication. " I am prepared to speak from my own observation, and from the reliablestatistics of the Brazilian Government, from the pen of the late PrimeMinister, the _Marquis of Paraná_, a few facts of the same naturerelative to the trade between Great Britain and the Brazilian Empire. In a paper which I prepared for the New-York Historical Society, andpublished in "_Brazil and the Brazilians_, " Philadelphia, Childs &Peterson, I said, at page 618, in speaking of the trade of GreatBritain: "From 1840 to 1850 her total imports from Brazil made no increase. In1853, they had advanced one hundred and fifty per cent. On 1848; and, in 1855, they had advanced over 1848--or the average of the ten yearsnoticed--about three hundred per cent. This, however, it must berecollected, was in coffee, for reëxportation; a trade which was lostto our merchants and to our shipping. Her total exports to Brazil from1840 to 1850 were stationary at about two and a half million poundssterling annually. In 1851--the first year after steam by the RoyalMail Company--they advanced forty per cent. ; and, in 1854, they hadadvanced one hundred and two per cent. On 1850. Thus, her exports havedoubled in five years, from a stationary point before theestablishment of steam mail facilities; whereas ours have beenthirteen years in making the same increase. The total trade betweenBrazil and Great Britain has increased in an unprecedented ratio. Thecombined British imports and exports, up to 1850, averaged £3, 645, 833annually; but, in 1855, these had reached £8, 162, 455. Thus, _theBritish trade increased two hundred and twenty-five per cent. In fiveyears after the first line of steamers was established to Brazil_. " In the analysis of the tables presenting these facts I had occasion tomake the following deductions, page 619: "We see, from a generalization and combination of these tables andanalyses, that our greatest advance in the Brazilian trade has arisenfrom imports instead of exports; whereas the trade of Great Britainhas advanced in both; and particularly in her exports, which werealready large; the tendency being to enrich Great Britain and toimpoverish us: that until 1850 her exports were stationary, while ourswere increasing; due, doubtless, to the superiority of our clipperships at that period, which placed us much nearer than England toBrazil: that she is now taking the coffee-trade away from us, andgiving it to her own and other European merchants and shipping: thatshe is rivalling us in the rubber-trade; wholly distancing us in thatof manufactures: and that from 1850 to 1855 she has doubled a largetrade of profitable exports, and increased her aggregate imports andexports two hundred and twenty-five per cent. ; whereas it has taken usthirteen years to double a small trade, composed mostly of imports: itbeing evident that, with equal facilities, we could outstrip GreatBritain in nearly all the elements of this Brazil trade, as we weredoing for the ten years from 1840 to 1850. "It will hardly be necessary to suggest to the wise and reflectingmerchant or statesman the evident causes producing this startlingeffect. It is the effect of steamship mail and passenger facilities, so well understood by the wise and forecasting British statesmen whoestablished the Southampton, Brazil, and La Plata lines; not as ameans of giving revenue to the General Post-Office, but of encouragingforeign trade and stimulating British industry. If England by steamhas overtaken and neutralized our clippers and embarrassed our trade, then we have only to employ the same agent, and, from geographicaladvantages, we feel assured that we will soon surpass her ascertainly, and even more effectually, than she has us. She sweeps ourseas, and we offer her no resistance or competition. Not satisfiedwith the Royal Mail lines, it is reported that she is making acontract with Mr. Cunard to run another line along by the side of theRoyal Mail, from Liverpool to Aspinwall, and from Panamá to theEast-Indies and China. She gains in these seas an invaluable trade, because she employs the proper means for its attainment and promotion, while we do not. Hence, although much farther off she is practicallymuch nearer. Suppose that Great Britain had no steamers to the greatsea at her threshold, the Mediterranean; and we had the enterprise torun a great trunk-line to Gibraltar and Malta, and nine branches fromthese termini to all the great points of commerce in MediterraneanEurope, Asia, and Africa. Would we not soon command the trade of allSouthern Europe, of Western Asia, and of Africa? But we find herwisely occupying her own territory, and that it is impossible for usto get possession. If we had been there, she would soon have given uscompetition. But Great Britain did not wait for competition to urgeher to her duty to her people. She could easily have continued thetrade already possessed; but she could enlarge and invigorate it bysteam, and she did it; not from outside pressure, but for theadvantages which it always presents _per se_. For the same reason weshould have established steam to the West-Indies, Brazil, the SpanishMain, and La Plata long since; to foster a trade naturally ours, butpractically another's. It is preeminently necessary now when steam, under the system of Great Britain, is ruining our trade; whereas, by asimilar process, we could reëstablish ours, if not paralyze theirs. Neutrality is impossible. Indifference to the present posture ofaffairs only leads to the ruin of our interests. We must advance andcontend with Great Britain and Europe step by step, and employ themeans of which we are generally so boastful, or we will be forced toretreat from the field, and be harassed into ignominious submission. " As in the case of Brazil and La Plata so is it in that of the PacificSouth-American States, and the great fields of Australia, China, andthe East-Indies generally, as before noticed. The trade of GreatBritain with those regions has gone on at a rate of progression trulyastonishing. Ours has continued just as much behind it as the slow anduncertain sailing vessel is behind the rapid and reliable mailsteamer. Our Pacific possessions have been shorn of half their gloryand power by the refusal of those steam aids which would by thepresent time have converted half the commerce of the fields mentionedinto the new channels of American enterprise and transport. Theinjustice has operated equally against the people of California andOregon, and against ourselves of the East; while there is no good andvalid reason for thus making the Pacific coast the _ultima thule_ ofcivilized, steam enterprise. The people of the United States, ofwhatever class, are far from being misers. They do not desire aneconomy of two or three millions of dollars per year, which would givethem great opportunities of obtaining wealth and power, merely thatthe sum so economized may be squandered, with twenty or thirtymillions more, on schemes of doubtful expediency, and of no real orpressing necessity. They do not, indeed, ask that these mailaccommodations may be paid for simply because much money is uselesslyotherwise spent; but because these accommodations are necessary tothemselves, to the development of their enterprise and labor, and tothe general good of all the active and industrial, and, consequently, all of the worthy classes. It is a question of little importance tothe great people of this country, whether the Government expends fortymillions per year or eighty millions. But it would be a delightfulconsolation to them to know that while they might be paying ten, twenty, or thirty millions per year more than strictly necessary, three or four millions of it at least were so appropriated as tobetter enable them to pay the large general tax for the aggregate sum. No one hears any complaint regarding the sum necessary to support theGeneral Government, except by those in remote districts, who have butan infinitesimal interest involved, but an imaginary part of the sumto pay, and who, producing but little, and having nothing to do, assume the right to manage the affairs of those who really havesomething at stake. The American people are willing and anxious thattheir money shall be expended for their own benefit, for the benefitof those who are to come after them, and for the glory of our greatcountry. The many instances of our dereliction in the establishment of steammail facilities, and the failure to establish locomotiveaccommodations for our merchants and other business classes callloudly for a change in our affairs, and the establishment of anational steam policy in the place of the accidental and irregularsupport hitherto given to foreign steam enterprise. The nation demandsthe means of competing with other nations. We have lost much of thetrade of the world without it. The commercial men of this countrycomplain bitterly that the Government gives them no facilities forconducting our trade or cultivating the large fields of enterprisesuccessfully which I have named, and competing, on fair terms, withforeign merchants. They see the West-Indies, the Spanish-AmericanRepublics, Brazil, Central America, and Mexico, lying right at oursouthern door, and the whole Pacific coast, the East-Indies, China, the Mauritius, Australia, and the Pacific Islands but half as far fromCalifornia as from England, all much nearer to us than to GreatBritain and other European countries, and offering us a trade whichlarge as it necessarily is to-day, is yet destined within the cominggeneration to transcend that of all other portions of the globecombined, in extent, in richness, and in the profits which it willyield. The capacity of these great fields for development andexpansion is indefinite and almost boundless. There is no doubt thatan American trade could be developed in those regions within the nextthirty years whose opulence and magnificence would rival and farsurpass our entire commerce of the world at the present time, and giveto our nation a riches and a power which would enable it to shape thedestinies of the entire civilized world. Our commercial classes complain not so much that Great Britain has the_monopoly_ of this trade, which naturally belongs to the UnitedStates; not so much that she conducts that trade by _steamfacilities_, to the detriment of us who have none; not so much thatshe has _lines of steamers_ by the dozen, and weekly communication, aswell as the advantage and use of all the other European lines; butthat the citizens of the United States are not permitted to enter intoa fair competition for this trade. Our people probably surpass everyother people in the world in individual and aggregate enterprise andenergy. They ask as few favors of the Government as any people onearth; doing every thing that is practicable, and that energy andcapital can accomplish, without the intervention of the Government. But there are some things that, with the entire concentrated skill andability of the nation, her citizens can not accomplish; and one ofthese is the maintenance of steamship mail lines upon the ocean. Inordinary enterprises competition necessitates improvement; andmechanical improvement and skill, in due course of time, enableindividuals to compass ends otherwise deemed impracticable andunattainable. These attempts have all been made, in every form, withocean steam navigation. It was supposed, as elsewhere stated, that, bysuperior engines and great economy of fuel, a speed high enough forall ordinary mail purposes could be attained, and yet leave enoughroom for freight and passengers to enable the income from these, atrates much higher than on sailing vessels, to pay for fuel, engineering, and the great additional cost of running a steamer. Vastengineering skill and ability have been directed to this point both inthis country and Europe; and this object has been declared thecommercial desideratum of the age. But all of these efforts havefailed in their design; so much so that there is not, to-day, morethan one permanent steam line upon the high seas of the whole worldwhich is not sustained by a subsidy from some government. Manyattempts have been made by British merchants to do a freighting andpassenger business in _propellers_, without any mail pay, anddepending on their receipts alone. These, too, have all failed. Nopermanent line of these propellers has been established to any of ourAmerican cities, except by subsidized companies, owning side-wheelsteamers also. The only trade in which it has ever been supposed that steamers of anydescription whatever could carry freight is that between Europe andthe United States, where there are large quantities of rich, costlygoods, in small and valuable packages, which pay an extra rate offreight, as express goods; but, even here, the steam freightingsystem without governmental aid has proved a failure. There have beenone or two cases where a steamer could make money in carrying freightand passengers alone, as between this country and California duringthe early part of the gold crisis, and owing to the great distancearound the Horn, as well as an unnaturally large passenger trade. This, however, was a state of commerce wholly abnormal and of shortduration, and such as is not likely to occur once in a century, orlast very long; or prove more than an infinitesimal exception to thegreat general laws of freighting and commercial transport. Great Britain has learned this doctrine from experience, and isprofiting by it. Her wise merchants and statesmen know that commercecan be accommodated only by rapid steam mails, which have regular andreliable periods for arrival and departure; and that, although thesemails cost the Government and the people something more than thoseslow and uncertain communications which depend on sailing vessels andoverland transit, yet they are enabled, by the facilities which theyafford, to monopolize and control the commerce of the world, anddivert it from even the most natural channels into the lap of Britishwealth. It is in this view of the subject that our merchants so justlycomplain that our Government, by refusing to give them the facilitiescommensurate with the demands of the age, _deprives_ them of the_power_ or _privilege_ of competing with foreign nations, and palsiestheir hands, simply because they are not able, individually and bytheir associated capital, to do that which the Government only can do. The reason why our mail steamers require the aid of our Government isthat foreign Governments subsidize their lines; hence our individualenterprise can not compete with their individual enterprise and thatof their Government combined. The reason why foreign Governments thussubsidize their mail lines is, that _those lines can not depend upontheir own receipts for support, or run without Governmental aid_. Thisis also the prime reason for Governmental aid in running our lines. These facts are undisputed by steamshipmen and merchants, and areverified by the practice of the whole world, and the great number offailures in attempting to sustain steamers, from year to year, onregular lines, by their receipts alone. Being thus unable to compete with other countries under our presentlimited steam arrangements, and considering the startling expenseswhich attend the running of steamers, such as their fuel, their extraprime cost, their large repairs, their depreciation, their wages, their insurance, their dock charges and light dues, their shoreestablishments, and the long list which comes under the head of itemsand accidents, it is unquestionably the duty of the Government to meetthis question in a frank and resolute manner, and afford to the peopleall those necessary facilities which they can get in no other way. SECTION VIII. HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? WE NEED A STEAM MAIL SYSTEM: HOW OUR LINES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONTRASTED: SPASMODIC AND ENDURING LEGISLATION: MR. POLK'S ADMINISTRATION ENDEAVORED TO INAUGURATE A POLICY: GEN. RUSK ENDEAVORED TO EXTEND IT: THE TERM OF SERVICE TOO SHORT: COMPANIES SHOULD HAVE LONGER PERIODS: A LEGISLATION OF EXPEDIENTS: MUST SUBSIDIZE PRIVATE COMPANIES FOR A LONG TERM OF YEARS: SHOULD WE GIVE TO OUR POSTAL VESSELS THE NAVAL FEATURE: OUR MAIL LINES GAVE AN IMPULSE TO SHIP-BUILDING: LET US HAVE STEAM MAILS ON THEIR MERITS: NO NAVAL FEATURE SUBTERFUGES: THESE VESSELS HIGHLY USEFUL IN WAR: THEY LIBERALLY SUPPLY THE NAVY WITH EXPERIENCED ENGINEERS WHEN NECESSARY: THE BRITISH MAIL PACKETS GENERALLY FIT FOR WAR SERVICE: LORD CANNING'S REPORT: EXPEDIENTS PROPOSED FOR CARRYING THE MAILS: BY FOREIGN INSTEAD OF AMERICAN VESSELS: DEGRADING EXPEDIENCY AND SUBSERVIENCY: WE CAN NOT SECURE MAIL SERVICE BY GIVING THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE GENERAL TREASURY SHOULD PAY FOR THE TRANSMARINE POST: REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONTRACTS: METHOD OF MAKING CONTRACTS: THE LOWEST BIDDER AND THE LAND SERVICE: THE OCEAN SERVICE VERY DIFFERENT: BUT LITTLE UNDERSTOOD: LOWEST-BIDDER SYSTEM FAILURES: SENATOR RUSK'S OPINION: INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF LOWEST BIDDER: INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS AND RIGHTS. As it will scarcely be denied that the Government should furnish ampleand liberal mail facilities, as well foreign as domestic, to itspeople, in view of the well-established fact that these facilities cannot be attained in any other way, the question naturally arises, howshall the Government discharge this clear and unquestionable duty tothe citizen? I trust that it will be admitted that we can not rely onthe Sailing-ship mail, or the Naval steam mail, or the PrivateEnterprise mail; while it is equally evident that we can not depend onthe Foreigner's mail, or should not if we could. A first step toward this important end, and one which every interestof the country demands, is the establishment of a governmental steammail system, a fixed steam policy, based upon common-sense, and guidedby the dictates of justice to the enterprising citizen, at the sametime that it is productive of certain efficiency toward the people. Itcan not be denied that our legislation on this subject has hithertobeen that of expedients, and merely temporary arrangement. We have hadno wise, immutable purpose, no great fixed rule of action. We havelaid no broad foundations for a system which should extend itselfwherever our trade extended, and work equitably with all of the largeinterests of the American people. When, by a spasmodic effort, weopened communication in one direction, and found that we had a fewsteamers running, we became self-complacently satisfied with ouraction, shut our ears to all other equally urgent claims and appeals, forgot that we had simply commenced instead of having finished, andcontented ourselves with the appearance of a mail system rather thanits realization. When we established the two lines to Europe, whichwere positively necessary to commerce, it was not so much becausethose were the only necessary lines, but because they were urged byparties who stood ready to build the ships, and run them in theservice. The California lines were established because the peoplewould not longer tolerate the neglect of our large and importantinterests in the Pacific. But there were several other lines whichwere of the greatest importance to our commerce and manufactures, extending to fields where we could have established the richest trade, but which never enlisted the attention of Congress, simply becausethere was no one who made it his special business to press them. Thisof itself manifested great want of a matured steam mail system, whichshould operate equally on all of the great interests of the country, and extend its facilities wherever American industry and enterprisecould find a footing. We need not only a steam system, but a fixed steam policy that shallextend from generation to generation, and operate equally, as well atall times and in all fields of American enterprise, as upon allclasses. No such system can be built up in one year or in ten years;much less by one spasmodic steam effort, even in the right direction, followed by an eternal sleep, or a total indifference. It is the workof ages. It is not a system which, if set in motion, will work onperpetually of itself, without assistance. It needs constant care andfostering; and its results prove it worthy of all the care andattention that can be expended on it. The mature system of GreatBritain has not grown up in a day. It has been constantly before theBritish public during twenty-four years, and has never been neglectedfor an hour. There has been no hiatus in it; for this would havedisrupted the system, broken the chain, and resulted in disastrousfailure. Neither has the one great purpose been changed every fewyears to suit the caprice of some new cabinet. It was a great cardinalidea, founded in reason and justice, that has gone on maturing fromyear to year; and none had the hardihood to touch it, or trifle withthe people's purpose in establishing it; not even so far as to make ita passing text for demagoguery. It composed and yet composes a part ofthe far-reaching and controlling policy of the British crown; apurpose limited not to the visions of to-day, or the financial crisesand panics of to-morrow, or to some new field of British effort, tobe developed in a year or two; but limited to that time only, when menshall cease the strife of commerce, abandon the pursuit of wealth, yield the palm of enterprise, and unlearn the love of money and itspower. There has been nothing spasmodic in this; nothing fitful, alluring, and evanescent; nothing that held out a hope to theenterprising man, and deceived him in all the essential conditions ofits fulfillment in the end. It was founded in reason, founded innecessity; and it was well determined that it should endure. It is creditable to the administration of President Polk, that therewas one effort made in this country to found a similar judicious andfruitful system. We had until that time taken no notice whatever ofmarine steam navigation; and British steamers swarmed around our coastnorth and south, thick as cruisers in a blockade. (_See Paper E. _)Indeed, it was a veritable blockade of our commerce, and told mostdisastrously upon our enterprise and independence. The Cabinet of Mr. Polk, headed by our present venerable Chief Magistrate of the Nation, determined to reverse this system, and did it as effectually as anything can be accomplished in a country, where a given policy, howeverwisely inaugurated, has no guaranty or safeguard against therevolutionary changes of new administrations. They established a basisof action, and inaugurated three steam lines under contracts whichplaced them beyond the attacks of the capricious; well knowing that ifthe system had merits, they would be manifested to the country withinten years by the fruits of these lines. The period was shorter thanthat designated by Great Britain; yet with the immensely rapiddevelopment of our people it inwrought itself into the affections ofthe public so effectually, even in this short time, that none willdare risk his reputation by attacking it boldly, or by other meansthan an indirect and harassing guerrilla warfare. But here the effortended, and the system, deprived of the aids and new lines whichCongress should have extended it, and of that continued developmentwhich was necessary to its perfection and usefulness, has been left towork itself out and die, until it may be resurrected by another greatdemonstration of public sentiment, and by an administration boldenough and far-seeing enough to grasp the interests of the wholecountry, and do itself and the people justice. It is due, however, tothe reputation of a lamented and departed statesman, the large-mindedand noble Gen. Rusk, of Texas, to say that he made a manly andsystematic effort in 1852, after seeing the fruitful workings of thethree lines noticed, to extend, enlarge, and fortify the goodbeginnings of President Polk and Secretary Buchanan, by inauguratingseveral new lines, and establishing a permanent and recognized basisof action. But in all this he was thwarted by the machinations ofnarrow-minded men, who deemed it a higher effort to agitate thecountry and endeavor to separate the North and the South, thanestablish and secure those mighty aids to industry which should givedevelopment, wealth, strength, and security to the whole AmericanUnion, and check the fratricidal blow of the disunionist. It is essential that we shall have in this country a policy on thissubject, which shall remain untouched under the changes ofadministrations, just as standard commercial laws and regulationsremain untouched. No system of such magnitude can mature or cheapenwhen but a few years are assigned to it, and when there is nocertainty that it will survive the life of a single ship. Companiesundertaking the mail service under such circumstances must be paidlarger sums for their general establishment, that they may be enabledto meet the exigencies and caprices of irregular legislation, whichmay at the close of their contracts suddenly throw a dozen good shipsout of employment. Every well-regulated and efficient companynecessarily builds new steamers through all the stages of itsexistence; and when the term of its service expires, necessarily hasseveral partially new ships. If the term of service is to be short, and if there is no rule by which those who do good service on a lineare to have, in renewing contracts, the preference of new and untriedparties, then it is reasonable to infer that they can not themselvesincur the expense of so large an establishment of new and uselessvessels, and that their service is either to be inefficient andunreliable, or that the department must pay a larger price thannecessary under a judicious and fixed system. The want of a reliablesystem operates injuriously both on the department and on thecontractors. It subjects us to expedients, and to all of the evils ofconstant lobbying and legislation on the subject. And one of the firstwants of this system is an extension of the term of contracts. Theperiod hitherto assigned has not been long enough for the properdevelopment of the service. The short term is a constant premium forbuilding an inferior class of vessels, which shall have becomeworthless by the time that the contract expires, so as not to entailloss upon the company. Such vessels are ever unfit for the mails orpassengers. Short terms also keep the subject continually beforeCongress and the Executive Government, and foster that extensive anddepraved lobbying which has wrought so injuriously on our legislation. Moreover, there is no reason why the term of service should not beextended, when it will certainly simplify and cheapen it, if, as Ihave assumed, the progress of engineering is not such as to throwwell-built ships out of use within twelve years, or in any wayintroduce improvements by which the Government could get the serviceat lower rates. Nor have we any reliable hope for the future. We waituntil commerce has been perverted into unnatural channels, and thenbecome suddenly and galvanically aroused, when it is too late toeffect a change until two or three years have expired in buildingships. We thus find ourselves in the midst of the difficulty withouthaving foreseen it, and without being prepared for it. The wise manplanned the campaign before others had even contemplated anydisturbance of the peace. As a matter of course he controlled thebattle, and brought up the victory in his own way. The only effectual means of accomplishing the foreign mail service inthis country is by liberally subsidizing private companies for a longterm of years, such as will induce them to provide first-class ships, run them rapidly, and fit them for the most comfortable conveyance ofpassengers. Lord Canning in his Report to both houses of Parliament onthe contract packet system in 1853, says, after showing that the navalvessels have been abandoned for the mail service: "There is nopeculiarity in this branch of business which renders it an exceptionto the general rule, that work is done more cheaply by contract thanby Government agency. " But when the idea of performing the mailservice by naval vessels was wholly abandoned in 1837, anotherquestion of equal importance arose, as to how far the mail steampackets might be made efficient as vessels of war in times ofemergency. As a consequence of the discussion nearly all of the mailcontracts made from that day until this by Great Britain containedstipulations requiring the vessels to be capable of carrying anarmament, in addition to the requirements of speed and punctuality. The same thing was done in this country in 1846-7; and one of theprincipal means of carrying the Collins bill through Congress was theself-deception of making the steamers equivalent to vessels of war. Itwas a plea to which statesmen and enterprising business men resorted, and was used as a means of securing those commercial facilities whichconstitutional quibblers would not vote for directly, but which theywould afford if allowed the subterfuge of "defenses" as a means ofprotecting them against a certain set of constituencies who foolishlyopposed the extension of commerce. Many of these would not grant onedollar for the aid of that commerce on which the revenues of thecountry and their own real prosperity and wealth depended; but theywere willing to suffer long and bleed freely at the old and just, though unrenewable war-cry: "The British and the Hessians. " Our casewas rather different from that of Great Britain which had a largesteam navy while we had neither naval nor commercial steamers. Therewas, consequently, and there yet is, more propriety in demanding acapacity for the naval service in our vessels than in the case ofGreat Britain. In obedience to this very proper spirit we produced some of thenoblest vessels that ever floated. Stronger vessels than the Collins, Aspinwall, and Pacific Mail Steamers were never built in any country. And although we have fortunately not been compelled to test theircapacity in naval transport or in action, yet there is no doubt thatthey would do honorable and efficient service in both, and by no meanssully the glory of the American colors. The establishment of these andthe Havre and Bremen lines, certainly gave an impulse to shipbuildingand the manufacture of steam machinery in this country which couldhave been given in no other way, and which in a few short years hasdemonstrated that we are behind no people on earth in capacity forthese noble and difficult arts. And although we are yet but in ourinfancy in experience, as compared, especially with Great Britain, yetthe increasing demand for mail facilities, the necessity for a largewar marine, and the rapidly increasing coast steam service, allindicate that we shall require a large amount of this class of workand a mechanical skill to which our ingenious countrymen have thusproven themselves entirely adequate. And although it is certainlyindispensable that we shall ever be provided adequately against allthe exigencies of foreign war, yet it is to be trusted that bold andfearless statesmen will support and extend our steam mail service onthe tenable grounds of its necessity to commerce and our citizens atlarge, and that its productive services will not be obscured by orsubordinated to the subterfuges and deceits of the war marine feature. Let us have steam mail facilities on high and independent grounds, andfor their benefits _per se_. The system is abundantly tenable on thisground alone; on this only ground that it will probably everpractically occupy. Let us also have our war marine, efficientlyseparate, as it should be. Let both systems be perfect, bothindependent, both mutually conducive to the prosperity and the defenseof the country. But there is no doubt that these vessels would doexcellent service in a conflict. They could swarm any particular coastwith troops in a few days. They could easily run away from dangerousvessels, or pursue and overtake others when necessary. They are alwayneeded for transport, while the time will probably never again comewhen mail steamers will not be even more necessary during war than intimes of peace. But this is not all. They fit and train a large numberof marine engineers who are ever ready at a day's warning to enterefficiently on the naval service. This is a point of greaterimportance than is generally supposed. Engineers, however skilled inthe shops, are wholly unfit for the service at sea until they have hadmonths of experience, and become accustomed to sea-sickness. When oneof our first American mail steamers sailed for Europe, no practisedmarine engineer could be found to work her engines. They took afirst-class engineer and corps of assistants from one of the NorthRiver packets; but as soon as the ship got to sea, and heavy weathercame on, all the engineers and firemen were taken deadly sick, and forthree days it was constantly expected that the ship would be lost. It is abundantly evident from all of the testimony, that most of themail packets are capable of carrying a handsome armament. Mr. Athertonsays to me in his letter: "Many of our ocean steamers are fit fornaval service of every description; and they are generally fit for alltransport service. " The Report of Lord Canning, the British PostMaster General, to which I have referred, was made in 1853, inobedience to a Treasury Minute issued by the Chancellor of theExchequer, who directed the Post Master General to form a committee, and report to both houses, on the propriety of continuing andextending the mail steam packet system; as there had been suggestionsthat the sum expended for the mail service was large. These gentlemenafter a lengthy investigation of several months, the examination of agreat number of witnesses, and the record of their testimony inshorthand, made their report, accompanied by the evidence in a largevolume. At page 5 of the report, in speaking of the requirements fornaval efficiency, they say: "In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Government seized the opportunity of requiring that the vessels should be constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for national defense in war as steam-packets belonging to the Crown would have been if employed in their stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in 1840; and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found requiring that the vessel should be of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as the Admiralty may think proper. In several cases they must be built of wood and not of iron; and there are some contracts which confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may be thought desirable to do so. "Generally speaking, these stipulations have been fulfilled, as appears from a return which has been laid before us by the Surveyor of the Navy, showing the number, tonnage, and power of the vessels constructed by the various companies under contract with the Admiralty for the conveyance of the mails, distinguishing those built of wood from those built of iron, and stating whether the companies have in any cases violated the terms of the contracts, and if so, whether any authority has been given by the Board of Admiralty for the deviation. It results from this return that out of 98 vessels which had been surveyed by the Government officers, one only (the 'Australian') has been reported as incapable of carrying guns if required, and two iron vessels (the 'Levantine' and the 'Petrel') have been accepted instead of wooden vessels, on Mr. Cunard's Halifax and Bermuda line. Two other vessels--one belonging to the Australian Royal Mail Company, and the other to Mr. Macgregor Laird's West Coast of Africa line--had also been accepted (temporarily) by Admiralty authority, although of less tonnage and power than the contracts prescribed. "The Surveyor's report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness for war purposes, is in the following terms: 'Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted. ' This report accords with the opinion expressed by the Committee of Naval and Artillery officers upon the vessels which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of that Committee, that although the packets they have examined are for the most part of sufficient strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would be necessary before they could be got ready for service would be very considerable, and that even when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal tonnage without endangering the honor of the British flag. "With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no expense should be incurred for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels. We believe the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. _Should a war suddenly break out, the immediate demand for mail steamers would probably be greater than ever, and it might be exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their legitimate use for the purpose of arming them for battle. _ Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been borne with the greater readiness, because it has been supposed by some to include a provision of large but unknown amount, for the defense of the country; while on the other hand the Naval Estimates have sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the force provided for was in addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers. We accordingly recommend that for the future the contracts for the conveyance of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature we have been describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency. " Again, in the _resumé_, after considering each of the British linesseparately, the committee say: "An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the public as to the efficiency of our postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged with the direction of the military affairs of the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any great service in an engagement; but their advantages as an auxiliary force will be very considerable. They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of dispatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and stores. Their speed will be such as probably to secure them from the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for procuring intelligence of hostile movements. They may also be expected to furnish the Queen's ships with men trained to steam-navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which can not fail to be valuable in several ways. " We have arrived at about the same conclusions in this country as thosepresented by the British Post Master General to Parliament in 1853, onthis subject. And yet, with our small navy we may at any time need allof our steam packets for actual service, and the Government shouldalways have the right to demand them for transport service. We haveabundant evidence that our mail packets are well fitted for carryingan armament, and being highly efficient in war duty. The testimony ofCommodore M. C. Perry, Mr. Cunningham, and others, as published in theSpecial Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is conclusive onthis point. They found that they were built with extraordinarystrength and of good materials. Many expedients have been proposed for the transmission of our foreignmails. It is said that the late Post Master General entertained thepurpose of paying some of the foreign screw lines to carry the mails, if Congress would permit it; but however all parties disapprove of thecontracted policy proposed by that gentleman, I can not believe thathe entertained any purpose so unpatriotic, and so subversive ofAmerican shipping interests. It is true, however, that, as hefrequently said, he would prefer returning to the old packet system, and carrying the mails by sail, if private enterprise could not carrythem across the ocean without a subsidy. But it is a consolingreflection that these singular views of that worthy gentleman neveranywhere took root in Congress. Certainly there is no reason why thisgreat, and rich, and proud nation should resort, like some littleseventh rate power, to expedients in the carriage of our ocean mails. We are not so poor as to have to live by practices; not so degraded asto be willing to catch at any little thing that may pass along forresources. We have a teeming prosperity, an abundant wealth, unendingresources, and a people everywhere clamorous for liberal expendituresfor adequate mails. Why shall we degrade ourselves by depending uponothers for our mail facilities? It alway humbles and mortifies me tosee one human being lick the hand of another; one who acknowledgeshimself a stupid drone that must needs have a master to direct andprotect him. And so with our nation when she stoops to subserviencyand begging, for even so much as the postal charities of otherenterprising and commanding nations. It has been suggested that the Government could secure the transit ofthe mails on the receipts, taking both ocean and inland postage; andindeed a temporary arrangement was made with two of our contendingcompanies running to Europe, to transport them on these terms; butsuch arrangements are temporary only, and can not be made the basis ofregular action. They would operate most unequally on different lines. While on the European lines they would pay probably one half the sumof subsidy required, on many other, and especially on new and untriedlines, they would not at first pay probably one tenth. And grantingthat on a given line, the receipts during fifteen years would amountto as much as the whole subsidy required for that time; yet no companycould live on them, as for the first few years the receipts from themail would be very small, while the general income of the line frompassengers and freight would also be smaller than at any other time. Moreover, almost every steam company has to borrow money largelyduring its first years, in anticipation of the larger income fromincreased trade during the last years of its existence. Thus, whilethe system of the receipts would operate most unequally, the sameaggregate sum given in the form of a regular annual subsidy operatesas an assurance for the company and keeps it alive. But the postalreceipts are not adequate to the support of any ocean line. In thereport before cited, the Committee say, at page 5, that the sum ofsubsidy then paid was £822, 390 per annum, whereas the postal receiptswere only £443, 782, or but a fraction over one half. There is probablyno regular service in the world where the postal receipts would payfor the transport, especially where competition existed. In making our contracts common-sense must dictate the lines necessary, and the general treasury should pay for them. There is no good reasonwhy the sums of subsidy to be paid for mail transportation should bechargeable on the Post Office Department. Nor is it really of muchconsequence where the account is settled, as the general treasury mustafter all meet the bills. It may create some misapprehension as to theservices on which the sums annually voted are bestowed. But theservice, whether sea or inland, is alike incapable of sustainingitself, and is alike beneficial to every citizen of the Republic. Andas this service so greatly benefits commerce, it is well that itshould be paid from the general revenues of the country; from theduties which it creates. At any rate, almost every Post Master Generalwill feel better disposed to subsidize ocean mail steamers adequatelyif the bills are payable by the treasury department, and notchargeable upon his own. It would be well in all new contracts that the law of Congressauthorizing them should require strength of vessel, a fair dynamicefficiency of performance, water-tight bulkheads for the safety bothof the vessel, and passengers and mails, and all those othersafeguards compatible with speed and mail efficiency. But the mostessential point is the mode of making the contracts. We have pursuedtwo system in this country, that of the lowest bidder, and that ofCongressional contracts. Some have supposed that as the land mails aresubmitted to the lowest bidder, so those of the ocean ought to bealso. But the cases are very unlike. The land service is a familiarthing, which every farmer understands, because running a wagon is oneof the first things in life that he learns. Every body is familiarwith the land service, and every body has more or less experimented init, or in something very similar to it. But it is far otherwise withthat of the ocean. Steamshipping is a comparatively new, a verydifficult, and a very little understood science. But few who know itsdifficulties will undertake its hazards. Steam power and its expensesare by no means understood by the people; and the first mistake madeby those unacquainted with it is in supposing it much cheaper than itreally is. This mistake leads to fatal consequences in bidding for theocean service, as most of those unacquainted with the business wouldengage to perform a given service for less than the actual price thatit would cost them, and certainly for much less than practical, experienced men would. And herein consists one of the evils of thelowest bidder system, that inexperienced persons taking such contractseither perform them inefficiently, or appeal constantly to Congressfor relief, or for increase of their pay. Such cases are exceedinglynumerous. Post Master General Campbell said that the lowest biddersystem was "a nuisance. " Senator Mallory declared in a debate aboutthe close of the last Congress, that it was a system which neverwrought efficiently, which never gave final satisfaction, and whichgenerally brought in a set of adventurers. The department and membersof Congress had experienced the annoyance and inefficiency of thesystem in the contract for carrying the mails between Key West andNew-Orleans through the Gulf. It was several times given to thelowest bidder, and as often fell through; being finally awarded byprivate arrangement to other parties, at more than double the pricesof the lowest bidders. In the elaborate Report made in 1852 to the Senate by Gen. Rusk, asChairman of the Committee on the _Post Office and Post Roads_, ofwhich Messrs. Soulé, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton were members, inspeaking on this subject the Committee said: "Contracts to carry the ocean mail should, like all other contracts made by the Government, be the subjects of a fair competition, and granted with reference to the public good, due regard being had to the excellence of the proposals made, under all the circumstances of the cases which may present themselves. Your committee are aware that it has been too much the practice to regard the _lowest_ as the _cheapest_ bid; but experience has taught them that _lowness of price_ and _cheapness in the end_, are not convertible terms, as the daily applications, from _low bidders_, to Congress for indemnity against losses incurred in the public service, will amply demonstrate. For examples of the kind the committee would respectfully refer to the numerous applications for remuneration, in connection with the public printing, which have for years past occupied the time and attention of Congress, and threaten to continue to do so to a most alarming extent, involving, in the end, an accumulation of expense infinitely beyond the cost that would have attended the performance of the work, at a fair and liberal compensation. This may be, by some, called economy, but it is the very worst sort of economy. It excludes the honest workman, who knows the real value of the service to be performed, and is unwilling to undertake to do his duty well, at the expense of himself and family; while it lets in the needy and greedy speculator who, having nothing to lose in point of character or money, will readily undertake what he can not perform, and become dependent upon the magnanimity of Congress for remuneration for his losses, real or fictitious. An honest and fair liberality should characterize the dealings between the Government and individuals, just as much as those between private citizens; and, when contracts are made, they should be entered into in the spirit of good faith, and with a full knowledge of the risks to be run, and the expenses to be incurred. " It is claimed on the other hand that in contracts made by Congress thetwo Committees have every opportunity of testing the value of theservice to be performed, of ascertaining the sum of subsidy reallynecessary to its support, of giving to every applicant a fair andimpartial hearing, and of presenting to Congress any case of doubtand difficulty, or of contested right. When the committees take anyline into consideration it is in effect inviting competition andproposals from every one else than the projector who supposes that hehas better claims to it, or can perform the service at cheaper rates. Such proceedings are always open and advertised to the world formonths and sometimes for years. And there are many persons who willcome forward and make a low bid for a service after some one else hasbrought it to the attention of the Government and labored it throughCongress, who would not turn their fingers over, or risk a dollar inbringing it before the nation, and securing for it a dueconsideration. These are the adventurers who never produce any thingthemselves by a legitimate and honest effort, but who alway stand backto take the chances of wresting from some enterprising, morefar-seeing, and more industrious person the fruits of the toil perhapsof years. There are many enterprises in which the public have taken nointerest because ignorant of the facts. Some enterprising individualgoes zealously to work, travels thousands and tens of thousands ofmiles, ascertains all of the facts bearing upon the question, determines its feasibility or its impracticability, spends years oftime and toil, and many thousands of dollars of money, indoctrinatesthe people of his country with the new and interesting facts, travels, writes, labors day and night for years, finally secures the attentionof the Government and Congress, and asks a fair and reasonablecompensation for the necessary service which he proposes performingfor the public. He has contended with every species of opposition, overcome unwonted embarrassments, foiled the machinations of selfish, interested parties who would through all time mislead the public ifthey could but continue a monopoly of trade, and finally succeeded ingetting a bill through Congress for the establishment of thelong-sought line. This done, he supposes that he is of course to be rewarded for theeffort, the toil, and the expenditure of years, and that he will havean opportunity of indemnifying himself for his losses and sacrifices. He hears many beautiful apostrophes to the principles of equal justiceand right which are said to characterize the legislation of hiscountry, and control the action of the Government; but he is notprepared to hear that some adventurer has carried off his prize simplybecause by chance or by concert he has made his bid one thousand orten thousand dollars lower than the prime projector. He becomesdisheartened; finds that the country neither appreciates nor desireshonorable effort and enterprise; that it will not reward the citizenin his self-sacrificing attempts to benefit the country and himselftogether; and that it will look on with careless indifference whilehis almost vested, his equitably vested rights, are neglected orstricken down. This is certainly one of the practical and demoralizingeffects of the lowest bidder system, which respects no rights, howeversacred, simply because based upon a dogma which is technically true. The system of the lowest bidder is technically correct, butpractically wrong. It can not be carried out in practice withoutabandoning equity and honest rights under the plea of technicalitiesand the action of chances. It is in reality but a species of gambling, a miserable lottery, in which those who are most honest and truthfulare invariably sacrificed. It is proper, then that Congress should notonly establish the postal routes, but also determine eitherspecifically or proximately the compensation to be paid; or leave thisentirely to the discretion and the largest liberty of action of thePost Master General. Responsibility must attach somewhere if justiceis obtained. With the lowest bidder system it rests and operatesnowhere; and the most important operations of the Government are takenout of the hands of a wise public functionary and the intelligentlegislators of the country, and put into a great wheel of fortune, where the proper person has, probably, but one chance in a hundred. This although true in every case of contract, is eminently so in casesof untried lines, where the experiment is to be made, and where it isgenerally necessary that an individual shall have spent years inbringing it to light. I come to the conclusion, therefore, that the Government can dischargethe clear and unquestionable duty of affording liberal mail facilitiesto the people, only by establishing all of the lines which thecommerce and convenience of the country and the Government require; bymaintaining them as a fixed policy of the country from generation togeneration; by encouraging enterprising companies to continuewell-performed services, and enterprising citizens to open new avenuesof trade and wealth; and by paying for the same from the generaltreasury of the people, and from the revenues which these postalfacilities, more than any other series of influences, conspire toproduce and to conserve. (_See Report of Lord Canning, Section IX. :also Report of Gen. Rusk, Paper E: also remarks of Hon. EdwinCroswell, Paper E. _) SECTION IX. THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS. STEAM MAIL SYSTEM INAUGURATED AS THE PROMOTER OF WEALTH, POWER, AND CIVILIZATION: THE EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM ON COMMERCE: THE LONG PERIOD DESIGNATED FOR THE EXPERIMENT: NEW LINES, WHEN, HOW, AND WHY ESTABLISHED: THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM: FIRST CONTRACT MADE IN 1833, LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN: WITH ROTTERDAM IN 1834: FALMOUTH AND GIBRALTAR, 1837; ABERDEEN, SHETLAND, AND ORKNEYS, 1840: THE "SAVANNAH, " THE FIRST OCEAN STEAMER: THE SIRIUS AND GREAT WESTERN: CUNARD CONTRACT MADE IN 1839: EXTRA PAY "WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS:" MALTA, ALEXANDRIA, SUEZ, EAST-INDIES, AND CHINA IN 1840: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY: WEST-INDIA SERVICE ESTABLISHED IN 1840: POINTS TOUCHED AT: PROVISIONAL EXTRA PAY: PANAMA AND VALPARAISO LINE ESTABLISHED IN 1845: HOLYHEAD AND KINGSTON IN 1848: ALSO THE CHANNEL ISLANDS: WEST COAST OF AFRICA AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE IN 1852: CALCUTTA VIA THE CAPE IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: PLYMOUTH, SYDNEY, AND NEW SOUTH WALES ALSO IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: INVESTIGATION OF 1851 AND 1853, AND NEW AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT IN 1856: HALIFAX, NEWFOUNDLAND, BERMUDA, AND ST. THOMAS IN 1850: NEW-YORK AND BERMUDA SOON DISCONTINUED: COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIES, RATES PER MILE, TOTAL DISTANCES, AND POSTAL INCOME: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAYS HIGHER SUBSIDIES THAN THE AMERICAN: WORKINGS AND INCREASE OF THE BRITISH SERVICE: GEN. RUSK'S VIEWS: SPEECH OF HON. T. B. KING: COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, 1849: NEW INVESTIGATION ORDERED IN 1853, AND INSTRUCTIONS: LORD CANNING'S REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT ABANDON HER MAIL SYSTEM: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN LINE: TESTIMONY OF ATHERTON AND MURRAY: MANY EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT: STEAM INDISPENSABLE: NOT SELF-SUPPORTING: THE MAIL RECEIPTS WILL NOT PAY FOR IT: RESULT OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM: ANOTHER NEW SERVICE TO INDIA AND CHINA: SHALL WE RUN THE POSTAL AND COMMERCIAL RACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN? CANADA AND THE INDIES. It is admitted that it is the clear and unquestionable duty of theGovernment to establish ample foreign mail facilities for the nation, and that the only means of accomplishing this is by guaranteeing aliberal allowance for a long term of years for the transport of themails, and paying for the same from the general treasury of thecountry. We will, therefore, now examine the British ocean steam mailsystem, and shall see that the practice of that great nation fullycorroborates and sustains the views which have been advanced in thepreceding chapters. The steamship policy of that nation has not been treated as a matterof slight or secondary importance. British statesmen from the earliestdays of the development of marine steam power saw the influence whichit was likely to exert in the revolutions of commerce and the controlof the nations of the world, and determined, with the sagaciousforesight and the firm, fixed purpose for which they aredistinguished, that it should be at once inaugurated as the greatinstrument of individual wealth and national power. They properlyconceived that the nation which used this transforming agent mostfreely in commerce, defenses and diplomacy would unquestionably exerta high controlling influence over the nations of the earth, and makeevery land tributary to its wealth and power. The end justifies theeffort, and the few temporary sacrifices and insignificantexpenditures which have been made. The British nation launched at onceinto an extended foreign mail system which has been twenty yearsmaturing and untouched, and which, on a small annual expenditure, hasgiven it the profitable control of every trade and every market on theface of the globe. It was wisely conceded that a long period would benecessary to make the great experiment of marine steam mails, and thatterm was granted in the outset. When the first term of twelve yearshad ended, the contracts were renewed for another term of twelveyears, in every instance with the companies first authorized, and thesums of subsidy were in every case increased. Not only thus. New lineswere established all along the course of these experiments, in a quietexecutive way, without agitation, without lobbying, withoutcorruption, just as the Post Master General would put some short andnecessary land route into operation. The last of these linesestablished was that in 1856, between Southampton and Australia forseven years, at an annual subsidy of £185, 000, or $925, 000. And thisline was established, not because there was no postal communication;for the Government already had a semi-monthly line to China, India, and Australia, and another around Africa; but because the increaseddemands of British trade, and convenience to the British public, madeit necessary. During all of this time the system has operated with unbrokenregularity. Established on a great general principle, as well as thehighest possible expediency, it has been regarded as a fixed policy ofthe Government and the people, and has been suffered to do itsexcellent work quietly and undisturbed. The legislation introducing itwas not an accident. It was not a spasm of generosity to the people;but it was a fixed purpose of the British public; the wise and onlyadequate means adapted to accomplish an important, an indispensableend. The first contract for carrying the mails in steamers, was madeby the Post Master General in 1833, with the "Mona Isle SteamCompany, " to run semi-weekly between Liverpool and the Isle of Man at£850 per annum. This Company has run the line ever since, a period oftwenty-four years, and at the same price per annum. After this, acontract was made in 1834 with the "General Steam Navigation Company, "for the semi-weekly conveyance of the mails between London andRotterdam, and London and Hamburg, at £17, 000 per year. The contractwas not annulled until 1853, nineteen years, when it was found best tosend the mail by a new route; that is, to Ostend, and over therailways of Belgium. The first contract for a long voyage was madewith Richard Bourne, in 1837, to convey the mails weekly from Falmouthto Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for £29, 600 per annum. The contract was transferred in 1843 to the "Peninsular and OrientalCompany, " Southampton was substituted for Falmouth, the weekly tripswere changed to three per month, and the subsidy was reducedaccordingly, or to £20, 500 per annum. The service has been performedon these terms ever since. The Aberdeen and Shetland contract was madein 1840, at £900 per year, after a failure to run on £600, by aprevious arrangement. It now continues as then made. It is known that the first passage across the Atlantic was made in theAmerican steamer "Savannah, " which left Savannah, Georgia, on the 25thMay, 1819, and at the end of twenty-two days arrived in Liverpool, steaming only fourteen days of the time. The Savannah was only 350tons tonnage, and had an engine of ninety horses' power. Captain MosesRogers was her commander. The "Sirius" arrived in New-York on the 23dof April, 1838. The steamer "Great Western" next followed, in the sameyear. And although this was only nineteen years ago, it is instructiveto notice the observations which the _London Times_ made at that day. That journal said, March 31, 1838: "There is really no mistake in this long-talked of project ofnavigating the Atlantic ocean by steam. There is no doubt of theintention to make the attempt, and to give the experiment, as such, afair trial. The Sirius is actually getting under way for America. " On the 4th of July, 1839, the British Government entered into acontract with Samuel Cunard of Halifax for a semi-monthly mail linebetween Liverpool, and Halifax, and Boston, at the sum of £60, 000 or$300, 000 per annum. That contract inaugurated a new era in ourAmerican commerce with the old world, and gave an impulse to thoseinternational interests and those commercial amities which have boundGreat Britain and the United States in the bonds of enduringfriendship and mutual, neighborly dependence. Boston soon provedinadequate to the support of the entire line, and half of the steamerswere sent to New-York; and thus they continue to run to this day. Itis a singular fact that since that contract was made, eighteen yearsago, there has never been one transatlantic steamer except those ofMr. Cunard running to or from that port. This contract was renewedwith Mr. Cunard in 1850, when weekly trips were required for thegreater portion of the year, and the subsidy was advanced, not in theratio of the service, which was only doubled, but as three to one, from £60, 000 to £173, 340, or from $300, 000 to $866, 700. The experienceof twelve years had demonstrated both the necessity of continuing theline, and of increasing the subsidy which the Government paid, to sucha sum as would secure good steamers, regularity of trips, andefficiency of service. The Company now has nine steamers, with 18, 406tons aggregate tonnage, and 6, 418 horses' power. The contract, whichis to continue for twelve years, until 1862, was so altered in 1852 asto provide for a weekly service as well in winter as in summer; and itwill continue in force from 1862 until twelve months after notice maybe given for the discontinuance of the line. The compensation for thesame is at the rate of 11_s_ 4-1/2_d_ per mile. Lord Canning's Reportto Parliament in 1853, before noticed, in particularizing on thisline, said: "An additional allowance, _within certain limits_, is to be made tothe contractors in the event of an increase in the rate of insuranceon steam vessels, or in the freight or insurance of coals, as comparedwith the rates payable at the date of the contract, if proved to thesatisfaction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. " Thus, instead of abandoning this line after an experiment of twelveyears, and finding that it could never be self-supporting, the BritishGovernment wisely determined to let their policy produce its fullfruits, and continued it for another similar term of years, with threetimes the former subsidy, for only twice the old service. (_SeeCollins and Cunard Lines, Sec. X. _) A contract was made in 1840 for steam to Malta, Corfu, and Alexandria, and the service was extended in 1845 to Suez, Bombáy, Ceylón, Calcutta, Hong Kong, and Shanghae. It was renewed again in 1853, terminable in 1862, or after twelve months' notice, with a servicebetween Sydney and Singapore, with the "Peninsular and OrientalCompany;" and the subsidy for the whole service was increased from£199, 600 or $998, 000 per annum, to $1, 224, 000 per annum. The Companyhave thirty-nine vessels of 48, 835 tons, and 12, 850 horses' power, andrun 796, 637 annually, at 6_s_ 1-3/4_d_ per mile. The steamers run thewhole service of 796, 637 miles annually, at this low rate because muchof the service is confined to the Mediterranean, as for example, theirline from Southampton to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar;and also that between Marseilles and Malta. This is but like thecoasting trade at the utmost, and is not ocean navigation proper. Before the contract was renewed the same company got for the servicebetween Hong Kong and Ceylon, 12_s_ 7_d_ per mile, and for thatbetween Suez and Calcutta, £1, 0_s_ 1-1/2_d_ per mile. The contract with the "West-India Royal Mail Packet Company" was madein 1840 for a semi-monthly service to the West-Indies, CentralAmerica, and Mexico, at £240, 000, and for 547, 296 nautical miles perannum. The contract was renewed on the same terms in 1846, and againin 1850, when the Brazil service was added, and the subsidy increasedto £270, 000 or $1, 350, 000 per annum, for twelve years, or until 1862, and one year after notice shall have been given. The length of theroutes now run by the Company is 37, 000 nautical miles, withthirty-four stopping places. The West-India service of 393, 432 miles, is performed at the rate of 10_s_ 10-1/2_d_ per mile, under specialcontract; no advertisement ever having been made for tenders. TheBrazilian portion of the service embraces 153, 864 miles annually. Payper mile for the whole Royal Mail service is 9_s_ 10_d_ per mile. ThisCompany has twenty steamers, of 29, 454 tons, and 9, 308 horses' power. On the Brazil portion of the service the touches are at Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janiero, Monte Video, and Buenos Ayres. On the West-India division, St. Thomasis the central dépôt, after touching at the Azores. Ten branch linesradiate from St. Thomas to Antigua, Barbados, Blewfields, Carriacou, Carthagena, Aspinwall, (which they call Colon, ) Demarára, Dominíca, Grenáda, Greytown, Gaudaloupe, Havanna, Honduras, Jacmel, Jamaica, Martinique, Porto Rico, St. Kitt's, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, SantaMartha, Tampíco, Tobago, Trinidad, and Vera Cruz. Lord Canning says: "It is stipulated that if at any time, from causes recognized by theLords of the Treasury as being of a 'distinctly public and nationalcharacter, ' the insurance on steam vessels shall rise above 6_l_ 6_s_per cent. , the freight of coals above 1_l_ 2_s_ 6_d_ per ton, and theinsurance on coals above 2_l_ 2_s_ per cent. , the Company shallreceive an additional sum, to be settled by arbitration, but not toexceed 75, 000_l_ a year in the whole. " The special contract for the West Coast of South-America, with the"Pacific Steam Navigation Company, " for three round trips per monthbetween Panama and Valparaiso, touching at Buenaventura, Guayaquil, Payta, Lambayeque, Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Aríca, Iquique, Cobija, Copiápo, Huasco, and Coquimbo, was made in 1845, at £20, 000, or $100, 000 per annum, for five years. It was renewed in 1850 for tenyears; and hence, expires in 1860, if notice may be given to thateffect; the trips being only semi-monthly, and the subsidy increasedto £25, 000 per annum. The Company has seven steamers, of 5, 719 tons, and 2, 396 horses' power. (_See List of British Mail Lines, Paper B, page 193. _) The contract for running fast packets between Holyhead and Kingston, in Ireland, was made in 1848 with the "City of Dublin Steam PacketCompany, " for £25, 000 per annum, and is terminable at twelve months'notice after 1860. The line is run twice every day. The service to theChannel islands, from Southampton to Jersey and Guernsey, wasestablished in 1848, at £4, 000 per annum, for three trips per week. That of the West Coast of Africa was established in 1852, at £21, 250per annum. Leaving Plymouth, the steamers touch at Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree, Bathurst, Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabár, Cameroon, and Fernando Po. This contract was made with the "African Steamship Company, " for amonthly service, and terminates in 1862 if twelve months' notice begiven. There must be three steamers of 700 tons each, and the pay is, for 149, 880 miles annually, at 2_s_ 6_d_ per mile. The contract withthe "General Screw Steamshipping Company, " for service semi-monthlyfrom Plymouth to the Cape of Good Hope and Calcutta, touching on thereturn voyage at St. Vincent, Ascension, Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Point de Galle, Madrás, and St. Hélena, for £50, 000 per year, to bereduced after two years to £40, 000 annually, and that to the Cape ofGood Hope and Port Natál, touching at Mossel and Algoa bays, Buffalo, and Port Francis, for £3, 000 per annum, with the same Company, wereboth made in 1852; but the service was found impracticable on theterms, and was abandoned. That from Plymouth every two months toSydney and New South Wales, with the "Australian Royal Mail SteamNavigation Co. , " for £26, 000 per annum, and touching at St. Vincent, Simon's Bay, or Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, King George Sound, PortPhilip, and St. Hélena, was made also in 1852; but was likewise soonabandoned, as the subsidy in each case was too small. About this time the Chancellor of the Exchequer requested a thoroughinvestigation into the foreign steam packet system. This was made inthe most searching manner in 1853; and such was the effect that it wasdetermined not only to sustain all of the existing lines in all oftheir integrity, but to extend the system and afford additionalfacilities to British commerce and the British people. Accordingly, anew contract was made last year, 1856, with the "European andAustralian Mail Steam Packet Company" for a monthly service betweenSouthampton, Marseilles, Malta, Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney, at anannual subsidy of £185, 000, or $925, 000. The Company has sevensteamers of 13, 410 tons, and 3, 290 horses' power. They run 336, 000miles per annum, and receive 11_s_ per mile from the Government. Itmust be borne in mind, too, that when this line was established therewere already two lines to the East-Indies and China, and one toAustralia. This makes two to Australia, and three to the Eastgenerally. There is also a contract, made in 1850 with Mr. Cunard, for runningmonthly between Halifax and Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, andNew-York, as well as between New-York and Bermuda and St. Thomas. New-York was soon dropped from the list, doubtless because the Britishsteamers yielded us more advantage than was gained by the mothercountry or the Provinces, and the line is now continued, at theoriginal compensation, £14, 700, or $73, 500, between Halifax andNewfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Thomas, connecting withthe Cunard steamers. The steamers are small coasters, and run at therate of 3_s_ per mile. Hence, they make 98, 000 miles per annum. The ocean mail steamers of Great Britain run 2, 532, 231 miles per year, at a total cost to the Admiralty of £1, 062, 797, or $5, 333, 985. Theocean mail steamers of the United States run 735, 732 miles per year, at a total charge on the Post Office Department of $1, 329, 733. TheBritish steamers run three and a half times as many miles as ours do, and receive for it a sum more than four times as large. The averageprice paid to their principal companies, as the West-India Royal Mail, the Cunard, the Australian, and the Peninsular and Oriental, includingits Mediterranean coasting service, is 9_s_ 7_d_, or $2. 39 per mile;while the average price paid by us, or for the Collins, Havre, Bremen, Aspinwall, and Panamá, San Francisco and Oregon, is $1. 80-3/4 permile. The highest sum paid per mile by the British Government is 11_s_4-1/4_d_, or $2. 83-1/2, to the Cunard Company, $2. 75 to theAustralian, and $2. 46 to the West-India; and the lowest, 6_s_1-3/4_d_, or $1. 53-1/2 to the Peninsular and Oriental, much of whoseservice is coasting. This is saying nothing of the Pacific and theAfrican coasting lines. The highest sum which we pay is to the Collinsline, $3. 10-1/2 per mile; and the lowest to the Havre, $1. 00-1/2 permile; while the sums paid to all of the other companies range butlittle above the last figures. The lowest rate per mile paid to any ofthe lines under the contract, was to the Pacific Mail, $1. 70. It mustnot be forgotten that the low rates per mile of the Havre and Bremenresult from those lines taking the postages, since their contractsexpired; a sum by no means adjusted to the service done. They hadships that they could not let lie idle. Under their regular contractsthe pay per mile of the Bremen line was $2. 08, and of the Havre$1. 76-1/2. While the British Government pays to four of her principaltransmarine services an average of $2. 39 per mile, we pay to five ofours an average of $1. 80-3/4 only, or but about two thirds as much asshe does. While our total annual expenditure for foreign mails is$1, 329, 733, a sum by $20, 267 less than that paid to the single serviceof the West-India Royal Mail Company, that of Great Britain is$5, 333, 985. And, while our total income from transmarine postages is$1, 035, 740, a sum but little short of that paid in subsidy, taking thepresent Bremen and Havre services at the estimates of last year forsea and inland postages combined, the income from the wholetransmarine service of Great Britain, including ocean and inlandpostage, was, when the last report was made in 1853, £591, 573, or$2, 957, 865; but little above half the sum paid in subsidy, andincluding the French, Belgian, and Dutch routes, where the postalyield was much greater than from the ocean lines. The estimates whichI present below have been made with great care from distances andsubsidies furnished me by the reliable First Assistant Post MasterGeneral, Hon. Horatio King, from the last report of the late PostMaster General, and from the report of the British Post MasterGeneral, Lord Canning, before noticed. Every item is consequentlyauthentic. AMERICAN. ----------+------+----------+----------+----------+-------+------------------ | | | | Gross | Total | Line. |Trips. |Distances. | Subsidy. | Postage. | Miles | Pay per Mile. ----------+------+----------+----------+----------+-------+------------------ Collins, | 20| 3, 100| $385, 000| $415, 867|124, 000| $3. 10-1/2 Bremen, | 13| 3, 700| 128, 987| 128, 937| 96, 000| 1. 34 Havre, | 13| 3, 270| 88, 484| 88, 484| 85, 020| 1. 00-1/2 Aspinwall, | 24| 3, 200| 290, 000| 139, 610|153, 600| 1. 88-3/4 Pacific, | 24| 4, 200| 348, 250| 183, 238|201, 600| 1. 70 Havana, | 24| 669| 60, 000| 6, 288| 32, 112| 1. 86-1/2 Vera Cruz, | 24| 900| 29, 062| 5, 960| 43, 200| . 67 | | |==========|==========|=======|================== | | |$1, 329, 733|$1, 035, 740|725, 732|$1. 80-3/4 Average. ----------+------+----------+----------+----------+-------+------------------ Total average per mile, $1. 80-3/4. Average of five principal lines, $1. 80-3/4. BRITISH. KEY: A: Cunard, B: Royal Mail, C: Pen. And Oriental, D: Australian, E: Bermúda and St. Thomas, F: Panamá and Valparaiso, G: West Coast Africa, H: Channel Islands, I: Holyhead and Kingston, J: Liv. And Isle of Man, K: Shetland and Orkneys, -----+------+----------+----------+------------+---------+-------------------- | | | | Gross | Total | Line. |Trips. |Distances. | Subsidy. | Postage. | Miles | Pay per Mile. -----+------+----------+----------+------------+---------+-------------------- A | 52| 3, 100| £173, 340|£143, 667. 10s| 304, 000|11s 4-1/2d $2. 38-1/2 B | 24| 11, 402| 270, 000| 106, 905. 00 | 547, 296| 9s10 $2. 46 C | 24| [F]| 244, 000| 178, 186. 11 | 796, 637| 6s 1-3/4 $1. 53-1/2 D | 12| 14, 000| 185, 000| 33, 281. 12 | 336, 000|11s00 $2. 75 E | 24| 2, 042| 14, 700| | 98, 000| 3s00 $0. 75 F | 24| 2, 718| 25, 000| 5, 715. 00 | 130, 434| 3s10 $0. 96 G | 12| 6, 245| 23, 250| 3, 196. 02 | 149, 880| 2s 6 $0. 62-1/2 | | | | French | | | | | | Belgian, | | | | | | and Dutch | | | | | | Postage. | | H | 156| 132| | {74, 430. 08 | 41, 184| I | 730| 64| | {36, 158. 09 | 93, 440| J | 112| 70| | {10, 032. 15 | 14, 560| K | 52| 200| | | 20, 800| | | |==========|============|=========|==================== | | |£1, 062, 797|£591, 573. 07s|2, 532, 231| 9s 7d $2. 39 -----+------+----------+----------+------------+---------+-------------------- Total Average per Mile, $2. 10-1/3. Average of four principal lines, $2. 39. [F] The Peninsular and Oriental Company run twice per month betweenSouthampton and Alexandria, and between Suez and Calcutta and HongKong; twice per month between Marseilles and Malta; between Singaporeand Sydney every two months; and three times per month betweenSouthampton and Gibraltar, touching at Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, andCadiz. It would hardly be expected that the lines of this country should runat cheaper rates than those of Great Britain, as the prime cost ofships and their repairs, fuel, wages, insurance, etc. , are muchcheaper there, and as they have more paying freights, in theirmanufactured goods. It only explains to us, what has alway seemed amystery; that while the regular companies in England were makingmoney, nearly all of those in the United States not only had not mademoney, but were embarrassed more or less, and were selling theirstocks at sixty to eighty cents on the dollar. It is pleasing and instructive to examine the steam mail service ofGreat Britain, and see the gradual, unfaltering progress that she hasmade from year to year, since 1833; increasing the mail facilities andthe sums paid for them by constant accretion based on system, ratherthan by any spasmodic legislation, or the ruling caprices of themoment. These improvements have not come all in a mass, or in any oneyear. Neither have they been abandoned at times of financialembarrassment, or commercial depression. At such periods they havebeen as regularly fostered as in the times of the most flushprosperity; and have ever been properly considered one of the primeagents and necessities for restoring commerce to its normal conditionand a safe equilibrium. The transmarine service, which cost but£583, 793, or $2, 918, 965, per annum until 1850, [G] now costs£1, 062, 797, or $5, 333, 985; within a fraction of double the sum. Whilethe increase has not been slow, it has been steady and systematic, just as it was necessary to meet the wants of British commercethroughout the world. The language of the Hon. Senator Rusk on thissubject, in his Report made to the Senate, Sep. 18th, 1850, found inSenate Ex. Doc. No. 50, 1st Session of 32d Congress, in Special Rep. Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is forcible and worthy of remembrance. Hesays: [G] See Second Report, Steam Communication with India, 1851. Appendix, page 419. "The importance of the steam mail service, when considered with reference to the convenience which it affords to the social intercourse of the country, is as nothing when compared with its vast bearing upon the commerce of the world. Wherever facilities of rapid travel exist, trade will be found with its attendant wealth. Of the truth of this proposition, no country, perhaps, affords a more forcible illustration than Great Britain, as none has ever availed itself, to so great an extent, of the benefits of easy and rapid intercommunication between the various portions of her almost boundless empire. The commercial history of England has shown that mail facilities have uniformly gone hand in hand with the extension of trade; and wherever British subjects are found forming communities, there do we find the hand of the government busy in supplying the means of easy and safe communication with the mother country. With a view to this, we have beheld England increasing her steam marine at an enormous expense, and sustaining packet lines connecting with every quarter of the globe, even in cases where any _immediate_ and _direct_ remuneration was out of the question. The great object in view was, to draw together the portions of an empire upon which the sun never sets, and the martial airs of which encircle the globe, and to make British subjects who dwell in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and even Oceanica, all feel alike that they are Britons. " The Hon. Thomas Butler King, formerly Chairman of the Naval Committee, in a speech in the House, 19th July, 1848, said on this subject: "In the year 1840 a contract was made by the Admiralty with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, at two hundred and forty thousand pounds sterling, or one million two hundred thousand dollars per annum, for fourteen steamers to carry the mails from Southampton to the West-Indies, the ports of Mexico in the Gulf, and to New-Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston. These ships are of the largest class, and are to conform in all respects, concerning size and adaptation to the purposes of war, to the conditions prescribed in the Cunard contracts. They are to make twenty-four voyages or forty-eight trips a year, leaving and returning to Southampton semi-monthly. "Another contract has recently been entered into, as I am informed, for two ships to run between Bermuda and New-York. The West-India line, in consequence of some disasters during the first years of its service, was relieved from touching at the ports of the United States; but in the spring of last year it was required to resume its communication with New-Orleans, and is at any time liable to be required to touch at the other ports on our coast which I have named. Thus it will be perceived that this system of mail steam-packet service is so arranged as not only to communicate with Canada and the West-Indies, the ports on the Spanish Main and the Gulf coast of Mexico, but also to touch at every important port in the United States, from Boston to New-Orleans. "These three lines employ twenty-five steamers of the largest and most efficient description, where familiarity with our seaports and the whole extent of our coast would render them the most formidable enemies in time of war. It is scarcely possible to imagine a system more skillfully devised to bring down upon us, at any given point, and at any unexpected moment, the whole force of British power. More especially is this true with respect to our _southern_ coast, where the great number of accessible and unprotected harbors, both on the Atlantic and the Gulf, would render such incursions comparatively safe to them, and terrible to us. And when we reflect that the design of this system is, that it shall draw the means of its support from our own commerce and intercourse, we should surely have been wanting in the duty we owed to ourselves and to our country, if we had failed to adopt measures towards the establishment of such an American system of Atlantic steam navigation as would compete successfully with it. " Previous to the renewal of the several foreign mail contracts, in1850, the Treasury ordered, 26th April, 1849, the formation of aCommittee in these words: "_Ordered_, that a Select Committee beappointed to inquire into the CONTRACT PACKET SERVICE. " That Committeewas composed of Sir James Hogg, Mr. Cardwell, Sir Wm. Clay, Mr. Cowper, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Fitz Roy, Mr. Hastie, Mr. Mangles, Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Bankes, Mr. William Brown, Mr. Childers, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Crogan, and Mr. Henley. Mr. Elliot was added in the placeof Mr. Baring. The Committee sat seventeen days, and examined fifteenwitnesses under oath, many of these being commanders in the Navy, Secretaries, Presidents, and engineers of the Companies, and othereminent men in steam. Mr. Cunard was among the witnesses. After takingevidence and papers extending over about seven hundred andeighty-three octavo pages, they said in their report, afterrecommending that great care should be exercised in making all futurecontracts: "1. That so far as the Committee are able to judge, from the evidencethey have taken, it appears that the mails are conveyed at a less costby Hired Packets than by Her Majesty's Vessels. "2. That some of the existing Contracts have been put up to publictender, and some arranged by private negotiation; and that a verylarge sum beyond what is received from postage is paid on some of thelines; but considering that at the time these contracts were arrangedthe success of these large undertakings was uncertain, Your Committeesee no reason to think that better terms could have been obtained forthe public. " This investigation was made to enable the Government to proceedintelligently with the many contracts which were to expire in 1850;and its immediate consequence was, not only the renewal of all the oldcontracts with the same parties at the same or larger pay, but theestablishment of several new services. The British system had operated to the very highest satisfaction ofthe public and the Government for twenty years, until 1853, as it hasdone ever since; but at that time it was put to a second and verysevere test. It had been suggested, probably by the Lords of theAdmiralty, who had to pay the bills from the Naval fund, that thepacket system was too costly, and should be remodelled, and perhapsreduced. Complaint was thus made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in a Treasury Minute, dated March 1, 1853, says: "Important as it is to secure rapid and certain communication with the remote dependencies of this country, and with other distant states, for national purposes, it is doubtless, under all common circumstances, from commercial considerations that such facility of correspondence derives its highest value. " "Her Majesty's Government conceive the time to have arrived when the entire charge of the packet service should be deliberately examined and reviewed, with joint reference to the questions--how far the purposes with which the present system was begun have been accomplished--how far the total amount of service rendered to the State is adequate to the total annual expense--how far there may be cause for a more than commonly jealous and scrupulous consideration of such further schemes of extension of the system as particular interests or parties may press, or even such as public objects may recommend from time to time; lastly, how far, on account of the early period at which certain of the contracts are terminable, or on account of requisitions put in by the contractors themselves for the modification of the terms, or for any other reason, it may be prudent to entertain the question of any revision of those terms, or of laying down any prospective rules with regard to them; such only, of course, as may comport with the equitable as well as the legal rights of the parties, and may avoid any disappointment to the just expectations of those classes who may have felt a peculiar interest in the establishment and extension of these great lines of communication. " After remarking that some of the vessels of some few Companies wereunfit for purposes of war, the "Minute of the Treasury, " ininstructing the Committee, further says: "At the same time, it is not to be conceived that, on account of this failure in a portion of the design, the country has cause to regret having paid a larger price than was intended to be paid simply for the establishment of these noble chains of communication, which well nigh embrace the world. The organization of a complete postal system upon the ocean, with absolute fixity of departures, and a general approach to certainty in arrivals, was a great problem, of high interest and benefit, not to England only, but to all civilized countries; and this problem may now be said to have been solved by England, for the advantage of mankind at large. It was to all appearance altogether beyond the reach of merely commercial enterprise; and if the price paid has been high, the object has been worthy, and the success for all essential purposes complete. " As a consequence of this "Minute, " the Lords Commissioners of HerMajesty's Treasury appointed a Committee, consisting of ViscountCanning, Post Master General of Great Britain, as President; Hon. Wm. Cowper, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty; Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart. ; and Mr. R. Madox Bromley, Secretary to the Board ofAudit. The Committee organized, examined the Evidence and Report ofthe Committee of 1849, also the three large volumes of Evidence andReport taken by the Committee in 1851 on "Steam Communication withIndia and Australia, " and the many elaborate documents of this classpublished by the Admiralty. After discussing thoroughly all of thepolitical, financial, commercial, ethical, and social questionsconnected with rapid steam mail communication, they made an elaborateand detailed examination of all the contracts existing with theGovernment, and of the affairs of the various companies, with a viewto deciding whether the ocean mail service should be abridged, orcontinued, or extended. They reported to both Houses of Parliament, July 8th, 1853. The conclusion of the Committee was, not only that thepresent service was demanded by every interest of the country andshould be sustained, but that it should be judiciously extended, so asto meet all of the wants of the British public of whatever class. Aselsewhere remarked, the new line established last year to Australiaand India, at a cost of $925, 000 per annum, for seven years, was alegitimate result of that test and that report, made in the mostsearching manner by the very ablest men of the kingdom; and this, notwithstanding the reports purposely circulated in this country everyfew years that Great Britain intends abandoning her steam mail system. She will abandon that system, as her practice plainly indicates, onlywhen her people shall have discovered some means of making andpreserving wealth without effort, enterprise, commerce, ormanufactures. (_See page 99, Mr. Atherton's Reply. _) The Report says: "Before the application of steam to the propulsion of ships, the contracts were often made for short periods, the Government being able to find, among the vessels already employed in trade, some of speed sufficient for the purpose; but when it became requisite to dispatch the mails by steam, the ordinary supply of trading vessels would no longer suffice, and the Government had to call into existence a new class of packets. "The postal service between England and the adjacent shores of Ireland, France, and Belgium, was at first performed by steam packets belonging to the Crown; but for the longer voyages it was thought better to induce commercial companies to build steamers; and with that view the contracts were at first made for periods which, unless previously terminated by failure to fulfill their engagements, would secure to the company the full benefit of their original outlay, by continuing the employment of their vessels until they might be expected to require extensive repairs, or to become unfit for continued service. In 1837 steam communication was created with Portugal and Gibraltar; in 1840 with Egypt, with the West-Indies, and with North-America. "When the public interest requires the establishment of a postal line on which the ordinary traffic would not be remunerative for steamers, the subsidy to be allowed in the contract may be ascertained either by the test of public competition, or by calculating the amount which, on an estimate of the probable receipts and expenditure, will cover the deficiency of receipts, or by comparing it with the cost of war vessels if employed for the same purpose. " "The objects which appear to have led to the formation of these contracts, and to the large expenditure involved, were--to afford a rapid, frequent, and punctual communication with those distant ports which feed the main arteries of British commerce, and with the most important of our foreign possessions; to foster maritime enterprise; and to encourage the production of a superior class of vessels which would promote the convenience and wealth of the country in time of peace, and assist in defending its shores against hostile aggression. "These expectations have not been disappointed. The ocean has been traversed with a precision and regularity hitherto deemed impossible--commerce and civilization have been extended--the colonies have been brought more closely into connection with the Home Government--and steamships have been constructed of a size and power that, without Government aid, could hardly, at least for many years, have been produced. "It is not easy to estimate the pecuniary value of these results, but there is no reason to suppose that they could have been attained at that time at less cost. " After noticing the objects of the postal contracts, the Report says, in speaking of their results: "To show what the system is capable of accomplishing, it will be sufficient that we should call attention to the two great lines of communication which have been opened, the one between this country and India, the other between this country and America. The mails are dispatched twice a month in the one case, and once a week in the other, and are conveyed to their destination with a regularity and rapidity which leaves nothing to be desired. The time occupied in the voyage to and fro between England and Bombay, which, before the establishment of the Overland Route, averaged about 224 days, is now no more than 87 days; and the time occupied in the voyage to and fro between England and the United States, which before 1840 varied from 45 to 105 days, is now reduced to an average period of 24 days. Nor is the service simply rapid, it is also regular; and the mercantile community can reckon with the utmost certainty on the punctual departure of the mails at the appointed times, and can also calculate with great precision the times of their arrival. "The same results have not been so conspicuous on some other postal lines; but, taking the service as a whole, it has undoubtedly been brought to a high state of excellence, and its value to the country, both politically and commercially, is very considerable. " In speaking further of the objects of the Government postal service, after inquiring whether the foreign mail service should be extendedany further, it says: "The object of the Government in undertaking the transmarine postal service, whether by packets or by the system of ship letters, is to provide frequent, rapid, and regular communication between this country and other states, and between different parts of the British Empire. The reasons for desiring such communication are partly commercial and partly political. In cases where the interests concerned are chiefly those of commerce, it is generally more important that the postal service should be regular, than that it should be extremely rapid, though of course rapidity of communication, where it can be obtained without sacrificing other objects, is of great advantage. It would clearly be the interest of persons engaged in an important trade, provided there were no legal impediment in the way, to establish a regular postal communication in connection with it, even without aid from the state. This, however, would not extend to many cases in which there are political reasons for maintaining such services, while the commercial interests involved are of less magnitude. _Nor is it probable that private communications would be nearly so rapid as those directed by the Government; for a high rate of speed can only be obtained at a great expense, which will generally be found to be disproportionate to the benefits directly received from it, unless under peculiar circumstances of passenger traffic. _ Lastly, it is to be considered that there are several services which, if they were not carried on by the British Government, would probably be undertaken by the Governments of foreign states, and that it is not likely that private individuals or associations would in such cases enter into competition with them. "From these considerations we infer that, even upon the lines in the maintenance of which the greatest commercial interests are involved, private enterprise can not be depended upon for providing a complete substitute for Government agency; while it is clear that in others, where regular communications are desired solely or chiefly for political purposes, such agency is absolutely indispensable. _It is, however, obvious, that to establish a Government system in some cases, and to leave others wholly to private persons, would cause much inconvenience. _ The conclusion therefore follows, that it is right that the Government should have the management of the whole of the transmarine postal communication, as it also has that of the communication within the country. "In undertaking this duty, the Government will in the first place have regard to the national interests, whether political, social, or commercial, involved in the establishment and maintenance of each particular line. Care must, however, be taken, in cases where the communication is desired chiefly for commercial purposes, to guard against an undue expenditure of public money for the benefit of private merchants. The extension of commerce is undoubtedly a national advantage, and it is quite reasonable that Parliamentary grants should occasionally be employed for the sake of affording fresh openings for it, by establishing new lines of communication, or introducing new methods of conveyance, the expense of which, after the first outlay has been incurred, may be expected to be borne by the parties availing themselves of the facilities offered them. But this having once been done, and sufficient time having been allowed for the experiment, the further continuance of the service, unless required for political reasons of adequate importance, should be made to depend upon the extent to which the parties chiefly interested avail themselves of it, and upon its tendency to become self-supporting. " Noticing the greater or less sums at which private companies may beinduced to undertake short line postal service, and stating that theline is both benefited and injured by the necessity of punctualsailing hours, the Report states the reason why subsidies arerequired, thus: "The vessels now under contract with the Government are, however, for the most part, required to maintain high rates of speed. The contractors are also subject to a variety of conditions, designed partly to secure the efficiency of the postal service, and partly to render their vessels available for other national purposes wholly unconnected with that service. In return, they are in the receipt of subsidies largely in excess of the amount of revenue derived from the mails they carry, and those subsidies are guaranteed to them for terms of years varying from four to twelve, most of which have at the present time not less than seven or eight years to run. An Estimate printed in the Appendix, will show that while the amount of the subsidies to foreign and colonial lines, as contracted for in the past year, was no less than £822, 390, the sums received for postage upon these lines can not be estimated at more than £443, 782. " The Report further says, as to the mode by which postal communicationcan be procured, "where frequent and rapid communication alreadyexists, it is only necessary for the Government to secure from time totime the services of vessels already engaged in private traffic. " Butas there are no such cases in the transmarine routes, and as privateenterprise supplies the demand of steam lines only on the shortroutes, like the inter-island service of Great Britain, or that to theContinent, or the service of the Sound, the North River, short coastroutes, etc. , in the United States, the Report goes on to say: "There still remain, however, some cases in which there exists no private communication sufficient to render such a mode of proceeding practicable. Where this is so, and where a communication has to be created, it will be necessary that contracts of longer duration should be made, _for it is unreasonable to expect that any person or association of persons should incur the expense and risk of building vessels, forming costly establishments, and opening a new line of communication at a heavy outlay of capital, without some security that they will be allowed to continue the service long enough to reap some benefit from their undertaking. It must be borne in mind, that the expensive vessels built for the conveyance of the mails at a high rate of speed are not in demand for the purposes of ordinary traffic, and can not therefore be withdrawn and applied to another service at short notice_. It is, then, fair, that on the first opening of a new line, contracts should be made for such a length of time as may encourage the building of ships for the purpose, by affording a prospect of their employment for a considerable number of years. But we see no sufficient reason for continually renewing such contracts for periods equally long, after the object has once been attained. " (_For the views of the Committee on the adaptation of the mail packetsto naval service, see pages 146 and 147. _) The Committee in summing up, presents the result of the investigationand the fruits of the service in the following impressive light: "The value of the services thus rendered to the State can not, we think, be measured by a mere reference to the amount of the postal revenue, or even by the commercial advantages accruing from it. It is undoubtedly startling, at first sight, to perceive that the immediate pecuniary result of the Packet System is a loss to the Revenue of about £325, 000 a year; but, although this circumstance shows the necessity for a careful revision of the service, and although we believe that much may be done to make that service self-supporting, we do not consider that the money thus expended is to be regarded, even from a fiscal point of view, as a national loss. " It has never been a favorite idea with British statesmen that thepacket service should be self-sustaining; nor have they had anyevidence to believe that steam companies could live on the postalreceipts. It is evident from the following that the packet system issustained without any reference whatever to the postal income, and forcommercial, political, and social purposes alone; only using theincome so far as it goes as a part of the contributions by the peopleto the general treasury. It says: "Your Lordships have seen from our Report that in framing these contracts various objects have entered into the consideration of the Government, the cost of which ought not in our opinion to be charged upon the revenues of the General Post Office. A simple comparison of the receipts and expenditure upon some of the lines is in itself sufficient to prove this. If the Post Office is to be considered as a department producing revenue, it is not to be supposed that a line of vessels which costs the State £240, 000 a year, and brings in no more than £56, 002, (as is the case with the West-Indian packets, ) or one for which £25, 000 is annually paid, and which returns little more than one fifth of that sum, (as the Pacific line, ) can be maintained as a part of its machinery; and, in fact, the contracts for many of the services have been made without reference to any estimate or opinion on the part of the Post Master General of their probable value as postal lines. " It thus becomes abundantly evident from the Reports of ParliamentaryCommittees, from the "Acts of Parliament, " and from the practice ofthe Admiralty and Post Office Departments, as well as from theunvarying experiences of twenty-four years, that the steam mail packetsystem of Great Britain was primarily adopted, and ever sincesustained as the choicest means of giving to that nation theirresistible control of the world. Watching this system from the germto its present maturity, we have seen the overshadowing tree reachhigher and higher, and the circle of each year's growth expand moreand more, until the outer ring now embraces the whole civilized andsavage world. An additional evidence of this arrives this very day. The Atlantic brings intelligence (_New-York papers, Nov. 22d_) thatGreat Britain has just completed another mail contract, by which thePeninsular and Oriental Company are to run a third semi-monthlyservice to India and China; so that the Government and people of GreatBritain shall have a weekly communication with those regions, while wehave none except through them, although we are many thousand milesnearer to those countries. It has been said that we should not attempt to run the postal andcommercial race with Great Britain. Why not? Because she has manycolonies, and must needs keep up communication with them. And why havesteam instead of sail to them? Because steam is the means of morereadily _controlling_ them. Grant it; and for the very same reason wewish steam with all the world; not that we may control the world, forthis is costly and unremunerative, as Great Britain finds; but toconform it, and especially to _control_ its commerce. Great Britainhas possessions in the West-Indies; but they are of the mostinsignificant importance when compared with the trade of the manyislands and countries near them, which she does not possess, and withthe Central American, Californian, Mexican, Peruvian, Chilian, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and Spanish markets, which she controls anduses. So with India and the Mauritius. It is a matter of soresatisfaction that she is compelled to govern them as a means ofreaching their rich trade, which, however rich, is far less importantthan that of China for which she so strives. So also with Canada. Shewas told some years since that, if she wished to secede from theKingdom, because the Government would not assist in building a certainrailroad, she might go, and carry peace, also, with her. TheGovernment would scout the idea of running the Cunard line to Canadaalone, and would not touch even at Halifax, except that the ships arecompelled to go in sight of the place; as the "great circle" on whichthey sail nearly cuts the city. Great Britain runs that line becauseher trade with the United States requires it. That trade is worth toher every year twenty of her Canadas, as that of the West-Indies isworth a dozen of all the possessions which she has there. As torunning the race of commerce with her, it is simply a _sine qua non_, on which there is no difference of opinion among Americans who lovetheir country. SECTION X. THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES. THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES: THE HAVRE AND BREMEN, THE PIONEERS: THE BREMEN SERVICE RECENTLY GIVEN TO MR. VANDERBILT: BOTH LINES RUN ON THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE CALIFORNIA LINES: WONDROUS DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PACIFIC POSSESSIONS: THE PACIFIC MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS HISTORY, SERVICES, LARGE MATERIEL, AND USEFULNESS: THE UNITED STATES MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS RAMIFIED AND LARGE EXTRA SERVICE: EFFECT UPON THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF: ITS HEAVY LOSSES, AND NEW SHIPS: STEAMSHIP STOCKS GENERALLY AVOIDED: CONSTANTLY FAR BELOW PAR: THE COLLINS LINE: A COMPARISON WITH THE CUNARD: ITS SOURCES OF HEAVY OUTLAY, AND ITS ENTERPRISE: THE AMERICAN MARINE DISASTERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY HUMAN FORESIGHT: THE VANDERBILT BREMEN LINE. It is not my intention to notice the various lines in detail, or inany wise become their apologist, eulogist, or prosecutor. As a generalthing they have discharged their obligations to the Government and thepeople in the most creditable manner; in a much better manner thancould have been expected of them, considering the novelty of suchenterprises in this country and our total want of experience either insteamship building or ocean steam navigation. It is a cause of greatgratulation and satisfaction that springing into the great arena ofthe mail and passenger strife at a single bound, our steamers at oncetook the lead in the race, and have ever since distanced those of thewhole world in speed, comfort, general accommodations, and cheaptransit. This may be asserted as a rule without a single exception. The Collins steamers and the steamer "Vanderbilt" have beaten theCunarders by nearly a day and a half on the average voyages; the Havreand Bremen steamers make just the same time as the Cunarders; and theCalifornia steamers of both lines have signally beaten those of allthe English lines in the West-Indies, the Mediterranean, and thePacific and Indian oceans. Indeed the triumphs of our steamersgenerally and specially have been so decided in every valuable pointthat we have great reason to be proud of the attainments to which thelegislation of 1846 and '47 led. We have nothing to record to thecredit of our legislation since that period. The Havre and Bremen services were the first established in the UnitedStates; and as the pioneers in our mail steamshipping they have bothproven themselves valuable to the country. The Bremen line went intothe hands of Mr. Vanderbilt during the present year, on the expirationof the old contract; the "Ocean Steam Navigation Company" beingunwilling to attempt the performance of the service on the small mailpay of the gross ocean and inland postages, even with their old ships. Mr. Vanderbilt having three ships wholly out of employment, determinedto try the service. How far it will prove remunerative we shall not beable to determine until the steamers shall have run through one or twowinters as well as summers. The Havre service was continued in the old hands. Mr. Livingston hadtwo fine new ships, which had been running but little over one year, and which, adapted specially to the mail, passenger, and transporttrade of France, could not easily be withdrawn from the business forwhich they were built; while it would have been quite impossible tofind for them employment in any other trade. He, consequently, made atemporary arrangement with the Department for one year, agreeing totransport the mails, as during the old contract, for the gross oceanand inland postages. With this small remuneration the Havre line getsa smaller pay than any other running; but one dollar per mile. TheCompany have deserved well of the Government for their untiringefforts to perform their contract; one of the greatest sacrificesbeing the necessity of building two costly new steamers just as theircontract was about to expire. They suffered most severely fromdisaster. Both of their fine and fast steamers, the "Franklin" and the"Humboldt, " were lost; and they were compelled to supply their placesby chartering at exorbitantly high prices, until they built the twoexcellent vessels now running, the "Arago" and "Fulton. " These twosteamers run probably more cheaply than any ever built in any country;otherwise, being as large as they are, about twenty-six hundred tonseach, they could by no means live on the small mail pay now giventhem. It may be that both these and the Vanderbilt Bremen steamers arelosing money; although the latter vessels are much smaller, and havethe advantage of an immense emigrant trade. I have no means of knowingthe position of affairs in either company. But no loss to the Havre Company has ever been so great as that of itslate President, Mr. Mortimer Livingston. An honorable and just man inhis dealings, both with individuals and the Government, he eschewedevery attempt by which some sought to pervert and deprave thelegislation of the country, and presented all of his views insteamshipping on high, honorable, and tenable grounds. He pursued theprofession in an enlarged spirit of enterprise, and was not unmindfulof his duties to his country, while he endeavored to establishlegitimate trade and preserve a profitable private business which hadbeen well founded long before the introduction of ocean steam. He wasa worthy and most honorable gentleman, and is a loss to the wholepublic. Prominent among the steamship enterprises of the country stand the twolines which connect the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard with our large andrich possessions in the Pacific, California, and Oregon. Establishedat a time when California was held by military government, and whenOregon was a wild untamed wilderness, these lines became the means ofdeveloping the richest portion of the American continent, and bindingthe far distant western world in close connection with the oldconfederacy, notwithstanding the mighty Cordilleras and RockyMountains which rose like forbidding barriers between them. Importantas these possessions were, naturally and geographically, they acquireda new interest about the time that the Pacific and the AspinwallSteamship Companies were established. The contracts which were madewith these companies would certainly have ruined them but for thediscovery of gold in California. This opened a new and brilliant fieldof effort, and the opportunities offered by these companies soondetermined tens of thousands of our hardy and enterprising countrymento enter and develop it. It is pleasing in this connection to trace the almost mysteriousprogress of our Pacific territory during the past eight years, and theagencies producing it. Among these agencies none have been soeffectual as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. That Company wascompelled to form an establishment of the most effective characterfour to five thousand miles away from home, and as it was at thetime, thirteen thousand miles distant. The country was wholly new, somuch so that it was, in most parts of the field which it had tooccupy, extremely difficult to procure ordinary food for theiroperatives. Their ships had to make a voyage more than half of thataround the world before they arrived at their point of service; andthey found themselves without a home when there. The steamer"California, " which left New-York on the 6th October, 1848, was thefirst to bear the American flag to the Pacific ocean, and the first tosalute with a new life the solitudes of that rich and untroddenterritory. She was soon followed by the "Panama" and "Oregon, " and indue course of time by the "Tennessee, " the "Golden Gate, " the"Columbia, " the "John L. Stephens, " the "Sonora, " the "Republic, " the"Northerner, " the "Fremont, " the "Tobago, " the "St. Louis, " and the"Golden Age. " From a small beginning that Company now has the fineststeam fleet in the United States, although the difficulties in formingit were probably much greater than any of our other companies had tocontend with. These steamers found nothing ready to receive them in the Pacific. TheCompany was compelled to construct large workshops and foundries fortheir repair, and now have at Benicia a large and excellentestablishment where they can easily construct a marine engine. Theyhad also to build their own Dry Dock; for that of the Government atMare Island was not ready until 1854. Theirs has ever been most usefulto the United States, as it furnished the only accommodations of thatclass in the Pacific. They had also to make shore establishments atPanama, San Francisco, and Astoria, which, with coal dépôts, etc. , were extremely costly, owing to materials having to be transported sofar, and labor at the time being so high. The price of labor inCalifornia at all times depends on the profits which can be made bydigging gold, and the prices paid for this species of labor have everbeen enormous. Beyond this most unusual price of labor along thePacific seaboard, the coals which they have used, whether from theEastern States or from England, have been invariably shipped aroundCape Horn, and have never cost less than twenty dollars per ton. For alarge portion of the time the Company had to pay thirty dollars perton for coal, and in one instance fifty dollars. Coal, like all otherprovisions of the steamers, has generally been purchased from thosewho sent it out on speculation, and took all the advantages of thepeculiar market. Twelve dollars per ton is a low price for freight toCalifornia or Panama. In addition to this, the cost price of the coal, the handling, the wastage, and the insurance, will amount to abouteight dollars per ton, making it never less than twenty dollarsdelivered. I have frequently seen coals sell even in Rio de Janeiro, which is but about one third of the distance from us, at eighteen totwenty-four dollars per ton. The nine steamers running consume about35, 000 tons of coal annually. If the vessels transporting it be of1, 000 tons each, it will employ something near thirty-five of thesevessels at profitable rates, in this one item of their business alone. Such expenditures are not necessary to any other steam company in theworld. The British lines in the Indian Ocean and the China Seas aresupplied with domestic coal which comes at very reasonable prices, andis shipped but a short distance. Yet this Company performs this distant and difficult service withgreat regularity and at a low price. They have never lost a trip, amail-bag, or a passenger by marine disaster during the eight yearsthat they have been running in the Pacific. This results from the factof the Company having thirteen steamers. If all of the steamers now incommission were sunk, they could supply their place from their reservefleet and have no hiatus in their service. Such a spare fleet is anenormous expense; but it is positively indispensable to regular andhighly efficient service. It is singular that under thesecircumstances they can perform the service at $1. 70 cents per mile. Itis a notorious fact that these steamers could not have supportedthemselves in 1854-55 without the aid which they obtained from theGovernment for the services which they performed. They never havetransported much freight, as it would not bear the transhipment atPanamá. The small quantity which they had was during the first yearsafter the discovery of gold, and then only. They have never at anytime brought any eastward. The Panamá Railroad was a splendidconsummation of which the world had dreamed for years, and towardwhose completion this Company was highly instrumental. Yet it did notenable the steamers to transport freight, and it never will. These steamers run the 3, 300 miles between Panamá and San Francisco bya time-table. They arrive at either end within a very few hours ofthirteen and a half days, including all of the stoppages, which arealso made at specified hours. Thus the average speed of the steamersis about 254 miles per day. They touch at Acapulco and Mazanilla, andsupply San Diego, Monterey, San Pedro, Santa Barbara, San Luis, andObispo, ports of California, from Panamá by a branch line. This is anextra service, and is not taken into account in calculating themileage paid the Company. The steamers have carried probably 175, 000 passengers to California, and have brought back about $200, 000, 000 in gold. They have also bytheir semi-monthly line from San Francisco to Oregon assisted inpopulating that rich and beautiful agricultural district, and makingit available for useful purposes as a part of the United States. Theyhave converted the wilderness of California into a smiling garden, andwill ere long produce the same effect on Oregon. With that coastcomparatively unprotected, and with the small standing army sustainedin this country, they become very important as a ready means ofconcentrating on the Pacific coast a large army in a few days. Theyalso afford a ready transit for the changing crews of our nationalvessels, which, when once around the Horn, may remain there severalyears; having to change their crews only. The large property of this Company in the Pacific can be madeavailable for no other purpose than that for which it was created. Anycompany to be thoroughly effective there, must create its own stock, and support works on the same general plan as those created by theBritish East-India Company. Their success in building up this largeestablishment on the Pacific was simply an accident; and that accidentthe discovery of gold. But for this the Company would have failed intwo years, or gone back pleading to Congress for relief. But the goldcrisis saved it, and the enterprise was very remunerative for thefirst few years; but since 1853 the profits have been limited, whilefor one or two years the Company have sustained actual loss. Theycalculated too largely on the prospective business with California, and have too large a sum invested to make much for the future. Andyet, with a smaller investment they could not perform the service, except in that dangerous, cheap, indecent way, of innumerable wantsand deprivations, which the American people have begun to despise. They have had some few disasters, but none of those of a fatalcharacter in the Pacific. The "Winfield Scott" was lost in enteringthe harbor of Acapulco; the "Tennessee" in entering that of SanFrancisco in a dense fog. The "San Francisco" was lost, as will beremembered, on this side, near our coast, as she sailed with troopsfor the Pacific. The Nicaragua Transit Company fared much worse withtheir steamers in the Pacific. They lost the "North America, " the"Independence, " the "S. S. Lewis, " the "Pioneer, " and the "YankeeBlade. " Mr. Wm. Brown also lost his steamer "America, " which he wasrunning between San Francisco and Oregon. She was burned. Their dividends for four years have been but twelve per cent. Andshould they be at any time thrown out of the service, more than halfof their property would be irretrievably lost. This percentage ofdividend would be large enough but for such possibilities as these, which may soon reduce it to a deficit and a loss. Thus it is thatsteam stock should declare three times the dividend of other stocks, to be eventually equal to them. And hence it is that, with the clearrecord of this Company before the Government, and with an investmentof between three and four millions of dollars, being at the same timefree from debt, the stock of the Company is selling at thirty-threeper cent. Below par. This is a good exemplification of my views in thepreceding Sections regarding the costs, and hazards, and low values ofocean steam stocks generally. Nor are the stocks of this Company keptfrom the public. They are advertised and sold at public auction atthese reduced rates every day in the year in this city; and no one ofthe five hundred and four stockholders, among whom these interests arediffused, seems anxious to put "his all" in the enterprise. And yetthere are some people who call such companies a monopoly. If amonopoly, why do they not come forward, buy the stocks, keep them intheir own hands, and profit by them; especially as a monopoly must bedoubly good when it can be bought for two thirds the cash originallypaid for it! I have noticed this Company thus fully, because its extent of stock, and large field of operation, make it a fit illustration of the viewswhich I have advanced throughout this work. I have no desire todepreciate the stock, or in any other way injure the Company, as myown enterprise gives me quite enough to do. Many of the views advanced with regard to the Pacific Mail Companywill apply to the United States Mail Steamship Company. That Company, at the outset, built very fine steamers, and ran them incessantly, until they were unfit for duty. They have constantly supplied theirplace, and have at all times, by building and by chartering at thehighest prices, kept up a large and costly fleet for their ramifiedservice. The service contemplated in their original contract, at$1. 88-3/4 cents per mile, is but about two thirds of that actuallyperformed. The contract required them to run 3, 200 miles semi-monthly, but they actually perform semi-monthly 5, 200. (_See Mr. King's Letter, Paper G. _) The actual service has required nearly twice the number ofsteamers necessary to do that for which they contracted, although apart of it is in the coasting trade. Consequently the steamers havebeen rapidly worn out, from too heavy duty, and the stock of theCompany has never paid as well as it should. The Company have, morever, suffered severely from disaster. The "Crescent City" was loston the Bahama Banks, in 1855; all hands saved. The "Cherokee" wasburned when in active service, in 1853; and the "George Law, " or"Central America, " but recently foundered at sea in a terrible gale. They were all good ships; but like those other excellent ships, the"Arctic" and "Pacific, " they could not defy the powers of pureaccident. In the same gale the "Empire City" was dismantled, havingall of her upper works swept off, while the "Illinois" was injured bybeing on the Colorado Reef. They have both been undergoing most costlyrepairs for several weeks. While writing this, the "Philadelphia" isalso in the shop. She recently broke her shaft and her cross-tail, andhad to put into Charleston. All of these repairs cost an immense sumof money, and are calculated, with the severe losses which the Companyhas sustained, to dishearten the most hopeful and enterprising. Yet, since these disasters, and the completion of the "Moses Taylor, " theCompany are about laying the keel of another fine ship. This isanother verification of my statement that the mail companies are innearly every instance compelled to build new steamers in the very lastyears of their contracted service. The new "Adriatic" attests the samefact on the part of the Collins Company. (_See pages 141 and 142. _) The Company have had at various times the "Falcon, " "Ohio, " "Georgia, ""Crescent City, " "El Dorado, " "Cherokee, " "Empire City, " "Illinois, "and "Philadelphia, " and now have the three last-named ships, the"Granáda, " the "Star of the West, " and the new steamer "Moses Taylor. "The benefits conferred by the Company's lines on the trade of thecountry generally, and especially on our southern seaboard and Gulfconnections, have been almost incalculable. They found all of theseports in the undisputed possession of the British, whose steamersfurnished the only mail and locomotive facilities of the times. Bytheir superior speed and accommodations the "Georgia" and the "Ohio"soon drove those enterprising steamers from our coast, and confinedthem to the foreign countries of the Gulf and the Carribean Sea, wherethey yet rule triumphant in news, transport, and commerce. Oursouthern harbors are no longer filled with British cruisers, while intheir stead we have built up a noble war marine, inured thousands ofAmericans to the ocean steam service, and made one most effectivemovement in the direction of successful defenses. (_See Letter of Hon. Edwin Croswell, Paper E, page 200. _) Of the Collins Company it is hardly necessary that I should speak. They have received much the largest subsidy from the Government; butthey have had a most difficult task to perform. Their ships have neverbeen surpassed in any country, whether as to the excellent style oftheir prime construction, their large size, or their very unusualspeed. They have literally been engaged in a continual race across theocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to farexcel those of the Cunard line. And this they have done most signallyin all points of accommodation and speed. They have gained one and ahalf days the advantage over the Cunard line on their average voyagesfor the seven years. And this was no small achievement. By referenceto Section IV. It will be seen how great is the cost of attaining andmaintaining such speed with a steamer. The Collins ships, being somuch larger than the Cunarders, the four present an aggregate tonnagenearly equal to the eight by which they run their weekly line. It is, moreover, not proportionally so expensive to maintain seven or eightships on a line as four. The prime cost and repairs are by no means sogreat when engines are duplicated, or two sets built from the samepatterns. Again, the general outlay in docks, shore establishment, offices, company paraphernalia, advertising, and innumerable items, isas great for a small as for a large fleet of steamers. The Collinsline has to contend against all this. It also found the Cunard linelong and well established, and inwrought into the public favor. It hadthe business, and most important of all, it monopolized the onlyfreights passing between the two countries; those from England toAmerica, which British shippers gave of course to British ships. Theyhave had also to pay much larger prices for construction, repairs, wages, etc. , than the Cunard Company; and not having so large aservice and so large a fleet, they have not had so many reserve shipsto fall back upon; but have been compelled frequently to send theirships off but half repaired, which of itself entailed immensely heavyexpenses in ultimate repairs. There is very much to be said in favorof this Company, which has endeavored to build the finest ships inthe world, and navigate them the most rapidly. If they haveprominently failed in any thing it is in building larger ships, running them faster, and being far more enterprising with them thanwas required of the Company by the contract with the Government. Theirdisasters have been saddening and severe; and yet they have resultedfrom nothing which could have been controlled by human foresight. There is a great error in supposing that there are more marinedisasters among American than among British ships. Such is not thecase, as a careful examination of the lists will show. Of the mail line belonging to Mr. Vanderbilt, between New-York andBremen, _via_ Southampton, it is impossible now to say any thing. Thesteamers "North Star" and "Ariel, " the one of 1, 867-60/95 tons, andthe other of 1, 295-28/95 tons, have but recently commenced theservice, on the gross mail receipts. Whether Mr. Vanderbilt desires tomake the service permanent or not, I am not advised. The service of the Charleston and Havana line has been performed withgreat regularity; and although the return from it in the form ofpostages has been small, yet it has been of essential service to theSouth, in opening communications toward the Gulf, and in establishingmuch needed travelling facilities between Charleston, Savannah, andKey West. PAPER A. LIST OF AMERICAN OCEAN STEAMERS. The mail service has 8 lines, and 21 steamers in commission, of 48, 027registered tonnage. Much of this tonnage belongs to supply ships, asfor instance those of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. (_SeeSection I. _) _Collins Line, 3 steamers, 9, 727 tons. _ Adriatic, 4, 144-74/95 tons: Atlantic, 2, 849-66/99 tons: Baltic, 2, 733-1/95 tons. _Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4, 548 tons. _ Arago, 2, 240 tons: Fulton, 2, 308 tons. _Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6, 523 tons. _ North Star, 1, 867-60/95 tons: Ariel, 1, 295-28/95 tons: Vanderbilt[H], 3, 360-54/95 tons. [H] Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, inconnection with the Bremen steamers. _United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8, 544 tons. _ Illinois, 2, 123-65/95 tons: Empire City, 1, 751-21/95 tons:Philadelphia, 1, 238-1/95 tons: Granada, 1, 058-90/95 tons: MosesTaylor, 1, 200 tons: Star of the West, chartered, 1, 172-1/95, (contracting for a new ship. ) _Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16, 421 tons. _ Golden Gate, 2, 067-35/95 tons: Golden Age, 2, 280 tons: J. L. Stephens, 2, 189 tons: Sonora, 1, 616 tons: St. Louis, 1, 621 tons: Panamá, 1, 087-31/95 tons: California, 1, 085-64/95 tons: Oregon, 1, 099-9/95tons: Columbia, 777-34/95 tons: Republic, 850 tons: Northerner, 1, 010tons: Fremont, 576 tons: Tobago, 189 tons. _Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer_, the Isabel, 1, 115 tons. _New-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer_, the Tennessee, 1, 149-1/2 tons. The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of 24, 071 tonsregistered tonnage. _New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans_, 2. The Black Warrior, 1, 556-1/95tons: Cahawba, 1, 643-1/95 tons = 3, 199 tons. _New-York, Havana, and Mobile_, 1. The Quaker City, 1, 428-3/95 tons. _New-York and Savannah_, 4. Alabama, 1, 261-13/95 tons; Florida, 1, 261-13/95 tons: Augusta, 1, 310-61/95 tons; Star of the South, (propeller, ) 960-1/95 tons = 4, 793 tons. _New-York and Charleston_, 4. Columbia, 1, 347 tons: Nashville, 1, 220tons: James Adger, 1, 151 tons; Marion, 962 tons = 4, 680 tons. _New-York and Virginia_, 2. Roanoke, 1, 071 tons: Jamestown, 1, 300 tons= 2, 371 tons. _Philadelphia and Savannah_, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia, each about 1, 300 tons = 2, 600 tons. _Boston and Baltimore_, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons= 1, 600 tons. _New-Orleans and Texas. _ The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, andAtlantic, averaging 600 tons each=2, 400 tons. _New-Orleans and Key West. _ The General Rusk, 600 tons, and theCalhoun, 400 tons = 1, 000 tons. There are also several propellers running: between New-York andCharleston, New-York and Portland, and between Philadelphia and theSouth. They are all, however, small, and irregular in their trade. TheCalhoun is not a regular steamship. Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24, 845 tons. Queen of the Pacific, 2, 801-92/95 tons. Washington, 1, 640-71/91 tons. Prometheus, 1, 207-61/95 tons. St. Louis, 1, 621-14/45 tons. Brother Jonathan, 1, 359-52/95 tons. Oregon, 1, 004-89/95 tons. Southerner, 900 tons. Herman, 1, 734-45/95 tons. Northern Light, 1, 747-91/95 tons. Uncle Sam, 1, 433-44/95 tons. California, 1, 058 tons. Northerner, 1, 012 tons. Ericsson, 1, 902-1/95 tons. Star of the West, 1, 172-33/95 tons. Daniel Webster, 1, 035 tons. Orizaba, 1, 450-62/95 tons. Panamá, 1, 087 tons. Fremont, 576 tons. The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P. Ingraham, of the New-York Custom-House. PAPER B. The following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from the reports towhich we have alluded, presents the British steam mail service infull detail. "The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the ocean mail service of Great Britain, now carried on almost exclusively by steamships. The numbers in the margin, running from 1 to 15, will point out the different lines in the recapitulation at the close. LINE OF COMMUNICATION, | CONTRACTORS, AND CONTRACT PRICE. | PLACES CONNECTED. ---------------------------------+-------------------------------- 1. --Liverpool and Isle of Man. | Liverpool and Douglas, Isle of _Mona Isle Steam Co. _ Twice a | Man. Week. $4, 250 per annum. | | 2. --England and Ireland. _City of| Holyhead and Kingstown, near Dublin Steam Packet Co. _ Twice a | Dublin. Day. $125, 000 a year. | | 3. --Scotland and Shetland. | Aberdeen, Wick, Kirkwall, _Aberdeen, Leith and Clyde | (Orkney, ) and Lerwick, Shipping Co. _ Weekly, $6, 000 a | (Shetland. ) year. | | 4. --England, Spain, and | Southampton, Vigo, Oporto, Gibraltar. _Peninsular and | Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Oriental Steam Navigation Co. _ | Three times a month. $102, 500. | | 5. --Mediterranean, India, and | Southampton, Malta, Alexandria, China. _Peninsular and Oriental | Suez, Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Steam Navigation Co. _ Twice a | Singapore, Hong Kong, and month to India--monthly to China. | Shanghae. $1, 121, 500. | | 6. --England and United States. | Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston; _Sam. Cunard. _ Weekly. $866, 700. | and Liverpool and New-York. | 7. --North America, (Colonial. ) | Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda, _Sam. Cunard. _ Monthly. $73, 500. | and St. Thomas. | 8. --West-Indies, Mexico and | Southampton, Kingston, South-America. _Royal Mail Steam | (Jamaica, ) St. Thomas, Vera Packet Co. _ Semi-monthly to the | Cruz and Aspinwall; Southampton, West-Indies and Gulf of Mexico, | Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St. And monthly to Brazil. | Vincent, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio $1, 350, 000. | Janeiro, Monte Video, Buenos | Ayres, and St. Thomas. | 9. --England, France, and Belgium. | Dover and Calais. Dover and _Jenkings and Churchward. _ Daily | Ostend. To Calais; thrice a week to | Ostend. $77, 500. | | 10. --Channel Islands. | Southampton, Jersey, and _South-western Railway Company. _ | Guernsey. Thrice a week. $20, 000. | | 11. --West Coast of South-America. | Panama, Callao, and Valparaiso. _Pacific Steam Navigation Co. _ | Allowed to touch at Buenaventura, Twice a month. $125, 000. | Guayaquil, Peyta, Lambayeque, | Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, | Aríca, Iquique, Cobija, Gopiapo, | Huasco, and Coquimbo. | 12. --Scotland and Orkney. _John | From Scrabster Pier (Thurso) to Stanger, Esq. , of Stromness. _ | Stromness, (Orkney. ) Daily in summer; every other day | in winter. $6, 500. | | 13. --West Coast of Africa. | Plymouth to Madeira, Teneriffe, _African Steamship Co. _ Monthly. | Goree, Bathurst, Sierra Leone, $106, 250. | Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, | Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, | Bonny, Old Calabar, Cameroon and | Fernando Po; omitting Cameroon, | Calabar, and Bonny on return. | 14. --South-Africa, Mauritius, and| Dartmouth to Cape of Good Hope, Calcutta. _Adam Duncan Dundas, | Mauritius and Calcutta. Esq. _ Monthly. $205, 000. | | 15. --England and Australia. _The | Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, European and Australian Mail | Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney. Steam Packet Co. _ Monthly. | $925, 000. | The following are the names of the steamers in service in each line, with the amount of tonnage, the horse power of each, the draught of water, the number of the officers and crew attached to each one, and, when it could be obtained, the date that each vessel was surveyed and approved for the service. Where the date of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible with others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line being arranged in chronological order: 1. LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN. Draft of Horse Water. Date of Name, Class, etc. Power. Tonnage. F. I. Crew. Survey ----------------------+------+--------+--------+-----+------------ King Orry, 190 429 0 0 22 Dec. , 1845 Tynwald, iron, 260 657 8 9 29 Oct. , 1846 Benmy Chree, 130 295 6 6 18 June, 1847 Mona's Queen, iron, 220 508 8 6 22 M'ch, 1853 ====== ======== ===== Total, 4 vessels, 790 2, 089 91 2. ENGLAND AND IRELAND. Prince Arthur, iron, 220 418 8 8 26 July, 1852 Llewellyn, iron, 342 654 9 6 29 Oct. , 1852 Eblana, iron, 372 685 8 11 31 Jan. , 1853 St. Columba, iron, 350 650 8 10 29 Sept. , 1853 ====== ======== ===== Total, 4 vessels, 1, 284 2, 407 115 3. SCOTLAND AND SHETLAND. Fairy, 120 350 -- 18 -- Duke of Richmond, 180 500 -- 24 -- ====== ======== ===== Total, 2 vessels, 300 850 42 4. ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND GIBRALTAR. Sultan, iron, 420 1, 001 14 0 67 Jan. , 1853 Madrid, iron, 133 448 10 2 40 Feb. , 1853 Tagus, 280 691 14 8 41 Jan. , 1854 Alhambra, 140 642 13 7 52 July, 1855 ====== ======== ===== Total, 4 vessels, 973 2, 782 200 5. MEDITERRANEAN, INDIA, AND CHINA. Lady Mary Wood, 270 619 0 0 40 Feb. , 1842 Precursor, 520 1, 783 18 0 121 July, 1844 Pekin, iron, 415 1, 003 14 0 78 Jan. , 1847 Oriental, 420 1, 427 13 0 78 M'ch, 1848 Achilles, 430 823 16 0 59 June, 1849 Malta, iron, 460 1, 222 0 0 82 Sept. , 1848 Hindostan, 500 1, 595 16 10 53 July, 1849 Singapore, iron, 465 1, 189 12 6 96 M'ch, 1851 Ganges, iron, 465 1, 189 14 7 69 June, 1851 Pottinger, iron, 450 1, 275 17 6 82 April, 1852 Formosa, screw, iron, 177 658 13 6 60 Aug. , 1852 Chusan, screw, iron, 100 765 11 3 45 Aug. , 1852 Haddington, iron, 450 1, 303 17 7 105 Nov. , 1852 Vectis, 400 900 0 0 51 -- Shanghae, screw, iron, 90 825 0 0 60 -- Manila, 60 646 0 0 60 -- Bentinck, 520 1, 973 19 3 83 Nov. , 1852 Euxine, iron, 430 1, 071 15 6 72 Jan. , 1853 Bengal, screw, 465 2, 185 17 6 115 Feb. , 1853 Valetta, 400 984 12 2 51 July, 1853 Norna, screw, 230 1, 040 0 0 80 Nov. , 1853 Colombo, screw, 450 1, 808 0 0 118 Dec. , 1853 Ripon, iron, 445 1, 400 14 9 94 Dec. , 1853 Douro, screw, 230 903 13 3 63 Dec. , 1853 Bombay, 280 1, 240 0 0 84 -- Madras, 288 1, 217 0 0 82 -- Indus, iron, 450 1, 302 17 9 88 Jan. , 1854 Candia, screw, iron, 450 2, 212 18 9 115 June, 1854 Nubia, 450 2, 095 21 0 122 -- 1855 Pera, screw, iron, 450 2, 013 19 0 129 Jan. , 1856 Ava, screw, iron, 320 1, 372 17 0 94 Feb. , 1856 Alma, screw, iron, 450 2, 164 20 0 124 M'ch, 1856 Aden, screw, iron, 210 507 18 9 40 Aug. , 1856 Delta, screw, 210 985 0 0 64 -- 1856 Delhi, screw, 450 2, 400 0 0 125 -- 1856 Unknown, 4 vessels. ====== ======== ===== Total, 39 vessels, 12, 850 46, 053 2, 877 6. ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES. Europa, 650 1, 777 15 6 88 July, 1848 Canada, 680 1, 774 19 6 88 Nov. , 1848 Niagara, 630 1, 774 19 6 88 Dec. , 1849 America, 630 1, 729 15 3 88 Jan. , 1850 Asia, 800 2, 073 19 0 105 May, 1850 Africa, 800 2, 050 0 0 105 Oct. , 1850 Arabia, 870 2, 328 16 7 105 Dec. , 1852 Persia, 858 3, 587 21 0 165 Feb. , 1856 ====== ======== ===== Total, 8 vessels, 5, 918 17, 092 922 7. NORTH AMERICA, (Colonial. ) Merlin, 120 451 0 0 26 May, 1850 Delta, screw, iron, 180 700 12 10 34 June, 1852 ====== ======== ===== Total, 2 vessels, 300 1, 151 60 8. WEST-INDIES, MEXICO, AND SOUTH-AMERICA. Dee, 410 1, 269 18 0 87 May, 1846 Trent, 450 1, 293 17 7 87 April, 1848 Eagle, 263 496 11 10 57 July, 1849 Derwent, 280 708 15 0 66 July, 1850 Magdalena, 760 2, 250 19 0 108 May, 1852 Medway, 420 1, 305 17 6 72 May, 1852 La Plata, 939 2, 404 21 10 114 Aug. , 1852 Conway, 270 827 12 10 55 Sept. , 1852 Orinoco, 800 2, 245 20 11 108 Oct. , 1852 Avon, 450 2, 069 17 0 94 M'ch, 1853 Teviot, 450 1, 258 18 1 97 April, 1853 Paraná, 800 2, 222 21 2 120 May, 1853 Clyde, 430 1, 335 19 1 87 June, 1853 Thames, 413 1, 285 18 3 72 Aug. , 1853 Solent, 420 1, 805 14 11 88 Oct. , 1853 Camilia, iron, 213 640 9 0 34 Oct. , 1853 Wye, screw, iron, 180 818 14 0 45 Feb. , 1854 Atrato, iron, 758 2, 906 20 6 127 M'ch, 1854 Tamar, 400 1, 873 18 7 93 June, 1854 Prince, 200 446 8 8 35 July, 1854 ====== ======== ===== Total, 20 vessels, 9, 306 29, 454 1, 667 9. ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM. Alliance, 120 300 7 3 16 -- Vivid, 120 300 7 0 16 -- Violet, 120 300 7 0 16 -- Empress, 100 308 6 6 16 -- Queen, 100 307 6 6 16 -- Ondine, 80 250 6 0 16 -- ====== ======== ===== Total, 6 vessels, 640 1, 765 96 10. CHANNEL ISLANDS. Atalanta, 120 240 8 4 21 Oct. , 1846 Wonder, iron, 150 449 0 0 22 Feb. , 1853 Courier, iron, 184 440 7 0 18 April, 1853 Dispatch, iron, 183 443 7 6 22 Aug. , 1853 Express, iron, 160 380 7 4 24 Nov. , 1853 ====== ======== ===== Total, 5 vessels, 797 1, 852 107 11. WEST COAST OR SOUTH-AMERICA. New-Granada, iron, 210 600 13 0 41 Nov. , 1846 Bolivia, iron, 252 705 0 0 41 Oct. , 1849 Inca, iron, 370 549 13 0 55 Aug. , 1851 Lima, iron, 370 1, 122 10 8 55 Nov. , 1851 Bogota, iron, 394 1, 122 13 6 61 April, 1852 Valdivia, screw, iron, 480 782 13 2 41 Nov. , 1853 Valparaiso, iron, 320 839 13 6 84 -- ====== ======== ===== Total, 7 vessels, 2, 396 5, 719 377 12. SCOTLAND AND ORKNEY. (Unknown, ) 60 250 6 0 16 -- 13. WEST COAST OF AFRICA. Hope, iron, 120 833 15 0 46 -- Charity, iron, 120 1, 007 15 6 52 -- Ethiope, 120 674 0 0 42 -- Candace, 120 900 0 0 46 -- Retriever, 120 900 0 0 46 -- Niger, 120 900 0 0 46 -- Gambia, 130 637 14 0 42 -- ====== ======== ===== Total, 7 vessels 850 5, 951 320 14. SOUTH-AMERICA, MAURITIUS, AND CALCUTTA. Five screw steamers, Total, 5 vessels, 2, 000 8, 000 -- 570 -- 15. ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA. Oneida, 400 1, 600 15 6 84 -- Simla, 630 2, 510 17 2 88 -- European, 530 2, 200 18 9 115 -- Columbian, 530 2, 300 17 6 120 -- (Unknown, ) 400 1, 600 0 8 88 -- (Unknown, ) 400 1, 600 0 8 88 -- (Unknown, ) 400 1, 600 0 8 88 -- ====== ======== ===== Total, 7 vessels, 3, 290 13, 410 671 RECAPITULATION. KEY: A: Lines. B: Number of steamers. C: Horse Power. D: Tonnage. E: Number of men. F: Service commenced. G: How often. H: Annual Compensation. ------+----+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+------------- A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H ------+----+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+------------- 1 | 4 | 790 | 2, 089 | 91 | 1833 | 2 a week | $4, 250 2 | 4 | 1, 284 | 2, 408 | 115 | 1850 | 2 a day | 125, 000 3 | 2 | 300 | 850 | 42 | 1840 | 1 a week | 6, 000 4 | 4 | 973 | 2, 782 | 200 | 1852 | 3 a month | 102, 500 5 | 35 | 12, 850 | 46, 053 | 2, 877 | 1853 | 2 a month | 1, 121, 500 6 | 9 | 6, 418 | 18, 406 | 922 | 1850 | 1 a week | 866, 700 7 | 2 | 300 | 1, 151 | 60 | 1854 | 1 a month | 73, 500 8 | 20 | 9, 308 | 29, 454 | 1, 667 | 1851 | 3 a month | 1, 350, 000 9 | 6 | 640 | 1, 765 | 96 | 1854 | 1 a day | 77, 500 10 | 5 | 797 | 1, 852 | 107 | 1848 | 3 a week | 20, 000 11 | 7 | 2, 396 | 5, 719 | 378 | 1852 | 2 a month | 125, 000 12 | 1 | 60 | 250 | 16 | 1856 | 1 a day | 6, 500 13 | 7 | 850 | 5, 951 | 320 | 1852 | 1 a month | 106, 250 14 | 5 | 2, 000 | 8, 000 | 575 | 1856 | 1 a month | 205, 000 15 | 7 | 3, 290 | 13, 410 | 671 | 1857 | 1 a month | 925, 000 |====|========|========|=======| | |============= Total, 121 | 42, 254 |140, 139 | 8, 137 | | |$5, 114, 700[I] -----------+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+------------- [I] There are some lines not here noticed, which swell the sum to $5, 333, 985. --T. R. PAPER C. PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN NAVIGATION. Mr. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following: "The French Government has offered the following contracts: "Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr. 3, 100, 000, or $620, 000. "Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or Pernambúco, and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, 24 voyages a year, fr. 4, 700, 000, or $940, 000. The Government now requires 13 departures from Bordeaux and 13 from Marseilles at the same price. "Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to Martinique, with the following branch lines: "No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to Aspinwall. "No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico. "No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne. "The subvention offered is fr. 6, 200, 000, or $1, 400, 000. "The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is therefore 14 millions of francs per annum, or $2, 800, 000. "The Messageries Impériales have given a tender for the Brazil lines. "William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul, for the Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of $3, 200, 000 is subscribed; their intention is to have a weekly departure from Havre to New-York, by making the fortnightly departures of the French boats alternate with American Havre and Bremen boats. "For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier is said to have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can make up their capital. " The _Messageries Impériales_ is one of the largest and strongestcompanies in all Europe. They have the following different lines: theItalian, the Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, theSyrian, that of the Archipelago, the Anatolia, the Thessalian, theDanubian, the Trebizond, the Algiers, the Oran, and the Tunis lines, and forty-seven sea-steamers. They have already obtained the Brazilianservice. Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, andwill doubtless get it. The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said. They had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma, Cadis, Barcelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and withoutsubvention. They found it impossible to run it without subsidy, andhence, sought a new home for their steamers. They attempted to runfrom Havre to New-Orleans; but this again failed, after four voyages. They had also the 1, 800 ton ether ships, "François Arago, " and"Jacquart, " which broke down. These ether engines were built on theprinciple of De Tremblay; but the Company are now substituting steamfor the ether engines. Thus, the experience of this Company proves twoimportant positions which I have taken; that ocean mail steamers cannot run on their receipts, and that many of the gazetted improvementson steam propulsion and the ordinary methods are valueless. The _Compagnie Gautier_ have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthlyvoyages between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25, 000 per round voyagefor each steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about1, 800 tons each. Lyons is the home of the Company. PAPER D. STEAM LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA. COLLINS, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:) HAVRE, steamers Arago, and Fulton; " BREMEN, steamers North Star, and Ariel; " HAVRE, _in connection with the Bremen_. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:) CUNARD, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America, Niagara, and Europa; (running:) CUNARD, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria, (side-wheel; all running:) GLASGOW, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:) BREMEN, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:) LIVERPOOL AND PORTLAND, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian, General Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1, 500 each, running _via_ St. John's, N. F. , the two former chartered for theEast-Indies: LONDON AND MONTREAL, screw-steamers; (names not known:) LIVERPOOL AND QUEBEC, screw-steamers; " " " LIVERPOOL AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City ofBaltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran toPhiladelphia and was withdrawn:) HAMBURG AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia; buildingtwo more steamers, each 2, 000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line;(running:) ANTWERP AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, LeopoldI. , Duc de Brabant, and Congress. _Taken off and chartered to BritishGovernment for transporting troops. Names altered:_ LONDON, CORK AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid up:) HAVRE AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, andFrançois Arago, _withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba_. (_SeePaper C. _) BREMEN AND NEW-YORK. The North Dutch Lloyds are building fourscrew-steamers in the Clyde, of near 3, 000 each, to run between Bremenand New-York: THE CONTINENT, SOUTHAMPTON AND NEW-YORK. Croskey's lino consists ofthe following screws, of about 2, 300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta, Queen of the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and GoldenFleece. (_Most of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route, and five of them are chartered for troops for India. _) PAPER E. The following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and1852, and also from the letter of Judge Collamer, then Post MasterGeneral, as well as from a letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, willpresent in detail a strong corroboration of the views which I havetaken in the preceding Sections. I copy first from the Report of 1852. The Committee was composed of Hon. Thomas J. Rusk, Chairman, andMessrs. Soulé, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton. The Report says: "Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that, regarding the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of all of the producing classes of the country, they have not felt at liberty to consider the propositions which have been presented to them, in any other point of view than as connected with and subservient to the general policy of the government, which embraces alike every section of the country, and can not know nor recognize any personal or local influence. "The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the Government for the joint purpose of extending and advancing the commercial and other great interests of the country, and, at the same time, providing a marine force which might be easily made available for the protection of American rights, in the event of a collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this double object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified the advance of public funds in aid of private enterprise, inasmuch as it was calculated to insure to the country the acquisition of a powerful means of maritime defense, with little or no expense, eventually, as the money so advanced was to be reimbursed in money or in mail service at the option of the parties concerned, while commerce and the arts would be promoted during the time of peace. "At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along our whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers, sustained and encouraged by the British Government, under the forms of contracts to carry the British mails; while the Cunard line between Liverpool and Boston, _via_ Halifax, constituted the only medium of regular steam mail communication between the United States and Europe. In this way the commercial interests of the United States were, on the one hand, entirely at the mercy of British steamers which plied along our Southern coast, entering our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors--a knowledge which might prove infinitely injurious to us in the event of a war with Great Britain; and on the other, of a foreign line of ocean mail steamers, which, under the liberal patronage of the British Government, monopolized the steam mail postage and freights between the two countries. Under such a state of things, it became necessary to choose whether American commerce should continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an American medium of communication should be established through the intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of pecuniary means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found to be impossible for our merchants to contend successfully, single handed, against the joint efforts of the British Government and British commercial influence. Our noble lines of packet ships which had far outstripped the sailing vessels of all other nations, in point of beauty and swiftness, had been superseded by the introduction of steamers, the power and capacity of which recommended them, as the best means of inter-communication by mail, and of transportation for lighter and more profitable freights, and American interests were becoming every day more and more tributary to British ascendency on the ocean. "Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for Congress to hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it was determined to adopt a policy which, while it would be in strict accordance with the spirit of our free institutions, should place the country in its proper attitude, and render its commerce and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or rival agencies. "Of the correctness of this determination, experience has furnished the most ample evidences in the results which thus far have attended the prosecution of the system. The line between New-York and Chagres _via_ New-Orleans and its auxiliaries, have, by their superiority in point of swiftness and accommodation, already superseded the British steamers which had previously plied along our Southern maritime frontier, and the United States mails for Mexico, South-America, and our possessions on the Pacific are no longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in American steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small expense, into war steamers, should occasion require, which have commanded the admiration of the world by their fleetness and the elegance of their accommodations for the travelling public. Our Southern ports are, consequently, no longer frequented by British steamers, commanded by officers of the British crown, whose legitimate business it is to collect intelligence respecting the approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to be made available for their own purposes, in the event of the existence of hostile relations. "A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the establishment of the American, or Collins line, between New-York and Liverpool. Previously to the commencement of this line, the transportation of the United States mail matter, as well as the finer and more destructible descriptions of merchandise, requiring rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had been monopolized by the British Cunard line; and the British Government had, within the short space of six years, from the postage on this route alone, derived a _clear income_ of no less than five million two hundred and eighty thousand eight hundred dollars, after deducting the amount paid to the concern under the contract to carry the mails. "Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the combined efforts of the British Government and commercial interests to confine their freights and postages to the Cunard line, the revenue to the Post Office Department of the United States has amounted to several hundreds of thousands of dollars per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for freights has been received by American citizens. The effects of this measure have, it is true, thus far been but partial, because the trips of this line have been but twice a month, while those of its rival have, for a considerable portion of the time been weekly. During the intervals between the trips of the American line, the postages and freights must, of necessity, enure to the advantage of the British, and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but partially remedied. " Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says: "It is not to be supposed that engines of such vast dimensions could have been constructed in a country where there were, as yet, no workshops adapted to the purpose and where labor is very high, as cheaply as in a country where every appliance of the kind already existed and where the prices of labor are proverbially low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that vessels of this description could have been navigated on as good terms, by men taken from this country, where there was little or no competition in this peculiar branch of maritime service, as by those who were easily to be found in a country in which the density of population and consequent competition for employment, caused the wages to be small. "An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to create an impression that the aid heretofore extended by the Government to the individuals engaged under contracts to carry the ocean mail, has been induced by feelings of personal friendship, on the part of members of Congress. Such is not the case. The friends of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, have, so far as your Committee are advised, considered this important subject as a matter of great national concern and independently of the very secondary motive of individual interest. The question presented to their minds has not been whether A, B, or C should have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce, manufactures, and agriculture of the country would be benefited by the performance of a public service through the instrumentality of individual enterprise, under proper conditions and restrictions. As matters stood at the period when the system was adopted, Great Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to make the United States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to her maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and South-America. There was not a letter sent by ocean steam conveyance, in these quarters, which did not pay its tribute to the British crown, and not a passenger nor parcel of merchandise transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean, which did not furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted her right to be the 'queen of the ocean, ' and, as such, she levied her imposts upon the industry and intelligence of all of the nations that frequented that highway of the world. "In this condition of affairs, the law instituting the system of American ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was enacted, as the best, if not the only means of correcting a great evil, and, at the same time, building up a naval force which should be available for national defense in the event of a war. The system so instituted was deemed to be not only calculated to draw forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but it avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a large and, for the moment at least, useless military marine, which could only be preserved in a condition for effective service by a vast annual outlay of the public money. "_It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your Committee, that these ocean steam facilities should exist, through the intervention of the Government, more especially as they were, in all probability, beyond the reach of private means. _ "The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible advantage to the important interests of the country at large, is an object of paramount importance; but which, however desirable, can only be effected at great expense. It is a matter of comparatively small moment at what precise time this expense is to be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required, under proper securities for reimbursement, appears to be the readiest mode by which the purpose can be effected. How is this security to be acquired? Simply, by taking due care that the funds advanced shall be faithfully and honestly applied to the object for which they are intended, and then holding a lien upon the ships, for the construction of which they are appropriated, in such a manner as to insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced in the form of mail service or money; or, should circumstances require, of ships suitable for national purposes, as war steamers. This has been done. In all cases the contractors for the transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to cause their ships to be built and equipped under the immediate superintendence of experienced naval officers and under the direction of naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in such manner as to be convertible, at the smallest possible expense, into war steamers of the first class. "Nor has experience caused any regret, on the part of the friends of the system, further than that in some cases, owing to the increase in the tonnage and power of the ships and other circumstances, the expenses incurred by the contractors have outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy losses, which might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the property acquired in this form. It should always be borne in mind, however, that in these cases, the increase of expenditure thus incurred has been caused by a laudable ambition on the part of the proprietors of these lines to do even more than they were required to do under their contracts, with a view to secure the confidence of the Government and the public. It should also be remembered that in thus increasing the cost and consequent value of their ships, these companies have enlarged the security of the Government for the money loaned, and promoted the safety and comfort of passengers. It has, in no instance, been charged that the companies referred to have, in any way, misapplied the aid extended to them, or given to it an improper direction. The products of their expenditures, even admitting them to have been greater than they might have been, show for themselves, in placing the American steam mail service, as far as it has gone, at the head of all others, in point of accommodation, elegance, strength, and swiftness. Nor is this all. The establishment of these lines is not to be regarded merely with reference to the immediate profits arising from the system, in connection with the transportation of the mails. Millions of money have been saved to American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam lines, would have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will refer to one fact in illustration of the truth of this proposition. Before the Collins line was established, the Cunard line was receiving £7 10_s_ sterling per ton for freights; at present (1852) the rate is about £4 sterling. By whom were these £7 10_s_ sterling paid? By the _American consumer_, in most instances, upon articles of _British manufacture brought to this country by a British line_. At present the American consumer pays but £4 sterling per ton; and, presuming that the American merchant makes his importations in the American line, this freight is paid to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our national wealth. Thus, it will be seen that, formerly, the American consumer paid _very nearly twice as much for the service_, and enriched the British capitalist; whereas, at present, he not only saves _one half of the former cost of freight to himself_ but, in paying the remaining half, benefits his fellow citizen, who in return aids in consuming perhaps the very merchandise which he has imported. "Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the propriety, even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the present system, which, at its very commencement, has given such ample proofs of its usefulness? Your Committee think not, and do not hesitate to give it as their opinion that, _merely as a matter of dollars and cents_, the service in question should be liberally sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns. "But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money feature of which is of minor consequence, when brought into comparison with other more important considerations. The question is no longer whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss or enabled to make fortunes, but whether the _American_ shall succumb to the British lines, and Great Britain be again permitted to monopolize ocean mail steam transportation, not only between Europe and America, but throughout the world. We are aspiring to the first place among the nations of the earth, in a commercial point of view--a place which belongs to us as a matter of right--and are we to suffer ourselves to be overcome by British commercial capitalists under the auspices of the British crown? Shall it be said that, at the very moment when our steamships are admitted to excel those of any other people on the face of the globe, our enterprising citizens have been forced to relinquish the proud position they have attained, for the want of a few thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to overflowing? Let this end be attained and our great commercial rival will have postages and freights all her own way, while we shall be compelled to contribute, as heretofore, to her undisputed supremacy. "With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important subject, your Committee have communicated, through their Chairman, with the Executive Departments of the Government and the presidents of the various companies engaged in carrying the ocean mail by steam, and will now proceed to lay before the Senate the results of their careful inquiries. It may not be improper here again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be derived from ocean steam mail transportation, when in successful operation, as manifested in the case of the British Cunard line, under the auspices of the British Government. During the first six years of its existence, the line above named received from the Government no less than $2, 550, 000, while the Government received from the Company, in the form of postages, the enormous sum of $7, 836, 800, or $5, 826, 800 net revenue. "The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins, ) for mail service, in the two years, $770, 000, and has received from the line $513, 546. 80. If the receipts be deducted from the outlay, the balance against the Government is $256, 453. 20 for the whole time, or $128, 226. 60 per annum. "Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account current between the line and the Government, the latter is out of pocket, at the end of the two first years of the undertaking and under circumstances the most disadvantageous to the line, $256, 453. 20, or in other words, has paid $128, 226. 60 per annum, for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about six thousand miles of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for which, as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee would ask, what has _the country_ received in return for this $256, 453. 20? They will furnish the answer. The country has received through the proprietors of this line, in the form of freights and passage money, a no less amount than $1, 979, 760. 85, in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much more, by saving the difference in freights and passage money, to say nothing of the general advantages derived by all of our producing interests from the existence of this American line, which, as your Committee believe, are incalculable. The money account will then stand as follows: Government debtor to $256, 453. 80; Country creditor to $1, 979, 760. 85 _in cash_; and if the former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of the country will stand $1, 723, 307. 05, _in cash alone_, leaving out of view the duties on increased importations caused by the establishment of the American line. " Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says: "It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six vessels which have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was to supervise them and decide whether they had been built in accordance with the requisitions of the law and terms of the contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your Committee, to be conclusive in the premises, has been $1, 555, 069, and that their aggregate tonnage is 7, 365 tons, instead of 5, 200 tons, the amount agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are informed, the company has in the Pacific seven steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of five thousand tons, not yet accepted by the Government. The additional steamers are, and have been, always kept ready to replace the mail steamers in the event of detention. The cost of these additional steamers has been, it is stated, about two thirds of that of the accepted steamers of the same class, say about $1, 036, 712, making in all an outlay for steamships alone, of $2, 518, 337. "It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes, transported by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in question, previously to December 31, 1851, from Panama northward, has been 17, 016, and from Oregon southward, 13, 332. The prices of passage have constantly fluctuated, but, on the date above named, the 31st of December, 1851, the average rates were, for the first cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars; second cabin, one hundred and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and seven dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the enormous prices of labor and supplies on that comparatively unsettled coast, but were subsequently reduced. At the commencement of the undertaking, the Company incurred, of necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper harbors for taking in provisions, water, coal, etc. , and in the construction of _dépôts_; and even at present, coal and supplies of every description are sent to the Pacific _viâ_ Cape Horn, a distance of from thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand miles. "The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount, and confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by express, while the mails have been very large, amounting in some instances to one hundred and fifty bags, each, and, together with coal, water, etc. , occupying all of the space not required for passengers. From California, the freights southward, have consisted of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the value of seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to compute the worth accurately, as a large portion of the gold, etc. , sent has been in the possession of passengers, and the value does not appear in the manifests. " In noticing the Panamá Railroad and the California lines, the Reportsays: "Nearly two millions of dollars have already, as your Committee are informed, been expended on this important work, by a company possessed of ample means, and the completion of it can not fail to open the way for a vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and at the same time cause our fellow-citizens in California and Oregon no longer to be regarded as exiles. This road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus, now so much dreaded, will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a couple of hours, instead of two or three days, as at present, and families, instead of individuals, will be enabled to seek homes in the fertile valleys of our possessions on the Pacific coast. The value of the lines of ocean steamers, of which your Committee have been speaking, to the commercial and other great interests of our country and the world at large, can not well be estimated until this road shall have been finished and put into full operation. When such shall be the case, the trade between California and Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific and Indian oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now passes around Cape Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand miles, will be enabled to take a direct course across the Isthmus of Panama, the passage of which will require but two or three hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco to New York, has already been transported within the space of twenty-five days and eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been taken by any other route, at a period, too, when there were but seven or eight miles of the road in operation. On a late occasion, five hundred government troops were sent to California by this route, and were placed at the point of their destination in a little more than thirty-five days, without any serious desertion or accident of any kind. A similar operation by the way of Cape Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship Lexington, which sailed from New-York for San Francisco, during the last year, arrived at the latter place on the last day of February, 1852, after a passage of _seven months and one day_. In a country the military establishment of which is so small as that of the United States, facilities of concentrating troops at points distant from each other, in a short time, are of incalculable value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the military force. "From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on this side of the Isthmus, and without taking into view the cost of the railroad, has expended in the construction of mail steamers alone $2, 518, 337; and if to this be added $2, 606, 440. 45, the expense incurred for a similar purpose by the Company on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships, to the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California and Oregon mails, has been $5, 124, 777. "It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state that the California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of Panama, have proved themselves worthy in all respects of the confidence of the country. In no single instance has an accident occurred involving loss of life or serious injury in any way to the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels employed, that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs and under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the charts of the Pacific coast, one of the ships of the Aspinwall line struck, at one time, upon a soft bottom, and, at another, upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed off, after thumping, without the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as these are the more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been lost on the same coast with a great sacrifice of human life, evidently owing to a want of the strength necessary to resist, effectually, the force of the winds and waves. In the opinion of your Committee, the security afforded to travellers by the strong fastenings and heavy timbers of the ocean mail steamers, built as they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and experience in such matters, and made capable of sustaining heavy armaments, is a matter of the greatest moment. Experience has shown that, in the race after gain, our countrymen are, perhaps, more regardless of risk to human life than the people of any other country in the world. Scarcely a day passes without fresh evidences of the truth of this proposition. The river, as well as the sea-going steamers, are generally built with reference to speed and lightness, coupled with smallness of draft of water, and hence, in case of touching the ground, or of violent storms, it is found that if one portion of the frame gives way, the breaking up of the entire structure follows with a rapidity that is but too well calculated to show the slight manner in which these vessels are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter not worthy of consideration, when brought into comparison with the loss of life, and would rather see even millions devoted to the construction of _strong steamers_, than witness the sudden and heart-rending ruptures of the dearest ties of our nature, caused by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is their feeling of stern disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting the safety of passengers, daily manifested by some of the proprietors and officers of steam lines, that they are resolved, so far at least as they are concerned, not in any way to countenance, directly or indirectly, such a course of proceeding. In the extension of the system of ocean mail transportation which they propose to recommend, care will be taken, that the steamers which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as national ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the law-making power, and be so built as to secure safety to travellers; and that, in all contracts, this consideration shall be regarded as one of paramount importance. " Regarding a few sailing-ship owners in New-York and Boston, who hadmemorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Reportsays: "The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the alleged improper interference of the Government with matters that should be left, as they say, entirely to individual enterprise, which in their opinion becomes paralyzed under the effects of Government patronage bestowed upon some to the exclusion of others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair and dispassionate view of the matter, they will, as your Committee think, be convinced that they are wrong in their supposition, and that the Government has not gratuitously meddled in concerns with which it should have nothing to do. The merchants and ship-owners referred to seem to forget, in the first place, that the system of ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure adequate protection for our commerce from foreign aggression in the event of war; and in the second, that it was instituted at a moment when the fine packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such becoming pride, had in fact been driven from the ocean to a certain extent by the overwhelming power of a British mail steam line, sustained by the British Government, which had monopolized ocean mail and passenger steam transportation, as well as the freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the sailing ships have been made to succumb, it has been under the force of an agency more certain and not less powerful than the one named by them--wielded by foreign capitalists and directed by a foreign government claiming for itself the supremacy of the ocean. The Cunard line of ocean steamers had been in possession of a monopoly of freights, letter postage, and passage money for years, in despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist, successfully, before the Government of the United States, seeing that American interests were made tributary to foreign capital, aided by a foreign government, adopted the wise course of correcting the evil by kindred means, and placing, at least, to a certain extent, American interests under the auspices of American intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the condition of the New-York lines and other ships had not the Government of the United States thought proper to extend its aid to the establishment of the Collins line? Would it have been any better than at present? or rather would it not have been infinitely worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper, as it must have done in the natural course of things, would it not in all probability have increased its number of ships until it would have monopolized every description of ocean transportation? Would not the trade with the United States have been entirely carried on in British steamers, navigated at small expense, and therefore able to do the carrying trade at low prices? Again, what would have been the condition of the Southern coasting business, so far as mails, passengers, and light freights, at least, are concerned, had the fourteen British steamers then employed been permitted to operate, unchecked by the American line of mail steamers, between New-York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely at the mercy of the commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well know how to avail themselves of opportunities to promote their own interests by advancing those of their government? To carry the inquiry further, what would have been the condition of our possessions on the Pacific coast, visited as they would have been by British steamers--for where is the spot on the inhabited or inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of old England--had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the universal pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at present, as is well known, the Cunard line has extended a branch to Havre, to transport goods to England almost free of cost, with a view to appropriate to itself the freights from that quarter, and thus not only crush the American line of steamers to Havre, but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if possible, again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route. Would all this have raised the prices of freights in American sailing vessels, and given an advantage to the memorialists in question, who had at one time monopolized to themselves the freights, postage, and passage money in sailing ships? or would not, on the contrary, such a state of things have operated so to give a British tendency to trade everywhere, and to furnish freights to British ships, at prices at which the American ship owners could not afford to navigate their vessels? "What, the Committee would ask, has the Government of the United States done in the premises? Having under its charge the control and direction of the United States mails upon land and sea, it has thought proper to say that it would pay for the transportation of the mails in _American steamers_, which can, if necessary, be converted, at a small expense, into war steamers, and adopted, if need be, into the navy proper, at an appraised value, and thereby become efficient protectors of American commerce in the event of a war. This is the head and front of the Government's offending, and has, forsooth, aroused the ire of the commercial monopolists of New-York, Boston, and elsewhere, because they can not any longer enjoy the gains which, for more than a quarter of a century, they had wrested from the mass of consumers throughout the land, north, south, east, and west. Your Committee must say that, in their opinion, such complaints come with a bad grace from such quarters, and it is to be feared that victorious steam will ere long, without the aid of the Federal Government, supersede the sailing ships of the memorialists, through the instrumentality of the discoveries daily in progress, whereby the navigation of vessels propelled by that power will be made a matter of comparatively small cost. " Speaking of steam communication with Pará and Rio de Janeiro, theReport further says: "When the almost unbounded capacity for trade of the basins of the La Plata and Amazon is taken into view, embracing as it does a great variety of useful products which may be advantageously exchanged for the manufactures and agricultural productions of our own country, the mind is at a loss what limit to assign to the trade to which civilization and the extension of commercial facilities must eventually give rise. Nor are the advantages of this great prospective commerce to be confined to the immediate intercourse between this country and the regions to which we refer. While the prevalence of certain winds, and the form of the coast of South-America, are favorable to a direct trade with the continent of North-America, they are such as to compel the commerce with Europe to pass along our shores, and thus constitute our Atlantic seaports so many stopping places at which the ships of the old world may touch in their voyages to and fro. Heretofore the policy of the governments which occupy the regions watered by the La Plata and the Amazon, and their respective tributaries, has been so exclusive in its character as to trammel, if not entirely prevent, their intercourse with distant nations. The different sovereignties which have sprung into existence since South-America became independent of European control, have been so jealous of each other that they have appeared to try which should be most succesful in expelling foreign commerce, lest it might bring to some one of them benefits which others did not and could not possess. A wiser policy, however, appears to be about to prevail since the fall of Rosas, and there is good reason to believe that, hereafter, the commerce of those communities with the rest of the world, will be placed upon a more liberal foundation. Should such be the case, Rio de Janeiro can not fail to become the great centre of a largely increased trade in the southern hemisphere. " "Should it be preferred to limit the extent of the American line to Para, at the mouth of the Amazon, the largest river in the world, there is at present a Brazilian line between that point and Rio de Janeiro, which, with the lines between Rio and the mouth of the La Plata, will render the connection complete. "Of the Amazon, it is proper to state that it is navigable by the largest vessels, and presents a line of shore of not less than six thousand miles, abounding in every description of product, with climates of all temperatures and soils adapted to all sorts of vegetable growth. As the regions through which this vast river passes are peopled by communities to which manufacturing is unknown, it will at once be seen what an immense market will be opened to American industry in the various departments of the useful arts. The proposed connection would, together with the intercourse by steam, which will inevitably be established on the Amazon, draw to that river the trade of the interior, which at present passes over the Andes on the backs of sheep and mules to the Pacific ocean, and constitutes a large portion of the commodities that are transported around Cape Horn. With a view to this river navigation, Brazil has already entered into a boundary treaty with Peru, by which she has engaged to establish steamboat navigation on the Peruvian tributaries of the Amazon, and is preparing to put seven steamers upon the river, where none have heretofore been. "The experience of the world has shown that nations do not become commercial or manufacturing, so long as the products of the soil are sufficiently abundant to yield them wealth; and, hence, it may be reasonably inferred that the carrying trade to and from South-America will, if proper measures be taken, fall into the hands of American ship-owners. By way of ascertaining what the extent of this trade will be, if reference be had to the interior or back country as the standard of the commercial resources furnished by rivers, it will be found that the total area drained by the rivers of the world is as follows: _Sq. Miles. _ Europe, emptying into the Atlantic, 532, 940 Africa, emptying into the Mediterranean, 198, 630 ---------- Total Old World, 1, 731, 570 ========== Asia, emptying into the Pacific, 1, 767, 280 Asia, emptying into the Indian ocean, 1, 661, 760 ---------- Total Asiatic, 3, 429, 040 ========== North-America, including St. Lawrence and Mississippi emptying into the Atlantic, 1, 476, 800 ========== South-America, emptying into the Atlantic-- Amazon and its confluents, 2, 048, 480 La Plata and all others, 1, 329, 490 ---------- Total South-American 3, 377, 970 ========== Total American to the Atlantic, 4, 854, 770 ========== "From the above statement it will be seen that the proposed line of steam communication will bring within thirty days of each other, the commercial outlets of navigable streams which drain a back country greater in extent than that which is drained by all of the navigable streams which empty themselves into the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian oceans, from those portions of Europe, Asia, and Africa, which are accessible to American commerce. Settlement and cultivation will, in the course of time, make these American river basins as rich in products as those of the old world. "The question next arises, who are to be the carriers of the trade which is hereafter to spring out of these American river basins, the English or the Americans? If Great Britain be suffered to monopolize commerce as she has heretofore done by her steam navigation, her people will enjoy this great boon; but if, on the contrary, the United States take advantage of circumstances as they should, the prize will be won by Americans. " "Your Committee would remark, in concluding this Report, that, regarding as they do the existence and rapid extension of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, as absolutely essential to the dignity and permanent prosperity of the country, and as the only means, consistent with the genius and policy of our free institutions, of acquiring a maritime strength, which, by keeping pace with the improvements of the age, shall place us upon an equal footing with other civilized countries of the world, without the necessity of an overgrown and expensive naval establishment proper, in time of peace, they would feel themselves derelict in the performance of their duties, did they not recommend the measure, with the earnestness which its importance demands. "Circumstances indicate, with a clearness not to be misunderstood, that in any future struggle for superiority on the ocean, the contest will be decided by the power of steam. With a view to this result, England has applied herself with even more than her wonted energy to the construction of a regular steam navy which shall be superior to all others. The number of ships which Great Britain has of this kind, is at present two hundred and seventy-one, and there are no less than nine royal war steamers in progress of construction, to say nothing of the mail and other steamers which are being built. The course thus pursued by the great commercial rival of the United States, renders a corresponding energy and activity on our part absolutely necessary, in a national point of view; a steam navy must be provided for future emergencies in the way proposed by the Committee, or war steamers must be built at an enormous outlay of public money and kept ready in the navy yards, or in commission, at an expense which is appalling to every lover of judicious economy, or the stripes and stars of our country, which have heretofore floated so triumphantly on every sea, must grow dim, not only before the 'meteor flag of England, ' but the standards of the secondary powers of Europe. If members of Congress are prepared to adopt either of these latter two alternatives, let them say so, and let a system which promises, under an honest and faithful discharge of duty on the part of the executive branch of the Government, to realize the most sanguine expectations of its friends, be at once abandoned. Let Great Britain be again the guardian of our commercial interests and the beneficiary of American trade. Let the Liverpool, Bremen, Havre, California, and other lines, which have furnished twenty-four as noble sea steamers as ever floated, be abandoned to their fate, and let the Cunard line and other British steam mail lines and royal steamers supply their places on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and our Southern seas. "Your Committee would again repeat that the question to be considered is not one of mere dollars and cents, or whether certain individuals are to be sustained, or not, but one of infinitely greater consequence--whether this proud republic shall now and hereafter exist as a power competent to maintain her rights upon the ocean. The present condition of political affairs in Europe is such as, in the opinion of many, to threaten a general war among the nations of that quarter of the globe, and the United States should stand ready, and able too, to protect the rights of her citizens upon the ocean, in such an event. Were such a crisis to take place to-morrow, or the next year, or within the next five years, is the country prepared for it? The steam navy proper amounts to sixteen steamers of all classes, which, together with the twenty-four ocean mail steamers in the employ of the Post Office Department, would give us a steam naval force not exceeding forty in all. Is this the position we should occupy, while Great Britain has at command upwards of three hundred war and mail steamers? France has, it is believed, upwards of a hundred, and the secondary powers of Europe have naval steam armaments in proportion, most of them exceeding our own. This question will be decided by the continuation or rejection of the system under consideration, which, with all the difficulties attendant upon new enterprises and under the most embarrassing circumstances, has gone very far to sustain itself, and promises, at no distant period, to become a source of large revenue to the Government, and incalculable commercial advantages, pecuniarily and otherwise, to the country. " The following is copied from the Report made by Mr. Rusk in 1850, andpublished in Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852. Speaking of the services of the mail steamers in our system ofdefenses, the Report says: "The truth is, that, in the opinion of your Committee, the temper of the times requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid improvements of other nations in their commercial and military marine, and that the only choice is, whether it is to be done by constructing vessels for the packet service, at a boundless expense to the Government, or by aiding private enterprise, and thus not only eventually avoiding expense, but adding largely to the revenues of the country. It will be seen from the above extract from Mr. King's speech, that, in the course of five years, the balance in favor of the Government from the Cunard line alone was $5, 286, 000. The New-York and Liverpool and Bremen lines will come in for a large, if not by far the greater, share of the postage and freightage heretofore enjoyed by the Cunard line; and the line to Chagres, for the advantages that have, up to the time of its partial commencement, been in the exclusive possession of the British packet establishment in that direction. Nor are the freightage and postage moneys the only sources of profit. In proportion to the increase of these facilities will be the extension of trade, and consequently the Government will receive the duties payable upon all foreign merchandise brought into the country. Besides, persons _in transitu_ will leave much money in our cities and along their routes, to say nothing of the porterage and costs of transportation of goods. To benefit our people is to benefit our Government; as the more we enrich the former, the more able are they to contribute to the support of the latter. "To construct ships and keep them in our navy-yards, subject to the injuries of time and casualties, does not consist with the notions of the American people, on the score of economy; nor is it in accordance with received opinions in regard to the propriety of placing excessive patronage in the hands of the General Government. At the same time, it is in perfect unison with the spirit of our free institutions that the arts of peace shall be made tributary to the purposes of defense, and the same energies which extend the commerce and manufactures of our country shall, in the event of necessity, be capable of being made use of for our protection. While the crowned heads of the Old World keep in constant pay vast armies and navies sustained by the heart's blood of the oppressed people, for the protection and preservation of their unhallowed power, it is the proud boast of our country that our soldiers are our citizens, and the sailors, who, in time of peace, spread the canvas of our commercial marine throughout the world, are the men who, in time of war, have heretofore directed, and will continue to direct, our cannon against our foes. " "The simple fact that the ships employed in it [the mail service] _may hereafter, if the Government thinks proper_, be purchased and commissioned as regular war steamers, to be officered and manned as ships of war, should not and can not prevent the construction of steam or sailing vessels for ordinary naval purposes. Your Committee are of opinion that, so far from being an impediment to the proper increase of the Navy, the prosperity of the ocean steam packet service must operate in favor of an enlargement of the naval force, the necessity for which is increased in proportion to the extension of our commercial relations with foreign countries. The routes upon which lines of steam packets can be sustained and made profitable to the owners are comparatively few, when we take into view the infinitely diversified ramifications of trade. Great Britain, with her vast colonial and general commerce, had, in 1848, but fifteen lines in which national or contract vessels were employed, including the home stations, as they are called, or points of connection between the British islands. Nor has the ocean steam packet system hindered, in the slightest degree, her progress in the construction of steam or sailing vessels for the naval service. In speaking of steam vessels available for naval service, Captain W. H. Hall, of the British Navy, in the course of his examination before the special Committee of the House of Commons, hereinbefore referred to, says: 'I some time ago sent to the Admiralty a plan for making the whole of the merchant steamers available in case of need; and if there were an Act of Parliament that these ships should be strengthened forward and aft to carry guns, it might be then done with a very trifling expense; that would give this country more power than any other country in the world. We have nearly one thousand steam vessels, half of which, at least, might be made available in case Government required their services. Our mercantile steamers are some of the finest in the world, and five hundred of them might be turned to account. They should all be numbered and classed, so that Government would merely have to ask for the number of vessels they wanted, when they might go to Woolwich, or other places, and put the guns on board, and then they would be ready for service. ' "Here is the opinion of a _captain in the British Navy_ with reference to the availability of steam vessels for national defense; and what a lesson does it teach to us in America, where steam navigation is found penetrating every portion of the Union, and spreading itself on our maritime and lake frontier in every direction! Here is found no expression of apprehension lest the mercantile steamers might interfere with the growth or efficiency of the Navy to which the witness belonged. This opinion, moreover, is expressed in a country where, according to the testimony before the Committee already named, there were, in 1848, 174 _war steamers, with an aggregate horse-power of_ 44, 480 _horses_; and where Mr. Alexander Gordon states, in a letter addressed to the same Committee, the Steam Navy had then cost the country £6, 000, 000 sterling, or $30, 000, 000, '_exclusive of all reïnstatements and expenses during commission_;' the same gentleman also alleging that the annual repairs amounted to £108, 000 Annual cost for coals, 110, 000 Depreciation at a moderate allowance, 600, 000 --------- Making the total amount of annual cost, £818, 000 Or $4, 094, 000 =========== "The regular employment of the best engineers on board of contract vessels, and the great experience they would acquire from being constantly on active duty, would furnish to the naval service, in the event of a war, a corps that would be invaluable. In speaking of the superiority of the engineers on board of contract vessels in the employ of the British Government over those on board of the Queen's ships, a witness before the select Committee of the House of Commons says: 'Last year there was a universal complaint of the inferiority of the engineers and all persons connected with steam employed in her Majesty's service. It was explained, and very easily explained, by the superior advantages in the merchant service, and particularly the high wages paid. In all contract steam packets, they have men on board the vessels who are competent to superintend any alterations or repairs in the machinery which may be required. '" Secretary Graham said on this subject to the Senate Committee, 20March, 1853: "While their discussions [mail steamers] justify the conclusion that vessels of this description can not be relied on to supersede those modelled and built only for purposes of war, it is respectfully suggested that a limited number of them, employed in time of peace in the transportation of the mails, would be found a most useful resource of the Government on the breaking out of war. "If conforming to the standards required by these contracts, their readiness to be used at the shortest notice, their capacity as transports for troops and munitions of war, and their great celerity of motion, enabling them to overhaul merchantmen, and at the same time escape cruisers, would render them terrible as guerrillas of the ocean, if fitted with such armaments as could be readily put upon them in their present condition. " Post Master General Collamer also said on this subject, June 27, 1850: "There are three modes which have been mentioned of transporting the mail. The first is by naval steamships, conducted by the Navy, as a national service. This will occasion so enormous an expense that it is not probable the project will be entertained. "The next mode suggested is the sending the mails, from time to time, by the fastest steamers which are first going. This has one advantage: it gives occasional aid to the enterprising; but there are many and great objections to it: "1st. It is entirely inconsistent with fixed periods of departure and arrival. "2d. It makes all connections on or with the route uncertain. "3d. A price must be fixed, to prevent undue exactions of the Government; and yet no one would be under obligation to take the mail at the price, so that it would be uncertain of going at all. "4th. It would be impracticable to send agents with all those mails, to take care of them and make distributions, except at an enormous cost. "5th. There would be constant difficulty with slow and unsafe boats. "6th. The great object of obtaining steamships, so constructed, under the inspection of the Navy Department, as to be suitable for war vessels, and subject to exclusive appropriation and use as such, would be sacrificed. "The third project is the making of contracts, for a stated term of years, _upon proposals advertised for in the ordinary method adopted for mail-coach service_. This would not answer for ocean steam service, unless provision were made for security, in the strength, capacity, and adaptation of the vessels, with their machinery, etc. " Regarding our steam service in the Gulf, and in reviewing the contractmade by the United States Mail Steamship Company, the Hon. EdwinCroswell, and associates, in a letter to the Chairman of the SenatePostal Committee, presented the following important reflections: "As early as the year 1835, the attention of the British Government was directed to the plan of changing the mode of conveying the mails by the ships of the East-India Company and the Government, and adopting the contract system with individuals and companies, with a view to combining the essential properties of a naval and commercial steam marine. "In consequence of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by Parliament to inquire into the management of the English Post Office Department in 1836, the mail steam packet service was transferred to the Admiralty. The Report stated the conviction of the Commissioners of Inquiry that 'the advantages which a System of contract must generally secure to the public over one of the establishment, however well conducted, were such that they wish they could have felt justified in recommending that it should be universally and immediately adopted. ' "The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that, 'in acting upon this opinion, the Admiralty entered into contracts for conveying the mails by steam vessels to and from Spain and Portugal, and subsequently between Alexandria and England, with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. Contracts were also entered into for the conveyance of the mails between England and North-America, and England and the West-Indies and Mexico. ' That 'the execution of all these contracts, with the exception of the latter, had given general satisfaction. But for this exception, the extent and complication of the plan at its commencement afforded some apology. ' That 'the spirit in which the steam contractors had generally executed their contracts merited notice, as they had in almost every instance exceeded the horse-power stipulated in their agreements, and thus insured an accuracy in the delivery of mails which experience has shown, if the letter of the contract had been adhered to by them, would not have been the case. ' And that 'the contract system had been generally satisfactory to the Admiralty and the public, and had tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of this country, (England, ) to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery, and the regulation and economical management of steam. ' "Such, certainly, were among the valuable results of the system; but these were not the only considerations that led to its adoption. The English Government, with the forecast for which that far-reaching power is distinguished, saw the advantages which an extended steam marine would give to its commerce over that of every other nation in the world. It saw also the value of connecting this great branch of the national service with the commercial and practical skill of the country. It soon formed and matured its plan, embracing within its scope nearly the entire commercial world. Steam lines, as stated in the preceding extract from the Admiralty Report, were established, radiating from England to all the prominent European ports, to the Mediterranean, to Egypt, the East-Indies and China, the West-India Islands, South-America and Mexico, the ports in the Gulf of Mexico and Havana, the United States and the English colonial possessions in North-America, and to the islands and ports in the Pacific ocean. This vast chain of intercourse was not only completely established, but it became a matter of national policy to enlarge, strengthen, and maintain it. By it much of the commerce of the world by steam, and nearly all the letter-carrying by steam between this continent and the European ports, and even the distant parts of our own territory, were engrossed by British ships. " "Important national considerations, aside from the design to engross for British bottoms and British capital the trade and intercourse of the commercial world, and especially with the American continent and islands, entered into the Government plan. It was ascertained to be a far less expensive mode of maintaining a naval steam force adapted to the purposes of Government, and to any emergency that might require these ships for other than mail purposes, than to build, equip, and keep in service national steamships of war. The experiment has proved its adequacy to the intended object; and it continues not only to receive the approval of the Admiralty and Government of England, but to be continually undergoing enlargement and expansion. " "The West-India mail steam line was proposed to the British Government in April, 1839, by sundry merchants of London. A charter was granted to the contractors in that year, under the title of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. It embraced the following routes: "1. _Outward Atlantic Route. _--From Southampton to Madeira, Barbados and Grenada--steamer, every 15 days. "2. _Trinidad Route. _--From Grenada to Trinidad and Barbados--steamer, every 15 days. "3. _Demarara Route. _--From Grenada to Courland Bay, (Tobago)--steamer, every 15 days. "4. _Northern Islands Route. _--From Grenada to St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Martinique, Dominique, Guadalupe, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitt's, Tortola, St. Thomas, and St. John's, (Porto Rico)--steamer, every 15 days. "5. _Jamaica and Mexican Route. _--From Grenada to Jacmel, (Hayti, ) Kingston, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico--steamer, every 30 days. "6. _Jamaica and St. Iago de Cuba Route. _--From Grenada to Jacmel, Kingston, St. Iago de Cuba, St. Juan's, (Porto Rico, ) and St. Thomas--steamer, every 30 days. "7. _Bermuda, Havana, and Jamaica Route. _--From St. Thomas to Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, Kingston, Jacmel, St. Juan's, and St. Thomas--steamer, every 30 days. "8. _Homeward Fayal Route. _--From St. Thomas to Southampton--steamer, every 30 days. "9. _Laguayra Route. _--From Grenada to Laguayra, Porto Cabello, and St. Thomas--steamer, every 30 days. "10. _Panama and St. Iago de Cuba Route. _--From Kingston (Jamaica) to Santa Martha, Carthagena, Chagres, and St. Juan de Nicaragua--steamer, every 30 days. "11. _Honduras Route. _--From Havana to Balize, (Honduras)--sailing schooner, every 30 days. " "The contract system, combining the efficient features of an extended commercial and Government steam marine, was thus adopted after full investigation on the subject by the Board of Admiralty, the Treasury, and the different Government Departments, including the Post Master General. The merits and benefits of this system have been tested by England. That Government was the first to engage in it, and, as we have already stated, fully approve, and are constantly extending it. The Committee of Inquiry of Parliament, as we have already quoted, say truly that it 'had tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of that country, to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery, and the regulation and economical management of steam. ' After an examination of it in the most scientific and practical manner, that Government regards it as altogether more economical for the nation, and for the general public interests, than the exclusive employment of Government vessels. The ships built by the contract companies have far exceeded in speed and other essential qualities the ships constructed by Government. A far greater amount of service was obtained, at a cost much less than would be incurred by Government in building, equipping, manning, and running national vessels for even a partial performance of the same service. Individual and associated skill, enterprise, and capital were called into requisition, and, aided by Government means, contributed to enlarge, extend, and fortify the naval and commercial power of England. "The practical operation of this great system of steam lines was to place within the reach of English vessels, of a semi-national character, and ready to be converted into ships of war, our entire Southern coast and harbors, besides yielding to them the foreign trade, commerce, and letter-carrying, by steam, to and from all parts of our country. To meet and counteract this state of things, became the object and duty of the American Congress and Government. It was the more obvious at that time particularly, engaged as we were in a war with Mexico, and our only means of coast defense of any force being a single steamer, and she not capable of entering the Southern harbors, while English steam fleets literally filled and occupied our waters. To counteract, so far as was demanded by the requirements of our own commerce, and the defense of our coast, a monopoly so formidable, which had grown up under the direct and liberal coöperation of the English Government, and the supposed superiority of English machinery, required the aid of Congress; for it was evident that unaided American enterprise and capital could not cope with it. Accordingly, at the close of the session of 1847, the Congress of the United States passed an act authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to contract with sundry parties and different steam lines for the construction of ocean steamships, as part of the plan of a combined naval and commercial steam marine, in connection with the mail service. " After enumerating the various lines established by Congress, hefurther says: "These (with the previously authorized line from New-York to Bremen) were the various parts of a complete and important plan adapted to the growing wants of the public service, and for providing an adequate steam marine, whenever the exigencies of the country might require it, and for facilitating intercourse and the transmission of the mails between remote parts of our own country and other nations. For the due performance of it in all its ramifications, it required a large aggregate of capital, skill, and intelligent enterprise. After a lapse of nearly three years, portions of the undertaking have gone into efficient operation; and already the fruits of it--its utility, and its advantages and benefits to the American government and people--have been demonstrated. When the various parts shall be completed, and the plan in all its features shall be in full operation, its immediate practical results, aside from its prospective effectiveness in furnishing a class of war steamers for any ultimate purpose of the American Government, will be found fully to justify the action of Congress and the participation and favor of the Government, and confirm the public confidence in its great utility and value. " "When it came to the knowledge of the English government that Congress had entered into contracts establishing steam lines to Chagres, Havana, and New-Orleans, its first movement to counteract or discourage the proposed American line in that direction was to run branches of the Royal West-India mail line from Bermuda to New-York, and from Jamaica to New-Orleans and Mobile. Now that the American line to Chagres has gone into full operation, and the news from the Pacific comes by this line to New-York, and thence to Liverpool, some fifteen days sooner than the same news brought by the British line, [J] the English government has revised, enlarged, and extended its West-India line. It has entered into a new contract with the Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company, a material feature of which is to run a mail line direct from Southampton to St. Thomas, and thence to Chagres and back, twice a month, with steamers of larger capacity and power, and with a proposed speed of from twelve to fourteen miles per hour. For this line, five or six new steamships are, under the contract, to be built, while the old vessels are to form branches from this main line or trunk to other of the routes of this great and extended plan of steam intercourse and letter-carrying; at the same time that government will withdraw its branches to the Balize, Mobile, and New-York, extend its line to Rio de Janeiro, and enlarge its line in the Pacific, from Panama to Valparaiso, converting it from a monthly to a semi-monthly route. These movements show not only the immediate results of American enterprise in ocean steamships, and the important consequences, aside from any purposes of coast and harbor defense, to which it has already led, but the strong public reasons on the part of our Government to foster, continue, and encourage it. It has already counteracted the best efforts of the large and long-established English steam lines, and transferred the commerce and letter-carrying so long exclusively enjoyed by them to American ships. If promoted and favored by the Congress of the United States, it will still meet and counteract the new efforts of the English Government to recover the ground which American skill, enterprise, and capital, aided by the Government, have won from them. [J] "By the contract of 1846 with the West-India Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company, the voyage from Chagres to Southampton is performed in 33 days. By the United States Mail Steamship Company the voyage from Chagres to New-York, and thence to Liverpool, is performed in 22 days. "In relation to the comparative cost to the two governments by which these lines of ocean steamers, in connection with the naval and mail service, are maintained, it will be seen that the British Government pays as much for its single West-India and Chagres line as the American Government pays for all its lines--Liverpool and New-York, New-York and Bremen, New-York and Havre, New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Chagres, and Panama and San Francisco. The entire annual payments by the British Government amount [This was in 1850. --T. R. ] to $3, 180, 000. Those by the American Government, when all its lines shall be in full service, will be $1, 215, 000. The British-West India Mail Steam-Packet Company are paid $3. 08 per mile for mail service: the United States Mail Steamship Company, $1. 88 per mile. " The Committee presented some few queries to Commodore M. C. Perry onthe capabilities of the postal steamers for war purposes, to which hereplies thus: "I now proceed to reply to the first division of the inquiry, as follows: "Question first: 'Whether the steamships employed in the transportation of the United States mail, under contract with the Navy Department, or any other steamships employed in the transportation of our foreign mails, are, in all respects, suitable for immediate conversion into steamers for war purposes, capable of carrying the armament or battery appropriate to the class specified in the contract?' "In answer to the foregoing (first) question, I am of opinion that they are _not_ 'in all respects suitable. ' "Question second: 'And if not suitable for such immediate conversion, whether they could be altered so as to make them efficient war steamers?' "Answer: The following named Atlantic steamers maybe converted, by slight alteration, into war steamers of the first class: "_Of Collins's line. _ The Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, and Baltic. "_Of Law's line. _ The Ohio, Georgia, and Illinois. "_Of Mortimer Livingston's line. _ The Humboldt and Franklin. "_Pacific steamers--of Aspinwall's line. _ First class, the Golden Gate. Second class, the Panama, Oregon, California, and Columbia. "The foregoing vessels of the respective contracts are variously constructed as to materials, fastening, strength, and model. "Question third: 'And if so, what alterations would be necessary to be made, and at what expense, to make them war steamers of the first class:' "Answer: If these vessels had been originally constructed comformably to the _spirit_ (though it was not called for by the letter) of the contracts, as they should have been, and all English mail steamers now are, _in anticipation of their possible conversion, into war vessels_, the cost of converting them would be much less. "Most of them were completed before I was ordered to their supervision; but I lost no time, after entering upon the duty, in calling the attention of the contractors to this important consideration, an observance of which would not have added more than one per cent upon the cost of construction. "In altering these vessels so as to make them available for war purposes, the most simple, expeditious, and economical plan would be to razee them, or cut off their upper decks and cabins forward and abaft the wheel-houses; not by tearing them to pieces and defacing the costly ornamental work, which, though of no value to the Government, still need not be destroyed. "The razeeing should be effected by sawing the top timbers, and cutting off by sections the whole of the upper dock, excepting the space between the wheel-houses, thus leaving the greater part of the main deck exposed and for the accommodation of the armament, and enough of the sides above that deck to answer for bulwarks and side-ports. "Below, it would only be necessary to remove the state-rooms not wanted for the accommodation of the officers, and convert the after-hold and fore and main orlops into magazines, store-rooms, shot and shell lockers, etc. , etc. "According to my calculation, the cost of the conversion of either of the before mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of machinery and ordinary repair, would not, or certainly _ought_ not, exceed, for steamers of the first class, $20, 000, and for those of the second class, $15, 000; and it could be readily done for this at any of our navy yards, provided that _useless_ alterations were not made. "It should be taken into view that those mail steamers, if called into service as war vessels, would be considered as forming an auxiliary force to the regularly constructed ships, and hence the impolicy of expending much money on them. The requisites of sound hulls and powerful engines, with efficient armaments, should alone be considered, leaving superfluous ornament out of the question. "The armaments of the respective vessels would, of course, be a separate cost; and to arrange the guns on the upper deck, it would only be required to close up three or four of the hatches or sky-lights; to strengthen the deck by additional beams and stanchions; to cut ports, and construct the pivot and other carriages; probably it might be desirable to shift the capstan and cables. "With respect to the description and weight of the respective armaments, I am clearly of opinion that the first-class steamers already named could easily carry each _four_ 10-inch Paixhan guns on pivots, two forward and two aft, of the weight of those in the Mississippi; _ten_ 8-inch Paixhans, as side-guns, ditto. "The _second-class_ steamers could with equal ease carry each _two_ 8-inch Paixhans on pivots, one forward and one aft, and _six_ 6-inch ditto, as side-guns. "With the additional strengthening recommended, I am perfectly satisfied that the armaments suggested would not, in the least, incommode the vessels. Indeed, the weight of armament would be actually less than that which would be taken away by the removal of the upper decks and cabins, and the miscellaneous articles usually stowed on one or the other of two decks--such, for instance, as ice, of which not less than forty tons is generally packed in one mass; nor would the munitions and provisions required for the war vessel be of greater weight than the goods now carried as freight, saying nothing of the provisions and stores carried by the steamers for an average of 150 to 250 souls, including crew and passengers. "It may again be remarked, that steamers thus brought into service would be far inferior to regularly constructed and appointed war vessels; yet in the general operations of a maritime war, they would render good service, and especially would they be useful, from their great speed, as dispatch vessels, and for the transportation of troops, always being capable of attack and defense, and of overhauling or escaping from an enemy. " Captain Skiddy, the Special Naval Constructor appointed by theGovernment to superintend the building of all the mail packets, saysin a letter to Com. Perry: "In reply I will commence with the first-class ships, which are the 'Atlantic, ' 'Pacific, ' 'Baltic, ' and 'Arctic, ' of Collins' Liverpool line; the 'Franklin' and 'Humboldt' of Mortimer Livingston's Havre line. "These ships, although equal in strength, probably, to any steamships afloat, are not suitable for _immediate_ war purposes, but can be made efficient in four or six weeks, capable of carrying the armament or battery of a first-class frigate--say four ten-inch guns and twelve eight-inch guns. These alterations would consist of a removal of the deck-houses, spar or upper deck, forward and abaft the paddle-wheel boxes, fitting the after and forward bulwarks in sections, cutting port-holes, fitting hammock cloths or nettings, putting in extra beams and knees, and stanchions, moving the windlass below, building magazines, shell-rooms, officers' rooms, etc. , etc. The cost of all these alterations and fixtures would not exceed ($15, 000 or $20, 000) twenty thousand dollars each ship. These ships would then be relieved of about one hundred and fifty tons weight, or nearly double the weight of guns and carriages, with less resistance to water and wind, adding an increase to their already great speed. " In the case of all these steamers, that is, of the Havre and Bremen, the Collins, the Aspinwall, and the Pacific lines, Commodore Perryreported that they "_were capable of being easily converted into warsteamers of the first class_. " PAPER F. OCEAN STEAM LINES OF THE WORLD. ------------------------------+--------------------------------+------+-------- LINE. |SERVICE. |Ships. |Tonnage. ------------------------------+--------------------------------+------+-------- Cunard, Paddle-wheel, |Liverpool, New-York, Boston, and| 8| 12, 000 |Halifax, | | " Screw, | " " " " | 4| 4, 800 North Atlantic Steamship Co. , |St. John's and Portland, | 3| 4, 800 European and American S. S. |Bremen, Antwerp, Southampton, & | 4| 10, 000 Co. , |New-York, | | " " " " |Bremen, Antwerp, Southampton, to| 4| 9, 000 |Brazil, | | London and Canada, |London and Montreal, | 2| 1, 870 Liverpool and Canadian, |Liverpool and Quebec, | 4| 5, 000 Liv. , Philadelphia, and | " " New-York, | 4| 8, 700 New-York, | | | Glasgow and New-York, |Glasgow and New-York, | 3| 6, 200 Belgian Transatlantic, |Antwerp and New-York, | 4| 8, 800 " " | " " Brazil, | 5| 6, 500 Hamburg and American, |Hamburg and New-York, | 4| 7, 300 " " Brazilian, [K] |Hamburg and Rio de Janeiro, | 2| 4, 500 Genoa and Brazilian, |Genoa, " " | 4| 8, 000 Royal Mail Co. , |Southampton, West-Indies, | 18| 21, 510 | Central America, | | | South-America, | | " " | " Per. , Rio, Bahia, | 4| 6, 820 | and La Plata, | | Pacific Steam Navigation Co. , |Panama to Valparaiso and | 7| 5, 719 |intermediate, | | Peninsular and Oriental Co. , |Portugal, Spain, Malta, | 39| 49, 416 |Alexandria, East-Indies, China, | | |and Australia, | | Europ. And Australian Royal |Southampton, Alexandria, Suez, | 7| 15, 500 Mail Co. , |and Sydney, | | Australian Royal Mail Co. , |Transport and other, | 4| 7, 800 Rotterdam and Mediterranean, |Rotterdam, Leghorn, and Trieste, | 4| 1, 900 North of Europe Steam |African, | 4| 3, 200 Navigation Co. , | | | McIver's, |Liverpool and Mediterranean, | 10| 9, 000 " | " " Havre, | 2| 2, 000 Bibby's, |Liverpool and Mediterranean, | 11| 11, 700 Fowler's, | " " " | 6| 7, 500 Dixon's, | " " " | 4| 8, 800 Liverpool and Australian, | " and Australia, | 2| 7, 000 London " " |London and " | 4| 7, 500 African, | " Liverpool, and Africa, | 5| 5, 000 Union Screw Co. , |Southampton and Cape Good Hope, | 3| 1, 800 Luzo-Brazileira, |Lisbon and Brazil, | 4| 8, 000 Austrian Lloyds, |Very large Mediterranean | | Unknown |service, | | Messageries Impériales, |Mediterranean, Black Sea, | 50| "[L] |Levant, | | W. Hartlepool Steam Navigation|Hartlepool, Hamburg, and St. | 6| " Co. , |Petersburg, | | Danube Steam Navigation Co. , |Vienna, Galatz, and | 6| " |Constantinople, | | Hamburg and Spanish, |Hamburg, Southampton, and all | 2| 2, 000 |Spanish ports, | | East-India Company, |Suez and India, and the Bombay | 12| 11, 471 |Mail lines, | | Spanish and Cuban, |Cadiz, Havana, and Mexico, | 5| 9, 000 Companhia Brazileira, |Rio de Janeiro to the Amazon and| 7| 5, 500 |La Plata, | | Collins Company, |New-York and Liverpool, | 3| 9, 727 Havre Steam Navigation Co. , | " Southampton, and Havre, | 2| 4, 548 Cornelius Vanderbilt, | " " " Bremen, | 3| 6, 523 United States Mail Steamship |New-York, Havana, Aspinwall, & | 6| 8, 544 Co. , |New-Orleans, | | Pacific Mail Steamship Co. , |Panamá, California, and Oregon, | 13| 16, 421 New-York and New-Orleans, |New-York, Havana, and | 2| 3, 198 | New-Orleans, | | New-York and Alabama, | " " " Mobile, | 1| 1, 300 Charleston and Havana, |Charleston, Key West, and | 1| 1, 115 |Havana, | | Savannah Steamship Co. , |New-York and Savannah, | 4| 4, 793 New-York and Charleston St. S. | " " Charleston, | 4| 4, 680 Co. , | | | " " Virginia, | " Norfolk, and Richmond, | 2| 2, 371 Philadelphia and Savannah, |Philadelphia and Savannah, | 2| 2, 600 Boston and Baltimore, |Boston and Baltimore, | 2| 1, 600 Texas Steamship Co. , |New-Orleans and Galveston, | 4| 2, 400 Southern Steamship Co. , | " " Key West, | 2| 1, 000 Mexican Steamship Co. , | " Tampico and Vera Cruz, | 1| 960 ------------------------------+--------------------------------+------+-------- [K] Building another steamer of 2, 500 tons for the Brazil line. [L] These vessels average about 250 horses' power each. Their tonnageis large, probably 1, 200 tons each. There are several other lines of ocean steamers in Europe; but it isalmost impossible to ascertain anything definite about them. The listabove embraces all of the most important companies of the world. Thelines are continually changing, while the vessels are passing into newhands almost every week. PAPER G. The following official letter from Hon. Horatio King explains itself. Post-Office Department, } Washington, Nov. 12, 1857. } Sir: In answer to your letter of 10th inst. , I have to inform you, that the ocean mail steamship lines now under contract with the Government for the conveyance of mails, are as follows, namely: 1. The New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, performing twenty round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $385, 000. Length of route, 3, 100 miles. 2. The New-York and Bremen Line, _viâ_ Southampton, performing thirteen round trips per annum, for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea and inland. ) Length of route, 3, 700 miles. 3. The New-York and Havre Line, _viâ_ Southampton, performing thirteen round trips per annum for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea and inland. ) Length of route, 3, 270 miles. 4. The New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, performing twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $290, 000. Length of routes 2, 000 miles from New-York to Aspinwall _direct_; 2, 000 miles from New-York to New-Orleans _viâ_ Havana; and 1, 200 miles from Havana to Aspinwall; making in all, 5, 200 miles. 5. The Astoria, San Francisco, and Panama Line, performing twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $348, 250. Length of route, 4, 200 miles. 6. The Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana Line, performing twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $60, 000. Length of route, 669 miles. 7. The New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, performing twenty-four round trips per annum, at $1, 210. 93 the round trip. Length of route, 900 miles. The contracts on these lines expire as follows, namely: New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, 27th April, 1860. New-York and Bremen Line, 1st June, 1858. New-York and Havre Line, 1st June, 1858. New-York, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, 1st Oct. , 1859. Astoria and Panama Line, 1st Oct. , 1858. Charleston and Havana Line, 30th June, 1859. New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, 30th June, 1858. I am very respectfully your obedient servant, HORATIO KING. To DR. THOMAS RAINEY. PAPER H. THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND AMERICAN NAVIES. The following list is kindly furnished me by Hon. Wm. A. Harris, ofWashington. The French list is taken from the "_Tableau General desBatiments a Voiles et a Vapeur composant les Flottes de la MarineImpériale Francaise_. " SAILING VESSELS. SHIPS OF 120 GUNS. --Ocean, Friedland, Ville de Paris, Valmy. SHIPS OF 100 GUNS. --Hercule, Temmasses, Tage Turenne. SHIPS OF 90 GUNS. --Jena, Suffren, Bayard, Breslau, Hector, Achille, Eole, Santi-Petri, Tilsitt, Sceptic, Castiglione. SHIPS OF 86 GUNS. --Diademe, Neptune, Jupiter. SHIPS OF 82 GUNS. --Marengo, Trident, Ville de Marsailles, Alger, Triton, Duperre, Genereux, Latour d'Auvergne, Saint-Louis. FRIGATES OF 60 GUNS. --Iphigenie, Independante, Didon, Uranie, Belle-Poulle, Surveillante, Andromaque, Forte, Minerve, Melpomene, Perseverante, Renomme, Vengeance, Etrepienante, Victoire, Semiramis, Guerrierre, Pallas, Semillante. FRIGATES OF 52 GUNS. --Alceste, Calypso, Sirene, Atlante, Andromede, Nereide, Zenobie, Sybille. FRIGATES OF 50 GUNS. --Reine Blanche, Cleopatre, Danae, Virginie, Poursuivante, Pandore, Nemesis, Bellonné, Amazone, Astrée, Junon, Hermione, Dryade, Circe, Flore. FRIGATES OF 46 GUNS. --Thetis, Armide, Grigone, Margicienne, Africane, Penelope, Médee. FRIGATES OF 40 GUNS. --Constitution, Psyche, Clorinde, Heliopolis, Jeanne d'Arc, Algerie, Resolue, Tiris, Ceres, Armorique. CORVETTES OF 30 GUNS. --Ariane, Thisbe, Heroïne, Alemene, Embuscade, Sabine, Aventure, Favorite, Jeanne-Hochette, Corneline, Circe, Cybele. CORVETTES OF 28 GUNS. --Arethuse, Bayonnaise, Arthemise, Galatée, Serieuse, Eurydice, Capricieuse, Constantine. CORVETTES OF 24 GUNS. --Brillante, Naide, Creole, Danaide, Triomphante. CORVETTES OF 20 GUNS. --Camille, Bergere, Iguala, Coquette, Echo. CORVETTES OF 16 GUNS. --Diligente, Cornelie, Egle, Perle, Oritie. CORVETTES OF 14 GUNS. --Astrolabe, Zélee, Prevoyante, Expeditive, Recherche, Active, Indienne, Sarcelle, Prudente, Indefatigable, Emulation. BRIGS OF 20 GUNS. --Ducouedic, Palinure, Cygene, Alcibiade, Adonis, Hussard, Chasseur, Griffon, d'Hassar, Meleagre, Acteon, Bisson, Lapeirousse, Cassard, Oreste, Pylade, Nisus, Euryale, Beaumanvir, Chevert, Droupot, Alacryti, Voltigeur. BRIGS OF 18 GUNS. --Mercure, Dragon, Faune, Genie, Faucon, Grenadier, Entreprenant, Fanfaron, Janus, Victor, Olivier, Zebre, Obligardo, Alerte, Cuirassier. BRIGS OF 10 GUNS. --Volage, Surprise, Fleche, Alcyon, Comete, Sylphe, Dupetit-Lhouars, Bougainville, Argus, Fabert, Lutin, Cerf, Messaeer, Papillon, Rossignol, Agile, Geyer, Inconstant, Zephir, Railleur, Russee, Lynx. BRIGS OF 8 GUNS. --Allouette, Alsacienne, Malouine, Tactique, Virgie, Eglantine, Panthere. CORVETTES DE CHARGE 32 GUNS, 800 HORSE POWER. --Proserpine, Adour, Abondante, Oise, Caravane, Allier, Agathe, Fortune, Aube, Egerie, Rhin, Somme, Meurthe, Mosselle. SLOOPS OF 28 GUNS, 600 TONS. --Perdrix, Loire, Provencale, Marsouin. SLOOPS OF 20 GUNS, 550 TONS. --Robuste, Giraffe, Chandernagor, Cormoran. SLOOPS OF 16 GUNS, 300 TONS. --Hecla, Dore, Cyclope, Vulcain, Lamproie, Volcan, Bucephale, Licome, Lezard, Mahe, Lionne. SLOOPS OF 12 GUNS, 200 TONS. --Anna, Pintado, Menagere. SLOOPS OF 8 GUNS, 150 TONS. --Pourvoyeur, Seudre. SLOOPS OF 6 GUNS, 90 TONS. --Vigilant, Pilote, Ile d'Oleron, Mayottais. SCHOONERS OF 6 GUNS. --Merange, Estafete, Gazelle, Hirondelle, Topaze, Beaucir, Euroquoise, Décidée, Jouvencelle, Tonguille, Amaranthe, Fauvette, Legere, Encelade, Etoile, Fine, Doris, Brestoise, Mouche, Bella Helene, Eugenie, Tafne, Parisienne, Gentille, Ibir, Mignonne, Souris, Egle, Iris, Papeiti, Sultan, Agathe, Touronnaise, Daphne, Levrette, Bose, Dorade. CUTTERS OF 4 GUNS. --Rodeur, Furet, Moustique, Espeigle, Moutin, Favori, Levrier, Eperlan, Renard, Eclair, Goelund, Chamois, Emeraude, Esperance, Cupidon, Orglae, Aigle d'Or, Colibi, Antilope, Seybouse, Pluvier, Ecureuil, No. 1, Ecureuil, No. 2, Mirmidon, Capelan, Corvril, Boberach, Palmer, Belette, Colombe, Cigorle, Tafnal, Amiral, Papillon. SAILING SHIPS CHANGED INTO STEAMSHIPS. SHIPS OF 120 GUNS. --Montibello 650, Souverain 650, Desaix 650, Louis XIV. 650, Bretagne 960. SHIPS OF 100 GUNS. --Fleurus 650, Ulm 650, Dugay-Etains 650, Annibal 650, Eyleau 650, Prince Jerome 650, Navarin 650, Austerlitz 650, Wagram 650, Massena 650. SHIPS OF 90 GUNS. --Inflexible 450, Dugueschin 450, Donnawerth 600, Fontenoy 600, Charlemagne 450, Duquesne 450, Tourville 450, Alexandre 600, Jean-Bart 450. STEAM VESSELS. SHIPS OF 90 GUNS, 960 HORSE POWER. --Napoleon, Imperiel, Algesiras. FRIGATES OF 650 HORSE POWER. --Mogador, Isly. FRIGATES OF 540 HORSE POWER. --Descartes, Vauban. FRIGATES OF 450 HORSE POWER. --Gomer, Asmodee, Labrador, Magellan, Montezuma, Cacique, Panama, Eldorado, Pomone, Albatros, Sane, Orenoque, Ch. Columb, Canada, Ulloa, Darien, Caffarelli. MIXED FRIGATES--(New Construction. ) 800 HORSE POWER, 50 GUNS. --Imperatrice Eugenie, Indomitable, Foudre, Audacieuse. CORVETTES OF 400 HORSE POWER. --Infernal, Reine Hortense, Bertholet, Catinat, Rolland, Phlegeton, Laplace, Primaugnet, Dassas. CORVETTES OF 320 HORSE POWER. --Prony, Caton, Colbert. CORVETTES OF 300 HORSE POWER. --Patriote, Eumenide, Gorgone, Tanger, Coligny, Tisiphone. CORVETTES OF 220 HORSE POWER. --Espadon, Veloce, Lavoisier, Cameleon, Gassendi, Pluton, Archimede, Duchayla, Phoque, Elan, Caiman, Titan, Cassini, Chaptal, Newton. ADVICE VESSELS. OF 200 HORSE POWER. --Monette, Heron, Laborieux, Eclaireur, Phenix, Lucifer, Biche, Goeland, Promethee, Souffleur, Milan, Aigle, Megere, Sentinelle. OF 180 HORSE POWER. --Petrel, Reguin, Epervier, Dauphin. OF 160 HORSE POWER. --Ardent, Crocodile, Phare, Fulton, Meteore, Chimere, Vantour, Styx, Acheron, Cerbere, Tartare, Phæton, Cocyte, Tonnerre, Gregois, Grondeur, Euphrate, Tenare, Australie, Narval, Bruddon, Solon, Etna, Sesostris. OF 120 HORSE POWER. --Castor, Brazier, Flambeau, Vedette, Passe-Partout, Pelican, Ramier, Salamandre, Ariel, Daim, Flambart, Marceau. OF 100 HORSE POWER. --Anacreon, Averne, Tantale, Galilee. OF 80 HORSE POWER. --Galibi, Voyageur, Marabout, Alecton, Rubis, Eperlan. OF 60 HORSE POWER. --Antilope, Chacul, Liamone, Var. OF 40 HORSE POWER. --Grand-Bassam, Ebrie. OF 30 HORSE POWER. --Basilic, Serpent, Pinogouin, Guet n'Dar. OF 20 HORSE POWER. --Oyapock, Acbar. FLOATING BATTERIES. Devastation, Lave, Tonnate, Foudroyante. GUN BOATS. Stridente, Mitraille, Etincelle, Bombe, Eclair, Flamme, Alarme, Coulevaine, Doilleuse, Alerte, Meurtriere, Bourasque, Raffale, Fusee, Foudre, Fleche, Grenade, Mutine, Tourmente. MIXED TRANSPORTS. Ariege, Adour, Durance, Loiret, Gironde, Marne, Aube, Rhin, Charente, Nievre, Rhone, Tarn, Mosselle, Yonne, Saone, Loire, Isere, Dordogne, Allier, Meurthe, Finestere, Meuse, Oise, Somme, Garone. GENERAL RECAPITULATION. SAILING VESSELS. Guns. 31 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2, 866 61 frigates do do 3, 028 49 corvettes do do 1, 024 57 brigs do do 1, 006 14 corvettes de charge do do 448 28 sloops do do 444 38 schooners do do 228 33 cutters do do 132 --- ----- 317 sailing vessels, carrying a grand aggregate of 9, 176 STEAM VESSELS. 27 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2, 680 21 frigates do do do 336 4 frigates, (new construction, ) do 200 34 corvettes of all sizes do 939 76 advice boats do do 456 4 floating batteries do 64 19 gun boats do 76 25 mixed transports do 150 --- ----- 220 steam vessels, mounting an aggregate of 4, 901 ORDINARY CLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 2 admirals in time of peace, and 3 in time of war; 13 vice admirals; 22 rear admirals; 113 captains of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 235 captains of frigates; 679 lieutenants of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 550 ensigns of ships; 109 midshipmen of 1st class; 165 midshipmen of the 2d class. With respect to the classes of midshipmen, the admiral minister of marine regulates yearly the number of young gentlemen who may be received in the service. According to the navy list for 1856, (July, ) the effective force of the navy of Great Britain was at that period: Guns. Sailing vessels, 269, carrying an aggregate of 9, 362 Steam vessels, 258 do do 4, 518 --- ------ Total, 527 do do 13, 880 The classification of officers was: In service. On half pay. Retired. Total. Admirals, 21 15 --- 36 Vice-admirals, 27 19 --- 46 Rear-admirals, 51 55 129 235 Captains of ships, 396 60 318 774 Commanders, 551 64 286 901 Lieutenants, 1, 139 668 --- 1, 807 NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES. SHIPS OF THE LINE, (10. ) ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Pennsylvania, | 120 | Philadelphia, | 1837 Columbus, | 80 | Washington, | 1819 Ohio, | 84 | New-York, | 1820 North-Carolina, | 84 | Philadelphia, | 1820 Delaware, | 84 | Norfolk, | 1820 Alabama, | 84 | | Virginia, | 84 | | Vermont, | 84 | Boston, | 1848 New-York, | 84 | | New-Orleans, | 84 | | ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- FRIGATES, (18. ) ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Independence, | 56 | Boston, | 1814 United States, | 50 | Philadelphia, | 1797 Constitution, | 50 | Boston, | 1797 Potomac, | 50 | Washington, | 1821 Brandywine, | 50 | Washington, | 1825 Columbia, | 50 | Washington, | 1836 Congress, | 50 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1841 Cumberland, | 50 | Boston, | 1842 Savannah, | 50 | New-York, | 1842 Raritan, | 50 | Philadelphia, | 1843 Santee, | 50 | | Sabine, | 50 | | St. Lawrence, | 50 | Norfolk, | 1847 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- SLOOPS OF WAR, (19. ) ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Constellation, | 22 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1854 Macedonian, | 22 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1836 Portsmouth, | 22 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1843 Plymouth, | 22 | Boston, | 1843 St. Mary's, | 22 | Washington, | 1844 Jamestown, | 22 | Norfolk, | 1844 Germantown, | 22 | Philadelphia, | 1846 Saratoga, | 20 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1842 John Adams, | 20 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1831 Vincennes, | 20 | New-York, | 1826 Falmouth, | 20 | Boston, | 1827 Vandalia, | 20 | Philadelphia, | 1828 St. Louis, | 20 | Washington, | 1828 Cyane, | 20 | Boston, | 1837 Levant, | 20 | New-York, | 1837 Decatur, | 16 | New-York, | 1839 Marion, | 16 | Boston, | 1839 Dale, | 16 | Philadelphia, | 1839 Preble, | 16 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1839 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- BRIGS, (3. ) ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Bainbridge, | 6 | Boston, | 1842 Perry, | 6 | Norfolk, | 1843 Dolphin, | 4 | New-York, | 1836 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- SCHOONER. ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Fenimore Cooper, | 3 | Purchased, | 1852 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- STEAMERS. _Screw Steamers, 1st class. _ ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Franklin, | 50 | | Merrimack, | 40 | Boston, | 1855 Wabash, | 40 | Philadelphia, | 1855 Minnesota, | 40 | Washington, | 1855 Roanoke, | 40 | Norfolk, | 1855 Colorado, | | | Niagara, | | | ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- _Screw Steamer, 2d class. _ ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- San Jacinto, | 13 | New-York, | 1850 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- _Screw Steamers, 3d class. _ ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Massachusetts, | 9 | Transferred from | | | War Dep't. | Princeton, | 10 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1851 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- _Side-wheel Steamers, 1st class. _ ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Mississippi, | 10 | Philadelphia, | 1841 Susquehanna, | 15 | Philadelphia, | 1850 Powhatan, | 9 | Norfolk, | 1850 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- _Side-wheel Steamer, 2d class. _ ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Saranac, | 6 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1848 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- _Side-wheel Steamers, 3d class. _ ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Michigan, | 1 | Erie, Pa. , | 1844 Fulton, | 5 | New-York, | 1837 Alleghany, | 10 | Pittsburgh, Pa. , | 1847 Water Witch, | 2 | Washington, | 1845 John Hancock, | 2 | Boston, | 1850 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- STEAM TENDERS. ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Despatch, | | Purchased, | 1855 Engineer | | Purchased, | Arctic, | | Purchased, | 1855 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- STORE-SHIPS. ----------------+-----+--------------------------- Name. |Rate. | Where | When | | built. | built. ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- Relief, | 6 | Philadelphia, | 1836 Supply, | 4 | Purchased, | 1846 Warren, | | Boston, | 1826 Fredonia, | 4 | Purchased, | 1846 Release, | 2 | Purchased, | 1855 ----------------+-----+-------------------+------- The United States Navy has 64 Captains, 96 Commanders, 311 Lieutenants, 69 Surgeons, 43 Passed Assistant Surgeons, 37 Assistant Surgeons, 64 Pursers, 24 Chaplains, 12 Mathematicians, 24 Masters, 24 Passed Midshipmen, 30 Midshipmen, and 145 Probationary Midshipmen and Students. --_Taken from the Navy Register of 1857. _ +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | TRANSCRIBERS NOTE. | | | | | | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected silently. | | | | Mathematical symbols in the original text have been transcribed | | as follows: | | ^ is used to represent 'to the power of' | | Square/cube root symbols have been written in words. | | ("The square root of . .. ") | | | | Tables have been reformatted as necessary to limit width of | | lines. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------------+