This file was produced from images generously made available by the CWRU Preservation Department Digital Library. MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR BY JACOB DOLSON COX, A. M. , LL. D. _Formerly Major-General commanding Twenty-Third Army Corps_ VOLUME II. NOVEMBER 1863-JUNE 1865 CONTENTS CHAPTER XXVII GRANT IN COMMAND--ROSECRANS RELIEVED Importance of unity in command--Inevitable difficulties in a doubleorganization--Burnside's problem different from that ofRosecrans--Co-operation necessarily imperfect--Growth of Grant'sreputation--Solid grounds of it--Special orders sent him--Voyage toCairo--Meets Stanton at Louisville--Division of the Mississippicreated--It included Burnside's and Rosecrans'sdepartments--Alternate forms in regard to Rosecrans--He isrelieved--Thomas succeeds him--Grant's relations to the change--Hisintellectual methods--Taciturnity--Patience--Discussions in hispresence--Clear judgments--His "good anecdote"--Rosecrans sendsGarfield to Washington--Congressman or General--Duplication ofoffices--Interview between Garfield and Stanton--Dana'sdispatches--Garfield's visit to me--Description of the rout ofRosecrans's right wing--Effect on the general--Retreat toChattanooga--Lookout Mountain abandoned--The President'sproblem--Dana's light upon it--Stanton's use of it--Grant'sacquiescence--Subsequent relations of Garfield andRosecrans--Improving the "cracker line"--Opening theTennessee--Combat at Wauhatchie. CHAPTER XXVIII SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE--END OF BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN Departments not changed by Grant--Sherman assigned to that of theTennessee--Burnside's situation and supplies--Hiscommunications--Building a railroad--Threatened from Virginia--Hisplans--Bragg sends Longstreet into East Tennessee--Theircross-purposes--Correspondence of Grant and Burnside--Dana andWilson sent to consult--Grant approves Burnside's course--Latterslowly retires on Knoxville--The place prepared for a siege--Combatat Campbell's station--Within the lines at Knoxville--Topography ofthe place--Defences--Assignment of positions--The forts--GeneralSanders killed--His self-sacrifice--Longstreet's lines ofinvestment--His assault of Fort Sanders--The combat--Therepulse--The victory at Missionary Ridge and results--Division ofConfederate forces a mistake--Grant sends Sherman to raise the siegeof Knoxville--East Tennessee a "horror"--Longstreet retreats towardVirginia--Sherman rejoins Grant--Granger's unwillingness toremain--General Foster sent to relieve Burnside--Criticism of thisact--Halleck's misunderstanding of the real situation--Grant's easycomprehension of it--His conduct in enlarged responsibility--GeneralHunter's inspection report. CHAPTER XXIX AFFAIRS IN DISTRICT OF OHIO--PLOT TO LIBERATE PRISONERS AT JOHNSON'SISLAND Administrative duties--Major McLean adjutant-general--His loyaltyquestioned--Ordered away--Succeeded by Captain Anderson--RobertAnderson's family--Vallandigham canvass--Bounty-jumping--Action ofU. S. Courts--of the local Probate Court--Efforts to provokecollision--Interview with the sheriff--Letter to GovernorTod--Shooting soldiers in Dayton--The October election--Greatmajority against Vallandigham--The soldier vote--Wish for fieldservice--Kinglake's Crimean War--Its lessons--Confederate plots inCanada--Attempt on military prison at Johnson's Island--Assemblingmilitia there--Fortifying Sandusky Bay--Inspection of theprison--Condition and treatment of the prisoners. CHAPTER XXX A WINTER RIDE ON THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS Ordered to East Tennessee--Preparation for a long ride--A smallparty of officers--Rendezvous at Lexington, Ky. --Changes in mystaff--The escort--A small train--A gay cavalcade--The blue-grasscountry--War-time roads--Valley of the Rockcastle--Quarters for thenight--London--Choice of routes-Longstreet in the way--A turnsouthward--Williamsburg--Meeting Burnside--Fording theCumberland--Pine Mountain--A hard pull--Teamsters' chorus--Big CreekGap--First view of East Tennessee--Jacksboro--A forty-miletrot--Escape from unwelcome duty--In command of Twenty-thirdCorps--The army-supply problem--Siege bread--Starvedbeef--Burnside's dinner to Sherman. CHAPTER XXXI WINTER BIVOUACS IN EAST TENNESSEE Blain's Cross-roads--Hanson's headquarters--A heartywelcome--Establishing field quarters--Tents and houses--A goodquartermaster--Headquarters' business--Soldiers' camps--Want ofclothing and shoes--The rations--Running the countrymills--Condition of horses and mules--Visit to Opdycke's camp--AChristmas dinner--Veteran enlistments--Patriotic spirit--Detachmentat Strawberry Plains--Concentration of corps there--Camp on aknoll--A night scene--Climate of the valley--Affair at MossyCreek--New Year's blizzard--Pitiful condition of thetroops--Patience and courage--Zero weather. CHAPTER XXXII GRANT'S VISIT--THE DANDRIDGE AFFAIR Grant at Knoxville--Comes to Strawberry Plains--A gathering atParke's quarters--Grant's quiet manner--No conversationaldiscussion--Contrast with Sherman--Talk of cadet days--Grant'sriding-school story--No council of war--Qualities of hisdispatches--Returns by Cumberland Gap--Longstreet'ssituation--Destitution of both armies--Railroad repairs and improvedservice--Light-draught steamboats--Bridges--Cattle herds on theway--Results of Grant's inspection tour--Foster's movement toDandridge on the French Broad--Sheridan--His qualities--AugustWillich--Hazen--His disagreement with Sheridan--Its causes andconsequences--Combat at Dandridge--A mutual surprise--Sheridan'sbridge--An amusing blunder--A consultation in Dandridge--Sturgis'stoddy--Retreat to Strawberry Plains--A hard night march--A roughday--An uncomfortable bivouac--Concentration towardKnoxville--Rumors of reinforcement of Longstreet--Expectation ofanother siege--The rumors untrue. CHAPTER XXXIII WINTER QUARTERS IN EAST TENNESSEE--PREPARATIONS FOR a NEW CAMPAIGN Sending our animals to Kentucky--Consultations--Affair with enemy'scavalry--Roughing it--Distribution of troops--Cavalry engagement atSevierville--Quarters in Knoxville--Leading Loyalists--Social anddomestic conditions--Discussion of the spring campaign--Of Foster'ssuccessor--Organization of Grant's armies--Embarrassments inassignment of officers to duty--Discussion of the system-Ciphertelegraphing--Control of the key--Grant's collision withStanton--Absurdity of the War Department's method--General Stonemanassigned to Twenty-third Corps--His career and character--GeneralSchofield succeeds to the command of the Department of the Ohio. CHAPTER XXXIV SCHOFIELD IN EAST TENNESSEE---DUTIES AS CHIEF OF STAFF--FINALOPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY Fresh reports of Longstreet's advance--They are unfounded--Grant'swish to rid the valley of the enemy--Conference withFoster--Necessity for further recuperation of the army--Continuanceof the quiet policy--Longstreet's view of the situation--Hissuggestions to his government--He makes an advance again-Variousdemonstrations--Schofield moves against Longstreet--My appointmentas chief of staff in the field--Organization of the activecolumn--Schofield's purposes--March to Morristown--Going the GrandRounds--Cavalry outpost--A sleepy sentinel--Return to NewMarket--Once more at Morristown--Ninth Corps sent East--GrantLieutenant-General--Sherman commands in the West--Study of plans ofcampaign--My assignment to Third Division, Twenty-thirdCorps--Importance of staff duties--Colonel Wherry and MajorCampbell--General Wood--Schofield and the politicians--Post atBull's Gap--Grapevine telegraph--Families going through thelines--Local vendetta--The Sanitary Commission--Rendezvous assignedby Sherman--Preliminary movements--Marching to Georgia--A springcamp on the Hiwassee--The Atlanta campaign begun. CHAPTER XXXV GRANT, HALLECK, AND SHERMAN--JOHNSTON AND MR. DAVIS Grant's desire for activity in the winter--Scattering tolive--Subordinate movements--The Meridian expedition--Use of theMississippi--Sherman's estimate of it--Concentration to be made inthe spring--Grant joins the Potomac Army--Motives in doing so--Meadeas an army commander--Halleck on concentration--North Carolinaexpedition given up--Burnside to join Grant--Old relations ofSherman and Halleck--Present cordial friendship--Frankcorrespondence--The supply question--Railway administration--Bridgedefences--Reduction of baggage--Tents--Sherman on spies anddeserters--Changes in Confederate army--Braggrelieved--Hardee--Beauregard--Johnston--Davis's suggestion ofplans--Correspondence with Johnston--Polk'smediation--Characteristics--Bragg's letters--Lee writesLongstreet--Johnston's dilatory discussion--No results--Longstreetjoins Lee--Grant and Sherman have the initiative--Prices in theConfederacy. CHAPTER XXXVI ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: DALTON AND RESACA The opposing forces--North Georgiatriangle--Topography--Dalton--Army of the Ohio entersGeorgia--Positions of the other armies--Turning Tunnel Hill--Firstmeeting with Sherman--Thomas--Sherman's plan as toDalton--McPherson's orders and movement--Those of Thomas andSchofield--Hopes of a decisive engagement--Thomas attacks north endof Rocky Face--Opdycke on the ridge--Developing Johnston'slines--Schofield's advance on 9th May--The flanking march throughSnake Creek Gap--Retiring movement of my division--Passinglines--Johnston's view of the situation--Use of temporaryintrenchments and barricades--Passing the Snake Creek defile-CampCreek line--A wheel in line--Rough march of left flank--Battle ofResaca--Crossing Camp Creek--Storming Confederate line--My divisionrelieved by Newton's--Incidents--Further advance of leftflank--Progress of right flank--Johnston retreats. CHAPTER XXXVII ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: ADVANCE TO THE ETOWAH Tactics modified by character of the country--Use of thespade--Johnston's cautious defensive--Methods of Grant andSherman--Open country between Oostanaula and Etowah--Movement inseveral columns--Sherman's eagerness--Route of left wing--OfMcPherson on the right--Necessity of exact system in suchmarches--Route of Twenty-third Corps--Hooker gets in the way--Delaysoccasioned--Closing in on Cassville--Our commandingposition--Johnston's march to Cassville--His order to fightthere--Protest of Hood and Polk--Retreat over the Etowah--Shermancrosses near Kingston--My reconnoissance to the Allatoonacrossing--Destruction of iron works and mills--Marching withoutbaggage--Barbarism of war--Desolation it causes--Changes in ourcorps organization--Hascall takes Judah's division--Our place ofcrossing the Etowah--Interference again--Kingston the newbase--Rations--Camp coffee. CHAPTER XXXVIII ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: NEW HOPE CHURCH AND THE KENNESAW LINES Sherman's plan for June--Movements of 24th May-Johnston's positionat Dallas and New Hope Church--We concentrate to attack--Pickett'sMill--Dallas--Flanking movements--Method developed by the characterof the country--Closer personal relations to Sherman--TurningJohnston's right--Crossroads at Burnt Church-A tangledforest--Fighting in a thunderstorm--Sudden freshet--Bivouac in athicket---Johnston retires to a new line--Formidable character ofthe old one--Sherman extends to the railroad on our left--Blair'scorps joins the army--General Hovey's retirement--The principlesinvolved--Politics and promotions. CHAPTER XXXIX ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: MARIETTA LINES--CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE Continuous rains in June--Allatoona made a field depot on therailway and fortified--Johnston in the Marietta lines--That fromPine Mountain to Lost Mountain abandoned--Swinging our rightflank--Affair at Kolb's farm--Preparing for a general attack--Battleof Kennesaw-The tactical problem--Work of my division--Topographyabout Cheney's--Our advance on the 27th--Nickajack valleyreached--The army moves behind us--Johnston retreats to theChattahoochee--Twenty-third Corps at Smyrna Camp-ground--Crossingthe Chattahoochee at Soap Creek--At Roswell--Johnston againretreats--Correspondence with Davis--Mission of B. H. Hill--Visit ofBragg to Johnston--Johnston's unfortunate reticence--He is relievedand Hood placed in command--Significance of the change to theConfederacy and to us. CHAPTER XL HOOD'S DEFENCE OF ATLANTA--RESULTS OF ITS CAPTURE Lines of supply by field trains--Canvas pontoons--Why replaced bybridges--Wheeling toward Atlanta--Battle of Peachtree Creek--Battleof Atlanta--Battle of Ezra Church--Aggressive spirit of Confederatesexhausted--Sherman turns Atlanta by the south--Pivot position ofTwenty-third Corps--Hood's illusions--Rapidity of our troops inintrenching--Movements of 31st August--Affair at Jonesboro--Atlantawon--Morale of Hood's army--Exaggerating difference innumbers--Examination of returns--Efforts to bring backabsentees--The sweeping conscription--Sherman's candidestimates--Unwise use of cavalry--Forrest's work--Confederateestimate of Sherman's campaign. CHAPTER XLI THE REST AT ATLANTA--STAFF ORGANIZATION AND CHANGES Position of the Army of the Ohio at Decatur--Refitting for a newcampaign--Depression of Hood's army--Sherman's reasons for atemporary halt--Fortifying Atlanta as a new base--Officers detailedfor the political campaign-Schofield makes inspection tour of hisdepartment--My temporary command of the Army of the Ohio--Furloughsand leaves of absence--Promotions of several colonels--GeneralHascall resigns--Staff changes--My military family--Anecdote ofLieutenant Tracy--Discipline of the army--Sensitiveness to approvalor blame--Illustration--Example of skirmishing advance--Sufferingsof non-combatants within our lines--A case in point--Pillaging andits results--Citizens passing through the lines--"The rigors of theclimate"--Visit of Messrs. Hill and Foster--McPherson's death--Theloss to Sherman and to the army--His personal traits--Appointment ofhis successor. CHAPTER XLII CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER--HOOD MOVES UPON OUR COMMUNICATIONS Hood's plan to transfer the campaign to northern Georgia--Madepartly subordinate to Beauregard--Forrest on a raid--Sherman makeslarge detachments--Sends Thomas to Tennessee--Hood across theChattahoochee--Sherman follows--Affair at Allatoona--Planning theMarch to the Sea--Sherman at Rome--Reconnoissance down theCoosa--Hood at Resaca--Sherman in pursuit--Hood retreats down theChattooga valley--We follow in two columns--Concentrate atGaylesville--Beauregard and Hood at Gadsden--Studying thesituation--Thomas's advice--Schofield rejoins--Conference regardingthe Twenty-third Corps--Hood marches on Decatur--His explanation ofchange of plan--Sherman marches back to Rome--We are ordered to joinThomas--Hood repulsed at Decatur marches to Tuscumbia--Our own marchbegun--Parting with Sherman--Dalton--Chattanooga--Presidentialelection--Voting by steam--Retrospect of October camp-life--Campsports--Soldiers' pets--Story of a lizard. CHAPTER XLIII NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN--HOOD'S ADVANCE FROM THE TENNESSEE Schofield to command the army assembled at Pulaski--Forrest'sTennessee River raid--Schofield at Johnsonville--My division atThompson's--Hastening reinforcements to Thomas--Columbia--Thebarrens--Pulaski--Hood delays--Suggests Purdy as a base--He advancesfrom Florence--Our march to Columbia--Thomas's distribution of theforces--Decatur evacuated--Pontoon bridge there--Withdrawing fromColumbia--Posts between Nashville and Chattanooga--The cavalry on29th November--Their loss of touch with the army. CHAPTER XLIV NASHVILLE-HOOD'S ARMY ROUTED Defensive works of Nashville--Hood's lines--The iceblockade--Halleck on remounts for cavalry--Pressing horses and itsabuse--The cavalry problem--Changes in organization--Assignment ofGeneral Couch--Confederate cavalry at Nashville--Counter-movementsof our own--Detailed movements of our right--Difference ofrecollection between Schofield and Wilson--The fielddispatches--Carrying Hood's works--Confederate rout. CHAPTER XLV PURSUIT OF HOOD--END OF THE CAMPAIGN Night after the battle--Unusual exposure--Hardships of companyofficers--Bad roads--Halt at Franklin--Visiting thebattlefield--Continued pursuit--Decatur reoccupied--Hood at Tupelo, Miss. --Summary of captures--Thomas suggests winter-quarters--Grantorders continued activity--Schofield's proposal to move the corps tothe East--Grant's correspondence with Sherman--Schofield'ssuggestion adopted--Illness--I ask for "sick-leave"--Do not useit--Promotion--Reinforcements--March from Columbia toClifton--Columns on different roads--Western part of thebarrens--Fording Buffalo River--An illumined camp--Dismay of thefarmer--Clifton on the Tennessee--Admiral Lee--Methods oftransport--Weary waiting--Private grumbling--Ordered East--Revulsionof spirits--On the transport fleet--Thomas's frame of mind at closeof the campaign. CHAPTER XLVI CAMPAIGN IN NORTH CAROLINA--CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON Rendezvous at Washington--Capture of Fort Fisher--Schofield orderedto North Carolina--Grant and Schofield visit Terry--Department ofNorth Carolina--Army of the Ohio in the field--Correspondence ofGrant and Sherman--Sherman conscious of his risks but hopeful ofgreat results--His plan of march from Savannah--Relation ofWilmington to New Berne--Our arrival at Washington--The Potomacfrozen--Peace conference at Fort Monroe--Interview with Mr. Stanton--The thirteenth amendment of the Constitution--Politicalexcitement at the capital--A little dinner-party--Garfield, H. W. Davis, and Schenck--Davis on Lincoln--Destination of ourarmy--Embarkation--Steamship "Atlantic"--Visit to Fort Monroe--Thesea-voyage--Cape Fear Inlet--General Terry's lines--Bragg theConfederate commander--Reconnoitring his lines--The coloredtroops--"Monitor" engaged with Fort Anderson--Alternateplans--Marching on Wilmington by the west bank of the river--Mycolumn opposite the town--Orders not applicable to thesituation--Difficulty of communication--Use ofdiscretion--Wilmington evacuated--A happy result. CHAPTER XLVII THE CONFEDERACY IN STRAITS--JOHNSTON COMMANDS IN THE CAROLINAS--OUROPERATIONS FROM NEW BERNE--BATTLE OF KINSTON The Confederates lose Charleston and Columbia--Facing acrisis--Hopeless apathy of Southern people--Mr. Davis'sperplexity--Beauregard startles him--Lee calls Johnston tocommand--Personal relations of leading officers--Dwindlingarmies--The cavalry--Assignments of generals--The Beaufort and NewBerne line--Am ordered to New Berne--Provisional corps--Advance tocover railway building--Dover and Gum swamps--Bragg concentrates tooppose us--Position near Kinston--Bragg's plan of attack--Our ownmovements--Condition of railroad and river--Our advance to Wise'sForks and Southwest Creek--Precautions--Conference withSchofield--Battle of Kinston--Enemy attack our left front--Rout ofUpham's brigade--Main line firm--Ruger's division reaches the fieldEnemy repulsed--End of first day's fight--Extending our trenches onthe left--Sharp skirmishing of the 9th--Bragg's reinforcements--Hisattack of the 10th--Final repulse and retreat of the enemy. CHAPTER XLVIII JUNCTION WITH SHERMAN AT GOLDSBOROUGH--THE MARCH ONRALEIGH--CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES Occupation of Kinston--Opening of Neuse River--Rebel ramdestroyed--Listening to the distant battle at Bentonville--EnteringGoldsborough--Meeting Sherman--Grant's congratulations--His ownplans--Sketch of Sherman's march--Lee and Johnston'scorrespondence--Their gloomy outlook--Am made commandant ofTwenty-third Corps--Terry assigned to Tenth--Schofield promoted inthe Regular Army--Stanton's proviso--Ill effects of living on thecountry--Stopping it in North Carolina--Camp jubilee over the fallof Richmond--Changes in Sherman's plans--Our march onSmithfield--House-burning--News of Lee's surrender--Overtures fromGovernor Vance--Entering Raleigh--A mocking-bird's greeting--Furthernegotiations as to North Carolina--Johnston proposes anarmistice--Broader scope of negotiations--The Southern people desirepeace--Terrors of non-combatants assuaged--News of Lincoln'sassassination--Precautions to preserve order--The dawn of peace. CHAPTER XLIX THE SHERMAN-JOHNSTON CONVENTION Sherman's earlier views of the slavery question--Opinions in1864--War rights vs. Statesmanship--Correspondence withHalleck--Conference with Stanton at Savannah--Letter to GeneralRobert Anderson--Conference with Lincoln at City Point--First effectof the assassination of the President--Situation on the Confederateside--Davis at Danville--Cut off from Lee--Goes toGreensborough--Calls Johnston to conference--Lee's surrender--TheGreensborough meeting--Approach of Stoneman's cavalry raid--Vance'sdeputation to Sherman--Davis orders their arrest--Vance asserts hisloyalty--Attempts to concentrate Confederate forces on theGreensborough-Charlotte line--Cabinet meeting--Overthrow of theConfederacy acknowledged--Davis still hopeful--Yields to thecabinet--Dictates Johnston's letter to Sherman--Sherman'sreply--Meeting arranged--Sherman sends preliminary correspondence toWashington--The Durham meeting--The negotiations--Two points ofdifficulty--Second day's session--Johnston's power to promise thedisbanding of the civil government--The terms agreedupon--Transmittal letters--Assembling the Virginialegislature--Sherman's wish to make explicit declaration of the endof slavery--The assassination affecting public sentiment--Sherman'spersonal faith in Johnston--He sees the need of modifying theterms--Grant's arrival. CHAPTER L THE SECOND SHERMAN-JOHNSTON CONVENTION--SURRENDER Davis's last cabinet meeting--Formal opinions approving the"Basis"--"The Confederacy is conquered"--Grant brings disapprovalfrom the Johnston administration--Sherman gives notice of thetermination of the truce--No military disadvantage fromit--Sherman's vindication of himself--Grant's admirableconduct--Johnston advises Davis to yield--Capitulation assented to, but a volunteer cavalry force to accompany Davis's flight--A newconference at Durham--Davis's imaginary treasure--Grant's return toWashington--Terms of the parole given by Johnston's army--Thecapitulation complete--Schofield and his army to carry out thedetails--The rest of Sherman's army marches north--His farewell toJohnston--Order announcing the end of the war--Johnston's finereply--Stanton's strange dispatch to the newspapers--Its tissue oferrors--Its baseless objections--Sherman'sexasperation--Interference with his military authority over hissubordinates--Garbling Grant's dispatch--Sherman strikesback--Breach between Sherman and Halleck--It also grew out of thepublished matter--Analysis of the facts--My opinion as recorded atthe time. CHAPTER LI PAROLING AND DISBANDING JOHNSTON'S ARMY--CLOSING SCENES OF THE WARIN NORTH CAROLINA General Schofield's policy when left in command--Lincoln'sEmancipation Proclamation in force--Davis's line of flight fromCharlotte, N. C. --Wade Hampton's course of conduct--Fate of thecabinet officers--Bragg, Wheeler, and Cooper--Issuing paroles toJohnston and his army--Greensborough in my district--Going therewith Schofield--Hardee meets and accompanies us--Comparingmemories--We reach Johnston's headquarters--Condition of hisarmy--Our personal interview with him--The numbers of histroops--His opinion of Sherman's army--Of the murder ofLincoln--Governor Morehead's home--The men in gray marchhomeward--Incident of a flag--The Salisbury prison site--Treatmentof prisoners of war--Local government in the interim--Unionmen--Elements of new strife--The negroes--Household service--Wisedealing with the labor question--No money--Death ofmanufactures--Necessity the mother of invention--Uses ofadversity--Peace welcomed--Visit to Greene's battle-field atGuilford-Old-Court-House. APPENDIX C INDEX MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR CHAPTER XXVII GRANT IN COMMAND--ROSECRANS RELIEVED Importance of unity in command--Inevitable difficulties in a doubleorganization--Burnside's problem different from that ofRosecrans--Cooperation necessarily imperfect--Growth of Grant'sreputation--Solid grounds of it--Special orders sent him--Voyage toCairo--Meets Stanton at Louisville--Division of the Mississippicreated--It included Burnside's and Rosecrans'sdepartments--Alternate forms in regard to Rosecrans--He isrelieved--Thomas succeeds him--Grant's relations to the change--Hisintellectual methods--Taciturnity--Patience--Discussions in hispresence--Clear judgments--His "good anecdote"--Rosecrans sendsGarfield to Washington--Congressman or General--Duplication ofoffices--Interview between Garfield and Stanton--Dana'sdispatches--Garfield's visit to me--Description of the rout ofRosecrans's right wing--Effect on the general--Retreat toChattanooga--Lookout Mountain abandoned--The President'sproblem--Dana's light upon it--Stanton's use of it--Grant'sacquiescence--Subsequent relations of Garfield andRosecrans--Improving the "cracker line"--Opening theTennessee--Combat at Wauhatchie. It is very evident that, at the close of September, Mr. Lincoln andMr. Stanton had become satisfied that a radical change must be madein the organization of the Western armies. The plan of sendingseparate armies to co-operate, as Rosecrans's and Burnside's hadbeen expected to do, was in itself vicious. It is, after a fashion, an attempt of two to ride a horse without one of them riding behind. Each will form a plan for his own army, as indeed he ought to do, and when one of them thinks the time has come for help from theother, that other may be out of reach or committed to operationswhich cannot readily be dropped. It is almost axiomatic that in anyone theatre of operations there must be one head to direct. [Footnote: Napoleon used to ridicule the vicious practice ofsubdividing armies in the same theatre of war. He called it puttingthem up in small parcels, "_des petits paquets_. " Memoirs of GouvionSt. -Cyr, vol. Iv. ] In the present case it ought to have been evidentto the authorities at Washington that as soon as Burnside occupiedEast Tennessee, both distance and the peculiar conditions of hisproblem would forbid any efficient cooperation with Rosecrans. Thelatter was the junior in rank, and knew that, whatever might beBurnside's generosity, there were many possible contingencies insuch a campaign in which the War Department might find it the easysolution of a difficulty to direct the senior officer to assume thecommand of both armies. So long as matters went well, Rosecrans hadlittle or no communication with Burnside; but as soon as the enemybegan to show a bold front, he became impatient for assistance. Theperplexities of his own situation made him blind to those ofBurnside. This is human nature, and was, no doubt, true of both invarying degrees. Halleck, at Washington, was in no true sense acommander of the armies. He had given peremptory orders to advancein June and again in July, but when asked whether this relieved thesubordinate of responsibility and took away his discretion, couldmake no distinct answer. The unpleasant relations thus creatednecessarily affected the whole campaign. Halleck hesitated to advisea halt when he learned that Longstreet had gone to reinforce Bragg, and Rosecrans dreaded the blame of halting without such suggestion. So the battle had to be fought, and the ill consequences had to berepaired afterward as best they could. The official correspondence of the summer shows a constantly growingfaith in Grant. His great success at Vicksburg gave him fame andprestige, but there was beside this a specific effect produced onthe President and the War Department by his unceasing activity, hisunflagging zeal, his undismayed courage. He was as little inclinedto stop as they at Washington were inclined to have him. He was asready to move as they were to ask it, and anticipated their wish. Hetook what was given him and did the best he could with it. Theresult was that the tone adopted toward him was very different fromthat used with any other commander. It was confidently assumed thathe was doing all that was possible, and there was no disposition toworry him with suggestions or orders. When the operations in the Mississippi valley were reduced tosecondary importance by the surrender of Vicksburg, it was certainthat Grant would be called to conduct one of the great armies whichmust still make war upon the rebellion. In a visit to New Orleans toconsult with Banks, he had been lamed by a fractious horse and wasdisabled for some days. As soon as he was able to ride in anambulance he was on duty, and was assured by General Halleck thatplenty of work would be cut out for him as soon as he was fullyrecovered. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iv. P. 274. ]At the beginning of October he was ordered to take steamboat and goto Cairo, where he would find special instructions. This dispatchreached him on the 9th, and the same day he sailed for Cairo, arriving there on the 16th, when he learned that an officer of theWar Department would meet him at Louisville. Hastening to Louisvilleby rail, he met Mr. Stanton himself, who had travelled _incognito_from Washington. The Secretary of War produced the formal orderswhich had been drawn at the War Department creating the Division ofthe Mississippi, which included Rosecrans's, Burnside's, and his owndepartments, and put him in supreme command of all. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 404. ] The order was drawn in two forms, one relievingRosecrans and putting Thomas in command of the Department of theCumberland, and the other omitting this. After consultation with Mr. Stanton, the order relieving Rosecrans was issued and Grantpublished his own assumption of command. His staff had accompaniedhim, on a hint contained in an earlier dispatch, and after a dayspent with the Secretary of War (October 18-19) he immediatelyproceeded to Chattanooga. He was hardly able to mount a horse, andwhen on foot had to get about on crutches. It has been commonly assumed that the choice whether he would removeRosecrans was submitted to Grant as a personal question affectinghis relations with his subordinates, and that he decided it on theground of his dislike of Rosecrans. The records of the officialcorrespondence seem to me to show the fact rather to be thatRosecrans's removal was thought best by the Secretary, the doubtbeing whether Grant would prefer to retain him instead of meetingthe embarrassments incident to so important a change in theorganization of the beleaguered army. Grant was always disposed towork with the tools he had, and through his whole military careershowed himself averse to meddling much with the organization of hisarmy. He had strong likes and dislikes, but was very reticent of hisexpression of them. He would quietly take advantage of vacancies orof circumstances to put men where he wanted them, but very rarelymade sweeping reorganization. If any one crossed him or becameantagonistic without open insubordination, he would bear with ittill an opportunity came to get rid of the offender. He hated verbalquarrelling, never used violent language, but formed his judgmentsand bided his time for acting on them. This sometimes looked like alack of frankness, and there were times when a warm but honestaltercation would have cleared the air and removedmisunderstandings. It was really due to a sort of shyness which wascuriously blended with remarkable faith in himself. From behind hiswall of taciturnity he was on the alert to see what was withinsight, and to form opinions of men and things that rooted fast andbecame part of his mental constitution. He sometimes unbent andwould talk with apparent freedom and ease; but, so far as Iobserved, it was in the way of narrative or anecdote, and almostnever in the form of discussion or comparison of views. It used tobe said that during the Vicksburg campaign he liked to have Shermanand McPherson meet at his tent, and would manage to set them todiscussing the military situation. Sherman would be brilliant andtrenchant; McPherson would be politely critical and intellectual;Rawlins would break in occasionally with some blunt and vigorousopinion of his own: Grant sat impassable and dumb in his camp-chair, smoking; but the lively discussion stimulated his strongcommonsense, and gave him more assured confidence in the judgmentsand conclusions he reached. He sometimes enjoyed with a spice ofreal humor the mistaken assumption of fluent men that reticent oneslack brains. I will venture to illustrate it by an anecdote of adate subsequent to the war. One day during his presidency, he cameinto the room where his cabinet was assembling, quietly laughing tohimself. "I have just read, " said he, "one of the best anecdotes Ihave ever met. It was that John Adams after he had been Presidentwas one day taking a party out to dinner, at his home in Quincy, when one of his guests noticed a portrait over the door and said, 'You have a fine portrait of Washington there, Mr. Adams!' 'Yes, 'was the reply, 'and that old wooden head made his fortune by keepinghis mouth shut;'" and Grant laughed again with uncommon enjoyment. The apocryphal story gained a permanent interest in Grant's mouth, for though he showed no consciousness that it could have anyapplication to himself, he evidently thought that keeping the mouthshut was not enough in itself to ensure fortune, and at any rate wasnot displeased at finding such a ground of sympathy with the Fatherof his country. Grant's telling the story seemed to me, under thecircumstances, infinitely more amusing than the original. During the month which followed the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecranshad elaborated his report of the campaign. On the 15th of October heordered General Garfield to proceed to Washington with it and toexplain personally to the Secretary of the War and theGeneral-in-Chief the details of the actual condition of the army, its lines of communication, the scarcity of supplies and especiallyof forage for horses and mules, with all other matters which wouldassist the War Department in fully appreciating the situation. Garfield's term as member of Congress began with the 4th of Marchpreceding, but the active session would only commence on the firstMonday of December. There was some doubt as to the status of armyofficers who were elected to Congress. General Frank P. Blair hadbeen elected as well as Garfield, and it was in Blair's case thatthe issue was made by those who objected to the legality of whatthey called a duplication of offices. Later in the session ofCongress it was settled that the two commissions were incompatible, and that one must choose between them. Blair resigned his seat atWashington and returned to Sherman's army. Garfield, who had foundcamp life a cause of oft-recurring and severe disease of hisdigestive system, resigned his army commission and retained hisplace in Congress. When he left Rosecrans, however, he was stillhopeful that the two duties might be found consistent, and lookedforward to further military employment. On his way to Nashville, Garfield made a careful inspection of theroad to Jasper and Bridgeport, and reported it with recommendationsfor the improvement of the transportation service. He arrived atNashville on the 19th of October, and was met by the rumor that theSecretary of War and General Grant were at Louisville, and thatGrant would come down the road by special train next day. Hetelegraphed the news to Rosecrans with the significant question, What does it mean? Rosecrans knew what it meant, for Grant's orderassuming command and relieving him had been earlier telegraphed tohim, and he had already penned his dignified and appropriatefarewell order to the Army of the Cumberland. Mr. Stanton awaited Garfield's coming at Louisville, and there was afull and frank interview between them. The order relieving Rosecransended Garfield's official connection with him, and, even if it hadnot been so, it would have been his duty to make no concealments inanswering the earnest and eager cross-questioning of the Secretary. Mr. Stanton had not only had dispatches full of information fromGeneral Meigs, who now also met him at Louisville, but hisassistant, Mr. Charles A. Dana, had gone early to Chattanooga, hadbeen present at the battle of Chickamauga, and had there someperilous experiences of his own. Dana was still with Rosecrans, andhad sent to the Secretary a series of cipher dispatches giving avivid interior view of affairs and of men. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxx. Pt. I. Pp. 220, etc. ; vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 69-74, 265; pt. Ii. Pp. 52-70. ] The talented journalist had knownhow to give his communications the most lively effect, and they hadgreat weight with the Secretary. They were not always quite just, for they were written at speed under the spell of first impressions, and necessarily under the influence of army acquaintances in whom hehad confidence. There is, however, no evidence that he waspredisposed to judge harshly of Rosecrans, and the unfavorableconclusions he reached were echoed in Mr. Stanton's words and acts. [Footnote: Since this was written Mr. Dana has published hisRecollections, based on his dispatches, but the omissions make itstill important to read the originals. ] The Secretary of War wasconsequently prepared to show such knowledge of the battle ofChickamauga and the events which followed it, that it would beimpossible for Garfield to avoid mention of incidents which boreunfavorably upon Rosecrans. He might have been silent if Mr. Stantonhad not known so well how to question him, but when he found howfull the information of the Secretary was, his duty as a militarysubordinate coincided with his duty as a responsible member ofCongress, and he discussed without reserve the battle and itsresults. Mr. Stanton also questioned General Steedman, who was onhis way home, and wrote to his assistant in Washington for theinformation of the President, that his interview with these officersmore than confirmed the worst that had reached him from othersources as to the conduct of Rosecrans, and the strongest things hehad heard of the credit due to Thomas. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 684. ] Garfield came from Louisville to Cincinnati, where I was on duty atheadquarters of my district, and found me, as may easily bebelieved, full of intense interest in the campaign. I had been keptinformed of all that directly affected Burnside, my immediate chief, but my old acquaintance with Rosecrans and sincere personal regardfor him made me desire much more complete information touching hiscampaign than was given the public. Garfield's own relations to itwere hardly less interesting to me, and our intimacy was such thatour thoughts at that time were common property. He spent a day withme, and we talked far into the night, going over the chief points ofthe campaign and his interview with Mr. Stanton. His friendship forRosecrans amounted to warm affection and very strong personalliking. Yet I found he had reached the same judgment of his mentalqualities and his capacity as a commander which I had formed at anearlier day. Rosecrans's perceptions were acute and oftenintuitively clear. His fertility was great. He lacked poise, however, and the steadiness of will necessary to handle greataffairs successfully. Then there was the fatal defect of theliability to be swept away by excitement and to lose all efficientcontrol of himself and of others in the very crisis when completeself-possession is the essential quality of a great general. We sat alone in my room, face to face, at midnight, as Garfielddescribed to me the scene on the 20th of September on thebattlefield, when through the gap in the line made by the withdrawalof Wood's division the Confederates poured. He pictured theastonishment of all who witnessed it, the doubt as to the evidenceof their own senses; the effort of Sheridan further to the right tochange front and strike the enemy in flank; the hesitation of themen; the wavering and then the breaking of the right wing into apanic-stricken rout, each man running for life to the Dry Valleyroad, thinking only how he might reach Chattanooga before the enemyshould overtake him, officers and men swept along in that mosthopeless of mobs, a disorganized army. He described the effort ofRosecrans and the staff to rally the fugitives and to bring abattery into action, under a shower of flying bullets and crashingshells. It failed, for men were as deaf to reason in their mad panicas would be a drove of stampeded cattle. What was needed was a freshand well-organized division to cover the rout, to hold back theenemy, and to give time for rallying the fugitives. But no suchdivision was at hand, and the rush to the rear could not be stayed. The enemy was already between the headquarters group and Brannan'sdivision which Wood had joined, and these, throwing back the rightflank, were presenting a new front toward the west, whereLongstreet, preventing his men from pursuing too far, turned hisenergies to the effort to break the curved line of which Thomas atthe Snodgrass house was the centre. The staff and orderlies gathered about Rosecrans and tried to maketheir way out of the press. With the conviction that nothing morecould be done, mental and physical weakness seemed to overcome thegeneral. He rode silently along, abstracted, as if he neither sawnor heard. Garfield went to him and suggested that he be allowed totry to make his way by Rossville to Thomas, the sound of whosebattle seemed to indicate that he was not yet broken. Rosecransassented listlessly and mechanically. As Garfield told it to me, heleaned forward, bringing his excited face close to mine, and hishand came heavily down upon my knee as in whispered tones hedescribed the collapse of nerve and of will that had befallen hischief. The words burned themselves into my memory. Garfield called for volunteers to accompany him, but only a singleorderly with his personal aide-de-camp followed him; and he made hisway to the right, passed through the gap at Rossville, saw Granger, who was preparing to move Steedman's division to the front, and rodeon to join Thomas, running the gantlet of the enemy's fire as hepassed near them on the Kelley farm. He never tired of telling ofthe calm and quiet heroism of Thomas, holding his position on thehorse-shoe ridge till night put an end to the fighting, and thenretiring in perfect order to the Rossville Gap, to which he wasordered. This part of the story has been made familiar to all. Aneyewitness has told how, when Rosecrans reached Chattanooga, he hadto be helped from his horse. His nerves were exhausted by the strainhe had undergone, and only gradually recovered from the shock. [Footnote: Cist, The Army of the Cumberland, p. 226. ] His firstdispatch to Washington was the announcement that his army had metwith a serious disaster, the extent of which he could not himselftell. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. I. P. 142. ] Themost alarming feature of the news was that he was himself a dozenmiles from the battlefield and had evidently lost all control ofevents. The truth turned out to be that two divisions would includeall the troops that were broken, --namely, Sheridan's, two brigadesof Davis's, and one of Van Cleve's, --whilst seven other divisionsstood firm and Thomas assumed command of them. As these retired inorder, and as the enemy had suffered more in killed and wounded thanour army, Bragg was entitled to claim a victory only because thefield was left in his hands with large numbers of wounded andnumerous trophies of cannon. It was then claimed by some of our bestofficers, and is still an open question whether, if Rosecrans hadbeen with Thomas and, calling to him Granger's troops, had resumedthe offensive, the chances were not in our favor, and whether Braggmight not have been the one to retreat. Unfortunately there was no doubt that the general was defeated, whether his army was or not. The most cursory study of the mapshowed that the only practicable road by which the army could besupplied was along the river from Bridgeport. Lookout Mountaincommanded this; and not to hold Lookout was practically to announcea purpose to retreat into middle Tennessee. Dana informed theSecretary of War that Garfield and Granger had urged Rosecrans tohold the mountain, but that he would not listen to it. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. I. P. 215. ] He could much betterafford to intrench a division there than Bragg could, for theConfederates were tied to Mission Ridge by the necessity of coveringthe Atlanta Railroad, which was their line of supply, and any troopsput across the Chattanooga valley were in the air and likely to becut off if the long and thin line which connected them were broken. Had Lookout Mountain been held, Hooker could have come at once intohis place in line when he reached the Tennessee, and the reinforcedarmy would have been ready, as soon as it was rested and supplied, to resume an offensive campaign. Instead of this, the country wasfor a month tortured with the apprehension that the Army of theCumberland must retreat because it could not be fed by means of themountain road over Walden's Ridge. After the fortifications atChattanooga were strong enough to put the place beyond danger fromdirect assault, it would only be adding to the danger of starvationto send more men there before a better line of supply was opened. The problem which the President and Secretary of War pondered mostanxiously was the capacity and fitness of Rosecrans to conduct thenew campaign. Would he rise energetically to the height of the greattask, or would he sink into the paralysis of will which so longfollowed the battle of Stone's River? Dana's dispatches were studiedfor the light they threw on this question more than for all theother interesting details they contained. For the first three orfour days, they teemed with impressions of the battle itself and thecause of the disaster to the right wing. Then came the assurancethat Chattanooga was safe and could withstand a regular siege. Next, in logical order as in time, was the attempt to look into the futureand to estimate the commander by the way he grappled with thedifficulties of the situation. On the 27th of September Danadiscussed at some length the army feeling toward the corps anddivision commanders who had been involved in the rout, and theembarrassment of Rosecrans in dealing with the subject. "The defectsof his character, " he wrote, "complicate the difficulty. He aboundsin friendliness and approbativeness, and is greatly lacking infirmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man, dreads soheavy an alternative as is now presented. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxx. Pt. I p. 202. ] On the 12th of October he returnedto the subject of Rosecrans's characteristics, mentioning hisrefusal to listen to the urgent reasons why he should hold LookoutMountain to protect his supply line. "Rosecrans, " he said, "who issometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he isirresolute, vacillating, and inconclusive, rejected all theirarguments, and the mountain was given up. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxx. Pt. I. P. 215. ] Picturing the starvation of thehorses and mules and the danger of it for the soldiers, he added:"In the midst of this the commanding general devotes that part ofthe time which is not employed in pleasant gossip, to thecomposition of a long report to prove that the government is toblame for his failure. It is my duty to declare that while fewpersons exhibit more estimable social qualities, I have never seen apublic man possessing talent with less administrative power, lessclearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practicalincapacity than General Rosecrans. He has inventive fertility andknowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration ofpurpose. His mind scatters. There is no system in the use of hisbusy days and restless nights, no courage against individuals in hiscomposition, and with great love of command he is a feeblecommander. " [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] It needs no proof that such a report would have great influence atWashington, and if it at all harmonized with the drift ofimpressions caused by the inaction and the wrangling of the summer, it would be decisive. It was with it in his pocket that Mr. Stantonhad cross-questioned Garfield, and drew out answers which, as hesaid, corroborated it. The same correspondence had set forth theuniversal faith in Thomas's imperturbable steadiness and courage, and the admiring faith in him which had possessed the whole army. The natural and the almost necessary outcome of it all was thatThomas should be placed in command of the Department and Army of theCumberland, and Grant in supreme control of the active operations inthe whole valley of the Mississippi. As to Rosecrans's removal, Grant did not bring it about, he only acquiesced in it; willingly, no doubt, but without initiative or suggestion on his part. [Footnote: Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 18. ] It may be well here to say a word upon the subsequent relations ofGarfield and Rosecrans. In the next winter a joint resolution wasoffered in Congress thanking General Thomas and the officers and menunder his command for their conduct in the battle of Chickamauga. The established etiquette in such matters is to name the generalcommanding the army, whose services are recognized, and not hissubordinates; these are included in the phrase, "officers and menunder his command. " To omit Rosecrans's name and to substituteThomas's was equivalent to a public condemnation of the former. Garfield had been promoted to be major-general for his conduct inthe battle, and it was popularly understood that this meant hisspecial act in volunteering to make his way to Thomas afterRosecrans and the staff were swept along the Dry Valley road in therout. The promotion was recognized as a censure by implication onhis chief. As Garfield was now chairman of the committee of theHouse of Representatives on military affairs, he was placed in apeculiarly embarrassing position. His sincere liking for Rosecransmade him wish to spare him the humiliation involved in the passageof such a resolution, and his generosity was the more stimulated bythe knowledge that his own promotion had been used to emphasize theshortcoming of his friend. He could not argue that on thebattlefield itself there had been no faults committed; but he wasvery earnest in insisting that the general strategy of the campaignhad been admirable, and the result in securing Chattanooga as afortified base for future operations had been glorious. He thereforemoved to amend the resolution by inserting Rosecrans's name andmodifying the rest so as to make it apply to the campaign and itsresults. He supported this in an eloquent speech which dwelt uponthe admirable parts of Rosecrans's generalship and skilfully avoidedthe question of personal conduct on the field. He carried the Housewith him, but a joint resolution must pass the Senate also, and itnever came to a vote in that body. When in 1880 Garfield was elected President, and in the midst of aheated campaign had to run the gantlet of personal attacksinfinitely worse than the picket fire under which he had gallopedacross the Kelley farm, a letter was produced which he had writtento Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, in June, 1863, when he wasurging Rosecrans to terminate the inglorious delays at Murfreesboroby marching on Tullahoma. In his letter to Mr. Chase he hadexpressed in warmest terms his personal affection for Rosecrans, buthad also condemned the summer's delays as unnecessary and contraryto military principles. In the violence of partisan discussion theletter was seized upon as evidence of a breach of faith toward hischief, who was now acting with the political party opposed toGarfield's election. The letter was a personal one, written inprivate friendship to Mr. Chase, with whom Garfield had kept up anoccasional correspondence since the beginning of the war. I had donethe like, for Mr. Chase had admitted us both to his intimacy when hewas Governor of Ohio. It cannot for a moment be maintained thatmilitary subordination is inconsistent with temperate and respectfulcriticism (for such this was) of a superior, in privatecommunications to a friend. But it was argued that the relation ofchief of staff involved another kind of confidence. Itunquestionably involved the duty of observing and maintainingperfectly every confidence actually reposed in him. But the publicacts of the chief were anything but confidential. They were in theface of all the world, and these only were the subject of hisprivate and friendly criticism. That criticism he had, moreover, expressed to Rosecrans himself as distinctly as he wrote it to Mr. Chase, and had declared it publicly in the written consultation orcouncil of war to which the corps and division commanders werecalled. [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. I. P. 483. ] But Garfield was also at that time a member of Congress, havingduties to the President, the Cabinet, and his colleagues and fellowmembers growing out of that relation. Rosecrans not only knew this, but was supposed by many to have invited Garfield to take the staffappointment partly by reason of this. Under all the circumstances, therefore, the ground of complaint becomes shadowy and disappears. Rosecrans, however, was made to think he had suffered a wrong. Heforgot the generosity with which Garfield had saved him fromhumiliation in the session of 1863-64, and said bitter things whichput an end to the friendly relations which had till then beenmaintained. To return to Chattanooga in October, 1863: one thing remained to bedone before a new campaign could begin. A better mode of supplyingthe army must be found. Thomas had answered Grant's injunction tohold Chattanooga at all hazards by saying, "I will hold the towntill we starve. " The memorable words have been interpreted as adauntless assurance of stubborn defence; but they more truly meantthat the actual peril was not from the enemy, but from hunger. Rosecrans had begun to feel the necessity of opening a new route toBridgeport before he was relieved, and on the very day he laid downthe command, he had directed Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, sent tohim to be chief engineer of his army since the battle, to examinethe river banks in the vicinity of Williams Island, six or sevenmiles below the town by the river, and to report upon thefeasibility of laying a pontoon bridge there which could beprotected. The expectation had been that Hooker would concentratehis two corps at Bridgeport, make his own crossing of the Tennessee, and push forward to the hills commanding Lookout Valley. Byintrenching himself strongly in the vicinity of Wauhatchie, he wouldconfine the Confederates to Lookout Mountain on the west, and coverthe roads along the river so as to make them safe for supply trains. The only interruption in the connected communications would then bearound the base of Lookout itself, where the road could not be used, of course, so long as Bragg should be able to hold the mountain. If, however, a bridge could be laid somewhere in rear of such afortified position, the road on the north bank of the river could beused, for this road ran across the neck of Moccasin Point, out ofrange of a cannonade from the mountain, and after a short haul of amile or two, the wagon trains could recross the river by the bridgeat the town. Hooker had showed no eagerness to take the laboring oar in thisbusiness, and excused his delay in concentrating at Bridgeport bythe lack of wagons. General Smith's reconnoissance satisfied himthat Brown's Ferry, a little above the island, would admirably servethe purpose. A roadway to the river on each side already existed. Onthe south side was a gorge and a brook, which sheltered the landingthere, and would cover and hide troops moving toward the top of theridge commanding Lookout Valley. Smith reported his discovery toThomas and suggested that pontoons be built in Chattanooga, and usedto convey a force by night to the ferry, where they might be met byHooker coming from below. Thomas approved the plan, and as soon asGrant arrived, he inspected the ground in company with Thomas andSmith, and ordered it to be executed. The boats were completed bythe end of a week, and on the night of the 26th of October theexpedition started under the command of General Smith in person. Brigadier-Generals Hazen and Turchin and Colonel T. R. Stanley ofthe Eighteenth Ohio [Footnote: Colonel Stanley had been one of myassociates in the Ohio Senate in the winter of 1860-61. On theorigin and development of the plan and its complete execution, seeReports of General Smith and others, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 77-137. ] were assigned to command the three detachmentsof troops and boats assigned to the duty, and reported to Smith. Covered by the darkness and in absolute silence, they were to floatdown the stream which flowed around Moccasin Point in a great curveunder the base of Lookout, on which batteries commanded long reachesof the river both above and below. Reaching the ferry on the enemy'sside, they would land and carry the picket posts with a rush, Hazento move to the left and seize the ridge facing the mountain, andTurchin to do the like toward the right, facing down stream. ColonelStanley's detachment had the charge of the boats, which were fittedwith row-locks and oars, and these were to do the ferrying when theproper place was reached. Each boat contained a corporal and fourmen as a crew, and twenty-five armed soldiers. They were fifty innumber, besides two flatboats to be used as a ferry to cross theartillery. The whole force consisted of 5000 men and three batteriesof artillery. The boats carried about a third of the whole, and theprincipal columns marched by the road on the north bank to theplaces assigned and were concealed in the forest. The plan workedbeautifully. Starting at three o'clock in the morning of the 27th, the darkness of the night and a slight fog hid the boats from theConfederate pickets. The oars were only used to keep the boats inproper position in the current, and great care was taken to movesilently. Colonel Stanley took the lead with General Hazen in one ofthe flatboats, having a good guide. The landing on the south bankwas found, and the troops landed and drove off the enemy's picket, which was taken completely by surprise. The boats were swiftlypulled to the north bank, where the troops which marched by the roadwere already in position. The ferrying was hurried with a will, andbefore the Confederates had time to bring any considerable force tooppose, strong positions were taken covering the ferry, these werecovered by an abatis of slashed forest trees and intrenched. Thesurprise had been complete, and the success had been perfect. Hooker crossed the river on the bridge at Bridgeport, and on themorning of the 28th marched by way of Running Waters and Whitesidesto Wauhatchie. Geary's division reached Wauhatchie about five in theafternoon, and about midnight was fiercely attacked by Jenkins'division of Longstreet's corps. The combat continued for some time, the enemy having some advantage at first as they attacked Geary'sleft flank in a direction from which he did not expect them. Othertroops were urged forward to Geary's assistance, but the enemyretired as they approached the scene of action and only his divisionwas seriously engaged. He reported a list of 216 casualties, whilstthe Confederates admitted a loss of about 400. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 119, 233. ] Hooker's position was madestrongly defensible, so that Bragg did not again venture to disturbit, and the easy lines of supply for Chattanooga were opened. Thesubsistence problem was solved. CHAPTER XXVIII SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE--END OF BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN Departments not changed by Grant--Sherman assigned to that of theTennessee--Burnside's situation and supplies--Hiscommunications--Building a railroad--Threatened from Virginia--Hisplans--Bragg sends Longstreet into East Tennessee--Theircross-purposes--Correspondence of Grant and Burnside--Dana andWilson sent to consult--Grant approves Burnside's course--Latterslowly retires on Knoxville--The place prepared for a siege--Combatat Campbell's station--Within the lines at Knoxville--Topography ofthe place--Defences--Assignment of positions-The forts--GeneralSanders killed--His self-sacrifice--Longstreet's lines ofinvestment--His assault of Fort Sanders--The combat--Therepulse--The victory at Missionary Ridge and results--Division ofConfederate forces a mistake--Grant sends Sherman to raise the siegeof Knoxville--East Tennessee a "horror"--Longstreet retreats towardVirginia--Sherman rejoins Grant--Granger's unwillingness toremain--General Foster sent to relieve Burnside--Criticism of thisact--Halleck's misunderstanding of the real situation--Grant's easycomprehension of it--His conduct in enlarged responsibility--GeneralHunter's inspection report. One of the first questions which General Grant had to decide wasthat of the continuance of the three separate departments of theOhio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. It was very undesirable toconcentrate the ordinary administrative work of these departments athis own headquarters. It would overburden him with business routinewhich need not go beyond a department commander. He needed to befree to give his strength to the conduct of military affairs in thefield. It was also convenient to have the active army under a tripledivision of principal parts. All these reasons led him to a promptdetermination to preserve the department organizations if the WarDepartment would consent. The very day of his arrival at Chattanooga(October 23) he recommended Sherman for the Department of theTennessee and the continuance of the others. His wish was approvedat Washington, and acted upon, so that from this time to the end ofthe war the organization in the West remained what he now made it. Before reaching Chattanooga, Grant had telegraphed to Burnside andhad received from him a detailed statement of the numbers andpositions of his troops. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 680, 681. ] Burnside also laid before him the dearth ofsupplies and short stock of ammunition, with the great need ofclothing. Unless the railroad to Chattanooga could be fullyreopened, he suggested making a depot at McMinnville, where was theend of one of the branches of the railway, from which the road toKnoxville would be considerably shorter than from Kentucky. He alsoinformed Grant that he had taken steps to repair the wagon road fromClinton in East Tennessee to the mouth of South Fork of theCumberland, the head of steamboat navigation when the stream shouldbe swollen by the winter rains. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. Pp. 33, 34. ] The problem of supplies for him was as difficult as for theCumberland army, and was not so soon solved. It grew more seriousstill when the siege of Knoxville interrupted for a month allcommunication with a base in Kentucky, in middle Tennessee, or atChattanooga. In reply to an inquiry from General Grant, Burnside, on the 22d, [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 702. ] gave his opinion as to therelative importance of points in East Tennessee, pointing out thatunless communication with Kentucky were to be wholly abandoned, thevalley must be held nearly or quite to the Virginia line; Knoxvillewould be the central position, and Loudon would be the intermediateone between him and Chattanooga. In a dispatch to the President ofthe same date, Burnside said that his command had been on halfrations of everything but fresh beef ever since his arrival in thevalley. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 701. ] He also explained that he wasimproving the wagon road along the line of projected railroad downthe South Fork of the Cumberland, so that sections of it could belaid with rails and the wagoning gradually shortened. He had beenable to make an arrangement with the railroad company in Kentucky toassume the cost of the extension of the line from the northward, andby using his military power to call out negro laborers and toprovide the engineering supervision, was making considerableprogress without any money appropriations from Congress for thisspecific purpose. The quartermaster's department had taken issuewith the general as to his authority to do this; but the Presidentand Secretary of War sanctioned his acts and would not allow him tobe interfered with. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt iii, p. 787. ] The work stopped when he was relieved of command; but solong as he was in power, his clear apprehension of the vitalnecessity of a railway line to feed and clothe his army kept himpersistent and indomitable in his purpose. The withdrawal of theenemy southward from Chattanooga, and the conversion of that placeinto a great military depot in the spring superseded Burnside'splan, but he had been right in concluding that East Tennessee couldnot be held if the troops depended upon supply by wagon trains. Grant had hardly reached Chattanooga when Halleck informed him thatit was pretty certain that Ewell's corps of 20, 000 or 25, 000 men hadgone from Lee's army toward East Tennessee by way of southwesternVirginia. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 712. ] There thusseemed to be strong confirmation of rumors which Burnside had beforereported. Before the end of the month there were also signs of aconcentration south of Loudon, and the question became a pressingone, what line of action should be prescribed for Burnside if theConfederates should thus attack him from both ends of the valley. Hedid not credit the rumor as to Ewell's corps, but began to thinkthat a large detachment from Bragg's army would attack him from thesouth. It is curious to find the report rife that Longstreet wouldmarch against Burnside, even before Bragg had issued orders to thateffect. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 718. Oct. 24. ] Burnside himself proposed to take up the pontoon bridge atLoudon, and move it to Knoxville, for both the Holston and theLittle Tennessee were now unfordable and would protect his flankagainst small expeditions of the enemy. [Footnote: 2 _Id_. , p. 756. ]His plan was to hold all the country he could and to concentrate atKnoxville and stand a siege whenever the enemy should prove toostrong for him in the open field. Grant was not yet persuaded thatthis was best, and wanted the line of the Hiwassee held for thepresent, so that Burnside should draw nearer to Thomas rather thanincrease the distance before the Cumberland army should be preparedfor active work in the field. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 770. ] Bragg's order to Longstreet to march against Burnside was issued onthe 4th of November. [Footnote: _Id_. Pt. Iii. P. 634. ] Railwaytransportation was provided for the first stages of the movement, but it was not efficiently used. Longstreet had no confidence in theresult of the expedition, as his correspondence with Bragg veryplainly shows. Stevenson's division of Hardee's corps was atSweetwater, the end of the railway at that time, and about a day'smarch from the crossing of the Holston at Loudon. Ten days had beenwasted in getting Longstreet's corps to Sweetwater, and Bragg and heeach charged the other with the responsibility for it. Longstreetasserted that he had been given no control over the railway, andBragg insisted that the control was ample. Then the former had urgedthat Stevenson's division should be attached to his command, sayingthis was his understanding at the start. Bragg replied that he neverhad any such intention and that Stevenson could not be spared. Longstreet retorted that with his present force it would beunreasonable to expect great results. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 635-637, 644, 670, 671, 680, 681, 687:Longstreet's Report, _Id_. , pt. I. Pp. 455, etc. ] Meanwhile Sherman was hastening to Chattanooga, and the chances formaking the diversion against Burnside profitable to the Confederatecause were rapidly diminishing. They soon vanished entirely, andGrant's great opportunity came instead. Longstreet's corps consistedof nine brigades of infantry in two strong divisions underMajor-General McLaws and Brigadier-General Jenkins, two battalionsof artillery aggregating nine batteries, and a cavalry corps ofthree divisions and three batteries of artillery under Major-GeneralWheeler. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 451, 454. ] Besides these troops aforce was collected in the upper Holston valley to operate from thenortheast in conjunction with Longstreet and under his command. Atits head was Major-General Ransom, and it consisted of threebrigades of infantry and three of cavalry, with six batteries ofartillery. The column with Longstreet numbered 14, 000 infantry andartillery, and about 6000 cavalry. It was strengthened when beforeKnoxville by Buckner's division about 3300 strong. Ransom's forcesnumbered 7500. [Footnote: These numbers are taken from the officialreturns for October 31st, except Wheeler's cavalry, which was notthen reported and is estimated. Longstreet's corps is given in thetables, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Ii. P. 656. Ransom's, _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 644. ] On November 22d Bragg wrote to Longstreetthat nearly 11, 000 reinforcements were moving to his assistance, butof what these were made up (except Buckner's division) does notclearly appear. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 736. ] The information Halleck collected at Washington indicated thatLongstreet's column was a strong one, possibly numbering 40, 000, buthe urged that Burnside should not retreat. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 145. ] The National forces in East Tennessee consisted, first, of thetroops under General Willcox at Cumberland Gap and the vicinity, 4400; the Ninth Corps, Brigadier-General Potter commanding, 6350;and part of the Twenty-third Corps, 7800, with two bodies of cavalrynumbering 7400. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 811. ] Willcox's troops and part of the cavalry were ordered to holdin check the Confederates under Ransom, one brigade of cavalry underColonel Byrd was posted at Kingston to keep up communication withChattanooga, and the rest was available to meet Longstreet, eitherin the field or behind intrenchments at Knoxville, as Grant shoulddirect. Longstreet's army was considerably overrated in the informationreceived from Washington, but not unnaturally. [Footnote: Halleck toGrant, _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 145. ] It was assumed that he had with himall three divisions of his corps, and it was not known that Walker'sdivision was detached. It had also been known that Stevenson'sdivision was at Sweetwater two or three weeks before Longstreetassembled his forces there, and it seemed certain that it was theadvance-guard of his whole command. Indeed Longstreet himselfsupposed so, and complained because it was not allowed to remainwith him. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 635. ] Concluding, therefore, thatBurnside could not safely meet Longstreet in the field, Grantproposed that he should hold the Confederates in check, retreatingslowly. He believed that in a week from the time Longstreet showedhimself at the Holston River, he could assume the aggressive againstBragg so vigorously as to bring Longstreet back at speed and relieveBurnside of the pressure. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 143; to Halleck, p. 154. ] Bragg also expected this, and had ordered that the railwayconnection should be maintained as far as possible, looking for acrushing blow at Burnside and a quick reassembling of his forces. The delays between the 4th and 14th of November had been fatal tothis plan, and it would have been the part of wisdom to abandon itfrankly. Neither the authorities at Washington nor Grant gave Burnsidecredit, at first, for the cheerful courage with which he was readyto take the losing side of the game, if need be, and thus give aglorious opportunity to the co-operating army. His chivalrousself-forgetfulness in such matters was perfect, when it was likelyto lead to the success of the larger cause he had at heart. To reacha more perfect understanding than could be had by correspondenceGrant sent Colonel J. H. Wilson of his staff to Knoxville to consultpersonally with Burnside. This officer was accompanied by Mr. Dana, and their dispatches to Grant and to the Secretary of War give aclear and vivid picture of the situation. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 258, etc; pt. Iii. Pp. 146, 154. ]Burnside clearly saw the importance of making his stand atKnoxville, and proposed to fortify that place so that he could standa siege there. [Footnote: Burnside to Willcox, _Id_. , p. 177. B. 'sReport, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 273. ] He proposed to draw back slowly fromthe Holston at Loudon, tolling Longstreet on and getting him beyondsupporting distance of Bragg. When Grant should have disposed of theweakened enemy in his front, he could easily drive Longstreet out ofEast Tennessee into Virginia. Grant approved without qualificationthe course taken by Burnside. [Footnote: Grant to Burnside, _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 177. ] During the siege which followed, there was a gooddeal of solicitude about Burnside, but it should be remembered injustice to him that his own confidence never faltered and was fullyjustified by the result. Prior to the visit of Wilson and Dana he had sent his engineer, Captain O. M. Poe, to Loudon to remove the pontoon bridge before theoccupation of the south bank of the Holston by the enemy should makeit impossible to save it. The bridge had been made of unusuallylarge and heavy boats, and it was a difficult task to haul them outof the water and drag them half a mile to the railway. The south endof the bridge was loosened and the whole swung with the currentagainst the right bank, where the dismantling and removal of theboats was successfully accomplished under the eyes of a cavalryforce of the enemy which watched the performance from the oppositebank. The bridge was carried to Knoxville and laid across theHolston there. Its size and weight proved to be great points in itsfavor for the special use there, and it was of inestimable valueduring the partial investment of the town. [Footnote: Poe's Report, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 294. Century War Book, vol. Iii. ] On the 13th of November Longstreet brought up his own pontoons andlaid a bridge near Loudon, and the next day began a vigorous advanceupon Knoxville. Burnside had matured his plans, and opposed theadvance of Longstreet with one division, Hartranft's of the NinthCorps, and another, White's of the Twenty-third Corps. He was weakin cavalry, however, and could only meet Wheeler's corps with asingle division under Brigadier-General Sanders. Burnside hadsecured Sanders's promotion from Mr. Stanton when the Secretary wasat Louisville in October, in recognition of the ability andgallantry shown in the expedition to East Tennessee in June and hisother services during the campaign. By giving Shackelford charge ofthe cavalry operating in the upper valley and putting Sanders incommand of those resisting Wheeler, Burnside was sure of vigor andcourage in the leadership of both divisions. Longstreet kept Wheeleron the left bank of the Holston, directing him to overwhelm Sandersand move directly opposite Knoxville, taking the city by a surpriseif possible. But Sanders opposed a stubborn resistance, falling backdeliberately, and held the hills south of Knoxville near the river. Wheeler was thus baffled, and returned to Longstreet on the 17th ofNovember. The absence of his cavalry had been a mistake, as itturned out; for the Confederate infantry, after crossing at Loudonto the right bank, had not been able to push Burnside back as fastas Bragg's plans required, nor had they succeeded at all in gettingin the rear of the National forces. As soon as it was definitely known at Knoxville that Longstreet wasover the Holston, Burnside went to the front at Lenoir's to takecommand in person. [Footnote: Burnside's Report, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 273. ] He left General Parke as chief of staffin general charge of affairs at headquarters, with Captain Poe incharge of the engineer work of preparing lines of defence connectingthe forts already planned and partly constructed. Wilson and Danastayed in Knoxville till the 15th, and then rode rapidly to thewestward, passing around Longstreet's columns and rejoining Grant atChattanooga on the night of the 17th, with latest assurances fromBurnside that he would hold Knoxville stubbornly. Longstreet'stactics were to move one of his infantry divisions directly atBurnside's position, while with the other he turned its flank andsought to get to the rear. Burnside met the plan by the analogousone of alternate withdrawals of a division, one holding the enemy atbay while the other took post in echelon in the rear and opposed theflanking column till a concentration could be made. At Campbell's Station Longstreet attacked with vigor, determined tofinish matters with the force before him. Ferrero's division of theNinth Corps had now joined. Hartranft repulsed an attack by McLaws, whilst the trains and the division of Ferrero passed on, and Ferrerotook a strong position half a mile in rear covering the junction ofroads. White then retired and came into line on Ferrero's left. Whenthese were solidly in place Hartranft took an opportune moment towithdraw and came into line on the left of White. The manoeuvreswere perfectly performed, and the fighting of our troops had beeneverything that could be desired, meeting and matching Longstreet'sveterans in a way to establish the soldierly reputation of all. Thecomparatively new organization of the Twenty-third Corps proveditself equal to the best, and Burnside declared that he could desireno better soldiers. The same tactics were continued through the day, and Burnside followed the hard labor and the fighting of the daywith a night march which brought him to Knoxville on the morning ofthe 17th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 274, 275, 296. ] He had personally handled his little army through the daywith coolness and success, and had raised to enthusiasm theconfidence and devotion of his men. Each side had a casualty list ofabout 300. Wheeler had marched back along the left bank of the Holston half-wayto Lenoir's and crossed at Louisville, joining Longstreet again nearKnoxville on the 17th, as has been already stated. He now took theadvance and pressed sharply in upon the town. General Sanders hadbeen recalled by Burnside from the south, and entering Knoxville bythe pontoon bridge, passed out to the westward on the Loudon road, meeting the enemy as he advanced, and gradually falling back to aposition a mile beyond the lines, where he made a stubborn stand andheld Wheeler at bay till night closed the combat. From the fortifiedpoints about the city the cavalry engagement had been in full view, and the heroism of Sanders and his men was in the presence of acloud of witnesses. They made little barricades of rail piles, andthough these were frequently sent flying by the cannon balls andshells with which Alexander's artillery pounded them all day, theyheld at nightfall the line Sanders had been directed to hold in themorning, and had not given back an inch. [Footnote: Colonel O. M. Poe, in "Century War Book, " vol. Iii. P. 737. ] Knoxville was so situated that its outline was a sort ofparallelogram of high ground, averaging a hundred and fifty feet ormore above the river which ran along the town on the south. Twocreeks ran through the town in little valleys, and in the northernsuburbs where the land was much lower than the town it had beenpracticable, by damming these streams to make inundations whichcovered a considerable part of the northern front and added verymaterially to the defences. At the four corners of theparallelogram, enclosed works had been planned for use by a smallgarrison, and these had been partly constructed. Captain Poe, thechief engineer, had staked out infantry lines connecting theseforts, with epaulements for artillery at intervals, and work hadbeen hastened during the days from the 13th of November, as soon asBurnside's plan of holding the city had been approved. When thetroops approached the city on the morning of the 17th, the positionfor every brigade and every battery had been assigned, and officerswere in waiting to lead each to its place. All the infantry was putin line except Reilly's brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, which wasplaced in reserve in the streets of the town. [Footnote: Poe'sReport, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 295. ] The most important of the forts was at the northwest angle of theworks, upon a commanding hill. It was afterward called Fort Sandersin honor of the cavalry commander who lost his life in front of itswestern face. This work was planned as approximately a square withsides of about a hundred yards and bastions at the corners. Theeastern front had not been completed, and was now left entirelyopen, as the northern face connected with the infantry trench. Theditch was twelve feet wide and about eight deep, and the parapet wasabout twelve feet high, making its crest about twenty feet above thebottom of the ditch. The berme usually left between the bottom ofthe parapet slope and the ditch was cut away so as to leave no levelstanding-place at the top of the scarp. This was the work whichLongstreet afterward assaulted. Its chief defect was due to thesituation and the contour of the ground around, which made itsposition so prominent a salient in the lines that the flanking firewas necessarily imperfect, leaving a considerable sector withoutfire beyond the angle of the northwest bastion. The point of thebastion was truncated, and a single gun put in the _pan coupé_. Thethree other forts were less elaborate but of similar profile. As soon as the infantry took position, the men were setindustriously to work to strengthen the defences. The first infantrytrench between the forts had been a mere rifle-pit two and one halffeet deep with the earth heaped in front as it was thrown out, toraise a parapet. Every hour made the line stronger, and work on itwas continued till nearly every part of it was a good cover againstartillery fire. The critical time was during the 18th of November, when as yet there was practically no cover between the forts. Thecavalry was ordered to oppose the most determined resistance to theestablishment of close investing lines by the enemy, and Sanders sethis men a most inspiring example. He was a classmate of Captain Poeat West Point, and on the night of the 17th he shared Poe's blanket. Before dawn he went to the front, and passed from one to another ofthe little barricades held by his dismounted troopers. TheConfederates increased the vigor of their attacks, and if any of ourmen were driven back by the hot fire, Sanders would walkdeliberately up to the rail-pile and stand erect and exposed tillhis men rallied to him. For hours he did this, and his life seemedto be charmed, but about the middle of the afternoon he was mortallywounded, and the screen he had so resolutely interposed between theenemy and our infantry digging in the trenches was rolled aside. [Footnote: Paper by General Poe in "Century War Book, " vol. Iii. P. 737. ] The time thus gained had been precious, though it was boughtat so high a price. The lines were already safe against a _coup demain_. [Footnote: Poe's Report, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 296. ] Longstreet's principal lines were north of Knoxville beyond therailway and the station buildings. He also occupied a line of hills, but pushed forward strong skirmish lines and detachments to coverthe making of intrenchments closer to the town. There were frequentbickering combats, but no general engagement. The enemy made effortsto destroy the pontoon bridge by sending down logs and rafts fromabove. These were met by an iron cable boom stretched across theriver above the bridge, borne on wooden floats to keep it at thesurface. [Footnote: Century War Book, vol. Iii. P. 739. ] Severalefforts were made to drive Burnside's men from the hills coveringthe town on the south side of the river, but they were defeated, andcommunication was kept up with the valley of the French Broad River, and supplies enough were brought in to make it certain that Burnsidecould not be starved out, although the rations were reduced to thesmallest quantity and the fewest elements which would support life. A week passed thus, Burnside being shut off from all communicationwith the outer world. The 25th of November came with the almostmiraculous storming of Missionary Ridge by the army under Grant atChattanooga. Bragg retreated southward and Longstreet had no longera possibility of rejoining him. Yet Burnside knew nothing of it, anddid not dream of the more than complete justification his slowdefensive campaign was having, in the tout and demoralization of theConfederate army in Georgia in Longstreet's absence. The latter wasnow forced to attack the fortifications or to raise the siege ofKnoxville. He knew, at least by rumor, what Burnside was ignorantof, --not only the defeat of Bragg, but that a force was alreadymoving from Grant's army to the relief of Knoxville. Bragg had alsosent to him a staff officer with exhortations to prompt action. Fora day or two Longstreet tried to attract Burnside's attention to thesouth of the river and to other parts of the lines, and then on the28th prepared a desperate assault upon the great salient of FortSanders. The artillery in the fort was under the command of Lieutenant SamuelN. Benjamin, Second U. S. Artillery, whose battery of twenty-pounderParrotts had done good service at South Mountain and Antietam. Theinfantry was of Ferrero's division of the Ninth Corps. There was aslight abatis in front of the fort, and on the suggestion of Mr. Hoxie, an officer of the railway, some old telegraph wire left atthe depot was used by Captain Poe to make an entanglement byfastening it between small stumps of a grove which had been felledalong the slope northwest of the bastion at the salient. Longstreet's plan of assault was to attack the northwest angle ofthe fort with two columns of regiments, consisting of Wofford's andHumphrey's brigades of McLaws's division. Anderson's brigade was toattack the infantry trench a little east of the fort. Longstreet'sinstructions were to make the assault at break of day on the 29th. The columns were to move silently and swiftly without firing andendeavor to carry the parapet by the bayonet. [Footnote:Longstreet's Report, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 461. ]The determined advance of the enemy's rifle pits by his skirmishersin the night of the 28th gave warning of what was to be expected. The morning of the 29th was damp and foggy, but the watchful picketsdetected the formation of the enemy's columns. About six o'clock theConfederate batteries opened a heavy fire on the fort, which did notreply, ammunition being too precious to be wasted. In about twentyminutes the cannonade ceased and the columns moved to the assault. The fire of our lines was concentrated upon them, and they lostheavily; but they kept on, somewhat disordered by the entanglementas well as by their losses, and came to the ditch. No doubt itsdepth and the high face of the parapet surprised them, for they hadno scaling ladders. They jumped into the ditch and tried to scrambleup the slope of the earthwork. Some got to the top, only to be shotdown or captured. The guns flanking the ditch raked it with doublecharges of canister. Shells were lighted and thrown as hand-grenadesinto the practically helpless crowd below. Those who had not enteredthe ditch soon wavered and fell back, at first sullenly and slowly, then in despair running for life to cover. Those who remained andcould walk surrendered and were marched to the southwest angle ofthe fort, where they were brought within the lines. The remnants of the broken columns were rallied behind their outerlines, but no effort was made to renew the assault. They had doneall that was possible for flesh and blood. The casualties in theassault had been about 1000, whilst within the fortifications only13 killed and wounded were reported. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 277, 278, 344, 461, 487, 490, 519, 520. ]Buckner's division had joined Longstreet a day or two before theassault, but took no active part in it. Their absence fromMissionary Ridge still further reduced Bragg's army, whilst it didnot give to Longstreet any practical benefit. The division of theConfederate forces had thus proved to be a great military mistake. Its only chance had been in a swift attack upon Burnside and aprompt return, and this chance had vanished with the delays in therailroad transportation of Longstreet's men to Sweetwater. Prudencedictated that the expedition should be abandoned on the 13th ofNovember; but the fear of seeming vacillating, a weakness ofsecond-rate minds as great as vacillation itself, had made Braggorder the column forward. Burnside's well-conducted retreat, on theother hand, had lured Longstreet forward, and the patient enduranceof a siege had kept the enemy in front of Knoxville, and even led tothe further depletion of Bragg by the detachment of Buckner, givingto Grant the very opportunity he desired. The good fortune of theNational commander culminated at Missionary Ridge. Soldiers believein good luck quite as much as in genius, and follow a leader whosestar is in the ascendant with a confidence which is the guaranty ofvictory. Great opportunities, however, come to all. The differencebetween a great soldier and an inferior one is that the great manuses his opportunities to the full, and so fortune seems to be inleague with him. When Grant had driven Bragg back on Dalton, thelatter could realize what he had lost by his errors. It was nowimpossible for Longstreet to rejoin him. It was even doubtful ifWheeler's cavalry could do so. The whole National army was betweenthe widely separated Confederate wings, and nothing was left toLongstreet but a humiliating march back to Lee by way of the upperHolston and the headwaters of the James River. Pride delayed it, andthe depth of winter favored the delay; but it was a foregoneconclusion from the hour that Wood's and Sheridan's divisionscrowned Missionary Ridge. For two weeks there had been no communication between Burnside andthe outer world. Lincoln had been full of anxiety, but had foundsome comfort in the reports from Cumberland Gap that cannonading wasstill heard in the direction of Knoxville. It proved that Burnsideheld out, and gave additional earnestness to the President'sexhortation to hurry a column to his relief immediately afterGrant's victory. Grant needed no urging. A report had reached himthat Burnside still was confident on the 23d, and had supplies forten or twelve days on the scale of short rations he was issuing. Onthe very evening of his success he wrote to Sherman, "The next thingnow will be to relieve Burnside. " He directed Thomas to detachGranger's Corps, and this with part of the Army of the Tennesseewould make a column of 20, 000 men to march at once for Knoxvilleunder Granger's command. Three days passed, and Grant, beingdissatisfied that the relieving column was not already far on itsway, directed Sherman on the 29th to take command in person and pushit energetically toward Burnside. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Ii. Pp. 45, 49; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. I. Pp. 366, 368. ]Sherman immediately went forward, and on the 1st of December he wasover the Hiwassee River, approaching Loudon. He telegraphed Grantthat he would let Burnside hear his guns on the 3d or 4th atfarthest; but he added what throws much light on the feeling ofmilitary men in regard to campaigning in East Tennessee. In hisfrank and familiar style he said, "Recollect that East Tennessee ismy horror. That any military man should send a force into EastTennessee puzzles me. Burnside is there and must be relieved; butwhen relieved, I want to get out and he should come out too. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 297. ] From astrictly military point of view this was sound; but Burnside hadbeen sent there more from political than from military reasons, andit was now too late to think of letting the loyal mountaineersreturn under Confederate rule. Meanwhile at Knoxville Burnside was closely watching the evidencesof Longstreet's purposes and eagerly listening for news fromChattanooga. On the 1st of December wagon trains began to moveeastward from the besiegers' camp, and on the 3d and 4th more ofthem, so that it became probable that Longstreet was about to raisethe siege. In the night of the 3d Captain Audenried, Sherman'saide-de-camp, came into Knoxville from the south, having made a longcircuit with a small body of cavalry, from Sherman's camp, which onthe night of the 2d was forty miles from the city by the directroad. Colonel Long, commanding Sherman's cavalry, had selected partof his best mounted men for the expedition, and Audenried hadaccompanied him. The good news of Sherman's approach was thus madecertain, and it was evident that Longstreet's information wasearlier than Burnside's. The Confederate camps were evacuated on thenight of the 4th, and on the 5th Burnside, sending a detachment tofollow up Longstreet's retreat toward the east, sent one of hisstaff with an escort in the other direction to meet Sherman. Themessenger from Burnside met the head of the relieving column atMarysville, a day's march for infantry. Sherman halted his littlearmy, and wrote Burnside that he felt disposed to stop, "for a sternchase is a long one, " since Longstreet had retreated. He rode in toKnoxville the next day and consulted with Burnside. He was evidentlydubious of any advantage from a pursuit of Longstreet, andBurnside's disposition was to avoid urging any comrade to undertakean unpleasant task for his sake. He therefore cordially assistedSherman in solving his doubts in favor of taking back all his troopsexcept Granger's Fourth Corps, and wrote a letter of warm thanks forthe prompt march to his relief, adding his opinion that the FourthCorps would make him strong enough to meet Longstreet, and that itwas advisable for Sherman to rejoin Grant with the rest. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Ii. P. 36. ] This was accordinglydone, and Sherman was free to give his attention to a wintercampaign toward the Gulf, from which he hoped important results. Granger did not relish the prospect of a protracted absence from theArmy of the Cumberland, and protested in vigorous and longdispatches to Thomas, to Grant, to Burnside, to Sherman, and laterto Foster, [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. Pp. 358, 365, 391-393;Sherman's Memoirs, vol. I. P. 368. ] but with no effect, except thatGrant was displeased with his original reluctance to march toBurnside's relief as well as with these protests. The result showeditself in the spring, when Granger was relieved from the command ofthe corps, which was conferred upon Howard. The raising of the siege brought Burnside into communication withCumberland Gap, and he learned that Major-General John G. Foster wasat Tazewell, under orders to relieve him of the command of thedepartment. This was in apparent accord with the wish which Burnsidehad expressed, [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. I. Pp. 527, 528. ] but asaction had been postponed it was reasonable to expect that furtherconsultation would be had before he should be relieved, and thatGrant's judgment would be asked in regard to it. After thecontroversies which followed the battle of Fredericksburg, Halleckwas habitually unfriendly to Burnside, and we have seen howuniformly a wrong interpretation was given to the events of thecurrent campaign. Foster's appointment to succeed Burnside was datedthe 16th of November, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 166. ] and he had been in Kentucky or near Cumberland Gapduring the siege of Knoxville. The day the order was made relievingBurnside was that on which he was battling with Longstreet atCampbell's Station, holding him at bay in the slow retreat uponKnoxville, where he arrived on the 17th. On this morning Grant waswriting him, "So far you are doing exactly what appears to meright, " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 177. ] and this was written after thereceipt of Dana and Wilson's full dispatches of the 13th and 14th, as well as Burnside's of the 13th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 138. ] Yet sostrangely was the same information misread by Halleck, that on the16th he was telegraphing Grant that Burnside was hesitating whetherto fight or retreat out of East Tennessee. "I fear he will notfight, " he added, "although strongly urged to do so. Unless you cangive him immediate assistance, he will surrender his position to theenemy. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 163. This dispatch of Halleck seems tohave been called out by one of Dana to Stanton on the 14th in whichhe said, "Burnside has determined to retreat toward the Gaps. "(Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 259. ) Halleck failed tointerpret this in connection with one of the 13th in which Dana hadstated alternate lines of retreat, "if finally compelled, " andBurnside's judgment in favor of the line of Cumberland Gap in suchlast resort rather than toward Kingston. (_Ibid_. ) Dana had fullyconveyed, however, Burnside's determination to hold Knoxville "aslong as possible, " and his reasons for making a stubborn fightthere. By failing to keep this in mind, the Secretary andGeneral-in-Chief became unnecessarily agitated, and forgot in theirconduct what was due to Grant almost as much as what was due toBurnside. ] On the next day Burnside entered Knoxville, wherefortifications had been hurriedly built, and the siege began. Theheroic defence of Knoxville lasted three weeks, and when Longstreetwithdrew toward Virginia, the successful general learned that he hadbeen removed from command at the very moment he was completing, withGrant's unqualified approval, the preparation for that stubbornresistance which saved East Tennessee and averted the "terriblemisfortune" which Halleck feared. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 145. ] The importance of holding East Tennessee, now that it had beenliberated, was urged upon the War Department by Burnside from thebeginning. He had pointed it out when ordered to abandon it andmarch to Rosecrans's assistance. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 904. ] So far from hesitating to fight Longstreet, Dana foundhim determined to "expose his whole force to capture rather thanwithdraw from the country. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 260. ] It was not till Mr. Dana's later dispatches were received thatthe misapprehensions were corrected at Washington. Then the story ofthe occupation and defence of East Tennessee was explained, andjustice was done the wisdom of the general's course as well as hispatriotic and unselfish spirit. A part of the trouble had been dueto the fact that after Grant reached Nashville Burnside'scorrespondence was with him, and, in accord with military usage, hedropped direct correspondence with Washington, except when addressedfrom there. It was too late, however, to undo what had been done. Foster was inKentucky, carrying forward into East Tennessee such detachments ascould be picked up. He reached Knoxville on the 10th of December, and the next day Burnside turned over the command to him, andstarted for Cincinnati by way of Jacksboro and Williamsburg. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 372, 384. ] ThePresident was most hearty in his approval of Burnside's conduct whenonce he understood it, and insisted that after a brief rest heshould again enter into active service. Congress passed strongresolutions of thanks to him and to his troops, [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 281. ] and it began to be understood that the campaign hadbeen a creditable one. It was in such a command that Burnside appeared at his best. Theindependence of his campaign gave full play to his active energy, whilst the bodies of troops were not so large as to prevent hispersonal leadership in their combats. In a great army he was at adisadvantage from lack of true system in handling great andcomplicated affairs when he was in chief command; and if hisposition was a subordinate one he lacked the sort of responsibilitywhich called out his best qualities, and he was therefore liable tobecome the formal intermediary for the transmission of orders. Insuch cases, too, he was in danger of suffering from faults ofsubordinates whom his kind heart had permitted to retain importantpositions for which they were not fit. When acting immediately underhis eye, he could give them energy and courage which they would lackwhen left to themselves. The sore spot in his experience in 1864 wasthe failure to make full use of the explosion of the mine atPetersburg, and the Court of Inquiry made it clear that the faultlay with inefficient subordinates. One of the most prominent ofthese was said to have stayed in a bomb-proof instead of leading hiscommand. But the same officer had done the same thing in FortSanders at Knoxville, as had been officially reported by CaptainBenjamin, the Chief of Artillery; [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 344. ] and Benjamin was an officer of such militaryand personal standing that a court-martial should certainly haveinvestigated the case. A mistaken leniency brought bitter fruit. The campaign had been a new test for General Grant also, and it isinstructive to follow him in grasping the details of his enlargedresponsibility. When communication with Burnside became difficultand infrequent, he gave orders to Willcox at Cumberland Gap and tosubordinates of Burnside in Kentucky and Ohio. He provided forstarting supplies to Knoxville by all practicable routes as soon asthe siege should be raised. He cut trenchantly through pretenceswhere he thought a lack of vigorous performance was covered up byverbosity of reports. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 233. ] He wasquietly but easily master, and showed no symptom of beingoverweighted by his task or flurried by the excitements of acritical juncture in affairs. He does not impress one as brilliantin genius, but as eminently sound and sensible. His quality ofgreatness was that he handled great affairs as he would little ones, without betraying any consciousness that this was a great thing todo. He reminds one of Wellington in the combination of lucid andpractical common-sense with aggressive bull-dog courage. Sometelling lines, developing his traits as he appeared to a criticalobserver, are found in a dispatch of General David Hunter to theSecretary of War, giving a report of his visit to Chattanooga wherehe was sent to inspect the army. Hunter was one of the oldest of theregular officers in service, knew thoroughly Grant's history andearly army reputation, and his words have peculiar significance. Grant had received him with a sort of filial kindness, making him athome in his quarters, and opening his mind and his purposes to himwith his characteristic modesty and simplicity of manner. Huntersays: "I saw him almost every moment, except when sleeping, of thethree weeks I spent in Chattanooga.... He is a hard worker, writeshis own dispatches and orders, and does his own thinking. He ismodest, quiet, never swears, and seldom drinks, as he took only twodrinks during the three weeks I was with him. He listens quietly tothe opinions of others and then judges promptly for himself; and heis very prompt to avail himself in the field of all the errors ofhis enemy. He is certainly a good judge of men, and has calledaround him valuable counsellors. " He naively adds: "Prominent asGeneral Grant is before the country, these remarks of mine mayappear trite and uncalled for, but having been ordered to inspecthis command, I thought it not improper for me to add my testimonywith regard to the commander. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 402. ] CHAPTER XXIX AFFAIRS IN DISTRICT OF OHIO--PLOT TO LIBERATE PRISONERS AT JOHNSON'SISLAND. Administrative duties--Major McLean adjutant-general--His loyaltyquestioned--Ordered away--Succeeded by Captain Anderson--RobertAnderson's family--Vallandigham canvass--Bounty-jumping--Action ofU. S. Courts--of the local Probate Court--Efforts to provokecollision--Interview with the sheriff--Letter to GovernorTod--Shooting soldiers in Dayton--The October election--Greatmajority against Vallandigham--The soldier vote--Wish for fieldservice--Kinglake's Crimean War--Its lessons--Confederate plots inCanada--Attempt on military prison at Johnson's Island--Assemblingmilitia there--Fortifying Sandusky Bay--Inspection of theprison--Condition and treatment of the prisoners. In the sketch I have given of the campaign in East Tennessee, I havereached the time when I joined the Twenty-third Corps in front ofKnoxville, and became part of the organization with which myfortunes were to be united till the end of the war. It is necessary, however, to go back and pick up the threads of personal experienceduring this autumn of 1863. The arrangement of the business of the department which I havementioned [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. I. P. 492. ] gave me some work inaddition to that which properly belonged to the District of Ohio andMichigan. I did not appear officially in it, but under Burnside'sinstructions to his adjutant-general on leaving Cincinnati, thequestions arising in daily administration were submitted to me, andon my advice current orders were issued in Burnside's name. Thiskept me in close communication with the general personally as wellas officially, and made me aware of the progress of events moreperfectly than I could otherwise have been. The adjutant-general incharge of the Cincinnati headquarters was Major N. H. McLean, anexperienced officer of the regular army, and most systematic andable in his administrative duties. He was punctilious in hisperformance of duty, and was especially averse to having hismilitary conduct seem in any way influenced by political motives. Like many other officers of the army, he made his devotion to hisgovernment as a soldier the basis of all his action, and disclaimedany interest in politics. But in the summer of 1863 politics in Ohiobecame too heated to allow any neutrality or even any hesitation inopen declarations of principle. Vallandigham was a candidate forgovernor, although an exile under the judgment of the militarycourt. Local politicians were not always discreet, and some of themdemanded avowals of Major McLean, which he refused to make, notbecause of any sympathy with Vallandigham's partisans, but becausehe thought it unbecoming his military character to submit tocatechising. This was enough to condemn him in the eyes of those wholiterally enforced the proverb that "he that is not for us isagainst us, " and they sent to the War Department a highly coloredstatement of McLean's conduct, accusing him of disloyalty. Mr. Stanton, in his characteristic way, condemned him first and triedhim afterward. The first we knew of it, an order came sending McLeanoff to the Pacific coast, --to Oregon, I believe. General Burnsideprotested, and warmly sustained the major as a loyal man and ableofficer; but the mischief was done, and it was months before itcould be undone. Indeed it was years before the injury done him inhis professional career was fully recognized and a serious attemptwas made to recompense him. When Major McLean was thus removed, the business of his office fellinto the hands of Captain William P. Anderson of theadjutant-general's department, who issued the orders and conductedthe correspondence in General Burnside's name. The captain was anephew of General Robert Anderson, and though the general had nosons himself, his near kinsmen gave striking evidence of the earnestand militant patriotism of a loyal Kentucky stock closely allied toa well-known Ohio family. The roster of the members of the familywho saw military service is an exceptional one. [Footnote: ColonelCharles Anderson, brother of the general, was in Texas when theCivil War began, but abandoned his interests there, and coming backto Ohio was made colonel of the Ninety-third Ohio Infantry, which heled in the battle of Stone's River, where he was wounded. He was in1863 made the Union candidate for lieutenant-governor on the ticketwith John Brough, whom he succeeded as governor when Brough died in1865. Colonel Latham Anderson, son of Charles, graduated at West Point in1859 and became a captain in the Fifth U. S. Infantry and colonel ofthe Eighth California Volunteers. His war service was mostly in NewMexico and on the frontier. Larz Anderson, another brother of the general, was represented inthe War of the Rebellion by five sons who had honorable records: (1)Nicholas Longworth Anderson was adjutant, lieutenant-colonel, andcolonel of the Sixth Ohio Infantry. He was severely wounded atStone's River and Chickamauga. He left the service at the close ofthe war as brevet-major-general. (2) William Pope Anderson enlisted as a private in the Sixth OhioInfantry, became sergeant-major and second lieutenant. He was thenappointed assistant-adjutant-general with rank of captain. He wasslightly wounded in the battle of Shiloh. (3) Edward Lowell Anderson was first lieutenant and captain in theFifty-second Ohio Infantry. He was wounded at Jonesboro, butcontinued in service to the end of the war. (4) Frederick Pope Anderson was first lieutenant in the One Hundredand Eighty-first Ohio Infantry. (5) Larz Anderson, Jr. , was a mere lad, but served withoutcommission as volunteer aide-de-camp on the staff ofBrigadier-General N. C. McLean. William Marshall Anderson, of Chillicothe, Ohio, another brother ofthe general, had two sons in the war service: (1) Thomas McArthurAnderson was captain in the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and after thewar became its colonel, and later a general officer in thePhilippines. ] Including the general himself, his brother Charles, and the nephews, ten kinsmen supported the flag of the country in the field. Such afamily record is so remarkable as to be worthy of preservation. To return to the affairs of our military administration of thedepartment and district, the situation was complicated by the factthat Vallandigham had openly declared a purpose to return to Ohioduring his candidacy. I did not hesitate to let it be known thatupon his doing so, the alternative in his sentence would beenforced, and that he would be sent to Fort Warren for imprisonment. Mr. Pugh, who had been induced to accept the nomination forlieutenant-governor with him, made a visit to Windsor, in Canada(opposite Detroit), where Vallandigham met him. The result of theconference was that Vallandigham remained quietly in Canada till theelection was over, leaving it to his friends to make as muchpolitical capital out of his exile as they could. As evidence of the fierceness of the passions roused among hispartisans, a few significant facts may be mentioned. Theconscription law had led, as we have seen, [Footnote: Henry ReubenAnderson was second lieutenant in the Forty-third Ohio Infantry, captain in the Sixth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, and after the war wastransferred to the Fourth U. S. Artillery as first lieutenant. ] towholesale frauds in the form of "bounty-jumping. " It was of coursethe duty of the military authorities to prevent this by arrestingdeserters and holding them to military service and discipline undertheir enlistment. A common form of fraud was for a well-grown youngman to offer himself as a recruit, take the oath that he was oflawful age, receive the hundreds of dollars of bounty, and thenbring forward his parents to claim him as a minor enlisting withouttheir permission. We always recognized promptly the authority of awrit of _habeas corpus_ from the Federal courts in such cases, andthe judges examined the recruit and his friends carefully, to detecta fraudulent conspiracy if there was one. If the case appeared to befree from collusion and the evidence of minority sufficient, anorder of release was made, conditioned on the repayment to thegovernment of the bounty received and the expenses of theproceeding. The depot of recruits for the army was on the south side of theriver in Kentucky; but in any case that was not palpably fraudulentI directed the officers in charge to bring the recruit toCincinnati, where Judge Leavitt's writ could reach him, and tosubmit the case to the United States District Court. The followingletter will illustrate this, being one addressed by me to GeneralTillson, who commanded in Covington, which, with the region within aradius of some fifteen miles, was part of my district:-- "HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF OHIO, CINCINNATI, 9th September, 1863. GENERAL, --Judge Leavitt of the United States District Court calledthis morning with a Mr. Eckmann, who wishes to get his son, a minor, out of the First Heavy Artillery. The boy is named SummerfieldEckmann, and is in Company C. As you have stated to me that it ispracticable to fill up the place of minors and invalids as fast asthey can be got rid of, I would like to have the case looked into atonce, and unless some reason unknown to me exists, have him sent toreport to Colonel Boone at Kemper Barracks, where the writ from theFederal Court may be served. By agreement with the father, if thejudge should discharge him, the bounty will be paid back, and youwill please send a statement of what amount was paid and how hisaccount with the government stands. Very respectfully, your obed't serv't, (Signed) J. D. Cox, B. G. Commanding. Brig. Gen. Davis Tillson, Com'g, etc. , Covington, Ky. " All honest and deserving cases could be satisfactorily disposed ofin this way. But the fraudulent "bounty-jumpers" wanted nothing solittle as a full investigation before the United States Courts. These cases, therefore, if they appeared in court at all, would bebrought before local judges supposed to be prejudiced against thegovernment and who would not require restitution. To prevent this, the War Department issued instructions based on the decision of theUnited States Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth, in which ChiefJustice Taney had delivered the opinion. These instructions directedthat in cases arising under the conscription and recruiting laws, the writ of habeas corpus should be obeyed only when issued byUnited States courts. With full knowledge of these instructions andof the Supreme Court decision which had been a party shibboleth inthe fugitive-slave cases before the war, the Probate judge of thecounty seemed bent on provoking a collision with the Nationalauthorities. His court was, among courts of record, that of inferiorjurisdiction in the county, and the higher courts gave us notrouble. A letter which I wrote to Governor Tod at the close ofAugust so fully gives the details of the matter and of the view Ithen took of it, that I prefer to let it stand as my statement ofit, rather than any paraphrase I could now make. I said:-- "I have the honour to call your attention to a persistent effort onthe part of the Probate Judge of the county to produce a collisionbetween the sheriff and posse of the vicinity and the United Statesgovernment. "You have probably noticed the newspaper accounts of a habeas corpuscase before Judge ------ some time since, in which the writ wasissued to Lieutenant-Colonel Boone, One Hundred and Fifteenth OhioVolunteer Infantry, commanding at Kemper barracks in this city, directing him to bring before the court one Hicks, held as adeserter from the army. "In accordance with instructions from the War Department, based uponthe decision of Chief Justice Taney in the case of Ableman v. Booth, Lieutenant-Colonel Boone answered in writing, stating that the manwas held by the authority of the United States as a deserter, andthat, without intending any disrespect to the court, it wasimpossible for him to deliver the prisoner to the officers of aState court. Lieutenant-Colonel Boone further attached to his answerand made part of it the instructions from Washington and the orderof Major-General Burnside promulgating the same, and it was thusmade matter of record in the court that the case was one directlyaffecting the government of the United States. The judge was alsonotified by counsel that it was the purpose of the Federal officersto take the case to the courts of last resort should his decision bein accordance with that which he had rendered in other cases, andthat the matter would thus, without doubt, be ultimately determinedby the judicial decision of the highest courts having cognizance, and that there could be no occasion for collision between himselfand the military authorities. "The judge issued an attachment against Lieutenant-Colonel Boone forcontempt, and directed Major-General Burnside to be made party tothe record. General Burnside answered in a similar manner to ColonelBoone. The court made no personal order in General B. 's case, butdirected the sheriff of the county to arrest Lieutenant-ColonelBoone and bring him before the court. The sheriff went to ColonelBoone's quarters and was there informed that the writ could not beexecuted, as, under orders received, the military authorities wouldnot permit it. The sheriff so made return to the court, and has, ashe informs me this morning, been again directed peremptorily by thejudge to execute the writ at every hazard. "The sheriff came to me to know what would be our course if heshould raise the posse comitatus in obedience to the writ. My answerwas that the United States forces would use no aggression, but thatI wished him and the judge to understand distinctly that the writcould only be executed by overpowering the United States troops inopen fight, and that it became all concerned to consider well beforethey became overt traitors by levying war against the Federalgovernment; that I should regard them as public enemies at the firstovert act and use the utmost vigor against them; and that aftersuppressing any disturbance they might create, my first duty wouldbe to arrest the judge and himself and hand them over to the UnitedStates courts to be tried for treason. I likewise expressed mysurprise that in a matter which was avowedly an undisguised attemptto bring the State authorities into open conflict with the Nationalgovernment, he had not appealed to the governor of the State, itschief executive (he being himself but a subordinate), forinstructions. As he professed embarrassment as to his duty, I toldhim I would state what in my opinion a loyal sheriff should do insuch a case; and that was to make a written return upon the writsaying that it could not be obeyed without levying open war againstthe United States, and was therefore returned unexecuted.... In viewof the circumstances, I have thought best to lay the matter beforeyou, that you may, if you see proper, direct the sheriff to take nosteps calculated to bring the State and National authorities intocollision, without full communication with and instruction fromyourself as chief executive. I have no concern as to the success ofany forcible attempt upon Colonel Boone, but regard it as verydesirable that no such attempt should be made, and especially thatit should not be precipitated, without your knowledge, by the actionof the Probate Court of this county in overruling a decision of theSupreme Court of the United States. "I shall forward a copy of this letter to the Secretary of War forhis information, and have the honor to remain, " etc. There were some amusing incidents connected with the sheriff'sembarrassment which could not properly appear in my letter to thegovernor. Both he and the Probate judge were candidates forre-election, and it seemed certain that the aggressive Vallandighamfaction in the party would control the nominations in the partyconvention. In such excited times extreme men are almost sure totake the lead. The sheriff saw very clearly that there was nothingprofitable to him in a forcible attack upon the United States troopsin barracks, and knew that a call upon the _posse_ would beresponded to by nobody but ruffians of the criminal class who mightlike an opportunity to gather as a mob with a pretext of lawfulauthority. He complained to me with a comical distress that thejudge had taken advantage of him to gain with the extremists of hisparty the credit for bold defiance of the government, whilst he, thesheriff, was left to bear the brunt of the real danger. I had toldhim in an earlier interview that if he called out the _posse_ itwould be his duty to lead it in person, and had intimated that Ishould direct the soldiers to save bloodshed by carefully markingthe leaders in an attack. I now suggested that if he should informthe judge that he should summon him first as one of the _posse_ andrequire him to march beside him, he would probably find the zeal fora collision diminished. Whatever were the reasons which controlled, there was no _posse_summoned, and I heard no more of the arrest of Colonel Boone. Bothjudge and sheriff lived to look back upon the episode in their liveswith other feelings than those which excited them nearly todesperation in that singular political campaign. It was not alwayseasy to draw a satisfactory line in dealing practically with suchpowdery elements and social conditions as those of 1863, but thebest results seemed to come from carefulness not to provokeunnecessary collision with political prejudices and not to interferewith personal liberty more than was necessary, whilst showinginexorable firmness in carrying out such measures as we had toadopt. Two cases which arose in Dayton made it necessary todistinguish between two possible courses, and though there was agood deal of difference in judgment among loyal men I thought theevent fully justified us in that which we pursued. The arrest of Vallandigham had left a certain class of people inDayton on the verge of violent outbreak. A mob had wrecked thepublishing office of the Union party paper, and we had kept a smallgarrison at the city to preserve the peace, The "roughs" of theplace were insolent to the soldiers and their officers, and itrequired firm discipline to keep our men as patient as we wishedthem to be. One day a wrangle began, and one of the city "rowdies"pulled a pistol and fired upon a soldier. We arrested the criminal, but whilst we held him, an indictment was found against him in thelocal court, and he was demanded by the civil authorities for trial. We knew very well that in any jury of that county enough partisansof Vallandigham would be found to prevent a conviction, but Iordered the man to be delivered up. This was pretty sharplycriticised by the more ardent Union men, but I answered that it wasnecessary to find out whether justice could be administered by thecivil authorities before applying military rule. The delivery of the man was no doubt looked upon as an act oftimidity, and it was not long before we had a repetition of theoffence. I had taken pains to have the garrison at Dayton carefullyinstructed that they must be patient and cool, avoiding everyprovocation, but if attacked, the aggressor must be punished on thespot. In the second case, the man who drew his weapon was instantlyshot down. There was now a demand for the soldier to be tried by thelocal civil court; but I said that the boot was on the other foot. The charge against the soldier was for an act performed in the lineof his military duty, and of this our military courts hadcognizance. The case was investigated by a military tribunal and theman justified. The result was every way satisfactory. Assaultingsoldiers lost its attractiveness to town bullies, and the case inwhich the civilian had been left to the action of the civil courtswas a standing proof of the inefficiency of those tribunals inmatters where partisan passions entered, and where the unanimity ofa jury was consequently impossible. The State election occurred in October, and although there had beengreat fears of rioting and bloodshed, these fears were happilydisappointed. There had been enough of the preliminary education asto the relations of the military authorities to the preservation ofthe peace, to make it generally understood that disturbances wouldbe dangerous. The soldiers were, however, kept carefully out ofsight except as they exercised their personal right to vote. Theywere under arms at their barracks, and no leaves of absence weregiven. These precautions were all that was needed. In Cincinnati theelection was said to be one of the quietest and most orderly everknown. The people seemed to appreciate the gravity of the situationand to realize that it must be soberly and thoughtfully met. Hostsof men who would willingly have been in opposition to theadministration party on questions of economy or of details in theconduct of the war declined to vote for Vallandigham, whoseutterances had been the great matter of debate during the canvass, and whose disloyalty being thus brought home to the voters in everyneighborhood, had repelled all but the most passionate of his partyfriends. John Brough, the Union party candidate, himself a "wardemocrat, " was elected governor by an unprecedented majority of overa hundred thousand. The soldiers' vote had helped to swell thismajority, and as returns had to be made from polling-places openedfor each Ohio regiment in the field, there was considerable delaybefore the extent of the political victory was fully known. The homevote was enough for every practical purpose, and it, of course, wasknown at once. The returns from the army vote kept adding to themajority, and gave, day by day, a new stimulus to politicalinterest, one party rejoicing over the unanimity of the country'sdefenders, and the other affecting to see dangers of militarydespotism. For this reason it was fortunate that the soldiers' votewas not necessary to decide the election, and that without itBrough's triumph went beyond any ordinary measure of party success. The remarkable result of the election was felt throughout thecountry as an indication of renewed determination of the people thatthe war must be fought out to the complete crushing of the Rebellionand the restoration of the Union. There was a noticeablecrystallization of public opinion after it. Reasonable men in thedefeated party found it easy to accept conclusions which were backedup by so great majorities. Agitation was quieted, and there was anevident disposition to acquiesce in what was so evidently thepopular current. My aversion for the anomalous position of a military commandant outof the actual field of war had not been lessened by my experiencesof the summer, and both directly and indirectly I renewed myrequests for a field command. I had been told that the Secretary ofWar awaited only an opening which would permit him to assign me toduty with the advanced grade which had been given me after Antietam, and I had been advised, in a way that seemed authoritative, to waitpatiently for this. It became evident in the autumn that suchwaiting was likely to be profitless as well as wearisome. A regulararmy officer had a backing in the _esprit de corps_ at thedepartments, and Halleck was watchful to give the full weight of hisofficial influence in favor of such a one. It was, perhapsnaturally, assumed that a volunteer would be assisted by politicalfriends, and if he did not make use of such influence he would fallbetween two stools. After my first appointment I was never aware ofreceiving any help from these personal influences, and had gottenwhatever recognition I had from my immediate commanders in thefield. Burnside had intimated that if Hartsuff's ill health shouldmake that officer retire from the command of the Twenty-third Corps, he would assign me to it in the expectation that the correspondingrank would then be conferred by the President. If I have any regretrespecting my own action in seeking active duty, it is that I didnot ask for the command of one of the divisions in the corps on themovement into East Tennessee. It was Burnside's wish that I shouldremain in Cincinnati and I acquiesced; but I have had a lingeringbelief that my influence with him would have helped decide him toremain in the West had I been with him in Knoxville in October andNovember. Be that as it may, I was fully determined after the Ohioelection was over to cease looking for anything more than a fieldcommand, according to my present rank, and to be urgent till Iobtained it. In this year the first volume of Kinglake's "History of the CrimeanWar" was published, and reading it in the intervals of other duty inCincinnati, I found in it lessons of hope and confidence in ourarmies that were to me both stimulating and encouraging. It wouldnot be strange if an English soldier should feel that Kinglake wasquite too frank in his revelation of the mistakes anddiscouragements which attended England's first military operationsafter the "forty years' peace. " But it was precisely thisphotographic realism and unreserve which gave the book its peculiarvalue. I found Lord Raglan and his subordinates intelligent men, feeling their way through doubts and mistakes to a new experimentalknowledge of their task. I compared them and their work with what Ihad seen in our own service when a great army had to be organizedand put in the field and everything had to be created anew. I sawthat we had been no worse off than our neighbors, and that ourtuition in the school of experience had gone on quite as rapidly astheirs. I thanked Kinglake in my heart for telling us that Raglantested what he was doing by asking himself how "the Duke" would havedone had he been there. It was only another way of applying thelessons of past experience to the present duty; but it seemedpeculiarly human that the English general in the perplexities of histroublesome problem in the Crimea should summon up the shade ofWellington and ask how the practical soldier of the SpanishPeninsular War would act were he deciding for his old staff officerwhat he must do at the Alma or in front of Sebastopol. The student of military history sees that the weak points in theBritish army on the peace establishment had been that systematic andcontinuous preparation for active war had not been insisted on. Itneeded the organizing genius of Roon and Moltke in the Prussian armyto make such a mobilization as that of 1866 and that of 1870, and toshow what is possible in preparing an armed host to take the field. Preparation for war has had a totally different meaning since thosecampaigns, and the start of a day or two in reaching the field wasshown to involve the winning and losing a great campaign. As mattersstood in 1854, however, the great military powers of Europe shouldbe considered as having only the raw material of armies as they haddepots of military stores, and true organization in every departmenthad to be effected after a declaration of war. Studying it in 1863, it seemed to me that the only advantage England or France would havehad over us at the outbreak of the Rebellion would have been in thegreater number of men partly drilled and the greater quantities ofarms and ammunition in store. Kinglake taught us that others wouldhave had to go through most of the discouragements we hadexperienced, and that our aptitude in learning had been perhapsgreater than theirs would have been. His unreserved disclosure ofthe errors and the miseries of the siege of Sebastopol wasinfinitely more instructive than any history which hid thehumiliating facts and covered all with the glamour and glory of thefinal success. His faithful dealing was in the line of truediscipline, though the reading of his story must have been a sorechastisement of spirit for many an English soldier and statesman. Itwas more effective than the comments of any "war correspondent, "however capable; for it was free from every suspicion ofunfriendliness, and was written with the fullest access to officialevidence. I cannot help believing that the book was no small factorin the general movement in Europe toward a much more scientificcomprehension and a much better practical mastery of the elements ofarmy organization and administration in times of peace. But what I am quite sure of is that its perusal was a source ofgreat comfort and encouragement to me in the midst of our ownstruggle; because it assured me, as I compared Raglan's experiencewith ours, that we had not gone so far astray in learning ourlesson, and were not so completely on the dunces' bench, as I hadbeen disposed to fear. We had plenty of blunders to confess, andthere was no room for over-confidence; but the book prompted everyearnest soldier among us to believe that we could make still betteruse of our experience, and to feel bolder in relying on his ownjudgment and courage in drawing new expedients from our peculiarcircumstances and in developing new adaptations of military scienceto our own campaigns. Staff schools cannot turn out great generalsto order, and the man who leads will continue to be more importantthan any other element of an army; but no leader can work well withdull and antiquated tools, and the present generation can hardly seea great war begun with so little adequate preparation for it as wascommon before our great civil strife. On the 9th of November the humdrum routine at my districtheadquarters was interrupted by a dispatch from the officercommanding at Detroit, Michigan, giving warning of what was moreexplicitly reported in one of the 10th, saying that he waspositively informed that within forty-eight hours two armed steamerswould attack Johnson's Island and release the prisoners held there. [Footnote: Official Records, series ii. Vol. Vi. Pp. 491, 495, 635. ] The military prison at Johnson's Island was built for theconfinement of Confederate officers who had been captured in battle, and their number was so large that to release them would be anenterprise of no little importance, if successful. The island lay inSandusky Bay, within a few hours' sail of several Canadian ports. Its garrison consisted of a single regiment which had all theemployment it needed to furnish the ordinary prison guards, andwould be entirely too weak to oppose any considerable forceattacking from without, especially as it would be prudent to assumethat such an attack would be accompanied by an outbreak of theprisoners within. I immediately communicated with Governor Tod and with the Commissaryof Prisoners at Washington, Colonel Hoffman, and on the same daysent a battery of three-inch rifled cannon and 500 newly raisedrecruits to Sandusky. I telegraphed the Hon. Joshua R. Giddings, ourconsul-general at Montreal, asking what he could learn in Canada asto the threatened expedition. He thought it was the mere "bombast"of Confederate emissaries and refugees in the Canadian provinces, and made light of it. On the 12th, however, the Secretary of Wartelegraphed me that Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, confirmedthe report, and directed me to take energetic action to defeat theexpected raid. The dispatch reached me at nine o'clock in themorning, and as it would be necessary to consult with the governorand get him to call out a force of State militia, I telegraphed himthat I would go to Columbus on the half-past-ten train fromCincinnati, and asked him to be ready to call out the militia assoon as I could see him. I then sent messages to the commandants ofmilitia regiments near the railway line, requesting them to call outtheir men at once in anticipation of an order from the governor toproceed to Sandusky. I also communicated with my subordinates incommand at Detroit, Sandusky, and Columbus, giving a hint of mypurposes. Finding I was likely to be late at the railway station, Isent a message to Mr. Woodward, the superintendent of the LittleMiami Railroad, asking him to hold the train for me. The train hadgone when the message reached him, but he ordered out an extralocomotive, and when I reached the station it was under orders toovertake the regular train. With an aide-de-camp I mounted thelocomotive, and we were off at speed. The train was overtaken atXenia, half-way to Columbus, and I was able to keep my appointmentwith the governor. It happened that there was at this time a plot also to take the campof military prisoners at Columbus, indicating a wide-spread schemeamong the Confederate prisoners in Ohio, and General Mason, whocommanded there, did not think it would be safe to reduce hisgarrison. The governor acted at once upon my suggestion, and orderedout the militia regiments which I had warned before leavingCincinnati. My regular train had gone on, but Mr. Woodward hadprovided for a special one from Columbus, and we were soon speedingon in the hope of making the connection with a train going West onthe Lake Shore Railway. The connection was made, though it becamenecessary to make what was then regarded as extraordinary speed todo it. Over one stretch of the road we ran twenty miles in eighteenminutes by the watch, and our average rate was high enough to makeit a noteworthy journey. I reached Sandusky at midnight, and foundreports of the militia regiments already on the way, and that thehostile expedition had not yet left Canada. There is always a considerable amount of business labor connectedwith the sudden assembly of new troops in a city like Sandusky. Provision must be made for quarters and for their subsistence. Themilitia were not like troops accustomed to take the field, and werenot provided with tents. The autumn was well advanced, and severewinter weather was likely to come at any time. Competent officershad to be selected to take responsible charge of each of the supplydepartments, including arms and ammunition. A battery ofParrott-rifled cannon was ordered to report to me as well as someheavy coast artillery. The first organization of means to look afterthe coming troops and the artillery being made, the next duty was apersonal reconnoissance of my field of operations. A gentleman putat my disposal a small sailing yacht of light draught, and with agood crew and a fresh breeze the principal points of the lower baywere visited, including Johnson's Island. Sandusky Bay is the largest land-locked body of water connected withLake Erie. It is some twenty miles long by three or four wide, itslength running east and west, and narrow tongues of land separatingit from the lake. The mouth of the bay is about a mile wide, but thewater is quite shallow except in the narrow channel, which issinuous and runs very close to Cedar Point, the extremity of thelong, low sandy cape which separates the eastern part of the bayfrom the open water. A lighthouse on the point and range lights nearit give direction to vessels approaching, which run from thenorthwest, head on, till they seem almost ashore at the foot of thelighthouse tower, when they turn sharply to the southwest, thechannel being zigzag up to the city, which lies on the southeastshore. It did not need a second glance to determine that Cedar Pointwas the place to fortify, and that batteries there would rake anyvessel approaching the harbor, as well as on its way in, if itshould succeed in passing the point. Johnson's Island lies a mile or two inside the entrance to the bayon the western side. A narrow channel separates it from the land onthat side, which is a high rocky peninsula called Marblehead. Theisland had been cultivated as a farm, containing a hundred acres ormore, with some pleasant groves amid the fields, and with a gentlyundulating surface which gave it an agreeable variety and apicturesque appearance. The landing at the island was on the bayside, three or four miles from the city wharves. If a hostile forceshould land on the peninsula at Marblehead, it could not reach theisland by reason of the channel which separates it from the land onthe west. The only chance of success for such a raid was to make asurprise of it before Cedar Point could be fortified, to enter thebay and land a force sufficient to overpower the prison garrisonbefore it should be reinforced. Under the terms of the treaty with Great Britain, our navy wasrepresented by a single vessel of war on Lake Erie, the steamer"Michigan, " which carried a battery of eight or ten guns. She wasordered to Sandusky to co-operate with me at the same time that Iwas directed to go there. She was commanded by Captain John Carter, a bluff and hearty seaman of the old school, whom I found cordiallyready to work with me in the most perfect harmony and mutualunderstanding. I lost no time in transporting my two rifledbatteries to Cedar Point, and throwing up hasty earthworks to coverthem. From the moment they were in position it was certain that nounarmed steamboat could enter the harbor. A part of my infantry wasencamped in rear of the batteries, covered by a grove of evergreentrees, near enough to support the guns if an effort were made toland there. The rest of the infantry was assigned to increase thegarrison on Johnson's Island itself. The news had spread that therewas a concentration of our forces at Sandusky, and by the time wewere ready for an attack the raiders were well aware that theirplans had failed. Their project had not been a hopeless one if they could have kept itsecret, but that was almost impossible. The leaders in it werecommonly reported to have been some of Morgan's men who had madetheir way to Canada when he was captured. By the aid of Confederateagents they had procured the means to organize a considerable bandof adventurers, and had chartered two steamboats which were to meetthem at the mouth of the Detroit River. The assembly of such a bodyof men attracted the attention of the Canadian authorities, andinformation was sent to Lord Lyons at Washington. Our officers atDetroit also got wind of it, and employed the police and detectivesto ferret out the facts. The raiders had assembled, and the boatswere ready, when, on the 14th of November, they learned that theirplans were exposed and the chance to succeed was lost. The lesseager ones were quick to abandon the enterprise, and the bolderspirits found themselves reduced to a handful. So they scattered, threatening to try it again at some more convenient time. As soon as the work of preparation at Cedar Point was well underway, I accepted the invitation of Captain Carter to make areconnoissance in the "Michigan. " We sailed out of the harbor andmade the tour of the beautiful group of islands known as the BassIslands, in the midst of which is the little harbor of Put-in-Bay. We were on the classic ground where Perry had won his naval victoryin the War of 1812, and although we found no trace of the threatenedraid, the circumstances which took us there added to the interestwith which we examined the scene of Perry's glory. On my return Ireported to the Secretary of War that all present danger had passed, and asked to be allowed to send the militia home. The weather hadbecome stormy, and the State troops naturally became impatient whenthe need of their continued exposure seemed to be at an end. Theywere soon allowed to go, but it was wisely determined to put theheavy guns in a fortification on the island, where they couldcommand the entrance to the bay and yet be so connected with thepermanent garrison as to avoid the establishment of two camps withthe necessary increase of expense as well as numbers. This delayed me a fortnight at Sandusky, and the delay was quite asunwelcome to me as to the militia. I had been away from Cincinnatibut a few days when I received a dispatch from General Burnside, saying that if I was still minded to accept a field command hethought he could give me one of his corps. As this was exactly whatI had been wishing for, it will be easily believed that I chafed atthe circumstances which seemed to tie me to the shore of Lake Eriewhen I longed to be on my way to East Tennessee. I laid the matterbefore the War Department by telegraph, and begged to be allowed togo. Mr. Stanton answered on the 22d that I could not yet leaveSandusky. I hurried the work to be done there with all possibleenergy, so as to remove the cause of delay, and on the 3d ofDecember was gratified to learn that the order had been issueddirecting me to report in person to the general in command atKnoxville. I was not informed that I should not find Burnside therewhen I should arrive, and assumed that my work at Sandusky was theonly cause of delay in my orders to go; but I was soon to learn ofother changes which I did not anticipate. My stay at Sandusky gave me the opportunity to make an inspection ofthe military prison at Johnson's Island, and I availed myself of it. As only officers were confined there, the high average intelligenceand character of these would of course show itself in their personalhabits and in their methods of employing the time, which hung heavyon their hands. In all such situations the energy and hopefulness ofthe individual are the best guaranty for continued good health, whilst ennui, listlessness, and idleness are the pretty sureforerunners of melancholy and homesickness, which lead to seriousmaladies. It would be hard to find a more salubrious site for a campthan Johnson's Island. Naturally well drained, diversified withgrove and meadow, open to the breeze from every quarter, washed bythe pure waters of Lake Erie, it is to-day, as it was then, abeautiful and attractive spot. The winter there is not usuallysevere. The vast body of water comprising the Great Lakes modifiesthe climate and tempers it so that the autumn is generally prolongedand pleasant. Winter begins late, but is apt to be changeable anddisagreeable, and a raw and backward spring, with chilling winds offthe frozen waters, is the part of the year most to be dreaded. Native Ohioans insist that there is no climate more wholesome andpleasant than this lake-shore belt, which is now the land ofcontinuous vineyards and peach orchards. A native of the Gulf Stateswould, however, find its winter and spring severe and trying, morefrom sudden changes than from any extremely low temperature. Takingit all in all, it is probable that no place for a prison camp couldbe found in the Northern States which would be liable to fewerobjections. The prison itself was constructed in the manner which seemedsimplest and cheapest. A large square on the sloping hillsides wassurrounded with a high wooden fence. On the outside of this, nearthe top, was a gallery or balcony supported on brackets. This was the walk for the sentinels, and from it they had acommanding view of the interior of the enclosure. Sentry-boxes, looking like turrets, were at the corners and at intervals on thesides. Within, the barracks for the prisoners were on the west ornorthwest side, leaving the larger space open in front for exercise. The buildings were of pine boards, roughly but well constructed, sothat they were dry and tight. Rows of bunks ran along the sides, filled with beds of straw. The shelter and accommodation wasdecidedly better than that which we made for our own troops at CampDennison, our first camp of instruction. Through most of the yearthere was no ground for complaint. In winter, and especially onwinter nights, it would be impossible to keep up anything like asteady temperature, and the thin shell of the building would soonchill through in a nipping and frosty air. We had to meet thisdifficulty in all winter quarters for troops, and there seemed to beno way to remove it. If one could be heavily clad, it was generallymore healthful to endure a steady low temperature, than to meet thealternations of heat and cold which came of the replenishing anddying out of the fires in stoves during the long winter night. Asmany men have many minds, it was almost impossible to secureanything like system in a long shed-like building occupied by alittle democracy of hundreds of persons. The food was plain but good in quality, similar to the army ration, and at the time of my visit was abundant. I took occasion to gothrough the barracks unattended by the officers of the garrison, andencouraged the prisoners to make known any complaints. There werepractically none that were not necessarily incident to the positionof a prisoner of war in actual confinement. The loss of liberty, theweary pacing of the enclosure in front of their barracks, the lackof interesting occupation, home-sickness, and generaldiscomfort, --these were the ills of which they spoke. Among theprisoners was General Jeff. Thompson, of Missouri, --the rankingofficer among them, as I recollect, --and I sought an introduction tohim and talked with him in regard to the prison life. He wasdepressed and ailing, though not consenting to go into hospital, andspoke feelingly of the discouraging monotony and ennui of theirexistence, but made no complaint of the administration of the prisonin any way. To be exchanged was the burden of their wishes andprayers, and in this every one with ordinary human sympathies mustfeel with them. Games of chess, draughts, dominoes, and cards weretheir indoor amusements, and some of the more energetic kept up anattempt at regular out-door exercise. It happened that the chief surgeon of the camp was an old neighborof mine, Dr. M. C. Woodworth, and I questioned him closely as to themedical and sanitary condition. He was a man of the highestcharacter in his profession and as a citizen. I had absoluteconfidence in his uprightness as well as his ability. His statementsfully corroborated the conclusions I drew from my own observation. Iwas fully satisfied that the garrison administration was honest andhumane, and that the prisoners suffered only such evils as werenecessarily incident to confinement in a narrow space, and to lifein temporary barracks of the kind used in all military camps. I learned that those prisoners who had means of their own werepermitted to open private accounts with merchants and bankers in thecity of Sandusky, and had little difficulty in increasing theirphysical comforts in many ways. Since the war I have conversed withbusiness men of that town who personally knew of these arrangements, and who have given me details of remittances and credits furnishedto prisoners, and of some considerable investments made for them. Acertain surveillance was necessary in such cases to give assurancethat no unlawful advantage was taken of such opportunities, butthere was very little if any reason to believe such leniency wasabused. CHAPTER XXX A WINTER RIDE ON THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS Ordered to East Tennessee--Preparation for a long ride--A smallparty of officers--Rendezvous at Lexington, Ky. --Changes in mystaff--The escort-A small train--A gay cavalcade--The blue-grasscountry--War-time roads--Valley of the Rockcastle--Quarters for thenight--London--Choice of routes--Longstreet in the way--A turnsouthward--Williamsburg--Meeting Burnside--Fording theCumberland--Pine Mountain--A hard pull--Teamsters' chorus--Big CreekGap--First view of East Tennessee--Jacksboro--A forty-miletrot--Escape from unwelcome duty--In command of Twenty-thirdCorps--The army-supply problem--Siege bread--Starvedbeef--Burnside's dinner to Sherman. The order of the War Department directing me to report in person tothe general commanding in East Tennessee was issued on the 2nd ofDecember. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 314. ]It was to take effect when I should have completed my duties atSandusky, but as I had pressed all my work forward to completionsome days before, in the expectation of the order, I was prepared toleave at once. A copy of the order was telegraphed to me on the 3rd, and I left for Cincinnati the same evening. On reaching the districtand department headquarters, I learned that Burnside was relieved, and that General Foster had passed through the city, going on towardEast Tennessee to assume command of the department. Longstreetraised the siege of Knoxville the very day I reached Cincinnati, butthis was not yet known, and several days passed before we hadauthentic information that the way to Knoxville was open. There waswork to do in closing up the business of the district, packingpapers and books pertaining to my headquarters, and providing fortheir safe-keeping. A number of officers belonging to Burnside'scommand were waiting an opportunity to rejoin the army, and Iarranged a rendezvous for these at Lexington, Ky. , where I wouldjoin them. A small troop of cavalry was detailed to act as ourescort, and the quartermaster's department promised wagons for ourbaggage and supplies. On the 8th the news of Longstreet's retreatindicated that the road through Cumberland Gap to Knoxville wasprobably open, and sending our horses and baggage to Lexington byrailroad, I left Cincinnati with my staff on Wednesday, the 9th, forthe same place. Reaching there at evening, the next day was spent inpacking our wagons and organizing our little party, and thecavalcade marched out of the pretty town of Lexington early on the11th. My staff was not altogether the same as it was in my Virginiacampaigns. I had lost my friend, Surgeon Holmes, by death. He hadbeen assigned to duty with me in Cincinnati, but his lungs hadbecome diseased through exposure in the field, and he had died ofconsumption a few weeks before. My aide Captain Christie wassimilarly affected, and resigned to prolong his life. He ultimatelydied of the illness thus contracted. My aide Lieutenant Conine wasappointed colonel of one of the new colored regiments, and went withit to Virginia. Major Bascom, my adjutant-general, Major Treat, mycommissary, and Lieutenant Theodore Cox, my aide-de-camp, wereordered to accompany me, and were all that remained of my old staff. In the place of Conine I secured the detail of Captain E. D. Saunders, assistant-adjutant-general, who had served temporarily onmy staff during the preceding season. He was the son of an oldresident of Cincinnati, an excellent officer in his department aswell as a gallant soldier, and he remained with me in closestrelations till he fell by my side in the Atlanta campaign in thefollowing year. His assignment as aide-de-camp was out of the usualcourse, but it was allowed in view of the contingency that MajorBascom could not remain with me if I should not continue in commandof an army corps. In this case Saunders would become myadjutant-general, and this was what in fact occurred a little later. At Lexington I found a group of ten or a dozen officers who wereeager to join my party in the ride over the mountains. The one ofhighest rank was Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Strong of General Foster'sstaff, who had been allowed a short leave of absence when his chiefstarted for the West, and was now hastening back to duty. I found aground for pleasant acquaintance with him in his relationship toBishop Bedell of Ohio, a venerated friend of mine as long as helived. Colonel Strong was a brother of Mrs. Bedell, and was arefined and cultivated gentleman. Lieutenant-Colonel James T. Sterling of the One Hundred and Third Ohio Infantry was also on hisway to join his regiment at Knoxville. He had been a captain in theSeventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and served with me in my firstcampaign in West Virginia, where I had become attached to him forhis military as well as his personal character. He became myinspector-general in the field. Captain D. W. H. Day, assistantquartermaster, was also en route to the Twenty-third Corps in thefield, and was directed to take charge of our little train. Hisunbounded energy and his power to surmount obstacles so impressed methat on our reaching Knoxville I had him also assigned to permanentduty with me in his department. The others passed out of the circleof permanent acquaintances when the journey was over, but they wereall pleasant travelling companions, and one or two of them wouldhave been remarkable anywhere for their wit and cheerfulness. It wasas happy and jolly a party as one need wish for in a rough ride of acouple of hundred miles over the mountains. Our escort turned out to be only twenty horsemen instead of a fulltroop, but these were enough for protection against mere marauders, and we had to take the chance of meeting organized bodies of theenemy. Four army wagons were furnished us. One of these was loadedwith oats for our horses, and carried the personal baggage of thecavalry troop. Another was loaded with ordinary army rations. Athird was devoted to mess supplies of the officers of the party, andas we were going into a country wasted by war and almostfamine-stricken, we each tried to carry with us a small stock ofchoice provisions which might eke out a little comfort to the mess. The fourth wagon carried our personal baggage. Captain Day hadcarefully selected strong and serviceable horses for the teams, andthe wagons were minutely inspected to see that they were fit for themountain work in a wilderness where wheelwrights could not be found. It was our purpose to get both forage and provisions on the road ifwe could buy them, and to save the stock in our wagons for a time ofnecessity or to carry as much as possible into Knoxville. I had telegraphed to Burnside as soon as I reached Cincinnati, formally reporting myself as under his orders for duty in the fieldby permission of the Secretary of War. I expressed my regret to hearof his leaving the command, and urged my assignment to duty beforehe laid down his authority. No answer to my dispatch was received, and the fact was that full communication with Burnside by theCumberland Gap route was not opened till the 9th of December, sothat my letter was among the correspondence received by Burnside theday he turned over the command to Foster. Another cause ofuneasiness to me was the change of department boundaries made in theorder assigning General Foster to command. The States north of theOhio were separated from the department, and I was apprehensive thatother changes might occur which would make me fall between twostools. That there was danger of just such disappointments turnedout to be very true. My anxious determination to get forward toKnoxville with the least possible delay was justified, and I hadreason to congratulate myself on acting promptly upon it. Our cavalcade presented a gay appearance as we marched out ofLexington on Friday morning. There were twelve or fifteen officers, all well mounted and followed by a group of servants riding andleading our extra horses. Part of the cavalry troop led the way, theguidons fluttering in the van. Behind us came an ambulance and thearmy wagons with clean white canvas covers and well-groomed teams offour horses each, driven in army fashion by a driver astride of thenear wheel-horse, a mounted wagon-master superintending the whole. The little column was closed by a squad of the cavalry acting asrear-guard. There had not been any severe winter weather as yet, andthough the road was sloppy, the sun was bright overhead, and itsbeams flashed from our side-arms and equipments. Our first day'sride was to take us to Richmond, a thriving town twenty-five milesaway, the county-seat of Madison County, and a good turnpike roadmade this an easy day's journey. We were in the rich blue-grassregion, and though all of central Kentucky showed the marks of war'sravages, this region was comparatively unscathed, and the beautifulrolling country was neither abandoned nor untilled. Horses andcattle were noticeably few, for raids like Morgan's had beenfrequent enough to teach the peril of having flocks and herds totempt the enemy. Farmers gave more attention than before toagriculture proper and the raising of crops which would directlysupport the family. There was nothing dispiriting in the view of thecountry on this first day's ride, and though a winter landscape canhardly be exhilarating when it is leafless and bare, gray, and alittle sombre in color, we found ourselves under no stress ofsympathy with misfortune or want, as is so often the case with thesoldier. On leaving Richmond our really rough work began. The roads wouldhave been bad enough at any time, but the hard use by army trains inbad weather and the entire lack of repair had made them execrable. All the ordinary methods of keeping highways in order by localadministration were suspended by the war, and the only work doneupon them was what each wagon-master could do with his drivers tomend the worst places so that his train could get through. As wecould not be sure of finding food for man or beast on the road, itwas necessary to gauge our speed by the distance our wagons couldmake, so that we should not be separated from them. About twentymiles a day was the maximum, and though we sometimes got a littlefurther, there were days when our journey was much less. South ofRichmond and on the border between Madison and Rockcastle counties, we crossed Big Hill, the first of the outlying ranges of theCumberland Mountains. These great ridges are nearly parallel to eachother, and even the "gaps" in them are so high that there is alwaysa long and hard pull for wagon teams in surmounting them. Over thesummit we came down into the valleys tributary to the RockcastleRiver. Twenty or twenty-five miles away another summit marks theboundary between this valley and the principal depression in whichthe Cumberland River finds its devious course to the south and west. The rocks are sandstone through which the Rockcastle River has cutdeep gorges and chasms, and the weathering of the cliffs has leftthe strata and crevices exposed with so much of the regularity oflayers of masonry as to tell at once the story of the impressionmade on the early explorers of the region, and the suggestion byNature herself of a name for the beautiful stream that dashes alongto join the Cumberland many miles below. Our second day's journey ended far from any village or tavern, inthis romantic valley. A pouring rain had begun about noon, and weplodded and splashed along till we reached a large log house whichseemed a convenient halting-place as far advanced as our wagonscould be brought. The house belonged to a thrifty widow. Half of itwas simply furnished, and in this part she and her children lived. The other half was a large unfurnished room with the walls of hewnlogs and a great fireplace of stone in the middle of the long sideof the room. Out of this opened a little bedroom, a mere closet, inwhich the spare bed for guests was placed. The widow put these tworooms at our disposal. A roaring fire was soon burning on thehearth, our saddles and horse trappings were arranged on the sidesof the room to serve as pillows, and blankets were brought in fromthe ambulance. Supper was got, partly from our own stores, cookedwith the help of the family, and we were early ready for bed. Theguest chamber was assigned to me, but it was so small that for thesake of ventilation the door was kept open, and the ruddy firelightflashed upon as picturesque and as merry a group as one could wishto see. A weary day in the saddle made all of us ready for sleep, and quips and jokes soon died out as one after another seemed todrop off into forgetfulness. The physical fatigue of the day madeone of the party develop a phenomenal capacity for snoring in hisheavy sleep, and in the quiet his nasal trumpeting grew morepronounced. It proceeded by phrases, as it were, each effortstronger than the preceding, till a fortissimo passage came andended with a snort which echoed through the room and was followed byperfect silence. From the corner of the room came a drawling voicewith a sigh as of deep relief, "Thank God _he's_ dead. " The shout oflaughter which followed showed that nearly all had roused themselvesfor the _finale_, and the badgered performer of the music lost muchof the real comfort of his night's rest by his fear of committinghimself to a complete oblivion which might subject him to anotherchaffing bout from his companions. Another wet and uncomfortable day's ride brought us to London, anunattractive village at the parting of the ways, the principal roadleading on to Cumberland Gap, and another on the right going to aford of the Cumberland River at Williamsburg, where there would beagain a choice of routes up the Elk Fork of the Cumberland betweenthe ridges known as Jellico Mountain and Pine Mountain. The leftwing of Burnside's column had taken this route in October, and aftercrossing the Cumberland had climbed Jellico Mountain on their righthand, and reached the headwaters of Emory River, a tributary of theTennessee which breaks through the mountains at Emory Gap, theeasiest route into East Tennessee. Another road kept in the valleyof Elk Fork till a place was reached where Pine Mountain, on theleft, could be scaled, and once over its summit a hard road led toBig Creek Gap in the Cumberland Mountains, and thence by way ofJacksboro to Knoxville. At London we were met with news from East Tennessee which made mereconsider the question of our route. We heard from Cumberland Gapthat after General Foster had joined Burnside at Knoxville, Longstreet had moved in force to Rutledge, where he intercepted thisline of communication, and that Knoxville could not be reached bythat road for some time to come. This seemed to make it necessary toturn off to the south. As between the road to Emory Gap over JellicoMountain and that to Big Creek Gap over Pine Mountain, the bestevidence seemed to indicate the latter as the easier, but with thequalification which travellers in so wild a region have often toface, that whichever way you go you will wish you had gone theother. The name of Williamsburg on the Cumberland sounded as if itmight be a considerable town, but the man who gave us the routewarned us that we should find "it's not much of a 'burg neither whenyou git thar. " Our ride into London had been on Sunday, and wassurely a work of necessity if not of mercy. Captain B. Had found hishorse a little shaky in coming down the steep hills, and at onelittle stream the jaded beast came down on his knees in the water. The captain with affected seriousness argued that it was apunishment for travelling on the day of rest, but was effectuallysilenced by the wag of the party, who humorously remarked, "Ah! ifyour horse is so weak on Sunday what would have become of him andyou on a week day?" London did not afford us any lodgings thattempted us indoors, and we wrapped ourselves in our blankets andslept on the open veranda of a dilapidated house, building acamp-fire in the yard in front. The rain had ceased, and wepreferred the frosty air to the narrow and stuffy quarters we shouldotherwise have had to take. The evening of the 14th of December brought us to the CumberlandRiver, and as it was rising from the heavy rain of the precedingweek, we should have been glad to get over at once, but the wagonscould not overtake us till night, and we stopped at a country-houseon the north side where we were made quite comfortable. About oneo'clock in the morning, however, I was awakened by voices in theroom below me, and recognized that of Captain French of Burnside'sstaff, who was asking the farmer to light a fire and prepare toreceive the general and his party, who were a little behind, wet andnearly frozen. I got up and dressed myself, went downstairs to greetthe captain, who was soon joined by the rest of the party. Thegeneral had come by the route I was taking, but his wagons hadbroken down on the mountain-side, and he had been obliged to abandonthem. The party had picked up somewhere an old-fashioned stage-coachon thorough braces, and this was drawn by ten mules. They had packedon the backs of other mules such of their personal effects andstores as they could, and had left the rest by the roadside. Theyhad halted for the night on the south side of the river, but atmidnight had been roused by the news that the river was rising, andthat they must pass the ford at once if they expected to get over. In the darkness of the night it had been both difficult andperilous, for the ford was diagonal to the course of the stream, andthere was great danger of getting into deep water. They were allsoaking wet and chilled, covered with mud, and as forlorn andunkempt a set of men as was ever seen. They warmed and partly driedthemselves by the fire, and pushed on as soon as day began to break, for the general was impatient to get forward. Colonel Goodrich, Colonel Richmond, Major Van Buren, and the personal staff were withhim, and as my own staff had been well acquainted with them, it wasan interesting rencounter with all the events of the Knoxvillecampaign to discuss. The general had sent his proposal to me to joinhim, the very day Longstreet reached the Holston River at Loudon, and when it had become evident that the Confederates were committedto an active campaign in East Tennessee. General Hartsuff had foundthat he could not endure the work, and had decided to leave beforeKnoxville should be invested. My regret that I could not start atonce was diminished by the fact that the investment was completebefore I could possibly have reached Knoxville, so that no time hadbeen lost. But all the circumstances showed that Burnside hadregarded his request to be relieved as indefinitely postponed, andthe appointment of General Foster to succeed him was unexpected. Hehad not heard that I was on my way, but after meeting me sent adispatch to Foster as soon as he reached the telegraph line. He hadinformed Foster at Knoxville of his purpose in having me join him, and sent this message in a friendly wish to promote my interests. As soon as the general and his party were off, we began ourpreparation to cross the river. Their experience had shown that theincrease of difficulty in keeping the ford at night was more thanwould probably come from the rise of the water. I therefore orderedeverything to be ready as soon as it was broad daylight. We hadeaten our breakfast and were in the saddle as soon as we could seeclearly. Captain Day carefully examined the ford with a few of thecavalrymen, and fixed the landmarks which would guide us to theshallowest places. With these precautions and by carefully followingdirections we got over without mishap. The water did not quite reachthe bodies of the wagons, and by lifting our feet out of ourstirrups we got over dryshod. The stream was swift, and the only wayto keep one's direction safely was to look ahead and not downward. Had we tried it in the night, we should no doubt have fared as badlyas our friends who had preceded us. A day's hard journey for the wagon teams brought us to the foot ofPine Mountain at the point where the road leaves the bed of Elk Forkto climb the steep ascent. We were now only nineteen miles fromJacksboro, in the valley of the Clinch, but the distance wasmultiplied by the cumulating difficulties of the way. We were notfar from Cross Mountain, a ridge which, as its name indicates, connects the long parallel ranges of Jellico, Pine, and Cumberlandmountains. We must climb Pine Mountain to its crest, descend alongthe shoulders of Cross Mountain near the head of the valley, thenscale the side of Cumberland Mountain to reach Big Creek Gap, fromwhich the valley of East Tennessee would open before us. We campedfor the night and prepared for an early start in the morning. Theteams were well fed and groomed, and the whole equipment wascarefully inspected to see that everything was ready for the strainof the rough work of the morrow. The morning of the 16th was fair and frosty, and we were astirearly. Pine Mountain loomed before us like the steep roof of somevast gothic cathedral. The ridge seemed as straight as a houseridge, and we could not see that any natural depression made theascent much easier in one place than another. Our road ran up a spurof the mountain till the regular slope was reached, then turning tothe right it gradually mounted the steep incline by a diagonalcourse on a long shelf cut in the hillside, with here and there alevel spot on which the teams could breathe. From where we stood inthe valley the mountain face looked precipitous, and the road a mereline gradually rising along its front. It would have been bad enoughif it had been a metalled road in good order; but it was only arough track alternating in mud and rock, that had never been goodeven in mid-summer, and it was now next to impassable. Under thedirection of Captain Day and the wagonmaster the teams were doubled, two of the wagons being left in the valley till the others shouldreach the summit, when the teams were to be brought back. When theycame to the long and hard pull, the drivers gave us a good sample ofarmy wagoning, their yelling and cracking of whips keeping up acontinual chorus, and at specially hard points the quartermaster andwagon-master joined in the music like the baying of a pack ofhounds, while the horses seemed to be stimulated to almost franticaction. This could not be kept up long, and when one of the levelbreathing-places was reached all subsided into quiet, while thesteaming and puffing horses regained their wind for another effort. Five miles of advance was the utmost we could make on that day, butthis was fifteen for the teams, as they had to be brought down themountain over the same road and drag up the wagons which had beenleft at the foot. Our party of cavaliers waited lazily in the valleytill the first of the wagons were near the summit, and then rode onto overtake them on the other side of the ridge. It was an easy andpicturesque ride for us who were well mounted, but a wearing laborand strain for the teamsters and their animals. We congratulatedourselves on the care with which the "outfit" had been selected atLexington, for we came through without accident on a road wherewrecks were plentier than milestones. We had sweet slumber that night in the keen air of the mountain top, and were ready for the last day of mountain work. We were fourteenmiles from Jacksboro, and were resolved to reach the little townbefore night. The road was unlike the long inclined plane cut in theside of Pine Mountain. We were in the midst of a mass of irregularstony hills, all of them part of the highlands between the summitsof the two ranges. It was hard and rough work, but we were notobliged to double the teams again. The last ascent of the CumberlandMountains toward Big Creek Gap was over bare rock much of the way, the sandstone strata lying horizontal, and the road being a giganticstaircase in which the steps were sometimes a foot each, but oftenermore, with an occasional rise of fully four feet in the edge of therocky outcrop. In the road the sharp edges of these stairs had beenrounded off, partly by wear and a little by mechanical means, butthey distinctly retained the stair-like character and lookedabsolutely impracticable. At the worst places the teamsters wouldhalt and throw together stones or branches of trees to fill theangle in the rock, then mounting, a whoop and a crack of the whipwas the signal for the team to dash at the obstacle. The horses'shoes would strike fire from the level rock of the long "treader"above, the wagon would be bounced up the step, when a little bit oflevel would bring them to another rise in the staircase. Wezigzagged along as the road sought the easiest places among therocks, and perseverance at last had its reward when we crowned thesummit and looked down into the broad and beautiful valleys of theClinch and the Holston, the lovely tributaries which form theTennessee River. Our first look into Big Creek Gap was a startling and pleasurablesurprise which has remained indelibly fixed in memory. Clouds hadbeen hanging about the top of the mountain, and as we ascended thelast slope and reached the crest, they hung so low over us that wecould almost touch them. It was not like going into a fog, as isusually the case in climbing mountains, but these seemed smooth assilk on the under surface and hung over us as well defined as thecovering of a tent. This gave to the prospect an accidental and verypeculiar effect that one might not see again in crossing the pass ahundred times. As we looked eastward from the depression in thecrest in which our roadway ran, a great circling amphitheatre laybefore us, almost perfect in the symmetry of its curves. The ridgeon right and left which formed its outer margin was higher than thespot on which we stood, and the silky clouds over our heads restedon it as on the walls of a natural coliseum, like the _velum_ ofcanvas of the ancient gigantic structure in Rome, except that here, nature outdoing all art, spread the lovely awning over the wholevast and cavernous auditorium a mile or more across. The gloom ofthe interior threw the retreating slopes into a mysterious shadow inwhich it were easy to imagine them peopled with ranks of ghostlyauditors gazing upon the stage. It was there, full in our faces, that the most startling and almost incredible effect was visible. The circle of the mountains was there broken by an opening flankedon either side by stupendous perpendicular cliffs, and we lookedthrough it upon a charming landscape bathed in glorious sunshine. Ablue stream dashed foaming through the great gap and wandered off tojoin the river beyond. The broad and undulating valley fifty milesacross was backed by another mountain wall which towered opposite tothat from whose battlements we were gazing, not a long and levelridge like so many of those in the Alleghanies, but a picturesqueAlpine mountain scene, with peaks snow-clad and dazzling in thesunlight, --the Great Smokies, the noblest of all the mountain groupsof the Appalachian chain. The gloom and shadow of our vastamphitheatre held us in awe, while the brilliancy of the scenebeyond the great stage opening seemed to draw us to it as to apromised land. We sat upon our horses, spellbound, gazing upon whatseemed at once too grand and too beautiful to be real. Had we beensuperstitious like soldiers of an ancient time, we might have seen amiraculous portent in it; and even as it was, such sentiment as maybe permitted in the sceptical spirit of our own day could find ahappy omen in the scene. We were entering upon a new chapter in ourmilitary lives, and it was cheering to us, in entering EastTennessee, through the great gate that opened before us, to have socharming a picture to lure us on. We wound down the mountain side, happy but quiet. There was no one among us so lacking in earnestcharacter as to be unmoved. We had left the wagons far behind, andthe clinking of our horses' shoes upon the rocks was the only soundwhich broke the silence till the roaring and laughing brook thatgives a name to the pass met us and rollicked beside us, as we wentout between the giant cliffs into the broad and cheerful valley. At Jacksboro we entered the theatre of active warlike operations, and found ourselves in the usual atmosphere of rumors. It was ofcourse known that Longstreet had retreated to the northeast afterraising the siege, but some insisted that he was moving down thevalley again, and that Foster was to be shut up in Knoxville asBurnside had been. It was evident that there was no definiteinformation on which any of these local opinions were based, and Iwas satisfied that our road was open and safe. The only risk wasfrom some raiding column of cavalry, and we must take our chances asto that. After a good night's rest, I decided on the morning of the18th to take with me Colonel Strong of General Foster's staff andColonel Sterling, and leaving the wagons behind, to make the fortymiles to Knoxville in a single day's ride. What we had heard of thedestitution in the city made it seem best that most of the partyshould remain with the wagons and the supplies, and so avoid therisk of throwing too many guests upon the hospitality ofheadquarters. We took a few of the cavalry as an escort, and bothhorses and men were in such good condition and so hardened to theroad that we scarcely broke from a trot in the whole distance, except to stop for resting and feeding our nags at noon. We reached Knoxville in the afternoon, and Colonel Strong was warmlywelcomed by those of the staff who were present, but the general wasabsent at the front. He was expected back the next night, however, and comfortable quarters were provided for us meanwhile. Myinstinctive fears of complications in regard to my own assignment toduty proved to be true. The very day I left Lexington General Fosterhad issued an order assigning me to command the District ofKentucky, and it had passed me on the road. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 383, 394. ] My determination to obeyliterally the order from the War Department to report in person, andthe haste with which I had started, proved my salvation from thekind of duty at the rear which I was bent on escaping. The Districtof Kentucky would have been even worse than that of Ohio, for thestrife between political factions embroiled every one who commandedthere, and the order to me had been issued because the officer incommand was obnoxious to one of these factions. General Foster returned on the 19th, and on my reporting to him Ifound at once the benefit of General Burnside's representations inregard to me. Colonel Strong was also well aware of my earnest wishfor field service, and the friendship which had grown up on theroad, no doubt, made him an influential advocate with his chief. Thegeneral received me very kindly, and said that his action had beenbased on the supposition that I would prefer duty in Kentucky duringthe winter rather than make the rough journey over the mountains atthat season. On my assuring him that my coming without waiting tocommunicate with him was because of my earnest request to the WarDepartment for service in the field, he was evidently pleased andimmediately revoked the orders already made, and assigned me to theTwenty-third Corps, to command it as the senior general officerpresent. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii, p. 457. ] I had been eight days on the road from Lexington, and the rest ofthe party who remained with the wagons were a day longer in reachingKnoxville. It had given me a vivid appreciation of the impossibilityof supplying an army in East Tennessee by wagon trains over themountains. The roads by Cumberland Gap or by Emory Gap were lessprecipitous, but they were more muddy. The forage was exhaustedalong all the routes, and till grass should grow large trains ofsupplies were not to be thought of. The effort to force trainsthrough in the autumn had been most destructive to the teams. Noticing how the way was lined by the carcasses of dead horses andmules, we kept an accurate count one day of the number of these. Inthe twenty miles of that day's journey we counted a hundred andfifty dead draught animals. The movement of wagon-trains had, ofcourse, been suspended when Longstreet advanced upon Knoxville, andbad weather had hardly begun then. Beef cattle could be driven inherds, but the country was so stripped of forage that the danger ofstarvation by the way made this mode of supply nearly as hopeless asthe other. The only permanent solution of the subsistence problem was to befound in enlarging the facilities for railway communication atChattanooga so that that town might become a great depot from whichthe East Tennessee troops could draw as soon as the railroad toKnoxville should be repaired, or light steamboats be brought to theupper Tennessee and Holston rivers. They showed us at Knoxvillesamples of the bread issued to the garrison during the siege. It wasmade of a mixture of all the breadstuffs which were in store orcould be procured, but the chief ingredient was Indian corn groundup cob and all. It was not an attractive loaf, but it would supportlife, though the bulk was out of proportion to the nutriment. Thecattle had been kept in corral till they were too thin and weak tobe fit for food, but there was no other, and the commissaries killedthe weakest and issued them as rations because these would otherwisedie a natural death. Sherman and his staff had expressed theirastonishment that an appetizing dinner had been spread for them atBurnside's headquarters; [Footnote: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. I. P. 368. ] but they would have wondered more if they had known of the wayin which the town and vicinity had been ransacked to do honor to thewelcome guests who had relieved the beleaguered army. General Poevividly describes the straits they were in, and the heroic sort ofhospitality which had hunted far and wide for something fit to setbefore the leader of the column which had raised the siege. [Footnote: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. Iii. P. 745. ]There had been no danger of actual starvation, but only the coarsestof bread and the poorest of beef could be distributed. Eating, insuch circumstances, was not a pleasure, and the pangs of real hungerwere necessary to make the ration at all palatable. The withdrawalof the enemy relieved the situation somewhat, for it opened thecountry to foraging parties, and every kind of produce which moneycould tempt the people to part with was bought and brought into thecamps. It was little enough at best, and three months of pinchingwant were to be endured before anything like regular supplies couldbe furnished to the army. It was to such a house of destitution wehad come, but we had come voluntarily to share the labors and thetriumphs of our comrades in the field and we had no regrets. CHAPTER XXXI WINTER BIVOUACS IN EAST TENNESSEE Blain's Cross-roads--Hanson's headquarters--A heartywelcome--Establishing field quarters--Tents and houses--A goodquartermaster--Headquarters' business--Soldiers' camps--Want ofclothing and shoes--The rations--Running the countrymills--Condition of horses and mules--Visit to Opdycke's camp--AChristmas dinner--Veteran enlistments--Patriotic spirit--Detachmentat Strawberry Plains--Concentration of corps there--Camp on aknoll-A night scene-Climate of the valley--Affair at MossyCreek--New Year's blizzard--Pitiful condition of thetroops--Patience and courage--Zero weather. The Twenty-third Corps was encamped at Blain's Cross-roads, seventeen miles northeast of Knoxville, on the road to Rutledge, where Longstreet was supposed to be. The Fourth Corps, under GeneralGranger, and the Ninth, under General Parke, were in the sameneighborhood. The cavalry corps covered the front and flanks on bothsides of Holston River. A concentration of the Army of the Ohio andits reinforcements had been made there to meet a rumored return ofthe Confederates toward Knoxville after an affair at Rutledge inwhich Longstreet had captured a wagon-train loaded with supplies forus. I left Knoxville on the morning of the 21st of December, accompanied by my staff officers, and rode to Blain's Cross-roads. Ifound the corps under temporary command of Brigadier-General MahlonD. Manson, of Indiana, who had commanded one of the divisions in thepreceding campaign. Manson occupied an old log house too small forhimself and staff. There was but one bed in it, and at night thegeneral occupied this, whilst his staff slept in their blankets onthe floor. We had travelled leisurely, as I wished to study thecountry between Knoxville and the camp, and we reached the corps toolate to make any arrangement for the night, and had to castourselves on our comrades' hospitality. I was most heartily welcomedby General Manson, who did the best he could for me by offering methe half of his own bed, whilst the staff took similar lodgings withhis officers in a shed veranda at the back of the house lying snuglytogether, wrapped in their blankets. Manson was a burly, whole-souled man, brave and loyally unselfish, and turned over thecommand to me with a sincerity of subordination which won myconfidence at once. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 462, 463. ] It was not a comfortable night in the overcrowded loghouse for either hosts or guests, but it was made cheery by thehearty soldiers' welcome we received, and we sat late around thecrackling fire in the stone chimney after we had eaten with arelish, known only in camp, the best supper which the meagre rationsof the army could furnish. Our first occupation next day was to establish my own headquarters, for a military man does not feel at home until his little camp isset in some decent nook with the regularity and order which showsgood system, and with the sentinel pacing before the entrance. Ihave always found it most comfortable and most healthful to liveunder canvas, even in winter, in the sparsely settled parts of thecountry. It might be different in Europe or in the more denselypeopled States at the East, but in the West and South a house cannotalways be found in proper proximity to the line, and changing fromhouse to tent and back again is much more dangerous to health thanadherence to what seems the more exposed kind of life. There is alsoa question of discipline and _morale_ involved, and the effect ofexample at headquarters is felt through the whole command. With nolittle difficulty we found four old tents without flies, but thesewere carefully pitched in a clean place accessible to all parts ofthe corps, and when we were installed in them we had a realsatisfaction in being at home and ready for business. Our difficultyin procuring four poor tents was simply an index of the scarcity ofall supplies and equipments. The depots at Cincinnati and Nashvillewere packed with everything we wanted, but there had been no time toget them forward when the siege began, and now the impassablemountain roads cut us off as completely as a circle of hostilecamps. We especially felt the lack of the flies for the tents inroughing it. This extra roof makes as great a difference in keepinga tent habitable in wet weather, as an extra cape or a poncho doesin keeping the rain off one's person, or in civil life theomnipresent umbrella. Our overcoats and ponchos kept out the wet inthe longest march, but without a fly the tent roof and walls woulddrip with moisture. In Captain Day, however, I had a quartermasterwhose indomitable energy would not be long baffled, and in hisjourneys to and fro in charge of the supply trains of the corps hekept a sharp eye out for whatever would make our headquarters outfitmore efficient. The warehouses at Knoxville were searched, and abetter tent found in one place and a fly in another graduallybrought our little camp into what soldiers regard as a home-likecondition. The clerical work and the official correspondence of thecommand could then go on; for the headquarters of an army corps inthe field is as busy a place as a bank or counting-house in a city. It is the business centre for a military population of 12, 000 or15, 000 men, where local government is carried on, and where theirfeeding, clothing, arming, and equipping are organized and directed, to say nothing of the military conduct in regard to the enemy, or ofthe administration of affairs relating to the neighboringinhabitants. The troops were in bivouac, generally in the woods about us, whereshelter could be made in ways well known to lumbermen and hunters. The most common form was a lean-to, made by setting a couple ofcrotched posts in the ground with a long pole for a ridge. Againstthis were laid other poles and branches of trees sloping to theground on the windward side. The roof was roughly thatched withevergreen branches laid so that rain would be shed outward. A bed ofsmall evergreen twigs within made a comfortable couch, and unlimitedfirewood from the forest made a camp fire in front that kepteverybody toasting warm in ordinary weather. The regimental andcompany officers had similar quarters, improved sometimes by a roofof canvas or tarpaulin beneath the evergreen thatch. There were butfew days in the East Tennessee winters when such shelter was not asufficient protection for men young and accustomed to hardship. Itwas in fact more comfortable than life in tents at division andcorps headquarters, but with us tents were a necessity on account ofthe clerical business which I have mentioned. The want most felt was that of clothing and shoes. The supply ofthese had run very low by the time Burnside had marched throughKentucky and Tennessee to Knoxville, and almost none had beenreceived since. Many of the soldiers were literally in rags, andnone were prepared for winter when Longstreet interrupted allcommunication with the base of supplies. Their shoes were worn out, and this, even more than their raggedness, made winter marching outof the question. The barefooted men had to be left behind, and ofthose who started the more poorly shod would straggle, no matter howgood their own will was or how carefully the officers tried toenforce discipline and keep their men together. The food question was in a very unsatisfactory way, but had improveda good deal after the siege of Knoxville was raised. Some herds hadbeen brought part of the way, and had been kept together, so thatthey were driven in as soon as the road was open. Some were capturedand some were lost, but enough arrived so that the meat ration waspretty regularly issued in full weight. A large amount of pork hadbeen salted and packed at Knoxville, and was issued as an occasionalchange from the ordinary ration of fresh beef. The "small rations"of coffee, sugar, salt, etc. , were almost wholly wanting, and oursoldiers had been so accustomed to a regular issue of these that thedeprivation was a very serious matter. As to breadstuffs, none couldbe got from our depots and we were wholly dependent upon thecountry. We put all the mills within our lines under militarysupervision, and systematized the grinding so that the supply ofmeal and flour should be equitably distributed to the army and tothe inhabitants. As the people were loyal, there was no wish on thepart of the military authorities to take corn or other grain withoutpayment, and the people brought in freely or sold to us on theirfarms all that they could spare. Still the supply was short, and wassoon exhausted in the vicinity of the army, so that we had to sendforage trains to great distances and with very unsatisfactoryresults. During the whole winter we rarely succeeded in obtaininghalf rations of bread, and oftentimes the fraction was so small asto be hardly worth estimating. In such a situation corn could not betaken for horse-feed, and as the long forage in our vicinity wasexhausted, the animals were in pitiful condition. In many instancesartillery horses dropped dead of starvation at the picket rope. The Fourth Corps was no better off than ourselves. Granger had leftthe Army of the Cumberland immediately after the battle ofMissionary Ridge, and although the situation at Chattanooga had beena good deal mitigated, no considerable supplies of clothing had thenarrived. The distress was therefore universal in our East Tennesseearmy. Learning that Sheridan's division was encamped not far from usat Blain's Cross-roads, I rode over to find Colonel Emerson Opdyckeof the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, who was in that division. He was a townsman of mine, and our families were intimate, and otherneighbors and friends were with him. I could give them later newsfrom home than any of them had, for until the end of the year thenewspapers I brought from Cincinnati were the latest in camp. Ifound Opdycke's camp like our own. He was in the woods, under alean-to shelter such as I have described, with a camp-fire of greatlogs in front of it. He was just opening the first letters he hadgot from home since the battle of Chickamauga in September, andthese had been a long time on the way, for they had gone toChattanooga and had come by casual conveyance from there. Hisstatements fully agreed with the reports I had got from theTwenty-third Corps officers in regard to the condition of thetroops. It was the same with all. They would not suffer greatly ifthey could remain in the forest encampments till shoes and clothingcould come to us, but any active campaigning must produceintolerable suffering. Our mess wished to celebrate Christmas by a dinner at which a few ofour comrades might share the luxury of some canned vegetables andother stores we had brought from Ohio, and we sent a man with aforaging party that was going twenty miles away for hay and corn. After a diligent search he succeeded in getting a turkey and a pairof fowls, and we kept the festival in what seemed luxurious style toour friends who had been through the campaign. The spirit ofofficers and men was all that could be wished, for they thoroughlyunderstood the causes of their privation, and knew that it wasunavoidable. Their patriotism and their moral tone weremagnificently shown in the re-enlistments which were at this timegoing on. The troops of the original enlistment of 1861 were nownear the end of their term of three years, and it was the wisepolicy of the government to let the question of a new term besettled now while the winter was interrupting active operations. Regiments whose term of service would expire in the spring or summerof 1864 were offered a month's furlough at home and the title of"veterans" if they would re-enlist. The furlough was to be enjoyedbefore the opening of the next campaign, and the regiments were tobe sent off as fast as circumstances would permit. We knew that thehome visit would be a strong inducement to many, but we wereastonished and awed at the noble unanimity of the popular spirit ofthe men. Almost to a man they were determined to "see it out, " asthey said. The re-enlistment was accepted by companies, but therewas great pride in preserving the regimental organization as well. The closing week of the year was devoted to this business, otherduty being suspended as far as circumstances would permit. When acompany had "veteranized" by the re-enlistment of a majority, theyannounced it by parading on the company street and giving threerousing cheers. These cheers were the news of the day, and thecompany letter and the number of the regiment passed eagerly frommouth to mouth as the signal of a new veteran company was heard. Some companies re-enlisted without an exception. In one regimentthere were only 15 men in the ten companies who did not sign the newrolls. In fact only the physically disabled with here and there adiscontented man were omitted in the veteran enlistment. It was aremarkable incident in the history of the war and a speaking one. Itillustrates better than anything, except the original outburst ofpatriotism in 1861, the character of the men who formed our rank andfile. Could we only have had then an efficient system of filling upthese veteran regiments by new recruits, the whole would have madean incomparable army; but, alas, we were to see them reduced to ahandful while new regiments were organized, only (as it looked to usin the field) to give the "patronage" of the appointments topoliticians, or to reward successful recruiting instead of soldierlyability tested in action. Soon after General Foster was assigned to the department he reissuedan order which Burnside had made earlier but had revoked, by whichBrigadier-General Samuel D. Sturgis was appointed to the command ofthe cavalry corps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii, p. 394. ] Sturgis had commanded a division of the Ninth Corps inMaryland and Virginia, and was one of those whose dismissal Burnsidehad demanded for the insubordination which followed the battle ofFredericksburg. Good policy would have dictated that he should besent to some other command; but he was ordered to report toBurnside, and had no active employment until Foster arrived. Thecavalry corps had had several lively engagements with theConfederate horse, and was now concentrated near Mossy Creek, whereit was supported by a brigade of infantry from the second divisionof the Twenty-third Corps, in command of Colonel Mott of the OneHundred and Eighteenth Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 488, 489, 562. ]Our information showed that Longstreet's forces were nowconcentrated about Morristown, and that nothing larger than scoutingparties came across to the west side of the Holston. It becameprudent, therefore, to transfer part of our forces from the Rutledgeroad over to that which runs from Knoxville along the line of therailroad to Morristown. Both the railroad and the wagon-road crossthe Holston at Strawberry Plains and go up the valley on the eastside of the river by way of New Market and Mossy Creek. On the 24thand 25th I was directed to send two more brigades to StrawberryPlains, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 490. ]one of which was put over theriver to cover the reconstruction of the railway bridge which wasgoing on. This was the long trestle which had been burned by Sandersin the preceding summer, and had since been repaired and destroyedby the opposing armies alternately. On the 27th I was ordered tomove the other division of the corps to Strawberry Plains, thusconcentrating my command in that vicinity. Our distance fromKnoxville would be about the same as at Blain's Cross-roads, but thedivergence of the roads made our march some six or eight milesacross the country. It was a great hardship to the men to abandon the huts they had madewith a good deal of labor, and which were the more necessary forthem by reason of the destitution which I have described. Nor was itpleasant for us at headquarters, for we had got our ownestablishment into a condition of tolerable comfort. Some brick hadbeen got from a ruined and abandoned house, and with them a chimneywith an open fireplace had been built at the back of one of ourtents, which thus made a cheerful sitting-room for our mess. It is asoldier's proverb that comfortable quarters are sure to bringmarching orders, and we were only illustrating the rule. The marchwas made in the afternoon through rain and mud, and we reachedStrawberry Plains just before nightfall in the short midwinter day. The Plains were a nearly level space in a curve of the river, thoughthe village of the name was on some rough hills on the other bank atthe end of the long trestle bridge. The level lands had been forsome time occupied by the cavalry, and were so cut into mud-holesand defiled in every way as to be unfit for an infantry camp. Alittle on one side, however, was an isolated gently rounded hillcovered with a mixed forest of oak and pine. With a little crowdingthis would make a clean and well-drained camp for the division I hadbrought with me. The brigades were placed so that they encircled thehill on the lower slopes with openings between leading to the top, on which I placed my headquarters. The little quadrangle of tents onthe top, the forest-covered slopes, the busy soldiery below makingnew camps for themselves, made a romantic picture despite thediscomforts. I cannot better show the impression made at the momentthan by quoting from a letter written home the next day: "When wearrived, the rain was pouring in torrents, the dead leaves, wet anddeep, soaked our boots and made it slow work to kindle a fire, andas we stood about in our overcoats heavy with water, we were notespecially impressed with the romance of the scene; but when we hadfound a few old pine-knots to start the fire with, and the heavysmoke of the damp leaves changed to a bright flame, --when the tentswere pitched, a cup of hot coffee made, and we sat about the firewatching the flashing light on the deep green of the pines and thebeautiful russet of the oak leaves with the white of the tentsbeneath, the few square yards about us were made as lovely as afairy scene shut in by the impenetrable gloom beyond. The oldwitchery of camp life now came over us, we forgot rain and cold, singing and chatting as merrily as if care were dead, till finallyrolling in our blankets under our tents, we went to sleep as sweetlyand soundly as children. " A day or two of bright mild weather followed, and the troops gotthemselves fairly well sheltered again. The cutting of trees forhuts and for firewood thinned out the forest, and the elevation ofthe camp above the surrounding country exposed us to the wind, as wesoon learned to our cost. Whilst the fair days lasted, we had afavorable example of an East Tennessee winter, as is shown by thefurther quotation from the home letter just cited. "I am sitting inthe open air, " I said, "before the camp-fire of great logs, writingupon my atlas on my knee, which is more comfortable than doing it inthe chilly shade of the tent. I wish you could have seen our camplast night. We were grouped around the fire, some sitting andlolling on the logs drawn up for fuel, some in camp chairs. Thesmoke from the camps about us made the whole air hazy. Over thetents through a vista of pine-trees the moon was rising red throughthe thickened air, while overhead the stars were shining. Thewonderful perspective the firelight makes in the forest, herebrought out and deepened the mass of color of the evergreens, theremade the bare trunk and limbs of a leafless oak stand like a chalkdrawing against the black background, and again it gave rich velvetywarmth to the brown of the dead leaves which hung thick on sometrees, while the gloom beyond and the snug enclosure of our littlequadrangle of tents shut us in with a sense of shelter, andcompleted a picture that would have made Rembrandt die of envy. " Wewere hardened by our continuous exposure so that we felt nodiscomfort in sitting thus in the open air till late in the evening, though we woke in the morning to find the dead leaves which made ourcarpet stiff and crisp with the frost. Still, it was much milderthan the Christmas weather of northern Ohio, or we could not havetaken it so easily. On the 29th the cavalry had a lively affair with the enemy at MossyCreek, some twenty miles above us. General Sturgis was making areconnoissance of the country between the French Broad and theHolston rivers, sending the cavalry partly toward Dandridge on theformer stream, under command of Colonel Foster, and partly towardMorristown, under Brigadier-General W. L. Elliott of the Cumberlandarmy. Elliott was supported by Mott's brigade of infantry, part ofwhich acted under his orders. Foster found no enemy, but Elliott hadadvanced about three miles beyond Mossy Creek when he encounteredthe cavalry corps of the Confederates, advancing, apparently, with apurpose similar to ours. The infantry were posted by Sturgis upon aridge half a mile beyond the railway bridge at Mossy Creek, and thecavalry with the artillery were ordered to retire slowly to the sameposition. The enemy under Major-General William T. Martin consistedof two divisions of horsemen and two batteries of artillery. Theyclosely followed our retiring troops, who made cool resistance anddrew back slowly and in order. When the position of the infantry wasreached, the whole force was halted to receive the Confederateattack. Sturgis had two batteries of artillery with his corps, buthad sent a section of each with Colonel Foster, and Elliott nowplaced the remaining sections on right and left of the road, eachsupported by infantry. Martin boldly attacked till he found himselfconfronted by Mott's infantry, which opened upon him with awithering fire. The artillery also fired canister upon the advancingenemy, and our horsemen, dismounting, extended the line and did goodexecution with their carbines. The first assault being repulsed, Martin was unwilling to give it up so, and bringing his artilleryinto better position renewed the fight. A sharp skirmishing combatwas kept up for several hours, when the enemy retreated. Darknesscame on soon after, and the pursuit was not pushed far. Our losseshad been 17 killed and 87 wounded. That of the enemy was reported tobe much more severe. The result of the engagement was to repress theenterprise of the Confederates, so that Mossy Creek remained forsome time our undisturbed outpost in the valley. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 625-641. ] On New Year's eve we had a change of weather which rudely broke inupon our dream of a steady and mild winter. It had been rainingnearly all day, and we had just turned in about ten o'clock in theevening when a sudden gale sprung up from the northward. Thewater-soaked ground did not hold the tent pins very well, and therattling of canvas warned us to look after the fastenings. The staffwere all quickly at work, the servants being, as usual, slow inanswering a call in the night. The front of our mess tent blew in, and the roof and sides were bellying out and flapping like a ship'ssail half clewed up. I caught the door-flaps and held them down tothe pole with all my strength, shouting to the black boys to turnout before the whole should fly away. Then we had a lively time foran hour, going from tent to tent to drive the pins tighter and makethings secure. We had just got them snug, as we thought, and beganto listen to the roaring of the wind with something like defiance, when a "stick-and-clay" chimney, which Colonel Sterling and mybrother had at the back of their tent, took fire and was nearsetting the whole encampment in a blaze. This made another shout andrush, till the chimney was torn away from the canvas and the fireextinguished. The gale was so fierce that the sparks from thecamp-fires rolled along the ground instead of rising, and we shouldhave burned up had not the rain kept the tents soaking wet. It grewcold so fast that by the time we had made the encampment safe, thewet canvas froze stiff. It must be confessed that we did not sleepwell that night, and we got up in the morning aching with cold. Itstill blew a gale, though the sky was clear and the thermometer hadfallen to zero. It was a typical cyclone coming as a cold wave fromthe North, and, as we afterward learned, was exceptional in itssuddenness and bitterness along the whole line from Minnesota tonorthern Georgia. The soldiers in the camps had slept but little, for they wereobliged to keep awake and near the fires to escape freezing. No onewho has not lived in tents or in bivouac in such a time canunderstand what real suffering from cold is. Exposure by day is easyto bear compared with the chill by night when camp-fires burn lowand men lie shivering, their teeth chattering, while extremedrowsiness makes exertion painful and there is danger of going offinto the sleep that knows no waking. On New Year's day morning theground was frozen solid. All huddled about the fires, but the galewas so fierce that on the windward side there seemed to be noradiation of heat, so completely was the fire blown away from thatside of the logs. On the leeward side the smoke suffocated and thesparks burned one, and men passed from one side to the otherdoubting which was the more tolerable. I spent a good part of the morning going through the regimentalcamps and giving such encouragement and cheer as I could. Thepatience and courage of the troops were marvellous, though many ofthe men were in a pitiable condition as to clothing. They weretatterdemalions in appearance, but heroes at heart. Some had nothingbut drawers upon their legs, their trousers being utterly worn torags. Some had no coats and drew their tattered blankets about them, sitting upon their haunches, like Indians, about the camp-fires. Ido not recall a single querulous or ill-natured complaint. It washeart-breaking work to see their misery, but they were sointelligent that they knew as well as I did that it had grown out ofthe inevitable fortunes of war, in spite of the utmost efforts oftheir commanders to get supplies forward as soon as the siege ofKnoxville had been raised. I estimated that fully one-third of thecommand had lost and worn out some material portion of theirclothing, so as to be suffering for lack of it. A little thing whichadded greatly to the discomfort of the men was that in some wholebrigades they had been without soap for two months. This madecleanliness impossible, and clustering about the fires as they wereforced to do, they became so begrimed that a liberal supply of soapwould have been necessary to restore their color and show to whatrace they belonged. Yet, hungry, cold, ragged, and dirty, theyresponded cheerily to my New-Year's greetings, and at this very timethe "veteranizing" was going on without a check until nearly everyone of the old regiments re-enlisted for another term. At our headquarters on the hill-top we realized that our picturesquesituation had its disadvantages, for we were doubly exposed to theforce of the wind. We were on a high dome, as it were, with nothingwhatever to make a lee or break the power of the icy gale. In one ortwo of the tents, furnaces or stoves of stone had been made, on thepattern of those we had used in West Virginia in 1861. The trench inthe ground with flat stone covering level with the tent floor andconnected with an opening on the outside, proved the most successfuldevice. We collected in these, and used every manner of pastime tokill the tedious hours till the subsidence of the wind made ourusual outdoor life and activity possible again. Our efforts at mealswere a woeful sort of failure. Cooking under such difficulties wasmore a name than a fact, and we left the mess tent shivering andhardly less hungry than we entered it. But all things have an end, however tedious they seem in passing, and the 2d of January seemedpleasant in the comparison, for the "blizzard" was over, and theweather was calm though cold. CHAPTER XXXII GRANT'S VISIT--THE DANDRIDGE AFFAIR Grant at Knoxville--Comes to Strawberry Plains--A gathering atParke's quarters--Grant's quiet manner--No conversationaldiscussion--Contrast with Sherman--Talk of cadet days--Grant'sriding-school story--No council of war--Qualities of hisdispatches--Returns by Cumberland Gap--Longstreet'ssituation--Destitution of both armies--Railroad repairs and improvedservice--Light-draught steamboats--Bridges--Cattle herds on theway--Results of Grant's inspection tour--Foster's movement toDandridge on the French Broad--Sheridan--His qualities--AugustWillich--Hazen--His disagreement with Sheridan--Its causes andconsequences--Combat at Dandridge--A mutual surprise--Sheridan'sbridge--An amusing blunder--A consultation in Dandridge--Sturgis'stoddy--Retreat to Strawberry Plains--A hard night march--A roughday--An uncomfortable bivouac--Concentration towardKnoxville--Rumors of reinforcement of Longstreet--Expectation ofanother siege--The rumors untrue. In the midst of the severest suffering of the army from cold andwant, General Grant came in person to inspect the condition ofaffairs in East Tennessee. He reached Knoxville on the 30th ofDecember, and after spending two or three days with General Foster, came up to Strawberry Plains. The first intensity of the cold wavehad passed by, but it was still "zero weather" when he came: indeedhe had waited in Knoxville for a little moderating of thetemperature, but finding that it continued very cold, his desire tocomplete the inspection hurried him on. The corps and divisioncommanders accompanied him in a ride through the camps that he mightsee the destitution of the army, and the necessity for sparing thetroops all unnecessary exposure. The great trestle bridge across theHolston was examined, and the features of the topography which madeStrawberry Plains an important point in military operations coveringKnoxville and the line of communication with Cumberland Gap. At the end of the ride we gathered in General Parke's quarters forwhat I supposed would be a discussion of the situation and acomparison of views as to our future work. It was my first meetingwith Grant, and I was full of interest in observing him. On the ridehe had been quietly attentive, making no show of curiosity, askingfew questions, carrying himself in an unpretentious business-likeway. In the social meeting at General Parke's I was disappointedthat the conversation did not take the direction of a militarydiscussion. Grant did not seem to desire further information, butwas satisfied with what he had seen. He took no lead inconversation, and it was evident that he almost wholly lackedfacility in that way. What he said was kindly; there was nothinglike surliness in his manner; but he seemed to be without thefaculty of drawing other people out and putting himself in easyaccord with them. No doubt his interviews with General Foster hadcontained all that was necessary for making up his mind as to oursituation except the personal inspection he was now engaged in; buthad he been Sherman, he would have gone over the phases of thematter which could properly be made the subject of generaldiscussion, would have emphasized whatever could be madeencouraging, and exhorted to patience and courage in doing thepresent duty. Grant did nothing of the kind. He smoked and listened, and did not accept any of the openings which others made forconversation upon the campaign. A majority of the officers in the group were West Point men, andcollege life is always a resource for small-talk when other subjectsfail. The experiences of the military school, the characteristics offriends and classmates there, the qualities of the officers andprofessors, escapades and larks at Benny Havens' were found to haveperennial freshness and interest. Grant evidently enjoyed this, andbegan to talk more freely. One could see that he did not lack thesense of humor, and he told an anecdote simply but without failingto make its points tell. His voice lacked volume, and seemed thinand rather high-keyed. It was half-deprecatory in tone, with an airof shyness, and he had a way of glancing quickly from one toanother, as if looking for signs of response to his venture intotalk. As he went on, this wore off to some extent, and he laughedquietly over the reminiscences he was telling. He told very well astory of his experience in the riding-school, where theriding-master in his time was an amusing sort of tyrant. Grant'sstrong point was horsemanship, and the riding-master, whetherseriously or as a joke, determined to "take down" the young cadet. At the exercise Grant was mounted on a powerful but vicious brutethat the cadets fought shy of, and was put at leaping the bar. Thebar was raised higher and higher as he came round the ring, till itpassed the "record. " The stubborn rider would not say enough, butthe stubborn horse was disposed to shy and refuse to leap. Grantgritted his teeth and spurred at it, but just as the horse gatheredfor the spring, his swelling body burst the girth and rider andsaddle tumbled into the ring. Half stunned, he gathered himself upfrom the dust only to hear the strident, cynical voice of theriding-master calling out, "Cadet Grant, six demerits fordismounting without leave!" I believe Grant's story is the only memory I brought away from whatI had imagined would be a council of war presided over by the mostprominent figure in our armies, soon to command them all. As acouncil of war it certainly did not fill the ideal of an eager andearnest young officer; but if we supplement it by a reading of thedaily and hourly dispatches in which the clear practical judgment, the unswerving faith in final success, the unbending will, therestless energy and industry, the power to master numberlessdetails, and a consciousness of capacity to command, all plainlystand forth as traits of Grant's character, we can see that ajudgment based only on the incidents of the meeting around thefireplace in the shabby house at Strawberry Plains after our ride onthat bitter winter's day would be very misleading. Grant's visit had plainly shown him that the great problem with uswas the clothing and subsistence of the troops, and that our veryexistence depended on it. He therefore determined to ride over themountains by way of Cumberland Gap, and form his own judgment as tothe truth of the reports of the impassable condition of the roads. The weather had hardly moderated at all when he left us on the 4thof January, and this long and severe journey was proof of hisforgetfulness of personal comfort in his devotion to duty. Beforefollowing him further in his investigation, it may be profitable togo back and note some of the circumstances which brought him toKnoxville. When Longstreet raised the siege of Knoxville, he took position nearRogersville, where he would be in reach of the unbroken part of therailway connecting him with Virginia, which now became his base. Hisforce continued unchanged, and was not materially increased ordiminished until the winter was nearly over, when the cavalry whichbelonged to the Army of Tennessee was ordered back into Georgia. Like Foster, he was reduced to inaction for lack of clothing andsupplies. Forage had become very scarce in every part of Tennessee, and it was with great difficulty that the horses were kept alive ineither army. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 817, 819. ] To go into cantonments, sheltering the men as well aspossible, to send all extra horses to the rear and wait for thespringing of the grass and the settling of the roads when wintershould be over, was the dictate of common-sense, as was clearly seenby everybody on the ground. It was not pleasant to leave the loyalmen of the upper counties of the valley to suffer under theConfederate occupation; but nothing short of a continuous andreliable line of supplies would enable Foster to occupy the countryup to the Virginia line. There was no gate to be shut behindLongstreet if he were driven out. He could come back as soon as ourtroops withdrew. Marching and countermarching would destroy thenearly naked and barefoot troops without accomplishing any permanentgood. The authorities at Washington were beset by the well-groundedcomplaints of the loyal representatives of the upper valley, and hadbecome blind by habit to the difficulties of supplying and movingtroops among the mountains in winter. From the first week afterFoster relieved Burnside, Halleck complained that Longstreet was notdriven beyond the Virginia line and kept there. These complaintswere repeated to Grant, and the latter promised, in dispatches ofthe 23d and 24th of December, to go to Knoxville in person. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 472, 479. ] Inthe last of these he said, "If Longstreet is not driven fromTennessee, it shall not be my fault. " He came, and saw that it wasnot Foster's fault, and that no more than Foster could he make awinter campaign with men in such a state of destitution. As I havealready said, droves of beef, cattle, and hogs could be brought "onthe hoof, " in poor condition it is true, but fit to be eaten. Yetsoldiers could not campaign on fresh beef and pork only, and breadstuffs and all vegetable food were practically not to be had; so ofcoffee, sugar, salt, and the small rations generally. This, however, was the least part of the trouble, for the condition of the army asto clothing and shoes was simply appalling. When many had not evenrags to cover their nakedness, and none were clad as civilized menshould be to face the winter's snows and rains, it was nonsense totalk of campaigning. Grant saw this at a glance when he reached ourcamps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 19, 43. ]We have not the whole situation when even this is told. Wagons andteams, artillery with their horses, cavalry with theirs, are asnecessary as infantry; and when foraging trains could hardly collectforage enough to feed the animals seeking it, those that were leftat the picket rope had to die there. To talk, then, of haulingsupplies for man and beast in a marching column was preposterous. It was quite proper to ask whether the impracticability of bringingwagon trains over the mountains was as complete as we reported, andGrant's horseback journey back into Kentucky when the thermometerwas at zero is sufficient proof that he found it imperativelynecessary to settle that question also with his own eyes and withoutdelay. We shall see presently what he reported. He knew before heleft Chattanooga that the railroad from Nashville was hardlysupplying Thomas's army. To Foster's appeals for at least someclothing and shoes by that route, General Meigs, who was there, replied that it could only be done "at the cost of starvation to ouranimals or short rations to our men" in the Army of the Cumberland. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 476. ] He said that therailroad must be "not only repaired, but rebuilt, " before it coulddo more than supply the troops already dependent on it. GeneralMcCallum, the superintendent of military railroads, had gone west, and was inspecting the Nashville and Chattanooga Road, and carefullystudying the problem of its possible capacity. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 422, 444. ] In consequence of this a change was made in the localsuperintendence, and Mr. Adna Anderson was put in charge ofoperating the line, while Mr. W. W. Wright was made constructingengineer. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 371, 372. ] Undertheir energy and ability it was repaired and operated so that EastTennessee as well as Sherman's army in Georgia were abundantlysupplied during the Atlanta campaign; but this is part of thehistory of the next spring and summer. To reduce the number ofmouths to feed at Chattanooga, Grant sent portions of the Army ofthe Tennessee into northern Alabama, where they could be supplied byboats coming up the Tennessee River. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 429, 496, 502. ] The same considerationsinfluenced him in assenting to Sherman's plan of the MeridianExpedition, where the troops engaged in it could live partly atleast on a country not yet ravaged by armies, whilst they would makea diversion in favor of the weakened army left with Thomas. It issafe to say that no such division of efforts would have occurred ifthe railroad had been ready to supply the concentrated army on anadvance into Georgia. Sherman understood it to be an interlude, andexpected to be back and join the main army by the time the railroadshould be repaired and supplies accumulated. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 498. ] As auxiliary to the line of supplies, the railroad fromBridgeport to Decatur was also to be repaired, so as to connect withsteamboats at the latter place. In Foster's department the same energy was directed toward improvingthe communication with Chattanooga. The hull of the light-draughtsteamboat which Colonel Byrd had found under construction atKingston was taken as a model, and two more were put on the stocks. [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. I. P. 523. Official Records vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 483. ] Pontoon bridges were prepared for use at differentpoints on the river. Lumber was cut to rebuild the great railwaybridge at Loudon and the long trestle at Strawberry Plains. Thelittle train of "twenty-odd cars" which Burnside had captured wascarefully guarded and kept running on the only bit of railroad inEast Tennessee that was now open, viz. , that from Loudon throughKnoxville to Strawberry Plains. Herds of cattle were threadingmountain paths to avoid the deep mud of the wagon roads fromKentucky, and on those roads desperate but too often fruitlessefforts were making to push forward some wagon-loads of shoes andclothing. In the consultations at Knoxville Foster had plainly stated his ownconviction that the only wise course was to abandon the thought ofaggressive warfare until spring; to station the troops so as tocover Knoxville, but to select their positions chiefly withreference to collecting forage and breadstuffs; to send allunnecessary animals to the rear and in every way to simplify to theutmost the problem of carrying the army through the winter, preserving it for active use when the change of season and theimprovement of the railway line should make regular suppliespossible. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 281 _etseq_. ] Grant listened and suspended his judgment till he hadexamined the situation for himself. An accident to General Fosterhad increased the complication of affairs. He was occasionallysuffering from lameness resulting from an old wound in the leg, andhad found on his first journey over the mountains that he was indanger of being disabled by it. Within a fortnight after he reachedKnoxville, his horse fell with him in passing over some slipperyrocks, and caught the wounded leg under him. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 502. ] This completely disabled the general for active fieldservice, and on the advice of his surgeon he asked to be relieved. This request was forwarded on the 26th of December, and Grant hadbeen notified of it on the same day. It could not be acted on atonce, and during the few weeks that Foster remained at the head ofthe department, he was obliged to remain in Knoxville, entrusting toGeneral Parke, as senior officer, the active command of combinedmovements in the field. When General Grant reached Nashville, he reported to the WarDepartment the results of his visit to us. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 99. ] He said that he found the troops so destituteof clothing and shoes that not more than two-thirds of them couldmarch; that the difficulty of supplying them even with food was sogreat that it was not advisable to send reinforcements; consequentlythat the policy advised by Foster must be followed and activeoperations suspended. Of his own journey he said, "From the personalinspection made, I am satisfied that no portion of our supplies canbe hauled by teams from Camp Nelson [Ky. ]. " He proposed, on thefirst rise of the Cumberland River, to send supplies by steamboat upthe Cumberland to the mouth of the Big South Fork, in the hope thatas this was a new route some forage for the teams could be got alongit, and that wagoning would be possible by that line into EastTennessee. It did not turn out to be so, and the only relief we gotwas by way of Chattanooga, where light-draught steamboats addedsomething to the facilities for supply. As his own most pressingneeds were relieved, General Thomas sent the steamboat "Lookout"with a small cargo of shoes and clothing to Loudon. There our littlerailway train met the boat and brought the goods to Knoxville, sothat in my own command we began to receive a little about the 10thof January. It was very little, but it was greatly encouraging as aforetaste of better things to come. On the 12th General Foster was obliged to telegraph Grant thatthings had grown worse rather than better since his visit. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 71, 72. ] Manyanimals were dying daily. The weather was still intensely cold, andfloating ice combined with high water, in the Holston had twicebroken the pontoon bridge at Knoxville. Food for man and beast wasall eaten out on the north side of the Holston River, and heproposed to move most of the troops to the south and east of theFrench Broad, in the hope of finding a region in which some corn andforage might still remain. The great trestle bridge at StrawberryPlains was completed, and a strong post would be left there toprotect it. A regiment was at work upon the bridge at Loudon. Todiminish the number of mouths to be fed, Foster gave the "veteranfurlough" at this time to several more of the regiments which hadre-enlisted. Trustworthy evidence showed that Longstreet was quiteas badly off as we were, and that he was not likely to move unless, like us, he was forced to do so to find forage. Cavalry parties hadreported to us that there were considerable quantities of corn inthe neighborhood of Sevierville, and this was the inducement to sendmost of our troops to that side of the French Broad River. To avoidany appearance of retreat, it was ordered that we march fromStrawberry Plains to Dandridge, which was a flank movement to ourright, one day's march. There we should extemporize some sort offerry to cross the French Broad and seek camps in regions whichpromised some supplies, but within supporting distance of ourseveral detachments. The men whose clothing was most lacking and whowere without shoes would remain in our present camp and betemporarily attached to the post established to protect the bridge. The cavalry, which had been near Mossy Creek (fourteen miles up theHolston), was directed to move straight across the angle between thetwo rivers, and cover the flank march of the infantry to Dandridge. It was thought probable that the cavalry might subsist for a shorttime in the neighborhood of Dandridge and in the valley of theNolachucky, the principal tributary of the French Broad from thenorth; indeed, the time of crossing the larger river by the infantrywas not fixed, but would be determined by our good or bad fortune infinding forage and bread-stuffs near Dandridge. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 82, 87, 99, 101. ] The 15th of January was the day fixed for the march. The weather wasnot so cold as it had been, but was very raw and uncomfortable. Atthe last moment General Foster found it necessary to have aconsultation with Parke and Granger; and Sheridan, whose division ofthe Fourth Corps led off on the road, was directed to selectpositions for the infantry of that corps and mine as we reachedDandridge. He was also authorized to assign mills to the use of thedifferent commands so as to systematize our means of supply andprevent disorder. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 102. ] The march was nineteen miles to Dandridge, and ourpositions were about a mile in front of the village, on the hillscovering it. Both the Fourth and the Ninth Corps had remained intheir camps at Blain's Crossroads up to this time, and the Ninth nowtook my place at Strawberry Plains, covering Knoxville from thatdirection. It had less than 4000 men present for duty. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 292. ] Our moving column consisted of Sheridan's and Wood'sdivisions of the Fourth Corps and parts of three brigades from theTwenty-third; less than 10, 000 men in all. The ground was frozen, and as we were moving over roads which had not been much travelled, the way was comparatively smooth for our artillery and wagons. Itwas not so much so for the infantry, and the little unevenness beingsharpened by frost, quickly cut through the men's old shoes. Thosewho were barefoot were ordered to stay behind, but the shoes ofothers were in so bad a state that there were places where I saw theroad marked with bloody tracks from the wounded feet of thesoldiers. Reaching Dandridge a little in advance of my command, I reported toSheridan, and he showed me the line he had selected, on which wewere to occupy the left. Colonel Sterling, my inspector-general, wasassigned the duty of placing the brigades in position as theyarrived. The cavalry had preceded us, and we found them occupyingthe town and picketing the roads toward Morristown and the elbow ofthe Nolachucky River northeast of us, locally called the Bend o'Chucky. A range of hills known as Bay's Mountain was the water-shedbetween the valleys of the Holston and the French Broad, and weexpected the cavalry to cover the front on a line from Kimbrough'sCross-roads near the mountain to the Bend o' Chucky. This line wouldbe nine or ten miles from Dandridge, and would communicate also withMott's brigade of my command, which had been left in its post atMossy Creek, on the Holston, under orders to fall back deliberatelyto Strawberry Plains if attacked by superior forces. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 99. ] If these positionscould be held, the cavalry could not only collect the forage in theNolachucky valley as far up as their detachments could reach, butwould also threaten the left flank of Longstreet's position atMorristown. Those who only knew Sheridan after the war would hardly recognizehim in the thin and wiry little man I met at Dandridge. His hollowcheeks made his cheekbones noticeably prominent, and his featureshad a decided Milesian cast. His reputation at that time was that ofan impetuous and vehement fighter when engaged, rousing himself to abelligerent wrath and fury that made his spirit contagious andstimulated his troops to a like vigor. At other times he wasunpretentious and genial, and whilst regarded as a good divisioncommander was not thought of as specially fitted for large andindependent responsibilities. He was not considered cool enough forthe broader duties of a commander, and indeed had had rather badluck in the great battles of Stone's River and Chickamauga, wherethe qualities called for were those which enable a perfectlyself-possessed officer to extricate his command from a perilousposition. He has told me himself that he was slow in learning tohave confidence in his own power to direct in such cases, and thatit was only after he had tested himself, step by step, that he cameto rely on his own judgment and will, as he did in the Shenandoahvalley and at Five Forks. It was his blazing impetuosity in actionthat made Grant think of him as specially fitted for a cavalryleader, and his growth into the able commander of an army was alater development of his talents. He received me very cordially, andin our trying wintry experience at Dandridge began a friendlyacquaintance which continued unbroken till his death. General Thomas J. Wood was not with his division, and it was underthe command of General August Willich, whom I had seen drillingRobert McCook's German regiment, the Ninth Ohio, as its adjutant, atCamp Dennison in the spring of 1861. I had expected to findBrigadier-General William B. Hazen in temporary command duringWood's leave of absence, but when I went to his quarters wassurprised to find him in arrest. Hazen had been one of the first ofthe officers of the regular army with whom I became acquainted atthe beginning of the war, and he had offered to accept a staffposition with me. I had a real regard for him, and naturally offeredmy friendly services in his present predicament. It seemed thatSheridan had called on him for a report as to the condition ofthings in his front, and Hazen had taken advantage of somepeculiarity of the situation which he thought Sheridan did notsufficiently understand, to make a report which was ironical and soirritating that Sheridan's answer was to order him to keep hisquarters in arrest. Their quarrel, however, dated from the battle ofMissionary Ridge, where Sheridan accused Wood's division, and Hazenin particular, with usurping the honors of being first on the crestand capturing part of Bragg's artillery. Sheridan honestly thoughthis division entitled to the honor, but the official evidence seemsto me to be against him. At any rate, it began a very pretty quarrelwhich never was wholly made up, and which had many queer littleepisodes, in war and in peace, on the Indian frontier and atWashington, for many years thereafter. Hazen was an officer of realability, of brilliant courage and splendid personal presence. Hisfault was that he was too keen in seeing flaws in other people'sperformance of duty, and apt to dilate upon them in his officialreports when such officers were wholly independent of him. This madehim a good many enemies notwithstanding his noble qualities and hisgenial kindliness to his friends. A military officer usually findsit hard enough to submit gracefully to the criticisms of hissuperiors, and naturally takes it ill if this prerogative isexercised by those of equal grade without authority. Such a practiceputs into the official records matter which does not belong there, and which, however honestly stated, may be very unjust, because allthe explanatory circumstances are not likely to be known to thecritic. At any rate, the person criticised is not amenable to thattribunal, and this is enough in itself to cause a sense of injury. [Footnote: See Review of General Hazen's Narrative of MilitaryService, "The Nation, " Nov. 5, 1885. ] Sheridan took very kindly mymediation in Hazen's behalf, and probably had never intended morethan a temporary arrest. After Granger came to the front and resumedcommand of the corps, I heard no more of the trouble. We had escorted a small train in which were some wagon-loads ofclothing and shoes for the cavalry, and the mounted corps remainedat Dandridge during the 15th of January, issuing these supplies. Therear of our infantry column came up on the next day, so that we wereassembled and in position before evening. The cavalry moved out inthe afternoon of the 16th, part on the right toward the NolachuckyRiver, and the left toward Kimbrough's Cross-roads on the Morristownroad. The right wing found the enemy's cavalry in their front aboutfive miles from town, but the left wing found Kimbrough's occupiedby Longstreet's infantry. His whole force, except Ransom's division, had advanced upon information of the movement of our cavalry on the14th. In doing this Longstreet had turned the position of thebrigade of infantry left at Mossy Creek, and Colonel Mott retired onthe 16th to Strawberry Plains in accordance with his orders. Towardevening the cavalry on our right were driven back in a livelyskirmish, and those on the left were recalled to give them support. The whole were united and repulsed the enemy's horsemen, takingposition for the night about a mile in front of our infantry camps. On the 17th the enemy's infantry advanced, and reached the posts ofour cavalry in the afternoon. Longstreet now made a vigorous attackwith his troops of both arms, and gradually drove back our horsemen, who resisted him with their carbines, fighting dismounted. Sheridansupported the cavalry with some infantry and a lively skirmishingcombat continued for an hour or two till darkness came on. Theaffair was something of a surprise to both parties. Longstreet hadevidently made his movement in the hope of giving our cavalry alesson which might check their enterprise and make them keep theirdistance, and was astonished to come upon our infantry at Dandridge. We were in motion to put our infantry on the south side of theFrench Broad, and were equally surprised to find the enemy in forceon the same route. General Parke and General Granger had ridden over from StrawberryPlains and reached Dandridge in the afternoon. Hearing of thepresence of what was reported to be the whole of Longstreet's army, and not liking to accept battle with superior forces with the riverat his back, Parke had caused an examination of the river to bemade, and learned that just below the town was a shallow, fordableat an ordinary stage of water, and now about waist-deep for the men. In the low physical condition of our troops and their lack ofclothing he very wisely thought it would not do to make them marchthrough the river, but devised a foot-bridge by putting army wagonsend to end and making a path over the boxes of the wagons. Sheridanwas ordered to detach a brigade immediately to make this bridge, andit set to work at once. The plan was to march the infantry to thesouth side of the river and afterward remove the wagons, coveringthe operation by the cavalry who could then ford the stream, whichthough very cold and running with ice was not impracticable forhorsemen. About dusk, as the skirmishing in front ceased, Sheridan and myself, with Sturgis, the commandant of the cavalry, were called to meetGenerals Parke and Granger at a house in the town to report thecondition of affairs in our front and to receive orders formarching. The bridge had been completed, as was supposed, and thebrigade which had made it had been ordered across, when, on reachingthe land on the left bank, they found, to their amazement, that theywere upon an island with an equally deep and wide channel beyond!This news had just been received when we assembled at headquarters. Sheridan was greatly mortified at the blunder, but there was then nohelp for it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. I. P. 79. ]It was impracticable to complete the bridge before morning, and itwas doubtful if wagons enough could be got together. My own commandwas on the extreme left of the line, partly covering the road backto Strawberry Plains, and we had not been engaged. The fighting hadbeen in front of the centre and right. I could therefore throw nolight on the question of the enemy's force. The information fromother parts of the line and from prisoners left no doubt thatinfantry had engaged in the attack late in the afternoon and thatLongstreet was present in force. There was therefore no dissent fromthe conclusion that it would be unwise to accept a battle with theriver behind us, and orders were given to leave the position in thenight and retire to Strawberry Plains. The wagons and most of theartillery were to follow the advance-guard, which was Sheridan'sdivision, my command to march next, and Willich's (Wood's) divisionof the Fourth Corps to be the rear-guard. The cavalry were to marchon a road a little to the right, leading to New Market, and wouldthus cover our flank. [Footnote: For the Dandridge expedition, seeOfficial Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. I. Pp. 79 _et seq_. ] Granger had been ailing for a day or two and had not been with thetroops. He was lying on a bed in the room where we met, and the restof us sat about the fireplace, a tallow candle being on a rude tablein the middle of the floor. Sturgis came in later than the others, having had a longer ride. He was a handsome fellow, with full, roundfeatures, sharp black eyes, and curly black hair and mustache. Hehad been seated but a few minutes when he noticed a bottle ofwhiskey on the table and a glass which had been placed there as camphospitality for any one that wanted it, but had apparently beenneglected. Glancing that way, Sturgis said, "If I had a little bitof sugar, I believe I'd take a toddy. " A colored boy produced asugar-bowl and the toddy was taken. The conversation ran on a fewmoments, when, as if it were a wholly new suggestion, the same voicerepeated, "If I had a little bit of sugar, I believe I'd take atoddy;" and again the attendant did the honors. Our orders werereceived and we were about ready to go to our commands, when again, with polite intonation and a most amusing unconsciousness of anyrepetition, came the words, "If I had a little bit of sugar, Ibelieve I'd take a toddy. " The incident was certainly a funny one initself, but I should not have cared to repeat it had not theofficial records of Sturgis's defeat by Forrest in the Tishimingoaffair later in the year emphasized the mischief of lax habits as totemperance. The judgment of his superiors and of those who knew himwell was made severer by the knowledge of his weakness in thisrespect. Railway officers insist upon absolute sobriety inlocomotive engineers; but if there be one employment in which suchcoolness of head is more absolutely essential than in another, Ibelieve it is in commanding troops in the field. [Footnote: SeeMarbot's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 242, for results of Wittgenstein'sreliance on an intemperate officer, Kulnieff, in the Russiancampaign of 1812. ] Sturgis's military downfall was a severe lesson, but he gave every evidence afterward of having learned it, and"lived cleanly" through many years of service after the Civil Warwas over. The march back to Strawberry Plains began by starting the wagontrain to the rear as soon as it was dark. Sheridan's division wasdrawn out soon afterward. My command was ordered to leave the lineat eight o'clock, and Willich's to follow when the road should beclear as far as the first defensible ridge beyond the village wherea rear-guard could make a successful stand. The cavalry were tomaintain their position till morning and cover the movement. It wasabout half-past eight when my column closed up upon the wagons aheadof me, but as they had not yet climbed the first hill, we foundourselves necessarily halted in the main street of the village. General Willich had prudently placed a tent a little to the right ofthe road where it leaves the town, and there he made his quartersuntil the column should completely pass that point. He could thuskeep his division in their bivouac in support of the cavalry till heknew the rest of the little army had cleared the place and couldsecure some rest, whilst he was still in easy communication withboth the marching column and his own men. He reaped the advantage ofhis forethought. As my command had to assist the wagons and theartillery, no such means of bettering the situation was possible forus. I had notified Willich that I would be in person at the extremerear of my command so that he could communicate with me mostpromptly and obtain my support if he were seriously attacked. Thebrigade in the lead was directed to give the wagons and cannon everyhelp in getting forward, and the column was ordered to keep wellclosed up. The day had been a mild one in comparison with the fortnightpreceding, and rain set in early in the evening. The surface of theclayey roads soon became very slippery, then cut into deep ruts, andthe moisture was just enough to give the mud the consistency oftenacious putty. The teams, half starved, were very weak, and itseemed as if they would never mount the hills before them, whichwere the southern end of the ridge of Bay's Mountain, separating theHolston valley from the Nolachucky. Three or four teams had to beunited to drag up a single cannon or caisson, and the time as wellas the distance was thus trebled or quadrupled. In some instancesmore than twenty horses were thus hitched to a single piece, besideshaving infantrymen at the wheels as thick as they could cluster, pushing and lifting. The column which was halted thus waiting forthe wagon trains and artillery to climb a hill, grew weary ofstanding. The men would break ranks and sit down in the fencecorners, where they built little camp-fires, and, rainy as it was, they fell asleep leaning against each other in these littlebivouacs. Then would come word from the front to close up, and theregimental officers would give the command to fall in. The men wouldrouse themselves, the column would march, perhaps less than ahundred yards, when the road would be blocked again, the men wouldagain seek the fence corners and stir up the fires that had beenleft by those who were now in advance. Thus in cold and wet andweariness the night wore on, till when day broke about six o'clocknext morning we had put a distance of less than two miles between usand the village, and Willich's division had barely reached the firstwooded ridge beyond the town. During all the last hours of the night we were anxious lest weshould be attacked by the enemy, who by crowning the hills above theroad would have had us at great disadvantage. I had concerted withGeneral Willich a plan of action if we were assailed, but the enemytook no advantage of our situation, and I have always believed thatas the meeting at Dandridge was a mutual surprise, by a similarcoincidence both parties were retiring at the same time. Our cavalrymoved off toward New Market at daybreak, but it was not till late inthe forenoon, when we had toiled on several miles further, that theConfederate cavalry approached our infantry rear-guard andaccompanied its march for a time with some light skirmishing. The weather grew colder during the day, and in the afternoon therain changed to moist driving snow. The sleepy, weary troops toileddoggedly on; the wagons and the cannon were helped over the badplaces in the way, for we were determined not to abandon any, andthe enemy was not hurrying us. When night fell, on the 18th, my owncommand and Willich's division were still three miles fromStrawberry Plains, though Sheridan's division and part of the wagontrain had reached that place and crossed the Holston. We halted themen here and went into bivouac for the night. It had been awretchedly cheerless and uncomfortable march, but the increasingcold and flying snow made the camp scarcely less inclement. Theofficers were, as was frequently the case, worse off than the men, for they could not carry their rations in haversacks, and theseparation from the wagons in such a desolate country meant aprolonged fast. The delay caused by the rain and mud had beenunexpected, and the march we had hoped to make in the night hadtaken more than twenty-four hours. During that time myself and staffhad not eaten a mouthful, and we had no expectation of seeing foodtill we should get across the Holston next day and reach ourheadquarters wagons. Better luck happened us, however. We found adeserted and unfinished log cabin which had a roof and astick-and-clay chimney, though it had no floor or chinking. The snowdrove through between the logs, but the roof was over our heads andwe soon had a lively fire roaring in the chimney. Some bundles ofcorn-stalks were found in a field near by, and of these we made abed on the ground in front of the fire, and began to think we mightforget our hunger in thankfulness for fire and shelter such as itwas. But still better was in store for us. One of our tired foragetrains had gone into park near us, and the teamsters offered toshare their supper with us. They had corn "pone, " some salt pork, and for a rarity some newly arrived coffee. We sat on thecorn-stalks around the fire with an iron camp-kettle in the midstcontaining the black coffee which we dipped out with battered tincups, and we held in our hands pieces of the corn-pone and slices offried pork, congratulating each other on the unexpected luxury ofour supper. Hunger and fatigue were so good a sauce that it seemedreally a luxury, and we banished care with an ease which now seemshardly credible. The supper ended, sleep was not long a-wooing, though my rest was more broken than that of the others, for frequentdispatches came from headquarters which I had to answer, and ordershad to be sent to the troops to continue the march on the morrow inaccordance with the directions which I had received. I had providedmyself in Cincinnati with a field dispatch book in form of amanifold letter-writer which I myself carried in a sabretasch duringall the rest of the war. In this, by means of the carbon sheets andagate-pointed stylus, a dispatch and its copy were written at once, and a valuable record kept of every day's business. I could sit bythe bivouac fire and write upon my knee without troubling a wearyaide-de-camp to make a copy. I had in my saddle portmanteau also alittle pair of brass candlesticks screwing together in form of alarge watch-case, so that I could be provided with a light at theroot of a tree in the darkness, if it was necessary to send orreceive dispatches where there was neither shelter nor fire. Thesewere necessaries; for food we could take our chances. We halted the troops in wooded slopes where they were sheltered fromthe storm and where the evergreen boughs were speedily convertedinto tents of a sort, as well as soft and fragrant beds. Theirration was still scant, but nearly all of them picked up someaddition to it on a day's march, so that the camps were morecheerful than they had been in the intensely severe weather of thefirst half of the month. On the next day we continued the movement, passing through Strawberry Plains and three miles further on theroad to Knoxville. The Fourth Corps troops were ordered to go to thelast-named city, there to cross the Holston and move out towardSevierville into the country we had expected to reach by way ofDandridge. The Ninth Corps remained a little longer at StrawberryPlains. On the 18th of January General Foster's plans were unsettled by adispatch received from General Grant, dated at Nashville on the16th, but in some manner delayed in transmittal. This conveyed therather startling information that Longstreet had been reinforced bya division of Ewell's Corps with expectation of another also, andthat the Confederate commander was in fact moving in force onKnoxville. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 109, 127. ] The source of the information is not disclosed, but the newswas stated with a positiveness uncommon with Grant. It reachedFoster just as he had Parke's report of our having most unexpectedlymet Longstreet's infantry at Dandridge and of our retreat onStrawberry Plains. The news was without foundation, for Longstreethad not been reinforced and his movement had no other significancethan that which I have given it; but, coming on the heels of theaccidental collision at Dandridge, there was a curious coincidencein the events which gave strong apparent confirmation to the report, and it was a matter of course that Foster should accept it as trueand act upon it. He directed the sick and all extra baggage to be sent at once toKnoxville. Part of the Fourth Corps troops were ordered to the sameplace. The cavalry, except two regiments left with General Parke forpicket duty, was ordered to pass through Knoxville towardSevierville to obstruct any further movement of the enemy on theDandridge line. Parke was ordered to hold the rest of the armytogether, resisting Longstreet's advance, and retiring deliberatelyon Knoxville. Preparations were made to destroy the long trestlebridge at Strawberry Plains, and this important structure wasdevoted to ruin for the third or fourth time since Sanders enteredthe valley in the preceding summer. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 129, 162. ] Grant had said to Foster that theimpossibility of supplying more troops in East Tennessee made ituseless to send reinforcements, and that he must keep betweenLongstreet and Thomas, retiring toward Chattanooga if necessary. Halleck complicated the situation by telegraphing direct to Thomasthat he must aid Foster to any extent needed, and that the line fromKnoxville to Cumberland Gap must be maintained at all hazards. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 130. ] Foster reported to Grant that he had sogreatly improved the defences and armament of Knoxville that itcould not be taken, and that he would not retire further than thisplace unless it were explicitly ordered. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 138. ]This was in accordance with General Grant's wish, and his confidencein the information as to Longstreet's reinforcement was such that hetelegraphed Halleck on the 20th that the siege of Knoxville wasabout to be renewed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 149. ] The chronic inability of Halleck to understand EastTennessee affairs is shown in his insistence on still maintainingthe Cumberland Gap line, which was necessarily uncovered wheneverthe enemy approached Strawberry Plains. Chattanooga had now becomeour base, and remained so for all troops in East Tennessee till theend of the war. We at the front got the first authentic informationwhich disproved the report of Longstreet's reinforcement and showedthat he had retired to Morristown. Foster was thus enabled totelegraph Grant on the 20th that the evidence did not sustain thereport, and that he doubted whether the Confederate commander wouldagain attempt Knoxville. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 151. ] CHAPTER XXXIII WINTER QUARTERS IN EAST TENNESSEE--PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN Sending our animals to Kentucky--Consultations--Affair with enemy'scavalry--Roughing it--Distribution of troops--Cavalry engagement atSevierville--Quarters in Knoxville--Leading Loyalists--Social anddomestic conditions--Discussion of the spring campaign--Of Foster'ssuccessor--Organization of Grant's armies--Embarrassments inassignment of officers to duty--Discussion of the system--Ciphertelegraphing--Control of the key--Grant's collision withStanton--Absurdity of the War Department's method--General Stonemanassigned to Twenty-third Corps--His career and character--GeneralSchofield succeeds to the command of the Department of the Ohio. In connection with the movements of concentration about Knoxville, General Foster carried out his scheme of sending back to pasture inKentucky and Tennessee all the horses and mules, except a very fewteams needed to distribute supplies and two or three horses at eachdivision headquarters for the commanding officer and an aide or two. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 203-204. ] Theanimals were herded and driven together, an escort of cavalryaccompanying them, and the whole put in charge of Captain Day of mystaff, as quartermaster, the same whose energy in our journey overthe mountains I have already noted. This measure definitelycommitted us, of course, to a quiet and defensive line of conductfor the next three months. On the 21st of January we weredeliberately closing in around Knoxville, where the Fourth Corps wasalready concentrated, and General Foster had called upon the threecorps commanders to meet him at his headquarters in the city for thepurpose of putting in official form our opinion upon the necessityof suspending active operations in view of the condition of thetroops and animals. We met there on the next day, and submitted ourreports in response to interrogatories on several points. My ownstatement summarized the facts in regard to the supplies of food, forage, clothing, and the impossibility of drawing anything morefrom the country except some very limited quantities ofbread-stuffs. My conclusion was that economy of life, animals, property, and (taking the next six months together) of time also, required that the troops should go into permanent quarters for ashort period to be devoted to recuperation, drill, and instruction, organization of means of supply, and general preparation for anactive campaign in the spring. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 176. ] I, however, added that this was on thehypothesis that no imperative military reasons existed for continuedactive campaigning; for in presence of such a necessity everyofficer and man of the corps would most cheerfully continue toundergo every hardship and endure every privation. There wascomplete unanimity among us in regard to the subject, and GeneralFoster's orders were issued accordingly. Whilst we were in conference, reports came in from General Willcox, who had been left in command of the Ninth Corps at StrawberryPlains, that the enemy were pressing him rather vigorously. Wordcame also from General Spears that hostile infantry and cavalry hadappeared in large force at Blain's Cross-roads. Sturgis alsoreported from the direction of Sevierville that the whole rebel armyhad gone to Strawberry Plains. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 163, 174. ]Toward evening of the 22d our troops had come within some five orsix miles of Knoxville, but the enemy showed so strong a dispositionto attack that Foster ordered me to return to the front, takecommand of both corps (Ninth and Twenty-third) and of the cavalrywith them, and check the Confederates, as there was some danger thatour troops would change the concerted movement into a precipitateretreat. General Parke was suffering in health from recent exposureand remained in Knoxville. Galloping out from the town, I reachedthe troops a little before dark, halted them, and by a personalreconnoissance satisfied myself that only cavalry were before us. Our men had passed some wooded hills which were important to coverour position and give a starting-point for an aggressive movement onour part. Reversing their movement, I reoccupied these hills, brusquely driving back the enemy's advance-guard and checking theirmain body. It was now dark, and putting our forces in line of battleready for an advance at daybreak, they were allowed to bivouac forthe night, whilst I rode rapidly back to Knoxville, in accordancewith my arrangement with General Foster to report to him in personthe particulars of the situation. He approved my suggestion that Ishould advance the whole line in the morning and settle the questionwhat force was before us. The wagons had come into the town, and myheadquarters with them; so taking each of us a blanket, myself andthe two staff officers who had accompanied me (Colonel Sterling andmy brother) rode back again at midnight to the front, and restedtill daybreak on the rough floor of a log cabin. The line then wasadvanced, but the enemy had taken the hint from the preparations ofthe evening and had decamped. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 184. ] Detachments went in pursuit some eightmiles, but the Confederates had definitely withdrawn, and weobtained conclusive proof that only their cavalry had followed usacross the Holston River. The interrupted movement toward Knoxville was resumed, but itrequired me to remain another night in roughest bivouac, and anotherday without food, except as a mouthful could be found at hazard. Ihad begun the Dandridge movement with a cold which threatenedpneumonia, but had grown steadily better through all the exposure, finding, as often happened to me in the course of the war, that thephysical and mental stimulus of active campaigning even in the worstof weather was tonic and health-giving. As soon as the situation was cleared up by trustworthy informationof Longstreet's movements, General Foster resumed his plans forwinter quarters. His first intention of sending the Fourth Corpstoward Sevierville was modified by Grant's directions to put thatcorps where it could most readily rejoin the Army of the Cumberland. He therefore ordered me to move the Twenty-third Corps in thatdirection, and formally united to the corps the brigade of EastTennessee troops under Brigadier-General James G. Spears, which hadtheretofore been an independent organization. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 162. ] Sturgis, who had marched withmost of the cavalry on the route thus assigned to me, reported thatthe road was the worst he ever saw, and, with all the experience ofbad roads we had had, this meant that it was impracticable for ourfew and weak teams. [Footnote: _Ibid. _] This put an end to all hopeof living on the country, and Foster accepted the necessity ofdistributing his troops about Knoxville and along the lines leadingto Chattanooga. On the 22d of January orders were issued assigning the Fourth Corpsto quarters extending from Kingston to Loudon along the river andrailroad. The Ninth Corps took post between Campbell's Station andKnoxville. The Twenty-third Corps encamped at Knoxville and in theimmediate vicinity. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 183. ] The cavalry occupiedthe country southeast of the Holston holding a front on the FrenchBroad River. A few small outposts further up the valley weremaintained for observation. A brilliant cavalry combat near Sevierville on the 27th ended theactive work under General Foster's command. Longstreet, hearing ofthe presence of our cavalry south of the French Broad, directedGeneral Martin, commanding his cavalry corps, to get his forcesacross the river and meet Sturgis at once. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 611. ] The latter had McCook'sdivision in advance, supported by Garrard's near Pigeon River. Martin advanced upon McCook, but was surprised to find his adversaryseize the initiative. Learning of the Confederate advance, McCookmarched to meet them on the road leading to Fair Garden. Martin wasdriven back, his right (Morgan's division) being routed by a gallantcharge led by Colonel La Grange, First Wisconsin Cavalry, whocommanded a brigade. [Footnote: Id. Pt. I. Pp. 139, 141. ] Tworegimental commanders, seven other commissioned officers, over ahundred privates, and two pieces of artillery were captured by thecharge. General Morgan's battle-flag was also among the trophies. Our own casualties amounted to only thirty-one. Martin beat a hastyretreat across the French Broad to Dandridge, and Longstreet franklyadmitted Martin's defeat with a loss of 200 men and the two guns. [Footnote: _Id_. Pp. 149-150. ] He attributed it to the inefficiencyof his cavalry commander, and urged that one more competent be senthim. [Footnote: _Id_pt. Ii. P. 632. ] Sturgis followed on the 28th toFair's Island Ford near Dandridge, where he was met by Armstrong'sdivision of the Confederates. Longstreet now passed over an infantryforce in rear of our cavalry, and they fell back to Maryville. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 653. ] Both parties found the winter work toocostly, and were now glad to take a few weeks for rest andrecuperation. As my headquarters were assigned to Knoxville, I had the opportunityof increasing my knowledge of the people and of the socialcomplications which grew out of the war. I found quarters for myselfand Lieutenant Theodore Cox, my aide, at the house of Mr. Cowen, ayoung merchant of the city, whose father was one of the prominentbusiness men. The house was on the north side of a suburban streetrunning parallel to the river, and not far from the buildings of theEast Tennessee University, which were partially fortified andconnected with Fort Sanders by a line of infantry trench. The fieldson the opposite side of the road were open, and sloped down to theriver bank, and in these my headquarters guard pitched their tentsand the general quarters of the staff were also placed. A nearneighbor, in the direction of the college, was the Rev. Dr. Humes, rector of the Episcopal parish, and after the war President of theUniversity. General Burnside had spoken of him as a noble man, ofdevoted loyalty as well as earnest piety, and I was glad to know himas one who by his high intelligence and character was an authorityon all that related to Holston valley. [Footnote: Thomas W. Humes, S. T. D. He has, since the war (1888), published a volume devoted tothe East Tennessee loyalists, entitled "The Loyal Mountaineers ofTennessee. "] John Williams, John M. Fleming, and O. P. Temple wereamong those who represented the Union sentiment of Knoxville, as didPerez Dickinson among the merchants. [Footnote: Since this chapterwas written, Chancellor Temple has contributed a valuable work tothe history of the Rebellion, in his "East Tennessee and the CivilWar, " Cincinnati. 1899. ] John Baxter, afterward Judge of the UnitedStates Circuit Court, was a strong and wise friend of thegovernment. Horace Maynard represented the district in Congress bothbefore and after the war, and was regarded at Washington as itsofficial representative even in the period when the Confederateoccupation made him an exile from his home. William G. Brownlow wasin Knoxville also, having returned as soon as our army had openedthe way. His son, "Colonel Jim, " was doing gallant service at thehead of the First East Tennessee Cavalry. Around this group ofleading men were arrayed the great majority of the people, devotedin their attachment to the Union. The men of property among them hadsometimes been forced to dissimulate in order to protect theirpersons and their possessions; but now that the National army was inthe valley, there was no mistaking the earnest satisfaction and thehearty sympathy of these people. There was a minority who had beenopen Secessionists, and these had been influential beyond theirnumbers, by reason of their wealth and social standing; for here, aswell as everywhere else in the South, owners of slaves easily becamechampions of the extreme doctrines of what they called theconstitutional guaranty of their property. They claimed to includemost of the "upper class" in their numbers, though this was by nomeans true in this region. The feelings of both Union men and Secessionists were very bitter, and social life was as strongly marked by these divisions as thehostile camps. The number of slaves was comparatively small, butthey were the house servants in the towns, and their disposition toassert their liberty added to the social turmoil. The mistress ofthe house where I lodged hired her cook from a neighbor who claimedthe woman as a slave; but the employer found herself obliged to makeanother bargain with the cook, and to pay her a second wage in orderto keep her at work at all. The Unionists of East Tennessee were notyet fully advanced to the emancipation of the slaves as a result ofthe war. Parson Brownlow had fiercely denounced the Secessionistsfor arguing that secession was necessary to preserve property inslaves. Our army commanders thought it prudent not to agitate thisquestion, and contented themselves with keeping within the limits ofthe statutes and the general orders of the War Department, whichforbade military interference to return fugitives to the masters orto compel their obedience. The matter was left to work itself out, as it rapidly did. After the first of February the weather became settled and gave us amore favorable opinion of the East Tennessee climate. We had sharpfrosts at night with occasional light flurries of snow, but the dayswere usually bright, it thawed about midday, and the averagetemperature was such as to make active exercise delightful. Thesummits of the Great Smoky Mountains were covered with snow, andmade a picturesque framing for the natural loveliness of thevalleys. The roads were nowhere metalled, and the alternate freezingand thawing made them nearly impassable; but if we had been able tobring forward proper forage and supplies, we should have overcomethe other obstacles to active campaigning. As it was, we could onlyawait the approach of spring, when the settling of the roads and theopening of railroad communication with Chattanooga and Nashvillewould make it possible to bring back from Kentucky and feed ourhorses which had been sent to the rear. There was, beside, the question of the change necessary in thecommand of the department, since there was no probability thatGeneral Foster's health would permit him to retain it and he hadurgently requested that his successor should be assigned to duty. Indeed, the question of organization reached down to the regimentsand brigades, and was a burning one in all the armies of Grant'sMilitary Division. Besides this, the revival of the grade ofLieutenant-General was already mooted in Congress, and it was nearlya foregone conclusion that Grant would have the command of all thearmies and the task of co-ordinating their movements. Our littlearmy in East Tennessee was agitated not only with the speculationsas to our new commander, but with debates as to our probable part inthe next campaign, and the forces which would be given to us withwhich to do our work. Would the Ninth Corps remain in thedepartment, or would it be ordered to the East for duty underBurnside, as was already rumored? Would our task be simply togarrison East Tennessee; should we make Longstreet's army ourobjective and follow him into Virginia; or should we be united toSherman's and Thomas's armies for a campaign in Georgia? We eagerlylistened for every hint which might be dropped at headquarters, butGrant's proverbial reticence left us to our conjectures, and eachquestion was answered only when official orders were finallypublished. Much that was very blind to us is now easily traced inthe Official Records. When General Foster informed the War Department that the opening ofhis old wound made it necessary to relieve him of command in EastTennessee, the President was in some perplexity in regard to severalprominent officers. He was disposed to find some adequate employmentfor Rosecrans, who was still backed by a very strong politicalcoterie in Washington. He was convinced that injustice had been doneBurnside, and was thinking of sending him with the Ninth Corps, largely increased in numbers, to his old field of successful work onthe Carolina coast. The opposition of influential politicians ofKansas and Missouri to Schofield, whose confirmation asmajor-general was still obstructed in the Senate, he felt as apersonal hostility to himself. Grant was also desirous of suitableassignments to command for McPherson, W. F. Smith, and Sheridan. Thealmost certain passage of the bill to give a higher grade in thearmy, and the assumption that Grant would be promoted to it, gavethe opportunity to make a satisfactory arrangement of all thesecases. Burnside's return to active work and the removal to the Eastof the Ninth Corps were determined on, with General Parke's return, at his own desire, to the position of Burnside's chief of staff. McPherson was to take the Army of the Tennessee when Sherman shouldbe promoted to the command of the Military Division of theMississippi. Smith and Sheridan were to have high assignments in theEastern army. Rosecrans was sent to Missouri, and Schofield, to hisgreat content, was appointed to command the Army of the Ohio. Thesechanges were gradually shaped in the correspondence of Grant witharmy headquarters during the fall and winter. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 122, 277, 458, 529, 571; vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 79, 80, 182, 202, 209, 229, 230, 251, 336; also acurious letter of Hooker to Stranton, _id_. , pp. 467-469. See alsoSchofield's "Forty-six Years in the Army, " pp. 108-110. I havetreated these changes more in detail in chapter vii. Of Force's"General Sherman" (Great Commanders' series). See preface of thework last named. ] They were followed by others in the corpsdivisions and brigades, so that the organization of all the Westernarmies took permanent form before Grant was called to Washington toassume his new rank at the beginning of March. In regard to general officers the question of assignments andpromotions was always an embarrassing one for commanders of armiesin the field. As the law prescribed the maximum number ofmajor-generals and of brigadiers, political and military pressurecombined to keep the list always full. [Footnote: In reply toGrant's request for the promotion of General W. F. Smith, HalleckInformed him, on Jan. 13, 1864, that there was not only no vacancy, but that by some error more had again been appointed that the lawauthorized, and some already in service would have to be dropped. Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 80. As to brigaders, seeHalleck to Grant, _Id_. , p. 481. ] Closest watch was kept bypoliticians and others at Washington, and if a vacancy occurred, thepressure to fill it was exactly such as would be made for a civiloffice in the gift of the government. Officers of the regular armyfound in General Halleck a powerful support, and it was assumed thatthose appointed from civil life would be looked after by theirpolitical friends. The effort which was made by the War Departmentin the winter to force into active service or into retirement allofficers who for any cause had been "shelved" was well intended, butin practice it accentuated the feeling of experienced commandersthat a radical reform was essential. An intelligent system wasdemanded, reaching from top to bottom of the army, separating itsdiscipline, its assignments to duty, its promotions and its removalsfrom political influences, and making merit alone the basis ofadvancement. In the condition of public affairs no such thoroughwork was possible. The embarrassments of army commanders had beenvery bluntly explained to the War Department in the confidentialdispatches of Mr. Dana from Chattanooga. His judgments may sometimeshave been hasty, but he gives a very vivid picture of the mischiefswhich follow from having incompetent, intemperate, or inefficientmen saddled upon an army. The same dispatches, however, showed alsohow unwillingly the commanders resorted to extreme severity with mentoward whom they had feelings of personal kindness. In strong handslike Grant's or Sherman's the power to get promptly rid of suchincumbrances (which Dana recommended) would be ably used and workwell. As to political considerations, the President on more than oneoccasion admitted that he felt obliged, at times, to let thesecontrol his action, instead of reasons based on the efficiency ofthe army. [Footnote: For Dana's dispatches on this subject, seeOfficial Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. I. P. 220; vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. Pp. 69, 73, 265; pt. Ii. Pp. 54, 63. In his published "Recollections of theCivil War" (1898), Mr. Dana has omitted some of his most trenchantpersonal criticisms. ] Along with the graver embarrassments which General Grant found inorganizing his armies for a new campaign were smaller ones, whichthough sometimes concerned with trivial matters were not on thataccount likely to be less annoying. When the general visited us atKnoxville and Strawberry Plains in the severe weather of earlyJanuary, he came practically unattended. He had with himLieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock of the engineers, who continued inconfidential staff relations to him to the end of the war, wellknown then and ever since as an officer of rare ability anddiscretion. At Knoxville Grant received a dispatch in cipher whichhe could not read because the telegraph operator at his headquartersat Nashville alone had the key. This gave him great annoyance andmight have had very serious consequences. When therefore he reachedNashville on his return ride over the mountains, he directed theoperator to reveal the key to Colonel Comstock, who was always withhim. The operator of course reported the fact to the superintendentof military telegraphs at Washington (Colonel Anson Stager), and onthe report of the latter to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stantonordered the operator summarily dismissed from his employment, andformally reprimanded Colonel Comstock as if the revelation had beenmerely on his personal order. Of course Grant, who had never dreamedthat he was treading upon anybody's toes, immediately assumed thefull responsibility. He showed the folly of making details of methodoverride the public necessity to which they were subservient, andasked that the operator should be restored to his employment and notmade to suffer for obeying his personal order. He said: "I could seeno reason why I was not as capable of selecting a proper person tointrust with this secret as Colonel Stager. " One would think thisought to have ended the matter, but it did not, though the operatorwas restored to duty. Mr. Stanton had the old cipher thrown away, issued a new one, and stuck to the plan of trusting it to anordinary civilian operator, whilst it was not allowed to be known tothe commanding general or the most responsible staff officer. Grantmade the sensible suggestion that the key be given to militaryofficers only, and be kept from the civilian operators; but Mr. Stanton adhered to the farcical notion of carrying on a ciphercorrespondence which should be open to the irresponsibletransmitter, but secret as to the responsible commanding general towhom it was addressed. If it were meant for a system of espionageupon the general by thus inseparably tying to him a civilian overwhom he had no control, like an agent of a secret police reportingto a Fouche or a Savary, it would be an intelligible though bunglingcontrivance; but as a means of secret communication with a generalit was ridiculous in the extreme. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 150, 159, 161, 172, 323, 324, 361. ] The telegraph operators were young men who had learned the artusually in the northern telegraph offices and were hired formilitary service like other civilian employees. The operator atGrant's headquarters at Nashville had a busy place, and could not bespared to accompany the general whenever he visited a distant post, even if such inseparable attendance had been agreeable to thecommander. Many of the operators were faithful and intelligent men, but there were some who were not; and an incident occurred in theNashville campaign in the next year which showed what mischiefs werelikely to happen when a telegraph operator was cowardly oruntrustworthy. [Footnote: See "The Battle of Franklin, " by thepresent writer, pp. 29, 30. ] Returning to the affairs of the Army of the Ohio, at the same timethat General Schofield was ordered to report to Grant for duty, Major-General George Stoneman was sent from the East with a similarorder. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 166, 182. ] It had not then been announced that the Ninth Corps wouldreturn to the East, and apparently assuming that the Army of theOhio would include more than one corps of infantry, General Grantsuggested the assignment of Schofield to the department and Stonemanto the Twenty-third Corps. This was ordered accordingly on the 28thof January. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 229, 251. ] Stoneman's last servicehad been as Hooker's chief of cavalry in the Chancellorsvillecampaign, and under Hooker's orders he had been upon a separateexpedition of cavalry during that unfortunate battle. In the generalmiscarriage of the campaign, he was, with questionable justice, heldresponsible in part for the failure and was displaced. In thegeneral plan of setting everybody to work again, he was sent toGrant, though, as time had brought about a more favorable judgmentregarding him, it would have been fair to assign him to duty againwith the Army of the Potomac. I think he expected the command of thecavalry of the western army, but Grant had selectedBrigadier-General William Sooy Smith for that position, and lookingabout for suitable duty for Stoneman, the Twenty-third Corps wasseen to have no permanent commander assigned by the President, andStoneman was nominated for it. As events turned out, the appointmentwas for a very short period. My command of the corps with the rank of brigadier was of courseanomalous, and would necessarily be temporary unless the appropriaterank were restored to me. Had Burnside remained in East Tennessee, it is probable that his wish would have prevailed; but he wasabsent, and I was a comparative stranger, forming new relations toGrant and his principal subordinates. Foster had also assured methat he would wish no change in the corps command if he stayed atthe head of the Department, but as his health caused his withdrawal, the new arrangements were made without consulting him. Under thesecircumstances there was nothing for me to do but to accept theinevitable and take such active work as my seniority in my presentrank would give. When General Foster learned that he would soon be relieved, he verycordially offered to do anything in his power to further my wishesin regard to any choice of duty when I should be superseded in thecorps. I replied that my strong desire was to get the most activefield service, and as it was doubtful whether the corps would not bekept to garrison East Tennessee, I would like to be transferred tothe Army of the Cumberland, which was certain to make the nextcampaign in Georgia. On his suggestion I wrote a letter to GeneralGrant asking the transfer on the grounds stated. This applicationGeneral Foster forwarded with a letter of his own supporting it invery friendly manner. Nothing came of this, but it was the reasonfor the delay which occurred in my assignment to permanent work inthe Army of the Ohio. Some of my friends in the Fourth Corps, knowing that Sheridan was to leave his division, had suggested myappointment there, but the surplus of general officers prevented. Major-General Newton, one of those who came west from the Potomacarmy, was assigned to that division. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. I. P. 18. ] Generals Schofield and Stoneman reached Knoxville on the 9th ofFebruary, and the changes in command were promptly made. [Footnote:_Id. _, pt. Ii. Pp. 356, 358, 359, 364, 365. ] For a fortnight I wasoff duty, awaiting orders. General Foster took his leave of us, thoroughly respected by all, though his crippled physical conditionhad interfered with his personal activity. My separation from the corps command only affected myself and my twopersonal aides-de-camp. I had recommended Major Bascom, myadjutant-general, and Major Treat, my commissary, for permanentpositions on the corps staff, and these recommendations were kindlyadopted by General Stoneman, so that they ceased to belong to mymilitary family, though both offered to follow my fortunes. Theother staff appointments were in the nature of details, most ofwhich were temporarily continued. Pending General Grant's action onmy application, I remained at Knoxville, looking on and making theacquaintance of the officers newly arrived. General Stoneman was a tall, thin man, full bearded, with largeeyes. He had an air of habitual sadness, or gravity approaching it, and was commonly reputed to have an irritable temper, but I sawnothing of it. I think he would have made an acceptable commander ofthe corps if fortune had left him in that position. His place in theregular army (Major of the Fourth United States Cavalry [Footnote:He and General Sturgis were the two majors of the same regiment. ])had led to his assignment to a cavalry command at the East, and hereturned to that arm of the service a little later. Grant took adislike to Stoneman, partly on account of the manner in which he hadbeen sent to him from the East. When the suggestion was made that, if the opposition in the Senate to Schofield's confirmation shoulddefeat his promotion, Stoneman should succeed to his command, Grantdryly replied that he did not know General Stoneman's merits. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 394] Even a yearlater he showed the same distrust by speaking of him as an officerwho had failed. This was by no means just, but showed thepersistence of Grant's impressions. [Footnote: General Stonemanretired from the army at the close of the war and made his home inCalifornia, of which State he became governor. ] With General Schofield's arrival began my close association with himwhich was to last until the end of the war. In person he was asolid, rather stout man, of medium height, with a round bald headand long black beard coming down on his breast. He had a reputationfor scientific tastes, and had, after his graduation at West Point, been instructor in astronomy there. He was two or three years myjunior in age, and was among the younger general officers. Theobstruction, thus far, to his confirmation in his higher grade sofar resembled my own experience as to be a ground of sympathybetween us. As I was glad of his better luck in his promptreappointment, I may also say that his hearty recognition of my ownservice and experience inspired me with sincere friendship. I lookback to my service as his subordinate with unmixed satisfaction. CHAPTER XXXIV SCHOFIELD IN EAST TENNESSEE--DUTIES AS CHIEF OF STAFF--FINALOPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY Fresh reports of Longstreet's advance--They are unfounded--Grant'swish to rid the valley of the enemy--Conference withFoster--Necessity for further recuperation of the army--Continuanceof the quiet policy--Longstreet's view of the situation--Hissuggestions to his government--He makes an advance again--Variousdemonstrations--Schofield moves against Longstreet--My appointmentas chief of staff in the field--Organization of the activecolumn--Schofield's purposes--March to Morristown--Going the GrandRounds--Cavalry outpost--A sleepy sentinel--Return to NewMarket--Once more at Morristown--Ninth Corps sent East--GrantLieutenant-General--Sherman commands in the West--Study of plans ofcampaign--My assignment to Third Division, Twenty-thirdCorps--Importance of staff duties--Colonel Wherry and MajorCampbell--General Wood--Schofield and the politicians--Post atBull's Gap--Grapevine telegraph--Families going through thelines--Local vendetta--The Sanitary Commission--Rendezvous assignedby Sherman--Preliminary movements--Marching to Georgia--A springcamp on the Hiwassee--The Atlanta campaign begun. On assuming command in East Tennessee, Schofield was met bydirections from General Grant, full of fresh urgency that Longstreetshould be driven beyond the Virginia line. The occasion for this wasthe receipt of new intelligence that Longstreet was reinforced fromthe East, and would make another effort at an aggressive campaign. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 337. ] Therecurrence of this stereotyped form of alarm looked very much likeinformation sent from the Confederates themselves for the purpose ofkeeping us on the defensive; but perhaps it is only of a piece withother evidence which shows the slight value of all information whichis not got by contact with the enemy. The truth was that none of thereports that Ewell and others had been sent to Longstreet had anyfoundation. He was left to his own resources, with only theauthority to call his next neighbor in southwestern Virginia to hisassistance if he were in danger of being overwhelmed. But Grant wasannoyed by these recurrent alarms, and his aggressive nature chafedat it. "I intend to drive him out or get whipped this month, " hesaid to Thomas before Schofield's arrival; and on the 11th ofFebruary he wrote to the latter: "I deem it of the utmost importanceto drive Longstreet out immediately, so as to furlough the balanceof our veterans and to prepare for a spring campaign of our ownchoosing, instead of permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 367. ] Nothing would have pleased Schofield better than to have hadLongstreet come down to Knoxville and fight there, but the cogentreasons which had made Foster suspend active operations and devoteevery energy to getting his men and animals in condition for avigorous spring campaign, had lost none of their force. Our animalshad already been sent away to save their lives, and by the help ofthe little steamboats built at Kingston and for which General Meigshad sent engines from the North, we were beginning to receive atKnoxville some of the clothing for which our men were suffering. Grant had already ordered Thomas to be prepared to march at once toreinforce Schofield, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 359. ] when he had apersonal interview at Nashville with General Foster, who was on hisway home. Foster so fully explained the impossibility of supplyingtroops much further up the valley than Knoxville, and the absoluteneed of building up the physical strength of man and beast after thehalf starvation since winter set in, that Grant yielded to theinevitable and directed Schofield to remain on the defensive tillthe approach of spring should give a prospect of activity whichshould not be destructive to the little army. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 373-375. ] He ordered that there-enlisting veterans should have their furloughs as soon aspossible, and that men and animals should have all the rest theycould get, preparatory for early operations in the spring. After his retreat from Knoxville, Longstreet had kept up an activecorrespondence with Mr. Davis, and with Lee, Johnston, andBeauregard, in reference to further plans of campaign. The ease withwhich Thomas could reinforce Schofield was so plain to him that hesaw nothing attractive in another advance on Knoxville. The planwhich seemed to attract him most was to mount his infantry on mulesand make a dash through the mountains into Kentucky by way of PoundGap. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 652-789, 790-792. ] To collect tenthousand mules and send them to him, to make a depot for rations andforage at Abingdon sufficient to support the column on its journeythrough the mountains, to furnish a train to carry it, --all thisseemed evidently chimerical to those to whom he proposed it. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 760. ] The Confederacy had all it could do tofeed its existing armies where they were, and was living from handto mouth. The thing which the Confederate government seemed most to desire wasthat Longstreet should effect a junction with Johnston and the twoopen an offensive campaign against Thomas. [Footnote: _Id. _ pp. 806, 808, 810. ] The evil consequences of Bragg's blunder in detachingLongstreet before the battle of Missionary Ridge became more evidentevery day; but how were the commands to be reunited? A long andperilous flank march must be made by both armies, with an almostcertainty that Grant would concentrate first and fall upon them insuccession. Longstreet was restless and anxious to do something pending thisdiscussion, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 699. ] and resolved to try an advance from Morristown upon Knoxville. He began his movement just as Grant had concluded to allowSchofield's army to remain quiet till spring. On the 19th ofFebruary he reached New Market, seven or eight miles aboveStrawberry Plains and twenty-five from Knoxville. The information hegot gave him the idea that our troops were "demoralized, " and thatit was a favorable opportunity for an effort to capture Schofield'sarmy. [Footnote: _Id. , _ p. 735. ] He was quite wrong as to the_morale_ of our troops, though we were depleted by furloughs andwere nearly immovable for lack of train animals. He urged Johnstonto move toward Knoxville to co-operate with him, [Footnote: _Id. , _p. 744. ] but Polk was now in trouble by reason of Sherman's marchfrom Vicksburg upon Meridian and Johnston was ordered to assistPolk. [Footnote: _Id. , _ p. 763. ] Then Grant, to balk both efforts, ordered Thomas to make a demonstration against Johnston, which waseffective in preventing co-operation in either direction. [Footnote:_Id. , _ p. 480. ] Schofield was at first disposed to regard the enemy's advance as aneffort to find forage and to strip the country more bare than italready was, if that were possible. On the 18th, however, Longstreetadvanced again, and threatened to cross the Holston at StrawberryPlains, scouring the country in the angle between that river and theFrench Broad. The rumors which reached Schofield were [Footnote:_Id. , _ p. 415. ] that his real purpose was to cross the French Broad, move along the foot of Chilhowee Mountains and make his way toJohnston. It is very probable that this was his real purpose. On the19th he was ordered to send at any rate Martin's cavalry to rejoinJohnston, [Footnote: _Id. , _ p. 772. ] and to make the junctioncomplete would so evidently please the Confederate government thatit may be assumed Longstreet would do it if he saw the way open. Schofield therefore prepared to concentrate and move in eitherdirection, but took no active step for a few days. On the 23d theinformation was sufficient to make it clear that Longstreet was notmoving in force toward Georgia, but was retiring toward Morristown, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 449, 455. ] andSchofield immediately issued orders of march to his troops tofollow. The fact was that Longstreet was so much disturbed by thewithdrawal of Martin's cavalry [Footnote: Martin's cavalry at thistime was what remained of Wheeler's corps which had accompaniedLongstreet from Bragg's army the previous autumn. ] that he declaredthis forced him to leave East Tennessee and place his forces atBristol on the Virginia border. On getting a second dispatch fromMr. Davis, he modified his reasons, saying that Schofield had beenreinforced from Chattanooga. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 788-790. ] Thiswas incorrect, for the Fourth Corps was the only part of the Army ofthe Cumberland which joined the Army of the Ohio at any time duringthe winter, and only Wood's division of it participated inSchofield's present movement. He also wrote as if he had been nearenough to Knoxville to discover for himself that the fortificationswere greatly strengthened;[Footnote: _Id. _, p. 810. ] but as he hadnot approached nearer than seventeen miles, he could hardly havegained much information on this subject. No doubt rumors of work onthe defences of the city had spread through the country during thewinter, but there could hardly have been any discovery at this time. The use of it to smooth the appearance of an abortive effort wasonly a passage in military apologetics. I had been awaiting orders in Knoxville a fortnight when the advanceagainst Longstreet began, and as no definite answer had come to myapplication for transfer, General Schofield invited me to act as hischief of staff in the field during active operations or until myassignment to permanent duty should be settled. I gladly acceptedthe general's proposal and joined headquarters at once. [Footnote:See Official Records vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 495. ] Our little armyconsisted nominally of parts of three corps, but the column in thefield consisted of one division of the Twenty-third Corps, under theimmediate command of General Stoneman, one of the Fourth Corps underBrigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, and the skeleton of the NinthCorps under General Parke. [Footnote: _Id_. P. 455. ] We had alsoColonel Garrard's division of cavalry. Another division of theTwenty-third Corps under Brigadier-General Milo S. Hascall was leftas the garrison of Knoxville, with the heavy artillery organizationunder Brigadier-General Davis Tillson and a small detachment ofcavalry. Hascall was particularly directed to scout far out to theeastward, watching for any attempt of the enemy to pass along themountain base, as well as against any effort to capture the city bya _coup de main_. Our marching column numbered 13, 873 officers and men, distributedthus: Wood's division, 5477; Parke's detachments of two divisions ofthe Ninth Corps, 3031; Stoneman with the second division of theTwenty-third Corps, 3363; Garrard's cavalry, 2002. [Footnote: _Id_. Pp. 502, 504. ] Longstreet's forces were 20, 787, of which 5034 werecavalry. Schofield's purpose was essentially that of areconnoissance in force to learn definitely the composition andapparent plans of the enemy, though willing to accept a defensivebattle if a favorable opportunity should occur. If Longstreet werefinally leaving East Tennessee, Grant's intention was to send alltroops of the Fourth Corps back to Thomas, so as to concentrate theArmy of the Cumberland in preparation for the spring campaign inGeorgia. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 456, 490. ] On the 24th of February we were at Strawberry Plains. The longtrestle bridge of the railway had been destroyed when our forces hadconcentrated at Knoxville a month before, and our first task was tocomplete a wagon bridge across the Holston so that we could moveonward toward New Market and Morristown with a possibility ofkeeping up a supply of food. We did not wait for the bridge to becompleted, however, and orders were issued on the 26th to begincrossing, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 474. ]using flatboats for the men, whilst the artillery and wagons used aford that was then passable. Grant did not expect Schofield to marchhis infantry farther than Strawberry Plains, but to push thereconnoissance beyond that point with cavalry. [Footnote: Id. , p. 495. ] Schofield, however, felt that to do his work thoroughly, hishorsemen should be strongly and closely supported. On the 29th ourheadquarters were at New Market and the column on its way toMorristown. We overtook it in the afternoon and occupied the townthat evening. As so often happens in war, our movement had hardlybegun when the fine weather ended, and we marched from StrawberryPlains in pouring rain, over wretched roads which rapidly becameworse. This delayed the troops and only part were at Morristown whendarkness fell. These were disposed so as to cover the town in frontwith pickets well out, and a detachment of cavalry a mile or twofarther forward. Most of the horsemen were on our flanks, coveringroads by which our position could be turned. All the information we could get pointed to an abandonment of EastTennessee by the enemy, but it was hard for us to believe that thesudden retreat of Longstreet, after his announced intention toattack Knoxville, was not under orders which indicated a plan weought to fathom. We had heard of his first purpose at many places onour road, for it is almost impossible to keep the people of thecountry from learning the destination of a moving column, and nowthe inhabitants who remained at Morristown were aware thatLongstreet's men regarded Bristol as their destination. There were, however, rumors and some evidence that Longstreet had stopped hisretreat and was about to turn upon us. This called for a carefuldisposal of our troops and preparation for supporting them promptlywith those that were still on the road. As nothing came of it, therewould be no reason for mentioning it, except that it was theoccasion for an amusing bit of personal experience of my own. Some of the more pronounced Secessionists had left the town withLongstreet, through fear that the loyalists might take vengeance onthem for some of the wrongs they had suffered. We occupied asheadquarters a house thus vacated, but it was absolutely empty andgave us only a roof over our heads. We had a few camp stools and acamp desk or two, and slept on the bare floor wrapped in ourblankets, with our saddles for pillows. Late in the evening someloyal men brought in such reports of the enemy advancing to attackus at daybreak, that as a measure of prudence determined to go the"grand rounds" an hour or two before day, and especially to visitthe cavalry outpost at the front and send forward a reconnoissancefrom it to make sure of full warning if there was any need of it. When I was roused by the sergeant of the headquarters guard and myhorse was brought to the door, it was not a night for a pleasureexcursion. A cold winter rain was pouring down, and the blackness ofdarkness was intense. I took only a single orderly with me, buttonedmy cape close over my great-coat, pulled down the rim of my felt hatand started off, trusting to my horse to keep the road till my eyesshould get a little used to the darkness. As both armies hadencamped around the town, the fences were of course all gone and thewagons had cut so many tracks to right and left that it seemed allroad, or rather all mire and no road. Whilst we were among the campsthe smouldering camp-fires were of some help, but when we got beyondthese we could only splash along cautiously, steering for thesmaller fires which marked the picket reserves. Beyond the line ofsentries there was nothing to guide us, and keeping our direction aswell as we could, we plodded on until a faint glimmer showed thecamp of the cavalry outpost. It was in an open wood, and the dyingcamp-fires gave only light enough to show the tall trunks of theforest trees, black against a background of dull red. Part ofLongstreet's army had been in cantonments here during the winter, and many of the huts were still standing, their dim outlines andirregular forms hardly visible, but giving an air of weird mysteryto the surroundings. Some of these huts were occupied by thecavalry, and the first we came upon had as its tenant an Irishdragoon, and him we turned out to guide us to the captain'squarters. The occasionally flashing light only seemed to make thedarkness visible, and the Irishman told us to follow him closely, "and look out, " says he, "for there's pits every little way wherethim ribils dug foundations for their chimbleys. " He started on andI followed, keeping my horse's nose close to his shoulder. Suddenlyhe disappeared, and as I jerked my horse back on his haunches, Paddysung out: "Och! I've found one, sorr!" and sure enough he had gonein, head and heels, in one of the "pits. " He scrambled out andcautiously led my horse around the hole, but we had hardly gone arod further before Pat went out again, like a candle, with "Bejabers, I've found another. " But he took his mud bathsgood-humoredly, and led us without further accident to the captain. From him I got the reports from the vedettes at the front, and afterordering a reconnoissance to be pushed well forward, turned back toinspect the infantry line of sentinels. These were generally foundon the alert and well instructed, but as we went across ditches andmiry fields we came suddenly upon one asleep in a fence corner wherehe had tried to make some shelter from the storm. When the horseshalted beside him, he sprang up bewildered, and stood bolt upright, trying to look at us, evidently uncertain whether we were rebels, but too confused to utter a single word. I ordered him to call thecorporal of the guard, and asked him if that was the way he guardedthe camp. He began to stammer out denials of being asleep with aforeign accent and in broken English, which made his stupidity seemmore stupid. I reported him to the officer of the guard, but findinghe was a raw recruit, I refrained from ordering him before a generalcourt-martial, and directed a lighter summary punishment that hisregimental officers could impose. After examining the more important part of the line, we splashedback to quarters as day was breaking, got a fire built in ourcheerless room, hung my coat, which was heavy with water, before itto dry, and crossing my mud-cased legs, sat down for half an hour ofrest and revery, listening for carbine shots at the front that wouldtell if the scouting party had found an enemy. The rest of the staffwere still sleeping, oblivious of war's alarms and preparing for thework of the day by trusting the watching to those on duty, as theywould be trusted in turn when similarly on guard. How often weresuch incidents repeated, night and day, through campaign aftercampaign, till they became so familiar that it seems almost puerileto mention them! On beginning the movement to Morristown, orders had been given topress the rebuilding of the railroad bridge at Strawberry Plains, for our continuance so far from our supplies depended upon it. Wehad no trains of wagons to keep up our communication with our base, and the utmost we could do was to carry four or five days' supplywith us. We therefore spent three or four days in vigorous effortsto gain information of the enemy by means of our cavalry. We learnedthat Longstreet held the line of Bays Mountain, where the railwaypasses through Bull's Gap, thirteen miles above Morristown. Hisright flank seemed to be at Rogersville on the Holston, and his leftrested near the Nolachucky beyond Greeneville. We could not learnthat any of his forces except Martin's cavalry had left him, thoughwe were mystified by the disappearance of Ransom's division from theaccounts of the enemy's organization. The fact was that that officerwas transferred to the cavalry command, and the organization of hisdivision was merged in the others. On the 2d of March Grant directed that McCook's division of cavalryshould go back to Thomas as soon as they could possibly be spared, and on Schofield's reporting the results of our reconnoissances, headvised the latter not to bring on an engagement, but to contentourselves with holding as much of the country as we could. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 14. ] The billcreating the grade of lieutenant-general was now the law, and Granthad been promoted to it. On the invitation of the President he wasabout to go to Washington for consultation, keeping in telegraphiccommunication with his department commanders. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 17. ] Consequently it agreed well with his views to let affairsremain quiet during his absence. The rains continued, however, andeven if he had desired further advance it would have been out of thequestion till the bridge at Strawberry Plains was rebuilt. Therations brought with us were exhausted, and on the 4th we withdrewthe infantry fourteen miles, to a position four miles above NewMarket, where we hoped to be able to feed the troops with our fewwagons, until the railroad should again be available. Headquarters in the field were established at New Market, and Iremained there with authority to direct and support the cavalrymovements actively kept up in our front. General Schofield was thusenabled to spend part of his time at Knoxville attending to theclothing and supply of the troops, the gathering of reinforcements, return of veterans, and all the matters of department administrationwhich centred there. In case of the necessity of combined action inGrant's absence, Thomas was authorized to assume command. The Holston bridge at Strawberry Plains was completed on March 11th, and our forces were at once put in motion for Morristown, where weonce more encamped on the 12th. Nothing new had been learned of theenemy; but there was nothing to learn, for Longstreet quietlyoccupied the line of Bays Mountain, and, like ourselves, was busygetting his troops clothed and shod, while he discussed with theRichmond authorities various plans of campaign. The cavalry orderedback to Johnston was making its way along the base of the mountains, and occasional news of their advance was exaggerated into stories ofall Longstreet's army being in motion. Schofield very wisely thoughtthe best way to know what his enemy was doing was to be as near himas practicable without assaulting his strong positions with aninferior force, and therefore ordered the fresh advance as soon asthe railway could be made to transport supplies. On the 14th Grant was again at Nashville, and took immediate stepsto send the Ninth Corps to Burnside at Annapolis, [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 67. ] in accordance with anarrangement which was settled at the Washington conferences. Schofield was directed to have no delay in getting the Ninth Corpsoff, and he issued his formal orders to that effect on the 16th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 82. ] This reduced the forces in East Tennesseeto a very small number, but a bold front was preserved and activereconnoitering kept up. On the 18th Stoneman's infantry was placedat Mossy Creek, between New Market and Morristown, and Wood with twobrigades of his division was ordered to Rutledge about half-way toCumberland Gap. The other brigade was placed at Strawberry Plains toprotect the stores accumulated there. The cavalry which remained toSchofield was divided, part reporting to Stoneman and part to Wood, and the country was carefully watched from the Nolachucky on theeast to Cumberland Gap on the northwest. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 88, 89. ] I was personally directedto keep headquarters in the field, with power to act, in emergenciesand in matters of detail, in Schofield's name, while the generalreturned to the department headquarters at Knoxville, where he madeto Sherman, as his now superior, a full report of the situation, with suggestions as to the future work of the army of the Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 96. ] It was now settled that a new campaign, both East and West, should open in April, if possible, andeverything else was to be made subservient to preparation for it. Steps were taken to bring back the furloughed veterans, to remountthe cavalry in Kentucky and bring it forward, and to secure suchadditional infantry as should enable Schofield to take the fieldwith three strong divisions of foot, and at least two of horse, besides leaving about ten thousand men in Kentucky and five thousandin East Tennessee. The question what should be the work of the Army of the Ohio hadnaturally interested us who belonged to it, and while Grant was inWashington I prepared and submitted to General Schofield a sketch ofa plan of campaign. It was based on the assumption that the Army ofthe Potomac would not operate by its left along the lowlands ofVirginia, as McClellan had done, but would follow the railwaythrough Culpepper and Orange Court House to Richmond. This route wasin a high and healthy country, the streams would be crossed wherethey were comparatively insignificant, and the natural obstacles toan advance seemed much less formidable than upon the coast line. True, the army would have to depend upon the railway for itssupplies, but so must Sherman in the West, and the Virginia line wasonly a fraction of his in length. It had the advantage of coveringthe Shenandoah valley as it advanced, and saving the largedetachment which had to be devoted to that region and to theprotection of Washington. But besides this (and this was the featuredirectly affecting us in East Tennessee), it opened for the Army ofthe Ohio a rôle of usefulness which seemed to me very important. If Schofield were to take the field in Georgia, he could carry toSherman, at most, some twelve or fourteen thousand infantry and sixor eight of cavalry. The proper protection of Kentucky and EastTennessee required just about the same number of troops. His activecolumn in the decisive campaign would therefore be only half of theforces in his department. Whenever it should be apparent thatGeorgia was our field of operations, Longstreet's twenty thousandmen would be set free to join Lee in Virginia (as actuallyhappened), or could be used in any other theatre of operations, whilst our garrisons could not be greatly reduced because smallraids of mounted men could harry the wide expanse of country behindus unless all the important points were fully guarded. This also wasdemonstrated by our actual experience, and was a plain deductionfrom facts and principles. To drive Longstreet into Virginia anddestroy the railroad so that he could not return was, therefore, toforce the enemy to do the thing most advantageous to himself; thatis, to concentrate his forces at the East in entire security that hewould not be troubled by any advance on our part into southwesternVirginia. If, on the other hand, we could move eastward along the railroad, wecould bring our supplies to our camps as we advanced. Sherman's armybehind us would make our base at Chattanooga safe; the greatmountain barrier on the right would so cover our flank that scarceany force need be left in Tennessee, but all could be put in theaggressive column: the troops in Kentucky could be brought forwardas we progressed, for our movement would cover that district;finally, on reaching the New River valley we could be joined by theforces in West Virginia. The advance, therefore, instead of beingwith a dwindling column would be with a growing one, and when theArmy of the Potomac should approach the valley of the James, weshould be ready with about forty thousand to come into line as theright wing of that army. Approaching Richmond from the north andwest, the south side railroad would be at once in our grasp, andthat to Petersburg within easy reach. The objection to such a plan which would first occur to a critic, would be that convergent movements from so distant bases areproverbially uncertain; but this objection is greatly weakened by astudy of the topography of the country. The Holston valley is soisolated that, approached by the railway line with a good basebehind the column, it is strongly defensible, and if the advance isso timed as not to pass the New River before the Army of the Potomacshould be swinging in toward Richmond from the northwest, Lee's armywould be too fully occupied to make a detachment strong enough tooppose us, and the line by which he would operate against us wouldbe threatened by the army of our friends. There would also be a safeline of retreat always open for us, in case of check. [Footnote:Napoleon was a master of strategy who fully appreciated theobjections to exterior lines, but in the campaign of Wagram in 1809he ordered Marmont to lead a column from Italy to Vienna by a routehaving strong resemblances to that which I have sketched. Heregarded the character of the route itself, protected as it was bymountain ranges, and giving the assurance of a line of retreat, asmaking an exception to ordinary cases and overcoming the objectionswhich would have been conclusive against attempting it in an opencountry. ] Another interesting feature in this plan is that ifrailway communication between Sherman and the Potomac Army had beenopened in the summer of 1864, it would have been an interior line ofimmense importance, not improbably modifying essentially the finalcampaign of the war. General Schofield thought well enough of my sketch to adopt it as asuggestion to General Grant, which he submitted as soon as thelatter returned from the East. The General-in-Chief had, however, already made arrangements which committed him to operating by theleft of the Potomac Army. He had sent General W. F. Smith toFortress Monroe for the purpose of taking the field at the head ofthe movable part of Butler's Army of the James, and Burnside'scommand at Annapolis was at that time expected to make another lineof operations from the seacoast in North Carolina. There was also adisposition to leave in Sherman's hands all the departments whichconstituted the Military Division of the Mississippi, and allow himto concentrate the movable forces of all in his operations againstJohnston. Grant therefore adhered to his original purpose ofdestroying enough of the railroad near the Watauga River to make aserious obstruction to hostile movements against East Tennessee fromthe east, and turn everything that could be spared into the advanceupon Atlanta. Another thing which had weight with him was the factthat Schofield's confirmation as major-general was still delayed andopposed in the Senate, and he intended, if it were finally defeated, to consolidate the Department of the Ohio with that of theCumberland under General Thomas. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 11. ] On the 29th of March General Sherman visited Schofield at Knoxville, and a full understanding was reached regarding the place the Army ofthe Ohio was to take in the great campaign of the spring. All thetroops in the department were to constitute the Twenty-third Corps, and Schofield was to command the moving column in the field as wellas the department. To avoid the inconvenience of having a doublehead to this column, Stoneman was to be transferred to the commandof the cavalry in place of Sturgis, and Schofield was to be assignedto the formal command of the corps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 221, 268, 312. ] Sturgis was then to be sentto Memphis to take command of the column there organizing for thepurpose of operating against Forrest. As to operations in the upper valley of the Holston, it wasdetermined to occupy Bull's Gap at an early day, and to keep up suchan apparent purpose of advancing as should detain Longstreet in EastTennessee as long as possible. If he retreated he was to befollowed, so as to induce him to burn the railway bridges, and thusto avoid disclosing our own purpose of leaving that portion of thevalley which we should plainly proclaim if we ourselves shoulddestroy the railway. Everything was to be ready for movement, and atthe last moment, if the enemy had not already done it, we were toburn railway bridges and tear up the track for a considerabledistance. Then the divisions which were to take the field in Georgiawere to march rapidly to Cleveland, and come in on the left ofSherman's grand army as he advanced from Chattanooga. As the plan of campaign thus took definite shape, it gave theoccasion also for a settlement of my personal problem of permanentassignment to duty. It had become evident that there was no room fortransfer to another command, and the active part marked out for theTwenty-third Corps removed the only ground for wishing it. No bettersoldiers could be found than those which made up our divisions, andmy acquaintance with General Schofield had ripened into a confidencewhich made me entirely content to follow him as my commander. Hewarmly invited me to continue permanently in the position of chiefof staff, but gave me the alternate choice of one of the divisionsof the active column. My preference for responsible command in thefield decided me to take a division, and by his further permission Ichose the third, in which were a considerable number of officers whohad served with me in other campaigns. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 245. ] I would not be understood, however, todepreciate the position of chief of staff of such a department andarmy. Properly filled, few positions in active service could bepleasanter or more useful. I had tested this during the six weekspreceding, and had found the associations and the duty every waymost agreeable. The general was always prompt to assume his properresponsibility and to order the movements or the administrative actswhich are peculiarly the province of the commander; but he gave methe task of arranging the subordinate details, and the authority todirect them in his name. To distribute the parts each corps ordivision was to perform; to co-ordinate all the arrangements so thatthey should move harmoniously; to bring to a common centre all theinformation, external and internal, which affected the conduct andefficiency of the whole; to supervise the matters of organization, of equipment, and of supply; to consult with the medical director asto hospital work and the sanitary condition of the army, and to beguarantor that the common end is vigorously and intelligentlypursued by every part of the army, --all this, as scarcely needstelling, makes a chief of staff the right arm of the commander, andhis most trusted adviser and confidant. He makes his commander feelfree to give his own thought to the larger problems of a campaign, with confidence that the whole machinery of the army will worksmoothly toward the object which he has in view. I did not then, nordo I now, underestimate the importance of the duty which anindustrious staff officer may thus perform, and I had found it madepersonally pleasant by the even temper and appreciative justice ofGeneral Schofield's rule. I had, however, formed so strong apredilection for the immediate and active conduct of troops in thefield, that this determined me to choose the division command. Inthe new organization of the corps I should, in this, report directlyto the general, and should be next in rank to him (in the infantry)by virtue of seniority, so that in his absence, or when twodivisions were temporarily detached from the army, I should exercisea superior command. These were advantages which every experiencedsoldier estimates highly, and I was to enjoy them, until goodfortune and the steady friendship of my superiors gave me, a secondtime, and this time in permanent form, the corps command with therank belonging to it. There was no mistake, therefore, in my choiceof duty; and considering the part Sherman's whole army was to playin the remaining campaigns of the war, it was a matter of personalgood fortune also that the Army of the Ohio became an integral partof the great western organization, and marched southward, noteastward. On the staff I had been thrown into intimate relations to ColonelWilliam M. Wherry, senior aide-de-camp, and Major J. A. Campbell, adjutant-general. These officers continued to the end of the war inthese positions, which they filled with great credit and usefulness. Major Campbell was admirably fitted for the supervision of therecords and the correspondence of the army, and for reducing to theform of clear and succinct orders the directions of the general. Hewas accurate, systematic, and untiring; always at his post, whetherit were at his desk in camp, or by the side of his chief in thefield. Of slight, almost frail body, with an intellectual face, helooked unequal to rough field work, but showed a stamina in factwhich many a more robust man envied. Colonel Wherry was theincessantly active personal representative of the general, intrustedwith his oral orders, and making for him those examinations andinvestigations which are only satisfactory when the commander haslearned to trust the eye and the cool judgment of his assistant ashis own. Wherry had been with General Schofield from the firstcampaign in Missouri in 1861, and both were with Lyon when he fellat Wilson's Creek. He remained his confidential aide through thewhole war, and for years afterward, being early appointed fromMissouri to the line of one of the new regiments of the regulararmy. Lithe, graceful, and genial, he was always welcome, when hecame to a point where fighting was going on, to learn for thegeneral the actual situation or to bring his orders. [Footnote:Wherry is now (1899) Brigadier-General of the United States Army, retired, after brilliant service in the campaign of Santiago, Cuba. ] During the winter the division of the Fourth Corps commanded byBrigadier-General Thomas J. Wood had been in closest connection withus. It had taken part in all the marchings and countermarchings ofthe period when I was chief of staff, and I had thus begun anacquaintance with its commander which was to grow into lastingfriendship. General Wood was colonel of the Second Regular Cavalry, a Kentuckian who had earnestly taken the National side, and aninfluential officer of the old army. His intelligence and activitywere very marked, and his courage was of the cool indomitablecharacter most highly prized in divisions of a great army. Of mediumheight, solid but not large build, dark hair and complexion, highforehead, he was a noticeable man in any assemblage of officers. Afluent talker, attentive to polite forms of speech as well as ofconduct, he was liked and respected throughout the army, andespecially in the Army of the Cumberland, where he had servedthroughout the war. He had won promotion by gallant and meritoriousservices again and again, when at the battle of Chickamauga it washis ill fortune to receive the famous order to "close up on Brannanand support him. " The situation made the order ambiguous, but Woodunderstood it to mean that he should move to the left till he shouldfind himself in rear of Brannan's division, since another divisionwas between them in the line. He thought it a strange order, butthought also that Rosecrans must know why he sent it, and that itwas "his not to reason why" but to obey. The obedience opened thegap through which Longstreet's men poured, breaking the line androuting part of the right wing. Wood took the place assigned him byThomas in the horse-shoe curve around the Snodgrass hill, and didhis full share of the desperate fighting which held that part of thefield. But he had thus become the subject of a controversy, and thefriends of Rosecrans charged him with a too literal obedience, and afailure to use a sound discretion in his action. The result was thatwhilst Rosecrans was removed from active field service, Wood stillfound himself under a cloud, and opposed by influences which stoodin the way of his promotion till the war was almost ended. Hecontinued to be distinguished in every engagement of the Atlantacampaign and that of Nashville, and no division saw harder or morehonorable service than his. The first week in April saw the changes in the organization of theTwenty-third Corps which I have indicated. On the 3d I was relievedof staff duty and assigned to the third division, with orders toproceed at once to Bull's Gap and take temporary command of thecorps whilst General Stoneman should hasten to Kentucky to preparethe cavalry corps for active service. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 245, 259, 268. ] I think the change wasagreeable to Stoneman, for he was most at home with mounted troopsand liked that service. Schofield's permanent assignment to theTwenty-third Corps was made on April 4th by the President, thoughthe general had still to await for some time the action of theSenate on the confirmation of his promotion. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 258. ] His enemies were stillpersistent, and even succeeded in obtaining a report of the Senatecommittee against his confirmation. General Sherman wrote to hisbrother, the senator, in behalf of his subordinate;[Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 332, 343. ] but it was not till General Grant was back inWashington and used his powerful personal influence that theconfirmation was finally secured after the campaign had opened. Itseemed at one time that not even the manifest mischief of derangingthe organization of the army, as deliberately settled by both Grantand Sherman, would overcome the political hostility arrayed againsthim. This was without any reasonable foundation. Although Schofieldwas not given to political discussion, my closeness to him enabledme to know that he was an earnestly loyal man whose heart was warmlyengaged in the National cause. He believed in emancipation as aright and politic war measure, and in fighting the rebellionvigorously till it should be conquered. He had made enemies amongthe Kansas politicians because he tried to prevent the war on thatfrontier from degenerating into a vendetta when murder and robberyshould take the place of civilized warfare. Some influentialradicals in Missouri were hostile because he held the scales evenbetween them and the conservative Union men. At Bull's Gap I found the corps headquarters in a shingle-palacewhich had been built for a hotel at the railway station, and whichwas now the only house there. It was empty as a barn and fast goingto ruin, but it gave shelter for our office work. Wood's division ofthe Fourth Corps was put in march to join the Army of theCumberland, and we were left to watch the enemy and await the momentwhen the destruction of the railway and our own march southwardshould begin. We soon had a curious bit of evidence that Longstreethad finally abandoned the expectation of re-occupying EastTennessee. It was found in the applications made by women to jointheir husbands who were in the Confederate service. The "grapevinetelegraph" was an "institution" during the whole war. News which waseither interesting or important was passed on through the lines, andit was impossible to be so rigid in precautions as greatly to delayit. To stop it was utterly futile. Longstreet had hardly receivedthe orders from his government to prepare to rejoin Lee's army inVirginia, when the headquarters of our army at Knoxville felt thepressure of applications for leave to pass the lines. On the 6th ofApril a party of forty women and children came up by railway, to besent through the lines under a flag. They were of course withouttents or any means of camping out, and the crazy building in which Ihad my quarters was that night as crowded and as picturesque as anAsiatic caravanserai. The rain and the almost impassable roads madetheir journey anything but one of pleasure, but by the aid of thefew wagons at the post they went forward in a day or two. A secondparty, about as large, followed in the course of a week, and hadeven a rougher time than the first. There were delays on the part oftheir friends, in sending trains and escort to meet them at thebreak in the railway, but the hope of rejoining loved ones gave themcourage, and they bore cheerfully their sufferings and privations. The bitterness of the feud between the loyalists and disunionists inthe Holston valley can hardly be imagined by those who did notwitness it. The persecutions of the loyal mountaineers had been suchthat when their turn of ruling came they would have been more thanhuman if they had not retaliated. The organization of home-guardsgave to these armed bodies of men the power, and with it came thetemptation to abuse it. The memory of the men who had been hangedfor bridge-burning, and of those who had languished and died inprison charged with no crime but disloyalty to the Confederacy, wasa constant stimulus to severity. Their blood seemed to cry from theground. We found a constant necessity for moderating their passions, and it was not always possible to keep them within the bounds ofcivilized warfare. My experience in West Virginia was repeated withsome phases of still greater intensity. When we got these loyal menaway from home, campaigning on distant fields, there was no troublein enforcing discipline, and they showed no more fierceness ofpersonal retaliation than other troops. I suspect this willeverywhere be true, in greater or less measure, and that in all warsit will be found for the interest of humanity not to allow localtroops to garrison their own homes. The scouts and irregular organizations were, as usual, the mostlikely to fall into excesses. I had an example of this, fallingunder my own eye at the time I am speaking of, and showing how, under this intense exasperation, the "bush-whacking" degeneratedinto guerilla war in which no quarter was given on either side. Ihad sent out a reconnoissance of a party of Indiana cavalryaccompanied by some thirty of the Tennessee scouts, the whole forceabout a hundred in number. They had encountered a hostile party of"irregulars" some thirty strong, and had routed them. They broughtin fifteen prisoners, and reported ten of the enemy killed. Thosewho were captured had all surrendered to the Indiana men, and theTennesseeans were disposed to complain that quarter had been given. True, the party which had been attacked was said to have committedgreat outrages, and to have been engaged in forcing loyal men intothe Confederate Army under their conscription laws. The chief of thescouts came to my quarters, and I put to him the ordinary questionas to the luck of his last expedition. "Oh, " said he, in a dejectednasal tone; "some pretty good luck and some bad luck. " "What badluck?" said I, thinking some of his men had got hurt. "Oh, themIndiana cavalry fellows let the captain of the gang and fourteen ofhis men surrender to 'em. " "And what became of the rest?" "_We_ hadto deal with them, " said he, significantly; "and they didn'tsurrender. " Such is civil war when it becomes a deadly feud betweenold neighbors and acquaintances. The month of April ran on with continued activity of reconnoitringparties, but no larger movements. The spring was unusually backward. There was a flurry of snow on the 16th, but it did not lie on theground, and about the 20th lovely spring weather began in earnest. The best evidence we had that our lines of communication weregetting in more efficient condition, was the arrival of an agent ofthe Sanitary Commission with a large shipment of fresh vegetablesfor gratuitous distribution. We were sorely in need of them. Therewas a good deal of incipient scurvy in camp, and scarce any one waswholly free from disorders caused by too restricted diet. Ourregular rations were bacon and flour, varied occasionally by a smallissue of dried white beans or rice. This was nutritious enough, butafter some months' steady use, nature pretty imperatively demanded achange. The noble organization of the Commission had been watchingfor the opportunity, and the arrival of a generous supply ofpotatoes, onions, and pickled cabbage made feast days for everybodyfrom the general down. At my headquarters we had been confined tothe soldiers' rations, and it was impossible to get anything else. The only ferment to raise our bread was saleratus, and we had becomevery tired of saleratus biscuit. No luxuries ever tasted so well asthese plain vegetables. Our physical condition craved them, and theywere food and medicine at once. The sauerkraut was finely shavedcabbage laid down in brine, and a steaming platter of it made the_pièce de résistance_ of our camp dinner as long as it lasted. Theonions we sliced and ate raw with a dressing of vinegar. The gustowith which we enjoyed this change of diet remains a vividremembrance after a quarter of a century, and is the best proof ofour need of it. The health of the whole camp was restored, and wewere "hard as nails" during the year of rough campaigning that wasto follow. The first week in May was the time of rendezvous for Sherman's grandarmy in northern Georgia, and with the opening of the last week inApril the signal was given to destroy the railroad between Bull'sGap and the Watauga River, or further if the enemy should leave thecrossing of that stream unharmed. Our position at the gap was highin the cleft of Bays Mountain through which the railway passes andthen turns southeastward to the Nolachucky. The road then goes upthe valley of that stream and over a ridge to the Watauga, whichruns to the northwest, joining the Holston again by a route which isnearly at right angles to the general trend of the valley. TheWatauga is not easily fordable at an ordinary stage of water, andthus the triangle between the Holston on the left, the Watauga infront, and the Nolachucky on the right, made the debatable ground ofthe upper valley. Whilst we held the barrier at Bull's Gap the enemycould not stay on the hither side of the Watauga, nor could we passthe river and stop short of a strong position an equal distancebeyond. We made a strong demonstration of cavalry supported by infantry, asif we were determined to cross the Watauga and push on intoVirginia. The Confederate cavalry set fire to the bridge, as weexpected them to do. One brigade was ordered to Jonesboro, to marchback destroying all the railway bridges and tearing up and twistingthe iron rails as far as possible. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 477, 492. ] With another force I began in persona similar work of destruction on the section nearest Bull's Gap. Time could only be given us for this work till the 27th of April, but on the evening of that day my division was reunited at the gap, having torn up and twisted about one third of the track over a spaceof fifty miles, and thoroughly destroyed all the wooden bridges. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 500, 512. ] The footsore and sick were put on a railway train, and with the restI began the march for Knoxville. As General Sherman was urgent forspeed in our movement, the columns were kept near the railway andthe trains were run to meet them, taking the men in detachments. Thefirst day of May found us at Charleston, the crossing of theHiwassee River, with two divisions of the Twenty-third corps andwith General Schofield in our midst. A new division from Indiana wason its way, by rail, to join us at Cleveland, and it was certainthat we could be in our place as left wing, before the 5th, the dayassigned by Sherman. Two days were given to getting up andorganizing our trains, and on Tuesday, the 3d, we marched atdaybreak, with our field organization complete. The Atlanta campaignwas begun. General Schofield went over to Chattanooga to meetSherman, and the command of the corps on the march was committed tome. [Footnote: _Id_. , xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 5, 22, 32, 48. ] On the4th, leaving Cleveland, we crossed the Georgia line and advanced toRed Clay, where, with the Army of the Cumberland on our right, theunion of Sherman's forces in the field was completed. At the Hiwassee we were a hundred and forty miles from Bull's Gap, and had made the distance in three days, marching half the way andbeing carried the other half by rail. In going south we seemed tomeet the advancing spring. In the upper valley we could only see asuspicion of green, here and there, on an early tree, but at ourSunday camp at Charleston in a fine bend of the Hiwassee, a freshgreen robe covered all the hills, and the sun was so bright and warmthat the shade of my clean new tent was very comfortable. It wouldbe hard to find a scene better making a romance of campaigning thanthat about us. Chilhowee and the great Smoky Mountains piled theirdeep blue masses against the eastern horizon, whilst at our feetrolled as beautiful a river as ever bore a musical Indian name. Thegrassy banks rise about a hundred feet above the water, and then thehills roll and rise around us in charming variety. Near the water'sedge a great spring pours out from the bank in a swift steady streamtwo yards wide and six inches deep, giving sweet and pure waterenough for a whole army, and the zigzag paths to it are filled withpicturesque groups of soldiers loaded with camp kettles or canteens. We should have been dull indeed if we had not felt the exhilarationof the scene. CHAPTER XXXV GRANT, HALLECK AND SHERMAN--JOHNSTON AND MR. DAVIS Grant's desire for activity in the winter--Scattering tolive--Subordinate movements--The Meridian expedition--Use of theMississippi--Sherman's estimate of it--Concentration to be made inthe spring--Grant joins the Potomac Army--Motives in doing so--Meadeas an army commander--Halleck on concentration--North Carolinaexpedition given up--Burnside to join Grant--Old relations ofSherman and Halleck--Present cordial friendship--Frankcorrespondence--The supply question--Railway administration--Bridgedefences--Reduction of baggage--Tents--Sherman on spies anddeserters--Changes in Confederate army--Braggrelieved--Hardee--Beauregard--Johnston--Davis's suggestion ofplans--Correspondence with Johnston--Polk'smediation--Characteristics--Bragg's letters--Lee writesLongstreet--Johnston's dilatory discussion--No results--Longstreetjoins Lee--Grant and Sherman have the initiative--Prices in theConfederacy. The threshold of the new campaign is a fit place to pick up thethreads of the relations of Sherman to his superiors and hissubordinates, and to notice the manner in which he laid out theresponsible work before him. Grant had no thought of suspending operations in winter, furtherthan circumstances should make it imperative. As soon as the siegeof Knoxville was raised, he applied himself earnestly to thequestion, What next? His first choice would have been to start fromChattanooga as a base, and make the Confederate Army his object. Theinsuperable obstacle to this was the impossibility, at the time, ofsupplying the forces already collected on the upper Tennessee. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 503. ] Therailroad to Nashville must be practically rebuilt and made much moreefficient than it was, or both Thomas's and Foster's armies would betied fast without the possibility of advancing. To make it possibleto feed Sherman's auxiliary force, he sent it down the river toBellefonte, some thirty miles below Bridgeport, opened steamboatcommunication with it, and set it at work repairing the railway fromNashville to Decatur and from Decatur to Stevenson. This wouldfurnish an additional line to Chattanooga when completed, and wouldmake an accumulation of stores there a possibility. He saw the risksinvolved in this scattering of forces, but he had no choice; theymust scatter to live. He did not mean that the army should beinactive, however; as early as the 7th of December, 1863, he wrotequite fully to Halleck suggesting a movement from the lowerMississippi on Mobile, using for this purpose the forces that wouldbe relieved from guarding the lines about Chattanooga. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 349. ] By the middle of the month he had begun to organize a cavalry forceunder Gen. W. Sooy Smith, to move against Forrest in West Tennessee, and was giving shape to other plans of activity. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 429, 431, 473. ] Sherman had taken a short leave of absence tovisit his family upon the death of one of his sons, a bright lad, whose loss was a severe bereavement. On his return to duty, he wasdirected to go down the Mississippi, visit the important posts ofhis department, and take steps to suppress guerilla interferencewith the navigation of the Mississippi. Before leaving his command, he had suggested an active movement of part of his army in northernAlabama, to break up the railroad in the neighborhood of Corinth, whilst he himself led a force up the Yazoo River to attack Granadafrom the south, with a similar purpose. He thought he could do thisand get back in time to take part in the "plan of grand campaign"which Grant was studying. In the same letter he said he deemed SooySmith "too mistrustful of himself for a leader against Forrest, " andsuggested Brigadier-General Joseph A. Mower, of whose energy andcourage he had a high opinion. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 445. ] On the subject of the necessity of protecting the river navigationby every means, Sherman expressed himself in superlatives, as he wasapt to do, but his meaning was plain and sensible. He said to Logan, to secure its safety "I would slay millions. On that point I am notonly insane, but mad, " and will convince the natives that "though tostand behind a big cotton-wood and shoot at a passing boat is goodsport and safe, it may still reach and kill their friends andfamilies hundreds of miles off. " [Footnote: _Id. _ vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 459. ] Out of this discussion came finally his suggestion of anextensive movement from Vicksburg upon Meridian for the purpose ofdestroying the railway lines, especially in the vicinity of thelatter place, and of isolating the region bordering on theMississippi, so that a small force could garrison it and protectcommerce. The suggestion was adopted by Grant. With Sherman's columnthe cavalry under Sooy Smith was to co-operate. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 473, 527. ] Meridian was made the objective point of this movement, though Grantintimated to Halleck that if Sherman found it would not too greatlyprolong the subordinate campaign, he might march on Mobile. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 100. ] When the march began, Sherman allowed it to be given out that he would attack Mobile, butthis was to deceive the enemy. In his correspondence with GeneralBanks he limited his task to that which has been stated, though heasked Banks to help him keep up the notion that Mobile was aimed at, as it would deter the enemy from heavily reinforcing General Polk bythe garrison there and by troops sent from Atlanta. "I must returnto the army in the field in Alabama in February, " said he, "butpropose to avail myself of the short time allowed me here in thedepartment, to strike a blow at Meridian and Demopolis. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 114. ] In this view themovement was a success, notwithstanding the failure of the cavalrycolumn to co-operate. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 498. ] The biographer ofGeneral Polk disputes the importance and the permanence of theinterruption of railway communication in Mississippi; [Footnote:Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General, vol. Ii. P. 309. ] but it iscertain that no important hostile movement from that region was madeagain till Hood's campaign against Thomas a year later, and that wasseriously if not fatally delayed by the want of railwaycommunication between Florence or Tuscumbia and the interior of theGulf States. On his first visit to Washington after he became lieutenant-general, Grant found that it was the general expectation of members ofCongress that he should infuse his personal energy into the nextcampaign of the army in Virginia. He learned also that thePresident, the Cabinet, and General Halleck despaired of theaccomplishment of this by any stringency of orders from a distance, and thought it could be done only when he should be near enough tosolve questions as they arose by his personal presence andinfluence. As a subordinate, few men could do better service thanGeneral Meade; but he seemed to develop a caution amounting almostto inaction in the presence of the Confederate Army under GeneralLee. This had allowed the Richmond government to send Longstreet'scorps to reinforce Bragg at the west; and it was because the grandopportunity was not improved by Meade that it became necessary tosend Hooker a thousand miles with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps toreinforce Rosecrans. Halleck expressed the sentiment of theadministration and of the country when he wrote to Grant on December13th, "As General Meade's operations have failed to produce anyresults, Lee may send by rail reinforcements to Longstreet withoutour knowing it. This contingency must also be considered. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 396. ] It was, infact, what Longstreet strenuously urged his government to do. Aslate as February 17th, when it was certain that Grant would soon bein command of all the National armies, Halleck, in a long letter ofwhich the burden was that Lee's army must be made the objective inthe Eastern campaign, plainly intimated that Meade could not givethe Army of the Potomac the necessary aggressive energy. "Meaderetreated before Lee with a very much larger force, " he said, "andhe does not now deem himself strong enough to attack Lee's presentarmy. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pt. Ii. P. 411] Aftermentioning the opportunities to break or defeat the enemy which hadbeen lost or not improved at Antietam and Chancellorsville, he addsthat of Meade after Gettysburg, and continues: "I am also of opinionthat General Meade could have succeeded recently at Mine Run had hepersevered in his attack. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 412. ] Pointing outthat McClellan had operated by exterior lines, and Burnside, Hooker, and Meade by interior ones, and that all had alike failed, he arguesthat this does not prove anything against either line of operation, whether by the James River or by Culpepper; but the sound militaryprinciple still is to avoid scattering the eastern army by NorthCarolina expeditions and the like, which were then mooted, and toconcentrate the forces in the east against Lee's army and fight itout to a finish. [Footnote: _Id_. P. 413. ] The letter is an ableone, but the reference to it is now made for the sole purpose ofshowing how the problem was placed before General Grant when thesupreme responsibility was cast upon him. He accepted the view soably presented. He did not allow the proposed expedition to be madeby Burnside, though he had himself favored it before; but united histroops to the army on the Rapidan. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 143. ] He kept up for a time a nominal duality oforganization, not putting Burnside under Meade or Meade underBurnside. This made an ostensible reason for the next step, whichwas to take the field there in person and try what effect his owninflexible will might have in giving an aggressive impetus to thatarmy. It seemed to him to be a choice between that and a continueddead-lock to the end of the chapter. Thus it was that Grant gave uphis own desire to continue at the head of the western armies whichhe had led to successive and glorious victories. Thus it was thatSherman was right in saying to him, "Like yourself, you take thebiggest load. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 313. ] The decision wasnot prompted by egotism. There was no vanity in Grant's composition. He simply saw, as he thought, that in that way decisive progressmight be made, and so he quietly went that way. Sherman's relations to Halleck had always been close and mostfriendly. Outside of official communications they had kept up apersonal correspondence, part of which is found in the OfficialRecords. From the day when it became apparent that Grant was tobecome lieutenant-general, Sherman yielded to his impulse to comfortand reassure his older friend on what must necessarily involvedisappointment if not humiliation. In a long letter from theMississippi in January, he takes pleasure in telling how he hadspoken in public of Halleck's good qualities and talents. "I spokeof your indomitable industry and called to mind how, when Ord, Loeser, Spotts, and I were shut up in our stateroom, trying to keepwarm with lighted candles and playing cards on the old Lexington, off Cape Horn, you were lashed to your berth studying, boning harderthan you ever did at West Point. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 261. ]This was on their voyage out to California during the Mexican War. In a cordial answer (February 16th), Halleck said he expected Grantto receive the promotion, and should most cordially welcome him tothe chief command, glad himself to be relieved from so thankless anddisagreeable a position. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 408. ] He enlarged upon its difficulties, though he didnot see, apparently, that it had been in his power to take the fieldas Grant afterward did, and that it was by his own act that he hadbecome "simply a military adviser of the Secretary of War and thePresident. " He bore witness to the fact that there was more harmonyin the western army than in the eastern, saying, "There is lessjealousy and backbiting and a greater disposition to assist eachother. " [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] In reply Sherman assured Halleck of hisown belief that Grant would prefer to command the "army of thecentre" which was to advance from Chattanooga, and did not want theposition of general-in-chief at Washington. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 498. ] At the beginning of April Sherman wrote again to Halleck, expressinghis belief that he could make his army a unit in action and feeling. "We have never had, " he said, "and God grant we never may have thedissensions which have so marred the usefulness of our fellows whoma common cause and common interests alone ought to unite asbrothers. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 222. ] It was in this letterthat he asked Halleck to say to the President that he would prefernot to be nominated to the vacant major-generalship in the regulararmy. "I have now all the rank necessary to command, and I believeall here concede to me the ability, yet accidents may happen, and Idon't care about increasing the distance of my fall. The momentanother appears on the arena better than me, I will cheerfullysubside. Indeed, now, my preference would be to have my FifteenthCorps, which was as large a family as I feel willing to provide for;yet I know Grant has a mammoth load to carry. He wants here some onewho will fulfil his plans, whole and entire and at the timeappointed, and he believes I will do it. I hope he is not mistaken. I know my weak points, and thank you from the bottom of my heart forpast favors and advice, and will in the future heed all you mayoffer, with the deepest confidence in your ability and sincerity. " A single reference more will complete this sketch of the relationsof those prominent men. The week before the opening of his campaign(April 24th) Sherman wrote again: "I see a mischievous paragraphthat you are dissatisfied and will resign; of course I don't believeit. If I did, I would enter my protest. You possess a knowledge oflaw and of the principles of war far beyond that of any otherofficer in our service. You remember that I regretted your going toWashington for your own sake, but now that you are there you shouldnot leave. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 469. ] This hearty friendship and cordial comradeship lasted unbrokentill Halleck's too famous advice to Mr. Stanton after Lincoln wasassassinated, to direct Sherman's subordinates in the Gulf Statesand in the West not to obey the orders he might issue in pursuanceof his convention with the Confederate General Johnston. That was asore blow which shattered this lifelong friendship, though it nowseems probable that had Halleck's dispatch to Stanton not beenpublished without the rest of the correspondence, Sherman might havefound possible a more innocent meaning for his words than theyseemed to have when they were read by themselves. This, however, isnot the place to discuss that subject. [Footnote: See Chap. L. , _post_. ] In considering Sherman's means of supplying his army in the field, we must note the situation and connections of Nashville, which madeit naturally the principal depot for operations in Alabama andGeorgia. A hundred and eighty-six miles by rail south of the OhioRiver, centrally situated as the capital of Tennessee, it wasdirectly connected with Chattanooga by a hundred and fifty miles ofrailroad, and indirectly by way of Decatur, Alabama, and Stevenson, a line thirty-five miles longer. These railway connections would ofthemselves make Nashville an important post, but it had also theadvantage of water communication with the Ohio. It lies at thesouthern bend of the Cumberland River, the course of which is nearlydue north from the city to its mouth, and the stream is navigablefor steamboats the greater part of the year. The Tennessee, a muchlarger river, is nearly parallel to the Cumberland in this part ofits course, and a partially constructed railroad from its banks atJohnsonville to Nashville, seventy-odd miles, was completed duringthe winter. With these three lines of communication, there was verylittle danger that the great Nashville depot could run short ofmunitions or rations, or be seriously isolated by raids of theenemy. It was to communication between Chattanooga and Nashvillethat Sherman had to give his best thought and will. The WarDepartment had sent out Colonel McCallum, the General Superintendentof Military Railways in January, and improvements had then beenbegun, which under Sherman's energetic command made a brilliantsuccess of this part of the military administration through thewhole campaign. [Footnote: See "Sherman" (Great Commanders Series), pp. 199 _et seq_. Also letter of McCallum to Stanton, OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 143-145: Order appointing AdnaAnderson general superintendent of transportation and W. W. Wrightchief engineer of construction, _Id_. , p. 365: Sherman's orderorganizing the military use of the railways, _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 279. ] The management of the railways in use was given to AdnaAnderson, and the engineering and bridge-construction to W. W. Wright. These gentlemen were both civil engineers and experts inrailroad building and management. Military rank was given them laterin order to enable them to control officers and men of the army onproper occasions. Their skill and energy were of inestimable valueto the army, and gave them brilliant reputations which they fullyearned. They remained in their military railway duties to the end ofthe war, and were distinguished in the same profession in civil lifeto the end of their lives. When Sherman assumed command of theDivision of the Mississippi, about eighty carloads a day was thelimit of the capacity of the road and the delivery at Chattanooga. It was only half of what was needed to insure rapid progress of thecampaign. By the 1st of May it had increased to a hundred and thirtycars a day, with exceptional days on which the delivery ran higher;but a steady average of a hundred and fifty (the needed quantity)had not been reached, and every day's advance into Georgia wouldincrease the length of the line. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 466, 490. ] In a characteristic letter to General Thomas, Sherman explained thenecessity of having the railway management directed from his ownheadquarters instead of those of the Army of the Cumberland, and inone to Mr. Lincoln he tersely repelled the idea that he was undulyhard on the inhabitants of the country and their business. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 489; and vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 25, 33. ]General Meigs, the quartermaster-general, who knew the country bypersonal inspection, fully agreed with Sherman and wrote him onApril 20th, advising him to "resist the pressure of civilians andprivate donations and supplies; march your troops, and devote thecars solely to transportation of military necessities.... Manycivilians, " he added, "can give charitable, patriotic, benevolent, and religious reasons to be allowed to go to the front; the reasonsare so good that nothing but an absolute and unchangeableprohibition of all such travel will do any good. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 434. ] The business management of the military railways was a matter ofgreatest importance, but it must be supplemented by an adequatesystem of defence. To cut the long line and interrupt thecommunications of the army would, of course, be the constant effortof the enemy. Every wooden bridge across a stream was a mostvulnerable point. A burnt bridge meant a delay of trains till itcould be rebuilt, and Sherman's estimate that he must receive at thefront a hundred and fifty car-loads daily, shows how soon troublewould be caused if the steady roll of car-wheels should cease. Forthe freight cars of that day, ten tons made a load, and with thelight locomotives and iron rails then in use, twenty or thirty carsmade a full train. A system of blockhouses for the protection of thebridges had been gradually developed by the engineers of the Army ofthe Cumberland on suggestions made by General Halleck and others, and was under the charge of Colonel W. E. Merrill, who enlarged andimproved it. This able officer was retained at the head of thedefensive system, and his success in it was noteworthy. [Footnote:Colonel Merrill has given a valuable memoir on the construction anduse of the blockhouses, in "Ohio Loyal Legion Papers, " vol. Iii. P. 389. After the war, he was for many years United States Engineer incharge of Ohio River improvements. ] With a careful system of railway work went also thorough study ofthe wagon trains necessary in the field to carry the baggage of thearmy, its ammunition, and a few days' rations, its hospitalsupplies, and the records and papers of all the businessdepartments. Besides the supplies for men, the food for the teams, for the cavalry horses, and for the horses of mounted officers makesin the aggregate a bulk and weight astonishing to those who for thefirst time undertake the calculation. Great droves of beef cattleaccompanied the march, and were coming forward on all the roads fromthe country in the rear where they could be bought and collected. The purchase, driving, coralling, feeding, and distributing of thesemade, of itself, a great business for the commissaries ofsubsistence. The introduction of the shelter tent of twoindia-rubber blankets got us rid of the regimental trains, which atthe beginning of the war had been the most unwieldy of all our_impedimenta_. The two soldiers who were thus partners in the littlehouse they carried on their backs, clubbed all their arrangementsfor comfort, and by working together greatly reduced the hardshipsof campaigning. Sherman applied the full force of his mind and thestrong impulse of his personal example to discarding everything notessential to the army work, and to securing the utmost mobility inhis columns. Throughout the campaign his own headquarters lookedsmall and bare compared with those of many of his subordinates. Somewriters have ridiculed this, as if it were a mere "fad" of thegeneral; but it was both wise and shrewd to keep before the army theconstant lesson that privation was necessary, and that the orders onthe subject must be obeyed, since the commander set the example ofobedience. It was akin to Bonaparte's marching on foot through theburning sands of Syria after his repulse from St. Jean d'Acre. Itwas speaking to the soldiers in the ranks a language which theyunderstood, and which helped them in their arduous work more thanproclamations. A marked trait of Sherman's military intellect was his accuratejudgment of the force of his enemy, and his freedom from the commonfault of overestimating the army opposed to him. In hiscorrespondence with General Thomas in April, discussing thepreparations for the campaign and the severe reduction of burdens toa scale which was "rather the limit of our aim than what we canreally accomplish, " he had occasion to acknowledge the receipt ofinformation concerning the enemy which Thomas had collected. "I readthe reports of your scouts with interest, " he said, but added, "Iusually prefer to make my estimate of the enemy from generalreasoning rather than from the words of spies or deserters. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 323. ] Theremark is significant. Prior to the opening of a campaign, whilstaffairs are quiet, pretty reliable information of an enemy'sstrength and positions may usually be got; but when the time ofaction comes, the very air is full of excitement, and the "secretservice" is apt to be a machine for self-delusion. Precedentknowledge supplemented by actual contact with the enemy is the bestreliance for a capable general. His own reasoning from trustworthydata at the earlier point of departure, is, with such aids, his bestguide. He knows where his enemy must be and what his force ought tobe, better than his spies, or the enemy's deserters who, by a commonstratagem, may be really hostile spies stuffed with the disturbinginformation they are sent to reveal. In the Confederate Army changes had also been occurring under thestress of Bragg's great defeat which culminated in the loss ofMissionary Ridge on the 25th of November. Dissatisfaction with theconduct of the campaign was prevalent in both military and civilcircles. Lee pointed out the embarrassment which must result toLongstreet from Bragg's misfortune, especially as the retreat of thelatter had been promptly followed by Grant's occupation ofCleveland. Communication between Longstreet and Bragg was thusinterrupted, and unless short work was made of Burnside, Longstreetwould have to retreat into Virginia or North Carolina. [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 779. ] In the letter to President Daviswhich contained these suggestions, Lee added a strong hint thatBeauregard was the most available officer of proper rank to succeedto the command of which Bragg asked to be relieved on the 29th. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 682. ] The unfortunate Bragg coupledwith this request another; namely, that the causes of the defeatshould be investigated. In his official report [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Ii. P. 665] he attributed it to a panicamongst the troops holding the apparently impregnable heights ofMissionary Ridge, and he characterized the conduct as shameful. "Theposition was one, " he said, "which ought to have been held by a lineof skirmishers against any assaulting column. " He declared that ourtroops reached the crest so exhausted by climbing as to bepowerless, and that "the slightest effort would have destroyedthem. " One who stands on that ridge and looks down into the valleycan easily agree with this opinion, and believe that no commanderwould order his troops to attack the position in front. The impulseof Wood's and Sheridan's divisions to attack, and the feebleness ofthe resistance of the astonished Confederates, are both phenomenal, and in a superstitious age would certainly have been attributed tosupernatural influences. The truth, however, seems to be that the confidence of theConfederate Army in its leader had declined so far that it lost hopewhen opposed to the prestige of the conqueror of Vicksburg, and wasmorally prepared for disaster. Mr. Davis's prompt acceptance ofBragg's retirement can only be understood in this way, for thegeneral was with good reason reckoned a favorite with theConfederate President. Except for this loss of prestige he wouldhave been answered as Lee was when he made a similar suggestionafter Gettysburg, -that confidence was undiminished, and that neitherthe army nor the people wished for a change. Bragg was directed to turn over the command to Lieutenant-GeneralWilliam J. Hardee, next in rank, and the evidence indicates thatHardee could have retained it, had he been willing. But, surpassedby none in ability and soldierly quality in command of a corps, heshrunk from the burden of chief responsibility for a campaign, anddeclined the permanent appointment. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 764. ] Mr. Davis seems to have taken no noticeof Lee's suggestion of Beauregard, but asked whether Lee himselfcould not, even temporarily, go to the West and by a vigorouscampaign restore the prestige of the Army of Tennessee. Lee calmlypresented the objections to this, from the point of view of the armyof northern Virginia as well as that of the western army; though hesubmitted fully to the decision the President might reach afterfurther consideration. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 785, 792. ] Mr. Daviswas convinced that it would be unwise to transfer Lee, but he didnot take kindly to the idea of appointing Beauregard. Theestrangement between them which began in the first campaign inVirginia had not been removed, but had rather been intensified bythe fact that Beauregard had, as he thought, failed in the commandof the army after A. S. Johnston fell at Shiloh, and now seemed tohave a party of friends and supporters in the Confederate Congresswho were looked upon as an organized opposition to hisadministration. [Footnote: For some indications of this, seeBeauregard's letters to Pierre Soulé and to W. Porcher Miles, Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 812, 843. Davis's Rise andFall of the Southern Confederacy, vol. Ii. P. 69. ] Whilst the subject was under consideration, General Polk, who was awarm friend both of President Davis and of General Johnston, wroteto Mr. Davis a strong letter urging Johnston's appointment. Headvocated it on the double ground of the wish of the army and of thecountry. He did not ignore the fact that the personal friendshiponce existing between Davis and Johnston had been broken, butappealed to the sense of public duty to yield to a general desire, and to motives of magnanimity to overlook personal differences. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 796. ] Beauregard and Johnston were in fact the only ones, out of the fiveofficers of the full rank of general, who were available to takeBragg's place; for the Confederate grades were much less flexiblethan ours, where any major-general by assignment of the Presidentacquired the legal right to command an army, and a superiority overhim who had just laid down the power. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 835. ] Mr. Davis felt the embarrassmentkeenly, but finally decided to appoint Johnston. On the 16th ofDecember the latter was ordered to turn over the command of the Armyof the Mississippi to Lieutenant-General Polk, and proceed to Daltonto assume command of the Army of Tennessee. [Footnote: General W. W. Mackall, who had been chief of staff to Johnston and Bragg in turn, wrote to Johnston on December 9th: "I never did believe that Mr. D. Would give you your place as long as he can help it; but he can't. "The letter has other piquant passages. _Id_. , p. 801. ] The result of conferences with Lee, and correspondence withLongstreet and others, had been the conviction on the part of theConfederate President that the only promising military policy in theWest was for the Army of Tennessee to take early aggressive action, turning Chattanooga by the east, getting between Thomas andSchofield by the occupation of Cleveland, and, if both the Nationalcommanders kept within their fortifications, move boldly over theCumberland Mountains by way of the gaps near Kingston. As part ofthis plan Longstreet should advance close to Knoxville, and joinJohnston either by turning Knoxville on the east before Johnstonpassed far beyond Cleveland, or by the west if Johnston had got toKingston. This indication of the wishes of the Richmond Government wasgradually developed. The earliest suggestions were of the necessityfor a prompt renewal of the aggressive. Mr. Seddon, Secretary ofWar, in the letter informing Johnston of his transfer (December18th), had said it was hoped that he would assume the offensive assoon as the condition of the army would allow it. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxi. Pt. Iii. P. 843. ] A few days later(December 23d) Mr. Davis himself wrote, quoting General Bragg as tothe good effect a prompt resumption of the initiative would have onthe _morale_ of the army, and General Hardee as to the fit conditionof the troops for action. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 856. ] To this headded that an "imperative demand for prompt and vigorous actionarises, not only from the importance of restoring the prestige ofthe army, and averting the dispiriting and injurious results thatmust attend a season of inactivity, but from the necessity ofreoccupying the country upon the supplies of which the propersubsistence of our armies materially depends. " Johnston's reply (January 2d) was a presentation of the difficultiesin the way of action. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxii. Pt ii. P. 510. ]He said that Bragg and Hardee had made the considerablereinforcement of the army a precedent condition of resuming theoffensive. His conclusion was that without large reinforcementsthere was "no other mode of taking the offensive here than to beatthe enemy when he advances and then move forward. " A fortnight laterhe said: "My recent telegrams to you have shown, not only that wecannot hope soon to assume the offensive from this position, butthat we are in danger of being forced back from it by the want offood and forage, especially the latter. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 559. ]The shortness of forage he attributed to bad management of theGeorgia Railroad, owned by the State. Supposing this were remedied(as a little later he said it was), he compared the advantages oftwo routes of advance into Middle Tennessee, --one by Rome, Gunterville, and Huntsville, the other by East Tennessee through theCumberland Mountains. He pronounced in favor of the former, whichwould turn the mountains by the south and save the task ofsurmounting them. If, whilst this was going on, the National armyshould push for Atlanta, two or three thousand cavalry could, hethought, prevent it from reaching that place in less than a month. Large reinforcements were, however, essential for any aggressivemovement. He was willing to try the East Tennessee route and unitewith Longstreet, if he were satisfied that the country could furnishthe provisions and forage for the march. To both of these routes, hepreferred one which should make a base still farther west, innorthern Mississippi. At the beginning of February he reviewed the situation as he thenbelieved it to be, and concluded that it was impracticable to assumethe offensive from northern Georgia. He advised the collection of aslarge an army as possible in northern Mississippi, with a bridgeequipage for the passage of the Tennessee. This army, he thought, should be larger than his and Folk's united. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 644. ] Sherman's Meridian expedition now interrupted the discussion ofplans for a month, except that Mr. Davis suggested a movement ofJohnston's army to strike Sherman's column in co-operation withGeneral Polk. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 729. ] Assuming that Sherman wasaiming at Mobile, Johnston declared it impossible to strike himbefore he should establish a new base. Hardee's corps was, however, put in motion to reinforce Polk. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 769. ]Beauregard was ordered to send ten thousand men from his departmenton the southern seacoast to Johnston, if possible, but he reportedthat it was not practicable. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 772. ] It must be said that making the correspondence a personal one on thepart of Mr. Davis, instead of carrying it on through the WarDepartment, was a waiving of etiquette, and thus it was also a steptoward a cordial and frank understanding. It must equally be notedthat General Johnston's tone remained that of cold formality, andhis letters do not show the hearty readiness to bend his views tomeet those of the President which is always apparent (for instance)in the letters of General Lee. The situation was not one in which ageneral may say, "I need certain supplies, equipment, transportationor pontoon bridges, and must have them before I can move. " TheConfederate cause was unquestionably in great straits, and callingfor men and means was a good deal like Glendower's call, "Will theycome?" Every commanding officer was expected to act with what he hador could get, were it much or little. Very warm friends of Johnstonsaw that his attitude was one likely to increase estrangement. General Polk, the mutual friend who had probably thrown the castinginfluence which gave Johnston the command, wrote to him through aconfidential intimate of both (Colonel Harvie, Johnston'sinspector-general), suggesting that he take private steps toward areconciliation with Mr. Davis. He urged the general, as he had urgedthe President, that private feeling and personal pride should besacrificed to the cause in which both were engaged. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 593. ] The appeal seems tohave failed, and cold formality continued to be the tone ofJohnston's communications with the government. About the first ofMarch Mr. Davis dropped the correspondence, turning it over toGeneral Bragg, now his chief of staff. Johnston had written to Bragg (February 27th) that the President'sletters had given him the impression that a forward movement wasintended _in the spring_; but if this were so, much preparationwould be necessary, and large reinforcements and equipment. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 808. ] He assumed that Longstreet was to unitewith him, if the President's plan had not changed. This treatment ofthe matter as problematic and intended only as a plan for thespring, must be admitted to be somewhat exasperating to Mr. Davis, as the pressure from Richmond since the 18th of December had beenfor immediate aggressive action, and had been so emphatically putthat to speak of it as creating only "an impression" sounded verylike a sneer, and was unfortunate if not so intended. Bragg answered in good temper, and after disposing of the matters ofbusiness, he added: "The enemy is not prepared for us, and if we canstrike him a blow before he recovers, success is almost certain. Theplan which is proposed has long been my favorite, and I trust ourefforts may give you the means to accomplish what I have ardentlydesired but never had the ability to undertake. Communicate yourwants to me freely and I will do all I can to give you strength andefficiency. We must necessarily encounter privations and hardships, and run some risk; but the end will justify the means. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 592. ] This, of course, implied prompt action whilst Grant's forcesremained scattered and were still suffering from the dearth ofsupplies which had so nearly approached starvation and nakedness. Schofield's forces were at Knoxville, over a hundred miles northeastof Chattanooga. Part of Sherman's were on the Meridian expedition ornow returning to Vicksburg on the Mississippi. Another part, underLogan, were about Huntsville, as far to the southwest as Schofieldwas to the northeast. In this condition of things a quick blow atThomas would find him isolated. He could be turned by the northbefore Schofield could join him if he stayed in his fortifications, and he could be fought on equal terms in the field if he came out ofhis lines. This made the southern opportunity. To wait for springwas to wait for Grant and Sherman to concentrate the now scatteredarmies, to have them clothed and fed, and to have the horses andmules ready for a campaign. It is no wonder the government atRichmond thought it worth while to "encounter privations andhardships and to run some risk. " Lee had been in Richmond and was in accord with this plan. He wroteto Longstreet on the day after the date of Bragg's letter justquoted, urging him to drop all other schemes and to unite ininfluencing Johnston to adopt it. "If you and Johnston could uniteand move into Middle Tennessee, " he said, "it would cut the armiesof Chattanooga and Knoxville in two and draw them from those points, where either portion could be struck at as opportunity offered.... By covering your fronts well with your cavalry, Johnston could movequietly and rapidly through Benton, cross the Hiwassee, and thenpush forward in the direction of Kingston, while you, taking such aroute as to be safe from a flank attack, would join him at or afterhis crossing the Tennessee River. The two commands, upon reachingSparta, would be in position to select their future course; wouldnecessitate the evacuation of Chattanooga and Knoxville, and byrapidity and skill unite on either army. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 594. ] There were no doubt difficulties in the way--when are there not? Butwe who were in Grant's command are glad that we were not called uponto meet the enemy under this plan of campaign vigorously executed. We did not lack faith that we could defeat it, but we were muchbetter pleased to have the enemy await the completion of our ownpreparation and allow us to take the initiative. It cannot be deniedthat it was based on sound strategy. With his usual considerateness, Lee said that Johnston and Longstreet on the ground should be betterable to judge the plan and to decide; but he urged it with much moreearnestness than was common in his letters. That Johnston rejectedit must be admitted to be very strong evidence that he lackedenterprise. His abilities are undoubted, and when once committed toan offensive campaign, he conducted it with vigor and skill. Thebent of his mind, however, was plainly in favor of the course whichhe steadily urged, --to await his adversary's advance, and watch forerrors which would give him a manifest opportunity to ruin him. Longstreet had written to Johnston on the 5th of March that Mr. Davis had directed a conference between them on the practicabilityof uniting their armies between Knoxville and Chattanooga, with aview to the movement into Middle Tennessee. Longstreet thinks he canmake his part of the movement, but must leave the question ofsupplies to Johnston after they unite. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 587. ] Lieutenant-General John B. Hood, whohad been assigned to a corps in Johnston's army, wrote to Mr. Davison the 7th that the army was well clothed, well fed, with abundanttransportation, in high spirits, anxious for battle, and needingonly a few artillery horses. A junction with Longstreet's army hethought would make it strong enough to take the initiative, and hestrongly supported the plan of moving before Grant couldconcentrate. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 606. ] Johnston wrote to Bragg on the 12th that no particular plan ofcampaign had been communicated to him. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 613. ] Hedoes not appear to have telegraphed a brief inquiry on this subject, but wrote at some length in regard to his requirements before hecould be in condition to take the field. He referred to his firstopinion in favor of a defensive campaign as unchanged. The ordinarycourse of mail seems to have required about a week for a letter toreach Richmond. It happened that on the same day Bragg at Richmondwas writing to Johnston outlining the plan of campaign mentionedabove, adding that it was intended to throw a heavy column ofcavalry into West Tennessee as a diversion, and that if by rapidmovement Johnston could capture Nashville, Grant would be in aprecarious position. The President, on assurance of the immediateexecution of the plan, would order to him 5000 men from GeneralPolk, 10, 000 from Beauregard, and Longstreet's command estimated at16, 000, but which was really nearer 20, 000. Putting thesereinforcements and Johnston's own army at lowest figures, his columnwould amount to 75, 000 men. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 614. ] After posting his letter of the 12th, Johnston went on an inspectiontour to Atlanta, and there on the 13th he received and answeredLongstreet's letter of the 5th. He pronounced impracticable the plansubmitted to them, and reiterated his fixed opinion that it was bestto wait for Grant's advance. In any event, he thought a forwardmovement should "wait for the grass of May. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 618. ] He argued that it was better to let the enemy's forcesadvance, and fight them far from their base and near his own. Bragg, on the other hand, had urged the recovery of the populous region ofMiddle Tennessee as necessary both for obtaining army subsistenceand forage, and for the recruitment of the ranks. Both theseresources he estimated very highly, and as Tennessee was stillclaimed as a seceding State, the Confederate conscription laws wouldbe enforced there. On the other hand, every movement in retreat cutoff a part of their area for supplies and men, was discouraging tothe army, and was followed by numerous desertions of soldiers whosefamilies were within our lines. In answering Longstreet, Johnston had said that he would executezealously any plan the President would order; but he evidentlyinsisted on definite and formal commands if he were to depart fromhis preconceived views to which he held tenaciously. On the 16th ofMarch he wrote again, this time in answer to Bragg's of the 7th. After telling of the impossibility of collecting artillery horses innorthern Georgia, he mentions Longstreet's letter to him, to saythat he thinks the point of junction suggested is too near theenemy, and that his army should have an accumulation of eighteen ortwenty days' supplies before entering upon such a movement. Theymust also have ordnance stores for a campaign, and wagon trains tocarry it all. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 636. ] Two days later he received Bragg's full letter of the 12thsent by the hand of Colonel Sale as special messenger, and he nowanswers by telegraph. He says that Grant is back at Nashville, andis not likely to stand on the defensive. To meet at Dalton hisexpected advance, the reinforcements that had been spoken of must besent at once. "Give us those troops, " he says; "and if we beat himwe follow. Should he not advance, we will thus be ready for theoffensive. The troops can be fed as easily here as where they noware. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 649. ] Next day he elaborated the sameideas in a letter, adding the suggestion before made by him that theline of advance by way of North Alabama was a preferable one to theroute through East Tennessee. The telegram was answered from Richmond whilst the longer letter wason its way. The answer conveyed the information that Grant would notpersonally lead the western army, but would turn over its command toSherman. It also briefly noted the fact that Johnston had notaccepted the aggressive policy on which the large reinforcementswere made conditional. [Footnote: I do not find this dispatch in theOfficial Records. It is given in Johnston's "Narrative of MilitaryOperations, " p. 298. ] He replied that his dispatch expresslyaccepted taking the offensive, and the only difference was as todetails. He therefore repeats the urgent request that the troops besent at once. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 666. ] It is not easy to accept his interpretation of his former dispatch. Waiting indefinitely to see whether the National army would advance, and declaring the administration plan impracticable, hardly lookslike assuming the initiative. It was not a difference as to details. The very gist of the subject under discussion was a prompt advanceagainst the parts of our army before they could be united for anypurpose. The question would naturally arise, What might happen inthe places from which troops were drawn, if they were not used byJohnston immediately? The latter had already said to Longstreet thathis requisitions on the commissaries and quartermaster's departmentsfor supplies and wagon-trains were so large as to make filling them"a greater undertaking than anything yet accomplished by thosedepartments, and if they succeed, it will not be very soon. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 618. ] Yet thesewere only part of the conditions which he considered essential toany advance. There seems to have been no rejoinder to Johnston's last telegram, and the subject was dropped. Longstreet was persuaded by hiscorrespondence with Johnston that the combined movement could not bemade, and turned to the scheme (already mentioned), of mounting histroops and making an expedition from southwestern Virginia intoKentucky. This was decisively rejected by the Richmond government. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 748. ] Grant was now known to be in Virginia, inspecting the commands there and preparing for an active campaign. Concentration on both sides, and not further morselling of armieswas to be the wholesome order of the day, and Longstreet was soonordered to report to Lee. Between Bragg and Johnston correspondencewas limited to the current business of the army, and general plansof campaign were not again mentioned. In April, Johnston becameuneasy at the silence which indicated that the President regarded itunprofitable to discuss plans with him, and sent Colonel B. S. Ewellof his staff to Richmond to make explanations in person. He waspolitely received, and his visit no doubt tended to relax a littlethe strain in the relations between Mr. Davis and Ewell's chief; butit was too late to accomplish what had been hoped for in January. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 839, 842. ]Spring had come, and Sherman's concentration was in progress; indeedit was almost completed. Ewell reported to Johnston again on the29th of April. On the 1st of May Schofield was at the Hiwassee Riverin touch with the left wing of Thomas's army, whilst McPherson wasclosing in on the right. The certainty that Grant was in Virginia had brought the Confederategovernment to the conclusion that Lee must be reinforced byLongstreet and by whatever troops Beauregard could spare. TheAtlantic coast States were thus to supply Lee with men and means. About four thousand men were to be immediately added to Johnston'sarmy, mostly drawn from Mobile. Polk's infantry would be sent to himalso, if, as was nearly certain, Sherman's advance on Atlanta shouldprove to be our great effort in the West. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 841. ]The doubt whether one of our columns might not move through Alabamamade it necessary to continue to the last moment ready for eitherevent. The Gulf States would then become the feeders of Johnston'sarmy in the campaign. The very unsatisfactory relations between Mr. Davis and GeneralJohnston cannot be overlooked if we would judge intelligently theevents of the Atlanta campaign. It may be that the general was rightin thinking a winter advance impracticable, though Lee's concurrencein the President's plan is no small argument in its favor. It is, nevertheless, the indisputable province of a government todetermine, in view of the whole situation, political and military, whether continued operations are necessary. The army is organizedfor the sole purpose of reaching the ends at which its governmentaims in the war. The expenditure of life and treasure should bestopped and the government should sue for peace, unless its armiescan be relied upon to act in hearty subordination to its view of theexisting exigencies. The general should meet it with absoluteingenuousness and the promptest and clearest decision. He should actat once or ask to be relieved in time to let another carry out theplan. Mr. Davis, like Mr. Lincoln on several occasions, had reasonto feel that a prolonged discussion had in fact thwarted him, andthat he had not the cordial service he might fairly expect. One of the results of the financial embarrassments of theConfederacy was the great and growing depreciation of its papercurrency. Its officers in the field found their pay a merely nominalpittance, and those who had no independent fortune were reduced tothe greatest straits. Interesting evidence of this has beenpreserved in petitions forwarded to the War Department in February, asking that rations might be issued to them as to the privatesoldiers. The scale of prices attached to their petition was that atwhich the government sold the enumerated articles to its officers, and was supposed to show the average cost and not a market pricefixed by the retail trade. They paid for bacon $2. 20 per pound, forbeef 75 cents, for lard $2. 20, for molasses $6 per gallon, for sugar$1. 50 per pound, for a coat $350, for a pair of boots $250, for apair of pantaloons $125, for a hat from $80 to $125, for a shirt$50, for a pair of socks $10. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 658. ] Their statements were verified and approvedby their superiors, and General Johnston, in forwarding thepetitions, said that at existing prices the pay of company officerswas worth less than that of the private soldiers. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 661. ] CHAPTER XXXVI ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: DALTON AND RESACA The opposing forces--North Georgiatriangle--Topography--Dalton--Army of the Ohio entersGeorgia--Positions of the other armies--Turning Tunnel Hill--Firstmeeting with Sherman--Thomas--Sherman's plan as toDalton--McPherson's orders and movement--Those of Thomas andSchofield--Hopes of a decisive engagement--Thomas attacks north endof Rocky Face--Opdycke on the ridge--Developing Johnston'slines--Schofield's advance on 9th May--The flanking march throughSnake Creek Gap--Retiring movement of my division--Passinglines--Johnston's view of the situation--Use of temporaryintrenchments and barricades--Passing the Snake Creek defile--CampCreek line--A wheel in line--Rough march of left flank--Battle ofResaca--Crossing Camp Creek--Storming Confederate line--My divisionrelieved by Newton's--Incidents--Further advance of leftflank--Progress of right flank--Johnston retreats. The history of the campaigns of 1864-1865 under Sherman have beengiven in another form, and I need not repeat the narrative of theconnected movements of his forces. [Footnote: See "Atlanta, " and"The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville. "] I shall confinemyself to the more personal view of events as they came under my owneye, and to such additional knowledge as the publication of theRecords has brought within our reach. Nashville and Chattanooga, being large depots of supply, werefortified and furnished with garrisons. A few other points had alsoto be garrisoned in some force, besides the numerous small posts andblockhouses. But after all deductions, Sherman still expected totake the field with an army of a hundred thousand men of all arms, and this was what he did. His returns for the 30th of April show hisstrength to have been 93, 131 infantry, 12, 455 cavalry, and 4537artillery. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. I. P. 115. ] His cavalry were not all at the front, and fell short of thenominal strength. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. Ii. Pp. 23, 24; OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 26. ] General Johnston's similar returns for the end of April show hisarmy actually present at Dalton to have consisted of 54, 500infantry, cavalry, and artillery, not including part of a brigade atResaca and some detachments _en route_. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xxxii. Pt. Iii. P. 866. ] General Polk was on his way to join with14, 000 men, [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 670, 737, 740. ] and these with about 5000 increase of Hardee's and Hood'scorps reached Johnston before he was seriously engaged with Sherman, giving him an army of 75, 000 men. [Footnote: For a careful analysisof these forces, see "Century War Book, " vol. Iv. P. 281, astatistical paper by Major E. C. Dawes; also "Atlanta, " Appendix A. For the meaning of "effective total" in Confederate returns, see_ante_, p. 482. ] The Richmond government only delayed ordering Polkto join Johnston until it was certain that Sherman intended tooperate with a single army upon the Atlanta line, and Polk went evenbeyond what they seemed to expect of him in carrying the troops ofhis department to the army at Dalton. Although he was not aware of the urgency of the Confederategovernment with Johnston to induce him to take the initiative andoperate by turning our left flank, Sherman had considered thepossibility of this. The Fourth Corps had been concentrated atCleveland on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railway about a dozenmiles north of the Georgia state line and thirty-five miles fromDalton. The line of this railway was the easy road out of northernGeorgia into Tennessee, and pretty closely followed the old Federalroad. Had Johnston marched northward, he must have taken this route, and would have found his way barred by the Fourth Corps, which wasstrong enough to retard his advance till Sherman could haveconcentrated to meet him. The railways made a nearly equilateraltriangle of the country between Cleveland, Chattanooga, and Dalton. It was thirty-eight miles from Chattanooga to Dalton, andtwenty-seven to Cleveland. The east side of the triangle was nearthe Cooyehuttee Creek, a stream heading quite close to Cleveland anduniting, below Dalton, with the Connasauga. This valley is narrowwest of the river, and is, much of the way, separated by a high andsharp ridge from the very broken country, which makes up the greaterpart of the triangle, where the branches of the Chickamauga runnorthward in parallel valleys till they unite near Chattanooga, andempty into the Tennessee. For nearly forty miles, therefore, thewaters on the east side of the dividing ridge run southward to theGulf of Mexico, whilst on the west side they run northward to theOhio. Going south from Chattanooga, the railroad and the wagon roads haveto thread their way from one valley to another, the latter climbingpainfully the high ridges intervening, the former taking shortercuts by deep excavations and tunnels. Within sight of Chattanoogathe north end of Missionary Ridge is pierced for the railway whereGrant's left wing fought in the battle which closed General Bragg'scareer as a commander in the field. Some twenty miles further on, another ridge is tunnelled where the railroad passes from theChickamauga valley into that of Mill Creek, a small tributary of theCooyehuttee, flowing eastward into that river in front of Dalton. Here, at Tunnel Hill, had been Johnston's advanced post during thewinter, and Thomas's had been above Ringgold on the top of Taylor'sridge facing it on the west. But as Tunnel Hill did not extend manymiles northward, and could be turned in that direction, theConfederates had made Dalton their intrenched camp, and wereprepared to retire from Tunnel Hill whenever Sherman should advancein force. [Illustration: Map] The position at Dalton was an impregnable one to an attack in fronton the Chattanooga road. Mill Creek breaks through the ChattanoogaMountains (here known by the local name of Rocky Face), by a crookedgorge flanked by precipitous cliffs called the Buzzards Roost. Thewest side of Rocky Face is a nearly perpendicular wall, and in theMill Creek gorge, spurs from the sides so project as to enfilade theentrance like bastions. A little north of the gorge a larger spurfrom the ridge runs down to the east, connecting with a subordinateparallel ridge, and from the lower slope a line of heavy earthworkscontinued the defences toward the Cooyehuttee. Mill Creek had beendammed so as to make an inundation in the gorge, and theConfederates held the ridge and cliffs on both sides as well as thefortified line in the lower ground. Some three miles north of MillCreek Gap, Rocky Face and Tunnel Hill break down into smallerdisconnected hills, and here about Catoosa Springs a bit of moreopen country made a practicable connection between the centre of theUnion Army at Ringgold and its left wing advancing from Cleveland. Johnston hoped that Sherman would dash himself against the walls ofRocky Face and suffer severe loss in doing so; and if the ridge wasturned on the north by part of the Union Army, this wing would finditself in presence of the strong earthworks skirting Mill Creek, andwould be so separated from the centre that he could reasonably hopeto crush it. Sherman, of course, could know little of theConfederate position till he was near enough to reconnoitre it, andmust find out by experiment how the nut was to be cracked. On Thursday, the 5th of May, the Army of the Ohio under GeneralSchofield was at Red Clay, a hamlet just south of the Georgia stateline. My own division (the third) was encamped a mile in advance, atsome springs which furnished a good supply of water. General Judah'sdivision (the second) was at Red Clay. General Hovey's division (thefirst) was still at Blue Springs, Tennessee, covering the armytrains and the repairs of the railway. The cavalry covered the leftflank and reconnoitred forward toward Varnell's Station, skirmishingwith the enemy's horse. The valley was a narrow one, tributary tothe principal valley of the Connasauga, and, near my camp, wasfilled with a dense thicket of loblolly pine, a second growth whichcame up in the exhausted light soil of abandoned fields, and whichwe were to become very familiar with as we advanced into Georgia. Aswe could not see out in any direction except that of the road, Icovered my front with a slashing of the trees by way of a roughabatis to prevent a surprise. We were now the left flank of thegrand army. When we passed Cleveland, the Fourth Corps took up its line ofmarch, bearing away to the westward of ours and went into positionat Catoosa Springs, about eight miles southwest of Red Clay, with aridge intervening. Here General Howard became the left of the Armyof the Cumberland, having Palmer's Corps (the Fourteenth), nextbeyond him facing Tunnel Hill, and Hooker's (the Twentieth) stillfarther to the southwest, marching by way of Woods Station overTaylor's Ridge upon Trickum in the upper valley of the EastChickamauga. Thomas's army was the heavy centre of the grand army, and his infantry was about two-thirds of the whole. This greatpreponderance of one organization was faulty in a purely militarypoint of view, but Grant and Sherman both felt that it would not bewise to disturb the _esprit de corps_ of the Cumberland Army bysubdividing it, or to offend Thomas by diminishing it, and, anyhow, no such change could have been made without the concurrence of thePresident. General McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was to constituteSherman's right, but was a little delayed in its concentration. Atthis time it contained only Logan's Corps (the Fifteenth) and theleft wing of the Sixteenth (Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge incommand). It was moving behind the Army of the Cumberland, to Leeand Gordon's Mills, and thence upon Villanow. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 39. ] General Kenner Garrard'sstrong division of cavalry accompanied McPherson's movement. Sherman was anxious to allow the enemy as little time forpreparation as might be, yet, as he had to give McPherson a day ortwo to come into line, he set Saturday the 7th of May as the timefor the more complete concentration, and an attack upon Tunnel Hillif Johnston should continue to hold it. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 38. ]Accordingly, on Saturday morning all the columns were in motion. Palmer advanced against the ridge of Tunnel Hill in front, andHoward coming from the north turned the flank of the ridge. The hillwas held by the Confederate cavalry under Wheeler, supported byStewart's division of infantry, who were ordered to resist ouradvance with stubbornness enough to force the display of Thomas'sforces. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 672. ] A lively skirmishing fight waskept up till Howard's men advanced toward the flank and rear of theposition, when the enemy retreated within Mill Creek Gap. Wheelerwas ordered to let a brigade of cavalry retire up the valley of MillCreek, outside of Rocky Face, and to cover Dug Gap, through whichruns the road from Villanow to Dalton. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] My division marched from its camp in front of Red Clay over theridge by Ellidge's Mill to Dr. Lee's on the main road from Varnell'sStation to Ringgold, and near the northern end of Tunnel Hill ridge. Here we came into close connection with the Fourth Corps. The restof the Army of the Ohio followed, the rear-guard holding a gaplooking eastward above Ellidge's Mill, and the cavalry covering thefront and flank to Varnell's Station. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 48, 54. ]Our supply station was moved over to Ringgold on the Chattanoogaline, and the railroad at Red Clay was soon abandoned. In themovement all the division commanders were ordered to report to me inthe absence of General Schofield. At Dr. Lee's I met Sherman and Thomas for the first time. They hadcome over from Ringgold to reconnoitre for themselves and observethe effect of Howard's movement turning Tunnel Hill. The house stoodupon a knoll looking southward over farm fields and rolling countryto the sharp end of Rocky Face, and when my column halted near by, Irode forward with General Schofield to meet the army commander. Itwas a bright May morning, and a picturesque group was gathered onthe sloping lawn in front of the house. The principal officers weredismounted, their horses and escort in the background. An occasionalpuff of white smoke on the slope of Tunnel Hill in the distancemarked the attack going on there, but it was too far away for thecannonade to be more than a muffled sound, not interrupting theconversation. Sherman was tall, lithe, and active, with light brownhair, close-cropped sandy beard and moustache, and every motion andexpression indicated eagerness and energy. His head was apt to bebent a little forward as if in earnest outlook or aggressiveadvance, and his rapid incisive utterance hit off the topics ofdiscussion in a sharp and telling way. His opinions usually took astrong and very pronounced form, full of the feeling that was forthe moment uppermost, not hesitating at even a little humorousextravagance if it added point to his statement; but in such casesthe keen eye took a merry twinkle accentuated by the crow-foot linesin the corner, so that the real geniality and kindliness thatunderlay the brusque exterior were sufficiently apparent. Thegeneral effect was of a nature of intense, restless activity, bothphysical and mental. In conversation he poured out a wealth oforiginal and striking ideas, from a full experience, observation, and reading; his assertions would be strong and confident, highlycolored by the glow of momentary feeling, unsoftened by themodifications and exceptions which have to tame down broadgeneralizations before they are put in practice. One did not knowhim long before discovering that in responsible action he did notlack the prudence which took all probable contingencies intoaccount. His practical work in the field was never reckless, but hisboldest outlines of plan were worked out with thoughtful caution indetail and full provision for possible disappointment. Whendiscussing a situation with his familiars, after strongly statinghis own view he would add, "Now what is Joe Johnston's game?" and hewould analyze his adversary's possible moves with a candor andinsight that left no doubt of his full comprehension of the problembefore him. In carrying out a plan he was free from the commonweakness of giving increased weight to doubts when the conflict isjoined, and making a timid execution of a strong purpose; he knewwhen it was time for debate to stop (even with his own thoughts), and to bend every energy to decisive action. All this was, ofcourse, not visible in the first meeting at Dr. Lee's, but no onecould doubt that here was a most original and interesting character, and I soon acquired an undoubting conviction that of all the men Ihad met, he was the one to whose leadership in war I would commit myown life and the lives of my men with most complete confidence. Inhim the combination of intellectual insight with fertility ofinvention and with force of will in execution was of the highestorder. I felt that if the end we aimed at was a noble and worthyone, the price he asked us to pay was reasonable, and the object wasworth the sacrifices he called for: we were therefore enthusiasticin our obedience. General Thomas was in person and manner a strong contrast toSherman. Equally tall, he was large and solidly stout, with an airof dignified quiet and deliberation. His full beard was not of sostubbly a cut as Sherman's, his countenance was almost impassive, and the lines of his brow gave an air of sternness. His part in theconversation was less, his words much fewer and less expressive, butalways clear and intelligent. His manner was kindly, but ratherreserved, and one felt that his acquaintance must be graduallycultivated. His reputation for cool intrepidity and stubborntenacity could not be excelled, and no soldier could approach himwithout a deep interest and respect that was not diminished by hisnatural modesty of demeanor. Better acquaintance with him made onelearn that his intellect was strong and broad, and his mind had beenexpanded by general reading, with some special scientific tastesbeyond his military profession. He was a noble model of patrioticdevotion to country, and of the private virtues that make a greatcitizen. His military career had been an important one from thebeginning of the war. Second in rank in the armies of Buell andRosecrans in 1862 and 1863, at the great battles of Stone's Riverand Chickamauga he had held his wing of the army defiant andinvincible when other parts were swept back by the Confederateimpetuosity. No sobriquet conferred by an admiring soldiery was morecharacteristic than the "Rock of Chickamauga. " Between him andSherman the old affection of schoolmates at the Military Academy wasstill warm. Sherman still called him "Tom, " the nickname of cadetdays, and Thomas evidently enjoyed, in his quiet way, the vivacioustalk and brilliant ideas of his old friend, now his commander. Hisarmy so much outnumbered the organizations of McPherson andSchofield that, as a massive centre, it was necessarily the chiefreliance of Sherman for the results of the campaign, and waspersonified in its leader's weight and deliberation; while thelighter organizations of the Tennessee and the Ohio were thrown fromflank to flank in zigzag movements from one strategic position toanother as we penetrated into Georgia. Grant's plan of having the armies of the East and West beginsimultaneous movements on the first days of May had been respondedto by Sherman with the information that on the first of the monthhis three armies were in mutual support, and that he would "draw theenemy's fire within twenty-four hours of May 5th. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 1. ] The delay inMcPherson's reaching his position, slight as it was, had to beconsidered in ordering other movements in view of the promise toGrant to get into immediate contact with the enemy, and helped inthe decision to let Thomas's army advance strongly in the centre andengage the enemy if the chance seemed at all favorable, whileMcPherson made the flanking movement by way of Snake Creek Gap. Onthe 4th Sherman had telegraphed Grant that he would "first securethe Tunnel Hill, then throw McPherson rapidly on his (the enemy's)communications, attacking at the same time cautiously and in force. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 25. ] McPherson's orders went to him on the evening of the 5th, directingthat whilst the movements of Thomas and Schofield already describedwere in progress, on Saturday the 7th he should "secure Snake CreekGap, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's flank or hisrailroad at any point between Tilton and Resaca. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 39. ] Sherman expressed the hope that Johnston would fight atDalton, but should he fall back along the railroad McPherson was tohit him in flank. "Do not fail, in that event, " he continued, "tomake the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attackpossible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, aslow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it. " McPhersonwas assured that Thomas and Schofield would prevent Johnston fromturning on him alone, and the sound of battle at the north wouldshow the greater necessity for rapid movement on the railroad. "Ifonce broken to an extent that would take them days to repair, youcan withdraw to Snake Creek Gap, and come to us or await thedevelopment according to your judgment or information you mayreceive. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 39. ] Sherman's orders to Thomas were to take Tunnel Hill, and threatenDalton in front, but not to attack its defences "unless the enemyassume the offensive against either of our wings, when all mustattack directly in front toward the enemy's main army, and notwithout orders detach to the relief of the threatened wing. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 40. ] With similar orders to Schofield, Shermanadded: "As soon as Tunnel Hill is secured to us, I shall pause togive McPherson time for his long march; but we must occupy theattention of all the enemy, lest he turn his whole force onMcPherson, which must be prevented. Therefore, on the sound of heavybattle always close up on Howard and act according to circumstances. We will not be able to detach to McPherson's assistance, but canpress so closely from this direction that he (Johnston) cannotdetach but a part of his command against him. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 38. ] These lucid orders show that Sherman was not contemplating merely aflanking movement to make Johnston retreat and yield territory; onthe other hand he strongly expressed the desirability of forcingconclusions as near his own base as possible, and showed hisapprehension of the disadvantages which must come from stretchingstill further his long line of communications. The same desire andthe same apprehension were constant with him throughout thecampaign, and it was with an unwillingness growing at times intoimpatience that he found himself compelled to follow Johnston's slowand skilful retreat. It was not till the change of the Confederatecommanders that aggressive tactics on the part of the enemy gave theopportunity for severe punishment and led to the speedy destructionof the hostile army. Herein lies the key of the whole campaign. The possession of Tunnel Hill enabled Sherman to look into MillCreek Gap, the break in Rocky Face, and the first look was enough toshow how desperate would be an attack either upon the precipitouscliffs or into the fortified gorge. His orders for the 8th of Maywere for Thomas to threaten the Buzzard Roost pass and try to get asmall force on Rocky Face ridge. Schofield from Dr. Lee's was tofeel along the same ridge southward toward the gap and the signalstation which the enemy had established above it on Buzzard Roost. It was to be a skirmishing advance, but no battle, attracting theenemy's attention whilst McPherson was seizing on Snake Creek Gap inJohnston's rear. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 56. ] On our part, Schofield ordered Judah's division to ascend the northpoint of Rocky Face and press along the sharp ridge southward. Myown division was to occupy the passes looking toward Varnell'sStation, sending a regiment to support the cavalry there. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 55, 66, 85. ] General Thomas, seeing no chance of gettingto the top of Rocky Face from the west, had ordered the Fourth Corpsto attempt it from the north, and Howard had sent in Newton'sdivision to do this before Schofield received his orders for theday. The latter therefore put Judah's division in support ofNewton's, extending the line along the east base of the ridge, andcalled up Hovey's division into close support. With my own divisionI advanced southeastwardly to hills in that direction, keepingabreast of the movement on Rocky Face. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 82, 83;pt. Ii. P. 675. ] Sherman had conjectured that the hill-tops would be found to beplateaus on which troops might manoeuvre to some extent, but theyproved to be sharp and steep to the very summits, and composed ofloose rock of every size, but all as angular as if from freshcleavage. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. P. 675;pt. Iv. P. 84. ] Harker's brigade of Newton's division had theadvance, but even a brigade was too large a body for combinedaction, and Colonel Opdycke with his regiment (One Hundred andTwenty-fifth Ohio) took the lead. He made a demonstration as if toturn the north point and go up the eastern side; then leaving thebrigade skirmish line to continue to push there, he rapidly movedagain to the west side and climbed swiftly to the ridge. Here wasonly room for four men to march abreast, but charging from rock torock he succeeded in advancing about a third of a mile southwardalong the ridge to a breastwork of stone where the enemy, who hadfought bravely for every "coign of vantage, " were finally enabled tocheck him. He also threw together a heap of stones to cover andenable him to hold the ground he had gained. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 367. ] Schofield in person had followed the advance of Judah's division, and reconnoitred along the ridge parallel to Rocky Face on the east. It was plain that there was little chance of getting near BuzzardRoost by following Harker's path along the knife-like summit, and hewas disposed to let Judah try the effect of a night attack upon thefortified outpost at the enemy's signal station in front of Harker. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iv. P. 83. ] Sherman realized that he could nothope to carry the Dalton lines from the west and north, and thatJohnston was too well satisfied with his defensive position to leaveit unless some part of our army was compromised by making a falsemove. McPherson, however, was entering Snake Creek Gap with solittle opposition as to show that the importance of that pass wasnot understood by Johnston, if indeed he knew of its existence. Sherman therefore determined to keep up active demonstrations withwatchful observation of the enemy for another day, whilst thedecisive part of McPherson's movement should go on, and was alreadyplanning to transfer Hooker's Corps to McPherson's column as soon asthe latter should hold the outlet of his gap. He wrote to Schofield, "We must not let Johnston amuse us here by a small force whilst heturns on McPherson. " He sometimes suspected this was being done, andhad been uneasy during the day at the absence of cannonade fromJohnston's lines. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 83, 84. ] The orders for the 9th were that Thomas should continueto push along the crest of Rocky Face from the north and makedemonstrations on other parts of his line, whilst Schofieldcautiously swung his left flank out toward the east at right anglesto the principal ridge and made a strong reconnoissance of theenemy's lines in the immediate front of the town. At midnightSherman learned that Hooker had made an effort to carry Rocky Faceat Dug Gap, two or three miles south of Buzzard Roost, and hadfailed with considerable loss to Geary's division, which wasengaged. At daybreak on the 9th, my own camp was astir. The division advancedbeyond the left flank of the position of Hovey's, then swung theleft forward and moved southward astride of the ridge parallel toRocky Face on the east. Judah's division connected our movement withthe left flank of the Fourth Corps across the intervening valley. Hovey's division marched in rear of my left flank as a reserve. McCook's division of cavalry covered the extreme flank at Varnell'sStation, under orders to demonstrate on the direct road to Dalton asour infantry advanced. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 98-100. ] The enemyresisted with strong outposts and skirmish lines posted in severalstrong barricades of timber and stones. We drove him from these andcontinued the movement till we confronted the main line ofintrenchments. Schofield intended to attack these as soon asNewton's division of the Fourth Corps (which was our pivot) shouldbe able to force the position in its immediate front on the crest ofRocky Face, but Newton was obliged to report that Harker's brigadehad failed in its effort, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 102. ] and Schofield ordered us to stand fast where wewere. McCook had found a superior force of Confederate cavalry underWheeler on the Dalton road; his advanced brigade under Colonel LaGrange had been roughly handled, and that officer was captured. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 96. ] General Stoneman was, however, advancingfrom Charleston with the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio, and theaffair was of no great significance, though the Confederates claimeda considerable victory for their horse. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 683. ] Our movement had been an interesting one. As we went forward on theridge, we could see Judah's line keeping pace with us in the valleyand on the lower slopes of Rocky Face, whilst Newton's men continuedthe line to the summit, where Harker was having a sharp combat inwhich both artillery and small arms were brought into play. Offbeyond our left was a separate rounded height, Potato Hill, on whichthe enemy had artillery which annoyed us, and to which our own gunsanswered. The space between was filled with skirmishers, horse andfoot, and a rattling fusillade accompanied our march. It was evidentthat the lines before us were very formidable and held in force, andthat the reconnoissance had been pushed as far as possible; to gofurther would commit us to a desperate attack upon intrenchments. [Footnote: When Johnston's retreat gave us possession of Dalton, wefound the works of a very strong character, putting that front quitebeyond a _coup-de-main_. I examined them myself later in thecampaign. ] But Sherman did not desire to do this. He wished to keepthe enemy employed so that he could not send a great force againstMcPherson, and thus to give the latter a chance to make a success ofthe movement against Resaca. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 98. ] Toward evening he directed Schofield tofall back to a strong defensive position again, as from the news hegot from McPherson he was sure Johnston must either attack us orretreat on the next day, and he wished to be ready for a prompttransfer of his army to Snake Creek Gap. But Schofield thought anight movement too uncertain in that broken and tangled country, especially as he had not been pleased with the handling of Hovey'sdivision during the day, and obtained permission to bivouac for thenight where we were, sending a couple of infantry regiments tosupport McCook's cavalry and cover our flank. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 99, 119. ] During the night Sherman learned that McPherson had not succeeded intaking Resaca or breaking the railroad, and had retired to the mouthof Snake Creek Gap. Johnston was, of course, now aware of theturning movement, and before morning we had evidence that he waschanging the positions of his army to meet the new situation. Sherman immediately turned his whole energy to transferring his armyto McPherson's position. Hooker's Corps leading off was followed byPalmer's, and this by ours. Howard's was ordered to remain inposition covering the Chattanooga railway, and to follow Johnstondirectly through Dalton when he left his intrenchments. The movementcould not be begun till the 11th, as Stoneman with the cavalry ofthe Army of the Ohio was marching from Cleveland, and another daywas needed to enable him to get upon our left flank, the placeassigned him in the combined advance. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 112, 113, 126. ] Three days' rations in haversacks and seven more inwagons gave provisions for a short separation from our base, andorders to send back all baggage to Ringgold were strictly enforced. At daybreak of the 10th I advanced my skirmishers to reconnoitre theenemy's lines, which were found to be still held in force, and histroops on the alert. We then proceeded to wheel the whole of thecorps backward in line of battle, ready to halt at any moment, andengage the enemy if he should come out and attack us. My divisionbeing on the flank, it was to regulate the movement, Judah'sconforming to mine on the right, and Hovey's in reserve immediatelyin rear of mine. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 123, 131. ] We were under a warm skirmish fire of infantry infront, and the enemy's cavalry on our left flank also followed upthe movement sharply. Reinforcing the skirmish line till the enemywas driven back, a good position in rear was selected for my secondline and it was made to lie down. My first line was then marchedslowly to the rear over the other, to another position, where ithalted and lay down in turn, whilst the other rose and marched tothe rear in a similar manner. Making the troops lie down avoided thedanger, incident to such a manoeuvre under fire, that the men insecond line would be confused by the passing of the first linethrough their ranks and break their organization. [Footnote:Officers experienced in war know that manoeuvres which are easy andof fine effect on parade are difficult and even dangerous underfire, and that it is wise to simplify the tactics as much aspossible. Marshal Saint-Cyr, whose reputation for tactical skill wassecond to none in the wars of the French Republic and Empire, thusspeaks of the matter in his comments on the battle of Novi, aproposto the break of the French division Watrin, which was in two brigadelines: "La première, attaquée avec vigueur par le général Lusignanappuyé par Laudon, ne soutint qu'un moment le choc, et se rabattitsur la seconde; elle espérait se reformer en arrière de celle-ci, enfaisant ce qu'on appelle une passage de ligne; mais il fut démontréune fois de plus, que cette manoeuvre, qui fait un assez bel effet àla parade, ne peut réussir à la guerre lorsqu'on est suivi par unennemi actif. La premiere entraîna la seconde dans un mouvementrétrograde; de plus elle y apporta assez de confusion pour que cesdeux lignes réunies crussent n'avoir d'autre parti à prendre quecelui de la fuite, " etc. Mémoires, vol. I. P. 257. There can be noquestion as to the general soundness of this criticism, and weshould not have continued the movement described if we had beenattacked in force. We should then have fought where we stood, bringing the reserves to support the front line. It justifies, however, the precaution of selecting carefully the alternatepositions and making the rear line lie down. ] When we came oppositethe positions assigned us in the extension of the Fourth Corps line, the division changed front to rear on right battalion and so swunginto its place. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. P. 675. ] Sherman had sent Captain Poe, his chief engineer, toobserve our movement from the crest of Rocky Face held by Newton'stroops, and congratulated Schofield upon it, saying it "wasdescribed to me by Captain Poe, as seen from the mountain, as veryhandsome. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iv. P. 121. ] In his full reportmade at the close of the campaign, General Schofield referred to itas "a delicate and difficult one, owing to the character of theground, the position and strength of the enemy, and our comparativeisolation from the main army. " He adds: "I regarded it as a completetest of the quality of my troops, which I had not before hadopportunity of seeing manoeuvre in presence of the enemy. "[Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 510. ] Schofield had been so dissatisfied with General Hovey that on thesame day he asked to have him removed from the command of thedivision, notwithstanding his high personal esteem for him and hisconfidence in his personal gallantry. The trouble seemed to be inthe comprehension of orders and in the grasp of the surroundingcircumstances. Sherman did not feel at liberty to act on therequest, as Hovey had been assigned to the new division, before ittook the field, in fulfilment of a promise of General Grant underwhom Hovey had served in the Vicksburg campaign, and had beenrecommended for promotion as a recognition of good conduct at theaffair of Champion Hill. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iv. P. 122. Brigadier-General Alvin P. Hovey had been a Judge of the SupremeCourt of Indiana, and a "War Democrat" in politics. His subsequentwithdrawal from the army and his connection with Sherman's famousprotest against promotions given under stress of personal andpolitical influences at Washington would not be entirely clearwithout mention of the incident here told. ] Johnston seems to have heard rumors of Sherman's original plan tosend McPherson's column against Rome, much further in rear, and heremained under the impression that this was the meaning of themovements he now heard of, until McPherson was in possession ofSnake Creek Gap. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 674, 675. ] On the 7th he had urged Polk to hasten hisconcentration at Rome, and ordered Martin's division of cavalry toCalhoun to cover the communications with Polk, and protect therailroad south of the Oostanaula. Brigadier-General Cantey was atResaca with at least four thousand men, his own and Reynolds'sbrigades with fourteen pieces of artillery. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 679, 682. ] Movements toward his rear were reported to Johnston, andall his subordinates were on the alert to find out what it meant;the cavalry was ordered to watch all gaps south of Dug Gap, but nomention is made of Snake Creek Gap till McPherson had passed throughit. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 681, 683, 686, 687. ] Then Cantey was toldto hold Resaca firmly, and call on Martin for assistance if heneeded it. Cars were sent to bring a brigade from Rome, intrenchments were made to cover the south end of the Resaca bridge;Major Presstman, chief engineer, was sent to mark out more extensiveworks about Resaca, and Hood was ordered there with considerablereinforcements. As soon, however, as it was known that McPherson hadretired to Sugar Valley, Hood was called back to Dalton, andJohnston requested Polk to hasten in person to Resaca and takecommand, hurrying forward his corps as fast as possible. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 687, 689. ] This was the situation on the evening of the10th of May. When we took our position on the ridge of Rocky Face as the left ofthe line, the division was somewhat exposed to a flank attack, and Iordered the fallen timber on the hillside to be thrown together tomake obstruction to any hostile advance, besides the usual tacticalprecautions of outposts and reserves. This, like the slashing madeat Red Clay a few days before, was suggested by the difficulty ofknowing what was going on around us in a country covered by denseforests with only small cultivated openings here and there. In thisinstance it was only the gathering of logs and tree-tops alreadylying on the ground, and utilizing them as a means of delaying anenemy till our lines could be formed. From such beginnings grew upour more and more elaborate system of intrenched camps; a naturalevolution of campaigning in a country only partially cleared, withno roads worthy of the name. To pass such a defile as Snake Creek Gap with an army was no smallundertaking. Hooker was ordered to clear a second track, so that twolines could march by the flank at once, but this could only beimperfectly done in the time at command. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 126, 135, 145. ] Careful orders indetail were made, fixing the time for each corps and division tomove, keeping the roads filled night and day. Wagons were sent bythe rear to Villanow, and the regular subsistence trains werestopped at Ringgold and Tunnel Hill till the Confederate army shouldbe dislodged. For night marching men were stationed with torches atthe forking of paths, and boards were nailed to trees asfinger-posts. Early on the morning of the 12th May, my division left its positionon Rocky Face and marched through Tunnel Hill station. GeneralSchofield, finding the shorter road to Snake Creek Gap blocked bywagons of the Cumberland Army, ordered a detour to the west, and wemarched over to the Trickum and Villanow road, some two miles, andthen pushing southward got within three miles of Villanow. It wasevident that our movement and that of the whole army were visiblefrom the high ridge of Rocky Face. Johnston was aware of them, andtelegraphed to Richmond that Sherman was moving to Calhoun or tosome point on the Oostanaula. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 698. ] He put everything in motion upon hisinterior line to Resaca, and the last of his infantry left Daltonthat night, covered by a cavalry rear-guard. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 160. ] Howard entered the place next morning. [Illustration: Map] Taking only a short rest, my division marched again at one o'clockthrough Villanow and Snake Creek Gap into Sugar Valley, followed byJudah's division of our corps, the other (Hovey's) being left toguard the gap and the trains. McPherson's army covered the directroad to Resaca, having Kilpatrick's cavalry on its right flanktoward the Oostanaula; Thomas's army was in the centre, consistingof two corps (Hooker's and Palmer's) in Howard's absence; andSchofield was ordered to continue the curve to the left, my owndivision being the flank and directed to rest the left upon theridge or near it, facing northward. The different corps advanced from McPherson's intrenchments to thenew line which was near Camp Creek on the Resaca road, facing east, thence curving north and west through a quarter circle to myposition on the left close to the dominant ridge, and about fourmiles north of Sugar Valley P. O. On the main Dalton road. I sentHanson's brigade forward to reconnoitre toward Tilton (where Howardwas), and it reached Martin's store, at the forks of the Dalton andTilton roads and the crossing of Swamp Creek. A Confederate divisionhad left that position only an hour before, marching toward Resaca. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. P. 675. In theofficial Atlas (compiled after the war), plate lvii. Map 2, Martin'sStore is given as Roberts' Store, and the position of the enemythere is marked. ] Later in the afternoon the centre and left of the whole army swungforward toward the east into the line along Camp Creek, quite awayfrom the Dalton road. Reilly's brigade of my division was thereforeleft as a detachment covering that road until we should know thatHoward had advanced beyond Tilton. A regiment of Hanson's brigadewas left as an outpost at Martin's store, and the rest of thebrigade marched across country by the right of companies to thefront, keeping touch with Judah's division and this with the left ofthe Army of the Cumberland. It was a rough march over ridges andstreams through the forest, on the long outer curve, of which thepivot was several miles to the southeast. Sherman had hoped to be in time to interpose between Resaca andJohnston's army, as he had said in his orders of the 12th, [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iv. P. 158. ] but the Confederates had theshort interior line, and Johnston had been able to concentrate aboutResaca in the course of the 13th, his rear-guard resisting Howard'sadvance at Tilton, and his left under Polk holding some high hillswest of Camp Creek in front of Resaca which commanded the railroadbridge over the Oostanaula. With the latter exception his chosenline of defence was on the broken ridge between the Connasauga Riverand Camp Creek, which were nearly parallel to each other for somemiles. On the morning of the 14th the advance was renewed, guided as beforeby the progress of the Army of the Tennessee on the right andcontinuing the wheeling movement toward the east. My right brigade(Manson) continued its connection with the rest of the army, butReilly's had a very difficult and laborious march. I ordered it toadvance a mile upon the road it had covered during the night, andthen by the right flank to position in line with the rest of thecommand. After leaving the road Reilly had to break his way throughthe woods, crossing sharp and deep ravines and watercourses, with nopath or landmark to guide him. It was especially difficult for theartillery, and that they got through at all proved that the officersand men were experts in woodcraft. The regiment at Martin's storeremained there as an outpost during the day. Reilly came into line about ten o'clock, and we rested an hour tillour flankers reported Howard's corps within supporting distancecoming from Tilton. We were on the west bank of the main stream ofCamp Creek, where its upper course makes an angle with the lower, some small branches coming into it from the northeast. The valleyitself was open, and the change in its direction allowed it to beenfiladed by the enemy's batteries at the angle. Generals Thomas andSchofield were together upon a hill having a commanding view, and atthe word from them, "The line will advance, " we moved forward intothe valley from the slope before them. Each brigade was in twolines, and the artillery was left on the hither side of the valleyto cover the movement and reply to the enemy's cannonade. Theskirmish line had been advanced to the edge of the woods on the farside, and kept the lead until we approached the Confederatetrenches. We passed over two or three ridges and ravines, drivingback the skirmishers of the enemy, and charged the line ofearthworks on the crest of a higher ridge. Our men dropped fast aswe went forward, but the line was carried and the Confederates brokefrom the next ridge in rear, some two hundred yards away. Thedirection of these ridges was such that our left was constantlythrown forward as we passed from one to another. Judah's division on our right had not succeeded in crossing CampCreek, and our flank was exposed to a galling artillery fire, as theridge on which we were had its shoulder bare when it came out intothe valley, whose curve gave the enemy an enfilading fire upon us. His infantry sought also to drive us out of the position we hadcaptured, and the fighting was heavy for an hour or two. ButHoward's corps came up on our left, and we made firm our hold on thehills we had gained, forcing the Confederates to adopt a new linecurving to the eastward. The division had lost 562 men, and our ammunition was nearlyexhausted. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 676-679. ] Wagons could not follow us, and toward evening GeneralsThomas and Schofield arranged to relieve us with Newton's divisionof Howard's corps, let us replenish the cartridge boxes, and thenpass to the left. This brought again the Army of the Cumberlandtogether, and gave us our usual position on the flank. Newton's mencame over part of the ground we had traversed, and as they crossedthe open we saw them under the enemy's cannonade, the balls here andthere bowling them over like tenpins. Harker's brigade came up torelieve Manson's, which was the most exposed, and Manson and I werestanding together arranging the details, our horses being undercover in the edge of the wood. Harker rode up to confer with us andlearn the situation, and as we talked, a shell exploded among us, the concussion stunning Manson and a fragment slightly woundingHarker. Manson's experience was a curious illustration of the effectof such an accident. He was unaware of his hurt, and only thought, in the moment of failing consciousness as he fell, that the motionwas that of his companions flying upward instead of his own falling;and on coming to himself in the hospital began to speak his sorrowfor what he supposed was the death of his friends. He himself neverfully recovered from the effects of the concussion. ColonelOpdycke's regiment was one of the first in the winning column, andhis men were hardly placed in the line before he was led back, wounded; but as soon as his wound was dressed and he had recovered alittle from the shock, he was back at his post. The place was so hota one that Harker's brigade also exhausted its ammunition and had tobe relieved before the left of my own line was moved. The captured position was firmly held by Howard's corps, whilstHooker's, which had been relieved by the Army of the Tennessee, wasmarched to the left of Howard's, extending the line across the ridgetoward the Connasauga and turning the enemy's flank. The wholeTwenty-third Corps was also united during the night and moved toHooker's support, where next day Hood made strong efforts to driveour line back. My own and Judah's division were held in reserve, butHovey's was put in on Hooker's left, extending the line practicallyto the river, and the division took a gallant part in repulsingHood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. P. 511. ] On the extreme right McPherson had bridged the Oostanaula at Lay'sFerry and made demonstrations on Calhoun. The whole Army of theTennessee had pressed forward to Camp Creek, and toward evening ofthe 14th forced a crossing and carried some hills near its mouthwhich commanded the railway bridge. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 92, 377. ] Polk's Confederate corps madestrong efforts to dislodge McPherson's men, but failed, and thelatter intrenched the position. As Johnston had not succeeded indislodging Sherman at either flank of the position, and the courseof the Oostanaula made it possible for Sherman to put himself uponthe railway near Calhoun, the Confederate general evacuated theResaca position in the night of the 15th, retreating southwardtoward Kingston and Cassville. CHAPTER XXXVII ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: ADVANCE TO THE ETOWAH Tactics modified by character of the country--Use of thespade--Johnston's cautious defensive--Methods of Grant andSherman--Open country between Oostanaula and Etowah--Movement inseveral columns--Sherman's eagerness--Route of left wing--OfMcPherson on the right--Necessity of exact system in suchmarches--Route of Twenty-third Corps--Hooker gets in the way--Delaysoccasioned--Closing in on Cassville--Our commandingposition--Johnston's march to Cassville--His order to fightthere--Protest of Hood and Polk--Retreat over the Etowah--Shermancrosses near Kingston--My reconnoissance to the Allatoonacrossing--Destruction of iron works and mills--Marching withoutbaggage--Barbarism of war--Desolation it causes--Changes in ourcorps organization--Hascall takes Judah's division--Our place ofcrossing the Etowah--Interference again--Kingston the newbase--Rations--Camp coffee. The opening period of the campaign had developed the conditions ofwarfare in so broken and difficult a country, and they were onlyemphasized by the later experiences of both armies. Positions fordefence could be intrenched with field-works whilst the hostile armywas feeling its way forward through dense forests and over mountainridges. To carry such positions by direct assault was so costly thatthe lesson of prudence was soon learned and such attacks were moreand more rarely resorted to. Sherman had moved upon the enemy atResaca as promptly as the deployment and advance could be made afterthe turning movement and the passage of the Snake Creek defile; butwe found Johnston strongly placed, on ground naturally difficult ofapproach, with works which gave his men such cover as to overcomeany advantage we had in numbers. Still, the enemy found in turn thatwe could make counter-intrenchments and quickly extend them till weturned his flanks and threatened his communications, when he musteither retreat or assault our works, and that, if he assaulted, thebalance of losses would turn so heavily against him as to fatallydeplete his army. Johnston carefully and systematically maintainedthis defensive, and in Virginia, after Lee had tried the policy ofattack in the Wilderness, he became as cautiously defensive asJohnston. Grant was slower than Sherman in learning theunprofitableness of attacking field-works, and his campaign was byfar the more costly one. The difference in such cases goes muchfarther than the casualty list; it was shown in October, whenSherman's army was strong and well-seasoned, but Grant's was so fullof raw recruits as almost to have lost its veteran quality. Therewere special reasons which led Grant to adhere so long to the moreaggressive tactics, which would need to be weighed in any fulltreatment of the subject; but I am now only pointing out the factthat in both the East and the West the lesson was practically thesame. Aggressive strategy had the advantage it always has, butdefensive tactics proved generally the better in so peculiar a fieldof operations. Between the Oostanaula and the Etowah was the most open portion ofnorthern Georgia, and it was possible for Sherman to move his armysouthward in several columns of pursuit on parallel roads (such asthey were) without extending his front over a width of more thaneight or ten miles. He was eager to bring the Confederates to battlein this region, and urged his subordinates to make haste. Theassignment of routes to the different columns gave the centre toGeneral Thomas, following the railroad in general, but putting histhree corps upon as many country roads, when they could be found. General Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps was ordered to getover to the old Federal road which runs through Spring Place (eastof Dalton) to Cassville. General McPherson with his two corps wassent by the Rome road and such parallel road as might be available, keeping communication with the centre. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 216. ] Beyond him, on the extreme right, Davis's division of the Cumberland Army supported Garrard's cavalrydivision in a movement upon Rome by the west side of the Oostanaula. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 198, 202-204. ] The object of thelast-mentioned movement was the destruction of the Confederatemachine-shops and factories at Rome, as well as to cover the flankagainst movements along the main route of travel from Alabama. Theextreme left flank was to be covered by the cavalry of the Ohio Armyunder General Stoneman. In making such an advance, success as well as comfort depends uponthe care with which the several columns are led, so that each shallkeep its place, progressing equally with the others, and avoid aboveall things cutting into and interrupting those moving on its rightor left. Each must keep the common purpose in view, and avoidobstructing the rest, for nothing is more wearisome to the troopsand ruinous to the plans of the commander than to have the lines ofadvance cross each other. In our march of the 17th our own corps wasfated to feel the full annoyance and delay of such an interference. General Thomas ordered Howard's corps to cross by the bridges atResaca, followed by Palmer's, which was diminished by the absence ofDavis's division. He also ordered Hooker's corps to march by thelong neck between the Oostanaula and Connasauga rivers to Newtown, and cross the Oostanaula there. Hooker would then follow such roadsas he could find within two or three miles of Howard's line of marchtoward Adairsville. Sherman and Thomas both were with Howard. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 202, 209, 210, 216, 217. ] Schofield ordered the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps to crossthe Connasauga at different places, and make their way by differentroads eastward to the Federal road crossing of the Coosawattee, turning south after crossing that river and marching till abreast ofAdairsville and some four or five miles distant from it. As we hadto gain several miles of easting and to cross two rivers beforemarching southward, ours was, of course, much the longer route; andas the pontoons were all in use at Resaca and Lay's Ferry, we had tofind fords or build trestle-bridges. I marched my own division to Hogan's Ford on the Connasauga, twomiles below Tilton, and there crossed in water so deep that the menhad to strip and carry their clothes and arms on their heads. Onceover we pushed for the Federal road and the crossing of theCoosawattee at Field's Ferry. The other two divisions of the corpscrossed the Connasauga at or near Fite's Ferry, where weretrestle-bridges. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 210. ] General Hooker started upon the Newtown road, which runs southwardsome miles upon a long, narrow ridge which here separates theOostanaula from its tributary; but before he had gone far he learnedthat the crossing at Newtown (the mouth of the Connasauga) wasunfordable, and other means of getting over doubtful. He now turnedabruptly to the east, crossed the Connasauga at Fite's, and marchedtoward McClure's Ford on the Coosawattee. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 205, 206. ] In moving out from Hogan's (or Hobart's) Ford, I had learnedthat the road from the north which crosses the Coosawattee atMcClure's was probably the principal and shortest route to Cassvilleand had reported this to General Schofield, who ordered Judah's andHovey's division to take the most direct roads to McClure's. Thesecolumns, however, ran into Hooker's, which were making for the samepoint and had headed Schofield's off, having the inner of theconcentric routes on which we were marching. Neither at McClure'snor the more distant ferry at Field's Mill was there any bridge ortolerable ford, and Hooker was no better off than he would have beenat Newtown. This movement had wholly disjointed Sherman's plan ofkeeping the three armies upon separate lines of march. Finding nomeans for rapid crossing at McClure's, he pushed one of hisdivisions to Field's, and so occupied and blocked both of theCoosawattee crossings, which by the orders should have been whollyat Schofield's disposal. We found ourselves obliged therefore tocamp on the north side of the Coosawattee on the night of the 16th, instead of being well over that river and ready for a prompt advanceon the 17th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 210, 211, 220, 221, 225, 226. ] Hooker himself might much better haveobeyed his original orders. He reported to Thomas at ten o'clock onthe morning of the 17th that he was not yet over, and had not themeans of constructing a bridge that would stand; in short, that hehad been "bothered beyond parallel. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 221. ] WhenSchofield requested that he would allow our troops to takeprecedence of the Twentieth Corps wagons at either the ferry or thebridge, so that Sherman's expectation might not be disappointed, Hooker suggested that we should march back to Resaca and followThomas across the bridges there, thus getting into the place hehimself should have taken if the Newtown crossing had been reallyimpossible! [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 227. ] Modern systems lay great stress upon the most scrupulous care on thepart of corps commanders to follow the roads assigned them, and toavoid trespassing upon those assigned to others. Moltke has evencondensed the whole strategic art of moving troops into "marchingdivided in order to fight united, " and to avoid interference andconfusion of columns _en route_ is quite as essential as to keeptactical manoeuvres on the battle-field from crossing each other. [Footnote: See Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen's Letters on Strategy(Wolseley Series), vol. Ii. Pp. 160, 161, 185, 237, etc. ] No betterproof of the necessity of the rule could be given than this. Shermanwas most anxious to bring Johnston to battle in the open countrybetween the two rivers, and ordered his subordinates to press thepursuit and to engage the enemy wherever he might be overtaken, trusting to the quick advance of the several columns to theirsupport. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 201, 202, 211, 220, 232, 242. ] Anything which delayed the columns or putthem on different roads from those indicated by the commandinggeneral, directly tended to thwart his plans. All of Sherman'sdispatches during the 17th, 18th, and 19th of May show hisdisappointment at not getting forward more rapidly. Johnston seemed disposed, in the afternoon of the 17th, to meetSherman's wish for a decisive battle, and had selected a position amile or two north of Adairsville, where the valley of the OothcalogaCreek seemed narrow enough to give strong positions for his flankson the hills bordering it. Preliminary orders were given and thecavalry was strongly supported by infantry to hold back Sherman'sadvance-guard till the deployment should be completed. Theskirmishing was so brisk that, at a distance, it sounded like abattle; but upon testing the position by a partial deployment, Johnston concluded that his army would not fill it, and he resumedhis retreat on Cassville and Kingston, hoping that Sherman's columnswould be so separated that he could concentrate upon one of them, and so fight his adversary in detail. [Footnote: Narrative, pp. 319, 320. ] Schofield had pressed the march of his troops after getting over theCoosawattee, but the interruptions had been such that the distancemade was not great, though the time was long and the troops weremore tired than if they had made double the number of miles on anunobstructed road. My division was on the extreme left flank and inadvance. After crossing the river at Field's Mill, the infantry byHooker's foot-bridge and the artillery by the flat-boat ferry, Imarched at ten o'clock in the evening and reached Big Spring Creekat two o'clock in the morning of the 18th. Resting only till fiveo'clock, we marched again, going southward on the Cassville roadthree miles, thence westward on the Adairsville road five miles toMarsteller's Mill. The other divisions of our corps took roadswestward of that which I followed, and the cavalry under Stonemanpassed beyond our left flank, scouting up the valley of SalequaCreek as far as Fairmount and Pine Log Post-Office. Hooker moved twoof his divisions toward Calhoun after getting over the Coosawattee, and these regained the position relative to the rest of Thomas'sarmy which the corps had been ordered to take. The other division(Butterfield's), which had crossed in advance of my own at Field'sMill, was necessarily on roads assigned to Schofield's command, anda good deal of interference was inevitable. Hooker was personallywith this division, and in the afternoon of the 18th met GeneralSchofield at Marsteller's Mill, and then went forward about sixmiles to the foot of the Gravelly Plateau, Butterfield's divisiongoing still further forward on its top. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 238-242. The Atlas of the Official Recordsdoes not give the routes of all the columns of either Hooker's orSchofield's corps, nor does it give the line of march of the cavalryon our left. The march of my own division is fixed by the memorandaof my personal diary of the campaign. The official "Atlas" (Platelviii. ) gives two mills as Marsteller's. It is difficult to identifythe several roads, but my own line of march was the principalCassville road leading from Field's Mills and ferry through Sonorauntil we reached the road running directly to Adairsville. On thislast we marched to Marsteller's Mills. Our route on the 19th is alsoincorrectly marked on the map. See Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 256. ] General Schofield assembled the corps at the mills and rested forthe night. Early on the 19th my division took the advance andmarched southward on by-roads till we overtook Hooker's corps andfound it in line of battle, its movement being disputed by theenemy's cavalry. Schofield deployed his corps on Hooker's left, mydivision taking the extreme flank and advancing in line to the southfork of Two Run Creek. Crossing this, we went forward to a positiona mile northeast of Cassville, briskly skirmishing with part ofHood's corps. We found that we were opposite the extreme right ofthe Confederate position, which was a strong one on the hills behindCassville; but an exchange of artillery shots satisfied us that weto some extent enfiladed their intrenchments. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. P. 680. ] The concentration ofThomas's army with Schofield's made a continuous line facing theenemy on the north and west. Night was falling as we took position. Johnston had followed the railroad to Kingston, where he was joinedby French's division coming to Polk's corps from Rome, and stillstuck to the general line of the railway to Cassville, though thisled him by a considerable detour to the east. His manifest policywas to make the largest use of the railroad to move his baggage andsupply his troops, for wagon trains were not over-abundant with theConfederates. He naturally reckoned also that Sherman could not gofar from the same line, and as the road crossed the Etowah near thegorges of the Allatoona hills, he wished to lead the nationalcommander into that difficult country from the north, instead oftaking the more direct wagon-roads from Kingston toward Marietta. Could Sherman have been sure of the route his adversary would take, no doubt he would have concentrated his columns by shortest roads onCassville, gaining possibly a day thereby. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iv. Pp. 242, 266. ] The position on the hills behind the village of Cassville was sostrong a one, and Johnston so much desired to offer battle at anearly day, that he resolved to retreat no further and to tryconclusions with Sherman here. He signified this in an unusuallyformal manner by issuing a brief and stirring address to his troops, in which he said that as their communications were now secure, theywould turn and meet our advancing columns. "Fully confiding in theconduct of the officers and the courage of the soldiers, " he said, "I lead you to battle" [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 728. ] But when our left flank crossed Two Run Creek andpartly turned the right of his position, his corps commanders, Hoodand Polk, became so uneasy that they protested against giving battlethere, and induced Johnston to continue the retreat throughCartersville across the Etowah River. He saw the mistake he had madeas soon as it was done, and never ceased to regret it. [Footnote:Narrative, p. 323, etc. ] The Richmond government had beendisappointed at his retreat from Dalton and Resaca and itscontinuation through Adairsville. His strained relations with Mr. Davis were rapidly tending toward his deprivation of command. Butmore strictly military reasons made his change of purpose veryundesirable. Hardly anything is more destructive of the confidenceof an army than vacillation. The order to fight had been published, and even a defeat might be less mischievous than the sudden retreatin the night without joining the battle which had been so formallyannounced. Either the order had been an error or the retreat wasone. Every soldier in the army knew this, and the _morale_ of thewhole was necessarily affected by it. Sherman had no mind to follow the enemy into the defiles ofAllatoona from Cartersville. His position at Kingston offered a farmore easy way to turn that fastness by the south, if he couldreplenish his stores, rebuild the bridges behind him, and makeKingston the base for a march upon Dallas and thence on Marietta. Onthe 20th of May his orders were issued for the new movement, tobegin on the 23d with preparation for a twenty days' separation fromthe railroad. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 271. ] My own duty on the 20th was to follow the enemy's rear-guardto the river and learn the condition of the bridges and crossings. The division marched early, most of the distance to Cartersvillebeing made in line of battle, the opposition being at timesstubborn. The purpose of this was probably to prepare for thedestruction of the bridges, which were burned as soon as therear-guard crossed. We sent detachments to destroy the Etowah Millsand Iron Works a few miles above; [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 286, 298. ]meanwhile General Schofield concentrated the Army of the Ohio atCartersville, General Thomas occupied Kingston as the centre, andMcPherson came into position on the right near the same place. General J. C. Davis's division had occupied Rome, finding thereimportant iron-works and machine-shops as well as considerabledepots of supplies. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 264. ] General Blair wasadvancing from Decatur, Ala. , with the Seventeenth Corps, underorders to relieve Davis at Rome, when the latter would rejoinPalmer's corps at the front. The ten days which had passed since the movement to turn the enemy'sposition at Dalton was begun, had been in literal obedience to theorder to march without baggage. At my headquarters we were, in fact, worse off than the men in the ranks, for, although the privatesoldier finds his knapsack, haversack, canteen, and coffee-kettle aburden and a clattering annoyance, he soon learns to bear thempatiently, for they are the necessary condition of the comparativecomfort of his bivouac when the day's march is over. The veteran, indeed, clings to them with eager tenacity, when he has fullylearned that they are his salvation from utter misery. But theofficer, whose hours of halting are crowded with important business, and whose movements must be light and quick whenever occasionarises, cannot carry on his person or on his horse the outfitnecessary for his cooking and his shelter. We had been full of themost earnest zeal to respond thoroughly to the general's wishes, andhad not tried to smuggle into wagons or ambulances any extracomforts. We had left mess chests behind, and had used our fingersfor forks and our pocket-knives for carving, turning sardine boxesinto dishes, and other tins in which preserved meats are put up intocoffee-cups. Such roughing can be kept up for a week or two, but itis not a real economy of means to make it permanent. A compromisemust be found in which the wholesome cooking of food and the shelterin a rainstorm, without which no dispatches can be written orrecords kept, may be made to consist with the lightness oftransportation which active campaigning requires. The simple, closely packed kitchen kit of a Rob-Roy canoe voyager was more orless completely anticipated by the devices and inventions born ofnecessity in our campaign in Georgia. The remainder of the seasonbore witness that we could organize our camp life so as to securecleanliness of person and healthful living without transgressing thereasonable rules as to weight and bulk of baggage which Shermaninsisted on. Every day proved the reasonableness of his system, without which the campaign could not have been made. The tendency of war to make men relapse into barbarism becomes mostevident when an army is living in any degree upon the enemy'scountry. Desolation follows in its track, and the utmost thatdiscipline can do is to mitigate the evil. The habit of disregardingrights of property grows apace. The legitimate exercise of the rulesof war is not easily distinguished from their abuse. The crops aretrampled down, the fences disappear, the timber is felled forbreastworks and for camp-fires, the green forage is used for thearmy horses and mules, barns and houses may be dismantled to buildor to floor a bridge, --all this is necessary and lawful. But thepigs and the poultry also disappear, though the subsistence officersare issuing full and abundant rations to the troops; the bacon isgone from the smoke-house, the flour from the bin, the delicaciesfrom the pantry. These things, though forbidden, are half excused bysympathy with the soldier's craving for variety of food. Yet, as thehabit of measuring right by might goes on, pillage becomes wantonand arson is committed to cover the pillage. The best efforts of aprovost-marshal with his guard will be useless when superiorofficers, and especially colonels of regiments, encourage or wink atlicense. The character of different commands becomes as notoriouslydifferent as that of the different men of a town. Our armies wereusually free from the vagabond class of professional camp-followersthat scour a European battlefield and strip the dead and thewounded. We almost never heard of criminal personal assaults uponthe unarmed and defenceless; but we cannot deny that a region whichhad been the theatre of active war became desolate sooner or later. A vacant house was pretty sure to be burned, either by malice or byaccident, until, with fences gone, the roads an impassable mire, thefields bare and cut up with innumerable wagon-tracks, no livingthing to be seen but carrion birds picking the bones of dead horsesand mules, Dante's "Inferno" could not furnish a more horrible anddepressing picture than a countryside when war has swept over it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 273, 297, 298. ] The orders issued from our army headquarters in Georgia forbadesoldiers from entering houses or stripping families of thenecessaries of life. Most of the officers honestly tried to enforcethis rule; but in an army of a hundred thousand men, a smallfraction of the whole would be enough to spoil the best efforts ofthe rest. The people found, too, that it was not only the enemy theyhad to fear. The worse disciplined of their own troops and the hordeof stragglers were often as severe a scourge as the enemy. [Footnote: See Hood's orders, Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. Pp. 960, 963. ] Yet I believe that nowhere in the world is respectfor person and property more sincere than among our own people. Theevils described are those which may be said to be necessarilyincident to the waging of war, and are not indications of ferocityof nature or uncommon lack of discipline. In the organization of the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield madean important change by assigning Brigadier-General Hascall tocommand the second division in place of General Judah. In the battleof Resaca the division suffered severe loss without accomplishinganything, and General Schofield found, on investigation, that it wasdue to the incompetency of the officer commanding it. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 243. ] The brigadecommanders, in their reports, complained severely of the way inwhich the division had been handled, and the army commander feltobliged to examine and to act promptly. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 581, 610, 611. ] Judah was a regular officer, major of the FourthInfantry, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1843, but lackedthe judgment and coolness in action necessary in graveresponsibilities. General Schofield kindly softened the treatment ofthe matter in his report of the campaign, but in his personalmemoirs he repeats the judgment he originally acted upon. [Footnote:Schofield's Report, _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 511; Forty-two Years in theArmy, p. 182. In the passage of his memoirs last referred to, General Schofield had been using the case of General Wagner atFranklin to give point to "the necessity of the higher militaryeducation, and the folly of intrusting high commands to men withoutsuch education" (p. 181); but he also distinctly recognizes the factthat such education is gained by experience, and the fault of thosehe uses as illustrations was that they had not learned either byexperience or theoretically. I have discussed the subject in vol. I. Chapter ix. , _ante_. There must be knowledge; but even this will beof no use unless there are the personal qualities which fit for highcommands. ] The crossing of the Etowah River on May 23d was again theoccasion of an interference of columns, because Sherman's orderswere not faithfully followed. To McPherson was assigned a countrybridge near the mouth of Connasene Creek, to Thomas one four milessoutheast of Kingston, known as Gillem's Bridge, and to Schofieldtwo pontoon bridges to be laid at the site of Milam's Bridge, whichhad been burned. There were fords near all these crossings whichwere also to be utilized as far as practicable. [Footnote: Sherman'sgeneral plan was given to his subordinates in person, but herepeated it to Halleck, Official Records vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 274. Thomas's order is given, _Id. _, p. 289, and accompanyingsketch, p. 290. Gillem's Bridge in the Atlas is called Free Bridge, plate lviii. Schofield's place for pontoon bridges is fixed by hisdispatch to Sherman, _Id. _, p. 284, my own dispatch, _Id. _, p. 298, and my official report, _Id. _, pt. Ii. P. 680. The line of march andplace of crossing as given in the Atlas are incorrect. ] We marchedfrom Cartersville on the Euharlee road by the way of the hamlet ofEtowah Cliffs, till we reached the direct road from Cassville toMilam's Bridge, when we found the way blocked by Hooker's corps, which had possession of the pontoons which Schofield's engineer hadplaced. Hooker, however, was not responsible for this, as he hadbeen ordered to change his line of march by a dispatch from Thomas'sheadquarters written without stopping to inquire how such a changemight conflict with Schofield's right of way and with Sherman'splans. Halted thus about noon, we were not able to resume the marchtill next day, as Hooker had ordered his supply trains to follow hiscolumn. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iv. Pp. 283, 291. Schofield to Shermanand reply, _Id. _, pp. 296, 297. When I wrote "Atlanta, " I supposedHooker acted without orders. ] The incident only emphasizes the wayin which we learned by experience the importance of strict system insuch movements, and the mischiefs almost sure to follow when thereis any departure from a plan of march once arranged. There was, ofcourse, no intention to make an interference, and the difficultyrarely, if ever, occurred in the subsequent parts of the campaign. In preparation for the movement to turn Johnston's new position atAllatoona we were ordered to provide for twenty days' absence fromdirect railway communication. Within that time Sherman expected toregain the railway again and establish supply depots near the camps. Meanwhile Kingston was made the base, and was garrisoned with abrigade. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 272, 274, 278. ] The returning veterans were coming back by regiments andwere fully supplying the losses of the campaign with men of the verybest quality and full of enthusiasm. Nine regiments joined theTwenty-third Corps or were _en route_ during the brief halt at theEtowah. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 291. ] The ration was the full supply offresh beef from the herds driven with the army, varied by bacon twodays in the week, a pound of bread, flour, or corn-meal per man eachday, and the small rations of coffee, sugar and salt. [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 272. ] Vegetables and forage were to some extent gatheredfrom the country. The coffee was always issued roasted, but in thewhole berry, and was uniformly first-rate in quality. The soldierscarried at the belt a tin quart-pail, in which the coffee wascrushed as well as boiled. The pail was set upon a flat stone like acobbler's lapstone, and the coffee berries were broken by using thebutt of the bayonet as a pestle. At break of day every camp wasmusical with the clangor of these primitive coffee-mills. The coffeewas fed to the mill a few berries at a time, and the veterans hadthe skill of gourmands in getting just the degree of fineness incrushing which would give the best strength and flavor. The cheeringbeverage was the comfort and luxury of camp life, and we habituallyspoke of halting to make coffee, as in the French army they speak oftheir _soupe_. CHAPTER XXXVIII ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: NEW HOPE CHURCH AND THE KENNESAW LINES Sherman's plan for June--Movements of 24th May--Johnston's positionat Dallas and New Hope Church--We concentrate to attack--Pickett'sMill--Dallas--Flanking movements--Method developed by the characterof the country--Closer personal relations to Sherman--TurningJohnston's right--Cross-roads at Burnt Church--A tangledforest--Fighting in a thunderstorm--Sudden freshet--Bivouac in athicket--Johnston retires to a new line--Formidable character of theold one--Sherman extends to the railroad on our left--Blair's corpsjoins the army--General Hovey's retirement--The principlesinvolved--Politics and promotions. Sherman's general plan of campaign for the month of June was to movehis army in several columns upon Dallas, and then along the ridgebetween the Etowah and Chattahooche rivers on Marietta. As Johnstonwas at Allatoona and his cavalry was active all along the south bankof the Etowah, our left flank was not only covered by Stoneman'scavalry, but Schofield was purposely held back a day's march so asto cover the rear as well as the flank, which was exposed to apossible attack from Johnston as we marched south and opened a spacebetween us and the river, uncovering the supply trains which filledthe roads over which the troops had passed. After crossing the river at Milam's bridge on May 24th, we turnedeastward through Stilesborough, to and across Richland Creek, reaching the road on the upland which runs from Cassville toMarietta by way of Rowland's Ferry. Stoneman, who had crossed theEtowah with his division of horse at Shellman's Ford on the 22d, andcovered the laying of the pontoon bridges at Milam's, went back tolook after a raid by the Confederate cavalry at Cass Station, andwas not able to return to his position south of the river until theevening of the 24th, when he scouted the road toward Allatoona. Having the advance, my division marched southward on the Mariettaroad to Sligh's Mill, where the road forks, the right-hand branchturning southwest, along the ridge, to Huntsville, better known inthe neighborhood as Burnt Hickory. This place was about half-way onthe direct road from Kingston to Dallas, and was the rendezvous forthe Cumberland Army for the night. We camped at Sligh's Mill, beingjoined by Hascall's division of our corps. Hovey's division and thecorps trains took the road from Stilesborough up Raccoon Creek, somemiles west of us and covered by our march. The Army of the Tennesseereached VanWert, some miles west of Burnt Hickory, on the Rome andDallas road. We lay at Sligh's Mill during the 25th, till five P. M. , [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 311. ] giving time forMcPherson to approach Dallas, and for Thomas to continue hismovement of the centre upon the same place. We were then to march toBurnt Hickory and follow Thomas to Dallas. But the enemy was alsoactive and modified our program. His cavalry had reported ourconcentration in front of Kingston, and the laying of our pontoonsat Milam's bridge on the 23d. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 737. ] They hadalso made a reconnoissance to Cass Station, and found nothing therebut the wagons of the Twenty-third Corps, of which a number werecaptured and destroyed. Satisfied that Sherman was marchingsouthward in force, Johnston immediately put his army in motion. Hardee's Corps, being his left, marched to Dallas and took positionsouth of the town, covering the main road to Atlanta and extendingits line northeast toward New Hope Church. Hood was assigned to theright at the church, and Polk had the interval in the centre, uponthe main road they had travelled from Allatoona. The line was alongthe ridge dividing the headwaters of Pumpkin Vine Creek, which flowsnorthward into the Etowah, from the sources of the Sweetwater andPowder-spring creeks which empty into the Chattahoochee at thesouth. The movement was begun on the 24th, and in the forenoon of the 25ththe Confederate troops were taking the positions assigned them, covered by their cavalry. A captured dispatch gave Sherman usefulinformation, and he directed that instead of marching straight toDallas, Hooker should test the appearance of hostile force towardNew Hope Church, turning off on the Marietta road at Owen's Mill. This brought on the fierce combat at New Hope Church, where Hood'sCorps held its line against Hooker's very vigorous attack. Thefighting began about four o'clock in the afternoon and lasted tilldarkness put an end to it. All the other troops of the grand armywere hurried forward. McPherson continued his march to Dallas, Thomas hastened the Fourth Corps to Hooker's support, holding partof the Fourteenth as a general reserve, and Schofield was directedto hasten the march of the Twenty-third Corps by way of BurntHickory. My division marched from Sligh's Mill at five o'clock, and onreaching Burnt Hickory took the road Hooker had travelled to Owen'sMill, accompanied by Hascall's division, Hovey's being left nearBurnt Hickory to protect the trains. A thunderstorm with pouringrain came on soon after we started and lasted through the night. Onreaching the road behind Hooker, we found it filled with his wagons, and the storm, the darkness, and the obstructed road produced acombination of miseries which made the march slow and fatiguing tothe last degree. We plodded on till midnight, but had not yetreached Pumpkin Vine Creek, when we halted for a little rest, and toget further orders from Schofield, who had before nightfall gone onto communicate with Sherman. Word came that he was disabled by anaccident when on his way back to us, and I was directed to lead thetwo divisions forward and report to Sherman. After a halt of an hourthe men fell into ranks again, and pressing the toilsome march, reached the field at daybreak. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 303, 311, 320. The official Atlas is againinaccurate in making our line of advance from Sligh's Mill followthe Marietta road instead of that to Burnt Hickory (Huntsville). ] By Sherman's orders we joined the Fourth Corps (Howard's), extendingits line to the left, and the whole swung forward through a terriblytangled forest till we passed Brown's saw-mill and reached the openvalley which was the continuation of that in front of Hooker, andtook our extreme left over the Dallas and Allatoona road. We had metwith a strong skirmishing resistance, for Johnston was manifestlyunwilling to give up the control of the road we had crossed. Havingthus partly turned the Confederate position on our left, Shermanhoped that McPherson might complete their dislodgment by a similarflanking movement through Dallas on our right. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 321, 322. ] The distances, however, were greater than we estimated, and though McPherson kept with him Davis's division of Palmer'sCorps (greatly to Palmer's disgust), [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 316, 324. ] he was still unable to connect his line with Hooker's, andoccupied an isolated, salient position in front of Dallas whichwould be perilous if Johnston were able to concentrate upon him. The enemy's line was along one of the smaller branches of PumpkinVine Creek, and Sherman ordered for the 27th that McPherson shouldpress toward the left down the little valley, whilst Howard, withone division of his own corps withdrawn from the line and onedivision of Palmer's which had been in reserve, should push outbeyond our left and turn the enemy's right near Pickett's Mill. Abrigade of the Twenty-third Corps moved in the interval to coverHoward's flank and keep connection with the intrenched line. Thealmost impenetrable character of the forest made the movement slow, and it was late in the afternoon when Howard reached the enemy'sposition. He found they too had been busy in extending their lines, though pretty sharply recurved, to the eastward. The fierce combatdid not succeed in carrying the Confederate position, but it gainedgood ground near the mill, better covering all the roads toward therailway. The left wing of the Twenty-third Corps swung forward toHoward's position, and all intrenched strongly upon it. On May 28th McPherson was ordered to prepare for moving to theextreme left, continuing the extension of our line toward therailroad. Suspecting this, the Confederates made a fierce attackupon the position in front of Dallas, but were repulsed with heavyloss. At McPherson's request his movement was delayed a little, lestit should seem to be forced by Johnston's attack. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 339, 340. ] Sherman had been very unwilling to give up the hope of puttingJohnston's army to rout in a decisive engagement, and to accept, instead, the patient flanking movements by which he should forceupon his adversary the dilemma of abandoning more and more ofGeorgia, or of himself making attacks upon intrenched lines. Inwriting to Halleck after the battle of Resaca, he had said thatalthough the campaign was progressing favorably, he knew that hisarmy "must have one or more bloody battles such as havecharacterized Grant's terrific struggles. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 219. ] But the affairs at New Hope Church and Pickett's Mill showthat the country was so impracticable that it was not possible todeliver an attack by his whole army at once, and so to give realunity to a great battle. He was therefore brought, perforce, toaccept the systematic advance by flanking movements, and to avoidassaults upon intrenched positions on the forest-covered hills. Heknew that this policy would bring a time when the enemy could nolonger afford to retreat and must resort to aggressive tactics, evenat the risk of destruction to his army. It was a curious repetitionof the ancient colloquy, --"If thou art a great general, come downand fight me. --If thou art a great general, make me come down andfight thee. " It may be readily admitted that in such a country asCentral Europe other methods would have been feasible andpreferable; but in the tangled wildernesses of Virginia and Georgiathe matter was brought to the test by leaders who had courage andwill equal to any, and the result was a system which may beconfidently said to be the natural evolution of warfare in suchenvironment. Johnston knew that his retreat, though slow, was givingdissatisfaction to President Davis at Richmond, but he saw also thatto assault Sherman's lines meant final and irretrievable disaster, and he continued his patient and steady defence. Our progress aroundhis right warned him that the New Hope Church position must soon beabandoned, and a new one was already selected, closer to Marietta, with Kennesaw, Pine and Lost mountains, for its strongholds. The two or three days during which General Schofield had beendisabled had brought me into closer personal relations with Shermanthan I had enjoyed before, and was the beginning of an intimatefriendship which lasted as long as he lived. I had the opportunityof learning more of his characteristics and his methods, and saw howsound his judgment was, and how cool a prudence there was behind hisapparent impulsiveness. The untiring activity of his mind turnedevery problem over and over until he had viewed it from every pointand considered the probable consequences of each mode of solving it. At bottom of all lay the indomitable courage and will which wereonly stimulated by obstacles, and which stuck to the inexorablepurpose of keeping the initiative and making each day bring himnearer to a successful end of the campaign. By the 1st of June McPherson had brought the Army of the Tennesseeinto close connection with the centre, where Palmer's Corps of theCumberland Army had its three divisions reunited (except onebrigade), relieving us and enabling Thomas to draw out Hooker'sCorps as a reserve. The orders for the 2d were that we were to passto the left beyond Howard's Corps, and push out upon the BurntHickory and Marietta road, turning the enemy's flank and reaching, if possible, the cross-roads where it intersected a second roadleading from New Hope Church to Ackworth, a little in rear of theenemy's lines. The object was to cover more completely theconnections with the railroad south of the Etowah, and to gainpositions which would take in reverse portions of the Confederatelines. Hooker's Corps was ordered to support this movement on ourextreme left. The cavalry were ordered to make a combined effort toreach Allatoona Pass on the railroad, and to hold it till Blair's(Seventeenth) Corps, coming from Alabama by way of Rome, couldarrive and occupy it in force. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 348, 349, 362, 366, 367. ] Stoneman with the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio entered Allatoonaon June 1st, and reported the gorge a place he could hold against asuperior force. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 379. ] General Johnston was sowell persuaded that his position was no longer tenable that heissued the same day a confidential order directing a withdrawal, butrecalled it late in the day in view of the changes evidently goingon at our extreme right, and so remained a few days longer. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 753. ] On the morning of the 2d, the preliminarychanges in the line being completed, Schofield marched with theTwenty-third Corps to the left until he reached the Burnt Hickoryand Marietta road, near the Cross Roads Church, or Burnt Church, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 396. ] then turning to the east and guiding hisleft on the road he pushed forward through an almost impenetrableforest where it was impossible to see two rods. There was greatdifficulty in keeping the movement of the invisible skirmish line inaccord with the line of battle, which we directed by compass, like aship at sea. In the advance, my adjutant-general, Captain Saunders, was mortally wounded by my side, as we were riding, unconscious ofour danger, through an opening out of our skirmishers in a momentaryloss of direction. There were extensive thickets of the loblollypine occasionally met, where these scrub trees were so thick andtheir branches so interlaced that neither man nor horse could forcea way through them, and the movement would be delayed till thesedensest places were turned by marching around them. The connectionwould then be made again, the direction of the skirmishersrectified, and the advance resumed. The regiments advanced by theright of companies in columns of fours at deploying distance, butnot even the men of a company could see those on right or left, sodense was the tangle. We passed over the divide separating Pumpkin Vine Creek, and itsbranches from Allatoona Creek, and the sharp skirmishing began as weapproached the latter. The afternoon was well advanced when wereached the creek, and a heavy thunderstorm broke as our line fordedthe stream and pushed up the hill on the other side. We now drew theartillery fire from an intrenched line on the crest which we couldnot see, and for a time the mingled roar of the thunder and of theenemy's cannon was such that it was hard to tell the one from theother. My advanced line closed in as near the intrenchments aspossible, whilst the second remained on the hither side of thecreek. At my request Hascall's division swung still farther out tothe left to develop the line of the enemy's works, and Schofieldasked Butterfield's division of Hooker's Corps to advance on theextreme flank. He found that Hascall developed the full extent ofthe Confederate line, and thought it a good opportunity to take theposition in reverse. Butterfield, however, declined to do more thanmove up to Hascall's support in rear, and night fell beforeSchofield could accomplish anything decisive. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 386. In this instance the questionof relative rank by date of commission was slightly involved. Butterfield claimed to rank Schofield and declined to do more thanis stated. Schofield's Report, _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 512; Schofield'sForty-six Years in the Army, p. 130. ] The downpour of rain had been such that the creek, which wasinsignificant when we first came to it, became unfordable beforesunset, and gave me no little concern for the first line of mydivision, which was over it. It was ordered to cover itself withsuch abatis as could be speedily made and to intrench, whilst weimprovised footbridges for crossing to its support if it should beattacked. I announced that my headquarters for the night would beimmediately in rear of the centre of my second line; but when thepressure of duty was off and I was at liberty to go to the positionI had named, I found that it was one of the densest parts of a pinethicket, and I could not even get back of the troops in line till apath was cut for me by a detachment of men with axes. They cleared anarrow way for a few rods, and then widened it out into a circularspace at the foot of the trunk of a great tree so that there wasroom for a camp-fire, and for two or three of us to bivouac, butmost of the staff remained at a more approachable place a little inrear. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 396. ] Weregarded it so important that the notice given to subordinates ofour whereabouts at night should not be misleading, that we stuck tothe place that had been named, in spite of the inconvenience anddiscomfort. The fall of rain is amusingly illustrated by the factthat in the height of the storm my knee-boots filled with the waterrunning off me, and I emptied them as I sat in the saddle by liftingfirst one leg and then the other up in front of me till the waterran out of the boot-top in a stream. I had been a little ailing fora day or two, and my sleep was not as sound as it usually was evenin close contact with the hostile lines. In the wakeful hours theloss of my friend and able staff officer, Captain Saunders, filledme with mournful thoughts; for though the daily work under fire hadexposed all the little circle at headquarters to casualties, ourgood fortune hitherto had bred a sort of confidence in immunity, andthe sudden fall of him who had been the centre of the staff groupand a personal favorite with all was a heavy blow to us when we hadtime to think of it. Next morning Schofield arranged with General Thomas to relieveHovey's division of our corps which had been on our right, andmarching this division beyond Hascall's on our extreme left, thewhole line went forward. The Confederate intrenchment in myimmediate front was completely outflanked, and was found to be adetached position which the enemy abandoned when threatened byHascall's advance, and my men at once occupied it. The movement wascontinued until Hovey's division was upon the interior Dallas andAckworth road near Allatoona church, whilst my division andHascall's held the cross roads which had been covered by thefortifications we had captured. Hooker's Corps passed beyond Hovey, covering the flank to the eastward. Sherman now hastened theextension of the line toward the railroad by passing the whole armybehind us, till by the 6th we became the extreme right flank of thearmy. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Ii. P. 681;_Id. _, pt. Iv. P. 407. ] Johnston had abandoned his position on thenight of the 4th, falling back on the new line he had selected withhis left resting on Lost Mountain and his right upon Brush Mountain, the next eminence north of Kennesaw. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iv. Pp. 408, 758. ] The abandonment of the New Hope line gave us the opportunity toexamine it, which, of course, we did with great interest. It wasabout six miles long, of the most formidable character of fieldfortifications. The entry in my diary says of them that we foundthem "very strong, both for artillery and infantry, with abatiscarefully sharpened and staked down. They have never before shown somuch industry and finished their defensive works with so much care. "When it is remembered that these lines could only be approachedthrough forests which hid everything till we were right upon them, it will easily be believed that we congratulated ourselves that theenemy was manoeuvred out of them and was being crowded back till hemust soon assume the aggressive and assault our works. Sherman's new positions placed McPherson's army on Proctor's Creek, a branch of the Allatoona in front of Ackworth on the railroad, Thomas's army between Mt. Olivet Church and Golgotha, covering theprincipal roads from Cassville and Kingston to Marietta and LostMountain, whilst Schofield was placed in echelon on the right flank, covering the hospitals and trains until the base could betransferred to the railway. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 423, 428, 430. ] My own division was left forsome days in the position we had carried on the 3d, about a mileseparated from the rest of the line. A pontoon bridge was laid atthe Etowah railway crossing till the great bridge could beconstructed, and General Blair, who was on the 6th at Kingston, withtwo divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, was ordered to march toAckworth by this direct road. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 424. ] Blair'scommand was the only important reinforcement received by Shermanduring the campaign, and just about made up for the losses by battleand by sickness up to the time of its arrival. A more open belt ofcountry lay along the western side of the line from Kennesaw to LostMountain, and Sherman hurried the readjustment of his forces in thehope of a decisive engagement with Johnston by the 9th of June orsoon afterward. A change now occurred in the organization of our corps whichafterward became a matter of so much historical notoriety that itmay be worth while to give the particulars with accuracy. GeneralHovey tendered his resignation as a division commander, and asked aleave of absence to await the action of the President upon it. Thereasons assigned by him were his dissatisfaction and unwillingnessto serve longer with his division, which he claimed should beincreased by five regiments of Indiana cavalry, recruited at thesame time and in connection with his infantry regiments, and, as heasserted, with some assurance that they should be one organizationunder him. He also intimated that he had reason to expect promotionwhich had not been given him. I have already mentioned some dissatisfaction on General Schofield'spart with him at the beginning of the campaign, [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 214. ] but the middle of the campaign seemed so inconvenient atime to make a change that Schofield sought earnestly to smooth thematter over, and tried to obtain for Hovey other troops to increasethe size of his division. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 439. ] Sherman had no infantry which was not a regularpart of other divisions, and could not increase Hovey's command inthat way. He said that he could not tolerate the anomaly ofcombining five cavalry regiments with infantry in a division offoot, and that, in fact, the regiments were along the railroad, protecting our communications and could not be spared. He invitedHovey to a personal conference, and urged him to withdraw hisresignation, to take time at least for reflection, and not insistupon changes in the midst of a campaign and in the presence of theenemy. The appeal was unsuccessful, and Sherman telegraphed to theWar Department that Hovey was discontented because he was not made amajor-general, and that, though he esteemed him as a man, he shouldrecommend the acceptance of the resignation. On the paper itself heendorsed a full statement of the circumstances and hisrecommendation that General Hovey be allowed to resign. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 433, 439, 443, 448. ] The official censure of General Sherman having been thus spread uponthe records of the War Department, and that department having made atender of resignation in the presence of the enemy a cause forsummary dismissal of inferior officers, the surprise of the army maybe imagined when, on July 25th, Sherman was notified from Washingtonthat Hovey and Osterhaus had been promoted to bemajor-generals, --the first by brevet, the other to the full grade. To Sherman himself the thing was exceedingly galling, for not onlywas his action in Hovey's case reversed, and that which he condemnedmade the occasion for reward, but he had, only the day before, inasking to have Howard transferred to the command of the Army of theTennessee, made vacant by McPherson's death, added a special requeston the general subject of promotions. "After we have taken Atlanta, "he had said, "I will name officers who merit promotion. In the meantime I request that the President will not give increased rank toany officer who has gone on leave from sickness, or cause other thanwounds in battle. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. V. P. 241. ] This languagehad manifest reference to the cases in hand, and was, no doubt, based on rumors of what was about to happen: but it was too late, for a dispatch from Colonel Hardie, Inspector-General, was alreadyon the way to him, announcing the promotions by order of the WarDepartment. Sherman's indignation boiled over in his reply, which said: "I wishto put on record this, my emphatic opinion, that it is an act ofinjustice to officers who stand by their posts in the day of dangerto neglect them and advance such as Hovey and Osterhaus, who left usin the midst of bullets to go to the rear in search of personaladvancement. If the rear be the post of honor, then we had betterall change front on Washington. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 247. ] The vigor of this protest carried it to Mr. Lincoln's personal attention, and he answered it, admitting that itwas well taken, but urging reasons for his action which show onlytoo well that they were more political than military. A Presidentialcampaign had just begun, and with all his great qualities, Mr. Lincoln was susceptible to reasons of political policy in the use ofappointments to office. He referred to the recommendations forpromotion that Grant and Sherman had given these officers in aformer campaign, and to "committals" which had been drawn from himwhich he "could neither honorably nor safely disregard. " [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 259. ] In the case of Osterhaus the President added thathis promise had been given "on what he thought was high merit andsomewhat on his nationality. " In short, Indiana and Missouri weredoubtful States, and the German vote was important. But what idea ofmilitary promotions was that which, in such a war and in the midstof such a campaign, advanced officers to the highest grade uponpersonal importunity, not only without consultation with theircommanding general in the field but in spite of his protest; whichdoes not seem even to have asked the question what was going on inGeorgia and what would be the effect of such action upon the armythere! If there had been unlimited power of promotion, the casemight have been less mischievous; but Congress had limited thenumber of officers, so that vacancies were now filled, and, for theAtlanta campaign and Sherman's army in Georgia, these two were theonly promotions that could be given, and of those whom Shermanrecommended for the grade of major-general for service in thatcampaign when Atlanta was taken, not one then received it. Whenthese things are remembered, Sherman's indignation will be seen tobe righteous, and his protest a memorable effort in favor of goodmilitary administration. In replying to the President he apologizedfor the freedom of his language and assured Mr. Lincoln of hisconfidence in the conscientiousness of his general course, but hedid not soften or blink the facts. "You can see, " said he, "howambitious aspirants for military fame regard these things. They cometo me and point them out as evidence that I am wrong in encouragingthem to a silent, patient discharge of duty. I assure you that everygeneral of my army has spoken of it, and referred to it as evidencethat promotion results from importunity and not from actual service. I have refrained from recommending any thus far in the campaign, asI think we should reach some stage in the game before stopping tobalance accounts or to write history. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 271. ] Some promotions to the rank of brigadier were made in the PotomacArmy at this time, and Grant was notified that there were three orfour other vacancies in that grade. This led him to say he wouldlike to have them given to such men as Sherman might recommend. Headded: "No one can tell so well as one immediately in command thedisposition that should be made of the material on hand. Osterhaushas proved himself a good soldier, but if he is not in the field Iregret his promotion. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 260. ] As it had beenGrant's former recommendation which had been the strongestostensible ground of the promotion, this remark of his is importantas pointing out the true principle in such matters. Recommendationsof such a sort are always on the implied condition that the claimshall not be forfeited by subsequent conduct, and Grant said insubstance that the circumstances had altered the cases and relievedhim (and the administration too) of any obligation. To complete the discussion, it must be noted that there were threebrigadiers from Indiana in the Twenty-third Corps at this time, andHovey was not only the junior of the three but had been the leastactively employed in the campaign. Manson had been stricken down inthe battle of Resaca whilst heroically leading his men to thecapture of the rebel position, and never fully recovered from theinjury. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 221. ] Hascall distinguished himself atevery step of the campaign. Both left the service at last withoutany further recognition. It was common fame in the army that theywere not favored by Governor O. P. Morton, the dominant politicalinfluence in their State. Hovey's further service was not in thefield, but as commandant of the District of Indiana. Osterhausreturned to the Fifteenth Corps and served creditably in Sherman'sremaining campaigns. Hovey's division was broken up, one brigadebeing added to Hascall's division and the other to mine. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 448. ] CHAPTER XXXIX ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: MARIETTA LINES--CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE Continuous rains in June--Allatoona made a field depot on therailway and fortified--Johnston in the Marietta lines--That fromPine Mountain to Lost Mountain abandoned--Swinging our rightflank--Affair at Kolb's farm--Preparing for a general attack--Battleof Kennesaw--The tactical problem--Work of my division--Topographyabout Cheney's--Our advance on the 27th--Nickajack valleyreached--The army moves behind us--Johnston retreats to theChattahoochee--Twenty-third Corps at Smyrna Camp-ground--Crossingthe Chattahoochee at Soap Creek--At Roswell--Johnston againretreats--Correspondence with Davis--Mission of B. H. Hill--Visit ofBragg to Johnston--Johnston's unfortunate reticence--He is relievedand Hood placed in command--Significance of the change to theConfederacy and to us. In the month of June we had more than three weeks of pouring rains, making a quagmire of the whole country. The "dirt roads, " which werethe only ones, were soon destroyed by the heavy army wagons, andeven the place where they had been could not be distinguished in thewaste of mud and ruts which spread far and wide. Sherman found theintrenchments Johnston had left "an immense line of works, " andcongratulated himself that they had been turned with less loss tohimself than he had inflicted on the enemy. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 408. ] The first reconnoissancesfound that Johnston had retreated so far that, from the commanderdownward, we all harbored the hope that he had retreated beyond theChattahoochee. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 427. ] To prepare for our nextstep, the railway crossing of the Etowah must be completed and ourdepot of supplies advanced to Allatoona. The gorge there was almostas defensible on the south as on the north, and Sherman set CaptainPoe, his engineer, to work laying out fortifications to cover itssouthern mouth and thus prepare for holding it by a small garrisonas a secondary base if we should have to leave it again to make awide turning movement. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 428. ] [Illustration: Vicinity of Marietta, June 20, --July 4, 1864. ] We were not long in learning that Johnston was not over theChattahoochee, but had only fallen back to a shorter and moreformidable line about Marietta, covering the railway where it passedthrough the defiles of Kennesaw Mountain, extending his left centreto the isolated knob of Pine Mountain, and thence recurving hisflank by way of Gilgal (Hard-Shell Church in local nomenclature)toward Lost Mountain, which was held by his cavalry. At the first appearance of a retreat by the Confederates beyond theChattahoochee, Sherman's mind naturally turned to the plans ofcampaign which should follow his approach to Atlanta as they hadbeen indicated by General Grant at the beginning of operations inthe spring, and he inquired of Halleck whether the intended movementof the fleet under Farragut and part of the southwestern army underCanby against Mobile had been ordered. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 418. ] Halleck answered that it had beensuggested to Canby, but that Grant had, just then, all he couldattend to on the Chickahominy. The fierce battles in Virginia hadculminated on June 3d, in the terrible struggle at Cold Harbor, where the assault had been so costly as almost to produce dismaythroughout the country, and in all our armies to enforce the lessonof caution in attacking such works as the enemy was now habituallyconstructing. The feeling was hinted at by Sherman in his dispatchto Washington on the 5th, when he said that although he shouldprobably have to fight Johnston at Kennesaw, he would not "run headon to his fortifications. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 408. ] Amid the discouragements incident to the incessant rains the armygained positions closely enveloping Johnston's lines, and we whoconstituted the right flank, pushing out from hill to hill and frombrook to brook, gradually outflanked the enemy and forced him toswing back his left. On the 14th he let go of Pine Mountain, whereGeneral Polk was killed and General Johnston himself had a narrowescape from our artillery fire while they were reconnoitring ourpositions from its summit. On the 16th we were close upon the Gilgaland Lost Mountain line, and the enemy again withdrew that flankbeyond Mud Creek, which with Noyes's Creek [Footnote: Noyes's Creekwas pronounced Noses Creek by the negroes and the people of theneighborhood, and the name took that form in our reports at thetime. It was afterward corrected in the Official Records. ] andOlley's are the tributaries of the Sweetwater (before mentioned)which flows southward into the Chattahoochee. Sherman was on thelookout for weak places in his adversary's line where he might breakthrough and change into a rout the war of positions which was toomuch like siege operations to suit him. He said to Halleck thatJohnston had declined the assault which must have followed our soclose contact, "and abandoned Lost Mountain and some six miles of asgood field-works as I ever saw. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 498. ] Still keeping the right shoulder forward, we crowded in upon the new line, and in the night of the 18th theenemy retreated from the intrenchments behind Mud Creek to those ofNoyes's Creek, whilst at the same time he drew back his extremeright behind Noonday Creek, compacting his lines with the purpose oftransferring a corps to his left, where we now began to threaten hiscommunications. Again there was a momentary belief that Marietta was abandoned, butagain it was premature, for the apex of the angle was stoutly heldat the rocky crest of Kennesaw. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 519. ] There wasnothing for it but to continue the swing of the right flank. In hisinstructions to Thomas, Sherman said, "Until Schofield develops theflank we should move with due caution; but the moment it is found orwe are satisfied the enemy has lengthened his line beyond hisability to defend, we must strike quick and with great energy. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 509. ] The waters were up in all the streams, and Noyes's was whollyunfordable. Following the Sandtown road southward, my division wasstopped by the creek, and the enemy's artillery and dismountedcavalry held a good position on the other side, having removed theflooring of the bridge. In a brilliant little affair by a part ofCameron's brigade, the bridge was carried, and the whole divisionwas soon across and intrenched at the crest on the south side, covering the intersection of the Sandtown road with that fromMarietta to Powder Springs Church. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviiii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 534, 540. ] On the morning of June 22d, therest of Schofield's corps crossed the creek and took the Mariettaroad, whilst Hooker's corps swung forward from the right of theCumberland Army to keep pace with Schofield. My own division at thesame time marched southward on the Sandtown road to Cheney's farm, near the crossing of Olley's Creek, the next in the series ofparallel valleys trending to the southwest. Cheney's was also at thecrossing of the lower road from Marietta to Powder Springs village, which forked near Kolb's farm, the northern branch being that onwhich Schofield was advancing with Hascall's division. But Hood'scorps was also upon this road, having marched in the night from theextreme right of Johnston's army to extend the left and meet ouraggressive movement. This brought on the bloody affair of Kolb's (orCulp's) farm, Hood making a fierce attack on Schofield's left andHooker's right, which was repulsed. [Footnote: Atlanta, p. 108, etc. ] The enemy had to content himself with extending southward theline confronting ours, till it passed over the ridge behind Noyes'screek and covered the valley of Olley's. Schofield had called mewith three brigades to Hascall's support, leaving one (Reilly's) atthe Cheney farm. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 558, 559, 566-569. ] Hood's attack had checked the flanking movement from which Shermanhad hoped good results. Johnston had also been able to stretch outhis right so that the works in front of McPherson seemed to be heldin force enough to make an assault unpromising. On the reports ofsubordinates as to their uneasiness at the stretching of theirlines, Thomas suggested to Sherman that the lines be contracted andstrengthened. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 581. ] At the same time reportswere received that Confederate cavalry had crossed the Etowah in ourrear, and had begun to make use of torpedoes to derail and destroytrains on the railway. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 579. ] Yet Garrard's cavalry on our left reported theenemy's horse superior in numbers, and were unable to make suchprogress there as Sherman had expected. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 542, 555. ] It began to look like a dead-lock, and that, of all things, was what Sherman could not endure. With grim humor he wrote toThomas, "I suppose the enemy with his smaller force intends tosurround us!" [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 582. ] The only alternative seemedto be to find the places where that smaller force was mostattenuated and break through by main strength. He notified hissubordinates that this must be done on the 27th. [Footnote: _Ibid_. And p. 588. ] As a preliminary, he ordered demonstrations to be keptup on both flanks to draw the enemy away from the centre. His formalorder, issued on the 24th, directed General Thomas to select a pointof attack near his centre. McPherson was directed to make a feintwith his cavalry and one division of infantry on the left, but tomake his real attack at a point south and west of Kennesaw. Schofield was likewise to make a demonstration on the extreme right, in front of my division, but to attack a point as near aspracticable to the Powder Springs road, which was the scene of theaffair of the 22d. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] The tactical details were allleft to the subordinate army commanders. On the 25th Sherman visited our positions in person, and accompaniedthe active reconnoissances which we were making. The result hestated in an evening dispatch to Thomas, saying, "I found that theenemy had strengthened his works across the Powder Springs road verymuch, having made embrasures for three complete batteries, allbearing on that road. Line extends as far as can be seen to theright, mostly in timber and partly in open ground. The enemy is alsoon his [Schofield's] right flank on the other side of Olley'sCreek. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 589. ]The outcome of this was a modification of Schofield's orders, sothat instead of attacking seriously in force, he should make strongdemonstrations to attract the enemy to our wing of the army as muchas possible, and thus assist Thomas and McPherson in their attacksnear the centre. It was with reluctance that Sherman was brought to the determinationto make a front assault. His preference and his earlier purpose hadbeen to make an equal force to Johnston's keep the Confederates intheir works whilst the remainder of his own army should move fromour right and attack beyond Johnston's left flank. He had thoughtthe opportunity was come when we had secured the crossing of Noyes'sCreek, and he indicated the morning of the 22d for an advance on thePowder Springs and Marietta road which we then commanded. In hisdispatch to Thomas on the 21st, he said, "I feel much disposed topush your right, supported by Schofield and Stoneman's cavalry, whilst McPherson engages attention to his front, but keeps ready tomarch by his right to reinforce you. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 546. ] The founderous condition of the whole region had made every movementslow, and in the same note to Thomas, Sherman had summed it up inthe two words: "Roads terrific. " Yet on the morning of the 22d theway to Marietta by the Powder Springs road was only contested bycavalry, though Johnston's ever-watchful eye had seen the danger andby his order Hood was marching his corps from the other flank of thearmy to meet Sherman's extension by our right. In going to examineMcPherson's lines himself, Sherman had added to his dispatch, "Ifanything happens, act promptly with your own troops and advise meand your neighbor, Schofield, who has standing orders to conform toyou. " [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] The situation was, in fact, exactly whathe had been hoping for. The flank of the enemy was exposed, and wehad the opportunity to use the broad road leading to Marietta toturn it. Could Hooker, supported by Hascall's division of our corps, have reached Zion's Church before Hood, or at the same time withhim, it seems almost certain that the position gained would havecompelled Johnston to abandon Kennesaw and Marietta at once, andfall back to the line of the Nickajack if not beyond theChattahoochee. In that case the battle of Kennesaw would not havebeen fought. In the evening of the 22d, when Sherman received Hooker's answer toa question sent him during the progress of the combat in theafternoon, and found the latter laboring under the conviction thatthe whole of Johnston's army was in his immediate front, he wasnaturally annoyed at so exaggerated a view of the situation. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 558. ] Thomasreceived similar reports from Hooker and a call for reinforcements, and though he said he "thought at the time he was stampeded, "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 559. ] he sent to him a division from Howard'scorps. The truth was that one brigade of Hooker's corps and one ofSchofield's were the only ones that had suffered at all severely, the total list of less than 300 casualties being about equallydivided between them. Hood had been repulsed with a loss of morethan 1000. [Footnote: Atlanta, p. 113. ] When to these circumstancesare added those which have before been mentioned, [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 258, 259. ] we can understand how Sherman began to fear that, inthe systematic flanking operations he had been carrying on, his armywas losing the energetic aggressive character without which he couldnot profit decisively by the opportunities which might offer. [Footnote: See Sherman's personal letters to Halleck of July 9th, Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 91; to Grant of June 18th, _Id_. , pt. Iv. P. 507; and of July 12th, _Id_. , pt. V. P. 123. ]Adding still further the difficulty, amounting almost to animpossibility, of supplying the wing of the army most distant fromthe railroad, and the probability that Johnston's army was stretchedinto a line even thinner than his own, it will not seem strange thathe concluded it was time to try whether a bold stroke would notbreak through the Confederate defences and rout his adversary. I amsaying this from the standpoint of our own experience in the woodedand sparsely settled region we were operating in. From a Europeanpoint of view, an aggressive policy of attack would be taken as amatter of course, and the only questions open for debate would bethe tactical ones as to the method of making the assault and thepoints at which to deliver it. [Footnote: For a recent summary ofthe discussion of "Attack or Defence, " see Letters and Essays ofCaptain F. N. Maude, R. E. (International Series), p. 70; also his"Cavalry and Infantry" (same series), p. 127, etc. ] The attack was made on the 27th, and failed to carry the enemy'sworks, though our troops were able to hold positions close to theditch and to intrench themselves on a new line there. The casualtiesin the action were 2164. [Footnote: In Logan's Corps, 629 (OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. P. 85); in Howard's, 756 (_Id_. , pt. I. P. 205), and in Palmer's, 779 (_Id_. , p. 509). ] Some of the bestofficers who took part in the assault were of the opinion that hadthe supports been well in hand, so as to have charged quickly overthe first line when it was checked and lost its impetus, the worksin front of Davis's division would have been carried. [Footnote:McCook's Brigade at Kennesaw Mountain, by Major F. B. James of theFifty-Second Ohio; Ohio Loyal Legion Papers, vol. Iv. Pp. 269, 270. ]It is hardly necessary to say that at the present day an entirelydifferent deployment and organization of the attacking forces wouldbe considered essential, and the preparation by concentratedartillery fire would be much more thorough than was practicablethen. The dense forest made the cannonade almost harmless at thepoints chosen for assault, and the attack was one of infantryagainst unshaken earthworks. [Footnote: For description of thebattle, see "Atlanta, " chap. X. ] In Sherman's visit to our position on the 25th, he had arranged withSchofield the general plan for our demonstrations on the 26th and27th. Hascall's division was to make a feint of attack near thePowder Springs road, whilst mine should force the crossing ofOlley's Creek near Cheney's, on the Sandtown road, build a temporarybridge over the creek a mile or two above, and make a strong show ofa purpose to attack beyond Hascall's right flank by crossing with abrigade there. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 589, 592. ] The valley of Olley's Creek was broad and open, and the countrybeyond my right was more practicable than the tangled wilderness onthe northern slope of the watershed. We had got beyond the denserthickets of the loblolly pine, and could better see what we wereabout. The old Sandtown road south of Cheney's crossed the creek ona wooden bridge which was commanded by a fortified hill a littlebeyond where a battery of artillery swept the bridge and itsapproaches. The stream widened out after passing the bridge and ranbetween low and marshy banks with bluffs further back. I had placedReilly's brigade astride the road at Cheney's with Myer's Indianabattery of light twelves, smooth-bore bronze guns. A gap of morethan a mile lay between Reilly and the other three brigades of thedivision after I had marched to Hascall's support on the 22d. Thelower branch of the Powder Springs road was parallel to the creekand not far from it, and my artillery near the right of the threebrigades was on an advancing knoll where the guns not only commandedthe valley before them, but Cockerill's Ohio battery of three-inchrifles swept nearly the whole space to Reilly's position. [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 568. ] To give more effect to our demonstration, Sherman directed that itbegin on the 26th, and preparations were made to build a bridge infront of Byrd's brigade, which was ordered to cross the stream whenReilly's effort against the lower bridge should begin. Our firstinformation was that the fortified hill in front of Reilly was heldby infantry, and as the work was in form a redoubt, its garrison ofcourse on foot, we assumed that it was a detached outwork of theConfederate line. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 597. ] Reilly kept up a cannonade of the hill in front of himduring the 26th, and made some attempts to get over the stream atthe bridge, but did not seriously try to force the passage. Atemporary bridge was laid at Byrd's position, and soon after noon hecrossed the creek with little opposition, our artillery thoroughlycommanding the further bank. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 599] I personallyaccompanied Byrd's movement. The artillery of Hascall's division aswell as my own was turned on the enemy's works when they came outinto the open. The hills along this part of Olley's Creek were not acontinuous ridge, but knobby and somewhat detached; the higher landmarking the edge of the plateau about Marietta was further back, andthe Confederate line of works followed it. Byrd's direction of marchwas nearly parallel to the Sandtown road, and by advancing about amile and a half he reached the summit of a rough wooded hill aboutsix hundred yards from the main ridge, with open ground intervening. He was here from half a mile to a mile east of the Sandtown road, and from the fortified hill in front of Reilly, which was on thecontinuation of the same ridge, though with ravines interrupting it. The position was a very threatening one, and if any demonstrationcould draw the enemy in that direction, this seemed likely to do it. I directed Byrd to intrench on the crest, drawing back the flanks ofthe brigade so as to be ready for attack from any direction. Ourmovement had been sharply resisted by the enemy, but so far as wecould see, only by dismounted cavalry. Sherman had said that he didnot care to have Reilly force the passage of the creek thatafternoon, for a strong threatening of the fortified hill would bemore likely to draw the enemy that way than actually capturing it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 597. ] On myreporting to General Schofield in the evening the position of Byrd'sbrigade with the favorable look of the country beyond, it wasarranged that Byrd's bridge should be made stronger for permanentuse, and that Cameron's brigade should follow him at daylight in themorning. With my whole division except Barter's brigade, which wasleft to cover Hascall's right flank, I was to test what furtherprogress could be made on the Sandtown road. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 598-600. ] At peep of day on the 27th we were astir, anxious to get our part ofthe day's work well advanced before the more serious engagement atthe centre should begin. Another battery had been sent to Reilly, and he was directed to silence the enemy's guns and find a wayacross the creek under cover of his own if he could, but if thisfailed, to storm the bridge. Cameron was over Byrd's bridge at four o'clock, and was ordered uponreaching the ridge in rear of Byrd to push boldly along it towardthe fortified hill the other side of the Sandtown road in front ofReilly. Byrd's orders were to hold his position with the main bodyof his brigade, but to throw out detachments and skirmishers in alldirections to watch the enemy and to get information of the country. Leaving Cameron as soon as he was well on his way, I rode to Reillyin front of the Cheney farm, and found that at five his dispositionsfor forcing the passage of the stream were well under way. He haddetermined to try it some distance below the bridge, at a placewhere, though the banks were swampy, the creek was fordable, and thehills behind gave good opportunity to use the artillery and put themen across under shelter. My chief of artillery, Major Wells, waswith him, selecting places for the batteries and getting them inposition. Soon after six I was with Cameron again, and before eightwas back at Reilly's position, urging each to all the speed whichthe strong skirmishing opposition would permit. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 619. ] As it was necessary to passfrom one position to the other by way of the roads at the rear, itmade hard riding for one who wished to be as much as possible withthe active heads of columns. Soon after eight o'clock part of Reilly's brigade got over the swampand creek under cover of the artillery, uncovering the bridge at theroad where the rest crossed; Cameron's was now coming into closeco-operation from the east, and a dashing charge by both carried thehill. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Ii. Pp. 683, 703, 720. ] It was nowhalf-past eight, and the cannonade which preceded the attacks at thecentre was opening heavily behind us. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. Pp. 199, 632. ] The captured position was a commanding one, and the viewfrom it covered the whole region from Kennesaw to Lost Mountain. Cameron was left there whilst Reilly followed the retreating enemywith orders to advance as far as he could toward the Marietta andSandtown road, which was supposed to come into the old Cassville andSandtown road a mile or two ahead. We now knew from prisoners thatthe force opposed to us was the division of Confederate cavalryunder Jackson, and that they were not closely supported by infantry. The hill had been held by Ross's brigade, which retreated to anothereminence half a mile further down the road. Reilly again advanced, supported by Cameron. Ross was again dislodged and retreated uponthe rest of the division at the junction of the roads abovementioned. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iv. Pp. 799-801. ] As we advanced itbecame evident that the principal ridge on which Johnston's army wasbroke down into separate hills as it came forward toward the forksof the main roads, and it seemed feasible to hold some of these insuch a way as to make mutually supporting positions from Byrd toReilly, covering a front of two miles and commanding the lower partof the Nickajack valley, in which the Marietta road ran. Reilly wasput in one of these positions with his right across the road onwhich we had come, two miles south of Cheney's; Cameron was orderedforward upon high ground near Reilly's left, and Byrd was directedto straighten out his line on his right and reach as far as he couldtoward Cameron. All were ordered to intrench as rapidly andthoroughly as possible, for it was plain that we now commanded ashort road to the railway in Johnston's rear, and that he must driveus out or abandon the Kennesaw line he had clung to so stubbornly. I had sent my aide, Mr. Coughlan, with the orders to Byrd, and whenthe line was extended and skirmishers partly covered the front, hecame back to me by a direct course from Byrd to Cameron and Reilly, with the daring and intelligence which made him a model staffofficer, and reported that a continuous ridge connected the brigadesso that pickets could be well placed in the interval to give warningof any hostile attempt to pass between. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. Pp. 620, 621. Lieutenant Coughlan wasafterward killed in the heroic performance of duty at the battle ofFranklin. See "Franklin, " p. 114. ] A small hill a few hundred yardsin front of the main line better commanded the Marietta road, andupon this I directed Reilly to build a lunette for an advanced guardof a regiment and a battery. The whole affair was one of the minor class in war, but it had aspecial interest, in our ignorance of the topography of the country, because it revealed a way to Johnston's line of communications, which could not be seen and was not suspected when Sherman made thereconnoissance with us on the 25th, and saw the Confederate linescrossing the Powder Springs road and stretching away far beyond ourright. In my field dispatch to General Schofield I said: "Thepossession of the end of the ridge, if we can hold it, I am now surewill prevent the enemy from extending his line along it, since itwould be necessarily flanked and enfiladed by our positions. Theonly objection is the extension relatively to the strength of mycommand and the distance from supports. Upon carefully re-examiningthe ground my conviction is strengthened that it is exceedinglydesirable to hold all we have gained, and if Hascall's place couldpossibly be filled by troops drawn from other parts of the line, itwould give all the force needed to make a _point-d'appui_ whichwould be safe and exceedingly available for future movements in thisdirection if they become necessary. I only suggest this by way ofindicating the impression made on my own mind by the position. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 621. ] Reilly was three miles distant from Barter's brigade, which coveredthe right of the continuous line of the army intrenchments, and itwas certainly risking something to extend the brigades of a singledivision so far, but it would have been a great disappointment to usto have been called back. General Schofield instantly saw theadvantage, and in answering my dispatch, said, "I do not think theimportance of the position you have gained can be over-estimated, especially in view of the failure elsewhere and probable futuremovements. " [Footnote: _Ibid_. See map, p. 255. ] He orderedStoneman's cavalry to aid me in holding the ground and in picketingthe intervals, and reported to General Sherman the details of theoperation. The latter determined to make use of the advantagegained, and said, "If we had our supplies well up, I would move atonce by the right flank, but I suppose we must cover our railroad afew days. " [Footnote: Dispatch to McPherson, _Id. _, p. 622. ] We wereleft, therefore, for a little while in our exposed position, whilstthe whole army made strenuous efforts to get forward supplies enoughfor a few days' separation from the railway. The weather had begunto favor us. The day of the affair at the Kolb farm (22d) had beenthe first fair day of the month, and the continuous clear skies andhot suns rapidly dried the roads. Sherman sent Captain Poe to makean engineer's examination of our position and reconnoissance infront. The report confirmed his purpose of making us the pivot in aswinging movement of the whole army. On the 29th Generals Thomas andHoward accompanied General Schofield and myself in a similarinspection, to help fix the details of the movement for the Army ofthe Cumberland. Crittenden's brigade of dismounted cavalry reportedto me for temporary duty as infantry with my division. On the 1st ofJuly Hascall's division was relieved by the extension of Hooker'scorps, and Schofield with his whole corps in hand advanced a mileupon the Marietta road toward Ruff's Mill. Johnston's failure toattack was proof that he was preparing for retreat, and Shermanpressed the movement of his own army. On the 2d Johnston knew that McPherson's army was marching tointerpose between him and the Chattahoochee, and issued his ordersfor the evacuation of the Marietta lines in the night, and theoccupation of the position beyond the Nickajack. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 860. ] But Thomas and McPherson bothfollowed so vigorously that the Confederate general saw that hecould not cover the crossings of the river which Stoneman's cavalrywas already reaching on our right, and in the night of the 4th heagain retired, this time to intrenchments with both flanks restingon the river and covering the railway bridge with two or three ofthe principal ferries. With his usual prudence, Johnston hadprepared both these lines with the aid of the Georgia militia underGeneral Gustavus W. Smith, who, being himself an engineer, wasadmirably fitted to co-operate with the plans of the staff. Again a few days had to be given to repairs of the railroad and areadjustment of the depots and means of supply, whilst carefulreconnoissances of the river were made both above and below theConfederate position. Schofield's corps was placed in reserve nearthe railway, at Smyrna Camp ground, and on the 8th my division wasassigned the duty of making a crossing of the Chattahoochee, andlaying pontoon bridges at Isham's ford and ferry at the mouth ofSoap Creek, [Footnote: In the official Atlas, pl. Lx. , two creeksare named Rottenwood. The upper one of these with paper-mills uponit is Soap Creek. The ford was sometimes called Cavalry Ford in theConfederate dispatches. For particulars of the movements at thisperiod of the campaign, see "Atlanta, " chap. Xi. ] about nine milesabove the railway crossing of the river. Johnston does not seem tohave been well served by his cavalry on this occasion, for thecrossing was gained and two bridges laid with only triflingopposition, and my division was over and strongly intrenched beforeany concentration of the enemy was made in my front. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. Pp. 85, 89, 93. ] This, ofcourse, decided Johnston to abandon the northern bank of the river, and he selected a strong position behind Peach-tree Creek as thenext line of defence for Atlanta, burning the railway bridge andother bridges behind him. Several days were occupied by Sherman in moving McPherson's commandto Roswell, twenty miles above the railway, and building atrestle-bridge there, in accumulating supplies and organizingtransportation for another considerable absence from the railroad. By the 17th the army was over the Chattahoochee, McPherson on theleft, Schoneld next, and Thomas from the centre to the right. Ageneral wheel of the whole toward the right was ordered, to find anddrive back the enemy upon Atlanta. Meanwhile the relations between General Johnston and the Confederategovernment had reached a crisis. He had regularly reported theactual movements of his army, but had carefully avoided anyindication of his intentions or of his hopes or fears. When, on the5th of July, he retreated to the position at the Chattahoocheecrossing, his dispatch briefly announced that "In consequence of theenemy's advance toward the river below our left, we this morningtook this position, which is slightly intrenched. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 865. ] Mr. Davis replied onthe 7th, expressing grave apprehensions at the situation, pointingout the dangers of the position, and saying that other places hadbeen stripped to reinforce him, that further increase wasimpossible, and that they now depended on his success. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 867. ] By an unfortunate blunder of a subordinate, thedispatch was not sent in cipher as was intended, and Johnston knewthat the contents with its implied criticism was known to thetelegraphers along the line and was practically public property. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 871] this was not soothing to the general'sfeelings, even when explained. His answer said that he had beenforced back by siege operations, and had no opportunity for battleexcept by attacking intrenchments. He suggested that the enemy'spurpose to capture Atlanta might be foiled by sending part of the16, 000 cavalry believed to be in Alabama and Mississippi to break upthe railroads behind Sherman and force him to retreat. Davis repliedwith the intimation that Johnston must know that no such force wasavailable in the West, and that it would be much more to the purposeto use the cavalry he had for that task of pressing importance. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 875] He sent also by letter fuller details ofthe stress under which General S. D. Lee was in the Department ofMississippi, showing that the hands of that officer were more thanfull. [Footnote: The letter, however, did not reach Johnston tillafter he had been relieved of command. ] On the 10th Johnston hadforwarded a laconic dispatch, saying, "On the night of the 8th theenemy crossed at Isham's Cavalry Ford; intrenched. In consequence wecrossed at and below the railroad, and are now about two miles fromthe river, guarding the crossings. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 873. ] On the 11th he telegraphed, recommending the immediate distribution elsewhere of the prisonersat Andersonville. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 876] It cannot be denied that there was a certain justification for Mr. Davis's conclusion that the circumstances foreboded the yielding ofAtlanta without the desperate struggle which the importance of theposition demanded. Had Johnston expressed any hopefulness, or said, what was the fact, that he was himself coming to the determnation totry the effect of a bold attack whilst Sherman's army was in motion, he would probably have been left in command. But the personalestrangement had gone so far that he confined himself rigidly to thebriefest report of events, leaving the Richmond government to guesswhat was next to happen. His attitude was in effect a challenge tothe Confederate President to trust the Confederate cause in Georgiato him absolutely, or to take the responsibility of removing him. The Hon. B. H. Hill, who was in Richmond, at Johnston's request, tolearn if it was possible to reinforce him, telegraphed him on the14th, "You must do the work with your present force. For God's sake, do it. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 879. ] Governor Brown offered to furnish5000 "old men and boys" for the local defence of Atlanta in theemergency, in addition to the similar number of the militia reservesalready in the field. These were 'promptly accepted by Mr. Davis andthe order was issued to arm them. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 878, and vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 691-695, 704. The correspondence between Mr. Hilland Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, is especially instructive as tothe issue between Johnston and Davis. ] Before acting further the Confederate President sent out GeneralBragg to Atlanta to examine on the spot and report upon thecondition of affairs. Bragg arrived on the 13th and reported that anentire evacuation of Atlanta seemed to be indicated by what he saw. The army was sadly depleted, he said, and reported 10, 000 less thanthe return of June 10th. He could find but little encouraging. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 878. ] On thefollowing two days he visited Johnston twice and was "receivedcourteously and kindly. " "He has not sought my advice, " Bragg added, "and it was not volunteered. I cannot learn that he has any moreplan for the future than he has had in the past. It is expected thathe will await the enemy on a line some three miles from here, andthe impression prevails that he is now more inclined to fight. Theenemy is very cautious, and intrenches immediately on taking a newposition. His force, like our own, is greatly reduced by the hardcampaign. His infantry now very little over 60, 000. The morale ofour army is still reported good. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 881. ] The receipt of this dispatch with Johnston's of the 16th seems tohave decided President Davis to make a change in the command of thearmy, and on the 17th Hood was appointed to the temporary rank ofgeneral in the Provisional Army and ordered to relieve Johnston. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 885, 887, 889. ] Hood shrank from theresponsibility in the crisis which then existed, and suggested delaytill the fate of Atlanta should be decided; but Mr. Davis replied, "A change of commanders, under existing circumstances, was regardedas so objectionable that I only accepted it as the alternative ofcontinuing in a policy which had proved so disastrous. Reluctance tomake the change induced me to send a telegram of inquiry to thecommanding general on the 16th instant. His reply but confirmedprevious apprehensions. There can be but one question which you andI can entertain: that is, what will best promote the public good;and to each of you I confidently look for the sacrifice of everypersonal consideration in conflict with that object. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 888. ] Johnston magnanimously assisted Hood in completing the movements ofthe army during the 18th to the Peachtree Creek position andexplained to him his plans. These were, first, to attack Sherman'sarmy when divided in crossing that difficult stream, and, ifsuccessful, to press the advantage to decisive results. Ifunsuccessful, to hold the Peachtree lines till Governor Brown'smilitia were assembled;[Footnote: Johnston says ten thousand ofthese were promised him instead of five. Narrative, p. 348. ] then, holding Atlanta with these, to draw the army back through the townand march out with the three corps against one of Sherman's flanks, with the confidence that even if his attack did not succeed, withAtlanta so strongly fortified he could hold it forever. [Footnote:Narrative, p. 350. ] In reading his more elaborate statement of the plans of which theabove is an outline, one cannot help thinking how unfortunate forhim it was that he did not give them to Mr. Davis as fully as hegave them to Hood! In answer to the pressing inquiry of the 16th for"your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me toanticipate events, " he had replied, "As the enemy has double ournumber, we must be on the defensive. My plan of operations musttherefore depend upon that of the enemy. It is mainly to watch foran opportunity to fight to advantage. We are trying to put Atlantain condition to be held for a day or two by the Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 883. ] A good understanding with his government was so essential, just then, that the most reticent of commanders would have been wisein sending in cipher the whole page in which he tells the specificdetails of his purposes and their alternates as he gave them toHood. Had he done so, it is quite safe to say that he would not havebeen removed; but reading, in the light of the whole season'scorrespondence, the dispatch he actually sent, we cannot say thatMr. Davis was unreasonable in finding it confirm his previousapprehension. Had the general fully and frankly opened to Bragg thesame purposes, the latter could not have sent the hopeless messagewhich clinched the President's decision. Johnston said in his final message to Davis that the enemy hadadvanced more rapidly and penetrated deeper into Virginia than intoGeorgia; and that confident language by a military commander is notusually regarded as evidence of competency. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 888. ] There was much force in bothpoints, but they do not touch the heart of the matter. Between Leeand his government there was always a frank and cordial comparisonof views and perfect understanding; so that even in disaster it wasseen that he had done the best he could and was actively planning torepair a mischief. On the other hand, they got from Johnston littlebut a diarist's briefest chronicle of events with no word of hopefulpurpose or plan. It was not necessary that he should use "confidentlanguage, " but words were certainly called for which expressedintelligent comprehension of the situation and fertility in purposedaction according to probable contingencies. His advice to Hoodshowed that he only needed to be equally frank with the Richmondauthorities. [Footnote: Mr. Davis has discussed his relations toJohnston in chapter xlviii. Of his "Rise and Fall of the ConfederateGovernment, " vol. Ii. Pp. 547, etc. ; but the most succinct statementof his views is found in a paper prepared for the ConfederateCongress, but withheld. See his letter to Colonel Phelan, Meridian, Miss. , O. R, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1303-1311. ] The assignment of Hood to the command was, of course, in the beliefthat he would take a more energetic and aggressive course. He seemsto have been free in his criticisms of his commander, and uponBragg's arrival had addressed to him a letter which it is hard toview as anything else than a bid for the command. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 880. ] It said Johnston hadfailed to use several opportunities to strike Sherman decisiveblows; that yet the losses of the army were 20, 000; that under nocircumstances should the enemy be allowed to occupy Atlanta; that ifSherman should establish his line at the Chattahoochee, he must beattacked by crossing that river; that he had so often urgedaggressive action that he was regarded as reckless by "the officershigh in rank in this army, who are declared to hold directlyopposite views. " He concluded by saying that he regarded it a greatmisfortune that battle was not given to the enemy many miles northof the present position. When Johnston learned from Hood's report [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. P. 628. ](dated February 15, 1865) the nature of the latter'sstatements and criticisms, he notified the Richmond government aswell as Hood that he should demand that the latter be brought beforea court-martial; [Footnote: Id. , p. 637. ] but it was then April, onthe very eve of the collapse of the Confederacy, and the discussionwas left for continuance in the private writings of the parties andtheir friends. Johnston affirmed that in the only instances in thecampaign in which it could be said that a favorable opportunity forbattle had not been seized, Hood himself had been prominent inprotesting against an engagement or had himself failed to carry outthe orders given. In his service as commander of the army, Hoodbecame involved in disputes as to fact with Hardee and Cheatham aswell as with Johnston, and the result was damaging to his reputationfor accuracy and candor. [Footnote: Johnston's case is stated in his"Narrative, " chapters x. And xi. ; Hood's in his "Advance andRetreat, " chapters v. To ix. In connection with these, Hardee'sReport of April 5, 1865, is of interest (Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. P. 697), and his letter to General Mackall (_Id. _, pt. V. P. 987). ] The change of commanders undoubtedly precipitated the ruin of theConfederate cause; yet we must in candor admit that the situationwas becoming so portentous that human wisdom might be overtaxed intrying to determine what course to take. Of one thing there is noshadow of doubt. We of the National Army in Georgia regarded theremoval of Johnston as equivalent to a victory for us. Three monthsof sharp work had convinced us that a change from Johnston's methodsto those which Hood was likely to employ, was, in homely phrase, tohave our enemy grasp the hot end of the poker. We knew that weshould be kept on the alert and must be watchful; but we wereconfident that a system of aggression and a succession of attackswould soon destroy the Confederate army. Of course Hood did not meanto assault solidly built intrenchments; but we knew that we couldmake good enough cover whilst he was advancing against a flank, toinsure him a bloody repulse. The dense forests made the artillery oflittle effect in demolishing the works or weakening the _morale_ ofthe defenders, and it was essentially an infantry attack uponintrenched infantry and artillery at close range. The action of the Confederate government was a confession thatSherman's methods had brought about the very result he aimed at. Theenemy had been manoeuvred from position to position until he musteither give up Atlanta with its important nucleus of railwaycommunications and abandon all northern Georgia and Alabama, or hemust assume a desperate aggressive with a probability that thiswould fatally reduce his army and make the result only the morecompletely ruinous. This was the meaning of the substitution of Hoodfor Johnston. CHAPTER XL HOOD'S DEFENCE OF ATLANTA--RESULTS OF ITS CAPTURE Lines of supply by field trains--Canvas pontoons--Why replaced bybridges--Wheeling toward Atlanta--Battle of Peachtree Creek--Battleof Atlanta--Battle of Ezra Church--Aggressive spirit of Confederatesexhausted--Sherman turns Atlanta by the south--Pivot position ofTwenty-third Corps--Hood's illusions--Rapidity of our troops inintrenching--Movements of 31st August--Affair at Jonesboro--Atlantawon--_Morale_ of Hood's army--Exaggerating difference innumbers--Examination of returns--Efforts to bring backabsentees--The sweeping conscription--Sherman's candidestimates--Unwise use of cavalry--Forrest's work--Confederateestimate of Sherman's campaign. In advancing from the Chattahoochee, the arrangements Sherman madefor the supply of his army provided separate lines for the trains ofthe three columns. McPherson' s wagons would reach him from Mariettaby way of Roswell and the bridge which General Dodge built there. Schofield's had their depot at Smyrna and came by the wooden bridgewhich we built at the mouth of Soap Creek to replace the pontoons. The latter were of canvas, and whilst unequalled for field use, wereunfit for a bridge of any permanence, because the canvas would bedestroyed by long continuance in the water. As soon as they could bereplaced by a pier or trestle-bridge of timber, they were taken up, cleaned and dried, and then packed on their special wagons fortransport. This train was in charge of a permanent detachment oftroops who became experts in the handling and care of the materialand in laying the bridge. The brigade of dismounted cavalry in mydivision was left at the river as a guard for the wooden bridgewhich was kept up till the railway bridge was built and opened foruse. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 163. ]Thomas's troops, who were more than half the army, drew theirsupplies from Vining's Station byway of bridges at Power's Ferry(mouth of Rottenwood Creek) and Pace's Ferry, a mile below. Grant sent warning of rumors afloat that reinforcements would besent Johnston from the east, and in advancing from the Chattahoocheeby a great wheel to the right, Sherman extended his left so thatMcPherson should move to the east of Decatur and break the GeorgiaRailroad there, whilst Garrard with his division of cavalry shouldcontinue the destruction toward Stone Mountain and make the gap aswide as possible. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 158. ] This movement made the distance travelled by McPherson and Schofielda long one, and extended their front largely, whilst Thomas was muchmore compact. But when once the railway should be so broken thatJohnston's direct communication with the east would be interrupted, McPherson and Schofield would both move toward their right, and inclosing in upon Atlanta, come into close touch with Thomas. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 167. ] It was whilst this movement was progressing, on the 20th of July, and was near its completion, that Hood made the attack alreadyplanned by Johnston, upon Thomas's columns, crossing Peachtree Creekby several roads converging at Atlanta. It involved the right ofHoward's corps, the whole of Hooker's, and the left of Palmer's. Itwas a fierce and bloody combat, in which the Confederates lost about6000 men in killed and wounded, whilst the casualty lists ofThomas's divisions amounted to 2000. Again, on the 22d, the secondpart of Johnston's plan was tried, and Hardee's corps, moving bynight through Atlanta and far out to the southward of Decatur, advanced upon the flank of McPherson's army, whilst Cheatham at thehead of Hood's own corps advanced from the Atlanta lines andcontinued the attack upon the centre and left of McPherson and uponthe right of Schofield. A great battle raged along five miles offront and rear, but at evening the worsted Confederates retiredwithin the fortifications of the city, a terrible list of 10, 000casualties showing the cost of the aggressive tactics. The losses onthe National side were 3500, heavy enough, in truth, but with verydifferent results on the relative strength of the armies and their_morale_. But the end was not yet. On the 28th McPherson's army, nowunder the command of Howard, was marching from the left wing to theright, to extend our lines southward on the west side of Atlanta, when once more Hood struck fiercely at the moving flank at EzraChurch, but again found that breastworks grew as if by magic as soonas Howard's men were deployed in position, and again the graycolumns were beaten back with a list of 5000 added to the killed anddisabled. Howard had less than 600 casualties in the action. It wasonly a week since Johnston had been relieved, and matters had cometo such a pass in his army that the men stolidly refused to continuethe assaults. From our skirmish line their officers were seen toadvance to the front with waving swords calling upon the troops tofollow them, but the men remained motionless and silent, refusing tobudge. [Footnote: For details of these engagements, see "Atlanta, "chaps, xii. -xiv. ] During the first half of August Sherman extended his linessouthward, until my own division, which was the right flank of theinfantry lines, was advanced nearly a mile southeast of the crossingof the Campbelltown and East Point roads on high ground covering theheadwaters of the Utoy and Camp creeks. We were here somewhatdetached and encamped accordingly in a boldly curved line ready foraction on the flanks as well as front. It was now the 18th of Augustand Sherman devoted the next week to the accumulation of supplies, the removal of sick and wounded to the rear, getting rid ofimpedimenta, and general preparation for a fortnight's separationfrom his base. My position had been selected with reference to thisplan, as a pivot upon which the whole of the army except theTwentieth Corps should swing across the railways south of Atlanta. [Illustration: Map of the Atlanta, GA area, showing the Federal andConfederate lines. ] The movement began on the 25th, and we stood fast till the 28th, when we began our flank movement on the inner curve of the march ofthe army, taking very short steps, however, as we must keep betweenthe army trains and the enemy. On the 30th Schofield moved our corpsfrom Red Oak Station, on the West Point Railroad, a mile and a halfdirectly toward East Point, so as to cover roads going eastwardtoward Rough-and-Ready Station on the Macon road. We were hardly inposition before our skirmishers were briskly engaged with anadvancing force of the enemy's cavalry, and we felt sure that it wasthe precursor of an attack by Hood in force. It proved to be nothingbut a reconnoissance, and showed that Hood was strangelymisconceiving the situation. Its chief interest to me at the momentwas in the experiment it enabled me to make of the speed with whichmy men could cover themselves in open ground in an emergency. Thedivision was astride the East Point road, the centre in open fieldswhere no timber could be got for revetment, and only fence rails togive some support to the loose earth. Giving the order to make thelight trench of the rifle-pit class, where the earth is thrownoutward and the men stand in the ditch they dig, in fifteen minutesby the watch the work was such that I reckoned it sufficient coverto repel an infantry attack, if it came. It would be anextraordinary occasion when we did not have more warning of animpending attack; and the incident will illustrate the confidence wehad that in forcing the enemy to assume aggressive tactics, thecampaign was practically decided. On the 31st, as Sherman's left wing, we held the Macon Railway atRough-and-Ready Station, Howard, as right wing, was across FlintRiver, closing in on Jonesboro, whilst the centre under Thomasfilled the interval. Hood had sent Hardee with his own and Lee's(late Hood's) corps to defeat what was supposed to be a detachmentof two corps of Sherman's army, and a sharp affair had occurred atthe Flint River crossing, where Howard succeeded in maintaining hisposition on the east side. On hearing of our occupation ofRough-and-Ready, Hood jumped to the conclusion that it waspreliminary to an attack on Atlanta from the south, and orderedLee's corps to march in the night and rejoin him at once. Getting abetter idea of the situation before morning, he stopped Lee andprepared to evacuate Atlanta. On September 1st Sherman closed in onJonesboro, his latest information indicating that two corps of theenemy were assembled there. Late in the day he learned of thedisappearance of Lee's corps, but assumed that Hood was assemblingsomewhere near. He tried hard to concentrate his forces to preventHardee's escape, but his scattered army could not be united tillnightfall. In the night Hood blew up the ordnance stores at Atlanta, andhastening to join Lee by roads east of Sherman's positions, hemarched on Lovejoy Station. Hardee evacuated Jonesboro also, andbefore morning the Confederate army was assembled again upon therailroad, five miles nearer to Macon. Atlanta was occupied by theTwentieth Corps on the 2d, and Sherman ordered his army to return tothe vicinity of that city for a period of rest. Hood's conduct forthe past three days had been the result of complete misapprehensionof the facts; but its very eccentricity had been so incomprehensiblethat no rule of military probabilities could be applied to it, andbefore Sherman could learn what he was doing, the time had passedwhen full advantage could be taken of his errors. The condition of Hood's army at the close of the campaign wasanything but satisfactory to him. His theory was that his offensivetactics would keep up the spirit and energy of his men andconstantly improve their _morale_. When he found that they were, onthe contrary, discouraged and despondent, and could not be inducedto repeat the assaults upon our positions which had followed eachother so rapidly in the last days of July, he querulously laid theblame at the door of his subordinates. He called the attack uponHoward's advance at Flint River "a disgraceful effort" because only1485 were wounded, and asked to have Hardee relieved and sentelsewhere. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. Pp. 1021, 1023, 1030. Hardee had before asked to be relieved. (_Id_. , pp. 987, 988. ) For Hood's final, urgent request and the result, seevol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 832, 880, 881. ] True, he had telegraphedHardee that the necessity was imperative that the National troopsshould be driven into and across the river, and that the men must goat them with bayonets fixed; but it was his own old corps, now underLieutenant-General S. D. Lee, that made the principal attack and wasrepulsed. Lee was not one of the officers who might be presumed tobe discontented with Johnston's removal, but had been brought fromthe Department of Mississippi, at Hood's suggestion, to take thecorps when the latter was promoted, and had won Davis's admirationby his zeal. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 892, and vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 713. ] It would be hard to find better proof that the trouble lay inthe consciousness of the men in the line that they were asked to laydown their lives without a reasonable hope of benefit to theircause. The discouragement pervaded the whole army, and is seen inHood's own dispatches hardly less than in others. [Footnote: Hood toDavis, September 3, two dispatches, _Id_. , vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 1016. In another, p. 1017, he repeated an earlier suggestion toremove the prisoners from Andersonville. When Johnston had donethis, it was made one of the charges against him. See Davis to Lee, _Id_. , vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 692. For Hardee's opinion of thesituation, see _Id_. , vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 1018. ] In a laboredletter to Bragg on September 4th, he unconsciously shows how his owntotal misunderstanding of Sherman's movements was the prime cause ofhis disaster, whilst the shame at the result leads him to charge itupon others. As to the spirit of the army, nobody has given moretelling testimony, for he says, "I am officially informed that thereis a tacit if not expressed determination among the men of thisarmy, extending to officers as high in some instances as colonel, that they will not attack breastworks. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 730. This letter seems to have come to lightsince the first publication of the records of the campaign, and isfound in the supplemental volume. ] In the correspondence between Johnston and the Confederategovernment regarding the numerical force of his army, he naturallyemphasized his inferiority to Sherman in numbers as an explanationof his cautious defensive tactics and his retreating movements. Theintroduction into the Southern returns of a column of "effectives"as distinguished from the number of officers and men "present forduty, " [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. I. P. 482. ] led to a habitualunderestimate by their commanding officers. On several occasionsJohnston defended his conduct of the campaign by asserting that hisarmy was less than half the size of Sherman's, [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 795. ] and this necessarily led toan examination of his returns. These regular numerical reports areof course the ultimate authority in all disputes, and we find theRichmond government doing just what the historian has todo, --comparing the estimates of the general with his officialreturns. Officers of all grades and of the highest character fallinto the error of memory which modifies facts according to one'swish and feeling. Thus at the beginning of this campaign we findGeneral Bragg, speaking for the President, saying that GeneralPolk's "estimates and his official returns vary materially. "[Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 659. ] Nobody could be freerfrom intentional misstatement than the good bishop-general. We findthe same discrepancies at the East as well as the West. Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and their subordinates fall into the sameerror. It is therefore the canon of all criticism on this subject, that nothing but the statistical returns in the adjutant-general'soffice shall be received as proofs of numbers, though, of course, the returns must be read intelligently. Conscious of straining every nerve to reinforce the great armies inthe field, Mr. Davis naturally asked what it meant when the army inGeorgia was said to be so weak. General Bragg assisted him with ananalysis of Johnston's last returns. Writing on June 29th, he refersto the last regular return, that of June 10th, which is the same nowpublished in the Official Records. In using it, therefore, we agreewith the Confederate government at the time in making it conclusive. It shows that Johnston's army had present for duty 6538 officers and63, 408 enlisted men, or, in round numbers, was 70, 000 strong. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iv. P. 805; _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 677. ] The "effectives" are given as 60, 564; but this, aswe know, is the result of subtracting the number of the officers andnon-commissioned staff from the aggregate present for duty. But inaddition to the troops named, Bragg very properly adds that Johnston"has at Atlanta a supporting force of reserves and militia, estimated at from 7000 to 10, 000 effective men, half of whom wereactually with Johnston near Marietta. " We thus have from Confederateauthorities the proof that the army was nearly 80, 000 strong on June10th, after the first month of the campaign had closed, includingthe engagements at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope Church, Dallas, andPickett's Mill. To complete the examination of the same return, it is necessary tonotice that the "aggregate present" is given at 82, 413, or 12, 500more than the "present for duty. " This includes "extra-duty men, "such as clerks at headquarters of the organizations from Johnston'sown down to brigades and regiments, men permanently detailed for anyspecial service, men in arrest, etc. [Footnote: Hood's dispatch ofSeptember 5, _Id_. , pt. V. P. 1021; and his Order No. 19, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P. 835. ] It is here that good administration in anarmy seeks to reduce the number of those who are withdrawn from thefighting ranks, and to make the "aggregate present" agree as closelyas possible with the "present for duty. " I shall presently note theresult of such an effort. Sherman's return of "present for duty" on May 31st, just after Blairhad joined him with the Seventeenth Corps, was the largest of thecampaign, being 112, 819. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. I. P. 117. ] By the end of June it was reduced to 106, 070, whenJohnston's was 59, 196 without the reserves and militia. [Footnote:_Id. _, pt. Iii. P. 679. ] When Hood assumed the command, Bragg visited the army a second time, and gave new impulse to the effort to increase its effective force. On July 27th, in a very full report to Mr. Davis, he says, "theincrease by the arrival of extra-duty men and convalescents, etc. , is about 5000, and more are coming in daily. The return of the 1stof August will show a gratifying state of affairs. " [Footnote:_Id. _, vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 714. ] This promise was fulfilled whenthat return showed a diminution in the "present for duty, " since the10th of the month, of only 7403, [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. P. 680. ] although the period included the bloody engagements ofPeachtree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church. The Confederate conscription included the whole able-bodiedpopulation, and details as for extra duty were the means by whichphysicians, clergymen, civilian office-holders, etc. , were exemptedfrom service in the army. These lists were rigidly scrutinized, andthe laxity which had grown was corrected as far as possible. Theaggregate of Hood's army, "present and absent, " on August 1st, was135, 000, though his "aggregate present" was only 65, 000. [Footnote:_Ibid. _] It included, of course, prisoners of war, deserters, andmen otherwise missing, besides the class last mentioned. The extentto which the efforts to bring back absentees succeeded, is shown bythe return for September 20th, when the aggregate of the "presentand absent" falls to 123, 000, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. P. 637. ] though the "present for duty" are almostas numerous as at the end of July. The difference of 12, 000 showshow many were added to the army in this way, and these are inaddition to the thousands which Bragg spoke of as gained bytransferring non-combatants present with the army to the list ofthose present for duty. It is only by examining Hood's returns in this way that they becomeintelligible, for his rolls of those present for duty hardlydiminish at all during the whole month of August, being 51, 793 onthe 1st, 51, 946 on the 10th, and 51, 141 on the 31st. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 680-683. ] On September 10th he reports 46, 149, and on the20th 47, 431, the first of these returns including his losses in thefinal combats of the campaign and the fall of Atlanta, and thelatter indicating a gain by the exchange of prisoners with GeneralSherman. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 828, 850. ] Byignoring all the additions to his fighting force from the sourceswhich I have enumerated, Hood was able to claim that his totallosses while in command of the army were 5247. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. P. 636. ] The absurdity was indicated byHardee, who replied in his official report that the losses in hisown corps, which was only one third of the army, "considerablyexceeded 7000" during the same period. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 702. ] Sherman's returns show a steady diminution of his available numbersduring July and August, though, as he himself has said, it was notaltogether from casualties on the battlefield and the diseases ofthe camp. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 134. ] The term of serviceof all the troops enlisted in the spring and summer of 1861 forthree years was now ended, and an interval occurred in which the newlevies under the law to enforce the draft had not yet reached thefield, and the army was depleted by the return home of the regimentswhich had not "veteranized" in the last winter. He had present forduty, on July 31st, 91, 675 officers and men; on August 31st, 81, 758. Sherman's statement of his losses in battle and his comparison ofthem with his opponents is a model of candor and fairness. With thelight we now have, he might properly have increased considerably hisestimate of Johnston's casualties. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. Ii. Pp. 131-136. ] General Hood was quite right in arguing, in his memoirs, that thewounded in a campaign are not all a permanent loss to an army, "since almost all the slightly wounded, proud of their scars, soonreturn to the ranks. " [Footnote: Advance and Retreat, p. 217. ] Butwhat I have said above shows that he was entirely astray when heconcluded that the difference in the returns of his effective forceat the beginning and end of the campaign would show the number ofkilled and permanently disabled. The absence of data as to theadditions to his field force through the means which I haveanalyzed, shows how absurd a result was drawn from his premises. Thereports of casualties are not unfrequently faulty, but with alltheir faults they would be much more valuable if a complete seriesexisted which could be compared and tested. It would require aminute examination of all returns, from companies to divisions, todetermine accurately how many men returned to duty after beingwounded or captured. The imperfect state of the Confederate archiveswould prevent this, if it were otherwise practicable. Thestatistical returns are conclusive for what they actually give, butinferences from them must be drawn with care. As an illustration (inaddition to those already given) it may be noted that theConfederate cavalry made no returns of casualties or losses, andthey do not appear at all in the Medical Director's report whichGeneral Hood makes the basis of his own assertions. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. Iii. P. 687. ] How grave anomission this is will be partly seen from the fact that Wheeler'scorps, which reported 8000 men present for duty on August 1st (thelast return made), was in such condition when he reached Tuscumbiaafter the raid in the rear of Sherman's army, that itsadjutant-general doubted if more than 1000 men could be gottogether. [Footnote: Letter of General Forrest to General Taylor, Sept. 20, 1864, Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P. 859. ] The use of the cavalry in "raids, " which were the fashion, was anamusement that was very costly to both sides. Since Stuart's rideround McClellan's army in 1862, every cavalry commander, Nationaland Confederate, burned to distinguish himself by some suchexcursion deep into the enemy's country, and chafed at thecomparatively obscured but useful work of learning the detailedpositions and movements of the opposing army by incessant outpostand patrol work in the more restricted theatre of operations of thecampaign. From Chattanooga to the Chattahoochee, good work was done byStoneman and McCook in scouting upon the front and flanks of thearmy, and by Colonel Lowe in vigilant guard of the railway close inrear of Sherman's movements; but the use of mounted troops in masswas not satisfactory, and as to the raids on both sides, the gamewas never worth the candle. Men and horses were used up, wholesale, without doing any permanent damage to the enemy, and never reachedthat training of horse and man which might have been secured bysteady and systematic attention to their proper duties. Forrest, ofthe Confederates, was the only cavalry officer whom Sherman thoughtat all formidable, and he showed his high estimate of him byoffering, in his sweeping way, to secure the promotion of theofficer who should defeat and kill him. In another form he expressedthe same idea, by saying he would swap all the cavalry officers hehad for Forrest. [Footnote: The matter took an odd turn, when on thereport that General Mower had defeated Forrest in West Tennessee andthat the brilliant cavalry leader had fallen in the action, Mowergot his promotion, but it turned out that it was Forrest's brother, a colonel, who was killed--"a horse of another color. " Mower, however, was worthy of promotion "on general principles. " SeeOfficial Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 471; vol. Xxxix. Pt. I. P. 228; _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 130, 142, 219, 233. ] High as was the National estimate of the importance of Sherman'scampaign, Southern men rated it and its consequences quite as highas we did. In the conferences at Richmond, at which Mr. Hill hadrepresented the strong desire of Governor Brown and General Johnstonfor reinforcements, Mr. Davis had made his apprehension of thedisastrous results which would follow the loss of Atlanta the reasonof his urgency for a more aggressive campaign. In closing theinterviews, Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, and Mr. Hill showedtheir sense of the importance of the crisis by exchanging letterswhich were diplomatic memoranda of the conversations. Mr. Hillrepeated his conviction that the fate of the Confederacy hung uponthe campaign. He said that the failure of Johnston's army involvedthat of Lee; that not only Atlanta but Richmond must fall; not onlyGeorgia but all the States would be overrun; that all hopes ofpossible foreign recognition would be destroyed; in short, that "allis lost by Sherman's success, and all is gained by Sherman'sdefeat. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 706. ]Governor Brown had accompanied Mr. Hill's effort by a dispatch inwhich he declared that Atlanta was to the Confederacy "almost asimportant as the heart is to the human body. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 680. ] So far from taking exception to these strong expressions, Mr. Davis based his action in regard to General Johnston upon theabsolute necessity of a military policy in Georgia, which would holdAtlanta at all hazards. When the city fell, the whole South as wellas the North knew that a decisive step had been taken toward thedefeat of the rebellion. CHAPTER XLI THE REST AT ATLANTA-STAFF ORGANIZATION AND CHANGES Position of the Army of the Ohio at Decatur--Refitting for a newcampaign--Depression of Hood's army--Sherman's reasons for atemporary halt--Fortifying Atlanta as a new base--Officers detailedfor the political campaign--Schofield makes inspection tour of hisdepartment--My temporary command of the Army of the Ohio--Furloughsand leaves of absence--Promotions of several colonels--GeneralHascall resigns--Staff changes--My military family--Anecdote ofLieutenant Tracy--Discipline of the army--Sensitiveness to approvalor blame--Illustration--Example of skirmishing advance--Sufferingsof non-combatants within our lines--A case in point--Pillaging andits results--Citizens passing through the lines--"The rigors of theclimate"--Visit of Messrs. Hill and Foster--McPherson's death--Theloss to Sherman and to the army--His personal traits--Appointment ofhis successor. At the close of the first week in September the Army of the Ohioencamped at Decatur, and prepared for a month's rest. My divisiontook position on the east of the little town, Hascall's on thesouth, and our division of cavalry under Colonel Israel Garrard waseast of us, with outposts and patrols watching the roads in thatdirection as far as Stone Mountain. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 828. ] The Army of the Cumberland wasencamped about Atlanta itself, and the Army of the Tennessee was atEast Point. As Sherman cheerily announced in general orders, wemight expect "to organize, receive pay, replenish clothing, andprepare for a fine winter's campaign. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 801. ] It was of course probable that Hood would use the interval, whichwas even more welcome to him than to us, in similar preparation forresuming the struggle, though the resources of the Confederacy wereso strained that the Treasury was in debt to the soldiers for tenmonths' pay. He told the government that "it would be of vastbenefit to have this army paid, " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 1027. ] but this expressed his desire rather thana hope. Depression reigned in his camps about Lovejoy's Station, ofwhich the name was a mockery. Dissent was rife among his generalofficers, and with the whole army he had lost prestige by the costlyfailure of his campaign. A period of rest might relieve thediscouragement somewhat, and stringent means were to be used tobring absentees and conscripts to the ranks. Hardee was transferredto Savannah; Mackall, Johnston's devoted friend, was removed fromthe head of the staff, and other changes of organization were madewith a view to give Hood the men of his own choice in importantpositions. [Footnote: These were mostly in accordance with Hood'srecommendations to General Bragg when the latter visited him at theend of July. See Bragg to Davis, _Id. _, vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. P. 713. ] Sherman was fully aware that he would have many advantages inpushing after Hood at once, but besides his army's real need ofrest, he was clear in his judgment that he must, at this stage ofaffairs, prepare for a campaign on a great scale to be continuedthrough the winter till great results should be achieved. If theline of operations was to be extended toward Mobile, as wascontemplated by General Grant at the opening of the campaign, or ifHood should retreat toward the east, in either case he must makeAtlanta a fortified base. Experience had proven that his long lineof communications was liable to interruption, and would be stillmore so as he penetrated further into Georgia. He must have awell-supplied and well-protected depot in the same relations to thenext forward movement that Chattanooga had been to the campaign justfinished. He wanted to get his share of the drafted men under theconscription law now in operation, to fill up the places ofregiments whose terms had expired, and to be assured that Canby fromNew Orleans would co-operate in a settled plan. He was alreadyrevolving in his mind other problems which Hood might possibly openfor solution; but the probability seemed strong that the Confederatearmy would bar the way to his advance, and must be beaten and drivenback again. His first task, therefore, was to prepare Atlanta forhis uses. "I want it, " he said, "a pure Gibraltar, and will have itso by October 1st. " [Footnote: Dispatch to Halleck, September 9th. See also that of September 4th, in which his ideas were fullyoutlined. Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. Pp. 794, 839. ] Thisuse of the town made it necessary to remove the resident citizens, sending north those who were loyal and ordering south those whoadhered to the Confederacy. As a fortified depot must be ready for asiege, trade and free intercourse with the surrounding country couldnot go on. The inhabitants, therefore, would be dependent on thearmy for food, their industries must cease, and it was more mercifulto them, as well as a military necessity, to send them away. [Footnote: Sherman to Hood, _Id_. , p. 822. ] The temporary interruption of active campaigning was eagerly seizedupon as an opportunity for leaves of absence by those whose privateand family affairs urgently called for attention. The presidentialcampaign was on, and in consultation with Governor Morton ofIndiana, Secretary Stanton selected half a dozen officers from thatState, which was politically a doubtful one, to vary their labors inthe field by "stumping the State" for a month. The form of therequest indicates the feeling as to the character of the civilcontest. "In view, " said the Secretary, "of the armed organizationsagainst the Government of the United States that have been madethroughout the State of Indiana and are now in active operation inthe campaign for Jefferson Davis, this department deems it expedientthat the officers named should have leave to go home, provided theycan be spared without injury to the service. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 802. Among these appears the nameof Colonel Benjamin Harrison, 70th Indiana, afterward President. Sherman's characteristic reply was sent from camp near Jonesboro, on6th September: "The officers named in your dispatch of the 5th willbe ordered to report to the Governor of Indiana for special duty, assoon as I return to Atlanta, which will be in a day or two unlessthe enemy shows fight, which I am willing to accept on his own termsif he will come outside of his cursed rifle-trenches. " _Id_. , p. 809. I don't recall any other instance of a regular military detailfor a political campaign. ] Generals Logan and Blair also went Northfor similar work in Illinois and Missouri. In the middle of September General Schofield left the army for atime, to visit Knoxville and Louisville, within his department, onofficial business, and extended his absence for a brief reunion withhis family north of the Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P. 379; pt. Iii. P. 10. ] This left me in command of the Army of theOhio, and Hood's later movement upon our communications preventedSchofield's return till the end of our active campaign in October. Aliberal issue of furloughs to enlisted men, especially convalescentsin hospital, was made, so that we might get them back in robusthealth and good spirits when the fall campaign should open. GeneralHascall resigned and left us, and the command of his division passedto General Joseph A. Cooper, who had been promoted from thecolonelcy of the Sixth East Tennessee. My own division wastemporarily commanded by General James W. Reilly, who had beenpromoted on my recommendation from the colonelcy of the One Hundredand Fourth Ohio. Hascall had commanded his division with markedability throughout the campaign, but had become discouraged by theevidences that he need expect no recognition from the Indianagovernor, [Footnote: See _ante_, vol. I. Pp. 406, 485; vol. Ii. P. 253. ] whose influence was potent if not omnipotent in the promotionof Indiana officers. The recently announced promotion of Hovey overhim seemed to him equivalent to an invitation to resign, and heacted upon it. The resting-spell at Decatur was the natural time for such changesin organization as had become necessary. The death of myadjutant-general, Captain Saunders, in June, made it necessary tofill that very important position, and my aide, Lieutenant TheodoreCox, was promoted to it. His regiment (the Eleventh Ohio) was justcompleting its term of enlistment, and he would be mustered out ofservice with it, unless a new appointment were given him, fairlywon, as it had been, by two years of meritorious service. My requestwas so cordially backed by Generals Schofield and Sherman that therewas no hesitation at Washington, and I secured for the rest of thewar an invaluable assistant, whose system, accuracy, and neatmethods made the business of my headquarters go on mostsatisfactorily. My inspector-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Sterling, felt obliged toresign for business reasons connected with events in his father'sfamily, and I had to part with another faithful friend and ableofficer. As the adjutant-general is the centre of the formalorganization, keeping its records, carrying on its correspondence, and formulating the orders of his chief, so the inspector-general isthe organ of discipline and of soldierly instruction as well as thesuperintendent of the outpost and picket duty, which makes him theguardian of the camp and the head of the intelligence service whenno special organization of the latter is made. He should be one ofthe most intelligent officers of the command, and a model ofsoldierly conduct. It was no easy thing to fill Colonel Sterling'splace, but I was fortunate in the selection of Major Dow of the OneHundred and Twelfth Illinois, a quiet, modest man, a thoroughdisciplinarian of clear and strong intellect, and of that perfectself-possession which is proof against misjudgment in the mostsudden and terrifying occurrences. I had brought with me from East Tennessee, as my chief of artillery, Major Wells, who had commanded an Illinois battery, and who directedthe artillery service of the division with great success. My medicaldirector was Surgeon-Major Frink, of Indiana, who, though he tookthe position by virtue of his seniority in the division medicalstaff, was as acceptable as if I had chosen him with fullestknowledge of his qualifications. The topographer was LieutenantScofield of the One Hundred and Third Ohio, educated in civilengineering, and indefatigable in collecting the data by which tocorrect the wretched maps which were our only help in understandingthe theatre of operations. He was a familiar figure at the outposts, on his steadily ambling nag, armed with his prismatic compass, hisodometer, and his sketch-book. The division commissary ofsubsistence was Captain Hentig, a faithful and competent officer whoworked in full accord with Captain Day, the energetic quartermasterwho had come with me over the mountains the preceding year. A general officer's aides-de-camp are usually his most intimateassociates in the military family, and were sometimes selected withtoo much regard to their social qualities. Those of a major-generalwere appointed on his nomination, but a brigadier-general mustdetail the two allowed him, from the lieutenants in his command. When commanding a division, custom allowed him to detail a third. They were the only officers technically called the personal staff, the others being officers of the several staff corps, or merelydetailed from regiments to do temporary duty. Thus, noinspector-general was allowed to a brigadier, but when commanding adivision or other organization larger than a brigade, he waspermitted to detail an officer of the line for the very necessaryand responsible duty. The aides are authorized to carry oral ordersand to explain them, to call for and to bring oral reports, and asthe general's confidential and official representatives they shouldbe of the most intelligent and soldierly men of their grade. All theother staff officers may be called upon to act as aides when it isnecessary, but these are _ex officio_ the ordinary go-betweens, and, if fit for their work, are as cordially welcomed and almost as muchat home with the brigade commanders as with their own chief. My senior aide, after my brother's promotion, was LieutenantCoughlan of the Twenty-fourth Kentucky, a handsome young Irishman ofvery humble origin, to whom the military service had been therevelation of his own powers and a noble inspiration. He was litheand well set up, though by no means a dandy; would spring at callfor any duty, by night or by day, and delighted the more in hiswork, the more perilous or arduous it was. He was captured in thelast days of our operations about Atlanta; [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 623. ] but the exchange of prisonersnegotiated by Sherman gave me the opportunity to secure his returnafter a month's captivity and imprisonment at Charleston. Two monthslater he died heroically in the battle of Franklin. [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 356. ] Lieutenant Bradley of the Sixty-fifth Illinois was second on thelist, an excellent officer who was competent and ready to assist theadjutant-general in his department when work there was pressing. The third was Lieutenant Tracy of the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio, aman of original character. Tall and angular, there was a littlestoop in his shoulders and a little carelessness in his dress. Hisgait was a long stride, and he was not a graceful horseman. Hisexterior had a good deal of the typical Yankee, and our ConnecticutReserve in Ohio, from which he came, has as pure a strain of Yankeeblood as any in New England. But whoever looked into his sallow andbony face was struck with the effect of his large, serious eye, luminous with intelligence and will. Devotion to duty and perfecttrustworthiness, with zeal in acquiring military knowledge, were thequalities which led to his selection for staff duty. When we werepreparing for the great swing of the army to the south of Atlanta, my division had been advanced close to the enemy's position nearEast Point, where, from a strong salient in their works, their linecurved back toward the east. Our position was to be the pivot of themovement, and we intrenched the top of a forest-covered knollseparated from the Confederate lines by a little hollow in which rana small affluent of Camp Creek. Our pickets were directed to advanceas close to the enemy as practicable, so that any attempt to make asally would be detected promptly. Tracy had been directed toaccompany the officer of the day and see that the outposts were inproper position. Early next morning General Schofield visited me, and desired to see in person the point most advanced. I called Tracyfor our guide, and from the trenches we went down the slope, throughthe woods, on foot. A spur of the hill went forward, and as weneared the edge of the forest Tracy signalled to go quietly. Stooping carefully in the undergrowth, we noiselessly advanced to afence corner where a sentinel stood behind a tree. Halting a fewpaces away, Tracy motioned to us to avoid moving the bushes, but toapproach the fence and look between the rails. Doing so, we foundthe fence at the border of a little strip of hollow pasture in whichthe brooklet ran, and across it on the other slope, frowning uponus, was a formidable earthwork, an embrasure and the muzzle of agreat Columbiad looking directly at us. The enemy's sentinels hadbeen driven in, so that, where we looked, one was pacing his beat atthe counterscarp of the ditch. As we drew back to a distance atwhich conversation was prudent, Tracy asked with a grim little smilewhether the picket line was sufficiently advanced. The whole wascharacteristic of his thoroughness in the performance of duty andhis silent way of letting it speak for itself. He was struck in thebreast and knocked down by a spent ball in the assault by Reilly'sbrigade at Utoy Creek on August 6th, but in a week was on dutyagain, though he never wholly recovered from the injury to hislungs. [Footnote: Being in delicate health after the war, he wasmade Governor of the National Home for disabled soldiers at Dayton, Ohio, and died in 1868 from an abscess of the lung caused by the oldinjury. ] Officers were detailed from the line for other staff duty, such asordnance officer, commissary of musters, etc. , and there was no lackof good material. The general officer who sought for sober, zealous, and bright young soldiers for his staff could always find them. Theywere his eyes and his hands in the responsible work of a campaign, yet their service was necessarily hidden a good deal from view, andtheir opportunities for personal distinction and rapid promotionwere few compared with those of their comrades in actual command oftroops. It was interesting to observe the rapid progress in all theessentials of good discipline made in commands which were permanentenough to give time for development of order and system. We werefortunate in Sherman's army in having in himself and in the threecommanders next in rank examples of courteous treatment ofsubordinates coupled with steady insistence upon the prompt andright performance of duty. Under such a _régime_ intelligent mengrow sensitive to the slightest indication of dissatisfaction, and asuperior officer has to weigh his words lest he give more pain thanhe intended. An amusing instance of this occurred during thecampaign just ended. Late one evening my division was directed tomake a movement at sunrise next day, and the camp was quiet in sleepbefore my orders were sent out to the brigade commanders. He who wasassigned to lead the column was an excellent officer, but irascible, and a little apt to make his staff officers feel the edge of anyannoyance he himself felt. Some strain of relations among hisassistants at his headquarters happened to be existing when my ordercame. He had turned in for the night and was asleep when hisadjutant-general came to his tent to report the order. Not fullyaroused, he made a rough and bluff reply to the call, really meaningthat the staff officer should issue the proper orders to thebrigade, but in form it was a petulant refusal to be bothered withthe business. The adjutant took him literally at his word and lefthim. Next morning I was in the saddle at the time set, and with mystaff rode to the brigade to accompany the head of the column, when, lo, his command was not yet astir, though in the rest of the campbreakfast was over, the tents struck, and officers and men wereawaiting the signal to fall in. I rapped with my sword-hilt on thetent-pole, and when the dishevelled head of the colonel appeared, his speechless astonishment told the story of some great blunder. Idid not stop for particulars, but only said, "Your brigade, colonel, was to have had the place of honor in an important day's work; as itis, you will fall in at the rear of the column. Good-morning, sir. "He stood, without a word, till we rode off, and then turning to anaide who had come to him, exclaimed, "I wish to God he had cursedme!" In the movement upon Atlanta, after crossing the Chattahoochee, wewere not met in force till we came to Peachtree Creek and theextension of that line southward. The country was similar incharacter to that near Marietta, with openings of farming landsalong the principal roads, but probably three fourths of the countrywas covered with forest. In answer to questions from home as to whatour continuous skirmishing in such advances was like, I took as asample the 20th of July, when we were pushing in to connect withGeneral Thomas's right, and he was making his way to and acrossPeachtree Creek, where the battle was to rage in the latter part ofthe day. "My camp last night, " I said, "was formed of three brigades in twolines across the principal road, another brigade in reserve, and theartillery in the intervals, all in position of battle. A strong lineof pickets and skirmishers covered the front and flanks some threehundred yards in advance. In the morning we drew in the flanks ofthe skirmish line, reducing it to about the length of one brigadeacross the road, and it was ordered to advance. The men go forward, keeping the line at right angles to the road, stopping for neithercreek nor thicket; down ravines, over the hills, the skirmisherstrotting from a big tree to a larger stone, taking advantage ofeverything which will cover them, and keeping the general form ofthe line and their distance from each other tolerably correct. Themain body of the troops file into the road marching four abreast, with a battery near the leading brigade. Presently a shot is heard, off on the right, then two or three more in quick succession, and abullet or two comes singing over the head of the column. 'They'vestarted the Johnnies, ' say the boys in the ranks, and we move on, the skirmish line still pushing right along. It proves to be only arebel picket which has fired and run to apprise their comrades thatthe 'Yanks' are coming. Forward a few hundred yards, when, bang, bang, and a rattle of rifles too fast to count. The column ishalted, and we ride to the skirmish line to see what is up. A prettystrong body of 'rebs' is about some old log houses with a goodskirmish line on either side where our men must approach over two orthree hundred yards of open fields. A regiment is moved up to thenearest cover on each side of the road, a section of artilleryrattles up to the front, the guns are smartly unlimbered and pointedand a couple of shells go screaming into the improvised fort, exploding and scattering logs and shingles right and left. Out runthe rebs in confusion, and forward with a rush and a hurrah go ourmen over the open, getting a volley from the other side. Into thewoods they go. The rebs run; two or three are caught, perhaps, asprisoners, two or three of ours are carried to the rear onstretchers, and on we go again for a little way. This is lightskirmishing. Sometimes we find extemporized breastworks of rails orfallen trees, requiring more force to dislodge the enemy, and then, finally, we push up to well-constructed lines of defence where wehalt for slower and heavier operations. " The inhabitants within our lines about Atlanta had a hard time ofit, in spite of all efforts to mitigate their suffering. Theirunwillingness to abandon their homes was very great, and it was verynatural, for all they had was there, and to leave it was to bebeggared. They sometimes, when within range of the artillery, builtbomb-proofs near their houses, and took refuge in them, much as thepeople of the Western plains seek similar protection from tornadoes. In closing in on the west side of the town, near the head of UtoyCreek, we took in a humble homestead where the family tried to stay, and I find that I preserved, in another of my home letters, adescription of the place and their life there. "Just within my lines" (this was written on August 11th), "and notten paces from the breastworks, stands a log house owned by an oldman named Wilson. A little before the army advanced to its presentposition, several relatives of his, with their families, came to himfrom homes regarded as in more imminent danger, and they unitedtheir forces to build, or dig, rather, a place of safety. Theyexcavated a sort of cellar just in rear of the house, on thehillside, digging it deep enough to make a room some fifteen feetsquare by six feet high. This they covered over with a roof oftimbers, and over that they piled earth several feet thick, coveringthe whole with pine boughs, to keep the earth from washing. In thisbomb-proof four families are now living, and I never felt more pitythan when, day before yesterday, I looked down into the pit, and sawthere, in the gloom made visible by a candle burning while it wasbroad day above, women sitting on the floor of loose boards, restingagainst each other, haggard and wan, trying to sleep away the daysof terror, while innocent-looking children, four or five years old, clustered around the air-hole, looking up with pale faces and greatstaring eyes as they heard the singing of the bullets that wereflying thick above their sheltering place. One of the women had beenbed-ridden for several years before she was carried down there. Oneof the men was a cripple, the others old and gray. The men venturedup and took a little fresh air behind the breast-works; but for thewomen there is no change unless they come out at night. Still, theycling to home because they have nowhere else to go, and they hope wemay soon pass on and leave them in comparative peace again. " In an earlier chapter I have spoken of the easy descent from carefulrespect for the rights of property to reckless appropriation of whatbelongs to another, to robbery and pillage. [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 233-235. ] I find an instance of it given in one of the letters Ihave been quoting, which is the contemporary record of the thingitself which we had to deal with. It occurred on July 5th, when thewhole army was in motion, hurrying past our position southeast ofMarietta and following up Johnston's retreating army. "Some soldierswent to a house occupied only by a woman and her children, and afterrobbing it of everything which they wanted, they drove away the onlymilch cow the woman had. She pleaded that she had an infant whichshe was obliged to bring up on the bottle, and that it could notlive unless it could have the milk. They had no ears for the appealand the cow was driven off. In two days the child died, ofstarvation chiefly, though the end was hastened by disease inducedby the mother's trying to keep it alive on food it could not digest. I heard of the case when the child was dead and two or three of theneighbors were getting together stealthily to dig its grave. " One ofthem came to me to beg permission to assist, and to explain that thelittle gathering meant nothing hostile to us. I got the facts onlyby cross-questioning, for the old man was abject in his solicitudenot to seem to be complaining, and did not give the worst of thestory till my hot indignation at what I heard assured him ofsympathy and of a desire to punish the crime. "A woman came to me the same morning, and said the cavalry had takenthe last mouthful from her, telling her they were marching andhadn't time to draw their rations, but that she would be fed byapplying to us of the infantry column. The robbers well knew that wewere forbidden to issue rations to citizens. They sacked the houseof an old man with seven daughters by a second wife, all youngthings. He came to me in utter distress--not a mouthful in thathouse for twenty-four hours, their kitchen garden and farm utterlyruined, the country behind in the same condition, and he withoutmeans of travelling or carrying anything if he tried to move away. "I added, "Of course in such extreme cases I try to find some way ofkeeping people from death, and usually send them to the rear in ourempty wagon trains going back for supplies, but their helplesscondition is very little bettered by going. " Such things were done chiefly by the professional stragglers andskulkers, and the stringent orders which were issued in bothSherman's and Hood's armies did not easily reach men who would notreport for duty if they could help it. The country people could nottell who had done them the mischief, and the rascals would be gonebefore the case came before any superior officer who would interesthimself in it. I must not, however, suppress the comment I made inthe letter quoted. "The evil is the legitimate outgrowth of the hueand cry raised by our Christian people of the North againstprotecting rebel property, etc. Officers were deterred fromenforcing discipline in this respect by public opinion at home, andnow the evil is past remedy. The war has been prolonged, the armydisintegrated and weakened, and the cause itself jeoparded, becausediscipline was construed as friendliness to rebels. " Straggling andits accompanying evils may be said to be the gauge of discipline inan army. There were brigades and divisions in which it hardlyoccurred; there were others in which the stragglers were aconsiderable fraction of the whole. During the evacuation of Atlanta by the citizens, there was a gooddeal of migration beyond our lines among those who were notcompelled to go. In Decatur applications were made to me daily, andwe kept a record of the passes we issued, trying to know the purposeand motives of those going away, for, of course, a good deal of itwas with the intent to carry intelligence to the enemy. The reasonsgiven were often amusing. Two ladies applied, one day, for leave togo to Florida, which they claimed as their home. They said they hadbeen visiting kinsmen in Decatur when the advance of our armybrought them within our lines before they were aware of it. Whenasked why not stay with their friends till the armies should moveaway, they answered that they were sure they could not endure therigors of the climate! The phrase became a byword at ourheadquarters, where we were longing for the invigorating breezes ofthe North. We had a visit, about the middle of September, from two gentlemen ofsome prominence in the public affairs of Georgia, --Mr. Hill and Mr. Foster. They came ostensibly to seek to obtain and remove the bodyof Mr. Hill's son, who had fallen in the campaign, but I suspectedthat they represented Governor Brown, who was known to be in a stateof exasperation at the results to Georgia of a war begun to assertan ultra doctrine of State rights, but which had destroyed everysemblance of State independence and created a centralized governmentat Richmond which ruled with a rod of iron. Mr. Hill was the samewho had represented Governor Brown and General Johnston at Richmondin the mission in July, [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 272. ] and whilst hedid not formally present any subject except that of getting hisson's body, our conversation gave me sufficient knowledge of hisviews on the subjects of controversy to make me deeply interested inthe outcome of the visit to General Sherman which I arranged forhim. [Footnote: See Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 137. ] Nothing ofpresent practical importance came of the interviews, but thevoluminous and bitterly controversial correspondence between theGeorgia Governor and the War Department of the Confederacy is acurious revelation of the antagonistic influences which had sprungup in the progress of the war. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Lii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 736, 754, 778, 796, 803. ] The death of General McPherson in the battle of Atlanta had been agreat loss to the army, but to Sherman it was the loss of anintimate friend as well as an able subordinate. They had beenclosely associated under Grant in all the campaigns of the Army ofthe Tennessee, and their mutual attachment and confidence was asstrong as their devoted loyalty to their great chief. My ownacquaintance with McPherson had been slight, but yet enough toenable me to understand the warm personal regard he inspired inthose who came to know him well. I met him first on the day wepassed through Snake Creek Gap into Sugar Valley, before the battleof Resaca. We had to learn from him the positions of the troopsalready advancing toward the town, and I rode with General Schofieldto his tent for this purpose. Schofield and he had been classmatesand room-mates at West Point, and McPherson revealed himself to hisold friend as he would not be likely to do to others. His affabilityand cordial good-will struck one at once. His graceful bearing andrefined, intelligent face heightened the impression, and one couldnot be with him many minutes without seeing that he was a lovableperson. An evenly balanced mind and character had given him a highgrade as a cadet, and at the beginning of the war he was serving asa captain of engineers. Being appointed to General Grant's staff, hewon completely the general's confidence, and his promotion wasrapid, following closely behind that of Sherman. His death was sincerely mourned, and his place as a soldier was noteasy to fill. Sherman would have given the command of the Army ofthe Tennessee to General Logan, who was next in rank in it, but thestrong opposition of General Thomas made him conclude that thiswould be unwise. [Footnote: See Sherman, in The Great CommandersSeries, pp. 229, 332. ] If he made a selection outside of the Army ofthe Tennessee, Hooker had first claim by seniority of rank, but bothSherman and Thomas lacked confidence in him. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 272. ] When Howard was selected onThomas's suggestion, Hooker was doubly offended, for Howard had beenhis subordinate at the beginning of the year, and there had been nolove lost between them. Hooker now asked to be relieved from furtherservice in Sherman's army, and he retired from active fieldservice, --Slocum, another of his former subordinates, with whom hehad a violent quarrel, being appointed to the command of his corpson Thomas's nomination. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 272, 273. ] Halleck, ina letter to Sherman of September 16th, gave pointed testimony tofacts which showed why Hooker was personally an unacceptablesubordinate. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 857. ] Sherman insisted, with goodreason, that Hooker had no real grievance, as he was left in commandof his corps, and Howard's promotion was in another and independentorganization, the Army of the Tennessee. He also declared that noindignity was intended or offered, and that he simply performed hisown duty of selection in accordance with what he believed to besound reasons. As to Logan, he took pains to praise his handling ofthe Army of the Tennessee after McPherson's death, and to emphasizehis own high opinion of him as an officer and the respect in whichhe was held by the whole army. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 522. ] CHAPTER XLII CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER--HOOD MOVES UPON OUR COMMUNICATIONS Hood's plan to transfer the campaign to northern Georgia--Madepartly subordinate to Beauregard--Forrest on a raid--Sherman makeslarge detachments--Sends Thomas to Tennessee--Hood across theChattahoochee--Sherman follows--Affair at Allatoona--Planning theMarch to the Sea--Sherman at Rome--Reconnoissance down theCoosa--Hood at Resaca--Sherman in pursuit--Hood retreats down theChattooga valley--We follow in two columns--Concentrate atGaylesville--Beauregard and Hood at Gadsden--Studying thesituation--Thomas's advice--Schofield rejoins--Conference regardingthe Twenty-third Corps--Hood marches on Decatur--His explanation ofchange of plan--Sherman marches back to Rome--We are ordered to joinThomas--Hood repulsed at Decatur marches to Tuscumbia--Our own marchbegun--Parting with Sherman--Dalton--Chattanooga--Presidentialelection--Voting by steam--Retrospect of October camp-life--Campsports--Soldiers' pets--Story of a lizard. General Hood had been pretty well informed of what was going on inSherman's army, and was disposed to take advantage of the reductionof our forces by furloughs and the absence of numerous officers onleave. The Confederate President had visited him, and changes in hisarmy had been ordered which made the organization more to his mind. Hardee being sent to Savannah to command a department on the coast, General Cheatham succeeded to the command of the corps. Hoodproposed to cross the Chattahoochee some twenty miles west ofAtlanta, and move on Powder Springs, where he could reach therailroad and force Sherman to attack him or to move south. In thelatter case he proposed to follow, and had urged that the forces incentral Georgia be increased so as to resist Sherman's progress ifit should be toward Augusta or Macon. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 847, 862. ] Mr. Davis had been convinced by the campaign just ended that Hood'sfiery energy needed the guidance of a better military intellect, andthe plan of placing a common head over Hood's and Taylor'sdepartments had occurred to him. Beauregard was the officer whoserank, next to Johnston, indicated him for the command, but he wasdisaffected toward Davis, and his friends in Congress were active inopposition to the government. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 183. ] GeneralLee had suggested Beauregard to take Hood's place, and had soundedhim as to his willingness to do so after discussing with him thewhole situation in Georgia. Lee felt able, thereupon, to assure thePresident that Beauregard would accept the assignment; saying, "Ithink you may feel assured that he understands the general conditionof affairs, the difficulties with which they are surrounded, and theimportance of exerting all his energies for their improvement. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P. 846. ] But havinglearned Hood's plan of operating upon Sherman's communications, andbeing impressed anew by his visit with the energy of Hood's nature, which quickly reacted from the discouragement following the fall ofAtlanta, he partly accepted Lee's suggestion, modifying it by givingBeauregard the supreme direction of affairs in Georgia, Alabama, andMississippi, whilst leaving Hood free to carry out the plan ofcampaign which he proposed, and to retain the command of his armyexcept when Beauregard might be actually present with it. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 880. ] General Forrest with his cavalry corps had already been ordered tomake a raid upon the railways in Tennessee in pursuance of asuggestion of his own, and on September 16th he started northward. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 818, 835. ] This plan very well accorded withHood's, and when the latter determined, later in the campaign, himself to invade Tennessee, Forrest's orders were extended so as todirect a junction with him. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 843. ] On September 24th Sherman learned that Forrest was at Athens andPulaski on the railway from Decatur to Nashville. He had sent adetachment to burn bridges on the Memphis road also, and the wholeof middle and western Tennessee was afire with the excitement of thenew raid by the doughty Confederate leader. He received thesurrender of the garrison at Athens without serious resistance, butby the time he approached Pulaski, burning bridges as he went, General Rousseau, who was in command of the district, hadconcentrated force enough to repulse him. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 450, 455, 456, 870, 876, 879. ] After that Forrest attacked noconsiderable post, and did not reach Sherman's principal line ofcommunications, but making circuitous routes in the region aboutColumbia, finally retreated across the Tennessee River at Florenceon the 5th and 6th of October. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 547. ] On getting the news of Forrest's raid, Sherman sent back twodivisions of the Army of the Cumberland to Chattanooga, and one fromthe Army of the Tennessee to Rome. He also sent General Thomas toChattanooga to bring into co-operation all the troops posted inTennessee and northern Georgia. This scattering of his forces toprotect his railways proves how low an estimate he put upon theefficiency of Hood's army, and his willingness to receive an attackfrom it. When he moved northward after Hood, a week later, he leftthe Twentieth Corps to hold Atlanta, and had with him little morethan half of the forces with which he had made the Atlanta campaign;but they proved enough. My own command had been quietly resting at Decatur with nothing moreexciting to do than to send out foraging parties andreconnoissances, when on Friday, September 30th, I got a dispatchfrom General Sherman which put us on the alert. He told me that Hoodhad part of his infantry over the Chattahoochee, and was evidentlycombining desperate measures to destroy our railways. Afterreferring to his arrangements to checkmate Forrest, he gave the"nub" of his own ideas as follows: "I may have to make some quickcountermoves east and southeast. Keep your folks ready to sendbaggage into Atlanta and to start on short notice.... There are finecorn and potato fields about Covington and the Ocmulgee bottoms. Weare well supplied with bread, meat, etc. , but forage is scarce, andmay force us to strike out. If we make a countermove, I will go outmyself with a large force and take such a route as will supply usand at the same time make Hood recall the whole or part of hisarmy. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P. 540. ] Ianswered that we would be "minute men, " and also informed GeneralSchofield by telegraph that we might resume active work any moment. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 541. ] Next day Sherman had evidence that Hood was crossing theChattahoochee with his whole army, and wrote to General Howard andto me that if Hood should swing over to the Alabama railroad and tryto get into Tennessee, he would, if Grant consented, draw to him thetroops south of the Etowah, leave Thomas with the rest, and make forSavannah or Charleston by way of Milledgeville and Millen. By thedestruction of the east and west roads, Georgia would thus become abreak in the Confederacy. But should Hood move upon ourcommunications between the Chattahoochee and the Etowah, he wouldturn upon him. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 6. ] Thelatter was the movement Hood actually made, and the March to the Seawas postponed for a few weeks. I need not repeat here the details of the October campaign, which Ihave given elsewhere. [Footnote: See "Atlanta, " chap. Xvii. ; and forthe growth and completion of the plan of the March to the Sea, reference is made to the Life of General Sherman (Great CommandersSeries), chap. X. ] On the 2d Sherman was aware that the enemy wasadvancing on Marietta; but far from hurrying to anticipate himthere, we were held back yet another day that Hood might be luredfar enough to let us strike him in rear. General Corse at Rome wasordered to reinforce Allatoona pass and hold stubbornly there, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 8. ] and then, on the 3d and 4th, Sherman was in motion, trying to catch the enemyin that rough country on the border of the Etowah. On the 2d I hadsent a division to make a strong reconnoissance eastward to FlatRock, and a brigade to Stone Mountain to make sure that no enemy wasnear us in that direction, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 33. ] and on itsreturn we followed the rest of the army northward, Slocum's corpsremaining in garrison at Atlanta, as before mentioned. There had been continuous heavy rains, and all the rivers wereswollen, which retarded Hood's movements as well as ours; but heshowed commendable prudence, did not advance with his main bodybeyond Dallas, and operated by detachments on the railway, which hebroke near Ackworth, but did no serious damage. On the 5th Corse andTourtelotte made their fine defence of the position at Allatoonaagainst French's division, and on the 6th my reconnoissance provedthat Hood had concentrated again in the neighborhood of Dallas. Thetwo most important bridges on the railroad were now safe, thosecrossing the Chattahoochee and the Etowah; and as Forrest had failedto reach the line from Chattanooga to Nashville, Hood's plan ofcampaign had failed and Sherman's communications were unbroken. Unwilling to confess defeat, Hood now determined to make aconsiderable circuit westward, cross the Coosa below Rome and marchby the Chattooga valley upon Resaca, where the bridge over theOostanaula was next in importance to that at Allatoona. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 804. ] As the enemy's firstmovement from Dallas was westward, Sherman had to look forinformation as to his further course. Strengthening the garrison atRome, he waited at Allatoona for news, discussing with General Grantby telegraph his own plan of marching upon Savannah if Hood movedfar westward. The latter repeated to his government his purpose tofollow Sherman if he did so. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] The storms andfloods had done much more damage than Hood, several of the largebridges being injured and smaller ones carried away. At Allatoona Sherman's headquarters were close to my own, and heopened to me his views of the situation. He did not propose to leavethe railway line to follow Hood far; but if the opportunity offeredto fight him near the line, he would seize it. If Hood enteredTennessee near the Georgia line, he would follow and destroy him;but he was already confident that his enemy would not dare do this, and pointed to Muscle Shoals as the nearest point at which he waslikely to cross the Tennessee River. He hoped that General Grantwould consent, in this case, to his own march on Savannah, andpromised to lead Hood a lively chase if the latter turned back tofollow him. Once a new base on the sea was reached, he would turnupon and crush his opponent. His plan had a personal interest for myself, for as we were out ofcommunication with General Schofield and might march southward anyday, he thought it probable that he should separate the Twenty-thirdCorps from the Department of the Ohio and take it with him, makingmy command of it permanent. He assumed that Schofield would preferto remain in the higher position of department commander, ratherthan leave it for the field command of the corps, which was a gooddeal weakened by the hard service of the summer. From the 10th to the 13th of October the army moved in echelon byshort marches to Rome, and on the date last named I was ordered topush a reconnoissance with the corps and General Kenner Garrard'sdivision of cavalry down the Coosa far enough to settle the questionwhere Hood had gone. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 230. ] We started early and made thirteen miles in theforenoon, routing the enemy's cavalry holding that road andcapturing two cannon. It was definitely learned that Hood had takenup the pontoon bridge and gone north. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 250. ]Meantime the enemy had appeared at Resaca, and as soon as it wascertain that they were in force Sherman put everything in rapidmotion in that direction. He had warned Thomas on the 11th, anddirected him to reinforce Chattanooga and Bridgeport. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 251. ] There was again a chance that Hood might be caughtbetween the forces. He had approached Resaca from the west, by thenorth bank of the Oostanaula, on the 12th, but his summons of theplace being defied, he did not assault, but after some threateningdemonstrations marched north to Dalton. He plainly felt that he hadno time to spare, but it was just as plain that in his haste he wasaccomplishing nothing. My march down the Coosa had put me in the rear on the movement northfrom Rome. I reached Resaca on the 15th, in the early afternoon, having received authority from Sherman to pass the trains and pushforward. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 294. ] The Army of the Cumberland hadfollowed Hood to Dalton and Buzzard Roost, the Army of the Tennesseehad driven his cavalry out of Snake Creek Gap and occupied it, andwe were halted at Resaca to support either. General Schofield hadreached Chattanooga on the 13th, and was given command of all troopsin that vicinity by General Thomas, who was at Nashville. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 253. ] Schofield had inhand the two divisions which had been sent back from Atlanta afortnight before, besides the garrison; and other troops were on theway to him from Nashville. But communication with Sherman wasinterrupted, and Hood had better knowledge of the full situation. Learning that Chattanooga was held strongly, Hood marched fromBuzzard Roost by way of Villanow over Taylor's Ridge into theChattooga valley, up which he had just come. Prisoners told us thathis army was out of provisions, as they had failed in the hope ofcapturing depots of stores. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 791. ] Hemust get back within reach of his own depots. Gadsden had been madea temporary base, and he made haste to reach the valley of theCoosa, in which it lay. Sherman had wished that the rumor would turn out to be true whichgave the neighborhood of Bridgeport as the place at which Hood wouldenter Tennessee; [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. Pp. 296, 312. ] but if hedid so anywhere from Guntersville to Chattanooga, it would bepossible to head him off by General Thomas's forces whilst ourprincipal army closed in upon him from the rear. During the 16thSnake Creek Gap was cleared of the timber blockade which Hood hadmade to delay our chase, and my corps reached Villanow. The Army ofthe Tennessee was at Ships Gap, and that of the Cumberland in closesupport. We here learned definitely that Stewart's corps of Hood'sarmy had marched southward from Villanow to Subligna on the eastside of Taylor's Ridge, and the main body from Lafayette toSummerville on the west side. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 310, 311. ] After a day spent in reconnoissances and renewal of communicationswith Chattanooga and Nashville, we marched again on the 18th, Sherman leading the main army from Lafayette southward, whilst heordered me to march from Villanow by way of Subligna to Gover's (orMattox's) Gap, and thence to Summerville, following the enemy'scorps which had gone that way. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 325. ] We reached Subligna at noon, drivingvedettes and patrols of the enemy's cavalry as we advanced. FromSubligna I sent Major Wells of my staff with a regiment over themountain by a bridle path, to inform General Sherman of ourprogress. He had an unexpectedly long and rough march, but reportedas ordered. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 351. ] We continued the march toGover's Gap, drove away a cavalry rear-guard, and repaired the roadwhich ran along a bench cut in the precipitous hillside. An easy wayof communication with Sherman in the Chattooga valley was thusopened, after a day's march of twenty-two miles. General KennerGarrard with his cavalry had followed a parallel valley furthereast, toward Dirt-town, and joined me at Gover's Gap soon after myarrival there. We now marched through Melville to Gaylesville, wherethe army was concentrated on the 20th. The Twenty-third Corps wasplaced in advance, near Blue Pond, where a bridge over the Chattoogawas to be rebuilt, and one division was sent to Cedar Bluff, apretty village on the Coosa, where it covered the main road down thevalley from Rome to Gadsden. I made a reconnoissance to Center, overthe Gadsden road, and learned definitely that the whole army of Hoodwas at Gadsden. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 346, 357, 359, 361, 364, 369. 376, 399, 423. ] Sherman's wish that Hood would cross the Tennessee near Stevensonwas very sincere. He approved the movement by Schofield to occupyTrenton with the two divisions still under his command, but hedisapproved the directions given by Thomas to place troops atCaperton's Ferry, which was on the direct road to Stevenson. Hewanted that door left open till Hood should have part, at least, ofhis army over the Tennessee River. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 335. ] Hefelt so sure, however, that Hood would not fall into such a trap, that his dispatches reiterate the opinion that if the enemy crossedthe river at all, it would be west of Huntsville or at MuscleShoals. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 333, 357, 395. ] He was turning his whole mind to the March to the Sea, and studying the contingencies which it involved. In a long dispatchto Halleck on the 19th [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 357-358. ] he had mappedout his general scheme, and gave his reasons why he must havealternates in his choice of objectives, though his real aim would beSavannah. He therefore named, as the points where the Navy shouldwatch for him, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, and Mobile, saying, "I will turn up somewhere. " On the 22d, writing to General Grant, hereviewed the ground and the effect which it would have on theConfederacy when the Georgia railroads were destroyed and he should"bring up with 60, 000 men on the seashore about Savannah orCharleston, " concluding, "I think this far better than defending along line of railroad. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 395. ] At the outsetThomas had advised Sherman, in view of the fact that General Granthad not yet been able to carry out his plan to take southernseaports as a preliminary to an advance beyond Atlanta, to "adoptGrant's idea of turning Wilson loose rather than undertake the planof a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea. "[Footnote: Id. , p. 334. ] General James H. Wilson had been sent fromGrant's army to be chief of cavalry with Sherman, and Thomas'ssuggestion was that until Grant's part of the general plan should beaccomplished, activity should be limited to the defence of theterritory already occupied, except as cavalry raids might harry theConfederate country. But Sherman answered, "To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox and wear out any army inpursuit. To continue to occupy long lines of railroad simply exposesour small detachments to be picked up in detail and forces me tomake countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I amright in this, and shall proceed to its maturity. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 378. ] He set to work toorganize the two armies in such force that Thomas should feelcontent with his means of meeting Hood if the latter should not turnback after the Georgia column. General Schofield had been feeling his way southward with Wagner'sand Morgan's divisions, and on the 19th Sherman ordered him to moveby the most direct route to Alpine, overtaking the column which wasmarching on the west side of the Chattooga valley, as I was doing onthe east. Sherman added the direction to keep the command as it wastill they should meet in person. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 366. ] This hadreference to his purposes in regard to myself and the Twenty-thirdCorps, which have been mentioned. On the 21st Schofield's column reached Alpine, and he rode forwardto Sherman's headquarters at Gaylesville. I had gone up from my ownheadquarters to make some report to Sherman, and was with him whenSchofield arrived. Our greeting was a warm one. The presentsituation and what had occurred since the parting at Atlanta was ofcourse the first topic of conversation, and I had the keen pleasureof hearing Sherman praise the handling of the corps during the pastmonths in much stronger terms than he had used to me alone. Thenfollowed the forecast of the future. Sherman put strongly his beliefthat Hood would not cross the Tennessee above the Shoals, and hispurpose to march to Savannah as soon as the enemy should bedefinitely committed to a movement across Alabama. He then touchedupon the details of organization, and referring to the fact that thecorps was weak in numbers and that it would be perhaps unpleasantfor Schofield to leave the command of his department for anindefinite period, suggested that he should consent to the temporaryabsence of the corps. Schofield very promptly replied that he shouldprefer almost any alternative to the mere administrative work of thedepartment and its garrisons in East Tennessee and Kentucky. He saidthat if Hood should not follow the southern movement, but shouldturn his whole force upon Thomas with desperate purpose to drive himout of Tennessee, another veteran corps, though a small one, mightmake all the difference between defeat and victory. Sherman repliedthat he would consider the whole matter carefully and adjourned thediscussion, requesting that Schofield should confer fully with me. We continued the conference at the corps headquarters, and I agreedwith General Schofield that no military duty was so littleattractive as the perplexing semi-political administration at therear, adding that till the war ended I desired to be with thebiggest and most active column in the west. I frankly said that itwas this consideration that made with me the great attraction of thearrangement Sherman had suggested. Schofield expressed the strongconviction that Hood would not follow Sherman, and that in middleTennessee the real fighting must be done. He had no idea of puttingthe corps in garrison anywhere, but felt sure that Thomas mustconcentrate everything he might have for most active field work, andthat in strictest military sense our task, if we were there, wouldbe not less important or less honorable than that of our comradeswho marched eastward. It would, besides, give us the opportunity tofill up the corps with the new regiments that were coming forward, when otherwise, with the expiration of the term of some we had andthe casualties of a new campaign, we should probably find it reducedto a single division. Schofield's clearly expressed purpose to seekthe most active field work with Thomas in a campaign against Hood'sarmy if we went back to middle Tennessee brought me to agreementwith his views, and I promised to support them in my next interviewwith General Sherman, as I did. I still look back with pleasure tothis incident as proof of the hearty comradeship between Sherman andhis subordinates, which continued to be shown toward me by both himand Schofield to the end. [Footnote: My memory is supported, in thismatter, by home letters written at the time. ] Sherman postponed his decision till he was quite sure what courseHood would take, for the latter was concentrating his army atGadsden and having a conference with Beauregard on the day of theinterviews on our side which I have narrated. After agreeing withhis immediate superior upon the plan of entering Tennessee at ornear Guntersville, Hood started on the morning of the 22d, but inaccordance with confidential directions he gave his corpscommanders, his column changed direction at Benettsville, taking theDecatur road, which there branched to the left and forced themarching westward. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 831, 835, 81, 843. ] The gloss which he afterward put on thematter was that he changed his plan in consequence of informationthat Forrest could not join him as he expected. [Footnote: Advanceand Retreat, p. 20. ] This does not bear examination. Forrest was, under the orders of General Taylor, preparing a raid into westernTennessee to bring out all the supplies that country contained andto break up the railway to Memphis, sending the iron to repair theroad in the vicinity of Tuscumbia, where the base for the newoperations in middle Tennessee would be. On the 20th Hood hadhimself informed Taylor of his purpose to cross at Guntersville, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 835. ] andWheeler's cavalry was relied upon to cover the movement till middleTennessee should be reached. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 845. ] On the 22dTaylor was directed to have Forrest open communication with Hood "byletter or otherwise, " and act for the time under his orders, [Footnote: _Ibid. _] but no immediate interference with what Forrestwas doing in western Tennessee was indicated. The only reasonableinterpretation of Hood's conduct is that when he faced theconsequences of a movement to Guntersville with Sherman atGaylesville ready to close the _cul de sac_ behind him, even hisaudacity shrunk from the plan, and he proved the truth of Sherman'sprediction that he would not dare to do it. Beauregard explicitlysays that the change in Hood's plan was made after leaving Gadsden, where it had been definitely arranged. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 662. ] On our side several days were spent in watchful observation. Ireturned to my division, Schofield resumed the command of the Armyof the Ohio, and the divisions he had led from Chattanooga joinedthe Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, to which they belonged. [Footnote:_Id. _, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 401, 402. ] Thomas was informed thatthe Fourth Corps would be sent back to him with about 5000 men fromother commands who were not quite in condition for the March to theSea, but who would be fit for post garrison. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 408. ] Sherman's recommendations for promotions earned in the pastcampaigns were made on the 24th, in urgent and explicit terms, endorsing the approval expressed by the separate army commanders, and saying that if the law did not allow the addition to the numberof general officers, he believed that "the exigencies of the countrywould warrant the muster out of the same number of generals now onthe list that have not done service in the past year. " We who werethus recommended thought we had the right to feel that the terms ofapproval used by such a commander gave a military standing hardlyless than the actual gift of a grade from the government. [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 413. See Appendix C for the language used by Sherman, andfor the recommendation of General Schofield. ] On the 25th reports came from the light-draft gunboats patrollingthe Tennessee River that the enemy was making demonstrations atseveral points below Guntersville, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 436. ] and next day Sherman ordered the FourthCorps to march to Chattanooga and report to General Thomas. He alsoissued his order that "in the event of military movements or theaccidents of war separating him from his military division, " Thomasshould "exercise command over all troops and garrisons notabsolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief. " [Footnote: Id. , p. 442. ] He pointed out to Thomas that Chattanooga and Decatur werethe points to be held "to the death;" that it would not be wise tomove into West Tennessee unless he knew that the enemy had followedsouth, as he thought they would do when they found him starting fromAtlanta; and that when Thomas was ready for aggressive movements, his line of operations should be against Selma. [Footnote: Id. , pp. 448, 449. ] On the 27th of October Schofield wrote to Sherman, giving details ofthe reduction in numbers of the divisions of the corps now in thefield, and renewing his urgency for some arrangement to increase itsforce. [Footnote: Id. , p. 468. ] The news from the west now made itcertain that Hood was before Decatur, and Sherman issued orders onthe 28th for the army to march to Rome. His purpose in this wasdouble. He would try the effect on the enemy of the apparent starttoward the east, whilst he concentrated his army on the railroadwhich was now repaired and which gave him the means of rapidlyreinforcing General Thomas to any extent that might becomenecessary. He informed Halleck that he had sent the Fourth Corpsback and that he might send ours also, though he still thought itprobable that his movement on Macon would make Hood "let go. " Heurged the hastening of reinforcements to Thomas. Rosecrans promisedto send General A. J. Smith with his two divisions back fromMissouri, and Sherman only waited to get his sick and wounded to therear, and to accumulate at Atlanta the supplies he reckoned itnecessary to take with him. His determination to send us back tojoin the Fourth Corps was shown by his confidential dispatch toColonel Beckwith, his chief commissary, that he might reduce hisestimates for rations to enough for 50, 000 men to go south. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 476, 477. ] Our orders to march came at noon, and we started at once, with theinformation that from Rome we should go back to Tennessee. [Footnote: Id. , pt. I. P. 793. ] In the evening of the same daySherman definitely advised Thomas of his decision to send Schofieldto him, and the outline of the arrangements for the new campaign wascompleted. [Footnote: Id. , pt. Iii. P. 484. ] General R. S. Grangerwent with reinforcements to the aid of Colonel Doolittle, whocommanded the post at Decatur, and that place was held against Hood, who was too short of supplies to delay long. He hastened on toTuscumbia, where his new base was established, and where he haltedto collect the means for the invasion of Tennessee, near the greatbend of the river. He first gave orders to lay his pontoons atBainbridge, at the foot of Muscle Shoals, the place named by Shermanas his probable crossing; but the lack of supplies and the desirefor better preparation prevented, and he moved on, reachingTuscumbia on the 30th. [Footnote: Id. , p. 866. ] Our march to Rome was lengthened by our taking the right, leavingthe more direct roads for other parts of the army. We crossed theCoosa, following the road to Jacksonville for five miles, and thenturned east on the so-called river road. This, however, provedimpassable, and, next morning, we were obliged to retrace our stepsto the Jacksonville road, and going an hour's march on it reach theroad from Centre to Cave Spring, which we followed to the latterplace, which takes its name from a remarkable spring breaking outbeneath a mountain, a considerable brook at once. Some sixty feet upthe hill-side is the mouth of a cave at the bottom of which is theunderground stream, which finds its way out by another fissure. Thevillage was the rendezvous where Beauregard overtook Hood on theevening of the 9th of October, and held their first consultation inregard to the campaign. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. I. P. 796. ] It was a pretty place which had not suffered the ravagesof war; the situation was a lovely one, and there were there apublic Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb and some other public buildings. Our countermarch had lengthened the day's journey to twenty-twomiles. On the 30th my division marched to Rome and encamped on the Calhounroad, two or three miles northeast of the town. At Rome I made myfarewell visit to General Sherman at his headquarters. He talkedfreely of his plans to the group of officers who were present, andin the final hand-shaking with me said that Hood had now put solarge a space between them that the March to the Sea could not beinterfered with, and that whatever hard fighting was to come in thecampaign would fall to the lot of us who were going back to middleTennessee. [Footnote: The fullest resume of Sherman's views when onthe point of starting is found in his letter to Grant of Novembereth. Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 658-661. ] Ourmovement northward was through Calhoun and Resaca to Tilton, wherewe were to take railway trains for Nashville; but the rolling stockwas overtasked in the rush of work to complete Sherman'spreparations, and we marched on to Dalton. An autumnal rainstorm hadcome on, and though we had good camping ground, our impatience atthe delay made our stay of three or four days at the ruined villageanything but pleasant. On the 3d of November I noted in mypocket-diary that it was one of those rainy, gusty days "when thesmoke from the camp-fire fills your eyes whichever side of the fireyou get. " As we had gone northward we met large numbers of officersand men who had been on leave, and who were now hurrying to jointheir commands. Two of my own staff rejoined us in this way, and abrand-new brass band that had been recruited for Casement's brigadecame also, making that command proud as peacocks for a while. Our stay at Dalton gave me the opportunity in the intervals of thestorm to ride out and carefully examine the positions the enemy hadheld at the beginning of May. In the progress of an active campaignthe soldier rarely has an opportunity to make such an examination offortified positions out of which the enemy has been manoeuvred, andI had eagerly seized every chance to do this interesting andinstructive work as we had come back through our lines aboutMarietta and Allatoona. Here at Dalton Johnston's positions had beenplainly impregnable, and I congratulated myself that my division hadnot been ordered to assault them when we made our reconnoissance inforce, before Sherman began the turning movement through Snake CreekGap. Whilst waiting for our railway trains we heard of Hood'sdemonstration at Decatur, and of his repulse and his march towardFlorence. We knew that he had not yet crossed the Tennessee, andthat our delay was not causing embarrassment to General Thomas atNashville. I got one of my brigades away on November 6th, and theothers on the 7th, going with Casement's, which was the last. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 655, 673. ] Aswe ran into Chattanooga, we were all alert to see the place whichhad become of such historical importance, for we had advanced intoGeorgia in the spring by roads far to the east, and I had nevervisited it. We reached the town just as the sun was setting and thelong storm was breaking. My headquarters were in a freight car, andwith the side doors slid wide open, we sat on our camp-stools in thedoorway watching our progress. Fort Phelps on its isolated hillstood up black and sharp against the western sky, which wasgray-clouded, with a long rift, blood red where the sun was breakingthrough, whilst still further to the left the huge shoulder ofLookout Mountain threw its deep shadows over the landscape. From theother side a fine reach of the Tennessee River opened before us, backed by the mountainous ridges on the north, gleaming in the levelsunlight. We did not leave our train, but after a short delay started againfor Nashville. The crowded state of the road made frequent haltsnecessary, and when day broke we had made only eight miles. As weran between the high hills, they were in their most gorgeous autumndress; and, free from care, we enjoyed it all as a holiday outing, calling each other's attention to every new combination of mountainand river, and of changing schemes of brilliant color. It was thePresidential election-day, and in accordance with the provisions ofthe statutes, we opened the polls in my box car, and the officersand men voted at the halts of the train when they could get to thevoting place. Colonel Doolittle of the Eighteenth Michigan, commandant of the post at Decatur, joined us at Stevenson, cominginto my car to vote. From him we learned the details of Hood'sattempt upon the Decatur post, and got interesting news, throwinglight upon the situation before us. At my invitation he remainedwith us till we reached Nashville, and the acquaintance thus formedled to an arrangement for his temporary service with me after thebattle of Franklin. As I wrote home, we voted by steam for "A. Linkum, " seeing the end of the war manifestly approaching. Theelection for Ohio State officers had occurred in October when wewere on the march after Hood, and at a noon halt we turned anambulance into a polling booth in a grove on the banks of the EtowahRiver, where I voted with one of the Ohio regiments. Our little October campaign had been a good example of what soldiersregard as pleasant work. There had been constant activity, with nosevere fighting, and the weather had been, for the most part, magnificent. The rains had ceased at the end of the first week ofthe month, and from that time till we halted from our chase on thebanks of the Coosa in the edge of Alabama we had a succession ofbright, cool days, and comfortable nights. It had been like a huntfor big game on a grand scale, with excitement enough to keepeverybody keyed up to a high pitch of physical enjoyment, ready forevery call to bodily exertion. The foliage was ripening and changingin the equable autumnal airs without frost, and the results wereoften very surprising and very beautiful. The gum-tree [Footnote:Liquidambar Styraciflua. ] is very common in the open fields of thatpart of Georgia, and each fine rounded mass had its own specialtint, bright crimson, green-bronze, maroon, or pure green; and whena camp-fire was lighted in a grove of such trees the evening effectwas a thing to remember for a lifetime. The regimental camps wereall alive with diversions of different sorts from the time of thehalt at the end of a march till tattoo sounded. Each had its trainedpet animals, and the soldiers exhausted their skill and patience inteaching these varied tricks. One regiment had a pair ofbull-terrier dogs that played a game which never failed to amuse. Ata signal one of the dogs would seize a firebrand by the unburnt endand start off on a run through the camp; the other would follow atspeed, trying to trip up the first, to collar him or push him over, and so force him to drop the brand. The second would then grasp itand the chase would be renewed, doubling in and out, over logs, orthrough a group of lounging men, scattering them right and left, theyelp of the chasing dog accompanying the blazing meteor as it cutodd figures in the darkness, and the shouting laughter of the menencouraging the dogs to new efforts to outdo each other. Theintelligence of the dogs in playing the game with apparentrecklessness, yet without getting burnt, was something wonderful. I had myself an interesting experience with a beautiful littlecreature. Coming one day suddenly into my tent, I surprised a littlegold and green lizard on my camp desk. The desk was a small portableone, with lid falling to make the writing-table, set on a trestle, and my appearance scared the little animal into a pigeon-hole, whichit took for a way of escape. I sat down on my camp stool in front ofthe desk, and resumed my writing, watching, also, to see what myprisoner would do. Its little jewel eyes shone in the recess of itsprison cell, and soon it cautiously came to the front; but the firstmove of my hand toward it made it dodge back into the darkness. Twoor three times this was done, and I got no nearer to it; so Ichanged my tactics. I placed my hand against the next pigeon-hole, extending one finger over the occupied one, and waiting in perfectquiet for a few moments, my beauty came slowly forward over thepaper files to the mouth of the pigeon-hole near my finger. Withgreat caution and gentleness I stroked its head and it remainedquiet. A few more strokes and it seemed pleased and rapidly grewtame. It ceased to be afraid of my motions, and did not try to getaway. At intervals, as I sat, the acquaintance was renewed, and thelittle thing seemed to become fond of me, running about on mypapers, climbing my arm to my shoulder, and running back to its homeif any one entered the tent. In short, I had followed the example ofthe private soldiers and had a pet. When we marched I put it on myhat rim as I mounted my horse, thinking it would soon leave me; butit did not. It sat on my hat-crown like a most gorgeous aigrette, ortook a little tour around the hat-band or down on my shoulders. Iforgot it when busy, but it stayed by, and at the end of a march, when my tent was pitched again and my desk in the usual place, itresumed its home there and thrived on the flies it caught. It waswith me for some weeks and became known at headquarters as anattache of the staff. The day we followed Hood westward from Resacathrough Snake Creek Gap, I had dismounted, and was talking withGeneral Whitaker, commanding a brigade in the Fourth Corps, whosemen with mine were cutting out the timber blockade in the Gap. I hadno thought of my lizard, but one of his orderlies caught sight of iton my shoulder. With the common prejudice among the soldiers thatthe harmless thing was a deadly poisonous reptile, he stood a momentstaring and half transfixed, thinking me in deadly peril. Then, witha jump, he struck it off my shoulder with his open hand, and stampedit dead with his heavy boot heel, sure he had saved my life. Butwhen one of my attendants exclaimed reproachfully, "There, you'vekilled the general's pet, " the poor fellow slunk away, the pictureof shame and remorse. Pets were sacred by the law of the camp, andhe felt and looked as if he were a murderer. No doubt he was alsostupefied at the idea that such a thing could be a pet, but in thematter of pets, as in some other things, he bowed to the law, "Hisnot to reason why!" CHAPTER XLIII NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN--HOOD'S ADVANCE FROM THE TENNESSEE Schofield to command the army assembled at Pulaski--Forrest'sTennessee River raid--Schofield at Johnsonville--My division atThompson's--Hastening reinforcements to Thomas--Columbia--Thebarrens--Pulaski--Hood delays--Suggests Purdy as a base--He advancesfrom Florence--Our march to Columbia-Thomas's distribution of theforces--Decatur evacuated--Pontoon bridge there--Withdrawing fromColumbia--Posts between Nashville and Chattanooga--The cavalry on29th November--Their loss of touch with the army. Our railway train reached Nashville in the forenoon of Wednesday the9th of November, and I at once visited General Schofield to reportmy arrival and get further orders. He had himself reported toGeneral Thomas by telegraph when we reached Calhoun on the last dayof October, and Pulaski, eighty miles south of Nashville, had beengiven as the rendezvous for our corps with the Fourth. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 538. ] Thomas was taking acheerful view of the situation now that the Twenty-third Corps hadbeen ordered to him, and on the 3d of November, in giving Sherman anoutline of the progress of events, said that if Beauregard "does notmove before Sunday (6th), I will have Schofield and Stanley togetherat Pulaski, and he can then move whenever he pleases. " [Footnote:Id. , p. 618. ] Schofield got part of Cooper's division off onThursday, with arrangements for the rest to follow, and took therailway train himself next day. Thomas's plans then were to send thetroops through Nashville without stopping, but he asked Schofield tostop for a short consultation. [Footnote: Id. , p. 624. ] Withoutwaiting for this, however, he issued his order on Friday, assigningSchofield to command the troops assembling at Pulaski to operate infront of that place. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxiv. Pt. Iii. P. 638. ] This was a graceful act toward an officer of his owngrade as a department commander, when as yet it was an open questionwhether the assignment by the President to command a department andarmy in the field gave precedence over officers in otherorganizations, senior in date of commission, but not so assigned. [Footnote: The matter has been decided in the affirmation by the Wardepartment and the decision had been transmitted in Halleck's letterto Sherman dated October 4th, but the interruption of communicationshad prevented its reaching Sherman for some time, and Thomas had notreceived it when he made the order. For the whole discussion andcorrespondence, see _Id_. , vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. Pp. 734, 753, 797;vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 64, 638, 666, 684, 685, 691, 692, 703, 704;vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 959. ] When Schofield reached Nashville on the 5th, he found Thomas busywith a new problem. Forrest had set for him by his raid down theTennessee valley on the west side. A gunboat had been captured, anddemonstrations opposite Johnsonville by the raiders had beenfollowed by the unnecessary destruction of a fleet of transports, three gunboats at the landing, and vast quantities of stores. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxix. Pt. I. P. 861, 864, 866. ] The placewas the terminus of a railway from Nashville to the Tennessee River, and was an intermediate depot of supplies in a low stage of water inthe rivers. At other times steamboats could ascend the Cumberlandall the way to Nashville. The exaggerated reports of the enemy'sforce and apparent purpose to cross the river there made Thomasthink it wise to modify his plans for the moment, and he orderedSchofield to proceed at once to Johnsonville with the two brigadesof the Twenty-third Corps then in hand, Moore's and Gallup's, intending to concentrate the whole corps there as fast as theyshould come from Georgia. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 647. ] As soon as Sherman could decipher Thomas's dispatches, he warned thelatter of the danger of a false move, as only Forrest's cavalry wasdown the river, and Hood's army was known to be at Florence. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 647. ] WhenSchofield got to Johnsonville, he soon saw the real state ofaffairs, and advised Thomas that the two brigades were enough. Heinstructed General Cooper as to improving the defences of the town, and returned to Nashville on the 7th. Next day he made a hurriedvisit to Pulaski to examine the situation there, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 708. ] where was now the railway terminus of the line to Decatur, the bridges and trestles about Athens having been destroyed byForrest in his September raid. He got back to Nashville before dayon the 9th, and was ready to meet me on my arrival there. From him Igot full information of the situation, and orders to take mydivision to Columbia, where he expected to join me in two or threedays. Leaving Nashville in the afternoon, we learned on reaching Franklinthat a wreck on the railway near Spring Hill obstructed the track, and our trains were halted till the way should be cleared. We hadmade only twenty miles; the weather had changed again to a cold, drenching rain. Thursday, the 10th, was clear and cold, and whilstwaiting for the railway to be open again, I made my firstacquaintance with the pretty village on the banks of the Harpeth inwhich I was to feel a much more lively interest three weeks later. As soon as the railway officials could put the trains in motion weresumed our journey. Reilly's brigade gets to Spring Hill, half-wayto Columbia, but the insufficiency of siding at that place makes itimpracticable to handle all the trains there, and the rest of us arestopped at Thompson's Station, three miles short. We leave the carsand go into camp so as to release the trains for other work, whilstwe organize again for field operations, though our wagons had notreached us. Strickland's brigade of Cooper's division hasaccompanied us and is attached to my command temporarily. Some fivemiles north of Columbia there is a break in the railway, and we aredelayed till it can be repaired and communication with Columbiafully opened. The two or three days intervening are spent in gettingforward horses for the artillery, rations, and advance stores, so asto become again a self-dependent unit of the army. We found thecountry in this part of Tennessee richer and finer than any we hadcampaigned in, much more open, with well-tilled farms. The news we got indicated that Forrest had joined Hood at Florence, and that the enemy was preparing there for a forward movement. Iopened communication with the Fourth Corps at Pulaski, and was underorders, to join them whenever an advance of Hood should make itnecessary. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 748, 749. ] On the 11th Sherman still inclined to the opinion thatBeauregard would order Hood to follow him, as soon as his southwardmarch should really begin. "I rather think you will find commotionin his camp in a day or two, " he said to Thomas; for his ownpreparations were now complete, and his communications with theNorth were to be cut next day. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 746. ] Thehumorous side of things struck him forcibly, and in giving toCaptain Poe, his engineer, directions to destroy the foundries, workshops, and railway buildings at Atlanta, he had added, "Beauregard still lingers about Florence, afraid to invadeTennessee, and I think slightly disgusted because Sherman did notfollow him on his fool's errand. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 680. ] Theirony fitted Hood better than Beauregard, for the latter had nottaken personal direction of the active army; but the relationsbetween the two Confederate generals were very imperfectly known tous, and we naturally assumed that Beauregard was himself responsiblefor the immediate conduct of the whole. The progress of the work of reinforcing Thomas was not quite asrapid as it seemed. Grant had sent General Rawlins, his chief ofstaff, from Petersburg to St. Louis to see that A. J. Smith's corpswent promptly forward from Rosecrans's department. Besides the 9000in Smith's immediate command, 5200 men were collected from posts onthe Mississippi and Ohio, and were put in motion toward Nashville. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 684. ] Rawlins'sreport on the 7th, that these were starting, was understood byThomas to apply to the whole of Smith's force, and he thereforereckoned on their reaching him in a few days. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 685. ] Rawlins in fact expected Smith's own divisions to leave St. Louis on the 10th, but even this was much sooner than they reachedthe river. The same news was sent to Sherman, and he expressed hisjoy that these veteran reinforcements were on the way, and hisconfidence that the enemy was now checkmated. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 686. ] The result was a little over-confidence in all quarters, whichprobably had its influence in making Thomas less energetic inconcentrating the troops available in Tennessee than he would havebeen had he known that Smith's 9000 would not reach Nashville tillthe last day of the month. [Footnote: See "Franklin and Nashville, "pp. 132 _et seq_. ; "Battle of Franklin, " pp. 40, 41. ] On the 13th I marched to Columbia, and Schofield went in person toPulaski, where he assumed command. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt iii. Pp. 764, 768. ] Wooden pontoons were sent the same dayto Columbia for the crossing of the Duck River there, and the bridgewas completed at ten o'clock in the evening. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 795. ] As the river was too high to ford, we had encamped onthe north side, in the tongue made by the horse-shoe bend to thesouthward. We occupied the fine open wood on rolling ground, andmade ourselves as well acquainted with the village and surroundingcountry as time would allow. Columbia, on the south bank of theriver, had been a centre of education and refinement, and severalcollege buildings were there, surrounded by ample groves. Theneighborhood was the home of the Polks and the Pillows and otherpeople of national reputation, whose ample estates lay on the roadsdiverging from the town. Between the village and the railway bridgebelow the place was an isolated hill on which was an enclosedredoubt, commanding the crossing. It was a strong position whenconnected with sufficient forces near by, but too small and toodetached to have much independent value. Leaving Strickland's brigade as a garrison for the town, the rest ofmy command marched next morning toward Pulaski, reaching Lynnville, eighteen miles south of the river, where a road from Lawrenceburgcomes into the turnpike. I was pretty strong in artillery, havingfive batteries, two of which properly belonged to the seconddivision. Ten miles south of Columbia we left the open country andentered a hilly, forest-covered region, with cultivation only in thenarrow valleys of small streams. This high water-shed between theDuck River and the Elk extends nearly all the way from the plateauof the Cumberland westward to the Tennessee River, where it has madeits great bend to the north. It is known as the "barns" (barrens), and is desolate enough. In many places one may travel for mileswithout seeing a house. Wood-chopping and charcoal-burning forsmelting furnaces seemed to be the principal industry. On the 15th we continued our march in a heavy, cold rain to PigeonCreek, two miles north of Pulaski, making sixteen miles. GeneralSchofield met me there, and we examined the country westward somethree miles, our reconnoissance determining him to keep the divisionat the turnpike crossing of the creek, where we accordinglyencamped. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 357. ] Ithad been confidently expected that Hood would march northward by thetime we could reach Pulaski, but he delayed, and it was a week laterbefore he really opened his new campaign. Various things combined togive plausible reasons for his delay. He could not get the supply ofstores which he needed. The gap in his railroad from Cherokee toTuscumbia was not rebuilt. The weather was continuously cold withheavy rains, and the roads going from bad to worse. The truth, nodoubt, was that Sherman's march southward had a most perplexingeffect, raising portentous problems as to its result upon theConfederacy, and reducing Hood's own campaign to a secondary placein the general progress of the war. Torn by doubts, he seemedwilling to find excuses for postponing action, hoping to see clearerlight on the future before committing himself to a decisivemovement. An interesting item in the discussion between theConfederate generals was that Hood suggested Purdy as a better basethan Tuscumbia, and proposed to abandon the work of rebuilding therailroad near that place. Purdy was some twenty-five miles north ofCorinth on the Mobile and Ohio Railway, and not far from the oldbattlefield of Shiloh. Its landing-place on the Tennessee River wasnearly opposite Savannah, and it was there that Grant had stoppedhis steamboat for a conference with General Lew Wallace on his wayto Pittsburg Landing the morning of the great battle. It is probablethat Hood thought it advantageous to take a line by which he mightavoid the risk of expeditions from Decatur, and could more safelyturn Schofield's position at Pulaski, by operating further from ourline of railroad and making it necessary for us either to retirerapidly toward Nashville, or meet him so far from our supply line asto be dependent, like himself, on wagon transportation. Beauregardapproved the change of base if made after the first stage of thecampaign should be complete, and planned a scheme of floating boomsarmed with torpedoes to protect the pontoon bridge when it should belaid there. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 900, 905; vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 1210. ] The road from Savannah throughWaynesborough to Columbia was a turnpike, and would be safer forwagon trains than that from Florence, because so much further fromposts on our railway. It would also be a better line of retreat incase of disaster. The plan was not tried, because the withdrawal ofour forces from Decatur and Pulaski removed the dangers which Hoodapprehended, and made his communications secure. The rains raisedthe river so much that the bridge laid at Florence was no longerprotected by its situation between Muscle Shoals above and ColbertShoals below, and the Confederates had reason to fear that it wouldbe destroyed by gunboats coming up the river. The navy had beenunfortunate in the destruction of gunboats at Johnsonville, butRear-Admiral S. P. Lee had been sent to take command of the riverfleets co-operating with Thomas, and was planning active work withheavier vessels. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 734. ] On the 14th the river had risen eighteen feet at Florence, andHood's bridge was with great difficulty kept in its place. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 887. ] The same day GeneralWheeler informed him of Sherman's concentration at Atlanta, thedestruction of the railroad above, and the strong rumors of themarch on Augusta and Savannah. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1206. ] Forresthad not yet joined Hood, but did so in two days. Beauregard heard, through Taylor, of the movement of reinforcements to Thomas fromMemphis and below, as well as of A. J. Smith's from St. Louis. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1208-1209. ] On the 17th he got authentic newsof Sherman's start from Atlanta, and ordered Hood to "take theoffensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal the enemyrapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and bythis means to distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. " Hood repliedthat he had only one third of the quantity of rations accumulatedwhich he needed for beginning the campaign. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 1215. ] Beauregard himself leftTuscumbia for Montgomery and Macon, giving Hood the choice either tosend part of his troops to Georgia or to take the offensiveimmediately. Under this spur Hood gave orders for an advance on the19th, but there was still some cause of delay, and Beauregardreiterated, on the 20th, the peremptory order to "push an activeoffensive immediately. " Next day all were in motion, and Hood issueda brief address to his troops, saying, "You march to-day to redeemby your valor and your arms one of the fairest portions of ourConfederacy. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1220, 1225, 1226, 1236. ] During the week we were at Pulaski the rain had made our campanything but a pleasant one, yet, as we were daily in expectation ofHood's advance, we could do nothing to improve our shelter or themeans of warming our tents. The forests were near enough to furnishus the fuel for rousing camp-fires, and we made the most of them. Atnight I fastened back the flaps of my tent, and a blazing pile oflogs threw in heat enough to temper the cold, and one slept sweetlyin the fresh air as long as the wind was in the right direction. Theday Hood advanced the rain changed to snow, driving in flurries andsqualls all day. Marching orders for the 22d came in the evening, and we prepared for an early start to Lynnville, for the enemy wasmaking for Columbia through Lawrenceburg, and we must anticipatehim. The night was a freezing one, the mud was frozen stiff on thesurface in the morning, making the worst possible marching for theinfantry, while the artillery and horses broke through the crust atevery step. Our only consolation was in the reflection that it wasas bad for Hood as for us. By getting off at break of day mydivision reached Lynnville by noon, and took position on the northand west of the village. Wagner's division of the Fourth Corpsfollowed and reported to me. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 974, 985. ] I gave them positions on the south and west. Schofield remained another day at Pulaski with two divisions of theFourth Corps, but joined me at noon of the 23d, and under his ordersI marched my division ten miles further north to the crossing of theroad from Mount Pleasant to Shelbyville. Starting at three, weforced the pace a little, and went into position at six in thetwilight. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 357, 998. ] The rest was a short one, for we were off again at four in the morning, hastening the marchfor Columbia in the cold and thick darkness. Schofield had learnedin the night that the cavalry on the Lawrenceburg road had beendriven back to Mount Pleasant, and that the advance of Hood'sinfantry was at the former place. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 989. ] Therewas no time to lose if we were to reach Columbia in time to cover aconcentration there. At the two-mile post south of the town across-road turns westward, leading into the Mount Pleasant turnpikewhere it crosses Bigby Creek, three miles out from Duck River. Iturned the head of column upon this road, and reached the turnpikejust in time to interpose between Capron's brigade of cavalryretreating into Columbia and the Confederates under Forrest who weresharply following. The rest of our horse were covering the flank ofthe Fourth Corps, which was on the march from Lynnville. It wasclose work, all round. My men deployed at double-quick along thebank of the creek, and after a brisk skirmish Forrest withdrew outof range. The head of the Fourth Corps column came up about eleveno'clock, having left Lynnville at three. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1017, 1018, 1020, 1021. ] We naturally supposed Hood's infantry to be inclose support of the cavalry, but they were still at Lawrenceburg, and learning that Forrest had been foiled in the effort to takeColumbia, did not advance beyond Mount Pleasant till the 26th, though the cavalry made a vigorous reconnoissance on the 25th, giving us another lively skirmish in which my division had somefifteen casualties. My headquarters' tents were pitched in thegrounds of Mrs. Martin, a member of the Polk family. At Columbia we found General Ruger in command when we arrived. Hehad been transferred from the Twentieth Corps, and ordered to oursat the time we left Georgia, and Schofield had assigned him to thesecond division. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. Pp. 661, 682, 700, 748. ] He joined the two brigades at Johnsonville, but at Schofield's request Thomas ordered him on the 20th to bringone brigade (Moore's) to Columbia, where Strickland's of the samedivision already was. The railroad from Johnsonville was broken bysome raiders on the 21st, so that Ruger was delayed, and onlyreached Columbia himself in the afternoon of the 23d. Moore'sbrigade did not arrive till half-past two o'clock of the morning ofthe 24th. Under Thomas's orders he at once, upon his arrival, senttwo regiments of Strickland's brigade down Duck River toWilliamsport and Centreville to hold crossings there. It thushappened that Strickland was left with only his own regiment(Fiftieth Ohio), till, some new reinforcements coming forward, otherregiments were temporarily assigned to him. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 378, 955, 985, 999. ] Until he reached Columbia, therefore, Schofield did not know that Strickland had beenreinforced, and we all supposed that our safety depended on mygetting there before the enemy. Thomas also ordered General Cooper to march from Johnsonville on the24th, with his own brigade, direct to Centerville and Beard's Ferry, some fifty miles. There he would be in communication with the tworegiments sent down from Columbia to Williamsport, and he was put incommand of the whole. He was thirty miles from our principal column, and posted his troops to observe the crossings through some fifteenmiles of the river's course. He arrived at Beard's Ferry on theevening of the 28th, and was there only a day and a half, when ourretreat to Franklin made it necessary for him also to fall back. Hewas beset by guerilla parties, so that he was almost withoutcommunication with his commanders, and being thrown on his ownresources, made his way back to Nashville with a series ofadventures. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 370. ]Ruger's division was thus deprived of half its veteran troops at thebattle of Franklin. It must be noted also that it was not till the 24th that the troopsat Decatur and Huntsville were ordered back, the withdrawal beingmade on the 25th. General R. S. Granger's old troops were thenplaced at Stevenson, and those recently recruited were sent toMurfreesborough. Granger reported that the public property, except some forage, hadbeen removed; but by what seems to have been a misunderstanding withthe naval officers about convoying transports, the pontoon bridgewas only detached at its southern end, and was neither taken upstream nor destroyed. It swung with the current against the northernshore, and proved of great use to Hood in his retreat a month later. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1003, 1027, 1046. See also "Franklin andNashville, " p. 125. ] The continued hope that A. J. Smith's corpswould arrive in time to reach Pulaski or Columbia before we shouldhave to retreat counted for much, no doubt, in Thomas's postponementof decisive action; but it can hardly be disputed that the truemilitary course would have been to strip his garrisons to the boneimmediately after Sherman marched southward, concentrate at Pulaskia force superior to Hood's, and give him battle if he dared toadvance north from Florence. [Footnote: For the forces on both sidesin Tennessee, see Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 52-54, 678-679; "Franklin and Nashville, " pp. 132-136; "The Battle ofFranklin, " pp. 9, 208. I discussed the same subject in "The Nation"for Nov. 9, 1893, p. 352. ] As it was too late for concentration at Duck River or south of it, Schofield was limited to a careful defensive, though he was willingto receive Hood's attack upon our lines. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 1017. ] The latter, however, did no morethan keep up a combat of skirmish lines, whilst he looked for waysto turn the position. Schofield, on his part, prepared a shortinterior line to be held by part of his troops when it was time tocross the river with the rest. In the night of the 25th thismovement was made, and for a couple of days more our forces weredivided, part holding the short line on the south side, and thegreater portion encamped in the bend on the north bank, closelywatching the development of the enemy's evident purpose to crosssome miles above us. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1039, 1086-1091. ] The crossing of the river had been arranged for the early evening, the Fourth Corps moving first into the short line on the south ofthe river; and when this was done, I was to march two brigades of mydivision through the lines and across the river to the north bank bythe pontoon bridge. There were delays in the change of position bythe Fourth Corps, and it was past midnight when I was notified thatthey were in place and commenced my own movement. At that time arain-storm had set in which made our whole operation uncomfortablein the wet and darkness, but especially the seeking a bivouac forthe troops after we got over the river. We halted the men and parkedthe trains about a mile from the bridge at three o'clock. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 358. ] I had a tent roughly pitched, and got a littlesleep, but was roused at daybreak by musket firing, which sounded asif it were right among us. I sprang up with the feeling that I hadbeen caught napping in a double sense; but a little examinationshowed that the enemy's pickets and our own were skirmishing on theother side of the river. The Confederates had pushed in areconnoissance to find out what we had been at, and in the damp airthe sound of the firing on the opposite bank where the flank of ournew line rested was so loud and seemed so close that it had deceivedme. The remainder of our little army was brought over in the night ofthe 27th, and on the 28th Forrest's cavalry was over the upper fordsof the river, pushing back our mounted troops and covering thelaying of a pontoon bridge at Davis's ford, five or six miles aboveColumbia, where Hood's principal column of infantry crossed nextday. In the night of the 27th it occurred to General Thomas that Hood'sadvance left the bridge at Florence open to an attack, and on thenext day he sent an officer to General Steedman, commanding atChattanooga, with the suggestion that the latter should throw hisforce of 5000 men against Tuscumbia and destroy Hood's crossing ofthe Tennessee. Steedman was to use the railroad to Decatur, takingalong the pontoons which Thomas supposed had been carried toChattanooga from Decatur two days before, and relaying that crossingfor the purposes of the expedition. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 1100, 1125, 1126. ] There seems to have beenhesitation in letting Thomas know that the Decatur pontoons had notbeen brought away, and Steedman said he would take his infantry byrail, send his cavalry by steamboat transports, and use these boatsto cross the troops instead of pontoons. On further reflection, however, Thomas found that Hood's movement on the 28th to turnSchofield's left made the plan too adventurous, and on the 29th herevoked the order, directing Steedman to take his men to Cowan. Strong posts were thus established at Murfreesborough, Stevenson, and Cowan on the railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga, underthe impression which Thomas retained till after the battle ofFranklin, that Hood would not advance on Nashville, but would marchtoward one of the three places named. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 1159, 1160. ] A concentration in force at Decatur two weeks earlier, and anadvance toward Tuscumbia, would have had much to recommend it, andit would perhaps have been the surest way to defend the line of theTennessee; but it was now too late for that, as it was also too lateto affect Hood's determination to seek an early battle withSchofield. Despite his hesitation to leave Florence and Tuscumbia, and his plea that his supplies were insufficient, Hood had found onreaching Mount Pleasant that he could live on the country, andtelegraphed Beauregard that he found food enough and anticipated nofurther trouble on that score, --a confession that he might haveadvanced at the beginning of the month. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1245, 1254. ] If Steedman had made the expedition, therefore, it would nothave brought Hood back, and would only have wasted a strong divisionin a useless collateral operation. The scattering of 20, 000 menalong the Chattanooga route, "in small packages" (to use Napoleon'sphrase), cannot be regarded as sound, though Steedman was moreavailable at Cowan than at Chattanooga, and he got to Nashville "bythe skin of his teeth" when the battle of Franklin proved that theenemy was aiming at that place, and made Thomas see the desirabilityof greater concentration. [Footnote: Thomas's order to Steedman tobring his troops from Cowan to Nashville was dated at 5. 35 P. M. Ofthe 30th, and his forces arrived, part on the 1st and part on the 2dof December, the last of the trains being attacked by the enemy fivemiles out of Nashville. _Id_. , pp. 503, 1190. ] He then orderedSteedman to bring his division to Nashville; but Rousseau, withMilroy's and Granger's commands, were still left at Murfreesboroughand beyond. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1153. ] I have already told the story of the march to Franklin, and thefierce battle at that place, in the Scribner Series, "March to theSea; Franklin and Nashville, " and in "The Battle of Franklin, " andwill not repeat it here. The effect of the belief that Hood wouldmarch eastward toward Murfreesborough had, however, so strong aninfluence upon General Wilson, the cavalry commander, that it isinstructive to trace it in his dispatches. It seems to have been thecause of the loss of touch with our infantry during that importantmovement. In the middle of the night of the 28th Wilson had reason to thinkthat two divisions (Buford's and Jackson's) of Forrest's cavalrywere north of Duck River upon the Lewisburg and Franklin turnpike, about Rally Hill, the rest of Hood's army on the Columbia andShelbyville road in rear. They had driven our own horse away fromthe river, and the best Wilson had been able to do was toconcentrate his troops about Hurt's Cross-roads, some miles furthernorth on the same road. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 1143. ] His communication with Schofield was through SpringHill by a cross-road, and by that route he sent a report at threeo'clock in the morning of the 29th. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] He then hadinformation that the enemy were laying pontoon bridges for theinfantry, though the place was not accurately fixed. He thought itvery clear that they were aiming for Franklin by the turnpike he wason, and said he would stay on that road and hold them back as muchas he could. He indicated Spring Hill or Thompson's Station as thepoints on the Columbia turnpike where cross-roads would bringSchofield's couriers to him, and said he would try to get no furtherback than the Ridge meeting-house, due east from Thompson's Station. There he would leave the turnpike and take a still more easterncourse toward Nolensville. He closed the dispatch with, "Get back toFranklin without delay, leaving a small force to detain the enemy. The rebels will move by this road toward that point. " [Footnote:_Ibid_. ] These positions will be understood if we note that the Lewisburg andFranklin turnpike is some twelve miles in a direct line east of thatfrom Columbia to Franklin where they cross the river, and that theseroads converge toward the last-named place twenty-three miles north. Nolensville is about twelve miles northeast of Franklin andconsiderably nearer Nashville. As one goes north on the Lewisburgturnpike, after passing Rally Hill and Hurt's Cross-roads, the nextimportant crossing is at Mount Carmel, where the road from SpringHill to Murfreesboro intersects the turnpike. Three miles stillfurther on, a road from Thompson's Station is crossed at theso-called Ridge meeting-house. All these cross-roads gave the meansof regaining touch with Schofield's main column; but the cavalrycommander was so dominated by the belief that Forrest was makingdirectly for Nashville by roads still further east, that he proposedneither to join the infantry by the cross-roads, nor to adhere tothe converging one leading to Franklin, but would go to Nolensville. The imperative form of his suggestion to his commanding officer to"get back" shows not only the force of this mental preoccupation, but a forgetfulness that Schofield might have other information andbe under a necessity of forming other plans for the day's operationsto which the cavalry must be subordinate. The whole of Hood's force had not crossed the river, but two thirdsof Lee's corps and nearly all the artillery were still in Columbia, and made their presence known by a vigorous cannonade in the earlymorning of the 29th. The enemy's infantry was not marching to theLewisburg turnpike, but was seen making for Spring Hill by roadsfive miles east of Columbia, and Forrest was in touch with theirright flank. Schofield, under orders from Thomas, was obstructingthe lower fords of the river, and trying to get orders through toGeneral Cooper, directing him to concentrate his forces and retirefrom Centerville. The concentration of our cavalry had been socomplete that when it took an independent line of retreat it ceased, for the time, to be any efficient part of Schofield's forces, andleft him without cover for his flank or means of rapidreconnoissance. For conclusive reasons he held during the day of the29th the line from Spring Hill to the Duck River; but after teno'clock in the morning Wilson was wholly out of the game, lookingoff to the east for Forrest, who had gone west from Hurt'sCross-roads and Mount Carmel to attack our infantry at Spring Hill. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 1144, 753, 769. ] At noon, north of the Ridge church and the road to Thompson'sStation, Wilson was still of the opinion that the whole of theenemy's cavalry had gone to Nashville by eastern roads throughPeytonsville, Triune, and Nolensville. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1144. ]At two in the afternoon he repeated the same opinion in a dispatchto Thomas, although he had heard heavy artillery firing in thedirection of Spring Hill since eleven o'clock. He warned Thomas tolook out for Forrest at Nashville by next day noon, but promised tobe there himself before or very soon after he should make hisappearance. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1146. ] At four o'clock he was fourmiles east of Franklin, still looking toward Nolensville for theenemy, who had "disappeared, " and still of the opinion that Forresthad turned his left flank before he left Hurt's Cross-roads in themorning. The heavy firing he had heard all day had, however, awakened solicitude for Schofield. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1145. ] Afternightfall he sent a scout back on the road he had travelled, nearlyto the Ridge meeting-house, where was found a cavalry picket of theenemy, and a large camp was said to be discovered near by, --probablythe light of the camp-fires at Thompson's Station, where they werestill burning when Schofield placed Ruger's division there in theevening. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 342. ] At ten o'clock Wilson hadconcluded that it was "probable that a part of the enemy's cavalrythis afternoon aimed to strike your rear or flank at Thompson'sStation, " as he wrote to Schofield, and had marched a mile and ahalf toward Franklin, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 342. ] where at the Matthews house his headquarters remained nextday, when connection with the army had again been made. Nothing morethan scouting parties and patrols from Forrest's column had gonenorth of Mount Carmel during the day. The adventures of the marchhad emphasized the danger that a preconceived opinion ofprobabilities may make an officer misinterpret such real facts as hemay learn, or let very slight evidence take the place of thoroughknowledge got by bold contact with the enemy. The experience alsoteaches how sure mischiefs are to follow the forgetfulness of theprinciple that, in such operations, it is the primary duty of thecavalry to keep in touch with the main body of the army, and whereorders from the commanding general may be promptly received andacted on. Schofield, in fact, had no communication with his cavalryduring the whole day, and none of Wilson's messages had reached himafter the retreat from Hurt's Cross-roads began. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 343. ] CHAPTER XLIV NASHVILLE--HOOD'S ARMY ROUTED Defensive works of Nashville--Hood's lines--The iceblockade--Halleck on remounts for cavalry--Pressing horses and itsabuse--The cavalry problem--Changes in organization--Assignment ofGeneral Couch--Confederate cavalry at Nashville--Counter-movementsof our own--Detailed movements of our right--Difference ofrecollection between Schofield and Wilson--The fielddispatches--Carrying Hood's works--Confederate rout. At Nashville, when we reached there on the 1st of December, afterthe battle of Franklin, we were left for a couple of days inbivouac. The city had been covered by a line of interior earthworks, suitable for a moderate garrison, with strong forts on commandinghills. The Cumberland River, in its general course from east towest, partially encloses the town on north and west by one of itsbends, and the Chattanooga Railroad runs out of the place not farfrom the river, passing under St. Cloud Hill, on which was FortNegley, one of the strongest of the defensive works. Southwest ofthis, about eight hundred yards, was the Casino block-house on astill higher eminence, and some five hundred yards northwest of theCasino was Fort Morton, on a summit connected with the other. Mydivision was assigned to the line including these forts, whichformed the strong southern salient of the original city defences. Other troops of our corps continued the line on my left to theriver, and Steedman's division was placed in advance of the left, along Brown's Creek, which was crossed by the Murfreesboroughturnpike. From Fort Morton the original works continuednorthwestwardly, skirting the city to the Hyde's Ferry turnpike. [Footnote: Official Atlas, pl. Lxxiii. ] But the army now collectedneeded more room, and instead of turning back at the Casino the linewas continued southwest till it reached a prominent hill near theHillsborough turnpike. There it turned to the northwest, following asuccession of hilltops to the river, enclosing the whole of the bendin which the city was. The Fourth Corps occupied the part of theline next to us on the right, and General A. J. Smith's detachmentof the Army of the Tennessee was on the right of all. Until the eveof the battle of Nashville the cavalry were concentrated atEdgefield, on the north side of the Cumberland. Hood had followed us up promptly from Franklin, and established hislines nearly parallel to ours on our centre and left, though theywere shorter in extent, and a wide space near the river on our rightwas only occupied by his cavalry. In my own immediate front, lookingdown from the Casino block-house, were the Nolensville and Franklinturnpikes with the Alabama Railroad, along which we had retreated. Near my right was the Middle Franklin turnpike, which goessouthward, a mile or two distant from the main road, into which itcomes again below Brentwood. It is known locally as the Granny Whitepike. My headquarters were in rear of Fort Morton, at the dwellingof Mrs. Bilbo, a large house with a pillared portico the full heightof the front. We had two rooms in the house for our clerical work, and pitched our tents in the dooryard. A short walk along the ridgeled to the Casino, from which was a fine outlook southward andeastward. During the time of the ice blockade from the 9th of December to the13th, the slopes in front of the lines were a continuous glare ofice, so that movements away from the roads and broken paths could bemade only with the greatest difficulty and at a snail's pace. Menand horses were seen falling whenever they attempted to move acrosscountry. A man slipping on the hillside had no choice but to sitdown and slide to the bottom, and groups of men in the forts andlines found constant entertainment in watching these mishaps. Therehad been a mingling of snow and sleet with the rain which began onthe 8th, and this compacted into a solid ice sheet. On a levelcountry it would have caused much less trouble, but on the hills androlling country about Nashville manoeuvres were out of the questionfor nearly a week. The dissatisfaction of General Grant with the delay in taking theaggressive had begun with the withdrawal from Franklin on the 1st. Objections to waiting for new supplies of cavalry horses were notpeculiar to this campaign. The waste of animals had been a constantsource of complaint through the whole war. On the 5th Halleck made areport to Grant that 22, 000 new cavalry horses had been issued atthe posts where Thomas's forces were equipping, since September20th. This was exclusive of those used in Kentucky or sent toSherman. "If this number, " he said, "without any campaign is alreadyreduced to 10, 000 mounted men, as reported by General Wilson, it maybe safely assumed that the cavalry of that army will never bemounted, for the destruction of horses in the last two months hasthere alone been equal to the remounts obtained from the entirewest. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 55. ] It wason this report that Stanton's famous dispatch was based, "If hewaits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his lasthorn. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 84. ] Halleck repeated the same insubstance to Thomas, adding, "Moreover, you will soon be in the samecondition that Rosecrans was last year, --with so many animals thatyou cannot feed them. Reports already come in of a scarcity offorage. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 114. ] Yet, to remove as far aspossible the causes of delay, Grant directed mounted men fromMissouri to be sent to Nashville, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 130. ] and even the "pressing" of horses in Kentuckywas permitted, sure as it was to be abused in practice. This soonbrought protests from the leading loyal men of Louisville. Mr. Speed(U. S. Attorney-General) and Mr. Ballard (afterward Judge of the U. S. Courts) telegraphed Mr. Stanton, "Loaded country wagons withproduce for market are left in the road; milk-carts, drays, andbutchers' wagons are left in the street--their horses seized. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 139. ] Indeed, from the very beginning of thewar, the cavalry problem had been an insoluble one. Raw recruitscould not be made to take proper care of horses, to groom them, toride them with judgment, or to save their strength. We campaigned inregions where forage was scarce and where it could not be brought upfrom the rear. A big cavalry force would starve when not moving, yetexaggerated reports of the enemy's mounted troops made a constantclamor for more. [Footnote: An interesting contribution to thepractical discussion of the subject is found in Sherman's letter toGeneral Meigs, Quartermaster-General from Savannah, December 25th, ending with, "If my cavalry cannot remount itself in the country, itmay go afoot. " (Official Records, vol. Xliv. P. 807. ) For thediscussion of it in Rosecrans's campaign of '63, see _ante_, chap, xxiii. See also Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 300, 320. ]The attempts to use them in large bodies were rarely successful, andthe more modest duties of outpost and patrol in connection with theinfantry columns were distasteful. All this knowledge, combined withthe special causes of impatience now existing, gave to Grant'sdispatches a more and more urgent tone, leading up to the "Delay nolonger" of the 11th. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 70, 97, 143. ] To judge fairly the attitude of both Grant and Thomas, thismust not be overlooked, whilst we must also remember that the newelement of the icy covering of the earth in the immediate vicinityof Nashville was so exceptional that it was not appreciated or fullyunderstood at the East. The halt at Nashville was the occasion for some temporary changes inthe organization of my division. Colonel Henderson had not fullyrecovered from the ill-health which had interrupted the command ofhis brigade, and having obtained a leave of absence to go home for afew weeks, the command of this brigade remained with Colonel Stiles. General Reilly also found the need of recuperation and was granted ashort leave. It happened that Colonel Doolittle, who haddistinguished himself in command of the post at Decatur, had gotback from a short absence, and reached Nashville aftercommunications with Murfreesborough were interrupted. Not being ableto join his proper command, I was glad to make arrangements to givehim temporary service with me and to renew the pleasant acquaintancemade on our journey from Georgia. He acted as chief of staff for afew days till Reilly left, and I then assigned him to commandReilly's brigade, where there was no officer of sufficientexperience. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 86, 187. ] Another change which occurred was among the general officers, andstrongly illustrated the chafing likely to arise under suchcircumstances. In pursuance of a policy before mentioned, the WarDepartment was bringing pressure to bear upon officers to make themaccept any active service suitable to their rank, or resign andleave room for promotions for others, since Congress refused toenlarge the number of general officers. Major-General Darius N. Couch had been, during the war, hitherto connected with the Army ofthe Potomac, but had drifted out of active service and was "waitingorders. " Grant had suggested that he be sent to command the districtof Kentucky, relieving Burbridge, whose administration was notsatisfactory to the General-in-Chief. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 16, 28. ]But political influences at Washington did not favor this change, and Couch was ordered to report to General Thomas for duty, and byhim was sent to the Fourth Corps to report to General Stanley. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 58. ] The latterwas just going on "sick leave" on account of his wound received atFranklin, and without being assigned to any division, Couch, byrank, assumed temporary command of the corps in the absence of theregularly assigned commandant. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 72. ] Theimmediate result of this was to supersede Brigadier-General Wood, who had been second in rank in the corps through the year, and wasone of the oldest officers in the Army of the Cumberland. In therearrangement of divisions when the temporary command would cease, it would displace General Kimball, who was also one of the mostexperienced brigadiers, and would reduce him to a brigade. Thedissatisfaction thus caused in Thomas's own department made himtransfer the problem to Schofield and the Army of the Ohio. Thomasproposed to Couch to take a division, therefore, in the Twenty-thirdCorps. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] Schofield was induced to consent to this, as it was accompanied by an arrangement for the speedy organizationof a division of new troops, to which General Ruger could beassigned whilst Couch should take that which Ruger now commanded. When the new scheme was laid before Couch, he replied with dignitythat he would readily serve where he was ordered, but could not, ofhis own election, take a position that would throw him into a lessercommand. The formal orders making the changes were then issued. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 86, 103, 104. ] We had two good brigadiers inour corps, who had recently proved their capacity to take the newdivision, --Reilly, who had been distinguished in the battle ofFranklin, and Cooper, who had conducted his brigade by a mostperilous and circuitous retreat from Centerville to Nashville;[Footnote: "Battle of Franklin, " chap. Vii. And p. 206. ] but thecommissions of these dated only from the taking of Atlanta, andbeing juniors on the list of general officers, their claims to thelarger command were not considered very strong. My own position was the one most affected by the advent of a seniorin rank into the corps. I had been senior of the division commandersin East Tennessee as well as in the Atlanta campaign, and actuallyin command of the corps in the absence of its regular chief or hisassumption of still wider duties. As second in rank, one isnecessarily in confidential possession of much knowledge which hewould not otherwise have, for the possibility that accidents of thecampaign may throw the larger command upon him requires that heshould have the means of judgment and action in such an event. He istherefore in much closer relations to his superiors than he would beas division commander merely. Again in marches and in any scatteringof forces, as senior, his command will be extended over otherportions of the corps in the absence of the commander, and I had notinfrequently found myself in command of another division beside myown, either by definite orders or by operation of the articles ofwar. [Footnote: "Battle of Franklin, " pp. 277, 278. ] When to this isadded such command as fell to me in the October campaign in Georgia, and in the battle of Franklin, which could not have been mine if Ihad not stood next to Schofield in the corps, it will be seen thatfor me it was the practical loss of a grade, as it would have beenfor General Wood in the Fourth Corps if General Couch had remainedthere. My only purpose in noting these things is to makeintelligible the feeling in the army that such transfers are notgood administration, except where they are in the nature ofpromotion for brilliant service. The feeling was also strong thatthe loss of one's footing in one large army, unless caused byexceptional reasons, fully understood, is a reason against atransfer to another, where, in generous rivalry, all have beenstriving to merit advanced instead of diminished grades. In justiceto General Schofield, however, I must not omit to say that he fullyappreciated my situation, and with an earnestness which outrananything I could claim, exerted himself to secure my promotion andto make me eligible to the permanent assignment to the corps'command when his own authority was afterward enlarged. GeneralCouch's position was by no means a desirable one for him; for hecould not be ignorant of the sentiment of the army, and he wouldprobably have preferred a division in the Potomac Army to one inours, for there in spite of a temporary eclipse, he had a fixed andhonorable reputation which would justify a reasonable expectation ofregaining prominence in it. [Footnote: In the spring of 1863 GeneralCouch was the senior corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, andas such was nominally in command on the field in the battle ofChancellorsville during the temporary disability of General Hooker. Shortly after that battle he asked to be transferred to some othercommand, and was assigned to the Department of the Susquehanna inPennsylvania, where the duty was merely administrative. In reducingthese organizations in the fall of 1864, he became a supernumerary. See Walker's Second Army Corps, pp. 234, 235. ] Without going into a narration of the battle of Nashville, it may beworth while to remark that the publication of the official recordsincreases the importance of the absence of Forrest's cavalry, whichgave the opportunity for an almost unopposed advance of Thomas'sright in the manoeuvres of the 15th December to turn Hood's flank. We had known that Chalmers, one of Forrest's division commanders, had been sent to cover the four miles of space intervening betweenthe left of the Confederate line and the river. [Footnote: "March tothe Sea, Nashville, " etc. , pp. 107, 114. ] Chalmers' report now tellsus that he had only Colonel Rucker's brigade with him, the rest ofthe division having been sent to the other flank. He asserts that, after leaving one regiment on the Granny White turnpike in immediatetouch with the infantry line, he had only 900 men left. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 765. ] With so small a forcehe, of course, could hardly do more than observe and report theadvance of our three cavalry divisions. Coleman's brigade ofinfantry which had held the Hillsborough and Hardin turnpikes wasrecalled to the main line early in the day, [Footnote: Walthall'sReport, Official Records, vol. Xiv. Pt. I p. 722] and as it movedaway without his knowledge, Chalmers, on learning it, supposed itwas driven back. It left uncovered the cavalry baggage train on theHardin turnpike, which was captured by part of Colonel Coon'sbrigade of our horse. [Footnote: Chalmers' Report. _Id_. , p. 765;Coon's Report, _Id_. , p. 589. ] Chalmers then took Rucker's brigadeto the Hillsborough turnpike so as to cover more closely theinfantry flank, and left only one regiment to delay the advance ofour cavalry on the roads nearer the river. [Illustration: Map: Battle of Nashville. ] During the night of the 15th and the morning of the 16th themovement of Cheatham's corps to Hood's left had been observed byboth our infantry and our cavalry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 217, 224. ] As part of these troops had been seenmarching northward on the Granny White turnpike, Schofield verynaturally took into consideration the probability of their being newreinforcements coming to Hood from the rear. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 214. ] The extension of the enemy's fortified line to our right hadmade it necessary to extend my division in single line withoutreserves, and even then they were stretched almost to thebreaking-point. [Footnote: Cox's Report, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 407. ]Thomas began his inspection of the line at Wood's position on theleft in the forenoon, and came westward visiting the commands inturn. [Footnote: Wood's Report, _Id_. , p. 131; A. J. Smith's Report, _Id_. , p. 435; "Franklin and Nashville, " p. 118; Schofield's"Forty-six Years in the Army, " p. 246. ] At ten o'clock in the morning Wilson had most of his cavalry"refused, on the right of Schofield, the line extending across andperpendicular to the Hillsborough turnpike. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 220. In the dispatch quoted, the nameis given "Murfreesborough" by a manifest clerical error. Schofield'sright was near the Hillsborough turnpike, the Murfreesboroughturnpike being beyond the other flank of the whole army. ] A regimenthad been sent to try to reach the Granny White turnpike, but hadbeen driven off and reported Cheatham's infantry moving to the leftupon it. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 224. ] Wilson reported this toSchofield, adding, "The country on the left of the Hillsboroughpike, toward the enemy's left, is too difficult for cavalryoperations. It seems to me if I was on the other flank of the army Imight do more to annoy the enemy, unless it is intended that I shallpush out as directed last night. " [Footnote; _Id_. , p. 216. See alsoSchofield's "Forty-six Years, " p. 244. ] Schofield acknowledged thereceipt of this information at 11. 15, and forwarded it to GeneralThomas. In view of the apparent concentration of the enemy's forcesin his front, he advised Wilson, until he should receive otherorders from Thomas (who was then on the left with General Wood), tohold his forces "in readiness to support the troops here, in casethe enemy makes a heavy attack. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 216. See also Schofield's "Forty-six Years, " p. 244. ] At half-past one his dispatch to Thomas, from his position onthe field close to my own, fixes with clearness the situation atthat hour. "Wilson is trying to push in toward the Granny Whitepike, about a mile south of my right. My skirmishers on the rightare supporting him. The skirmishing is pretty heavy. I have notattempted to advance my main line to-day, and do not think I amstrong enough to do so. Will you be on this part of the line soon?"[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 215; see alsoStiles's Report, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 431. ] In a letter written in 1882, to assist me when preparing to write myaccount of the battle of Nashville, [Footnote: "Franklin andNashville, " etc. , chap. Vi. ] General Schofield gave me hisrecollection of the situation on our right during the morning of the16th of December. [Footnote: Letter of June 1, 1882. ] "I had goneback to Nashville in the night preceding, " he said, "to persuadeThomas to order Wilson to remain on my right and take part in thebattle the next morning, and A. J. Smith to close up on our left. Thomas had only partially adopted my views, and had not given Wilsonany orders to attack. I had waited impatiently all the morning, anduntil some time after noon for Wilson to get orders from Thomas, orto comply with my request to put his troops in without waiting fororders. Finally, some time after noon, Wilson had consented to go inwith his cavalry (I relieving him of all responsibility), and I haddirected you, with your reserve brigade, which was not then incontact with the enemy, to support Wilson or join with him inattacking the enemy's flank. " When Schofield received the proposalfrom McArthur through Couch, that an assault should be made on Shy'shill, in the angle of the enemy's line, by one of McArthur'sbrigades, supported by Couch, he "became impatient, " he says, "forWilson and Stiles [my flank brigade] to get possession of thecommanding ground to the enemy's left-rear, so as to prepare the wayfor your [my] assault upon his intrenched line. " [Footnote: See alsoGeneral Schofield's discussion of the events of the 16th, in his"Forty-six Years, " pp. 263-275. ] The field dispatch of General Couchin regard to supporting McArthur was dated at 2. 30 P. M. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 217. ] General Schofield sought an opportunity to compare recollectionswith General Wilson, and wrote me again on the 29th of June, 1882, saying that he was greatly surprised to find that Wilson did notrecollect the proposal and request stated above, but thought thatGeneral Thomas had come in person to his position on theHillsborough turnpike, and about 10 or 10:30 o'clock A. M. Had givenhim the orders under which he then undertook to advance againstHood's left-rear. Wilson also associated with it the capture of adispatch from Hood to Chalmers, urging the latter to drive theYankee cavalry from his left and rear, as otherwise he could nothold the position. This dispatch, Wilson said, he promptly sent toThomas. As the conference between Schofield and Wilson was for thepurpose of assisting me in getting undisputed facts for the historyof the campaign, I was permitted to know the result and to have thecontents of a letter from Wilson to Schofield of date of June 28, 1882, restating his recollection. In pursuance of my rule to avoidas far as possible the debate of subsidiary controverted points inmy connected history, I omitted any reference to them in thisinstance. General Schofield's memory is, however, so stronglysupported by the field dispatches, that it does not seem difficultnow to reach a sound historical judgment. It is plain that during the earlier part of the day General Wilsonwas reporting through General Schofield, who forwarded to GeneralThomas the information received. At some time before noon the latterhad completed his examination of the position of the Fourth Corps onthe left of the army, so that General Wood was at liberty to ride toGeneral Steedman's headquarters on the Nolensville turnpike. [Footnote: Official Records, vol xlv. Pt. I. P. 131. ] Thomas passedwestward to General Smith's headquarters at the centre, where heseems still to have been at three o'clock, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 435. ] or at the time of the arrangement between McArthur and Couch, which the latter places at half-past two. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 217. ] Thomas then visited General Schofield's position, where hewas when the final assault was made and the enemy routed. GeneralWilson's reports make no mention of a visit from General Thomas onthe 16th, and the contents of his dispatches show that there hadbeen none up to eleven o'clock, when Thomas was with Wood on theother flank of the whole army. It can hardly be necessary to mentionthe extreme improbability of the commander's omission to visitSchofield's quarters near the Hillsborough turnpike, if he weregoing by that road to Wilson, who was also on it. We must concludethat General Wilson is mistaken in his recollection. That he sawGeneral Thomas at Schofield's position late in the day, is concededby all. [Footnote: The account in "Franklin and Nashville, " etc. , p. 119, must be modified in accord with the facts above stated. ] We find no mention in the records of any capture of an importantdispatch from Hood to Chalmers, except that found on the person ofColonel Rucker, when he was wounded and captured at 6. 30 P. M. , trying to hold the pass of the Brentwood hills on the Granny Whiteturnpike, in the darkness, two hours after the collapse of Hood'sline. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 218. ] Thisdispatch seems to have strongly resembled the language used byWilson in his letter to Schofield in 1882. It is said to have statedthat Chalmers' cavalry must take care of this flank. In sending theinformation to General Johnson, Wilson added, "Go for him with allpossible celerity, as Hood says the safety of their army dependsupon Chalmers. " [Footnote: Wilson to Johnson, Id. , p. 222. ] As wehave already noted, Rucker's brigade, just routed, was all there wasof Chalmers' division on that flank except a regiment coveringtrains making for Franklin. The Confederate records support this view. Chalmers' report relatesthe skirmishing during the morning in which Rucker was holding theHillsborough turnpike against Wilson, and the attempt on our side tomove to the Granny White turnpike, from which Hammond's detachmentwas driven back. He says that with one regiment and his own escorthe "held the enemy in check for more than three hours. " [Footnote:_Id. _, pt. I. P. 765. ] This agrees very well with the situation asindicated in General Schofield's dispatch of 1. 30 P. M. , when aserious effort was making on our side to reach that road. Chalmersreported the fact that the regiment was hotly beset, and Hood'sadjutant-general, in acknowledging it at 3. 15 P. M. , said, "Yourdispatch, saying you were fighting the enemy with one regiment onthe Granny White pike, received. General Hood says you must holdthat pike; put in your escort and every available man you can find. "[Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Ii. P. 697. ] Chalmers reports that he receivedthis about 4. 30, when the regiment had been driven back; that hethen moved up Rucker's brigade, which had reached the same turnpikenearer Brentwood, and after a sharp struggle it was routed. "By thistime, " he adds, "it was so dark that it was impossible to re-formthe men, or, indeed, to distinguish friend from foe, so closely werethey mingled together. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 766. ] It was in this _mêlée_ that Rucker was wounded andcaptured. In preparation for the attack in concert with A. J. Smith's command, my flank brigade (Stiles's), which had been in echelon on our right, was ordered to swing forward in touch with our cavalry advance. [Footnote: My Report, _Id_. , p. 407. ] My own main attack was to beupon the bastion which made the flank of the enemy's works beforeus. I ordered Doolittle's brigade to charge straight at it. Casement's brigade, on Doolittle's left, was to march by the rightflank at double-quick in rear of Doolittle, so as to become a secondline to him and support the advance as might be necessary. Theskirmishers of Stiles's brigade had accompanied the cavalry advancesince half-past one, and in the final effort his troops in line wereto take part as already stated. [Footnote: See Schofield to Thomas, 1. 30 P. M. , _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 215; Stiles's Report, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 431; my own Report, _Id_. , p. 407, and sketch map accompanying thelatter, _Id_. , p. 408; also "Franklin and Nashville, " etc. , pp. 119-122. ] After personal conference with my brigade commanders toinsure complete mutual understanding, I rode to the hill in rear ofmy lines where Thomas and Schofield were together, [Footnote: Marked2 in map, p. 359. ] watching for the concerted attack upon Shy's hillin the salient angle of Hood's lines. When Smith's men were seen to reach the summit of Shy's Hill, Ireceived the signal from Schofield, and galloped down the hilltoward Doolittle; but he also had caught sight of the movement, andhis brigade was already charging on the run when I reached him. Theexcited firing of the enemy was too high, and Doolittle's menentered the works with very little loss. The collapse was general. As soon as we were over the works, I was ordered to stand fast withmy command and give General Smith's command the right of way downthe Granny White turnpike. Doolittle's brigade had carried thebastion in front of our right and the curtain adjoining it, and hisline halted immediately in rear of these, partly facing theturnpike. He had captured a four-gun battery of light twelves in thebastion and another of the same number in the curtain, with theartillerists and part of the supports. [Footnote: See the officialreports cited above, and special reports as to the guns, OfficialRecords, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 234, 235; also regimental reports, Twelfth Kentucky, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 417, One Hundredth Ohio, _Id_. , p. 420, and Eighth Tennessee, _Id_. , p. 423. ] Stiles, advancing withthe cavalry, was halted a short distance in front of Doolittle, facing southward on the right of the turnpike. Casement was haltedin the trenches from which Doolittle had started. [Footnote:Casement's Report, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 425. All the reports on theNational side except that of the cavalry refer to the concertedattack on Shy's hill as the signal for the general advance. TheConfederate reports also speak of the carrying of that salient asthe cause of the rout. In his second report, dated Feb. 1, 1865, andin his letter to General Schofield in 1882, cited above, GeneralWilson says that it was on his personal report of what his men weredoing on the enemy's left rear that Thomas ordered the finalassault. ] CHAPTER XLV PURSUIT OF HOOD--END OF THE CAMPAIGN Night after the battle--Unusual exposure--Hardships of companyofficers--Bad roads--Halt at Franklin--Visiting thebattlefield--Continued pursuit--Decatur reoccupied--Hood at Tupelo, Miss. --Summary of captures--Thomas suggests winter-quarters--Grantorders continued activity--Schofield's proposal to move the corps tothe East--Grant's correspondence with Sherman--Schofield'ssuggestion adopted--Illness--I ask for "sick-leave"--Do not useit--Promotion--Reinforcements--March from Columbia toClifton--Columns on different roads--Western part of thebarrens--Fording Buffalo River--An illumined camp--Dismay of thefarmer--Clifton on the Tennessee--Admiral Lee--Methods oftransport--Weary waiting--Private grumbling--Ordered East--Revulsionof spirits--On the transport fleet--Thomas's frame of mind at closeof the campaign. The night after the battle of Nashville was one we were not likelyto forget. Twilight was falling when we halted, after the crushingof the Confederate lines, and as we were likely to join in thepursuit before morning, I had announced that I would be found withDoolittle's brigade. Owing to the darkness and a gathering storm, the troops having the advance did not get far, but the risks ofmissing dispatches that might be sent in haste made me adhere to myrule of staying where I had said I might be found. This kept thestaff and headquarters in the space a little in rear of the capturedline of works, a spot unclean and malodorous. We built a camp-fire, and tried to clean off spots on which we could sit on the ground;but a heavy rain soon came on, and as we were in the woods, thelight soil soon made a mire, and we were forced to stand upright andtake the weather as it came. The extreme weariness of standingabout, with nothing to vary the monotony, physically tired andsleepy, in the reaction from the excitement of the afternoon, wassomething which cannot be understood unless one has had a similarexperience. We had hoped our servants might find us during theevening and bring us something to eat; but the advance over hillsand intrenchments had made it hard to follow our course even indaylight; but in the darkness and storm they entirely failed to findus. We felt a good deal like "belly-pinched wolves, " but we had noden in which we could "keep the fur dry. " Indeed, the suffering of adog that was with us was a thing we often referred to asillustrating our utter discomfort. A fine pointer, astray innorthern Georgia, had attached himself to me in October, and hadbeen constantly with us, leaping and barking with joy whenever Imounted my horse. He was with us now, and when the rain came on hestood in the mud like the rest of us, finding no spot to lie downin. He grew tired and sleepy, and looked wistfully about for a placehe could consent to lie in, but gave it up, and spreading all fourlegs well apart he tried to stand it out. Occasionally his eyeswould close and his head droop, his body would slowly sway back andforth till he made a greater nod, his nose would go into the mud, and gathering himself up he would lift his head with a most piteouswhine, protesting against such headquarters. The longest night must have an end, and early in the morning one ofour black boys found us, bringing with him on horseback a haversackfull of hard-tack, and in his hand a kettle of coffee which we soonmade piping hot at the camp-fire, and found the world looking muchmore cheerful. The storm continued, however, and made the pursuitslower and more difficult than it would have been in better weather. The cavalry had the advance, supported by A. J. Smith's troops onthe Granny White turnpike, and by Wood's Fourth Corps on theFranklin turnpike. We were ordered to follow Smith. Our camp on theevening of the 17th was not far from Brentwood between the two roadswhich come together a little further on after crossing the LittleHarpeth, some seven miles from Franklin and the larger stream of thesame name. Our headquarters the second night after the battle were animprovement on those of the night before. We found a knoll which wasfairly drained, we borrowed a tarpaulin from a battery, and withfence-rails made of it a lean-to with back to the storm. A pile ofevergreen boughs made a couch on which we lay, and a camp-fireblazing high in front made a heat which mitigated even the drivingDecember storm. Our faithful black boys had coffee-pots andhaversacks, so that we did not go supperless. I wrote home that myovercoat with large cape weighed about fifty pounds with the waterin it, but it kept my body dry, and I found it better to wear itthan to put on a rubber waterproof, for perspiration did notevaporate under the latter. Our private soldiers wore the rubber poncho-blankets above theirovercoats in wet weather, and two "pardners" would make a sheltertent of the pair of waterproofs which had metal eyelets to adaptthem to this use. Veterans carefully selected the place for thetent, pitched it in good form, trenched it so that the water wouldflow off and not run into the tent; then with their bed of cedarboughs, their haversacks and coffee-kettles, they were not worse offthan the officers, --better off indeed than their company officerswho trudged afoot like themselves. Transportation was so difficult to get that, in pressing forward, baggage was reduced to smallest possible allowance. In bad roadssuch wagons as we had were far behind the troops, and the companyofficers were exposed to severe hardships by the delay. I laid theircondition before General Schofield, in a letter which better tellsthe tale than I could now give it from memory alone. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 312. ] "From the time we leftNashville, " I wrote, "until last night [21st December], thesegentlemen had no shelter, and only such food as they could obtainfrom the private soldiers, being far worse off than the men, sincethe latter had their shelter-tents and their rations in haversacks. The officers' rations and their cooking utensils are in theregimental wagons, which are necessarily left behind in movementssuch as we have lately made, and they must either furnish themselveswith knapsacks and haversacks, and carry their cooking utensils upontheir own persons or those of their servants, or be utterlydestitute. Even if they do this, the wagons of the commissary ofsubsistence are also at the rear, except upon ordinary days ofissue, and it would be necessary to issue to them precisely as isdone to the soldiers in the ranks, and so break down the lastvestige in distinction in mode of life between them and theircommands. As it is, I state what I know from personal observationwhen I say that no individuals in any way connected with the armyare enduring so much personal suffering and privation upon thepresent campaign as the officers of the line. As I know thecommanding general will be most desirous to make any arrangementwhich is feasible to reduce the amount of discomfort, I take theliberty of suggesting that during the winter campaign thetransportation for each regiment be one wagon for regimentalheadquarters and for company books and papers, desks, etc. , as now, and in addition one pack-mule for each company. The pack-mules makelittle or no obstruction in the road, are easily moved to flank orrear in case of manoeuvre of troops, and will be up with the commandwhen the regiment goes into camp. Unless some such arrangement ismade, I fear many of our officers will break down in health, andmany more, becoming disgusted with the hardships of the service, andespecially with the difference between themselves and their morefortunate brethren of the staff and staff-corps, will seek to leavethe army. In many commands some similar arrangements to the one Ihave suggested have been surreptitiously made; but as I have rigidlyenforced the rule turning over to the quartermaster all unauthorizedanimals, I am the more desirous of obtaining for the gentlemen ofthe line whom I have the honor to command such authority to regulatetheir transportation as will save them from the apparentlyunnecessary hardships they have of late endured, without detractingfrom the mobility of the division. " The plan suggested was one wehad used in exigencies in the Atlanta campaign, and GeneralSchofield immediately authorized it for winter use. The cold rainstorm, in which the battle of Nashville had ended, lasted for a week, turning to sleet and snow on the 20th andclearing off with sharp cold on the 24th. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. Pp. 360, 361. ] Worse weather for fieldoperations it would be hard to imagine. The ordinary country roadswere impassable, and even the turnpikes became nearly so. They hadnever been very solidly made, and had not been repaired for threeyears. In places the metalling broke through, making holes similarto holes in thick ice, with well-defined margin. These were filledto the brim with water, and churned into deep pits by the wheels ofloaded wagons. It required watchfulness to see them, as the wholesurface of the road was flowing with slush and mud. When a wheelwent into one, the wagon dropped to the axle, and even where therewas no upset it was a most difficult task to pry the wagon out andstart it on the way again. The wagon-master was lucky if it did notstop his whole train, and it was no uncommon thing for a mule to bedrowned by getting down in one of these pits. Hood's rear-guardunder Forrest and Walthall destroyed bridges behind them, of course, and that our cavalry with the head of our infantry column were ableto keep close on the enemy's rear till they passed Pulaski is goodproof of the energy with which the pursuit was conducted. Yet it wasnecessarily slow, for it was confined to one road, the rest beingimpassable, and flanking operations could only be made on a smallscale when in contact with the enemy. When we reached Franklin on our southward march, we were halted fora day, so that we might not crowd too much upon the rest of thecolumn, and I took advantage of the opportunity to study thecondition of the battlefield there. My division camped between theColumbia and the Lewisburg turnpikes, on the ground over which theConfederates had advanced to attack it in the battle. Portions ofthe second line of works close to the Carter house and theretrenchment across the Columbia road had been levelled, but theprincipal defences were as we had left them. The osage orange-treeswhich we had used for abatis had been evenly cut away by thebullets, and the tough fibres hung in a fringe of white strings, theupper line quite even, and just a little lower than the top of theparapet. The effect was a curiously impressive one as we looked downthe line we had held and thought what a level storm of lead wasindicated by this long white fringe, and what desperate charges ofHood's divisions they were that came through it, close up to theline of this abatis. Every twig was weeping with the cold pouringrain of the dark midwinter storm, and this did not lessen the gloomyeffect of the scene. At the Carter house we learned from the familymany incidents of their own experience during the battle and of thescenes of the next day. [Footnote: See "Franklin, " chap. Xv. ] Our position in the rear of the marching columns put upon us theduty of building bridges, repairing roads, and improving the meansof supplying the troops in front. We consequently made halts, one oftwo or three days at Spring Hill, and another in our old camps northof Duck River, where we had held the line of the river on the 28thand 29th of November. The day after Christmas we moved over theriver and encamped in front of Columbia, on the Pulaski turnpike. Weremained here for several days, whilst the Fourth Corps and thecavalry, making Pulaski their depot for supplies, followed Hooduntil he crossed the Tennessee on the 28th and 29th of December. Theline of the Confederate retreat was stripped bare of supplies andforage, and every energy was devoted to rebuilding railroad bridgesand getting the road opened to Pulaski so that wagon transportationmight be limited to the region beyond the head of the rails. Thomashad ordered Steedman's and R. S. Granger's divisions to Decatur byrail, going by way of Stevenson. Once there, they were to operate inthe direction of Tuscumbia and Florence, seeking to destroy Hood'spontoon bridges crossing the Tennessee. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 260. ] The light steamboats in the upper riverwere reckoned on to take supplies from Chattanooga, where anabundance was in depot. Steedman reached Decatur on the 27th ofDecember, and Granger joined him from Huntsville, but Hood hadreached Bainbridge, at the foot of Muscle Shoals on the 25th;[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 731. ] and next day had a bridge there, built inpart of our pontoons which had been floated down from Decatur. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 343. ] He assembled the remnants of his army atTupelo, Miss. , fifty miles south of Corinth. The inspection reportof January 20th showed 18, 708, infantry and artillery, present forduty; Forrest's cavalry not reported. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 664. ] Thomas's prizes in the two days' fightingat Nashville were reported by him as amounting to 4462 prisoners andfifty-three pieces of artillery. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 40. ] Thepursuit after the battle doubled the number of the prisoners, gathered large numbers of deserters, and considerably increased thenumber of guns captured. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 46, 48, 51. ] On the 29th of December Thomas indicated to General Halleck hisopinion that all had been done which was now practicable, and hispurpose to put his forces into winter quarters, --A. J. Smith's corpswith most of the cavalry at Eastport, where the Mississippi andAlabama line reaches the Tennessee River; the Fourth Corps atHuntsville, Ala. , and the Twenty-third at Dalton, Ga. Steedman's andGranger's divisions were already at Decatur, and would hold thatimportant position, with which direct railway communication fromNashville would be opened as quickly as the road could be repairedfrom Pulaski southward. Thomas also outlined for the spring aconcerted advance of the columns into southern Alabama. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 402. ] The same day he issuedhis order to Schofield to prepare at once for the march of a hundredand fifty miles to northern Georgia. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 409. ] Amarch of the same distance southward along the Mobile and OhioRailway would have carried us to Hood's camps at Tupelo, with aprospect of immediate results, and we were not exhilarated by theorder, which, however, was countermanded on the 30th in consequenceof dispatches received by Thomas from Halleck. General Grant had, on the 16th, authorized Sherman to make his ownplan for a new campaign, and the latter had indicated the march fromSavannah to Columbia and thence to Raleigh as that which he wouldmake if left to himself. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xliv. Pp. 727-729. ]The necessity of reducing the war expenses as soon as possible, aswell as more purely military reasons, seemed to the General-in-Chiefto make a continuous winter campaign imperative, and by his ordersHalleck had directed Thomas not to go into winter quarters, but toassemble his army at Eastport and prepare for further active work. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 441. ] Grant rightly concludedthat Hood's army would be sent to the Carolinas as soon as Shermanmarched northward. He was therefore considering combinations ofThomas's with Canby's forces for the capture of Mobile and amovement on Selma, Ala. , which was the only great armory andmanufacturing centre now remaining to the Confederates in the GulfStates. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 419, 420. ] Our army was a good deal worn with the hardships of thecampaign, our wagon trains had not been brought up to therequirements for full field service, and we were receiving newtroops which were not yet fully assimilated to the old; but theadvantages of following up our successes by unflagging efforts inthe West as well as in the East, and of making the "long pull and apull all together" which would end the war, were so plain that allresponded cheerily to the call. But in the Twenty-third Corps a new element entered into the debate, which resulted, a fortnight later, in orders for us to move in awidely different direction. On the 27th, the day that we received atColumbia the news that Sherman had taken Savannah, Schofield wrotean unofficial letter to Grant, suggesting that the corps would nolonger be needed for the spring campaign which Thomas was thenplanning, and that with its increase of strength it might be of moreuse in Grant's own operations in Virginia if it was not practicablefor us to rejoin Sherman. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 377. ] Circumstanceswere making Schofield's situation in Tennessee uncomfortable, for, as he said in the same letter, he was in an anomalous position, nominally commanding a department and an army, but practically doingneither. Such considerations reinforced the military reasons, butthe latter were strong enough to establish the wisdom of hissuggestion to Grant. He wrote at the same time to General Sherman, indicating that his strongest wish would be to join the army atSavannah if it should be feasible, for he recognized the greatmilitary importance of now concentrating against Lee. [Footnote:"Forty-six Years, " p. 254. ] It happened that on the same day thatSchofield was writing these letters, Grant was writing to Sherman, expressing his pleasure in the latter's confidence of his ability tomarch through the Carolinas, and his own belief that it could bedone. "The effect of such a campaign, " he said, "will be todisorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armiesfrom their broken fragments. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xliv. P. 820. ] Giving a sketch of the situation in the West, hethought Sherman's advance would force the Confederacy to use Hood'sbroken army without allowing it time to collect its deserters andreorganize. As it would thus be "wiped out for present harm, " he wasconsidering the plan of ordering A. J. Smith away from his temporaryconnection with Thomas's main army, and bringing him with ten orfifteen thousand men to Virginia to make his own army strong enoughto deal effectually with Lee, whether the Confederate generalcontinued to defend Richmond or should abandon that city. [Footnote:_Ibid_. ] Schofield's suggestion fitted so well the plan Grant wasrevolving in his mind, that he decided to bring the Twenty-thirdCorps East, instead of Smith's. On the 7th of January he directedThomas to send Schofield and the corps to him with as little delayas possible, if he were sure that Hood had gone further south thanCorinth. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 529. ] When Thomasreceived the order on the 11th, he was at Paducah on the Ohio River, and about to start up the Tennessee by steamboat. We were at Cliftonon the Tennessee, after a hard march of some seventy miles southwestfrom Columbia, and were awaiting steamboats to take us up toEastport, wholly ignorant of the surprise that was in store for us. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 363. ] Even Schofield had received noword from Grant as to his action. In making this outline of the changing plans of our superiors, Ihave outrun the current of my personal experience in which somethings may be worth noting. On the day after the battle ofNashville, I was conscious of malarial poisoning from the speciallyunwholesome conditions of our bivouac on the night of the 16th, butwas so confident in the vigor of my constitution in throwing offsuch ailments that I paid no attention to my health, and kept aboutmy duties with my ordinary activity. I found, however, that mystrength was not equal to the demands upon it, and by the time wereached the Duck River on the 23d of December, I was glad to findquarters at the house of Mrs. Porter, in the bend of the river, where we had been during the two days before the battle of Franklin, and where we were again received with a kindness and hospitalitywhich was wonderful when one considers how the passing and repassingof armies had ruined the country and overstrained the sympathies ofthe people. Fortunately for me, our movements were suspended for a week and wemade but one change of camp, crossing to the south side of theriver, and taking the position in front of Columbia which I havealready mentioned. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 373. ] My medical director, Surgeon Frink, gave me heroic treatment, and by the time we marchedagain on the 2d of January, I was able to do my ordinary duties, though I did not become quite well again till I reached thesea-coast and got a complete change of climate. At this time we wereexpecting to go into winter quarters, and when, on 29th December, Ilearned that orders were issued for the corps to winter at Dalton, Irequested and received a leave of absence for thirty days, to gohome and recover my health. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 361. ] My order had been issued, turning over the commandto Colonel Doolittle, the senior brigade commander present, [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Ii. P. 476. ] when I learned from GeneralSchofield that the active campaign was to be resumed and that he hadabandoned the purpose he had formed of going north himself as far asLouisville. I immediately rescinded my own order, and marched withthe command. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 426, 474, 475, 486. ] During the pursuit of Hood from Nashville, Thomas had followed inperson the Fourth Corps, which was in advance of ours, and Schofieldhad no opportunity of personal conference with him, so that our onlyknowledge of his purposes was got from the formal correspondencewith his headquarters. When Colonel Doolittle sent forward hiscommunication reasserting the capture of the battery in the curtainof the Confederate works on the 16th of December, [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 366. ] it was accompanied by my own and indorsed by GeneralSchofield. It reached Thomas at Duck River, and he made it theoccasion of indorsing upon it a recommendation for my promotion tothe grade of Major-General. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 234, 235. ] On the 19th, from Franklin, General Schofieldmade his own recommendation in terms which I may be pardoned forfeeling more pride in than in the promotion itself. [Footnote: SeeAppendix C. ] This was earnestly supported by General Thomas andforwarded on the 20th. The only vacancy in the grade was one made bythe resignation of General McClernand, and to this I was assigned, as of the 7th of December, the date of General Schofield's report ofthe battle of Franklin, though the official notice of the promotiondid not reach me till the 15th of January, at Clifton, as we wereabout to take steamboats for our movement to the East. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 273, 274; _Id_. , pt. I. P. 364. Army Register for 1865, pp. 54, 95. Another vacancy occurred onthe 13th December, by the resignation of General Crittenden, and tothis General W. B. Hazen was appointed for his assault of FortMcAllister near Savannah. (_Ibid_. ) On December 22d Mr. Stantonasked Thomas to make a list of promotions he desired to recommend, but informed him that there was then no vacancy in the grade ofMajor-General, and only two in that of Brigadier. (Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 307. ) General Schofield thinks that Stanton, inthe dispatch last mentioned, referred only to vacancies in theregular army. (Forty-six Years, p. 279. ) The circumstances and thewhole correspondence seem to me inconsistent with this view. Thomasmade out his list on the 25th, and it was for promotions in thevolunteer service only. (Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 343. ) Thomas's own promotion as Major-General in the regular armywas made on the 24th. (_Id_. , pp. 318, 329. )] Before leaving Columbia, General Schofield had, on the 28th ofDecember, a consultation with his three division commanders inregard to the assignment of the new regiments, to the number oftwelve or thirteen, which had been added to the corps. [Footnote:These included two or three which had been temporarily attached atFranklin, but were now made permanent parts of the organization. ] Itwas agreed that it was best to preserve the older organizations ofdivisions and brigades, and to strengthen these by some newregiments, while the rest of the new regiments were organized into adivision under General Ruger. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 409. ] Schofield had the promise of several otherregiments whenever they should come forward; and by correspondencewith Halleck and with the Governor of Illinois, as well as withThomas, he was actively striving to bring the corps to the properstrength of three full divisions. At the end of the month we had15, 000 men, with at least two other regiments ordered to join us, one of them convalescing from the measles, which was very apt to runthrough a new organization taking the field. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 426, 436, 445, 461, 473, 475. ] The new troops were nearly allofficered by men of experience, and contained many veterans who hadre-enlisted. We thus welcomed back valuable men who had served inthe corps, and came to us with increased rank and a renewed zealwhich made our reinforcements at once nearly equal to seasonedtroops. Our orders to march from Columbia on the 1st of January were inpursuance of the orders Thomas had received to concentrate his armyat Eastport and Tuscumbia for the continuance of the campaign. TheFourth Corps was _en route_ to Huntsville, and Thomas did not changeits destination, as he thought it could take part in new movementsas well from that position as from Tuscumbia. A. J. Smith's corpshad already been ordered to Eastport for winter quarters, and hadmarched from Pulaski by way of Lawrenceburg and Waynesborough, reaching Clifton on the 2d of January, where it awaited steamboattransportation. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 396, 410, 420, 427, 486. Clifton is called Carrollville in officialAtlas, pl. Cxlix. The former name is that used in the dispatches andwhich we found in use by everybody. The roads and topography in themap are very incorrect. ] Thomas himself was at Pulaski, and wentback by rail to his headquarters at Nashville, whence he took asteamer to convey his field headquarters and staff by way of theCumberland and Tennessee rivers to Eastport. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 470, 530, 567. ] We marched from Columbia on the morning of the 2d of January, 1865, following the turnpike to Mt. Pleasant, ten miles, through some ofthe finest farms in the State. The afternoon was spent in organizingthe corps to move in separate columns by division, each with its ownsupply train; for the information we got as to the condition of theroads made it wise to try any country roads which had not been usedby the armies. It was arranged that Couch's division should march bythe turnpike to Waynesborough, wind by a ridge road through the"barrens" north of the turnpike, and Ruger should follow me somedistance, and then take an intermediate road through Laurel-HillFactory, leaving an interval of a day's march between our columns. Couch's division was preceded by the engineer battalion of thecorps, as pioneers to repair the turnpike. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 475, 486. ] Promptly at six o'clock on the 3d, my division marchedfrom Mt. Pleasant, continuing for five miles on the Waynesboroughturnpike, then turning to the right upon the Gordon road, we climbedby a steep and long hill to the barren ridge which is the watershedbetween the Duck River and Buffalo River. Five miles from theturnpike our way ran into the Beaverdam road, which we kept for fivemiles further to the fork of the Ashland road, turning to the left. Here we camped and waited for our trains, which had slow work inclimbing the ridge, for it had rained all the morning, and the roadswere slippery. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 362; pt. Ii. P. 498. ] It was noon of the 4th before the trains overtook us, and I thenordered an issue of rations to lighten them, and we started again, with a citizen for a guide. We followed the Perryville road sevenmiles to the headwaters of Grinder's Creek, a tributary of BuffaloRiver, and down the creek three miles, the road being a mere trackin its bed. We now turned to the right over a ridge and came downinto Rockhouse Creek, the course of which we followed to the river. I had learned that we must ford the Buffalo, and from the wetweather it would be whole leg deep. It was getting late in the day, and Rockhouse Creek had to be crossed many times; so I passed theorder along the line not to try to bridge, but to march straightthrough the creek and make the more important crossing of the riverbefore going into camp. This seemed hard, in the month of January, when, as it had cleared and was cold, ice was forming in the stillplaces of the stream; but I heard that open farm lands bordered theriver on the other side, and if our wading was done all at once, wecould make the men dry their clothes and shoes with less danger tohealth than if we began another day with a soaking. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 362. ] It grew dark several hours before we reached Buffalo River, thecolumn plodding along in the wooded ravine. I had turned out fromthe road to wait for the brigades to pass, and have a word with thecommanders in turn, and was picking my way to the head of columnagain, when I overheard one of those little colloquies betweensoldiers which give real pleasure to an officer. A fresh recruit wasgrumbling at marching in the darkness and in the water, andwondering what generals could mean by putting such hardships uponthe soldiers, when a veteran by his side answered cheerily, "Whenyou've been in this division as long as I have, you'll know there'ssome good reason for pushing us this way; so take it easy, and don'tgrowl. The General knows what he's about. " I turned further out intothe darkness, with a feeling that it would cheapen the brave man'swords to let him learn who had heard him, but the evidence of thetrust which is the foundation of soldierly devotion gave a deepsatisfaction. When the column reached the river, which was aboutseventy-five yards wide, fires were lit on both sides as guides tothe ford, and though it was near nine o'clock, the men were notpermitted to rest till they had thoroughly dried themselves aroundthe great fires of fence-rails. They did not need orders to boiltheir coffee and cook a hot supper in their bivouac. The broadfields between the hills and the river were illuminated far andwide, and the stillness of the dark valley was transformed into thenoisy activity of the armed host. All in the camp were "merry asgrigs, " and did not need to be told why the march had been prolongedinto the night. But the fun of the soldier was the grief and dismayof the farmer. The place belonged to an elderly man named Churchill. We had to makeuse of his house for headquarters, and while our boys were cookingour supper, a busy group of officers was seated about the cracklingfire in an open fireplace, writing dispatches and orders, receivingreports, and sending messages, while in the shadows of thebackground the farmer and his wife were moving uneasily about, looking out of door or window, and wringing their hands at thevision of destruction which had suddenly descended upon them. Theold man protested at the burning of his fences, naturally enough, and all we could say was that, in the end, if he could prove hisloyalty, he would be indemnified for his loss; but this was smallconsolation, and we pitied him whilst we applied the pitiless codeof military necessity to save the troops from worse mischiefs. The ridge road we had followed had been so completely a wildernessthat we saw but one inhabited house for fifteen miles. The hillsideswere covered with a young forest, the original woods having been cutoff and made into charcoal for the iron furnaces of the region. Ingood weather it would have been easy marching through the region, for the top of the ridge was fairly level, winding along in ageneral westerly direction; but as the road had never been "worked, "and was a mere wagon track, it soon became muddy, and our wagons cutit so deeply as to spoil it for the use of any who were to followus, and to make about fifteen miles a day the most we couldourselves accomplish. Starting again on the 5th, we marched through Ashland, [Footnote: Inthe Atlas, pl. Cxlix. , Ashland is erroneously placed north ofBuffalo river. ] up the valley of Forty-eight-mile Creek and thencealong a ridge to Waynesborough, encamping just beyond the town. Ourroad ran into the turnpike two miles east of the village, and we metCouch's division at the junction of the roads. We took the advance, which we kept during the next day's march to the Tennessee, reachingClifton toward evening of the 6th, after a very hard day's work, theweather beginning with rain in the morning and turning to sleet andsnow after noon. We pitched our tents in the snowstorm, locating thecamp more than a mile from the landing-place, as the eligible groundnearer was occupied by Smith's corps, which was waiting fortransports to take them up the river. It was a desolate outlook. A few chimneys and two or three housesmarked the site of what had once been a flourishing village, butwhich had been burned in the guerilla warfare of the last year. Thelandscape was bare, the trees having disappeared in the demand forcamp-fires, as different bodies of troops had camped there from timeto time. The bluff above the river was level and monotonous, and thegreat turbid stream rolling northward reflected only the heavystormy skies. The only consolation we could gather was thatEastport, for which we supposed we were bound, was more desolate, more muddy, and a worse camping-ground. The other divisions of the corps halted at Waynesborough for two orthree days, till transports should take Smith's corps away and giveus our turn at the landing. General Schofield joined me on theafternoon of the 7th, and on Sunday, the 8th, a fleet of transportscame down the river, convoyed by three gunboats under Rear-AdmiralLee. They had taken part of Smith's troops to Eastport and hadreturned for the rest. A pleasant recollection of the time is theacquaintance then begun with the Admiral, which was afterwardsrenewed at Washington when I met him in the attractive circle of theBlair families, both the elder Francis P. Blair, and Montgomery, with whom Admiral Lee was connected by marriage. When the fleet wasgone again, the rest of our corps gathered at Clifton, but we seemedshut off from all communication with the outer world. We had brokenour connection with the country we had left, in the expectation ofhaving our base on the lower Tennessee, and our supplies weregetting short. An occasional steamboat would go by us, steaming upthe river without stopping. Feeling the necessity of getting newsfrom General Thomas below, General Schofield ordered me, on the 9th, to send a piece of artillery to the river bank and force up-boundboats to stop and report. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 557. ] On the same day Schofield issued his order for themovement by transports up the river, giving the method of shippingthe troops by divisions, each with its own artillery, baggage, andordnance trains. Open barges were provided for the artillery andordnance, and these were to be lashed alongside the steamboats onwhich the troops and the regimental baggage would be loaded. Themethod was arranged in consultation with Admiral Lee, to whom thedivision commander was ordered to report during the transit. [Footnote: _Ibid. _] The intent was to keep each division together asa military unit, with its baggage, guns, and trains, so that itcould take care of itself when landed. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 557. ] Nearly a week passed, the only variation in the monotony being thechanges of the weather, which went through the cycle of raining, snowing, clearing, thawing, and freezing which had been regularlymarked during the season. The delays in reaching the up-riverrendezvous, the complete absence of all news, the wearying effect ofwaiting, all told upon the troops in a depressing way. GeneralSchofield evidently had little faith that much would be done beforespring, and the fact that he had heard nothing from his letters toGrant and Sherman left him without the means of relieving thegeneral tendency to apathy and discontent under which we weresuffering. In my own case I had the further discomfort of physicalailing, for though the worst symptoms of my illness had beenmitigated, I was far from my usual vigor. The undeniable result ofthis appeared in my home letters, and it would not be altogetherhonest to suppress the hearty bit of private grumbling which Iindulged in. Writing on the 13th, after noting the utter lack of stability in theweather and its effect on our operations, I broke out on thepersonal results of the winter campaigning. "I am getting ragged andbarefoot, " I said. "My boots are worn out, my coat is worn out, mywaistcoats are worn out, my hat is worn out, and I am only whole andrespectable when I am in my shirt and drawers. If I ever get nearcivilization again, I shall be obliged to lie abed somewhere till Ican get some clothes made. I don't wonder the Washington people wantto have the campaign go on, and if they would apply a little of the'go ahead' to the army on the James, would appreciate it stillbetter. Here we know to an absolute certainty that the army is stuckin the mud; but the administration would not believe General Thomaswhen he told them so, and force him to pretend to move, with thefear of being superseded hanging over him, whilst he knows that anyeffective movement is impossible. We can ruin our horses and mules, and put half our men in hospitals without getting twenty-five milesfrom the Tennessee unless the weather changes, and this is all wecan do. Hood can laugh at us unless the Mobile and Ohio Railroad canbe repaired as we go and be made to furnish us supplies. If thiscould be done, or if the season would permit us to chase the rebelsright into the gulf, I would be perfectly content to stay, and infact couldn't be coaxed to go home; but knowing what I know, I feelperfectly sure that I might as well be making a biennial visit to myfamily as not. " On the day after this letter was written General Thomas came up theriver with a fleet of transports which we were ordered to take for amovement down instead of up the river. The word spread that we weregoing to join Sherman, and though this meant journeys by boat, byrail, and by ocean ships, two thousand miles or more, our campsleaped from apathy to enthusiasm, such creatures of circumstance weare! Looking back at the situation, I have to admit that Grant'splan of keeping everything moving was the right one, and that ifhopeful energy and enterprise could have combined Canby's movementswith ours, and we had all been told that this active co-operationwas afoot and would soon take us southward where we would meet thecoming spring while Tennessee was still shivering in the winterstorms, we should all have caught the spirit of the opportunity andcheered our leaders on. But this impulse in an army must come fromthe head downward. The trudging columns perfectly know the fatigue, the cold, the mud. They very imperfectly catch the larger view whichstimulates to great effort by the hope of great results. In acouncil of war the division commanders would probably advise delayin sympathy with the hardships of the troops, when the same officerswould have sprung with ardor to the work under a brief and strongappeal from a confident leader, presenting the broader reasons forenergetic persistent activity. It was this quality of leadership inSherman which made Grant say to Stanton in December, "It isrefreshing to see a commander, after a campaign of more than sevenmonths' duration, ready for still further operations without wantingany outfit or rest. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 264. ] Thomas did not stop at Clifton except to send us his orders, andwent on to Eastport, arriving there on the morning of the 15th. Fromthat place he reported that Hood's infantry, much disorganized, wasat Tupelo, West Point, and Columbus, Miss. Forrest's cavalry, insimilar condition, was about Okolona. Roads were almostimpracticable, but the high water in the river made it easy to getsupplies to Eastport by the largest steamers. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 586, 593. General Schofield does not remember seeing General Thomasin Tennessee after December 25th ("Forty-six Years, " p. 276), andthis accords with my impression that Thomas did not stop at Cliftonlong enough for us to visit him. ] As to our new movement, Mr. Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, had been intrusted withthe supervision of the transfer, and sent west Colonel L. B. Parsonsof the Quartermaster's Department to collect a fleet of steam-boatsat Louisville for the purpose. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 560, 568, 586. ]But meanwhile, under Thomas's orders, the fleet of transports hadbeen collected and had come for us, and the troops were joined byColonel Parsons when they reached the Ohio. He then took charge ofthe transportation by boat and by rail. [Footnote: Dana'sRecollections, pp. 253, 254. ] As the transfer would take ten days ormore, Schofield arranged to go on in advance to close up business atLouisville and for consultations with Grant and Halleck bytelegraph. I went with him to Cairo, where we took railway trains, and I was authorized to go to my home in Ohio to recuperate until heshould telegraph me from Washington. The command of the corps _enroute_ was given to General Couch. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 588. ] As we were leaving the Military Division ofthe Mississippi, Colonel Doolittle was obliged to give up thecommand of Reilly's brigade and return to his own regiment. Reillyrejoined the corps after we reached North Carolina. Theconvalescents of Sherman's army and his recruits were collected in aprovisional division under General Thomas Francis Meagher, tooksteamboats at Nashville, and made part of the same general transferto the East. There was an amusing coincidence when the brilliantIrish "patriot" telegraphed that his fleet had started, "the SaintPatrick leading the way. " [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 564, 600, 613. ]Colonel Wright, Sherman's efficient chief of railway construction, had been ordered, a little earlier, to proceed eastward with onedivision of the construction corps with the object of joiningSherman at Savannah. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 393. ] Changingcircumstances, however, brought him as well as Meagher's divisioninto our column a little later, as will soon appear. In a similarway General S. P. Carter joined us by transfer from duties atKnoxville, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 620. ] and General George S. Greene, of the Twentieth Corps, who had been serving on a court-martial atWashington, was also temporarily attached to our command till he wasable to join his own organization, which was with Sherman. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 623. ] The reduction of Thomas's forces could not have been altogetheragreeable to him, though he no doubt preferred it to the continuanceof a winter campaign under imperative orders from Washington. He hadnot ceased to believe that it was better to rest and refit his armytill spring;[Footnote: _Id. _, p. 621. ] but Grant insisted that he"must make a campaign or spare his surplus troops, " and thoughThomas was a model of obedience to orders, his continued oppositionof opinion, frankly expressed, naturally led to the detachment ofour corps. The discussion of the subject between Grant and Halleckclearly stated the reasons which were conclusive. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 609, 610, 614; also vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 101, 859. ] Thomas suffered mentally under thepressure and the criticisms of the whole campaign, and we maypersonally share his pain in sympathy with the noble man, whilst weadmit that Grant's views were such as the situation demanded. Thosewho knew Thomas intimately knew that he was a man of quick feelingif of slow action; and his nature was truthfully described by hisquartermaster, Colonel Donaldson (who was an old and intimatefriend), in a letter to General Meigs, after a parting interview onthe steamboat as Thomas left Nashville for Eastport. "He opened hisheart to me, " says Donaldson. "He feels very sore at the rumoredintentions to relieve him, and the major-generalcy does notcicatrize the wound. You know Thomas is morbidly sensitive, and itcut him to the heart to think that it was contemplated to removehim. He does not blame the Secretary, for he said Mr. Stanton was afair and just man. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 561. ] CHAPTER XLVI CAMPAIGN IN NORTH CAROLINA--CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON Rendezvous at Washington--Capture of Fort Fisher--Schofield orderedto North Carolina--Grant and Schofield visit Terry--Department ofNorth Carolina--Army of the Ohio in the field--Correspondence ofGrant and Sherman--Sherman conscious of his risks but hopeful ofgreat results--His plan of march from Savannah--Relation ofWilmington to New Berne--Our arrival at Washington--The Potomacfrozen--Peace conference at Fort Monroe--Interview with Mr. Stanton--The thirteenth amendment of the Constitution--Politicalexcitement at the capital--A little dinner-party--Garfield, H. W. Davis, and Schenck--Davis on Lincoln--Destination of ourarmy--Embarkation--Steamship "Atlantic"--Visit to Fort Monroe--Thesea-voyage--Cape Fear Inlet--General Terry's lines--Bragg theConfederate commander--Reconnoitring his lines--The coloredtroops--"Monitor" engaged with Fort Anderson--Alternateplans--Marching on Wilmington by the west bank of the river--Mycolumn opposite the town--Orders not applicable to thesituation--Difficulty of communication--Use ofdiscretion--Wilmington evacuated--A happy result. On Thursday the 26th of January, 1865, I received a telegram fromGeneral Schofield directing me to join my command without delay, andI started from my home in northern Ohio the same evening. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 131. ] I had spent a week ina delightful visit with my family after two years of absence fromthem, and had been rapidly improving in health. The growing faiththat the campaign of the winter and spring would end in completevictory for the national arms created an ardent zeal to be about itand to have an active hand in the final scenes. Our orders hadindicated Annapolis as our port of rendezvous, and our destinationthe Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 529, 586. ] On reaching Annapolis Junction inthe night of the 28th, I learned that my division was in Washington, and followed it, arriving there in the morning of the 29th. [Footnote: To get an adequate idea of the task of transporting anarmy corps so great a distance, one should look at Colonel Parsons'sreport, including 250 dispatches. Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 215-284. ] The change from Annapolis to Washington and Alexandria had been madeby Grant upon a suggestion of General Halleck that there was noshelter at Annapolis for such a body of troops, whilst there wasenough at the capital. As the winter weather was then severe, thisthoughtfulness saved the command much suffering. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 596. ] The military situation had also changedmaterially by the capture of Fort Fisher on the North Carolinacoast, on the very day we embarked on the transports at Clifton(January 15th). This capture by the forces under General A. H. Terrywas one step in the preparation of a new base for Sherman in hismarch northward through the Carolinas, and Grant was most anxiousthat it should be followed by the occupation of Wilmington. Hisdesire to strengthen his own army was made secondary to hisdetermination to make Sherman's movement an assured success. Hewrote to Sherman on the 21st that he would send Schofield toWilmington, if, as was rumored, the fall of that place had followedthe capture of Fort Fisher. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 102. ] On the 24th he had made up his mind to send Schofield thereanyhow, and was going himself to inspect the fort and the situationat the mouth of Cape Fear River. He telegraphed for Schofield tojoin him on this visit to Terry, and the outline of the new campaignwas then arranged. A new department of North Carolina was decidedupon, Schofield was to command it, his army in the field to consistof two provisional corps besides the Twenty-third, of which Terrywas to command one, and the other for a time fell to me. This fieldforce was to retain our old title of the Army of the Ohio. OnSchofield's recommendation the brevet rank of major-general wasgiven to General Ruger, and that of brigadier to Colonel Hendersonof the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois, for services at Franklin. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 121, 179, 190, 201. ] Sherman had heard of the fall of Fort Fisher before he brokehis communications with Savannah, and was assured of a new basethere, even if the line from New Berne to Goldsborough should not beopened. The correspondence between Sherman and Grant at this time is verycharacteristic of both men, and throws a bright light on theirunselfish friendship and their earnest purpose to bring the war to asuccessful end without rest or delay. In his letter of the 21st ofJanuary, after giving the latest details of his situation, Shermanadds: "I am told that Congress meditates a bill to make anotherlieutenant-general for me. I have written to John Sherman to stop itif it is designed for me. [Footnote: See Sherman Letters, p. 245. ]It would be mischievous, for there are enough rascals who would tryto sow differences between us, whereas you and I now are in perfectunderstanding. I would rather have you in command than anybody else, for you are fair, honest, and have at heart the same purpose thatshould animate all. I should emphatically decline any commissioncalculated to bring us into rivalry, and I ask you to advise allyour friends in Congress to this effect, especially Mr. Washburne. Idoubt if men in Congress fully realize that you and I are honest inour professions of want of ambition. I know that I feel none, andto-day will gladly surrender my position and influence to any otherwho is better able to wield the power. The flurry attending myrecent success will soon blow over and give place to newdevelopments. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 103. In the same letter Sherman referred to the farewell orderGeneral Butler had addressed to his troops on being relieved ofcommand. "I am rejoiced that Terry took Fisher, " Sherman said, "because it silences Butler, who was to you a dangerous man. Hisaddress to his troops on being relieved was a direct, mean, andmalicious attack on you, and I admired the patience and skill bywhich you relieved yourself and the country of him. " In the addressreferred to, Butler had said: "I have been chary of the preciouscharge confided to me. I have refused to order the useless sacrificeof the lives of such soldiers, and I am relieved from your command. The wasted blood of my men does not stain my garments. " (O. R, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Ii. P. 71. ) Such a publication made its author liable tocourt-martial, but Grant took no public notice of it, except tooppose his further assignment to duty. _Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 537, 562. See also Sherman to Admiral Porter, _Id_. , p. 104, andGrant to Sherman, _Id_. , p. 859. ] Replying on the 1st of February, Grant said: "I have received yourvery kind letter, in which you say you would decline, or are opposedto, promotion. No one would be more pleased at your advancement thanI, and if you should be placed in my position and I put subordinate, it would not change our relations in the least. I would make thesame exertions to support you that you have ever done to support me, and I would do all in my power to make our cause win. " [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 193. ] That Sherman knew his campaign in the Carolinas would involve greatrisks, and had no blind confidence in his fortune, was shown by hisreply to the well-known letter of congratulation which PresidentLincoln sent him upon the surrender of Savannah: [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xliv. P. 809, and Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 166. ] "Themotto 'Nothing venture, nothing win, ' which you refer to, is mostappropriate, and should I venture too much and happen to lose, Ishall bespeak your charitable inference. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 18. ] In writing to Grant also, on the 29th of January, in a very full andinteresting letter, he said: "I expect Davis will move Heaven andearth to catch me, for success to my column is fatal to his dream ofempire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia andthe heart of South Carolina. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 155. ] [Illustration: Map: Northeast Georgia / South Carolina border area] The general plan which he adopted was to threaten both Charlestonand Augusta with the wings of his army, keeping the enemy in doubtas to his purpose as long as possible, whilst he pushed his centrerapidly toward Columbia. He had no mind to waste time in seriousoperations against Charleston, for he knew that it must fall whenhis advance threatened to cut it off from communication withRichmond. From Columbia he planned to march on Raleigh by way ofGoldsborough, the last-named place being connected by railroad withboth Wilmington and New Berne, and being therefore the objective ofGeneral Schofield's movements from both seaports. Beaufort, theharbor of New Berne, was deeper than the mouth of Cape Fear River, and was therefore to be made the principal base of supply forSherman when he should enter North Carolina; but Wilmington was somuch further south that prudence required it to be first occupiedand provisioned to give Sherman temporary supply, if any contingencyshould make it necessary to him before the railroad from New Berneto Goldsborough could be rebuilt. These subsidiary operations inNorth Carolina were to be our special task. [Footnote: For connectedhistorical treatment of Sherman's march northward, and of thecapture of Fort Fisher, see "March to the Sea, " etc. , chaps, viii. -xi. : Life of Sherman (Great Commanders' Series), chap. Xii. ] On reaching Washington, I found that my troops were just arriving ontrains from the West. They were temporarily placed in barracks inthe city, till the fleet of transports should be ready. The unusualseverity of the winter had frozen the Potomac, and Annapolis wasalso blocked with ice, so that the quartermaster's department had towait two or three days for a change of weather, before fixing thepoint of departure. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 154. ] The time passed pleasantly for me, since it gave me theopportunity of renewing old acquaintance with public men, and ofobserving for myself the spirit which animated political circles atthe capital. Mr. Lincoln with Mr. Seward had gone to Fort Monroe tomeet Mr. Stephens and others, commissioned by the Richmondgovernment to confer informally as to the possibilities of peace. The Confederate officials were at Grant's headquarters on the 1st ofFebruary, "very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr. Lincoln, "as the General-in-Chief wrote Sherman incidentally. From hisinterview with them, Grant was convinced that "the peace feelingwithin the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly, " but he added, "This, however, should not relax our energies in the least, butshould stimulate us to greater activity. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 194. ] Going to pay my respects to Secretary Stanton at the War Department, I was met by him in an exceedingly cordial way, and in parting, after an interesting visit, he congratulated me on my promotion, saying I owed nobody any thanks for it, as it had been fully andfairly won. I owe it to him to mention this, for so much was currentabout the brusqueness of his intercourse with army officers, that heis entitled to the testimony that, on this as on all other occasionswhen I met him personally, nothing could be kinder or moreconsiderate than his manner to me. My visit to Washington happened to include the day on which theconstitutional amendment abolishing slavery passed the House. Breakfasting with Chief-Justice Chase, I met also Henry WardBeecher, and the great historical event was, of course, the centralsubject of conversation. The forecast by such men of the effect uponthe country and upon the world made a blending of solid wisdom withbrilliant eloquence not to be forgotten. My friend Governor Dennisonwas Postmaster-General, and in his house I had full opportunity tojudge of the keen, almost feverish interest with which public menand leading citizens were following the rapid march of both militaryand civil affairs. Coming, as I was, out of the rough wintercampaign of the West for a brief halt in the centre of politicalactivity, before sailing to the swamp-lined shores of Carolina, there was something almost unreal, though fascinating, in thecontrast of the excitement of the field with the totally differentbut scarcely less absorbing excitement which I saw in every face. Garfield arranged a little dinner at which, besides himself, I metGeneral Schenck and Henry Winter Davis, all of them playing leadingroles in the House of Representatives. We four were alone, and itwas a rare opportunity for me to hear unrestrained discussion ofeverything in public affairs. Nearly every phase of currentpolitical and military events was treated in brilliant and trenchantcriticism, and the conversation turned at last upon the peaceconference going on at Fort Monroe. Mr. Davis was a Marylander, whowas second to none in uncompromising loyalty to the Union, and hadan acknowledged pre-eminence in eloquent advocacy of the Nationalcause. He, however, did not understand or appreciate Mr. Lincoln, and in the celebrated "Wade and Davis manifesto" of the previousyear, had opposed the re-election of the President. He now let loosein a witty and scathing denunciation of Lincoln and all his works. The current epithets among the President's opponents, of which"baboon" was one of the mildest, were flung at him with a venomthat, to me, was half shocking and half comical. The soldier habitof making the Hurrah for Lincoln our answering war-cry to the Hurrahfor Davis of our enemies in the field, made a bewildering puzzle ofsuch an outburst. The meeting with the Southern commissioners wasdenounced as a weak compromising of our cause. He saw no force inthe argument that weak hearts among us would be strengthened whenthey saw that now as upon former overtures the Confederateauthorities insisted upon independence as the necessary condition ofpeace, whilst Mr. Lincoln stood firmly for restoration of the Unionand abolition of slavery as the essentials. The curious fact wasthat such a man, ably busied for four years in politicalco-operation with the President, living in the same city, infrequent personal contact with him, had utterly failed to measurehis character and his intellect, or to get even a glimmering idea ofwhat lay beneath that ungraceful exterior and that quaint andhumorous speech. The elegant orator and polished man of the worldfelt no magnetism but that of repulsion; and his senses were sodulled by it that he never guessed the wisdom and the breadth, thesubtle policy and the deep statesmanship, the luminous insight andthe unfaltering purpose which now seem writ so plain in Lincoln'swords and deeds. General Schenck did not appear to differ greatly from Davis, butwhat he said was in short, trenchant sentences, interjected fromtime to time. Garfield treated the outburst as a sort ofextravaganza, and in his position as host did not seriously debate, but rallied his friend with good-humored persiflage, met hisoutbursts with jovial laughter and prodded him to fresh explosionsby shafts of wit. It was a strange and not altogether exhilaratingexperience for me; but I had afterward to learn that the belittlingview of Lincoln was the common one among public men in Washington. The people at a distance got a juster perspective, and knowing himby his written papers and his public acts, divined him better andgave him a loyal support hardly to be distinguished from theirdevotion to the cause of the country itself. We may fairly concludethat the failure of so many men near the President to understand himis not creditable to their sagacity; but we must also admit that afirst impression and a superficial view would in his case be almostsurely misleading, and that to correct it would take betteropportunities for an intimate study of the man than most public menwould have, and most would not care to seek them. The belittlingview of men in power fits best our self-esteem. As soon as General Schofield got back from his trip to Fort Fisherwith Grant, he had issued his orders for our movement which was totake place as soon as the ice would permit our transports to enteror leave the harbors on Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac. My owndivision was to take the lead and sail to Cape Fear River. Couch'swould come next and land at Beaufort for operations on the New Berneline. Ruger's (the new troops) would sail last, and find orders atFort Monroe in going down the bay, deciding whether its destinationshould be Wilmington or Beaufort. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 135. ] Meagher's provisional division ofdetachments belonging to Sherman's army was temporarily attached tous, for it was too late to join Sherman by way of Savannah. Meagherhad ordered it to rendezvous at New York, but Grant changed itsdestination to Washington with the purpose just stated. Itscommander had gone on to New York in advance without anyunderstanding with army headquarters, and the convivial andunsystematic Irishman thereby fell into trouble. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 116, 119, 126, 204, 293. ] On Thursday the 2d of February, General Schofield was able to issuehis final orders for embarkation. Only vessels enough for twobrigades of my division had been able to reach Alexandria, andCasement's brigade was sent by rail to Annapolis to take ship thereand to be followed immediately by Meagher's provisional command. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 213. ] Friday was spent in getting troops onboard the ships at Annapolis and systematizing their accommodationfor the voyage. One of our transports was the "Atlantic, " CaptainGray, which, as the crack ship of the Collins Line of New York andLiverpool packets, had led the van of the ocean greyhounds in thedays of wooden hulls and side-wheels. General Schofield and myselfmade our headquarters on this ship. On each of the other vessels thesenior officer was made responsible for all the troops on board, andwas confidentially authorized, after it should enter Chesapeake Bay, to instruct the master of the ship to make the best of his way toCape Fear Inlet as the rendezvous for the division. [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 293. ] General Grant had asked the War Department toarrange for a patrol of the coast by the navy during the transit ofSchofield's little army. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 284. ] On Saturday the 4th we had expected to start at daybreak, but aheavy fog delayed us. When it lifted, we made our way slowly downthe Potomac, the drifting ice obstructing the passage so that wecould only go at a snail's pace, backing and filling to keep in theice openings and to save injury to the vessel. Starting at teno'clock, we only reached the head of Kettlebottom Shoals bynightfall of the short winter day, making less than twenty miles. The passage of the shoals was too dangerous for so large a vessel inthe dark, and we dropped anchor for the night. I had made it myfirst task on Friday evening to have a complete understanding withCaptain Gray, and to get his suggestions as to the orders I desiredto issue for the conduct and discipline of the troops while on boardship for which I was responsible. He was a gentleman of ability andlarge experience in his profession, and co-operated with me socordially that our week on board the "Atlantic" was a mostcomfortable one, full of interest and enjoyment, though we met roughweather outside the capes. My order was issued on Saturday andrigidly enforced during the voyage. By Captain Gray's invitation Imade my office in his chart-room on the upper deck, enforcingregular tours of duty for officers and men of the division, of whomnearly 2000 were on board. In the intervals, when the captain wasnot himself on the bridge, we exchanged stories of our verydifferent experiences, and I found his conversation both interestingand instructive. We had besides, of course, the large circle ofcomrades and old friends in the cabin, and for those who escapedsea-sickness the hours never hung heavy. [Footnote: As the Recordsdo not seem to contain many orders for the conduct of troops ontransport ships, I insert that which I made for this voyage. It was, of course, supplemental to the Army Regulations of 1863, chap, xxxvii. "Special Orders No. 9. HEADQUARTERS, THIRD DIV. , 23D ARMY CORPS, Steamship Atlantic, February 4, 1865. The following regulations will be strictly observed by the officersand men of this command during the present voyage: 1. No open lights will be allowed in any part of the ship occupiedby troops. The ship's lanterns will be arranged by the officers ofthe vessel in such a way as to light the decks during the night, andwill not be opened or interfered with by the men. 2. No smoking will be allowed in any part of the vessel used forsleeping except the open decks. The men may smoke in the open airupon the upper decks, and the brigade commander will provide forgiving proper airing, and opportunity to smoke, to the men quarteredbelow. Officers will smoke, either upon deck or in the smoking-roomnear the water-closets. 3. The division and brigade commissaries will make arrangements withthe steward of the ship for cooking the men's coffee and doing othernecessary cooking for the command, and for serving the same out atregular hours. 4. The canteens of the men may be filled with drinking water onceeach day, the men being marched by companies under their properofficers to the pump in the fore part of the ship for that purpose. 5. The brigade commander, in consultation with the commander of theship, will arrange for the perfect policing of the quarters, sinks, etc. 6. The starboard side of the upper and main decks abaft of theengine, will be kept clear of men and reserved for the use ofofficers, both of the command and of the ship, during the day; andsuch portion of this space as may necessarily be occupied by the menfor sleeping at night, will have a passage kept entirely clear forthe use of the officers and crew of the vessel in working her atnight. No men will at any time be allowed to go upon the roofs ofthe houses on the upper deck. 7. Proper roll-calls will be established, and the line officers willbe strictly required to attend them, and to make close personalinspections daily of the condition of their men, and to bepersonally in command of them when marched out for water, or coffee, or when on duty. 8. An officer of the day will be daily appointed by the brigadecommander, and shall have full charge of the execution of thisorder, and supervision of all the police arrangements of thecommand. Proper line officers will be detailed on guard duty, andsentries will be regularly posted at the bulkhead of the shipstoreroom on the forward lower deck, at the sinks, over the lightsat night, and on the middle line of the decks reserved underparagraph six. 9. The officer of the day, after reporting at brigade headquarterseach day, will report to the captain of the ship, in order that theship's officers may know to whom to apply for any enforcement ofthese regulations. By command of Major-General Cox. (Signed) THEO. Cox, Capt. And Ass't Adj't-General. " Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 303. ] Weighing anchor at daybreak on Sunday morning, we passed KettleBottom Shoals safely, and found much more open water in the lowerriver. The day was mild and calm, and we made good progress to FortMonroe, where we stopped in the evening to take on board a supply ofammunition. While this work was going on, I took advantage of theopportunity to land in a small boat and pass through the place bymoonlight. As one of the largest and most important of thefortresses of the old style, with heavy walls of masonry, casemated, and with regular moat, it was an interesting study to a soldier, andall the more so as we were then in the full heat of the discussionof the relative value of such formal works compared with mereearthworks, of which Fort Fisher, to which we were bound, was a verystriking example. It was admitted that modern ordnance could soonknock the walls into a rubbish-heap, but Fort Sumter had raised thesupplementary debate, whether the rubbish-heap did not begin a newchapter in the defence, longer and more important than the firstperiod of attack. As soon as the ammunition was on board and properly stowed, ourvoyage was resumed, and at daybreak we had passed out of ChesapeakeBay, joining our consorts of the transport fleet near Cape Henry, and were running down the coast along the even line of keys whichlie as a breastwork against the Atlantic Ocean outside of the muchindented coast proper of North Carolina. The wind was moderate andoff shore, so that Captain Gray laid his course straight for CapeHatteras, with only offing enough to keep in a good depth ofwater, --say fifteen or twenty miles. At intervals during the day wecould see isolated clumps of pine-trees rising out of the water, like low-lying, blue clouds, so that we could hardly say that wewere wholly out of sight of land. We passed Cape Hatteras late inthe afternoon, about sunset, and as the coast now trends much moreto the westward, with concave lines from Hatteras to Cape Lookout(near Beaufort), and from Lookout to Cape Fear, our course took usfarther out to sea. I woke on Tuesday morning to find the shippitching heavily and heavy rain sounding loud on the deck over myhead, driven by gusts of wind. Doubts as to the reliability of my"sea legs" made me prudently keep my berth till about ten o'clock, when I went on deck to find a [Illustration: [map of south-centralNorth Carolina at the South Carolina border]] dense fog and a highrunning sea. The rain had ceased, but the succeeding fog was a worseobstacle to navigation. We were nearly at our destination, and werefeeling our way slowly along. My "doubts" vanished in the fresh air, and the bit of real seafaring was exhilarating. Most of the cabinpassengers, however, failed to show themselves on deck, and thesoldiers and officers whom duty kept there did not all enjoy itgreatly. The recruiting regulations, just then, allowed transfers tothe gunboat service of soldiers who had any experience even ininland navigation, and the impulse to change had made the subject a"burning question, " even while we were in the West The inveteratepractical jokers now had their opportunity, and a man leaninguneasily over the lee rail was sure to be offered the chance toenlist in the navy, with glowing eulogies of its superior comfortcompared with marching in the mud. In the middle of the afternoon wedropped anchor in nine fathoms, but toward evening the fog lifted, and we ran further in, anchoring in seven fathoms, about a mile offthe shore. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 927. ]Fort Fisher was abreast of us, on Federal Point, its big parapetlooking like a long, low hill, with knobs upon it, rising from thebeach of glittering white sand against a background of the pineforest. Admiral Porter's fleet lay at their moorings all around us, a few of the lighter vessels having crossed the bar and run into themouth of Cape Fear River behind the fort, where the river channelwas nearly parallel to the sea beach and less than a mile from it. We were at New Inlet, between Federal Point and Smith Island, orrather the long, narrow key which runs northward from the island. Cape Fear is the sharp southern point of Smith Island, some sevenmiles south of where we lay, and the old entrance was south and westof the cape, between the island and the mainland. [Footnote: Seeofficial Atlas, pl. Cxxxix. ] The landing of the troops was a difficult task, for the roughness ofthe sea made it impossible for another vessel to lie alongside thetransports, and we had to resort to the slow and somewhat dangerousmethod of transferring the men from the ships to a light-draftsteamer in the ship's small boats. A little wharf was on the innerside of Federal Point, but there the water was so shallow that eventhe light-draft propeller could not get to the wharf, and anothertransfer had to be made. Crossing the bar could only be done at highwater or near it, and the time for work was consequently so muchshortened that the whole of the 8th and 9th was used in landing thedivision. At sunset of the 9th the sea went down enough for thepropeller to come alongside; the headquarters tents and baggage weretransferred to her, and we took leave of the good ship "Atlantic. "By the time this transfer was made, the tide was too low to let uspass in over the bar, and we had to pass the night on the dirtypropeller, lying outside till eight o'clock of Friday the 10th, whenwe ran in at high tide, and after the second transfer resumed ourcharacter of land forces on the sandy shore of North Carolina. Allthe saddle horses of the command were, however, upon a freight shipthat did not arrive for several days, and mounted officers who hadlived in the saddle for years found it slow and tiresome work towade on foot through the soft sands in the performance of militaryduty. General Terry with his forces was holding a line across FederalPoint about two miles above Fort Fisher, [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 910. ] and I directed my own troops toencamp a little in rear of Terry's line. My own quartermasterarranged with the chief of that department on the ground to send ourheadquarters tents and baggage with the division. Meanwhile, takingthe little river steamboat which had made our final transfer to theshore, I visited General Schofield, who had his headquarterstemporarily on the steamer "Spaulding, " assigned to the medicaldepartment for hospital use, but which at the time had no sick orwounded on board. Like myself, he was for the nonce dismounted, andas he was contemplating movements up both sides of Cape Fear River, some means of ready communication with both banks was a necessity. With him I visited Admiral Porter on the flag-ship "Malvern, " and amovement for next day, the 11th, was arranged. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 927. ] [Illustration: Map] General Bragg was in command of the Confederate Department of NorthCarolina, to which he was assigned when General Lee, being made bylaw general-in-chief of the army, superseded him in the similarduties he had been performing by appointment of President Davis. Bragg's headquarters were at Wilmington. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1088, 1099. ] Hoke's division wasmostly in intrenchments across Federal Point about four miles aboveFort Fisher, his right resting at Sugar-loaf Hill on the left bankof the river, and his left near the lower end of Myrtle Sound. Opposite Sugar-loaf, at Old Brunswick, was Fort Anderson, a strongearthwork with ten pieces of heavy ordnance, garrisoned by GeneralHagood with his brigade of two thousand men. [Footnote: OfficialAtlas, pl. Cxxxii. ; Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 911, 1077. ] The channel of the river was obstructed by torpedoes andother defensive devices. The enemy's fortifications on Smith Islandand near Smithville had been abandoned when Fort Fisher fell, opening the way into the river above them. On board the "Malvern" it was arranged that a monitor and othervessels of the fleet which could cross the bar should ascend theriver and engage Fort Anderson, whilst Terry's troops, supported bymy division, should make a strong reconnoissance of Hoke's linesand, if they were found to be strongly held, establish counter linesnear them, so that most of the forces could then be used forflanking operations. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 958. ] Returning to mycommand, I found it encamped as had been ordered, and ourheadquarters tents in comfortable shape by the zealous labors of ourservants aided by the headquarters guard. General Terry kindly sentover four horses as a mount for myself and my most necessary staffofficers in the movement to begin in the morning. One of the firstquestions a soldier asks in regard to his camping-place is, Where iswater to be got? One's first impression would be that on this flattongue of sand covered only with a sparse growth of pines and scrublive-oak, with the ocean on one side and a tidal river on the other, fresh water would be scarce and brackish. But we were agreeablydisappointed to find that near us, in the middle of the sands, was ajuniper swamp and pond of which the water was sweet and wholesome, though from the juniper roots it had the bright brown color ofcoffee. On the 11th the movement was made as planned. Hoke's outposts andpickets were driven from their rifle-pits, and his main line atSugar-loaf well reconnoitred. Terry's new line was establishedwithin small-arm range of the enemy and intrenched so that Hokemight be obliged to hold his own position in force. In the advance Iwas much interested in observing the conduct of the colored troopsin General Paine's division, for I had never before seen them inaction. They were well disciplined and well led, and went forwardwith alacrity in capital form, showing that they were good soldiers. I rode well forward purposely to watch their skirmishers, and wasgreatly pleased to see the pace they took and the lively way inwhich they followed up the Confederate outposts when once these werestarted. When the new position was taken up, I went to the river bank, andthere, from a sand breastwork so white that it looked like asnow-drift, I watched with my field-glass a duel between the monitor"Montauk" and Fort Anderson. The monitor, which lay about a milefrom the fort, was of the original single-turret form, armed withthe large-calibre smooth-bores, which were fired with greatdeliberation and with surprising accuracy. I could not see how anyrifled guns could have improved on their practice. The conical shotwould, of course, have excelled in penetrating power and in range, but the big round shells seemed to be put just where the gunnerswished. A group of men stood on the deck of the monitor behind theturret, and they frequently came out from its cover to watch theeffect of the firing, having time to step back again, between theflash of the enemy's gun and the passing of the shot. The deck ofthe monitor, being almost awash, was no mark at all for theartillerists in the fort, and it would be the merest chance if aricochet shot struck it. If it did, the very low angle of impactmade it fly off without doing any harm. The turret was dented withsome centre shots, as I saw when I visited the vessel later, but itwas practically impregnable to the ordnance the Confederates used. On the other hand, the direct fire from the ship was limited in itseffect to the displacement of earth on the parapet or the knockingaway of the cheeks of the embrasures. The body of the garrison waskept out of range, and the artillerists were so close to the rampartthat when shells exploded over them, the fragments flew beyond andthere were few casualties. General Terry was left to hold the new line established in face ofHoke with Paine's division and Abbott's brigade, whilst my divisionand Ames's (of Terry's command) were marched back to camp near FortFisher. Schofield's own idea had been to send me with my own andAmes's divisions across the river to operate against Fort Andersonby the west bank and, by taking it, force the enemy to evacuate theSugar-loaf position opposite. By thus concentrating on the bank mostweakly held, we would by a sort of see-saw work them back till theymust give up Wilmington or fight for it in the open. I was directedto be ready to cross the river on the 12th, but the order wascountermanded, and it was determined to try a plan which would avoidthe necessity of dividing the forces on the two sides of a largeriver. Colonel Comstock of Grant's staff, who had accompanied Terryas engineer in the taking of Fort Fisher [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Ii. P. 30. ] and who was still with us, hadmade a reconnoissance up the coast on the 11th, and found at BigHill, three miles south of Masonboro Inlet, a position from which itseemed practicable to cover the collection and launching of enoughpontoon boats to ferry a column of troops across Myrtle Sound. Ifthis could be done with secrecy and speed till enough were over tomake head against the enemy while the rest were crossing, Hoke'sposition would be turned and he would have to fall back upon moreopen country, where our whole force could be manoeuvred against him. On Comstock's suggestion Schofield determined to try the plan, whichwas a promising one if winds and waves would permit. The navy was totow the boats to the place of rendezvous with a body of engineertroops under Comstock's orders, whilst Schofield led Ames's and mydivisions by the shore. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 403, 404. ] The movement was made after dark on the evening ofthe 12th, but the bad weather had hardened down into a regularnortheaster, and it proved impossible to tow the pontoon boatsthrough the heavy sea. After a night of severe exposure we returnedto camp to find many of our tents flattened by the gale. After aday's rest the effort was renewed on the 14th, but as the admiralreported that the sea was too rough for even the smaller steamers togo outside, the plan was modified so as to try drawing the boats ontheir trucks, though the number of our draft animals was as yet verysmall. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 426, 427. ] What with the heavy surf onthe beach and the deep, soft sand beyond it, the weak teams couldnot pull the trucks far, and gave out before we reached the chosenposition. As we turned back after midnight the moon was just rising, and the scene was a wild one, with the flying clouds and the foamingwaves silvered by the moonlight; but the rarest sight was, just ashalf the moon's great disk was above the horizon, a ship of warstood against it, exactly framed in the semicircle of light as ifdrawn in black on the silver surface. The plan was an interestingone and would probably have succeeded in favorable weather, but thewinter storm forbade. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 437. ] Then came the resumption of the original purpose, and I was assignedto command the column advancing from Smithville up the other bank ofthe river. One brigade of Couch's division (Moore's) had arrived, and it was ordered to report to me. Ames's division was also in thecolumn till Fort Anderson was evacuated in the night of the 18th, when it rejoined Terry and I moved on against the Confederateposition at Town Creek. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 960; pt. Ii. Pp. 492, 493. ] Ferrying the unfordable stream, Hagood's brigade wasattacked and routed on the 20th, capturing two cannon and nearly 400prisoners, including Colonel Simonton the commandant, Hagood himselfhaving gone to Wilmington. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 495, 509. ] On the21st we pressed on to Brunswick Ferry, and saved part of the pontoonbridge there which the enemy had not been able to destroycompletely. An advance-guard was got over on Eagle Island, the largeswampy island lying in front of Wilmington, where the remnant ofHagood's brigade held the narrow causeway. Bragg had been toRichmond on an official visit, but was back at Wilmington and sawthat the time to evacuate had come. The naval stores were set onfare, and the dense black pillars of smoke from the warehouses ofresin and turpentine told us the story. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 1241-1245. ] My route from Town Creek around Mcllhenny's mill-pond to BrunswickFerry had taken me some three miles back from the river, and thebroad swamps and rice-fields intervening made communication withGeneral Schofield on the "Spaulding, " very slow and difficult. [Footnote: Official Atlas, pl. Cxxxii. ] The sequel well illustratesthe importance of complete confidence on the part of a subordinatethat his chief will sanction and heartily approve the use of fulldiscretion in circumstances where quick and full intercourse isimpossible. By long service with General Schofield, I knew that hewas no martinet, snubbing any independence of action, but an officerof sound and calm judgment, fairly considering the reasons we mighthave for any departure from the letter of an order. General Terry'stroops were facing the greater part of Hoke's division in a positionnearly opposite the mouth of Town Creek, and were meeting withstubborn resistance. It was known that Hardee's command, havingevacuated Charleston, was moving northward to unite with theConfederates in North Carolina, and it was supposed to aim atreaching Wilmington. There were rumors that he had already joinedBragg. In these circumstances General Schofield had said to me, by adispatch in the morning, "If you can destroy the bridge overBrunswick River or break the railroad to-day, do so, but be ready tocross the river early this evening near the mouth of Town Creek. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 520] Early inthe afternoon I reported progress, saying: "My head of columnreached this place [Brunswick Ferry] about one o'clock. The rebelshad partially destroyed their pontoon bridge, but from the creek Igot several boats, and have put a regiment over on the island. Theygot most of the way across, when the enemy opened with one gun, commanding the straight road. As the rest of the island seemsimpracticably swampy, this checked our reconnoissance; but there canbe little doubt the rebels are evacuating. They have made immensefires, the smoke of which you must have seen, indicating that theyare destroying turpentine, etc. A few skirmishers were on theopposite side of Brunswick River when we reached it, but they ran atonce. The enemy has destroyed all flatboats within reach, but I mayhunt some up. I am pushing a reconnoissance further up the river, byway of threatening to cross above the island, and so hasten theirmovements. I shall put my command in position covering the crossingand the Georgetown road, and watch the movements, in the town. Therailroad bridge across Brunswick River is partially destroyed, andwe hear the cars on the other side of the town from here. I cannotdoubt that General Terry will have an open road in the morning, andthink from the general indications that I am entirely secure here. Iwill face in all directions and get all the intelligence I can, while awaiting orders. There is no railroad or other bridge overCape Fear River. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 521. ] Whilst this report was on the road to Schofield, a messenger wholeft the general about noon was slowly working his way to me, bearing this message: "My last report from General Terry indicatesthat he will not be able to force the enemy back from the positionheld by him last evening. General Terry thinks Hoke has his wholeforce in his front. It will therefore be necessary to transfer yourtroops to the east bank of the river to-night. The men will be putacross in small boats near the mouth of Town Creek, unless Terrysucceeds in effecting a lodgment higher up. In the latter event Iwill signal you. Otherwise move your troops to the mouth of TownCreek without further orders. Let your artillery and animals go downto Fort Anderson. I will have them sent from that place by steamersto Federal Point this evening. If you can destroy the bridges overBrunswick River to-day, do so; but in any event be ready to commencecrossing the river by dusk or earlier, if practicable. You mightperhaps send back a brigade or two while the others are doing thework. " [Footnote: _Ibid. _] At six o'clock, in the dusk of the evening, this letter reached me, and I instantly replied: "Your dispatch directing movement is onlyjust received, the messenger having lost his way. As I am eightmiles from the mouth of Town Creek, and it is already dark, yourdirections cannot be literally followed, and the circumstancesimpress me so strongly with the belief that the enemy are about toevacuate Wilmington to-night that I venture to send one brigade nowand wait further orders before withdrawing all. It will take allnight to get the whole command to Town Creek, and it seemsimpossible to cross them all, beginning at an hour so much laterthan you anticipated when sending the dispatch. Some engineers onthe railroad who have come into my lines, several other citizens, and a number of slaves, all agree in reporting the intention ofevacuating immediately. The destruction of immense quantities ofproperty since I came up this evening looks the same way. I havecollected and repaired nearly all of the pontoons and materials ofthe bridge, and had begun relaying them when your dispatch came. Icannot retire my own force now without it appearing a retreat. Iwould be entirely willing to stay here with one brigade, and shouldfeel quite confident that I could at any time bring it off safely, if we remained here several days even. Thinking you would not desiremore troops at Town Creek than you can cross to-night, I ... Thinkit right to send the one brigade, and if more can cross, I can stillsend them, so as to be not much behind the others if the messengermakes reasonable haste. I believe I mentioned in a former dispatchthat the rebels themselves destroyed the Brunswick River railroadbridge. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 522. ] The orderly who reached me had been landed from a small boat andmade his way to me on foot, and as he had eight or nine miles towalk by a wretched road, it was not strange that he was late inreaching me. Giving him his supper whilst I wrote my dispatch, Ithen mounted him on a horse, and sent with him another mounted manto bring the return message. My first messenger had tried to reachthe river through the swamps at several points, but had notsucceeded in getting within hailing distance of any vessels in thestream. He happened, however, to fall in with the second messengersin his wanderings, and was now taken to the place where a small boatwas to be sent, and so it happened that both my dispatches reachedSchofield together, but not till about half-past ten. Meanwhile, thegeneral having heard nothing whatever from me, and gettingunfavorable reports from Terry, wrote me again at a quarter-pastseven. He said: "My orderlies and your signal officer seem to have gotlost, and I have heard nothing from you since 10. 30 A. M. I sent anorder to you by an orderly on foot about noon, but do not feel atall certain that it has reached you. I want you to move back abreastof the fleet, just above the mouth of Town Creek, to-night, and beready to cross the river at dawn of day in the morning. Send allyour wagons and horses to Fort Anderson. The men will cross in smallboats. Better send a regiment with your wagons, horses, andartillery. Should the enemy be in force in your front, it might benecessary to cross Town Creek before crossing the river. About this, act according to your judgment. I intended you to cross the riverto-night, but it is now too late. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 522. ] But whilst this last orderly was on his dark and weary way to me, mytwo dispatches finally got through, and at 10. 20 Schofield wrote mefrom the cabin of the "Spaulding" as follows: "Your dispatch of 6P. M. Is just received, and is highly satisfactory. The one of anearlier date, but the hour not given, came at the same time. Aboutseven o'clock I sent another to you directing you to come back. Ihope this will reach you in time to take its place. My orders werebased on General Terry's report of an increase of the force in hisfront, and that of prisoners that Hardee's forces had arrived fromCharleston. I think you would certainly have learned it if thelatter were true That you have sent one brigade back is well. Youmay send another as soon as you get this dispatch. Keep the othertwo where you are until daylight in the morning. Then, if the rebelshave gone, you can enter the town, taking care to hold the rivercrossings. If the enemy has not gone, or you are not positive thathe is going, then move back and cross the river as before directed. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvit. Pt. Ii. P. 522. ] Immediately after this, Schofield wrote me another dispatch, briefer, but of the same general purport. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 523. ]It was probably sent by way of precaution, in case any accidenthappened to the bearer of the other. Arrangements had been made toget over some horsemen so as to speed these dispatches, and theycame through to me by midnight. But meanwhile my perplexity as to myduty was intensified. I had put over the Sixteenth Kentucky uponEagle Island, and made them throw up a breastwork across thecause-way facing that of the enemy, which was near the main channelof Cape Fear River. They were exploring the swamps, seekinginformation and preparing to force the position in the morning. Myconfidence in my forecast was such that I did not cease work on therepair of the pontoons, and had the crossing ready for use late inthe evening, but awaited further orders with great anxiety. At11. 45, however, came the order dated at 7. 15, reiterating thedirection to withdraw. Moore's brigade had gone under the firstorder, Henderson's was waiting ready to march, and I started it forTown Creek. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 524. ] Reilly's (Colonel Sterl incommand) began to follow. The march in a dark night made it properto leave reasonable intervals between the brigades, and I was stillwaiting with Casement's brigade, and had not destroyed the pontoonbridge, when, at midnight, I got Schofield's dispatch of 10. 20, which had come through in less than half the time other messages hadtaken, under his eager orders to force the horses through at speed. I at once recalled Sterl, and with great satisfaction wrote to theGeneral, "Your dispatch of 10. 20 received in time to stop twobrigades. Henderson's and Moore's have gone forward and will reportat the river above Town Creek. I will inform you of any changes inthe morning. The railroad employes who came in to me informed mepositively that Hardee's troops had not come here. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 523. ] My outpost on theisland was replaced, and before day dawned we knew that the last ofthe enemy had disappeared from our immediate front and thatWilmington was evacuated. Bragg had carefully removed all boats fromour side of the channel, but citizens anxious to prevent us fromfiring on the town came over in skiffs, and we learned that theConfederate forces had marched away toward Goldsborough, leaving theway open for Terry's march into the city, which took place in theearly morning of the 22d, which we were happy to recall wasWashington's Birthday. It has seemed worth while to give the correspondence at such length, because it well illustrates the difficulties under which officersmust labor in war, and the necessity for a good deal of freedom ofaction and of discretion in deciding upon his course, when thecommander of a detached column finds his communication withheadquarters obstructed and retarded by accidental circumstances. Had General Schofield's methods been rigid in requiring literalobedience, my command would have abandoned the advantages we hadgained, and the campaign might have taken quite another turn. Mycomplete confidence in the liberality of his judgment when the factsshould be all known, encouraged me to a course which would otherwisehave been impossible. [Footnote: In 1870 Moltke had adopted the wiserule of leaving to subordinates of the higher grades very largediscretion, and to avoid trammelling them by detailed orders or byprematurely communicated plans. "The very lack of instructions gavethem liberty and imposed on them the duty of acting on their ownresponsibility, in case unforeseen events should require such promptaction that orders from the Supreme Commander could not be waitedfor. " (Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Strategy, vol. I. P. 324. ) It was evenlooked upon as "an unwarranted censure" on the subordinate "ifanything was enjoined unnecessarily, " or which was within the properknowledge and discretion of the officer. _Id_. , vol. Ii. P. 39. ]There was with me a very efficient squad of the Signal Corps, underLieutenant Ketchum, which had kept up flag communication with the"Spaulding" and across the river in our advance from Smithville toTown Creek, but when we advanced to Brunswick Ferry, Mr. Ketchumfound it impossible, on account of the course of Brunswick River andthe dense woods upon the banks, to establish any station from whichhe could communicate with any of the vessels in the river below, orwith General Terry on the east bank of the Cape Fear. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 915, 916. ] This threw usunexpectedly upon messengers as the only go-betweens, and led to theembarrassments which have been described. CHAPTER XLVII THE CONFEDERACY IN STRAITS--JOHNSTON COMMANDS IN THE CAROLINAS--OUROPERATIONS FROM NEW BERNE--BATTLE OF KINSTON The Confederates lose Charleston and Columbia--Facing acrisis--Hopeless apathy of Southern people--Mr. Davis'sperplexity--Beauregard startles him--Lee calls Johnston tocommand--Personal relations of leading officers--Dwindlingarmies--The cavalry--Assignments of generals--The Beaufort and NewBerne line--Am ordered to New Berne--Provisional corps--Advance tocover railway building--Dover and Gum swamps--Bragg concentrates tooppose us--Position near Kinston--Bragg's plan of attack--Our ownmovements--Condition of railroad and river--Our advance to Wise'sForks and Southwest Creek--Precautions--Conference withSchofield--Battle of Kinston--Enemy attack our left front--Rout ofUpham's brigade--Main line firm--Ruger's division reaches thefield--Enemy repulsed--End of first day's fight--Extending ourtrenches on the left--Sharp skirmishing of the 9th--Bragg'sreinforcements--His attack of the both--Final repulse and retreat ofthe enemy. Upon our occupation of Wilmington, Bragg retreated northward alongthe line of the railroad toward Goldsborough, which was the crossingof the Wilmington and Weldon Railway with that from New Berne toRaleigh. Sherman had captured the capital of South Carolina, and inhis movement northward his left wing had followed the railroad fromColumbia toward Charlotte, N. C, as far as Winnsborough, fortymiles, for the purpose of making a permanent break in that line ofcommunication before turning his columns eastward toward Cheraw andFayetteville on his way to Goldsborough, the rendezvous he had fixedfor his junction with Schofield's army. Beauregard, whose commandnow included South Carolina, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1202, 1204. ] had moved with the forces under hisimmediate command from Augusta, through Columbia to Charlotte, andwas calling to him all the Confederate troops operating againstSherman. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1193, 1202, 1217, 1238. ] On the 14th of February he had ordered Hardee toevacuate Charleston, and the unwelcome proof that South Carolina waslost so alarmed Mr. Davis that he urged Hardee to hold on as long aspossible. But both Lee and Beauregard became uneasy lest Hardeeshould be caught before he could join the rest, and despite Mr. Davis's bitter disappointment, the evacuation was made in the nightof the 17th, Hardee being sick abed for a few days, and turning overthe command to General McLaws. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1177, 1181, 1195, 1201-1202, 1204, 1223, 1258. ] The loss of Charleston, the original cradle of secession, seemed aportent to the people of the South, and well-nigh destroyed allhope. Governor Magrath of South Carolina had written Mr. Davis, amonth before, that the fate of the Confederacy was involved in theearly movements of Sherman's march from Savannah, and that he was inearnest correspondence with the Governors of North Carolina andGeorgia, urging extraordinary efforts. "Richmond will surely fallwhen Charleston is lost, " he said, adding emphatically, "To retainRichmond until Charleston is lost is to sacrifice both. " [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 1035. ] Davis was not blind to the consequences, or to thenature of the crisis. A week before Magrath's letter was written, the Confederate President had sent a dispatch to Governor Brown ofGeorgia, declaring the absolute necessity of making Hardee strongenough to stop Sherman on the line of the Combahee, which he rightlysaid was stronger than any position that could be occupied furthernorth. He ended with the appeal, "We must look forward, and leavediscussions of the past to a more convenient season. " [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 1016. ] Governor Vance of North Carolina issued aproclamation powerfully appealing to his people for a final rally, using the failure of the recent peace conference at Fort Monroe asproof that there was only subjugation offered us, the mere detailsof which they [Lincoln and Seward] proposed to settle. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 1189. ] But the whole Southwas already in apathetic despair under the conviction of theirhelplessness to check the triumphant march of Sherman's 60, 000veterans or prevent his junction with Schofield's 30, 000. Instead ofgrowing by an enthusiastic rally of the old men and the boys, theSouthern army was dwindling by steady small streams of deserters, nolonger able to repress the impulse to go to their helpless familieswithin the Union lines. [Footnote: Lee to Vance, Id. , p. 1270. ] Theappeals of the governors produced no result, or only called outresponses in the press, never ventured before, saying the desperateefforts had already been made, the physical power of the States wasexhausted, it was vain to talk of independence, it was time to makereal overtures for peace. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1250-1255. ] The military outlook for the South was certainly gloomy enough. Distrusting Beauregard's ability to deal with his perplexingproblem, Mr. Davis had asked Lee (on the 19th) whether it waspossible for him to get away from Petersburg long enough to go toBeauregard and advise him after a personal conference. [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 1222. ] But Lee could not leave his post for a moment withany confidence that Grant's iron grip would not crush the defencesof Petersburg and bring the final struggle. Davis became still moretroubled when, on the 21st, Beauregard sent him a dispatchindicating his belief that Lee must join him at Salisbury with partof his forces, say 20, 000 men, give Sherman battle there, " crushhim, then to concentrate all forces against Grant, and then to marchon Washington to dictate a peace. " Beauregard's evident opinion thathe was wholly unable to cope with Sherman was much more depressingthan his light-hearted suggestion of marching on Washington todictate a peace was inspiring. Davis sent it to Lee, saying it was"of a startling character, " and urged that the General-in-Chiefshould direct the concentration of the forces in the Carolinas. Hesent also General Gilmer, his chief of engineers, to Beauregard toexamine the situation, to advise with him and report. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1229, 1237, 1238. ] In this condition of affairs, Beauregard's retreat into NorthCarolina, where Bragg commanded and was senior in rank, made a newcomplication; whilst the fall of Wilmington and the danger ofHardee's being cut off before he could unite with the Confederateforces trying to resist Sherman, made a climax of embarrassmentswhich imperatively required the appointment of some one to commandin chief in the Carolinas. The same current of opinion in theConfederate Congress which had resulted in Lee's assignment by law(February 9th) [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 1. ] to command all theConfederate armies, indicated General Johnston for the post secondin importance. Indeed, the knowledge of Mr. Davis's determinationnot to intrust Johnston with another army in the field entered intothe motives for taking the military command out of the President'shands, for it was understood that Lee believed Johnston to be theman best fitted for the second place. Action could be no longerdelayed, and the very day of our occupation of Wilmington, Leetelegraphed to Johnston to assume command, concentrate all availableforces, and drive back Sherman. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 1247. ]For the moment Bragg was not directed to report to Johnston, butconsideration for the unpleasant personal relations between themsince the Atlanta campaign could not stand long in the way. Beauregard accepted loyally his subordination to Johnston, and, hishealth not being very strong, was assigned at his own request toadministrative duties at Raleigh, including the collection andforwarding of troops, their supply in the field and the managementof the relations to the civil authorities of North Carolina, withnominal position of second in command. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1248, 1399. ] Johnston had been at Lincolnton, N. C. , when notified of hisappointment, and in accepting the call to duty, gave his opinionthat it was too late to concentrate troops enough to drive backSherman. He promised, however, to learn from Beauregard the actualsituation, and to do all in his power to collect the army and resistSherman's advance. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1047. ] He met Beauregard atCharlotte, and on the 25th of February assumed command. As to hismeans of resistance, the returns show a significant dwindling ineach of his corps. Hardee had reported, on January 20th, 25, 290present for duty in his department. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1032. ]Hood's army at Tupelo, at the same date, returned 18, 708 infantryand artillery, which were soon nearly all in motion for theCarolinas. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlv. Pt. I. P. 664. General Taylorvolunteered to send the whole to Beauregard except French'sdivision, which he said was very weak. Some Mississippi troops weregiven a short furlough, others took "French leave" (_Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 1059, 1174, 1194), and delays in transportationoccurred, so that it is very hard to say how many of the Army ofTennessee were actually in the final combats in North Carolina. Theyall seem to have gathered there before the final surrender atGreensborough. ] Bragg's return for his command in North Carolina onFebruary 10th was 11, 206. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1154. ] Besides these, there were some militia from Georgia and South Carolina estimated at1450, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1084. ] and Butler's division of cavalry, more than 3000 strong, had been sent from Lee's army in Virginia. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] Here were, then, between 55, 000 and 60, 000 menapparently available to oppose Sherman, and making a larger armythan the Confederate generals attributed to him when he started fromSavannah. [Footnote: When Beauregard took command of the forces inSouth Carolina, etc. , on February 16th, he reckoned them at "about20, 000 effective infantry and artillery, more or less demoralized, "and said of Sherman's army that it numbered "nearly double ourforce. " (Dispatch to Lee, Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 1202. ) This would make Sherman about 40, 000 strong. Beauregard'sunderestimate of his own force is in accordance with the commonhabit of officers who are somewhat discouraged and wish to bereinforced. ] It was not strange, therefore, that when, at aconference of Beauregard with Hardee and others in Augusta onFebruary 3d, the troops relied on for the campaign were estimated at33, 450, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1084. ] Mr. Davis noted by hisindorsement on the paper that the previous returns showed a largerforce present for duty. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1086. ] He however addedthat the language "relied on as effectives" might account for thedifference. But when on the 21st Beauregard, in the dispatchproposing that Lee should send part of his army to Salisbury, N. C. , said, "Hardee and myself can collect about 15, 000 exclusive ofCheatham and Stewart, not likely to reach in time, " [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 1238. ] the startling effect on the Confederate Presidentwas the most natural thing in the world. Armies seemed to vanish inthin air. On taking command, Johnston had accepted his predecessor's estimatesof both his own forces and those of Sherman. From Charlotte, N. C. , he wrote Lee that his opponent now seemed to be moving eastward, aiming at Fayetteville. This place he thought he might make thepoint of concentration for Hardee's troops, coming from Charlestonto Cheraw by railroad, and those with Beauregard, which were in themain the divisions of Hood's army, coming forward piecemeal, and nowamounting to something over 9000 men. He suggested that Bragg shouldjoin him at Fayetteville also. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1271. At the endof February, the portions of S. D. Lee's corps which had joinedBeauregard had 2502 present for duty, Cheatham's 4697, Stewart's1694, Engineers 185; total, 9078. (_Id. _, pp. 1285, 1326. ) The restof the Army of Tennessee were still in Georgia on their way to thefront. ] The Confederate cavalry was now led by Wade Hampton, who wasmade lieutenant-general to outrank Wheeler, who was not regardedequal to the responsibility. The latter retained two divisions, andthe rank of corps commander under Hampton. [Footnote: The complaintsof marauding by Wheeler's cavalry had been loud and bitter, andinefficiency was charged. D. H. Hill to Hardee, Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 1046; Do. To Iverson, pp. 1047, 1068;Beauregard to Lee, p. 1165; Davis to Hampton, 1207. For Wheeler'searnest defence, see _Id_. , pp. 987, 1004. ] As soon as it wasevident that Sherman was likely to reach the North Carolina border, Johnston was authorized to control Bragg's operations also. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1320. ] This was, of course, a personal grief tothe latter, who asked to be relieved; but in the critical conditionof affairs personal feelings had to give way, and Bragg's requestwent unanswered. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1328. ] He did not insist uponit and gave loyal support to Johnston. General D. H. Hill had beensent from Virginia to report to Beauregard, and was commanding atAugusta, Ga. , when Sherman's march eastward from Columbia relievedAugusta from danger, and Hill at his own request was ordered to joinBeauregard. S. D. Lee was absent from his corps by reason of a woundhe had received at Nashville, and Hill was assigned to its temporarycommand. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1002, 1003, 1272, 1317. ] The growingdecay of discipline and organization was shown by the irregularityof reports, and for the few weeks the war still went on, Johnstonhad to content himself with abbreviated returns, which containedonly the numbers of effectives and aggregates present. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 1382. ] Even these were not regularly sent up, and couldnot be made to agree with the lists of paroles when the surrenderfinally occurred. [Footnote: See chap. Li. _post_. ] Upon our occupation of Wilmington, Schofield turned his attention atonce to the opening, of the line from Beaufort and New Berne toKinston and Goldsborough. Terry's troops were sent to follow Braggnorthward. Couch's division of the Twenty-third Corps joined mine atWilmington. Meagher's provisional command of detachments ofSherman's army had reached New Berne; but its commander had givensuch dissatisfaction by his failure to remain with it and conductits shipment from Annapolis, that Grant directed that he should berelieved and sent home. Such had been the result of a spicycorrespondence between Grant and Halleck which called up poorMeagher's notorious failings. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 305-306, 316-318, 501, 509, 561. ] Schofield hadasked for the assignment of Terry to a corps to comprise the troopsin the department not belonging to the Twenty-third Corps, and ofmyself to the permanent command of the latter corps;[Footnote:_Id. _, p. 559. ] but, pending action on this, he determined to sendme to New Berne to take command of the so-called District ofBeaufort and the troops assembling there, which would constitutethree divisions. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 579, 580. ] General Palmer, who had been there for a long time, coming in the small steamer"Escort" to visit Schofield and consult concerning the advance fromthat base, I went back with him, and was accompanied by GeneralCarter, whose coming from Tennessee has already been mentioned andwho was to supersede Meagher. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. Pp. 930, 931. ] As my assignment to this duty was intended to be temporary, Itook only part of my staff with me, and assigned General Reilly, whohad now joined us, to the temporary command of the division. GeneralCouch was assigned to command the two divisions of our corps whichwere at Wilmington. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Ii. Pp. 581, 607, 620. ] Astorm delayed the departure of the "Escort" from Cape Fear Inlet, but we reached New Berne in the evening of the last day of February. Next day I formally assumed command and organized the forces, distributing the garrison troops and Meagher's men between the twodivisions to be commanded by Palmer and Carter, but keeping Ruger'sdivision of the Twenty-third Corps intact. This last had been sentdirect to Beaufort and arrived there about the same time withmyself. It had not been with us on the Cape Fear River. An immediateadvance was ordered for the 2d of March, to cover the work ofrailroad building. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 607, 620, 637, 638. ] Colonel Wright, chief of railway construction, had joined Sherman atSavannah, and from thence had been sent to Schofield to rebuild theNew Berne-Goldsborough road under his directions. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 157, 356, 384. ] Palmer's forces occupied a position atBatchelder's Creek, nine miles above New Berne on the road toKinston, and the railroad building began there. Had we been wellprovided with wagon-trains, it would have been easy to march at onceto Kinston, on the left bank of the Neuse, a little over thirtymiles from Newberne, and hold that place whilst the railroad wasbuilt, obstructions removed from the river, and easy communicationsopened both by rail and by water. But we were almost destitute ofwagons, having only ten to a division. This tied us close to the endof the rails, for after carrying our necessary baggage to thecamping-place, it was the utmost the few wagons could do to bringrations and ammunition a very few miles from the nearest temporarystation on the railroad. Dover and Gum swamps were practicallycontinuous to within three miles of Kinston, and steady rains hadput most of the road under water. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 654, 683. ]This necessarily slow progress gave the enemy time to arrange forconcentrating upon us. The importance of trying to check our columns advancing from thesea-coast was seen by General Johnston as soon as he learned thesituation in North Carolina. On the 3d of March, when he supposedSchofield to be continuing his movements up Cape Fear River, he hadinquired of Bragg whether it were not feasible to interpose betweenSchofield and Hardee. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 1318, 1329. ] As soon as it was known that Schofield was notmarching against Hardee, Bragg sent Hoke with his division toKinston, and on the 6th telegraphed to Johnston that my forces wereadvancing and were within nine miles of the town. He believed thatthe union with him of the troops near Goldsborough would "insure avictory. " [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 1334. ] Johnston immediately orderedall the forces he was moving towards Hardee to report to Bragg atGoldsborough for use in a quick effort to defeat us, with thepurpose of uniting them with Hardee immediately afterward to strikeat Sherman's advancing columns. [Footnote: _Ibid. _. ] It was boldlyconceived, and was manifestly the best plan the circumstancesadmitted. All the detachments of the Army of Tennessee were hurriedwithout change of cars toward Kinston. D. H. Hill had command ofthem as ranking officer present. It was not pleasant for him toreport to Bragg, for a bitter quarrel begun in the Chickamaugacampaign had never been appeased, and in giving him the order, Johnston added, "I beg you to forget the past for this emergency. "[Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1338. ] From Davis downward, personal griefs hadto be smothered in the crisis, and it is due to them all to rememberthat they did work together earnestly for their dying cause. On the 7th of March, Hill reached Kinston with Lee's corps. Hoke'sdivision had preceded him and advanced to Southwest Creek andoccupied the lines of intrenchments earlier made along its leftbank. This stream was a tributary of the Neuse River and was thenunfordable. It described roughly a curve with a radius of aboutthree miles around Kinston, and had for a long time been regarded asthe principal defensive line against National troops advancing fromNew Berne. Several roads radiated from Kinston, crossing SouthwestCreek. The Neuse road kept near the bank of the river, going east. Then came the railroad following a nearly straight line to NewBerne. The Dover road forked from the Neuse road not far from thetown, and took a devious way through the swamps in the same generaldirection. The upper Trent road ran more nearly south towardTrenton, and followed the course of the Trent River. The Wilmingtonroad went southwesterly toward the city of that name. The severalbridges over the creek were from a mile to two miles apart, but hadbeen destroyed or dismantled, and earthworks for artillery had beenprepared commanding them. The whole constituted a formidable line offieldworks when held by an adequate force. Whitford's brigade and adetachment of cavalry had been the only Confederate force at Kinstonat the beginning of our campaign, but Bragg had now assembled thereHagood's brigade, which had numbered 2000 in front of Wilmington, and a similar force of North Carolina militia under General Baker, besides Hill and Hoke. [Footnote: Hill's Report, Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 1086. ] Johnston had also informed Bragg thatCheatham's corps and more than half of Stewart's were on the way byrail, under the same orders as Hill's. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 1339. ] These constituted in fact all of Johnston's army exceptHardee's column, which was still in South Carolina. The necessity for haste was such, however, that upon Hill's arrivalin the night of the 7th, Bragg determined to attack me at once, inthe belief that he was strong enough to do so successfully. Hill'scorps was accordingly marched to Southwest Creek before day, andrelieved Hoke's division in the works extending from the Dover roadcrossing to the railroad, whilst Hoke, with Clayton's division ofLee's corps besides his own, marched to the upper Trent andWilmington bridges with orders to sweep down and attack my lines inflank and rear. The plank had been relaid on the bridges which hadbeen held by outposts, and a new bridge had been built of felledtrees between the Dover road bridge and the railroad. At the soundof Hoke's attack, Hill was to cross by the last-mentioned bridges, and fall upon our front with all the rest of the Confederate forces. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 1087. ] On our side, Colonel Wright had found that some miles of therailroad had only been partially destroyed, and as iron for sixmiles had been received when I reached New Berne, he was able to putseven miles of track in passable condition by the evening of the4th. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 654, 683. ] On that day I hadconcentrated at Core Creek, twenty miles from New Berne by the wagonroads, and the head of the rails was only one or two miles behind. On the 6th Palmer's and Carter's divisions were advanced to GumSwamp, seven miles further, taking four days' rations, and Ruger'swas to follow on the 7th. On this march I found that for five milesbeyond Core Creek the railway had only been capsized, ties and railstogether, and was lying in the ditch by the roadside. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 706-708. ] Relying on the more rapid construction thiswould enable Colonel Wright to make, I ordered a still furtheradvance for the 7th, hoping to reach Southwest Creek. There we mustexpect to halt for several days, for the total destruction of therailroad for the last ten or twelve miles from Kinston made itprobable that a mile a day was the utmost the construction corpscould rebuild, to say nothing of the bridging which would also benecessary. For our own sake, as well as to provide for getting forward largequantities of supplies for Sherman's army when we should join him, it would be necessary to organize a line of river transportation tosupplement the railroad. Heavy obstructions to navigation had beenplaced in the Neuse River, a little above New Berne, as a defenceagainst an iron-clad ram the Confederates had built at Kinston. As, however, she could only come down the river on a freshet, owing toher great draft, I had, upon leaving New Berne, ordered that theobstructions be removed, and light-draft steamboats and flatsprocured to bring supplies to some point near our camp, or to ferrytroops across if I found it advisable to shift my line of operationsto the north bank of the river. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 707. ] On Tuesday, the 7th, the command was in motion, Palmer's divisionfollowing the railroad, except Claassen's brigade, which had beensent the previous afternoon by the Dover road to Wise's Forks, whereit crosses the lower Trent road, which ran diagonally across ourfront toward the Neuse River. In the skirmish at Wise's Forks, andfrom a deserter, it was learned that Hoke had joined the Kinstonforces with his division, and there were rumors of otherreinforcements arriving. Advancing along the railroad, Palmerreached the drier ground near Southwest Creek and came underartillery fire from guns intrenched on the other side of the creek. The country here was wooded, and was traversed by an old road, called the British road, running parallel to the creek from half amile to a mile from it. The lower Trent road also crossed therailroad not far from the British road crossing. Palmer halted hisline in front of the British road covering all the crossings, andadvanced outposts and pickets to the creek. Boughton's brigade wason the left of the railroad, and Harland's on the right. The latterdetached a regiment to the Neuse road to guard against any attemptby the enemy to cross the creek beyond our right. Major Dow of mystaff was also sent with a troop of cavalry to reconnoitre the banksof the river, seeking for a place where steamboats might landsupplies and communicate with us. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 723-725. ] Ruger's division moved forward fromCore Creek to Gum Swamp. On my left, the Twelfth New York Cavalry, Colonel Savage, reconnoitred both Trent roads, under orders to reach out as far tothe south as they could, covering Claassen's position at Wise'sForks and giving early notice of any hostile movement in thevicinity. Carter's division delayed its march till it could load upwith rations and then followed the Dover road to Claassen'sposition. On reaching Wise's Forks we found that Claassen had mostof his brigade at the crossing of the British road in front, with adetachment of 300 men at Jackson's Mills, where the Dover roadcrossed the creek. He had smaller detachments also upon the Britishroad on both flanks. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. Pp. 976, 981, 989. ] Idirected General Carter to relieve Claassen's brigade with one ofhis, that Claassen might rejoin Palmer and make the latter strongenough to spare a detachment to test the condition of the Neuse roadcrossing of the creek and the presence of the enemy there. Cartersent Upham's brigade to the British road crossing to relieveClaassen, and put the other two in line across the Dover road infront of Wise's Forks, Malloy's on the right of the road andSplaine's on the left with a recurved flank. Upham seems to havemarched the whole of his brigade to Jackson's Mills and to have leftonly a picket post at the British road. He established a skirmishline in rifle-pits close to the creek, and placed a section ofartillery which was with him where it would command the bridge siteon the Dover road. His picket line connected with Palmer's divisionon the right, and with the outpost at the British road on the left. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 993, 997. ] Toward evening the cavalry reportedthat they had found a picket post of the enemy at the bridge on theupper Trent road, had driven it off, taken up the plank of thebridge and piled them on the hither side of the creek, and hadestablished there a picket of their own. Their scouting partiesreported no enemy at the Wilmington road crossing. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 976. ] The divisioncommanders were directed to have Southwest Creek in front carefullyreconnoitred, to find narrow places where an infantry crossing mightbe made by an improvised bridge of felled trees. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] [Illustration: Map] My habit was to keep my own headquarters well at the front, and Ihad purposed moving them from Gum Swamp to Wise's Forks on the 7th, but during the day I received word that General Schofield hadarrived at Beaufort from Wilmington, coming by sea. We arranged thathe should come up for a consultation with me next morning, and tofacilitate this, I left my headquarters with Ruger's division, andafter a personal visit to Palmer and Carter, I rode back to GumSwamp in the evening. General Schofield was to come up to the end ofthe track on the railroad in the morning, and I sent led horses tomeet him. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 722-724. ] The telegraph was made to keep pace with the progress ofthe railway, and from its upper station we had the aid of flagsignals along the railroad bed to Palmer's headquarters. [Footnote:_Id_. , pt i. P. 918. ] The information we had received of Hoke'spresence made it all the more important that we should get out ofthe swamps, where we could only operate by head of column, to thedrier region along Southwest Creek, where the lower Trent road andthe British road would give us communication between our flanks andsome chance to manoeuvre. These reasons had made me push forward onthe 7th, though the movement put us ten miles above the head of therails and made it sure that we should be short of supplies. As soonas the troops were in position the few wagons with them wereunloaded and hurried back, first for ammunition and then forrations. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 734. ] We then had no knowledgeof the arrival of any part of Hood's army in North Carolina, andalthough my provisional corps was far short of being solidlyorganized, and the troops were either new or unused to fieldservice, I felt no concern lest Hoke should take the offensivealone. General Schofield had joined me at Gum Swamp about nine o'clock onthe morning of the 8th, and after our conference we had mounted toride to General Palmer's headquarters to see what prospect theremight be for securing a crossing near the railroad which wouldpermit preparation for rebuilding the railroad bridge. A note nowcame from General Carter at Wise's Forks telling of informationreceived from a negro that a large body of the enemy had crossedSouthwest Creek at the Wilmington road early in the morning. As thecavalry had a picket at the upper Trent bridge and were supposed tobe patrolling beyond the Wilmington road, the information did notseem threatening, but I sent back directions to have the cavalryordered to do their work thoroughly by instantly testing the truthof the information. Carter was also ordered to support the cavalrywith a regiment of infantry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 734. ] The message from the front was followedalmost instantly by another, saying that a heavy force of the enemyhad penetrated between Upham's brigade and the rest of the division, almost simultaneously with a report from the cavalry that theirpicket had been driven from the bridge at the Trent road. As thatpicket was two miles in front of Upham's left on the British road, it was too evident that the duty of the horsemen had not been welldone. Ruger was ordered to march his division at speed to the front, and we galloped to Wise's Forks. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. Pp. 977, 994. ] The account I have before given of the enemy's dispositions for theday's work [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 429, 430. ] makes it easy tounderstand the situation as we found it. Hoke, with his own andClayton's divisions, had turned northward on the British road aftergetting over Southwest Creek, and as he approached the Dover road, had deployed and advanced upon Upham's flank. The latter, upon thefirst intimation of an enemy's approach, had hurried theTwenty-seventh Massachusetts to the British road and placed it inline about a quarter of a mile south of the Dover road, which was, of course, his connection with the rest of the division. He alsoordered to the same point the section of artillery, and directed theleft battalion of his other regiment (Fifteenth Connecticut) tochange front also to the south. These orders were judicious, but theodds were too great to make them successful. Far outflanked oneither hand, the Massachusetts regiment was put to rout, all thehorses of one of the guns were killed, and though the men cut thetraces and tried to save the gun by hand, they had to abandon it, while the other retreated on the run toward the main position. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 997-999. ]General Hill had crossed the creek at the improvised bridge onhearing the sound of Hoke's engagement, but finding a swamp betweenhim and Upham's right, had to make a circuit of it, driving back ourpickets in the interval between Carter's and Palmer's divisions. Turning toward the noise of Hoke's firing, he intercepted the rightbattalion of Upham's Connecticut regiment, and took many of themprisoners. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1087. ] Most of the rest of theregiment finding Hoke's division partly surrounding them, and allother retreat cut off by Hill, surrendered to Hoke. Colonel Uphamand most of the Massachusetts regiment succeeded in reaching ourmain lines, though in confusion. All this was not done, however, without fighting, which took time, and as the whole engagement wasin forest or swamp, the enemy was a good deal delayed in hismovements and in rectification of lines. When we reached the field Carter had gone in person toward Upham'sposition, having first sent a regiment forward on the Dover road totry to reopen communication with him. Palmer was ordered to send hisreserve brigade rapidly to extend his left and assist Carter. But asthere was still an interval between them, the regiment of cavalrywhich had come in on the left was transferred to the centre andordered to make a strong skirmishing fight till Ruger's divisioncould arrive on the ground. Palmer at the same time was ordered todemonstrate strongly toward the creek. Riding forward on the Doverroad, I found Carter with the regiment from his division, stillenergetically striving to reach Upham. As the sound of the battleshowed that the enemy was also in front of our centre, it wasevident that we must make a concentration of our forces till thedivisions were in touch with each other. I therefore directed Carterto make his main line in front of Wise's Forks as solid as possible, concentrating his artillery near the Dover road, and to limit theactivity of the advanced regiment to bold skirmishing, drawing itback to the main line as the enemy advanced in force. Hoke had evidently supposed that Upham's detachment on the Britishroad was the flank of our principal position, and was surprised atfinding strong demonstrations from the direction of Wise's Forks, now partly in his own rear. This checked his progress and made himturn upon Carter. The advanced regiment retired as ordered, and whenit was within the lines the enemy was saluted with such a fire ofartillery and musketry as instantly checked him. Although herepeated his efforts to force the position at the Forks severaltimes, they all were futile, and Carter had at no time the leastdifficulty in holding his main line firmly. In Palmer's division, when Hill's advance across the creek droveback the pickets and threatened to pass the left flank of Boughton'sbrigade, this officer drew back his left to the British road andthrew up a hasty barricade there. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 992. ] Claassen's brigade was sent to prolongBoughton's line to the left, and Ruger's division having come up, the connection between Palmer and Carter was secured, the latteradvancing his brigades so as to make a better continuous line. Theattacks of Hoke and Hill extended across Ruger's front, but nothingheavier than brisk skirmishing occurred on Boughton's line. Claassen's brigade was sent forward toward Jackson's Mill, accompanied by my aide, Captain Tracy, in order to locate the leftof the enemy's line, and determine the extent of his forces in frontof our left and centre. No strong opposition was met till the Doverroad came in sight, where the enemy were seen moving toward Hoke'sposition in front of Carter. Claassen was followed back in hisorderly retirement to his position on Ruger's right, and wasattacked there, but easily repulsed his assailants. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 982, 990. ] Palmer had reported sharp skirmishing across his front all the wayto the Neuse road on his right, and had drawn his lines back alittle, so as to keep them in front of the British road, contractinghis right and extending his left, as the sound of the fightingshowed that the heaviest attacks were falling upon Carter. By themiddle of the afternoon a continuous line of breastworks had beenmade along the whole of Palmer's division in front of the Britishroad. Ruger had extended it diagonally till it joined Carter'sright, the latter continuing it across the Dover road in front ofWise's Forks to a difficult swamp on the extreme left. For our left, the lower Trent road served for our communication along the front, and for our right the British road was used in like manner. Late in the day there were indications of an attempt to turnPalmer's right on the Neuse road, and this, which added to thecomplexity of the situation, seems to have grown out of an excentricmovement of the Confederate left under Hill. In crossing SouthwestCreek to make his attack, he tells us the plan had been that whenHoke should strike our flank on the Dover road, he should cut offany retreat on the British and Neuse roads. This would be bestaccomplished by pushing straight from his bridges for the Britishroad. But having made a circuit about a swamp to the rear of Upham'sright, he received a note from Bragg's headquarters saying that Hokewished he would enter the British road from the Neuse road, whichimplied a long circuit to their left. As Hoke had himself made thebridge by which Hill had crossed, and knew the field better than therest by his skirmishes of the previous day, it is evident that therewas an error in interpreting his wish. But as Hill was on groundunknown to him, and Bragg's dispatch directed Hoke's suggestion tobe carried out, Hill obeyed, and turned his troops down the rightbank of Southwest Creek, feeling the way to the Neuse road throughswamps and woods. Reaching the outlet of the British road athalf-past four without seeing signs of our retreat that way, and thedistant firing showing that Hoke was not advancing, Hill thought ittoo late to venture further, and marched back by the way he had comefive miles to his bridge. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 1087. ] His presence had been observed by our pickets andskirmishers, and was naturally interpreted by Palmer as the advanceof a new column which had crossed the creek by the Neuse road. It, of course, gave an exaggerated impression of the enemy's strength, and as prisoners had been taken belonging to Lee's corps, whoreported part of Hood's old army present with Bragg in command ofthe whole, we had to take into account the contingency of our havingon our hands the formidable force thus indicated. Hill was met athis bridge by orders to cross to the left bank and join Hoke byrecrossing at Jackson's Mills and following the Dover road. Heeffected the junction about midnight. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] Hoke hadbeen keeping up a skirmishing fight in the latter part of the day, and at night intrenched himself across the Dover road just in frontof the British road. Hill, after joining him, continued the linenorthward, parallel to ours, and therefore crossing the British roadagain, recurving toward the creek. Our breastworks were madestronger, and we kept our teams hard at work bringing up ammunitionand supplies. General Schofield went back to New Berne to get intocommunication with the rest of his department, and try to hurryforward the two old divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, who weremarching to join us. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 743-751. ] My own orders were to remain on the watchfuldefensive whilst the construction of the railroad toward us went onenergetically. On Thursday, the 9th, we husbanded our resources, forour ammunition was running short and the roads through the swampwere nearly impassable. We extended our works on Carter's left, recurving them so as to cross the lower Trent road, and, though wehad no troops at the moment except one regiment of Ruger's to putinto these intrenchments, they were ready for prompt occupation byany we might send there if another effort were made to turn thatflank. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. Pp. 978, 995. ] With this in view, General Ruger was directed to put one of his brigades in reserve, extending the rest of his troops to fill the vacancy so made, andcovering the front with abatis and slashed timber. Pickets wereadvanced and every effort made to obtain information and keep closewatch of the enemy's movements. About ten o'clock General Palmerreported a force moving toward the Neuse road which, afterdemonstrating there for some time, marched back again. [Footnote:_Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 747, 749-750. ] This seems to have been an effortto repeat the movement of Hill on the previous afternoon, but thistime by Hoke's division. Finding Palmer's line in good earthworks, Hoke made no attack, and returned to his position, though Bragg'sorder declared that "success must be achieved. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1359. ] While this was going on, Hill advanced his line and drove inCarter's skirmishers; but these being reinforced, quickly retooktheir rifle-pits, and Hill retired to his own works. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 1087. ] Bragg's delay intesting conclusions with us was due, in part no doubt, to the factthat Stewart's corps of the Army of Tennessee was _en route_ to him, and the railway was being worked energetically to bring up thesereinforcements. They arrived during the day, and the final attackupon us was arranged for Friday, the 10th. Stewart's men were underthe command of General Walthall, the senior division commanderpresent. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1088. ] In the night of Thursday and the early morning of Friday, the activeskirmishing of the enemy was so continuous as to remind us of thedays in the Georgia campaign when the intrenched lines of theopposing armies faced each other in the narrow valley near New HopeChurch. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 769. ] Bragg ordered Hoke'stroops to be relieved by Walthall's, and to make a considerablecircuit to their right, seeking to reach the lower Trent road in ourrear, and, advancing upon it, attack Carter's division in reverse. The sharp skirmishing had covered these changes of position. Uponhearing the sounds of Hoke's attack, Walthall and Hill were toassist him by strong demonstrations, but, as the latter says, indeference to his report that the men were very unwilling to attackearthworks, "their experience in the late campaign [in the west] notbeing favorable to such an undertaking, " no actual assault wasordered, but doubled skirmish lines were to advance as far aspossible. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 1088. ] On our side we were watchful and expectant, my orders to thedivisions being that whenever one part of the line should beengaged, the rest should push forward strong skirmish lines to testthe extent of the enemy's deployment, and gain the information onwhich I could act in reinforcing either wing from the other. GeneralGreene, who was on his way to rejoin Sherman, volunteered for dutyas a staff officer, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 979. ] as did General Stiles of my own division of theTwenty-third Corps, who was likewise returning to his propercommand. [Footnote: General George S. Greene, division commander inthe Twentieth Corps, had commanded a division in the Twelfth Corps, before its consolidation into the other. He was the same who wasdistinguished at Antietam (_ante_, vol. I. Pp. 321-331). Hegraduated at West Point in 1823, and was a descendant of GeneralGreene of the Revolutionary War, a military stock well continued inF. V. Greene of the Engineers, a general officer in the late SpanishWar. ] The absence of most of my own staff made their help mostacceptable. General Schofield was on his way up from New Berne, and horses wereawaiting him at the end of the railway when, about half-past eleven, Hoke's attack came with much more energy and resolution than theConfederates had shown before. Ruger's reserve brigade (McQuiston's)was ordered over to the left at once, a brigade he had loaned toPalmer (Thomas's) was ordered back, and Palmer was ordered to sendanother brigade if the enemy was quiet in his front. Hoke's attacklapped so far over the lower Trent road as to threaten the Doverroad also, and lest General Schofield should be in danger ofcapture, I directed Palmer to signal down the railroad track for himto await further news from us before leaving the train. [Footnote:_Id. _, pt. Ii. P. 772. ] The artillery of both Carter's and Ruger's divisions wereconcentrated upon Hoke, who was surprised to find our line so wellprepared to meet him. For nearly an hour, however, the fighting wasfierce; but it then began to flag a little, and I at once orderedMcQuiston's brigade to charge, throwing the left forward upon Hoke'sflank. This was decisive, and the enemy broke and fled. Walthall andHill were now advancing against Carter's right and against Ruger, and as the line of the latter was very thin, I had to recallMcQuiston in the full tide of pursuit and send him back to thecentre double quick. He brought in nearly 300 prisoners, and ourleft was relieved of all danger. For a while my headquarters groupwas in a hot place. General Greene had his horse shot under him, oneorderly had an arm taken off by a shell, two others were wounded, and several had horses killed. The men of Stewart's and Lee's corps were to have co-operated withHoke, but the difficulty of movement over such blind and woodedcountry caused delay which gave time for me to reinforce the centre. The artillery was hurried to the same position, and the Confederateswere defeated easily, their unwillingness to assault breastworksbeing increased by the sight of Hoke's men in disordered flight. Athalf-past twelve I was able to send word to General Schofield thatthe road was no longer threatened by the enemy, and he joined usbefore the fighting at the centre was over. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 978; pt. Ii. P. 772. ] Bragg withdrewto the intrenchments he had occupied on the 9th. The certainty thattwo corps of the Army of Tennessee were represented in the attackbesides the troops of Bragg's own department, added to the lack ofsupplies and munitions, made us quite willing to remain on thedefensive and await the arrival of Couch, who was within a day'smarch of us with the two veteran divisions of the Twenty-thirdCorps. The construction of the railroad and the hurrying forward ofammunition were ordered with strenuous urgency, and messages toCouch made him force the marching to join us. [Footnote: The officerwho was sent by Schofield to hasten Couch's march found my olddivision at the head of the column slowly filing over a ricketyfoot-bridge in the darkness, grumbling at the continued plodding inthe mud. He shouted to them the news of our fighting and my possibleneed of help. The cry went up from the men, "If General Cox wantsus, he can have us, " and they dashed into the stream in solidcolumn, forcing the pace till they reached the field. ] Braggretreated in the night of the 10th and was speeding back toGoldsborough by rail, for Johnston was now hastening to join Hardee, who was retreating before Sherman out of South Carolina. The numbers which Hill and Walthall brought to Bragg were smallerthan we inferred from our knowledge of the organizations present. Wetook prisoners belonging to four divisions of Hood's old army. Hoke's division and the brigades of Whitford, Hagood, and Baker hadall been stronger in numbers than similar organizations of our own. We were necessarily wholly ignorant of the causes which had reducedthe divisions coming from the West, and indeed learned of theirpresence in North Carolina only through the prisoners we took in theengagement and the deserters who came into our lines. As we haveseen, [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 424. ] the number of Hood's men in theState at the beginning of the month was over 9000, with otherdetachments on the way. Bragg's other forces were an equal number. After all the casualties of the campaign, the Army of Tennesseereported 11, 442 present on April 7th, of which 8953 were"effectives. " When they were paroled at Greenesborough on April26th, 17, 934 appeared and signed the papers. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 1059, 1066. In the table of theparoled, Cheatham's two divisions (his own and Brown's) are listedin Hardee's corps, and with those of Stewart's and Lee's corps, lessAnderson's (late Talliaferro's) division, make the total given. ] Itis impossible to tell exactly what part of these were at Kinston. Hill's claim that he had but little over 1300 effectives in fivebrigades of Lee's corps is not credible. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1088. For my criticism of his amusingly erroneous statements in regard toAntietam, see "The Nation, " No. 1538, p. 462, and No. 1543, p. 71. ]It is certain that Bragg knew I had three divisions and that hebelieved his force was the stronger. Our losses had been 1337, ofwhich 900 were the "missing" in Upton's brigade and the cavalry. Bragg made no formal report of the campaign or of his losses in thispart of it. CHAPTER XLVIII JUNCTION WITH SHERMAN AT GOLDSBOROUGH--THE MARCH ONRALEIGH--CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES Occupation of Kinston--Opening of Neuse River--Rebel ramdestroyed--Listening to the distant battle at Bentonville--EnteringGoldsborough--Meeting Sherman--Grant's congratulations--His ownplans--Sketch of Sherman's march--Lee and Johnston'scorrespondence--Their gloomy outlook--Am made commandant ofTwenty-third Corps--Terry assigned to Tenth--Schofield promoted inthe Regular Army--Stanton's proviso--Ill effects of living on thecountry--Stopping it in North Carolina--Camp jubilee over the fallof Richmond--Changes in Sherman's plans--Our march onSmithfield--House-burning--News of Lee's surrender--Overtures fromGovernor Vance--Entering Raleigh--A mocking-bird's greeting--Furthernegotiations as to North Carolina--Johnston proposes anarmistice--Broader scope of negotiations--The Southern people desirepeace--Terrors of non-combatants assuaged--News of Lincoln'sassassination--Precautions to preserve order--The dawn of peace. Reconnoitring parties sent toward Kinston on the 11th showed thatonly a rear-guard occupied that town and that we could occupy itwhen we pleased. General Couch joined us on the 12th, and Hokehaving sent in a flag of truce offering to exchange prisoners, ofwhom we had nearly 400, I sent Major Dow of my staff with GeneralSchofield's answer declining to do so. The major found no enemy onour side of the Neuse. The railroad bridge was burned and the middlepart of the wagon bridge destroyed. The roads were so nearlyimpassable that we could hardly feed the troops where we were, andwhilst the railroad building went on, we hastened also the openingof a supply line by water. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 933, 934; pt. Ii. Pp. 801, 802, 814. ] Commander Rhind ofthe navy efficiently co-operated in this, and we marched to Kinstonbridge on the 14th, laid pontoon bridges on the next day, andoccupied the town. The Confederate ram had been burnt and her wrecklay a little below the bridge. The transports and their convoyingwar vessel did not get up till the 18th, but as they then brought ahundred thousand rations, we were able to begin accumulating storesat Kinston as an advanced depot. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 836-839, 880, 883. ] Small additions to ourwagon-trains also arrived, and orders were issued to march towardGoldsborough on the 20th. Meanwhile 2000 men had been set at workgetting out railroad ties and timber for bridges. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 836, 851. ] During the halt at Kinston we partly reorganized the troops in viewof the approaching union with Sherman. The officers and men whobelonged to the divisions in Sherman's army were separatelyorganized into a division under General Greene, so that they couldeasily be transferred to their proper commands. The rest of Palmer'sand Carter's divisions were united in one under Carter, and Palmerwas assigned to the District of Beaufort, from which I was relieved. Ruger's division remained in my provisional corps with the othertwo. General Stiles was assigned to a brigade in Ruger's division. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 839, 895. ] On Monday, the 20th, we were in march for Goldsborough, leaving abrigade to garrison the post at Kinston and protect the growingdepot there. On Sunday we had heard all day the very distantartillery firing, which we knew indicated a battle between Shermanand Johnston. It was a scarcely distinguishable sound, like a dullthumping, becoming somewhat more distinct when one applied his earto the ground. We judged that this final battle in the Carolinas wasnear Smithfield, and we were not far out of the way, for Bentonvillewas only a little south, and either place about fifty miles from us. Two days' march took us into Goldsborough with no opposition butskirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. We found the railroaduninjured, except that the bridges were burned; but they were smalland would not delay Colonel Wright long when the large one atKinston should be completed. Captain Twining, General Schofield'sengineer and aide, had carried dispatches to Sherman on the 20th, and the latter was now in full possession of the story of ourmovements since the fall of Fort Fisher. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 942. ] On the 22d Sherman was able toannounce in field orders the retreat of Johnston toward Raleigh andour occupation of Goldsborough, whilst Terry had laid his pontoonsacross the Neuse completing the connection with Wilmington also. Hisdeclaration for the whole army that the "campaign has resulted in aglorious success" was more than justified. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 44. ] On Thursday, the 23d, Sherman joined us in person, and we paradedthe Twenty-third Corps to honor the march-past of Slocum's Army ofGeorgia, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, as they came in fromBentonville. Sherman took his place with us by the roadside, and theformal reunion with the comrades who had fought with us in theAtlanta campaign was an event to stir deep emotions in our hearts. The general did not hesitate to speak out his readiness, now thathis army was reunited, to meet the forces of Lee and Johnstoncombined, if they also should effect a junction and try to open away southward. The men who had traversed the Carolinas were raggedand dirty, their faces were begrimed by the soot of their camp-firesof pine-knots in the forests, but their arms were in order, and theystepped out with the sturdy swing that marked all our Westerntroops. Our men were in new uniforms we had lately drawn from thequartermaster, and the tatterdemalions who had made the march to thesea were disposed to chaff us as if we were new recruits or pamperedgarrison troops. "Well, sonnies!" a regimental wag cried out, "dothey issue butter to you regularly now?" "Oh, yes! to be sure!" wasthe instant retort; "but _we_ trade it off for soap!" The ironicalemphasis on the "we" was well understood and greeted with roars oflaughter, and learning that our men were really those who had beenwith them in Georgia and had fought at Franklin and Nashville beforemaking the tour of the North to come by sea and rejoin them in NorthCarolina, they made the welkin ring again with their greetingcheers. Keeping close watch of Sherman's movements, as hinted at in theSouthern newspapers, [Footnote: Till the capture of Columbia, theSouthern newspapers gave Sherman's movements with satisfactoryaccuracy, and Grant's information on the subject was chiefly drawnfrom them. Afterward a more rigid censorship was enforced. OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 385, 405, 428, 441, 455, 472, 499, etc. ] Grant concluded on the 22d that he must have reachedGoldsborough, and wrote him congratulations on the same day thatSherman announced to his army the good result. "I congratulate youand the army, " said Grant, "in what may be regarded as thesuccessful termination of the third campaign since leaving theTennessee River less than one year ago. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 948. ]He briefly but clearly outlined his own plans. Sheridan was to startwith his cavalry on the 25th, and, passing beyond the left of thelines before Petersburg, to strike the Southside railroad as nearthe town as might be, and destroy enough of it to interrupt its useby the enemy for three or four days. This done, he was to push forthe Danville Railroad, do the like, and again cut the Southside roadnear Burkesville. After that Grant would leave Sheridan at libertyto join Sherman or to return to his own army. At the same time hewould himself diminish the forces in his investing lines to thesmallest that could hold them, and with all the rest crowd to thewestward to prevent Lee from following Sheridan. He would attack ifLee should detach part of his army to follow Sheridan or to joinJohnston, or would fight a decisive battle if the Confederates cameout in force. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 948. See also p. 859. ] The general principles which resulted in FiveForks and the abandonment of Richmond are here clearly evident, andSherman could plan his own work accordingly. The latter was also writing on that day to the Lieutenant-General, taking up the thread of his own story from the time he reachedFayetteville and learned that Johnston had been put in command ofall the forces opposing him. He sketched the sharp combat betweenSlocum and Hardee at Averasborough on March 16th, where the latterhad taken a strong position across the narrow swampy neck betweenCape Fear River and North River at the forks of the Raleigh andGoldsborough roads. Hardee was working for time, as Johnston wascollecting his forces at Smithfield after Bragg's unsuccessful blowat us near Kinston. A day's delay was gained at heavy cost for theConfederates. At Bentonville, on the 19th, Johnston had concentratedhis army and struck fiercely at Slocum again, for the almostimpassable mud had made it necessary for Howard's wing to seek roadssome miles to the right. Slocum had to give some ground and drawback his advanced division to a better position, on which he formedthe rest of his troops, Kilpatrick's cavalry covering his left. Herehe repulsed all further efforts of Johnston and held his ground tillSherman could bring forward the right wing, when the enemy wasforced to intrench and was put on the defensive. On the 21stHoward's extreme right broke through or turned the line, and nearlyreached Johnston's headquarters. The blindly tangled swampy groundprevented full advantage being reaped from this success, andJohnston managed to hold on till night, when he abandoned his linesand retreated on Raleigh. Sherman's casualties of all sorts in thetwo engagements of Averasborough and Bentonville were 2209. He hadburied on the abandoned fields 375 of the Confederate dead, and held2000 prisoners. Johnston's wounded were 1694 at Bentonville, besidesseveral hundred at Averasborough. [Footnote: Sherman to Grant, Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 949; his report, Id. , pt. I. Pp. 27, 66, 76; Johnston's do. , Id. , pp. 1057, 1060. ] The lastbattle in the Carolinas had been fought, Johnston had added to hisreputation as a soldier by quick and strong blows skilfullydelivered, first at Schofield, then at Sherman; but his numbers werenot enough to make either blow successful, and the junction of ourarmies at Goldsborough made further fighting a mere waste of life, unless he and Lee could unite for a final effort. This Grant wouldnot permit, and Johnston's message to Lee on the 23d was insubstance the old one from Pavia, "All is lost but honor. ""Sherman's course cannot be hindered by the small force I have. Ican do no more than annoy him. I respectfully suggest that it is nolonger a question whether you leave your present position; you haveonly to decide where to meet Sherman. I will be near him. "[Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1055. ] General Lee, from his own point of view, saw with equal clearnessthe net that was closing round him. He had telegraphed to Johnstonon the 11th, "I fear I cannot hold my position if road to Raleigh isinterrupted. Should you be forced back in this direction both armieswould certainly starve. " [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Ii. P. 1372. ] On the15th he repeated, "If you are forced back from Raleigh and wedeprived of the supplies from east North Carolina, I do not know howthis army can be supported. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 1395. ] But whilehe pointed out the vital importance of repulsing Sherman, he did noturge rashness in giving battle without prospect of success. Suppliesin Virginia, he said, were exhausted. The western communication byDanville was now his only reliance. Since sending Hoke, Conner, andHampton south, his forces were too weak to extend his lines, and heapprehended the very break in the Danville road which Grant wasplanning to make by Sheridan. "You will therefore perceive, " headded, "that if I contract my lines as you propose, with the view ofholding Richmond, our only resource for obtaining subsistence willbe cut off and the city must be abandoned; whereas, if I take aposition to maintain the road, Richmond will be lost. " If Shermancould not be checked, "I cannot remain here, but must start out andseek a favorable opportunity for battle. I shall maintain myposition as long as it appears advisable, both from the moral andmaterial advantages of holding Richmond and Virginia. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 1395. ] Danville, he saw, was his necessary aim if he broke away, and he pointed out theadvantages they would have for manoeuvre if Sherman could be keptwell to the east, giving them more room and a wider region to liveupon after uniting. But Grant saw all this too, and the inexorabletenacity and vigor with which, a few days later, he pushed Lee northof the Danville line and cornered him at Appomattox, showed that hismeasure of the situation was as accurate as Lee's, and that he knewthe quick ending of the war depended on his preventing at allhazards the junction of the Confederate armies. Nothing in militaryhistory is more interesting than the comparison of the letters anddispatches of the leaders on both sides in this crisis. Grant wasnot content with being upon Lee's heels when he abandoned Richmond, as he had promised Sherman he would be. He would do better. Wellserved by Sheridan's fiery energy, he would out-foot his adversaryin the race for Danville, and even block his path on the road toLynchburg when the junction with Johnston had to be given up. For us at Goldsborough a day or two was delightfully spent in freeconferences with Sherman and in getting from his own lips the storyof his wonderful campaigns since we parted from him in Georgia. Allthe empty wagons of his enormous trains were now sent back toKinston under escort to bring up clothing and supplies, and hethought a delay of a fortnight might be necessary to get ready forfurther active movements. He fixed April both as the date foropening a new campaign, and suggested to General Grant that when hehad his troops properly placed and the supplies working well, hemight "run up and see you for a day or two before diving again intothe bowels of the country. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 969. ] On the 25th the railroad was running toGoldsborough, and Colonel Wright was anxious to have the general goover the road with him and see for himself its condition and whathad been acomplished as well as what was still needed to make itsequipment ready for the heavy work of another campaign. AccordinglySherman put Schofield temporarily in chief command, and after aninspection trip on a locomotive with Colonel Wright, he continuedhis journey to City Point in a steamer belonging to thequartermaster's department. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. Pp. 19, 20. ]His memorable visit to Grant and Lincoln, there, will be consideredin connection with the negotiations with Johnston a little later. Having spent the 27th and 28th of March there, he was sent back byAdmiral Porter in a fast vessel of the navy, reached New Berne onthe 30th, and rejoined us at Goldsborough the same evening. His return was a matter of some personal interest to me, for itbrought my permanent assignment to the command of the Twenty-thirdCorps by Presidential order. The other troops under Schofield wereorganized into a new corps with Terry for commandant, and as changeshad vacated the original Tenth Corps organization, that number wasgiven to Terry's. Schofield had asked for these appointmentsimmediately after our occupation of Wilmington, but the letters hadnot reached General Grant, and action had not been taken. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 559. ] At Goldsborough hehad renewed the request which Sherman cordially indorsed, and thelatter carried the papers with him to City Point, where the matterwas acted upon at once by the President and General Grant. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 960, 961; pt. Iii. Pp. 18, 34. See alsoAppendix C. ] Schofield's promotion to the rank of brigadier-general in theregular army had been recommended by Grant as a reward for thecapture of Wilmington, with the remark that he ought to have had itfrom the battle of Franklin. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Ii. Pp. 545, 558. ] Mr. Stanton replied that the nomination would be made asrequested, "subject, however, to his obedience to orders. I am notsatisfied with his conduct in seizing the hospital boat 'Spaulding'to make it his own quarters, " he said; adding, "I have directed himto give it up. If he obeys the order promptly, I will send in hisnomination; otherwise I will not. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 562. ] By anodd coincidence, the order to Schofield with the Secretary'sreprimand was written on the same day Grant was making hisrecommendation for promotion, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 545. ] and it wellillustrates Stanton's characteristic impulsiveness and hasty temperwhich made him act on first reports, when a quiet investigation offacts would have changed his view and saved the feelings of hissubordinates. An order forbidding the use of hospital boats forother military purposes, diverting them from hospital use, had beenissued on February 8th, the day we reached Cape Fear Inlet after oursea voyage, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 342. ] and by another coincidenceSchofield had made the "Spaulding" his temporary headquarters on thesame day. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 927. ] Not being a clairvoyant, Schofield knew nothing of the order which was then being written inthe adjutant-general's office at Washington, and which did not reachhim till his temporary use of the vessel had ended. Moreover, as hewas as yet without his tents or horses, and as he intended histroops to operate on both sides of Cape Fear River, his promptprogress with the campaign depended on his ready communication withboth banks, [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 405. ] and the boat had been namedas available for the purpose by the quartermaster responsible forthe army transports and vessels. As it was a question of successfulhandling of his forces, the discretion would have belonged to thegeneral commanding the department to make an exception to a rule, ifthe order had been in his hands instead of being wholly unknown tohim. Still again, the use he made of the boat helped instead ofhindering its availability as a hospital, for he kept it close tothe advancing lines on the river banks so that the wounded werebrought to it with greatest ease, and it had in fact no sick ordisabled men on board till they were brought there under thesecircumstances. Lastly, the superior medical officer of thedepartment was a member of Schofield's staff, wholly in accord withhis views, and the complaint had been sent by the subordinatesurgeon on the boat directly to the surgeon-general at Washingtonwithout the knowledge of the department medical director. To havereferred it back to the general for his comments, calling hisattention to the order, would have been regular and would haveresulted in commendation of his action instead of disapproval. WhenGrant received the Secretary's dispatch, Colonel Comstock hadreturned from Wilmington, and from him the general got theinformation which enabled him to remove Stanton's misapprehension, so that the appointment was made before Schofield knew of thecomplaint. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 562, 582. ] Nearly a month later he made a full statement of thecircumstances to put himself personally right with the Secretary. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 832. ] The latter had borne no ill-will toSchofield, but even at the closing period of the war had not learnedto temper his zeal with considerate patience. The work which occupied us the ten days of April which we spent atGoldsborough was chiefly that of organizing our trains andcollecting supplies in our depots, so that the foraging on thecountry which had been necessary in Georgia and South Carolina mightcease, now that we had railway communication with a safe base on theAtlantic. Sherman had informed his principal subordinates that whenhe reached North Carolina he would resume the regular issue ofsupplies as far as possible, and put an end to the indiscriminateseizing of whatever the army needed. It had answered its purpose inthe long marches from Atlanta to Savannah and from Savannah toGoldsborough, where the condition of success was cutting loose fromthe base; but the tendency to demoralization and loss of disciplinein troops which practise it too long, made a return to regularmethods very desirable. As the army had approached the North Carolina line, General Blair, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, had written to Howard, hisimmediate superior: "Every house that we pass is pillaged, and as weare about to enter the State of North Carolina, I think the peopleshould be treated more considerately. The only way to prevent thisstate of affairs is to put a stop to foraging. I have enough in mywagons to last to Goldsborough, and I suppose that the rest of thearmy has also. . . . The system is vicious and its results utterlydeplorable. As there is no longer a necessity for it, I beg that anorder may be issued to prohibit it. General Sherman said that whenwe reached North Carolina he would pay for everything brought to usand forbid foraging. I believe it would have an excellent effectupon the country to change our policy in this respect. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 717; pt. Iii. Pp. 46, 47. ]Stringent orders were at once issued to modify the system andprevent the abuses of it, but it was not practicable to stopforaging entirely till the junction of the forces was made atGoldsborough. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 718, 728, 760, 783. ] The regular issue of rations furnished by thegovernment was then resumed, except that long forage for horses andmules could not be obtained in this way and was collected from thecountry;[Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. Pp. 7-9. ] but even then thecorrection of bad habits in the soldiery was only graduallyaccomplished. The evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg on the morning of the 3dof April was not known to Sherman till the 6th, when Grant's letterreached him containing the joyful news. On Saturday, the 8th, it wasconfirmed, with particulars of Lee's disastrous retreat. [Footnote:_Id. _, pp. 89, 99, 100, 109. ] That night there was a noisy jubileein our camps. Regular artillery salutes were fired, but the soldiersalso extemporized all sorts of demonstrations of their joyfulness. The air resounded with cheers, with patriotic songs, with thebeating of drums, with the music of the brass bands, with musketfiring; whilst beautiful signal rockets rushed high into the air, dropping their brilliant stars of red, white, and blue from the veryclouds. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 936. ] So long as Lee held fast at Petersburg, Sherman's plan had been tofeint on Raleigh, but make his real movement northward, crossing theRoanoke above Gaston and marching between Johnston and Lee. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. P. 102. ] Now, however, as he wroteHalleck, he would move in force upon Raleigh, repairing the railroadbehind him and following the Confederate army close in whateverdirection it should move. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 118. ] Grant's letterof the 5th, giving his opinion that Lee was making for Danville withan army reduced to about 20, 000 men, [Footnote: _Id. _, P. 99. ]reached Sherman on the 8th, and he immediately answered it, saying:"On Monday [10th] all my army will move straight on Joe Johnston, supposed to be between me and Raleigh, and I will follow himwherever he may go. If he retreats on Danville to make junction withLee, I will do the same, though I may take a course round him, bending toward Greensborough for the purpose of turning himnorth.... I wish you could have waited a few days or that I couldhave been here a week sooner; but it is not too late yet, and youmay rely with absolute certainty that I will be after Johnston withabout 80, 000 men, provided for twenty full days which will last meforty. I will have a small force here at Goldsborough and willrepair the road to Raleigh. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 129. ] On Monday we marched, --Slocum with the Army of Georgia straight forSmithfield, Howard with the Army of the Tennessee going north toPikeville and then turning toward Raleigh, keeping to the right ofSlocum and abreast of him on parallel roads. Schofield with our Armyof the Ohio moved a little to the left of Slocum in echelon, mycorps taking the river road on the left (north) bank of the Neuse toTurner's Bridge, a little below Smithfield, and Terry's goingthrough Bentonville somewhat further to left and rear. Kilpatrickwith the cavalry covered the march of this flank. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 123. ] It will be seen that this order of movement assumed thatJohnston was at or near Smithfield, where our latest information puthim. My corps had been somewhat scattered to cover ourcommunications with Kinston and Newberne, and I was ordered toconcentrate at Goldsborough on the 10th, advancing-from there on the11th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 134. ] My old division, which had beencommanded by General Reilly since he joined us at Wilmington, wasfor the rest of the campaign led by General Carter, Reilly'suncertain health making him anticipate the quickly approaching endof the war by resigning. Ruger and Couch continued in command of thefirst and second divisions respectively. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 936. ] My own march was impeded by the slow progress of the pontoon-trainwhich had been sent ahead of my column, where a part of Slocum'ssupply-train also moved. For this reason we found numbers ofstragglers on our way and evidences of pillaging by which I wasexasperated. We halted at noon of the 11th near a large housebelonging to a Mr. Atkinson, a man of prominence in the region. Themansion had a Grecian portico with large columns the whole height ofthe building. Part of the furniture and the carpets had beenremoved, but evidences of refinement and intelligence were seen inthe piano and the library with its books. With my staff I rested andate my lunch in the spacious portico, and moving on when the haltwas over, I had hardly ridden half a mile when a pillar of whitesmoke showed that the house was on fire. I sent back a staff officerin haste to order an instant investigation and the arrest of anyauthors of this vandalism. The most that could be learned was thatsome stragglers of another corps had been seen lurking in the housewhen we moved on, and soon after fire broke out in the second story, having been set, apparently, in a closet connected with one of thechambers. Efforts were made to extinguish it, but it had found itsway into the garret and had such headway that the house was doomed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 936. ] This wasthe first instance in my experience where a dwelling had been burnedwhen my troops were passing, and I was greatly disturbed by theirapparent responsibility for it. My anger was increased byrepetitions of similar outrages during the afternoon. From our campat Turner's Bridge I issued an order directing summary trial bydrum-head court-martial and execution of marauders guilty of suchoutrages, whether belonging to my own corps or stragglers hanging onat its skirts. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. P. 189. ] The evidenceseemed conclusive that the crimes were committed by "bummers" whohad separated themselves from the army when marching up fromSavannah, and were following it for purposes of pillage. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 281. ] It was reported thatAtkinson was a "conscription agent" of the Confederate government, and this perhaps was the incentive in his case for the outrage. As aprecaution, I ordered sentinels to be left at dwellings on ourmarch, to be relieved from the divisions in succession, the last toremain till our trains had passed and then join the rear-guard. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 189. ] In the march of the 12th Howard remained on the east side of theNeuse with a pretty widely extended front, aiming for the crossingof the river due east of Raleigh, at the Neuse Mills and Hinton'sBridge. Slocum crossed at Smithfield and took the roads up the rightbank of the Neuse. Schofield crossed at Turner's Bridge, and soughtroads further west, intending to reach the main road leading fromElevation to Raleigh. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 163, 164, 187-189. ] AtSmithfield we learned that Johnston was at Raleigh, but we did notknow that he had heard of Lee's surrender and had no longer a motiveto hold tenaciously to the central part of the State. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 777. ] It was on our march of Tuesday, the 12th, that thenews of the surrender reached us, and was greeted with extravagantdemonstrations of joy by both officers and men. [Footnote: For avivid description of the scene, see "Ohio Loyal Legion Papers, " vol. Ii. P. 234, by A. J. Ricks, then a lieutenant on my staff, sinceJudge of U. S. District Court, N. Ohio. ] Sherman had got the news ina dispatch sent by Grant on the 9th, as soon as the capitulation wascomplete, and which contained the terms he had offered Lee, withtheir acceptance. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 140. ] Replying at once, Sherman said, "I hardly know how toexpress my feelings, but you can imagine them. The terms you havegiven Lee are magnanimous and liberal. Should Johnston follow Lee'sexample, I shall of course grant the same. He is retreating beforeme on Raleigh, but I shall be there to-morrow. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 177. ] He indicated his hope thatJohnston would surrender at Raleigh, but should he not do so, hisown plan would be to push to the south and west to prevent theenemy's retreat into the Gulf States. "With a little more cavalry, "he said, "I would be sure to capture the whole army. " He issued alsoa Special Field Order, announcing to the army the momentous news. "Glory to God and to our country, and all honor to our comrades inarms toward whom we are marching. A little more labor, a little moretoil on our part, the great race is won, and our government standsregenerated after four years of bloody war. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 180. ] Such were the words which created a tumult of emotion in theheart of every soldier, when they were read that day, a beautifulspring day, at the head of each command. The order reached me nearmid-day at a resting halt of the corps, and with bared heads mystaff listened to the reading. We then greeted it with three cheers, I myself acting as fugleman, and the tidings sped down the column onthe wings of the wind. Late in the same day a delegation met Slocum's advance-guard comingfrom Raleigh in a car upon the railroad with a letter from GovernorVance making overtures to end the war, so far as North Carolina wasconcerned. The little party was headed by ex-Governor Graham and Mr. Swain, men who had led the opposition to secession till swept awayby the popular whirlwind of war feeling, and who now came toacknowledge the victory of the National Government. Mr. Graham hadbeen the candidate for Vice-President in 1852, nominated by the Whigparty on the ticket with General Scott. Sherman received themkindly, and gave a safeguard for Governor Vance and any members ofthe State government who might await him in Raleigh, though, after aconference with Graham and his party in regard to their presentrelations to the Confederate government, he wrote to Vance, "I doubtif hostilities can be suspended as between the Army of theConfederate Government and the one I command, but I will aid you allin my power to contribute to the end you aim to reach, thetermination of the existing war. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 178. ] The Twenty-third Corps marched eighteen miles on the 12th, and, asGeneral Schofield reported, found that "Slocum's bummers had beenall over the country, " foraging it bare. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 187. ]On the 13th we marched within two miles of Raleigh, making nineteenmiles, the Army of Georgia entering the city just ahead of us. Sherman was with the head of Slocum's column, expecting to meetGovernor Vance, but such delays had occurred to the train taking hismessengers that Vance lost confidence, and had left the city aheadof Hampton's cavalry, the rear-guard of Johnston's army. Hampton wasbitterly opposed to all negotiation by Vance, holding it to betreasonable, and had put such obstacles in the way of Graham's partyas to make Vance think that they had been arrested and that themission had failed. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 178, 196. ] Graham andSwain, however, were still there, and at once waited upon Sherman, who established his headquarters in the governor's mansion. Thenews, as it came to us in the marching column, was that Vance hadmet Sherman in person and surrendered the capital of the State; butthe facts turned out to be as I have stated them. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 937. ] A trifling incident gave us pleasure as we were approaching our campnear Raleigh, and, with the soldiers' disposition to interpretfortuitous things in earth and air, was greeted as a good omen. Agreat tree stood at the roadside, and, perched upon a dead limb highabove the foliage and overhanging the way, a mocking-bird pouredforth the most wonderful melodies ever heard even from that princeof songsters. Excited but not frightened away by the moving hostbeneath, the bird outdid its kind in its imitations of other birds, and in its calls and notes of endless variety, whistling and singingwith a full resonant power that rose above all other sounds. Themarching soldiers ceased their talk, listening intently and craningtheir necks to get a sight of the peerless musician. It was acelebration of the coming peace, unique in beauty and full of sweetsuggestions. On the 14th the greater part of the army moved westward a few milesin front of Raleigh, the Twenty-third Corps closing up to theeastern suburbs of the town. Sherman issued his marching orders forthe 15th, beginning, "The next movement will be on Ashborough, toturn the position of the enemy at Company's shops in rear of HawRiver Bridge and at Greensborough, and to cut off his only availableline of retreat by Salisbury and Charlotte. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 208, 217. ] This march had hardlybegun, however, when it was temporarily suspended and was neverresumed. Our last hostile march against the Confederate armies hadbeen made. Mr. Badger, the last senator from the State in theNational Congress, and other leading men, including Mr. Holden, theleader of the Union element in the State, had joined Mr. Graham'sparty, and Sherman had been busy with them, negotiating informallyto obtain the withdrawal of North Carolina from the Confederacy. Thegeneral was willing that the executive and legislature of the Stateshould come to Raleigh for this purpose, but refused to suspendhostilities against Johnston's army except upon direct overtures forsurrender on the part of the latter. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 221. ]Whilst these conferences were in progress, others had been going onat Greensborough, and as a result General Johnston had sent a letterrequesting an armistice. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 206. ] Shermanimmediately replied in terms which brought about the halt andtemporary truce between the two armies and a personal conferencethree days later. Thus opened the famous negotiations, the story ofwhich will be told in the next chapter. Whilst the Southern people had shown wonderful fortitude andpatience as long as a hope of success remained, they were mostanxious to be spared the horrors of war when there was nocompensating advantage to be looked for. The dread of our armies hadbeen increased by the exaggerations which the Confederateauthorities had used to excite the people to desperate resistance, and the terror now reacted in a general popular demand forsurrender. The story of the burning of Columbia had been given tothem as a wanton and deliberate barbarity on Sherman's part, and thedelegation which met him could hardly believe their own senses whenthey heard his earnest expressions of desire to end the war at onceand save the people from suffering and the country from devastation. An experience of my own as we entered Raleigh gave me a startlingview of the abject terror which had seized upon helpless familieswhen they found themselves defenceless in our hands. In the night ofWednesday, the 12th, Hampton had made it known that the rear-guardwhich he commanded must retire before daylight, and the frightenedpeople had at once begun to close their windows and sit in gloomyexpectation of what the morning would bring. Early on ThursdayKilpatrick's cavalry clattered through the town, and on the furtherside some skirmishing occurred and an occasional cannon shot wasthought to be the opening of battle. Slocum's infantry marchedthrough after the cavalry advance-guard, and the heavy rattling ofcannon and caissons with the shouting of the drivers of the trainsseemed a pandemonium to unaccustomed ears. Sherman had issuedstringent orders that no mischief should be done and no lootingpermitted in the city, and all the superior officers were earnest inenforcing the orders, so that I believe no town was ever morequietly occupied by an army in actual war. On Friday morning I wasplacing my own troops in the suburb and arranging to assume theguard of the city, left to us by the camping of the main body of thearmy beyond its western limits. An officer of the general staff cameto me, saying he had been appealed to in a most piteous way forprotection by a lady who with her household of women and childrencould endure the terror and suspense no longer. Knowing that I wasto be in immediate charge of the place, he had given assurances thatI would remove all cause for fear, but had still been begged to askme to come in person and relieve their great distress. I went withhim to one of the most comfortable homes of the town. The family hadbeen collected in the parlors since midnight of Wednesday. They hadnot dared to retire to sleep, but clung about the mother andmistress. The windows were close shut, the rooms lit by candles, andpale, jaded with the long nervous strain, momentarily fearing thebreaking in of those they had been taught to look upon as littlebetter than fiends, their hollow eyes showed they were perilouslynear the limit of human endurance. I earnestly vouched for the goodintentions of our generals, and promised the most ample protection. I assured them of sympathy and a purpose to give them the samesafety as I should wish for my own wife and children if they were ina like situation. A guard was ordered for the house and theneighborhood. They were urged to open the windows to the cheerfullight and to resume their ordinary way of life. The passing of thepanic and the revival of confidence was a sort of return from theshadow of death and was most touching to behold. It added a newelement of thankfulness that such terrors for the helpless were notto be renewed, since peace was really coming to heal the terriblewounds of war. There was a moment when we once more feared we might not be able tosave the city from vengeance. It was when, on the 17th of April, thenews of Lincoln's assassination reached us. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 221. ] Sherman had received thedispatch in cipher just as he was starting for his conference withJohnston at Durham Station, and had enjoined absolute secrecy uponthe telegraph operator till his return in the evening. GeneralStiles, one of my most trusted subordinates, had been madecommandant of the post of Raleigh with a garrison of threebattalions of infantry, a brigade of reserve artillery, and theconvalescents of the Army of the Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 217. ] Assoon as Sherman returned from his visit to Johnston, he sent for meand told me the terrible news of Lincoln's murder. He expressed thegreat fear he had lest, on its becoming known, it should be theoccasion of outbreaks among the soldiers. He charged me tostrengthen Stiles's garrison to any extent I might think necessary, to put strong guards at the edge of the city on the roads leading tothe several camps, to send all soldiers off duty to their propercommands, and in short, till the first excitement should be over, toallow no one to visit the city or wander about it, and to keep allunder strict military surveillance. Schofield and the other armycommanders were with him, and all were seriously impressed with thedanger of mischief resulting and with the need of thoroughprecautions. Sherman's general order announcing the assassinationwas then read, but its distribution and publication to the army wasdelayed till I should have time to prepare for safeguarding thecity. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 238. ] Fortunately the announcement of thefirst convention for the disbanding of all the remaining armies ofthe Confederacy accompanied the exciting news, and as it wasregarded as the return of general peace, the effect on our army wasthat of deep mourning for the loss of a great leader in the hour ofvictory rather than an excitement to vengeance in a continuingstrife. There was no noteworthy difficulty in preserving order, and, though the inhabitants of Raleigh had a day or two of greatuneasiness, the beautiful town did not suffer in the least. Itsbroad streets, lined with forest trees, and the ample dooryards inthe lush beauty of lawns and flowers were no more trespassed uponthan the avenues and gardens of Washington, and nobody suffered fromviolence. CHAPTER XLIX THE SHERMAN-JOHNSTON CONVENTION Sherman's earlier views of the slavery question--Opinions in1864--War rights vs. Statesmanship--Correspondence withHalleck--Conference with Stanton at Savannah--Letter to GeneralRobert Anderson--Conference with Lincoln at City Point--First effectof the assassination of the President--Situation on the Confederateside--Davis at Danville--Cut off from Lee--Goes toGreensborough--Calls Johnston to conference--Lee's surrender--TheGreensborough meeting--Approach of Stoneman's cavalry raid--Vance'sdeputation to Sherman--Davis orders their arrest--Vance asserts hisloyalty--Attempts to concentrate Confederate forces on theGreensborough-Charlotte line--Cabinet meeting--Overthrow of theConfederacy acknowledged--Davis still hopeful--Yields to thecabinet--Dictates Johnston's letter to Sherman--Sherman'sreply--Meeting arranged--Sherman sends preliminary correspondence toWashington--The Durham meeting--The negotiations--Two points ofdifficulty--Second day's session--Johnston's power to promise thedisbanding of the civil government--The terms agreedupon--Transmittal letters--Assembling the Virginialegislature--Sherman's wish to make explicit declaration of the endof slavery--The assassination affecting public sentiment--Sherman'spersonal faith in Johnston--He sees the need of modifying theterms--Grant's arrival. To understand Sherman's negotiations with Johnston, we must recallthe general's attitude toward the rebellious States and his views onthe subject of slavery. Originally a conservative Whig in politics, deprecating the anti-slavery agitation, as early as 1856 he hadwritten to his brother, "Unless people both North and South learnmore moderation, we'll 'see sights' in the way of civil war. Ofcourse the North have the strength and must prevail, though thepeople of the South could and would be desperate enough. " [Footnote:Sherman Letters, p. 63. ] In 1859 he was still urging concessionsinstead of insisting on the absolute right, saying, "Each State hasa perfect right to have its own local policy, and a majority inCongress has an absolute right to govern the whole country; but theNorth, being so strong in every sense of the term, can well affordto be generous, even to making reasonable concessions to theweakness and prejudices of the South. " [Footnote: Sherman Letters, p. 77. ] He returned to the same thought in 1860, saying, "So certainand inevitable is it that the physical and political power of thisnation must pass into the hands of the free States, that I think youall can well afford to take things easy, bear the buffets of asinking dynasty, and even smile at their impotent threats. "[Footnote: _Id. _, p. 83. ] The world is familiar with the ringing words with which he threwaway his livelihood and turned from every attractive outlook inlife, when, Secession having actually come, he said to the governorof Louisiana, "On no earthly account will I do any act or think anythought hostile to or in defiance of the United States. " [Footnote:_Id. _, p. 106. ] But he was also one of the clearest-sighted inseeing that when slavery had appealed to the sword it would perishby the sword. In January, 1864, he expressed it tersely: "The Southhas made the interests of slavery the issue of the war. If they losethe war, they lose slavery. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 222. ] At the endof the same month he said, "Three years ago, by a little reflectionand patience, they could have had a hundred years of peace andprosperity; but they preferred war. Last year they could have savedtheir slaves, but now it is too late, --all the powers of earthcannot restore to them their slaves any more than their deadgrandfathers. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol, xxxii. Pt. Ii. P. 280. ] And in the same letter, written to a subordinate with expressauthority to make it known to the Southern people within our lines, he said of certain administrative regulations: "These arewell-established principles of war, and the people of the South, having appealed to war, are barred from appealing for protection toour Constitution, which they have practically and publicly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide _its_ rules and laws. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxii. Pt ii. P. 279. ] Two years later Thaddeus Stevens, as radical leader in Congress, enounced the same doctrine in no more trenchant terms. Sherman wasexplicit in regard to its scope, but he differed from Stevens in theextent to which he would go, as a matter of sound policy andstatesmanship, in applying the possible penalties of war whensubmission was made. It is clear that he insisted there could be noresurrection for slavery, and that the freedmen must be protected inlife, liberty, and property, with a true equality before the law inthis protection; but he held that they were as yet unfit forpolitical participation in the government, much less for theassumption of political rule in the Southern States. In a friendly letter which General Halleck wrote to Shermanimmediately after the capture of Savannah, he said with a freedomthat long intimacy permitted: "Whilst almost every one is praisingyour great march through Georgia and the capture of Savannah, thereis a certain class, having now great influence with the Presidentand very probably anticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedly disposed to make a point against you--I mean inregard to 'Inevitable Sambo. ' They say that you have manifested analmost _criminal_ dislike to the negro, and that you are not willingto carry out the wishes of the government in regard to him, butrepulse him with contempt. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xliv. P. 836. ] Inshort, it was said that his march through Georgia might have beenmade the means of a general exodus of the slaves, and ought to havebeen. Sherman made a humorous reply, saying he allowed thousands ofnegroes to accompany his march, and set no limit but the necessitiesof his military operations. "If it be insisted, " he said, "that Ishall so conduct my operations that the negro alone is consulted, ofcourse I will be defeated, and then where will be Sambo? Don'tmilitary success imply the safety of Sambo, and _vice versa_?... They gather round me in crowds, and I can't find out whether I amMoses or Aaron or which of the prophets. . . . The South deservesall she has got for her injustice to the negro, but that is noreason why we should go to the other extreme. I do and will do thebest I can for negroes, and feel sure that the problem is solvingitself slowly and naturally. It needs nothing more than ourfostering care. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 36. ] The Secretary of War was broadly hinted at in Halleck's letter, butwhen Mr. Stanton visited Sherman at Savannah, the latter understoodthat his mind was disabused of any unfavorable impressions he mayhave had. Mr. Stanton had assembled a score of the leading coloredpreachers as the most intelligent representatives of their race, andexamined them by written questions respecting their hopes anddesires, their attitude in regard to military service, and in regardto living among the whites or separately. He learned that theygenerally preferred to try life in a separate community of theirown, and that they were strongly opposed to the methods by whichState agents were trying to enlist them as substitutes for mendrafted in the Northern States. He even went so far as to ask thesemen whether they found Sherman friendly to the colored people'srights and interests or otherwise! The answer was that they hadconfidence in the general, and thought their concerns could not bein better hands. Some of them had called upon him on his arrival, and now said that they did not think he could have received Mr. Stanton with more courtesy than he showed to them. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 41. ] Sherman's order relating to the allotment of sea-islandlands to the freedmen for cultivation, and to the methods ofprocuring their enlistment as soldiers [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 60. ] was drafted while Mr. Stanton was withhim, and he affirms that every paragraph had the Secretary'sapproval. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 250. ] In his feelings toward the men chiefly responsible for secession andthe war, Sherman had never measured his words when expressing hiscondemnation and wrath. In a letter to General Robert Anderson, written only a few days before meeting Johnston in negotiation, hehad spoken with deepest feeling of his satisfaction that Andersonwas to raise again the flag at Fort Sumter on April 14th (the fatalday on which also Lincoln died), saying he was "glad that it fallsto the lot of one so pure and noble to represent our country in adrama so solemn, so majestic, and so just. " To him it looked like "aretribution decreed by Heaven itself. " Reminded by this thought ofthose who had caused this horrid war, he exclaimed: "But the end isnot yet. The brain that first conceived the thought must burst inanguish, the heart that pulsated with hellish joy must cease tobeat, the hand that pulled the first laniard must be palsied, beforethe wicked act begun in Charleston on the 13th of April, 1861, isavenged. But 'mine, not thine, is vengeance, ' saith the Lord, and wepoor sinners must let him work out the drama to its close. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 107. ] Such wasthe man who went to meet General Johnston on the 17th of April; andin considering what he then did, we must take into the account theprinciples, the convictions, and the feelings which were part of hisvery nature. Still further, we must remember that he had, less than three weeksbefore, a personal conference with the President at City Point, andhad obtained from him personally the views he held with regard tothe terms he was prepared to grant to the several rebel States aswell as to the armies which might surrender, and the method by whichhe expected to obtain an acknowledgment of submission from somelegally constituted authority, without dealing in any way with theConfederate civil government. General Sherman is conclusiveauthority as to what occurred at a conference which was in thenature of instructions to him from the Commander-in-Chief; and themore carefully we examine contemporaneous records, the strongerbecomes the conviction that he has accurately reported what occurredat that meeting. "Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation, " says Sherman, "assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civilreorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over;and he distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and thepeople of North Carolina that as soon as the rebel armies laid downtheir arms and resumed their civil pursuits, they would at once beguaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common country; andthat to avoid anarchy, the State governments then in existence, withtheir civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as thegovernment _de facto_ till Congress could provide others. "[Footnote: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 327. ] When the general met Mr. Graham and others, he was aware thatGeneral Weitzel at Richmond had authorized the Virginia Stategovernment to assemble, Mr. Lincoln being on the ground. The viewsexpressed in the famous interview at City Point had taken practicalshape. In correspondence with Johnston while they were awaitingaction on the first convention, Sherman referred to Weitzel's actionas a reason for confidence that there would be "no trouble on thescore of recognizing existing State governments. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 266. ] With the burden of the terrible news of Lincoln's assassination, Sherman went up to Durham Station to meet the Confederate general onthe 17th of April. His grief was mingled with gloomy thoughts of thefuture, for it was natural that he as well as the authorities atWashington should at first think of the great crime as part of asystem of desperate men to destroy both the civil and the militaryleaders of the country, and to disperse the armies into bands ofmerciless guerillas who would try the effect of anarchy now thatcivilized military operations had failed. We did injustice to theSouth in thinking so, but it was inevitable that such should be thefirst impression. As soon as we mingled a little with the leadingsoldiers and statesmen of the South we learned better, and theperiod of such apprehensions was a brief one, though terrible whileit lasted. But we must here consider what were the motives and purposes which, on his part, Johnston represented, when he came from Greensboroughto meet his great opponent. To understand these we must tracerapidly the course of events within his military lines. WhenPetersburg was taken and Richmond evacuated, Mr. Davis with themembers of his cabinet went to Danville, where he remained for a fewdays, protected by a small force under General H. H. Walker. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 741, 750. ]Beauregard was at Greensborough, collecting detachments to resist anexpedition which General Stoneman was leading through the mountainsfrom Tennessee. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 751. ] Johnston was atSmithfield with the main body of his forces, watching our army atGoldsborough and preparing to retreat toward Lee as soon as thelatter might escape from Grant and give a rendezvous at Danville orGreensborough. The retreat from Petersburg made a union east ofDanville probably impracticable. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 682, 737. ] Grant's persistent and vigorous pursuit soon turned Lee away fromthe Danville road at Burkesville, pushed him toward Lynchburg, anddestroyed all hope of union with Johnston. Davis had no directcommunication with Lee after reaching Danville, and his positionthere being unsafe, after Grant had occupied Burkesville, he went toGreensborough. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 750, 787. ] From Danville, on the 10th, he telegraphed Johnston thathe had a report of the surrender of Lee, which there was little roomto doubt. He also asked Johnston to meet him at Greensborough toconfer as to future action. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 777. ] The dispatchwas, by some accident, prevented from reaching Johnston on the 10th, and Davis repeated it on the 11th, so that the news reached theConfederate headquarters only a day before we got it, on our marchfrom Smithfield. On the same day (11th) Davis informed GovernorVance of the disaster, and suggested a meeting with him also. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 787. ] He also forwarded to Johnston thesuggestion of Beauregard (which he approved), that all theConfederate forces north of Augusta should concentrate at Salisbury. The best evidence that Vance regarded the cause of the Confederacyas lost is found in his resolve to send a deputation to meet Shermanwithout waiting to confer with Davis. Johnston issued on the 11thhis orders for the continued march of his army westward from Raleighalong the railroad, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 789. ] and himself proceededto Greensborough by train, to have the appointed conference. WhilstDavis and he were together on the 12th, Stoneman's cavalry, whichhad been in the vicinity the day before and had made a break in theDanville road, was heard of at Shallow Ford, on the Yadkin, aboutthirty miles west. Part of the troops at Greensborough were at oncesent to Salisbury, which was about the same distance from the Yadkinford. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 791. ] At the same time came a cipherdispatch from Colonel Anderson of Johnston's staff, whom the latterhad left at Raleigh, saying that Governor Vance was sending Messrs. Graham and Swain to meet Sherman, presumably by permission ofHardee, who was senior officer in Johnston's absence. ColonelAnderson had taken the responsibility of asking Hampton not to letthem pass his cavalry outposts. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 791. ] By Davis's direction, Johnston at oncetelegraphed Hardee to arrest the delegation and to permit nointercourse with us except under proper military flag of truce. [Footnote: _Ibid. _] Vance was of course informed by Hardee, andreplied that he intended nothing subversive of Davis's prerogativeor without consulting him. He also said that Johnston was aware ofhis purpose. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 792. ] In saying further, however, that the initiative had been on Sherman's part, he was dissembling. [Footnote: See the letters, _Id. _, p. 178. ] The difficulty put inthe way of his representatives in getting beyond the Confederatelines is thus accounted for, as well as his failure to remain inRaleigh on our arrival. Davis found it politic to accept theexplanation, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 792. ] but we may safely assumethat the matter was discussed between him and Johnston, and that itled to its discussion with his cabinet also; for Johnston remainedwith him till the 14th, leaving to Hardee the direction of the armyon the march, which was ordered to be pressed towards Greensborough. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 796, 797. ] The troops at Danville were calledto the same rendezvous, and General Echols, with those in WestVirginia, was ordered to make his way through the mountains to thenorthwestern part of South Carolina. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 795, 796. ] In a formal conference with his advisers on the 13th (Thursday), allof the cabinet officers except Benjamin declared themselves ofJohnston's and Beauregard's opinion, that a further prosecution ofthe war was hopeless; that the Southern Confederacy was in factoverthrown, and that the wise thing to do was to make at once thebest terms possible. [Footnote: Johnston's Narrative, pp. 397-400. ]Davis argued that the crisis might rouse the Southern people to newand desperate efforts, and that overtures for peace on the basis ofsubmission were premature. The general opinion, however, was sostrong against him that he reluctantly yielded, and, to make surethat he should not be committed further than he meant, he himselfdictated, and Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Navy, wrote, theletter to Sherman, signed by Johnston, asking for an armisticebetween all the armies, if General Grant would consent, "the objectbeing to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needfularrangements to terminate the existing war. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 206. ] The form of each sentence ofthe letter is significant, in view of its authorship, but most so isthe plain meaning of that just quoted, to make a complete surrenderupon such terms as the National government should dictate. In likemanner the opening sentence, "The results of the recent campaign inVirginia have changed the relative military condition of thebelligerents, " was a confession in diplomatic form of final defeat. Before sending the letter to Sherman, Johnston copied it with hisown hand, in order, no doubt, to have a duplicate for his ownprotection, as well as to preserve secrecy. [Footnote: The onlydifference is that in his copy he put the date of the 13th at itshead (the true date), whilst the original which he says he sent toSherman (Narr. , p. 400) was dated the 14th, when it would be sentfrom his outposts; a bit of forethought on Mr. Davis's part, whichguarded against Sherman's suspicion that it had been prepared at adistance and had travelled more than a day's journey. Both of theduplicates are in the war archives, that written by Mr. Malloryhaving the indorsement in Sherman's own hand of its receipt on the14th. (Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 206, note. ) In theRecords Sherman's indorsement of the receipt of Johnston's dispatchis "12 night. " This seems to be a clerical error, and should be"noon. " (See _Id_. , pp. 209, 215, 216, and Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 346. ) Mr. Davis's account is not inconsistent withJohnston's, which he had seen. (Rise and Fall, vol. Ii. Pp. 681, 684. )] Sherman lost not a moment in answering, 1st, that he had power andwas willing to arrange a suspension of hostilities between thearmies under their respective commands, indicating a halt on bothsides on the 15th; 2d, that he offered as a basis the terms givenLee at Appomattox: 3d, interpreting Johnston's reference to "otherarmies" which he desired the truce to include as referring toStoneman (whom we had heard of in Raleigh as burning railway bridgeson both sides of Greensborough [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 197. ]), he said that Stoneman was under hiscommand, and that he would obtain from Grant a suspension of othermovements from Virginia. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 207. ] All this wasstrictly within the limits of Sherman's military authority anddiscretion. The 15th of April (Saturday) was a day of pouring rain, making theroads almost impassable for wagons, as they were already cut up bythe retreating army and by our advance. Sherman expected a replyfrom Johnston early, for he had directed Kilpatrick on Fridayafternoon to send his answer at once to the Confederate lines. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 215. ] He was annoyed at the delay, and sent upMajor McCoy of his staff to Morrisville on the railway, whereKilpatrick's headquarters were, taking with him a telegraph operatorto open an office there. But Kilpatrick had gone to his own outpoststoward Hillsborough, and his staff seem to have been in no hurry toforward Sherman's letter, so that it was delivered to Hampton atsundown of the 15th instead of the 14th. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 222, 233, 234. ] A locomotive engine was sent to McCoy on Sunday (16th), and with it he went on to Durham, taking his telegrapher along. Sometorpedoes had been found on the road below, and McCoy diminished therisk from any others, by putting some empty cars ahead of thelocomotive to explode them if there should be any. He got throughsafely, however, found Kilpatrick at Durham, opened telegraphiccommunication with headquarters at Raleigh, was authorized to readand transmit by the wire Johnston's reply, and so was able beforenight to give his impatiently waiting chief the Confederategeneral's proposal to meet in conference between the lines nextmorning, and to return Sherman's consent. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 229-231. ] Meanwhile Kilpatrick had been sending dispatches saying he did notbelieve Johnston could be trusted, that his whole army was marchingon, that the delay was a ruse to gain time, and that no confidencecould be placed "in the word of a rebel, no matter what may be hisposition. He is but a traitor at best. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 224, 233. ] Sherman answered: "I have faith in General Johnston's personalsincerity, and do not believe he would use a subterfuge to cover hismovements. He could not stop the movement of his troops till he gotmy letter, which I hear was delayed all day yesterday by youradjutants' not sending it forward. " His faith in Johnston'shonorable dealing was justified, but the delay had brought theConfederate infantry to the neighborhood of Greensborough. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 234. Also Johnston's Narrative, p. 401. ] On the 15th Sherman had sent both to Grant and to the Secretary ofWar copies of Johnston's overture and his own answer. He added thathe should "be careful not to complicate any points of civil policy;"that he had invited Governor Vance to return to Raleigh with thecivil officers of the State, and that ex-Governor Graham, Messrs. Badger, Moore, Holden, and others all agreed "that the war is overand that the States of the South must resume their allegiance, subject to the Constitution and laws of Congress, and that themilitary power of the South must submit to the National arms. Thisgreat fact once admitted, " he said, "all the details are easy ofarrangement. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 221. ] He directed this to be sent by a swift steamer to Fort Monroeand from there by telegraph to Washington. As this dispatch was sentpart of the way by telegraph, it should have reached Washington morethan three days ahead of the convention signed on the 18th andcarried to the capital by Major Hitchcock, who left Raleigh in thenight of that day:[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 246. ] but no answer seems to have been made to it, unless it bein a dispatch of Grant on the 20th in which he directed the movementof Howard's and Slocum's armies to City Point in case Johnstonsurrendered. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 257. ] On Monday (April 17th), with the burden of the knowledge ofLincoln's assassination on his mind, Sherman went up to Durham byrail, accompanied by a few officers. There he met GeneralKilpatrick, who furnished a cavalry company as an escort, andled-horses to mount the party. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 234, 235. ] Thebearer of the flag of truce and a trumpeter were in advance, followed by part of the escort, the general and his officers camenext, the little cavalcade closing with the rest of the escort indue order. They rode about five miles on the Hillsborough road, whenthey met General Wade Hampton advancing with a flag from the otherside. The house of a Mr. Bennett, near by, was made the place ofconference. When Sherman and Johnston were alone, the dispatchannouncing Mr. Lincoln's murder was shown the Confederate, and as heread it, Sherman tells us, beads of perspiration stood out on hisforehead, his face showed the horror and distress he felt, and hedenounced the act as a disgrace to the age. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 349, ] Both realized the danger that terrible results wouldfollow if hostilities should be resumed, and both were impelled toyield whatever seemed possible to bring the war to an immediate end. In this praiseworthy spirit their discussion was carried on, Johnston saying that "the greatest possible calamity to the Southhad happened. " [Footnote: Johnston's Narrative, p. 402. ] Johnston's first point was that his proposal of the 14th had beenthat the civil authorities should negotiate as to the terms ofpeace, while the armistice should continue. Sherman could not dealwith the Confederate civil government or recognize it. It could onlydissolve and vanish when the separate states should make theirsubmission, and these were the only governments _de facto_ with whomdealings could be had. Postponing this matter, they proceeded to thepractical one, --the terms that could be assured to the armies of theSouth and to the States. Here they found themselves not far apart. As to the troops, nothingmore liberal could be asked than the terms already given to Lee. Sherman knew of Mr. Lincoln's willingness that the State governmentsshould continue to act, if they began by declaring the Confederacydissolved by defeat, and the authority of the United Statesrecognized and acknowledged. He had no knowledge of any change inthe policy of the government in this respect, and what he had saidto Governor Vance's delegation was satisfactory to both negotiators. But how as to amnesty? Here Sherman was also able to give Lincoln'sown words, declaring his desire that the people in general should beassured of all their rights of life, liberty, and property, and thepolitical rights of citizens of a common country on their completesubmission. Lincoln wanted no more lives sacrificed, and would usehis power to make amnesty complete. He could not control thelegislative or the judicial department of the government, but hespoke for himself as executive. An agreement was easy here also. What, then, as to slavery? Sherman regarded it utterly dead in theregions occupied by the Confederates at the time of the EmancipationProclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), and Johnston frankly admitted thatsurrender in view of the whole situation acknowledged the end of thesystem which had been the great stake in the war. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 243. ] The ThirteenthAmendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery, had then beenaccepted by twenty States, Arkansas did so three days later, and thesix Northern States which had been delayed in action upon it were ascertain to ratify as that a little time should roll round. [Footnote: Rickey's Constitution, p. 43. ] It was therefore no figureof speech to say that slavery was dead: Sherman, Johnston, andBreckinridge knew it to be true. But Johnston urged that to securethe prompt and peaceful acquiescence of the whole South, it wasundesirable to force upon them irritating acknowledgments even ofwhat they tacitly admitted to themselves was true; further, that thesubject was not included in the scope of a military convention. Ifslavery was in fact abolished by Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, it wasfor Congress and the courts so to declare it, and two soldiersarranging the surrender had no call to assert all the legalconsequences which would flow from the act. Sherman yielded to thisargument, not from any doubt as to the fact of freedom, but from acertainty of it so complete that he would not prolong dispute toobtain a formal assent to it. He was the more ready to do so as heinsisted that he acted simply as the representative of the Executiveas Commander-in-Chief, and neither could nor would promise immunityfrom prosecutions under indictments or confiscation-laws. He saidalso that whilst he agreed with Mr. Lincoln in hoping no executionsor long imprisonments would occur, he advised the leading men in theConfederate Government to get out of the country. As to the disposal of the arms in the hands of the Confederatesoldiers from North Carolina to Texas, both knew that little ofpractical moment depended on the form of the agreement. So many armswere thrown away, so many were concealed by soldiers who loved theweapons they had carried, that even in our own ranks no satisfactorycollection of them could be made. But a real and presentapprehension with both officers was the scattering of armed men inguerilla bands. If the law-abiding were disarmed and those whoscattered and refused to give up their weapons were at large, howcould the States preserve the peace? To this point Sherman said heattached most importance. This was not an afterthought whendefending his action; he wrote it to Grant in the lettertransmitting the terms when they were made. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 243. ] The same thought was forcedhome on the Confederates by their experience at the time. Before thenegotiations were finally concluded, bands of paroled men from Lee'sarmy, and stragglers were able to stop trains on the railroad onwhich Johnston's army was dependent for supplies, and it would havebeen intolerable to leave the country at the mercy of that class. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 818, 819. ] To keep the troops of each Stateunder discipline till they deposited the arms at State capitals, where United States garrisons would be, and where the final disposalof them would be "subject to the future action of Congress, " seemedprudent and safe; and this was agreed to. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 243, 244. ] In the first day's conference it seemed clear that the generalscould easily agree upon all they thought essential, except theexclusion of Mr. Davis and his chief civil officers from any part inthe negotiations and making the terms of amnesty general. Anadjournment to Tuesday was had to give Johnston time to consult withGeneral Breckinridge, the Secretary of War, and for Sherman toreflect further on the amnesty question. [Footnote: Sherman'sMemoirs, vol. Ii. P. 350; Johnston's Narrative, p. 404. ] As soon asthe latter reached Raleigh, he dispatched to Grant, through a staffofficer at New Berne, a brief report of the "full and frankinterchange of opinions" with Johnston. "He evidently seeks to maketerms for Jeff. Davis and his cabinet, " he said. The adjournment wasmentioned with its reason; and to negative any thought that he mightneglect military advantages by the delay, he said, "We lose nothingin time, as by agreement both armies stand still, and the roads aredrying up, so that if I am forced to pursue, we will be able to makebetter speed. There is great danger that the Confederate armies willdissolve and fill the whole land with robbers and assassins, and Ithink this is one of the difficulties that Johnston labors under. The assassination of Mr. Lincoln shows one of the elements in therebel army which will be almost as difficult to deal with as themain armies. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 237. ] When the two generals met again on Tuesday, General Breckinridge waswith Johnston's party, and the latter requested that he might takepart in the conference; but Sherman adhered to his position that hewould deal only with the military officers and objected toBreckinridge as Secretary of War. Johnston suggested that he mightbe present simply as a general officer, but adding that his personalrelations to Mr. Davis would greatly aid in securing final approvalof anything to which he assented. With this understanding he wasallowed to be present. Mr. Reagan, Postmaster-General, had also comewith Breckinridge to General Hampton's headquarters, but did notproceed further. He was busy there, Johnston tells us, in throwinginto form the terms which the general thought were fairly includedin the conversational comparison of views on the previous day, withthe exception of the amnesty, which was made general withoutexceptions. [Footnote: Johnston's Narrative, p. 404. ] This must, ofcourse, have been from notes written at Johnston's dictation. Sherman was now informed that the Confederate general had authorityto negotiate a military convention for the surrender of all theConfederate armies, and that if the terms could be agreed upon, theDavis government would disband, like the armies, and use theinfluence of its members to secure the submission of all the severalStates. Johnston, on his part, would be content with the conclusionsinformally reached on Monday, except that he wanted the principleinserted of amnesty without exceptions. Mr. Reagan's draft wasproduced and read. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 806. ] It contained a preamble stating motives for the actionproposed, and professed to be no more than a basis for furthernegotiation. A note appended to it referred to several thingsnecessary to a conclusion of the business which might besubsequently added. The preamble, as well as this note, was noproper part of the terms, and Sherman entirely objected to anypreamble of the kind, wishing to include only the things necessaryto an agreement. He therefore took his pen, and then and there wroteoff rapidly his own expression of the points he had intended toagree to, but explicitly as a "memorandum or basis" for submissionto their principals. They were, _First_, the continuance of the armistice, terminable onshort notice; _Second_, the disbanding of all the Confederate armiesunder parol and deposit of their arms subject to the control of theNational government; _Third_, recognition by the Executive ofexisting State governments; _Fourth_, re-establishment of FederalCourts; _Fifth_, guaranty for the future of general rights ofperson, property, and political rights "so far as the Executivecan;" _Sixth_, freedom for the people from disturbance on account ofthe past, by "the Executive authority of the government;" the_seventh_ item was a general résumé of results aimed at. [Footnote:_Id_. , p 243. ] The most striking difference between this statementand that which Mr. Reagan had drawn, besides the omission of thepreamble, was the express limitation of the proposed action by thepowers of the National executive, with neither promise norsuggestion as to what the courts or Congress might or might not do. In transmitting the memorandum through General Grant, Sherman wrotethat the point to which he attached most importance was "that thedispersion and disbandment of those armies is done in such a manneras to prevent their breaking up into guerilla bands, " whilst therewas no restriction on our right to military occupation. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 243. ] As to slavery, hesaid, "Both generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slaverywas dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail. " [Footnote:_Ibid. _] He also referred to the financial question, and thenecessity of stopping war expenditures and getting the officers andmen of the army home to work. Writing to Halleck as chief of staffat the same time, he referred to the same topics, expressed hisbelief, from all he saw and heard, that "even Mr. Davis was notprivy to the diabolical plot" of assassination, but that it was "theemanation of a set of young men of the South who are very devils. "[Footnote: _Id. _, p. 245. ] He told Halleck that Johnston informedhim that Stoneman's cavalry had been at Salisbury, but was then nearStatesville, which was on the road back to Tennessee, about fortymiles west of Salisbury and double that distance west ofGreensborough. A week now intervened, in which the important papers were journeyingto Washington and the orders of the government coming back. On the20th Sherman had occasion to inform Johnston of steps he had takento enforce the details of the truce, and as evidence that he had notmistaken Mr. Lincoln's views in regard to the State governments, heenclosed a late paper showing that "in Virginia the Stateauthorities are acknowledged and invited to resume their lawfulfunctions. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 257. ] The convention seemedtherefore in harmony with the course actually pursued by theadministration at Washington, and the negotiators were justified infeeling reassured. Another day passed, and as other incidents in the relations of thearmies needed to be communicated to Johnston, Sherman recurred againto the encouraging feature of the leave to assemble the Virginialegislature, but added some reflections on points which he thoughtmight require more explicit treatment than they had given, and hesuggested Johnston's conference with the best Southern men, so thathe might be ready to act without delay if modifications should berequired in the final convention. "It may be, " he said, "that thelawyers will want us to define more minutely what is meant by theguaranty of rights of person and property. It may be construed intoa compact for us to undo the past as to the rights of slaves, and'leases of plantations' on the Mississippi, of 'vacant andabandoned' plantations. I wish you would talk to the best men youhave on these points, and if possible, let us, in the finalconvention, make these points so clear as to leave no room for angrycontroversy. I believe if the South would simply and publiclydeclare what we all feel, that slavery is dead, that you wouldinaugurate an era of peace and prosperity that would soon efface theravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain in theSouth and afford you abundance of cheap labor, which otherwise willbe driven away, and it will save the country the senselessdiscussions which have kept us all in hot water for fifty years. Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject of a militaryconvention, yet I am honestly convinced that our simple declarationof a result will be accepted as good law everywhere. Of course Ihave not a single word from Washington on this or any other point ofour agreement, but I know the effect of such a step by us will beuniversally accepted. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 266. ] On the same day (21st), he was replying to a letter from anacquaintance of former days residing at Wilmington. In this reply hespoke out more vigorously his own sentiments: "The idea of war toperpetuate slavery in the year 1861 was an insult to theintelligence of the age. " War being begun by the South, "it wasabsurd to suppose we were bound to respect that kind of property orany kind of property. . . . The result is nearly accomplished, andis what you might have foreseen. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 271. ] On the 23d he sent a bundle of newspapers to Johnston and Hardee, giving the developments of the assassination plot and the hopes thatthe Sewards would recover. In the unofficial note accompanying them, he said: "The feeling North on this subject is more intense thananything that ever occurred before. General Ord at Richmond hasrecalled the permission given for the Virginia legislature, and Ifear much the assassination of the President will give a bias to thepopular mind which, in connection with the desire of ourpoliticians, may thwart our purpose of recognizing 'existing localgovernments. ' But it does seem to me there must be good sense enoughleft on this continent to give order and shape to the now disjointedelements of government. I believe this assassination of Mr. Lincolnwill do the cause of the South more harm than any event of the war, both at home and abroad, and I doubt if the Confederate militaryauthorities had any more complicity with it than I had. I am thusfrank with you, and have asserted as much to the War Department. ButI dare not say as much for Mr. Davis or some of the civilfunctionaries, for it seems the plot was fixed for March 4, butdelayed awaiting some instructions from Richmond. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 287. ] The whole tenor of this letter speaks most clearly the faith whichpersonal intercourse with Johnston had given Sherman in his honorand his sincerity of desire that the war should end. The same hadbeen expressed in an official note of the same date in which Shermanhad said in regard to his directions to General Wilson in Georgia:"I have almost exceeded the bounds of prudence in checking himwithout the means of direct communication, and only did so on myabsolute faith in your personal character. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 286. ] The faith was not misplaced and was not disappointed. The correspondence thus quoted reveals to us Sherman's thoughts fromday to day, the real opinions and sentiments which he intended toembody in the convention, and his recognition of the probabilitythat its provisions would need more explicit definition before thefinal acts of negotiation. It shows, too, how frank he was inwarning Johnston that the terrible crime at Washington had changedthe situation. It seems indisputable that this open-hearted dealingbetween the generals made it much easier for them to come togetheron the final terms, by having revealed to Johnston the motives andconvictions which animated his opponent in seeking the blessing ofpeace as well as in applying the scourge of war. As further evidence of what Sherman told us, his subordinates, ofthe terms agreed upon, I quote the entry in my diary of what Iunderstood them to be, on the 19th, the day following the signing ofthe convention, after personal conversation with the general:"Johnston's army is to separate, the troops going to their severalStates; at the State capitals they are to surrender their arms andall public property. Part of the arms are to be left to the Stategovernments and the rest turned over to the United States. Theofficers and soldiers are not to be punished by the United StatesGovernment for their part in the war, but all are left liable toprivate prosecutions and indictments in the courts. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. P. 938. ] In the evening of the 23d Sherman heard of the arrival at MoreheadCity of Major Hitchcock, his messenger to Washington, and he at oncenotified Johnston that the dispatches would reach him in themorning. He asked the latter to be ready "to resume negotiationswhen the contents of the dispatches are known. " [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 287. ] When Major Hitchcock came up on a night trainreaching Raleigh at six in the morning, to Sherman's great surpriseGeneral Grant came also, unheralded and unannounced. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 286. ] CHAPTER L THE SECOND SHERMAN--JOHNSTON CONVENTION--SURRENDER Davis's last cabinet meeting--Formal opinions approving the"Basis"--"The Confederacy is conquered"--Grant brings disapprovalfrom the Johnston administration--Sherman gives notice of thetermination of the truce--No military disadvantage fromit--Sherman's vindication of himself--Grant's admirableconduct--Johnston advises Davis to yield--Capitulation assented to, but a volunteer cavalry force to accompany Davis's flight--A newconference at Durham--Davis's imaginary treasure--Grant's return toWashington--Terms of the parole given by Johnston's army--Thecapitulation complete--Schofield and his army to carry out thedetails--The rest of Sherman's army marches north--His farewell toJohnston--Order announcing the end of the war--Johnston's finereply--Stanton's strange dispatch to the newspapers--Its tissue oferrors--Its baseless objections--Sherman'sexasperation--Interference with his military authority over hissubordinates--Garbling Grant's dispatch--Sherman strikesback--Breach between Sherman and Halleck--It also grew out of thepublished matter--Analysis of the facts--My opinion as recorded atthe time. When Grant reached Sherman's headquarters on the morning of the 24thof April, Johnston had not yet been notified of the action of theConfederate government as to the agreed "Basis" of surrender. Havinggot Sherman's dispatch of the evening before, he telegraphed toGeneral Breckinridge, the Secretary of War at Greensborough, thatthere must be immediate readiness to act. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 834. ] Breckinridge, however, hadgone to Charlotte, about eighty miles down the road, near the SouthCarolina line, where Mr. Davis held the last meeting of his cabinet, and procured from each of them his formal, written opinion andadvice. Davis himself now telegraphed the result to Johnston, saying: "Your action is approved. You will so inform GeneralSherman, and if the like authority be given by the Government of theUnited States to complete the arrangement, you will proceed on the'Basis' adopted. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 834. ] He added that further instructions would be given as to thesubordinate details which, by common consent, must be added to the"Basis" to perfect it. The cabinet opinions were unanimous in favor of approving the"Basis. " Benjamin's, Reagan's, and Attorney-General Davis's weredated the 22d, Breckinridge's the 23d, and Mallory's the 24th. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 821, 823, 827, 830, 832. ] In varying words they all admitted what Mallory put most tersely, insaying "The Confederacy is conquered. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 833. ]Several of them discussed the possibility of carrying on a guerillawarfare, but could see in it no useful result. They agreed that ifJohnston retreated to the Gulf States, the troops would dispersespontaneously. Virginia and North Carolina would separately withdrawfrom the Confederacy, and the other States would follow. Benjaminexpressed the common opinion that the terms of the convention "exactonly what the victor always requires, --the relinquishment by his foeof the object for which the struggle was commenced. " [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 822. ] He also well formulated their judgment that, aspolitical head, Davis could not make peace by dissolving theConfederacy; but as commander-in-chief he could ratify the militaryconvention disbanding the armies. "He can end hostilities. TheStates alone can act in dissolving the Confederacy and returning tothe Union according to the terms of the convention. " [Footnote:_Ibid. _] Reagan alone spoke of hopes that by submission the Statesmight procure advantages not mentioned in the "Basis, " and foundcomfort in the fact that it contained "no direct reference to thequestion of slavery. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 824. ] Taken together, these important documents contain thestrongest possible admission of the utter ruin of the Confederacyand of the simple truth that there was nothing left for them but tosurrender at discretion, with such dignity as they might. Ofthemselves the cabinet opinions changed the situation, and made itimpossible to resume plans of further resistance after theconvention was rejected at Washington. With them the ConfederateGovernment vanished. For it was a disapproval that Grant had brought. On receiving the"Memorandum, or Basis, " from Sherman, on the 21st, he had at onceseen that the latter had acted in ignorance of the facts: first, that Mr. Lincoln had himself, two days before his death, withdrawnthe permission for the Virginia legislature to assemble; and second, that he had, a month before Lee's surrender, directed that militarynegotiations should not treat of any subject of civil policy. Inview, therefore, of the tendency to severity which followed theassassination, it was evident that the convention would not beapproved, and, as soon as action had been taken by the President incabinet meeting, Grant wrote a calm and friendly letter to Sherman, in explanation of the rejection of the "Basis, " inclosing Stanton'sformal notice and order to resume hostilities. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 263, 264. ] These were intrusted to Major Hitchcock, but, as we haveseen, Grant accompanied the messenger in person. Sherman having, only the day before, learned of the change of policywith regard to Virginia, and notified Johnston of its probableeffect, was prepared in part for the disapproval, and was personallyglad to be rid of political negotiation. He made no objection orremonstrance, but even before discussing the subject with Grant, wrote his notice to Johnston of the termination of the truce withinforty-eight hours, as agreed. With this he sent a note stating hisorders "not to attempt civil negotiations, " and demanding surrenderof Johnston's own army "on the same terms as were given General Leeat Appomattox. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 293, 294. ] These dispatches were dated at six in the morning ofthe 24th, a few minutes after Grant's arrival. [Footnote: Grant toStanton, _Id_. , p. 293. ] Sherman then explained to the General-in-Chief the militarysituation, the position of his several corps, his readiness to makethe race with Johnston for Charlotte, the completed repair of therailroad through Raleigh to Durham, the accumulation of supplies, and the improved condition of the country roads. The truce hadworked him no disadvantage from a military standpoint, but thecontrary. The only thing which annoyed him in the dispatches fromWashington was the last sentence in Mr. Stanton's communication toGrant, saying, "The President desires that you proceed immediatelyto the headquarters of General Sherman and direct operations againstthe enemy. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 263. ] The implication in this was adistrust of him which was wholly unjust, and he replied to it, "Ihad flattered myself that by four years' patient, unremitting, andsuccessful labor I deserved no such reminder. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 302. ] In a letter to Grant of the same date he put upon record thefact that he had reason to suppose that his "Memorandum" accuratelyreflected Mr. Lincoln's ideas and purposes, and that he was whollyuninformed of the instructions in regard to negotiating upon civilquestions. He stood by his opinions on the propriety of using the_de facto_ governments in the separate States as agents ofsubmission for their people. He pointed out that the militaryconvention did not meddle with the right of the courts to punishpast crimes, and stated that he admitted the need of clearerdefinition as to the guaranty of rights of person and property. [Footnote: _Ibid. _] The points he thus discussed were those he gotfrom Grant orally, for he had, as yet, no other knowledge of thecriticisms made by President Johnson or his cabinet. Grant's sincere friendship and his freedom from the least desire toexhibit his own power had made him act as a visitor rather than acommander. He appreciated Sherman's perfect readiness to accept themethods dictated by the civil authorities, and saw that his zeal wasas ardent as it was at Atlanta or Savannah. The results of thehonest frankness of the dealings between Sherman and Johnston werespeedily seen. The Confederate general perfectly understood themeaning of the notice to end the truce, and that his great opponentwould do his military duty to the uttermost. Whilst ordering hisarmy to be ready to move at the expiration of the truce, he alsodeclared to Mr. Davis, in asking for instructions, that it werebetter to yield than to have Sherman's army again traverse thecountry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 835. ]Davis suggested, through Breckinridge, that the infantry andartillery might be disbanded, but the cavalry and horse-batteriesbrought off to accompany the high civil officers who would try toreach the Southwest. [Footnote: _Ibid. _] Johnston replied that thiswould only provide for saving these functionaries from captivity. This might be done by Mr. Davis moving with a smaller cavalryescort, without losing a moment. To save the people, the country, and the army, an honorable military capitulation ought to be madebefore the expiration of the armistice. He said that his subordinatecommanders did not believe their troops would fight again, and thatnews was received of the fall of Mobile, with 3, 000 prisoners, andthe capture of Macon, with a number of prominent generals. [Footnote: _Id. _, P. 836. ] Early on the 25th Breckinridge assentedto the capitulation, but directed that General Wade Hampton, withthe mounted men who chose to follow him, might join the President. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 837. ] Upon this, Johnston wrote Sherman, askingthat instead of a surrender and disbanding in the field, his armymight have the arrangement for going home in organizations which hadbeen made by the Memorandum of the 18th, giving as a reason thatLee's paroled men were already afflicting the country, collecting inbands which had no means of subsistence but robbery. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 304. ] Sherman thenappointed a new conference at Durham, for the 26th, at noon. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] He had learned from Grant that it was believedat Washington that Davis had with him a large treasure in specie, making for Cuba by way of Florida, and sent at once a dispatch toAdmiral Dahlgren, naval commander at Charleston, asking that officerto try to intercept him. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 310. ] General Grant's complete satisfaction with Sherman's personalattitude and readiness to accept the action of the President wasshown in his wish to return at once to Washington. He prepared tostart from Raleigh on the morning of the 26th, taking a steamer fromNew Berne on arriving there. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 309. ] He expected, of course that the surrender would be completed and the resulttelegraphed him by the time his vessel was ready to start, but hewas also moved by delicacy toward Sherman and the desire to relievehim from every appearance of supervision which his stay at Raleighmight give. Sherman, however, was also chivalrous, and requestedGrant not to leave till he should see the capitulation finallysigned. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 312. ] All this, it must be remembered, was in entire ignorance of the follies perpetrated at the WarDepartment during those days. The hour fixed for the new conference at Durham was the same atwhich the armistice would expire; but Sherman, having the troops inreadiness to start at a moment's notice, ordered that no movementshould be made till his return. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 314. ] Anaccident to his railroad delayed Johnston two or three hours, but onhis arrival a brief conference satisfied him that the only course topursue was to surrender on the terms given to Lee, and to trust toSherman's assurance that such arrangements would be made inexecuting the capitulation as would guard against the evils of thedispersion of his army without means of subsistence, which bothofficers justly feared. As in Lee's case the language used avoidedterms which implied being prisoners of war even momentarily, butprovided that after delivering the arms to an ordnance officer atGreensborough (excepting side-arms of officers) and giving an"individual obligation not to take up arms against the Government ofthe United States, . . . All the officers and men will be permittedto return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United Statesauthorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws inforce where they may reside. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 313. ] At half-past seven in the evening Grant was able to write hisdispatch to Stanton, Secretary of War, that the surrender wascomplete, and by using the telegraph to New Berne and Morehead City, and from Fort Monroe to Washington, the news reached Washington atten in the morning of the 28th. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 311. ] The sameevening, and by same means of transmittal, he also informed Halleckat Richmond of the surrender, and recalled all his troops out ofSherman's theatre of operations. [Footnote: On April 16th Halleckhad been assigned to command the Department of Virginia, thusrelieving him of duty as chief of staff of the army in which GeneralRawlins succeeded him. On April 19th his command was made theMilitary Division of the James, including besides Virginia suchparts of North Carolina as Sherman should not occupy. (OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt, iii. Pp. 230, 250. ) In reading the OfficialRecords of this period, it must be borne constantly in mind thatfrom two to four days was required to convey dispatches from Shermanto the War Department and _vice versa_, --the longer time in casethey were sent by mail, and the shorter when use was made in part ofthe telegraph lines. ] After hearing the details of Sherman'sconversations with Johnston, and approving the suggestions ofliberal arrangements looking to getting the Confederate troopsquickly and quietly back to peaceful industry at their homes, Grantparted with us at Raleigh on the 27th, and returned as rapidly aspossible to Washington, where the influence of his calm judgment andexecutive ability was sorely needed. The orders for National forces in North Carolina except Schofield'stroops to march homeward were issued on the 27th. Kilpatrick'sdivision of cavalry was attached to Schofield's command, and theArmy of the Ohio thus reinforced was left to garrison the Departmentof North Carolina. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 323. ] To General Schofield was also intrusted the preparation ofthe printed paroles for all the troops included in the capitulation, so that there might be uniformity. To him also was committed theconclusion of the supplementary terms needed for the liberalexecution of the convention, as had been discussed at the personalmeeting of the commanders, at which he had been present. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 320, 322. ] Johnston sent in a draft of what he hadunderstood to be thus informally arranged, the most important itemsof which were the "loan" to the Confederates of their army animalsand wagons for farming purposes, the retention of a portion of theirarms to enforce order and discipline till the separate organizationsshould reach their homes, and the extension of the privileges of theconvention to naval officers of the Confederacy. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 321. ] With slight modifications these were accepted by GeneralSchofield and carried out. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 350, 355, 482. ] Alarge issue of rations to Johnston's troops had been voluntarilyadded without any request or stipulation. [Footnote: Schofield'sForty-six Years in the Army, p. 352, etc. ; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. Pp. 362, 363; Johnston's Narrative, pp. 412-420. GeneralSchofield's recollection is that he wrote the convention of the26th, Johnston and Sherman being unable to agree: but as it was insubstance a transcript of the Grant-Lee terms of April 9th, according to Sherman's note to Johnston of the 24th demanding theiracceptance "purely and simply" (Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 294), the account I have given seems to me best supported byall the evidence. ] Both parties understood that Johnston's commandincluded all Confederate troops east of the Chattahoochee, thoughthis is not stated in the terms. [Footnote: Grant to Halleck, Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 312; Johnston to York, _Id. _, p. 854; Do. To Governor Brown, _Id. _, p. 855. Sherman's FieldOrder No. 65, _Id. _, p. 322. ] At the earnest request of theConfederate general, none of our troops were sent up toGreensborough, where his headquarters and principal camp were, untilthe printing of the paroles was completed and staff officers sent toissue them on April 30th. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 349, 350, 35l. 483. ]Sherman wrote a farewell letter to Johnston on the 27th, telling ofhis instructions to General Schofield to give him ten days' rationsfor 25, 000 men, "to facilitate what you and I and all good mendesire, the return to their homes of the officers and men composingyour army. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 320. ] He spoke also of hisdirections to "loan" to them enough animals fit for farming purposesto insure a crop. Concluding, he said: "Now that war is over, I amas willing to risk my person and reputation as heretofore, to healthe wounds made by the past war, and I think my feeling is shared bythe whole army. I also think a similar feeling actuates the mass ofyour army, but there are some unthinking young men who have no senseor experience, that unless controlled may embroil their neighbors. If we are forced to deal with them, it must be with severity, but Ihope they will be managed by the people of the South. " [Footnote:_Ibid. _] His Field Order No. 65, announcing the end of war east ofthe Chattahoochee, referred to the same purpose "to relieve presentwants and to encourage the inhabitants to renew their peacefulpursuits and to restore the relations of friendship among ourfellow-citizens and countrymen. " He directed that "great care mustbe taken that all the terms and stipulations on our part befulfilled with the most scrupulous fidelity, whilst those imposed onour hitherto enemies be received in a spirit becoming a brave andgenerous army. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 322] A copy of this order was enclosed in Sherman's letter to Johnston, and the latter replied in a similar noble tone. "The enlargedpatriotism manifested in these papers, " he said, "reconciles me towhat I had previously regarded as the misfortune of my life--that ofhaving had you to encounter in the field. The enlightened and humanepolicy you have adopted will certainly be successful. It isfortunate for the people of North Carolina that your views are to becarried out by one so capable of appreciating them. I hope you areas well represented in the other departments of your command; if so, an early and complete pacification in it may be expected.... Thedisposition you express to heal the wounds made by the past war hasbeen evident to me in all our interviews. You are right in supposingthat similar feelings are entertained by the mass of this army. I amsure that all the leading men in it will exert their influence forthat object. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 336. ] Down to this moment the progress of events had been full ofsatisfaction to Sherman, and of gratification to his noble ambition. If the implication contained in the order sending Grant in person tohis headquarters had pained him, Grant's perfect handling of thesituation had prevented the wound being deep, and Sherman waspleased, on the whole, to be relieved of negotiations on all civilquestions. But the day after Grant had left him, --when he had issuedhis admirable Order No. 65, and exchanged chivalrous sentiments withJohnston, --when he had completed his work in his great campaign and, leaving to Schofield the finishing of the administrative task inNorth Carolina, was turning his face homeward full of anticipationof rejoining family and friends, with his great career in aretrospect which was altogether gratifying--at this culmination ofhis glory as a soldier and his pride as a patriot, he received thesorest blow and the deepest wound he ever knew. The mail, on the 28th, brought a copy of the "New York Times, "containing Mr. Stanton's now famous dispatch to General Dix datedthe 22d, sent for the purpose of general publication, in which hemade known the fact that Sherman had entered into a convention withJohnston, that it was disapproved by the President, and that Shermanwas ordered to resume hostilities. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 285. ] Had the newspaper publication stopped here, it would still have been a grave indiscretion, for the news of whatwas done in Washington usually reached the enemy more promptly thanit came to our officers at the front, and the enterprising spies atthe capital would have thought their fortunes made by getting on the22d orders which did not reach Sherman, in fact, till the 24th, withofficial comments of which the general was ignorant till the 28th. But this was the least of the faults of this curious document. Itsaid that Sherman had entered into "what is called a basis ofpeace. " No such name was given the paper, and the manner ofattributing it misled the public as to its character. It suppressedthe fact that the "Memorandum" was by its terms wholly withoutbinding effect if not approved by the President. Without saying so, it persuasively led the reader to believe that Sherman had violatedinstructions issued by Mr. Lincoln on March 3d, which in fact werenever published till it was done in this dispatch, and were whollyunknown to the general, who believed he was acting in accordancewith President Lincoln's wishes given him orally at the end ofMarch. It spoke of orders sent by Sherman to Stoneman "to withdrawfrom Salisbury and join him" as opening "the way for Davis to escapeto Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be verylarge. " Only complete ignorance of the actual military situationcould account for so erroneous a statement. Davis was in the midstof Johnston's whole army, most of which was halted by the truce atGreensborough. Stoneman, on a brilliant cavalry raid, passed rapidlyfrom the North near Greensborough a week before, had struckSalisbury on the 13th, and immediately marched northwest, on hisreturn to East Tennessee, whence he had started. He was atStatesville, forty miles on his way, when Sherman and Johnston madethe armistice on the 18th, of which he did not hear a word till hewas over the mountains on the 23d. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. I. Pp. 334, 335. ] Sherman first heard of Davis's"plunder" from Grant on the 24th, and immediately asked the navy tofrustrate any efforts to take it out of the country. [Footnote:_Ante_, p. 494. ] Davis did not leave the protection of Johnston'sarmy till he knew that Stoneman was far away and his road was clear. In fact, it was only when, after the rejection of the firstconvention, Johnston had begun negotiations for the separatesurrender of his own forces, and further delay would have made him aprisoner. As to the "plunder of the banks" thus published by theSecretary, it turned out that officers of Carolina banks who hadtaken their assets to Richmond for protection against the perils ofwar, had taken advantage of the protection of Mr. Davis's escort tocarry them home when Richmond fell. As to the specie treasure, rumored to be many millions, about forty thousand dollars was atGreensborough paid to Johnston's soldiers at the rate of $1. 17 toeach, and the remainder, except a small sum, seems to have beendistributed to the cavalry escort, about 3000 strong, whichprotected Mr. Davis to the Savannah River and then dispersed; thesum was thirty-five dollars per man, given as part of their arrearsof pay. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 801, 803, 820, 850; _Id. _, vol. Xlix. Pt. I. Pp. 548, 551, 552, 555;Davis's Rise and Fall, vol. Ii. Pp. 691, 695; Johnston's Narrative, p. 408; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 373. ] The statement in Mr. Stanton's dispatch regarding this "plunder, " copied from onereceived from Halleck, which in turn was based on anonymous rumor, was so couched as to give credit to the imputation that Sherman wasto be duped or bribed to allow Davis with his effects, "includingthis gold plunder, " to escape. Not only did the form of thepublication give this impression, but that it was in fact sounderstood and treated is simple matter of history. Even this was not all. There were appended to this nine enumeratedcriticisms, most of which were baseless. The first declared thatboth Sherman and Johnston knew the former had no power to do whatwas done in the Memorandum. What was done in fact was to transmit tothe government, for its acceptance or rejection, Johnston's offer todisband all the remaining armies of the Confederacy, whereversituated, on the terms which were stated. The "Memorandum" itselfsaid that the generals lacked power "to fulfil these terms;" butthat they had power to make a truce till the government of theUnited States considered the proposal, is too plain for seriousdispute. Yet Mr. Stanton's criticism implied that the arrangementhad not been merely proposed, but had been actually concluded, forthe strictures otherwise had no meaning. The second said that "it was a practical acknowledgment of the rebelgovernment. " On the other hand, Sherman had utterly refused to dealwith or acknowledge that government in any way. The effect ofratification of the terms would have been its silent disappearancewithout being named. If the argument were worth anything, it wouldhave been much more potent against the exchanges of prisoners whichhad been carried on through commissioners of both governments. Butthe next clause had the added bugbear that the arms when depositedat the State capitals might be "used to conquer and subdue the loyalStates. " This suppressed the fact that by the "Memorandum" the armswere "to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington Citysubject to the future action of the Congress of the United States. "The allowance of arms to local authorities to preserve order was anecessity so self-evident that, in the face of this objection by Mr. Stanton, General Schofield, in supplementary terms of the finalsurrender, allowed Johnston's troops to retain part of the arms inthis way, and no whisper of further objection was made. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 482. ] The third objection was that "it undertook to re-establish the rebelState governments that had been overthrown. " This was untrue infact. It proposed that the executive should recognize actuallyexisting governments _de facto_ in the States, for the purpose ofrenouncing the Confederacy and acknowledging under oath theirallegiance to the United States. For the purpose of such submission, it would seem clear that it would be an advantage to have it made byVance, and Magrath, and Brown, and the rest who had been the realrebels, rather than by new men whose essential representativecharacter might be denied. The subsequent history of reconstructiongives small support to the opinion that anything was gained whichmight not have been got more effectively by dictating the civilchanges and terms of peace to these old State governments ratherthan to such provisional makeshifts as were afterward used. But theobjection was, after all, not against Sherman, but against the deadLincoln under whose oral authority Sherman was acting, and who hadput the same in clearest written terms in his correspondence withGeneral Weitzel and Judge Campbell after Richmond was in ourpossession. [Footnote: Dana to Stanton, April 5th: "Judge Campbelland Mr. Meyer had an interview with the President here this morningto consider how Virginia can be brought back to the Union. All theyask is an amnesty and a military convention to cover appearances. Slavery they admit to be defunct, " etc. (_Id_. , vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 575. ) Lincoln to Grant, April 6th, says he had put into JudgeCampbell's hands "an informal paper" repeating former propositionsand adding "that confiscations shall be remitted to the people ofany State which will now promptly and in good faith withdraw itstroops and other support from resistance to the government. JudgeCampbell thought it not impossible that the rebel legislature ofVirginia would do the latter if permitted, and accordingly Iaddressed a private letter to General Weitzel with permission forJudge Campbell to see it, telling him that if they attempt this, topermit and protect them, unless they attempt something hostile tothe United States, " etc. (_Id. _, p. 593. ) Lincoln to Weitzel, April6th. (_Id. _, p. 612. ) Dana to Stanton, April 7th. (_Id. _, p. 619. )Dana to Stanton, April 8th, with enclosures of papers by JudgeCampbell giving the contents of Mr. Lincoln's written memorandum tohim. (_Id. _, pp. 655-657. ) When Mr. Lincoln got back to Washington, Lee having surrendered with the Virginia troops and the rebellegislature of Virginia not having assembled or acted, the Presidentwithdrew his permission for them to meet, saying he had dealt withthem as men "having power de facto" to do what he wished but whichwas already done. Lincoln to Weitzel, April 12th. (_Id. _, p. 725. )] The fourth criticism was that by the terms proposed the Stategovernments "would be enabled to re-establish slavery. " Apart fromthe admissions of leading men of the South, and the facts alreadycollated, [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 481, 485. ] Mr. Stanton, in sayingthis, ignored the Proclamation of Emancipation, on which, in hisconversation with Judge Campbell, Mr. Lincoln had been entirelywilling to rest. The Southern jurist had recognized the solidity ofthe legal ground "that if the proclamation of the President be validas law, it has already operated and vested rights. " This the judgehad stated to his fellow-citizens as a fact in the situation not tobe ignored, and had repeated it in his letter of April 7th toGeneral Weitzel in a stronger form, if possible, saying, "Theacceptance of the Union involves acceptance of his proclamation, ifit be valid in law. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 656, 657. ] The condition of its legal validity was not aninsertion by Campbell--it was the expression of Mr. Lincoln himself, conceding the authority of the courts to pass upon the question ashe had done in his amnesty proclamation. [Footnote: Gorham'sStanton, vol. Ii. P. 235. ] Mr. Stanton had these things before him, hardly a fortnight old, when he made his singular publication. Theyadd no little to the difficulty of determining the true motives ofhis appeal to the public. The fifth objection was the possibility of resulting liability forthe rebel debts, which could hardly have been seriously meant. The sixth was that it put in dispute the loyal State governments andthe new State of West Virginia. As to the latter, the "Memorandum"was based on Mr. Lincoln's action in Virginia, and assumed thatquestion to have been determined, so far as the executive wasconcerned. The criticism, like some of the rest, was aimed at whatMr. Lincoln had done, which was thus flogged over Sherman'sshoulders; for the latter was, as we have to reiterate, ignorantthat on Mr. Lincoln's return to Washington he had been induced tocancel what he had done. From any point of view but that of amomentary party advantage, it is hard to see the evil of submittingcontesting State governments to the decision of the Supreme Court. Those of Louisiana and Arkansas were swept away very soon byCongressional action, and they were the only ones intended to bereached by the Sherman-Johnston "Memorandum. " The seventh declared that it "practically abolished the confiscationlaws and relieved the rebels of every degree, who had slaughteredour people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes. " Thosewho had "slaughtered" were primarily the officers and soldiers ofthe armies, and no fault was found with Grant's extension of amnestyto them by the Appomattox terms. It was true, besides, that thewhole male population of the South, of military age, was part of thearmy, and that even State officers were "furloughed" to enable themto perform public duties of a civil nature. We have seen thatSherman carefully limited immunity to the action of the executive, that he meddled with no laws, and said that all the people werestill liable to what the judicial department of the government mightdo. But he had also acknowledged, upon reflection, that clearerdefinition would be desirable in this respect, and had askedJohnston to be ready to act upon this. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 266. ] It is our privilege, moreover, judgingafter the fact, to note how little Stanton's objection practicallymeant, and how much better Sherman represented the deeper purpose ofthe American people, since neither Mr. Davis nor any of his chiefcounsellors suffered "the pains and penalties for their crimes. " The eighth criticism was that the "Memorandum" offered terms "thathad been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected byPresident Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever askedin their most prosperous condition. " Mr. Stanton could hardly haveforgotten, when writing this, that they were in fact not only basedon what Sherman had learned of his policy from Mr. Lincoln himself, as we have seen, but they were what President Lincoln had repeatedlyoffered and the Confederates had repeatedly rejected, the lastrejection being after the Hampton Roads conference in the first daysof February. [Footnote: Nicolay and Hay's "Lincoln, " vol. X. Pp. 122, 123, 128] Exactly what was meant by the ninth criticism it is hard to say. Itis said that the "Memorandum, " if adopted, would "relieve the rebelsfrom the pressure of our victories" and leave them "in condition torenew their efforts to overthrow the United States government andsubdue the loyal States whenever their strength was recruited andany opportunity was offered. " As it provided for the disarming anddisbanding of every Confederate company, left our victorious troopsfree to garrison every State, and gave protection to individualsonly so long as they were obedient to the National government, wemust regard the apprehension of new efforts to subdue the loyalStates as fantastic and not serious. It was inevitable that such a manifesto to the public should begreatly exasperating to Sherman. Seeing also the manner in which itwas interpreted by the newspapers, he believed that it was purposelyso worded as to imply what it did not explicitly assert, and to holdhim up to the nation as one little better than a traitor. He wasvery emphatic in saying that being overruled did not trouble him; itwas the public perversion of what he had done, attributing to his"Memorandum" what the publication of its text would havecontradicted, which outraged his feelings. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 335, 345. ] Grant frankly adheredto his opinion that in the actual condition of affairs he could nothimself advise the ratification of the terms proposed; yet he sawthe injustice done Sherman, and condemned it. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 410, 531. ] Their relations continued as cordial as ever, and hisinfluence was potent in preventing further ill results fromfollowing the quarrel. The publication was followed by other acts of Mr. Stanton whichincreased the irritation. On the 27th of April he informed Halleck, Canby, and Thomas that "Sherman's proceedings" were disapproved, andordered them to direct their subordinates "to pay no attention toany orders but your own or from General Grant. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlix. Pt. Ii. P. 484; vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 321. ] This was aday after Johnston had made his final surrender under the secondconvention, and when Grant had been two days with Sherman. It led toHalleck's ordering Meade to pay no attention to the truce, evenafter the surrender of Johnston was signed, and might have causedserious results if Grant had not been very prompt in givingcounter-orders to Halleck. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 312. ] All thedepartment commanders naturally understood Stanton's language insending Grant to North Carolina, as superseding Sherman in command, though in fact this was not done. They concluded that if any newterms were made with Johnston the action would be in Grant's name, and his signature would verify the truce. But as Grant did not dothis, and everything remained in Sherman's hands as before, theactual surrender was ignored and credit refused, by order of theSecretary of War, to the armistice declared while the paroles werebeing issued. Stanton took no steps to correct this, and for twoweeks the strange muddle continued in the Southwest. This came tosuch a pass that on May 8th Sherman inquired of Grant whether "theSecretary of War's newspaper order" had taken Georgia out of hiscommand. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 434. ]Grant replied, "I know of no order which changes your command in anyparticular, " and, in his patient rôle of peacemaker, suggested thatthe necessity of prompt communication when Sherman was not intelegraphic communication with Washington had caused someirregularities. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 445. ] One of the minor incidents in Stanton's course of action throws sostrong light on his methods and was so irritating an example of the_suppressio veri_ that it must be mentioned. Immediately after hisinterview with Sherman in the early morning of the 24th, Grant hadsent a dispatch to Stanton, which the latter sent to General Dix forpublication in the following form: "A dispatch has just beenreceived by this department from General Grant, dated Raleigh, 9 A. M. , April 24th. He says: 'I reached here this morning, and deliveredto General Sherman the reply to his negotiations with Johnston. Wordwas immediately sent to Johnston, terminating the truce, andinformation that civil matters could not be entertained in anyconvention between army commanders. '" [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 311. ]Taken in connection with the previous publication, this wasnaturally interpreted to mean that Grant had sent the "word" toJohnston, and it strengthened the current against Sherman. Thedispatch as sent by Grant was this: "I reached here this morning anddelivered to General Sherman the reply to his negotiations withJohnston. _He was not surprised, but rather expected theirrejection_. Word was immediately sent to Johnston terminating thetruce, and information that civil matters could not be entertainedin any convention between army commanders. _General Sherman has beenguided in his negotiations with Johnston entirely by what he thoughtwas precedent authorized by the President. He had before him theterms given by me to Lee's army and the call of the rebellegislature of Virginia authorized by General Weitzel, as hesupposed with the sanction of the President and myself. At the timeof the agreement General Sherman did not know of the withdrawal ofauthority for the meeting of that legislature. The moment he learnedthrough the papers that authority for the meeting had beenwithdrawn, he communicated the fact to Johnston as having bearing onthe negotiations had_. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 293. ] I have italicized the omitted parts to show howabsolutely essential they were to a true statement of Sherman'sattitude, and how grave was the offence against fair dealing tosuppress them after the appeal to the public had been made by thefirst publication. The dispatch is also historically important asproof of the ideal character of Grant's disinterestedness and frankfriendship for Sherman in this juncture. Mr. Stanton's habit of impetuous action without reflection, uponfirst impressions and imperfect knowledge, was notorious, as was hisconstitutional inability to admit that he had been in the wrong. Once aroused, he was a fierce combatant, using any weapon that cameto hand, inquiring only whether it would hurt his opponent. Whenobliged to see that he had judged wrongly, his silence was the onlyconfession: he was seldom equal to a candid apology. If a tacitretreat was accepted by the other party, he might endeavor tocompensate for the wrong in some other manner. [Footnote: On thissubject General E. D. Townsend, as adjutant-general, is a mostcompetent and conclusive witness. (Townsend's Anecdotes of the CivilWar, p. 137. ) Two little matters occurring at nearly the same timewith the Sherman quarrel perfectly illustrate this characteristic inStanton. General Townsend was in charge of the funeral escort ofLincoln's body, and in New York a photograph was taken of thecoffin, in state, in the City Hall, with the drapery of the alcoveformed of national flags and crape, with Admiral Davis and GeneralTownsend as guard of honor at head and foot. Stanton read of it in anewspaper, and without further knowledge sent a violent andundignified reprimand to Townsend, ordering him to relieve and sendback to Washington the officers on duty, and to seize and destroythe plates. A telegraphic correspondence followed, bringing in thephotographers, Henry Ward Beecher, H. J. Raymond, and the militaryofficers, with the proof that there was nothing to find fault with, but rather the desirable preservation of a memento of a memorablescene. There was a retreat, but no apology by the Secretary. (Official Records, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. Pp. 952, 965, 966). The otherwas the permission given the Episcopal clergy in Richmond tocontinue Divine service in the churches if they omitted the prayerfor the Confederate President in their liturgy, that being treatedas a demonstration in favor of the insurgent government. GeneralWeitzel was in command, and Mr. Lincoln was in the city when thequestion first arose whether, in addition to the above prohibition, the clergy should be required to insert, affirmatively, a prayer forthe President of the United States. Weitzel supposed he was actingin accordance with Mr. Lincoln's direction not to be sticklish inlittle things, stopped at the prohibition, as was generally done bycommanders in the field, on the ground that to order a form to beinserted in any liturgy where it did not exist, would be ridiculousfor a government based on total separation of church and state. Stanton, hearing of it through Mr. C. A. Dana, informed Weitzel thathis action was "strongly condemned, " and that he was "unwilling tobelieve that a general officer of the United States, commanding inRichmond, would consent to such an omission of respect to thePresident. " Weitzel asked whether the direction would apply to RomanCatholics, Hebrews, and other churches having a prescribed liturgy, and Stanton replied _ex cathedra_, in the affirmative, repeating hisreprimand. Weitzel now appealed to the President, and the absurdcontroversy was stopped. Stanton seems to have acted at first inignorance that individual ministers had no power to insert a prayerinto the formal liturgy; but he could not yield when betterinformed, and a temperate memorial of the local clergy stating thecanonical difficulty and their earnest intention to have the changemade with all speed possible, is in the Records, "disapproved byorder of the Secretary of War"! (_Id_. , pp. 619, 677, 678, 684, 696, 711, 737). Perhaps the nearest historical parallel is Napoleon'sorder to the Russian clergy to pray for him instead of the Czar in1812. (Fezensac, Souvenirs Militaires, 4th ed. , liv. 2, chap. I. P. 233. )] Sherman was not the man to submit to what he considered and calledan outrage, and when made aware of it, he struck back with all hisforce. He exposed and denounced the perversions of fact andmisstatements of what he had done, and demanded the publication ofthe original "Memorandum" with his statement of its relations to Mr. Lincoln's policy and wishes as stated by the dead President himself. Grant advised him to omit some of the expressions of his officialreport, but he refused and courted an official investigation, whilsthe clearly stated his duty and his purpose to obey without questionsuch orders as were given by competent authority. He was quite toolarge a man to be made the victim of a manifest wrong, and when oncethe case was fairly presented, the purity of his motives and thereasonableness of his belief that he was acting under highestauthority were generally acknowledged, even by those who supported aseverer policy toward the Southern States. The President and nearlyall the members of the Cabinet assured him that the publishedbulletins had been without their knowledge, and cordially strove tosoothe his wounded feelings. [Footnote: For the correspondence, seeOfficial Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 302, 334, 345, 371, 410, 476, 515, 547, 576, 581, 582, 586, 662; _Id_. , pt. I. P. 40. Seealso Sherman's Memoirs, vol. Ii. P. 375; Conduct of the War, vol. Vi. P. 3. ] The genuineness of character, patriotism, andsubordination tempered by proper self-respect, which he exhibited, did not diminish the public regard, but rather heightened it. As tothe debatable questions of policy involved in his first convention, he proudly left them to the judgment of time. The breach of friendship between Sherman and Halleck, which was alsocaused by Mr. Stanton's bulletins, was especially to be regretted. Their early close relations as young officers going "around theHorn" to California have already been mentioned, as well as the warmpersonal correspondence between them during the Atlanta campaign. [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 174-176. ] He had been grateful also forHalleck's friendly conduct toward him in his period of depression in1861, and expressed it strongly in a long letter when Atlanta hadfallen and he had won his commission as major-general in the regulararmy. "I confess I owe you all I now enjoy of fame, " he said, "for Ihad allowed myself in 1861 to sink into a perfect 'slough ofdespond. '" Halleck's friendship and encouragement had put him in theway of recovering from this. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 791. ] But now his faith in human nature wasrudely shocked by finding, apparently, this friendly hand joining inthe hardest blows at his fame and honor. In the first of Stanton's bulletins concerning him, Sherman foundcopied the dispatch from Halleck giving the rumor of Davis's great"plunder, " and the hope of the Confederate leaders to "make termswith Sherman or some other commander, " by which they would bepermitted to escape out of the country with this treasure. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 286. ] The sting of thiswas in the apparent insinuation that Sherman might be bought. Itnaturally roused him to explosive wrath. Had Mr. Stanton quoted thefinal sentence of Halleck's dispatch, it would have shown that thelatter intended no such thing. It concluded, "Would it not be wellto put Sherman and all other commanding generals on their guard inthis respect?" [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 887. ] Theapparent insinuation was in the Secretary's bulletin by the omissionof this sentence from the quoted dispatch. Had Sherman seen thedispatch as Halleck wrote it, he would not have been angered by it. But on the 28th there appeared in the New York papers anotherdispatch of Halleck to Stanton, dated the 26th, and saying that hissubordinates were ordered "to pay no regard to any truce, or ordersof General Sherman suspending hostilities, on the ground thatSherman's agreements could bind his own command and no other. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 953. ] This was upon receipt of a dispatch fromBeauregard stating "that a new arrangement had been made withSherman. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 953. ]In the same dispatch Halleck suggested that orders be telegraphedthrough General Thomas to General Wilson, at the head of a strongcavalry column in Georgia, to mind no orders of Sherman, but, withother commanders in the Gulf States, to "take measures to interceptthe rebel chiefs and their plunder, " now estimated, ratherindefinitely, at "from six to thirteen millions. " The folly of such publications was egregious, and justifiedSherman's sarcasm that if anybody was conniving at Davis's escape, it was the officer who gave them to the public. It was, however, thedirection to disregard his new truce, embracing Johnston's troopsalone and based on their actual surrender, that stirred anew hisindignation. He had made a short inspection tour down the coastafter starting his columns northward, and saw the dispatch innewspapers he received at Morehead, May 4th, on his return there bysteamer from Savannah. In writing General Grant, he characterizedHalleck's action as an insult. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 388. ] Fortunately, he had met at Savannah an officer ofGeneral Wilson's staff, Captain L. M. Hosea, who had made anadventurous journey across half Georgia to open communications, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 371. ] and in sending a steamboat up to Augustawith supplies for Wilson, he had hurried Captain Hosea back withsuch full information as enabled Wilson to observe scrupulously thefinal convention with Johnston whilst vigorously pushing his effortsto capture Davis. These efforts were successful on the 10th. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlix. Pt. I. Pp. 515, 526. ] Sherman's sense of military honor was violated and shocked by theorders disregarding his truce, which were "cordially approved" bythe Secretary of War. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 967. ]Grant suggested that Halleck's action was so connected with Mr. Stanton's orders that it might not seem so bad on fullerinformation, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 410. ] but Sherman's sense of injury was such that in passingRichmond on the 8th he refused Halleck's offered hospitality, sayingthat after the dispatch of the 26th of April friendly intercoursewas impossible. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 435. ] Halleck's was the "softanswer which turneth away wrath, " and it is due to him to rememberit. "You have not had during this war, nor have you now, a warmerfriend and admirer than myself. If, in carrying out what I knew tobe the wishes of the War Department in regard to your armistice, Iused language which has given you offence, it was unintentional andI deeply regret it. If fully aware of the circumstances under whichI acted, I am certain you would not attribute to me any impropermotive. It is my wish to continue to regard and receive you as apersonal friend. With this statement I leave the matter in yourhands. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 454. ] But what had occurred seemed to Sherman to be so ingeniously fittedtogether as parts of a malignant plan, that he replied, "I cannotconsent to the renewal of a friendship I had prized so highly till Ican see deeper into the diabolical plot than I now do. " [Footnote:_Ibid_. ] His words were all the bitter expression of a heart woundedbeyond endurance by wrongs which seemed too palpable and plain fordiscussion or explanation. In the distribution of commands on thepeace establishment made soon afterward, Halleck went to the Pacificcoast and did not live long. It is to be feared that no opportunityfor a full understanding between him and Sherman occurred, thoughthe latter was as placable as he was impetuous; and when he found, as he soon did, that his fame and reputation had not sufferedpermanent injury, he ignored the past so far, at least, as to showthat he harbored no lasting enmity. Yet Halleck was probably right in saying that he had done nothingbut what he deemed his duty, and with no unfriendly purpose towardSherman. His dispatch of the 26th of April was only one of a series, and it was made to have a different effect, taken by itself, fromwhat it would have had if read in its connection with the others. There is no reasonable doubt that Stanton's angry purpose had beento humiliate Sherman by practically superseding him in command. Halleck knew this and went to Richmond, where he assumed command onthe 22d, with full knowledge of the sentiment which then ruled theWar Department. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 891. ] In the afternoon of the same day, Grant, on his way to NorthCarolina, telegraphed him that the truce would be ended as soon ashe could reach Raleigh, and ordered him to send Sheridan with thecavalry toward Greensborough, sending also a corps of infantry alongas far as Danville. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 888. ] This assumed that bythe time these troops could enter Sherman's theatre of operationsthe truce would have been terminated; for Sheridan was then atPetersburg, and the Sixth Corps at Burke's Station. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 895. ] The cavalry could not be ready to march before the24th (at the earliest) and did not start in fact till the 25th or26th. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 931, 947. ] Neither it nor the infantrygot beyond Danville or entered North Carolina before they werehalted by Grant's order to Halleck of the 26th, received in themorning of the 28th. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 954, 997. ] Nointerference with Sherman's truce, either the first or the second, actually occurred. Halleck knew that the first truce would be endedas soon as the two days' notice could expire after Grant reachedRaleigh, and long before his troops could come into contact withJohnston's. But he was also moving them by Grant's order, and mustnot only obey, but must assume that the first truce was no longer inquestion. It was not necessary or proper for him to explain fully tohis subordinates all he knew of Grant's journey and purpose. Fortheir direction it was enough to say they were not to regard thetruce which had been made on the 18th and was currently spoken of as"Sherman's truce. " Had Sherman known of Grant's order to Halleck andthe assumed situation on which it was based, he would not haveregarded Halleck's language an insult. Without such knowledge itlooked very much like it. Halleck, however, had to face the question how his subordinates mustact if, on coming near the enemy, Johnston should claim a newarmistice. He shared the War Department opinion that the negotiationwas not sincere on the part of the Confederates, but was a ruse togain time for Davis's escape with the imaginary "plunder. " Apretended armistice is an old and familiar stratagem in warfare. Itwould seem that Halleck fully believed that Grant would assumeactual command, on reaching Sherman (as he had commanded when withMeade during the past campaign), and concluded that any realarmistice again made would be in Grant's name. Any other would be asham or would have been made before Grant was present. Under suchcircumstances he could not be blamed for telling his subordinatesthat only Grant's authority or his own must bind them. He wasmistaken, in fact, for Grant's arrival was not even known toJohnston, and Sherman concluded the final convention as if Grant hadstill been in Washington. The curtness of telegrams often createsambiguities, and when Sherman saw in print Halleck's dispatch of the26th separated from the rest of the series, he naturally gave to itthe meaning which hurt him so. Had he known the rest of the story, he would have seen no treachery to old friendships. The sin was inthe unprecedented publications which embroiled everything. In truth, Halleck's order to Meade was more guarded in form than the languageof his dispatch to Stanton, for Meade was only told to ignore "anyagreements made by General Sherman before the arrival ofLieutenant-General Grant. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 941. ] A curious theoretic question was raised by Halleck's incidentalstatement that an armistice by Sherman could only bind his own army. Sherman said he must defend his truce at all hazards till it wasduly terminated. Each was right in a sense, but fortunately the lawsof war and military regulations would prevent practical difficultyarising. If Sheridan had advanced to Greensborough, Sherman wouldhave met him there, and by virtue of his superior rank would haveassumed command and responsibility for the united forces. Besidesthe orders and instructions from the President he already had, hewould have to act in view of any authentic instructions orinformation which Sheridan might bring. On the other hand, ifHalleck had accompanied his own forces, his seniority would havemade Sherman his subordinate in the common field of operations; butas commander, he would have to respect, at his own peril, all therights which Johnston had acquired under the principles ofinternational law. The situation had perplexities only so long asthe generals were playing at cross-purposes by reason of imperfectknowledge. Their intelligence and character were such that dutywould have been plain to both as soon as they came together. Stanton made no public explanation of his conduct, but in aconversation with General Howard, he asserted that Sherman's orderto his troops announcing the armistice, by saying that when ratifiedit would "make peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, " had putthe government on the defensive, and made it seem proper to publishreasons for disapproving the terms. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 476. ] This does not touch the question of the wisdom orfolly of the matter published, or of its form. Sherman's reason formentioning the prospect of a general and speedy peace was that thecondition of his army under the news of Lincoln's assassination wassuch that he felt it necessary to soothe his excited soldiery withthe hope of soon marching home in triumph, thus turning theirthoughts from the vengeance which would have been inevitable iffighting were to be resumed. Instead of appreciating this, Mr. Stanton seems to have jumped to the conclusion that it was an act ofvanity or of political ambition which was to be squelched _per fasaut nefas_, and in his passionate and hasty action he compromisedthe whole administration. We who were Sherman's subordinates in the field knew so well hisintegrity and patriotism that we sympathized strongly with hisindignation at the appeal to popular sentiment against him. Yet thesense of duty to the country and to the government preventedthoughtful men from being blind partisans of our chief. Without fullmeans of judging of the possible effect of the first convention, ifcarried out, some of us were disposed to believe that there musthave been a mistake on his part, since we were not able to believethat the Secretary of War would publish his "nine reasons" if theyhad no solid support and were not approved by the President andCabinet. My personal opinion I wrote in my diary at the time, and Ireproduce it to show the contemporaneous sentiment of one who wasboth a warm supporter of the government and a warm friend of thegeneral. What I have written above will also show how far furtherinvestigation and fuller knowledge have modified my judgment. "Friday, April 28th.... Some of the Northern papers are very bitteron Sherman for the terms first offered by him, and it is manifestfrom the dispatches sent by the Secretary of War to New York to bepublished there, that the new administration is willing to giveSherman a hard hit. He made a great mistake in offering to Johnstonthe terms he did, but he has done the country such service that theadministration owed it to him to keep the thing from the public andto come kindly to an understanding with him, instead of seeming toseek the opportunity to pitch upon him as if it desired to humblehim. In conversation this morning he showed that he felt theirconduct very sorely, but I hope he will keep out of controversy withthem in regard to it. He complains with justice that they haverefused to give any instructions to guide military officers as tothe policy to be adopted, and then, when these are forced to act, seem to take pleasure in repudiating what the officers have done, and in humbling them or exposing them to popular odium. " CHAPTER LI PAROLING AND DISBANDING JOHNSTON'S ARMY--CLOSING SCENES OF THE WARIN NORTH CAROLINA General Schofield's policy when left in command--Lincoln'sEmancipation Proclamation in force--Davis's line of flight fromCharlotte, N. C. --Wade Hampton's course of conduct--Fate of thecabinet officers--Bragg, Wheeler, and Cooper--Issuing paroles toJohnston and his army--Greensborough in my district--Going therewith Schofield--Hardee meets and accompanies us--Comparingmemories--We reach Johnston's headquarters--Condition of hisarmy--Our personal interview with him--The numbers of histroops--His opinion of Sherman's army--Of the murder ofLincoln--Governor Morehead's home--The men in gray marchhomeward--Incident of a flag--The Salisbury prison site--Treatmentof prisoners of war--Local government in the interim--Unionmen--Elements of new strife--The negroes--Household service--Wisedealing with the labor question--No money--Death ofmanufactures--Necessity the mother of invention--Uses ofadversity--Peace welcomed--Visit to Greene's battlefield atGuilford-Old-Court-House. On Thursday, the 27th of April, the same day on which Sherman issuedhis order announcing the final agreement for the surrender ofJohnston's army and the homeward march of most of his own forces, General Schofield issued his own order declaring "the duty of all tocultivate friendly relations with the same zeal which hascharacterized our conduct of the war, that the blessings of union, peace and material prosperity may be speedily restored to the entirecountry. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. 330. ] Heinvited all peaceably disposed persons to return to their homes andresume their industrial pursuits. He promised also the loan ofcaptured horses, mules, and wagons to those who had been deprived oftheir own by the armies, and food for the needy during the periodwhen all must be busy planting if the season were to be made of anyavail for agriculture. His order concluded with these words: "Itwill be left to the judicial department of the government to punishthose political leaders who are responsible for secession, rebellion, and civil war with all its horrors. Between theGovernment of the United States and the people of North Carolinathere is peace. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 330. ] In a separate order of the same date, to remove all doubt as to theend of slavery, he declared that "by virtue of the proclamation ofthe President of the United States, dated January 1, 1863, allpersons in this State heretofore held as slaves are now free, and itis the duty of the army to maintain the freedom of such persons. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 331. ] He recommended immediate fair contractsof hiring and the resumption of profitable industry, so thatdisorganization of labor might be avoided. He told the freedmen thatit was not well for them to congregate about towns or militarycamps, and that they could not be supported in idleness. All classesof people were thus put upon the footing Sherman had intended in hisfirst convention with Johnston, and Schofield's orders issued whilstSherman was still with us at Raleigh may be received as anauthoritative interpretation of the latter's views. The Confederate troops were mostly concentrated about Greensboroughupon the railroad from Richmond through Danville and Charlotte toColumbia in South Carolina, and the line of railroad we had followedfrom Goldsborough to Raleigh continued westward to Greensborough. Outposts, Confederate as well as National, remained at stationsbetween the two armies, but no collision had occurred since thetruce established on the 19th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 250. ] Mr. Davishad remained at Charlotte in the interval between the twoconventions, but when the separate surrender of Johnston's army wasdetermined, he started southward with a vague purpose of joiningsome of the smaller organized armies released from the armistice byour administration's rejection of the terms of Sherman's firstconvention. He tells us that he still hoped that he might cross theMississippi with such forces as could be concentrated, joining KirbySmith, who commanded there, and in the last resort carrying a bodyof irreconcilables out of the country into Mexico. [Footnote: Davis, Rise and Fall, vol. Ii. Pp. 694, 696. ] A line of retreat southwardhad been agreed upon in case Johnston should not surrender, and someaccumulations of supplies had been made at Chester, S. C. , and otherpoints upon it. General Bragg had been placed in command there, reporting directly to Davis or the Confederate War Department, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 836. ] and somecavalry in West Virginia under General Echols had been ordered topass by mountain routes to the same region. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 795. ] As soon as the truce was ended by the notice of the 24th, Davis started southward by the route indicated, which kept well tothe westward of Columbia by way of Abbeville, aiming to cross theSavannah River above Augusta at the pontoon bridge near the junctionof Broad River with the Savannah. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xlix. Pt. I. P. 548. ] His party disintegrated before he entered Georgia, andhe was nearly alone with his family when he was captured thirty orforty miles southeast of Macon. General Wade Hampton was one of those who preferred any alternativerather than surrender, and had opposed even the terms of the firstconvention to which Davis had assented. [Footnote: _Id. _, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 813. ] He promised that he would bring to Davis'ssupport "many strong arms and brave hearts, --men who will fight toTexas, and who, if forced from that State, will seek refuge inMexico rather than in the Union. " [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 814. ] On the25th, when Johnston's surrender was already resolved upon, Breckinridge sought to arrange that Hampton, with his cavalry, mightjoin Davis, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 837. ] but Sherman insisted on the capitulation of the army as aunit, and Hampton was included. The latter had visited Davis duringthe first armistice and obtained his permission to bring out thecavalry before the surrender, but on his return to his command, onApril 26th, he found that the surrender had been made. Setting upthe claim that the arrangement made with Davis had detached histroops from Johnston's army, although they were actually serving init, he notified Johnston that they and he would not regardthemselves as embraced in the capitulation, unless Breckinridge, theSecretary of War, should say they were within it. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 841. ] He had given orders to Wheeler to move the command towardSouth Carolina, and Butler's division was moving in the samedirection. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 841, 847. ] Johnston, feeling thathis honor as a commander was involved, sent peremptory orders toHampton to march back to the position near Hillsborough which he hadabandoned. He gave Wheeler similar orders. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 844, 846. See also Johnston to Sherman, _Id. _, p. 336. ] Breckinridgegave Hampton the opinion that the troops were bound by thecapitulation, though Hampton himself might not be. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 851. ] The latter thereupon informed Butler and Wheeler that hecould give them no orders, and asked leave of Johnston to withdrawhis former letter, substituting one which only claimed personalexemption from the surrender. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 845, 847. ] Intransmitting this, he sent a long letter of apology, explaining hisembarrassment. He asserted that in his consultation with Mr. Davis aplan was agreed upon to enable the latter to leave the country. Hemust now either leave him to his fate or go with him under the banof outlawry. He thought his personal duty was to go, but would leavehis command to abide the terms of the convention, or if any joinedhim, he said, "they will be stragglers like myself. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 846. ] Enough "straggled"to make up Davis's escort to about 3000 men, comprising six brigadeorganizations; but Hampton seems to have thought better of thedetermination to be an outlaw, and though he did not give his parolewith the rest of Johnston's command, he did not join Davis. [Footnote: Davis, Rise and Fall, vol. Ii. Pp. 689, 690. ] Hisexplicit statement of the aim of Davis's flight warrants us inconcluding that the dream of further military operations beyond theMississippi was never a serious purpose. After the disbanding of theescort at the Savannah River, Breckinridge and Benjamin reached thecoast of Florida and escaped to Cuba. Mallory and Attorney-GeneralDavis seem to have reached their own homes; Reagan remained with hischief, and was captured; [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 694, 695. ] Bragg andWheeler were captured near Athens, in Georgia, using questionableruses to escape. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlix. Pt. I. Pp. 550, 551. ] General Cooper, the adjutant and inspector-general of theConfederate army, remained at Charlotte, and received the benefit ofJohnston's capitulation, while he did all in his power to preservethe Confederate archives, which were there in railway cars. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 842, 848. ] Thisdigression to follow the fate of Mr. Davis and the group of civiland military notables who were with him in his southward flight, will help us understand some of the peculiar incidents attending theparoling of Johnston's army at Greensborough. I will now return toevents of which I was a witness. On Sunday, the 30th April, the printed blanks for the paroles wereready, and Brevet Brigadier-General Hartsuff, inspector-general onSchofield's staff, was put in charge of the details of their issue. He went up to Greensborough from Raleigh, accompanied by about adozen officers detailed from the department and corps staff. It hadbeen intended that he should take with him a guard of a regiment Ihad selected for the purpose, but at Johnston's request the troopswere held back a few days. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 349, 351, 483. ] Schofield had arranged the generalscheme of subdividing the State into military districts, of which Iwas to command the western, whilst Major-General Terry took thecentral, and Brigadier-Generals Palmer and Hawley retained the coastdistricts which they already had. In anticipation of the formalorder, [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 396. ] the detachment to guard the armsand stores which should be received came from my command, and Idetailed the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio, a regiment which had wonhigh praise in the review at Raleigh for its splendid form anddiscipline, and which was an orderly, reliable body of men in battleas on parade. It was ordered to take along also its excellent brassband and drum corps, for I meant to have the duties of a garrisonperformed in the presence of the Confederates with all the honors. Sherman had left Raleigh in the evening of Friday (28th), to make abrief tour to Charleston and Savannah, by sea, nominally to inspectthat part of his command, but really to pass the time whilst thebody of his army was marching to Washington, and to avoid visitingthat city in the irritation he felt at his treatment by theSecretary of War. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 337, 338. ] Johnston hadarranged, on the 1st of May, to send General Hardee down to Raleighfor personal consultation with Schofield in regard to details of thehomeward march of his troops, but the satisfactory arrangement ofthe supplementary terms made this unnecessary. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 366, 857. ] Schofield determined to go to Greensborough himself, starting early on Tuesday morning (2d), and I was asked to accompanyhim. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 376. ] We left Raleigh by train at seveno'clock, with the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio as a guard, and atDurham were met by a dispatch from General Hartsuff, saying that thewhole Confederate army was "dissolving and raising the devil. " Itelegraphed for another regiment to follow us, and we went on toHillsborough. There we met General Hardee, who joined our party, andwe went on to Greensborough. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 376. ] As the train left Hillsborough, we passed through a body ofConfederate cavalry, and were within the enemy's lines. I confess itwas with a curious, half-uneasy sensation that I thus for the firsttime found myself on the wrong side of the Confederate outpostswithout having driven them in by a hostile advance. It was not easyto orient one's self at once with the new condition of things, andit would hardly have been a surprise to find that we had beenentrapped by a ruse. This soon wore off, however, and Hardee made the journey a veryagreeable one to us. He had been commandant of cadets at West Pointjust before the war, and had from the first an "inside" view of therebellion. His "Tactics, " adapted to our army use from the French, had been the authoritative guide of our army drill, and by thatmeans his name had been made very familiar to every officer and manamong us. His military career had been among the most distinguished, and he had commanded a corps in front of us during the whole Atlantacampaign. There was therefore no lack of subjects for conversation, and the time ran rapidly away. Hardee was in person and bearing agood type of the brilliant soldier and gentleman. Tall and wellformed, his uniform well fitting and almost dandyish, his mannergenial and easy, his conversation at once gay and intelligent, itwould be hard to find a more attractive companion, or one with whomyou would be put more quickly at ease. Our mission naturally led us into a review of the war, and we askedhim what had been his own expectation as to the result, and when hehad himself recognized the hopelessness of the contest. "I confess, "said he, laughing, "that I was one of the hot Southerners who sharedthe notion that one man of the South could whip three Yankees; butthe first year of the war pretty effectually knocked that nonsenseout of us, and, to tell the truth, ever since that time we militarymen have generally seen that it was only a question how long itwould take to wear our army out and destroy it. We have seen thatthere was no real hope of success, except by some extraordinaryaccident of fortune, and we have also seen that the politicianswould never give up till the army was gone. So we have fought withthe knowledge that we were to be sacrificed with the result we seeto-day, and none of us could tell who would live to see it. We havecontinued to do our best, however, and have meant to fight as if wewere sure of success. " Amongst many other things, our talk turned upon the Atlantacampaign, and he told some interesting facts in regard to Hood'sobstinate holding on at Atlanta when Sherman was executing themovement around the place on the south. It happened that my owndivision held the pivot point close to the works of the city on thesoutheast, and Hardee's corps occupied the lines in front of us. Hesaid an old woman had been brought to him who said she had gone toGeneral Cox's headquarters to beg some provisions, and the generalhad told her she could have none, as the soldiers had not enough forthemselves. I had no remembrance of such an incident, and suchapplications were hardly likely to reach a general officer unless hewished to catechise the person for information's sake; but a laughwas raised at my expense as Hardee in telling the story repeatedsome profane camp expletives as having added emphasis to therefusal, according to the old woman's account of it. Schofieldmerrily rallied me on a change of habits of speech when not with myusual associates, and refused to credit my protestation that thestory only proved that she had seen some wicked commissary ofsubsistence. Hardee helped the fun by pretending to think of otherproof that the woman was right; but he went on to give the matterreal historical interest by telling how he had taken the woman toHood that he might learn what she said she had seen and heard. Onher repeating the expression about our not having rations enough forourselves, Hood exclaimed, "There, Hardee! It proves that it is justas I told you. Wheeler [his cavalry commander who was on a raid] hasbroken Sherman's communications; he is short of provisions and isretreating north by the Sandtown road. The troops that have movedfrom the north of the city have gone that way. " The Sandtown road was a well-known road going northward from theChattahoochee River at the place named, which was some miles west ofthe Chattanooga Railroad. It was a plausible explanation ofSherman's movements as far as they then knew them, but had no betterfoundation than Hood's own hopes and wishes. Yet, Hardee said, Hoodstuck to this view till in our swinging movement to the south, webroke his railway communication with Jonesboro. Then came his hastyevacuation of Atlanta, the destruction of his stores, the explosionof his ammunition, and the night march to reassemble his army atLovejoy's station. He confidently believed that the siege was raisedtill Sherman's army was astride of his principal line of retreat, and it was only by the most desperate exertion that he escaped fromutter ruin. On reaching Greensborough we were at once escorted to GeneralJohnston's headquarters, the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio beingordered to remain near the station till more complete arrangementswere made. Our object had been to have force enough to guard thearms and stores against petty pillage or destruction, but not enoughto provoke a collision with the larger organizations of theConfederates. Johnston had declined the hospitality of citizens ofGreensborough, partly from a motive of delicacy, as I suspect, fearing he might compromise those who would thus be indicated as hisfriends, though his usual custom was to live under canvas ratherthan in a house. His tents were pitched in a grove in the outskirtsof the town, and he awaited us there. It seemed to us, as weapproached, that the little encampment was not quite so regular andtrim as our own custom required. The wall tents did not sit quite sosquarely upon the ground, and the camp was not laid out withregularity. The general indirectly apologized for some of thesethings by saying that we could not expect the discipline in his armyto be fully maintained when all knew that it was on the eve of beingdisbanded. Indeed our presence there with a detachment of our owntroops was partly the consequence of the tendency to disintegrationand the consequent breaking down of discipline which was rapidlygoing on, of which the dispatch which met us on the way was awarning. We learned that the officers of the staff had for severalnights stood guard over their own horses, efforts to steal themhaving been successful in one or two instances. The general himselfwas the only one who had been exempt from guard-duty. The soldiersknew that the war was over and that there was in fact no superiorpower to enforce military subordination. They were anxious to maketheir way homeward, and fearful that they might be treated asprisoners of war if they remained. A horse or a mule was toovaluable a prize not to be a great temptation; they naturallythought that as there was no longer a Confederate States government, the men to whom arrears of pay were due had a right to whatever theycould seize, and they were not disposed to distinguish betweenpublic and private property. The guards set to protect thecommissary stores would wink at the pillage of them or assist in it, and the men were inclined to defy any authority exercised in thename of the Confederacy. They remembered the relentless character ofthe conscription which put them in the ranks, and were kept togetherchiefly by the assurance that they should all be promptly paroledand helped on their homeward way. The strongest consideration wasperhaps the announcement that the parole would be a necessaryprotection to them against subsequent arrest. It was a curious factthat the moment the blue-coated sentinels began to pace the "beats"around the warehouses, parks of artillery, etc. , the submission ofthese men to the United States authority was most complete. Theywere scrupulously respectful in their bearing and language, and thegroups of them who gathered about with an earnest sort of interest, would obey the slightest direction of the sentry with a cordialityand alacrity which was in singular contrast with the sort ofostentation of defiance they showed toward their own officers. I have anticipated a little in order to give some idea of thecondition of things in Johnston's army, and will return to ourinterview with the general himself. He welcomed us with dignity, though there was a little reserve in his courtesy that was naturallydue to the gravity of the responsibility and the duty imposed uponhim. Hardee, as a subordinate, free from this burden, could affordto give way to a natural _bonhommie_, and the difference ofsituation emphasized the distinctive traits of the men. Johnston wasa smaller man than Hardee, his uniform showed less care forappearances, his manner was quieter, but no one would for a momentfail to see that he was the commander. His quiet tones were clear, his gravity was full of conscious power, and the deference shown himby his subordinates was earnest and respectful. The preliminary details of our task were soon settled. GeneralSchofield had already promised rations to the Confederate troopswhilst awaiting the issue of the certificates of parole, and ontheir way home; to give them railway transportation as far asrailroads were running, and to carry out Sherman's offer to let theConfederate horses and mules be distributed as far as they would go, to assist the men on their way, and in putting in a crop for theirfamilies' support as soon as possible. When the necessary businesswas disposed of, the conversation became more general. General Schofield inquired what was the number of officers and mento be paroled. Johnston replied that he could hardly be definite ashe would like to be: his morning report of "effectives" gave onlythe men answering to their names with arms in their hands in theline of battle. It would not include stragglers or men detached oron special duty. His last return of effectives showed, as he said, about 16, 000 men. Wade Hampton, with much of his cavalry, hadrefused to come in to Greensborough to be paroled with the rest, andwere supposed to be either disbanded or to be making their waysouthward. Johnston thought the place of these might be made up bythe classes not enumerated in the return of effectives, and thatthere might therefore still be about 16, 000 in camp who wouldpresent themselves to be paroled. He then added that in thiscampaign their reports and returns had not been kept up promptly, and that he had relied for practical use upon a summary of themorning reports of "effectives. " [Footnote: See pp. 424, 425, _ante_. ] There could be no question as to his complete frankness andsincerity in this. The inquiry was put to make sure that we hadenough printed blanks for the paroles, and it was a matter of mutualinterest to get their issue completed with as little delay aspossible. The Official Records, moreover, confirm his statement asto the abbreviated returns and the numbers they gave, while makingclear their loose inaccuracy. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 1382; pt. I. P. 1059; pt. Iii. P. 839. ] The mostimportant fallacy in the Confederate return of "effectives" was thatby giving only the arms-bearing men answering to the roll-call, itomitted the growing large class of stragglers hanging about thecamps many of whom might be in line when an engagement occurred. The number of officers and men actually paroled by us in theCarolinas turned out to be 39, 012, which included men in hospitals, some naval officers and sailors, the quartermaster's and otherspecial duty, detachments, etc. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 1066. ]Johnston's inspector-general reported on 3d May the number of "finalpapers" issued to the army proper at 27, 749, and the number of menwho received their share of the silver distributed on April 28th was32, 174, [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. Pp. 850, 867. ] the differencebeing in the cavalry, where 5000 men disbanded or went off withHampton before the paroles were issued. The report of the parolesshows also that the Carolina troops had nearly all vanished duringthe campaign, the Western troops of Hood's old army making the greatbulk of those who stayed with the colors. Johnston was very warm in his recognition of the soldierly qualitiesand the wonderful energy and persistence of our army, and theability of Sherman. Referring to his own plans, he said he had hopedto have time enough to collect a larger force to oppose Sherman, andto give it a more complete and efficient organization. TheConfederate government had reckoned upon the almost impassablecharacter of the rivers and swamps to give a respite tillspring, --at least they hoped for this. "Indeed, " said he, with asmile, "Hardee here" (giving a friendly nod of his head toward hissubordinate) "reported the Salkehatchie swamps as absolutelyimpassable; but when I heard that Sherman had not only started, butwas marching through those very swamps at the rate of thirteen milesa day, making corduroy road every foot of the way, I made up my mindthere had been no such army since the days of Julius Caesar. " Hardeelaughingly admitted his mistaken report from Charleston, butjustified it by saying that all precedent was against such a march, and that he would still have believed it impossible if he had notseen it done. All the Confederate officers from Johnston downward were veryearnest in impressing upon us their confidence that the army gave upthe struggle without bitterness, and that we could rely not onlyupon their keeping their parole in good faith, but in their anxietyto become again good citizens of the United States in every sense ofthe word. The assassination of Mr. Lincoln was spoken of, as both anodious crime and an extremely great misfortune to the South, tendingto involve the future in gloomy doubt by reason of the probableeffect upon Northern public sentiment and upon the policy ofCongress and the new administration. Hardee said that for himself hethought he should go abroad for a time, till the heated andexasperated feeling at the North should subside, and then return tohis home and his private affairs. I do not remember that Johnstonopened his mind on this point, and think he was gravely reticent, scarcely choosing to share with strangers, in our relation toaffairs, the deep anxiety he must have felt. Hardee's means wereunderstood to be more ample than most of the Southern officerspossessed, and a course that was feasible for him was not so formost of them. The task of winning a mere livelihood was by no meansa promising one for men left without a profession and withoutproperty, in a country that seemed to be irretrievably ruined. When we closed the interview, I am very sure that we of the Nationalside had already formed a very high opinion of the personalcharacter of the distinguished officers we had met, and had begun tofeel a sincere sympathy with them in their manifest purpose to meethonorably and manfully the demands of the new situation. I recordedat the time my own feeling that I had rarely met a man who waspersonally more attractive to me than General Johnston. His mode ofviewing things was a high one, his thoughts and his expression ofthem were refined, his conscientious anxiety to do exactly what wasright in the circumstances appeared in every word and act, hisability and his natural gift of leadership showed without effort inhis whole bearing and conduct. An incident which occurred at the time General Johnston leftGreensborough is striking proof of the scrupulous exactness he wasdetermined to exercise in carrying out the terms of the surrender. He had gone southward as far as Charlotte to superintend the lastmovement of his forces as a body and the final disbanding, andbefore parting with the members of his staff learned that one ofthem had preserved as a relic a little cavalry guidon of silk in theform of a national flag scarce larger than a handkerchief. Thegeneral immediately reclaimed it, and afterward sent it back underthe provision of the surrender which agreed that all captured flagsin the hands of the Confederates should be restored. He apologizedfor the staff officer, saying that he knew no wrong had been meantand the little flag had been regarded as a trifling but interestingrelic; yet he felt that there should be no limitation on their partin carrying out strictly the terms agreed upon. The manner in whichall this was done, quite as much as the thing itself, showed theearnestness and sincerity of his purpose to do everything in hispower to enforce the spirit as well as the letter of every promisehe had made for himself and his army. He had returned to his home atDanville, Va. , before he had been able to send to us this flag withanother that had been omitted, and his solicitude in regard to it, even in the midst of anxiety in regard to his family, was shown by anote which accompanied the parcel. It ran as follows:-- "DANVILLE, June 5th, 1865. GENERAL, --I have requested Major Shackford, Provost Marshal of thispost, to forward to you a small box containing the color, standard, and guidon which I mentioned to you in Greensborough. I beg you to explain to Major-General Schofield that they were notin my possession when we were in Greensborough, nor until I reachedCharlotte, and that they were not sent to him from that placebecause I expected to visit Raleigh and there deliver them to him. This visit was prevented by the condition of my family. You mayremember that the same cause, as I explained to you orally, prevented my delivering them to you in person. Most respectfully, Your ob't serv't, J. E. JOHNSTON. MAJOR-GENERAL Cox, U. S. Army. " General Schofield and myself passed the night at the house ofex-Governor Morehead, who had urged us to do so. Our host had beenone of the leading Whigs of North Carolina in the _ante-bellum_days, and with his friends and neighbors Gilmer and Graham hadopposed secession at the beginning; but with the instinct ofpoliticians, they had striven to lead the current they could notstop when once it had carried them away. The house was a comfortablevilla in the Italian style, with a tower overlooking the rollingcountry for a long distance. The architecture was simple buteffective, and the house had evidently been a home of comfort andease in better times. We were frankly and cordially welcomed, andallowed to see the mixed feelings with which the reassembled familyaccepted the collapse of the Confederacy. Among the young people wasa son of the governor who had been desperately wounded but hadrecovered. The rebellion had had their devoted support, but theysaid, "That is all past now, " and seemed eagerly desirous to getinto accord with the new order of things. The young man told of hisarmy adventures, and compared notes with us as to camp life in thedifferent armies. We were struck with the strong comparison he madein speaking of his wound. A bullet had entered his mouth and passedout at the back of his neck, and he said it felt, for all the world, as if a city lamppost with its cross-bar had been dragged throughhis head. I have no doubt this gave as good an idea of the sensationas possible, for I have often heard wounded men speak of the feelingof having received a terrible blow from some big and heavy thing, when hit with a musket-ball. The ladies entertained us withhalf-gay, half-pathetic stories of the way home-life had run onduring the long campaigns, and of the ingenuity they were obliged touse to supply the place of tasteful articles of dress or adornmentwhen the blockade had become stringent, and when each littlecommunity was thrown almost wholly upon its own resources. The headof the house discoursed more gravely of the situation of the countryat large, and tried to forecast the future. Now that the surrenderwas made, he was anxious that the army should be disbanded and senthome as soon as possible, for the disposition of the Confederatesoldiers to pay their arrears by pillage made him fear that his ownfarm would be stripped bare before they got away. There is no doubtthat there was a good deal of cause for such anxiety, especially forleading men whom the private soldiers were disposed to hold largelyresponsible for all their woes. It was no slight test of characterand good breeding, under such anxieties, for the family to paydelicate and courteous attention to the comfort of their guests, andto keep as far as possible in the background everything that mightbetray their own troubled feelings. On Wednesday (3d May) General Schofield returned to Raleigh, leavingme in responsible command of the district. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 394, 407. ] By administering theparole to the troops by companies and regiments, keeping a number ofofficers at work and using abundant clerical assistance in verifyingthe copies of rolls, the task had been completed in a couple ofdays, and General Johnston began to move his men southward. GeneralCheatham with the Tennessee troops marched across the Great SmokyMountains, but the others were ordered to rendezvous at West Pointin Georgia, which was a central place for all who lived in the GulfStates, from which they could most readily reach their homes. Whilethey remained together they were fed by us, and we furnished rationssufficient to sustain them on the journey. Our ration, too, wasquite a different thing from theirs, and the men seemed moreaffected by this bestowal of unwonted and abundant supplies than byany other incident in the surrender. They said it seemed hardlypossible that men who were but yesterday arrayed in deadly hostilityto them, could now be supplying their wants so liberally. Whilst they stayed they seemed never to tire of watching our men onduty and on the various parades. Our guard-mounting was particularlya show affair. From the moment the music struck up on the paradeground, and the detachments for the guard from the differentcompanies began to file out and march into place, there was always alarge concourse of the men in gray making a most interested body ofspectators. The smart appearance of the men, the rapid inspection ofarms, of haversacks and knapsacks, the march in review, theassignment to posts, the final marching off the field, all seemed togive them great enjoyment. They said they had not paid muchattention to the formalities which so greatly relieve the drag andlabor of military life even in the field, and they were ready withcordial and appreciative praise of the discipline and finish indrill which they saw. As the Confederate troops left Greensborough, I concentrated my owncorps there, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 376, 384, 396, 502. ] sending one of the infantry divisions toSalisbury, and Kilpatrick's cavalry division to posts still farthertoward the southwest. A visit of inspection which I made toSalisbury gave me the opportunity of examining the site of therecent prison camp there. The treatment of our prisoners by theConfederate authorities is a repellent subject, and I would gladlypass it by and say nothing discordant with the tone of high honorand respectful good-will which marked the conduct of the leadingofficers of the Confederate forces in the field. We may fairly admitthat the resources of the Confederacy had been so taxed that foodand clothing were hard to procure, and that their armies in thefield were ill-fed and in rags. There is, however, a limit beyondwhich a government calling itself civilized may not go, and as thepublic opinion of the world, crystallized into what we callinternational law, will not permit the wholesale decapitation ofprisoners, as might be done by a king of Ashantee or Dahomey, so itforbids the herding of captive men in a mere corral, leaving themutterly without shelter of any sort through the sleet and rain ofwinter, near the North Carolina mountains. It forbids starving themto death or leaving them to rot with scurvy because they are notsupplied with wholesome food and medicines. It is the plain duty ofa civilized government to parole and send home military prisonerswho cannot be fed or sheltered. If controversies as to exchangeexisted, such conduct would have been the surest way to shame us outof any position that was wrong, and the public opinion of the worldwould have been powerful in making it the more profitable way, as itwas the only one not utterly barbarous. I speak with a solemn senseof the obligation to avoid every railing accusation when I say thatit would have been humane and civilized in the comparison, if theprisoners at Andersonville and Salisbury had been shot down byfusillades or quickly poisoned by wholesale (as Napoleon was accusedof doing at Jaffa) instead of subjecting them to death by starvationand exposure which swept them away at a rate no plague ever rivalledor approached. I have seen too much of the Southern people, in armsin the field and in their homes, to believe for one moment that theywould knowingly approve the treatment our prisoners received. Buttheir own reputation before the world makes it their duty to fix theresponsibility for a great crime upon those whose commands or whosecriminal negligence caused horrors which are among the most odiousthings in the world's history. I had seen at Wilmington and Goldsborough the condition oftrain-loads of these released captives. Their situation has beensurgically and medically recorded in the surgeon-general's officialreports. There is no room for dispute. They were men reduced toidiocy and to the verge of the grave by the direct effects of hungerand exposure and the diseases necessarily connected with suchsuffering. They were not of the dregs of humanity, who might be saidto fall into animality when the restraints of society and ofdiscipline were removed. They were many of them men who hadrespected positions and refined surroundings at home. These were thevictims who looked vacantly with glazed eyes and could mumble nointelligent response when asked their names, where was their home, what was the name of the mother that bore them. At Salisbury the pen in which part of the prisoners had been keptwas still to be seen. There were, as I remember it, two levels or"benches" in it, and in the little bluff or slope from one to theother were still to be seen the holes the poor prisoners had dug tomake a little cave in the earth that would drain itself and givesome shelter from the winter weather. I talked to women of the placewho with tears upon their faces told of the efforts some of them hadmade to have the worst of the treatment corrected, or to procuresome mitigation of the want and hardship. The evidence seemedconclusive that any marks of common sympathy or Christian pity wererepelled by the officials in charge of the prisoners and treated asindications of disloyalty to the Confederate government. The Confederacy was full of places where the almost limitless forestafforded timber without end, and the labor of the prisonersthemselves under the same guards that garrisoned the prison wouldhave comfortably housed and warmed them, and then the scant andwretched rations would not so soon have been the cause of emaciationand disease. The risk of escape would not have been great, and Idoubt if as many would have got away as in fact managed to do so inthe actual circumstances. The almost certainty of sickness and deathnerved many a man to incredible exertions to be free, who would havewaited more patiently for an exchange if his condition had been lessintolerable or less sure of a fatal result. But even if there hadbeen some more escapes, it would be no argument in favor of thehorrible system which was adopted. There is no resemblance betweenthe situation of prisoners in a pen, and that of soldiers inbivouac. The latter build shelters of rails or of brushwood, if theyhave no shelter-tents, and they are very rarely stinted in firewood. Their active life helps to preserve their vigor. To liken these tomen without shelter of any kind and without fire enough to cook by, herded inside a ring-fence in winter weather, is an abuse of words. Enough of the shocking subject! As soon as headquarters baggage could be brought up I established myown camp in the northern edge of Greensborough, in a grove which waspart of the grounds attached to the mansion of Mr. Dick, since thattime judge of the United States District Court. The first impressionof the people was that all government was now in the hands of thearmy, and we had no little difficulty in correcting it. The policyof the government was to recognize the ordinary courts and localmagistrates, and to support their authority in preserving the peace, punishing crimes, and determining ordinary civil rights. Thepolitical organization of the State was left subject to such changesor conditions of reconstruction as might be prescribed by nationalstatute. The army, however, was the present palpable fact. Themuskets and the cannon were physical engines of power that everybodycould see, and everybody knew that the commandants of department anddistrict could use them if need be. There was, therefore, a nationaltendency, both in civil magistrates and in the people, to refer allsorts of questions to the military authorities. I tried in goodfaith to make it understood within my own district that we wereaverse to meddling with local affairs, and wished the ordinarycurrent of civil administration to run on in its accustomed channelstill it should be replaced by that which should have the newauthority of a reconstructed state under Acts of Congress. I notonly promulgated this through the military channels, but I acceptedseveral invitations to address the people at different points andexplain our attitude and purpose during the interregnum, and to givethem serious advice as to their conduct in the very tryingcircumstances in which they were. It need hardly be said that thegist of this advice was to recognize the absolute death of thesystem of slavery, to deal with the freedmen with perfect sincerityas free laborers who were at liberty to make the best bargain theycould for their labor, and to confine for the present theirpolitical activity to the duty of keeping alive such localmagistracies as would prevent the community from falling intoanarchy. There was a wistful solicitude noticeable in people of allclasses to know what was to become of them. Their leaders hadeducated them to believe that the success of the National arms wouldmean the loss of every liberty and subjection to every form ofhateful tyranny. Yet they almost universally showed a spirit ofcomplete resignation to what might come, and a wish to conformobediently to everything enjoined by the officers of the occupyingarmy. It was the rarest thing in the world to meet with anythinglike sullen resistance or hostile or unfriendly utterances. [Footnote: The same disposition in the people was noticed elsewherein the South. Halleck said, in a dispatch of April 22d, "From all Ican learn, Richmond is to-day more loyal than Washington orBaltimore. " (Official Records, vol. Xlvi. Pt. Iii. P. 888. ) Shermansent similar reports from Savannah. (_Id_. , vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 371. )] My own stay in North Carolina did not extend into the periodof the provisional governments authorized by Acts of Congress, and Iwas not personally witness to the varying phases of sentiment amongthe people at that time. The political character of North Carolina during the war had beendifferent from that of the Gulf States. We found very few indeed whowere known as "original Secessionists. " The "old Whigs" had giventhe tone to public sentiment, and the community as a whole hadsincerely desired that the Union might be preserved. Yet a societybased upon slavery had such community of interest with the Statesfurther south that it was soon dragged into the secession vortex. When once war had begun, the growth of hostility against what wasregarded as their public enemy was rapid, and in every State a warparty in time of war has a great advantage over the opposition. Thecharge of "giving aid and comfort to the enemy" is too powerful aweapon against the minority, and the outward appearance was soonthat of almost complete unanimity in the desperate struggle to makesecession a success. Party leaders were borne along upon thecurrent, and vied with each other in extravagant professions ofdevotion to the Confederacy. In such circumstances the men who were at heart opposed to the warthought they were doing all that was wise or prudent in making whatthey called a constitutional opposition to the Davis government, professing to acquiesce in the Confederate organization, but urgingthe negotiation of peace on the best attainable terms. In the feverof actual conflict the following of such men was small, although itseemed plain to me that a majority of the people of the Statesympathized with them at heart. The outspoken Union men were, almost as a matter of course, treatedas traitors, and lived under a reign of terror. In the mountains, where their numbers were considerable, they were the victims of arelentless guerilla warfare, as the same class was upon the otherslope of the Great Smokies in East Tennessee. Out of these classes came the elements of new struggles forpolitical power. The minority naturally felt that their time had nowcome, and were not altogether patient with the principles of ourdemocratic Constitution, which require that a majority shall not bedisfranchised, and which therefore make it practically impossiblethat a minority shall rule. At the time I am speaking of, theseelements were quiet in the first stunning effect of the collapse ofthe Confederacy; but we could see the tendencies to antagonisms thatwere to agitate the State during the next decade. The negroes were, of course, of none of these parties. Very few ofthe whites were in favor of emancipation on principle, though allaccepted it as the inevitable result of the war. Tacitly oravowedly, they all admitted that the fate of the "system" had beenthe real issue at stake, and that the surrender meant universalfreedom. But the colored people were ignorant, and had cherishedstrange illusions as to the change which was to come to them. It wasa common belief among them that the whites were to be stripped ofall property, and the land to be given to them. We had heard curiousdiscussions among them around the camp-fires, in which they hadapportioned the real and personal property among themselves. Thefaith that they were each to have "forty acres and a mule" was of alittle later growth. The first noticeable thing among them after thesurrender was the almost universal disposition to quit work. Itwould have been very natural that they should wish for a greatholiday, and try to realize their freedom by extending it at theirown will, and thus prove to themselves that no man was their master. But in addition to this, they seemed to fear that any continuance ofthe relation of laborers for their former masters would cover somewaiver of their right to freedom. Yet, as they had hopes that thereal estate would be given to them by the National government, theywere disinclined to leave the old home. The outcome was that for atime they occupied their old quarters and asserted a kind ofproprietorship in them, whilst they "struck" from labor. When it is remembered that the kitchen of Southern houses is adetached building of which the servants have exclusive occupation, it will easily be understood that the situation was anything butcomfortable for housekeepers. Oftentimes they could neither hirecooks nor get access to the open kitchen fire and the rude utensilswhich the colored people appropriated as their own. According to myobservation, the Southern white women were very systematic andthorough in the supervision of household work, but were necessarilyignorant of the actual manipulation. They knew what flour and otheringredients to weigh out for a batch of bread, but they had neverdone the baking. Some of them tried their first experiments over theopen fire with "Dutch ovens" and other primitive implements, whilsta group of colored women sat around commenting drolly but mostexasperatingly upon the results. As a temporary compromise, we wereobliged to "clear the kitchen" by military authority, making itknown that that was part of the "house, " and that if the mistressesof the mansion had to do their own work, it was not necessary thatit should be done before such an "audience. " Such a social crisis isalways short, but it is very severe. No doubt those who have gonethrough it look back upon it as one does upon the day after a fire, when the wretchedness of dirt and destruction seems hopeless, but, like other mundane things, soon passes away and is spoken of as all"part of a lifetime. " A delicate and amiable lady, whose fortune at her marriage had beenof that ample sort which was measured in Southern parlance as "ahundred negroes, " herself told me, with a mixture of tearful pathosand recognition of the comic side of it, of her own first efforts tomake a batch of soda biscuit for her husband and children after shegot possession of her kitchen. She knew all about the rule, but innew practice the rule didn't work. The ingredients got wronglymixed; the fire was too hot or not hot enough; some biscuits wereburnt to a crisp, some were not cooked, and none were eatable, andher heart was ready to break at the prospect of her family'scondition till something could be done to remedy the trouble. Inmore than one household our officers' messes helped tide over thepainful interval by giving camp hospitality and friendly assistanceto their new neighbors. We frequently heard housekeepers say that ifthey only had the snug ranges of Northern kitchens within the housethey would have made light of the labor; but their outdoor kitchensand primitive methods, which produced appetizing results in thehands of colored cooks who had been brought up to them, were killingupon those who had been delicately reared. We saw more of the domestic form of this social anarchy than of farmlabor, for the outdoor work could wait, whereas the indoor workcould not. The same difficulty was everywhere, however, and theintelligence of the community soon hit upon temporary expedients. Such men as Mr. Gilmer and Judge Dick took the lead in advising thecolored people to avoid their apprehended risk of compromising theirfreedom, by hiring out temporarily to work for others than their oldmasters. By thus changing about, the consciousness of working undera voluntary contract was stronger, and the uneducated brain was lesspuzzled to tell whether any change of situation had really come. Wedid our best to dispel the notion that wealth and idleness were tofollow emancipation, and to encourage the freedmen to resumeindustrious labor as the foundation of real freedom andindependence. [Footnote: See General Schofield's Order No. 46;Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 503. ] The peacefulcharacter of the colored people was shown even in what they supposedwas a great revolution in their favor. There was no rioting or angrydisturbance, --no effort to accomplish anything by force. Theyabandoned for the time their usual employments, and congregated intheir quarters or in groups about the streets, waiting for somegreat thing to happen. There was, of course, plenty of talk and someexcitement, but even this gradually diminished; and as they began torealize that without work there would be no food, they made suchbargains as suited them, and the affairs of the plantation and ofthe house began to move on. The owners of property did not hope forprofits; they expressed themselves earnestly as anxious only thatsuch crops might be raised as would save the community, white andblack alike, from absolute destitution. I know of prominent examplesof well-known men offering the farm hands all that they could raisefor that season if they would only go to work and plant somethingwhich could still ripen into food. The season was advancing, and alittle delay was very dangerous. The last chance for a crop in thatyear would soon be gone. The influence and advice of sagacious andprudent men was never more useful, for society seemed to be resolvedinto its original elements when all authority but the military wentfor nothing. As soldiers, we refrained from meddling in civilaffairs, but it was understood that we should preserve the peace andallow no force to be used by others. It was a time when everybodyfelt the need of being patient and conciliatory, and the naturalauthority of known character and wisdom asserted itself. Everybodysoon went to work to make a living, and the burning problems ofpolitical and social importance were postponed. A serious inconvenience was immediately felt in the lack of acirculating medium. The Confederate currency was at once madeworthless by the failure of the rebellion, and there was nothing totake its place. The extent to which its depreciation had gone wasamusingly shown by a printed notice and list of prices I foundposted in a country tavern, already some months old. In it the priceof a dinner was put at ten dollars, and other meals andaccommodation in proportion. Still this currency had served forbusiness purposes, and it being gone, the community had to go backfor the time to primitive barter. We had opportunity to notice to what great straits the people hadbeen reduced for two years in the matter of manufactured goods ofall kinds. Factories of every sort were scarce in the South when thewar began, and resources of every kind were so absorbed in the warthat there was no chance for new ones to spring up. Carriages, wagons, and farm implements went to decay, or could only be rudelypatched up by the rough mechanics of the plantation. The stringentblockade shut out foreign goods, and the people were generallyclothed in homespun. In many houses the floors were bare because thecarpets had been cut up to make blankets for the soldiers. Ladiesmade their own shoes of such materials as they could find. Theybraided their own hats. They showed a wonderful ingenuity insupplying from native products the place of all the articles of usewhich had formerly been imported from foreign lands or from theNorth. Taste asserted itself, perhaps all the more in suchdiscouraging circumstances, and feminine refinement and love ofadornment worked marvels out of the slenderest materials. Ahome-made straw hat ornamented with feathers of barnyard fowls anddomestic birds was often as jaunty and as pretty as any Parisianbonnet. Simple dyes were made to give to coarse cotton stuffs alively contrast or harmony of pure colors as effective as the variedand elaborate fabrics from the European looms. In some respects thisself-dependence heightened the personal advantages of those whoexcelled in ingenuity, in taste, and in skill; for the clothesindicated better the character of the wearer than those which aremade on one pattern in the shop of a fashionable mantua-maker. Adversity has such uses and such compensations that I should hardlyreckon the poverty of the Southern States during 1864-65 as a burdengreatly felt in private life. All such things are comparative, andwhere all the people undergo the same privations, the odiouscomparisons and jealousies between richer and poorer disappear in ameasure. A simple life full of great enthusiasms is one aphilosopher may find much satisfaction in, and has, many a time, been pictured as an ideal calculated to bring out the best qualitiesof men and women and therefore to make life more truly enjoyable. Igreatly doubt if Southern people, in looking back on the war time, find anything to regret in the simple fare and plain dress of theenforced economy of that period. The real griefs and burdens, if Iam not mistaken, came from other sources. Among thoughtful peoplethere must have been from the summer of 1863 serious doubts of thepossibility of a successful outcome of their struggle, and a growingand unhappy conviction that the fearful waste of life and treasurewould be in vain. They must have had grave misgivings also as to therighteousness of a cause which championed an institution condemnedby the whole world and in conflict with the general progress ofChristendom. To see their best and bravest consumed in the fire ofsuccessive battles, and to be waiting only till the slaughter shouldmake it impossible to keep armies in the field, must have been agrief and a suffering which made all physical deprivations seemsmall indeed. I think I cannot be mistaken in the judgment I formed at the time, that to the great body of the Southern people it was a relief thatthe struggle was really over; that they breathed more freely andfelt that a new lease of life came with peace. They had been halfconscious for a good while that it must end so, and they were in themood to be at least resigned, if not readily to profess the piousconviction that "it was all for the best. " With the reactions andpolitical exasperations that came later, I have here nothing to do. My purpose has been to reproduce, as far as my memory serves, thescenes and the surroundings of that last military duty of the greatwar. Why it was that the mellowness of spirit which seemed then soprevalent could not have ripened without interruption or check intoa quicker and more complete fraternization, belongs to another fieldof inquiry. The military chronicler stops where he was mustered out. A summer ride which a party of us took to the battlefield of"Guilford-Old-Court-House" may be worth noting as an encouragementto believe that our descriptions of the scenes of our ownengagements need not become unintelligible even in the distantfuture. Among the combats of our Revolutionary War, Guilford CourtHouse ranks high in importance; for the check there given to theinvading British army under Lord Cornwallis by the Continentalforces under General Greene was the turning-point in a campaign. Greensborough is the present county-seat of Guilford County, and the"Old Court House, " a few miles distant, has disappeared as avillage, a few buildings almost unused being the only mark of theold town. Natural topography, however, does not change its materialfeatures easily, and in this case a cleared field or two where theforest had formerly extended seemed to be the only change that hadoccurred in the past century. With General Greene's official reportof the battle in our hands, we could trace with complete accuracyevery movement of the advancing enemy and his own dispositions toreceive the attack. We could see the reasons for the movements onboth sides, and how the undulations of surface and the cover ofwoods and fences were taken advantage of by either commander. Military principles being the same in all times, we found ourselvescriticising the movements as if they had occurred on one of our ownrecent battlefields. It brought the older and the later war intoalmost startling nearness, and made us realize, as perhaps nothingelse could have done, how the future visitor will trace themovements in which we have had a part; and when we have been dustfor centuries, will follow the path of our battalions from hill tohill, from stream to stream, from the border of a wood to the openground where the bloody conflict was hand to hand, and will commentupon the history we have made. It pointed the lesson that what isaccurate in our reports and narratives will be recognized by theintelligent critic, and that the face of the country itself will bean unalterable record which will go far to expose the true reasonsof things, --to show what statements are consistent with the physicalconditions under which a battle was fought, and what, if any, arewarped to hide a repulse or to claim a false success. Nature herselfwill thus prove the strongest ally of truth. NOTE. --General Cox was the spontaneous choice of the "Union Party"of Ohio for Governor, and was nominated at its Convention held inColumbus, June 21, 1865, while he was still engaged in his militaryduties in North Carolina. At a ratification meeting, held in theevening after the Convention, Senator Sherman said, speaking of theticket: "It is headed by a gentleman who is not only a soldier, buta statesman and scholar, --a man of the highest and purestcharacter, --a man who, in all the walks of life, will be a model forus all. I thank you for that nomination, --although I believe thepeople made it before the Convention met. " At a reception in honorof General Sherman given in Columbus, July 13, 1865, the generalhimself was called on to speak. After mentioning Grant, whose famewas secure, and McPherson, his beloved companion in arms, he said:"And here is General Cox, who is your candidate for Governor, --a manwho did his whole duty from first to last and did it well and willdo it to the end. " General Cox was elected by a handsome majority, served one term, returned to the practice of the law, and in 1869 was appointedSecretary of the Interior, by General Grant. Retiring to privatelife at the end of twenty months, he occupied many positions oftrust and honor: President of the Toledo and Wabash Railroad, Memberof Congress from the Toledo District, President of the CincinnatiUniversity, Dean of the Cincinnati Law School, etc. His reading wasextensive; his scholarship profound. In microscopic research heattained world-wide distinction and he received the Gold Medal ofHonor at the Antwerp Exposition of 1891, for excellence inmicro-photography. He was thrice honored with the degree of LL. D. , the last time byYale College, in June, 1877. As an indication of the esteem in whichhe was held by those among whom he went as an armed invader, itshould be mentioned that one of the degrees was conferred by theUniversity of North Carolina, in June, 1870. He was a member of the American Philosophical Society, theMassachusetts Historical Society, the Royal Microscopical Society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, theMilitary Historical Society of Massachusetts, the Cobden Club, and anumber of others. His contributions to the magazines, historical, literary, andscientific, were numerous, and his series of critical andbiographical reviews in "The Nation, " from the beginning of itspublication to the summer of 1900, constitutes a most valuable andinteresting commentary on public men and affairs and militaryoperations at home and abroad. His public addresses, many of which were published in pamphlet form, were marked for their literary finish, their wealth of learning andsuggestion, their deep philosophical insight, and their loftypatriotism. He had little leisure for writing books, but has contributed to theliterature of the war several articles in "Battles and Leaders ofthe Civil War"; the volumes on "Atlanta, " and "The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville, " in the Scribner War Series; "The SecondBattle of Bull Run, " in which he took issue with the findings of theSecond Court of Inquiry in the Fitz-John Porter case; "Franklin, " adetailed account of that battle, together with the events leading upto it and the controversies following it; the last half of Force's"Sherman" in the Great Commander Series; and the above "MilitaryReminiscences. " However much men may differ with his conclusions, none who knew him personally ever questioned his candor andsincerity, and his disposition to be absolutely fair in histreatment of others. W. C. C. APPENDIX C TESTIMONIALS OF COMMANDERS _Rosecrans, in his Report of the Campaign of_ 1861, _Nov. _ 25, 1861. _Official Records, vol. V. P. _ 259. "It is a great pleasure to say to the commanding general that I havefound General Cox prudent, brave, and soldierly, and I speciallycommend his prudence and firmness in occupying Cotton Hill, detailsof which are given in his report in the appendix. " _Rosecrans, in Correspondence with McClellan_, _Nov. _ 19, 1861, _asking for Changes in Officers, etc. _ _Official Records, vol. V. P. _657. "General Cox is the only reliable man here;" _i. E. _, of thebrigadiers with him at Gauley, Schenck having gone home sick. _McClellan, to Army Headquarters, after South Mountain andAntietam_, _Oct. _ 5, 1862. _Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. _383. "MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. In compliance with your instructions, General Cox has been orderedto report to you for duty on the Kanawha. General Cox's gallantservices in the battle of South Mountain and at Antietam, duringwhich, after Reno's fall, he commanded an army corps, contributedgreatly toward our success in those hard-fought engagements. He hasbeen recommended by General Burnside, his immediate commander, forpromotion. Although I am now to lose the services of this valuableofficer with this army, it is no more than an act of justice to himthat I should concur in the recommendation of General Burnside, which I do most cordially and earnestly, and request that thepromotion be made at once. (Signed) GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Maj. -Gen. " _Schofield to Sherman, after the Atlanta Campaign. Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P_. 366. "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE OHIO, DECATUR, GA. , Sept. 12th, 1864. MAJOR-GEN. W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of theMississippi. GENERAL, --I have the honor to recommend for promotion the followingnamed officers of my command for gallant and meritorious servicesduring the campaign just ended: Brigadier-General J. D. Cox is now the senior Brigadier-General ofVolunteers in active service. He has held various important commandsduring the war and was appointed Major-General in 1862, but his namewas withdrawn from the list sent to the Senate for confirmation, because of the limitation by law of the number of Major-Generalsauthorized to be appointed. General Cox commanded the 23d Army Corpsfor some time previous to the assignment of Major-General Stonemanto that command. During the summer's campaign he has commanded thethird division of that corps under my immediate personalobservation. I have no hesitation in saying that I have never seen amore able and efficient division commander. General Cox is possessedof a very high order of talent and superior education. As acommander he is discreet, energetic, and brave. As a just reward forlong, faithful, and efficient service, and as an act of justice tothe army and the country, I earnestly recommend thatBrigadier-General J. D. Cox be appointed Major-General ofVolunteers. I earnestly hope all the appointments above recommended may be made. Should the number of vacancies in the grades of Major-General andBrigadier-General not justify the appointment of so large a numberfrom this army, I respectfully request that the officers who may notbe appointed may receive the Brevet of the rank for which they arerecommended. Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General Commanding. " _Sherman to Halleck, after the Atlanta Campaign. Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. _ 413. "HEADQUARTERS, MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS. IN THE FIELD, GAYLESVILLE, ALA. , Oct. 24, 1864. GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, etc. GENERAL, --I always designed to canvass the claims to promotion ofall aspirants in the army, so as to save the President the invidioustask of judging among so many worthy men, all of whom can only beknown to him by the record. But events and movements have followedeach other so rapidly that my army commanders have not been able toattend to the matter, but have sent into my office the detachedpapers of each. These I herewith inclose, indorsed with my ownindividual opinion. I have not General Thomas' list, but willinstruct him to send it direct from Nashville, where he now is. Ifnecessary [_sic_] to promote to divisions and brigades the officersnow exercising the rank of major-general and brigadier-general, itbe necessary to create vacancies, I do think the exigencies of thecountry would warrant the muster out of the same number of generalsnow on the list that have not done service in the past year. The following persons should be promoted to the rank ofmajor-general: . . . Army of the Ohio: Brig. -Gen. J. D. Cox to be major-general.... All these are actual division commanders, men of marked courage, capacity, and merit, who are qualified to separate commands.... I am, with respect, your obedient servant, (Signed) W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. " _Schofield to Thomas, after the Battles of Franklin and Nashville. Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. _ p. 273. "HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE OHIO, FRANKLIN, TENN. , Dec. 19, 1864. MAJ. -GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Dep't of the Cumberland. GENERAL, --I have the honor to enclose herewith a letter to Maj. -Gen. Halleck, Chief of Staff, urging the promotion of Brig. -Gen. Cox, andto urge that it may be forwarded with your indorsement. UnlessGeneral Cox can obtain the promotion which he has so often earned, he will soon quit the service, which would be an irreparable loss tomy command. I am, general, Very Respectfully, Your obed't serv't, (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Maj. -Gen. " _Schofield to Halleck, after the Battles of Franklin and Nashville. Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 273. _ "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE OHIO, FRANKLIN, TENN. , Dec. 19, 1864. MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, D. C. GENERAL, --I desire earnestly to ask your attention, and, throughyou, that of the President and Secretary of War, to the claims ofBrigadier-General J. D. Cox to promotion. It is unnecessary torecite, in detail, the services of so distinguished an officer. Hehas merited promotion scores of times by skilful and heroic conductin as many battles. He is one of the very best division commanders Ihave ever seen, and has often shown himself qualified for a highercommand. Permit me to say that in overlooking the merits of such an officeras General Cox, the Government has, unintentionally of course, committed an act of great injustice, and one which must soon deprivethe country of his services. An officer cannot exercise for threeyears a command which he is universally admitted to be eminentlyqualified for, and yet be denied the corresponding rank, while hisjuniors, notoriously less deserving, are promoted, without feelingsuch mortification and chagrin as must drive him from the army. Excuse, General, the earnestness with which I refer to this matter. I do not exaggerate the merits of the case; on the contrary, I donot half state it. I am, General, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General. " _Thomas to Halleck, after the Battles of Franklin and Nashville. Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. P. 274. _ [Indorsement] "HEAD Q'RS, DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND. IN THE FIELD, TENNESSEE, Dec. 20, 1864. Respectfully forwarded, earnestly recommending the promotion ofBrig. -Gen. J. D. Cox to the grade of Major-General. His services onthe Atlanta campaign entitle him to the promotion asked for, and atthe battle of Franklin he was eminently distinguished for personalcourage as well as for the skilful management of his command. (Signed) GEORGE H. THOMAS, Maj. -Gen. Com'g. " _Thomas to Halleck, Dec. 23, 1864, again recommending General Coxfor Promotion. Official Records, vol. Xlv. Pt. Ii. Pp. 234, 235. _ "HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, 23D ARMY CORPS. ON GRANNY WHITE PIKE, December 17, 1864. MAJ. J. A. CAMPBELL, Ass't Adj't-Gen. , Army of the Ohio. MAJOR, --I have the honor to claim for my command the capture ofeight pieces of the enemy's artillery, in the charge made by thefirst brigade last evening. The four pieces captured by the EighthTennessee Infantry, as stated by Colonel Doolittle in theaccompanying dispatch, were not put under guard at the moment, and aguard was subsequently put over them and the pieces claimed byMcArthur's division, Sixteenth Corps. J. D. Cox, Brigadier-General Commanding. " [Inclosure] "H'DQ'RS, 1ST BRIGADE, 30 Div. , 23d ARMY CORPS. IN THEFIELD, December 17, 1864. CAPT. THEODORE Cox, Ass't Adj't-General. SIR, --I have the honor to report that in the charge on the enemy'sworks yesterday, my brigade captured eight pieces of artillery, light twelves, instead of four as reported verbally. The four piecesclaimed by McArthur's division, Sixteenth Corps, were taken by the8th Tennessee, who drove the enemy from them. The 12th Kentucky tookthe other four pieces. CHAS. C. DOOLITTLE, Col. 18th MichiganInft'y, Commanding. " [First Indorsement] "HEAD Q'RS, ARMY OF THE OHIO, FRANKLIN, TENN. , Dec. 19th, 1864. Respectfully forwarded to Head Quarters Department of theCumberland. (Signed) J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General. " [Second Indorsement] "H'DQ'RS DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND, DUCK RIVER, TENN. , Dec. 23, 1864. Respectfully forwarded to Maj. -Gen. H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff, recommending that Brig. -Gen. J. D. Cox be promoted to the grade ofMajor-General. (Signed) GEO. H. THOMAS, Maj. -Gen. U. S. Vols. , Commanding. " RECOMMENDATION FOR CORPS COMMAND "HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA, WILMINGTON, N. C. , February 24, 1865. LIEUT. -GEN. U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the United States. City Point, Va. GENERAL, --I respectfully request that the troops in this departmentwhich do not belong to the Twenty-third Army Corps may be organizedinto an army corps, and that Maj. -Gen. Alfred H. Terry be assignedto its command. Also that Maj. -Gen. J. D. Cox may be assigned to thecommand of the Twenty-third Army Corps. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. P. 559. ] [_Letter of same date_. ] "... I have asked for the assignment of General Cox and GeneralTerry to corps commands, both because the strength of my commandrenders it desirable, and because it will enable me to leave eitherthe one or the other in command of the column which I may not bewith at any time. " [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE OHIO, GOLDSBOROUGH, N. C. , March 22, 1865. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va. Near a month ago I wrote you a letter requesting that Maj. -Gen. J. D. Cox be assigned to the command of the Twenty-third Army Corps, and that the remaining troops in this department be organized into acorps in command of Maj. -Gen. A. H. Terry. Having received no reply, I presume that my letter did not reach you; therefore I beg leave torenew the request. But if it be not deemed advisable to organize acorps for General Terry, I nevertheless respectfully request thatMajor-General Cox may be assigned to the command of the Twenty-thirdCorps. J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General. " [Indorsement] "GOLDSBOROUGH, N. C. , March 23, 1865. I approve this. I know that General Cox is a good officer, andGeneral Terry has the best possible reputation. General Schofieldwill want two corps organizations as soon as possible. W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 960, 961. ] "CITY POINT, VA. , March 25, 1865. HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington. General Schofield recommends and I approve the appointment ofGeneral Cox to the command of the Twenty-third Corps. He also asksthe organization of the balance of the troops in his department intoa corps under General Terry. This will be of great advantage to hiscommand. I would suggest that Terry's corps be called the Tenth. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "[Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iii. P 18. ] "GENERAL ORDERS No. 49. WAR DEP'T, ADJ'T-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, March 27, 1865. By direction of the President, the following assignments are herebymade: I. Maj. -Gen. A. A. Humphreys, to the command of the Second ArmyCorps. II. Maj. -Gen. J. G. Parke to the command of the Ninth Army Corps. III. Maj. -Gen. J. D. Cox to the command of the Twenty-third ArmyCorps. IV. All other troops in North Carolina not belonging to corps inGeneral Sherman's army will constitute the Tenth Army Corps, ofwhich Maj. -Gen. A. H. Terry is assigned to the command. By command of the Secretary of War, E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xlvii. Pt. Iii. P. 34. ] INDEX NOTE. For economy of space the usual abbreviations for proper andgeographicalnames are employed. Other abbreviations are: A. , army;a. A. G. , assistant adjutant-general;a. D. C. , aide-de-camp;adm. , admiral;adm'n, administration;A. C. , army corps;art. , artillery;bat. , battery;br. , brevet;brig. , brigade, brigadier;capt. , captain;cav. , cavalry;ch. , church;ch'f, chief;C. H. , courthouse;co. , company;col. , colonel;com. , commodore;com'd'g, commanding;com'r, commander;conf. , confederate;cr. , creek;C. S. A. , Confederate States Army;dep't, department;dist. , district;div. , division;gen. , general;Gov. , Governor;h'dqu'r's, headquarters;inf. , infantry;insp. , inspector;l't, lieutenant;maj. , major;mt. , mountain;pos. , position;reg. , regular;reg't, regiment;R. , river;R. R. , railroad;Sec'y, secretary;sta. , station;U. S. A. , United States Army;U. S. V. , United States Volunteers. The rank of officers is given as of the date when the eventsdescribed in the text occurred. ABBOTT, Jos. C. , colonel 7th New Hampshire, commanding brigade, atFederal Point, North Carolina. Aides-de-camp, intimate association with commanding officer; how appointed; duties of, Ames, Adelbert, brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding division at Federal Point and Ft. Fisher, NorthCarolina; with General Cox's column on Cape Fear River. Amnesty, approved by Lincoln; discussed by Sherman and Johnston; extended to all in arms at Lee's surrender; sustained by popular feeling. Anderson, Adna, operates Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. Anderson, Chas. , colonel 93rd Ohio; wounded at Stone's River; elected Lieutenant Governor of Ohio. Anderson, Edw. L. , captain 52nd Ohio, wounded at Jonesboro. Anderson, Fred. Pope, lieutenant 181st Ohio. Anderson, Geo. B. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain. Anderson, Geo. T. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, assaults Ft. Sanders. Anderson, Henry R. , captain 6th U. S. Infantry Anderson, Larz, brother of General Robt. Anderson, had five sons in Union army. Anderson, Larz, Jr. , aide-de-camp on staff of General North Carolina McLean. Anderson, Latham, colonel 8th Cal. Anderson, Nicholas L. , colonel 6th Ohio, wounded at Stone's River and Chickamauga. Anderson, Richard H. , major general Confederate States Army, at Maryland Heights; at Antietam. Anderson, Robt. , lieutenant colonel 9th Pennsylvania, commanding brig, at Antietam. Anderson, Thos. McA. , captain 14th U. S. Infantry, later colonel same. Anderson, Wm. M. , brother of General Robt. Anderson, had two sons in Union army. Anderson, Wm. P. , captain and assistant adjutant-general at Cincinnati. Andersonville, confederate treatment of prisoners at. Ankele, Chas. , major 37th Ohio, at Princeton, West Virginia Andrews, Lorin, President Kenyon College, colonel 4th Ohio. Anthony, Sister, hospital work at Camp Dennison. Antietam, battlefield described; map of; fords of; battle on the right; battle on the left; conduct of, criticised; losses at. Appointments, general officers U. S. A. , laws regulating; practice concerning. Army of the Potomac, shares in McClellan's errors as to enemy's strength and supports his views; its failures contrasted with success of western armies. Army Corps, 1st, at South Mountain and Antietam; losses at Antietam; 2nd, at South Mountain and Antietam; 4th, marches to relief of Knoxville; at Blain's Cross-roads; privations in E. Tennessee; withdrawn to Knoxville; winter quarters between Kingston and Loudon; Wood's div in pursuit of Longstreet; returns to Army of the Cumberland; concentrates at Cleveland; connects Army of Cumberland with Army of the Ohio; at Tunnel Hill; Newton's division at Rocky Face; during Hood's Tennessee campaign; General Couch assigned to; dissatisfaction in corps; at battle of Nashville; in pursuit of Hood. 5th, at Antietam. 6th, at Alexandria; in reserve at Crampton's Gap; not at Antietam when fight began. 9th, Kanawha division attached to; at Fox's Gap, South Mountain; extreme left at Antietam; waiting for orders to advance; difficulties in carrying bridge and fords over the Antietam; overcomes them all and drives enemy into Sharpsburg; attacked in left and rear by A. P. Hill's division; maintains its position; losses at Antietam; moved by sea from North Carolina to Ft. Monroe; sent to Falmouth, Virginia, and Warrenton to join Pope; Kanawha division detached and sent to West Virginia; sent to Kentucky much weakened by malarial disease; recuperates in Kentucky; moves into E. Tennessee; movements in E. Tenn; at siege of Knoxville; at Blain's Cross-roads; Strawberry Plains; in winter quarters; ordered East again with Burnside in command. 12th, covers trains of Pope's army; at Antietam; losses at Antietam; in support of Sedgwick. 14th, at Tunnel Hill; at Resaca; deprived of Davis' division; reunited at New Hope Church; at Peachtree Creek; at Averasborough and Bentonville. 15th, at Villanow; at Dallas; at Roswell; at Atlanta; at Ezra Church; at Bentonville; on march to Raleigh. 16th, same as last. 17th moves from Decatur, Alabama, via Rome to Allatoona; and Ackworth; in North Carolina 20th, at Bridgeport and Wauhatchie, Tennessee; at Dug Gap; through Snake Creek Gap; at Resaca; off its beat; again, at crossing of the Etowah; assaults confederate lines at New Hope Church and is repulsed; in reserve; flanking movement near Ackworth; at Kolb's farm; at Peachtree Creek; holds Atlanta; at Averasborough and Bentonville; on march to Raleigh; marches through Raleigh. 23d, organized; pursuit and capture of Morgan raiders; scattered and fatigued by the chase; ordered back to Kentucky; advance into E. Tennessee; service in E. Tennessee; at Loudon; in battle of Campbell's Station; at siege of Knoxville; at Blain's Cross-roads; privations; unanimous re-enlistment; at Strawberry Plains; sufferings from intense cold; marches to Dandridge; back to Strawberry Plains; winter quarters at Knoxville; march to Morristown; good soldiers; at Rocky Face; at Resaca; reinforced by nine new regiments at the Etowah; at Burnt Hickory; swings to the left; forces crossing of Noyes's Creek; advances to Cheney's; at battle of Kolb's farm; forces crossing of Olley's Creek and gains threatening positionbeyond enemy's left flank; holds position while Sherman's army passes to rear and right; forces crossing of Chattahoochee at Soap Creek; extreme right flank of army southwest of Atlanta; Cox's division covers itself by field intrenchments in fifteenminutes; October campaign, 1864, General Cox in command; ordered to report to Thomas; march to Dalton; cars to Nashville; at Columbia, Tennessee; at Pulaski; race back to Columbia; at Columbia; at battle of Franklin; at battle of Nashville; follows Smith's corps in pursuit of Hood; recruited to 15, 000; hard winter march from Columbia to Clifton, Tennessee; transported from Clifton to Washington: shipped to NorthCarolina; ascends right bank of Cape Fear River, captures Ft. Anderson, Town Creek, and compels evacuation of Wilmington; at battle of Kinston; losses at Kinston; dress parade at Goldsborough in honor of Sherman's arrival; march to Raleigh; at Raleigh; at Greensborough. Army Headquarters, business centre for a large military population. Army Pets. Army Regulations, necessity for careful study of. Atlanta Campaign; decisive importance of, recognized by Southern leaders. Atlanta, Battle of. "Atlantic, " Collins line steamship used in transporting part of 23d army corpsto North Carolina. Audenreid, Jos. C. , captain, and aide-de-camp on Sherman's staff, rides around enemy's linesinto Knoxville. Augur, Christopher C. , appointed major general Averasborough, North Carolina, battle of. Badger, George E. , ex-senator from North Carolina, joins Graham's peace delegation; mentioned. Baker, Lawrence S. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, in command of North Carolina militia at Kinston. Ball, Hon. Flamen, attorny for Burnside in Vallandigham _habeas corpus_ case. Ballot, extension of, to soldiers in the field. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, importance of; Union forces collected on line of. Banks, N. P. , major general United States Volunteers, commanding forces in Shenandoah Valley; defeated by "Stonewall" Jackson; in charge of defences of Washington. Barbarism, tendency of war to make men relapse into; efforts of officers to curb tendency; of Union armies exaggerated to keep up war spirit of Southernpeople. Barker, C. W. , major 12th Ill. Cavalry, in West Virginia Barlow, Francis C. , colonel 61st New York, desperately wounded at Antietam. Barnett, James, colonel 1st Ohio Artillery, in West Virginia Barriger, John W. , captain and commissary on General Cox's staff; good qualities. Barter, Richard F. , colonel commanding brigadier, in 23d army corps, at Olley's Creek Bascom, Gustavus M. , aide-de-camp on General Cox's staff; promoted to major; accompanies General Cox to E. Tennessee; transferred to Stoneman's staff. Bates, Joshua H. , brigadier-general Ohio Vol. Infantry, at Camp Dennison. Batteaux, used for transportation of supplies from head of navigation toKanawha Falls; more economical than wagon transportation. Baxter, John, loyalist, lawyer at Knoxville, afterwards U. S. Circuit Judge for 6thCircuit. Beauregard, P. G. T. , lieutenant general Confederate States Army, suggested by Lee to succeed Bragg; Davis takes no notice of suggestion; ordered to reinforce Polk with 10, 000 men; replies, impracticable; in command Western Department; confers with Hood; says latter departed from plans agreed on; criticised by Sherman; hears of Thomas' expected reinforcements and orders Hood to takeaggressive immediately; commands forces in the Carolinas; orders Hardee to evacuate Charleston; confesses inability to resist Sherman's march; startles Davis; retreats into North Carolina; superseded by Johnston; estimates of forces contradicted by official returns; at Greensborough; declares further prosecution of war hopeless. Becker, Gottfried, lieutenant colonel 28th Ohio, at South Mountain. Beecher, Henry Ward, meeting with General Cox; correspondence with Stanton about photographs of Lincoln cortege. Bell, T. S. , Pt colonel 51st Pennsylvania, killed at Burnside bridge. Benham, H. W. , captain of engineers; consults about fortifying Gauley Bridge; appointed brigadier general; at Carnifex Ferry; Cross Lanes; near Gauley Bridge; ordered to move to rear of Floyd's position on Cotton Hill andintercept retreat; fails to do so; Rosecrans orders court-martial, but McClellan suppresses it; transferred to another department. Benjamin, Judah P. , attorny-general Confederate States Army, at Davis' last cabinet meeting; decides States alone can dissolve confederacy and return to theirallegiance; escapes to Cuba. Benjamin, Samuel N. , lieutenant 2nd U. S. Artillery, at Antietam; at Ft. Sanders; reports cowardice of commanding officer. Bennett, residence of, near Durham, North Carolina, where Sherman and Johnston discussed terms of surrender. Bentonville, North Carolina, battle of; sound of battle heard fifty miles away. Beverly, West Virginia, concentration of confederate troops at; importance of situation; abandoned after battle of Rich Mountain Big Creek Gap, fine view through. Big Sandy River, as transportation route to E. Tennessee Big Sewell Mountain, reached by Cox's advance; occupied by General Cox; difficulty of hauling supplies to; compels retirement. Birkhimer's "Military Government and Martial Law" cited. Blair, Frank P. , major general United States Volunteers, prefers command in Sherman's Army to seat in Congress; commands 17th army corps; marches from Decatur, Alabama, to Rome, Kingston, and Ackworth; his corps makes good Sherman's losses in Atlanta campaign; sent to Missouri to stump; wants to stop foraging in North Carolina Blenker, Louis, brigadier general United States Volunteers, ordered to join Fremont; does not arrive in time to participate in advance. Blizzard, fearful in E. Tennessee, Jan. 1864. Blockhouses, construction and use in railroad defence. Bloodgood, Edw. , lieutenant colonel 22nd Wisc. , captured with his command by Forrest. Bloody Lane, at Antietam. Bluestone River, West Virginia, operations on. Bondurant, J. W. , captain Alabama artillery, at South Mountain Bonticou, Jos. C. , lieutenant 2nd Kentucky, scout, mistakes McCook's tents for enemy's camp. Boone courthouse, West Virginia, confederate militia routed at. Boone, Thos. C. , lieutenant colonel 115th Ohio, commanding Kemper Barracks, Cincinnati. Border States, slavery question most troublesome in; military administration in; distasteful. Boughton, Horace, colonel 143rd New York, commanding brig, at battle of Kinston. Bounty Jumping, evils and extent of; arrest of deserters and efforts to prevent frauds. Boyle, Jere. T. , brigadier-general United States Volunteers, in Morgan raid; commanding 1st division 23d army corps Bradley, D. C. , lieutenant 65th Ill. , aide-de-camp on General Cox's staff. Bragg, Braxton, general Confederate States Army, invades Kentucky; sends large forces to Johnston's assistance in Mississippi; reinforced by Longstreet's corps before Chickamauga; forces of, opposing Rosecrans; weakened by absence of Morgan; losses at Chickamauga; unable to break line of supplies for Chattanooga; orders Longstreet to E. Tennessee; intends crushing Burnside and quick return; defeated at Chattanooga; Longstreet's return cut off; evil consequences; asks for investigation; want of confidence in; directed to turn command over to Hardee; quoted by Davis; correspondence with Johnston; with Hood; goes to Atlanta to examine condition of affairs and reports; exposes habitual underestimate of their forces by confederategenerals; commanding department of North Carolina; headquarters at Wilmington; forced to evacuate by General Cox; forces of, Feb. 10th; serves under Johnston; concentrates all forces and attacks General Cox at Kinston; mistaken order; waits for reinforcements; final attack at Kinston; repulsed; forces of, at Kinston; at Chester, South Carolina; captured near Athens, Georgia Brannan, John M. , brigadier-general United States Volunteers; at Chickamauga. Breckinridge, John C. , Secretary of War Confederate States Army, admits slavery to be dead; takes part in Sherman-Johnston conference; at Davis' last cabinet meeting; decides Hampton's troops bound by capitulation but H. Himself freeto ignore; escapes to Cuba. British Army, weak points revealed; not so apt in learning new lessons as our own. Brough, John, Union Democrat, defeats Vallandigham. Brown, Rev. Fred. T. , chaplain 7th Ohio, trip from Sutton to Gauley through enemy's lines to bring Coxinformation. Brown, Jos. E. , Governor of Georgia, tenders 5000 militia for defence of Atlanta; urges reinforcements to prevent fall of Atlanta; exasperation with confederate government; bitter correspondence with confederate war department; mentioned. Brownlow, James P. , colonel 1st E. Tennessee Cav. Brownlow, Wm. E. , "Parson, " leading loyalist at Knoxville. Buckner, Simon B. , major general Confederate States Army, commanding in E. Tennessee; joins Longstreet in siege of Knoxville. Buell, Don Carlos, major general United States Volunteers, General Cox ordered to join; order countermanded on Rosecrans' protest; objects to invasion of E. Tennessee; sends Garfield to Big Sandy, and Morgan to Cumberland Gap; retreats before Bragg; ordered before military commission; why Rosecrans chosen to succeed. Buford, Abram, brigadier-general Confederate States Army, commanding division Forrest's cavalry Buford, N. B. , appointed major-general United States Volunteers; not confirmed. Bull Run, second battle of, guns heard at Washington; news of Pope's defeat reaches Washington. Bull Run bridge, stout defence by Scammon. Burbank, Sidney, major, mustering officer at Camp Jackson. Burdsall, Henry W. , commanding ind. Co. Ohio Cavalry. Burnside, Ambrose E. , twice declines command of Army of Potomac and urges McClellan'sretention; commanding right wing; first impressions of; at South Mountain; sharp reply to Hooker's report; relations with McClellan; command divided at Antietam; leaves Cox in command of 9th army corps; understanding of McClellan's plans; practically without command; order to attack, when received; efforts to hurry advance; McClellan's true friend; heartily advocates emancipation and advises McC. On subject; forwards Porter's dispatches about Pope to Washington; held responsible by Porter for his court-martial; grieved by division of his command, and McC. 's withdrawal ofconfidence; and unjust reprimand; explains delay; fine appearance on field; cordial manners, popularity with his troops; sincerity and unselfishness; appointed to succeed McC. In spite of his protests; dispiriting effect of his defeat at Fredericksburg; ordered to Department of the Ohio; plans for occupying E. Tennessee; headquarters at Cincinnati; character and habits of; General Order No. 38; warns Cincinatti papers against publishing military information; causes arrest and trial of Vallandigham; suppresses "Chicago Times"; overruled by the President; plans campaign into E. Tennessee; efforts to agree with Rosecrans on plan of advance; directed to send 9th army corps to Vicksburg; departure with staff for E. Tennessee; recall; organizes raids into West Virginia, E. Tennessee, and S. W. Kentucky; efforts to catch Morgan; declares martial law in southern Ohio, during Morgan raid; imprisons Morgan and his officers in Ohio penitentiary; dramatic announcement of fall of Vicksburg; rejoices in return of 9th army corps; Halleck's unjust treatment of; concentrates forces and advances into E. Tennessee; captures General Frazer and 2500 men at Cumberland Gap; impossibility of co-operating with Rosecrans; congratulated by President and Halleck; asks to be relieved; organizes and arms E. Tennessee volunteers; directed to move toward Chattanooga and support Rosecrans; inability to reach River before battle of Chickamauga; explains to War Department; concentrates near Loudon; attacks confederate General Jones and drives him into Virginia; relations with Rosecrans; informs Grant of his situation and necessities of troops; opposes Longstreet; well-conducted retreat to Knoxville; relieved of command; habitual unfriendliness of Halleck; Congress passes resolutions of thanks; at his best in such commands; lack of system and other faults; offers General Cox corps command in E. Tennessee; recommends him for such appointment to General Foster; plans another expedition to North Carolina; not allowed to carry it out. Burnside's Bridge, across the Antietam; least promising point of attack; carried by Cox's command; losses at. Butler, Benj. F. , major general United States Volunteers, relieved of command; criticises Grant in farewell order; further assignment to command opposed by Grant. Butler, M. C. , major general Confederate States Army, sent to assist Johnston in driving back Sherman; included in Johnston's capitulation. Butterfield, Daniel, major general United States Volunteers, interferes with Schofield's advance; declines to act on his request; claims to outrank S. And disputes his authority. Buzzard Roost, strong defensive position at Dalton, Georgia; attacks on, by Newton, and Geary. Byrd, Robt. K. , colonel E. Tennessee volunteers; commanding cavalry in E. Tennessee; at crossing of Olley's Creek Cameron, Daniel, commanding brig, in Cox's division 23d army corps, carries bridge over Noyes' Creek; supports Byrd beyond Olley's Creek; intrenches between Byrd and Reilly. Camp Dennison, Ohio camp of instruction; laid out by General Cox; huts built; floors laid; drilling of militia; water works; routine at; measles at; re-enlisting of three months men at. Camp Jackson, near Columbus, Ohio, first depot of recruits. Camp Lookout, West Virginia; amusing incident. Campbell, John A. , ex-justice U. S. Supreme Court, confederate peace commander. Campbell, John A. , major and assistant adjutant-general onSchofield's staff. Canby, Edw. R. , major general United States Volunteers, Grant plans movement by. Cantey, James, brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Resaca. Carnifex Ferry, West Virginia, map of; battle of. Carrington, Henry B. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, superseded by Hascall at Indianapolis; restored at Morton's request; active in prosecuting Knights of Golden Circle. Carter, John C. , captain U. S. Steamer "Michigan"; aids in defeating plot to release rebel prisoners. Carter, Samuel P. , assists in re-occupation of Kanawha valley; commanding division of mounted troops; advance into E. Tennessee; joins 23d army corps; succeeds Meagher in command of division at Beaufort, NorthCarolina; in advance on Kinston; good conduct in first day's battle; again, on final assault; commanding division composed of Palmer's and his own; transferred to third (Cox's) division of 23d army corps, whenlatter assumes corps command. Casement, John S. , major 7th Ohio, brings 400 to Charleston after surprise at Cross Lanes; colonel of 103rd Ohio; recruits new brass band for his brigade; at battle of Nashville; on expedition to North Carolina; on advance up right bank Cape Fear River Cavalry, activity of confederate; raids usually costly affairs; difficulties of mounting; enormous waste of horses; outpost and patrol duties more important than showy raids. Cave Spring, Georgia, description of; rendezvous for Hood and Beauregard. Chalmers, James R. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, commanding division in Forrest's cavalry, at battle of Nashville. Chantilly, battle of. Chaplains, army. Charleston, South Carolina, fall of, has depressing effect on Confederacy. Charleston, West Virginia, strategic position; taken by General Cox; inundated; headquarters of General Cox winter of 1861-2; remissness of city officials; reoccupied by General Cox. Chase, Salmon P. , Secretary of Treasury; differences with President Lincoln: corresponds with Garfield; chief justice, entertains General Cox. Chattanooga, Tennessee, siege by Bragg; line of supplies opened; lines of communication with Nashville and North; fortified and garrisoned. Cheatham, Benj. F. , major general Confederate States Army, controversy with Hood; at battle of Atlanta; succeeds to command of Hardee's corps; at battle of Nashville; joins Bragg's army in North Carolina; after capitulation, moves across Great Smoky Mountains withTennessee troops. Chickamauga, battle of. Chief Command, strain of, as compared with subordinate position. Chief of Staff, importance of position Christ, B. C. , colonel 50th Pennsylvania, commanding brigade at South Mountain; at Antietam. Christian, Wm. A. , colonel 26th New York, commanding brig, at Antietam. Christie, S. L. , captain and aide-de-camp on General Cox's staff; resigns on account of ill health. Cincinnati, headquarters Department of the Ohio; in 1863 a centre for rebel sympathizers; refuge for Southern women; defended against Morgan raiders; enthusiasm over surrender of Vicksburg. Claassen, Peter J. , colonel 132nd New York, commanding brig at battle of Kinston. Clarke, Melvin, lieutenant colonel 36th Ohio, at South Mountain Clay, Cassius M. , major general United States Volunteers, not assigned to duty; resigns and is appointed min. To Russia. Clayton, H. D. , major general Confederate States Army, at Kinston; falls on Upham's flank. Cluseret, Gustave, colonel and aide-de-camp on Frémont's staff; amusing controversy with General Milroy; military chief of Paris commune in 1870. Cobb, Howell, brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain Coburn, John, colonel 33rd Indiana commanding brigade, captured by Van Dorn. Cochrane, John, brigadier general United States Volunteers, war Democrat, consults McClellan about Emancipation Proclamation; publishes recollections of interview; attempts to bring McClellan and Chase into harmony. Cockerill, Giles J. , commanding battery D 1st Ohio artillery, at Kolb's farm. Coffee, value of, in army rations; improvised coffee-mills. Colburn, A. V. , colonel and assistant adjutant-general onMcClellan's staff, accompanies him on rides about Washington. Coleman, Aug. H. , lieutenant colonel 11th Ohio, leads charge up Cotton Mountain, West Virginia; at South Mountain; killed at Burnside bridge. Coleman, D. , colonel Confederate States Army, commanding brigade at battle of Nashville. Colored Troops, excellent conduct in skirmish at Federal Point. Colquitt, Alfred H. , colonel Confederate States Army commanding brigade at Antietam. Comly, James M. , major 23d Ohio; repulses attack at Pack's Ferry, West Virginia Comstock, C. B. , lieutenant colonel engineers on Grant's staff; gets key to cipher dispatches; reprimanded by Stanton; accompanies Terry's expedition against Ft. Fisher; suggests flanking Hoke's position at Federal Point; plan adopted by Schofield, but fails on account of heavy gales anddeep sands; explains Schofield's use of hospital steamer "Spaulding". Confederate Army, dwindles as hopes of success vanish; disorders threatened on capitulation; complete submission to U. S. Authority; paroled and sent home; manifest interest in drill and discipline of U. S. Troops. Confederate Currency, enormous depreciation of. 195. Conine, Jas. W. , lieutenant and aide-de-camp on General Cox's staff; appointed colonel of 5th U. S. Colored troops. Connecticut Troops, 8th Infantry at Antietam; 11th Infantry at Antietam; 15th Infantry at Kinston. "Contrabands, " slaves of confederate officers coming into Union lines; term gradually applied to all escaped slaves; difficulties in treatment of. Cook, Asa M. , captain 8th Massachusetts Artillery, at South Mountain Coon, Datus E. , colonel United States Volunteers, commanding 2nd brigade Wilson's cavalry at Nashville; captures enemy's cavalry baggage train. Cooper, Jos. A. , colonel 6th E. Tennessee, promoted brigadier general and assigned to command 2nd division23d army corps; at Johnsonville, Tennessee; ordered to Beard's Ferry; masterly retreat from. Cooper, Samuel, adjutant and inspector general Confederate StatesArmy, capitulates with Johnston's army; tries to preserve confederate archives. Corps Commander, takes precedence over ranking major generals not assigned to corpscommand. Corse, John M. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, successfully defends Allatoona. Cotton Mountain, West Virginia, overlooking Gauley, seized by Floyd; annoying fire from; Floyd's position on, carried by Cox and Schenck. Couch, Darius N. , major general United States Volunteers, at Yorktown; ordered to observe A. P. Hill at Harper's Ferry; should have come on field of Antietam not later than Hill; but did not appear; reports to General Thomas for duty, assigned to 4th army corps; owing to dissatisfaction in that corps assigned to 23d army corps; outranks General Cox and displaces him as second in command; at battle of Nashville; on march from Columbia to Clifton; commands 23d army corps _en route_ from Clifton to Washington; sails with his division to Beaufort, North Carolina; commands two divisions 23d army corps left at Wilmington; ordered to support of Cox at Kinston; commands 2nd division 23d army corps under General Cox. Coughlan, James, lieutenant 24th Kentucky and aide-de-camp on General Cox's staff; daring ride at Olley's Creek; captured near Atlanta, exchanged, and killed at Franklin. Councils of War, why they never fight. Cox, Jacob D. , in Ohio Senate; assists Governor Dennison in enrolling and organizing Statemilitia; appointed brigadier general O. S. V. April 23d, 1861; inspects State arsenal with McClellan; in command of Camp Jackson; inspects site with McClellan and lays out Camp Dennison; first lessons in camping out and brigade drill; extensive reading of military works; all but one of his regiments ordered away; ill effects of repeated change of command; appointed brigadier general United States Volunteers; confirmed; ordered to Kanawha valley with raw regiments not yet equipped; begins operations on a base 100 miles broad; with 3400 men ordered to drive out Wise, who had 4000; begins advance July 11th; wild rumors; affair at Scary Creek; turns enemy's flank at Tyler Mountain; captures Charleston; presuming colonels; quiet manner often led to similar difficulties; experience with newspaper correspondents; captures Gauley Bridge with 1500 stands of arms and munitions ofwar; congratulated by McClellan and Rosecrans; establishes post at Gauley, scouts in all directions, sends outdetachments to deceive enemy; left with only 1800 men to oppose Wise and Floyd with 8000; suppresses mutinous excitement; meets Rosecrans at Cross Lanes; joined by McCook's brigade; at Camp Lookout; at Big Sewell Mountain; skirmish with Wise's legion; difficulty of obtaining supplies forces retirement to CampLookout; holds post at Gauley during occupation of Cotton Mountain byFloyd; carries Cotton Mountain by front attack up river face; commands District of Kanawha, headquarters at Charleston; ordered to report to Buell in Kentucky, countermanded onRosecrans' protest; first military execution ordered; weeding out incompetents and improving drill and discipline ofKanawha division; scrutiny of correspondence between confederates and residentswithin the lines; dealing with non-combatants; disapproves of test oaths; policy with regard to escaped slaves; controversies with owners; prefers seasoned volunteers to regulars; rapid improvement of volunteer officers; rebuilds bridge at Gauley; uses batteaux for transportation on upper Kanawha; reports to Frémont 8500 seasoned troops under his command; pursuant to Frémont's plan of campaign moves to Princeton, WestVirginia; affair at Princeton; retires to Flat Top Mountain, on advices that Jackson's defeat ofBanks upsets campaign; ordered to Washington with his command; Kanawha division marches 90 miles in 3-1/2 days fully equipped, over mountain roads; impressions of Secretary Stanton; in defences of Washington under McClellan; meets Pope and McDowell retreating to Washington; commends general scheme of Pope's campaign; learns through his scouts of Lee's invasion of Maryland; methods of collecting and sifting information; condemns McClellan's spy system; ordered to report to Burnside; first impressions; attached to 9th Corps and takes advance; shocked at straggling in Army of Potomac; meets General Reno; good impression made by Kanawha division; at the Monocacy; at Frederick, Maryland; supports Pleasanton; commands in action at Fox's Gap, South Mountain; Reno arrives late in day, is killed almost immediately, and Coxsucceeds to command of the corps; expresses his pride in the conduct of the Kanawha division; meets McClellan and principal officers of Army of Potomac atheadquarters; retained in command of 9th Corps; part it was to take in the battle; carries Burnside bridge and fords in front and drives confederateright wing back to Sharpsburg; movement arrested by arrival of A. P. Hill's division fromHarper's Ferry and flank attack; holds his position and sleeps on battlefield; gets hints of a project to make McClellan dictator; consulted by McC. As to how he should treat EmancipationProclamation; warns him against putting himself in opposition to administration; accompanies Lincoln in ride over battlefield of Antietam; promoted to major general and command of 9th Corps; ordered to return to Kanawha valley, overrun by confederate forcesin his absence; commands District of West Virginia; takes leave of 9th Corps; Stanton; and Chase; reports to General H. G. Wright at Cincinnati; impressions of; inspects commands of Morgan and Lightburn; contracts for wagons and transportation; reoccupies Kanawha valley, driving out Loring, Echols, andJenkins; administration of affairs in West Virginia; headquarters at Marietta; staff reorganized; appointment as major general not confirmed; severe disappointment; evils of subjecting military appointments to political action; reports to General Schenck at Baltimore; ordered to Columbus to assist Governor in enrolling and organizingconscripts; commands Military District of Ohio, headquarters at Cincinnati; relations to Burnside; disinclined to arrest Vallandigham followers; District of Mich, added to his command; acting chief of staff for Burnside; transacts business of the Department of the Ohio, in Burnside'sname; firm dealing with extreme Democratic partisans; nomination fails because it had support of neither regular armyofficers nor politicians; secures approval of immediate commanders; urgent to obtain field command; reads Kinglake's "Crimean War" and derives comfort from record ofexperiments and blunders in English Army; defeats plot to free prisoners on Johnson's Island; offered corps command in E. Tennessee by Burnside; investigates treatment of prisoners at Johnson's Island; ordered to report to commanding general in E. Tennessee; winter ride over Mountains; meets Burnside and staff coming out; assigned to command District of Kentucky; distaste for such commands; assigned to command 23d army corps; at Strawberry Plains; first meeting with Grant; reports to Sheridan at Dandridge, in; retreat to Strawberry Plains; drives back rebel advance toward Knoxville; threatened with pneumonia; winter quarters at Knoxville; yields command of 23d army corps to Major General Stoneman; asks for command of Sheridan's division 4th army corps; Major General Newton gets it; meets Schofield; acts as chief of staff for Schofield; amusing occurrence on grand rounds; at Newmarket, E. Tennessee; at Morristown; offers plan of campaign for Army of the Ohio; approved by Schofield; offered permanent position as chief of staff, or division in 23darmy corps; takes latter; second in command to Schofield; ordered to join Sherman, drives enemy out of E. Tennessee anddestroys railroad back to Knoxville; march to Dalton; first meeting with Sherman and Thomas; commands extreme left at Dalton; retires left wing in presence of enemy; movement praised by Sherman and Schofield; protects exposed flank by fallen timber; beginning of field intrenchments; marches through Snake Creek Gap and takes position on left ofarmy; carries intrenchments on confederate right at Resaca; commands advance and extreme left on march from Resaca toCassville; outflanks confederate army and forces abandonment of positionbefore Cassville; follows confederate rearguard to crossing of Etowah River; privations when marching without baggage; on march to New Hope Church lines; assumes command of 23d army corps on Schofield's becomingdisabled; turns confederate position at New Hope Church; closer relations with Sherman; unseen perils, narrow escape; heavy rains and discomfort; gloomy thoughts; occupies position on extreme right, separated a mile from rest ofarmy; forces crossing of Noyes' Creek; supports Hascall at Kolb's farm, against Hood's attack; forces crossing of Olley's Creek, intrenches in commandingposition beyond enemy's left flank;holds position gained, three miles from continuous lines ofSherman's army, for several days; effects crossing of Chattahoochee at Soap Creek; extreme right flank southwest of Atlanta; his division covers its front with intrenchments in fifteenminutes; at Decatur, Georgia; in command of Army of the Ohio during October campaign; mild reproof of brig, commander who prefers a cursing; in pursuit of Hood; Sherman plans to take 23d army corps on march to the sea with Coxin command; Schofield protests, Cox yields; resumes command of his own division; recommended for promotion by Schofield and Sherman, App. C; farewell to Sherman; march to Dalton; visits Chattanooga; and Nashville; votes for Lincoln, on train; pet lizard; at Franklin, Tennessee; at Columbia; at Pulaski; race back to Columbia; writes book on "Battle of Franklin;" at Nashville, after retreat from Franklin; position as second in command, reduced by appointment of MajorGeneral Couch to a division; at battle of Nashville; exposure on night after battle; pursuit of Hood; revisits Franklin and studies battlefield; also Spring Hill and Columbia; rebuilds bridges and improves roads; suffers from malarial poisoning; obtains sick leave; does not use it, as active campaigning is proposed; earnestly recommended for promotion by Schofield and Thomas, App. C; appointed major general as of Dec. 7, to fill vacancy caused byMcClernand's resignation; hard march from Columbia to Clifton; still suffering from malaria; goes home while 23d Corps is transported from Clifton toWashington; rapid improvement in health, and new zeal; rejoins corps atWashington; interviews with Stanton, Chase, Garfield, Dennison, Schenck, HenryWard Beecher, Henry Winter Davis, and others; sails with his division to Cape Fear River, North Carolina; atFederal Point; commands column ascending right bank of Cape Fear River, capturingFt. Andersonand Town Creek, with two cannon and 400 prisoners, and compellingevacuationof Wilmington; uses discretion in not strictly obeying Schofield's orders; permanent assignment to command 23d army corps urged by Schofield, App. C; takes command of troops at New Berne, North Carolina, and advanceson Kinston; two battles at Kinston; losses at Kinston, chiefly in Upham's brigade, which wassurprised; hears sound of battle of Bentonville, fifty miles away; occupies Goldsborough; permanently assigned to command 23d army corps, App. C; march to Raleigh; vigorous measures to stop pillage and arson; precautions against soldiers wreaking vengeance for assassinationof Lincoln; commands western district of North Carolina, with headquarters atGreensborough; interview with General Hardee; with Johnston; visit to Salisbury, confederate treatment of prisoners denounced; recognizes local courts and magistrates; notes complete submission on part of North Carolina people toresults of the war; limits authority to preserving the peace; visits Guilford-Old-Court-House, and battlefield; sentiments inspired thereby. Cox, Theodore, brother of above, vol. Aide-de-camp, at South Mountain and Antietam; lieutenant in 11th Ohio and aide-de-camp by appointmentt; at skirmish before Knoxville; at Knoxville; adjutant general on General Cox's staff; accuracy and business system of; issues orders for good conduct of troops on shipboard. Crane, Orrin J. , major 7th Ohio, at Antietam. Cranor, Jonathan, colonel 40th Ohio, in West Virginia Crawford, Samuel W. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, atAntietam. Creighton, Wm. R. , lieutenant colonel 7th Ohio, comes in with Tyler after surprise at Cross Lanes; reproaches himself with cowardice; record of gallantry, until killed at Ringgold, Georgia Crittenden, Eugene W. , colonel commanding cavalry brigade in 23d army corps, reports to General Cox at Olley's Creek Crittenden, Thos. L. , major general United States Volunteers, in E. Tennessee. Crome, G. L. , lieutenant McMullin's battery; killed at South Mountain Crook, Geo. , captain 4th U. S. Infantry, colonel 36th Ohio, at Cross Lanes; Summersville; personal description of; captured at Cumberland; first vote; at Lewisburg, West Virginia; defeats Heth; attached to Kanawha division; reports to Pope at Warrenton, Virginia; commanding brig, in Kanawha division; supports Scammon; at South Mt; attached to Sturgis' division at Antietam; carries ford of Antietam above Burnside bridge; promoted brig, general; ordered to Clarksburg, West Virginia; commands Kanawha division; marches from Clarksburg to Gauley Bridge; at Gauley Bridge; transferred to Rosecrans' command in Tennessee; commends discipline of Kanawha division, Cross Lanes, West Virginia, 7th Ohio surprised at and routed; consultation of Rosecrans and Cox at. Cutler, Hon. Wm. P. , M. C. From Marietta, Ohio, expresses popular distrust of Lincoln'sability. DALTON, Georgia, geography of vicinity; impregnable to attack from north or west; operations about; strong character of defensive works. Dana, Chas. A. , Assistant Secretary of War; cipher dispatches to Stanton about Rosecrans and his officers; visits Burnside at Knoxville; reports to Grant; judgment of army officers at Chattanooga; advises Stanton concerning interview between Lincoln andconfederate peace commanders; concerning prayers for the President in Episcopal churches atRichmond. Dandridge, E. Tennessee, affair at; a surprise all around; both armies retreat. Davis, David, Justice of U. S. Supreme Court, change in views regarding trial by military commissions inIndiana; Davis, Henry Winter, M. C. From Maryland, dines with General Cox in Washington; opposes re-election of Lincoln; witty and scathing denunciation of L. Davis, Jefferson, President Confederate States Army, advises with Lee about successor to Bragg; differences with Beauregard and Johnston; finally appoints Johnston; urges aggressive action; correspondence with Johnston; plans thwarted by long discussion; begs Johnston to retreat no further; receives no encouragement from him; sends Bragg to Atlanta to examine and report on condition ofaffairs; relieves Johnston and appoints Hood; convinced Hood needs intellectual guidance; urges Hardee to hold Charleston, and stop Sherman on line ofCombahee River; startled by Beauregard's confession of inability to stop Sherman; notes difference between B. 's estimate of forces available andofficial returns; goes to Danville on fall of Richmond; thence to Greensborough, North Carolina; orders arrest of Governor Vance's peace commanders; advised by all his generals and cabinet that further prosecutionof war was hopeless; authorizes Johnston to negotiate with Sherman; holds last cabinet meeting at Charlotte; unanimous decision that confederacy is conquered; assents to Johnston's surrender; reputed "plunder" nearly all paid out to Johnston's troops and hispersonal escort; tries to escape beyond Mississippi; captured S. E. Of Macon. Davis, Jeff. C. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding division in Army of the Cumberland; movement on Rome; occupies Rome; attached to McPherson's command temporarily; assault on Kennesaw. Dawes, Ephraim C. , major 53rd Ohio, analysis of opposing forces in Atlanta campaign. Dawes, Rufus R. , lieutenant colonel 6th Wisc. , at Antietam; "Service with the Sixth Wisconsin, " cited. Day, D. W. H. , captain and assistant quartermaster, accompanies General Cox on winter ride to E. Tennessee; selects wagons and teams; marks fords; keeps teams moving; secures tents and flies for army headquarters; in charge of horses and mules sent from E. Tennessee to Kentuckyfor pasture; energy commended. Dayton, Ohio, assaults on soldiers at, not punished by local courts; how punished. DeCourcey, John F. , colonel 16th Ohio, in West Virginia campaign fall of '62; moves on Cumberland Gap. Defensive Tactics, generally better in rough country. Dennison, Wm. , Governor of Ohio, prepares State for war; appoints McClellan major general; sends two regiments to Washington; incessant work; urges McClellan to occupy West Virginia in force; at Washington; mediates between Lincoln and McClellan; supported by Cox in Ohio senatorial contest; postmaster general; entertains General Cox. De Trobriand, P. R. , colonel 55th New York, says New York 7th furnished 300 officers for Union army. De Villiers, Chas. A. , brigadier major on General Cox's staff; captured outside of lines at Scary Creek; escapes and reports for duty at Gauley; hazardous ride to report occupation of Cotton Mountain by Floyd; crosses New River, scales cliffs and assaults enemy on CottonMountain. Devin, Thos. C. , colonel 6th New York Cavalry, ordered to report to General Cox. Dick, Robt. P. , resident of Greensborough, North Carolina, in whose grove army headquarters were established, since appointedU. S. District Judge; advises colored people to hire out to others than their oldmasters. Dickson, Wm. M. , cited as to Key's influence over McClellan. Discretion, to be exercised by subordinate on detached service in obeyingorders issued without full knowledge of his position. Doddridge, cashier of a Charleston, West Virginia bank, Union man; paymaster in Union army. Dodge, Grenville M. , major general United States Volunteers, commands 16th Corps; builds bridge over Chattahoochee at Roswell. Donaldson, James L. , colonel United States Volunteers, chiefquartermaster at Nashville, describes Thomas's feelings after Nashville campaign. Doolittle, Chas. C. , colonel 18th Michigan, commanding post at Decatur, repulses Hood; joins General Cox at Stevenson; chief of staff for General Cox; takes command of Reilly's division 23d army corps; carries enemy's intrenchments and captures eight guns at battle ofNashville; and returns to his own regiment when 23d Corps goes to Washington. Doubleday, Abner, brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding division, at Antietam. Douglas, Stephen A. , speech at Columbus after fall of Ft. Sumter; pledges support of Dem. Party to Lincoln's administration. Dow, Tristram T. , major 112th Ill. , appointed inspector general on Cox's staff; reconnoitres fords before Kinston; carries message from Schofield to Hoke. Draft, preferred to system of raising new regiments and letting old onesdie out; Sherman cited; act providing for; weakened by commutation clause; insignificant numbers drafted in Ohio. Drayton, Thos. F. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain Duke, Basil W. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, history of Morgan raid cited. Dunham, Robert T. , captain and assistant adjutant-general on General Geo. W. Taylor's staff at Bull Run bridge, Dunker Church, on battlefield of Antietam, Durell, Geo. W. , captain battery D Pennsylvania Artillery, at South Mountain; at Antietam. Duryea, Abram, brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam. Early, Jubal A. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Antietam. East Tennessee, plans for Union advance into, Rosecrans'; approved by McClellan; Frémont's; ignorance of topography: combination of the two adopted; fails because separate columns defeated and driven back by Jacksonbefore concentration effected; occupation of E. Tennessee urged by Lincoln on all generalofficers in the West; Burnside's plan; proposes railroad from Danville to; Chattanooga best base for supplies; confederate forces in; map of; rejoicing of people at Burnside's coming; terror and indignation when he was ordered to leave and joinRosecrans; military operations in; Sherman's horror of; importance of holding; impossibility of supplying army in, by mountain roads; terrible destruction of draft animals; privations of army in, during winter of; almost unanimous re-enlistment, in spite of hardships; absence of forage; fearful blizzard; sufferings of troops; bitterness of feeling between loyalists and secessionists. East Tennessee troops, unwillingness to serve away from home; discipline lax, courage and devotion unexcelled; 1st Cavalry; 1st Infantry; 6th Infantry; East Tennessee University, at Knoxville, fortified; Echols, John C. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, pursues Lightburn down the Kanawha; supersedes Loring in command of West Virginia forces; resumes positions abandoned by Loring; retreats before General Cox; ordered to make his way from West Virginia into N. W. Part ofSouth Carolina, Effective Total, meaning of, in confederate reports; leads to habitual underestimate of their forces by confederatecommanders. Elliott, Washington L. , colonel 47th Ohio, in West Virginia; in E. Tennessee; at Mossy Creek Ellsworth Zouaves, equal in drill to West Point cadets, Emancipation Proclamation, how received in McClellan's army. Enyart, David A. , lieutenant colonel 1st Kentucky, routs confederate militia at Boone courthouse, West Virginia; crosses Kanawha, scales cliffs and helps capture Cotton Mountain Episcopal Clergy, at Richmond, ordered by Stanton to pray for the President of the U. S. Evans, N. G. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, in Maryland campaign; at Antietam. Ewell, Benj. S. , colonel Confederate States Army, on Johnston's staff; sent to Richmond to explain Johnston's position; reports to Johnston. Ewell, R. S. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, division of, at Antietam, Ewing, Hugh, colonel 30th Ohio, in Kanawha Division; reports to Pope at Warrenton, Virginia; at South Mountain Executive Power, exercised in spite of adverse judicial decisions, Ezra Church, battle of, Fairchild, Harrison S. , colonel 89th New York, at South Mountain; at Antietam. Fayette courthouse, West Virginia, advanced post; Union troops. Ferrero, Edw. , colonel 51st New York, at South Mountain; at Antietam; in E. Tennessee; at Ft. Sanders. Field Intrenchments, development of; facility in making; costliness of assaulting; at New Hope Church; at Cold Harbor; at Ezra Church; confederate troops refuse to assault breastworks; at Kinston. Fitch, E. P. , quartermaster on General Cox's staff; arrives at Alexandria with trains and baggage of Kanawha Division; at Antietam; chief quartermaster District of West Virginia Flat-top Mountain, West Virginia, barrier to approach from S. W. Virginia; advance of Kanawha Division to; key point for movement to S. West Virginia; description of; abandoned by U. S. Troops. Floyd, John B. , unites with Wise to drive Union forces out of Kanawha valley; surprises and routs 7th Ohio at Cross Lanes; mysterious inaction thereafter; defeated at Carnifex Ferry; differences with Wise; marches to Fayette courthouse; and occupies Cotton Mountain, from which he shells Gauley Bridge; driven off the Mountain by General Cox; escapes capture by reason of Benham's inactivity; indirectly commends General Cox's administration of KanawhaDistrict. Foraging, easily degenerates into pillaging and arson; Blair and Howard recommend its prohibition; Sherman promises to stop it after reaching North Carolina; vigorous measures of General Cox to repress; country near Raleigh stripped bare by Slocum's "bummers". Force, Manning F. , lieutenant colonel 20th Ohio; brig, general, married sister of General Pope's wife. Foreign Intervention, threatened. 485. Forrest, Nathan B. , brigadier general cavalry Confederate StatesArmy, captures Col. Bloodgood's command near Nashville; compared with Morgan; successful handling of mounted troops; Mower promoted for reputed defeat of; ordered to join Hood, captures Athens, repulsed at Pulaski; ordered to raid Western Tennessee; causes panic and destruction of three steamboats and stores atJohnsonville; joins Hood at Florence; covers Hood's turning movement east of Columbia; attacks at Spring Hill; absence seriously felt by Hood at battle of Nashville; commands rearguard on Hood's retreat; at Okolona. Forts, masonry and earthworks discussed. Ft. Anderson, Cape Fear River, attacked by "Montauk" and gunboats; captured by General Cox. Ft. Fisher, captured by General Terry; where described. Ft. Sanders, Knoxville, E. Tennessee, named after General W. P. Sanders; described; assault on, by Longstreet's forces, repulsed. Ft. Sumter, bombardment announced in Ohio Senate; occasions popular uprising, without distinction of party; flag raised again by Anderson. Foster, Abby Kelley, shouts "Glory to God" when bombardment of Sumter announced. Foster, John G. , appointed major general United States Volunteers; succeeds Burnside in E. Tennessee; assigns General Cox to command 23d army corps; Sturgis to cavalry corps; demonstrates to Grant impossibility of winter campaign; disabled by fall of horse; gives veteran furlough to several regiments; concentrates at Knoxville; sends horses and mules to pasture in Kentucky; permanent winter quarters; retires from command on account of ill health; again explains to Grant, at Nashville, impossibility of wintercampaign in E. Tennessee. Foster, John W. Colonel United States Volunteers, operations in E. Tennessee; at Mossy Creek Fourth U. S. Artillery, battery B, at Antietam. Fox's Gap, in South Mountain, captured by Kanawha Division under General Cox. Franklin, battle of, undeceives Thomas as to Hood's intentions; where described. Franklin, F. E. , major 37th Ohio, at Princeton, West Virginia Franklin, Wm. B. , major general United States Volunteers, ordered to join Pope; slow in moving; assigned position near Alexandria; relieved on charges preferred by Pope; reinstated at McClellan's request; with 6th army corps, held in reserve, at Antietam. Frazer, John W. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, captured with 2500 men by Burnside at Cumberland Gap. Frederick, Maryland, confederate army concentrates near; evacuated by; a loyal city; demonstration on arrival of Union troops; grand army encamped near. Frémont, John C. , major general United States Volunteers, commands Mountain Department; appointment on political grounds; plan for advance on E. Tennessee; modifies it on Rosecrans' suggestion; separate columns defeated before concentration effected; relieved of command; not again assigned to duty. French, Samuel G. , major general Confederate States Army, joins Johnston's army at Kingston, Georgia French, W. H. , captain and commissary on Burnside's staff. French, Wm. H. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam. French's Mill, West Virginia, operations near. Frietchie, Barbara, a fictitious character. Frink, Chas. S. , surgeon major, General Cox's division; treats General Cox for illness due to exposure after battle ofNashville. Frizell, Jos. W. , lieutenant colonel 11th Ohio; traps confederate cavalry near Hawk's Nest, West Virginia Fry, Jas. B. , colonel and assistant adjutant-general U. S. A. , on Lincoln's reasons for certain military appointments; provost-marshal-general at Washington; ably administers draft laws. Furnace, for tent, field construction. Gallup, Geo. W. , lieutenant colonel 14th Kentucky commanding brigadein 23d army corps, at Johnsonville, Tennessee Garfield, Jas. A. , in Ohio Senate; resolves to enter army; defeated in election for colonel of 7th Ohio; appointed colonel of 42nd Ohio; in Big Sandy valley; Rosecrans' chief of staff; sums up answers of general officers and urges Rosecrans toadvance; influence of his report; sent to Washington with Rosecrans' report after battle ofChickamauga; questioned by Stanton; tells General Cox the story of Chickamauga; leaves army to enter Congress; chairman of commission on military affairs; regard for Rosecrans; letter to Chase about R. 's inaction at Murfreesborough; defended; entertains General Cox in Washington; draws out his guests. Garland, Samuel, Jr. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, killed at South Mountain Garnett, Robt. S. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Beverly, West Virginia; retreats after battle of Rich Mountain; killed near Carrick's Ford; lacking in enterprise. Garrard, Israel, colonel cavalry United States Volunteers, in East Tennessee; at Decatur and Stone Mountain, Georgia Garrard, Kenner, brig, general, commanding cavalry division in McPherson's army; movement on Rome; reports confederate cavalry at Kennesaw superior in numbers; destroys Georgia RAILROAD east of Atlanta; in pursuit of Hood. Garrett, John W. , President B. And Official Records R. Co. , suggests dictatorship of McClellan. Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, key point of Kanawha valley; captured by General Cox with 1500 stand of arms and munitions ofwar; importance of position; map of; how fortified; Rosecrans' headquarters; cannonaded from Cotton Mountain by Floyd; bridge reconstructed; burned on Lightburn's retreat; supplies forwarded to, by batteaux on upper Kanawha; Lightburn's abandonment of, criticised; reoccupied by General Cox. Geary, John W. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Wauhatchie; assaults Rocky Face, at Dug Gap, repulsed with loss. Georgia, map of northern. Gibbon, John, brigadier general United States Volunteers, high opinion of volunteers; deficient knowledge of military history; at South Mountain; at Antietam. Gibbs, Ira B. , lieutenant and com's'y on General Cox's staff; shoots Serg. Joyce of 2nd Kentucky for refusing to obey orders; courtmartialed and acquitted; excused from attending execution of a mutineer. Gibson, Horatio G. , captain 2nd Ohio Artillery, at South Mountain Giddings, Hon. Joshua R. , consul general at Montreal, makes light of plot to releases confederate prisoners. Gilbert, Samuel A. , colonel 44th Ohio, in second Kanawha campaign; marches his brigade 60 miles in 52 hours, in E. Tennessee Gillmore, Quincy A. , brigadier general commanding District of Kentucky; resists Pegram's raid and drives him out of Kentucky Gilmer, Jeremy F. , major general Confederate States Army, Davis'Chief of Engineers, sent to advise with Beauregard. Gilmer, John A. , one of Governor Vance's peace commanders. Goldsborough, North Carolina, place of meeting of Sherman's and Schofield's armies. Goodrich, E. R. , lieutenant colonel, and chief comm's'y on Burnside's staff. Goodrich, Wm. B. , colonel commanding brigade in Greene's division at battle ofAntietam; killed at Antietam. Gordon, Geo. H. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam. Graham, Milton, lieutenant colonel 11th Kentucky Cavalry Graham, Wm. A. , ex-Governor of North Carolina, heads Vance's peace delegation; candidate for Vice President on ticket with Scott; mentioned. Granger, Gordon, captain and mustering officer at Camp Dennison; states reasons why theoretical knowledge of regular army officersso small; appointed major general United States Volunteers; at Chickamauga; sent to relief of Knoxville; dissatisfaction of Grant and Sherman; in E. Tennessee; at Dandridge. Granger, Robt. S. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, sent to reinforce Col. Doolittle at Decatur; posted at Stevenson; suffers pontoon bridge to fall into hands of Hood; ordered to Decatur again. Grant, U. S. , major general United States Volunteers, high opinion of volunteers; accepts emancipation policy as best; policy of attrition; captures Vicksburg; "copious worker and fighter, but a very meagre writer"; growing faith of administration in; in command of Division of the Mississippi; approves substitution of Thomas for Rosecrans; reticent and averse to controversy; hears in silence and decides; good story about Washington; at Chattanooga; culmination of good fortune; sends Granger and Sherman to relief of Knoxville; characteristics; visits army in E. Tennessee; reticence; riding-school story; sees for himself condition of troops and mountain roads; reports destitution and impracticability of supplying army bymountain roads; correspondence with General Foster; asks promotion of Sherman, McPherson, and W. F. Smith; embarrassments about cipher dispatches; objects to Stoneman; correspondence with Schofield; appointed lieutenant general and goes to Washington; scatters army at Chattanooga, to secure supplies and forage; puts Sherman in charge of Western armies and assumes command inVirginia; plans simultaneous advance of eastern and western armies; slow to learn unprofitableness of assaulting intrenched positions; on appointments of brigadiers in Sherman's army; confidence in McPherson; secures his rapid promotion; dissatisfied with Thomas; reasons for his feeling; favors winter campaigns by Sherman and Thomas; plans advance on Selma and Mobile; orders Schofield and 23d corps sent to Washington; praises Sherman's readiness for further operations; sends Schofield to carry out new plan of campaign in NorthCarolina; unselfish attitude toward Sherman; relieves Butler and opposes his further assignment to command; receives confederate peace commanders at his headquarters; congratulates Sherman; outlines his own plans; prevents Lee's union with Johnston; recommends Schofield's appointment as brigadier in regular armyand permanent assignment of Cox and Terry to corps commands; brings administration's disapproval of Sherman-Johnston conventionto Sherman; considerate treatment of Sherman; returns to Washington; condemns injustice to Sherman; smooths away causes of Sherman's irritation. "Grape Vine Telegraph, " Great Smoky Mountains, picturesque character of. Greene, Geo. S. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam; in 20th Corps and on court-martial at Washington; goes to North Carolina, with General Cox and volunteers as staffofficer at Kinston; commands provisional division of returning officers and menbelonging to Sherman's army. Grigsby, A. J. , colonel commanding Winder's brigade, Jackson'sdivision, at Antietam. Guerillas, in West Virginia, annoyance by and suppression of. Guilford-Old-Court-House, North Carolina, and battlefield visited. Gunn, W. A. , locates line for railway from Danville to E. Tennessee Guthrie, J. V. , colonel 1st Kentucky, correspondence with General Cox, App. Army; in West Virginia Guyandotte, West Virginia, taken by 2nd Kentucky; occupied. Habeas Corpus, writ of, used to release minors enlisting without parents' consent; U. S. Officers directed not to recognize, unless issued by U. S. Courts. Hagood, Johnson, brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Ft. Anderson, N. C; routed at Town Creek by General Cox, losing two cannon and 400prisoners; repulsed at Kinston. Halleck, Henry W. , commands Western Department; authorizes Pope to send for General Cox's Kanawha Division; commits defence of Washington to McClellan; sacrifices Pope; owed his appointment as commander in chief largely to Pope; expected to take command in the field; but does not, and remains bureau officer until close of war; responsible in part for McClellan's slow pursuit of Lee inMaryland; sends McClellan peremptory orders to advance after Antietam; persistently favors regular army officers over volunteers; directs Burnside to advance into E. Tennessee; correspondence with Burnside shows forgetfulness and lack ofappreciation; inconsistency between official and private letters to Rosecrans; fails to understand distances and difficulties of transportationin E. Tennessee; indecision of character; wrong interpretation of Burnside's reports and action; thinks personal presence of Grant with Army of Potomacindispensable; criticises Meade; friendly relations with Sherman; correspondence with; on enormous waste of cavalry horses; tells Sherman he is accused of hostility to the blacks; assigned to command Department of Virginia; orders Meade to pay no attention to Sherman's truce; forfeits Sherman's life-long friendship by his orders anddispatches after Sherman-Johnston convention; goes to Pacific coast at close of war and dies soon after; disclaims personal hostility to Sherman; explanation of his attitude; notes complete submission to U. S. Authority at Richmond. Hamilton, Schuyler, appointed major general United States Volunteers; resigns. Hammond, John W. , lieutenant colonel 65th Indiana at battle of Nashville. Hampton, Wade, brigadier general Confederate States Army, at the Monocacy; at South Mountain; appointed lieutenant general to outrank Wheeler; opposed to Vance's peace negotiations; retires from Raleigh; arranges for interview bet. Johnston and Sherman; refuses to be included in Johnston's capitulation. Hancock, Winfield S. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam; sent from 6th Corps to command Richardson's division 2nd Corps; classmate of McClellan. Hanson, Chas. S. , lieutenant colonel 20th Kentucky, captured at Lebanon, Kentucky Hardee, Wm. J. , lieutenant general Confederate States Army; succeeds Bragg in temporary command Army of Georgia; declines permanent command; quoted by Davis; sent to reinforce Polk; forces increased; at Dallas; at battle of Atlanta; controversy with Hood; at Jonesboro; impeaches Hood's statement of his losses; transferred to Savannah; evacuates Charleston; rumored junction with Bragg; fails to reach Wilmington; forces of; low estimate contradicted by official reports; reports to Bragg at Goldsborough; at Averasborough; commands army in absence of Johnston; arranges details of capitulation with Schofield; reputation and character of; end of war only a question of time after first year; humorous report of General Cox's treatment of old woman asking forprovisions; reported Salkehatchie swamps impassable when Sherman was marchingthrough them at rate of 13 miles a day; determines to go abroad for a time. Hardie, Jas. A. , colonel United States Volunteers and inspector general Harker, Chas. G. , commanding brig, in Newton's division 4th armycorps, at Rocky Face; relieves Hanson's brigade at Resaca; wounded at Resaca. Harland, Edw. , colonel 8th Conn. , at South Mountain; at Antietam; commanding brigade in Palmer's division at Kinston. Harper's Ferry, attacked by Jackson; and taken; A. P. Hill left in charge of. Harrison, Benj. , colonel 70th Indiana, detailed to stump State of Indiana in 1864. Hartranft, John F. , colonel 51st Pennsylvania, at Antietam; in E. Tennessee; repulses McLaws at Campbell's Station Hartsuff, Geo. L. , captain and assistant adjutant-general on Rosecrans' staff; appointed brigadier general, wounded at Antietam and appointedmajor general; assigned to command 23d army corps; sent to arrange plans with Rosecrans for simultaneous advance; commands District of Kentucky; directed to capture Morgan raiders; disabled by old wounds; attends to office business at Knoxville; decides to retire; inspector general on Schofield's staff, in charge of parolingJohnston's army; telegraphs "Johnston's army dissolving and raising the devil". Harvie, Edwin J. , inspector general on General Johnston's staff. Hascall, Milo S. , commands District of Indiana; removed on Governor Morton's application; commands 3rd division 23d army corps; in E. Tennessee; transferred to 2nd division same; near New Hope Church; distinguished services throughout campaign, never recognized; not favored by Governor Morton; at Kolb's farm; moves to Cox's position south of Olley's Creek; at Decatur, Georgia; resigns on account of Governor Morton's hostility and Hovey'spromotion over him. Hatch, John P. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, calls for three cheers from Pope's army on learning that McClellanwas in command again; Pope's dissatisfaction with; takes position on Cox's left in defences of Washington. Haupt, Herman, colonel and military superintendent of railways, at Alexandria, Virginia, Hawley, Jos. R. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commands coast District of North Carolina Hayes, Rutherford B. , lieutenant colonel 23d Ohio, Judge Adv. At trial of Gibbs; at Princeton, West Virginia; criticised by General Reno; charge of pillaging brought out in Presidential campaign; wounded at South Mountain; letter in regard to discipline of Kanawaha Division Hazen, Wm. B. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Chattanooga; ordered in arrest by Sheridan at Dandridge; good qualities and faults of; released on mediation of General Cox. Heintzelman, Samuel P. , major general United States Volunteers, temporarily commanding Franklin's corps. Henderson, Thos. J. , colonel 112th Ill. , commanding brig, in Cox'sdivision 23d army corps, absence on account of illness; brevet brigadier general; in advance up right bank Cape Fear River Heth, Henry, brigadier general Confederate States Army, in West Virginia; at Pearisburg; at narrows of New River; French's; defeated by Crook at Lewisburg, West Virginia Hill, Ambrose P. , major general Confederate States Army, at Bull Run bridge; at Harper's Ferry; at Antietam. Hill, Benj. H. , goes to Richmond to ask that Johnston be reinforced; correspondence with Seddon; visits Union army to obtain body of son and confer with Sherman. Hill, Chas. W. , brigadier general Ohio Valley Infantry, in West Virginia Hill, Daniel H. , major general Confederate States Army, left to guard Richmond; rearguard in Maryland; at South Mountain; at Antietam; commanding at Augusta, Georgia, ordered to join Johnston in NorthCarolina; reports to Bragg at Kinston; captures many prisoners from Upham's brigade; attack on hastily intrenched line repulsed; forces of, at Kinston. Hines, Jonathan D. , major 12th Ohio, in charge of scouts in W, Virginia; on reconnoitring expeditions; in charge of sentinels in rear on retreat from Big Sewell Mountain Hines, Thos. H. , captain cavalry in Morgan's raid. Hitchcock, Ethan A. , major general United States Volunteers, chairman committee to revise Articles of War, and armyregulations. Hitchcock, Henry, major and assistant adjutant-general on GeneralSherman's staff, carries "Memorandum" between Sherman and Johnston to Washington; brings back disapproval--and Grant. Hobson, Edw. H. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, in Morgan raid. Hoffman, Wm. , colonel and comm's'y of prisoners at Washington. Hofmann, J. Wm. , lieutenant colonel 56th Pennsylvania, succeeds to command of brigade, at Antietam. Hoke, Robt. F. , major general Confederate States Army, at Federal Point, North Carolina; retreats when General Cox threatens Wilmington; opposes advance of General Cox at Kinston; routs Upham's brigade of new troops; repulsed by Carter; repulsed again with heavy loss; offer to exchange prisoners declined. Holden, Wm. W. , leader of Union element in North Carolina, joins Graham's peace delegation, mentioned. Holmes, Wm. W. , major, surgeon 12th Ohio, brigadier surgeon on General Cox's staff; dies of consumption. Holmes Co. , Ohio, armed resistance to draft. Hood, John B. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain; at Antietam; mentioned; rosy picture of condition of Johnston's army; corps increased; at Resaca; at New Hope Church; repulses Hooker's assault; attacks advanced brigades of Hooker's and Schofield's corps atKolb's farm; succeeds Johnston, and assumes aggressive; criticism of Johnston; involved in disputes with Hardee and Cheatham as well as Johnston; reputation for accuracy and candor damaged; appointment gives satisfaction to Union army; unsuccessful attacks on Union forces at Peachtree Creek; Atlanta; Ezra Church; at Jonesboro; evacuates Atlanta; reports refusal of his army to attack intrenched positions; forces of, Aug. 1st; Sept. 20th; absurd minimizing of his losses in battle; depression in his army; changes his subordinate officers; plans to renew struggle; recrosses Chattahoochee; fails to injure Sherman's communications; futile October campaign; plans for invasion of Tennessee; repulsed at Decatur, Alabama; delays crossing the Tennessee River; ordered by Beauregard to resume offensive at once; adopts tactics of skirmishing advance while looking for ways toturn Schofield's position; terrible repulse at Franklin, where described; takes position at Nashville; at battle of Nashville; escapes owing to cold rainstorms and impassable roads; severe losses at Franklin, Nashville, and on retreat; forces of Jan. 20, 1864; part of his army present at battle of Kinston, North Carolina; constitutes bulk of those who capitulated with Johnston. Hooker, Jos. , major general United States Volunteers, assigned to command Porter's corps; afterwards, McDowell's; in pursuit of Lee; at South Mountain; Burnside's stinging reply to untrue report of, note; ordered to extreme right at Antietam; his march; at battle of Antietam; wounded and retires; sent with two corps to reinforce Rosecrans at Chattanooga; at Tunnel Hill; assault on Rocky Face, fails; at Snake Creek Gap; at Resaca; ordered to cross Oostanaula at Newtown; instead, takes route assigned to Schofield and delays latter; does same at crossing of Etowah; assaults confederate lines at New Hope Church repulsed; movements near; repulses attack by Hood's corps at Kolb's farm; reports whole of Johnston's army in his immediate front; reinforced; at Peachtree Creek; offended at Howard's promotion to command Army of Tennessee; unacceptable to Halleck, retires from active service. Hopkins, Henry H. , notorious secessionist in Kanawha valley; controversy with General Cox over escaped slave. Hosea, Lewis M. , captain on General Wilson's staff, adventurous ride throughGeorgia and back to carry dispatches to Sherman. Hovey, Alvin P. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Dalton; at Rocky Face; handling of division not satisfactory to Schofield; who asks his removal; Sherman declines to remove; at Snake Creek Gap; at Resaca; hindered by Hooker on march to Cassville; movements near New Hope Church; tenders resignation as division commander; its acceptance recommended by Sherman; promoted to be major general by brevet, on political grounds; Sherman's indignation; honored above other brigadiers in same corps who outranked him and were rendering distinguished service. Howard, Oliver O. , major general United States Volunteers, commands 4th army corps; at Tunnel Hill; at Rocky Face; at Dalton; at Resaca; comes to support of Cox; holds position captured by Cox; crosses at Resaca; turns confederate right at Pickett's Mill; at Olley's Creek; at Peachtree Creek; commands Army of the Tennessee; at battle of Ezra Church; at Jonesboro; accompanies Sherman's march to the sea; turns Johnston's left at Bentonville; on march to Raleigh. Howe, Albion P. , captain 4th U. S. Artillery, in West Virginia Humes, Rev. Thos. W. , S. T. D. , loyalty and learning; President of E. Tennessee University; author of "The Loyal Mountaineers of Tennessee". Humphreys, Benj. G. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, assaults Ft. Sanders. Hunter, David, major general United States Volunteers, sent to inspect army at Chattanooga; report concerning Grant. Hurlbut, Stephen A. , appointed major general Illinois Troops, 19th Infantry; 65th Infantry; 112th Infantry; 5th Cavalry; Barker's Cavalry; Schambeck's Indiana Cavalry Inactivity in field, evil results of. Indiana Troops, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry; 33rd Infantry; 51st Infantry; 63rd Infantry; 65th Infantry; 70th Infantry; 23d Cavalry Information of enemy's strength, how gained. Inspector General, important duties of. Intemperance in army officers, evils of. Interference with lines of march of other columns condemned; illustrations. Irvine, James, colonel 16th Ohio, fails to intercept remnant of Garnett's force. Irwin, Wm. H. , colonel 49th Pennsylvania, commanding brigade at Antietam. Jackson, Thos. J. ("Stonewall"), defeated at Kernstown; defeats Milroy at McDowell; Banks in Shenandoah valley; captures Manassas Junction, burns Bull Run bridge; at Antietam. Jackson, Wm. H. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, commanding division in Forrest's cavalry Jenifer, W. H. , colonel at Princeton, West Virginia Jenkins, A. G. , colonel of cavalry under Floyd; trapped by Frizell at Hawk's Nest; cavalry raid in West Virginia; opposed by Cranor; covers Loring's retreat; and Echols'; abandons Tyler Mountain; forces of. Jenkins, Micah, brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Wauhatchie; in E. Tennessee Johnson, Andrew, Mil. Governor of Tennessee, asks to have E. Tennessee troops returned to their homes; Governor of Tennessee Johnson's Island, Sandusky Bay, military prison; plot to release confederate prisoners at, defeated; description of, and surroundings; treatment of prisoners. Johnson, Richard W. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, in Tennessee; at Battle of Nashville. Johnston, Jos. E. , lieutenant general Confederate States Army, resigns commission in U. S. Army; McClellan's principal opponent; urged by Longstreet to unite with him near Knoxville; ordered to assist Polk near Meridian; prevented from doing either by demonstration of Thomas; appointed as successor to Bragg; expected to assume aggressive; objects; prolonged discussion; lack of enterprise; bent on defensive campaign; demands reinforcements; unsatisfactory relations with Davis; forces opposed to Sherman; skilful avoidance of battle in the open; fails to anticipate McPherson's move; fortifies Resaca, abandons Dalton; evacuates Resaca; careful defensive; decides to give battle near Adairsville; concludes not to; retreats to Kingston and Cassville; issues orders to join battle at Cassville; revokes them on statements of Hood and Polk that Union left(General Cox) enfiladed their position; retreats across the Etowah; abandons New Hope lines; lets go Pine Mountain; withdraws left flank behind Mud Creek; abandons lines about Marietta; retires behind Chattahoochee; relations with confederate administration reach a crisis; gives Davis no encouragement that he will hold Atlanta or attackenemy; had he revealed his plans would have been retained; demands that Hood be courtmartialed; removal equivalent to a Union victory; attacks at Peachtree Creek and Atlanta made in accordance with hisplans; underestimate of his forces; assumes command in the Carolinas; forces at his disposal; foresees importance of checking Schofield's advance; orders Bragg to strike at General Cox; attacks Slocum at Bentonville; repulsed; losses at Averasborough and Bentonville; at Raleigh; requests armistice; confers with Davis; declares further prosecution of war hopeless; sends dispatch to Sherman requesting conference; distress when advised of Lincoln's assassination; admits slavery is dead; will surrender all armies east of Mississippi; notified of termination of truce; signs capitulation on terms granted to Lee; form of parole; asks for loan of confederate animals and enough arms to enforcediscipline; capitulation includes all east of Chattahoochee River; reply to Sherman's farewell letter; orders to Hampton; sends Hardee to confer with Schofield about details; meets Schofield and Cox; unable to approximate number of troops to be paroled; praises Sherman and his army; "no such army since days of Julius Cassar"; gives up struggle without bitterness; denounces assassination of Lincoln; scrupulous integrity illustrated; moves southward with his troops. Jomini, importance of his books to theoretical training of an officer. Jones, David R. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain; at Antietam. Jones, John R. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Antietam. Jones, Samuel, major general Confederate States Army, commanding in E. Tennessee; forces of; retreats and burns bridges; resumes the aggressive; driven out of E. Tennessee Judah, Henry M. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding division in 23d army corps; on Morgan raid; at Dalton; at Rocky Face; near Resaca; on march to Cassville; hindered by Hooker; relieved. Kanawha Division, training of; marching powers; hardiness and self-reliance; composition of; marches 90 miles over rough mountain roads in 3-1/2 days; transferred to Washington; train of, supplies 9th army corps with rations; two regiments report to Pope at Warrenton; two resist Jackson at Bull Run bridge; rest occupy defences about Washington; united again; temporarily attached to 9th Corps; takes advance from Washington to South Mountain; reviewed and praised by General Reno; wrongly accused of straggling and pillaging; at the Monocacy; captures Fox's Gap and turns confederate position at SouthMountain; opposed to more than double its number; fine conduct of; losses at South Mountain; captures 600 prisoners; on march to Antietam; divided just before battle of Antietam; at Antietam; ordered to Clarksburg, West Virginia; leaves Army of the Potomac. Kanawha River, course and character of; advance of General Cox up; impracticability of invading E. Virginia by this line; unpublished letters and dispatches relating to campaign in; abandoned by Lightburn; annexed to Department of the Ohio; recovered and occupied by General Cox. Kautz, August V. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, pursues Morgan raiders. Kearney, Philip, brigadier general United States Volunteers, killed at Chantilly. Keith, F. M. , major 117th Ohio, defends Hamilton, Ohio, against Morgan raiders. Kelley, B. F. , colonel 1st West Virginia; takes Philippi, West Virginia; character and services of; under McClellan; commands upper Potomac; guards B. & Official Records R. Kelley, Wm. , jailer at Charleston, West Virginia, denounced. Kennedy, Robt. P. , lieutenant and assistant adjutant-general on Scammon's staff. Kentucky Troops, 1st Infantry; 2nd Infantry; threatened mutiny; mentioned; 14th Infantry; 16th Infantry; 20th Infantry; 24th Infantry; 5th Cavalry; 9th Cavalry; 11th Cavalry; Simmonds' battery in West Virginia; attached to Kanawha division; at South Mountain; at Antietam. Ketchum, Edgar, lieutenant signal corps U. S. A. , at Cape Fear River Key, Thos. M. , Democratic leader in Ohio Senate; thought people gone stark mad; supports war measures; aide-de-camp on McClellan's staff; satisfied slavery ought to be abolished; influence over McClellan. Kilpatrick, Judson, brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding cavalry at Resaca; covers Union left at Bentonville; on march to Raleigh; clatters through Raleigh; thinks Johnston not to be trusted; furnishes escort for Sherman on way to meet Johnston; attached to Schofield's command. Kimball, Nathan, brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding division in 4th army corps; displaced by assignment of Couch to the corps. Kinglake's Crimean War, published in 1863; read with interest by General Cox; inspires him with hope and confidence in Union army. Kingsbury, Henry W. , colonel 11th Conn. , at Antietam; killed at Burnside bridge. Kinston, North Carolina, situation of; field works before; battles of; confederate ironclad in Neuse River destroyed; map of vicinity; occupied by Union forces; base of supplies. Knights of the Golden Circle. Knoxville, E. Tennessee, situation and fortifications; invested by Longstreet. Kolb's (Culp's) Farm, battle of. Kountz, W. J. , captain in charge of water transportation on Kanawha. La Grange, Oscar H. , colonel 1st Wisc. Cavalry, at Sevierville, E. Tennessee; captured by Wheeler at Dalton. Lane, P. P. , captain in 11th Ohio, bridges Elk River at Charleston, West Virginia; manages ferries across Kanawha, improvises ferryboats, etc. ; later colonel of regiment. Laurel Mountain, fortified and held by Garnett. Lawton, Alex. R. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Antietam; wounded. Leavitt, Humphrey H. , Judge U. S. District Court. Cincinnati, hears Vallandigham _habeas corpus_ case and refuses writ; good effects of his decision; issues writs of _habeas corpus_ for release of minors enlistingwithout parents' consent. Lee, FitzHugh, brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain Lee, Robt. E. , resigns commission in U. S. Army; appointed major general and commander in chief of Virginia forces; plans invasion of West Virginia; arrives at Lewisburg, West Virginia, and takes command of army; at Big Sewell Mountain; retires to Meadow Bluff; admits quieting effect of Cox's administration in Kanawha valley; moves into Maryland; accurate information as to Cox's transfer to Washington; unites with Jackson; concentrates near Frederick, Maryland; copy of orders for Maryland campaign falls into McClellan's hands; escapes disaster by McClellan's slowness; withdraws to Sharpsburg; plans with reference to McClellan's lack of aggressiveness; force greatly inferior to McClellan's for two days before battle; enabled to concentrate whole army except one division; left wing almost destroyed at Antietam; had no better success than western generals when opposed to Grant; orders Loring to clear Kanawha valley; learned that General Cox was ordered to return to Kanawha valleywithin three days after order was issued; defeated at Gettysburg; suggests Beauregard as successor to Bragg; declines to assume command of Bragg's army; deference and cordiality in dealings with confederateadministration; urges union of Johnston and Longstreet and aggressive campaign; becomes as cautiously defensive as Johnston; general in chief of Confederate States Army; sees net closing around him; too weak to extend lines at Petersburg; unable to unite with Johnston; surrender reported to Davis and Johnston. Lee, S. D. , lieutenant general Confederate States Army, in Department of the Mississippi; at Jonesboro; ordered to Atlanta; commands Hood's old corps; at Flint River; at Columbia; wounded at Nashville, turns command over to D. H. Hill. Lee, Samuel P. , rear admiral U. S. N. , in command of river fleets co-operating with Thomas; transports A. J. Smith's corps to Eastport. Letcher, John, Governor of Virginia, proclaims secession of State, transfers Virginia troops toConfederate States Army. Liberty of speech, abused by Vallandigham and followers. Lightburn, Jos. A. J. , colonel 4th West Virginia; character of; protects line of supplies, Kanawha division; suppresses guerillas; left in command of Kanawha district, when General Cox wastransferred to Washington; Lee learns forces of; destroys stores and bridges, and retreats down valley; retreat panicky and unnecessary;advances up valley under General Cox;relieved of command of division. Lincoln, Abraham, President of U. S. , restores McClellan to command; embarrassed by dissensions of officers; grants all of McClellan's requests; distrusted by his party; Emancipation Proclamation; visits battlefield of Antietam; urges McClellan to follow up his success; military sagacity; exceeds authority in appointing major and brig, generals; proclamation against treasonable practices; commutes Vallandigham's sentence; practically revokes his own proclamation and Burnside's order No. 38; ardent wish to relieve loyal E. Tenneseeans; quaint description of Grant; congratulates Burnside; authorizes him to hold E. Tennessee; anxious about B. 's safety; approves B. 's conduct in E. Tennessee; makes promotions on political grounds; congratulates Sherman; popular estimate of, better than politicians'; policy as to confederate States on submission announced to andfollowed by Sherman;authorizes Virginia legislature to assemble; recalls permission; policy opposed and criticised by Stanton; funeral cortége photographed, in New York City Hall; in Richmond, when Stanton orders prayers for the President of theU. S. To be read in churches. Logan, John A. , major general United States Volunteers, at Huntsville, Alabama; commands 15th army corps; sent to Illinois to stump State; why not promoted to command Army of the Tennessee; praised by Sherman for his handling of that army at battle ofAtlanta. Long, Eli, colonel 4th Ohio Cavalry, on relief expedition to Knoxville, Longstreet, James, major general Confederate States Army, unites with Jackson against Pope; at Boonsboro, Maryland; at South Mountain; withdraws to Sharpsburg; at Antietam; no more successful than western generals when transferred to theWest; sent to reinforce Bragg; at Chickamauga; moves on Knoxville; invests city; assaults Ft. Sanders; repulsed; raises siege and retires toward Virginia; at Rutledge, E. Tennessee; at Morristown; lack of clothing and supplies; attacks Union forces at Dandridge; admits defeat at Sevierville; plans of campaign; forces, opposed to Schofield; ordered to rejoin Lee's army; later to join Johnston; again to report to Lee. Loomis, Cyrus O. , colonel 1st Mich, Artillery in West Virginia Loring, Wm. W. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, in West Virginia; reinforces Lee; sent to Stanton; commanding all West Virginia forces; ordered to push things in West Virginia; attacks Siber, and is repulsed; drives Lightburn out of Kanawha valley; retreats on arrival of General Cox; relieved from command; forces of. Love, John, brigadier general United States Volunteers, defends Vernon, Indiana, against Morgan raiders. Lowe, John W. , colonel 12th Ohio, at Scary Creek, West Virginia; killed at Carnifex Ferry. Lowe, Wm. W. , colonel 5th Indiana commanding 3rd Cavalry Division, protects railway in rear of Sherman's advance. Lyons, Lord, British Ambassador, reports plot to release confederate prisoners; Lytle, Wm. H. , colonel 10th Ohio; wounded at Carnifex Ferry. McArthur, John, brigadier general United States Volunteers, at battle of Nashville. McCallum, Dan'l C. , superintendent of transportation, inspects Nashville and Chattanooga railroad; suggests needed improvements. McClellan, Geo. B. , consulted by Governor Dennison; personal appearance; appointed major general Ohio Valley Infantry; inspects Ohio State arsenal; selects site for Camp Dennison; takes General Cox's regiments to West Virginia; appointed major general in regular army; victory at Philippi credited to; moves against Garnett; Pegram surrenders to; appointed commander Army of the Potomac; rhetorical dispatches contrasted with personal demeanor; characteristic faults shown in first campaign; relieved from command of all other forces except Army of Potomac; at Alexandria, Virginia; greets General Cox cordially, explains importance of his duties; discusses Peninsular campaign; dress and popular bearing; in command again; cheered by Pope's army; habitual overestimate of Lee's army; victim or accomplice of secret service; false estimates fatal to success; predicted Pope's defeat; responsible for delay in Franklin's movement; Porter and Franklin reassigned to their commands and McDowell relieved at his request; plenary powers; slow advance in pursuit of Lee; secures copy of Lee's orders; loses his advantage by delay; at South Mountain; breaks up organization of his army on eve of battle; examines battlefield under fire; does not appreciate importance of time; personally selects positions for different divisions; plan of battle at Antietam; dilatory habits and orders responsible for failure to crush Lee; no co-ordination of corps movements; orders Burnside to attack; unjust criticism of 9th Corps advance; fails to support 9th Corps when attacked by fresh troops from Harper's Ferry; talks with General Cox; politics; consults his officers about emancipation proclamation; issues General Order No. 163; tempted to assume dictatorship; chafes at Lincoln's suggestion to follow up victory; defeats Lincoln's plans without openly antagonizing; compared to Marshal Daun; weakened morale of army; removed from command; "Own Story" exposes his weakness; confidential relations with Burnside; favoritism toward Porter; jealous of Burnside; unjust reprimand of B. In unsigned dispatch; effect of reprimand on their relations; not assigned to duty again; superior to any other commander of Army of Potomac until Grantcame. McCook, Alex. McD. , inspector and mustering officer at Camp Jackson; colonel 1st Ohio Inf; opinion on expediency of Rosecrans' advance. McCook, Daniel, major and paymaster U. S. A. , mortally wounded in fight with Morgan raiders. McCook, Edw. M. , brigadier general U. S. Cavalry, at Sevierville, E. Tennessee; rejoins Thomas; covers left flank at Varnell's; defeated by Wheeler; useful scouting in Atlanta campaign. McCook, Robt. , colonel 9th Ohio; at Carnifex Ferry; Cross Lanes; character of; brigade attached to Cox's command; "Battle of Bonticou"; at Gauley Bridge; advance on Fayette courthouse McCoy, James C. , major and aide-de-camp on Sherman's staff, opens communication with Johnston. McDowell, Irvin, major general United States Volunteers, maps country about Washington; disliked by McClellan; under McC. 's orders at Washington; absence from his command before second battle of Bull Run, disarranges Pope's plans; relieved at McClellan's request; requests Court of Inquiry; unscrupulously maligned; ordered before a courtmartial. McElroy, Jas. N. , captain and assistant adjutant-general on General Cox's staff; appointed major 20th Ohio; lieutenant colonel, returns to duty on General Cox's staff asinspector general. McLaws, Lafayette, major general Confederate States Army; at Antietam; in E. Tennessee; commands troops on evacuation of Charleston. McLean, N. H. , major and assistant adjutant-general at Cincinnati; accused of disloyalty and sent to Pacific coast; Burnside's protest. McMullin, Jas. R. , captain 1st Ohio Battalion; attached to Kanawha division; at South Mountain McPherson, Jas. B. , appointed major general United States Volunteers; assigned to command Army of the Tennessee; Sherman's right before Dalton; goes through Snake Creek Gap, without opposition; fails to take Resaca, or break railroad; captures position commanding railroad bridge at Resaca, andcompels its evacuation; march to Kingston; crosses the Etowah; moves on Dallas; repels fierce assault; swings over to Ackworth; seeks to interpose between Marietta and the Chattahoochee; moves to Roswell and crosses Chattahoochee; attacked on front and left flank at Atlanta; death of, a great loss to army and personal loss to Sherman; affability and high character. McQuiston, John C. , colonel 50th Ohio, commanding brig, in Ruger's div, 23d army corps at Kinston; captures 300 prisoners. McRae, D. K. , colonel 5th North Carolina, at South Mountain; at Antietam. Mackall, W. W. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, chief of staff to Bragg and Johnston; removed from that position by Hood. Magilton, Albert L. , colonel 4th Pennsylvania res. Commanding brigade at Antietam. Magrath, A. G. , Governor of South Carolina, says fate of confederate involved in Sherman's march fromSavannah; mentioned. Mahone, Wm. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain Mallory, S. R. , Secretary of Navy in Davis' cabinet, writes letter sent by Johnston to Sherman inviting conference; at last cabinet meeting; reaches his home after capitulation. Malloy, A. G. , colonel 17th Wisc, commanding brigade in Carter's division at Kinston. Mansfield, Jos. K. F. , major general United States Volunteers, assigned to command Banks' (12th) corps; at Antietam; mortally wounded; movements and losses of his corps. Manson, Mahlon D. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, pursues Morgan raiders; commands 2nd division 23d army corps; relieved by White; in temporary command of corps; turns command over to General Cox; at Resaca; severely injured. Marcy, Randolph B. , father-in-law of General McClellan and chief of staff; responsibility for Burnside's reprimand. Marietta, Georgia, military operations near; map of vicinity. Marshall, Humphrey, brigadier general Confederate States Army Martial Law, when proper, outside field of military operations; declared in S. Ohio counties during Morgan raid. Martin, Wm. T. , major general Confederate States Army, in E. Tennessee; defeated at Sevierville; ordered to join Johnston with cavalry; at Calhoun and Resaca. Mason, John S. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding camps at Columbus; ordered to suppress draft riots; precautions against plots to release confederate prisoners. Massachusetts Troops, 21st; 27th; 8th Artillery, Matthews, Stanley, lieutenant colonel 23d Ohio, Maury, Dabney H. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, in E. Tennessee; at Mobile. Maynard, Horace, M. C. From E. Tennessee; asks to have E. Tennessee regiments returned to their homes; influential representative, Meade, George G. , brigadier general, at Antietam; succeeds to command of 1st Corps; appointed major general; inactivity after Gettysburg and consequences; excessive caution. Meagher, Thos. F. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding provisional division of Sherman's convalescents and newrecruits; leaves his command without authority; relieved; spicy correspondence concerning; command turned over to General Carter. Measles, a dangerous camp disease, Meigs, Montgomery C. , quartermaster general, nearly correct estimate of Lee's forces; at Chattanooga; never saw such roads; reports strength of position and confidence of army; approves seizure of railroads by Sherman. Merrill, W. E. , colonel and eng. , in charge of railroad defences; on construction and use of blockhouses. Michigan Troops, 18th; 25th; 1st Artillery Military Executions, Militia, contained more well-drilled regiments than regular army atoutbreak of war. Militia, Ohio, lack of uniforms and equipment; elect their own officers; should have been officered by young regular army officers; re-enlistment of; high character of; called out during Morgan raid; and to resist attempt to release confederate prisoners. Miller, D. R. , house and barn at Antietam, Milligan, Lambdin P. , condemned to death for treasonable practices by militarycommission; discharged by U. S. Supreme Court. Milroy, Robt. H. , brigadier general in West Virginia; defeated by Stonewall Jackson; ordered to Kanawha valley; character of; promotion urged by Governor Morton; lack of transportation; at Beverly; controversy with Col. Cluseret; lacked judgment. Minors, enlisting without parents' consent, how released, Missionary Ridge, depressing effect of loss on confederacy; natural strength of; no commander would have ordered front attack. Monocacy River, skirmish at. "Montauk, " monitor, excellent practice in bombardment of Ft. Anderson, North Carolina, Moor, August, colonel 28th Ohio, in West Virginia; at Raleigh courthouse; at Princeton; at Wolf Creek; French's; commanding 2nd brigade Kanawha division; at the Monocacy, captured; paroled; valuable hint. Moore, Orlando H. , colonel 25th Michigan, repulses Morgan's attack on Green River bridge; commanding brigade in 23d army corps; at Columbia; in movement up right bank, Cape Fear River Morehead, John M. , ex-Governor of North Carolina, entertains Schofield and Cox at Greensborough; war experiences of family. Morell, Geo. W. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam, Morgan, Edwin D. , major general United States Volunteers, resigns. Morgan, Geo. W. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, Cumberland Gap expedition; bad condition of command; E. Tennessee and Kentucky troops discontented; in Kanawha valley; ordered to Cincinnati. Morgan, John H. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, raid into Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio; captured and imprisoned in Ohio penitentiary; escapes; futility of raid from military standpoint; wholly unauthorized. Morris, Thos. A. , brigadier general commanding Indiana brigade; takes Philippi, West Virginia; pursues Garnett; captures cannon and wagons. Morton, Oliver P. , war Governor of Indiana, favors Milroy's promotion; urges appointment of Rosecrans to succeed Buell; dominant influence in Indiana appointments and promotions; asks for detail of army officers to stump State. Mott, Samuel R. , colonel 118th Ohio, in E. Tennessee; at Mossy Creek Mountain Department, constituted, and Frémont placed in command; abolished when Frémont relieved. Mountain Howitzers, use of. Mower, Jos. A. , brigadier general U. S. A. , recommended by Sherman to succeed Sooy Smith in cavalry command; promoted major general on mistaken report that he had defeated andkilled Forrest. Mumma House, at Antietam. Myers, Jas. H. , captain 23d Indiana Bat. , at Cheney's. Nagle, James, brigadier general United States Volunteers, at South Mountain; at Antietam. Nashville, situation and lines of communication; fortified and garrisoned; conditions before battle of; map of part of battlefield; Schofield and Wilson's attack at. Neff, Geo. W. , lieutenant colonel 2nd Kentucky, captures Guyandotte, West Virginia; taken prisoner at Scary Creek; defends Camp Dennison against Morgan raiders. New Berne, North Carolina, base of supply for Sherman's army. New Hope Church, fighting at; formidable character of works. New Jersey, Taylor's brigade, disorderly retreat from Bull Run bridge; honorable exceptions; 13th Infantry at Antietam. Newspaper Correspondents, difficulties of officers in field with; "write down" some; and make fictitious reputations for others. Newton, John, major general United States Volunteers, assigned to command Sheridan's division, 4th army corps; at Rocky Face, Georgia New York Seventh Regiment, equal in drill to West Point cadets; furnished 300 officers for other volunteer regiments. New York Troops, 51st; 6th Cavalry, attached to Kanawha division temporarily; 12th Cavalry, at Kinston; 4th Heavy Artillery, reports to General Cox. Night retreats, not to be commended, panicky conditions. Noble County, Ohio, resists the draft. Non-Combatants, usual treatment of; losses and perils of, in field of operations; straits of. Officers, qualifications of good; business training helpful to; Union, usually serving in grades above their rank; unfit, retained upon roster, deprived capable, of their justreward; best qualities not learned at school; good subordinates not always fit for high command. Official Returns, preferable to general estimates of commanding generals; of confederate forces in North Carolina confessedly defective. Ohio Democrats, at first opposed to putting down secession; revulsion of feeling after bombardment of Sumter; nominate Vallandigham for Governor. Ohio Senate, when bombardment of Sumter announced; members drill on State House terrace. Ohio State Election, fall of '63, excitement attending; soldiers vote in; overwhelming defeat of Vallandigham; good effect of, felt throughout North. Ohio Troops, in general; 1st; 3rd; 4th; 5th; 7th; 8th; 9th; 10th; 11th; 12th; 13th; 14th and 15th; 16th; 17th; 18th; 19th; 20th; 21st; 22nd; 23d; 26th; 28th; 30th; 34th; 37th; 40th; 42nd; 44th and 47th; 50th; 52nd; 61st; 89th, 91st, and 92nd; 93rd; 100th; 103rd; 104th; 115th; 118th; 125th; Cavalry, see BURDSALL, LONG, and PFAU; Artillery, see BARNETT, COCKERILL, and McMULLIN. Osterhaus, Peter J. , brig, general, promoted major general on political grounds; returns to 15th army corps, and serves throughout war. Paine, Chas. J. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding div of colored troops at Federal Ft. , N C.. Palmer, Innes N. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Beaufort, North Carolina; Batchelder's Creek; Gum Swamp; in front of British Road; ordered to support Carter; and demonstrate toward Southwest Creek; exaggerated impression of enemy's strength; at second battle of Kinston; division incorporated with Carter's under command of latter; commands District of Beaufort. Palmer, John M. , major general United States Volunteers; at Tunnel Hill; in Snake Creek Gap; at Resaca; crosses river at Resaca, following Howard; deprived of Davis' division; complains; corps reunited; at Peachtree Creek Parke, John G. , Burnside's chief of staff; character and services; appointed major general; assigned to command 9th army corps; sent to Vicksburg with corps; returns and goes on sick leave; leads 9th army corps to Cumberland Gap; chief of staff in E. Tennessee; in command 9th army corps; meeting with Grant; at Dandridge; resists Longstreet's advance toward Knoxville; health impaired; resumes staff position. Paroles, for Johnston's army prepared by Schofield; General Hartsuff takes charge of their issue; difficulty of ascertaining number required; number actually paroled; speedy accomplishment of. Parsons, L. B. , colonel quartermaster's department, supervises transfer of 23d army corps from Clifton, Tennessee, toWashington. Partisan Rangers, organized under confederate auspices, little better thanguerillas, methods of, condemned by Stuart; Lee; and Rosser Patrick, Marsena B. , brig, general, reports to General Cox in lines about Washington; appointed provost marshal with extended powers to preventstraggling at Antietam Peachtree Creek, battle of; planned by Johnston, fought by Hood Pearisburg, Virginia, operations near Pegram, John, lieutenant colonel, held position at Rich Mountain; attacked in rear by Rosecrans; surrenders to McClellan. Peirpoint, F. H. , Governor of West Virginia; holds rebel sympathizers as hostages for safety of Union men; courts established by, ignored; calls for help in West Virginia Pemberton, John C. , lieutenant general Confederate States Army, surrenders Vicksburg. Peninsular Campaign, discussed by McClellan. Pennsylvania Troops, 10th res. Infantry; 51st; 8th Cavalry; Bat. D. Perry, Hon. Aaron F. , attorny for Burnside in Vallandigham _habeas corpus_ case. Pfan, Philip, captain 3rd Ohio ind. Cavalry, at Princeton, West Virginia Phelps, Walter, Jr. , colonel 22nd New York, at Antietam. Philippi, West Virginia, captured by Morris. Pickett's Mill, Georgia, operations at. Pine Mountain, E. Tennessee, difficulties of ascent. Piper's house, at Antietam. Pleasanton, Alfred, brigadier general commanding cavalry division Army of Potomac; at South Mountain; classmate of McClellan. Poe, Orlando M. , lieutenant of topographical engineers on coastsurvey. Assists Governor Dennison in organizing regiments; engineer on Burnside's staff, E. Tennessee; removes heavy pontoon bridge from Loudon to Knoxville; fortifies Knoxville; describes privations during siege; praises Cox's movement retiring left wing at Dalton; fortifies Allatoona; examines Cox's position south of Olley's Creek Poffenberger, J. , house and barn at Antietam. Political Appointments, mostly lawyers; political leaders naturally foremost in enlisting men; President selected from these officers for 3 months service; not bad, if method adopted to get rid of known incompetents; evils in actual practice; condemned by Governor Tod; Polk, Leonidas, lieutenant general C. S, A. , opposes Sherman in Mississippi; urges Johnston's appointment as successor to Bragg; commands Army of the Mississippi; reinforced; urges reconciliation of Johnston with Davis; ordered to reinforce Johnston; concentrates at Rome; at Resaca; position between Dallas and New Hope Church; killed at Pine Mountain; underestimate of his own forces. Pontoons, canvas, unequalled for field use, but unfit for permanent bridges. Pope, John, captain, consulted by Governor Dennison; commands Army of Virginia; orders ridiculed; drafted under direction of Stanton; admits bad taste of; hostility of Army of the Potomac; General Cox ordered to join, with Kanawha division; disliked by McClellan; retires within defences of Washington after second Battle of BullRun; army affronts him by cheering McClellan; character and mistakes of; unfair treatment of; general conduct of campaign skilful; plans disarranged by McDowell's absence from his command andPorter's inactivity; slow movement of Peninsular Army to his relief; prefers charges against Porter and Franklin; permanently retired from active service; orders on assuming command disapproved by Lincoln and McClellan; sarcastically criticised by Fitz-John Porter; Porter, David D. , rear admiral with fleet off Cape Fear; visited by Schofield and Cox; transports Sherman from City Point to New Berne. Porter, Fitz-John, major general United States Volunteers, inaction before second battle of Bull Run; relieved from duty and corps assigned to Hooker; reinstated at McClellan's request; on march, South Mountain to Antietam; classmate and intimate friend of McClellan; in reserve at Antietam; with John W. Garret at McClellan's headquarters; letters to Burnside forwarded to Washington; sarcastic comments in, most damaging evidence against Porter; becomes unfriendly to Burnside; notoriously favored by McClellan; extraordinary effort to make a record against Burnside; erroneous report in regard to withdrawal of Burnside's corps atAntietam; ordered before a court-martial; cashiered. Porterfield, G. A. , colonel commanding confederate forces at Philippi, West Virginia Potter, Robt. B. , colonel 51st N. Y. , at Antietam; president military commission to try Vallandigham; commanding division in 9th army corps, returns from Vicksburg illand unfit for service; commands 9th army corps temporarily. "Present for Duty, " only fair basis of comparison between Union and Confederatearmies; See EFFECTIVE TOTAL. Presstman, Stephen W. , major and church engineer on Johnston'sstaff, marks out defences at Resaca. Prices in Confederacy in 1864. Princeton, West Virginia, battle of. Privations of officers, when marching without baggage. Probate Court, Hamilton Co. , Ohio, tries to arrest U. S. Officers for contempt of court. Promotions, affected by politics; should be based on merit alone; evil tendency of opposite policy; those recommended by Sherman for promotion on account ofdistinguished services in Atlanta campaign could not be advancedbecause vacancies had already been filled by appointments made onpolitical grounds. Pugh, Geo. E. , counsel for Vallandigham; visits V. In Canada. Raglan, L'd, dependence on what Wellington would have done. Railroads, in Kentucky and Tennessee seized and administered by Sherman ininterests of his army; system of defences for. Raleigh, North Carolina, occupied by Union troops; abject terror of inhabitants; guarded by General Cox; measures taken to prevent outbreak on news of Lincoln'sassassination. Raleigh courthouse, West Virginia Ransom, Robt. , major general Confederate States Army, in E. Tennessee; transferred to cavalry command. Rawlins, John A. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, chiefof staff for General Grant, sent to St. Louis to hurry reinforcements to Thomas. Raymond, H. J. , correspondence with Stanton about photograph of Lincoln cortège inCity Hall, New York. Reagan, John H. , p. M. General in Davis' cabinet, excluded from conference between Sherman and Johnston; draft of agreement presented by Johnston and rejected by Sherman; at last cabinet meeting; captured with Davis. Rear-guard, place of honor on retreat. Regimental Histories, value to the historian limited to actual experience of regiment, camp gossip about other commands and generals usually worthless. Regular Army officers, should have officered volunteer regiments at the start; professionals usually more likely to succeed than amateurs; lacked, however, experience in high command or large operations; few above rank of captain fit for field service; theoretical knowledge comparatively small; contempt for books; study of strategy and grand tactics, begun after war broke out; familiar with post and garrison duty and army regulations; slavish adherence to French precedents; marked conservatism prevented adoption of new and improvedweapons; indifference and lack of patriotism; unwillingness to go beyond orders; spontaneity drilled out of; superiority to volunteer officers limited to knowledge of companyand battalion drill, army regulations and administration; keeping up separate organization with its grades, belittled actualcommand in military operations, and resulted in grading regularofficers who had done little or nothing, above volunteers who hadworthily commanded divisions and corps. Reilly, Jas. W. , colonel 104th Ohio, commanding brigade in 23d army corps, at siege of Knoxville; at Resaca; at Cheney's; forces crossing of Olley's Creek at Cheney's; intrenches three miles from continuous line of Unionintrenchments; in temporary command 3rd division 23d army corps; promoted on recommendation of General Cox; at Spring Hill, Tennessee; gets leave of absence, after Franklin; rejoins corps in North Carolina; commands Cox's division when latter assumes command of corps; resigns on account of ill health. Reno, Jesse L. , major general United States Volunteers, commands 9th army corps; praises marching of Kanawha division; observes affair at the Monocacy; approves Cox's advance on Fox's Gap; comes to Cox's position just before sunset; killed a few minutes afterward; succeeded by General Cox in command of corps; classmate of McClellan. Resaca, fortified and occupied by Johnston; map of; natural strength of position; battles around; evacuated by Johnston. Reynolds, D. H. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Resaca. Reynolds, Jos. J. , in command of Cheat Mountain district; repulses attack by Loring; at Romney; opinion as to expediency of Rosecrans' advance. Rhind, Alex. C. , commander U. S. N. , at Kinston. Rice, Henry M. , senator from Minnesota, questions power of President to appointment additional major andbrig, generals. Rich Mountain, West Virginia, fortified by Garnett; held by Pegram; battle of. Richardson, Israel B. , major general United States Volunteers, supports cavalry advance toward Antietam; at Antietam; mortally wounded. Richmond, Lewis, lieutenant colonel and assistant adjutant-general on Burnside'sstaff, leaves E. Tennessee. Ricketts, Jas. B. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam. Ricks, Augustus J. , lieutenant on staff of General Cox, since Judgeof U. S. District Court N. District of Ohio, vivid account of celebration of Lee's surrender in Sherman's army. Rifled Guns, superiority over smooth-bores. "Rigors of Climate, " laughable excuse for going South in August. Ripley, Roswell S. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Antietam. Rockcastle River, Kentucky, picturesque character of. Rocky Face, Georgia, description of; natural defence of Dalton; northern extremity carried by Newton; sharp and rugged character of ridge. Rodman, Isaac P. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, in Maryland campaign; at South Mountain; first position at Antietam; ordered to cross at ford below Burnside's bridge; killed at Antietam; on left at Antietam. Rosecrans, Wm. S. , captain and engineer on McClellan's staff; appointed brigadier general in regular army; at Rich Mountain, West Virginia; succeeds McClellan in Department of West Virginia; comes to Gauley and assumes chief command; defeats Floyd at Carnifex Ferry; characteristics of; at Big Sewell Mountain; on the retreat; in camp near Gauley; mode of dealing with privates; strong excitement when Floyd seized Cotton Mountain; plan for capturing Floyd's army; foiled by Benham's inactivity; plans expedition into E. Tennessee; physical obstacles; winter quarters at Wheeling; sends reinforcements to Buell; attitude in regard to escaped slaves; new plan for advance into E. Tennessee; turns over command to Fremont; sent to conduct Blenker's division to Fremont; regards Porter as McClellan's confidential adviser; appointed major general; directed to move on Chattanooga; inability to agree with Burnside; unwillingness and inaction; secures opinions of division commanders; Garfield's summing up; dissatisfaction of administration; forces of, opposed to Bragg; inactivity enables Bragg to send reinforcements to Johnston; on promotion as a reward for merit; again urged by Stanton and Halleck to advance; querulous disposition; drives Bragg out of Tennessee; plans, after reaching Chattanooga; demoralized by defeat at Chickamauga; relations with Burnside; relieved from command; sends Garfield to Washington with his report; conduct at Chickamauga; described by Dana; House resolution of thanks fails in Senate; resents Garfield's letter to Chase; plans for supplying army at Chattanooga; sent to Missouri; sends A. J. Smith with two divisions to Thomas. Ross, L. S. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Olley's Creek; driven off by Reilly and Cameron. Rosser, Thos. L. , colonel 5th Virginia Confederate States Army; condemns "Partisan Rangers" in Virginia Rousseau, Lovell H. , appointed major general; repulses Forrest at Pulaski; at Murfreesborough. Rucker, E. W. , colonel Confederate States Army, commanding brigade in Chalmers' cavalry division at battle ofNashville; wounded and captured. Rue, Geo. W. , major 9th Kentucky Cavalry, in Morgan raid. Ruffin, Thos. Jr. , colonel 13th North Carolina Ruffner, Lewis, prominent Union man in West Virginia Ruger, Thos. H. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, transferred from 20th army corps to 2nd division 23d army corps; joins at Johnsonville, Tennessee; at Columbia; Franklin; assigned to command new division 23d army corps; on march from Columbia to Clifton; brevet major general; reports to General Cox at Beaufort, North Carolina with newdivision; at Gum Swamp; at battle of Kinston; repulses Hoke's attack; mentioned. Rullett and Clipp houses, at Antietam. Sale, John B. , military secretary of General Bragg, takes special message to Johnston. Salisbury, North Carolina, confederate treatment of prisoners at; prison pen described. Sanders, Wm. P. , colonel 5th Kentucky cavalry, raid into E. Tennessee; pursuit of Morgan raiders; defeated at Richmond; turns tables on Scott at Lancaster; made brigadier general; resists Wheeler in E. Tennessee; splendid conduct before Knoxville; mortally wounded. Sanitary Commission reaches E. Tennessee with needed supplies. Saunders, E. D. , assistant adjutant-general on Gen Cox's staff; killed while riding at his side; loss severely felt. Savage, Jas. W. , colonel 12th New York Cavalry, at Kinston. Scammon, E. P. , colonel 23d Ohio, at Canfex Ferry; history and characteristics; succeeds to command of Schenck's brigade; at Fayette courthouse; at Flat Top Mountain; at Princeton; at French's; commands 1st brigade Kanawha division; at Bull Run bridge; at the Monocacy; supports Pleasanton; attached to Rodman's division; at Antietam; promoted; commands division in Kanawha valley; at Fayette courthouse; heads off Morgan at Pomeroy, Ohio Scary Creek, West Virginia, skirmish at. Schenck, Robt. C. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, in West Virginia; movements near Gauley; efforts to intercept Floyd; leaves West Virginia on account of ill health; under Fremont in Mountain Department; appointed major general; political acquaintance and influence secures confirmation; commands District of Maryland with West Virginia annexed; attitude toward Lincoln. Schleich, Newton, brigadier general Ohio Valley Infantry. Schofield, John M. , appointed major general in 1862, not confirmed; reappointed as of first date; opposition to confirmation; appointed to command Army of the Ohio; arrives at Knoxville; instructed to drive Longstreet out of E. Tennessee; impossibility of making campaign explained; remains on defensive; reports to Sherman; instructed to join him; even temper; permanently assigned to command 23d army corps; unites with Sherman's army; left wing of army before Dalton; manoeuvres at Dalton; dissatisfied with Hovey; asks to have him removed; praises Cox's movement, retiring left wing; orders advance at Resaca; advances on extreme left from Resaca to Cassville; hindered by Hooker's getting on his line of march; concentrates at Cartersville; appoints Hascall commander 2nd division in place of Judah; again hindered by Hooker; movements south of the Etowah; disabled by fall of horse; turns command over to General Cox; resumes command; question of rank with Butterfield; outflanks confederate army and compels abandonment of New Hopelines; at Kolb's farm; demonstrates on extreme right; says importance of position gained by General Cox, south ofOlley's Creek, cannot be overestimated; at Smyrna; across the Chattahoochee; builds wooden bridge; wide circuit east of Atlanta; attacked by Cheatham at Atlanta; at Rough and Ready; at Decatur, Georgia; turns command of corps over to General Cox during October; classmate and roommate of McPherson; commands all troops in Chattanooga and vicinity; objects to being relegated to Department command; resumes command of Army of the Ohio; wants corps filled up to its quota; reports to Thomas; commands all forces assembling at Pulaski; at Columbia; limited to careful defensive; holds on at Columbia under orders from Thomas; deprived of benefit of cavalry; earnestly demands General Cox's promotion; at battle of Nashville; in pursuit of Hood; asks to have 23d corps transferred to eastern army; corps filled up; at Clifton, Tennessee; transferred with corps to Washington; appointed to command Department of North Carolina; headquarters on steamer "Spaulding, " controversy over; efforts to flank Hoke out of position on Federal Point; approves General Cox's discretion in not obeying orders; asks permanent assignment of General Cox to 23d Corps command, andGeneral Terry to new corps in advance on Kinston; in temporary command of Sherman's army; promoted to brigadier general in regular army; on march to Raleigh; commands District of North Carolina; prepares paroles and arranges details of capitulation ofJohnston's army; loans horses to the needy and issues rations to Johnston's troops; proclaims an end of slavery; confers with Hardee at Greensborough. Schurz, Carl, appointed major general United States Volunteers Scofield, Levi T. , lieutenant 103rd Ohio, topographer on General Cox's staff. Scott, Thos. M. , brig, gen, Confederate States Army, raid into southern Kentucky; defeated by Sanders at Lancaster. Scott, Winfield, General U. S. A. , mistake in discouraging service of regular army officers withvolunteer regiments. Seddon, Jas. A. , Secretary of War, Confederate States Army, correspondence with Johnston; correspondence with B. H. Hill. Sedgwick, John, major general United States Volunteers, at Antietam; severely wounded. Separate Commands, evils of, in same field of operations; ridiculed by Napoleon. Sevierville, E. Tennessee, cavalry combat at. Seward, Wm. H. , Secretary of State, goes with Lincoln to meet confederate peace commander's. Seymour, Truman, brigadier general United States Volunteers, at Antietam. Shackelford, Jas. M. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, in Morgan raid; captures Morgan and most of his command; operations in E. Tennessee Shelter Tent, substituted for all other kinds; advantages of. Sheridan, P. H. , first vote; appointed major general United States Volunteers; reasons for opposing Rosecrans' advance in Tennessee; at Chickamauga; at Missionary Ridge; in E. Tennessee; at Dandridge; personal appearance; slow development as a commander; builds bridge which lands on an island; retreats to Strawberry Plains; transferred to eastern army; part assigned in final round-up of Lee's army. Sheriff of Hamilton Co. , Ohio, directed to arrest U. S. Officers for contempt of court; comical perplexity. Sherman, Hon. John, senator from Ohio; correspondence with Wm. T. Sherman, Wm. T. , appointed colonel of regulars; high opinion of volunteers studies evolutions of the line after Bull Run; acquiesces in Emancipation policy; urges draft to fill up regiments in the field; commands Department of the Tennessee; hastens to Chattanooga; marches to relief of Burnside; horror of E. Tennessee; dissatisfied with Granger; good dinner at Burnside's headquarters, explanation of; Meridian expedition; promoted to command Mil. Division of the Mississippi; visits Schofield at Knoxville; urges confirmation of his appointment as major general; correspondence with Halleck; modest estimate of his own powers; studies problem of supplying his army in the field; takes possession of railroads from Louisville to Nashville andNashville to Chattanooga; cuts down personal and headquarters baggage to bare necessitiesand sets example himself; accurate judgment of opposing forces; concentrates for Atlanta campaign; forces of; personal appearance and characteristics; cordial relations with Thomas; orders for operations about Dalton; satisfied Johnston's position could not be carried by assault; orders demonstrations to cover McPherson's movement; congratulates Schofield on Cox's movement retiring left wing; declines to relieve Hovey; presses after Johnston when he evacuates Resaca; unwilling to give up hope of general engagement; compelled by results to avoid assaults on intrenched positions; losses on campaign compensated by arrival of Blair's (17th) corps; recommends acceptance of Hovey's resignation; indignation at promotion of Hovey and Osterhaus; foresees probable necessity for attack at Kennesaw; uneasy at stretching of lines; hopes to break through enemy's lines; orders demonstrations on both flanks and assaults by two columnsin middle both assaults fail; might have succeeded if followed up; recognizes importance of position gained by General Cox on rightflank forces confederates to give up Atlanta or assume desperateaggressive; closes in on Jonesboro; occupies Atlanta; steady diminution in forces of; offers promotion to any one who will capture or kill Forrest; odd mistake, resulting in promotion of General Mower; orders citizens to leave Atlanta; leaves of absence and furloughs freely granted; orders certain officers to report to governors of Indiana and Mo. For duty--on the stump; courteous treatment of subordinates; would have given Logan command of Army of Tennessee but forThomas' opposition; praises L. 's handling of that army at battle of Atlanta; sends back troops to protect railroads against Hood's raid; leaves 20th army corps to garrison Atlanta; plans March to the Sea; pursuit of Hood; tires of countermarching to protect his communications; praises Cox's management of 23d army corps; recommends his promotion to be major general; urges Halleck to send reinforcements to Thomas; orders Schofield to report to Thomas with 23d Corps; cuts communications and starts on March to the Sea; plans campaign from Savannah, north; inspiring quality of his leadership; unselfish relations to Grant; opposes bill providing for another lieutenant general; knows Carolina campaign involves great risks; where described; general outline; captures Columbia; effects junction with Schofield and Terry, confident he can whipLee and Johnston combined; battles of Averasborough and Bentonville; losses at; leaves Schofield in command, goes to City Point to consult Lincolnand Grant; endorses Schofield's request that Cox be assigned to permanentcommand of 23d Corps and Terry, of new corps; prohibits foraging after reaching Goldsborough; moves upon Raleigh; extravagant demonstrations of army, on learning of Lee'ssurrender; receives Governor Vance's peace delegation; negotiates informally for withdrawal of North Carolina fromconfederacy; on Johnston's request agrees to an armistice; stringent orders against pillage and arson; fears outbreak of army on hearing news of Lincoln's assassination; measures to prevent; announces first step toward disbandment of confederate armies; attitude before war on slavery question; emphatic statements that if the South loses the war it losesslavery; freedom for the blacks to be secured, but they are unfit to assumepolitical rule; set no limits on their following the army, except militarynecessity; representative colored men had confidence in him; allots Sea-island lands to freedmen for cultivation with Stanton'sapproval; wrath against men chiefly responsible for secession and war; conference with Lincoln only three weeks before he met Johnston; understood his policy to involve guaranty of rights as citizens, as soon as rebels laid down their arms, and recognition of existingState governments as _de facto_ to prevent anarchy; aware that Weitzel had authorized Virginia legislature to assemblewith Lincoln's consent; not aware that permission was revoked; meets Johnston with heavy burden of Lincoln's assassination on hismind; expresses full confidence in Johnston's sincerity; sends full copies of Johnston's overture and his reply to Grantand Stanton; no notice taken of them; witnesses Johnston's distress when advised of Lincoln'sassassination; declines to deal with confederate government; will recognize _de facto_ State governments only; gives Johnston Lincoln's views; regards slavery as utterly dead, but does not insist on irritatingacknowledgments; reasons for depositing arms at State capitals; loses nothing by delay, while negotiations in progress; drafts memo or basis of agreement to be submitted to respectiveprincipals; sends it to Grant; urges on Johnston a public declaration that slavery is dead andpredicts an era of good feeling to follow; says war to perpetuate slavery was an insult to the intelligenceof the age; warns Johnston of intense feeling at the North over Lincoln'sassassination; changes the situation; notifies Johnston of termination of truce and demands surrender ofhis army on terms given to Lee; resents Stanton's distrust as evidenced in orders to Grant todirect operations against the enemy; supposed the memo reflected Lincoln's ideas and purposes; asks Grant to remain until capitulation finally signed; farewell letter to Johnston; field order No. 65; deeply wounded by Stanton's press dispatches condemning hisconduct; first heard of Davis' "plunder" through Grant; takes immediate steps to prevent his escape with it; imputation of Stanton that he could be bribed; strikes back at Stanton in letter to Grant and in his report; popular regard for, soon asserts itself; life-long friendship for Halleck destroyed by latter's "plunder"dispatch, and orders to disregard his truce; refuses H. 's proffered hospitality, and denounces "diabolicalplot" to ruin him; says he will defend his truce at all hazards; theoretic discussion of his right and ability to do so; sympathy of his subordinates; leaves Raleigh, visits Charleston and Savannah; notes complete submission to U. S. Authority in Savannah. Siber, Edward, colonel 37th Ohio, at Raleigh courthouse; retreats before Loring; operates on south bank of Kanawha. Sigel, Franz, major general United States Volunteers, commands 11th Corps; Pope's proposal to consolidate Kanawha division with, and put allunder Hooker. Sill, Joshua W. , ordnance officer at Camp Dennison; character and heroic death at Stone's River Simmonds, Seth J. , captain Kentucky battery, attached to Kanawha division; at South Mountain; at Antietam. Simonton, Chas. H. , colonel commanding brigade Confederate StatesArmy, captured at Town Creek by General Cox. Sisters of Charity, in hospitals at Camp Dennison. Skirmishing Advance, described. Slack, John Jr. , deputy U. S. Marshal at Charleston, West Virginia Slavery, question, most troublesome in all border States; admitted to be dead as result of war; Sherman urges upon Johnston frank acknowledgment of fact, aslikely to usher in era of good feeling; end of, in North Carolina, proclaimed by Schofield. Slaves, common belief among, that property of whites was to be taken awayand divided among them; difficulties in getting them to work; embarrassments of housekeepers. Slemmer, Adam J. , major 16th U. S. , at Ft. Pickens; inspector general on Rosecrans' staff; good qualities. Slocum, Henry W. , major general United States Volunteers, at Antietam; succeeds Hooker in command of 20th Corps; left to garrison Atlanta; commands Army of Georgia, composed of 14th and 20th Corps; march past 23d Corps at Goldsborough; chaffing between soldiers; at battles of Averasborough and Bentonville; on march to Raleigh; "bummers" of, forage country bare near Raleigh; marches through Raleigh. Smith, Andrew J. , major general United States Volunteers, ordered to reinforce Thomas at Nashville; delayed in starting; at Nashville; at battle of Nashville; supports cavalry in pursuit of Hood; ordered to Eastport; at Clifton awaiting transportation. Smith, Benj. F. , leading lawyer and "new state man, " in West Virginia; U. S. District Atty. , father of Major Smith of Confederate StatesArmy; demands return of son's escaped slave, refused by General Cox; acts as advocate for return of others' slaves. Smith, E. Kirby, major general Confederate States Army, threatens Cincinnati; commanding in trans-Miss, department. Smith, Gustavus W. , major general Confederate States Army, commands Georgia militia and prepares line of defence on NickajackCreek, and Chattahoochee. Smith, Wm. F. , major general United States Volunteers, at Antietam; consulted by McClellan as to what he should do about EmancipationProclamation; chief engineer, Army of the Cumberland; opens new line of supply for Chattanooga; transferred to Eastern Army; on the James. Smith, W. P. , master of transportation on Kanawha River Smith, Wm. Sooy, brigadier general United States Volunteers, selected by Grant to command cavalry of Western army; ordered to co-operate with Sherman's column; fails to do so. Soldier Vote, in Ohio State election, 1863; in 1864. Southern People, complete submission immediately after the war; reaction and political exasperation. South Mountain, passes of; battle of. Spears, Jas. G. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, in Morgan's command; at Blain's Cross-roads; assigned to 23d army corps Spies, army, false reports of Lee's strength; worse than useless to McClellan; conscious, or unconscious, purveyors of false news. Splaine, Henry, colonel 17th Massachusetts, commanding brigade in Carter's division at battle of Kinston, North Carolina. Sprague, Wm. , Governor of R. I. , on McClellan's favoritism for Porter. Staff Officers, services hidden from view, chances for promotion less than thoseof line officers; qualifications and appointment of. Stafford, Leroy A. , colonel 9th La. , commanding brigade at Antietam. Stager, Anson, colonel, suerintendent of military telegraphs at Washington. Stahel, Julius, appointed major general United States Volunteers. Stanley, David S. , appointed major general United States Volunteers. Stanley, Timothy R. , colonel 18th Ohio, at Chattanooga; in Ohio Senate at outbreak of war. Stanton, Edwin M. , Secretary of War, first meeting with; disapproves of restoring McClellan to command; pleasant leavetaking; maintains right of President to appoint additional major andbrigadier generals; reports six major generals at home with no assignments to duty; informs himself about conditions of things in Rosecrans' army; dismisses telegraph operator for revealing cipher to Grant'sengineer; adopts new cipher known only to operators; this system criticised; asks Sherman to detail certain officers to stump northern States; impatience with Thomas before battle of Nashville; cordial manner with General Cox; petulance about Schofield's use of hospital steamer forheadquarters; inquires about Sherman's treatment of the negro; approves his allotment of sea-island lands to the freedmen; dispatch to Dix, reflecting on Sherman; false implications of; refutation; nine criticisms of Sherman-Johnston Convention considered; objections, really to Lincoln's policy; position against amnesty not sustained by the people; orders Sherman's subordinates not to obey his orders; ignores capitulation, while paroles were being issued; _suppressio veri_; mutilates Grant's dispatch for publication; constitutional inability to admit that he was in the wrong; publishes Halleck's "plunder" dispatch in garbled form; evident purpose to humiliate Sherman; makes no public explanation; tells Howard that Sherman had put administration on the defensive; regarded Sherman's convention and dispatch as acts of vanity to beput down. Starke, Wm. E. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Harper's Ferry; killed at Antietam. Steedman, James B. , brig, gen, United States Volunteers, questioned by Stanton about Rosecrans and Thomas; at Chickamauga; ordered to Tuscumbia to destroy Hood's bridge of boats; later ordered to Cowan and Nashville; at Nashville; at battle of Nashville; ordered to Decatur, Alabama Sterl, Oscar W. , colonel 104th Ohio, commanding Reilly's old brigade in 23d army corps, in movement upright bank of Cape Fear River. Sterling, Jas. T. , lieutenant colonel 103rd Ohio, accompanies General Cox on winter ride to E. Tennessee; at Dandridge; at skirmish before Knoxville; inspector general on General Cox's staff, resigns for businessreasons. Stevens, Isaac J. , major general United States Volunteers, killed at Chantilly. Stevens, Thaddeus, radical leader in Congress. Stevenson, Carter L. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, in E. Tennessee Stewart, Alex. P. , major general Confederate States Army, at Tunnel Hill; on way to join Bragg at Kinston, North Carolina; arrives in time for second battle. Stiles, Israel N. , colonel 63rd Indiana, succeeds Henderson in command of brigade in 23d army corps; at battle of Nashville; volunteers as staff officer at battle of Kinston; commands brigade in Rugers division; commands post at Raleigh; garrison under, strengthened to prevent outbreak after news ofLincoln's assassination. Stone's River, battle of, resemblance to Antietam. Stoneman, Geo, major general United States Volunteers, reports to Grant for duty; assigned to command 23d army corps; why relieved from command in Army of Potomac; arrives at Knoxville; personal appearance; disliked by Grant; in pursuit of Longstreet; at Mossy Creek; placed in command of cavalry; on march, Resaca to Cassville; movements near the Etowah; enters Allatoona and reports ability to hold it; aids General Cox in holding position south of Olley's Creek; crosses Chattahoochee; good work from Chattanooga to Chattahoochee; raid from E. Tennessee into North Carolina Straggling, in Army of Potomac; in confederate army; measures to prevent; in Kanawha division Strategy, principles of, easily learned; same in all times. Strawberry Plains, E. Tennessee, strategic importance of; railroad bridge at, alternately destroyed and rebuilt; hardships of troops at; threatened by Longstreet. Streight, Abel D. , colonel 51st Indiana commanding cavalry brigade, captured with his brigade near Rome, Georgia Strickland, Silas A. , colonel 50th Ohio, commanding brigade in Cooper's division 23d A. C. , at Columbia. Strong, Jas. H. , lieutenant colonel on Foster's staff, accompanies General Cox on winter ride to E. Tennessee; advocates General Cox's appointment to field command. Stuart, J. E. B. , major general Confederate States Army, praises fighting of 11th and 12th Ohio, at Bull Run bridge; learns of Cox's transfer from West Virginia to Washington on dayhe left Parkersburg; at the Monocacy; covers movements of Lee's army in Maryland; at South Mountain; at Antietam; ride around McClellan's army arouses false ambition in cavalrycommanders. Sturgis, Samuel D. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding division in 9th army corps; at South Mountain; first position at Antietam; carries Burnside bridge; on the left before Sharpsburg; in pursuit of Morgan raiders; commands cavalry, corps in E. Tennessee; skirmish at Mossy Creek; "takes a toddy"; at Sevierville; reports hopeless condition of roads; sent to Memphis to operate against Forrest. Summers, Geo. , ex-M. C. And prominent citizen of West Virginia; compelled by force and imprisonment to take oath of allegiance toConfederacy; offers to take oath of allegiance to U. S. Sumner, Edwin V. , major general United States Volunteers, commands left wing (2nd and 12th Corps) in Antietam campaign; none of his command in 2nd battle of Bull Run; placed in centre at Antietam; his corps ordered to support Hooker; left practically without command; misconception of Hooker's position; died March 21, 1863. Supplies for army in Chattanooga, how forwarded; for Sherman's army, arrangements for forwarding. Susini, famous basso, helps celebrate fall of Vicksburg. Swain, David L. , ex-Governor of North Carolina, in Vance's peace delegation to Sherman; mentioned. Swinton, Wm. , newspaper correspondent, threatens and proceeds to "write Cox down"; inconsistency exposed. Taylor, Geo. W. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, fatally wounded at Bull Run bridge. Taylor, Richard, lieutenant general Confederate States Army, orders Forrest to raid Western Tennessee; informs Beauregard of reinforcements moving to Thomas; offers to send all of Hood's army, except French's division, toBeauregard. Temple, O. P. , Chancellor, Knoxville, Tennessee, author of "East Tennessee and the Civil War". Tents, preferable to houses for army officers. Terry, Alfred H. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, captures Ft. Fisher; at Federal Point; unable to force Hoke's position opposite Town Creek; enters Wilmington after Cox's flanking movement compelsevacuation; follows Bragg northward; assigned to command new corps designated as the 10th; on march to Raleigh; commands central district of North Carolina Test Oaths, little value of; illustrated by case of Summers. Thirteenth Amendment to U. S. Constitution, abolishing slavery, ratified by requisite number of States. Thomas, Geo. H. , major general United States Volunteers, reasons for opposing Rosecrans' advance in Tennessee; saves day at Chickamauga; succeeds Rosecrans in command of Army of the Cumberland; House resolution of thanks; at Chattanooga; sends part of his own supplies to army in E. Tennessee; commands centre of Sherman's army in Atlanta campaign; personal appearance and characteristics; cordial relations with Sherman; at Tunnel Hill and Dalton; at Resaca; from Resaca to Kingston; changes Hooker's line of march so as to interfere with Schofield; supports Hooker at New Hope Church; suggests necessity of contracting and strengthening lines aboutMarietta; visits Cox's position south of Olley's Creek; follows up Johnston's retreat from Marietta vigorously; at Peachtree Creek; at Jonesboro; warned to protect Chattanooga and Bridgeport; advises Sherman to turn Wilson loose; reinforced and put in command of all forces not taken by Sherman; cheerful over prospects; disturbed by Forrest's raid; does not concentrate rapidly; reinforcements delayed; wrong impression as to Hood's intentions; at battle of Nashville; prizes in battle and in pursuit of Hood; proposes going into winter quarters; ordered to send 23d army corps to Grant; urges promotion of General Cox; personal movements in Tennessee; mental suffering under unjust criticism. Thomas, Minor T. , colonel 8th Minn. , commanding brig, in Ruger's division at battle of Kinston. Thompson, M. Jeff. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, prisoner at Johnson's Island. Tillson, Davis, brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding post at Covington, Kentucky; commanding heavy artillery at Knoxville. Tod, David, Governor of Ohio; bewails system of military appointments; warns persons resisting the draft to desist; calls out militia to oppose Morgan; advised of Hamilton Co. Sheriff's attempt to arrest U. S. Officers; calls out militia to defeat plots to release confederateprisoners. Toland, J. P. , lieutenant colonel 34th Ohio. Tompkins, C. Q. , colonel Confederate States Army, ex-U. S. Officer; home near Gauley; courteous treatment of family; residence of, used as headquarters by Rosecrans. Toombs, Robt. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Antietam. Tourtelotte, John E. , colonel 4th Minn. , commanding brig, at Allatoona. Town Creek, North Carolina, confederate position at, captured by General Cox with two guns and400 prisoners. Townsend, E. D. , adjutant general U. S. A. , anecdotes of Stanton; in charge of funeral escort of Lincoln's body. Tracy, Edw. E. , lieutenant 104th Ohio, aide-de-camp on General Cox's staff; wounded at Utoy Creek; appointed Governor of Dayton Soldiers' Home; personal appearance and characteristics; anecdote; reconnoissance with Claassen's brigade at Kinston. Transfers of officers from one army to another not generally goodadministration. Treasonable practices, President's proclamation against; Burnside's order No. 38; Burbridge's order No. 42; practically annulled. Treat, Richard B. , brigadier quartermaster on General Cox's staff; adjutant general; transferred to Stoneman's staff. Trimble, Isaac R. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Antietam. Tunnel Hill, Georgia; view of confederate position at Dalton, from. Turchin, John B. , colonel 19th Ill. , court-martialed; sentenced to be dismissed Aug. 6, 1862; appointed brigadier general Aug. 5, 1862, and confirmed; opinion as to expediency of Rosecrans' advance; at Chattanooga. Twining, Wm. J. , captain eng. And aide-de-camp on Schofield's staff, takes messageto Sherman. Tyler, Erastus B. , colonel 7th Ohio; surprised at Cross Lanes. Upham, Chas. L. , colonel 15th Conn. , commanding brig, in Carter's division at battle of Kinston; cut off from rest of division and routed by Hoke; losses at Kinston. Upton's Hill, fortified for defence of Washington; occupied by General Cox. Upton's Manual, an improvement on the book previously studied at West Point. Vallandigham, Clement L. , sensational case of; character and views; speech at Mountain Vernon, Ohio; arrested by Burnside; tried before military commission; convicted and sentenced to confinement in Ft. Warren; application for _habeas corpus_ refused; sentence commuted by Lincoln to expulsion beyond our lines; incites Holmes Co. To resist the draft; application to U. S. Supreme Court to annul sentence denied; nominated for Governor of Ohio and overwhelmingly defeated. Van Buren, James L. , major and aide-de-camp on Burnside's staff, leaves E. Tennessee Vance, John L. , captain 4th West Virginia Vance, Zebulon, Governor of North Carolina, issues proclamation calling for final rally to repel invaders; makes overtures to Sherman to end war; loses confidence and leaves Raleigh; Davis orders arrest of his peace commanders; invited by Sherman to return to Raleigh; mentioned. Van Cleve, Horatio P. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, opinion against expediency of Rosecrans' advance; at Chickamauga. Van Dorn, Earl, major general Confederate States Army, captures Coburn's brigade near Franklin, Tennessee Vicksburg, news of surrender, how received in Cincinnati. Virginia, passes ordinance of secession; admitted to confederacy; topography of. Virginia Troops, 22nd, largely composed of young men from Charleston West Virginia; 44th, at Beverly, West Virginia; 8th Cavalry Volunteers, high character and spirit of; superior to recruits for regular army; many volunteer regiments not excelled in drill by regulars; methods of discipline necessarily milder; after a year's service, superior in everything that givesassurance of victory in battle; in 1862 as well fitted for their work as any army in the world; so said Grant and Sherman; many need not have shunned competitive examination with regularsin studies pursued at West Point. Volunteer Officers, at first elected by militia; afterwards appointed by Governor; necessity for sifting; military aptitude often wanting in men brave and intelligent; fitness in subordinate position not always proof of capacity forhigh command; ignorance of tactics and regulations seldom overcome by men ofadvanced age; business training helpful to; rapid advance of many young volunteers; peers of any officers of their grade in regular army or any other; value of West Point training before the war exaggerated; comparative merits and defects of regular army officers; costly conservatism of regular officers and prejudice againstimproved weapons; distinction between volunteers and regulars should have beenabolished, and officers promoted on their merits. Von Blessingh, Louis, lieutenant colonel 37th Ohio. Von Borke, Heros, major on staff of J. E. B. Stuart, amusing report of. Von Moltke favors giving largest discretion to subordinates ondetached service. Wade, Hon. Benj. F. , Sen. From Ohio, opposes re-election of Lincoln; "Wade-Davis Manifesto. " Wagner, Geo. D. , brigadier general commanding division in 4th armycorps, reports to General Cox. Wagner, O. G. , lieutenant of eng. , superintends fortifications at Gauley; modest young man of great promise, killed at Yorktown. Walker, Henry H. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, protects Davis and cabinet at Danville, Virginia Walker, John G. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, at Harper's Ferry; at Antietam. Walthall, E. C. , major general Confederate States Army, commands rear-guard on Hood's retreat from Nashville; destroys bridges and obstructs roads; commands Stewart's corps at battle of Kinston; forces of, at Kinston. Washington, at time of General Cox's arrival with Kanawha division; defences of; country about; McClellan in charge of defence; necessity for covering and defending prevented full adoption ofMcClellan's plans. Watson, P. H. , Assistant Secretary of War. Way, Wm. B. , major 9th Michigan Cavalry, in Morgan raid. Webb, Alex. S. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, estimate of Lee's forces in seven days' battles. Weitzel, Godfrey, brigadier general United States Volunteers, mentioned; major general at Richmond, Virginia Welker, Hon. Martin, M. C. From Wayne Co. , Ohio, urges arrest of Vallandigham followers; appointed judge of U. S. District Court N. District of Ohio. Wells, Henry W. , major and chief of artillery on General Cox's staff; rough march over mountain road to carry information to Sherman. Welsh, Thos. , colonel 45th Pennsylvania, commanding brigade at South Mountain; at Antietam; returns from Vicksburg with 9th army corps, and dies of malarialfever. West Point Academy, course limited before the war; requirements for admission, common country school education; graduates of, equal to sophomores in leading colleges; no instruction in strategy or grand tactics; little French; mental furnishing for field work not superior to that of anywell-educated man; physical training and drill, good; but no opportunity for most to exercise command; battalion evolutions the highest known; graduates of, not fitted--by their course alone--for high command. West Virginia, importance of occupying; map of; loyalty to Union; mountain regions impracticable for military operations on largescale; sentiment of leading families divided; bitter feeling between Union men and secessionists; intensified by Loring's invasion; attached to District of Maryland See KANAWHA VALLEY. West Virginia Troops, in general; 1st and 2nd; 4th; 5th; 8th; 9th; 13th; and Cavalry; Daum's battery Wharton, Gabriel C. , colonel commanding brigadier Confederate StatesArmy, in West Virginia; repulsed at Pack's Ferry; in pursuit of Lightburn. Wheeler, Jos. , major general Confederate States Army, authorizes Morgan's raid into Kentucky; in E. Tennessee; at Tunnel Hill and Dug Gap; defeats McCook and captures Col. La Grange; forces of, reduced from 8000 to 1000 after raid in rear ofSherman's army; relied on to cover Hood's movement into Tennessee; informs Hood of Sherman's rumored march to the sea; complaints of his inefficiency; included in Johnston's capitulation; captured when trying to escape. Wherry, Wm. M. , colonel and aide-de-camp on Schofield's staff; brigadier general in war with Spain. White, Carr B. , lieutenant colonel 12th Ohio, in Kanawha valley; in Kanawha division; at South Mountain White, Julius, brig, general, expedition into West Virginia; pursues Morgan raiders; succeeds Manson in command and division 23d army corps; in E. Tennessee Whitford, John N. , colonel commanding brigade Confederate StatesArmy, at Kinston. Whiting, W. H. C. , major general Confederate States Army, at South Mountain Whittier, John G. , his poem "The River Path, " recalled at Gauley. Whittlesey, Chas. , colonel and eng. On Cox's staff; appointed colonel of 20th Ohio. Willcox, Orlando B. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, reports to General Cox at South Mountain; first position at Antietam; at Burnside bridge; on heights near Sharpsburg; commands District of Indiana, returns to 9th army corps, with newdivision of Indiana troops; goes to Cumberland Gap; to Morristown; posted at Greeneville; at Cumberland Gap and vicinity. Williams, Alpheus S. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, succeeds to command of 12th army corps on death of Mansfield; at Antietam. Williams, John S. , colonel 5th Kentucky, commanding brigadierConfederate States Army, at Princeton, West Virginia; pursues Lightburn down the Kanawha. Williams, Seth, brigadier general United States Volunteers, assistant adjutant-general on McClellan's staff; afterwards served on Burnside's staff. Willich, August, adjutant 9th Ohio; commands Wood's division on march to Dandridge; commands rear-guard on retreat from D. Wilmington, North Carolina, importance of, as base of supplies for Sherman's army; General Cox compels evacuation of. Wilson, Hon. Henry, Sen. From Massachusetts, chairman committee onMilitary Affairs, offers resolution questioning power of President to appointadditional major and brigadier generals. Wilson, Jas. H. , colonel on Grant's staff, sent to Knoxville to consult with Burnside; reports to Grant; sent to be chief of cavalry for Sherman; deceived as to Hood's intentions; at battle of Nashville; operating in Georgia; captures Jeff. Davis. Winter Quarters, in E. Tennessee Wisconsin Troops, 6th Infantry; 22nd Infantry; 1st Cavalry Wise, Henry A. , ex-Governor of Virginia, invades Kanawha valley; forces of, opposing General Cox; retreats beyond Gauley; forces of, not well handled; ludicrous contrast between promise and performance; joined by General Floyd; fails to co-operate with Floyd; repulsed at Pig Creek; retreats beyond Hawk's Nest; and Big Sewell Mountain; quarrels with Floyd, ordered to report to Richmond. Wofford, Wm. T. , brigadier general Confederate States Army, assaults Ft. Sanders. Wolf Creek, West Virginia, affair at. Wolford, Frank, colonel 1st Kentucky Cavalry, famous command "Huddle on the hill, boys"; pursues Morgan raiders; commands ind. Cavalry brigade; defeated near Loudon. Wood, Thos. J. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, advises against Rosecrans' advance in Tennessee; at Chickamauga; at Missionary Ridge; in pursuit of Longstreet; at Rutledge; character of; explanation of error at Chickamanga; returns to Army of the Cumberland; dissatisfied with Couch's assignment to 4th army corps; at battle of Nashville; supports cavalry in pursuit of Hood; to winter at Huntsville, Alabama Woodruff, W. E. , colonel 2nd Kentucky, captured outside the lines at Scary Creek Woodward, E. W. , suerintendent Little Miami railroad Woodworth, Dr. M. C. , surgeon at Johnson's Island. Worthington, Thos. , publishes abridgment of Hardee's Tactics; furnishes waterworks for Camp Dennison; irascible temper. Wound, sensation produced by bullet. Wright, Elias, lieutenant 4th N. J. , reports ten men to Scammon at Bull Run bridge. Wright, Horatio G. , brigadier general United States Volunteers, commanding Department of the Ohio; description of; plan of West Virginia campaign; appointed major general, and fails of confirmation; suppresses disloyal newspapers. Wright, W. W. , constructing engineer Nash. And Chatt. Railroad; ordered east with view to joining Sherman at Savannah; sent to North Carolina, to rebuild New Berne and Goldsboroughrailroad; rapid work; bridging Neuse River; completes railroad to Goldsborough.